This thesis aims to shed light on the various motivational factors that affected the political decision-making processes of Norway’s contribution to the UN-led operation in Chad 2009/10 (MINURCAT). By applying a theoretical framework of interests and values, this thesis discovered a set of variables that contributed to the understanding of the two political decisions of entering and exiting Chad. The study traces the shifting discourse from the outspoken ambitions in Soria Moria to ‘increase participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa’, to the decision of discontinue the efforts due to ‘lack of resources’. Through a case study approach based on interviews and document analysis, this study found additional explanatory factors for the steps in the decision-making processes: Norway had accomplished the political goal of supporting a UN operation in Africa, which arguably was completed after one year of deployment. Also, the Norwegian Armed Forces had been introduced to a new type of conflict alongside the experiences through ISAF, making them more equipped to handle other missions post-Afghanistan. In all, the contributing to MINURCAT did indeed support Norway’s commitment to peace, but was arguably too brief to affirm a commitment to peacekeeping in Africa.