

“What is climate migration?”



HG4090 – Master’s thesis 60 credits

University of Oslo

Department of Sociology and Human Geography

Candidate number: 109

Spring 2021

Word count: 37186

Copyright Ingrid Alba Bonafede Heggernes

2021

“What is climate migration?”

Ingrid Alba Bonafede Heggernes

[Www.duo.no](http://www.duo.no)

Abstract

“What is climate migration?”

Climate migration has developed to become a popular topic within most platforms. Stretching from media, policy circles, academia and civil society most platforms seems to have an opinion on climate migration and is eager to share it. Pictures and narratives on *what* and *who* a climate migrant is divided between framings of victims, security threats and resilient entrepreneurs. A broad variety of multiple understandings of the phenomenon coexist, however, currently there are no global consensus on what climate migration is. It appears contradictory that the issue of climate migration is globally unsettled, yet it is increasingly gaining attention with multiple approaches and solutions. The research aims to rely on another path than the mainstream literature in order to understand the case before trying to solve it. This research provides a different motive by starting the research with the following question: “what is a climate migrant?”. For this reason, the research aims to deconstruct the concept of climate migration in order to bring stronger clarity to different ontological, ideological and political understandings of the phenomenon. This study suggests that the climate migrant is generally represented as a symbol of binary ontologies.

Acknowledgement

Writing the thesis on “What is climate migration” has been an enlightening and rewarding journey, and a challenge I am proud to have overcome. I am humbled by the support I have received. First, to my supervisor Andrea Nightingale I express my sincerest appreciation for inspiring and useful supervision and encouragement. Andrea’s nuanced guidance has been invaluable to the completion of this thesis, giving me directions and challenges that has been utmost rewarding. Secondly, I would like to thank my fellow students for our rewarding conversations and community. Lastly, I offer my gratitude to the people in my home for offering their support through the process of completing the thesis.

Table of Contents

<u>“WHAT IS CLIMATE MIGRATION?”</u>	1
<u>ABSTRACT</u>	3
<u>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</u>	4
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	7
RESEARCH QUESTION	8
DEFINITION AND TERMINOLOGY	9
AIM AND MOTIVATION	10
<u>BACKGROUND – THE SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT CLIMATE MIGRATION</u>	12
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT	12
THE NARRATIVE OF “CLIMATE REFUGEES”	14
MIGRATION AS ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE	15
POLITICAL AND ETHICAL SHIFT OF DEBATE	17
<u>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</u>	19
UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE	20
UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY	23
(UN)NATURAL DISASTERS – AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE	26
CLIMATE FUTURES – SCENARIOS AND SOLUTIONS	27
UNDERSTANDING MIGRATION	29
UNDERSTANDING MOBILITY- BEYOND PUSH AND PULL	30
NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE AND THE OTHER MIGRANT	32
BORDERS AND SECURITY ISSUES	34
NEOLIBERAL BORDER REGULATION: LABOUR AND GOVERNMENTALITY	36
UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE MIGRATION – A REAL PHENOMENON?	38
SUMMARY	40
<u>RESEARCH DESIGN</u>	42
METHODOLOGY	42
ONTOLOGICAL POSITIONING AND ONTOLOGY AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL	42
QUALITATIVE DOCUMENT METHODS	43
SELECTING DATA	44

GATHERING DATA	46
ANALYSING DATA	47
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS	47
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS	49
CODING	50
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION	51
POWER RELATIONS	51
LIMITATIONS	52
<u>INTRODUCING DATA MATERIAL</u>	<u>54</u>
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS - IGOs	54
GOVERNMENT BODIES	54
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS - NGOs	55
MEDIA	55
DOCUMENTARIES	56
<u>EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE</u>	<u>57</u>
EVIDENCE FROM DATA ANALYSIS – WHAT IS A CLIMATE MIGRANT?	58
NARRATIVE 1 - APOCALYPTIC HUMANITARIAN NARRATIVE	61
THE HUMAN FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE	63
APPROACHING CLIMATE MIGRATION – EXPANDING REFUGEE LAW	68
NARRATIVE 2 - APOCALYPTIC SECURITISING NARRATIVE	69
THE THREATENING MIGRANT	72
APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE	73
NARRATIVE 3 - OPPORTUNISTIC DEVELOPMENTAL NARRATIVE	76
THE RESILIENT MIGRANT	81
APPROACHING CLIMATE MIGRATION	83
NARRATIVE 4 - OPPORTUNISTIC GOVERNMENTAL NARRATIVE	87
THE IMMOBILE MIGRANT	88
<u>CONNECTING NARRATIVES</u>	<u>91</u>
<u>CONCLUSION</u>	<u>94</u>
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF CLIMATE MIGRATION	95
“WHAT EXACTLY IS CLIMATE MIGRATION”?	97
<u>REFERENCES</u>	<u>101</u>

Introduction

The topic of climate migration has gained increased interest within academia, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, government bodies and the media. Concerns about migrants from Africa flooding into Europe, or entire islands being submerged requiring their whole populations to relocate trigger deeper fears about sharing resources and mixing cultures (Trombetta 2014, Telford 2013, Baldwin 2012). Yet these stereotypes throw together migrants into one universal category as poor victims without agency to respond to current circumstances. Throughout the different platforms, climate migration appears to be a topic which generates strong opinions on how global community should respond to the issue. For this reason, multiple understandings and solutions to climate migration coexist, triggering polarised approaches.

Climate change is already impacting the lives of millions of people around the world. And it won't get better, unless we act now (Greenpeace, 2019).

Eventually, massive amounts of people, especially those living in coastal regions and in the Global South, will have to migrate to survive. If we don't make a collective push to address climate change now, the increased frequency of climate migrations and conflicts will be the new face of our everyday lives (Greenpeace, 2019).

Migration in the face of global environmental change may not be just part of the 'problem' but can also be part of the solution (Foresight, 2011, 10).

The three statements all frame climate migration differently, representing different narratives, platforms, motivations, values, and fears. The story of climate migration illustrates a growing tendency of increased human mobility globally due to climate change and disasters. In this thesis I want to turn this assumption on its head and explore how understandings of climate and migration lead to particular knowledges and actions. At core, I argue that the concept of climate migration is trapped in ontological misunderstandings of climate and migration, build on dualistic stereotypes of migrant bodies and climate predictions and relations. These

ontological misunderstandings have ideological and political implications which further impact how we approach climate migration epistemologically. The aim of approaching and solving the challenge of climate migration has been at the core of the climate migration debate. Whether the solution is an expanded refugee law (Jolly and Athmed 19, Picchi 2016, Boateng 2014) or development programmes (Foresight 2011), climate migration is globally considered an *issue* and situation to be *fixed* (Bettini, 2017, 34).

This research's contribution to the debate on climate migration is to better understand the ontological cores in the debate by exploring different narratives. How do different agents and platforms understand climate migration? Furthermore, how are solutions and approaches formed in light of different narratives? Throughout this research I will build and illustrate how different binary ontological understandings of reality fertilises our understanding of the phenomenon climate migration. Furthermore, these understandings and knowledge fuels a gap between *Us* and *Them* which increase the *case* and the *expert* of climate migration.

The common problem within climate migration debates is precisely that there is no clear understanding of what climate migration is or should be. Before we can solve the problem, we need to understand what there is to be solved. In other words, what is the real issue of concern? This research will contribute to the debate by asking the question: "what *exactly* is climate migration?". The question stimulates a deeper investigation of which underlying structures, assumptions and ontologies are fuelling current understandings of climate migration.

This thesis will start providing a solid foundation of the historical development of the concept climate migration, and further lay out how the debate is increasingly separated within two narratives, climate refugees and migration-as-adaptation. Thereafter, I will start by investigating binary

Research question

Mainstream climate migration literature and debates are driven by the motivation to explain, solve and fix the complex issue of climate migration without deeper engaging in question of its ontological origin. However, how can one solve a complex issue without understanding the concept's roots and foundations? *How* and *why* has the concept developed and with which implications?

The overall research question of this thesis aims to deconstruct the concept of climate migration to understand which ontological connotation the concept is built on. Furthermore, which implications the concept will serve global narratives on climate migration. For this reason, the research question is structured as following.

How do ontological framings of 'climate' and 'migration' shape debates on 'climate migration'?

In order to answer this question, I have developed two sub-questions to build a logical structure.

- i) *Which ontological understandings of "climate" and "migration" are constructing the understanding of the concept and phenomenon of "climate migration"?*
- ii) *In which ways are these understandings shaping different narratives and approaches in the global climate migration debate?*

Throughout the theoretical chapter, I will guide the reader through the different ontological understandings of climate and migration by answering question one. The chapter will then work as an analytical and theoretical perspective to equip the reader with analytical and critical tools to further understand the outcome of question ii.).

The second question will be analysed and answered in light of the different perspectives on climate migration among multiple platforms and agencies. This research will combine actors from academia, IGOs, governmental institutions, NGOs, media and art.

Definition and terminology

The main challenge in academia is how to approach, frame and define climate migration. How the issue is defined further affects how we act and respond to the people of concern. Research and literature on climate migration lack an international definition on what and who it includes and what it represents. For this reason, different scholars are mixing terms and definitions throughout the literature. Most concepts consist of an abstraction of nature or environmental condition combined with a concept of human mobility. For instance, climate change induced migration, environmental migration, ecological migration or the merged concept climigration. Furthermore, the concept migration can be replaced with other forms of mobility such as refugee, or established concepts such as migration as adaptation, forced or voluntary relocation and displacement due to climate change.

In general, these concepts refer to different variations of people and societies which leave their home and habitat because of climate change or environmental reasons. The different definitions emphasize variations of the same phenomenon. Either people move voluntary or are forced, crossed a border or not, or moved temporarily, seasonal or permanent. The term “climate migration” have in some contexts been used in studies to describe “Migration as adaptation”, distinguishing itself from the concept of “climate refugee” (Bettini et. Al. 2017).

In this master thesis I will not be leaning on one specific definition of the issue. There are several reasons for this decision. Firstly, the different definitions represent different established narratives of climate migration and thus serve different political agendas.

Considering I will depend on one concept to carry out a discussion and critique I have chosen to use the concept *climate migration*. In this research the concept works as an umbrella term to capture different concepts and narratives. When using the term climate migration in this study, it represents the “neutral”, general and the overall understanding of the issue and debate.

Aim and motivation

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the ongoing debate on climate migration. For the past three years of my life as a student, stretching from my bachelor years to my present time as a master student, the topic of climate migration has increasingly caught my attention. When I started engaging with the topic three years ago, then as bachelor student, my motivation was to provide scientific research with the aim of "serving justice", acknowledging rights", “address responsibility" and "provide solutions" to the *poor victims* of climate induced migration. What I referred to as the "the human face of climate change". My perspectives then were shaped by the narrative of NGOs such as Friends of the Earth, Changemaker and Greenpeace together with multiple media articles in The Guardian and Aftenposten among others. Additionally, my main source of knowledge within academia was a result of using the search word *climate refugee* which generally is the preferred word among the former mentioned agencies. However, a term which represent an alarmist, saviourism and victimizing narrative on the phenomenon of climate migration.

However, I gradually realized that the framing and narrative of climate migration notably changes when exchanging the search word “refugee” to “migration”. I developed several critical questions to the literature and the phenomenon on climate migration. I questioned

myself whether I accept the linkage between climate and migration too narrowly? Which voices are being represented in academia? Who are telling the stories of climate migration? To which extent should the term *climate* carry the importance of explaining migration on the contrary of other causalities such as social, economic, demographic, or political factors?

Furthermore, I increasingly realized the debate on climate migration only took place in the Global South and among indigenous communities. The debate rarely appeared in the Global North apart from in context of what I will suggest are “ironic” comparisons (source). It made me reflect on whether the occurrence of climate migration from the Global North is considered beyond our collective imagination. In that case, why? On the other hand, the dominating group addressing the issue originate from research bases in the Global North (Piguet et. al. 2018). My curiousness of this asymmetrical conduction and framing of academic research became a central fundament for my ongoing interest of climate migration research.

Additionally, I noticed that the terminology and definitions within climate migration is much questionable and unsettled. Within the debate on climate migration multiple definitions coexist, and different studies adapt the concepts and terms which support their own framing of the issue. Some studies will leave the term undefined. Resulting in confusing debates on the core of the issue and the question of what climate migration is. Why are the global community debating over responsibility and actions to prevent, support, rescue climate migration before developing a profound understanding of the concept?

When trying to navigate in the field of contradictions I started realising that my original research project for my master thesis would be a reincorporation of the mainstream climate migration literature. A question which most researchers will ask themselves before starting a new research project appeared to me: how could I contribute with science of relevance to this research field? Leading to the question: “*what exactly is climate migration?*”. This project aims to take a critical stand towards the ontology and narrative of climate migration studies. In other words, how we understand climate migration. Therefore, my motivation for this research project is to challenge the mainstream climate migration literature and provide a deeper understanding of which narratives and ontologies to deeper analyse which gaps and mechanism which have been dominant in the literature.

The question which triggered this research, “what exactly is climate migration” will be used as an analytical tool throughout the research to constantly active a curiousness of the concept and phenomenon.

Background – the scientific evolution of the concept climate migration

Since the term “environmental refugees” was mentioned in an United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in 1985, the literature on the topic have grown rich and fertilized a debate on how the international community is supposed to react and respond to people who are “forced to move from their home and habitat because of climate change” (Biermann and Boas, 2010). The debate has been shaped and formed by different studies, approaches, definitions, and outcomes. To set the scene for a further discussion on this issue, I will drive this section based on the following questions.

How has the debate historically evolved since 1985? In which way has academia engaged with concept of climate migration? Which framings of climate migration have been dominating, and which current challenges are driving the debate today? Why and how has the linkage between climate and migration developed to become a significant and urgent issue which the international society struggle to agree upon? Which elements have been driving the debate and which consequences have it served for the global narrative on climate migration? The purpose of this chapter is to understand how and why the debate on climate migration have developed and taken form in the academic and political landscape.

Historical development of the concept

Linking human mobility with environmental impacts is not a new phenomenon within studies of geography and social theory. Several studies have argued that change in environmental conditions have triggered human mobility patterns throughout history. Among others, Ratzel (1882) referred to “primitive migration” when explaining human migration caused by environmental conditions (in Piguet, 2013, 149). Ratzel emphasized a correlation between human mobility and environmental conditions with an emphasis on natural determinism (Piguet, 2013, 149). However, from 1985 and onwards, the framing of climate migration has increasingly become a global and political issue. Most researchers refer to Essam El-Hinnawi (1985) as the pioneer of placing climate migration on the international agenda, what he then referred to as “environmental refugees”. The concept developed as a result of a growing international consensus placing climate change and the possible future consequences on the global agenda. Furthermore, several essential and crucial documents within climate change and future consequences were published during the same time. For instance, IPCC stated in a

1990 report: “[Global warming] could initiate large migrations of people, leading over a number of years to severe disruptions of settlement patterns and social instability in some areas” (IPCC 1990, 20, in Piguet, 2013, 153). Furthermore, what is considered domaining reports such as the Brundtland report *Our Common Future* which was published in 1987 together with the Environment and Development Conference in Rio 1992 contributed to set a scene for global, environmental and developmental concerns. Placing future sustainability concerns at the global agenda (Nightingale et. al., 2019, 22).

Furthermore, the ecologist Norman Myers has further contributed significantly to the global debate on climate migration (1993, 1997, 2002). Most recognized is his work on the predicted and estimated numbers of potentially hundreds of millions of displaced victims of “environmental refugee” by 2050 (Myers, 1993). He describes the phenomenon as:

We increasingly hear about environmental refugees. They are people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their erstwhile homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, and other environmental problems. In their desperation, they feel they have no alternative but to seek sanctuary elsewhere, however hazardous the attempt. Not all of them have fled their countries; many are internally displaced. But all have abandoned their homelands on a semipermanent if not permanent basis, having little hope of a foreseeable return (Myers, 1993, 257)

Myers work delivers a strong political message. Rhetoric such as “*they feel they have no alternative*”, “*abandoned*” and “*having little hope of a foreseeable return*”, together paint a picture of a helpless group of people with little agency to combat their own living circumstances. His work has laid a solid foundation for the continuing academic and political discussions on climate migration (Piguet, 2013). Pressing the global community to collaborate in finding solutions, measurements, and legislations for protecting, securing the rights and lives for people and societies who will be left homeless because of environmental disruption caused by climate change. Figures by Myers influenced a growing reliance within a narrative characterized by futuristic and apocalyptic understandings of the destructive and predetermined fates of millions of climate refugees. For this reason, climate refugees are commonly described as “the human face” of climate change (Bettini, 2017, 34). Describing both a direct causal link between climate change and human displacement, as well as a moral obligation to serve justice for the people who has contributed the least to the global history of

climate change. Based on this evidence, this narrative addresses the global obligation to act and establish legal protection for the people of concern (Biermann and Boas, 2010).

However, this work has fuelled narratives of both solidarity and fear. The humanitarian and developmental concerns calling for action and justice of poor and helpless victims which lack essential assets to survive the extreme powers of nature. Representing one of the core framings of global responsibility and equality. On the other hand, Myers' research has had a great influence on the other side of the *solidarity pole*. The massive and alarming numbers of potential *poor* refugees has also fuelled a discourse embedded in security, protection and fear in the Global North. Possibly reflecting the very emphasis on the concept *refugee* framed through the homogenous lens as *victims of nature*, triggering both anxiety and justice on different political polarities (Bettini et. al. 2017). To make sense of these polarities of fear and solidarity, the next section will unpack the idea of climate refugees in more detail.

The narrative of “Climate refugees”

United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP) addressed the issue of “environment refugees” for the first time in a 1985 report (Klepp and Herbeck, 2014, 57), and the international community still lack an adequate definition and a global will to act on the issue. The term “refugee” contains strong moral connotations in most world cultures and religions. By using the traditional term in combination with climate, protection of people of concern might receive the legitimacy and urgency it deserves. (Biermann and Boas, 2010, p. 67). Boateng (2014) supports this argument by referring to the concept of climate refugee as an “alarmist rhetoric” to create action rather than endless academic debates (2).

The approach of climate refugees can be described as the call for the international community, the Global North, to take responsibility for environmentally displaced people and communities (Bettini et. El., 2017). This framing highlights the structural injustice of climate change *poor* and *vulnerable* societies are facing. Throughout history, the Global North has been responsible for most the emissions of greenhouse gasses (Biermann 2018). Furthermore, the climate refugee narrative usually explains that the “hotspot” zones for climate change are geographically located in the Global South (Boateng, 2014). The framing of climate refugees acknowledges that people in the Global North will be exposed to climate change as well. However, countries in the North are more equipped to prepare and adapt to external changes such as reinforcing coastal protection, water management and changes in agricultural

production. On the contrary, the Global South is considered less capable to enforce adaptation at the same technological scale (Picchi, 2016). For this reason, the people who has historically contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions are the ones who face the greatest challenges to climate change (Biermann and Boas, 2010).

The framing further stresses the tendency of households and societies which increasingly are pressured to leave their home and habitat because climate change turn them uninhabitable. The approach addresses the human rights of climate refugees (Biermann and Boas, 2014). While some scholars suggest an integration of climate refugees in the existing UNHCR convention for refugees (Boateng, 2014), others aim to establish a new law specially designed for climate refugees (Biermann and Boas, 2014). Some of the challenges to establish and enforce these protection mechanisms are based on the challenge of defining this group of refugees.

The concept of climate refugees has caused much debate because it frames the phenomenon of climate migration as both forced and involuntary. Furthermore, climate migrants usually move within their own national borders. Bringer further confusion to the concept of refugee which traditional refers to someone who can not obtain a secure life within own national borders. The unclarity of the concept arises when researchers such as Marta Picchi acknowledge the shortcomings of the concept refugee, yet continue to justify the usage of it in her own research (Picchi, 2016). Actively driving the debate on climate refugees onwards in spite of definitional and empirical flaws.

Migration as Adaptation to Climate Change

The framing of climate refugees has been criticised for creating portraits of an alarmist scenario predicting mass-migrations of millions of people from the Global South to the Global North. This argument is met by critique from a Migration-as-Adaptation point of view. Instead of continuing the debate whether climate migrants should be granted international legal protection, this approach rather focus on assisting and facilitate sustainable migration within national boarders or neighbour countries (Bettini et. al., 2017).

By leaning on the approach of climate refugees, one may argue that the agency of individuals to impact and cope with external changes is ignored. According to this approach, migrants should not be victimized as passive victims with no power or knowledge to shape their circumstances. Within this approach, migration is viewed in a more opportunistic way by

empowering migrants as active and resilient agents capable to adapt to changing surroundings. Migration-as-*adaptation* to climate change has become the dominant approach aimed towards climate migration in academia and policy circles. The increasing attention to this approach builds directly on the critique of climate refugees. The argument is based on the notion that migration has been a significant strategy throughout human history to cope with environmental changes and stresses (Piguet, 2013).

Another prevailing idea within this approach is based on the narrow premise of claiming environmental changes as the root cause for migration. Klepp and Herbeck (2016) claim that the climate migration nexus has resulted in a neglect of debates on a de-naturalising return (58). Meaning that the emphasis on environmental causality linked to migration has weakened in compare to the climate refuge narrative. Climate migration should rather aim to uncover the nuances of mobility. For instance, socio-economic conditions are considered a significant driver for mobility and migration in the Global South (Bettini, et. al. 2017).

Climate migration is not necessarily forced. Labour migration becomes dominant within this discourse. Rather than preventing displacement or establishing mechanisms to protect those who have been displaced, the responsibility becomes one of allowing, and even enabling, (some) people to become mobile (Bettini et al., 2017, 354). States are not active actors aimed to protect and rescue climate refugees, rather they should become facilitators of providing access to formal labour markets (Bettini et al., 2017).

Resilience have become dominant and well-established term in the literature on climate change and within international policy discourses. By comparing the two approaches, the term resilient has developed to carry great significance in framing of migration as adaptation. While the other approach emphasizes the human rights of climate refugees and the global responsibility to “save” populations from climate hazards, migration as adaptation work to promote “the resilient migrant” (Methmann and Oels, 2015).

The concept of resilience ‘encourages the idea of active citizenship¹, whereby people, rather than relying on the state, take responsibility for their own social and economic well-being’ (Bettini, 2017, 350). Methmann and Oels (2015) further argues that the term resilience in the context of climate induced migration carries a notion of transformative change, not focusing

¹ Due to scope and limitation this research will not consider citizenship. However, this is a topic of relevance and should be considered for further research

on adaptation like mainstream science on climate change (52). Resilience marks a governmentality of security of climate change migrants in the way that individuals are made responsible for coping with risk in terms they are familiar with. The society as a unit is given less responsibility and instead the community and local expertise is emphasized (Methmann and Oels, 2015, 53).

Political and ethical shift of debate

The recognition of local agency has encouraged an opportunistic and developmental take on the issue of climate migration, making the debate on climate migration increasingly depoliticised (Bettini et. Al. 2017). In other words, the former political salience within the climate refugee debate has gradually weakened in favour of “the natural phenomenon” of climate migration. Instead political actions are facilitated through the neoliberal emphasise on *managing migration* by facilitating labour migration through access to formal labour markets and assistance to overcome barriers to movement and settlement. Thereby, the responsibility has changed from the global (guilty and responsible) community towards individual migrants and the labour market. The approach of climate refugees emphasized the importance of *structural injustice* associated with climate change. However, the neoliberal turn of migration management describes inequalities as *individual differences* (Bettini, et. Al. 2017). Local agency has encouraged an opportunistic and developmental take on the issue of climate migration, however, the earlier salience of addressing injustice has gradually weakened within the framework of resilience.

Along with obscuring the uneven justice questions across scales, the debate on climate migration has thus taken a moral shift. The rhetoric of climate refugees significantly called for action and responsibility by describing the structural injustice climate migrants is, and will be, facing. On the contrary, the language of migration as adaptation are not recognizing the same moral responsibility from the countries that have historically contributed to climate change. Instead, the responsibility to adapt is placed by individuals and the labour market. Bettini et al. (2017) argues that the debate on climate migration has moved “one step forwards, (and) two steps back” (348). Because structural inequalities may pose challenges outside individuals’ capacity to adapt, the debate on climate induced migration need to re-integrate a moral and ethical dimension (Bettini et. al. 2017). Where do we go from here?

The main evidence which has been portrayed by now is the shifting language and aim within the climate migration debate. The former debate which was unified embedded in an alarmist

approach is now divided in an additional neoliberal approach. However, what exactly are the ethical and political shift implying? What we can learn from the previous sections is that the issue of climate migration continues to play a presiding and dynamic role. The de-politicised turn reflects stronger academic and empiric understanding of migration patterns, however, the narrative has mostly reflected on *individual* differences within migration motives. The narrative of migration as adaptation continue to withhold a deeper understanding of some of the structural obstacles for global migration. The withdrawing of political and moral accountability is recognised within critical academia, however, the question on misrepresentative and homogenous language and framings of climate migration continue to persist. Overall, climate migration represents an increasing issue within academic, policy and media circles, however, the main issue continue to be the misrepresentative issue of climate migration. In the following chapter I will use the following critique to build and nuance the understanding of climate migration across the two narratives.

Theoretical Framework

In this thesis I will take another path than the dominant literature. Instead of leaning on a pre-given acceptance of the linkages between climate and migration, or attempt to justify it, I will start by deconstructing the concept of “climate migration”, analysing the two concepts as two separate units. Which connotations carry each of the concepts? In which way are they influential on each other, or not. The purpose of my theoretical framework is to lay a foundation to better understand the phenomenon of climate migration. In other words, I will investigate which *structural conditions* of climate change and migration are shaping our understanding of climate migration as a phenomenon.

The separation of these components conflicts with my personal point of view and understanding of the society and nature nexus. According to my personal understanding, these units mutually affect each other, which I will outline more carefully later in this chapter. However, for analytical purposes, separating climate change and migration serves fruitful insights and illustrate the structure of how mainstreamed climate migration is ontological understood. In the following section I will introduce different lenses and perspectives which are consciously and unconsciously shaping our understanding of climate migration as a phenomenon. In this section I will discuss relevant topics and nuances, aiming for a better understanding of the debate on climate induced migration. In the subsequent section I will start by investigating the different framings of climate migration and further discuss which consequences the approaches serve for the responsibility to act towards this issue.

Considering the issue of climate migration stretches beyond what is currently presented in literature, the theoretical framework will not be based on explicit theories. Rather it seeks to bring attention to the general lacks, gaps and ontological and political assumptions which shape the global understanding of climate migration. Put differently, the theoretical chapter represent a tool, lens and critical narrative whose aim is to bring greater clarity to the complex issue of climate migration.

Based on the critical academic literature on climate migration combined with critical perspective on extended topics I will use theoretical tools to better engage, analyse, and understand how the concept of climate migration is formed. The first set of questions which appear to me becomes fundamental; *what is the “climate” in climate migration, and further*

what is “migration” representing in the same context? These perspectives can further be explained as *ontological* and *ideological* conditions which further shape the *narrative* view of climate migration. Ontologically, climate migration reflects a fundamentally dualistic framing of the world. Nature is the binary of society and migrants from the Global South are the Other. As I will argue, these conditions facilitate the expansion of a neoliberal political ideology which shapes our understanding of climate change responses, mobility, borders, and labour. However, my argument is not that these perspectives are exclusively the only lenses to understand the concept of climate migration, other perspectives such as class, emotions, sexuality, behaviour, gender, citizenship, democracy could be considered other useful tools. However, due to the scope of this thesis I will focus on my selected pillars.

Understanding climate

Climate change is known for posing one of the largest threats to human and environmental systems. Many ecosystems today are unsustainable at current levels because of human interaction with the environment (Bennett et. al. 2019). The responsibility to act and prevent the magnitude of current and future climate change impacts is well established across different scales, sectors, and disciplines. However, different agents will emphasise different approaches depending on their ontological understanding of nature systems and climate change. Different interpretations of climate change become visible in policy measures and academic research through the framing of climate change vulnerability, adaptation, and resilience. Making the concepts gradually loose its core meaning and risk the fear of becoming buzzwords.

How the issue is defined further affects how we act and respond to the people of concern. In this section I will discuss different nuances in the debate on climate induced migration. Suggestions for definitions are often criticised for being either too broad or complex. However, which phenomenon are they aiming to describe and how are the issue formulated? Different definitions will emphasise different aspects of the “climate” dimension. Some will leave the terms “environment”, “climate change” or “natural disaster” undefined (SOURCES). Others will include a broad spectrum, of climate shocks and stressors, such as; *droughts, cyclone/monsoon, rainfall induced-flood, climate induced sea level rise and intense icy winters* (Boateng 2014, 3). Furthermore, one of the pioneering definitions of environmental refugees by Myers (1995) emphasises: *environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, as well as natural disaster such as cyclones, storm surges and floods.* Nawrotzki

(2014) further stresses that the lack of empirical research on this issue adds to the stress on defining who migrates, thereby describing climate migrants as “the invisible migrant” (71).

Regardless of emphasis, the similarity among the definitions is a reliance on climate described as an external force, separated from society and human systems, which “pushes”, “triggers” or “determines” people to leave their home and habitat. Furthermore, a strong conceptual allegation that climate is the single or dominating cause of migration as opposed to other circumstances. However, where has this narrative originated from?

Vulnerability represent one of the core concepts which climate migration usually is understood from. While some actors will use the term to explain *which* regions, communities, sectors, and households are vulnerable, others will emphasise *why* some groups are more exposed and less capable to cope with the circumstances of climate change than others (O’Brien et.al, 2007, 78). O’Brien et.al (2007) distinguish between two different interpretations of vulnerability in the climate change discourse: *outcome* and *contextual* (75).

The outcome perspective is characterised by a positivistic and technical understanding of climate change, separating the nature and society systems. In other words, climate vulnerability is measured based on physical exposure to climate stressors and responses are targeted towards reducing exposure through climate change mitigation or developing adaptations to limit negative outcomes. For instance, measuring climate change vulnerability could mean measuring which regions, countries, communities, professions, and households are most vulnerable to climate change. This perspective resonates well with the narrative of climate refugees and the prediction and estimation of “hot zones” of climate exposure and vulnerability. By contrast, the contextual approach, views nature and society as inseparable. To decrease vulnerability to climate change, adaptation measures need to be incorporated into other development projects. This approach acknowledges that geographical location alone is not a sufficient indicator to understand vulnerability. Action towards climate change should rather understand who is vulnerable by taking account of social factors such as: class, age and gender, together with history and power relations (O’Brien et. al., 2007, 78).

O’Brien et. al. (2007) argue that the different interpretations of vulnerability are crucial to understanding how different stakeholders promote action and change towards climate change. Climate change adaptation should be considered a social-political process where social and

political relations shape the simultaneous management of various changes. Within this approach, adaptation is understood as a process intertwined with other dynamics of societies, rather than being a single technical embedded action towards biophysical change (Eriksen et al. 2015, 524). Tailor (2013) states that “*sustainable climate change adaptation is a question of transforming power relations rather than addressing their symptoms*” (325). Underlying structures can further explain and capture the political dimension and power relation between all actors involved (Eriksen et al., 2015).

For the same reason, resilience as a concept or goal of adaptation should represent more than the technical and ecological framing of “bouncing back”. Resilience has become a dominant and term in the literature on climate change and within international policy discourses. The concept has gradually been adapted by most climate change adaptation programs as a tool to measure vulnerability and responses. Furthermore, resilience represents the desirable standard of living post-disaster, climate shock and hazard. However, what is the desirable standard of living, and for whom? “Bouncing back” or recover back to the pre-state of disasters or climate stress risks the change of reintegrating previous relations of vulnerability and inequality. Instead, the concept of resilience should challenge underlying mechanisms which created vulnerability in the first place, and bring out transformative change (Cretney, 2014).

However, in which way is climate change understood, measured, and approached in the context of climate migration? If the climate migration narrative frames climate as the prominent driver of migration, then the concept needs to be further investigated. Exploring the concept will require a deeper understanding of the synonym of nature in climate migration. Which ontological assumptions of nature, environment, ecology, or climate change shape our understanding of how human migration and nature forces are connected? In other words, how is the relationship between nature and society commonly understood in academia and which effects does it serve for our understanding of climate migration?

Understanding the relationship between nature and society

The previous section indicated that mainstream understanding of climate migration is built on the accepted linkage between climate change and migration. An understanding which created an image of people being forced and pushed from their home and habitat because of environmental factors. This relationship indicates that social actions and the environment are two separate forces, leading us to the philosophical question on what we know and how we think about the environment that surrounds us? Further it calls for reflection on how our deep understanding of nature and climate shape how we, as humans, consider our relationship to the environment. Oliver-Smith (2012) argues that most studies on climate migration fail to acknowledge the socio-ecological relationship, the relation between society and nature. In the context of climate change impacts and responses it is valuable to understand how we understand climate change for better design and prepare measurements to better adapt to the changing circumstances.

The relationship between society and nature is one of the fundamental, if often, unexamined pillars of any ideological system (Oliver-Smith, 2012, 1063). To understand why Oliver-Smith calls for deeper engagement with the socio-ecological nexus in climate migration studies, one needs to set the scene for our current ontological standpoint. The prevailing climate change interoperation relies on the understanding of outcome vulnerability which further influences adaptation measures. An understanding which fertilises a measurable outcome and result on how we imagine sustainable climate futures. However, how and why has this prevailing view established itself within science and policy structures?

Engaging with questions of ontological character requires deeper investigation of which values, belief systems and imaginations we take for granted yet unconsciously shape our reality. This section will provide a historical illustration on how Western society understands the relations between nature and society from a philosophical and scientific perspective. The purpose of this section is to understand how we think of climate change and the environment and further how it impacts social and policy processes.

Our current geological epoch, the Anthropocene, is the illustration and outcome of the historical Western embedded socio-ecological relationship. The epoch marks a shift from the Earth's previous epoch, the Holocene. The Anthropocene is the geological era when human impacts actively interrupt the planet's natural cycles and systems (Biermann, 2018). These

activities are represented by human land use change and burning of fossil fuels, causing large concentrations of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere. Put otherwise, our current epoch symbolises the ability and right of the “civilized man” to alter the Earth’s natural systems to the extent that they can no longer be considered “natural” (Lynch and Veland, 2018). Lynch and Veland (2018) further claims that “the Anthropocene framings is characterizing humans as one of “the great forces of nature”” (5).

Nieto-Romero et. al. (2019) argues that the prevailing worldview of the Anthropocene is “the belief that humans are autonomous individuals, separated from each other as well as from nature and other conditions of their existence” (113). On the other hand, the Anthropocene represents the time when human intervention with nature is so impactful that one may argue that “nature is us” (Lövbrand et. al. 2015, 213). These arguments can appear contradictory in character however; these perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, considering how strong individualism and the dualistic human-nature nexus are deeply embedded in Western social, economic, and political systems (Feola, 2020).

To better understand this dualistic dynamic one needs to further identify the historical pattern of how this relationship developed. In other words, placing the Anthropocene in a broad historical context (Lynch and Veland, 2018, 34). By using *myths* as an analytical framework, Lynch and Veland (2018) contribute with a detailed historical, philosophical and scientific understanding on this issue. In this context, *myth* represents a “frozen meaning” as a metaphor which “emphasizes the stability of the pattern” (29). This means ontological understandings of reality which we stop questioning, or that we subconsciously take for granted because it resonates well with the life we know and its purpose. Myths can therefore serve as a doctrine, formula, and symbol in which human beings shape and share their values (33).

Lynch and Veland use Greek mythology as a starting point of the dualistic human-nature nexus in Western thought. From then onwards, the perspective evolved through the philosophy of Socrates and Aristoteles and their justification of humans’ right to dominate nature. Based on these assumptions, Western civilization has been embedded in the ontological doctrine which emphasises; “Not only was the creation of nature orderly, but man, as the last of God's creation, was given dominion over it “(42). They further outline how this dualistic doctrine has been integrated through the Enlightenment era and European colonial

period to be established within Western science, especially emphasising the thought that “humans could make nature better than it could make itself” (Lynch and Veland, 2018, 43).

Scholars within ecofeminism further point out the binary ontological understanding of humans as “outside” and “alien” to nature which is rooted within Western thought (Plumwood, 1991). As Nightingale et. al. (2019b) points out, this ontological stand has fuelled hierarchies between humans and the world around us (23). It justifies humans’ rational “right” and “privilege” to take advantage of non-humans for our own gain and profit. As (Plumwood, 1993) explains it, Western thought has paved the way to a growing idea that humans are “masters” of nature, and the capitalist system turns nature into a market commodity and resource without significant moral or social constraint on availability (111). Lövbrand et. al. (2015) further remark that nature in the Anthropocene is domesticated, technologised and capitalised, it is we who decide what nature is and what it will be’ (213). *It is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.* (Jameson, 2003: 73, in Swyngedouw, 2010, 216) However, how are these ontological positions on climate relevant for understanding the dimension of climate in climate migration?

Oliver-Smith further argues that understanding environmental change and its effects such as population displacement requires a new framing of nature-society relations. These ontological ramifications directly and indirectly influence our epistemological methods in acquiring knowledge on the issue. The claim that people are vulnerable to the environment is paradoxical when in fact, it is the environment that is increasingly vulnerable to human activity (1063). Central to the narrative of climate migration is the idea that nature is framed and blamed for the social processes of migration and displacement, a form of environmental determinism. It further becomes a dilemma of language. Whether the concept relies on the term climate, environment or ecology it refers to a binary conception of “nature” rather than the dynamic interaction of human processes and natural processes.

This perspective can be illustrated in the different interpretations of vulnerability (O’Brien et. al., 2007). The shortcoming of the outcome perspective is that it perceives vulnerability from an exclusive nature perspective and is locked in the binary understanding of nature and society. as this section has outlined, the logic of this ontological perspective has long roots and is deeply embedded in Western thought, science, and economics. To overcome shortcomings in such a narrative one should start with questioning our ontological

perceptions, and further bring new thoughts of social-ecological realities into conceptual work. Knowing that climate events may catalyse, exaggerate, and trigger underlying social and economic conditions, how can we conceptually and practically separate “climate” migration from economic, social, cultural, political migration?

(Un)natural disasters – an illustrative example

Using theories and literature from studies of “natural disasters” illustrate the dualistic embedded understanding of society and nature nexus and the dilemma of language and terminology. Considering the concept climate migration occasionally carries the connotation of *natural* disasters, this illustration is particularly evident. *Natural disasters* are usually used to refer to and describe a disaster which involves an event originating in the environment (Kelman, 2016, 1), such as; floods, earthquakes, droughts, storms. However, scholars of disaster research have for a long period of time argued towards the “unnaturalness” of natural disasters. Beyond merely physical explanations of disasters, scholars have worked to address pre-existing vulnerabilities to explain the consequences of hazards and disasters. The aim of disaster research is to locate the physical, social, political, economic conditions which shape the factual human vulnerability and exposure to disasters (Chmutina and von Medning, 2019). In the case of disaster studies, these pre-existing social conditions can be described as; regulation and building codes, urban planning, risk management and awareness raising, politics, governance and the media and development growth and culture (Gould et al. 2016, Bankoff, 2001 and Ward and Shively 2017, in Chmutina and von Medning, 2019). For this reason, the impacts of disasters are not equally distributed among individuals, households and societies. Kelman (2010) asks the following question: do *natural* disasters exist? He further argues; “*natural disasters do not exist because all disasters require human input. Nature sometimes provides input through a normal and necessary environmental event, such as a flood or volcanic eruption, but human decisions have put people and property in harm’s way without adequate measures to deal with the environment. The conclusion is that those human decisions are the root causes of disasters, not the environmental phenomena*” (2). In other words, there are numerous other conditions which affect the total outcome of disasters caused by environmental events.

However, if the consensus of lack of naturalness in natural disaster is, and has been, well established within academia for an adequate period of time then how and why do the concept

of natural disasters continue to flourish in policy, academic, and nongovernmental circles? The study provided by Chmutina and von Medning (2019) illustrates the multiple reasons why the concept of natural disaster is growing in popularity. In the 1990s natural disaster was used by the UN to campaign action and responsibility towards the International decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. Since then, the concept has been constantly used by the media regardless on the UN's change of narrative (285-286). Another argument is based on the advantage of the word "natural" when comparing with other disasters, such as technical (nuclear or building collapse disasters) or conflict and war related disasters. Some researchers or media correspondents will hold on to the word natural for reasons of convenience when reaching out to a general audience. However, Chmutina and von Medning further recognise that some researchers will continue to use the concept out of ignorance or without considering the implications of the politics of language.

The results of ongoing ignorance pose multiple challenges. Blaming nature for the failure of adequate development for instance in; urban planning, increasing socioeconomic inequalities, non-existent or poorly regulated policies, and lack of proactive adaptation and mitigation risks the case of maladaptation. In other words, maladaptation can be described as increased or withstanding vulnerability which a given adaptation process intended to decrease (Magnan et al., 2016, 647). Additionally, and perhaps more crucial, this understanding represents the lack of political responsibility because "natural" disasters are "nobody's fault". The probability of recreating existing social vulnerabilities is higher when the pre-existing conditions are not addressed in both explanation in magnitude of the disaster or considered in further post-disaster management (Chmutina and von Medning, 2019). The argument of Chmutina and von Medning is to address the political responsibility in adequate and correctly using the language to describe the issue rightfully. Their suggestion is to use the word disaster alone and rather emphasise a nuanced explanation of the other circumstances.

Climate futures – scenarios and solutions

A common trend within climate migration research starts with an introduction by outlining huge numbers, state of emergency and possible dystopian futures if immediate action is not undertaken. The origin of climate migration studies, featuring the work by Myers, is based on the prediction and estimation of hundreds of millions of people who will be displaced globally by the year 2050 due to climate change. They frame climate change as the constructor of a

human tide of displaced households in the future and some scholars predict a number between 50-200 millions of climate refugees by 2050 (Boateng, 2014). For this reason, climate refugees are commonly described as *the human face of climate change* (Bettini et. al, 2017, 34). Based on this evidence, this narrative addresses the global obligation to act and establish legal protection for the people of concern (Biermann and Boas, 2010). These alarming numbers have led to the ongoing negotiations and debate on climate migration and climate futures. One may argue that these estimates numbers are one of the crucial reasons why the topic has received increasing global attention. The narrative mobilises a call for responsibility, an act of justice, and contains strong moral connotations. While several studies have continued the work of Myers (Boeteng 2014, Biermann and Boas 2010, Kolmannskog 2008, Picchi 2016) other scholars have remained sceptical to these numbers. The sceptical voices within climate migration repeat the question: where are these numbers originating from? (Gemenne, 2011b). For instance, far less efforts are set to account for current numbers on displaced people than research which aim to predict the future flows of migration and displacement (Gemenne, 2011b, 42). Gemenne further argues that the threatening predictions by El-Hinnawi among other has generated huge attention in media and social society (2011b).

Eric Swyngedouw (2010) contributed an interesting perspective on the issue of future climate scenarios by combining apocalyptic climate futures with populist politics, the current de-politicised nature of neoliberal and capitalist system. He argues that the global problem of climate change is mediated through the framing of CO₂ emissions as the external and objectified evil. Climate migration continues to be staged as the common “fear” of all humanity and if not managed properly the future consequences could disrupt life as we know it (217). This has resulted in an alarming tendency and framing of climate change as an apocalyptic catastrophe. The political management of tackling climate change globally, what Swyngedouw refers to as “an issue of security”, is characterised by decision-making which increasingly reflects a question of expert knowledge and not of political position (225).

The technical management of climate change underlines the scientific and political consensus and embeddedness of the binary understanding of environment and society. Leading to the tendency of climate change being framed as an external unit to the human system. Blaming CO₂ as the evil and target for climate management reflects the rejection of acknowledging the ontological and underlying conditions which facilitated the global increasing CO₂ emissions. The “system” of unevenly distributed power relations, of the networks of control and

influence, of rampant injustices, or of a fatal flaw inscribed in the system are overlooked and rather targeted towards climate change, an external force beyond human systems, an “outsider”. Political responses to climate change reflect less of replacing the elite but rather populist tendencies will rather put pressure on the existing elites to undertake action (Swyngedouw, 2010, 222). The lack of transformational pattern repeats the argument of Feola (2020) emphasizing that change must occur outside and beyond our current political and economic system.

Returning to the global attention on climate migration, these existing political mechanisms help to explain some of the obstacles and ramifications of how we conceptualise and understand climate migration. Further, they explain how the narrative and alarmist approaches to millions of future climate refugees occur in debate, considering that global debate on climate change already carries strong rhetoric of both security issues and human catastrophes. Swyngedouw capture these fears in a bigger picture:

As particular demands are expressed (get rid of immigrants, reduce CO₂) that remain particular, populism forecloses universalization as a positive socio-environmental injunction or project. In other words, the environmental problem does not posit a positive and named socio-environmental situation, an embodied vision, a desire that awaits realization, a fiction to be realized. In that sense, populism does not solve problems, it moves them elsewhere.

(Swyngedouw, 2010, 224)

Understanding migration

Compared with the concept of “climate”, the other component “migration” has not received similar conceptual critique in the context of climate migration. However, other indicators connected to migration directly and indirectly influence our understanding of climate migration. To understand what *migration* represents in climate migration, it is crucial to understand which pre-existing narratives are shaping our understanding of migration today. Different concepts of mobility are applied in the context of climate migration, and in many cases, they represent different narratives and framings of climate migration. The two most common narratives are the difference between climate *migrant* and *refugee*. However, other studies emphasise different concepts of human mobility for instance climate change induced displacement, environmental and ecological relocation, internally displaced people due to natural disasters and climate events (Piguet et. al. 2018).

The lack of a concise and common understanding of the concept of climate migration have been an ongoing debate. For instance, while some studies emphasise that a climate migrant is someone who is *forced* to leave their home and habitat (Karanja and Abdul-Razak 2018, 258), others will include *or choose to do so voluntarily* (Boateng 2014, 3). This perspective is especially visible in the climate refugee-migrant debate. Similar disagreements can be found between the compositions *internal* and *external*, between local, national, regional or national borders. Lastly, the issue of *temporal*, *seasonal*, *traditional* and *permanent* relocation of habitat can be applied. The above-mentioned elements of migration are diversifying and create a somewhat ungraspable image of what climate migration is.

While some scholars will might argue for and against one of the concepts, other studies could use a concept without arguing or justify it. The different concepts of mobility serve different narratives and approaches, which is outlined in detail in the background section. The following section will provide a deeper understanding of narratives of mobility corresponding with the political climate of today.

Understanding mobility- Beyond push and pull

Throughout history mobility has represent a natural condition for humans. But, what is *mobility*? The narrative of climate refugees suggests that climate change represent a dominant *push* factor, forcing people to leave their home and habitat. However, there is more to mobility than the dichotomy of individual push and pull factors. As will be outlined in this section, the understanding of mobility connects a wide range of different structural and individual conditions.

The concept of mobility provides an analytical and methodological diverse lens to study human movement. In this case it further function as a bridge to capture the nuances between the different concepts of human movement such as *migration* and *refuge* as well as *relocation* and *displacement*. The mobility approach brings together a diverse array of forms of movement across scales ranging from the body to the globe (Cresswell, 2010, 18).

Furthermore, mobility represents a tool to analyse different forms of movement in a bigger picture by applying geographical instruments such as scale, place, and spatiality. New studies on mobility grasp on a vast variation of different forms of movement; physical and virtual, permanently, seasonal, temporary, forced, uneven, disrupted voluntary, legal and illegal, right

and wrong movement, accepted and unwanted, mobile and immobile. Mobility can refer to both human and non-human mobility and furthermore represent an individual and social group perspective (Cresswell, 2010).

For this reason, mobility is useful to better understand how we relate to the concept of climate migration. The concept of mobility works as an umbrella term to better understand individual, physical mobility, material mobility and restrictions of mobility, all together representing our collective understanding of mobility and which implications it serves for our understanding of human mobility in general. Several scholars have linked mobility to the modern social life which represents a pillar in our global, economic, and political system. In sum, mobilities research brings together studies of migration, transportation, infrastructure, transnationalism, mobile communications, imaginative travel, and tourism, new approaches to mobility (Massey, 1993 in Sheller 2014, 793). Bringing into view the political projects inherent in the power relations informing processes of globalisation (and thus calling into question associated claims to globality, fluidity, or opening) (Sheller, 2014, 793).

Within the climate refugee narrative there is an implicit understanding that some people will not be able to attain a state of mobility due to structural conditions. According to the narrative, these people will depend on external elements, such as a new refugee law or legal protection. For this reason, it is logical and necessary to introduce and understand the opposite concept of mobility, immobility. However, behind different structures of governance on mobilities are existing power relations (Sheller, 2018, 3). Immobility therefore reflects people's uneven abilities to move, regardless of aspirations. In addition to external control such as national and global regulations, personal access to social networks can make it difficult to obtain desired mobility (Sheller, 2014).

The duality within neoliberal way of governance actively facilitates free and liberal flows of mobility for some, while controlling and restricting movement of others. For this reason, mobility presented in modern society is contradictory in character. Highlighting the image that free mobility represents a symbol of modern society, promoting global tourism, trade, business and working opportunities through a cosmopolitan and globalised ideal society. However, on the dark side of this "free and borderless world" lie the unwanted, excluded and feared forms of mobility, mostly linked to migration from the Global South to the Global North. The contraction of free flow of mobility is the neoliberal narrative of globalisation that

is, on the one hand, constituted by ideas of progress and prosperity, while, on the other, being undergirded by notions of oppression and control (Leese and Wittendorp, 2018 177). This apparent contradiction has sparked political attempts to reconcile security and mobility that are far removed from a simple re-establishment of hard borders between nation states or slow and fragmented forms of mobility (Leese and Wittendorp, 2018, 177).

This perspective is crucial to understand when discussing different narratives of climate migration, considering the dominant framing of the “climate migrant” as a poor helpless migrant from the Global South (Piguet et. al., 2018). Consequently, understanding global mobility requires understanding the dominating perception of borders, governance and security, labour and the *Other* migrant.

North-South divide and the Other migrant

The climate refugee narrative’s framing of a potential mass-migration of climate refugees from the Global South to the Global North have been portrayed as both a “security treat” and a call for action (Baldwin, 2012). The action of this approach is to establish and enforce new international laws and protection. The advocating of “saving climate refugees” signalled the fiasco of global climate change mitigation policies and, subsequently, a failure to adapting to climate change (Felli, 2013). When comparing the different narratives it is clear that whether the climate migrants is portrayed as a victim or resilient, the debate is clearly making a disguised rhetoric between *Us* (The Global North) and *Them* (The Global South).

This section will illustrate an understanding of climate migrants in light of the characteristics of Otherness. Some studies have been carried out on this issue, however, the study of Andrew Baldwin is considered the most cited (2012). He argues in favour of an understanding of racial Otherness connotated to the figure of climate migration. Another, though less cited, study by Ruchita Raghunath emphasises an understanding of climate migration through the lens of a colonial Other (2020). Throughout the literature there is cases of both, linked to security, labour and ontology. I will adapt the binary framing of the Other in comparison to the Self, but I will divide it in a much broader understanding between the Global North and South.

A study provided by Piguet et. al (2018) analytically and methodologically illustrates that most research on climate migration is conducted by researchers based in the Global North with case studies in the Global South. They further argue that this tendency stems from the imagined stereotypical figure of poor Southern victims of climate change. The combination of both migration and climate change being considered a security issue for rich Northern countries nuances the debate with the character of securitisation (Piguet et. al. 2018, 373). How we frame climate migration is heavily influenced by established global narratives on South-North migration. Throughout the debate and with evidence from the academic literature, it becomes clear that it is representatives from the Global North who is authorised as experts to define *who* the climate migrants are. Whether there are people from the North or South, internal or external, voluntary or forced. Whether the migrants are described as “victims” or a “threat” it becomes clear that these definitions do not stem from the climate migrants themselves. Consequently, the mobility discourse of climate migration can be categorized as highly political.

For instance, the language of both climate refugees and migration as adaptation have portrayed futuristic scenarios of climate displacement as a threat to international security. In the US, climate change and migration figures routinely appear in the language of national security signalling that this migrant body and phenomenon will threaten US national security (Schwartz and Randall 2003, Campbell et al. 2007, CNA 2007, Werz and Conley 2012, in Baldwin 2012, 678). Further, framed as the embodiment of a potential catalyst for political violence and a potential humanitarian crisis (630-631).

Once again, the understanding of climate migration is built on ontological dualistic understandings of reality, in this case by divided one mobile group as *included* and *accepted* while the other group is *unwanted* and *excluded*. The rhetoric of climate migration is pictured as a figure from the Global South understood as a victim, threat (Baldwin, 2012) or development project (Felli, 2013). On the other hand, tourists, businessmen and labour migrants from the Global North access a greater freedom of mobility and are associated with health, prosperity and liberty (Sparke, 2005).

What becomes evident from this perspective is that the debate on climate migration lacks representation from the people of concern. The study by Piguet et. al. (2018) suggests that our

understanding of climate migration is the result of stereotypes, fear and asymmetrical research between the global north and south. Baldwin (2012) argues that the Othering of climate migration is not just a framing of the Global South and North, but the Othering of the future “potentiality for the world to become different as a result of climate change” (636). Framed as the embodiment of a potential catalyst for political violence and a potential humanitarian crisis (630-631). Maja Korac-Sanderson (2019) argues that this divide stretches further, in what she refers to as the “global apartheid order” (Hage, 2016), and “dividing the world into two realities” between the Global North and South (Korac-Sanderson, 2019). Reflecting persisting narratives which consider some migrants included and other excluded through both imaginative and physical borders.

Borders and security issues

Empirical evidence show climate migration are usually framed as an issue of potential migrants flows between South and North. The binary and Othering rhetoric on the possible threat which climate migrants are posing to the global community reflect existing fears and xenophobia within the global North. This rhetoric can be found in both narratives, whether the threat is posed by *tides* of climate refugees escaping environmental apocalyptic disasters or the management of migration dramatically fails. Maja Korac-Sanderson reflect further on this issue.

The so-called Western world is overwhelmed by fear of being besieged by the arrival of migrants who are often compared to a tidal wave (as in Britain) or a barbarian invasion (as in France) (Bigo 2002: 69), justifying heated political debates about “national security” and related policies to curb immigration. This also validates moves to curtail the right of forced migrants to protection. (Korac Sanderson, 2019, 135)

This perspective brings a coherent understanding of the linkage between the Other migrant, security threats, national security measures thereby strengthening borders in the Global North. Further linked to the fear of “narratives of reversed colonization”, which represent the “civilized” world as being on the verge of being overrun by “primitive” forces (Hage, 2016, 39). This section will bring clarity to the correlation between our understanding of borders in relation to what is referred to as *barbaric invasions* and *tidal waves*. Two concepts usually associated with climate migration within media (Baldwin, 2012).

Border becomes evident when discussing the definition of climate migration. Borders can represent physical territorial limitations in terms of internal or external forms of physical mobility. However, borders can further function as a tool to understand imagined limitations in terms of which migrants are *included* and *excluded* from accessing territorial lines. Therefore, borders represent a limitation for mobility and thereby facilitating immobility. To understand the “logics” of border politics it is necessary to understand who is crossing borders and who holds the power of regulating them. (Leese and Wittendorp, 2018)

Generally, international law distinguishes between political migrants and economic migrants. Often the discussion occurs in a binary language as either “forced” or “voluntary” migrants which generalises the causes and dynamics of migration. Political or forced migrants can be categorized as “refugees” or “asylum seekers” with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, ethnicity, or membership in a specific political or social group. However, the case of “economic migrants” contains a description of “voluntarily”. Economic migrants have no international protection or rights at the border, implying that their crossings will rather be governed by national immigration laws and policies based on the receiving country’s labour or demographic needs (Bates-Eamer, 2020, 3). For this reason, the distinction between “legal” and “illegal” migrants is relevant. While the former obtains legal qualification for international protection, the latter is lacking these requirements. From a policy and law perspective, the distinction between “voluntary” and “forced”, “legal” and “illegal” is highly relevant. However, from a rhetorical perspective the question of why people move might appear more blurred between the binary definitions (Bates-Eamer, 2020, 6).

Neither imagined nor physical borders are static, they are in constant change represent a response to what they are supposed to regulate (Balibar 1998; Parizot et al. 2014; Walters 2006 in Leese and Wittendorp, 2018, 176). Border politics operate under the geopolitical circumstances regarding which forms of global mobility they are supposed to protect. In today’s political climate we face strong rhetorical narratives on global mobility in right-wing Europe, the US and Australia. One illustrating consequence of such rhetoric can be found in increasing border control budgets. For instance, from 2002 to 2013 the US Custom and Border Protection increased their budget from 5.9 to 12 billion USD. In the case of Europe, an even larger budget increase can be found. In 2005, Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, had a budget on 6.2 million euros, and in 2017 the budget raised to 302 million euros (Bates-Eamer, 2019, 11).

This explains that the ideal of globalisation's "borderless world" is restricted to certain types of mobility. For instance, a business class civil citizenship has been extended across transnational space at the very same time as economic liberalisation and national securitization have curtailed citizenship for others (Sparke, 2006). Clearly illustrating the different notions of freedom/restrained, accepted/denied, liberty and prosperity/security issue. The political climate in irregular and illegal migration between the "borders" of the global South and North illustrate this point. The political climate for border control, both in terms of rhetoric, infrastructure and increasing budget are constantly withholding physical and imagined borders. Arguably, the xenophobic, securitising, and hostile migration narratives from the West creates a solid foundation on our perception of climate migration. Regardless of the dimension of "climate", the current status of economic migrants from the Global South to the Global North is neither particularly accepting nor welcoming. The previous section outlined in detail current stereotypes and understandings of *who* the climate migrants represents in current academic work, media and global debates. This further implies that potential climate migrants are naturally linked with border and security debates in the Global North.

However, this view brings us to further understand one of the reasons why climate change, the environment and natural dimensions of migration have been advocated as drivers of migration. Considering global inequality and challenges for economic and labour migrants.

Neoliberal border regulation: labour and governmentality

The de-naturalised turn in the climate migration debate shift the focus from the environmental determinate refugee to an economic resilient migrant. Driving the global debate in direction of labour and neoliberal mindset and policies. The promotion of 'migration-as-adaptation' could therefore signalize a broader trend toward the neoliberalisation of adaptation to environmental change.

Therefore, the lens of labour and migration need to be included in order to understand the narratives on climate migration. In this context, labour migration can be referred to as a synonym of climate migration, a promoted adaptive strategy of climate change and lastly, a perspective of inequality and limitation of mobility. Within the narrative of migration as

adaptation, presenting the resilient migrant, lies the emphasis on each individual's own responsibility to adapt to changing environmental circumstances. In compare to the narrative of climate refugee which promote the responsibility of the Global North to rescue those displaced by climate change. One of the ways to facilitate and increase resilience among migrants is usually promoted through facilitating labour markets. Nation states and the international community are to govern the movement of labour migrants in order for them to undertake adaptation measures and secure themselves (Bettini et al., 2017).

The emphasis on labour migration can be drawn from the shift to resilience and the de-politicisation of the debate. It is evident that this response marks a feasible response within the framework of neoliberal and capitalist ideologies which embrace the great capacity and autonomy of individuals to "build themselves a better life" (Felli, 2013, 350). However, the neoliberal mindset undermines global inequalities and structural limitation by favouring certain qualities. For instance, the system of labour migration is a subject to

Reflecting that within the migration-as-adaptation narrative, adaptation are not refer to a collective, political, and social transformation of the external conditions; rather, it is a transformation of the individuals themselves to become more suitable to adaptation (Chandler, 2010a: 143–168 in Felli, 2013, 348). Furthermore, the global climate for facilitating labour migration is already limiting and restrictive. Border control and the territorialisation of labour power is usually managed by favouring the interest of the employer at the expense of the worker (Felli, 2013).

Returning to the language of climate refugees, the direction of emphasising labour migration and the resilient migrants generates a question of deprived rights of the migrant. It becomes evident that even though agency is located within the individual migrant, external institutions retain the power of managing mobility (Felli, 2013). Further reflecting the grooving tendency of global governance structures.

Returning to the contradictory of modern era mobility, the perspective of labour migrants represents an evident example of these opposites. The debate on labour migration as adaptative measure to climate change consists of a blurry line between empowering the migrants through the concept of resilience and agency. While at the same time depriving migrants from political, social and environmental rights. International organisation like IOM

further claim that unmanaged environmental migration will possibly cause disruption and threaten human security (Felli, 2013).

Understanding climate migration – a real phenomenon?

Throughout this section it has become clear that several binary ontological understandings are shaping how we understand climate migration. The understanding of climate migration originally described the phenomenon of people being forcibly displaced by unruly powers of nature. The binary understanding of nature and society has deep roots in western thought and can further be linked to the ongoing environmental changes we are experiencing today. This chapter has outlined an historical understanding on this issue which further reflects that in order to combat current challenges of climate change, change should be promoted outside established narratives.

I will return to the literature of (un)natural disasters and reproduce the critical question of Kelman (2010) in the context of climate migration. That is, **does *climate migration* exist?** The question might appear rhetorical of character, and this thesis will not engage in a deeper philosophical discussion “what exists and what is real in the world”. However, words matter, and how we linguistically frame an issue will represent our ontological understandings of the issue. And from that case, what makes the concept *climate* migration a valuable concept in describing a pattern of migration? While dominating literature on climate migration suggests that the climate migration debate has become increasingly de-politicised due to neoliberalist ideology, I will argue that the issue is more complex than de-politicised. Considering countless political decisions are made in every step in the maze of different understandings which together form the outcome of our perception of climate migration. The concept of de-politicised tendencies marks a shift of both targeting individuals as opposed to states, however, more crucially, political actions and intentions are occurring on a sub-surface level. The climate refugee narrative suggests that the people who experiences the worst conditions of climate change today are the ones who has contributed the least to the problem. For this reason, climate migration should be a call for justice. However, this chapter has outlined that justice due to climate change is not the only obstacle towards climate migrants, in other words, migrants from the global south. Current narratives on southern migration carries features of Otherness within discussions the Global North.

Returning to the research question, *which ontological understandings of “climate” and “migration” are constructing the understanding of the concept and phenomenon of “climate migration”*? To make a unified answer to this question the figure below brings together the different layers and structures which together form the understanding of climate migration.

Structural conditions				Outcome	
Ontology à		Ideology à		Narratives	
Binary understanding		Neoliberalism		Political	De-politicised
Nature and Society	The Other and Self	Technical climate approach	Governing migrants	Climate refugees	Climate refugees
Humans over Nature	North/South divide	Measurable vulnerability, adaptation, resilience, and future	Borders, Security, Labour,	Crisis Justice Injustice	Solution Governance Individual differences

By studying this figure, the theoretical chapter can be considered explained and summarized. Drawing the line from binary ontological assumptions which further influence ideological neoliberal global structures of managing climate change measures, borders, migration and labour. The logic and reliance of measurable climate change approaches as illustrated within outcome vulnerability withhold the understanding that climate impacts and human responses represent two different units. The debate on climate migration has been divided within two main narratives each representing different values and approaches to the phenomenon. While the climate refugee narrative carries a clear political rhetoric, the latter should not be considered un-political. However, the emphasis on regulations and governance of migrants are not necessarily easy to observe on a surface level. Resulting in complex understandings within multiple fields in order to capture how climate migration is understood, discussed, approached and managed. Further reflecting subtle ontological layers necessary to understand climate migration.

Ultimately it boils down to how we target and label climate migrants. Returning to the question from the introduction, *what is the “climate” in climate migration, and further what*

is “migration” representing in the same context? Furthermore, how are these assumptions on climate and migration shaping our understanding of climate migration?

Binary obstacles stretch beyond the issue of climate change and migration. Existing binary narratives of Otherness facilitate the tendency to frame some selected migrants as an increasing threat and security issue. Combined with increasing budgets, protection and management of borders a wide set of structural mechanisms are further explaining how we perceive climate migrants. This reflects asymmetric power relations from the expansion of human intervention in the environment to the development of the concept of climate migration. Explaining how ontological binary understandings within both migration and climate fuel the outcome of reproduced binary ontology of climate migration. A case where climate change represents a catalyst of pre-existing social, economic, political and ontological conditions. Reflecting asymmetrical power relations throughout the conceptual and ontological maze of climate migration.

Summary

Placing the literature of (un)natural disasters in the context of climate migration serves fruitful possibilities of the potential transferability of insights and theories. Hartmann (2010) raises the issue of the emphasis on nature’s connection to migration. She argues that by applying such a definition one risks naturalising the economic and political causes of environmental degradation and masks the role of institutional responses to it (235). So far, the current literature on climate migration lacks a similar detailed analysis which Chmutina and von Medning provided for natural disaster. However, an interesting correlation can be found when returning to our ontological understanding of nature and society. A common perception that nature is a separate force from humans and their society. However, leaning on the word nature, climate and environment in this context carries political connotations considering the concepts are not representing a political neutral phenomenon. The emphasis on the wild and undisciplined nature as the unpolitical crucial trigger for disaster and migration masks the real political responsibility to facilitate adequate conditions which could minimise or prevent the scope of insecurity of the people of concern. To overcome this issue, addressing the power of language and binary society-nature understand is a good start to change policy outcome.

To further clarify these arguments, the issue of concern is not the natural element of the disaster. When a volcano, cyclone, hurricane, floods, soil erosion, tsunami or earthquake

occurs the potential of destruction of human inhabited land persists. Regardless of the terminology, the magnitude, frequency and scale of disasters may bring large damage to both human and non-human environments. However, these features must be recognized as part of an integral socio-ecologic system and thereby as features of social life (Oliver-Smith, 2012). The dilemma of language poses crucial implications on how we understand and respond on the issue. Concluding remarks from this chapter provide insights into some of the crucial elements in which we understand climate change and how we imagine futures and responses to the issue.

Western binary human-nature assumptions are not necessary something individuals consider much thought on the daily. However, these underlying understandings are shaping how we see ourselves in the world and in relation to our surroundings. It fertilizes our logical and rational acceptance and embracing of cultural, political and economic forms of capitalism. Furthermore, it reflects how we understand change, solutions and which imagines we have for the future. Solutions and initiatives which fail to take these considerations into account risks to be trapped in a system of business-as-usual. Meaning, that the underlying structures which cause the issue in the first place will continue to reproduce negative outcomes. The climate refugee narrative bring justice to the core, but how can global justice be served when we continue to separate different people and society & environmental relations in disconnected ontological systems?

Research design

In the process of developing a research project, countless decisions are made. Some are more important than others, however every decision somehow form the result of the final project. Transparency in research developed is crucial to understand the authors motive and subjectivities. To understand the design, questions, and perspectives of this project it is critical to understand the evolution of the authors research process. Introductions wise I have outlined my personal aim and motivation for this research. This chapter will aim to bridge the gap between aim, purpose and theoretical consideration on one side, and analysing data and bringing out a discussion later. In other words, this chapter will invite the reader into the different philosophical (methodology), and technical (methods) tools applied to carry out this research project.

Methodology

Our subjectivities as researchers such as values, personal opinions, decisions are naturally shaping the progress and outcome of our studies (Dowling, 2016, 39). The aim of this research is to more deeply understand the structural and ontological conditions which shape and influence our perception of the concept and phenomenon of climate migration. By engaging with these underlying conditions, I aim to challenge the current narratives by academic, intergovernmental, governmental and media. This chapter will serve as a crucial link and explanation of the structure and process of the research by bridging the logic between theory and data. Or put differently, it is here that in an analytical way I will approach my research question. This chapter will represent a gateway into my decisions, evaluations, and logic. In other words, the question aims to uncover the underlying perception the research posits and how they influence the research process, design, and methods. I will start by explaining my methodological positioning, referring to the philosophical assumptions which influence my approach to the research topic. Thereafter I will explain the analytical tools applied in order to answer these questions, more commonly referred to as method (Baxter, 2016).

Ontological positioning and ontology as an analytical tool

In this research, ontological positioning represents a crucial element theoretically, methodically, and analytically. The aim of this research is to investigate, locate and challenge

ontological understandings. For this reason, I consider it relevant to outline some of the implications of applying this approach to the research project. Blaikie (2007) defines ontology as “a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of what exists” (13). In the context of social science, it answers the question: “What is the nature of social reality?”. In other words, which values, beliefs, and conceptions of reality are embedded in our understanding of reality?

My own ontological assumptions, values, beliefs and understandings will influence my work, and for this reason I consider it relevant to discuss my own positioning within this field. For instance, it will directly influence *why*, *how* and *which* question I ask and in which direction I will lead this research. My personal background within development and human geography studies have equipped me with critical analytical tools, curiosity, and a drive to investigate underlying structures of asymmetrical power, inequality and injustice relations rooted in decolonial studies. Furthermore, the study by Nightingale et. Al. (2019b) *Beyond Technical Fixes: climate solutions and the great derangement* and Maria J. Goldman et. al. (2018) *A critical political ecology of human dimensions of climate change: Epistemology, ontology, and ethics*, has particular encouraged me to further question hegemonic nature and society ontologies and how it reflects shortcomings in climate adaptation, development and sustainable transformation. For this reason, I believe it is necessary to invite multiple ontologies to combat current global challenges of inequality and justice.

Throughout the research project I am using ontological binaries analytically as a tool to criticize persisting and challenging narratives and ontological positionings. From a personal perspective, I find binary constructions of reality misrepresentative. However, for this project they serve analytical advantages. In this research I have chosen to separate the two terms climate change/nature and migration/mobility in order to display the different connotations connected to each term, which further influence our way of perceiving climate migration.

Qualitative document methods

Qualitative geographers balance the fine art of examining structures and processes on the one hand and individuals and their experiences on the other (Winchester and Rofe, 2016, 6). This further contributes to reveal the human realities behind statistical numbers and evaluations (Pawson and DeLyser, 2016, 430). I have used a qualitative narrative method so I can explore the institutional and discourse perception of climate migration and the structures and mechanisms which shape it.

This research project was conducted under what should be considered uncertain and unpredictable times. Ongoing restrictions due to the current and persistent global pandemic have naturally shaped my research design and progress. I consider it relevant to briefly comment on some of the major decisions and logics in this research which has been shaped by external circumstances. Ideally, I wanted to do bring in human perspectives as well by interviewing representatives which work directly with addressing, approaching or researching on climate migration. Both interviews and fieldwork could represent essential and useful tools to deeper understand how different project on climate migration is carried out. Furthermore, how climate migration is approached and understood within different agencies which either address the topic explicit or work with similar topics. However, it was important for me to design a research project which would remain robust and feasible as possible to avoid potential setback caused by external conditions. For this reason, I eliminated potential interviews and other oral and observing methods of data gathering. The choices I made has limited my data material to documents and other sources which has been available virtually however, further work should aim to uncover human perspectives as well.

Selecting data

The research question of this study calls for a deeper understanding of what climate migration is. There are several directions the research could have taken in order to answer this question. The topic of climate migration is reflected in a range of different arenas including academia, IGOs, NGOs, governmental bodies, media, art, and civil society. Acknowledging possible fluid transitions between these groups, they generally represent seven, or more, different perspectives. For instance, while the jargon and rhetoric within in media can generally be recognized as more political than formal IGOs and government documents. However, there is no evidence to conclude that media represent “one united voice” within the climate migration perspective. Which applies for the other platforms as well.

For this reason, the research will distribute different purposes between the different documents and representatives for this study. As mentioned, academic literature represents the critical lens from which I will analyse the different understandings of climate migration. Furthermore, the academic literature in this research will provide insights on the historical and definitional dimensions of climate migration.

Documents I have used for the data analysis are divided in two sections, primary and secondary sources. The primary sources represent the main attention in the analysis and consist of IGO, government bodies, NGOs, media archives. Secondary sources take the function of supportive or counterarguments, represented by the same categories as above and additionally academic literature and documentaries. For primary data, I have chosen to exclusively include documents which addressed climate migration explicitly and engage in the debate of the climate migration nexus. In my theoretical chapter I address the issue of multiple definitions and concepts attached to the climate migration debate. These concepts include both climate refugee, climate migration, climate change displacement among others. However, the aim of this thesis is to understand how the concept climate migration is understood whether, or not, the author chooses to include other forms of mobility such as *displaced* and *relocated*. On the other hand, the selection of secondary sources has not been limited to the “climate migration” concept. The reason for this is to expand and support arguments.

Choosing which documents I should include has been a challenging task. The growing number of IGOs, government bodies and media articles addressing climate migration result in a broad and wide selection of archives. However, my selection has been based on what I consider highly influential agents which have the power to impact both the general public and national and international agencies.

My aim has been to balance the multiple understandings of climate migration by including perspectives from different agents with different agendas. For this reason, the chosen representatives are a combination of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), Government institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and media. I have chosen these categories of agents because the strong credibility and influential power. Both in terms of setting the agenda and providing measures and actions, or the lack of it, but nevertheless importantly by political influence and thereby shaping the general public’s understanding of what climate migration is. For this reason, it is crucial to understand the political and position of power of my selected representatives before I discuss the content of their reports and documents. In the following section I will introduce the different primary sources and their representative organization or institution. Secondary sources have not been analysed or emphasised in equal weight, therefore considered less space in the introduction.

However, there have been challenges in selecting which data is relevant and which data will serve the best purpose in conveying and capturing the global discussion on climate migration. I have come to realise that the literature and research on climate migration is considerably dynamic and expanding. Different IGOs, NGOs, Government institutions, media, art, and academia are producing new research and material at a fast rate which makes it difficult to both understand the current consensus on what climate migration is and further how we should approach it. For the case of this research it represents an interesting finding, however due to my personal challenge of data selection it represents a troubling case to select the most representative documents.

Gathering data

Main data was mainly gathered by using search words as:

1. Climate/environmental/ecological migration/refugee
2. Climate change induced migration
3. Climigration
4. Migration and climate change/environmental change

My main interest has been targeted to the documents addressing climate migration by relying on a concept of nature: climate change, environmental or ecological, combined with either refugee or migration. In the theory section I address all forms of human movement through the lens of mobility. However, while the emphasis on migration captures the nuances of displacement and relocation, the two latter concepts lack an inclusion of migration. The aim of this paper is to address the climate migration/refugee debate and for this reason I have made some analytical and strategic decisions.

The majority of documents included in this research is available for the public through the different agent's webpages. The only report with limited access was the *IOM 2017 – Atlas of environmental migration* which I had to depend on the university' library platform Oria to gain access. For this reason, there are some considerations attached to the decision to include this document in my research. Considering the document is limited to the public, there are reasons to believe that the document has a lower probability of general influence. My aim is to understand both how different agents understand climate migration but also with consideration of how they might influence others, both at expert and non-expert level.

However, because the document is produced by IOM which I consider to both be a highly relevant informant and with great influence among agencies who work with migration I made

the decision to include the document. Furthermore, the comparison with IOM' earlier document on migration and climate change, *IOM outlook on migration, environment and climate change*, provides an interesting attribute to my analysis.

Analysing data

Document analysis

Textual methods are the second major type of qualitative research in human geography (Winchester and Rofe, 2016, 10). This research builds on three sets of documents. My theory section is structured from what I consider are the main gaps and critical considerations within climate migration literature. The documents used reflect the combination of critical and mainstream climate migration literature within academia. Further, I have supplied additional academic literature on topics I consider necessary in order to understand climate migration.

Because my aim of this thesis is to understand how different agents consider climate migration I will depend on an analytical strategy which can help to uncover these underlying messages. I am inspired by the stage-management technique provided by Hillgartner (2000). What she describes as the careful design of hidden (backstage) and actively revealed (fronts stage) activities that takes place behind the processes of publishing reports. When analysing documents on climate migration, it will be equally essential to understand the content and arguments of the document as well as the agenda of the authors. However, in my analysis I have made use of my own terminology to describe this process.

The applied technique for analysis data has been inspired from elements from both narrative and discourse analysis. The process has developed in two steps. First, I was inspired by discourse analysis when I first started engaging with the data collection. Reading, coding and analysing first time was driven by the search and hunt for underlying agendas, meaning and power dimension of words, rhetoric and jargon. However, during the first analysis I gradually discovered a pattern of different narratives which appeared between the different documents. Realising that the story of different interpretations and understandings of climate migration would be more logically conveyed through narratives the analysis changed structure.

I developed three narratives and four sub-narratives to be the structure of this analysis.

1.	Apocalyptic Narrative		Opportunistic Narrative		Critical Narrative
2.	Humanitarian Narrative	Securitising Narrative	Developmental Narrative	Governmental Narrative	Academia

The logic of the different narratives will be carried out in more detail before entering the data analysis.

The aim of this strategy is to bring out the effect and challenge what we meet at the surface level. Which ideas and findings are staged to be at the frontline, and which assumptions are carefully concealed in the backstage? In other words, which perceptions are hiding on the sub-surface? Which myths of “frozen” meaning are influencing ontological and philosophical understandings among the informants? By revealing these levels step by step I seek to invite the reader to a journey I relied on myself when engaging with the material. I will argue that this strategy will serve clear and structured order for the reader to uncover the layers of climate migration. Additionally, it serves as a methodological tool to capture my findings in its natural and logical form.

In terms of locating the underlying meaning in the data material Asdal (2015) reflects on the benefit of document analyses.

“We need to be aware that not only may issues be modified and transformed, but the very concept “issue” may signify and mean radically different things and be translated in very different ways.” (Asdal, 2015, 75)

For this reason, we should not be satisfied that something becomes or is framed as an issue, but rather seek to understand how the concept emerged in the first place (Asdal, 2015). In my analysis I consider myself inspired by this approach when I aim to understand how the different agents relate and frame the issue of climate migration. Further, it seeks to capture some of the underlying mechanisms which assist in explaining how climate migration has gradually developed to become a topic of international attention.

Both Asdal and Hillgartner brings to my attention the potential power dynamics in within institutional documents. To approach this thematic I will make use of elements of discourse analysis to uncover the dimensions of power, rhetoric and ontological positioning.

Discourse analysis

Definitions and terminology have been at the core of climate migration studies and naturally becomes an entry point to understand the different viewpoints of the informants. The different researchers and organizations behind these documents are the responsible associates which are actively shaping the narratives and understandings of climate migration. The self-proclaimed authors and storytellers of what climate migration is and further who a climate migrant is. For this reason, language and narrative are strong indicators for analytical investigation. More specifically, aim and purpose of document and further definitions, terminology and concluding arguments. The first indicator which can provide insides on this issue is the preferred terminology and definitions. The different definitions represent a useful gateway into understanding how the different agents understand the concept, or more specifically which underlying presumptions that are shaping their perception of the concept. Naturally it becomes easier to apply this perspective in the case of IGO and Government reports considering they carefully devoted a separate section for defining concepts. All of the represented reports in this research have dedicated space to elaborate on the issue of *understanding the relation between climate change and migration*.

“Discourse is somewhat like grammar, in that it is not a thing to be seen and touched, but instead an implicit ‘set of capabilities, an ensemble of rules by which readers/listeners and speakers/audiences are able to take what they hear and read and construct it into an organized meaningful whole.’” (Berg, 2009, 216)

Many scholars associate Michel Foucault with discourse analysis and I will argue that I am myself inspired by his work. To clarify, I will not proceed with Foucauldian analysis of its true character. However, I will borrow elements. I seek to understand the underlying power dynamics in the word and concept of climate migration. Further, how different power relations are created and withheld between the experts which define words that aim to capture characteristics of a non-expert group. This process further facilitates different narratives, ideologies which succeed in sustaining the thesis of *a set of unspoken rules which govern, control, and produce knowledge in a subject culture (Berg, 2009, 216)*. Or as I will argue in this case, a subject. Further argued, some narratives function to construct and maintain a narrative that something or someone is considered the “Normal” in contrast to the “Abnormal”. Articulated differently, Foucault is engaged in the division between “Self” and

“Other”, framed through embedded narratives of the majority/empowered group (Berg, 2009, 217).

One key aspect to Foucault's notion of discursive power is that such power is not just 'repressive' in the sense that it prevents action or controls existing agents and outcomes, but that it is also 'productive' in that it creates new actions, events, agents, and outcomes (Berg, 2009, 216).

These perspectives are highly relevant for me considering how I aim to discuss how climate migration is understood on the basis of shaping ontological understanding of duality within environment and migration. Exemplified as security and sovereignty issues which shape the outcome of the global climate migration discourse. Further, how the framing of climate migration continues to fuel the existing narratives of these topics.

The other target of this research is then to understand the effect of the word and concept climate migration, and whether it is accurate for the phenomenon it aims to describe. For this purpose, I will engage in a discussion on the power dimension of this concept and how it affects our way of approaching it.

Coding

Coding the data material has worked as a useful strategy to make sense of the content, rhetoric, and narratives. The technical tool applied for analysing data was the coding programme Nvivo. Access to Nvivo was available through the University of Oslo's web page and access by student ID. The logic of coding was structured by combining the approaches of inductive and deductive methods. The main purpose of coding was to capture and locate words, sentences and agendas which correlated or stood out in relation to my theoretical assumptions. Thematic pillars from the theoretical chapter were used as starting codes, separated in two folders: climate and migration and further sub-coded with the same logic as the chapter. In other words, the deductive theory-testing method worked as the main strategy. However, as I continued to code other dimensions of interest occurred and I had to include new codes which functioned to provide a better overview of the data.

The only document which was coded separately was IOM - *The Atlas of Environmental Migration 2016*. The book is 100.27 MB large and contains a considerable amount of illustrations. I believe this is the reason why Nvivo refused to accept the document after

numerous attempts. For this reason, I had to apply different techniques of coding this book. I used a marking tool in Adobe Acrobat to highlight sections, in which one colour represented one code similar to Nvivo. The same coding strategy was carried out within media articles, websites and documentaries. From there, it became useful to make small notes next to the different codes. Additionally, I kept a notebook where I could elaborate my thought and reflections. There might be some limitations attained to this technique. For instance, I was not able to collect all the codes in one place, which is easily managed in Nvivo. However, due to the research emphasis on rhetoric and language I was able to capture the specific codes which I had to bring together for a broader comparison manually.

Ethical consideration

When doing research several potential ethical considerations should be reflected on. It is crucial to remember that even though a document research project doesn't consider private encounters with informants or participants, the researcher has a responsibility of making the research transparent for the reader.

Power relations

Dowling (2016) states that power never can be eliminated from the research because it exists in all social relations (36). For this reason, it is crucial that the researcher will consider space to reflect of which power relations which already exists or is created during the research project.

Power dynamics and relations is a natural and crucial topic to cover in this research. Power relations occur both as a theme in the research as well as the production of this study reflect different relations of power. My own position in this research represents the most natural and necessary to comment on first. There have been several considerations I had to be aware of and reflect on before I chose this research. Furthermore, other considerations have occurred during the research project.

Firstly, I am not a migrant, my parents are not migrants. I have belonged to the majority culture my entire life, which will most likely continue throughout my life. Furthermore, I live in a climatic and economically secure country in the Global North with little fear of facing strong consequences on this issue today or in the future. I attain no embodied feelings or experiences of any of the aspects as the study object of this research. My understanding of the topic is limited through academic research and personal interest.

Every dimension of my life is therefore disconnected from the concept of climate migration which I aim to discuss, understand, and study. In other words, I consider myself a (privileged) outsider of the topic of this research. Piguet et. al. (2018) argues that research conducted on climate migration represents asymmetrical power relations. He argues that the great majority of climate migration research is produced in the Global North with empirical evidence and case studies in the Global South. Piguet et. al. (2018) calls for more research from the Global South, and for research institutions in the Global North to better include climate migration research for their own region.

Part of my research is to stay critical to this tendency, which is why I have to ask myself the question: *How can I write about this topic when I have the privilege to not face the same situation and have no lived experiences of being an migrant, an Other or find myself in unsafe and unpredicted life situation due to climate change or economic, political or governmental unbalance?*

My position as a researcher in this case provides me the privilege and liberty to read, write and study this topic and then leave it whenever I feel like it. In this situation I have to make use of the tools of critical reflexivity and rather ask myself the question, *how can I approach this topic correctly?*

For this reason, I will also use my own position, and my own critical reflection to criticize the general power dimension within the climate migration debate. Furthermore, the aim of my research is to address the western embedded ontological and ideological conditions which fertilize the construction of the phenomenon of climate migration. In this case I will argue that by staying constantly critical to my positioning I can contribute with research of relevance.

I will use a personal narrative throughout the research for the reader to better understand where my personal decisions, interpretations and arguments take place. Research is not shaped or created by itself, it requires human analytical interpretations and decision taking. For this reason, I will aim to make it clear for the reader where the researcher' explicit choices and arguments are present.

Limitations

There are several other takes and structures this research could have taken. I have chosen a selection of different perspectives to analyse and understand climate migration. However, there are considerable other frames and perspectives which could have been useful. For instance, I could have included a lens and perspective of gender, age and sexuality, justice,

citizenship, demographics, race and ethnicity, war and conflict, emotions and subjectivities, scale and place among others. The selected pillars of this study is chosen based on interest, what I consider relevance but more importantly, perspectives which are feasible to apply through document analysis. Ideally, perspectives on emotions and behaviours, gender and citizenship would represent other interesting perspectives if fieldwork, focus groups and interviews would have been possible.

For instance, I have only included one perspective directly from a climate migrant's personal narrative and viewpoint, which was conducted through documentary and film analysis.

Additionally, this perspective stems from a group of climate migrants which is not commonly associated as the "mainstream" climate refugee. This is the exact reason why this perspective serves a valuable perspective in my analysis. However, I acknowledge that multiple perspectives could serve an interesting counterpart. On the other hand, these perspectives can be difficult to find. Usually, IGOs, NGOs, media and different art forms operate as the mediator for climate refugees, the narratives from the people of concern are usually interpreted to serve a specific purpose.

Furthermore, I have limited my study through the perspective of 4 main platforms. Within these four platforms I have limited my selection of informants to World Bank, Foresight, EU, IOM, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Naturally it would be interesting to include other perspectives as well. For instance, UNHCR, Nansen Initiative, Global Compact in Migration, Red Cross among others. However, my motivation for this research was to engage with platforms which articulated the issue of climate migration. For instance, while UNHCR are working to address the issue of climate change and displacement, I was analytically interested in limiting sources on the conceptual inclusion of the term climate migration. Furthermore, the scope and limitation of this research has restricted me to include more documents than what I would be able to carry out an interesting and in-dept analysis from. Within the selected documents, I have made limitation to focus on specific discussions, notably the understanding of climate migration, the understanding of the climate migrant, aims, solutions and approaches.

Another aspect which has the potential to both strengthen and weaken this research is the inclusion of too many lenses to understand climate migration. While I consider the chosen perspectives to adds broader nuance and deeper understanding, fewer lenses could provide a stronger in-dept analysis.

Introducing data material

This research is based on archival and document collection. I have chosen to include reports, research documents, NGO websites and media articles and two documentaries which directly address the issue of climate migration. Other documents which addressed similar topics of my theoretical chapter such as borders, security, migration, climate change or labour management would be interesting to include as well. However, the aim of the study is to investigate how we understand the concept *climate migration*, and for this reason I have only included documents which aim to address this topic explicitly. Considering other documents of relevance, they will work as valuable insides in the discussion section as supporting or counterarguments.

Intergovernmental Organizations - IGOs

International Organization for Migration (IOM) with *IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change* published in 2014, and *The Atlas of Environmental Migration* published in 2017. IOM represents an agent of high relevance in understanding the concept of climate migration. The IGO stands out as the leading organisation for dealing, supporting, and managing international cooperation and assistance for inter- and national migration with 70 years' experience. The IOM is a public body within the United Nations (UN) and therefore represents an organization with high relevance in development issues.

The World Bank report *Groundswell, Preparing for Internal Climate Migration*, published in 2018. The IGO represents one of the largest and most influential organisation for global development and thereby establishes itself as an organisation of importance and great influence in the discussion of climate migration. The World Bank focuses on multiple areas of development including, financial, education, climate change adaptation, labour management and forced displacement among others. Considering they operate within these varying fields of development the World Bank represent another approach than IOM.

Government bodies

The Foresight report *Migration and Global Environmental Change, Possible Challenges and Opportunities* published in 2011 by UK Government Office for Science. This project is considered highly influential within climate migration literature. This research is not a

government document, rather it belongs in the grey zone between research institution and government body. However, considering the research group is closely linked to the government and governmental decision making I have chosen to include this research under the category of government body. Foresight research group represents a public body for science, which advises policymakers for taking action for a resilient future. “We advise the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet, to ensure that government policies and decisions are informed by the best scientific evidence and strategic long-term thinking”.

European Union with *Climate change and Migration, Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration* published in 2020 and *The concept of 'climate refugee' Towards a possible definition* published in 2019. The EU represent an interesting contribution to this discussion. Bringing a regional government institution fertilizes interesting perspectives and discussion within the field of border management and global governance and responsibility. Additionally, the report *The EU and Climate Security* published in 2017 is included to bring in some other counterarguments.

Non-Governmental Organisations - NGOs

NGOs represent an important source of information to this research. The content of NGOs is political and represents a formerly highly relevant perspective within academia. They bring a nuanced and interesting discussion to the less political platforms mentioned above. The chosen NGOs of this research are Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Based on a previous and long lasting engagement with the topic of climate migration and considerable global recognition within their field these NGOs are considered highly relevant for this research.

Media

I have chosen to include media articles because they represent a strong opponent to IGOs and Government documents. Furthermore, media sources tend to speak directly to the public and for this reason are highly influential. However, during the years I have closely engaged with the topic of climate migration, I have noticed a clear division between the media's framing of climate migration in relation to the other agents, academia, IGOs, NGOs, and government bodies. Media documents in compare to the work of IGOs and government reports expands to enormous collection of information. I have chosen to include perspectives from big influential international media houses such as The Guardian, BCC, The Nation and Al-Jeezara, and Australian Times. Media represent no unified voice; however, I have purposely included

articles which present a strong political framing of climate migration. The reason for this is to bring out a more nuanced picture of the climate migration debate which do not appear equally clear other places.

Documentaries

In addition to reports, documents, and articles, I have chosen to include two documentaries. "

The UK's first climate change refugees? By Tom Baker published in 2020. The other documentary is produced by Michael Nash with the title *Climate refugees: the human face of climate change* published in 2010. The reason for including these documentaries is to bring out some supportive perspectives in discussion and debate. However, they have not been granted equally salience as the reports and documents.

Empirical Evidence

Who is telling the stories of climate migration?

Who is responsible for creating the narratives of climate migration?

How is the issue addressed among different agents?

How are these perspectives affecting responses to the people of concern?

My motivation for this analysis is driven by my own ongoing confusion regarding the topic of climate migration. I gradually realised that whenever I switched platforms of information from academic literature to IGO reports, NGOs, media archives and government documents the narrative of climate migration appeared contradictory.

As outlined in the methodology chapter, several indicators of relevance were carefully considered before data selection and gathering took place. The data collection should consist of reports, documents and journals of relevance within influential agents in the fields of development, climate change and migration. Furthermore, media articles and NGO websites were aimed to work as the opposite narrative, reflecting two fixed categories of climate migration narrative. In a broad sense this perception was confirmed during the data analysis. However, when analysing the different documents carefully, it becomes clear that what was considered as fixed and static narratives between IGO, NGO, government bodies, media and academia was in fact more fluid in character. However, what I first thought was a waste of the analysis process turned out to be an interesting discussion of crossing narratives and diverse ideas of what climate migration is and how it should be approached and *solved*. Due to rhetoric, language and solutions the media and IGOs appears like two polar oppositions on the surface. However, during the analysis it becomes evident that elements of the climate refugee narrative are still present in the narrative of migration as adaptation. As provided in O'Brien's different interpretations of climate change and vulnerability, aiming to understand different ontological lenses is useful when comparing different approaches to the same topic. The theoretical chapter provided a deeper understanding of binary ontological assumptions which shape our understanding of the concept and phenomenon of climate migration. The following chapter will outline the different agent's understandings and approach to climate migration. In other words, *in which ways are these understandings shaping different narratives and approaches in the global climate migration debate?*

Evidence from data analysis – what is a climate migrant?

The aim of the theoretical chapter was to deeper engage in the question of different ontological understandings climate and migration which are shaping the narrative of the concept of climate migration. Introduction wise I separated the narratives in two categories of climate refugee and migration as adaptation. Throughout the analysis it became clear that these narratives had to be further structured. For this reason, I developed a *map of narratives* aiming to establish some logical sense in what can appear as a chaos of narratives. The following structure of analysis and discussion will follow the logic of ontological understanding, approaches and narratives of climate migration. I will start by presenting the different takes on what and how the climate migrant is understood among the different representatives.

The following figure is a structured model of the different layers of narratives within the climate migration debate. The model is inspired by previous academic work on established narratives (Bettini 2019, Bettini 2017, Ayebe-Karlsson et. al. 2018), however the complete map illustrated below is developed as a result of the data analysis of this research.

	The map of narratives on climate migration				
Main narratives	Apocalyptic		Opportunistic		Critical
Characteristics	Political, climate and humanitarian crisis, future concern, global community, “If we don’t act now”		De-politicised, individual, de-naturalised, “Solution, not problem”		Ontologically, ideologically, politically
Sub-narrative	Humanitarian	Securitising	Developmental	Governmental	Academia
Approaches	Refugee law	Mitigation	Migration as adaptation	International and National Policies	Conceptual critique
	International legal protection	Borders	Relocation programmes	Regulation of Labour	Language critique
Dominant platform	NGOs	Media	IGOs and government bodies	IGOs and government bodies	Academia

Furthermore, this map will function as the structure of this chapter. The aim of this chapter is both to develop a greater understanding of how the concept of climate migration operates

within the different arenas as well as to illustrate the influential and fluid aspects of this division. The latter aim will illustrate how these narratives are far from fixed and set categories but rather function as tools in navigating the complex field of understanding climate migration.

The three main narratives which occur have been categorised as *Apocalyptic*, *Opportunistic* and *Critical* narratives. Furthermore, two sub-narratives are attached to each of the apocalyptic and opportunistic narrative, *Humanitarian*, *Securitising*, *Developmental* and *Governmental*. The Critical narrative is added to the map to place the narrative of this research and other voices from academia in the model. The **critical narrative** has been portrayed throughout the theoretical chapter and will thereby function as the storyteller and point of departure of this discussion. Although recognising that the academic perspective is diverse and understandably captures understandings of climate migration which resonate well with other narratives as well. However, considering the critical narrative rarely appears outside academia this platform has been recognised as dominating. Before I will lay out the findings of this analysis, a proper introduction of the apocalyptic and opportunistic narrative will be briefly outlined.

In this map, the **apocalyptic narrative** carries much of the similarities of the climate refugee narrative. However, it is not exclusive to the definitional concept of climate *refugees*, which is why the concept of apocalyptic is selected to bring more conceptual clarity. Within this narrative, climate migration is understood as a natural and humanitarian crisis of the future. The understanding of climate migration is based on estimations and predictions of millions of future climate migrants followed by a call for the global community to act on this issue before it is too late. Climate migration represents a case of an alarmist wave/tide/flood of migrants created by climate change. It represents several metaphors of a future apocalyptic crisis/doomsday future if not approached urgently. Represented by the phrase “if we don’t act now”.

Further sub-narratives within this narrative are divided within the category of **humanitarian** and **securitising** narratives. The former narrative understands climate migration as the result of human driven climate change. For this reason, it is our moral *responsibility* to save the poor and helpless victims of climate migration. This narrative represents a dimension bringing *justice* to climate migrants. The latter narrative carries a similar alarmist understanding of mass migration. However, the approaches reflect a stronger emphasis on the possible *threat*

and *fear* to the crisis of climate migration might serve to global societies. Research by Giovanni Bettini has earlier illustrated a link between the apocalyptic narrative and similar sub-categories as outlined above (2019, 341). In his work the apocalyptic narrative is referred to as the mainstream narrative, with sub-narratives which carry the same names as in this research. I will argue that it reflects a stronger credibility of the structure of the different narratives.

The **opportunistic narrative** on the other hand, reflects a positive-solutions take on the climate migration issue. This strategy stems from what I earlier have referred to as the migration-as-adaptation narrative. However, considering that narrative reflects several other approaches to climate migration the name of the concept is expanded to capture a broader field. The strategy of promoting climate migration as an opportunity is commonly articulated through the symbolic of “solution, not a problem”. Which reflects a response to the historically embedded apocalyptic narrative. The common denominator within the narrative is multi-causality of understanding migration motives and thereby, on a surface level, weakens the environmental dimension of migration.

The opportunistic narrative is further sub-divided in two categories, **developmental** and **governmental narratives**. In this research, the developmental narrative represents a perception of climate migration where climate mitigation has failed. Further development is necessary to facilitate climate adaptation, in most cases, through migration-as-adaptation programmes. However, this is not the only promoted strategy and approach. For instance, relocation programmes can also be perceived as a developmental response to facilitate climate migration. The governmentality narrative on the other hand refers to the policy and regulation approaches to climate migration. It reflects a global tendency of shifting development action through international and national policy regulations.

In both cases, climate migration is less perceived as a political concern in comparison to the apocalyptic narratives (at least on the surface).

In a broad sense, the following section will illustrate how narratives changes when you shift platform of information. The map above categorizes one platform within each narrative. This analysis will illustrate that these platforms are dominant within these narratives, however, far

from set or fixed. The following analysis will display how different platforms approaches carry elements of multiple narratives.

Narrative 1 - Apocalyptic humanitarian narrative

Historically, this perspective has represented the most dominant narrative within climate migration. Former academic studies by El-Hinnawe and Myers build a narrative of millions of future climate *refugees* which would *all have abandoned their homelands on a semipermanent if not permanent basis, having little hope of a foreseeable return* (Myers, 1993). This perspective is considered outdated throughout academic and policy related understandings of climate migration. However, the debate on global legal protection for climate migrants is kept alive through the narratives of different climate, migration, and justice NGOs. Throughout this research the humanitarian narrative has been mostly associated within different NGOs. The jargon and rhetoric of the documents reflect a strong emphasis on justice and moral obligation in addressing issues relating to climate change and migration. The following section will outline and discuss the common understanding of climate migration within this narrative, and furthermore which consequences it serves. The emphasis on climate change as the causal relation to forced and involuntary migration is evident in the approach by Friends of the Earth.

Refugees don't just flee wars, persecution and intolerance. Sometimes it's droughts, floods or famine. (Friends of the Earth, 2017)

Many of the reasons people becomes refugees are preventable. For instance, intolerant societies can change. Armed conflict can be averted. The political will is often lacking.
(Friends of the Earth, 2017)

Refugees from conflict or persecution have legal right under the UN Refugee Convention. But people fleeing from droughts, desertification, rising sea levels and floods are not legally recognised as refugees and do not have international legal protection. (Friends of the Earth, 2017)

This statement is taken from the UK's Friends of the Earth's paper on the NGO's position on climate refugees. The understanding of climate migration builds on persisting understandings of traditional refugees. Here, climate change is portrayed as an external force which persecutes people to *flee* their homes. A metaphor which compare climate change with war-like scenarios. The statement bears clear rhetoric from an activist's perspective by bringing the political dimension to the surface. The paper offers little thought to deeper understand the

mechanisms of climate migration, rather the paper reflects a public educational take on the issue. An informative paper which seeks to bring clarity of the possible dangers and thereby address the responsibility global community should take towards climate *refugees*.

Further calling for collective action to raise awareness and bring justice to the people of concern. Here, the statement brings a comparison with traditional refugees arguing that people fleeing climate change will face greater challenges considering they *do not have international legal protection* (Friends of the Earth, 2017). The issue at stake is the lack of global will to provide a response, what they refer to as *wealthier countries are refusing to provide this money* (Friends of the Earth, 2017). Further, *some politicians and sections of the media are even stirring up toxic media debates to poison the public opinion against refugees* (Friends of the Earth, 2017).

This understanding of climate migration reflects a strong political message by addressing a persisting political climate and rhetoric on traditional refugees. Underlying that is the broader issue in advocating for the rights of climate migrants. Furthermore, they provide a political stand by applying the concept of *refugee* in comparison to other concepts of human mobility, thereby referring to climate migration as a forced, involuntary and with developmental concerns. Furthermore, global, and in this case national, climate change and refugee management are currently considered insufficient. This arguably facilitates political engagement on the combined issue of climate refugees.

Colonization. The free market. Violent religious and political ideology. War. Famine. Since the beginning of time, huge forces have caused upheaval, displacements, and migration. As political waves ebb and flow, so do migration patterns. Climate change isn't like that. There won't be an ebb and flow. It will be like all of the worst things rolled into one. And worse. Our habitable planet, and the resources we need to survive, will continue to shrink, pushing more and more people into the increasingly smaller areas that will still be able to support life. Unless we drastically change the course we are on, we will have to figure out how to survive on a dying planet. And it won't be pretty. (Greenpeace, 2019)

The clock is ticking. If we don't make a collective push to address climate change now, the increased frequency of climate migrations and conflicts will be the new face of our everyday lives. . (Greenpeace, 2019)

This understanding of climate migration reflects the core of what is considered alarmist and apocalyptic climate migration narratives. Statements like *all of the worst things rolled out at*

once, dying planet and it won't be pretty are putting together a picture of what could be considered the end of the world if actions are not taken eminently. The binary oppositions of migration drivers are out of academic date and reflect understandings of nature determinism. Interesting to point out, is the comparison with Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace use the definition of climate *migration* not *refugee*. However, the rhetoric of Greenpeace is still embedded in Apocalyptic narrative. The message would even be considered more rhetorical alarmist, emphasising immediate action, *the clock is ticking*. These takes on climate migration have been criticised for fuelling securitising debates. As Friends of the Earth notice: *Some politicians and sections of the media are even stirring up toxic media debates to poison public opinion against refugees*. Reflecting on existing prejudice and xenophobic attitudes in western societies towards climate migrants and refugees in general. In this case there is no reason to believe that the motive of either Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth has cruel intentions. Rather, I will argue that it reflects a strong engagement of serving justice of people they consider too powerless and vulnerable to combat their situation.

The human face of climate change

The last statement by Greenpeace combined with Friends of the Earth's parallel to *toxic debates on refugees* indicates that the NGOs imagine climate migrants are, primarily, migrants from the Global South. However, during this data analysis another perspective have further drew attention.

In the World Bank report the concept of *the human face of climate change* appears frequently. For instance, in the illustrative introduction pages the catch phrase "*Internal climate migrants are rapidly becoming the human face of climate change*" are displayed in highlighted font (World Bank, 2018, 1). Followed by the next quote:

Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration helps to put a human face on the growing development issue of people being forced to move under distress to escape the long-term impacts of climate change. Its findings must be taken seriously if the world is to sustain recent development gains and provide sustainable livelihood options for all. (World Bank, 2018, 3)

Within climate migration literature, this concept is usually associated with the Apocalyptic narrative associated with old debates on climate refugees, clearly illustrating this group of

people as vulnerable, victims and in need of assistance to be saved. The concept of the “human face” is usually recognised in the context of *the grim picture of millions of climate refugees fleeing their destroyed habitats and flowing into northern havens* (Felli, 2013, 337). The metaphor further works as a concept to generate people’s emotions and sympathy and mobilise political engagement and responsibility of action. Furthermore, the concept symbolises an obligation to address the dimension of injustice of the people who have contributed the least to historically global GHG emissions.

The other dimension of the usage is to illustrate a vulnerable group of individuals not capable to react as active agents of their own life. They need a saviour and protection as advocated through the platforms Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Contradictory, in comparison with media references and the Apocalyptic narrative, the aim and purpose of the World Bank’s report is *not* to signal a helpless group in need of international laws or enforcement to rescue climate migrants. The World Bank is recognising that the issue of climate migration requires unified action among international agents and policy makers. However, according to the World Bank migration itself is not necessarily forced, and by applying migration as adaptation the situation can have a positive outcomes. Then what is the benefit of using this metaphor in the report? Furthermore, what does it mean to be “the human face of climate change?”

While the intention of the World Bank seemingly is not to place climate migrants as helpless agents, the symbolic use of *the human face of climate change* reflects the World Bank’s ontological positions towards *who* a climate migrant is. The following page in the introduction illustrates three pictures of three individuals, one from each case study of the World Bank report. The following highlighted quotation says: *By 2050—in just three regions—climate change could force more than 143 million people to move within their countries.* The three case studies are the regions Sub-Sahara Africa, Latin-America and South Asia. It is easy to draw the parallel from one page to the next. The question then becomes, why are the World Bank considering these three individuals, together with people from these regions as climate migrants, or potentially climate migrants?

The World Bank uses “hotspots” as a metaphor to map where (potentially) climate migrants is located. The chosen spots reflect a combination of vulnerability based on geographical

location, environmental exposure, and social and economic vulnerability. More specifically described:

“These ‘hotspots’ are increasingly marginal areas and can include low-lying cities, coastlines vulnerable to sea level rise, and areas of high water and agriculture stress” (World Bank, 2018, xxii).

However, nowhere in the report is it made clear why exactly these three regions have been chosen as case studies and behalf of other regions. This description itself does not indicate the three mentioned regions exclusively. For instance, the Netherlands, the US, and Japan are among the countries which will and are already facing challenges of increasing sea level rise. However, these countries and regions are not mentioned in the report of the World Bank. The correlation of the selected regions is therefore probably a result of the World Bank’s description of climate change vulnerability:

Vulnerabilities to climate risks—a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Adger 2006; IPCC 2014a)—are often highest in poorer countries and communities (ND-GAIN 2017; WRI 2016). Natural disasters affect poor people more because their resources to confront hazards are scarce and many of their livelihoods depend on increasingly threatened ecosystem goods and services (Hallegatte and others 2017). As a result, the poorest often bear climate impacts disproportionately (World Bank 2012). These pre-existing vulnerabilities shape the extent to which environmental change causes people to move and affects the type of movement (World Bank, 2018, 6).

Based on this description there is reason to believe that the World Bank chose these regions in the Global South because of existing developmental challenges. This perspective is commonly shared among IGOs, NGOs and the Media as well. Climate migration is a growing issue in the Global South with implications in the Global North. A perspective explicitly supported by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and several media articles.

However, I will argue that the case of the World Bank’s framing of climate migrants as the *human face of climate change* is not because climate change drives their mobility. The rhetoric of the term stretches deeper and can be considered embedded in our understanding of *climate migrants* as Southern migrants with characteristics of Otherness. My argument is

further supported by other forms of Otherness contained to the climate migration. Firstly, even though people in the Global North travel to cities or countries with more desirable climate, either for the sake of health conditions, economic or individual reasons, this group is rarely referred to as “climate migrants”.

An interesting illustration on this issue can be found in the comparison of American film director Michael Nash’s documentary “Climate refugees” and the BBC short series “The UK’s first climate change refugees?”. The former documentary portrays the phenomenon of climate migration as an increasing condition in the Global South. The object of the movie is to show the world (the Global North) the human face of climate change. However, the narrative of the film is problematic. The narrator, Michael Nash himself, distinguishes between the people he displays as climate “refugees” and the people who have an opinion or attain knowledge about the concept (Nash, 2010, BBC 2020).

The latter are representatives from the Global North, high profiled associates within the field of politics or academia. They are represented with full names and the authority to speak on behalf of the climate refugees. They are the selected group which holds the power of defining *who* a climate migrant is, and further *how* the global community should act on this issue. In contrast, the climate refugees themselves are portrayed as silent and nameless victims in need of a saviour. The contrast of the narrator and the object needs to be approached carefully. Michael Nash and his team are privileged by free spatial mobility to come and leave (Baldwin, 2012). If the purpose of this mobility is to bring attention to climate migration, the narrative of the story is crucial. The body of a climate migrant then becomes immobile, threatening, and foreign, represented as the Other in comparison to the free, mobile and expert Self.

The story of the climate refugees in the UK supports the structural conditions of this narrative. In this documentary, the climate migrants are people from the Global North. The narrator is a British resident in the predicted submerged coastal village Fairbourne in the UK. His position as both the narrator and self-claimed climate migrant soften the power gap. In this documentary all informants are introduced by full name and as individuals with position of knowledge to reflect on their own situation and future. In a news article related to the documentary the following quote was stated from one of the residents in Fairbourne:

“This is a wake-up call for the country,” she says, making her way up the steep shingle bank to the wall that protects her white bungalow from the waves. “This is going to happen elsewhere. Sometimes you have to see someone else go through it – we just happen to be the first.”(Wall, 2019)

Nowhere in the article or documentary are there found synonyms or references to security threat, danger or conflict or national challenges. The issue is simply the resident’s emotional aspect to changing habitual location. The usage of climate *refugees* in this context is further challenging, considering the term refugee imposes the meaning of forced mobility due to persecution. Further implying that the producer’s understanding of climate migration is simply involuntary human mobility due to climate change. The statement of *“this is a wake-up call for the country”* further suggests that *climate refugees* have been an unthinkable phenomenon in the context of the UK (and arguably in the Global North), stimulating the concept as a Southern phenomenon. This case might appear far from the context of the World Bank report however, I will argue that this perception of what climate migration is, and who the climate migrants are is an embedded understanding within the Global North. This further reflected in terms of language (World Bank) and case studies (IOM, Foresight, EU, Media).

Worth mentioning is the relatively homogenous Eurocentric project team within Foresight, the EU and IOM. A parallel to the documentary by Nash when *experts* on climate migration and climate migrants are clearly distinguished, creating a challenging power relation. It further reflects the work, by Piguet et. al. (2018) which highlighted the historical North-South divide in conducting climate migration research. Policy agents will naturally rely on previous academic work which further expands the gap. However, equally important is to consider which narratives shapes their perception of migration and which narratives are reproduced.

From a historical perspective, the term *settler* has been mostly associated with European migration patterns (Raghunath, 2020), while for today the word *expat* or simply *moving* is commonly used in media. Resulting in an exclusion of people from the Global North to be captured or framed as either climate migrants or the human face of climate change. In the context of Britain, most British *expats* are currently living in Australia (Inglefield, 2019). The following statement was captured by Australia Times with the headline “Why do Brits move to Australia?”

I would love to say that when I moved to Sydney, Australia it was to further my career and take a time-out from my hectic London lifestyle. But in truth, like so many other people from Britain, I went to Australia because I knew I would have a wonderful adventure and I wanted a change of scene and climate (Inglefield, 2019).

According to the open and multi-causal definitions by IGOs the British migrant could be defined as a climate migrant. However, the different narrative illustrates that even though the IGOs reports continue to use the term “climate migration” or human face of climate change, there is more to the concept than what meets the surface. To clarify, my argument is not that the human face of climate change is a synonymous with the Other migrant. However, it is interesting to see the comparison in which migrants from the Global South and the Global North are addressed differently in both media and policy reports.

Put differently, the human face of climate change only appears in the context of migrants from the Global South. Whenever someone from the Global North migrates and claims environmental reasons as their definite driver for moving, it is associated with wealth and freedom of choice. In other words, the climate migrant from the Global North is the accepted, wanted and non-problematic climate migrant. The mainstream concept of climate migration then reflects *who* is moving (people from the Global South), and thereby creates a certain imagination of what climate migration is and how it should be approached.

Approaching climate migration – Expanding refugee law

Arguably, the most associated approach within the debate represents the expansion of the current refugee law by UNHCR to include a category for climate refugees. However, within the critical narrative, as well as within UNHCR and several other IGOs this perspective has been heavily criticised. The report by EU 2019 argues:

One argument frequently put forward by the UNHCR is that those displaced as a result of environmental change could, in theory, still rely on the protection of their national governments, while traditional refugees could not, as states are often the source of persecution, thus making an individual 'unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country' as required by Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention (EU, 2019, 5).

Several studies emphasize this argument, furthermore, claiming that an expansion of the current requirements for the refugee law could result in overlooking the crucial need for traditional refugees. For this reason, the debate on a new refugee law has seen a withdrawal within the Critical narrative.

However, ground-breaking this year (2021) a French court offered full resident permit to a citizen from Bangladesh due to environmental and health reasons. The Bangladeshi citizen came to France in 2011 as a refugee of national persecution. During his years in France, his asthma condition got worse and the potential returning to Bangladesh where pollution conditions are worse than in France could be a matter of life and death. While this case might not represent the stereotypical case of the climate refugee debate it is still considered the first transnational case of a legal climate refugee (Henley, 2021). It further sends a strong political message worldwide, bringing the issue of climate asylum to a factual reality. Later this year (2021), current US President Joe Biden has continued the debate on climate migration to the public fora. The Nation writes:

“In February, President Biden issued an executive order mandating “a report on climate change and its impact on migration,” including “options for protection and resettlement” (Carpenter, 2021).

The debate which will follow this trend will be interesting to pay attention to because it clearly states a different approach than IGOs, government bodies and academia. By inviting the climate refugee debate to the surface of political action expand the gap between academia and political circles. This could further reflect both an ignorance of academic relevance, or the case of political dissatisfaction with de-politicised efforts such as migration as adaptation. Regardless, it becomes evident that the term “refugee” contains strong moral connotations in most world cultures and religions, and bringing this solution to the political surface marks a significant reappearance in the global debate.

Narrative 2 - Apocalyptic securitising narrative

The securitising narrative carries similar connotations on the strong binary understanding of the causality between nature and society. This narrative has been less associated with academic literature, rather it occurs frequently within the media’s framing of climate

migration, usually by illustrating futuristic metaphors of war-like scenarios. However, in comparison to the humanitarian narrative, the securitizing narrative reflect less a global will to act on the issue, or bring responsibility and justice to the political forum. Rather this narrative reflects rhetoric of fear, security, and possible threats to western societies.

Throughout this analysis, this perspective has been mostly associated with media articles. Reflecting political opinions in western countries. Furthermore, and generally, the emphasis on the refugee, migration, and southern mobility perspective carries heavier emphasis than global concern on climate change. Put differently, in cases where climate change is reflected as a concern, it reflects the fear of possible *invasion* of southern climate refugees.

“Tens of millions of people will be forced from their homes by climate change in the next decade, creating the biggest refugee crisis the world has ever seen (..)”(Taylor, 2017)

Furthermore

Senior US military and security experts have told the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) study that the number of climate refugees will dwarf those that have fled the Syrian conflict, bringing huge challenges to Europe (Taylor, 2017).

The securitizing narrative uses strong rhetoric drawing on existing and recent crises, referring to what the humanitarian narrative considered toxic narratives. There is reason to believe that the humanitarian and the securitising narrative are most influenced by each other. Both narratives lack adequate empirical and academic knowledge and sources to deeper understand the problems they address. For this reason, apocalyptic narratives work in polarised manners which is probably not an exclusive tendency within the field of climate migration. It is problematic when the humanitarian narrative illustrates a picture of climate migration similar to doomsday scenarios with thousands of helpless poor victims. However, the story of climate migration escalates when the securitising narrative contributes to the debate. It becomes especially problematic when statements like the above mention the correlation between conflict and climate change, further bringing the war in Syrian as a case of climate migrants.

While this case has occurred in literature of climate migration before, it is highly contested (see Hartmann 2010, Salehyan 2008, Nordås and Gleditsch 2007, Scheffran et al. 2012, in Bettini, 2014, 184). The purpose such statements provides is not only to create a threatening

image of climate migrants, but continue to fuel on the existing xenophobic narrative on traditional refugees and migrants from the Global South.

“Ecological threats pose serious challenges to global peace. Over the next 30 years, lack of access to food and water will only increase without urgent global cooperation. In the absence of action, civil unrest, riots and conflict will most likely increase.” (Henley, 2020).

Furthermore:

““This will have huge social and political impacts, not just in the developing world, but also in the developed, as mass displacement will lead to larger refugee flows to the most developed countries,” Steve Killelea, the institute’s founder, said.” (Henley, 2020).

It is interesting to comment on this rhetoric. Here, climate change is displayed as a crisis for the *developing world* with direct consequences for the *developed world*. However, not in terms of climate change impact but large *flows of refugees*. However, in general, the perspective from NGOs and the media is considerably different from the reports and documents based on rhetorical considerations. They capture the understandings of climate migration from a political and civil societies perspective and for this reason displays political opinions more directly. This reflects a significantly different discourse and narrative among the critical and scientific debate on the climate migration relation, a highly politicised politicised debate within media and NGOS (Ebrahimi and Ossewaarde, 2019, 5).

Nowhere in the IGO and government reports are such a strong, political warning mediated directly, although the underlying and subtle rhetoric can support the same agenda. This argument is evident within the framing of the Other migrant which becomes more visible in the discourse on security and border protection. Telford (2018) argues that this narrative stimulates the construction of cultural (in particular racialised) identities in climate migration debate. Further arguing that populations are racialized in a securitized climate migration discourse. What does this suggest for how they could, might, are likely to, or will act in climate insecure futures? (Telford, 2018, 268).

The threatening migrant

The securitising narrative appears to be much similar to the humanitarian framing of climate migration. Likewise, the climate migrant exclusively represents a southern, Other, migrant. However, the rhetoric and language within the securitising debate reflect a stronger threatening issue. In several cases, specific regions are brought to attention, building on existing migration and refugee narratives in western media.

“If Europe thinks they have a problem with migration today ... wait 20 years,” said retired US military corps brigadier general Stephen Cheney. “See what happens when climate change drives people out of Africa – the Sahel [sub-Saharan area] especially – and we’re talking now not just one or two million, but 10 or 20 [million]. They are not going to South Africa, they are going across the Mediterranean.” (Taylor, 2017) (The Guardian, Mathew Taylor, 6/5. kl.17:50)

Furthermore:

“Because of the direct threat it poses to Europe, the migration issue could become the strongest bargaining chip for North African states ... they might resort to outright blackmail, threatening to unleash unimpeded flows of migrants unless granted massive amounts of foreign aid. In a more general sense, they might play the “climate change card” citing the threat of climate change-induced regional crisis to garner Western aid, as they have done with the “terrorism card”. (NIC Report 2009 p.34 in Telford 2018, p. 274)

Statements like these have been increasingly flourishing in the media, stoking the idea that future climate migration might become a security issue in regions in the Global North. Notably, the first statement is captured from the newspaper The Guardian, while the latter is taken from a security report within the research of Telford (2018). The rhetoric is strong and actively refusing to accept a legal concept of climate migration. Instead they lean on the rhetoric of *climate change and terrorism card* which work to trivialize the real impact of both climate change and terrorism. Furthermore, a double binary understanding of both climate change and migration is identified. Trombetta 2014 further reminds us that the historical narrative on refugees and migrants in Europe has been gradually associated with a destabilization of public order (Huysmans, 2006, 65 in Trombetta, 2014, 140). This is further

linked to a narrative and rhetoric whereby foreign refugees and migrants are blamed for threatening jobs, social security and national identity (Trombetta, 2014, 140).

For this reason, the framing of the threatening climate migration poses hostile and challenging narratives not only to people affected by climate change, but migrants and refugees in general.

Approaches to climate change

Mitigation

The overall understanding of climate migration generally represents a future phenomenon. Within this narrative there is a common consensus acknowledging that climate impacts are increasing today. In this perspective we can draw on current alarm future numbers, within media (Carpenter 2021, Taylor 2017, Henley 2020, Seattle Times 2915) and IGO reports (World Bank 2018, IOM 2014). Therefore, the main agenda is to work to prevent the magnitude of climate migration in the future. In common, the humanitarian narrative is actively proclaiming immediate action, *now*. The alarmist perspective on the future is tightly associated with the securitising debate.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel says the world must do everything it can to meet an international goal to fight global warming, arguing that failing to do so could set off large new waves of refugees. (Seattle Times, 2015)

When placing this quote in the context of the earlier mentioned quote from the last section, we can argue that future *waves of refugees* are being used as a *motivation* to implement stronger climate change mitigation policies. These mitigation policies sympathise both a global initiative to decrease current GHG emissions as well as minimising the need to migrate. The World Bank report defines mitigation as: *Human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases* (World Bank, 2018, ix). Mitigation policies are included as an important approach within Foresight, IOM, EU and the World Bank, aimed to reflect a holistic understanding of the climate migration debate. Referring to combing the need of preventing further climate scenarios as well as managing the current impacts. It becomes difficult to draw an exact line from IGO policies directly from media statement, however considering these thoughts and discourses are appearing in the public there is reason to believe they have certain influence.

Further it becomes interesting to comment on the emphasis on mitigation in comparison to other approaches to climate change. Mitigation is usually associated with a technical understanding on climate change, where the *easy* target of *reducing* climate emissions is considered a sustainable solution. In other words, climate change is perceived as a technical barrier to withhold the preferable society. An understanding which resonates well with a binary understanding of society and nature. Humans are, and always have been, associated as creatures which possess the knowledge, expertise and privilege to extract, control and rule over nature (Lynch and Vedal 2018, Plumwood 1991, 1993, Lovbrand et. al. 2015).

Furthermore, the different interpretations of vulnerability further support the different take on climate change responses. Where outcome vulnerability represents measures to reduce vulnerability in a linear and measurable solution-oriented approach. However, from this narrative the term vulnerability does not seem to be particularly relevant.

Worth mentioning is that mitigation policies represent an approach within the humanitarian narrative as well (Greenpeace, 2019, Friends of the Earth, 2017). The difference between the two narratives are *whom* mitigation actions are supposed to benefit. Returning to Swyngedouw accusation in which CO₂ emission are framed as the external *evil*. The securitising narrative works to frame this argument in a bigger context by placing both climate change combined with increasing immigration imagines as the two external threats to modern society. The global hunt to mitigate CO₂ emissions represents the final attempt to preserve society as we know it, clearly rooted in indoctrinated understandings of Us/Them. For this reasons, problems are not solved but moved.

Borders and fences

Evidence from previous quotations within the securitising narrative refers to a strict rhetoric when it comes to potential unwanted flows of climate refugees and migrants. Indirectly approaching climate, and other migrant and refugees with stricter border management represent a solid departure from the humanitarian perspective. Research by Newman (2006) brings further clarity to the binary dimension of border imaginaries and practises. The opposites Self/Other, Wanted/unwanted, Included/Excluded, domestic/foreign becomes relevant in this discussion. However, inviting a discussion on borders from data analysis requires further elaboration. Nowhere in the previous mentioned media articles or other IGO and government documents in this data selection are border management mentioned directly.

Nevertheless, another report by the EU concerning climate change and security measures further states the following.

These stressors are in turn likely to disrupt the lives of millions of people, leading to local resource conflicts and higher rates of migration. European citizens are increasingly aware of these impacts and have begun to rank climate change as one of the biggest threats facing their countries and the continent.(The EU, 2017, 1)

Furthermore.

“Climate change and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict, in light of their impact on desertification, land degradation, and water and food scarcity”. The Strategy considers climate change to be “a threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement” (EU, 2017, 2).

From these two statements it is clear that the EU considers migration as a result of climate migration as a potential security issue and threat. Interesting to note is the absence of such strong and conflict related rhetoric in the two reports on climate migration (EU 2019, 2020).

However, based on the EU's historical association with immigration and the flourish rhetoric of immigration linked to destabilisation of public order these statements confirm this narrative (Duffield and Evans 2012, 93 in Trombetta, 2014, 140). Furthermore, the documented increasing Frontex and border control budget support this view. This perspective is considerably interesting in comparison to the EU's explicit take on climate migration which will later be illustrated within the narrative of Opportunistic developmental perspective. However, a media article by Jason Hickel in Al Jazeera pointed out the following solution to this issue.

The solution is simple, at least conceptually: open the borders. By tearing down the walls that separate the causes and consequences of climate change we can force a more honest reckoning with reality. Once the victims of climate change have the right to seek refuge in Europe and North America, it will obliterate the moral hazard of global warming. As rich nations finally start to feel the heat, so to speak, you can bet they'll act fast, doing everything in their power to ensure that people's home regions remain livable. Even if it means pushing for a new, more ecological, economic model. (Hickel, 2018)

This citation provides another side of the what has been outlined from media until now. However, this statement confirms existing narratives on xenophobic attitudes towards South-North migration. While this perspective is far from representing the Securitising narrative it nevertheless supports the narrative's presence in society.

Narrative 3 - Opportunistic developmental narrative

The opportunist narrative provides an almost unrecognisable understanding of the concept and phenomenon of climate migration. Within climate migration studies the opportunistic turn reflects stronger empirical research within the field. Throughout the data analysis this narrative has been mostly recognised in the IGO reports by IOM (2014, 2017) and the World Bank, as well as the government bodies European Union (2019, 2020) and Foresight report by the UK Government Office for Science. The opportunistic turn appears de-politicised and de-naturalised on the surface. However, the discussion will bring out a more nuanced understanding on this issue.

The impact of environmental change on migration will increase in the future. In particular, environmental change may threaten people's livelihoods, and a traditional response is to migrate. Environmental change will also alter populations' exposure to natural hazards, and migration is, in many cases, the only response to this. For example, 17 million people were displaced by natural hazards in 2009 and 42 million in 2010 (this number also includes those displaced by geophysical events). (Foresight 2011:9)

At first glance this excerpt by Foresight indicates that much of the same apocalyptic narrative is reoccurring in this research. However, articulate with considerable softer tones. Far from indication a doomsday scenario by 2050, yet emphasis on *future increased impacts, threatening people's livelihood* in addition to terrifying numbers of displacement creates and slightly alarming rhetoric. However, the message is further questioned later in the report by discussion of the relation between the environment and human mobility.

It is almost impossible to distinguish a group of 'environmental migrants', either now or in the future. (Foresight, 2011, 11)

This statement reflects one of the core shifts within the debate on climate migration. Compared with the apocalyptic understanding of climate migration where nature, articulated

as climate change, is presented as the strong and dominating force of involuntary migration. This quotation by Foresight suggests the opposite and questions the deterministic correlation between the environment and human mobility. Furthermore, Foresight expands the division between climate migration from the Apocalyptic narrative towards a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon. The report takes a stand towards the particular concept of *climate migration*. Rather, they explain the strong mainstream correlation as:


“Existing literature on the relationships between environmental change and migration has been hampered by the usage of an unwieldy and imprecise collection of terms and phrases. These have included at various points ‘environmental/climate migrants’, ‘environmental/climate refugee’, ‘environmentally induced population movements’ and ‘environmentally displaced persons’. This project has not used any of these terms as they imply a mono-causal relationship between environmental change and migration, a relationship which is dismissed by this report and other experts alike”. (Foresight, 2011, 33)

Unlike mainstream climate migration debate which focus on the justification between this link. Instead, the Foresight report marks a stand with a rather nuanced the definition of climate migration in two categories.

Migration influenced by environmental change: *Where environmental change can be identified as affecting the drivers of migration, and thus is a factor in the decision to migrate*

Non-migration influenced by environmental change: *Where environmental change can be identified as affecting the drivers of migration, and thus is a factor in the decision not to migrate.* (Foresight, 2011, 43)

Even though their concept aims to separate from the mainstream climate migration debate, Foresight is still choosing to rely on the concept of environment and migration. The title and aim of the research further imply that this relation is of special interest. The departure with the mainstream concept is therefore an interesting decision. However, as the model below suggests, the linkage between the environment and migration is still considered high relevance.



(Foresight, 2011, 10)

The Foresight report is considered a pioneer project for developing a nuanced view on how environmental factors influence migration. The aim of the model “Figure ES.1” above is to bring out an understanding of migration drivers beyond an environmental deterministic causal – effect explanation. In their research, environmental and climatic factors are both what they consider *push* and *pull* factors of migration. They are mediated by *macro* conditions such as: *economic, social, political* and *demographic* aspects. Additionally, individual indicators on *micro* level together with *meso* conditions which together capture a multi-level set of considerations which affect migrants’ decision of moving or not. When studying the model, we can clearly see that the different dimensions together define a community and an individual’s resilience and vulnerability. In other words, from a surface perspective, climate migration in this report is not considered an alarmist or threatening phenomenon but rather a natural aspect of human life and history. The environment represents a central co-driver of migration, what Foresight describes as the *influence of environmental change*.

The same model is found in the World Bank, the EU, and IOM which illustrate the strong influence this work carries. However, while the illustration is included there are slightly different approaches and definitions among the other agents

Foresight criticised previous studies for using estimated models predicting millions of climate refugees in the future. According to Foresight, models by Internal Displaced Monitoring Centre (IDMC) will bring more clarity to understand *who* and *how many* people in the world who migrates because of climate change. Furthermore, people are more likely to migrate shorter distances. The Apocalyptic narratives suggest that the phenomenon will cause

migration rates beyond a hundred million individuals seeking refugee from climate in the colder global North. By illustrating internal migration as the most likely concern of climate migration their research contributes to untie the knot of prevailing assumptions that climate migration always is the case of cross-border migration.

The work of the World Bank is continuing the work of the Foresight report. The report is exclusively focusing on internal climate migration in the regions of Sub-Saharan, South Asia, and South America (2018, 73-111). However, in comparison to the Foresight report, the World Bank has adapted the mainstream concept to describe the issue of concern. In their research they use the term *climate migration* to describe internal migration beyond the distance of 14 kilometres excluding cyclical and sessional migration.

In this report, climate migrants are people who move - within countries the modeling work captures people who move at spatial scales of over 14 kilometers - within a country - and at decadal temporal scales. Shorter distance or shorter term mobility (such as seasonal or cyclical migration) is not captured.

(The World Bank, 2018, 11)

Further emphasising the link between and urgency of climate migration by framing it as a development issue.

Internal climate migration is a development issue. Unless we act it will become the human face of climate change

(The World Bank, 2018, xvii)

In the case of EU, it makes an interesting case in comparing their approach to climate migration between the years 2019 to 2020. When comparing the report with their report from 2019, *The concept of 'climate refugee' Towards a possible definition*. In the former report, the concept of “climate refugees” was applied to both reflect on its weaknesses but also illustrate the benefits of relying on this specific term. Another change can be found in the different areas of focus. The former report from 2019 are only briefly discussing the climate change dimension and rather emphasizing the migrant versus refugee debate.

However, because the term refugee implies national cross-border migration, the term refugee will serve international protection of the people of concern. The document is especially emphasising the challenge of providing international protection for people and societies on potential sub-merged islands like Tuvalu (E2019, 6). These indicators reflect the understanding that climate migration was considered an involuntary and forced form of mobility within the approach of European Union in 2019. However, the new document of 2020 illustrates that the EU has changed their approach on climate migration considerably.

The term “environmental refugee” suggested two conclusions: first, that movement in response to environmental change was involuntary, and second, that the involuntary nature of movement gave rise to specific protection challenges.

(EU, 2020, 20)

Instead of discussing the concept of climate refugee, the European Union argues that the concept of environmental migration and displacement reflects the phenomenon most accurately. Environmental migration refers to tendencies of environmental related human mobility where choice of movement is considered voluntary, while environmental displacement describes people who are involuntary forced to move because of environmental reasons. The work of Foresight becomes visible in the later report which diversifies mobility motives and decisions of the individual. From a mobility perspective, it is clearly evident that the Foresight report has been highly inflectional.

The IOM report should be considered rather exceptional among the different reports. While supporting a similar framing to climate migration as the other reports, IOM (2017) further includes a perspective of political and injustice character. Compared with earlier research by IOM, the report *IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change* published in 2014, the narrative and framing of climate migration has slightly changed. While the former report had a similar approach to Foresight and mainstream opportunistic narrative, the latter includes new perspectives. Especially interesting is the inclusion on the dimension of justice and political perspectives. Compared to the other IGO and government reports within this research, IOM (2017) includes academic perspectives from similar sources as provided in the theoretical chapter of this research, including, Pigué (2013) and Oliver-Smith (2012). For this reason, IOM represents the strongest candidate within the selected IGO and government

documents which should be considered in the grey zone between opportunistic and critical narrative. The perspective of IOM invites an interesting discussion when it comes to approaches to climate migration.

The resilient migrant

Reflection on who is represented as climate migrants within this narrative is a challenging case. The inclusive definitions on climate migration invite a potentially large and diverse group of climate migrants. Climate migrants within this narrative carries few connotations to threats or problems. Rather they signal an opportunity for positive development outcome, carrying the connotation of resilience and empowerment.

The key message of this report is that migration in the face of global environmental change may not be just part of the 'problem' but can also be part of the solution. In particular, planned and facilitated approaches to human migration can ease people out of situations of vulnerability (Foresight, 2011, 10)

The opportunistic shift marks a change of debate by referring to climate migrants as solution, not a problem. Reflecting that individual choice, decisions and agency is increasingly located within the individual which further effect whether one choose to migrate or not.

Interestingly, IOM (2017) is the only document among IGOs and government bodies which brings a perspective on North – South climate migration (30-31). In the report they briefly discuss the historically and persistent tendency of humans who seek to settle in a climate favourable of their own preference. By using tables, they illustrate the considerably higher numbers of habitants in the warm and sunny regions in the US, as well in cities with particular colder climate (30). A recent study from Russia are showing the same tendency of climate related migration. Russians are increasingly moving south of the country to escape the cold climate in the north (IOM 2017, 31). However, these cases rarely make it to the attention of media or policy circles as a topic of *climate migration*. For instance, consider the definitions of climate migrants by EU (2019, 2020), IOM (2014), Foresight, and the World Bank, include a voluntary, multi-causal dimension as well as international, internal or temporary or permanent concept of the phenomenon.

However, the question of whom is considered a migrant within this perspective reflect a deeper analysis on surface and sub-surface perspectives. On the surface, a climate migrant reflects individuals from the former definitions by Foresight, World Bank, and EU (2019, 2020). In the case of Foresight, the “climate migrants” might as well be recognized as an economic or social motivated migrant. However, as former outlined in the Apocalyptic narrative there underlying ontological connotation attached to the above-mentioned institution’s understanding of who the climate migrant is. Resulting in clear evidence on the mixed and fluid narratives within the understanding of climate migration.

Regardless, the promoted climate migrant within this narrative has been characterised as the resilient migrant. It is clear that the climate migrant is not necessary a forced or involuntary migrant. Furthermore, migration is considered a natural aspect of human life and history. In fact, it is considered a feature which enables vulnerable individuals to become resilient. Meaning that resilience represents a tool to both characterize the development from being vulnerable to be empowered and migrate and as a development goal in itself. The reports address the rhetoric of framing migrant as a solution and adaptive strategy to climate change, and thereby abandoning the Apocalyptic narrative of associating climate migration as a problem. In the IGO and government reports, future climate change can pose challenges for certain livelihoods, however, by making migrants resilient, empowered with agency and rational drive, the *climate migrant* could be a solution to climate change.

The jargon of climate migration within the reports reflect another superficial understanding. Throughout the reports positive loaded words such as resilient and labour migrant are frequently occurring. Furthermore, the emphasis that climate migration does not have to be considered a crisis when development programmes such as migration as adaptation are provided. In other words, characteristics of the climate migrant within the IGO and government bodies represent an opportunity for economic development.

To the contrary, the narratives that dominate the emerging register stress the (pro)active role of that the ‘vulnerable’ can have in tackling the adverse impacts of climate change. An instance of such agency can manifest in their ‘autonomous’ decision to migrate, through which they can secure the resilience of households and communities (see previous sections).

Approaching climate migration

The opportunistic narrative brings interesting perspectives to the climate migration debate in terms of approaches. When studying Apocalyptic narratives one might fall into the belief that international legal protection mechanisms and refugee laws are the only solution to approach climate migration. The multi-causality emphasis on migration motives provide a range of opportunities to approach climate migration. Evidence from the humanitarian narrative reflected insights on characteristics within IGOs and government institution on the sub-surface.

Relocation as adaptation

In the face of future environmental change such as sea-level rise and other consequences of climate change, it may be an option for governments to choose to relocate large populations from rural and urban areas. (Foresight, 2011, 176)

Planned relocation, also called resettlement of populations, is promoted as an important aspect of solutions for minimizing the challenges of climate migration. This approach is aimed to target populations with low probability of maintaining a quality of life in their habitat of origin. Including the perspective of relocation emphasises the shift of debate to include various forms of mobility. The inclusion of relocation programmes as a part of the climate migration debate can appear confusing at first. Per definition the group could possible be included within the voluntary/forced/planned and temporary/seasonal/permanent as well as internal/cross-border definitions (Zhou et. al. 2012, West 2009, Haifeng, 2014). However, implementation of resettlement programmes has been a practice for several decades. For instance, China has operated with relocation programmes in environmentally fragile areas since the 1980s. The challenge of carry out these projects is to include perspectives and preferences from the people of concern. One can separate between planned relocation programmes and sudden relocation programmes due to unexpected climate change events (Zhou et. al. 2012, West 2009, Haifeng, 2014).

This dimension of climate migration appears different from the mainstream understanding of forced/voluntary individual migration. Nevertheless, the idea of applying relocation programmes is usually to meet the consequences of low-lying islands instead of expanding the

current refugee law (Foresight, 2011, 176-179). For this reason, relocation programmes bring an interesting perspective to the climate migration debate. However, the framing of Pacific-island climate refugees resonates with the different take on climate migrants from the Global North and South. Compared to the case of Netherlands, cross-border relocation is not a pressing topic. The Netherlands aim to be the leading nation in providing climate adaptation within water safety and security domain (Ebrahimi and Ossewaarde, 2019).

IOM (2014, 2017), Foresight, the World Bank and the EU (2019, 2020) emphasises the combination of migration as adaptation, planned relocation combined with general mitigation policies for assisting and preventing the magnitude of climate migrants. It is a growing acceptance that facilitating measures and solutions for climate migrant should be considered an opportunity rather than a challenge. The opportunity narrative is further attached to the idea of empowering migrants, making them resilient and individually capable to cope with their own circumstances.

Migration-as-adaptation

As migration continues in the decades ahead, in the context of global environmental change, policy should be orientated towards ensuring that it occurs in a way that maximises benefits to the individual as well as to both source and destination communities. In particular, migration is a key way for individuals to increase their long-term resilience to environmental change and offers scope for 'transformational' adaptation.(Foresight, 2011, 173)

Furthermore:

Policies that follow from individual action, or empower the individual (or indeed community) to take action are most resilient to future scenarios. Policies that require significant state action can be successful, but are likely to be ineffective in some scenarios.(195)

The jargon of the Foresight's messages is that migration as adaptation should be considered a key way to empower the resilient migrant in order to achieve transformational adaptation. The key word *resilience* continues to occur throughout the report. Foresight further defines resilience as *the ability of people, communities or systems to absorb shocks and regenerate after a disturbance* (2011,234). The message of bridging resilience with transformational

adaptation is therefore conflicting. Notably, both the term resilience and transformational change has developed to be popular buzzwords within climate change science and policy circles. For this reason it is not surprising to see the terms united and with great emphasis in this report. However, as Cretney argues, the concept of resilience should not be limited to *absorb shocks and regenerate after a disturbance*. Rather, the concept should intend to bring developmental and transformational change by attaining improved conditions than before. Therefore, to achieve transformational change resilience should aim to address the pre-existing vulnerabilities.

I will argue that underlying mechanisms of these shortcomings can be found in the global neoliberal trend of withdrawing state power and state reliance and instead placing the responsibility to adapt by each individual migrant. This statement clearly favours the individual migrant's resilience, a tool to manage migration in favourable manners. This argument is further evident in the emphasis on labour migration as an adaptive strategy for climate change.

The shift from the climate refugee narrative points out a shift from hard to soft laws. According to this shift, instead of implementing international laws, states and international agents applies "regulations", capacity-building" and "facilitating rural, urban and labour markets". Social and economic vulnerability are key concepts to understand the logic of these implementations. However, a general lack of investigating and mapping where these vulnerabilities stem for is remains un-questioned. IOM (2017) brings land grabbing and industrial accidents (54-57) to the discussion. However, the deeper discussion on land grabbing fades away and fails to question the global dynamics which allow land grabbing or the expansion what happened in the first place.

The vulnerability to climate change must be counted on a greater scale than the reports maintain. The perspectives of vulnerability within the reports are limited to an outcome definition of the concept. Vulnerability is rooted in a geographical understanding (hotspots) combined with an emphasis on social and economic indicators. However, I will argue it is problematic to uphold a system of a small team of experts from the Global North to address the topic of climate migration which accounts for "poor governments" and "poor individuals" with "low capacity" to adapt as the cause of climate migration (Foresight, 2011, 89).

Questions which should rather be asked are:

- *Why are these states vulnerable?*
- *Which structures are sustaining the system of increasing inequality between the Global North and South?*

In this case it is interesting to reflect on the creation of the phrase *human face of climate change* as a symbol of the victims of climate change, while we stay reluctant in framing the responsible partner. The injustice perspective on climate change has gradually faded with the Opportunistic narrative. The Apocalyptic narrative addresses the historical responsibility for GHG emissions. Academic research has called for a re-integrating of the justice perspective along the more nuanced framing with opportunistic narratives (Bettini et. al. 2017). IOM (2017) bring the topic back into debate, however, I will argue they continue to fail to address the root causes of present and historical inequality.

For instance, how individualism and rationalisation of society and nature relation has fuelled the privilege and logical thought of mass extraction and commodification of nature.

Furthermore, the imperialist and colonial past whereas global power structures generally remains today (Raghunath, 2020). Our current ideological and political system of neoliberal capitalism is rooted in the understanding of both binary society-nature relations and the logic of favouring individuals and the emphasis on “everyone is the architect of its own future”. This argument brings us to another question, which purpose are the non-binary understanding of migration motives serving if the development initiatives are still locked in the old dichotomy?

Raghunath (2020) argues that this understanding reflects a double dimension of Otherness, both in the delimitation to nature and the Other from the Global South. Feola (2020) further argues that a sustainable transformation is not possible within the same system and structures which created and laid the foundation for mass consumption and social and ecological exploitation of the world. It becomes difficult to separate capitalism in terms of economic and cultural dimension from our ontological perspectives because capitalism constantly shapes our individual and collective identities. This becomes relevant in terms of competition, individualisation, rationalisation, commodification of human and non-human beings, and the imaginary of progress based on endless accumulation (Feola, 2020, 242). This brings a holistic understanding of the conflicting definitions of *resilience* and *transformational* within

Foresight, World Bank and EU, by maintaining the system which has historically created and continues to create globally unequal vulnerabilities. Returning to adequate climate adaptation literature, Tailor (2013) argues that “*sustainable climate change adaptation is a question of transforming power relations rather than addressing their symptoms*”.

Bringing these arguments together assists to unfold the surface and sub-surface layers of the climate migration debate. The framing of some regions, states, and individuals as vulnerable towards climate change reflect a surface understanding of climate migration. This ontological understanding further influences epistemological responses which avoid bringing the root causes to the surface. It call for deep transformational change that interferes with global politics is probably too controversial of policy experts such as IOM, Foresight, EU and the World Bank. However, their argument interrupts not only our understanding of climate migration, but further how we understand climate change adaptation and transformational change to a sustainable future.

Narrative 4 - Opportunistic governmental narrative

On the surface, the opportunistic governmental narrative can appear similar to the developmental. It builds on the same, surficial, positive take on climate migration with strong connotations of empowering and making migrants resilient. My motivation for separating the two narratives is to discuss two different approaches associated within the Opportunistic narrative. Arguing that the Governmental narrative reflects the dimension of the right and need of globally governing and managing migration. This perspective provides the interesting question, *why it is considered internationally necessary to facilitate governance and management structures on migration?* The governmental narrative is saved for last to bring clarity to the structure which facilitates the debate on climate migration. In other words, why are IGOs and government institutions actively engaging in the debate on climate migration?

From a Humanitarian narrative the debate carries multiple moral connotations, and global consensus on the concept of refugees are usually associated with acts of solidarity. However, when it comes to migration, the different IGOs and government institutions are explicitly mentioning the crucial perspective of understanding migration as a natural aspect of human life and history. If migration should be considered a normal condition for all humans, then why are the IGOs aiming to only govern specific migration structures in certain geographical

parts of the world? Returning to the example of the British expat in Australia, it becomes evident that only certain migration trajectories are considered *a natural and unproblematic aspect of human life*. While Foresight, IOM, World Bank and the EU provide documents on 943 pages (combined) on how migration should be understood, facilitated, managed and governed elsewhere.

To summarize, this narrative is not explicitly explained in the reports. The inclusion of the governmental narrative in this research can be explained by current logic and world order which consider it necessary to govern certain trajectories of migration, and further question them. From which understanding are these governance structures accepted? Throughout this section of comparing narratives, it is reason to believe the underlying structures which facilitate the existence of the Apocalyptic narrative make a sub-surficial influence to the Opportunistic narrative. It is interesting to note that the means and structure of governance mechanism is carried out and explained though less explicit lenses by the Opportunistic narrative.

The immobile migrant

To further illustrate this perspective, the comparison of resilient labour migrant and the trapped and immobile migrant represent an interesting case. The Foresight report bring attention the immobile and trapped individuals and populations (2011, 33). The shift from focusing on waves of refugees to bring attention to those who are unable to move or chooses to stay bring more empirical clarity to mobility patterns. Interesting to notify in this context is how the words “immobile” and “trapped” is used and applied. The concept “immobile” usually carries negative connotation in sense that it refers so an action which is the opposite as mobile. Commonly associated with actions of positive character such as liberty and freedom. According to Foresight there are two dimensions of immobility, either the voluntary decision to stay in original habitat or being forced to stay. More commonly recognized as “trapped populations”.

The challenges of ‘trapped’ populations unable to leave: The challenges associated with those who remain may become more severe and more geopolitical in nature if these people become trapped in vulnerable locations. (...) For example, in Somalia, armed conflict hinders both the movement of pastoralists, who would otherwise relocate in the face of drought, and

the access of humanitarian organisations to those who are drought affected. (Foresight, 2011, 16).

And:

Vulnerable people have the fewest opportunities to adapt locally or to move away from risk and, when moving, often do so as a last resort. Others, even more vulnerable, will be unable to move, trapped in increasingly unviable areas (World Bank, 2018, xxi).

Furthermore:

“A significant group of people living in environmentally prone locations in the future face a double jeopardy: they will be unable to move away from danger because of a lack of assets, and it is this very feature which will make them even more vulnerable to environmental change” (EU, 2020, 30-31).

It is interesting to reflect upon the conditions of *why* some individuals or households will end up as “trapped” populations. I will argue that the selected reports fail to acknowledge the real causes of immobility. Foresight, the World Bank and EU (2020) focus on the natural and environmental aspects of vulnerability. The illustration of people trapped in hazardous environmental conditions mask some of the underlying and structural reasons of why they are vulnerable and trapped. Vulnerability is defined from an economic, social and environmental perspective, however, in the reports they carry a strong emphasis on *nature* as the trigger of either conflict or lack of assets or other social and economic conditions. I will argue that such disclaimer serves a strong political rhetoric embedded in our global political and economic order. My argument is that the *real* immobility is located within border regulations and the favouring of migrants from the Global North and high-skilled workers at the expense of low-skilled.

For instance, none of the IGOs or government reports engage in a broader discussion where structural conditions place limitations on mobility. The issue appears contradictory, considering the ideological embeddedness in neoliberalism are motivating the actions and solutions by suggesting labour migration as a preferred migration strategy. However, the *resilient* migrant seems to be trapped within structural borders by a global and neoliberal favouring of *certain* labour migrants. It becomes clear that the *resilience* in climate migrants

are limited to an individual and personal level and is blocked and trapped within current global structures. Nevertheless, the figure of the resilient migrant brings hope, opportunities at least on a surface level.

Connecting narratives

What became evident throughout the analysis was that the two former narratives from the background and theory section. The narrative of climate refugees and migration-as-adaptation, was not sufficient to carry out a nuanced understanding of the debate in this section. The two categories were too broad and overlooked the multiple layers and nuances which has been outlined in the previous chapter. Having the former map from the theory section in mind this analysis has been based on the understanding on how this structure shape the outcome of the climate migration debate.

Structural conditions		Outcome
Ontology à	Ideology à	Narratives

To combat the shortcoming of the former narratives, a more complex and nuanced map of narratives was carried out. Throughout this research it has been outlined a clear understanding of fluid boundaries between the different narratives. While it is a clear difference between the apocalyptic and opportunistic narrative on the surface, deeper investigation prevails stronger linkages.

	The map of narratives on climate migration				
Main narratives	Apocalyptic		Opportunistic		Critical
Characteristics	Political, climate and humanitarian crisis, future concern, global community, "If we don't act now"		De-politised, individual, de-naturalised, "Solution, not problem"		Ontologically, ideologically, politically
Sub-narrative	Humanitarian	Securitising	Developmental	Governmental	Academia
Approaches	Refugee law	Mitigation	Migration as adaptation	International and National Policies	Conceptual critique
	International legal protection	Borders	Relocation programmes	Regulation of Labour	Language critique
Dominant platform	NGOs	Media	IGOs and government bodies	IGOs and government bodies	Academia


Note: A blue arrow labeled "Sub-surface influence" points from the "Borders" cell to the "Migration as adaptation" cell. An orange arrow labeled "Surface influence" points from the "Regulation of Labour" cell to the "Language critique" cell.

The opportunistic narrative becomes the natural centre of departure for further elaborate on this issue. For instance, on a surface level it is clear and visible that the platforms within the Opportunistic narrative aim to convey an understanding of climate migration which emphasize with the Critical narrative. Based on the non-binary understanding of migration motives and multiple approaches the IGOs and Government institutions illustrates an image which reflect their understanding of climate migration as accurate and up to academic date. This is usually outline by referring to “old” apocalyptic narratives which they claim to be empirically flawed. Aiming to establish expertise and authority in the field and debate of climate change. However, it seems to be that the Critical influence is restricted to *individual* migration patterns within the Opportunistic narrative. Considering previous narratives on climate refugees usually considered one homogenous group, the new perspectives on mobility is relevant and empirical useful to consider. However, by neglecting global structures which facilitate immobility (in this case referred to as trapped) one is left with asymmetrical understanding of climate migration rooted in injustice.

It becomes evident that the non-binary take on understanding climate migration is further limited to mobilities perspectives. When it comes to consider other dimensions of climate change and nature all the represented documents within this research can be considered technical and strictly binary. For instance, the core concepts such as vulnerability, adaptation and resilience are frequently appearing in the IGO and government reports. However, it has been outlined that the Opportunistic narrative relies on a rather technical understanding of the issue. In line with de-politicised attitudes, neither Foresight, World Bank or EU aim to deeper understand, or at least present, a critical understanding of the underlying causalities for climate change, vulnerability, resilience or transformation.

Furthermore, when studying rhetorical patterns within the Opportunistic narrative it becomes evident that certain imaginations from the Apocalyptic narrative are still present. The human face of climate change and the threatening, resilient and immobile migrant all contain certain elements of Otherness. While in the case within the Apocalyptic narrative this perspective is more obvious outlined, the Otherness of the resilient and immobile migrant first becomes visible through the governmental narrative. Which further could be considered ironically and contradictory considering the Opportunistic narrative’s main goal it to present the resilient migrant as an opportunity and solution. For this reason, the human face of climate represents the most outstanding language connecting the two narratives.

In order to study the correlating narratives in more detail a final figure has been carried out to bring further clarity.



The model illustrates in more detail the correlations and paths of influence between the perspectives. The arrows illustrate the directing of the originated source. Within the apocalyptic and opportunistic narrative both sub-narratives are mutually impacting each other. However, what this analyse provide is the dimension of influence between the humanitarian narrative and the developmental, furthermore the securitizing narrative and the governmental. On a surface level, the critical narrative has served influence from a non-binary understanding of migration perspective within the opportunistic narrative. However, beside the IOM (2017) report a nuanced understanding and framing of *who* migrants beyond the North-South doctrine has been left out of the debate. The remaining narrative and dimension which seems to have been remained unconsidered is the dimension of broader understanding of root causes of climate change, human impact on the nature and critically address transformation. .

Interestingly, throughout this research it becomes evident that the opportunistic narrative seemingly stands out as the only narrative which is influenced by others. The apocalyptic narrative continues to represent the same characteristic it did from when the public debate on climate migration started in 1985.

Conclusion

Within this analysis, four migrants have been introduced, the human face of climate change, the threatening, resilient and immobile migrant. The four framings carry different characteristics which on the surface separates them. However, after engaging in a deeper analysis and nuancing the characteristics it becomes clear that all figures carry elements of non-Western Otherness. Furthermore, it become evident that regardless of considerable effort in nuancing the migration perspective within Foresight, IOM, EU and the World Bank some specific ontological *myths* continue to shape and influence our understanding of climate migration.

The growing attention to climate migration may in several way reflect an increasing global will to provide measure to people affected by climate change. Including a broader understanding of how climate change exposure is the result of multiple layers of social, economic, political and cultural aspects. Similar to the literature on (un)natural disasters presented by Kelman (2016) and Chmutina and Meding (2019), climate migration has arguably faced a process of de-naturalisation. In other words, the unnaturalness of climate migration is more visible than before and arguably stronger within the Opportunistic narrative. The Foresight reports marks a stand to not including a unified concept of climate migration, and rather emphasise the social and economic characteristics of migration. However, the core of addressing a conceptual change within disasters literature was to address political responsibility (Kelman 2016, Chmutina and Meding 2019). In comparison with disasters literature, the aim of de-naturalise the climate migration debate within the Opportunistic narrative is the opposite. At least from what we can see on a surface perspective. Leading to the question, *is the concept of **climate** migration the right label and frame and address issues of climate change and vulnerability?*

Throughout this research it has become clear that the mainstream and Opportunistic approach represented by IGOs and government bodies are more characterized by de-politicised and neoliberal aspects. This becomes evident in the technical understanding of the key concepts such as vulnerability, adaptation and resilience which bring limitation to rightfully transformational change. The concepts have lost their original salience and instead work to justify development programmes within the same structures which originally caused it.

It is reason to believe that the increasing attention from IGOs and government institutions stems from the apocalyptic narrative's attribution of constantly bringing the issue to political surface. Which is considerably the reason why the global events this year has surprised several among those platforms. This year we have witnessed two cases of influential western countries bringing the case of legalizing refugee for climate change on a national scale. Regardless academic critique, including an ontological and definitional dissatisfaction, as well as existing approaches to deal with this issue, such as relocation programmes, adaptation measures and policy regulations. This political action might reflect the strong mobilisation from alarmist NGO activists and media bringing the issue of climate change and justice to the political surface.

The political dimension of climate migration

While the political dimension has not always been outlined explicit within all platforms, this analysis makes it clear that the issue of climate migration is merely political of nature.

Throughout the previous sections of multiple narratives, I have illustrated some of the core challenges exposed in the climate migration debate which reflect some critical political and ontological stands. Throughout this analysis it has become evident that the NGOs, media, IGOs and government bodies operate with different political discourses and strategies than academia. In the case of NGOs and media, political statements particular regarding security are directly displayed. The politics of the debate is directly exposed on the surface.

Regardless, the lack of the same forwardness within the IGO and government reports should not be taking for political neutrality. Taking the neutral side in a considerably political and ontological loaded discussion is hard to avoid, and the framing of "unbiased" posing is unavoidable. The political ideology behind the migration management of the reports reflect both neoliberal positioning and the rhetoric of bringing forward one's political message through subtle indicators of strengthening "capacity building", "migration management" and "labour market facilities".

The opportunistic narrative is recognized with a de-politicisation of the climate migration debate. However, it strongly reflects another subtle, but powerful political agenda. While IGOs and government bodies are increasingly signaling withdrawing of the state action and governance, global governance structures work as a tool to maintain the security for each country's borders and safety. This idea also cooperates with the growing securitisation and

neo-liberalisation of border management globally and especially between the Global North and South. It becomes evident that one's national passport reflect considerable privilege. Promoting labour migration as an adaptation strategy for climate migration is challenging. Even though agency is located within the individual migrant, external institutions usually retains the power of managing mobility. For this reason, there are structural limitation related to mobility resulting in immobility of injustice. Migration to the Global North from the Global South has facilitated in a politically polarised divide, creating an ongoing discussion in immigration and security in media. I will argue that the general inhospitality and xenophobia towards migrants from the Global South has resulting in continuing debates on climate refugees in media. Activist, and those who considered themselves within the political left is increasingly discussing in favour the climate refugee, arguably in rhetoric of positioning a liberal stand towards conservatives.

This tendency further reflects the challenges of removing the climate from migration. Considering economic and labour migration from the Global South already attain several negative connotations. Thereby emphasising the "natural" dimension of migration which then represents a political neutral driver on the surface. In reality, as Foresights suggests, there might not be a difference between a climate and an economic migrant. In this context it is evident to remember that behind the labels of climate, labour and economic migrants are actual people who fall in-between different legal labels which restrict free mobility. Put more interestingly, what separates the labour migrant from the climate migrant?

Arguably, considering climate migration emerges from the concept of climate refugee some connotations to the latter narrative have been transferred to the current contextual understanding of climate migration (Ebrahimi and Ossewaarde, 2019). This perspective is especially evident in World Bank's usage of the human face of climate change and except from IOM, the exclusion of case studies from other regions than the Global South is a relevant indicator. The alarmist framing of security in term of 'climate refugees' has been very influential in policy areas (Bettini et al. 2016). The "refugee" and "forced migration" trope highlights the supposed situation of movement being involuntary and leaving one's country of origin directly because of impacts from climate change (Kelman et al. 2019). By taking distance from the "saviour" and "global injustice" perspective rooted climate refugee narrative, migrants are generally described as agents with agency. However, what seems to be

the reality is that the shift of debate changed the concept *refuge* to *migrant*, however the ontological connotation attached to the core phenomenon of climate migration consisted.

My argument is not that western individual rationality is the only to blame in this case. Neither claim that western individualism and rationality is the only facilitator for binary Otherness and nature-society relation. There is no reason to believe that such ontological understanding is not present within other non-western ontologies as well. However, considering the Western thought reflect our current hegemonic political ontology and ideology there is a need to address the power structures within (Feola, 2020). Climate migration is a question of both transformational adaptation to a sustainable future for our own and all upcoming generation. Furthermore, a topic which reflect current xenophobic and capitalistic and neoliberalist structures. My critique reflects the responsibility to consider our understanding of the world and reality which surrounds us. Further to call out influential policy makers and expert to stretch longer for sustainable achievement. However, I call for greater awareness of own and reflections of recognizing others ontological positioning. Furthermore, to challenge the aspects of our current understanding we need to understand critical ontology, and how power relation actively shapes what and how we think, speak and act. For this reason, the problem of climate migration is not as much what the phenomenon actually is, but the question of how we should approach it.

“What exactly is climate migration”?

This particular question has guided and motivated this research, which justifies its re-occurrence in the final section of this work. Throughout this research considerable space have been dedicated to discussing the ontological takes and understandings of climate migration, and which implications it will serve for the people of concern.

This analysis and discussion reflect that there is no clear and unified understanding of what climate migration is. Different platforms are mobilising different aims and with different political intention and ontological takes on the issue. However, it has become clear that the climate migrants are someone from the Global South. Within the Apocalyptic narrative, this understanding is explained explicit, while within the Opportunistic narrative this understanding is articulated in more subtle ways. The different IGOs and government reports emphasise a link to vulnerability and climate change hotspots. Based on each report’s selected cases the message and imagine of the climate migration is conveyed indirect. IOM (2017) the

stands out as the only report which cover climate migration outside the Global South. However, this section was offered a small space in compare to the full report. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe the section's aim was to provide a more holistic, including and historically perspective on climate migration.

Nevertheless, it becomes interesting to comment on the cycle of powerful and influential narratives. Evidence from this analysis show that the alarmist narrative arguably continues to push and pressure IGOs and government bodies to approach the topic of climate migration. Considering the topic continues to be highly relevant and occurring in both media and NGO circles, there is reason to believe global government and policy institutions are required to respond to the issue of concern. Even though platforms such as Foresight, World Bank, IOM and EU are well informed by academic literature and empirical evidence public demand are reason to believe they are required to meet demands from civil society and provide some solutions. It may reflect the aim to combat the two narratives of humanitarian and securitisation. Or, it could represent a lack of will to address the root causes of climate change and the securitising narratives towards Southern migrants.

Interesting to reflect on however, is how the apocalyptic and opportunistic narrative happens to continue to develop in two different direction. Based on the perspectives from this research's selected NGOs and media articles there seems to be a general lack of knowledge and information on existing measure towards climate migration. Whether this is the result of lacking attention in media regarding the existing programmes such as relocation and migration-as-adaptation programmes or a response to the dissatisfaction of these programmes is hard to tell. Results from this study fails to bring clarity to this question, however it represents an interesting lens and framing for further research.

Nevertheless, recent evidence from media confirm the first legal climate refugee, and US President Biden are continuing to bring the issue to political surface. The Critical narratives seems to have been lost in the public debate which further brings out the question: *is the legal concept of **climate refugee** the terminology we need to facilitate measure towards a group which would not be welcomed under other circumstances?* The humanitarian narrative points out that existing xenophobic and toxic narratives on refugees are existing in western societies. Further emphasizing that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are primarily environment activist support the theory that the narrow understanding of climate migration stems from a general dissatisfaction in climate change and humanitarian questions. By combing a concept

of nature with the political concept of human mobility we create a concept which originate from two moral contained phenomenon. Climate representing a natural force beyond human control and the word refugee contain strong moral associations in most world cultures. Even though this research has outlined a careful understanding of the two concepts, it seems like the global community longs for a label for justice and action.

Behind the multiple and diverse numbers, definitions, statistics and global debates are multiple lives and destinies. These concepts are constructed to capture these specific individuals and societies. Furthermore, elements of vulnerability, climate change exposure and lack of sufficient measures to provide safety and a quality of life are in varying degrees connotated to the concepts. Further supporting why this group has been linked to developmental concern. The question which remains are whether the current concepts, measures and approaches are sufficient to capture, understand and work in favour of the people of concern. This research has outlined several challenges connotated to the concept of climate migration which is rooted in dualistic western thought and further implemented and integrated in the majority of global structures, practises, targets and aims.

The issue is not whether people move voluntary or involuntary because of environmental conditions. The issue at stake is that despite ongoing attempts of both critical academia and IGOs continue to nuance the debate on climate migration, the general and perceiving idea on climate migration continue to operate within alarmist rhetoric with anxiety for the future. Even though Foresight, EU, IOM and World Bank emphasises an opportunistic solutions-oriented framing of climate migration this analyse prevails that old alarmist narratives are still embedded in the very concept and phenomenon of climate migration. Connected to imagines of tsunamis of climate migrants washing ashore in western countries. Furthermore, this research show that there is a correlation between the future fear of climate migrants and future fear of climate change. As Eric Swyngedouw research suggest, current public and academic discourses on future climate change scenarios carries strong connection to apocalyptic and doomsday scenarios and futures. His research further argues that these apocalyptic narratives encourage polarized and populist approaches. The aim of this critique is not to withdraw global attention to the people who are described as either vulnerable or resilient climate migrants. Rather the critique of this research aims to lift up some of the root causes which created the empirical and conceptual contested label climate migrant in the first place.

In this case, what purpose will the concept of climate migration serve for development and justice? Throughout this research the concepts reflect a strategy of attacking the symptom, but not the illness. For this reason, it should be considered the right time to bring *real* justice to the debate, beyond saviourism and maintenance of old structures. By addressing the root causes of climate change and further challenge hegemonic binary ontological understandings of both nature, society and the Other migrant, we might come closer to achieve transformational change beyond the limitations of a buzzword. To summarize this research and answer the question of this sections headline, climate migration works as a contested label to address issues of injustice within the same political and ontological structures which birthed injustice in the first place. In this context it makes sense to revisit the quotation by Fredric Jameson in *Swyngedouw*.

It is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism. (Jameson, 2003: 73, in Swyngedouw)

Lynch and Vendal (2018) emphasises the challenge of myths and frozen ontologies embedded in our consciousness and imagination of the world and reality. Maybe it is time to unfreeze these myths in the name of climate change, justice and the four migrants.

References

Adger, W. N. 2006. "Vulnerability." *Global Environmental Change* 16 (3): 268–81. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.02.006.

Asdal, K. (2015) What is the issue? The transformative capacity of documents. *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory*, vol.16, no.1, (pp.74-90), DOI: 10.1080/1600910X.2015.1022194

Ayeb-Karlsson, S. (2020). No Power without Knowledge: A Discursive Subjectivities Approach to Investigate Climate-Induced (Im)mobility and Wellbeing. *Social Sciences*, 9(6), 103. doi: 10.3390/socsci9060103

Ayeb-Karlsson, S., Smith, C.D. & Kniveton, D. A discursive review of the textual use of 'trapped' in environmental migration studies: The conceptual birth and troubled teenage years of trapped populations. *Ambio* 47, 557–573 (2018). <https://doi-org.ezproxy.uio.no/10.1007/s13280-017-1007-6>

Baker, T. (2020). The UK's first climate change refugees? *BBC*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-51667018>

Baldwin, A. (2012) Orientalising environmental citizenship: climate change, migration and the potentiality of race, *Citizenship Studies*, vol.16, nos.5-6, pp. 625-640, DOI: 10.1080/13621025.2012.698485

Balibar, Etienne. 1998. "The Borders of Europe." In *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, edited by Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, 216–232. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bankoff, G. (2001) Rendering the world unsafe: "Vulnerability" as western discourse. *Disasters* 25(1): 19–35.

Bates-Eamer, N. (2019). Border and Migration Controls and Migrant Precarity in the Context of Climate Change. *Social Sciences*, 8(7), 198. doi: 10.3390/socsci8070198

Baxter, J (2016) Case Studies in Qualitative Research.. Ian Hay (eds.), *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography* (p. 130 - 146). Canada: Oxford University Press

Bennett, N.J, Blythe, J., Cisneros-Montemayor, A.M., Singh, G.G., Rashid Sumaila, U. (2019) Just Transformations to Sustainability. *Sustainability*. 14(11) 1-18. doi:10.3390/su11143881

Bettini, G. (2014) Climate migration as an adaption strategy: desecuritizing climateinduced migration or making the unruly governable? *Critical Studies on Security*, vol.2, no.2, pp.180-195, DOI:10.1080/21624887.2014.909225

Bettini, G. (2017). Where Next? Climate Change, Migration, and the (Bio)politics of Adaptation. *Global Policy*, 8, 33-39. doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12404

- Bettini, G. (2019). And yet it moves! (Climate) migration as a symptom in the Anthropocene. *Mobilities*, 14(3), 336-350. doi: 10.1080/17450101.2019.1612613
- Bettini, G., Nash, S.L., Gioli, G. (2017) One step forward, two steps back? The fading contours of (in)justice in competing discourses on climate migration. John Wiley & Sons Ltd The Geographical Journal, Vol. 183, No. 4, , pp. 348–358, doi: 10.1111/geoj.12192.
- Berg, L.D. (2009) Discourse Analysis. R. Kitchen and N. Thrift. (Eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography*, (215-220) Oxford: Elsevier
- Biermann (2018) Global Governance in the “Anthropocene”. I.A Brown, C., Eckersley, R. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Political Theory. Oxford University Press.
- Biermann, F., & Boas, I. (2010). Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees. *Global Environmental Politics*, 10(1), 60-88. doi: 10.1162/glep.2010.10.1.60
- Blaikie, N. (2007). *Approaches to Social Enquiry: Advancing Knowledge (2nd ed.)*. Cambridge: Polity,
- Boateng, I. (2014) Assessing Climate Change Induced Displacements and Its Potential Impacts on Climate Refugees : How can Surveyors Help with Adaptation? FIG Congress 2014, DOI: 10.13140/2.1.2077.7608
- Campbell, K.M., et al., (2007). The age of consequences: the foreign policy and national security implications of global climate change. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and Center for a New American Security.
- Carpenter, Z. (2021, 09.06.21). Climate Change Will Force Us to Rethink Migration and Asylum. *The nation*. <https://www.thenation.com/article/environment/border-biden-climate-migration/>
- Chandler D, 2010 International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-liberal Governance (Routledge, New York)
- Chmutina, K., von Meding, J. A Dilemma of Language (2019) “Natural Disasters” in Academic Literature. *Int J Disaster Risk Sci* 10, 283–292. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-019-00232-2>
- CNA, (2007). National security and the threat of climate change. Alexandria: CNA Corporation.
- Cresswell, T. (2010). Towards a Politics of Mobility. *Environment And Planning D: Society And Space*, 28(1), 17-31. doi: 10.1068/d11407
- Cretney, R. (2014). Resilience for whom? Emerging critical geographies of socio-ecological resilience. *Geography Compass*, 8(9), 627-640.

Duffield, M., and B. Evans. 2012. "Biospheric Security." In *A Threat against Europe? Security, Migration and Integration*, edited by P. Peter Burgess and S. Gutwirth. Brussels: VUB Press.

Dunn, K. (2016) "Doing" qualitative research in human geography. Ian Hay (eds.), *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography* (p. 149 - 188). Canada: Oxford University Press

Dowling, R. (2016) Power, Subjectivity, and Ethics in Qualitative Research. Ian Hay (eds.), *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography* (p. 29 - 44). Canada: Oxford University Press

Ebrahimi, S.H., Ossewaarde, M. (2019) Not a Security Issue: How Policy Experts DePoliticize the Climate Change–Migration Nexus. *Soc. Sci.* Vol.8, No.214.
<https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8070214>

El-Hinnawi, E. 1985. *Environmental refugees*. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environmental Program.

Eriksen S.H, Nightingale, A.J., and Eakin H. (2015) Reframing adaptation: The political nature of climate change adaptation. *Global Environmental Change*35: 523-533.

(EU, 2017) Stang, G., Dimsdale, T. (2017) The EU and Climate Security. Planetary Security Initiative [PB The EU Climate Security.pdf \(planetarysecurityinitiative.org\)](#)

(EU 2019) Apap, J.(2019) *The concept of 'climate refugee' Towards a possible definition*, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Union. Access at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI\(2018\)621893](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)621893)

(EU 2020) Kraler, A., Katsiaticas, C., Wagmer, M. (2020) *Climate Change and Migration* <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses>

Felli, R. (2013) Managing Climate Insecurity by Ensuring Continuous Capital Accumulation: 'Climate Refugees' and 'Climate Migrants', *New Political Economy*, vol.18, no.3, pp. 337-363, DOI:10.1080/13563467.2012.687716

Felli, R., & Castree, N. (2012). Neoliberalising Adaptation to Environmental Change: Foresight or Foreclosure?. *Environment And Planning A: Economy And Space*, 44(1), 1-4. doi: 10.1068/a44680

Feola, G. (2015) Societal transformation in response to global environmental change: a review of emerging concepts. *Ambio* 44 (5):376-390. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13280-014-0582-z>

Feola, G. (2020) Capitalism in sustainability transitions research: Time for a critical turn? *Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions*. 35. (241-250)
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2019.02.005>

Foresight (2011) *Migration and Global Environmental Change Final Project Report*, The Government Office for Science, London

Friends of the Earth. (2017, 30.05.21). *Climate refugees: our position*,. Friends of the Earth, Policy. Retrieved 29.05 from <https://policy.friendsoftheearth.uk/policy-positions/climate-refugees-our-position>

(Gemenne, 2011a) Gemenne, F. (2011) How they became the human face of climate change. Research and policy interactions in the birth of the ‘environmental migration’ concept. In Pigué, E., Pecoud, A., de Guchteneire, P. eds *Migration and Climate Change* Cambridge University press, Cambridge. <http://hdl.handle.net/2268/141894>

(Gemenne, 2011b) Gemenne, F. (2011). Why the numbers don’t add up: A review of estimates and predictions of people displaced by environmental changes. *Global Environmental Change*, 21, S41-S49. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.005

Goldman, M. J., Turner, M. D., & Daly, M. (2018). A critical political ecology of human dimensions of climate change: Epistemology, ontology, and ethics. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 9(4), <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.526>

Gould, K.A., M.M. Garcia, and J.A.C. Remes. (2016). Beyond “‘natural-disasters-are-not-natural’”: The work of state and nature after the 2010 earthquake in Chile. *Journal of Political Ecology* 23(1): 93–114.

(Greenpeace, 2019) Stackl, V. (2019). *Climate Migration Will Be Like Nothing We’ve Ever Seen Before*. Greenpeace. Retrieved 30.05 from <https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/climate-migration/>

Hage G (2016) Etat de siège: A dying domesticating colonialism? *American Ethnologist* 43(1): 38–49. <https://doi.org/10.1111/amet.12261>

Hallegatte, S., A. Vogt-Schilb, M. Bangalore, and J. Rozenberg. (2017) “Unbreakable: Building the Resilience of the Poor in the Face of Natural Disasters.” Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25335>.

Hartmann, B. (2010). Rethinking climate refugees and climate conflict: Rhetoric, reality and the politics of policy discourse. *Journal of International Development*, 22(2), 233-246. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1676>

Haifeng, D.; Yumin, Z. (2014). *Legal study on the climate change-induced migrants in china*. *Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy*, 4(1), 77-103.

Henley, J (2021, 19.05.21). Man saved from deportation after pollution plea in French legal 'first'. *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/12/bangladeshi-man-with-asthma-wins-france-deportation-fight>

Henley, J. (2020, 18.08.21). Climate crisis could displace 1.2bn people by 2050, report warns. *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/09/climate-crisis-could-displace-12bn-people-by-2050-report-warns>

Hickel, J. (2018, 31.05.21). To stop climate change, we need to open borders. *Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/2/23/to-stop-climate-change-we-need-to-open-borders>

Hilgartner, Stephen (2000) “Staging Authoritative Reports”, in *Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama*. (p. 42-70) Stanford University Press.

Huysmans, J. (2006) *The Politics of Insecurity*. Abingdon: Routledge.

International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 1990. *Climate change: The IPCC impacts assessment*. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization—United Nations Environment Programme.

Inglefield, C. (2019, 17.05.21). Why do Brits move to Australia? *Australien Times*.

<https://www.australiantimes.co.uk/move-to-australia/why-british-move-to-australia/>

IOM (2014) *IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change*. IOM.

<https://publications.iom.int/books/iom-outlook-migration-environment-and-climate-change>

(IOM 2017) Ionesco, D., Mokhnacheva, D., Gemenna, F. (2017) *The Atlas of Environmental Migration*. Routledge

IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2014a. *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects*. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Edited by C.B. Field, V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, et al. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/>.

Jolly S., Ahmad N. (2019) *Climate Change Migration: Legal Protection Under International Refugee Law and Climate Change Legal Regime*. In: *Climate Refugees in South Asia. International Law and the Global South (Perspectives from the Rest of the World)*. Springer, Singapore.

Karanja, J., Abdul-Razak, Z. (2018) *Africa and Climate Change Refugees' Quandary: Kenya Perspectives*. O. Akanle, J.O. Adésinà (eds.), *The Development of Africa (255-267)*, Social Indicators Research Series 71, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66242-8_14

Kelman, I. 2010. Natural Disasters Do Not Exist (Natural Hazards Do Not Exist Either) Version 3, 9 July 2010 (Version 1 was 26 July 2007). Downloaded from <http://www.ilankelman.org/miscellany/NaturalDisasters.doc>

Kelman, I. (2019). *Imaginary Numbers of Climate Change Migrants?*. *Social Sciences*, 8(5), 131. doi: 10.3390/socsci8050131

Klepp, S., Herbeck, J. (2016) *The politics of environmental migration and climate justice in the Pacific region*. *Journal of Human Rights and the Environment*, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 54– 73. DOI:<https://doi-org.ezproxy.uio.no/10.4337/jhre.2016.01.03>

- Kolmannskog, V. O. (2008). Future floods of refugees. A comment on climate change, conflict and forced migration. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council.
- Korac- Sanderson, M. (2020) Gendered and racialised border security: Displaced people and the politics of fear. *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy* 9(3): 75-86. DOI: [10.5204/ijcjsd.v9i3.1590](https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v9i3.1590)
- Leese, M., and Wittendorp, S. (2018) The new mobilities paradigm and critical security studies: exploring common ground, *Mobilities*, 13:2, 171-184, DOI: [10.1080/17450101.2018.1427016](https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2018.1427016)
- Lövbrand E, Beck S, Chilvers J, et al. (2015) Who speaks for the future of Earth? How critical social science can extend the conversation on the Anthropocene. *Global Environmental Change* 32: (211-218). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.03.012>
- Lynch, A., Veland, S. (2018) Whose Anthropocene? Lynch, A.H., & Veland, S. (eds) *Urgency in the Anthropocene*. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Chicago
- Magnan, A. K., Schipper, E. L. F., Burkett, M., Bharwani, S., Burton, I., Eriksen, S., . . . Ziervogel, G. (2016). Addressing the risk of maladaptation to climate change. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 7(5), <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.409>
- Massey, D. (1993) "Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place", in *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change* Ed J Bird, B Curtis, T Putnam, G Robertson, L Tickner (Routledge, London) pp 59- 69
- Methmann, C., Oels, A. (2015) From 'fearing' to 'empowering' climate refugees: Governing climate-induced migration in the name of resilience. *Security Dialogue*, SAGE, vol.46(1), pp.51-68, DOI: [10.1177/0967010614552548](https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614552548)
- Mladenović, M. (2019). Mobility justice: the politics of movement in an age of extremes. *Transport Reviews*, 40(1), 117-120. doi: [10.1080/01441647.2019.1654556](https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2019.1654556)
- Myers, N. 1993. Environmental refugees in a globally warmed world. *Bioscience* 43:752–61.
- Myers, N. 1997. Environmental refugees. *Population and Environment* 19 (2): 167–82.
- Myers, N. 2002. Environmental refugees: A growing phenomenon of the 21st century. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences* 357 (1420): 609–13.
- Myers, N. 2005. Environmental refugees: An emergent security issue. 1, 1–29
- Nash, M., 2010. Climate refugees: the human face of climate change. Los Angeles: LA Think Tank.
- Nawrotzki, R. J. (2014). Climate Migration and Moral Responsibility. *Ethics, Policy & Environment*, 17(1), 69-87. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2014.885173>
- ND-GAIN (2017) "Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index, Section Vulnerability, Data from 2015." South Bend, IN. <http://index.gain.org/ranking/vulnerability>.

Newman, D. (2006). The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our 'borderless' world. *Progress In Human Geography*, 30(2), 143-161. doi: 10.1191/0309132506ph599xx

(NIC, 2009) National Intelligence Council (2009) North Africa: The Impact of Climate Change to 2030:Geopolitical Implications.

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2009%20Conference%20Report_North%20Africa_The%20Impact%20of%20Climate%20Change%20to%202030.pdf

Nieto-Romero, M, Valente, S., Figueiredo, E., Parra, C. (2019) Historical commons as sites of transformation. A critical research agenda to study human and more-than-human communities. *Geoforum*. 107. (113-123) <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.10.004>

Nightingale, A. (2019) Commoning for inclusion? Political communities, commons, exclusion, property and socio-natural becomings. *International Journal of the -Commons* 13(1). (16-35) <http://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.927>

(Nightingale et. al. 2019a) Nightingale, A., Böhler, T., Campbell, B., & Karlsson, L. (2019). Background and History of Sustainability. In (pp. 13-34). <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315714714-2>

(Nightingale et. al. 2019b) Nightingale, A., Eriksen, S, Taylor, M., ... et. al. (2019) Beyond Technical Fixes: climate solutions and the great derangement. *Climate and Development*. 12(4). (343-352) doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2019.1624495

Nordås, R., and N. P. Gleditsch. 2007. "Climate Change and Conflict." *Political Geography* 26 (6): 627–638. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.003

O'Brien, K., Eriksen, S., Nygaard, L.P., Schjolden, A. (2007). "Why Different Interpretations of Vulnerability Matter in Climate Change Discourses." *Climate Policy* 7 (1): 73–88. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2007.9685639>

Oliver-Smith, A. (2012). DEBATING ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION: SOCIETY, NATURE AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT IN CLIMATE CHANGE. *Journal Of International Development*, 24(8), 1058-1070. doi: 10.1002/jid.2887

Parizot, Cédric, Anne Laure Amilhat Szary, Gabriel Popescu, Isabelle Arvers, Thomas Cantens, Jean Cristofol, Nicola Mai, Joana Moll, and Antoine Vion. 2014. "The antiAtlas of Borders: A Manifesto." *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 29 (4): 503–512.

Parsons, L. (2019). Structuring the emotional landscape of climate change migration: Towards climate mobilities in geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, 43(4), 670–690. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132518781011>

Pawson, E., DeLyser, D. (2016) Communicating Qualitative Research to Wider Audience. Ian Hay (eds.), *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography* (p. 422 - 433). Canada: Oxford University Press

Picchi, M. (2016). Climate change and the protection of human rights: The issue of climate refugees. *US-China Law Review*, Vol.13, No.7, pp.576-583.

Piguet, E. (2013). From “Primitive Migration” to “Climate Refugees”: The Curious Fate of the Natural Environment in Migration Studies. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 103(1), 148-162. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2012.696233>

Piguet, E., Kaenzig, R., & Guélat, J. (2018). The uneven geography of research on “environmental migration”. *Population And Environment*, 39(4), 357-383. doi: 10.1007/s11111-018-0296-4
Plumwood, V. 1991. Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism. *Hypatia* 6(1):3–27.

Plumwood, V. 1991. Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism. *Hypatia* 6(1):3–27.

Plumwood, V., 1993. *Feminism And The Mastery Of Nature*. New York: Routledge.

Press, T. A. (2015, 09.06.21). Merkel: We must hit climate target to avoid refugee waves. *Seattle Times*. <https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/merkel-we-must-hit-climate-target-to-avoid-refugee-waves/>

Raghunath, R (2020) Natural Enemy: A Postcolonial Analysis of the Climate Migrant. *Broad street Humanities Review*. (4/Nature)

Ratzel, F. 1882. *Anthropogeographie* [Anthropogeography]. Stuttgart, Germany: J. Engelhorn. 1903. *Politische geographie* [Political geography]. Munich, Germany: Oldenbourg.

Salazar, N. (2011). The Power of Imagination in Transnational Mobilities. *Identities*, 18(6), 576-598. doi: 10.1080/1070289x.2011.672859

Saldaña, J. 2009. “An introduction to codes and coding”. *The coding manual for qualitative researchers*. Sage, London. Chapter 1, p. 1-32

Salehyan, I. 2008. “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet.” *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (3): 315–326. doi:10.1177/0022343308088812.

Scheffran, J., M. Brzoska, J. Kominek, P. M. Link, and J. Schilling. 2012. “Climate Change and Violent Conflict.” *Science* 336 (6083): 869–871. doi:10.1126/science.1221339.

Schwartz, P. and Randall, D., 2003. An abrupt climate change scenario and its implications for United States National Security. San Francisco: Global Business Network, 1–22.

Sheller, M. (2014). The new mobilities paradigm for a live sociology. *Current Sociology*, 62(6), 789-811. doi: 10.1177/0011392114533211

Sheller, M. (2018) Theorising mobility justice. *Soc. Time*, 30, 17–34.

Sheller, M., & Urry, J. (2006). The New Mobilities Paradigm. *Environment And Planning A: Economy And Space*, 38(2), 207-226. doi: 10.1068/a37268

Sparke, M. (2006). A neoliberal nexus: Economy, security and the biopolitics of citizenship on the border. *Political Geography*, 25(2), 151-180. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.10.002

Stratford, E., Bradshaw, M. (2016) *Qualitative Research Design and Rigour*. Ian Hay (eds.), *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography* (p. 117 - 129). Canada: Oxford University Press

Swyngedouw, E. (2010). Apocalypse Forever? Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 27(2-3), 213-232.
<https://doi.org/DOI:10.1177/0263276409358728>

Taylor, M. (2013). Climate change, relational vulnerability and human security: rethinking sustainable adaptation in agrarian environments. *Climate and Development*, 5(4), 318-327.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2013.830954>

Taylor, M. (2017, 06.05.21). Climate change 'will create world's biggest refugee crisis'. *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-change-will-create-worlds-biggest-refugee-crisis>

Telford, A. (2018). A threat to climate-secure European futures? Exploring racial logics and climate-induced migration in US and EU climate security discourses. *Geoforum*, 96, 268-277.
doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.08.021

Trombetta, M. (2014). Linking climate-induced migration and security within the EU: insights from the securitization debate. *Critical Studies On Security*, 2(2), 131-147. doi: 10.1080/21624887.2014.923699

Turhan, E., & Armiero, M. (2019). Of (not) being neighbors: cities, citizens and climate change in an age of migrations. *Mobilities*, 14(3), 363-374. doi: 10.1080/17450101.2019.1600913

UN World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. *Our Common Future*. (*The Brundtland Report*) . New York: Oxford University Press. Available electronically from the UN:www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf .

Wall, T. (2019, 18.05.19). This is a wake-up call': the villagers who could be Britain's first climate refugees. *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/18/this-is-a-wake-up-call-the-villagers-who-could-be-britains-first-climate-refugees>

Walters, William. 2006. "Border/Control." *European Journal of Social Theory* 9 (2): 187–203.

Ward, P.S., and G.E. Shively. 2017. Disaster risk, social vulnerability, and economic development. *Disasters* 41(2): 324–351.

Werz, M. and Conley, L., 2012. *Climate change, migration and conflict: addressing complex crisis scenarios in the 21st century*. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.

West, J. (2009). *Perceptions of ecological migration in Inner Mongolia, China: summary of fieldwork and relevance for climate adaptation*. Report 2009:04. Oslo. Cicero.

Wiegel, H., Boas, I., Warner, J. (2019) A mobilities perspective on migration in the context of environmental change. *WIREs Climate Change*. Pp.1-9 <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.610>

World Bank (2012) *Turn down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided*. Washington, DC. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/865571468149107611/Turn-down-the-heat-why-a-4-C-warmer-world-must-be-avoided>.

(World Bank, 2018) Rigaud, K., Kanta, de Sherbinin, A., Jones, B., Bergmann, J., Clement, V., Ober, K., Schewe, J., Adamo, S., McCusker, B., Heuser, S., and Midgle, A. (2018). *Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration*. Washington, DC: The World Bank <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29461>

WRI (World Resources Institute) (2016) *World Risk Report 2016*. UNU-EHS and Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft.

Zhou, H., Zhang, W., Sun, Y., Yuan, Y. (2012). *Policy options to support climate-induced migration: insights from disaster relief in China*. Springer Science+ Business media Dordrecht. DOI: 10.1007/s11027-012-9438-7