This paper deals with states that cooperate with international organizations without being a member. I study the theoretical implications of the fact that Georgia and Armenia have different reasons for being part of the European Neighborhood Policy. Georgia can be understood as playing chess, strategically positioning itself in relation to the Russian opponent. Armenia on the other hand seems to be playing Monopoly, as it primarily seeks to achieve economical benefits. Two different theoretical approaches are tested on the cases to shed light on the question: How can a realist approach complement the external governance theory when it comes to explaining Georgian and Armenian motives for participating in the ENP? Realist theory provides a perspective about security as motive for state action. The external governance approach focuses on sectoral interests, such as economic interest, as drivers in institutional integration. These two perspectives provide a background for the analysis which is structured around two hypotheses:H₁: Armenian/Georgian policy toward the EU seeks support against foreign intervention. In the case of Georgia against Russia. In the case of Armenia against Azerbaijan. H₂: Georgian/Armenian policy toward the EU is based on sectoral interests, in this case economic interests, resulting shared institutional values and interests between the EU and Georgia/Armenia.