The Asian crisis is perhaps one of the most brutal financial crises. This thesis aims at investigating the influential sources that lie behind the IMF's economic policy towards the Asian Financial Crisis, more specifically towards Thailand and Korea. The thesis has taken inspiration from the Washington Consensus, in order to deduce some preferences that the institutional investors are to have towards the IMF's policy making. Five points have been selected; monetary -, exchange rate - and fiscal policy, as well as capital market liberalisation and risk distribution. The first perspective selected to be investigated is the continuity perspective, which defends that the institutional investors are lying behind and influencing the IMF's policy making. Here I build on liberal IR theory from Moravcsik in order to develop a model that has two levels of influence and three levels of aggregation. I argue that Wall Street exerts influence on the US policy makers, who in turn wields influence on international institutions like the IMF. The other perspective is the change perspective, which contends that technocratic learning is the reason behind an eventual shift in the IMF's policy making. Regarding the change perspective, a hypothesis of technocratic learning with substantial effect and a supplementary hypothesis (technocratic learning without substantial effect) are developed. The first is developed by making use of historical institutionalism, whereas the last departs from sociological institutionalism.The findings of the thesis include a change perspective to be observed for monetary -, fiscal - and exchange rate policy. The last points; the point about capital market liberalisation and risk distribution, indicate that there is "window dressing" (Brunsson 1989) to be observed. Further I argue that there is a role for the IMF in the future if they include the voices of the poor countries, but I also contend that the IMF will find it difficult to tame the global forces connected to the financial markets today.