The thesis deals with Norwegian responses to EU defence cooperation. From the early 1990s onwards, the EU members gradually extended the cooperation in this area. This represented a challenge to Norway, as a non-member of the union.
However, the challenge remained moderate as long as the UK insisted on NATO supremacy in European security and defence policy. To the British, US involvement in Europe was of crucial importance. The "British way" therefore led to Washington.
This changed fundamentally when Tony Blair took office in 1997. Compared to his predecessor, Blair was a euro-enthusiast. With the Franco-British St. Malo agreement the UK took a leading role in the EU, strongly extending EU defence cooperation. The British way suddenly led to Brussels.
In the thesis, I study how Norwegian actors dealt with the changed situation. I specifically compare Norwegian responses before and after St. Malo.
Theoretically, I concentrate on two main ways of explaining the Norwegian policy. Both rational choice theory and a social constructivist approach is used.