|dc.description.abstract||GAP - SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT, A COOPERATION OR A CONFLICT FACTOR IN THE TURCO-IRAQI AND TURCO-SYRIAN RELATIONS:
Water is one of the most significant, politicized and conflict ridden issues in the Middle East. According to some researchers the 21. century will be the epoch of water wars. On the other hand, it is claimed that because of its essential character for the life, water might force states (even the enemies) to cooperate.
Southeastern Anatolia is one of the seven geographic regions in Turkey and the GAP has been built in this quite underdeveloped region. It comprises eight provinces in Southeastern Turkey, bordering Syria and Iraq.
The GAP is planned as a complex by a task to transform an area twice as large as the Netherlands, namely the whole southeastern Anatolia region. It consists of projects on both the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. (13 main projects; seven on the Euphrates and six on the Tigris. These projects include 15 dams, 14 hydroelectric power stations, and 19 irrigations projects). I should add that these figures are constantly being revised by the authorities. The Euphrates traverses a distance of 2,700 kilometres, of which some 40 percent are in Turkey, 25 percent in Syria, and 35 percent in Iraq. The Tigris has a total length of 1,900 kilometres, of which about 20 percent lie in Turkey, 78 percent in Iraq and only 2 percent in Syria.
Because of the grandiose structure of the GAP, the downstream side is concerned about the amount of water they will get in the future. Additionally, they are also anxious about the quality of this water.
My statement of the problem is as follows: How will the GAP, with its huge dimensions, influence the relations between the upstream and downstream states? In other words, to what extent does the GAP have conflict and cooperation potentials between these two parties, namely Turkey and Iraq-Syria? (I use cooperation and conflict concepts in a Keohaneian sense). In the first chapter, I debate the water problem in general. After that I deal with the legal aspects of the management of international rivers. In this part I discussed adequacy of the Helsinki Rules and ILC.
In the second chapter, I present the method and data collection. I also present the case study, confronted source problems and the limitation of a case study.
In the third chapter, I present the theoretical analysis. I refer to Keohane's cooperation and conflict concepts and I present the game theory.
In the fourth chapter I present the GAP and the significance of this project is conveyed. First, general information is given on this project, Then, the Turkish expectations regarding the GAP is attributed and feasibility of these expectations is discussed. Secondly, the Iraqi-Syrian point of view on the project is presented. And finally, it is debated whether the Iraqi-Syrian pessimism or the Turkish optimism will be prevalent in the future.
In the fifth chapter, I implement the game theory to the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. First, the priorities of the parts are presented. Then the game is defined. After that, the strategic options of the parts is attributed. Furthermore, the preference structure is referred to and finally, an analysis of the game with dominant strategies is presented.
In the last chapter, I present a summary in which the facts referred to in the earlier chapters and I comment on the future of the water issue in the Middle East in general and in the Euphrates-Tigris in particular.||nor