Does Gender Equality Matter? The Effect Of Gender Equality On Protest Campaign Success

Women's political empowerment, campaign tactics, and the success of resistance campaigns

Master's thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies

Name: Birthe Einen
Department of Political Science
University of Oslo
Spring 2022

Does Gender Equality Matter? The Effect Of Gender Equality On Protest Campaign Success

Spring 2022

http://www.duo.uio.no/

Wordcount: 29 509

Abstract

Why some protests succeed while others fail has been a central question in the mass mobilisation literature. Few studies, however, examine whether gender equality affects the likelihood of campaign success. This thesis draws on theoretical insights from the literature on armed conflict and terrorism and suggests a gendered argument on why resistance campaigns succeed. Particularly, I hypothesise that nonviolent resistance campaigns are more likely to achieve their goals where the level of gender equality is high. On the other hand, violent resistance campaigns have a higher probability of succeeding where gender equality is low. I theorise that this is due to the underlying mechanisms of norms promoting nonviolence or violence and the effect gender equality might have on opportunity structures favouring different forms of mobilisation.

To examine the relationship between campaign success and gender equality, I specifically look at the effect of the Women's Political Empowerment Index (WPEI) to further theorise about which specific aspects of gender equality shape protest outcomes. By utilising the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes dataset (N = 2717) and logistic regression, I find a positive significant relationship between the level of women's political empowerment and the likelihood of nonviolent campaign success and a negative significant relationship with violent campaign success. This indicates that the level of women's political empowerment indeed affects whether resistance campaigns succeed and that this effect differs between protest tactics in the hypothesised direction. Overall, this thesis emphasises the importance of taking aspects of gender equality into account when seeking to understand collective action and adds to our knowledge of the structural elements that promote campaign success.

Acknowledgements

I am fortunate to have many people to thank for their time and effort in assisting me through this process. First, I would like to thank my supervisor Solveig Hillesund whose experience and analytical clarity have been invaluable. Thank you for the many inspiring discussions, valuable comments and encouragement throughout the writing process.

To the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), thank you for providing a great sense of collegiality and an open and vibrant research environment throughout the spring of 2022. My deepest gratitude goes out to Louise Olsson whose mentorship and comments on this thesis have been vital. I owe a special thanks to the Gender Research Group for reading and discussing my thesis at the brownbag session where I presented my findings. Here, I especially want to express my gratitude to Erik Melander for his valuable feedback. I also want to thank Fritt Ord for the generous funding of this project.

Next, I want to thank all my fellow PECOS students for the mutual encouragement and despair during the last years - this process would not have been the same without you. Furthermore, I would like to thank the other master's students at PRIOs Learners Loft for the daily discussions (and distractions). Finally, I want to thank my family and friends for supporting me and motivating me throughout this process. A special thanks go to my partner Eirik for always believing in me and what I do and whose support has been invaluable in completing this thesis.

Birthe Einen
Oslo, May 20, 2022

Do-file can be provided upon request.

Contents

Figures

Tables

1. Introduction

Why do some protest movements succeed while others fail? The overthrows of dictators, for example, are often not followed by a smooth transition to democracy but instead by instability, violence, and returns to dictatorship (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 42). Especially since the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East, typically referred to as the "Arab Spring", such patterns and why they occur have been of particular salience in the scholarly literature (Roberts et al., 2016; Zartman, 2015). Oppositionists in several countries faced repression and were unable to overthrow dictators or advance toward democracy, leading to protests breaking down in countries such as Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, or spiraling into violence such as those in Libya, Syria, and Yemen (Weyland, 2012, p. 92).

In the absence of conclusive information, the field has produced several taxonomies (Tarrow, 2011, p. 215). Unfortunately, problems with establishing a correlation between the timing of protest efforts and outcomes have left the literature with few convincing inferences (Tarrow, 2011, p. 216). Collective action often coincides with other changes in the political landscape, making it difficult to identify actions as the cause of specific outcomes. This is further complicated when considering that the target of contention such as authorities, elites, or other groups, respond differently to similar opportunities (Tarrow, 2011, p. 216). At the same time, some suggestions have been made. Possible contributing factors from the literature related to for example the employment of various protest tactics (Barkan, 1979; Maney et al., 2012; McAdam, 1983; Morris, 1993), mobilising support for protest claims (Heaney & Rojas, 2014; Meyer & Whittier, 1994; Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010), or power resources between the challengers and incumbents (Korpi, 1974; Walker et al., 2008).

1.1 The Puzzle And Its Relevance

Few studies, however, consider whether country-level gender[1] equality affects the likelihood of campaign success. Gender equality relates to equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for women and men. It is often regarded as a human rights issue and considered a precondition for and an indication of sustainable, people-centred development (Bouta et al., 2004, p. 5). Lower gender equality may be visible through unequal division of labour among genders, patriarchal structures, imbalances in family roles within family units, and unequal protection of rights and liberties based on gender identification (B. Carter et al., 2021, p. 4).

Those in the protest literature who include gender-related dynamics tend to focus on gender-inclusive ideologies (Asal et al., 2013; J. L. Thomas & Bond, 2015) or the extent of women's frontline participation and the formal involvement of women's organisations in campaigns (Chenoweth et al., 2019). Although important findings, these accounts do not often theorise or evaluate the effects of gender equality at the country level. The unresolved question of what relationship exists between gender equality and resistance campaign outcomes thus remains. In turn, this may not only lead to misguided conclusions about the effects of increasing gender equality on contentious politics but also a lack of understanding of the dynamics of resistance campaigns.[2]

In the field of research on non-institutional political conflict, on the other hand, scholars have increasingly begun to recognise the transformative potential of gender dynamics. A growing body of conflict research points to a robust relationship between gender inequality and armed

[1] "Gender" refers to socially constructed roles, behaviours, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women. "Sex", conversely, refers to biological and physiological characteristics that define men and females (WHO, 2014).

[2] Importantly, men and women are not the only existing genders, although the most common ones (Lussenhop, 2018, p. 197). To date, however, we lack systematic data on gender-specific society-level characteristics that transcend these categories (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021, p. 1003). Consequently, the only genders considered are men and women. Still, it should be acknowledged that gender non-conforming groups, including those in the LGBTQIA+ community, are especially prone to political violence during conflict (Nyanzi, 2013; Thomann & Corey-Boulet, 2017).

conflict (Forsberg & Olsson, 2021, p. 1). Some quantitative scholarship, for instance, suggests that women's inclusion in politics, in general, has a pacifying effect (Caprioli, 2005; Dahlum & Wig, 2020; Melander, 2005a). When it comes to another form of political violence, terrorism, studies show that gender can influence who perpetuates attacks and who is victimised (L. Huber, 2019b). Few, however, look explicitly at which effect gender equality might have when contention first occurs and whether participants reach their post-conflict objectives. Consequently, these studies neglect the possibility that gender equality not only affects the likelihood of conflict onset but also conflict outcome.

The literature on the gender-peace nexus proposes multiple ways in which gender equality might lead to peace, for example relating to gender norms and the possible repercussions the prevalence of these have on the legitimisation of different conflict solutions. It also highlights that gender equality may impact the tolerance of violence and stipulate who might join a movement. This thesis aims to build on insights related to gender equality and peace to discover what impact, if any, gender equality has on the success rate of resistance campaigns. Possible avenues for influence derived from the literature on gender and peace may be the link between gender equality and expectations of violence, its implications for legitimate solutions to political conflicts, and its effect on the possible recruitment of protesters.

Given the ambiguity of gender equality as a concept, academics have used various methods to capture probable mechanisms relating to how gender equality is linked to the outbreak of civil war (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016). Consequently, further research is needed to develop the theoretical arguments on what gender equality consists of and the effect that individual aspects that contribute to gender equality have. In this thesis, I specifically look at women's political empowerment as a proxy for gender equality. Hence, I intend to investigate whether women's political empowerment shapes protest outcomes. By focusing on women's political empowerment, this thesis comments on the disentangling and development of the complex gender equality concept that scholars call for, thereby moving the theoretical explanation of

mass mobilisation dynamics forward (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016).

An important distinction between resistance campaigns is their use or non-use of violence (Dahlum, 2019, p. 4). Most studies on gender equality and its effect on resistance campaign dynamics, however, focus on armed resistance exclusively (e.g Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005a), thus missing out on alternative channels of mobilisation such as nonviolent resistance (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 762). By including both violent conflict and nonviolent campaigns, this thesis provides new insights into the effect of gender equality on the dynamics of campaign tactics. As a result, it contributes to a more complex understanding of the outcome of different strategies used to challenge governments and whether nonviolent behaviour differs from violent behaviour.

In this thesis, I thus pose the following research question:

> *What effect does the level of gender equality have on the success rate of resistance campaigns, and does this effect differ between violent and nonviolent campaigns?*

The focus on gender equality has significantly altered the work of international organisations over the last 20 years. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda associated with the United Nations (UN), is widely recognized as a wide-reaching global framework for enhancing gender equality in security governance and conflict resolution (Basu et al., 2020, p. 1). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 and seven subsequent resolutions make up the cross-cutting WPS agenda (Davies & True, 2019, p. 2). Till now, research on resistance campaigns have generally failed to include country-level gender equality as an explanatory factor (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 763). The relationship between gender equality and resistance success thus remains under-theorised. In addition, studying the successes and failures of protest campaigns can provide insight into the most effective ways for governments and non-government groups to assist such movements. This thesis contributes to the scholarly literature by suggesting a gendered argument on campaign success.

This thesis aims to focus on the possible empirical link between gender equality and campaign success at the macro level. Answering this research question requires an understanding of the dynamic interactions between campaign onset and outcome. Hence, this thesis adopts a large-N approach which quantitatively tests the impact of gender equality operationalised as women's political empowerment on the success of campaigns. By doing this, it aims to suggest some insights meant to refine the theoretical framework on the effect of gender on non-institutional political mobilisation. I utilise the NAVCO 2.1 dataset to test my research question, which covers 384 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1945 to 2013. As a result, this thesis investigates the effect of gender equality on campaigns with "maximalist goals" with at least 1000 observed participants as operationalised by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013, p. 416-417).

1.2 Structure

In Chapter 2, I review the literature on contentious politics, nonviolent and violent protest campaigns, as well as the existing scholarship on the relationship between protest dynamics and effectiveness. I then demonstrate that the literature on the success rate of protest campaigns has largely overlooked aspects of gender equality. Armed conflict and terrorism research, on the other hand, has presented gender equality as a contributing explanatory factor. Hence, the chapter contains a review of the research on the distinct gender dimensions of other types of violent political mobilisation and a discussion of how such insights can advance research on protest success. Lastly, I explain how this thesis furthers the research agenda by contributing to this knowledge gap and its policy relevance.

Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical framework derived from the expectations of the effect of gender equality on political violence identified in the literature review. Here I present the possible underlying theoretical mechanisms that might link what I aim to test in this thesis, namely if gender equality affects protest success. Particularly, I argue that gender equality produces norms which promote nonviolence or violence and have consequences for

opportunity structures which favours different forms of mobilisation.

I conclude the chapter with my theoretical expectations and present the hypotheses tested in the statistical analysis. Here, I propose that higher levels of gender equality are positively associated with nonviolent campaign success. In other words, nonviolent resistance campaigns are more likely to succeed where gender equality is high. On the other hand, higher levels of gender equality are negatively associated with violent campaign success. Therefore, violent resistance campaigns are more likely to succeed in areas with low levels of gender equality.

In Chapter 4, I present the research design and describe the dataset, operationalisation of key variables, and discuss issues concerning the measurement of vital concepts. In particular, I present the Women's Political Empowerment Index (WPEI) as a measurement of gender equality. I also introduce my estimation techniques and the methodological concerns related to them. Here I show that I run the risk of including bias in my models since there appears to be selection into the NAVCO dataset, which might correlate with the level of gender equality. For instance, Schaftenaar (2017) find that, on average, nonviolent campaign onset is more likely to occur at higher levels of gender equality measured as fertility rate compared to inaction and armed conflict onset. Similarly, others find that higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to see violent conflict (Caprioli, 2000, 2005; Caprioli & Boyer, 2001; Demeritt et al., 2014; Melander, 2005a). To account for such confounding factors, I test the Heckman two-stage model and the two-part model to guard against selection bias. This is an important step that most studies of protest outcomes do not pay adequate attention to. Finally, I also demonstrate how I handle the challenge of missing data by utilising multiple imputation.

I continue to present the results in Chapter 5 and evaluate the hypotheses. Importantly, I do not detect any selection bias legitimising the utilisation of a single-stage logistic regression model as my main model. In my analysis, I find support for both the hypotheses and argue that the level of women's political empowerment positively affects the success rate of nonviolent resistance campaigns, but negatively affects the success rate of violent resistance

campaigns.

Chapter 5 also discusses the degree of generalisability and internal and external validity of the statistical analysis and whether the causal inferences are satisfactory. Here I argue that the model estimating the probability of nonviolent campaign success is appropriately valid and robust across different specifications. Regarding the model estimating violent campaign success, the support was somewhat weakened by the additional sensitivity tests. At the same time, there appear to be clear differences in the effect of WPEI on violent- and nonviolent campaign success in the presented models. As a result, WPEI appears to have a definite impact on the relative likelihood of success of nonviolence compared to violence.

In Chapter 6, I summarise the main insights and theoretical contributions and point to avenues for further research. Here I present the key takeaway that gender-related aspects do not only affect the peacefulness of a society but also have consequences for the dynamics of resistance campaigns. I thus conclude that more attention needs to be paid to gender-related dynamics when seeking to understand collective action and that gender equality as a complex concept should be further examined.

2. Literature Review

I begin the chapter by introducing protest as a form of contentious politics and describe the contentious activity I focus on in this thesis, namely maximalist resistance campaigns. I then discuss the distinction between nonviolent and violent mobilisation, which frames how I will study protest. Following this, I review the emerging field of scholars which examine the dynamics of contention and its success rate before I show that these studies do not adequately address gender-related variables. I then review the literature on other forms of non-institutional political conflict. Here I mainly focus on the trend of including different proxies for gender equality as a determinant for both civil peace and different forms of political violence. Here I argue that insights from such fields can advance the research on the success rate of resistance campaigns and on gendered dimensions of contentious politics. I thus aim at bridging the protest literature and the conflict literature in order to answer the research question.

2.1 Protest As Contentious Politics: Defining Protest

Political participation is a defining feature of a functioning political system (Tocqueville, 2000). Political participation allows citizens to communicate their interests and concerns to the governments and provide a link between them and the governing process. There exist many channels of exercising political voice (Cho & Rudolph, 2008, p. 273). The main conventional channel, voting, is the most institutionalised way of expressing political views (Biggs, 2015, p. 142). In some cases, however, institutional channels do not exist, and even if they do, not all groups can anticipate realising their objectives through them (Cunningham, 2013, p. 292). Individuals and organisations seeking political change can employ various non-conventional tactics ranging from nonviolent strategies to violence. Operating in such ways is generally more costly than through conventional politics (Cunningham, 2013, p. 292).

Protest, for example, takes place outside such institutionalised channels. The term protest is

sometimes used narrowly to define a particular type of gathering, synonym with demonstration and march (Caren et al., 2011). It can also be used broadly to denote collective action, which combines expressions of grievances and demands for change directed against a powerful adversary (Biggs, 2015, p. 142). Protest is often understood as a form of contentious politics that is an episodic, public, collective interaction between claim makers and their objectives and the government as a claimant, where the claims would, if realised, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 5). In its simplest version, contention means that one party makes claims on another (Tilly, 2008, p. 6).

In my analysis, I confine the analysis to a particular form of contentious activity, namely "resistance campaigns". Such sustained forms of mass mobilisation can be viewed as observable, continuous tactics by a non-state actor toward a state actor in pursuit of a political objective with a discernible leadership which distinguishes them from random riots or spontaneous acts (Chenoweth & Lawrence, 2010, p. 250). Specifically, I look at sustained forms of mass mobilisation with maximalist goals which aim to alter the political order fundamentally. Campaigns with goals that are commonly perceived to be maximalist involve those who aim at regime change, anti-occupation, or secession. One of the main reasons for studying campaigns is that they are often more significant units of political importance than unorganised one-off events. Some scholars argue that protests by themselves rarely pose a threat to regime stability, and social groups aren't always engaged in overthrowing the system in which they operate (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013, p. 417). The likelihood of making significant changes in the political climate is greater for campaigns that display organisational maturity, have specific political goals, and employ a combination of tactics.

Such sustained forms of contentions have different dynamics, involve different performances, and produce different levels of violence (Tarrow, 2013, p. 1). It can thus be costly for individuals to participate. Moreover, protestors, as well as agents of the state such as police and military personnel, also risk injuries and in the worst case, death (E. F. Thomas & Louis,

2014, p. 236). Consequently, campaigns with maximalist goals often turn into collective action problems. A collective action problem arises when the benefits of an action are not exclusive to those who participated (Olson, 1965). Since any goods from dissent are non-excludable and cannot easily be restricted to participants only, many have stressed how the individual costs of participation and risk of government repression should make individuals inclined to free ride on others and discourage active participation (Gleditsch & Celestino, 2015, p. 1125). Solving such collective action problems is particularly problematic in authoritarian regimes where people lack information about other people's true preferences and cannot easily assess the extent of popular dissatisfaction (Chwe, 1999; Kuran, 1990). Consequently, it is difficult for a single person who wants to participate in a campaign against the regime to know if they will have sufficient supporters.

2.2 Campaign Outcome: How Do Protests Succeed?

What affects the success of mass-resistance campaigns? Scholars, policymakers and activists alike have long grappled with such a question. A growing body of literature assesses the effectiveness of different approaches to contentious political action (e.g. Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Gamson, 1990; Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Tarrow, 2011; E. F. Thomas & Louis, 2014; Wang & Piazza, 2016). Scholars have suggested many different possible mechanisms in this regard. Examples include resources that can sustain the participants (Sharp & Paulson, 2005), the campaign's goal (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011), strategic organisations and leadership (Sharp, 1973), the length of the campaign (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), cognitive shortcuts (Weyland, 2012), ethnic divisions between opposition and regime supporters (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011) and diffusion mechanisms (Rasler, 1996).

In this thesis, I disaggregate resistance campaigns by their tactics. Both nonviolence and violence are coercive strategies that sidestep conventional politics and are employed by organised opposition groups or resistance movements against a regime (Tompkins, 2015, p. 105). The literature on political violence states that murder and physical injury are considered

violent acts. No consensus exists, however, on whether using lower intensity physical forces or targeting non-human entities are also considered violent (RezaeeDaryakenari, 2021, p. 5). I define violent resistance similarly to Chenoweth and Shay (2019, p. 4) as resistance which involves the use of force to harm or threaten to harm the opponent physically. On the other hand, nonviolent resistance does not directly threaten or harm the physical wellbeing of the opponent (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 3).

Some argue that armed violence can help popular movements to achieve maximalist change, and others suggest that armed violence undermines the potential of maximalist unarmed uprisings (Chenoweth & Schock, 2015, p. 427). A seminal contribution to such a discussion is Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan's (2011) book "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict". They argue that nonviolent resistance campaigns are more effective in achieving their objectives than violent campaigns, even under repression. A successful campaign must be able to mobilise participants. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that nonviolent campaigns have both lover moral, physical and informational barriers to participation than their violent counterpart. They thus attract larger numbers of individuals, resulting in a diverse membership, increasing the chance of seeing loyalty shifts among regime supporters.

They also point to the mechanism of backfire when explaining this correlation. Backfiring is defined as "a process that occurs when an action is counterproductive for the perpetrator" (Martin, 2007, p. 2). According to the civil resistance literature, backfiring describes circumstances in which an illegitimate act by the regime toward the opposition results in increased domestic and international support for the resistance campaign. Particularly important in this process is winning the loyalty of domestic security forces (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Chenoweth and Stephan argue that other factors such as regime characteristics cannot completely explain civil resistance outcomes. The influence of the lack of violence holds despite government repression, which undermines the hegemonic belief that violence, if

sufficiently ruthless, will always triumph over nonviolent opposition (Onken et al., 2021, p. 3). In contrast, others have argued that opposition movements select terrorism and violent insurgency strategies because such means are more effective at achieving policy objectives (Abrahms, 2006; Pape, 2006).

Violent and nonviolent protests also differ when it comes to recruitment. As opposed to popular protest, for example, insurgents are selected for recruitment. Weinstein (2005) argues that at the earlier stages of rebellion, the presence of uncommitted soldiers can harm a movement and lead to a quick defeat. Hence, rebel leaders wish to recruit high-commitment individuals (Weinstein, 2005). Building relationships with the non-combatant population that rebels depend upon for support is also more time-consuming (Kalyvas, 2006).

As a result, organisational strength might take longer to build up. Also, while nonviolent and violent resistance disrupts the country's governance for the state authorities, the intensity and cost of these actions differ (RezaeeDaryakenari, 2021). Nonviolent movements primarily rely on socioeconomic actions to persuade people not to cooperate with or obey the government, while violent movements use physical forces to eliminate state officials or properties (RezaeeDaryakenari, 2021, p. 5). This may in turn affect success.

The sociological and political science literature suggests that the success of protest in achieving its stated aims depends primarily on how it manages to shape public opinion (Burstein, 2003; Burstein & Linton, 2002; Louis, 2009). This, in turn, depends on the level of violence where nonviolent collective action may more effectively convey a sense of the legitimacy of the issue and the efficacy of the group, thereby promoting support for future nonviolent actions (E. F. Thomas & Louis, 2014). At the same time, if a social context of corruption exists, this may undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of nonviolent resistance relative to support for violence, thereby promoting indirect support for future extreme action.

On the other hand, others focus on the role and conditions of the military (Lee, 2009), the

fragmentation of groups (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012), and the willingness of the military to fire upon the civilians (Quinlivan, 1999). In this regard, some argue that it is helpful to evaluate the different political systems in which the protest occurs (Saideman, 2012). When it comes to autocracies, for example, fragmentation might be different in military regimes, single-party regimes and personalist dictatorships (Geddes, 2003, p. 60). Indeed, much of the literature on campaign success has centred around the actions of protest participants rather than the characteristics of the protest target. Some quantitative studies address aspects of regime characteristics such as Ulfelder (2005) and Teorell (2010). The latter study, for instance, finds that authoritarian regimes with many political parties are more likely to democratise in response to peaceful protests than those with one party.

In addition, some argue that government response, such as repression and the resilience to it, influence the likelihood that the campaign will be successful (Schock, 2005). Repression refers to "the use of force by government officials against protesters, including beatings, destruction of property, the use of live ammunition, and the imposition of draconian anti-protest laws" (Girod et al., 2018, p. 504). On the one hand, repression can support governments by eliminating or marginalising challengers, thus consolidating their political power and the power of their key constituents (Davenport, 2007). On the other hand, extreme forms of repression could increase the base of support for opposition groups (Girod et al., 2018, p. 505).

The readiness of governments to use various forms of repression also varies (Cunningham & Beaulieu, 2010). When the government has complete control over the security apparatus in autocracies, repression costs are low compared to the costs of policy compromise (Pierskalla, 2010). Democracies and semi-democracies, on the other hand, are thought to prefer compromise to repression. While repression is costly to protesters, it also has the potential to be costly for the government. These include the cost of drawing an audience and the risk of losing one's career, among other things (Davenport, 2007; Pierskalla, 2010).

2.3 Identifying The Gap: Gender Equality

Few studies on campaign success, however, take into account the dynamics of gender equality at the country level. Though, some scholars do look at how the gender composition of groups and their ideology affects the dynamics of protest. Murdie and Peksen (2015), for instance, find that higher levels of gendered economic and political discrimination, strong presence of women's organisations, and higher female population rates increase the likelihood of women's protest onset. Accordingly, they indicate that collective mobilisation among women is more likely in wealthier countries. When it comes to the adoption of tactics, Asal et al. (2013) find that groups that hold a female-inclusive ideology increases the chance of the adoption of nonviolent methods. Similarly, Huber (2019) conclude that state-level women's rights and campaign-level gender diversity increase the probability that a contentious political campaign will use nonviolent tactics. In addition, Thomas and Bond (2014) argue that gender-inclusive ideologies made armed groups more likely to attract female participants.

Building on this, Chenoweth (2019) conclude that campaigns with gender-inclusive ideologies tend to have higher rates of success, something both Codur and King (2015) and Principe (2017) have suggested. Here, Chenoweth (2019) points to the possible mechanisms of lower barriers of entry for women as a probable cause. She also finds that women's frontline participation is highly associated with successful resistance campaigns, even when considering other factors such as campaign size. Numerous studies also focus on the role of women's movement in authoritarian regimes and how they mobilise differently from other movements (Beckwith, 2000; Safa, 1990; Waylen, 1994).

Despite their importance, these studies seldom theorise or assess the implications of gender equality in themselves on protest outcomes. Consequently, the question of the link between gender equality and the outcome of resistance efforts remains unanswered. This might lead to inaccurate conclusions regarding the consequences of policies attempting to increase gender equality in contentious politics. It could also result in a lack of knowledge of resistance

campaign dynamics itself, thus limiting our ability to understand why some campaigns do not achieve their objective. By specifically studying women's political empowerment as a proxy for gender equality and campaign success, one can more adequately assess what contributes to the effectiveness of campaigns and gain a better understanding of how different aspects of gender equality affect mobilisation.

Some studies of violent and nonviolent contention do focus on gender equality at the country level as a structural condition affecting protest dynamics. Schaftenaar (2017) and her study of gender equality measured as fertility rates on nonviolent and armed conflict onset thus represent an important exception. She concludes that a decrease in fertility rates is associated with the onset of nonviolent campaigns as opposed to both violent and no campaign onset. Consequently, nonviolent conflicts and armed conflicts occur in different contexts. Nevertheless, few studies have explored whether gendered contexts also shape campaign outcomes or applied these analyses to other variables beyond fertility rates.

2.4 Armed Conflict And Terrorism: The Effect Of Gender

While no contributions look specifically at the effect of gender equality on campaign success, many have studied the link between gender and armed conflict onset at the country level (Forsberg & Olsson, 2021). The insight that gender equality and political violence are interconnected is not new; feminist peace activists have been voicing it for decades (see e.g. Von Süttner, 1899). According to Tickner et al. (1992), such a link has been central to feminist international relations literature. Inspired by Mary Caprioli's (2000) article "Gendered conflict" and assumptions derived from feminist research, a growing body of literature emerged which examines the correlation between gender equality and conflict.

There seems to be an emerging consensus in the literature that gender equality has a general pacifying effect on conflict (Bjarnegård et al., 2015; Caprioli, 2000, 2005; Caprioli & Boyer, 2001; Demeritt et al., 2014; Gizelis, 2009, 2018; Hudson & Boer, 2002; Melander,

2005a). These accounts all point in the same direction: countries with higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to see violent conflict. This refers both to the increased occurrence of international conflict (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli & Boyer, 2001), civil war and intrastate conflict (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005a), and civil war relapse (Demeritt et al., 2014) compared to countries with higher levels of equality. Some scholars even suggest that gender equality trumps economic development and democracy levels in terms of detecting the possibility of civil war (Bjarnegård et al., 2015; Hudson et al., 2015). The same holds true for multiple operationalisations of gender equality such as traditional patriarchal gender identities, female suffrage, the level of violence against women, the state-level gender gap, women's representation in parliament, and women's parity in education (Birchall, 2019, p. 4-5).

Hudson et al. (2015) found that the physical security of women is one of the most compelling predictors of the degree to which a state is of concern to the international community or the quality of relations between the state and its neighbours. They conclude that the latter explained more of the variance in state security than other conventional explanatory factors assumed to be related to such measures, including the level of democracy, level of wealth, and prevalence of Islamic civilisation (Hudson et al., 2015, p. 41). Caprioli and Boyer (2001) arrive at similar conclusions, arguing that higher levels of female parliamentary representation and participation in education have a pacifying effect on state behaviour. According to Bjarnegård et al. (2015, p. 107), this indicates that state behaviour may be strongly gendered, that is the more gender equality there is, the less likely a state is to engage in violent conflict, violate treaties, and have strained neighbouring relations.

Some individual-level studies find that men are more likely to support violent solutions and have a generally more positive attitude towards using force (Feldman, 1993; T. W. Smith, 1984). Others report a correlation between women and positive attitudes toward peace (Wilcox et al., 1996; Yablon, 2009). On the other hand, the effect of biological sex often

disappears when controlled for other factors such as feminist attitudes or gender equality (Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Tessler & Warriner, 1997). Consequently, it is likely that gender-equal attitudes rather than sex explain attitudes to violence (Bjarnegård et al., 2015, p. 106). Scholars have provided strong evidence for such a relationship, focusing on how beliefs and values behind unequal gendered power relations and gender roles are important in building support for violent conflict (Wright & Welsh, 2014).

When it comes to another form of political violence, terrorism, scholars have only recently started to include the role of gender, suggesting that there exist links between terrorism and the political, economic, and social equality of women (B. Carter et al., 2021; Robison, 2010). Some scholars link the lack of women's political rights, for example, to women's participation in terrorist and insurgent activities (Dalton & Asal, 2011; Sixta, 2008). Others focus on the link between terrorism and female labour participation (Berrebi & Ostwald, 2016), on gender imbalances and heightened levels of terrorism in societies with weak bureaucratic institutions (Younas & Sandler, 2017), and on indicators of women's social equality, which are strong predictors of the level of terrorism in societies (Fisher & Lee, 2019; Salman, 2015). Some studies also focus on how gender equality affects the quality of terrorism and the type of victims targeted. For example, Huber (2019) finds that more gender-equal societies impose higher costs on terrorists who specifically target civilian-oriented locations or individuals due to potential public backlash.

In addition, scholars have hypothesised that gender inequality is a motivator for both women and men to participate in terrorism (B. Carter et al., 2021, p. 3). Inequality between the genders in society and at home may prompt male family members to assert their masculinity and maintain social value and respect (Berko & Erez, 2007; Hasan, 2002; Kedar, 2006; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 1999). Scholars have also found a "gender gap" in support of terrorism. Women are less supportive of terrorist attacks (Silke, 2010) and hold more negative attitudes towards suicide bombing (Saad, 2011).

2.5 My Contribution

The literature on peace and gender suggests that higher levels of gender equality decrease the chance of seeing violent conflict. Despite this, few studies have examined what impact gendered equality has when conflict arises. Hence, these studies do not focus on the possibility that gender equality does not only affect the likelihood of conflict onset but also conflict outcome. By focusing on campaign success rather than campaign onset, this study provides new insight into the scholarship on gendered dynamics of conflict.

The literature on armed conflict shows that gendered contexts influence whether an armed conflict arises. When it comes to campaign success, the setting in which a protest emerge has also been pointed out as a contributing factor (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 184). For example, scholars have presented arguments about economic variables such as GDP (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013), urban population (Dahl et al., 2016) or the political regime in which the protest arises (Saideman, 2012) as factors which can explain variance in protest success. The field of contentious politics, however, has not adequately studied a possible gendered context. To explore this, this thesis draws on the growing pool of literature on gender dynamics from other types of political violence such as civil wars or terrorism.

Also, what aspects of gender equality explain the connection between gender inequality and civil war has also been underexplored. That is to say that the development and differentiation of theoretical ideas when it comes to the abstract and complex phenomena of gender equality needs to be addressed further. Previous positivist research has struggled to find longitudinal and cross-national valid comparable data. As a result, most researchers employed the same set of variables to examine what they perceive to be different types of mechanisms such as women in parliament, fertility rates, access to education or women's participation in the labour force (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016). This illustrates how gender equality is used as a "catch-all term". Such research, which operates with somewhat varied, underlying understandings of gender equality, demonstrates the necessity to evaluate the term carefully. By focusing on women's

political empowerment, this thesis contributes to the untangling of the concept of gender equality.

Other issues are the restricted temporal and cross-sectional scope of existing studies on the gender-peace-war nexus. For example, Cueva Beteta (2006) find that countries often do not report data on variables such as women in the labour force. This can lead to selection bias, as the analysed sample skews towards highly developed countries (Dahlum & Wig, 2020, p. 881). Many time-series of countries that do report data are short. Caprioli (2005) and Schaftenaar (2017), for instance, employ data that start in 1960. According to Dahlum and Wig (2020, p. 881), this omits several great advancements in women's empowerment related to voting rights and civil liberties. By using a dataset with a more extended temporal and geographical scope, I am to mitigate some of this bias.

Much of the analysis of contentious activity has analysed the use of violence or nonviolence separately (Asal et al., 2013, p. 305). Studies that focus on violence typically neglect all variations within periods of peace (Dahl et al., 2016, p. 2). Such studies often compare violent conflict to no conflict (e.g. Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005a). Citizens, however, have multiple ways of expressing political views, including civil resistance. Nonviolent strategies are often ignored in previous quantitative studies (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 762). Studies on nonviolence, on the other hand, have tended to focus on individual cases and ideological motivations (Dahl et al., 2016, p. 2).

Only recently, scholars have started to systematically analyse and compare different campaigns with diverging levels of violence (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Cunningham, 2013; White et al., 2015). There has been considerable growth in the literature related to nonviolent tactics with the advent of new data, which has contributed to greater analytic rigour in the field (Lehoucq, 2016). Before this, scholars of civil resistance tended to use qualitative case study approaches and did not directly compare violent and nonviolent tactics (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994; Chenoweth et al., 2017; Schock, 2013). This thesis contributes to a more

complete representation of the reality in which different strategies are used to challenge governments combined with a gendered perspective by including both violent and nonviolent campaigns.

Also, existing studies that predict campaign success do not adequately account for the selection bias that often exists in their dataset. Scholarship on contentious politics seldom treats problems connected to the fact that the sample used for estimation is non-random, that is the observability of events is often a function of specific structural processes. Domestic terrorist attacks or protester violence, for example, are conditional upon the formation of domestic terrorist groups or protest movements in the first place (Chyzh et al., 2018). As a result of such considerations, campaign success cannot be modelled separately from campaign onset (Tanneberg, 2020, p. 90). In this thesis, I use statistical models such as two-stage models which are designed to deal with selection bias. Despite the fact that two-stage approaches are widely recognized in international relations research, such models have not been applied to the study of protest success (Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019, p. 227).

3. Theoretical Framework: Gender Equality And Campaign Success

The literature review shows that gender equality influences armed conflict, and suggests that it may have an effect on the outcome of contention as well. This chapter asks how and why and conceptualises the theoretical underpinnings of such an argument. Especially, I focus on two strands of explanations: why gender inequality may be associated with an increased risk for armed conflict and why gender equality alternatively may contribute to peaceful conflict resolution (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 7). According to Forsberg and Olsson (2016, p. 7), these two strands are not two sides of the same coin. Low levels of equality may, in theory, influence the probability of violence. Where there is a high level of gender equality, it is the lack of these systems that leads to peace. On the other hand, high levels of gender equality may create peace. Where gender equality is low, violence can be the outcome of a lack of these peace-making mechanisms.

Thus, this chapter outlines the proposed gendered mechanisms that could affect conflict. I then aim to explain how such mechanisms can be at play in a political mobilisation setting and how gender equality affects whether protests succeed or not. Finally, to theorise the relationship between gender equality and campaign success, I draw on both expectations derived from the armed conflict literature and the literature on contentious politics.

This chapter consists of four sections. First, I briefly explain an underlying logic that frames my theoretical framework, namely the difference between the gender gap and the feminist gap concerning war and peace issues. In the second section, I connect explanations regarding the link between gender inequality and violent conflict to violent protest success. The third section focus on mechanisms linking gender equality and peace while discussing how these processes affect whether nonviolent protest succeeds. Lastly, I draw on the discussed theoretical expectations for protest success and suggest hypotheses on the link between gender

equality and violent- and nonviolent protest.

3.1 The Gender Gap Versus The Feminist Gap

An underlying assumption in the scholarship that studies the link between gender equality and conflict is that women tend to hold more peaceful beliefs, whether for biological or social reasons. In contrast, men tend to be more accepting of war (Cohen & Karim, 2021, p. 10). Some argue that in societies where women are more empowered, their predisposition toward tolerance and peace will bring about more peace (Bjarnegård et al., 2020, p. 4). In the literature, such an explanation is referred to as "the gender gap". The gender gap refers to disparities in political behaviour and attitudes between men and women such as support for war (see e.g. Brooks & Valentino, 2011; Eichenberg, 2019; Koch & Fulton, 2011).

In recent studies, some scholars have questioned the existence of such a gap (Bjarnegård et al., 2020). Cohen and Karim (2021) highlight that several quantitative studies on sex, gender, and war use gender interchangeably with biological sex. It is common for scholars to conflate gender and sex by assuming that women are always feminine and men are always masculine. These assumptions about what it means to be a woman or a man are created by dominant narratives, which assume that all women and men have the same preferences. People who identify as a gender, however, may differ greatly depending on their ethnicity, racial background or socioeconomic status, among other factors. Bjarnegård et al. (2015; 2020) thus argue that a feminist gap better explains the gender and peace relationship.

The feminist gap specifies that in actuality, a difference between feminist men and women and non-feminist men and women exists (E. A. Cook & Wilcox, 1991). When an individual has a positive attitude toward gender equality, who thus believes that women should have the same rights as men, he or she should also embrace respect and tolerance for the rights of all people in general. As a result, feminist attitudes and notions of masculinity rather than biological sex explain why gender equality conveys peace or conflict (Bjarnegård et al., 2017).

3.2 Gender Equality: Effect On Violent Campaign Success

To link inequality and violent conflict, I draw on two clusters of proposed explanations, namely the existence of societal norms which promote violence and opportunity structures which favour violent mobilisation (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 8).

3.2.1 Norms promoting violence

Some argue that gender inequality affects the chance of violent conflict due to its implications for societal norms and attitudes toward the use of violence (Forsberg & Olsson, 2021, p. 2). In the conflict literature, gender-inequitable attitudes have been suggested as relating to a more positive attitude towards the use of force. Highly patriarchal societies where the support for gender equality is low typically espouse traditional gender roles based on the idea that men are superior to women due to their toughness and more "warlike" attitudes (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 8). Such traditional gender identities often frame men as fighters and protectors, while women are considered vulnerable and need protection.

The discourse of women as weak while men are presented as masculine protectors suggests that force can be used if necessary (Cohn, 2013; Jackson et al., 2011; Wright & Welsh, 2014). There exist substantial evidence that traditional patriarchal gender norms lead to militaristic conflict approaches and fosters political violence (Bjarnegård & Melander, 2011; Herbert, 2014). In such a culture, militarism tends to be glorified, often referred to as a culture of "militarised masculinities" (Bjarnegård & Melander, 2011).

Notably, such notions of gender norms which foster political violence are not restricted to men only. Goldstein (2003, p. 251) explains that in the making of militarized masculinities, “[c]ultures use gender in constructing social roles that enable war”. It is thus not the masculine nature of men or the feminine nature of women but rather socialisation processes which produce militarized masculinities (Eichler, 2011). Women can also directly support such norms by encouraging male family members to participate in violence (El-Bushra & Sahl, 2005;

Wright & Welsh, 2014). Krause (2019), for example, found in the case of Jos, Nigeria, that women in violence-prone neighbourhoods contribute to tolerating or even upholding norms of violent masculinity by encouraging or shaming men into fighting. Consequently, gender inequality can produce norms that normalise violence with both domestic and international repercussions. This argument applies across sexes, with people more inclined to support strategies dependent on the societal level of gender equality (Schaftenaar, 2017).

On the other hand, the protest literature proposes that the general public opinion is essential in producing effective protest outcomes (Burstein, 2003; Burstein & Linton, 2002; Louis, 2009). Attitudes towards violence and propensity for violent conflict may affect such notions: if the general population perceive violence as acceptable, protest campaigns might not risk losing legitimacy in the population if participants use violence. This can result in violent campaigns gaining more acceptance and more support from the wider population when they first occur. Consequently, norms which promote violence should increase the chance of seeing violent protests succeed.

As a result of these norms promoting violence, violent solutions can be perceived as more legitimate (Bjarnegård & Melander, 2011, p. 42). When gender equality is low, violence often becomes the norm when it comes to administering order and solving disputes between individuals, groups, or states. The more widespread and pervasive militarised masculinity is, the more likely it is that conflict will be dealt with violently. For example, Caprioli (2005, p. 163), notes that "norms of intolerance and inequality should have an incendiary impact on domestic and international behaviour by legitimising violence as a tool of conflict resolution."

Forsberg and Olsen (2016) suggest that norms of gender inequality can be viewed as a form of intolerance, in which some groups believe it is legitimate to oppress and dominate other groups, whether they be women, sexual minorities, ethnic minorities, or political opposition groups. It is common in such societies for the "superior" group to dominate other "inferior" groups. Some argue that societies with a high level of male dominance in politics have

hypermasculine political cultures, which prescribe violence to resolve conflicts even at the highest levels of decision-making. Melander (2005) for example, mentions that this is related to the fear of losing face or appearing weak if one opted for peaceful resolutions to struggles such as negotiations. Consequently, gender inequality can be understood as a reflection of how societies deal with existing grievances, i.e., how elites deal with horizontal differences between groups (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 9). Accordingly, norms arising from gender equality do not only increase the willingness to support violent campaigns but also make violent solutions acceptable. This points in the direction that violent campaigns should be more successful where gender equality is low since the tactic they are employing can be seen as a legitimate solution to political conflict.

3.2.2 Opportunity structures favouring violent mobilisation

Some also suggest that gender equality affects conflict risk through the opportunity for military organisations to recruit (Forsberg & Olsson, 2021, p. 4). Despite some rebel groups recruiting women, men constitute most of those who fight in armed conflict (Bjarnegård et al., 2015; Goldstein, 2003; Melander, 2016). When women are included as actors in armed conflict, they are more rarely involved in active combat (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 765).

Since Gurr (1970) asked "why some men rebel", scholars have increasingly reorganised questions relating to recruitment as essential. Especially some suggest that it is critical to understand under what conditions men (particularly young men) decide to join a military organisation (Bjarnegård et al., 2017; Bjarnegård et al., 2015). While access to men is a crucial resource for a possible rebel group's capacity to fight, Eck (2009) contends that recruiting is a significant burden on their limited resources. Because identifying suitable candidates for recruiting is challenging and time-consuming, things that can help make it easier are crucial. Because men and women have distinct roles in society, this explanation for the link between gender and armed conflict focuses on how socioeconomic trends have different implications for men and women.

For example, some argue that gender inequality affects this pathway by creating a male surplus (Hudson & Boer, 2002). Gender inequality might have such an effect due to multiple mechanisms. Hudson et al. (2009), for instance, argues that a society characterised by gender inequality can result in a persistent and strong son preference which can lead to a large male surplus conducive to easing recruitment. In India, for example, some regions have high levels of imbalanced sex ratios at birth to boys' advantage due to highly prevalent sex selection (Guha, 2017; Jayal, 2008). Such a statement is supported by Urdal (2008) who concludes that Indian states with large youth bulges are increasingly prone to armed conflict. This is particularly the case when coupled with a predominantly male population. Furthermore, the size of the cohort of young men in an area means that there exists a larger recruitment pool for rebel organisations (Forsberg & Olsson, 2021, p. 5). Consequently, a surplus of young males is likely to indicate that there are more people with low barriers to joining an armed organisation.

To be able to mobilise citizens is presented as essential for protest success. This link can be affected by the existence of a large participation pool produced by the surplus of males. Also, if this increases the size of the campaign, it can make it easier to demonstrate the strength of the campaign to attract even more recruits (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Consequently, the opportunity structures following from gender equality may increase the probability of violent campaign success.

The effect of a young male surplus can be even more pronounced under certain circumstances. Hudson et al. (2009), for example, suggest that the sex ratio balance in a region is affected by men migrating to urban centres to find work due to altered economic conditions while women remain in rural areas. Here, they can be easier to identify and target in recruitment campaigns. Similarly, early studies on urbanisation, armed conflict, and migration revealed that migrating men might be more prone to recruitment due to the possibility of economic marginalisation and difficulties adjusting to a new environment (Gizewski & Homer-Dixon,

1995). If this is the case, it can lower the cost of recruiting even further.

Some dispute such a link. Earlier research suggests that urban environments result in more tolerant and cosmopolitan values (Buhaug & Urdal, 2013). Despite this, Hudson et al. (2009) find that in situations where many male individuals are unable to find a spouse or a job, the likelihood of men joining armed groups may increase because they have few viable alternatives to raising income. Thus, lower opportunity costs could affect recruitment potential. Similarly, Toft (2005) who studied ethnic groups, stated that in urban centres, groups who have greater access to media, economic resources, and networks, enable groups to mobilise and organise more effectively.

Research has also proposed other gendered motives which can affect those who participate in conflict. Wight (2014) for example, finds that patriarchal notions of masculinity, in particular, can fuel conflict and insecurity. He introduces the concept of 'thwarted masculinities' to explain why some men are thought to be more likely to commit violence, including as combatants in armed conflicts. This is used to describe "the experiences of men who are unable to conform to standards of manhood imposed by their societies, for example, because they are unable to find work, get married or support a family" (Wright & Welsh, 2014, p. 11) Several studies also show how ideals of manliness encompassing sexist attitudes are associated with numerous destructive behaviours (Barnes et al., 2012).

In some cases, women also actively contribute as combatants in conflicts. This, however, is often seen as transgressing traditional gender roles, as violence is not understood as feminine (Wright & Welsh, 2014, p. 15–16). Similarly, Bjarnegård (2020) find that the most compelling explanations of gender and violence and extremism are linked to sexist ideas of dominant masculinity and subordinate femininity.

To summarise, socioeconomic mechanisms affected by gender equality can create conditions where a larger number of men are available for recruitment. At the same time, research on such

recruitment says that violent protests are less dependent on a large number of participants than their nonviolent counterparts to achieve success. Simultaneously, recruitment is more dependent on finding competent individuals, which can be difficult due to the high barriers to participation in a violent context. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that the greater the number of participants from different societal sectors involved in a campaign, the greater its likelihood of producing tactical innovations. Suppose gender inequality creates a surplus of mainly men who are more predisposed to participate in violence. In that case, gender inequality makes recruitment to violent campaigns easier by increasing the pool of possible participants. This might make it easier for recruiters to find competent individuals from different societal sectors. Finding competent participants may in turn increase the likelihood of campaign success.

Simultaneously, since the size of the mobilisation pool and its effect on the competence of available individuals positively impact campaign success, one might argue that gender inequality has a negative effect on success since it decreases the overall number of available recruits. That is to say, where gender equality is high, more women are also theoretically available for recruitment. At the same time, with the increase in gender equality, one might also see a decrease in violence accepting norms. An interplay should therefore exist between the mobilisation pool and the norms that govern society. As a result, the increase in the overall mobilisation pool following gender equality might lose its positive effect on campaign success since the loss of violence accepting norms follow such an increase. In that way, even though gender equality increases the number of available recruits, such individuals should not accept violence as a means of solving political conflict and would not have an individual motivation to join violent rebel groups. Gender inequality should thus overall have a positive effect on violent campaign success since it increases the number of individuals who have a larger acceptance of violence and hence are motivated to join violent campaigns.

3.3 Gender Equality: The Effect On Nonviolent Campaign Success

In the last section, I argued that highly unequal societies are dominated by a political culture based on negative masculine roles that overemphasise violent methods of conflict resolution. Despite the inevitable conflict over resources and power, more equal states may be governed by norms that are more likely to deal with grievances nonviolently (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 10). I draw on two clusters of explanations to explain the association between gender equality and peace, which is norms promoting nonviolence and opportunity structures favouring nonviolent mobilisation (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 10).

3.3.1 Norms promoting nonviolence

Melander (2005) argues that gender equality promotes mutual respect between individuals irrespective of their gender and that these positive interpersonal relationships spread to broader societal patterns of tolerance, respect, and peacefulness. In this sense, gender equality is considered as a broader concept of normative tolerance. In her study of the impact of gender inequality on civil conflict, Caprioli (2005), for instance, compares discrimination against women and ethnic groups as manifestations of an environment characterised by inequality (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 3).

As a norm, gender equality entails respect and nonviolent dispute resolution (i.e., decreases the role of hypermasculinity) (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 10). As a result, equality norms can reduce the danger of a post-war society relapsing into violence and prevent grievances from developing into violent conflict in the first place (Demeritt et al., 2014). As Melander (2005; 2005) points out, gender equality cultures are based on norms that require men and women to treat each other with respect. These standards often coincide with respect in other societal relationships and can explain why such states are relatively peaceful (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 10). As a consequence, where socially constructed gender roles are more equal, respect for others in the private sphere is expected to carry over into the public sphere (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016, p. 10). The expansion of gender equality thus decreases violence

excepting norms and the masculine militarism that follow them. Therefore, there is less use of violence to control social organisation and interpersonal relations. Instead, gender equality encourages relational norms of respect and acceptance.

Societies with higher levels of gender equality are thus likely to have citizens who are more favourable to nonviolent protest and less accepting of violent movements. Like violent campaigns, which form of conflict resolution tactic is perceived as more legitimate also affects the chance of campaign success. This might be the case for nonviolent campaigns in societies with higher levels of gender equality because their choice of tactic follows the more commonly accepted nonviolent mode of behaviour and conflict resolution.

At the same time, nonviolence is not the same as peace. The relative peacefulness often associated with gender equality may therefore not necessarily translate into support for nonviolent campaigns, which can still be regarded as conflict although utilising nonviolent tactics. Nevertheless, nonviolent tactics should align more closely to violence rejecting norms following gender equality rather than violence accepting norms related to gender inequality. Consequently, nonviolent campaigns should be more likely to gain support from the wider population in states with higher levels of gender equality than in unequal countries. Since support for a campaign can be associated with an increased probability of success, higher levels of gender equality should increase the probability of nonviolent campaign success since people should support actions that are more in line with their societal norms.

3.3.2 Opportunity structures favouring nonviolent mobilisation

Gender equality can also produce capacities for resolving conflict nonviolently. When it comes to the risk for conflict relapse, Gizelis (2009) finds that the greater level of investment in women and their access to more resources results in greater capacity to influence, create and maintain both vertical and horizontal networks among a larger part of society. These capabilities can be utilised to promote peace and create alternative peaceful methods of

resolving conflict. For example, Regan and Paskeviciute (2003) argue that power will be more diffused in a society with higher levels of gender equality. This can affect the grassroots level, where women's networks can serve as a positive resource for peace. Accordingly, the risk of armed conflict is lower the higher the status of women.

Higher levels of gender equality may also have more direct consequences participation of women in society (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 765). Due to predominating gender norms, women can be restricted from accessing public spaces legally or socially. Additionally, it can limit communication and network-building between sexes by limiting their interaction. Women and men are, for instance, segregated in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Some countries also require men to accompany women in public spaces (Hudson et al., 2012, p. 63–65). These limitations based on gender norms can prevent women from participating in different areas of society.

A common argument in the protest literature is that armed groups and nonviolent movements face different resource mobilisation demands to function (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 765). According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, p. 30), nonviolent movements are more dependent on mass mobilisation than violent campaigns to succeed. According to them, tactical innovation develops on the periphery of a movement. Campaigns with more participants and broader margins are more likely to yield tactical innovations allowing them to switch between concentration and dispersion strategies while keeping pressure on the opponent.

Being able to recruit across sexes should increase the likelihood, extent, and diversity of mass mobilisation (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 765). The increased number of active participants available following from gender equality's effect on the recruitment pool broadens the range of repertoire and diverse participants accessible to nonviolent campaigns. The prevalence of nonviolent conflict norms in a gender-equal society can also have the same effect, that is when people support nonviolent conflict norms, they are more likely to participate in nonviolent movements. Following this is an expected increase in the success rate for nonviolent movements when gender equality is high.

Gender norms following from the level of gender equality can also affect the actual willingness of campaigns to recruit both men and women. According to Schaftenaar (2017), if societies are more gender-equal, this should increase the chance of campaigns mobilising more broadly. Campaigns in states with higher levels of gender equality are thus expected to be more positive about the inclusion of women in their campaigns. Gender equality may therefore not only increase the probability of seeing nonviolent campaign success by expanding the challengers' pool of possible participants but can also create an incentive and willingness to make use of such an advantage by recruiting across genders.

3.4 Summary And Hypotheses

Low levels of gender equality can influence the likelihood of protest success through several mechanisms. Gender inequality may be associated with conflict norms which make people support and legitimise violent campaigns and view such campaigns as desirable solutions to political conflict. This can subsequently expand the support of the campaign in the wider public thus increasing the probability of success. Low levels of gender equality should also increase the participation pool from which the challengers can recruit. This can increase the chance of recruiting competent individuals making the campaign more likely to succeed. Gender inequality can have this effect by producing a surplus of young males with low participation barriers, creating an individual push for participation where male dominance governs society, and by having consequences for state capacity and economic development through the lack of female participation in different socioeconomic sectors. Such different mechanisms all point in the same direction, that is lower levels of gender equality are expected to be associated with a higher likelihood of violent campaign success. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of gender equality are negatively associated with violent campaign success

Figure 3.1: Gender equality: proposed causal relationship with violent campaign success



High levels of gender equality are also expected to affect the probability of observing nonviolent campaign success through multiple mechanisms. Gender equality can result in the prevalence of norms entailing respect and nonviolent dispute resolution, making citizens more likely to support nonviolent protest than citizens in gender unequal countries. Gender equality should also be associated with higher availability of competence and individuals with networking experience and a greater number of available female participants among a larger part of society, reinforcing the expected success of nonviolent campaigns. Based on these considerations, I argue that nonviolent campaigns should be more successful in societies with higher levels of gender equality. I therefore suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of gender equality are positively associated with nonviolent campaign success

Figure 3.2: Gender equality: proposed causal relationship with nonviolent campaign success



4. Research Design And Methods

In this chapter, I present the data used for the analysis and how I have operationalised concepts. Firstly I present my dataset and discuss its limitations. The second section in this chapter covers the variables I include in my models. Third, I discuss the methodological considerations I have made regarding choosing an estimator. After this, I describe my two-stage modelling approach. Here, I present the Heckman selection model and argue that election years can function as an appropriate instrument. Due to the high bar for justifying instruments, I also present an alternative two-stage model, namely the two-part model (2PM). Such a model does not require an instrumental variable with a strict exclusion restriction. Lastly, I demonstrate how I handle the challenge of missing values in the dataset by using multiple imputation.

4.1 Dataset: NAVCO 2.1

The central unit of analysis in my thesis is resistance campaigns. In my thesis, I make use of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 2.1 (NAVCO 2.1) dataset, which contains annual data on 384 mass movements from 1945 to 2013. NAVCO is a well-established database project that several studies have used in their research (e.g Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Schaftenaar, 2017). Unlike the NAVCO 1. series which focussed on the campaign as a whole, the NAVCO 2. series disaggregate campaigns on the yearly level (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Researchers can thus follow campaign changes over time. The unit of analysis in the NAVCO dataset is therefore campaign-years. In order to employ a two-stage estimation strategy and also estimate the observation of campaigns to adjust for any possible selection bias, I change the data structure to country-years.

To be included in NAVCO 2.1, campaigns must have held "maximalist" goals of overturning the existing system, that is regime change, self-determination or against foreign occupation. They are are also “mature” campaigns, in the sense that they mobilise at least 1,000 participants

in at least one calendar year, and a coherent organisation linking episodes of activities to one another over time.(Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 2). Also, NAVCO only reports incidents of violent campaigns with more than 1,000 battle deaths. Consequently, the findings in this thesis only apply to mature campaigns with maximalist goals with at least 1,000 observed participants and for violent campaigns that succeeded 1,000 battle-related deaths.

4.1.1 Limitations

Before describing the variables and statistical model, a few frequently raised concerns with NAVCO 2.1 need to be mentioned. For example, the threshold of 1,000 participants is inherently arbitrary, as recognized by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013, p. 417). They argue, however, that this is an appropriate starting point since a high cutoff reduces the risk of underreporting, and 1,000 participants correspond to the Correlates of War Project's threshold of 1,000 war deaths. By setting the cutoff point at 1,000 participants, comparisons with similar datasets of violent conflict are made easier without the substantial underreporting difficulties that would arise if they set the cutoff point lower, such as at 25 participants. Furthermore, the high participation threshold implies that any findings in this thesis would only apply to campaigns with sustained participation. Consequently, the participation threshold is not necessarily a reason for alarm as long as inferences reflect this understanding.

Chenoweth and Lewis (2013, p. 420) also mentioned that users of NAVCO 2.1 may be worried that the data is biased toward success as successful campaigns are more frequently reported on. Consequently, would-be campaigns that are crushed in their infancy and therefore fail will not be included in the dataset. This is especially the case regarding nonviolent campaigns. This is a well-documented problem that plagues most studies of social behaviour (Earl et al., 2004). Chenoweth and Lewis (2013, p. 4-5) suggest that by incorporating both violent and nonviolent campaigns as well as a criterion of 1000 participants, this bias is evenly dispersed throughout both types of campaigns. In addition, they have also requested field specialists to examine and contribute to the dataset, ensuring that all relevant campaigns are included

(Chenoweth & Orion A. Lewis, 2013, p. 4-5). As a result, the bias toward success can be mitigated to some extent. Still, we should remain careful in generalising results to all types of protest events since NAVCO include primarily larger and more resilient campaigns and that movements crushed in their infancy not included in the dataset may represent an important underreported group.

Scholars also highlight problems relating to how to determine whether a campaign qualifies as nonviolent or violent (see e.g. Anisin, 2020, 2021). In some cases, violent and nonviolent campaigns exist simultaneously or employ both violent and nonviolent tactics (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 5). Scholars have addressed this dilemma by characterising campaigns as "primarily nonviolent" or "primarily violent" according to the predominant resistance methods employed. Chenoweth and Shay (2019) established some standards of inclusion in each of these categories. Nonviolent resistance is defined as campaigns that do not directly threaten or harm the opponent's physical well-being. Campaigns where a significant amount of violence occurred, on the other hand, are characterised as violent. Violent resistance is defined as involving the use of force to harm or threaten to harm the opponent physically, and the campaign organises itself around the use of force.

To identify nonviolent or violent campaigns in this thesis, I use the NAVCO 2.1 variable for the primary method, which can vary from year to year to incorporate that the use of violence as a tactic may fluctuate and that its employment is not static. Even so, I realize that this is a somewhat ambiguous dichotomy. Still, I argue that this simplification is useful to gain greater insight into general patterns regarding resistance campaigns and the outcome of contentious efforts (Onken et al., 2021).

4.2 Dependent Variable: Campaign Success

The dependent variable in my analysis is a dichotomous variable derived from the NAVCO 2.1 dataset that indicates whether a resistance campaign succeeded. A campaign's success is

determined by whether it met at least one specified maximalist aim within one calendar year of the date it ended (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 26). In some cases, campaigns achieved their goals years after the "peak" of the struggle in terms of membership, but the success was a direct result of campaign activities. These campaigns are coded as successful when such a direct link can be demonstrated.

Policy changes, democratic elections, regime change, and national independence are among the goals. If a campaign meets its stated goals in a particular year, it is considered successful, that is (1) if successful and (0) if not successful (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019). This is a strict measure of success according to Chenoweth and Lewis (2011), but it removes weaker examples that reverted to active resistance after gaining success. While a dichotomous measure can be difficult to use for capturing variation in campaign performance, this rigorous criterion limits the measurement of false positives.

In total, the NAVCO dataset codes 2570 observations as (0) and 147 observations as (1). An overview of the number of resistance campaigns at both the campaign level and campaign-year level disaggregated on tactics can be found in Table 4.1. The disparity between these categories can be explained by the fact that a campaign can only be coded as successful in the final campaign-year. Consequently, the campaigns years earlier that gained the status of success are classified as unsuccessful.

I have chosen to look at the success rate at such a yearly level rather than at the campaign level because a single resistance movement might experience substantial changes in gender equality throughout its existence. Breaking campaigns down into yearly units provides a framework to account for effects produced by changes in gender equality that might happen while a campaign is ongoing (Tompkins, 2015, p. 116-117).

Table 4.1: The number of successful campaigns

Unit: campaign-years	**No success**	**Success**	**Total**
Violent campaigns	2,151 (97,5%)	56 (2,5%)	2207 (100%)
Nonviolent campaigns	419 (82.2 %)	91 (17.8%)	510 (100%)

Note: The registered success of campaigns in country-years with ongoing campaigns

Unit: campaigns	**No success**	**Success**	**Total**
Violent campaigns	164 (74.5%)	56 (24.5%)	220 (100%)
Nonviolent campaigns	73 (44.5%)	91 (55.5%)	164 (100%)

Note: The registered success of the total number of campaigns

4.3 Explanatory Variable: Gender Equality And Women's Political Empowerment

The independent variable of interest is women's political empowerment, which is a critical aspect of gender equality. Scholars have operationalised gender equality in a variety of ways such as women in parliament, fertility rates, access to education, and women's participation in the labour force (Forsberg & Olsson, 2021, p. 2). To explain the effect of gender equality and how different aspects of the concept affect protest outcomes, I look particularly at women's political empowerment. Women's political empowerment can be defined as "a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making"(Sundström et al., 2017, p. 322).

According to Dahlum and Wig (2020, p. 879), existing literature on gender equality often depends on multiple indicators for women's political empowerment such as women political leadership (e.g. Melander, 2005b) or indicators of socio-economic empowerment such as labour force participation or fertility rates (e.g. Caprioli, 2005; Schaftenaar, 2017). Despite being

important, such measures often omit vital aspects of women's political empowerment such as participation in civil society or mass politics and protection of civil liberties. Also, aspects such as participation in society play an important role in my argument that gender equality affects the likelihood of protest success amongst others through the available mobilisation pool of the campaign. Therefore, the decision to focus on women's political empowerment rather than other socio-economic indicators of gender equality also has a theoretical basis.

For that reason, I follow Dahlum and Wig (2020) and consider the Women's Political Empowerment (WPEI) index, embedded in the V-Dem dataset and presented in Sundström et al. (2017). The WPEI covers over 170 countries and dates from 1900 to 2012. It spans from 0 to 1, with 1 being the highest level of empowerment, and is based on assessments by over 2600 country experts (Sundström et al., 2017).

The index averages the scores of three sub-dimensions.[1] (1) The women's civil liberties index is created by taking the point estimate from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes three concrete items: women's freedom of domestic movement, freedom from forced labour, women's right to private property, and access to justice. (2) The women's civil society participation index is the second component. This is a latent factor variable based on the following items: freedom of discussion for women, women's civil society organisation participation, and share of female journalists. The last component, (3) women's political participation, is calculated by averaging V-Dems indicators of female legislators and political power distribution by gender.

I argue that the index's three sub-categories represent a proxy for social norms toward gender equality. Women's freedom from forced labour, participation in civil society, and representation in legislative authorities, for example, should reflect more positive sentiments about gender equality in a particular country. It is also a better predictor than the proportion

[1] For more information about the WPEI and its components, see Appendix 19.

of women in parliament or female heads of state because it considers a wider range of factors rather than elite-level considerations. Additionally, its broad coverage contributes to its advantages, as it covers most observations in the NAVCO 2.1 dataset.

At the same time, there exist several downsides to employing such an index. As an example, the WPEI does not account for women's economic empowerment (Sundström et al., 2017). Other scholars in the field have also adopted a variety of other proxies for gender equality such as fertility rates or educational indicators (e.g. Caprioli, 2000, 2005; Schaftenaar, 2017). Consequently, I present models using alternative indicators for gender equality such as female-to-male literacy, infant mortality, as well as the commonly used fertility rates as robustness tests in Appendix 9 (Forsberg & Olsson, 2021; Schaftenaar, 2017). All indicators for gender equality, including the WPEI, are lagged $t - 1$ to establish temporal order.

Figure 4.1: The global development of WPEI over time



Note: The line reflects the global average of the WPEI (1945–2013).

4.3.1 Control variables

Through a complex interplay of mechanisms and connections, there are likely to be many confounding variables related to those of interest in this thesis. My objectives are to account for many of the best-established confounding variables that may affect campaign success and gender equality which may generate omitted variable bias if not entered in my models. If this is not done, I risk estimating biased and inconsistent coefficients.

Achen (2002) criticises the practice of including all feasible controls in a model, referring to it as "garbage can regressions." Furthermore, he argues that estimated coefficients can be sensitive to the addition of even marginally correlated controls making this method hazardous. I thus begin the primary empirical analysis by presenting basic models to maintain a parsimonious model, keeping with Achen's (2005) recommendations.

I include several control variables related to nonviolent- and violent campaign success and gender equality. Firstly, I include a variable for GDP per capita (logged) from the World Bank (2013) which may function as an indicator of poverty. Poor economic performance are commonly argued to affect grievances in society (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hudson et al., 2012; Schaftenaar, 2017). GDP has also been used as a proxy for state capacity (Koos, 2016). The probability of protest success has again been argued to depend on the weakness of the state (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001, p. 184). In addition, GDP per capita captures the positive effect of economic development on gender equality through improvements in education, job opportunities, and welfare (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021). To ensure temporal order, the variable is lagged t-1.

I also control for the level of democracy as some show it affects campaign success (Fearon, 1994; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Democratic governments, according to some scholars, should be more tolerant of dissent, less prone to utilise violence to suppress internal opposition and have a more easily coercible population. As a result, attacks against democratic targets,

both violent and nonviolent, should be more effective than those against authoritarian targets. In addition, democratic states are frequently associated with higher levels of gender equality (Schaftenaar, 2017). I thus include the electoral democracy index, Polyarchy, from the (V-Dem) dataset which reflects a minimalist democracy definition of contestation and participation (Coppedge et al., 2017). The variable is also lagged t-1,

I include a lagged t-1 variable for population size (logged) as countries with large populations are more difficult for leaders to control (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Herbst, 2014; B. Smith, 2011). Such countries should also have a greater variation in gender norms (Dahlum & Wig, 2020).

States with stronger military capabilities may be able to counter political efforts, lowering the chances of seeing protests succeed. The lagged t-1 variable military personnel (logged) is therefore included from the National Military Capabilities v6.0 dataset (Singer et al., 1972).

In addition, time dependency can be a problem when relying on cross-sectional time-series data (Beck et al., 1998; D. B. Carter & Signorino, 2010). This study accounts for time dependency by adding cubic polynomials of years since the last active resistance campaign from the NAVCO 2.1 dataset (t, t^2, t^3: one for nonviolent and armed conflict respectively) following the advice of Carter and Signorino (2010).

Finally, region dummies[2] are included to control for context-specific confounding factors, for example related to culture, history, or geopolitics. I also include a dummy variable for the Cold War era (1960-1989) because nonviolent movements were more popular after the Cold War and due to the anticipation of an increasing trend of women's empowerment (Webster et al., 2019).

[2] The regions are categorised as Africa, Americas, Asia, Oceania and Europe.

Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics

Variables	**Count**	**Mean**	**Min**	**Max**
WPEI t-1	11400	.5204538	.035	.965
Election year t-1	11778	.2140431	0	1
(ln) GDP per capita t-1	7843	23.203	16.026	30.416
The Polyarchy index t-1	9708	0.373	0.006	0.926
(ln) Population size, total t-1	9139	15.818	10.638	21.026
(ln) Military personnel t-1	9209	3.760	0	9.433
Time since violent conflict t-1	11778	21.190	0	69
Time^2 since violent conflict t-1	11778	848.975	0	4761
Time^3 since violent conflict t-1	11778	40593.435	0	328509
Time since nonviolent conflict t-1	11778	27.576	0	231
Time^2 since nonviolent conflict t-	11778	1423.583	0	53361
Time^3 since nonviolent conflict t-1	11778	118048.741	0	12326391
Africa	11973	.3236449	0	1
Asia	11973	.2970851	0	1
Europe	11973	.1881734	0	1
Oceania	11973	.0348284	0	1
Americas	11973	.1562683	0	1
Cold War	11973	.4132632	0	1

4.4 Choosing Estimators: Methodological Considerations

The standard approach for studies that investigate the determinants of resistance campaign success is to examine the events in which a campaign took place. At the same time, research suggests that country-level gender equality effect whether protests happen, that is the likelihood of observing violent protest decreases when gender equality increases while the probability of observing nonviolent protest increases (Schaftenaar, 2017, p. 774). Since the level of gender equality at the country-level differ systematically across states and thus the occurrence of violent or nonviolent protest, one can expect the likelihood of observing violent and nonviolent protest and success to covary similarly. As a result, there is selection into the NAVCO dataset, which is correlated with women's political empowerment.

Failing to control for potential selection effects can lead to selection bias (Heckman, 1979). In the classical application, Heckman (1979) noted the problem by looking at self-selection among women participating in the labour force. To mitigate this bias, Heckman (1979) developed a two-stage estimator, alternatively called the Heckit or sample selection model. By analysing the relationship in such a way, it is possible to control for sample selection bias statistically (Carson, 2005, p. 2).

Selection models work in two stages. The first stage predicts selection into the sample and the second stage predicts the outcome of interest using that sample, adjusted using the results of the selection equation (Reynolds-Stenson, 2018, p. 54). In this case, I use selection models to predict whether resistance campaigns are observed (Stage 1) and then campaign success (Stage 2). This is an important step to guard against selection bias that most studies of protest outcomes do not pay adequate attention to.

4.4.1 The Heckman selection model

Given the binary nature of the outcomes of interest: whether protest is observed and protest success, I employ the probit variation of Heckman's two-stage selection model. The Heckman

model is appropriate for determining the impact of women's political empowerment on campaign success by incorporating the predicted probability of observing protest in the first place. In a Heckman model, Stage 1 is estimated by including a Probit estimation of the probability of having positive outcomes in the first stage. The second stage uses the inverse Mills' ratio, that is the ratio of the probability density function and the cumulative density function from the select equation as a regressor in the second stage Probit regression. By including the prediction values from Stage 1, one can control for the problematic sampling effects in the dataset (Frondel & Vance, 2013, p. 9). To recover unbiased estimates using a two-step approach, the model relies on two assumptions: (1) a bivariate normal distribution of error terms in the selection and outcome equations; and (2) the inverse Mill's ratio has a linear effect on the outcome equation (Nieman et al., 2018, pp. 10–11).

A binary selection model with normal errors is theoretically identified without any restriction on the regressors (A. E. Sartori, 2003). In particular, the same regressors can appear in the equations for both stages. So, identification in the bivariate sample selection model with normal errors is being achieved by functional form assumptions (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p. 551). By utilising the inverse Mill's ratio, these assumptions are theoretically sufficient for identification. But in practice, multicollinearity can make this difficult. As a consequence, many empirical applications use instrumental variables, which are presumably related to selection, but do not have any direct effect on the outcome (M. Huber & Mellace, 2011, p. 1)

The validity of an instrument in a two-stage estimation relates to two central concerns. Firstly, its validity is related to whether the instrument predicts the outcome in Stage 1, that is the observation of protest campaigns. Secondly, it should influence Stage 2 or campaign success only through its effect on Stage 1, that is it has no independent effect. This is referred to as the exclusion restriction.

The basic identification assumption that the instrument Z has no net association with the outcome Y except for the one generated by the directed path $Z \rightarrow D \rightarrow Y$ is a strong

assumption. Such an assumption cannot be tested empirically by for example assuming that if Z does not directly affect Y, there is no association between Z and Y when D is present. In such a test the treatment could be a collider allowing the instrument to interact with unobservable confounders if the instrument is not perfect (Morgan & Winship, 2015, p. 301-302). Consequently, it is primarily a theoretical evaluation that determines exclusion. An alternative specification of the Heckman style two-step model without an instrument can be found in Appendix 1.

4.4.1.1 Introducing and validating the instrument

For the two-stage models, I include a lagged variable for election year as the instrument. Most correlates of campaign success, however, can plausibly be linked to observing protest which violates the exclusion criteria. It is thus challenging to identify an appropriate instrument.

According to political process theory, however, mobilisation becomes more likely when changes in the political environment create opportunities (Tanneberg, 2020). Examples of such opportunities include movements towards more democratic norms or elections which have both been argued to create opportunities for mobilisation (Karakaya, 2018; Tucker, 2007). I argue that such changes which increase the probability of mobilisation may work as an instrument in Stage 1 of my model.

According to Tucker (2007), for example, election years provide a focal point for an aggrieved population, making conflict more likely in those years. In addition, elections mobilise large sectors of the population, leading to popular resistance if grievances arise due to the election (Beissinger, 2007, 2013; Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Tucker, 2007). Hence, elections satisfy the relevance criterion for Stage 1, which is being relevant for observing protest.

When it comes to the exclusion criterion, few plausible direct paths exist. One might argue that frequent elections are correlated with political instability and state capacity. Some

scholars claim that the probability of protest success depends on the weakness of the state (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001, p. 184). Similarly, elections might be closely related to the level of democracy, which some also state affect campaign success (Fearon, 1994; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Such arguments, however, do not entail the possibility of interpreting elections as causing success by themselves. Consequently, no reason can be found to justify why elections by themselves should predict success, over and above what influences it has on the likelihood of observing protest.

To further assess the plausibility of the proposed instrument election, I follow Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019) and performed a comprehensive literature search on ISI Web of Science. I make use of the keywords "election" and "success", in addition to "resistance campaign" or alternative identifiers such as "protest" to identify studies with election as a predictor for campaign success. This returned 25 studies, where none focussed on estimating probable campaign success. None of them had success as a dependent variable and included election year as an independent variable. The lack of studies that propose a plausible direct link between elections and campaign success further strengthens my argument that elections can function as a good instrument.

As a result, I include a binary indicator for any executive, legislative, or constituent assembly elections in the country-year in Stage 1 of my model from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) data set (Hyde & Marinov, 2012). The variable is lagged t-1 to ensure temporal order.

This may be a challenge as not all countries hold elections. I, therefore, introduce the alternative instruments "democratisation" and "economic growth", which follow a similar logic to that of "election" since they can disrupt and alter the political environment resulting in opportunities for mobilisation (the latter has also been shown by Chenoweth and Stefan (2011, p. 249) to not significantly affect the odds of success). Models with the alternative

instruments can be found in Appendix 2.[3]

4.4.2 The two-part model (2PM)

Another way of modeling selection problems, is by using a so-called two-part model (2PM) (Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Vance & Ritter, 2014). Cragg (1971) developed the 2PM model as an extension to the Tobit model. When the correlation between errors is modest, the 2PM generally performs better than a Heckman model (Puhani, 2000). One of the frequent complaints when using a Heckman model is that it treats censored observations[4] as missing, which exacerbates the sample selection problem that the model is designed to correct (Vance & Ritter, 2014, p. 529). Results are typically interpreted in terms of potential outcomes. This is a significant issue when dealing with data on resistance campaign success, for which a value of zero represents the lack of success, not missing data. As with the Heckman model, the 2PM model estimates both stages as regressions but differs from the previous model by omitting the inverse Mills ratio from the latter. Results are thus interpreted in terms of actual outcomes (Vance & Ritter, 2014).

In addition, the 2PM model does not require an exclusion restriction and is more appropriate for studies that examine the effects of observed values of the independent variable (Kellogg, 2016). For confirmation that possible violations of the exclusion restriction in the Heckman model do not affect my results, I also use the less restrictive 2PM model proposed by Vance and Ritter (2014) to test my hypotheses. Due to the binary nature of my dependent variable, I estimate a two-stage logit model following the 2PM approach.

In spite of this, the 2PM is not a universal remedy (Lis, 2018, p. 287). It is based on the assumption that the two stages of the model can be treated independently from each other based on the observed explanatory variables. Conversely, if the assumption does not hold and

[3] For more information about the alternative instruments, see Appendix 2.

[4] Censored observations refers to observations where its values are only known within a certain range (Kruschke, 2015, p. 732)

the same unobserved factors affect both stages, then a Heckman model would be justified. Hence, I run both models to obtain comparable results in terms of signs and significance.

4.4.3 Selection equation

My model's dependent variable for the selection equation is a binary measure indicating the existence of an ongoing resistance campaign from the NAVCO 2.1 dataset in a given country-year. To identify the first year in which a campaign was ongoing, the coders looked for the earliest instances of mobilisation connected with the campaign. They coded a campaign-year for each calendar year in which mobilisation was observed (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 4). Timeline continuity and continuity in leadership cohorts were key to ensuring that coders did not treat unrelated social unrest or mobilisation as part of a given campaign (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 4). The early mobilisation must be extra-institutional, meaning it must challenge or undermine the authority of regime-sponsored institutions and depart from conventional political tactics. As a result of this criterion, campaigns can arise from pre-existing groups and organisations that did not previously use extra-institutional methods.

Table 4.3: The number of ongoing campaign-years

	Ongoing	**Not ongoing**	**Total**
Violent campaigns	2,207 (18.4%)	9,766 (81.6%)	11,973 (100%)
Nonviolent campaigns	510 (4.3%)	11,463 (95.7%)	11,973 (100%)

Note: The registered country-years with ongoing campaigns.

As in Stage 2 and presented in Section 4.3, I include WPEI in the estimation of Stage 1 in my model. I also include all control variables as presented in Section 4.3.1 to control for confounding factors.

4.5 Missing Values

Missing data (also known as missingness) is a pervasive problem in global analyses of political phenomena (Pischedda, 2020, p. 287). Missingness can lead to bias and will always result in a reduction in efficiency (Madley-Dowd et al., 2019). Studies that account for missing data must take the causes of the data's absence into consideration. According to Rubin's (1976) classification, missing data can be missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), or missing not at random (MNAR). Data is missing (1) MCAR if the probability that a given value is missing does not depend on any information in the dataset; (2) MAR if it depends on observed data only; and (3) MNAR if it depends (at least in part) on missing data (Lall, 2017).

In multivariate time-series cross-section data, it is not uncommon to encounter missingness. Issues related to missingness can be dealt with in various ways (Honaker & King, 2010). For dealing with missing data, complete case analysis (CCA) such as listwise deletion is a common approach and the default for most statistical packages (Madley-Dowd et al., 2019, p. 63). Listwise deletion involves omitting observations with missing values on any variable. Listwise deletion is unbiased only when the restrictive MCAR assumption holds which is rarely the case with data in political science (Lall, 2017). Conversely, there is a multitude of instances in the discipline in which some units are systematically more likely to have missing data than others.

Another increasingly common approach is to impute missing values (Honaker & King, 2010). The approach is referred to as multiple imputations (MI) and involves replacing each missing cell with multiple values based on data from the observed portion of the dataset. This approach not only produces significantly more efficient inferences than listwise deletion, but it also produces unbiased results under more realistic missing data distributions (Lall, 2017). In this thesis, I use multiple imputations to avoid the loss of valuable information and bias associated with listwise deletions (King et al., 2001, p. 49–52).

I make use of King and Honaker's (2010) proposed imputation algorithm, Amelia II, as my imputation technique[5]. This approach generates several "filled in" or rectangularised versions of the incomplete data set, allowing studies that require complete observations to utilise all information available in a data set with missing observations (Honaker et al., 2011). Amelia II draws imputations of the missing values using a novel bootstrapping approach, the EMB (expectation-maximisation with bootstrapping) algorithm.

Table 4.4: Magnitude of missingness

Variable	**Missing**	**Total**	**Percent**
Women's political empowerment	573	11,973	4.79
Election year	195	11,973	1.63
GDP per capita	4,130	11,973	34.49
The Polyarchy index	2,265	11,973	18.92
Population size, total	2,834	11,973	23.67
Military personnel	2,764	11,973	23.09
Time since violent conflict	195	11,973	1.63
Time^2 since violent conflict	195	11,973	1.63
Time^3 since violent conflict	195	11,973	1.63
Time since nonviolent conflict	195	11,973	1.63
Time^2 since nonviolent conflict	195	11,973	1.63
Time^3 since nonviolent conflict	195	11,973	1.63

The key assumption behind multiple imputation is that data are missing at random (MAR). This indicates that the pattern of missingness should be based solely on the observed data in the imputation model, rather than unobserved variables or data characteristics (Honaker & King, 2010). I included a wide range of variables in the imputation model that may influence the missingness to account for such issues. I include all variables from the main

[5] Available at http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia

models except for campaign success and most of the variables from the robustness checks in the imputation process. I also include leads and lags of the independent variables as recommended by Honaker and King (2010).[6] In addition, I use a ridge prior of 5 per cent to address convergence issues caused by significant missingness and high correlations among the covariates. Doing this makes it less likely that the MAR assumption will be grossly violated.

Kernel density estimates for marginal distributions of the observed data and average m = 10 densities of each imputed variable are presented in Appendix 3. The imputed values and distributions generally match the observed values well. Those variables with the highest percentage of missing data will produce the largest discrepancies between observed and imputed data. Still, most of these imputations can be considered to perform reasonably well. The imputation does struggle, however, to pick up on the bimodal distribution of Polyarchy and struggles to predict values for years sine nonviolent- and violent conflict. There is a widespread practice of limiting the range of imputed values to keep them within bounds, but this often does more harm than good. In some cases, it improves the appearance of the imputed values, but it can bias regression estimates (von Hippel, 2013). Although the situation is not ideal, since I have taken into account all variables in the dataset that may be capable of correlating with the variable, it is the best fit I could achieve with this data.

To ensure that any results are not driven by the way I imputed the data, I run robustness checks on the original data using listwise deletion in Appendix 18. In addition, I also include models with alternative ways of controlling for time dependency due to the bad fit between the imputed and original values for years since conflict.

[6] It is also recommended to include polynomials of time associated with each cross-sectional unit. Unfortunately, the AmeliaView version of Amelia II does not provide an option for incorporating these features.

5. Analysis

This chapter present the empirical analysis of the data. Its objective is to test the hypotheses made in the theoretical framework in Chapter 3. There, I presented the hypothesis regarding the effect of women's political empowerment on campaign success, and that this effect is likely to be different for violent- and nonviolent campaigns. I made two hypotheses about the nature of such a relationship. Hypothesis 1 predicted that higher levels of gender equality are negatively associated with violent campaign success while Hypothesis 2 stated that higher levels of gender equality are positively associated with nonviolent campaign success.

5.1 The Baseline Models

I first run my model on the campaign-year data, which is the standard approach in the literature on protest success. A preliminary Model (1) with a logit regression of a combined measure of resistance campaign success on the campaign is presented in Table 5.1. The dependent variable success captures the change from no success (0) to success (1). I also added the explanatory variable women's political empowerment. This is modelled as a single stage as opposed to a two-stage model, with campaign-year as the unit of analysis. I run such a model to test my claim that violence and nonviolence should be disaggregated rather than merged and that the effect of WPEI should significantly differ between those tactics. I therefore include an interaction of WPEI and primary campaign tactic, that is whether the campaign was primarily violent or nonviolent.

When running Model (1), I find that the interaction term between the primary method and women's empowerment is significant at $p < 0.001$, indicating that there is a difference in the effect of WPEI based on the primary campaign tactic. The coefficient for the interaction term suggests that WPEI has a positive and significant effect on campaign success for nonviolent campaigns. For violent campaigns, on the other hand, WPEI has a negative and significant effect on campaign success at $p < 0.05$.

Table 5.1: Combined success: WPEI interacted with campaign tactic

	Logit
	(1)
WPEI	-2.181*
	(0.908)
Primary Method = Nonviolence	-0.118
	(0.546)
Primary Method x WPEI	4.789***
	(1.076)
Polyarchy	0.0924
	(0.425)
GDP	-0.285*
	(0.118)
Population	0.0421
	(0.120)
Military Personnel	0.0720
	(0.137)
Election Year	0.165
	(0.211)
Cold War	-0.825***
	(0.235)
Constant	3.170
	(2.140)
N	2717

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Cubic polynomials and region dummies are included in the estimations but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

I then move on to the selection models to account for the possible selection bias. Table 5.2 shows my four baseline models without control variables. The first two show the estimation of nonviolent campaign success, while the last two show the estimation of violent campaign success. Models (2) and (4) are 2PM models, while Models (3) and Model (5) are Heckman models. The models include only the covariates of interest, that is violent and nonviolent campaign success in addition to WPEI and the instrument election year for the Heckman models. In all models, the dependent variable, nonviolent and violent campaign success, captures the change from no success (0) to success (1) in a given campaign-year.

The 2PM[1] baseline Model (2) demonstrates that WPEI influences whether nonviolent campaigns succeed or not significant at $p < 0.01$. The coefficients in the model are expressed as the natural log of the odds. The log odds ratio can tell us something about the direction of the relationship between WPEI and nonviolent campaign success.[2] WPEI appears to affect nonviolent campaign success positively. In line with Hypothesis 1, nonviolent campaigns are more likely to succeed in countries where WPEI is higher. That is to say at higher levels of WPEI, there is a higher probability of observing successful nonviolent campaigns. For lower levels of WPEI, nonviolent protest has a lower probability of succeeding.

In the Heckman baseline models (3) which also estimate the effect of WPEI on nonviolent campaign success, WPEI no longer has a statistically significant effect at $p < 0.05$. In the selection equation, however, the instrument election year is insignificant at $p < 0.05$. This suggests that election year has no independent effect on the observation of nonviolent campaigns, indicating a weakly specified selection equation. Testing for weak instruments is increasingly standard, thanks to the work of Staiger and Stock (1994) and Stock and Yogo (2005). Following such an approach, the standard first-stage F-statistic can be used to test for

[1] The is no default option to run a 2PM model for a binary outcome in Stata 17. I have thus adopted the Stata code used in Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019).

[2] If $\beta = 0$, there is no relationship between WPEI and the chance of a nonviolent resistance campaign succeeding. If $\beta > 0$, there is a positive association. If $\beta < 0$, there is a negative relationship.

Table 5.2: Baseline two-stage model estimating campaign success

	Nonviolent Campaigns		Violent campaigns	
	2PM	**Heckman**	**2PM**	**Heckman**
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Outcome Equation: Campaign Success				
WPEI	1.568**	0.157	-3.156***	0.259
	(0.567)	(0.214)	(0.922)	(1.277)
Constant	-2.364***	1.732***	-2.406***	0.288
	(0.318)	(0.122)	(0.339)	(1.104)
Selection Equation Ongoing Campaigns				
WPEI	-0.0492	-0.0214	-1.227*	-0.716*
	(0.418)	(0.198)	(0.573)	(0.325)
Election year		0.0272		0.00598
		(0.023)		(0.035)
Constant	-3.087***	-1.712***	-0.882***	-0.544***
	(0.246)	(0.115)	(0.266)	(0.157)
Athrho		-5.635***		-2.970
		(1.092)		(4.231)
N	11973	11973	11973	11973

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

instrument weakness in a single endogenous variable model (Sanderson & Windmeijer, 2016, p. 212). A threshold above 10 is regarded as conventionally appropriate (Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019, p. 236). The F-test for the first stage estimation of ongoing nonviolent campaigns is reported in Table A.3 in Appendix 4. The F-statistic is not significant at $p < 0.05$ indicating that the relevance of the instrument does not hold. I can therefore not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments do not enter the first stage regression. I also test alternative instruments in Appendix 2 Table A.2. Both the alternative instruments of economic growth and democratisation are estimated as weak instruments according to the F-statistic in Appendix 5.

For the Heckman model, the parameter athrho is a goodness of fit measure and represents the correlation between the equations.[3] In Model (3), the athrho parameter is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$, implying some systematic relationship between the error terms in the two stages of the model, indicating selection bias. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is not supported by the Wald tests of independent equations that examine whether athrho differs from zero which is reported in Appendix 6 Table A.6.[4] An insignificant Wald test of independent equations signals that the two stages are independent of each other, indicating that a singular probit can be used to measure the effect of WPEI on nonviolent campaign success. I can therefore conclude that selection bias is not driving my results.[5]

Existing Monte Carlo experiments imply that a Heckman selection model performs worse than a 2PM in the absence of selection (Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Puhani, 2000). Therefore, it would make sense to mainly rely on the 2PM results when testing Hypothesis 1

[3] The estimates of arthro is the inverse hyperbolic tangent of rho.

[4] Since there is no reported Wald test of independent equations for Heckman models in Stata 17. when working with multiply imputed data, a manual comparison of the reported Wald tests for each of the M = 10 datasets is done. For the baseline model estimating nonviolent campaign success, the Wald tests did not provide evidence for rejecting the null of no correlation in 9 out of 10 datasets.

[5] This is confirmed when testing the alternative instruments in Appendix 2 Table A.2 where the athro is insignificant, indicating that modelling both stages simultaneously is not strictly speaking necessary.

in the baseline model.

Turning to the effects of WPEI on violent campaign success, the 2PM baseline Model (4) show that WPEI does not only have an effect on whether nonviolent campaigns succeed or not but also influences whether violent campaigns succeed significantly at $p < 0.001$. Supporting Hypotheses 2, WPEI appears to have a negative effect on violent campaign success. This indicates that when the level of WPEI is higher, there is a reduction in the probability of a violent campaign succeeding. At lower levels of WPEI, however, we can expect a higher likelihood of a violent protest succeeding.

Similar to the Heckman estimation of nonviolent campaign success, the effect of WPEI on violent campaign success is no longer significant at $p < 0.05$ in the Heckman baseline Model (5). Accordingly, election year also has no independent effect on the observation of nonviolent campaigns suggesting a weak specification of the selection equation. The F-test confirms this for the first stage estimation reported in Appendix 4, where Table A.3 reveal an insignificant F-statistic at $p < 0.05$. This is also the case for the alternative instruments economic growth and democratisation in Appendix 5 Table A.5. The reported athro parameter in Model (5) and the Wald test of independent equation in Table A.7 in Appendix 6 also indicates model misspecification.[6] Following similar reasoning as with the estimation of nonviolent campaign success, I rely on the 2PM results when testing Hypothesis 2 in the baseline model.

Since the Heckman models provided no substantial evidence of selection bias indicating that modelling both stages simultaneously is unnecessary, I estimate the effect of WPEI on campaign success with a single-stage probit regression model. The results are reported in Table 5.3. Similar to Table 5.2, only the covariate of interests, WPEI, is included. In this table, Model (6) reports a probit model estimating nonviolent campaign success, while Model (7) reports a probit model estimating violent campaign success.

[6] For the baseline model estimating violent campaign success, the Wald test of independent equations provided no evidence for rejecting the null of no correlation in either of the $M = 10$ datasets.

Table 5.3: Baseline single stage probit model estimating campaign success

	Nonviolent campaigns (6)	Violent campaigns (7)
WPEI	0.816*	-1.458***
	(0.335)	(0.403)
Constant	-1.318***	-1.363***
	(0.180)	(0.162)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Both Model (6) and (7) report similar results to the baseline 2PM model. The claim that WPEI influence whether resistance campaigns succeed is supported for both violent and nonviolent campaigns. Model (6) estimates that higher levels of WPEI are associated with a greater likelihood of nonviolent campaign success significant at $p < 0.05$. Higher values of β mean that it is more likely that a nonviolent campaign will succeed.[7] Therefore, the significant positive coefficient indicates that WPEI has a positive effect on nonviolent campaign success.

Looking at the effect of WPEI on violent campaign success, Model (7) estimates that higher levels of WPEI decrease the likelihood of a violent campaign succeeding significant at $p < 0.001$. These results indicate that violent campaigns are more likely to succeed when WPEI is low. The probit modelling of the effect of WPEI on nonviolent- and violent campaigns is similar to those of the 2PM model, indicating support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. This model also suggests that the level of WPEI does affect whether a resistance campaign succeeds.

5.2 The Full Models: Including Controls

As discussed in Section 4.6.2, various cofounders are believed to correlate with both the dependent and independent variables. Consequently, the results presented above may be

[7] A positive coefficient means that an increase in the predictor leads to an increase in the predicted probability. A negative coefficient means that an increase in the predictor leads to a decrease in the predicted probability.

spurious. I, therefore, include control variables that are anticipated to correlate with both campaign success and WPEI to reduce the threat to internal validity stemming from omitted variable bias. Since the main interest is in the effect of WPEI, the coefficients of the controls will not be addressed in detail.

Since little evidence of selection bias exists, as shown in the previous section, I rely on a single-stage logit model estimating the effect of WPEI on campaign success. The full two-stage 2PM- and Heckman models as well as single-stage probit models are reported in the Appendix 7 and Appendix 8 to ensure that the results from the full models are robust against selection bias and not sensitive to model specifications. The marginal effect of women's political empowerment on campaign success is visualised in Figure 5.1.[8]

Figure 5.1: The marginal effect of women's political empowerment on campaign success



Note: The band reflects the confidence intervals for the effect of WPEI on campaign success.

Table 5.4 shows a logit model which estimates the effect of WPEI on nonviolent campaign success. When it comes to the effect of WPEI on nonviolent campaign success, Model (8) reports similar results to that of the baseline model, significant at $p < 0.01$. The results from

[8] The plot extracts the unique values of WPEI observed in the sample and evaluates the margin at each unique value, together with a pointwise confidence interval.

Table 5.4: Full logit model estimating nonviolent and violent campaign success

	Nonviolent Campaigns	Violent campaigns
	Logit	**Logit**
	(8)	(9)
WPEI	2.299**	-2.076*
	(0.795)	(1.022)
Polyarchy	0.252	0.00626
	(0.513)	(0.783)
GDP	-0.281	-0.307*
	(0.168)	(0.145)
Population	0.226	-0.227
	(0.181)	(0.208)
Military personnel	-0.0812	0.263
	(0.199)	(0.227)
Oceania	-0.110	1.311
	(1.082)	(1.696)
Asia	0.125	-0.322
	(0.411)	(0.363)
Europe	0.250	-0.657
	(0.489)	(0.969)
Americas	0.341	0.990
	(0.488)	(0.537)
Cold war	-0.389	-1.235***
	(0.348)	(0.340)
Election year	0.339	-0.0816
	(0.286)	(0.365)
Constant	0.472	7.300*
	(3.168)	(3.144)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Cubic polynomials are included in the estimation but are not reported.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

the full model are therefore in line with Hypothesis 1, indicating that nonviolent campaigns have a higher likelihood of succeeding where WPEI is high. This suggests that the effect of WPEI on nonviolent campaign success reported in the baseline models is not spurious.[9]

Table 5.4 also include a logit model which estimates the effect of WPEI on violent campaign success. Model (9) estimates that WPEI has a negative and significant effect at $p < 0.01$ on the likelihood that a violent campaign will succeed. This remains in line with the previously reported results. Consequently, the estimation of the full model lends support to Hypothesis 2 that violent campaigns are more likely to succeed when WPEI is low. Thus, this indicates that the effect of WPEI on violent campaign success reported in the baseline models is not spurious, implying that the results are robust.[10]

5.3 Predictive Power

5.3.1 In sample predictive power

While WPEI seems associated with campaign success, it is necessary to investigate if it also improves the performance of my models when it comes to predicting campaign success. I therefore estimate the area under the ROC curve (AUC). The Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) graphs the sensitivity (the true positive rate) over specificity (the rate of false positives) for all probability cutoffs classifying an observation as a successful resistance campaign (1) or as a failure (0). I also estimate McFadden's pseudo-R-squared (Pseudo R^2). For both measures, a higher value will indicate a better fit for the model.

[9] In Appendix 7, both the 2PM and probit model estimate positive signed significant coefficients for WPEI. The full Heckman model confirms model misspecification and an absence of selection bias from the baseline model with an insignificant athrho and no grounds for rejecting the null of no correlation (8 out of 10 datasets) in Table A.8 Appendix 6. It also report an insignificant instrument and F-statistic in Appendix 4 Table A.4. An insignificant athrho is also reported for the model without the instrument in Appendix 1.

[10] In Appendix 8, both the 2PM and probit model estimate significant negative signed coefficients for WPEI. The full Heckman model supports model misspecification and an absence of selection bias with an insignificant athrho and no support for rejecting the null of no correlation in the Wald tests of independent equation in all datasets reported in Table A.9 in Appendix 6. It also reports an insignificant F-test of the instrument in Appendix 4 Table A.4. This is also the case for the model estimated without the instrument in Appendix 1.

Table 5.5: AUC and Pseudo R^2: WPEI

	Nonviolent Campaign	Violent Campaign
AUC with WPEI	.654	.802
AUC without WPEI	.626	.783
Change in AUC:	*.028*	*.019*
Pseudo R^2 with WPEI	.051	.139
Pseudo R^2 without WPEI	.033	.128
Change in Pseudo R^2:	*.018*	*.011*

Note: Table measuring the change in the area under the roc curve (AUC) and McFadden's pseudo-R^2.

For the prediction of nonviolent campaign success, the AUC value increased from .626 to .654. A similar increase is found in the estimation of Pseudo R^2.[11] For the prediction of violent campaign success, the value of AUC similarly increases from .783 to .802. As with the prediction of nonviolent campaign success, the Pseudo R^2 also increase when WPEI is included. Although a modest increase, this indicates that the inclusion of WPEI improves the performance of my model when it comes to predicting both nonviolent- and violent campaign success.

5.3.2 Out of sample predictive power

I also test the performance of the WPEI variable out of sample. This indicates if the effect of WPEI on nonviolent- and violent campaign success is a generalisable pattern that extends beyond the estimation sample. Testing the model's performance outside of the sample on which it was estimated is critical for determining whether the model's performance is influenced by the specifics of the dataset at hand. Since I do not have data outside my sample as there are no cases I have information about outside the NAVCO dataset, I use the approach of k-fold cross-validation which is performed within the dataset itself. When no available data outside of the sample at hand exists, this is recommended as the second-best

[11] Since scholars recommend that the Pseudo R-squared must be interpreted with caution, only the direction of the increase is commented upon rather than the size of the Pseudo R^2 in itself (Allison, 2012, p. 70).

option (Ward et al., 2010). The following models exclude the variable election year, as its inclusion was dependent on the presence of selection bias that I did not detect in the previous sections.

I produce a cross-validated AUC value following the analysis of samples of the data (training sets) that is tested on the remaining sample (test set) based on a fold split of the original data. In my case, I split the sample into 10 subsets. Then a logit model is estimated on 9 out of 10 subsets of the dataset with a following test of the predictive performance on the remaining 1/10 of the dataset that has not been used for estimating the model. Finally, the AUC value is calculated, indicating the model's out-of-sample predictive performance. This procedure is repeated ten times, using a new random division of the sample each time. These steps are repeated for each of the M = 10 datasets, with each mean being merged into a single average for the imputed dataset as a whole. This is done twice for nonviolent- and violent campaign success respectively with and without WPEI.

Table 5.6: K-fold cross-validation: AUC

	Nonviolent Campaigns	Violent Campaigns
AUC Mean with WPEI	.565	.739
AUC Mean without WPEI	.532	.720
Change in AUC:	*.033*	*.019*

Note: Table measuring the change in the k-fold cross validated area under the roc curve (AUC).

Overall, when WPEI is used as a predictor, I find that the out-of-sample performance improves. When the model estimating nonviolent campaign success includes the baseline controls but excludes WPEI, the out-of-sample AUC mean is .532, whereas when WPEI is included, it rises to .565. However, AUC values below commonly used thresholds of 0.75 or 0.7 are generally regarded as poor (Youngstrom, 2014, p. 211).[12] The model estimating the probability of

[12] Scholars have suggested benchmarks for AUCs, suggesting that values > 0.9 are excellent, > 0.80 are good, > 0.70 are fair, and < 0.70 are poor (Youngstrom, 2014, p. 211).

nonviolent campaign success is thus somewhat sensitive to specific features of the NAVCO dataset. As a result, the k-fold cross-validation indicates that although the inclusion of WPEI increases the out-of-sample performance of the models, it also suggests poor generalisability. Turning to the model estimating violent campaign success, the out-of-sample AUC mean increases from .720 to 0.739 when WPEI is included. Such a value exceed commonly used low thresholds for accuracy, being moderate accurate if the threshold of 0.7 is used.

5.4 The Subcomponents Of The WPEI

To further unravel the relationship between WPEI and resistance campaigns, I also run a logit model estimating the relationship between nonviolent- and violent campaign success and the three subcomponents of the WPEI: (1) women's civil liberties index, (2) women's civil society participation index, and (3) women's political participation index. It is expected that multicollinearity among the indices will occur, so each index is introduced separately. These results are presented in Table 5.7.

At the same time, each component should be difficult to assess on its own as the proposed theory linking gender equality to campaign success predicts that women's political empowerment would function as a macro-concept rather than a set of specific metrics. Nonetheless, the study of specific subcomponents could provide some clues to the type of women's political empowerment which may affect protest outcomes and thus provide avenues for further research.

In the results for nonviolent campaigns in Model (10-12), all three indices have the expected positive signed coefficient. Similarly, for violent campaigns in Model (13-15), all three indices have the expected negative signed coefficient. At the same time, none of the indexes are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. This might indicate that the three sub-components individually cannot explain variations in the probability of campaign success.

Table 5.7: Components of the WPEI

	Nonviolent success			Violent success		
	(10)	**(11)**	**(12)**	**(13)**	**(14)**	**(15)**
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Women's civil liberties index	0.0539			-0.0429		
	(0.789)			(0.728)		
Women's civil society participation index		0.224			-0.936	
		(0.893)			(1.000)	
Women's political participation index			0.515			-0.908
			(0.640)			(0.646)
Polyarchy	0.277	0.182	0.0654	-0.171	0.261	0.207
	(0.812)	(0.779)	(0.611)	(0.937)	(1.036)	(0.870)
GDP	-0.124	-0.132	-0.154	-0.427**	-0.394**	-0.407**
	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.141)	(0.148)	(0.144)
Population	0.227	0.230	0.238	-0.222	-0.222	-0.226
	(0.187)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.220)	(0.214)	(0.215)
Military personnel	-0.178	-0.168	-0.161	0.337	0.305	0.342
	(0.196)	(0.203)	(0.191)	(0.229)	(0.234)	(0.222)
Cold war	-0.557	-0.548	-0.568	-1.059***	-1.093***	-1.032***
	(0.338)	(0.335)	(0.337)	(0.316)	(0.321)	(0.310)
Constant	-1.846	-1.787	-1.566	8.958**	8.601**	8.855**
	(3.008)	(3.052)	(3.023)	(2.776)	(2.776)	(2.741)
N	510	510	510	2207	2207	2207

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependency (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix 19 analyses the relationship between nonviolent- and violent campaign success and the subcomponents of the three indices that make up the WPEI. (1) the civil liberties index consists of the indicators for freedom of domestic movement for women, freedom from forced labour for women, property rights for women, and access to justice for women. (2) The civil society participation index consists of the indicators for freedom of discussion for women, CSO women's participation, and female journalists. Lastly, (3) the political participation index consists of the indicators for lower chamber female legislators and power distributed by gender. Since multicollinearity between the indices is expected, I introduce one index at a time.

In the results for nonviolent campaigns in Table A.35, freedom from forced labour for women, access to justice for women, freedom of domestic movement for women, CSO women's participation, and power distributed by gender have the expected positive signed coefficient. For violent campaign success in Table A.36, lower chamber female legislators, freedom of discussion for women, freedom of domestic movement for women, property rights for women, CSO women's participation, female journalists and power distributed by gender have the expected negative signed coefficient. Nevertheless, none of the sub-components is significantly related to either nonviolent- or violent campaign success. Similar to the sub-components of the WPEI, the sub-components of the three indices also do not individually explain variations in the probability of observing campaign success at $p < 0.05$.

Overall, this may tie back to the difficulty of measuring any abstract idea and the complexity of gender equality. It also demonstrates that an index is appealing since it might measure gender equality more adequately by weighing and combining different aspects related to, e.g. different outcomes for women. Therefore, I argue that the WPEI better captures the multidimensional characteristics of gender equality instead of a single indicator related to women's empowerment. Therefore, the results above could reflect that in societies with higher or lower levels of both women's freedom from forced labour, participation in civil society,

and representation in legislative authorities, there is an effect on the probability of campaign success. Said in another way, there is not a single component which seems to drive my results. At the same time, most of the components pull in the same hypothesised direction, but they have a clearer effect together. This points in the direction that women's political empowerment does matter for campaign outcomes as a macro-concept.

5.5 Reliability And Validity

Both the reliability and validity influence the credibility of an analysis. Adcock and Collier (2001, p. 531-532) define reliability as the existence of random error in the study. If the results are reliable, repeating the analysis should provide similar results. Furthermore, for causal analyses to be of high quality, Cook and Campbell (1979) describe four types of validity: (1) statistical conclusion validity, (2) internal validity, (3) construct validity and (4) external validity. In the following subsections, I will analyse whether the presented results may be reliable and valid. Since both the 2PM model and the probit model report similar results to the logit model, the following sensitivity analysis will be made using the logit models. As in the previous section, the following models are estimated without the variable election year.

5.5.1 Reliability

The reliability of the analysis refers to the presence of random error (Adcock & Collier, 2001). If the results are reliable, running an analysis several times should yield similar results. Statistical conclusion validity and content validity are especially vulnerable to inadequate reliability (Lund, 2002, p. 115).

Both the main NAVCO dataset and the WPEI derived from the V-DEM dataset are easily available, and the coding rules are described in detail, increasing the reliability. There is also provided public information about possible biases and the reliability of the datasets for both NAVCO 2.1 and V-DEM. Still, the coding of resistance campaigns does involve subjective

evaluations as is common in most quantitative assessments of political phenomena. This introduces some compromise in the reliability of the data used. The application of multiple collection methods such as extensive literature studies, expert surveys, and data distribution to cross-check between academic experts strengthens the reliability of the NAVCO 2.1 data. The V-DEM dataset also employs similar expert coding. Random measurement errors may still occur. Nonetheless, I assume that strategies for reducing errors to a minimum employed by the coders of the datasets used in this thesis are sufficient.

5.5.2 Construct validity

The construct validity of operationalisations refers to how well they measure the concepts they claim to measure (Lund, 2002, p. 106). The justification for the operationalisation of the proxy for gender equality, WPEI, is discussed in Section 4.6.1. In this section, I introduce alternative operationalisations of gender equality, which are reported in Appendix 9. In total, I present three commonly used alternative proxies for gender equality, namely fertility rate, literacy ratio, and infant mortality.[13] All proxies are lagged $t-1$ to establish temporal order. Table A.12 and Table A.13 presents the models estimating the effect of these operationalisations on nonviolent- and violent campaign success. These models estimate that none of the proposed alternative indicators of gender equality has a significant effect on either nonviolent- or violent campaign success at $p < 0.05$.

These findings may talk to the ongoing debate about the use of gender equality as an umbrella term which some argue leads to imprecise theories and concept stretching (Karim & Hill, 2018). Concept stretching is the distortion that occurs when a concept does not fit cases (G. Sartori, 1970). Since I find that women's political empowerment affects the success rate of resistance campaigns but not fertility rate, literacy ratio, or infant mortality, is it possible to assert that gender equality reduces or increases the probability of a campaign succeeding?

[13] For more information about the measures, see Appendix 9.

In one way, it is possible to critique the alternative operationalisations and argue that the WPEI may work as a better proxy for gender equality. Ellerby (2017, p. 50) for example, argues that many indicators used to measure gender equality such as fertility rates and literacy ratios actually measure sex ratios in various social spheres, which does not necessarily imply a measurement of gender equality. The WPEI model is also superior when it comes to model fit.[14]

At the same time, it is important to clarify that there is no "true" measurement for gender equality. As the analysis showed here, different mechanisms of gender equality affect protest outcomes. Understood this way, aspects of women's political empowerment such as participation in civil society, mass politics and protection of civil liberties picked up by the WPEI are more salient in explaining variation in campaign success than other indicators. To refrain from conceptual stretching, I therefore argue that my results show that women's political empowerment understood as only a part of the multi-faced concept of gender equality affects the success rates of campaigns.

This points in the direction that it is women's political empowerment and not necessarily other aspects of gender equality that produce the gender norms and opportunity structures that effects campaign success as presented in the theory chapter. The lack of any significant alternative proxies therefore represents an important nuance to my findings and lays the foundation for further research on which components of gender equality affects different outcomes in different ways.

[14] This is reported by Akaike's information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) reported in Table A.14 and Table A.15. For both the estimation of nonviolent campaign success and violent campaign success, the WPEI model has a smaller AIC and BIC than any alternative operationalisations of gender equality. Both criteria therefore pick the WPEI model as the better fitting model. This is also the case when comparing the AUC score and Pseudo R^2. When the other operationalisations are introduced as a substitute for WPEI, a clear decrease in both AUC score and Pseudo R^2 is present. These results are presented in Appendix 9.

5.5.3 Statistical conclusion validity

The degree to which conclusions about the relationship between variables based on data are correct or "reasonable" is known as statistical conclusion validity. The first of two main threats to this validity is insufficient statistical power (Lund, 2002, p. 286). Therefore, the validity of the results is based partly on the strength of the relationships and whether they are statistically significant at standard levels of uncertainty. In social sciences, the level of uncertainty is usually fixed at 5 %, which I also adopted in this thesis (Lund, 2002). To put it another way, there's a 5 % possibility that type-1 errors were made within the statistically significant data reported. Type I error, also known as a "false positive" refer to the error of rejecting a null hypothesis when it is actually true. Given an appropriate amount of data, the use of the 5 % significant level should be rigorous enough to provide adequate statistical power.

The second threat to conclusion validity relates to incomplete statistical assumptions (Lund, 2002, p. 286). For the results to be valid, some basic assumptions must be met for the models employed in this thesis. For logistic regression, this includes independence of errors, linearity in the logit for continuous variables, absence of multicollinearity, and lack of strongly influential outliers (Stoltzfus, 2011).

Dependency of errors in the data means that the errors of one observation are correlated with another. If this is the case, the estimation of standard errors may be incorrect, causing a threat to the inferences it is possible to draw about statistical significance (Beck and Katz 1995). The way dependence may be structured and how to deal with it depend on the data structure. For example, since the unit of analysis in this thesis is campaign-year, dependence may be structured along temporal lines or dependent on the geographical location of the campaign. To mitigate a possible bias stemming from such problems, I employed country-clustered standard errors and incorporated cubic polynomials to deal with time dependency.

Another commonly used strategy to deal with time dependency is to include different forms of dummies for time. Results from models running with time dummies are reported in Appendix 10. In Table A.17, the models estimating the probability of nonviolent campaign success report similar results to the main models including cubic polynomials. For the estimation of violent campaign success, the coefficient for WPEI changes to insignificant although in the expected negatively signed direction.[15] The model estimating violent campaign success thus might be dependent on how time dependency is dealt with. On the one hand, including the decade dummies could have introduced some collinearity, making the standard errors larger and the coefficient fluctuate more. This might make it harder to estimate the effects of each variable separately. On the other hand, the change in significance might be that the correlation between WPEI and violent campaign success is largely attributable to both of them growing over time. Since the latter option is not possible to rule out, the lack of significant results introduces some uncertainty to my findings and the support for Hypothesis 2.

Another logistic regression assumption is that the relationship between the independent variables and the logit of Y must be linear (Menard, 2010, p. 106). I use three tests to assess the functional form. The first, a link test, tests whether the relationship between the independent and dependent variables can be expressed as a logarithmic function (Pregibon, 1980).[16] In the results from the link-test on the relationship between WPEI and nonviolent campaign success, the predicted value is insignificant as a variable, suggesting model misspecification. By removing one variable at the time, I find that the cubic polynomials seem to drive this result. When replaced with time dummies, the link-test is passed indicating that the logarithmic link function is appropriate. Since Appendix 10 Table A.17 where time dummies

[15] Since the inclusion of year dummies in the estimation of violent campaign success resulted in a high degree of collinearity rendering the model to emit approximately half of the dummies, I opted for decade dummies instead.

[16] The test employs the predicted values from the previous model as variables and the squared expected value in a new model. The model is correctly specified if the predicted value is a significant variable in the new model.

are included report a significant positive effect of WPEI on nonviolent campaign success, this does not alter the results presented above. The results from the link-test on the relationship between WPEI and violent campaign success suggest that the prediction squared does not have explanatory power, indicating a well-specified model.

The Box-Tidwell Test is used to test whether the logit transform is a linear function of the predictor by adding the non-linear transform of the original predictor as an interaction term.[17] I use the Box-Tidwell test to test WPEI for nonlinearity (Menard, 2010, p. 108). In the model estimating the probability of nonviolent campaign success, WPEI has an insignificant Box-Tidwell term. On the other hand, for the model estimating the probability of violent campaign success, WPEI has a significant Box-Tidwell term. This indicates that the relationship between violent campaign success and WPEI might be linear. I therefore transform WPEI and find that a log transformation produces better estimations since the Box-Tidwell term for logged WPEI is insignificant. This does not alter the results, as running a full model estimating the effect of WPEI logged on violent campaign success as reported in Appendix 11 estimated a negative signed coefficient significant at $p < 0.05$.

Lastly, The Hosmer and Lemeshow test determine how effectively a logistic regression model is calibrated.[18] For the model estimating nonviolent campaign success, the test estimates a significant Chi-square, indicating that the model does not satisfactorily fit the whole set of observations. By removing one variable at a time, I identify the cubic polynomials as the variables driving this result. When the cubic polynomials are replaced with time dummies, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test results in an insignificant Chi-square, indicating that the adjusted model is well calibrated. This does not fundamentally alter the inference made about the effect of WPEI on nonviolent campaign success since the model estimated with time dummies reported in Appendix 10 Table A.17 estimates a positive signed significant

[17] If this term is significant, then there is nonlinearity in the logit.

[18] The test should yield a non-significant Chi-square result, indicating that the model is correctly calibrated.

coefficient. The Chi-square is insignificant for the model estimating violent campaign success, demonstrating a good model fit.

Another assumption in logistic regression relates to collinearity. A model with collinearity, that is a strong relationship between independent variables, can produce unstable regression coefficients. Like other regression models, logistic regression assumes that no perfect multicollinearity exists. I used the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to test for multicollinearity, which is reported in Appendix 12. Commonly, a VIF > 5 is considered as a cause for concern and a VIF > 10 indicates a serious collinearity problem (Menard, 2001). The VIF value for military personnel, population and GDP do exceed the threshold of VIF > 5, with values ranging from 5 to 6. To ensure my results are not driven by multicollinearity, I remove the covariate with the highest VIF value; military personnel and rerun the full logit models for the estimation of nonviolent and violent campaign success respectively. Table A.20 reports the results. This brings the VIF value of all the covariates down to an appropriate level as reported in Table A.21 and shows no change in direction or significance for the independent variable of interest, WPEI.

In addition, I also follow the advice of Carter and Signorino (2010, p. 13) and demean years since nonviolent- or violent conflict before squaring and cubing it. This is to make sure that the collinearity between the cubic polynomials is not skewing my results. According to Carter and Signorino (2010, p. 13), this will reduce (although not completely eliminate) collinearity. The results from the logistic regression including demeaned cubic polynomials for time since nonviolent- and violent campaigns are reported in Table A.22 and show no change in the coefficients when it comes to direction or significance from the main models.

Outliers are observations with an unexpected value of the independent variable" given its predicted value in the estimated model. On the other hand, influential observations are those that have a significant impact on the regression results. If observations have extreme values on the independent variables or if their value on the dependent variable is unexpected given

the independent variables, they can have a large impact (Menard, 2010, p. 135). In this thesis, outliers are detected by looking at standardised residuals, while influential observations are identified by computing dbeta statistics and DfBeta statistics.[19]

Here, Influential observations are categorised as observations with a dbeta statistic greater than 1 (Menard, 2010, p. 135-137).[20] I also calculate DfBetas for the variable of interest, WPEI, employing the threshold of DfBetas $> 3/$square root of N (Mason et al., 2003, p. 625). Outliers are regarded as observations with standardised residuals greater than 3 or smaller than -3 [21].

One measure I have taken which limits the effect of outliers is to log-transform some variables to control for the skewness in the data. I also remove outliers to see if that changes the results. For the estimation of nonviolent campaign success in Appendix 13 Table A.23, I find no change from the main model estimating a positive significant effect of WPEI on nonviolent campaign success at $p < 0.05$. When removing the outliers in the estimation of violent campaign success, however, the model encounters convergence troubles where multiple variables predict success and failure perfectly. Therefore, it is impossible to comment upon the logit models estimating violent campaign success without outliers and evaluate the potential difference in coefficients. I therefore examine the observations with large positive or negative residuals in more detail. Here I find that a large number of outliers exist (a total of 48). Secondly, all observations have the value of 1 on the dependent variable, that is campaign-years in which a violent protest did succeed. This suggests that my model does a poor job estimating violent campaigns that succeed, as 48 out of 56 successful campaign-years

[19] The dbeta statistic is comparable to the Cook's D statistic used in OLS regression.

[20] Estimates on multiply imputed data cannot be used to compute residuals as is done in non-imputed analysis. Instead, completed-data residuals should be calculated for each imputed dataset. Still, for both the identification of outliers and influential observations, the results did not vary greatly across datasets, so only estimations on M = 1 are reported.

[21] Menard (2010) argues that outliers should be defined as observations with residuals more than 2 or less than -2. If I employed this criterion, it would force me to exclude a larger number of observations. As a result, I adopt the criterion outlined above.

are identified as outliers.

Also, while large residuals indicate that an observation does not fit well, it is not justified to delete them as the outliers identified above are not likely to be data errors but more likely because successful campaigns are a rare event in my sample. For example, if most observations are campaign-years in which a campaign failed (0) and the fitted function is nearly flat then all the values of success (1) will be associated with large residuals.

In addition, they do not indicate whether an observation has a large influence on the estimated coefficients or the overall fit (Long, 1997, p. 98-101). On the other hand, extreme observations can influence the estimates even when they do not have large residuals. It is thus important to identify observations with influence. The dbetas reported one case as influential for the estimation of nonviolent campaign success. In contrast, it reported three cases as influential for the estimation of violent campaign success. When these observations are removed, the models reported in Table A.24 suggests similar results to that of the main models.

I also calculate DfBetas for the variable of interest, WPEI, to see if any campaign-years are especially influential on the estimation of the effect of WPEI on campaign success. DfBetas focus on one coefficient and measure the difference between the regression coefficient when the ith observation is included and excluded, the difference being scaled by the estimated standard error of the coefficient (Mason et al., 2003). A number of influential observations are detected. For the estimation of nonviolent campaign success, 5 observations can be regarded as influential. For the estimation of violent campaign success, 21 observations are influential. Almost all influential observation (25 out of 26) is a successful campaign-years. Given the fact that campaigns fail far more frequently than they succeed, those observations are likely to drive the results, which is not surprising. A list of the influential observations can be found in Table A.26 and Table A.27.[22] The removal of these influential observations does not

[22] The list covers the influential observations in M = 1, but the results were similar across imputed datasets.

alter the direction of significance of my results as reported in Table A.25. As such, influential units do not appear to be driving my results.

In addition, I also run alternative model specifications to make sure that my results are not dependent on fitting the logit models, which are reported in Appendix 14. Here I report the result from an Ordinary Least Square Model (OLS) and a Complementary log-log model which estimates the effect of WPEI on nonviolent- and violent campaign success respectively. When OLS is used where the outcome variable is binary as in my case, it is no longer an OLS model but a linear probability model (LPM).[23] Table A.28 reports the LPM results where both Model (1) and Model (3) estimating coefficients signed in the expected direction significant at $p < 0.05$. Another alternative to the traditional logistic approach is the complementary log-log model (Christian, 2017). Unlike logit, the complementary log-log model is asymmetrical and it is frequently used when the probability of an event is very small or very large. In Table A.28 both Model (2) and Model (4) also report similar results from that of the main model estimating coefficients signed in the expected direction significant at $p < 0.01$ for nonviolent campaign success and $p < 0.05$ for violent campaigns. Overall, this analysis indicates that the results are statistically robust to alternative model specifications.

5.5.4 Internal validity

Internal validity refers to strength of the causal inferences (Lund, 2002). One threat to causal inference is omitted variable bias. To minimise such a risk, the models presented thus far have included control variables theoretically evaluated as affecting both the dependent and independent variable of interest.

To deal with concerns related to omitted variables, I assess the sensitivity to selection on

[23] Some critique the use of LPM as it produces predictions that fall outside 0 and 1. This is not a good fit for binary data, as is the case with the dependent variable campaign success. LPM can thus lead to nonsensical findings. In addition, with binary variables, LPM often produces residuals that are non-normal and most likely heteroscedastic. Still, the bias stemming from this may be mitigated by adopting robust standard errors.

observable confounders of my results and use this as a reference to detect the possible selection from unobservable covariates (Altonji et al., 2005). This is based on the premise of proportional selection, namely that the bias stemming from included covariates can inform us about the threat from omitted variables (Dahlum & Wig, 2020, p. 890). By removing these selected controls from the equation, it is possible to indicate whether any biases are caused by additional unmeasured factors.

To do so, I estimate a restricted baseline model R that only incorporates the WPEI and then record the coefficient β_R. I then estimate models using various control sets, F and record the coefficients β_F. The selection is then calculated using observables: $\frac{\beta_F}{\beta_F - \beta_R}$. These results are commonly referred to as the AET statistics and indicate how much larger the estimated controlled coefficient is than the selection bias caused by observable variables (Dahlum & Wig, 2020, p. 890). The intuition is that the smaller the difference between β_R and β_F, the less the estimate is affected by observable selection, and the stronger the selection on unobservables must be to explain away the entire result.

In total, I include five different sets of controls which are described in Appendix 15. In Table A.29, I present AET statistics from different control sets for the estimation of nonviolent campaign success. The AET statistics range from 2.91 to 3.79. Of the five ratios reported, none are less than one. In the worst-case scenario, unobservable selection would have to be double that of observable selection. This makes it less likely that unobservables fully drive the estimated effects of WPEI on nonviolent campaign success. Regarding the estimation of violent campaign success in Table A.30, the AET statistics range from 1.19 to 1.49. Although more modest than the statistics reported for nonviolent campaign success, the AET statistics are different from the critical value of 1, thereby suggesting unobservables cannot fully account for the size of the coefficients associated with the probability of nonviolent campaign success.

In addition, all of the observable controls (when excluded) pull the coefficient towards zero, inducing a bias that pulls in the direction of null-finding. This adds to the robustness of the

results (Dahlum & Wig, 2020). Consequently, when plausible confounders are included, the coefficient for nonviolent campaigns becomes more strongly positive and negative for violent campaigns. This suggests that the relationship is likely stronger than the current models suggest (Dahlum & Wig, 2020, p. 891). If more covariates were added, the relationship should become stronger in the hypothesised direction, assuming they behave similarly to the included confounders.

Another threat to causal inference is reversed causality or endogeneity. A variable X is endogenous if it is correlated with the model's error term for example if the explanatory variable is affected by other variables in the model. This can be the case if campaigns in themselves cause changes in WPEI rather than the other way around. One measure I have taken against endogeneity is to lag the independent variables by one year. The idea is that, while current WPEI values may be endogenous to campaign success, past WPEI values are unlikely to be affected in the same way.

One might also argue that the causal direction between campaign success and WPEI on the one hand, and the control variable military personnel on the other, is unclear. It might be the case that size of the military personnel is in reality a product of the level of gender equality. At the same time, as the logit model in Table A.20 show that when military personnel is removed the results remain the same, this does not seem to lessen the validity of my results.

I also test different lag lengths of WPEI, where WPEI is lagged t-2 and t-3, which is reported in Appendix 16. In the Appendix, Table A.31 shows that for the estimation of nonviolent campaigns with different lag lengths for WPEI produces similar results to that of the main models. Table A.32 show the estimation of violent campaign success with different lag lengths for WPEI. The coefficient for WPEI, however, is negatively signed as expected but is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. This suggests that in the estimation of violent campaign success, the time period in which WPEI affect the probability of violent campaign success might be shorter than the effect on nonviolent campaign success.

5.5.5 Generalisability: external validity

5.5.5.1 Within-case generalisability

External validity refers to the generalisability of the results (Lund, 2002, p. 106). One form of generalisation involves generalising within the case, from the sample to the specific population, situation, and time period the research questions cover (Lund, 2002, p. 105). One step I have taken to evaluate such validity is to test alternative methods of handling missingness. I therefore run logit models with the default option of listwise deletion and estimate the effect of WPEI on nonviolent- and violent campaign success in the original data. These results are reported in Appendix 18. In Table A.33, the models produce WPEI coefficients with expected signed coefficients. At the same time, neither estimate significant relationships with campaign success at $p < 0.05$. The employment of listwise deletion, however, does result in a drastic decrease in the total number of observations and larger standard errors in all models compared to estimations done on the imputed data. The loss of information and the resulting change in variation following the use of listwise deletion therefore might have led to less precise estimates. This may have driven the change in significance. When the control variables that reduced the sample size are removed and only the variable for WPEI is included, the baseline model reported in Table A.34 estimates coefficients in the expected signed direction significant at $p < 0.05$. This indicates that my results are not dependent upon how missingness is handled, and are therefore reasonably stable allowing for the generalisation of my results to the entire NAVCO sample.

5.5.5.2 Across-case generalisability

Generalising across populations, situations, and time periods is the second form of generalisation (Lund, 2002, p. 122). One measure I have adopted to obtain statistically generalisable results is to adopt a quantitative large-N approach on a global dataset. The sample used in

this thesis is 2717 campaign-years in a total of 384 countries.[24] This makes sure that a high number of campaigns in different geographical contexts with distinct political environments are considered, increasing the generalisability of the results presented. The ability to generalise across time is also bettered by the temporal scope of this thesis, which consists of the years between 1945 and 2013. Furthermore, the inclusion of WPEI also increases the out-of-sample AUC values.

The ability to generalise beyond the sample, however, is also limited by the scope of this thesis. As earlier mentioned, the findings in this thesis are only applicable to mature campaigns with maximalist goals and at least 1,000 observed participants and violent campaigns with 1,000 battle-related deaths. I also note that NAVCO 2.0 series focus on short term success. In the NAVCO datasets, the success of a resistance campaign does not necessarily entail long-term success (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 202). Hence, the findings presented here only apply to short-term campaign success with the proviso that this does not entail long-term success or backtracking when it comes to previously achieved goals. Overall, one can thus not necessarily claim that a relationship between WPEI and protest success exists beyond that of the campaign-years considered and results should therefore be interpreted with caution.

5.6 Summary: Another Look At The Results

The findings in this study indicate support for the proposed theory linking notions of gender equality to campaign outcomes. I find support for both hypotheses. For both models, I conclude that the reliability and external validity is sufficient.

The model estimating support for Hypothesis 1, that is WPEI has a positive effect on nonviolent campaign success found in the main analysis is valid and robust across a range of

[24] A list of all countries included in the NAVCO 2.1 sample and the frequency of resistance campaigns in each country can be found in Appendix 17.

different specifications. The logit model estimating nonviolent campaign success appears not to be influenced by incomplete statistical assumptions. This is also the case for omitted variable bias and endogeneity. Moreover, it seems to be robust to alternative model specifications.

In the main analysis, I also found support for Hypothesis 2, that WPEI negatively affects violent campaign success. This support is somewhat weakened by the additional sensitivity tests. Despite the logit model fulfilling most statistical assumptions, being robust across different model specifications and lacking signs of omitted variable bias, there are various indications of the logit model being sensitive to how time dependency is dealt with. Therefore, the results from the sensitivity model are more mixed.

Despite the fact that the finding for violent campaign success is somewhat weaker, WPEI has a recurring negative coefficient in almost all specifications while it for nonviolence has a recurring positive and significant coefficient. The results presented in this Chapter show that there are clear differences in the effect of WPEI on violent- and nonviolent campaign success in these models. As a result, WPEI does seem to have a definite impact on the relative likelihood of success of nonviolence compared to violence.

6. Conclusion

The main emphasis of this thesis has been on addressing the unresolved question of what relationship exists between aspects related to gender equality and resistance campaigns. This study presents a gendered framework derived from the conflict literature, which examines the interaction between gender equality, campaign tactics and resistance campaign outcomes. I especially focus on the effect of the Women's Political Empowerment Index (WPEI) to further theorise about whether specific features of gender equality shape protest outcomes.

I have argued that the effect of women's political empowerment should significantly differ between nonviolent and violent tactics. I hypothesised that violent resistance campaigns have a higher probability of succeeding where women's political empowerment is low and that nonviolent resistance campaigns are more likely to succeed where women's political empowerment is high. By utilising the NAVCO 2.1 dataset and logistic regression, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that women's political empowerment does have an effect in accordance with these expectations. These results seem to not be driven by selection bias as the testing of two-stage models shows.

I find a positive significant relationship between women's political empowerment and nonviolent campaign success and a negative significant relationship with violent campaign success. The support for Hypothesis 1, that WPEI has a positive effect on nonviolent campaign success appears valid and robust across various specifications. The supplementary tests introduce some uncertainty to my results regarding violent campaign success and support for Hypothesis 2. Although the model meets most statistical assumptions, it appears to be sensitive to handling time dependency. Despite these limitations, the analysis presented above suggests that the degree of women's political empowerment affects whether resistance movements succeed and that this effect differs in the hypothesised direction depending on protest tactics.

It is also important to note the distinction between correlation and causation. The statistical associations found here show correlation but not causation. This suggests that the findings describe significant correlations between variables that could be attributed to causal processes between the variables. On the other hand, it could also be a product of reverse causation or due to omitted variables. The sensitivity to selection from unobservable covariates, however, seems minimal and I conclude that appropriate measures have been taken to guard against endogeneity. This indicates that a causal relationship does exist.

Still, while this thesis quantitatively indicates a causal connection between levels of women's political empowerment and campaign success, the nature of this relationship is not clear. In other words, it is not clear whether this connection works through the mechanisms presented in the theory. This thesis theorises that it has to do with gender equality norms and opportunity structure which stimulate the recruitment of individuals. The aim of the thesis, however, was to test the effect of gender equality operationalised as women's political empowerment on campaign success and not which mechanism explains such a relationship. Consequently, the methodological framework adopted here cannot pinpoint the causal chain.

As a result, future research should further investigate the causal mechanism that could explain the relationship between women's political empowerment and campaign success in greater detail. Examples could include directly studying the proposed mechanisms presented in this thesis through both quantitative and qualitative means and moving below the cross-national level as gender equality levels can vary between groups living in the same state (Forsberg & Olsson, 2021). For example, particularly interesting avenues for future research could be to further investigate norm related mechanisms by looking at gender equality related questions in the World Values Survey (Ingelhart et al., 2022). Other examples can be to investigate whether any interaction exists between women's political empowerment and the gender ideology of the campaign or the degree of female frontline campaign participation. In this regard, Chenoweth's (2019) Women in Resistance (WiRe) dataset represents a promising

advance in the field.

The additional sensitivity tests do offer some additional clues regarding the nature of the relationship between gender equality and campaign success. As mentioned, there is an ongoing debate on the appropriate way to assess gender equality in the literature (Forsberg & Olsson, 2021). The findings above show that no effect of gender equality on campaign success is found when using alternative proxies such as fertility rates, infant mortality and literacy ratio. The lack of significant alternative proxies might imply that the WPEI impacts campaign success by picking up aspects of gender equality that other commonly used indicators miss. The fact that women's political empowerment affects the success rate of resistance campaigns but not fertility rate, literacy ratio, or infant mortality may talk to the ongoing debate about the use of gender equality as an umbrella term. Some argue that the latter leads to imprecise theories and concept stretching.

This thesis indicates that aspects of the complex gender equality concept related to political empowerment of women such as participation in civil society, mass politics and protection of civil liberties are more salient in explaining variation in campaign success than other indirect measures such as fertility rates. Also, the complexity of gender equality is further highlighted by the lack of significant subcomponents of the WPEI. This demonstrates why an index is appealing because it can better measure gender equality by weighing and combining various factors that relate to different outcomes for women. As a result, the WPEI, rather than a single indicator related to women's empowerment, may better capture aspects of the multidimensional characteristics of gender equality. Overall, this highlights the need for future research to continue exploring the various components of gender equality in the context of contentious politics but also the importance of specifying the precise structural components at play to avoid simplistic associations between gender equality and different forms of conflict.

This thesis also advances our understanding of nonviolent protest tactics and the similarities

and contrasts between them and violent tactics. By disaggregating resistance campaigns depending on their use of violence, this thesis presents a more comprehensive picture of the reality in which different strategies are utilised to challenge governments and how these strategies interact with different structural elements. Thus, the findings presented also speak to the literature investigating the most effective protest strategies and how governments and non-government groups can assist such movements and how increases or decreases in gender equality might affect the dynamics of mass mobilisation. Hence, thesis represents one of the first steps towards bridging an important gap related to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda by showing that gender-related aspects do not only affect the peacefulness of a society but also have consequences for the dynamics of resistance campaigns. Therefore, the main contribution of this thesis is that explicit attention needs to be paid to gender-related dynamics when seeking to understand collective action.

7. Bibliography

Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. *International Security*, *31*(2), 42–78.

Achen, C. H. (2002). Toward a new political methodology: Microfoundations and ART. *Annual review of political science*, *5*(1), 423–450.

Achen, C. H. (2005). Let's put garbage-can regressions and garbage-can probits where they belong. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *22*(4), 327–339.

Ackerman, P., & Kruegler, C. (1994). *Strategic nonviolent conflict: The dynamics of people power in the twentieth century*. Praeger publishers.

Adcock, R., & Collier, D. (2001). Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research. *American political science review*, *95*(3), 529–546.

Allison, P. D. (2012). *Logistic regression using SAS: Theory and application*. SAS institute.

Altonji, J. G., Elder, T. E., & Taber, C. R. (2005). Selection on observed and unobserved variables: Assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools. *Journal of political economy*, *113*(1), 151–184.

Anisin, A. (2020). Debunking the myths behind nonviolent civil resistance. *Critical Sociology*, *46*(7), 1121–1139.

Anisin, A. (2021). Reinforcing criticisms of civil resistance: A response to onken, shemia-goeke, and martin. *Critical Sociology*, *47*(7), 1205–1218.

Asal, V., Legault, R., Szekely, O., & Wilkenfeld, J. (2013). Gender ideologies and forms of contentious mobilization in the middle east. *Journal of Peace Research*, *50*(3), 305–318.

Bakken, I. V., & Buhaug, H. (2021). Civil war and female empowerment. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *65*(5), 982–1009.

Barkan, S. E. (1979). Strategic, tactical and organizational dilemmas of the protest movement against nuclear power. *Social Problems*, *27*(1), 19–37.

Barnes, C. D., Brown, R. P., & Osterman, L. L. (2012). Don't tread on me: Masculine honor ideology in the u.s. and militant responses to terrorism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *38*(8), 1018–1029.

Bartusevičius, H., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2019). A two-stage approach to civil conflict: Contested incompatibilities and armed violence. *International Organization*, *73*(1), 225–248.

Basu, S., Kirby, P., & Shepherd, L. J. (Eds.). (2020). *New directions in women, peace and security*. Bristol University Press.

Beck, N., Katz, J. N., & Tucker, R. (1998). Taking time seriously: Time-series-cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable. *American Journal of Political Science*, *42*(4), 1260–1288.

Beckwith, K. (2000). Beyond compare? women's movements in comparative perspective. *European journal of political research*, *37*(4), 431–468.

Beissinger, M. R. (2007). Structure and example in modular political phenomena: The diffusion of bulldozer/rose/orange/tulip revolutions. *Perspectives on politics*, *5*(2), 259–276.

Beissinger, M. R. (2013). The semblance of democratic revolution: Coalitions in ukraine's orange revolution. *American Political Science Review*, *107*(3), 574–592.

Berko, A., & Erez, E. (2007). Gender, palestinian women, and terrorism: Women's liberation or oppression? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *30*(6), 493–519.

Berrebi, C., & Ostwald, J. (2016). Terrorism and the labor force: Evidence of an effect on female labor force participation and the labor gender gap. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *60*(1), 32–60.

Biggs, M. (2015). Has protest increased since the 1970s? how a survey question can construct a spurious trend. *The British Journal of Sociology*, *66*(1), 141–162.

Birchall, J. (2019). *Gender as a causal factor in conflict* (K4D Helpdesk Report 549). Institute of Development Studies. Brighton, UK.

Bjarnegård, E., Brounéus, K., & Melander, E. (2017). Honor and political violence: Micro-level findings from a survey in thailand. *Journal of Peace Research*, *54*(6), 748–761.

Bjarnegård, E., & Melander, E. (2011). Disentangling gender, peace and democratization: The negative effects of militarized masculinity. *Journal of Gender Studies*, *20*(2), 139–154.

Bjarnegård, E., Melander, E., Bardall, G., Brounéus, K., Forsberg, E., Johansson, K., Muvumba Sellström, A., & Olsson, L. (2015). Gender, peace and armed conflict. In I. Davis (Ed.), *SIPRI yearbook 2015: Armaments, disarmament and international security* (pp. 101–109). Oxford University Press.

Bjarnegård, E., Melander, E., & True, J. (2020). Women, peace andsecurity: The sexism and violence nexus. *Folke Bernadotte Academy, PRIO and UN Women*.

Bouta, T., Frerks, G., & Bannon, I. (2004). *Gender, conflict, and development*. The World Bank.

Brooks, D. J., & Valentino, B. A. (2011). A war of one's own understanding the gender gap in support for war. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *75*(2), 270–286.

Buhaug, H., & Urdal, H. (2013). An urbanization bomb? population growth and social disorder in cities. *Global environmental change*, *23*(1), 1–10.

Burstein, P. (2003). The impact of public opinion on public policy: A review and an agenda. *Political research quarterly*, *56*(1), 29–40.

Burstein, P., & Linton, A. (2002). The impact of political parties, interest groups, and social movement organizations on public policy: Some recent evidence and theoretical concerns. *Social forces*, *81*(2), 380–408.

Butcher, C., & Svensson, I. (2016). Manufacturing dissent: Modernization and the onset of major nonviolent resistance campaigns. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *60*(2), 311–339.

Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2005). *Microeconometrics: Methods and applications*. Cambridge university press.

Caprioli, M. (2000). Gendered conflict. *Journal of peace research*, *37*(1), 51–68.

Caprioli, M. (2005). Primed for violence: The role of gender inequality in predicting internal conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, *49*(2), 161–178.

Caprioli, M., & Boyer, M. A. (2001). Gender, violence, and international crisis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *45*(4), 503–518.

Caren, N., Ghoshal, R. A., & Ribas, V. (2011). A social movement generation: Cohort and period trends in protest attendance and petition signing. *American Sociological Review*, *76*(1), 125–151.

Carson, J. L. (2005). Strategy, selection, and candidate competition in u.s. house and senate elections. *The Journal of Politics*, *67*(1), 1–28.

Carter, B., Rogers, B., & Turner, A. (2021). Gender inequality and state security: The effects of women's social equality on domestic terrorism. *Women & Criminal Justice*, 1–25.

Carter, D. B., & Signorino, C. S. (2010). Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data. *Political Analysis*, *18*(3), 271–292.

Chenoweth, E. (2019). Women in resistance dataset, version 1.

Chenoweth, E., & Lawrence, A. (2010). *Rethinking violence: States and non-state actors in conflict*. MIT press.

Chenoweth, E., & Lewis, O. A. (2013). Unpacking nonviolent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *50*(3), 415–423.

Chenoweth, E., & Orion A. Lewis. (2013). NAVCO 2.0 codebook.

Chenoweth, E., Perkoski, E., & Kang, S. (2017). State repression and nonviolent resistance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *61*(9), 1950–1969.

Chenoweth, E., & Schock, K. (2015). Do contemporaneous armed challenges affect the outcomes of mass nonviolent campaigns? *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *20*(4), 427–451.

Chenoweth, E., Seyle, C., & Dharmapuri, S. (2019). Women's participation and the fate of nonviolent campaigns. *ICNC Special Report Series*.

Chenoweth, E., & Shay, C. W. (2019). NAVCO 2.1 codebook.

Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2011). *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. Columbia University Press.

Cho, W. K. T., & Rudolph, T. J. (2008). Emanating political participation: Untangling the spatial structure behind participation. *British Journal of Political Science*, *38*(2), 273–289.

Christian, C. (2017). Lynchings, labour, and cotton in the US south: A reappraisal of tolnay and beck. *Explorations in Economic History*, *66*, 106–116.

Chwe, M. S.-Y. (1999). Structure and strategy in collective action. *American journal of sociology*, *105*(1), 128–156.

Chyzh, O., Nieman, M. D., & Gibler, D. M. (2018). Modeling structural selection in disaggregated event data. *Iowa State University Digital Repository*.

Codur, A.-M., & King, M. E. (2015). Women in civil resistance (M. M. Kurtz & L. R. Kurtz, Eds.). *Women, war, and violence: Topography, resistance, and hope*, 401–446.

Cohen, D. K., & Karim, S. M. (2021). Does more equality for women mean less war? rethinking sex and gender inequality and political violence. *International Organization*, 1–31.

Cohn, C. (2013). *Women and wars: Contested histories, uncertain futures*. John Wiley & Sons.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford economic papers*, *56*(4), 563–595.

Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Rohner, D. (2009). Beyond greed and grievance: Feasibility and civil war. *oxford Economic papers*, *61*(1), 1–27.

Conover, P. J., & Sapiro, V. (1993). Gender, feminist consciousness, and war. *American Journal of Political Science*, *37*(4), 1079–1099.

Cook, E. A., & Wilcox, C. (1991). Feminism and the gender gap–a second look. *The Journal of Politics*, *53*(4), 1111–1122.

Cook, T. D., Campbell, D. T., & Day, A. (1979). *Quasi-experimentation: Design & analysis issues for field settings* (Vol. 351). Houghton Mifflin Boston.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Cornell, A., Fish, M. S., & Gastaldi, L. (2021). V-dem codebook v11.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., & Hicken, A. (2017). V-dem dataset v7.

Cragg, J. G. (1971). Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to the demand for durable goods. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, *39*(5), 829–844.

Cueva Beteta, H. (2006). What is missing in measures of women's empowerment? *Journal of Human Development*, *7*(2), 221–241.

Cunningham, K. G. (2013). Understanding strategic choice: The determinants of civil war and nonviolent campaign in self-determination disputes. *Journal of Peace Research*, *50*(3), 291–304.

Cunningham, K. G., & Beaulieu, E. (2010). Dissent, repression, and inconsistency. In E. Chenoweth & A. Lawrence (Eds.), *Rethinking violence: States and non-state actors in conflict* (pp. 173–96).

Dahl, M., Gates, S., Gleditsch, K., & González, B. (2016). Accounting for numbers: How group characteristics shape the choice of violent and non-violent tactics. *Typescript, Peace Research Institute Oslo*.

Dahlum, S. (2019). Students in the streets: Education and nonviolent protest. *Comparative Political Studies*, *52*(2), 277–309.

Dahlum, S., & Wig, T. (2020). Peace above the glass ceiling: The historical relationship between female political empowerment and civil conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, *64*(4), 879–893.

Dalton, A., & Asal, V. (2011). Is it ideology or desperation: Why do organizations deploy women in violent terrorist attacks? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *34*(10), 802–819.

Davenport, C. (2007). State repression and political order. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *10*(1), 1–23.

Davies, S. E., & True, J. (2019). Women, peace, and security: A transformative agenda? In S. E. Davies & J. True (Eds.), *The oxford handbook of women, peace, and security* (pp. 2–14). Oxford University Press.

Demeritt, J. H., Nichols, A. D., & Kelly, E. G. (2014). Female participation and civil war relapse. *Civil Wars*, *16*(3), 346–368.

Earl, J., Martin, A., McCarthy, J. D., & Soule, S. A. (2004). The use of newspaper data in the study of collective action. *Annual review of sociology*, *30*, 65–80.

Eck, K. (2009). From armed conflict to war: Ethnic mobilization and conflict intensification. *International Studies Quarterly*, *53*(2), 369–388.

Edgell, A. B., Maerz, S. F., Maxwell, L., Morgan, R., Medzihorsky, J., Wilson, M. C., Boese, V., Hellmeier, S., Lachapelle, J., Lindenfors, P., Lührmann, A., & Lindberg, S. I. (2020). Episodes of regime transformation dataset, v1. 0.

Eichenberg, R. C. (2019). *Gender, war, and world order*. Cornell University Press.

Eichler, M. (2011). *Militarizing men: Gender, conscription, and war in post-soviet russia*. Stanford University Press.

El-Bushra, J., & Sahl, I. M. (2005). *Cycles of violence gender relations and armed conflict*. ACORD.

Ellerby, K. (2017). *No shortcut to change: An unlikely path to a more gender equitable world*. NYU Press.

Elsbach, K. D., & Sutton, R. I. (1992). Acquiring organizational legitimacy through illegitimate actions: A marriage of institutional and impression management theories. *The Academy of Management Journal*, *35*(4), 699–738.

Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American political science review*, *88*(3), 577–592.

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American political science review*, *97*(1), 75–90.

Feldman, S. (1993). The rational public: Fifty years of trends in americans' policy preferences. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *57*(5), 612–614.

Fisher, D., & Lee, J. G. (2019). Testing the universality of the gender equality–peace thesis: The influence of increased gender equality on terrorism in turkey. *Women & Criminal Justice*, *29*(4), 242–265.

Forsberg, E., & Olsson, L. (2016, August 5). Gender inequality and internal conflict. *Oxford research encyclopedia of politics*. Oxford University Press.

Forsberg, E., & Olsson, L. (2021). Examining gender inequality and armed conflict at the subnational level. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, *6*(2).

Frondel, M., & Vance, C. (2013). On interaction effects: The case of heckit and two-part models. *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, *223*(1), 22–38.

Gamson, W. (1990). *The strategy of social protest*. Wadsworth.

Geddes, B. (2003). *Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics*. University of Michigan Press.

Girod, D. M., Stewart, M. A., & Walters, M. R. (2018). Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *35*(5), 503–522.

Gizelis, T.-I. (2009). Gender empowerment and united nations peacebuilding. *Journal of Peace Research*, *46*(4), 505–523.

Gizelis, T.-I. (2018). Systematic study of gender, conflict, and peace. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, *24*(4), 1–10.

Gizewski, P., & Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1995). Urban growth and violence. will the future resemble the past. *American Association for the Advancement of Science*.

Gleditsch, K., & Celestino, M. R. (2015). The diffusion of nonviolent campaigns. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *61*(5), 1120–1145.

Goldstein, J. S. (2003). *War and gender: How gender shapes the war system and vice versa*. Cambridge University Press.

Goldstone, J. A., & Tilly, C. (2001). Threat (and opportunity): Popular action and state response in the dynamics of contentious action. In R. R. Aminzade, J. A. Goldstone, D. McAdam, E. J. Perry, J. W. H. Well, S. Tarrow, & C. Tilly (Eds.), *Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics* (pp. 179–194). Cambridge University Press.

Guha, R. (2017). *India after gandhi: The history of the world's largest democracy*. Pan Macmillan.

Gurr, T. R. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton University Press.

Hasan, M. (2002). The politics of honor: Patriarchy, the state and the murder of women in the name of family honor. *Journal of Israeli history*, *21*(1), 1–37.

Heaney, M. T., & Rojas, F. (2014). Hybrid activism: Social movement mobilization in a multimovement environment. *American Journal of Sociology*, *119*(4), 1047–1103.

Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. *Econometrica*, *47*(1), 153–161.

Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2001). Toward a democratic civil peace? democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992. *The American Political Science Review*, *95*(1), 33–48.

Herbert, S. (2014). *Links between gender-based violence and outbreaks of violent conflict*. University of Birmingham. Birmingham, UK.

Herbst, J. (2014). *States and power in africa*. Princeton University Press.

Honaker, J., & King, G. (2010). What to do about missing values in time-series cross-section data. *American journal of political science*, *54*(2), 561–581.

Honaker, J., King, G., & Blackwell, M. (2011). Amelia II: A program for missing data. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *45*(7).

Huber, L. (2019a). Gender equality and nonviolent political campaigns. *ISA Annual Convention, Atlanta*.

Huber, L. (2019b). When civilians are attacked: Gender equality and terrorist targeting. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *63*(10), 2289–2318.

Huber, M., & Mellace, G. (2011). Testing instrument validity in sample selection models.

Hudson, V. M., Ballif-Spanvill, B., Caprioli, M., & Emmett, C. F. (2012). *Sex and world peace*. Columbia University Press.

Hudson, V. M., & Boer, A. D. (2002). A surplus of men, a deficit of peace: Security and sex ratios in asia's largest states. *International Security*, *26*(4), 5–38.

Hudson, V. M., Bowen, D. L., & Nielsen, P. L. (2015). Clan governance and state stability: The relationship between female subordination and political order. *American Political Science Review*, *109*(3), 535–555.

Hudson, V. M., Caprioli, M., Ballif-Spanvill, B., McDermott, R., & Emmett, C. F. (2009). The heart of the matter: The security of women and the security of states. *International Security*, *33*(3), 7–45.

Hyde, S. D., & Marinov, N. (2012). Which elections can be lost? *Political Analysis*, *20*(2), 191–210.

Ingelhart, R., Haerpfer, C. W., Moreno, A., Welzel, C., Kizilova, K., Diez-Medrano, J., Lagos, M., Norris, P., Ponarin, E., Puranen, B., & Kizilova, K. (Eds.). (2022). World values survey: All rounds – country-pooled datafile version 3.0.

Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J., & Breen-Smyth, M. (2011). *Terrorism: A critical introduction*. Macmillan International Higher Education.

Jayal, N. G. (2008). Left behind-women, politics, and development in india. *Brown J of World Affairs*, *14*, 139–147.

Jenkins, J. C., & Eckert, C. M. (1986). Channeling black insurgency: Elite patronage and professional social movement organizations in the development of the black movement. *American Sociological Review*, *51*(6), 812–829.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). *The logic of violence in civil war*. Cambridge University Press.

Karakaya, S. (2018). Globalization and contentious politics: A comparative analysis of nonviolent and violent campaigns. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *35*(4), 315–335.

Karim, S., & Hill, D. (2018). The study of gender and women in cross-national political science research: Rethinking concepts and measurement. *Annual Convention of the International Studies Association*.

Kedar, M. (2006). Gap of values: Gender and family issues as a source of tension between islam and the west. *IDC Herzeliya, Institute for Policy and Strategy*.

Kellogg, A. (2016). When it is not "business as usual": Petro-states and international conflict. *University of California*.

King, G., Honaker, J., Joseph, A., & Scheve, K. (2001). Analyzing incomplete political science data: An alternative algorithm for multiple imputation. *American Political Science Review*, *95*(1), 49–69.

Koch, M. T., & Fulton, S. A. (2011). In the defense of women: Gender, office holding, and national security policy in established democracies. *The Journal of Politics*, *73*(1), 1–16.

Koos, C. (2016). Does violence pay? the effect of ethnic rebellion on overcoming political deprivation. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *33*(1), 3–24.

Korpi, W. (1974). Conflict, power and relative deprivation. *American Political Science Review*, *68*(4), 1569–1578.

Krause, J. (2019). Gender dimensions of (non) violence in communal conflict: The case of jos, nigeria. *Comparative Political Studies*, *52*(10), 1466–1499.

Kruschke, J. K. (2015). Tools in the trunk. In J. K. Kruschke (Ed.), *Doing bayesian data analysis* (pp. 721–736). Academic Press.

Kuran, T. (1990). Private and public preferences. *Economics & Philosophy*, *6*(1), 1–26.

Lall, R. (2017). How multiple imputation makes a difference. *Political Analysis*, *24*(4), 414–433.

Lee, T. (2009). The armed forces and transitions from authoritarian rule: Explaining the role of the military in 1986 philippines and 1998 indonesia. *Comparative Political Studies*, *42*(5), 640–669.

Lehoucq, F. (2016). Does nonviolence work? *Comparative Politics*, *48*, 269–287.

Lis, P. (2018). The impact of armed conflict and terrorism on foreign aid: A sector-level analysis. *World Development*, *110*, 283–294.

Long, J. S. (1997). *Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. advanced quantitative techniques in the social sciences number 7* (Vol. 7). SAGE Publications.

Louis, W. R. (2009). Collective action—and then what? *Journal of Social Issues*, *65*(4), 727–748.

Lund, T. (2002). *Innføring i forskningsmetodologi*. Oslo: Unipub forlag.

Lussenhop, A. (2018). Beyond the male/female binary: Gender equity and inclusion in evaluation surveys. *Journal of Museum Education*, *43*(3), 194–207.

Madley-Dowd, P., Hughes, R., Tilling, K., & Heron, J. (2019). The proportion of missing data should not be used to guide decisions on multiple imputation. *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology*, *110*, 63–73.

Maney, G. M., Andrews, K. T., Kutz-Flamenbaum, R. V., Rohlinger, D. A., & Goodwin, J. (2012). An introduction to strategies for social change. In G. M. Maney, D. A. Rohlinger, R. V. Kutz-Flamenbaum, & J. Goodwin (Eds.), *Strategies for social change* (pp. xi–xxxviii).

Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (2013). Polity IV index.

Martin, B. (2007). *Justice ignited: The dynamics of backfire*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Mason, R. L., Gunst, R. F., & Hess, J. L. (2003). *Statistical design and analysis of experiments: With applications to engineering and science*. John Wiley & Sons.

McAdam, D. (1983). Tactical innovation and the pace of insurgency. *American Sociological Review*, *48*(6), 735–754.

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). *Dynamics of contention*. Cambridge University Press.

Melander, E. (2005a). Gender equality and intrastate armed conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, *49*(4), 695–714.

Melander, E. (2005b). Political gender equality and state human rights abuse. *Journal of Peace Research*, *42*(2), 149–166.

Melander, E. (2016). Gender and civil wars. In T. D. Mason & S. M. Mitchell (Eds.), *What do we know about civil wars* (pp. 197–214).

Menard, S. (2001). *Applied logistic regression analysis*. SAGE Publications.

Menard, S. (2010). *Logistic regression: From introductory to advanced concepts and applications*. Sage.

Meyer, D. S., & Whittier, N. (1994). Social movement spillover. *Social problems*, *41*(2), 277–298.

Morgan, S. L., & Winship, C. (2015). *Counterfactuals and causal inference*. Cambridge University Press.

Morris, A. D. (1993). Birmingham confrontation reconsidered: An analysis of the dynamics and tactics of mobilization. *American Sociological Review*, 621–636.

Murdie, A., & Peksen, D. (2015). Women and contentious politics: A global event-data approach to understanding women's protest. *Political Research Quarterly*, *68*(1), 180–192.

Nieman, M. D., Chyzh, O. V., & Gibler, D. M. (2018). Modeling structural selection in disaggregated event data. *Iowa State University Digital Repository*.

Nyanzi, S. (2013). Homosexuality, sex work, and HIV/AIDS in displacement and post-conflict settings: The case of refugees in uganda. *International Peacekeeping*, *20*(4), 450–468.

Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Harvard University Press.

Onken, M., Shemia-Goeke, D., & Martin, B. (2021). Learning from criticisms of civil resistance. *Critical Sociology*, 5–25.

Pape, R. A. (2006). *Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism*. Random House Incorporated.

Pearlman, W., & Cunningham, K. G. (2012). Nonstate actors, fragmentation, and conflict processes. *Journal of conflict resolution*, *56*(1), 3–15.

Pierskalla, J. H. (2010). Protest, deterrence, and escalation: The strategic calculus of government repression. *Journal of conflict Resolution*, *54*(1), 117–145.

Pischedda, C. (2020). Ethnic conflict and the limits of nonviolent resistance. *Security Studies*, *29*(2), 362–391.

Pregibon, D. (1980). Goodness of link tests for generalized linear models. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series C (Applied Statistics)*, *29*(1), 15–24.

Principe, M. A. (2017). *Women in nonviolent movements*. United States Institute of Peace.

Puhani, P. (2000). The heckman correction for sample selection and its critique. *Journal of economic surveys*, *14*(1), 53–68.

Quinlivan, J. T. (1999). Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the middle east. *International Security*, *24*(2), 131–165.

Rasler, K. (1996). Concessions, repression, and political protest in the iranian revolution. *American Sociological Review*, *61*(1), 132–152.

Regan, P. M., & Paskeviciute, A. (2003). Women's access to politics and peaceful states. *Journal of Peace Research*, *40*(3), 287–302.

Reynolds-Stenson, H. (2018). Protesting the police: Anti-police brutality claims as a predictor of police repression of protest. *Social Movement Studies*, *17*(1), 48–63.

RezaeeDaryakenari, B. (2021). The dilemma of violence. *Political Research Exchange*, *3*(1), 1–24.

Roberts, A., Willis, M. J., McCarthy, R., & Garton Ash, T. (Eds.). (2016). *Civil resistance in the arab spring: Triumphs and disasters*. Oxford University Press.

Robison, K. (2010). Unpacking the social origins of terrorism: The role of women's empowerment in reducing terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *33*(8), 735–756.

Rubin, D. B. (1976). Inference and missing data. *Biometrika*, *63*(3), 581–592.

Saad, L. (2011). Americans' fear of terrorism in US is near low point. *Gallup website. Available online: http://www. gallup. com/poll/149315/Americans-Fear-Terrorism-Near-Low-Point. aspx*. Retrieved April 22, 2022, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/149315/americans-fear-terrorism-near-low-point.aspx.

Safa, H. I. (1990). Women's social movements in latin america. *Gender & Society*, *4*(3), 354–369.

Saideman, S. M. (2012). When conflict spreads: Arab spring and the limits of diffusion. *International Interactions*, *38*(5), 713–722.

Salman, A. (2015). Green houses for terrorism: Measuring the impact of gender equality attitudes and outcomes as deterrents of terrorism. *International journal of comparative and applied criminal justice*, *39*(4), 281–306.

Sanderson, E., & Windmeijer, F. (2016). A weak instrument f-test in linear IV models with multiple endogenous variables. *Journal of Econometrics*, *190*(2), 212–221.

Sartori, A. E. (2003). An estimator for some binary-outcome selection models without exclusion restrictions. *Political Analysis*, *11*(2), 111–138.

Sartori, G. (1970). Concept misformation in comparative politics. *American political science review*, *64*(4), 1033–1053.

Schaftenaar, S. (2017). How (wo)men rebel: Exploring the effect of gender equality on nonviolent and armed conflict onset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *54*(6), 762–776.

Schock, K. (2005). *Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies*. University of Minnesota Press.

Schock, K. (2013). The practice and study of civil resistance. *Journal of Peace Research*, *50*(3), 277–290.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (1999). The politics of disclosing female sexual abuse: A case study of palestinian society. *Child abuse & neglect*, *23*(12), 1275–1293.

Sharp, G. (1973). The politics of nonviolent action, 3 vols. *Boston: Porter Sargent*, *2*.

Sharp, G., & Paulson, J. (2005). *Waging nonviolent struggle: 20th century practice and 21st century potential*. Extending Horizons Books.

Silke, A. (2010). *The psychology of counter-terrorism*. Routledge.

Singer, J. D., Bremer, S., & Stuckey, J. (1972). Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820-1965. *Peace, war, and numbers*, *19*(48), 9.

Sixta, C. (2008). The illusive third wave: Are female terrorists the new "new women" in developing societies? *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, *29*(2), 261–288.

Smith, B. (2011). *Hard times in the lands of plenty*. Cornell University Press.

Smith, T. W. (1984). The polls: Gender and attitudes toward violence. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, *48*(1), 384–396.

Staiger, D. O., & Stock, J. H. (1994). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments.

Stephan, M. J., & Chenoweth, E. (2008). Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. *International security*, *33*(1), 7–44.

Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. In J. H. Stock & D. W. K. Andrews (Eds.), *Identification and inference for econometric models*. Cambridge University Press.

Stoltzfus, J. C. (2011). Logistic regression: A brief primer. *Academic Emergency Medicine: Official Journal of the Society for Academic Emergency Medicine*, *18*(10), 1099–1104.

Sundström, A., Paxton, P., Wang, Y.-t., & Lindberg, S. I. (2017). Women's political empowerment: A new global index, 1900–2012. *World Development*, *94*, 321–335.

Svensson, I., & Lindgren, M. (2011). Community and consent: Unarmed insurrections in non-democracies. *European Journal of International Relations*, *17*(1), 97–120.

Tanneberg, D. (2020). Does repression prevent successful campaigns? In D. Tanneberg (Ed.), *The politics of repression under authoritarian rule* (pp. 77–120). Springer International Publishing.

Tarrow, S. (2011). *Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Tarrow, S. (2013). Contentious politics. In D. A. Snow, D. Della Porta, B. Klandermans, & D. McAdam (Eds.), *The wiley-blackwell encyclopedia of social and political movements*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Teorell, J. (2010). *Determinants of democratization: Explaining regime change in the world, 1972–2006*. Cambridge University Press.

Tessler, M., & Warriner, I. (1997). Gender, feminism, and attitudes toward international conflict: Exploring relationships with survey data from the middle east. *World Politics*, *49*(2), 250–281.

Thomann, M., & Corey-Boulet, R. (2017). Violence, exclusion and resilience among ivoirian travestis. *Critical African Studies*, *9*(1), 106–123.

Thomas, E. F., & Louis, W. R. (2014). When will collective action be effective? violent and non-violent protests differentially influence perceptions of legitimacy and efficacy among sympathizers. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *40*(2), 263–276.

Thomas, J. L., & Bond, K. D. (2015). Women's participation in violent political organizations. *American Political Science Review*, *109*(3), 488–506.

Tickner, J. A. (1992). *Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security*. Columbia University Press.

Tilly, C. (2008). *Contentious performances*. Cambridge University Press.

Tocqueville, d. A. (2000). *Democracy in america*. Penguin UK.

Toft, M. D. (2005). *The geography of ethnic violence*. Princeton University Press.

Tompkins, E. (2015). A quantitative reevaluation of radical flank effects within nonviolent campaigns. In P. G. Coy (Ed.), *Research in social movements, conflicts and change* (pp. 103–135). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Tucker, J. A. (2007). Enough! electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. *Perspectives on politics*, *5*(3), 535–551.

Ulfelder, J. (2005). Contentious collective action and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. *International Political Science Review*, *26*(3), 311–334.

Urdal, H. (2008). Population, resources, and political violence: A subnational study of india, 1956–2002. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *52*(4), 590–617.

Van Dyke, N., & McCammon, H. J. (2010). *Strategic alliances: Coalition building and social movements*. University of Minnesota Press.

Vance, C., & Ritter, N. (2014). Is peace a missing value or a zero? on selection models in political science. *Journal of Peace Research*, *51*(4), 528–540.

Von Süttner, B. B. (1899). Universal peace: From a woman's standpoint. *The North American Review*, *169*(512), 50–61.

von Hippel, P. T. (2013). Should a normal imputation model be modified to impute skewed variables? *Sociological Methods & Research*, *42*(1), 105–138.

Walker, E. T., Martin, A. W., & McCarthy, J. D. (2008). Confronting the state, the corporation, and the academy: The influence of institutional targets on social movement repertoires. *American Journal of Sociology*, *114*(1), 35–76.

Wang, D. J., & Piazza, A. (2016). The use of disruptive tactics in protest as a trade-off: The role of social movement claims. *Social Forces*, *94*(4), 1675–1710.

Ward, M. D., Greenhill, B. D., & Bakke, K. M. (2010). The perils of policy by p-value: Predicting civil conflicts. *Journal of peace research*, *47*(4), 363–375.

Waylen, G. (1994). Women and democratization conceptualizing gender relations in transition politics. *World politics*, *46*(3), 327–354.

Webster, K., Chen, C., & Beardsley, K. (2019). Conflict, peace, and the evolution of women's empowerment. *International Organization*, *73*(2), 255–289.

Weinstein, J. M. (2005). Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *49*(4), 598–624.

Weyland, K. (2012). The arab spring: Why the surprising similarities with the revolutionary wave of 1848? *Perspectives on Politics*, *10*(4), 917–934.

White, P. B., Vidovic, D., González, B., Gleditsch, K. S., & Cunningham, D. E. (2015). Nonviolence as a weapon of the resourceful: From claims to tactics in mobilization. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *20*(4), 471–491.

WHO. (2014). *What do we mean by "sex" and "gender"?'* Retrieved April 23, 2022, from http://www.who.int/gender/whatisgender/en/

Wilcox, C., Hewitt, L., & Allsop, D. (1996). The gender gap in attitudes toward the gulf war: A cross-national perspective. *Journal of Peace Research*, *33*(1), 67–82.

World Bank. (2013). *World development indicators 2013*. World Bank. Washington, DC.

Wright, H., & Welsh, P. (2014). *Masculinities, conflict and peacebuilding: Perspectives on men through a gender lens*. Saferworld.

Yablon, Y. B. (2009). Gender differences in the consistency of attitudes towards peace. *Women's Studies International Forum*, *32*, 305–310.

Younas, J., & Sandler, T. (2017). Gender imbalance and terrorism in developing countries. *Journal of conflict resolution*, *61*(3), 483–510.

Youngstrom, E. A. (2014). A primer on receiver operating characteristic analysis and diagnostic efficiency statistics for pediatric psychology: We are ready to ROC. *Journal of Pediatric Psychology*, *39*(2), 204–221.

Zartman, I. W. (2015). *Arab spring: Negotiating in the shadow of the intifadat*. University of Georgia Press.

A. Appendix

Appendix 1: Heckman Selection Models Without The Instrument

Table A.1: Heckman model without the instrument

	Nonviolent Campaigns		Violent campaigns	
	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WPEI	1.089	-0.481	-0.849	-0.188
	(0.818)	(0.263)	(0.466)	(0.249)
Polyarchy	-0.0921	0.245	0.0324	-0.0490
	(0.311)	(0.165)	(0.310)	(0.137)
GDP	-0.218**	0.181***	-0.137*	0.0110
	(0.066)	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.030)
Population	0.0921	-0.0380	-0.149	0.241***
	(0.127)	(0.048)	(0.100)	(0.046)
Military personnel	0.0325	-0.0705	0.131	-0.112**
	(0.169)	(0.047)	(0.097)	(0.040)
Oceania	0.345	-0.473*	0.657	-0.409
	(0.517)	(0.240)	(0.828)	(0.327)
Asia	0.100	-0.0845	-0.163	0.180
	(0.195)	(0.122)	(0.166)	(0.104)
Europe	0.208	-0.193	-0.157	-0.153
	(0.225)	(0.141)	(0.404)	(0.163)
Americas	0.273	-0.193	0.408	-0.0933
	(0.193)	(0.118)	(0.257)	(0.141)
Cold war	-0.424**	0.412***	-0.604***	0.446***
	(0.156)	(0.080)	(0.135)	(0.084)
Constant	3.620	-4.032***	4.018*	-3.602***
	(2.896)	(0.811)	(1.609)	(0.634)
Athrho	-1.391		-0.393	
	(2.845)		(0.394)	

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependence (i.e., cubic polynominals) are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 2: Heckman Selection Models With Alternative Instruments

In this section, I describe the measurement of the alternative instruments. These are democratisation from the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset (Edgell et al., 2020) and economic growth (GDP growth annual) from the World bank (World Bank, 2013). The information is derived from the respective codebooks.

Economic growth is measured as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2015 prices, expressed in U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.

Democratisation measures whether there was an ongoing democratisation episode during the country-year. It represent a period of substantial and sustained increases on V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). The default parameters require that such a period begin with an initial 0.01 increase on the EDI and a total increase of at least 0.10 throughout the episode. A democratisation episode ends the final year of a positive change greater than or equal to the initial increase (e.g. 0.01), prior to experiencing an annual drop, cumulative drop, or stasis period. These are defined in the defaults as –0.03, –0.10, and 5 years, respectively.

Table A.2: Heckman model with alternative instruments

	Nonviolent Campaigns		Violent campaigns	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Outcome Equation: Campaign Success				
WPEI	0.766	0.672	0.0554	0.269
	(0.495)	(0.474)	(1.195)	(1.751)
Constant	-1.016	-2.291	0.168	0.459
	(3.518)	(1.960)	(1.070)	(1.290)
Selection Equation Ongoing Campaigns				
WPEI	-0.0454	-0.0214	-0.723*	-0.715*
	(0.198)	(0.196)	(0.321)	(0.326)
Economic growth	-0.0104*		-0.00410	
	(0.005)		(0.004)	
Democratisation		0.0773		0.0328
		(0.102)		(0.122)
Constant	-1.657***	-1.724***	-0.522***	-0.549***
	(0.117)	(0.113)	(0.156)	(0.160)
Athrho	0.479	0.820	-2.046	-2.298
	(3.028)	(1.457)	(2.296)	(4.666)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependence (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 3: Imputation: Comparison Of Variables

Figure A.1: Kernel density plots over observed and imputed values



Note: The squared and cubed terms of years since nonviolent- or violent campaigns are also imputed, but since they only control for time dependency and the coefficients are not of interests in themselves the squared and cubed polynomials of years since campaigns are left out from this overview.

Appendix 4: F-tests Of The Heckman Selection Equation

Table A.3: The F-test of the Heckman selection equation: Baseline models

Baseline nonviolent	**Baseline violent**
F(1,45223.5) = 0.08 Prob > F = 0.7781	F(1,47537.4) = 0.16 Prob > F = 0.6902

Table A.4: The F-test of the Heckman selection equation: Main models

Main nonviolent	**Main violent**
F(1,6613.4) = 2.32 Prob > F = 0.1277	F(1,4187.5) = 0.45 Prob > F = 0.5012

Appendix 5: F-tests Of The Heckman Selection Equation: Alternative Instruments

Table A.5: The F-test of the Heckman selection equation: alternative instruments

	Nonviolent	**Violent**
Economic growth	F(1, 172.6) = 6.74 Prob > F = 0.0102	F(1, 43.6) = 0.32 Prob > F = 0.5745
Democratisation	F(1, 207.0) = 1.56 Prob > F = 0.2127	F(1,1667.5) = 0.73 Prob > F = 0.3944

Appendix 6: Wald Tests Of Independent Equations

Table A.6: Wald tests of independent equations: baseline estimation of nonviolent success

M = 1	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.04
M = 2	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 1.50
M = 3	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.24
M = 4	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 3.50
M = 5	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.03
M = 6	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.83
M = 7	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.02
M = 8	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 1.48
M = 9	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 8.13 **
M = 10	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.58

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.7: Wald tests of independent equations: baseline estimation of violent success

M = 1	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.27
M = 2	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.34
M = 3	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.11
M = 4	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.34
M = 5	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.13
M = 6	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.47
M = 7	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.98
M = 8	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.36
M = 9	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.21
M = 10	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.10

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.8: Wald tests of independent equations: full estimation of nonviolent success

M = 1	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.08
M = 2	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 1.47
M = 3	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.01
M = 4	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.05
M = 5	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.12
M = 6	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.02
M = 7	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.17
M = 8	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 7.75 **
M = 9	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 1.22
M = 10	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 5.46 *

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.9: Wald tests of independent equations: full estimation of violent success

M = 1	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.62
M = 2	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.74
M = 3	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.69
M = 4	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.82
M = 5	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.18
M = 6	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 1.17
M = 7	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.17
M = 8	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.95
M = 9	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.83
M = 10	Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 1.18

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 7: 2PM, Heckman And Probit Models: Nonviolent Campaign Success

Table A.10: 2PM, Heckman and Probit models estimating nonviolent campaign success

	2PM		**Heckman**		**Probit**
	(1)		(2)		(3)
	Stage 2	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 1	
WPEI	2.299**	-0.934	0.705	-0.472	1.236**
	(0.793)	(0.559)	(0.469)	(0.266)	(0.432)
Polyarchy	0.252	0.506	0.237	0.233	0.140
	(0.512)	(0.342)	(0.276)	(0.163)	(0.288)
GDP	-0.281	0.402***	-0.0147	0.183***	-0.148
	(0.167)	(0.075)	(0.118)	(0.036)	(0.093)
Population	0.226	-0.0802	0.0637	-0.0356	0.120
	(0.181)	(0.101)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.103)
Military personnel	-0.0812	-0.189	-0.0541	-0.0750	-0.0485
	(0.199)	(0.101)	(0.084)	(0.046)	(0.113)
Cold war	-0.389	0.845***	0.0455	0.414***	-0.199
	(0.347)	(0.158)	(0.280)	(0.080)	(0.189)
Election Year	0.339	-0.236		-0.103	0.200
	(0.285)	(0.124)		(0.063)	(0.167)
Athrho				3.231	
				(3.102)	
Constant	0.472	-8.368***	-2.442	-4.064***	0.118
	(3.162)	(1.720)	(3.090)	(0.798)	(1.851)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependency (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$.

Appendix 8: 2PM, Heckman And Probit Models: Violent Campaign Success

Table A.11: 2PM, Heckman and Probit models estimating nonviolent campaign success

	2PM		**Heckman**		**Probit**
	(1)		(2)		(3)
	Stage 2	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 1	
WPEI	-2.076*	-0.250	-0.848	-0.198	-0.937*
	(1.019)	(0.451)	(0.469)	(0.250)	(0.429)
Polyarchy	0.00626	-0.121	0.0320	-0.0490	0.0226
	(0.781)	(0.250)	(0.310)	(0.136)	(0.315)
GDP	-0.307*	0.0340	-0.137*	0.0105	-0.140*
	(0.145)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.030)	(0.064)
Population	-0.227	0.412***	-0.150	0.240***	-0.102
	(0.208)	(0.084)	(0.100)	(0.046)	(0.089)
Military personnel	0.263	-0.212**	0.132	-0.112**	0.111
	(0.226)	(0.073)	(0.097)	(0.040)	(0.099)
Cold war	-1.235***	0.741***	-0.605***	0.446***	-0.539***
	(0.339)	(0.152)	(0.135)	(0.084)	(0.144)
Election Year	-0.0816	0.0547		0.0402	-0.0373
	(0.364)	(0.116)		(0.064)	(0.158)
athrho				-0.397	
				(0.397)	
Constant	7.300*	-6.357***	4.028*	-3.591***	3.074*
	(3.139)	(1.157)	(1.626)	(0.635)	(1.401)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependency (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$.

Appendix 9: Alternative Measures of Gender Equality

In this section, I describe the alternative operationalisations for gender equality. These are fertility rates, literacy ratio and infant mortality. The information is derived from the World bank (2013).

Fertility rate, total (births per woman) represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates of the specified year. Total fertility rates are based on data on registered live births from vital registration systems or, in the absence of such systems, from censuses or sample surveys. The estimated rates are generally considered reliable measures of fertility in the recent past. Where no empirical information on age-specific fertility rates is available, a model is used to estimate the share of births to adolescents. For countries without vital registration systems fertility rates are generally based on extrapolations from trends observed in censuses or surveys from earlier years.

Literacy ratio is a ratio calculated based on two measures: literacy rate, adult female (% of females ages 15 and above) and Literacy rate, adult male (% of males ages 15 and above). Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can both read and write with understanding a short simple statement about their everyday life. Literacy statistics for most countries cover the population ages 15 and older, but some include younger ages or are confined to age ranges that tend to inflate literacy rates. The youth literacy rate for ages 15-24 reflects recent progress in education. It measures the accumulated outcomes of primary education over the previous 10 years or so by indicating the proportion of the population who have passed through the primary education system and acquired basic literacy and numeracy skills. Generally, literacy also encompasses numeracy, the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. Data on literacy are compiled by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics based on national censuses and household surveys and, for countries without recent literacy data, using the Global Age-Specific Literacy Projection Model (GALP).

Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. The main sources of mortality data are vital registration systems and direct or indirect estimates based on sample surveys or censuses. To make neonatal, infant, and child mortality estimates comparable and to ensure consistency across estimates by different agencies, the United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME), which comprises the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Bank, the United Nations Population Division, and other universities and research institutes, developed and adopted a statistical method that uses all available information to reconcile differences. The method uses statistical models to obtain a best estimate trend line by fitting a country-specific regression model of mortality rates against their reference dates.

Table A.12: Alternative gender equality operationalisations: nonviolent campaign success

	Logit	**Logit**	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Fertility rate	-0.118		
	(0.080)		
Literacy ratio		1.100	
		(0.740)	
Infant mortality			-0.00499
			(0.003)
Polyarchy	0.264	0.263	0.265
	(0.510)	(0.515)	(0.511)
GDP	-0.136	-0.145	-0.150
	(0.148)	(0.150)	(0.153)
Population	0.260	0.246	0.248
	(0.185)	(0.181)	(0.180)
Military personnel	-0.212	-0.203	-0.195
	(0.195)	(0.190)	(0.188)
Cold war	-0.576	-0.592	-0.547
	(0.345)	(0.346)	(0.341)
Constant	-1.605	-2.533	-1.334
	(3.024)	(3.072)	(2.993)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependence (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.13: Alternative gender equality operationalisations: violent campaign success

	Logit	**Logit**	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Fertility rate	-0.00116		
	(0.081)		
Literacy ratio		-0.0388	
		(0.879)	
Infant mortality			-0.0000556
			(0.003)
Polyarchy	-0.200	-0.187	-0.196
	(0.776)	(0.776)	(0.787)
GDP	-0.428**	-0.427**	-0.428**
	(0.143)	(0.145)	(0.143)
Population	-0.222	-0.223	-0.222
	(0.214)	(0.216)	(0.213)
Military personnel	0.337	0.337	0.338
	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.225)
Cold war	-1.056***	-1.063***	-1.061**
	(0.318)	(0.320)	(0.327)
Constant	8.969**	8.983**	8.986**
	(2.739)	(2.868)	(2.770)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependence (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.14: AIC and BIC (alternative measures): nonviolent campaign success

	Nonviolent Campaigns	
Indicator	**AIC**	**BIC**
WPEI	488.52769	564.74709
Fertility rate	493.95955	570.17895
Literacy rate	493.78399	570.00339
Infant mortality rate	492.49594	568.71534
Life expectancy	493.75319	569.97259

Note: Estimation of Akaike's Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC)

Table A.15: AIC and BIC (alternative measures): violent campaign success

	Violent Campaigns	
Indicator	**AIC**	**BIC**
WPEI	485.31901	587.90801
Fertility rate	490.60982	593.19884
Literacy rate	490.08902	592.67803
Infant mortality rate	490.62491	592.61905
Life expectancy	490.55623	593.1452

Note: Estimation of Akaike's Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC)

Table A.16: AUC and Pseudo R^2: alternative specifications of WPEI

Nonviolent campaigns		**Violent campaigns**	
AUC with Fertility Rate	Pseudo R^2 with Fertility Rate	AUC with Fertility Rate	Pseudo R^2 with Fertility Rate
.63274674	.03814296	.78388208	.12886853
AUC with Literacy Ratio	Pseudo R^2 with Literacy Ratio	AUC with Literacy Ratio	Pseudo R^2 with Literacy Ratio
.63477669	.03814433	.78504599	.12987816
AUC with Life expectancy	Pseudo R^2 with Life expectancy	AUC with Life expectancy	Pseudo R^2 with Life expectancy
.62785807	.03576462	.78404729	.12866749
AUC with Infant Mortality Rate	Pseudo R^2 with Infant Mortality Rate	AUC with Infant Mortality Rate	Pseudo R^2 with Infant Mortality Rate
.63310605	.03765997	.784122	.12928533

Note: Estimation of the area under the roc curve (AUC) and McFadden's pseudo-R^2. For comparison, the model containing the WPEI received an AUC-score of .6536075 and a R^2 of .05102636 when estimating nonviolent campaigns and an AUC-score of .80189032 and a R^2 of 13923407 when estimating violent campaigns.

Appendix 10: Dependency Of Errors

Table A.17: Models including time-dummies

	Nonviolent Campaigns	Violent campaigns
	Logit	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)
WPEI	1.890*	-1.470
	(0.901)	(1.139)
Polyarchy	0.259	0.249
	(0.596)	(0.785)
GDP	-0.253	-0.241
	(0.199)	(0.168)
Population	0.210	-0.348
	(0.203)	(0.228)
Military personnel	-0.0237	0.253
	(0.207)	(0.222)
Constant	-0.987	8.773**
	(3.769)	(3.195)
Year-dummies	X	
Decade-dummies		X

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year-dummies (nonviolent campaign success), decade-dummies (violent campaign success), and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 11: Linearity

Table A.18: Violent campaigns success and WPEI (logged)

	Logit
	(1)
WPEI (logged)	-0.560*
	(0.274)
Polyarchy	0.165
	(0.777)
GDP	-0.367*
	(0.161)
Population	-0.218
	(0.249)
Military personnel	0.261
	(0.244)
Cold war	-1.054**
	(0.357)
Constant	6.976
	(3.667)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependency (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix 12: Colliniarity

Table A.19: VIF

Variable	**VIF**	**1/VIF**
Military personnel	5.93	0.17
Population	5.74	0.17
GDP	5.50	0.18
WPEI	2.30	0.43
Europe	2.10	0.48
Asia	1.69	0.59
Cold war	1.48	0.67
Americas	1.41	0.71
Polyarchy	1.25	0.80
Oceania	1.13	0.89

Note: Cubic polynominals are included in the estimation but are not reported. Multicollinearity, of greater or lesser extent, is expected whenever cubic polynomials are included.

Table A.20: Models excluding military personnel

	Nonviolent Campaigns	Violent campaigns
	Logit	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)
WPEI	2.500**	-2.333*
	(0.780)	(1.040)
Polyarchy	0.273	0.0351
	(0.516)	(0.777)
GDP	-0.303*	-0.241
	(0.145)	(0.137)
Population	0.176	-0.0621
	(0.154)	(0.180)
Cold war	-0.430	-1.206***
	(0.330)	(0.343)
Constant	1.511	4.118
	(1.629)	(2.269)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Demeaned cubic polynomials and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.21: Campaign success without military personnel; VIF

Variable	**VIF**	**1/VIF**
GDP	4.65	0.21
Population	3.74	0.27
WPEI	2.11	0.47
Europe	1.97	0.51
Asia	1.57	0.64
Cold war	1.49	0.67
Americas	1.40	0.71
Polyarchy	1.23	0.81
Oceania	1.13	0.89

Note: Cubic polynominals are included in the estimation but are not reported. Multicollinearity, of greater or lesser extent, is expected whenever cubic polynomials are included.

Table A.22: Logit regression with demeaned cubic polynominals

	Nonviolent Campaigns	Violent campaigns
	Logit	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)
WPEI	-2.144*	2.519**
	(1.014)	(0.816)
Polyarchy	0.0595	0.269
	(0.795)	(0.520)
GDP	-0.302*	-0.285
	(0.145)	(0.168)
Population	-0.222	0.183
	(0.208)	(0.187)
Military personnel	0.235	-0.0520
	(0.228)	(0.209)
Cold war	-1.092**	-0.376
	(0.347)	(0.351)
Constant	7.516*	0.756
	(3.021)	(3.226)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Demeaned cubic polynomials and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 13: Outliers And Influential Cases

Table A.23: Nonviolent campaign success: outliers

	Outliers dropped
	Logit
	(1)
WPEI	3.477***
	(0.897)
Polyarchy	0.174
	(0.504)
GDP	-0.232
	(0.160)
Population	0.514**
	(0.170)
Military personnel	-0.549**
	(0.180)
Constant	-4.493
	(2.989)
N	499

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependency (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A.24: Logit regression without influential cases: categorised by dbeta

	Nonviolent Campaigns	Violent campaigns
	Logit	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)
WPEI	2.057**	-2.133*
	(0.737)	(0.951)
Polyarchy	0.0881	-0.213
	(0.483)	(0.737)
GDP	-0.123	-0.276*
	(0.149)	(0.112)
Population	0.309*	-0.190
	(0.155)	(0.162)
Military personnel	-0.345*	0.203
	(0.169)	(0.150)
Cold war	-0.232	-1.438***
	(0.360)	(0.320)
Constant	-3.424	6.541*
	(2.903)	(2.636)
N	505	2194

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Cubic polynomials and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.25: Logit regression without influential cases: categorised by DFbeta

	Nonviolent Campaigns	Violent campaigns
	Logit	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)
WPEI	1.477*	-7.146***
	(0.745)	(1.160)
Polyarchy	0.0604	-0.954
	(0.501)	(0.979)
GDP	-0.0867	-0.0338
	(0.146)	(0.117)
Population	0.356*	-0.0543
	(0.168)	(0.192)
Military personnel	-0.436*	0.116
	(0.177)	(0.191)
Cold war	-0.132	-1.570***
	(0.361)	(0.437)
Constant	-4.451	0.0539
	(2.943)	(3.433)
N	501	2025

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Demeaned cubic polynomials and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.26: Nonviolent campaign success and WPEI: influential observations

Success (0/1)	**Location**	**Year**	**WPEI**
1	Argentina	1987	0.73
1	Fiji	2000	0.682
1	Ecuador	2005	0.774
1	Peru	2000	0.665
1	Venezuela	2002	0.839

Note: List over observations with dfbetas $> 3/\sqrt{510}$

Table A.27: Violent campaign success and WPEI: influential observations

Success (0/1)	**Location**	**Year**	**WPEI**
1	Cambodia	1979	0.319
1	Liberia	1990	0.458
1	Rwanda	1994	0.468
1	Rwanda	1994	0.468
0	East Timor	1975	-0.22034
1	Pakistan	1971	0.351
1	Palestine	1948	0.672912
1	Cameroon	1959	0.306231
1	Rwanda	1961	0.304
1	Argentina	1955	0.626
1	Cambodia	1975	0.397
1	Costa Rica	1948	0.43
1	Nicaragua	1990	0.626
1	Liberia	2003	0.525
1	Lebanon	1978	0.451
1	Central African Republic	2013	0.598
1	Romania	1989	0.587
1	Guinea-Bissau	1999	0.575
1	Fiji	1987	0.549
1	Georgia	2008	0.802
1	Slovenia	1991	0.725

Note: List over observations with dfbetas $> 3/\sqrt{2207}$

Appendix 14: Alternative Models: LPM And Log-log

Table A.28: Alternativ models: LPM and log-log

	Nonviolent Campaigns		Violent campaigns	
	LPM	**Log-Log**	**LPM**	**Log-Log**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WPEI	0.318**	2.266**	-0.0488*	-2.036*
	(0.123)	(0.719)	(0.024)	(1.025)
Polyarchy	0.0324	0.235	-0.00135	-0.0140
	(0.066)	(0.466)	(0.014)	(0.774)
GDP	-0.0339	-0.259	-0.00897*	-0.291*
	(0.019)	(0.150)	(0.004)	(0.138)
Population	0.0253	0.205	-0.00193	-0.222
	(0.025)	(0.160)	(0.005)	(0.202)
Military personnel	-0.0116	-0.0721	0.00529	0.256
	(0.025)	(0.177)	(0.007)	(0.218)
Cold war	-0.0526	-0.380	-0.0296**	-1.200***
	(0.044)	(0.316)	(0.009)	(0.328)
Constant	0.469	0.274	0.281**	6.831*
	(0.385)	(2.742)	(0.093)	(2.989)

Note: Model (1) and (3) report robust standard errors in the parenthesis. Model (2) and (4) report country clustered standard errors in the parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependence (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 15: AET-statistics

The first set includes the previously presented baseline controls. The second sett adds the disaggregated WPEI measure, that is the three indices in which the WPEI is made up from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017). These should be correlated with WPEI but are included in case the WPEI depends on the different subcomponents' weighting. The third set of controls includes demographic variables that could bias the link between WPEI and campaign success, specifically fertility rates, literacy rates, infant mortality, and life expectancy from the World Bank (2013). The fourth set introduces another proxy for democracy, the Polity II measure, Polity 2, and the squared Polity II term, $Polity^2$. (Marshall et al., 2013) Such a measure could be correlated with both success and WPEI, but may not be adequately controlled for by including the Polyarchy index. The set also includes urbanisation (logged) from the World Bank (2013) as this could be a potential omitted confounder. The fifth set includes all controls. All additional control are lagged t-1.

Table A.29: AET-statistics: the probability of nonviolent campaign success

Nonviolent Campaigns	
Controls	$\frac{\beta_C}{\beta_C - \beta_R}$
Baseline controls	-3.088430504
Baseline controls with WPEI: subindexes	-2.913176699
Baseline controls with fertility and literacy	-3.794366855
Baseline controls with urbanisation and polity II	-2.828337073
All controls	-3.181893731

Note: Selection from observables as a guide to selection from unobservables

Table A.30: AET-statistics: the probability of violent campaign success

Violent Campaigns	
Controls	$\frac{\beta_C}{\beta_C - \beta_R}$
Baseline controls	1.338762339
Baseline controls with WPEI: subindexes	1.109523927
Baseline controls with fertility and literacy	1.495368201
Baseline controls with urbanisation and polity II	1.229040418
All controls	1.220427866

Note: Selection from observables as a guide to selection from unobservables

Appendix 16: Models With Alternative WPEI-lags

Table A.31: The estimation of nonviolent campaign success: different WPEI lags

	Nonviolent Campaigns	
	Logit	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)
WPEI t-2	2.325**	
	(0.807)	
WPEI t-3		2.150**
		(0.829)
Polyarchy	0.444	0.437
	(0.534)	(0.537)
GDP	-0.314	-0.307
	(0.182)	(0.180)
Population	0.128	0.132
	(0.187)	(0.186)
Military personnel	0.0860	0.0796
	(0.208)	(0.205)
Cold war	-0.426	-0.464
	(0.376)	(0.378)
Constant	2.495	2.386
	(3.352)	(3.316)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Demeaned cubic polynomials and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.32: The estimation of violent campaign success: different WPEI lags

	Violent Campaigns	
	Logit	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)
WPEI t-2	-1.913	
	(1.111)	
WPEI t-3		-1.904
		(1.127)
Polyarchy	-0.264	-0.278
	(0.891)	(0.895)
GDP	-0.350*	-0.363*
	(0.163)	(0.161)
Population	-0.216	-0.211
	(0.232)	(0.236)
Military personnel	0.260	0.261
	(0.245)	(0.245)
Cold war	-1.107**	-1.132***
	(0.343)	(0.342)
Constant	8.155*	8.448*
	(3.344)	(3.406)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Demeaned cubic polynomials and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 17: Countries Covered In The NAVCO Sample

Country	Freq	%	Country	Freq	%
Afghanistan	4	1.04	Jordan	2	0.52
Albania	1	0.26	Kenya	3	0.78
Algeria	4	1.04	Kyrgyzstan	4	1.04
Angola	3	0.78	Laos	3	0.78
Argentina	4	1.04	Latvia	2	0.52
Armenia	1	0.26	Lebanon	7	1.82
Aruba	1	0.26	Liberia	4	1.04
Azerbaijan	1	0.26	Libya	1	0.26
Bahrain	1	0.26	Lithuania	2	0.52
Bangladesh	3	0.78	Madagascar	5	1.3
Belarus	2	0.52	Malawi	3	0.78
Benin	1	0.26	Malaysia	1	0.26
Bolivia	5	1.3	Maldives	2	0.52
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2	0.52	Mali	3	0.78
Brazil	1	0.26	Mauritania	1	0.26
Brunei	1	0.26	Mexico	2	0.52
Bulgaria	2	0.52	Moldova	1	0.26
Burma/Myanmar	6	1.56	Mongolia	1	0.26
Burundi	4	1.04	Morocco	2	0.52
Cambodia	4	1.04	Mozambique	2	0.52
Cameroon	3	0.78	Namibia	1	0.26
Central African Republic	4	1.04	Nepal	4	1.04
Chad	4	1.04	Nicaragua	3	0.78
Chile	2	0.52	Niger	1	0.26
China	8	2.08	Nigeria	6	1.56
Colombia	2	0.52	North Macedonia	1	0.26
Comoros	1	0.26	Oman	1	0.26
Costa Rica	1	0.26	Pakistan	11	2.86
Croatia	1	0.26	Palestine	1	0.26

Cuba	1	0.26	Palestine/West Bank	1	0.26
Cyprus	1	0.26	Panama	1	0.26
Czechoslovakia	2	0.52	Papua New Guinea	1	0.26
DR Congo	8	2.08	Paraguay	1	0.26
Djibouti	2	0.52	Peru	3	0.78
Dominican Republic	1	0.26	Philippines	6	1.56
East Germany	2	0.52	Poland	5	1.3
Ecuador	1	0.26	Portugal	1	0.26
Egypt	6	1.56	Republic of the Congo	2	0.52
El Salvador	1	0.26	Romania	2	0.52
Eritrea	1	0.26	Russia	6	1.56
Estonia	2	0.52	Rwanda	5	1.3
Eswatini	1	0.26	Senegal	3	0.78
Ethiopia	4	1.04	Serbia	6	1.56
Fiji	3	0.78	Sierra Leone	1	0.26
France	1	0.26	Slovakia	1	0.26
Georgia	5	1.3	Slovenia	1	0.26
Ghana	1	0.26	Somalia	4	1.04
Greece	2	0.52	South Africa	2	0.52
Guatemala	2	0.52	South Korea	4	1.04
Guinea	2	0.52	South Sudan	1	0.26
Guinea-Bissau	2	0.52	South Vietnam	2	0.52
Haiti	4	1.04	Spain	1	0.26
Honduras	1	0.26	Sri Lanka	3	0.78
Hungary	3	0.78	Sudan	6	1.56
Iceland	1	0.26	Suriname	1	0.26
India	14	3.65	Syria	3	0.78
Indonesia	8	2.08	Taiwan	1	0.26
Iran	6	1.56	Tajikistan	1	0.26
Iraq	7	1.82	Thailand	9	2.34
Iraq	7	1.82	Timor-Leste	1	0.26
Israel	1	0.26	Togo	3	0.78
Ivory Coast	3	0.78	Tonga	1	0.26
Total Count: 384			**Total percent: 100**		

Appendix 18: Estimations Using Listwise Deletion

Table A.33: Listwise deletion

	Nonviolent Campaigns	Violent campaigns
	Logit	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)
WPEI	0.375	-0.264
	(1.136)	(0.865)
Polyarchy	-0.631	1.270*
	(0.719)	(0.535)
GDP	-0.870***	-0.218
	(0.261)	(0.117)
Population	0.178	-0.271
	(0.199)	(0.169)
Military personnel	0.509	0.110
	(0.298)	(0.140)
Cold war	-1.920*	-0.193
	(0.783)	(0.381)
Constant	14.80**	6.730*
	(5.413)	(2.811)
N	268	1219

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Demeaned cubic polynomials and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.34: Listwise deletion and controls dropped

	Nonviolent Campaigns	Violent campaigns
	Logit	**Logit**
	(1)	(2)
WPEI	1.911*	-1.482***
	(0.767)	(0.389)
Constant	-1.988***	-1.054***
	(0.511)	(0.189)
N	457	2111

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Demeaned cubic polynomials and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 19: The Components Of The WPEI

This section includes information about the three indices which the WPEI consists of as well as what nine measures which make up those three indices, from the V-dem codebook version 11 (Coppedge et al., 2021).

The subcomponents of the WPEI

Women civil liberties index: Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives? Women's civil liberties are understood to include freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice. Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Women civil society participation index: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups? Women's civil society participation is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists. Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Women political participation index: Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions? Women's political participation is understood to include women's descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power. Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

The subcomponents of the subcomponents

Women civil liberties index

Freedom of domestic movement for women: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country? This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to

establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

Freedom from forced labor for women: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor? Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

Property rights for women: Do women enjoy the right to private property? Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

Access to justice for women: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice? This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

Women civil society participation index

Freedom of discussion for women: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

CSO women's participation: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)? Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

Female journalists: The percentage of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.

Women political participation index

Lower chamber female legislators: The percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female.

Power distributed by gender: Is political power distributed according to gender?

Table A.35: The WPEI index and nonviolent campaigns: the sub-components of the indices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Lower chamber female legislators	-0.006								
	(0.017)								
Freedom from forced labor for women		0.028							
		(0.155)							
Access to justice for women			0.034						
			(0.158)						
Freedom of discussion for women				-0.042					
				(0.141)					
Freedom of domestic movement for women					0.058				
					(0.136)				
Property rights for women						-0.069			
						(0.148)			
CSO women's participation							0.074		
							(0.177)		
Female journalists								-0.006	
								(0.014)	
Power distributed by gender									0.174
									(0.140)
Polyarchy	0.386	0.250	0.203	0.467	0.148	0.528	0.139	0.440	-0.094
	(0.540)	(0.631)	(0.797)	(0.799)	(0.679)	(0.719)	(0.683)	(0.603)	(0.637)
GDP	-0.117	-0.126	-0.123	-0.121	-0.128	-0.122	-0.136	-0.108	-0.167
	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.145)
Population	0.223	0.227	0.230	0.228	0.214	0.236	0.226	0.215	0.243
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.180)
Military personnel	-0.179	-0.177	-0.179	-0.186	-0.161	-0.194	-0.160	-0.189	-0.148
	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.190)	(0.193)	(0.200)	(0.196)	(0.203)	(0.192)	(0.190)
Cold war	-0.560	-0.568	-0.559	-0.569	-0.562	-0.548	-0.551	-0.575	-0.593
	(0.338)	(0.347)	(0.339)	(0.338)	(0.337)	(0.334)	(0.336)	(0.341)	(0.341)
Constant	-1.902	-1.775	-1.865	-1.919	-1.563	-2.017	-1.595	-1.861	-1.072
	(3.046)	(3.030)	(2.989)	(3.053)	(3.143)	(3.062)	(3.141)	(3.036)	(3.083)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependence (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The coefficients are rounded to two decimal places and the standard errors to three decimal places.

Table A.36: The WPEI index and violent campaigns: the sub-components of the indices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Lower chamber female legislators	-0.009								
	(0.019)								
Freedom from forced labor for women		0.106							
		(0.154)							
Access to justice for women			0.089						
			(0.169)						
Freedom of discussion for women				-0.130					
				(0.141)					
Freedom of domestic movement for women					-0.055				
					(0.115)				
Property rights for women						-0.094			
						(0.136)			
CSO women's participation							-0.194		
							(0.191)		
Female journalists								-0.011	
								(0.016)	
Power distributed by gender									-0.287
									(0.148)
Polyarchy	-0.126	-0.411	-0.447	0.265	-0.039	0.060	0.145	-0.015	0.408
	(0.833)	(0.846)	(0.947)	(0.927)	(0.889)	(0.911)	(0.958)	(0.882)	(0.865)
GDP	-0.423**	-0.439**	-0.428**	-0.418**	-0.424**	-0.419**	-0.399**	-0.402**	-0.404**
	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.151)	(0.143)
Population	-0.214	-0.227	-0.227	-0.219	-0.217	-0.211	-0.212	-0.236	-0.237
	(0.215)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.215)	(0.212)	(0.216)
Military personnel	0.335	0.349	0.339	0.335	0.330	0.318	0.303	0.322	0.348
	(0.227)	(0.227)	(0.225)	(0.224)	(0.231)	(0.233)	(0.234)	(0.227)	(0.220)
Cold war	-1.044***	-1.059***	-1.044***	-1.123***	-1.068***	-1.067***	-1.063***	-1.090***	-1.022***
	(0.309)	(0.308)	(0.315)	(0.321)	(0.316)	(0.318)	(0.316)	(0.318)	(0.309)
Constant	8.792**	9.288**	9.120**	8.576**	8.792**	8.584**	8.220**	8.848**	8.382**
	(2.818)	(2.795)	(2.757)	(2.796)	(2.834)	(2.927)	(2.842)	(2.777)	(2.745)

Note: Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Variables accounting for time-dependence (i.e., cubic polynominals) and region dummies are included in the estimation but are not reported. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The coefficients are rounded to two decimal places and the standard errors to three decimal places.