| dc.description.abstract | FROM EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION TO A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY. TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY COMPLEX? A study of the EU s foreign and security policy. A neofunctionalist perspective
The study focuses on two research questions:
1)To what extent will the absence of a bipolar structure have implications for the EU s development of a common foreign and security policy?
2)To what extent will the EU in a post-cold war era play a leading role in the creation of a new security system in Europe?
In respect to the security interests in a bipolar international structure it was almost impossible for the Western European countries to create a potent European security arrangement. The Western European countries had to defend their interests within an Atlantic framework, particularly through NATO. However, already in the 1970s the member states of the European Union started to redefine their security interests in order to act as a single actor in international politics. The creation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) in 1970 must be regarded as an expression of the growing dissatisfaction with the hegemonic role of the US in the Euro-Atlantic relationship. Several proposals and initiatives, such as the Copenhagen reports (1973), the Tindemanns report (1975) and the London report (1981), indicated a movement towards a new security complex. The institutional change, seen in the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty incorporated high politics on the same level as low politics within a single Community framework. In the light of the revolutionary changes of the past ten years, the idea of a common European foreign and security policy is no longer a taboo. In a transformative period towards a new security arrangement, the European Union will play an essential role, according to its soft-power capabilities. In the new international system the concept of security have to be defined by criteria different from traditional military capabilities. The EU role as the chief provider of further integration is crucial for such a new concept of security.
As a theoretical framework I have conceptualised the "new" Europe as a set of "concentric circles" picturing Europe encompassing subsets of states on different levels of integration. The "circle of shared law" includes the EU Member States while the "adjacent circles" include the applicant countries outside the Union or countries with different co-operation agreements with the EU. In this new Europe both the Member States of the Union and the peripheral countries will define the EU as the primary security and defence institution in Europe. In the process leading up to a new security arrangement in Europe, it is important to clarify the division of labour between the existing security institutions; the EU, NATO and WEU. Which institutions are best suited to build a genuine European security and defence identity in order to constitute a new security complex? Diverging national interests have so far prevented any agreement on this point. Whereas France and Germany stress the importance of a operational security and defence capacity within the EU, Great Britain defines its security interests within the traditional Atlantic framework. As a consequence, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is still at the bottom of a learning curve. If European foreign policy is to achieve greater effectiveness, several features of the present arrangements would need to be altered.
In the Maastricht Treaty, Article J.4 provides for the extension of the CFSP to all questions relating to security, including the possible evolution of a common defence policy and a common defence. The United States and its continued role in Europe through NATO and the OSCE will have cociderable impact on the attainment of this goal. In respect to the new security challenges, NATO had to be internally transformed. The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) was a major contribution towards this end, although the question of leadership in the new Atlantic relationship remains unsettled. European demands for more equality have been met with reluctance from the US government. Likewise, the realisation of Article J 4 will depend on the EU member states conception of success and failure, in meeting existing challenges on and out of their own continent. The Gulf war and the Bosnian-conflict showed the EU incapable of reaching common position or common action in high politics. The objective of a European foreign policy has always been expressed on paper in grandiose terms, and Maastricht is no exception. Yet the procedures followed this far have been designed to co-ordinate the policies of the member states rather than forming a truly integrated European policy.
The substantial national differences regarding the EUs role in foreign and security politics, caused French and German demands for major reforms to intensify the integration process. In order to constitute a new security complex, I have argued that further integration is crucial. Otherwise the new system could lead to a renationalisation of the Member States foreign and security policy. The different national policies have raised the question of differentiated integration in order to improve the effectiveness of EU foreign policy. As argued in this thesis, the possibility of a multi-speed or inner core EU raises questions as to whether the outer core members will catch up and join the inner core, how the process of decision-making will operate, and what relations should be between the inner and outer core. The 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference included, as an agenda item, a set of proposals for "enhanced co-operation". In the Amsterdam Draft Treaty, a flexibility clause is to be incorporated as a new Title in the Common Provisions of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). However, the integration process, regardless of its form, has to take into consideration the concept of legitimacy. Whether an inner core Europe would be desirable is a matter of debate. Without legitimacy from the Member States not included and the other peripheral states, the multi-speed Europe might have a divisive and fragmenting effect on the future development of the EU, rather than acting as a force for dynamism and cohesion. | nor |