A Study of the Negotiations of the European Agreements between the EU and Visegrad This thesis is a product of my interest of the European Union throughout my study. The historical events of 1989 created a unique historical situation in Europe. The relationship between the Western and Eastern Europe had to start at a basic lever, while the Western European integration were at an extremely high lever, compared to the rest of the world. The first serious attempt to reintegrate these two geographic al areas w as first exemplified by the negotiation of the European Agreements in the period of 1990-1991. This thesis is an attempt to describe and analyze the negotiations and the outcome of the negotiations between the European Union and the Visegrad countries -Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.The thesis is an amalgam of the fields of politics and economics. Hence the natural theoretical choice has been found within the school of «International Political Economy» (IPE). However, it was important to find a theoretical choice that combined the understanding of trade policy with an understanding of the EU as a regime. I found these elementa in Moravcsik's «Liberal Intergovernmentalism» (LI).Using LI as a theoretical approach in itself, is not sufficient given its concentration of the intergovernmental bargains within EU. LI must be opened up to an external negotiation as well, as well as the field of security policy. The latter modification, due to the special case of East-West integration in the aftermath of the cola war.Basically LI includes a preference analysis and an intergovernmental bargain analysis. The preference analysis (demand) revealed a strong division within EU toward a free trade agreement with Visegrad. This is a pure economical consequence of the economic structure within EU and Visegrad. The Northern (Central) countries were far more complementary to the Visegrad countries than the Southern (Periphery) countries in the EU.The supply analysis (intergovernmental bargaining) confirmed these preferences. It also illustrated the fact that EU as a trade regime (CCP) is very strong. CCP reduces the alternative strategies in the negotiation compared to the traditional intergovernmental bargains in the EU. Hence the «flexibility» within EU is reduced. However, the external phase of the negotiation give EU another opportunity to reach consensus. Instead of internal compensations, a solution could be found with external compensations. This was very much the case in the negotiations of the European Agreements. The more power asymmetry between EU and the external actors, the easier it would be to use the principle of external compensations (protectionism). Visegrad were regime takers, and suffered for their weak bargaining position.There were also forces supporting the degree of free trade with Visegrad. In addition to the economic preferences for some countries, the security were an important factor in the negotiations. Both the traditional perception of security and the «widened» perception of security mattered in this case. The latter exemplified with the «risks» stemming from economical related problems - as etg. migration, regional conflicts, criminality. These «risks» influenced the economic preferences to the countries that were geographically closest to the problems, much stronger than the countries more distant from the «risks». Hence these security related preferences reinforced the economic preferences. The same countries that were negative toward free trade of economic reasons, tended to be negative also in this field of security. Another example of the influence of security is connected to the traditional military threat. With the coup in Moscow, August 1991, the demands from Visegrad were accepted by the EU. However, as soon as the situation stabilized in Moscow, some countries (France) went back to their former position. This illustrates both the fact that security mattered, and the fact that without a clear threat, the politicians in the EU were heavily influenced by domestic economic interests.These domestic interests reflects the type of «economic threat» the free trade agreement with Visegrad would give. Hence the situation could be described as following. The EU countries faced a challenge simultaneously. They had to adapt as one entity, given the strict rules of CCP. Their functional and geographical position toward the «challenge» gave different preferences. These preferences had to be solved either by internal or external compensations. Given the power balance, these compensations were in a high degree external (protectionism). This gave birth to the following statement by a Visegrad negotiator: "the fate of our fragile democracies hangs in the balance against the fate of Irish potato grower".