Traditionally, the member states have been especially concerned with national sovereignty in matters pertaining to energy. On this background, then, it is astonishing that a procedure that codified a decision-making process that was to result in a set of harmonized rules at the European level was passed by the European Union in 2009. Moreover, this mandate was given to non-state actors acting within European bodies outside the formal structure of the EU.
This thesis seeks to explain why the procedure for developing common cross-border network codes for electricity was enacted in its particular form. As a procedural rule, this represented a case of institutional change. Therefore, a complementary institutional approach was taken for analysing the process leading up to the formal decision from different perspectives in isolation and in combination. An important finding in this study was the decisive role played by non-state actors for the specific allocation of roles and tasks within the enacted procedure. Moreover, these non-state actors had emerged through a gradual transformation, which represented vertical specialization within government, and horizontal specialization within the industry. These changes fed back into their transnational associations, which were subsequently redefined.