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dc.date.accessioned2013-03-12T09:24:10Z
dc.date.available2013-03-12T09:24:10Z
dc.date.issued1996en_US
dc.date.submitted2002-10-01en_US
dc.identifier.citationJølstad, Finn Ola. Win-sets in a multiple-level game. Hovedoppgave, University of Oslo, 1996en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10852/14022
dc.description.abstractWIN-SETS IN A MULTIPLE-LEVEL GAME EU´S ACTOR CAPABILITY IN THE SHIPBUILDING SUBSIDY TACKS The main objective of this study is to illuminate factors which makes it possible for the EU to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in trade negotiations. In other words, it asks the question: How does the European Union 's actor capability decide the win-set formulation in multilateral trade negotiations? EU is regarded as an actor in international trade negotiations as the member states act through the institutions of the EU in the Common Commercial Policy. The EU is given the exclusive authority to enter into international trade agreements on behalf of its member states, and the Commission conduct the negotiations in cooperation with the member states' representatives of the Article 113 Committee. The formal powers of the EU is here called the actor capacity. The actor ability is the way the EU manage to perform this function, and together these two dimensions constitute the EU's actor capability. The actor capability is studied through the process of establishing a win-set, defined as: the set of potential agreements which can conclude an international negotiation at the same time fulfilling the need of ratification by the domestic constituency. In order to study the process of establishing a win-set, a model of EU's policy making in international trade negotiations is presented. At the basis of this model are three levers of analysis: the international lever, the EU lever and the member state lever. These three levers are combined in two interrelated games. The extra-EU game takes place between the EU and external actors in order to establish an agreement of the international negotiations, and the intra-EU game takes place between the Commission and the member states in order to establish the EU position and to achieve ratification in the Council of Ministers. As the levers of analysis in this study are taken as objects of analysis, the EU win-set formulation is studied from seven possible factors of explanation The three contextual variables are: international power-structure, international market-situation and internal market-position, whereas the four causal variables are: internal political position, internal institutions and procedures, strategies of other actors, and finally, economic ideology. From the deductive establishment of an analytical model, the study proceeds through inductive empirical investigation to reveal factors impinging on the EU's actor capability. The single case study design was chosen as the aims of the study were to illuminate factors of explanations and to make a point of departure for further studies of the role of the EU in international trade negotiations. It further puts down a sectoral approach to effectively disentangle the key processes , actors and structures shaping the outcome of the negotiations. The case which is studied is the negotiations which under the auspices of the OECD from 1989 to 1994 led to the "Agreement Respecting Normal Competitive Conditions in the Commercial Shipbuilding and Repairs Industry". The aim of the negotiation was to eliminate subsidies to the shipbuilding industry, and the signatory parties, Japan, the USA, KU, Norway and South Korea, together represented an estimated 80% of the world shipbuilding market. After the EU actor capability had been defined and the multiple- level model been presented, the study proceeds to present the shipbuilding sector and the domestic shipbuilding industry of the signatory parties on the basis of the contextual variables. Then the OECD negotiation is presented chronologically. The EU win-set is analysed on background of the causal variables, and then the process towards this win-set is analysed in order to explain what constitute the EU actor capability. The main findings were that the Commission could increase the EU actor capability either through changing member states' interests, or to shift the issues from the extra-EU game to the intra-EU game where it could facilitate side-payments. The commitment the member states have to the integration also increase the EU actor capability as a short-term self-maximising policy-making strategy is not compatible with the long term goals of political integration in Europe. Finally, on the basis of the results, some theoretical assumptions are further developed in order to guide further studies along the multiple-level model approach to EU policy-making in relation to other actors.nor
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.subjecthovedoppgave statsvitenskap DEWEY: sjøtransport:skipsfart:transport: sjøtransport:Skipsfartsmarkeder:transport: sjøtransport:Skipsfartspolitikk:transport: sjøtransport:Skipsfartsøkonomi:transport: næringsøkonomi:Skipsbyggingsindustri:en_US
dc.titleWin-sets in a multiple-level game : EU's actor capability in the OECD shipbuilding subsidy talksen_US
dc.typeMaster thesisen_US
dc.date.updated2003-07-04en_US
dc.creator.authorJølstad, Finn Olaen_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::240en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographiccitationinfo:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft.au=Jølstad, Finn Ola&rft.title=Win-sets in a multiple-level game&rft.inst=University of Oslo&rft.date=1996&rft.degree=Hovedoppgaveen_US
dc.identifier.urnURN:NBN:no-35123
dc.type.documentHovedoppgaveen_US
dc.identifier.duo355en_US
dc.identifier.bibsys97036783xen_US


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