

Can Pre-Election Protests Influence Voter Behaviour?

The Case of Hong Kong's Anti-ELAB Movement

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Abstract

“We are living in a world of global mass protests that is historically unprecedented in frequency, scope and size” (Brannen, Haig, & Schmidt, 2020, p. 1).

Scholars of social movements recognize the threat that opposition protests pose to the stability of an authoritarian regime. Extensive research has been done on how mass protests can induce regime change, and in turn, democratization. We know less about the micro-level processes by which protests can influence the voter behaviour of the ordinary citizen. This thesis aims to fill this gap, by using evidences from the 2019 social unrest in Hong Kong. By combining protest data from ACLED and the Anti-ELAB Research Archive, with a post-election survey from Hong Kong Election Study, I examine how citizens who *did not* vote for opposition parties in the previous election respond to anti-regime protests and police brutality in their neighbourhood. The findings imply that the effects of protests and police brutality are dependent on whether the respondents identify themselves as “Hongkongers” or as “Chinese”. By using logistic regression, I find that opposition protests and police brutality can mobilize “Hongkongers”, who previously abstained from voting, to vote for opposition parties. However, it also refrains those who identify themselves as “Chinese” from doing the same. I also find that nonviolent protests increase the likelihood that previous regime supporters, who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”, will defect to opposition parties.

Understanding how protests influence voter behaviour in autocratic elections is of utmost importance. Incumbent defeats in autocratic elections do not necessarily result in democratic transitions, but they do signal changes in the dynamics between the opposition and the ruling elite. This may have implications for the democratic (or autocratic) development of the regime in the longer run.

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All remaining errors are mine alone.

Amalie Nilsen
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Hong Kong Election Study (HKES): Wong, S., Clarke, H. D., Ho, K. *2019 post-election survey*
The web site of HKES is currently down. I recieved the data used in this thesis in October 2020

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1 Introduction

Most authoritarian regimes in the world hold elections. Incumbents in these elections are usually assured of victory, due to electoral fraud or violation of civil liberties (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). Nonetheless, on rare occasions, the opponent defeats the incumbent. Do pre-election protests contribute to such outcomes? Extensive research has been done on how mass protests can induce regime change, and in turn, democratization. We know less about the micro-level processes by which opposition protests influence the voter behaviour of the ordinary citizen. Drawing on evidences from Hong Kong, this thesis seeks to understand how opposition protests, and the authorities' response to the protests, influence voter behaviour at the individual level.

During the summer of 2019, millions of Hong Kong citizens took to the street to protest against a proposed bill, that would allow Hong Kong authorities to extradite suspected criminals to mainland China. The protests soon evolved into a prolonged and city-wide movement, known as the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) movement. Initially calling for the withdrawal of the extradition bill, the protests developed into a comprehensive movement, demanding full universal suffrage, amnesty of arrested protesters, an independent inquiry to look into police actions, and the protests to not be characterized as "riots". Over the summer, the clashes between the protesters and the police became more frequent and more violent (F. L. Lee, Yuen, Tang, & Cheng, 2019). One of the heated debates was the police officers' use of teargas. While the pro-democracy parties sided with the protesters, the pro-Beijing camp supported the heavy-handed approach of the police arguing that it was the only way to restore public order (Teo & Fu, 2021). As violent street-level confrontations persisted until one week prior to the 2019 District Council Election the social unrest became the most salient issue of the election, which was widely seen as a barometer of the public sentiment for the mass protests that had been going on for half a year.

Two years after the Anti-ELAB movement broke out, it is now clear that the movement failed in achieving its political goals. In July 2020, Beijing passed a new security law on Hong Kong that has destroyed Hong Kong's democratic development (Lo, 2021) . However, although the protesters failed in achieving democratic reforms, the record-breaking turnout and landslide victory of the pro-democracy camp in the

2019 District Council Election indicate that they were successful in mobilizing the support base for the opposition. 17 out of Hong Kong's 18 districts flipped from "Pro-Beijing" to "Pro-Democracy, and the polls also saw the highest voter turnout since the first district council election was held in 1999 (Lam, 2021). Beneath these election outcomes lie subtle electoral dynamics that should interests political scientists: the impacts of protests, and state repression, on voter behavior. By using empirical evidence from Hong Kong, this thesis seeks to answer the following research question:

How do nearby opposition protests, and the authorities' response to the protests, influence voter behavior in Hong Kong?

The main research question will be analyzed by assessing the following sub-questions:

- a) Did the Anti-ELAB movement mobilize people who did not vote in previous elections, to vote for opposition parties in the 2019 District Council Election?
- b) Do pre-election protests increase the likelihood of voter defections among those who supported the regime in the past?
- c) Does a greater prevalence of protestor violence reduce the potential support for the opposition parties?
- d) Does a greater prevalence of police brutality increase the sympathy with the protestors, and thereby the electoral support for the opposition camp?

Drawing on cascade theories, one of the central arguments of this thesis is that anti-regime protest can influence voter behavior by providing new information about the regime and its opponents, and thus help people to overcome *preference falsification* (Kuran, 1989). In such, mass protests may change the citizens' opportunities to infer whether political change is likely or not. However, how the citizens see the regime, and the regime's opponents, are assumed to be influenced by the prevalence violence, both by protestors and by state actors. A high level of protestors violence can reduce the potential support for the opposition, but in similar vein, brutal crackdowns of the protests may backfire at the regime (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Finally, the theoretical arguments presented in this thesis also highlights people's tendency to select the information that best fits their pre-existing belief systems. In Hong Kong, there is a growing conflict between the local identity as a "Hongkonger" and

the national identity as a “Chinese” (Ortmann, 2021). I assume that the sense of a “national identity” predispose people’s narratives of the pro-Beijing vs. the pro-democracy camp, which in turn influence how they treat the information revealed from the protest events. This *confirmation bias* will also be taken into consideration when discussing the research question(s) presented above.

1.1 Clarifications and Limitations

The outcomes of the 2019 District Council Election clearly imply faith in democracy among Hong Kong’s citizens, but any simplistic argument about how the protests has led Hong Kong any further towards democratization will be misguided. First, district councilors have limited political influence, and usually deal with local issues such as waste management and bus routes. On the other side, the district councilors are the only officials elected by full universal suffrage in Hong Kong. Over the past years, these elections have been widely seen as a barometer of the public sentiment for the regime and its opponents (Wong, 2015, p. 20) . Therefore, voting the district council elections can, in many ways, be seen as an act of signalling support for either the regime or its opponents.

Second, through the New Security Law passed by Beijing in 2020, Hong Kong has suffered more in repression than it has gained in freedom. Under this law, “subversion”, “secession” and “collusion with foreign forces” incur maximum penalties of life imprisonment (Repucci, 2020). Many of the provisions in the security law are broadly defined, and “endangering national security” can mean virtually anything, including attending peaceful protests, receive donations from foreign institutes or companies or running for opposition parties in elections. The aim of this thesis is not to tell a success story about democratic transition, nor to discuss Hong Kong’s further democratic development or its relationship with the mainland. Rather, it seeks to understand the micro-level processes by which nearby anti-regime protests can influence voter behaviour at the individual level.

1.2 Data and Research Design

The research questions will be answered by using a quantitative research design with large-N data. This thesis aims to study variation in voter behaviour during periods of anti-regime protests, and large-N studies are more likely to encounter variation in the variables that we are interested in (Bryman, 2016, p. 53) In such, a quantitative research design allows us to draw more generalized conclusions about the associations between protests, police brutality and voter behaviour in Hong Kong. On the other side, a qualitative analysis would have provided more in-depth insight the mechanisms that connects pre-election protests to voter behaviour. The choice to use a quantitative research design is based on the research question and the collected data at hand. In addition, I also assume that using anonymous survey data, conducted before the implementation of the Security Law, will provide more reliable data and also comes with less risks than interviewing people in Hong Kong about their political attitudes under the current situation in Hong Kong. Therefore, I argue that a quantitative research design with regression models is preferable in this study.

The public opinion data I analyse is the 2019 District Council Post-Election Survey, conducted by Hong Kong Election Study (HKES) in the following week after the 2019-district council election. The survey allows me to track (self-reported) changes in the respondents' voter behaviour from the 2016 Super District Council Election to the 2019 election. I use protest data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to track the protest events that occurred in Hong Kong in the period 1st of June, when the Anti-ELAB movement broke out, to the 23rd of November 2019, the day before the District Council Election. A teargas map provided by the Anti-ELAB Research Archive, led by the University of Hong Kong, will be used to measure police brutality in each of the districts. I have merged these datasets together based on the reported location of the teargas- and protest events, and the reported living district of the respondents in the 2019 post-election survey. This allows me to investigate whether a higher frequency of (violent) protest and teargas events in the respondent's neighbourhood mobilize previous "non-voters", and previous regime supporters, to vote for opposition parties.

The analysis will be conducted by implementing logistic regression models, investigating whether the likelihood of changing voter behaviour is influenced

by the number of violent and nonviolent protests in the voter's district. The focus will be on those who *did not* vote for the opposition parties in 2016, either because they voted for the regime or because they did not vote at all. It is important to keep in mind that I am investigating changes in voter behaviour between two different types of elections. The 2016 Super District Council Election is a part of the legislative election, while the 2019 District Council Election is a local election. Ideally, I would have investigated changes in voter behaviour comparing the 2015 District Council Election with the 2019 election, but this was impossible due to data availability. Nevertheless, the data still allows me to study whether changes in voter behaviour are more likely to occur among voters who live in districts with a high number of (violent) protests, and that have experienced a high level of police brutality.

1.3 Relevance and Case Selection

“We are living in a world of global mass protests that is historically unprecedented in frequency, scope and size” (Brannen et al., 2020, p. 1). The frequency of mass protests related to democracy movements has expanded over the last years. Despite of this trend, the Freedom House clearly states that the global freedom is declining and that democracy is in retreat (FreedomHouse, 2019). More authoritarian leaders are banning opposition groups and arresting opposition figures, and they are also tightening the screws of independent media (ibid.). The case of Hong Kong is in fact a part of a decade-long trend affecting many regions of the world, from the Arab countries to Belarus, and from Myanmar to Chile.

Besides of being a part of a global trend, however, Hong Kong is also unique due to its status as a semi-autonomous city state within an authoritarian sovereign national state. In Hong Kong, autocratization is being advanced first and foremost by a foreign, autocratic government. The Hong Kong protestors are not only fighting their own leaders, but a far more powerful and authoritarian regime. On the surface, Hong Kong does not make up a good comparative case, given its status a semi-autonomous city within the People's Republic of China (PRC). At the same time, the dynamics of the protests may be similar to the dynamics of the protests in other cases where the protestors face very autocratic governments, or even occupants.

Unlike many other autocracies, the Hong Kong citizens have (at least until recently) enjoyed several civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech and an independent media. Voting for opposition parties has therefore not been associated with any particular risk. One could ask how generalizable the findings from Hong Kong are likely to be. While Hong Kong clearly differs from many other autocracies, it also provides a unique opportunity to study how voters in autocracies may have voted in times of mass protests, within a context where voting for the opposition is not associated with any particular risk, but is not expected to result in any political change either. In other words, the case of Hong Kong may be applicable in contexts where voting is first and foremost considered as a symbolic act, in terms of signalling (dis)satisfaction with the regime or its opponents. Related to voting as a symbolic act, Hong Kong also provides a unique case when studying how the sense of a “national identity”, in correlation with protests, influence voter behaviour. While some argue that voting in electoral autocracies can be considered as an act of *patronism* (Letsa, 2020), Hong Kong provides a unique opportunity to investigate expressive motivations behind vote choices in a context where the sense of a “national identity” is highly diverse. This may provide useful insight to independence movements in other places in the world, or in other regions experiencing a growing pressure from centralizing states, such as Taiwan or the “russification” of Ukraine (Chan, Nachman, & Mok, 2021).

Finally, the case of (pre-2020) Hong Kong is unique due to data availability. Because autocracies are generally opaque and the quality of public opinion data is questionable, the impact of protests on voter behavior in such contexts are not well-understood. Hong Kong, at least before 2020, does not suffer from such shortcomings. Publicly available data on voting behavior in the 2019 District Council Election, conducted before the New Security Law was introduced, helps study the variables of interest. With that said, the web site of Hong Kong Election Study, which I received my data from, was shut down in March 2021. Without being too speculative, I assume that public opinion data in Hong Kong will no longer be as available, or reliable, as it was before the New Security Law was implemented. As it turns out, using pre-2020 Hong Kong as a case provides a rare opportunity to investigate voter behavior in an electoral autocracy, and especially within a Chinese context.

1.4 Thesis Outline

This thesis will be structured as follows: Chapter 2 will define and discuss the key concepts used in the thesis, and present some of the existing literature and ongoing debates within the field. To gain a better understanding of the case, Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the political environment in Hong Kong and the ongoing conflict. Chapter 4 lays out the theoretical foundations of the thesis. I will use cascade theories and the *backfiring mechanism* to develop a theory on how (violent) protests and police brutality influence voter behaviour. I will also discuss this in the light of a *confirmation bias*, in which the sense of a “national identity” may predispose people’s narratives of the regime and the opposition. In Chapter 5, I will present the data and models used for testing the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4. I will present and discuss the data sets and the operationalization of the variables, and discuss the model choice and its implications. In Chapter 6, the hypotheses are finally put to an empirical test, followed by a discussion of the robustness of the results. Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes the main findings and their implications, and provides suggestions for further research.

2 Concepts and Literature Review

This chapter begins with a clarification on how the key concepts in this thesis are defined and understood, followed by a brief discussion of the distinction between violent vs. nonviolent protests. The second part of this chapter provides an overview over some of the existing research and ongoing debates in the field. I conclude this chapter by spelling out the knowledge gaps that this thesis seeks to fill: the micro-level mechanisms that connects protests to voter behaviour.

2.1 Concepts

In this section, I will clarify the key concepts used throughout the thesis: *electoral autocracies*, *social movements*, *violent vs. non-violent protests*, *harsh repression of protests and confirmation bias*. None of these concepts are easy to define, and they are understood and applied in different ways by different scholars and researchers. It is therefore important to clarify how I define these concepts, as it has implications for how we are exploring, measuring, and interpreting the data used in this thesis.

2.1.1 Electoral autocracies

The most minimalistic conception of democratic regimes focuses on elections, and relies on the notion that the ruled have the authority to choose their rulers (Przeworski, 1999). The head of the government should therefore be accountable to the elected bodies. Most regimes in the world today hold elections, but in electoral autocracies, elections are rather used as a tool to consolidate the regime's power and claim democratic legitimacy. Although elections are held, the incumbents are usually assured of victory, due to systems that favors the ruling elite, such as suffrage restrictions and little contestation. Autocratic elections are often associated with a high level of electoral fraud, manipulation, and violence. While elections are central to democracy, holding elections is not sufficient for a regime to be considered as democratic (Kadivar, 2017). The elections must be free, fair, and competitive, which also requires that the citizens enjoy a high level of civil liberties, including the freedom of speech, free press, and strong judicial institutions (ibid.).

Traditionally, Hong Kong has been considered as an electoral autocracy, with limited

electoral franchise and strong civil liberties. The district councilors and half of the legislature is elected by democratic procedures, but the other half of the legislature is elected by a small elite of voters. The Chief Executive is not elected by universal suffrage and is not accountable to the elected bodies (Wong, 2015, p. 6). Because of the New Security Law from 2020, Hong Kong can today be categorized as more autocratic than democratic. When using terms such as “democratic setbacks”, I refer to both changes in the electoral systems, including arrestations of opposition candidates and postponement of elections, and violations of the citizen’s civil liberties and the media freedom.

2.1.2 Social movements and protests

The concept of social movements is not easy to define, but according to Kriesi (2014), the concept includes at least three components: 1) a group of people with a conflicting orientation towards an opponent, 2) a collective identity with and common beliefs and goals, and 3) a repertoire of collective actions (p.268). Social movements are constituted by informal networks of multiple individuals and organized actors, who engage in coordinated efforts to bring about change in society (Heaney, 2013, p.1). Social movements are loosely organized, which distinguish them from political parties and interest organizations. Political parties or candidates may take part in social movements, but the movements are not reduced to them (Kriesi, 2014, p.269). In the case of Hong Kong, pro-democracy candidates might be a part of the movement, and many of the protestors are supporters of the pro-democracy camp, but the movement is not led by, or reduced to, members of certain political parties.

Social movements engage in non-institutionalized collective actions, as they do not have regular access to decision-making arenas such as the parliament and state administration. Therefore, social movements must draw attention to their cases by mobilizing in the public sphere. Mass protests are one of many tactics employed by opposition movements. The aim is to gain public “standing” for their movement and thereby have an impact on the decision-making process (Kriesi, 2014, p.270). While protests can take many different forms, such as civil disobedience or strikes, this thesis primarily focuses on events in which a group of individuals is taking to the streets in forms of public demonstrations.

2.1.3 Violent vs. non-violent demonstrations

Because one of the objectives of this study is to investigate how violent vs. nonviolent protests may affect voter behavior, it is important to clarify how I define violence, as it has implications for how the findings are interpreted and understood. I follow the conventional definition of violence as the intended physical damage to persons or property (Pinckney, 2016). This definition does not set any minimal threshold of harm or fatalities, and does not require any weapons to be used. Pickney (2016) argues that *“even actions with minimal actual harm may be perceived as harmful and threatening”* (p.16).

Nonviolent is defined in negative terms, as the absence of violence. This provides an empirical distinction between violent and non-violent demonstrations. Nonviolent protestors are not passive, but they aim to bring political change without causing any physical harm at people or properties (Bond, 1988). “Nonviolence” has often been attributed with a moral dimension, referring to an ideologically, ethically, or religiously belief systems that reject the use of violence (Chenoweth, Perkoski, & Kang, 2017). In this thesis, however, I define the use of (non)violent tactics as a strategic choice.

Defining the protests events simply by the absence or presence of violence is not unproblematic, as it often oversimplifies reality. I acknowledge that there are different types of violence, some causing more harm than others, which may also have different implications for the relationship between violent protests and voter behavior. Nonviolent tactics sometimes occur in parallel with violence, as movements sometimes shift from “nonviolent” to “violent” tactics over time, or employ multiple tactics simultaneously. The choice to define protests by a dichotomous “violent” and “non-violent” distinction is mainly based on substantial and pragmatical reasons. On the practical note, ACLED does not distinguish between different types of violence, when coding demonstrations as either “violent” or “peaceful” (ACLED, 2019). In addition, several protests took place in Hong Kong every day for almost half a year, but few fatalities were reported. Therefore, this thesis rather focuses on the implications of the “every-day” violence, such as road-blocking or vandalism of shops and metro stations, that influence people’s daily life, rather than limiting “violence”

to only events including killings or serious injuries. The operationalization of the events will be presented and discussed in more details in Chapter 5.

2.1.4 Repression of protests

“Repression is any realized or threatened limit or coercive action taken by the state authorities that could alter the status quo-policy or distribution of power” (Ritter & Conrad, 2016, p.86). Repression is often associated with the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against individuals or organizations, but does also involve nonviolent use of state power, that violate civil liberties such as basic security, and the freedom of speech or of assembly. These forms of “harsh” repression aim to increase the cost of participating in protests, as well as deterring activities or beliefs that are perceived as challenging to the authorities. Repression is assumed to be more common in authoritarian contexts, but is also present in democracies, often in a “softer” form, related to social control, for instance by creating stigma around certain groups or beliefs (Lindekilde & Olesen, 2015). In this thesis, I will assess “police brutality” by tracking the number of events in which tear gas has been fired by police officers in each district. Firing tear gas is clearly not the only way to repress a protest, but it gives some indications on the level of police brutality in each of the districts of Hong Kong. Thus, the focus of this thesis is on “harsh”, rather than “soft” repression.

2.1.5 Confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance

As mentioned in the introduction, the theoretical arguments in this thesis also emphasize that individuals have a tendency to prefer the messages that align pre-existing attitudes, over the messages that challenge them. Cognitive dissonance occurs when newly acquired information is in conflict with pre-existing understandings. Because cognitive dissonance causes discomfort, people generally approach political messages with a *confirmation bias*, meaning that they favour the messages that best fit their pre-existing beliefs (Knobloch-Westernick, Mothes, & Polavin, 2020). In this thesis, I will discuss cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias in the light of the somewhat conflicting relationship between the national identity as a “Chinese” and the local identity as a “Hongkonger” . Chapter 4 will, in greater details, discuss how the sense of a national identity may correlate with (repression of) protests and voter

behaviour.

2.2 What do we (not) know? A Review of the Literature

While pre-election protests are not uncommon, whether they are beneficial to the opposition remains a question of scholarly debate. There are several reasons for why pre-election protests can strengthen the opposition's support base. Large scale protests often influence the salience of issue, and sometimes give rise to new civic organizations (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010; Heaney, 2013). Analyzing Milosevic's rule in Serbia in the late 1990s, Bunce and Wolchik (2010) argue that pre-election protests help maintain the level of anti-regime sentiments, and they also send signals to the citizens that there is a considerable number of people that are willing to change the status quo. This may motivate people to cast a ballot for the opposition. In such, anti-regime mobilization can help regime opponents to overcome collective actions problems and coordinate their efforts to challenge the incumbents (Kadivar, 2017). During periods of mass protests, the incumbents may realize that they are facing serious challenges, and thereby try to manage these challenges by holding more competitive elections (Schedler, 2009). Kadivar (2017) argue that because pre-election protests signal the spread of grievances, creates new grievances, and provides viable alternatives to the regime, they are likely to influence the citizens' voter behaviour. By using survey data from 195 elections in 65 countries, Kadivar (2017) also finds empirical evidences for his claim, suggesting that pre-election protests increase the likelihood of incumbent defeat in autocratic elections.

On the other side, there are also some arguments for why protests might reduce the power of those they intend to support. Levitsky and Way (2010) are pessimistic about the effectiveness of protests, arguing that it is the features of the incumbent regime itself that determine their trajectories, not the opposition's mobilization. In addition, protests may escalate into large-scale conflicts that can intimidate by-standing citizens and disturb the public order. If the general public perceive the protesters as "radicals", it might damage the reputation of the protest movement and demobilize the opposition (Simpson, Willer, & Feinberg, 2018). One of the most discussed features of protests concerning the chances of achieving successful outcomes is the use of violent vs. nonviolent protest tactics.

Theoretical and empirical research on large-scale, (non)violent actions has expanded in recent years. Some scholars assume that violent methods of resistance are the most coercive, and thereby the most efficient way to produce desired policy changes (Pape, 2008; Horowitz & Reiter, 2001). Drawing on insight from resource mobilization theories, non-normative actions are driven by a low sense of efficacy, implying that violence are more likely to be supported when individuals feel that they are powerless, and do not have access to conventional channels to influence politics (Dyrstad & Hillesund, 2020). Such non-normative actions may then be highly strategic, for instance by provoking extreme counteractions that could facilitate the opposition in the longer run (Becker & Tausch, 2015). In addition, violent events may also gain more attention, and thereby have a greater chance to put the protestors' demand on the agenda.

A growing body of literature recognizes that the use of violent tactics reduces the public support for protestors. Chenoweth and Stephan (2008) argue that nonviolent protests are more likely to be perceived as legitimate and they also attract more people. Violent protests, on the other side, may backfire at the opposition, as the public might perceive the violent protestors as less reasonable, which in turn leads to reduced identification with the protests group (Simpson et al., 2018). By using data on major violent and nonviolent campaigns from 1900 to 2006, Chenoweth and Stephan (2008) present empirical support for their theory, finding that nonviolent campaigns are successful more than twice as many times as violent campaigns (p.8).

In addition to being perceived as more legitimate, the regime's costs of repressing a nonviolent protest are assumed to be higher than the costs of repressing a violent protest (Schock, 2003; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). In the nonviolent action literature, a "political jitsu-jitsu", is a situation in which the regime uses violence against peaceful protestors, that damage the domestic and international reputation of the regime and increase the support for the opposition (Sutton, Butcher, & Svensson, 2014). Chenoweth and Stephan (2008) find that state-repression of nonviolent protests are likely to increase both the domestic and international sympathy with the protestors. However, while most of this work is at the macro or meso level, less is known about the micro level processes by which protests can influence voter behaviour at the individual level, which leads to the knowledge gaps that this thesis seeks to fill.

2.2.1 The knowledge gap

As discussed in the section above, most studies of social movements and elections focus on the associations between (non)violent protests and the likelihood of regime transitions. However, we know less about the micro-level processes that underpin the associations between these macro-level phenomena. As it turns out, the Anti-ELAB movement clearly failed in generating any democratic reforms, but I argue that we should not leave it as a “complete failure”, and thereby ignore its success in mobilizing the electoral support for the opposition camp.

Although scholars have developed rigorous programmes to investigate elections (Norris et al., 2004; Blais, 2000), and (nonviolent) protests (Tarrow & Tilly, 2007; Kuran, 1989; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), the association between protests and voter behaviour is not well-understood. This is particularly true in non-democratic regimes, as detailed data on public opinion seldom comes easily in these regimes. A post-election survey from Hong Kong, conducted before the implementation of the Security Law, provides a unique opportunity to study the associations between pre-election protests and voter behaviour within an autocratic context. Hopefully, this study can enrich the existing literature on social movements and elections by providing empirical evidence on how (non)violent protests, and repression of the protests, influence the citizens’ voter behaviour at the individual level. In addition, this study also investigates whether the effects of protests on voter behaviour vary in a society that is experiencing growing political pressure from a centralizing state, and where the sense of a “national identity” is highly diverse.

Understanding how protests, and the repression of protests, affect voter behaviour is of utmost importance. Even if an election does not lead to a regime change alone, the outcomes may have implications for the dynamics between the opposition and the elite, and for the regime’s further democratic (or autocratic) development. Understanding how previous nonvoters respond to protest events may also have implications for the regime’s further development, as voter apathy sometimes contributes to the resilience of non-democratic regimes (Tertytchnaya, 2020). The protestors’ ability to win support from by-standing citizens in the elections could fuel further anti-regime protests, and

also shift the ruling regime towards the protesters' preferences (McAdam & Su, 2002). However, protests may also demobilize a large share of the population, and thereby reduce the likelihood of political change (Tertychnaya, 2020). In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the associations between mass mobilisation and incumbent defeat in autocratic elections, this thesis pays greater attention to protests' effect on the individual voter behaviour, which has been theoretically and empirically understudied in the literature of social movements.

3 The Hong Kong Case

In this chapter, I will provide a brief overview of the historical context and the political environment in Hong Kong. As discussed in the introduction, Hong Kong is, in many ways, a special case. The aim of this chapter is to highlight some of the features of Hong Kong that influence how I theorize, test, and discuss the associations between pre-election protests, police brutality and voter behavior in this particular case.

3.1 One Country - Two Systems

In 1997, Hong Kong's status changed from a "British colony" to a "Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC)". The retrocession of Hong Kong has been a challenging task for Beijing for several reasons. During the 150 years of British rule, Hong Kong developed a highly capitalistic market economy, characterized by low taxation and a well-established international financial market. Although Hong Kong made little progress towards democracy in this period, the citizens enjoyed substantial civil rights, such as freedom of speech, an efficient civil service, and relative strong judicial institutions (Boniface & Alon, 2010). None of these factors seemed to favor Hong Kong's reunification with an economically backward China under a communist rule (Wong, 2015, p.47). The mainland authorities therefore realized that a smooth transition was required to restore the citizens' confidence in the future (ibid.) As a guiding principle for the relationship between Hong Kong and the mainland, Deng Xiaoping proposed "One country – Two systems". The principle is stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, agreed between Great Britain and PRC in 1984, and guarantees that Hong Kong's existing capitalistic system and way of living should remain unchanged until 2047, 50 years after Hong Kong's return to China.

Being a Chinese SAR implies that Hong Kong should enjoy a high degree of autonomy in political, social and political affairs, while being a part of the PRC. Hong Kong's mini constitution, the Basic Law, states the separateness between the systems in Hong Kong and PRC, and limits the power relationship between the central authorities and Hong Kong. However, many of the provisions in the Basic Law contain obscurely worded terms and contradictions (Ghai, 1999, p. 185), and Beijing has the final say in the law's application. Long before Hong Kong loses its unique status as a SAR, Beijing has already made several attempts on tightening its grip and interfere in

Hong Kong's domestic affairs. Over the past decade, an anti-China sentiment has emerged, especially among the younger citizens (Wong, Zheng, & Wan, 2020). Leaders of various social movements have highlighted the conflicting interests of Hong Kong and the mainland and promoted the local "Hongkonger"-identity as incompatible with the national identity. Hong Kong's democratic aspirations vs. the mainland's authoritarianism has become a prominent political cleavage on the territory and is considered as an important factor in creating an identity gap between those who identify as a "Hongkonger" and those who identify themselves as a "Chinese" (Fong, 2017).

3.2 Pro-Beijing vs. Pro-Democracy

Already before the British handover in 1997, Hong Kong had developed a strong pro-democracy opposition force. Although universal suffrage was never granted by the British, some democratic reforms began during the 1980s (Ortmann, 2015). Inspired by the hope for a democratic reform on the mainland, democracy activists also showed their support for the Chinese democratic movement in 1989. However, the brutal crackdown of the Tienanmen protest movement in Beijing in June 1989 had a deep impact on Hong Kong citizens' confidence in the Chinese government, who feared that integration with the mainland could lead to serious setbacks in the democratic development, and that it would violate the citizen's civil liberties (ibid.). During the sovereignty transfer, Beijing was facing a widespread pessimism and distrust in the PRC government among Hong Kong's citizens.

In the initial post-handover period, there was a growing optimism about Hong Kong's future. Unlike the pessimistic predictions, Beijing adopted a policy of non-intervention, and Hong Kongers still enjoyed widespread civil and political liberties, compared to the people on the mainland (Ortmann, 2015). In the first years after the handover, most Hong Kong people did not refuse to identify culturally with China (Wong et al., 2020), but the "identity conflict" is related to the rising political conflict around Beijing's role (ibid.).

The introduction of an anti-subversion law in 2003 was a turning point in Beijing's non-interference policy towards Hong Kong. On the 1st of July 2003, about 500

000 people took to the street to oppose the anti-subversion law. The 2003 protests presented an alternative way of changing the government policies, and they empowered the pro-democracy parties, as evidenced by their strong showing in the 2004 legislature election. The shift in the political landscape alarmed Beijing, which began to approach Hong Kong's political affairs in a more interventionist way, such as changing the electoral systems in ways that favored the pro-Beijing parties (Ping & Kin-ming, 2014).

Over the past two decades, large-scale pro-democracy protests have constituted one of the most prominent features of the political scene in Hong Kong. In late September 2014, a 79-days long protests movement broke out, after Beijing decided that the chief executive should be elected from a list pre-approved by the Chinese government. The 2014 protests are known as the Umbrella Movement, because the protesters used umbrellas to protect themselves from tear gas fired by the police (Ping & Kin-ming, 2014) Although the Umbrella protests died out, the actions inspired many Hong Kongers to take to the street to protest.

3.2.1 The Anti-ELAB Movement

In 2019, Hong Kong witnessed the longest, the largest and the most violent protest movement in the territory's history. Initially calling for a withdrawal of the extradition bill, the mass protests soon evolved into a prolonged movement targeting the police officers' abuse of power and seeking democratic reforms. Although key figures such as Joshua Wong and Nathan Law played a significant role, the case has been described as a "headless" movement (F. L. Lee et al., 2019). The protesters early claimed to have "No Central Stage", meaning that there should be no political parties or activists able to represent the protesters as a whole. Unlike the "Occupy Central"-movement in 2014 (Umbrella Movement), the protesters applied a "be water"-philosophy, allowing them to stay energetic. This prevented the movement from causing continual nuisance to the same district, and also created difficulties for the police to predict their movements (ibid.).

3.3 Regime Type, Political Parties and Elections in Hong Kong

The citizens of Hong Kong have traditionally enjoyed substantial civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech and an independent media. However, half of the legislature and the Chief Executive are chosen through indirect elections that clearly favours the pro-Beijing parties. Although the Basic Law states that “(...) *the ultimate aim is the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nomination committee in accordance with democratic procedures*” (Article 45), the election committee consist of only 1200 members, and a majority of these are pro-Beijing politicians and business elites. In addition, Beijing has implemented a system that prohibits people who oppose the Central Government from running for the Chief Executive Office. Hong Kong has often been referred to as a “hybrid regime” , combining both democratic and autocratic elements. Over the past couple of years, the citizens’ freedoms have been sharply reduced due to the growing political intervention from the mainland. Instead of transiting into a full democracy, Hong Kong is increasingly moving towards autocracy. Therefore, I argue that today’s Hong Kong falls under the classification of an “electoral autocracy”.

There are numerous parties in Hong Kong, but they are divided into two main political ideological blocs: pro-Beijing and pro-democracy. As the pro-Beijing camp has strong ties to the Central government in Beijing and the Hong Kong Chief Executive, the pro-democracy camp plays the role of the opposition (Wong, 2015, p. 6). While the pro-democracy camp strongly demands democratization, the pro-Beijing politicians are more conservative, and have vested interests as they benefit from existing system of limited-suffrage elections (Kurata, 2015).

3.3.1 *The LegCo and the Super Seats*

Because the opposition parties have no chance of winning the chief executive office, the election of the Legislative Council (LegCo) has become the major battleground between the pro-democracy – and pro-Beijing camp (Wong, 2015, p.130). Half of these seats are elected through democratic procedures, while the other half is elected by a small group of pro-Beijing elites and companies. As an attempt to make the legislature more representative, the Hong Kong government introduced five new seats in the 2012

election. These seats are often referred to as the “super-seats”, and only members of the district councils can become nominees and nominate candidates for these seats. This election is known as the “Super District Council Election”, and these seats provide a playing field for the pro-democracy camp to demonstrate its popular support.

3.3.2 The District Councils

Over the past years, the intensity of electoral competition in the LegCo has spilled into lower-level elections, namely, the district council elections. According to Ngok Ma, “*One does not truly understand Hong Kong Politics without knowing the political significance of the District Councils*” (ref. in Wong, 2015, p. v). The district council elections are held every fourth year, and nearly 500 local representatives are directly elected by the registered voters in Hong Kong’s 18 districts. The district councillors capture 117 seats in the CE election committee, but, apart from that, they have limited political influence. Traditionally, these elections have gained little public attention, and a low voter participation, especially among the younger generation. Despite of the political insignificance of the district councillors, pro-Beijing parties have spent enormous resources to capture seats in the District Councils (Wong, 2015, p.19). As the cleavages between the pro-democracy and the pro-Beijing parties deepen, the district council elections have gradually been perceived as a reflection of the public opinion on mainland-integration and of questions regarding democratisation in general.

Before the 2019 election, Hong Kong was witnessed rising electoral popularity of the pro-Beijing parties. Considering the media freedom at that time, as well as the growing number of pro-democracy protests in the territory, the picture might be puzzling. Before 2020, there are no evidence of electoral fraud and no reports of voters being coerced to vote for a certain party. Although the recent mass-protests (Umbrella movement and the Anti-ELAB movement) are associated with high level of police violence, electoral violence has virtually been non-existent in Hong Kong’s district council elections (Wong, 2015, p. 8). However, as reported in Table 1, the 2019 District Council Election is a clear break with this trend, as the polls saw the highest voter turnout since the handover. The pro-democracy camp also captured a clear majority of the votes, indicating that the political landscape in Hong Kong did change during the 2019 social unrest. In the next chapter, I will discuss theories on *how* pre-election

protests may have influenced the vote choices of the previous “non-voters” and regime supporters.

Table 1: District Council Election Results

Year	Establishment	Anti-Establishment	Turnout
1999	54,70 %	45,30 %	35,82 %
2003	46,50 %	53,50 %	44,10 %
2007	54 %	46 %	38,83 %
2011	55,42 %	44,58 %	41,50 %
2015	54,61 %	45,39 %	47 %
2019	42,30 %	56,90 %	71,20 %

Source: Registration and Electoral Office, Hong Kong Government

Establishment: pro-Beijing parties.

Anti-Establishment: Pro-democracy, Localist and Independent Candidates

4 Theoretical Approaches

In democracies, elections aim to allow voters to choose desirable policies. Voters can oust incumbents if they fail to deliver results, by voting for the opposition. If removing an incumbent through elections becomes unlikely, elections no longer provide a mechanism for voters to choose desirable policies. If so, we might assume that voters should have little incentive to vote for opposition parties, or even to vote at all (Wong, 2015, pp.10-11). Nevertheless, we do observe that a considerable number of people in electoral autocracies participate in voting. Why do citizens in electoral autocracies vote, and does mass protests affect these choices?

This chapter consists of three sections. First, I will discuss incentives for voting in electoral autocracies, mainly focusing on expressive reasons for voting. Drawing on cascade theories and the backfiring-mechanism, the second part will present theories on how and why pre-election protests, and the level of protestor- and regime violence, may influence the choice to vote and who to vote for. I will combine this with insights from social psychology, to discuss how (repression of) protests may interact with the citizen's sense of a "national identity" in the formation of their vote choices. Finally, I will use these theories to draw some hypotheses on how the Anti-ELAB movement affected the outcomes of the 2019 District Council Election in Hong Kong.

4.1 Why do people in electoral autocracies vote?

What makes people decide to vote or not to vote? This question is often answered by referring to the rational choice model, initially developed by Downs (1957), and extended by Riker and Ordeshook (1968). In short, this model suggests that people make up their mind to vote or not to vote through a simple cost-benefit calculus. Traditionally, the rational choice model has been applied to explain voter behaviour in democratic elections. The expected benefit of voting is understood as benefit (B) of having her preferred candidates winning, multiplied with the probability (P) of casting the decisive vote. The costs (C) represent the time it takes to get registered and go to the polls, as well as the time and resources required to obtain information about the candidates in order to decide which candidate to vote for (Blais, 2000, p.2). In large elections, the probability of casting a decisive vote is minuscule. However, we

do observe that a majority of the citizens in democracies vote, at least in the most important elections. From a purely utilitarian perspective, voting does not appear to be “rational” in a large election where each single vote has a very low probability of changing the outcomes. This is an even greater puzzle in electoral autocracies, as fraud further reduces the probable impact of a single vote. In their extension of the rational choice model, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) argue that the rational explanations of voting do not explain turnout as well as expressive reasons. According to Letsa (2020), expressive motivations for voting can be just as important in an autocratic election.

4.1.1 Expressive reasons for voting in electoral autocracies

Expressive reasons are motivated by the act of voting itself, regardless of who wins, or of the probability of casting a decisive vote (Letsa, 2020). Scholars of electoral behaviour mainly focus on two forms of expressive voting: a sense of civic duty (Blais 2000 ; Riker and Ordeshook 1968), and the expression of partisanship (Hillman, 2011; Brennan & Buchanan, 1984). The choice to vote in electoral autocracies has often been explained by material rewards, such as patronage or vote-buying. However, Letsa (2020) argue that even though economic rewards are present, voters in electoral autocracies should still vote for expressive reasons. Where bribes are not available, expressive motivations should be just as important in electoral autocracies as in democracies.

Instead of calculating the cost-benefit of voting, the sense of civic duty applies to the moral obligation to vote. Blais (2000) defines voting out of civil duty as “*the belief that not voting in a democracy is wrong*” (p.93). In this sense, civic duty is conceptually tied to participating in democratic elections. It might seem surprising that civic duty also motivates people to vote in electoral autocracies. Letsa (2020) explains this with the blurring boundaries between the ruling party and the state. Voting for the ruling party can be seen as an act of patriotism and duty. Incumbents in electoral autocracies often legitimize their power by crediting their party for the state’s history of peace or economic development, comparing the state with neighbours facing civil war or economic crisis. When the opposition is weak and the citizens lack access to free media, messages about civic duty taught by the state often go unchallenged.

In addition, the perception of democracy can be subjective, and the authorities in autocratic regimes may use considerable resources to convince the citizens that the elections are free and competitive. Voters in electoral autocracies may then have the same motivation to vote as in democracies, believing that voting is the right thing to do (Letsa, 2020)

Voting can also be seen as a way to express dissatisfaction with the regime. If the regime is perceived to treat its' citizens unfairly, people might respond with anger, motivating them to oppose the regime, even if symbolic. Voting for the opposition can suppress the margin of victory of the regime, which makes the incumbents lose face (Wong, 2015, p.10). Voting motivated by “punishing the regime”, or signalling dissatisfaction with the incumbents, is often referred to as an act of “protest vote”. According to Letsa (2020), citizens who have access to opposition narratives, either because of higher level of education, or because they live in a society where the opposition is strong and the level of media freedom is high, voting might be considered as an act of symbolic protest).

In electoral autocracies, voter behaviour cannot only be explained by expected political change, or because people receive or expect to receive material rewards after voting for a particular party or candidate. As in democracies, the choice to vote, and who to vote for, are also motivated by expressive reasons. In electoral autocracies, voting as a civic duty might be considered as an act of patriotism or loyalty to the regime, especially in countries where the citizens lack access to opposition narratives, and where messages from the authorities goes unchallenged. Furthermore, when citizens have access to opposition narratives, voting for the opposition can be considered as an act of protest, signalling dissatisfaction with the incumbents (Letsa, 2020).

4.2 Cascade Theories: How Can Mass Protests Influence Voter Behaviour?

Mass protests and elections are assumed to be reciprocally inter-correlated with each other (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). Elections, at least when they are free and fair, are mechanisms whereby citizens collectively can decide who occupies positions in the government or legislature, and thereby replace incumbents who fail to deliver results

(Heaney, 2013). Mass protests are collective, yet unconventional, efforts to bring about change in the society. Albert Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty (1970) identifies several ways that popular disaffection can lead to political change. Citizens who dislike their government can withdraw their support and vote for the opposition (exit) or protest against the regime (voice). An extension of Hirschman's theory allows some interdependency between the voter's decisions; the choice is also affected by the number of people choosing the same alternative (Lohmann, 1994). In this section, I will use cascade theories to discuss how mass protests may affect electoral behaviour by revealing new information about the regime (Lohmann, 1994) or by empowering people to overcome preference falsification (Kuran, 1989).

4.2.1 Mass protests and revealing new information.

In an election, voters must decide if they support the incumbents or the opposition, and whether they want to cast a ballot for any of these alternatives or abstain from voting. According to Lohmann (1994), the policy preferences of one individual are correlated with the preferences of others. An information cascade refers to a situation, in which one individual decides by the observations of the others. Individuals are found to put greater weight to vivid events within their localities, meaning that their preferences are highly influenced by neighbors, family members, colleagues, friends, or other members of their local networks (ibid.). People learn about others' political beliefs by observing them vote and from the opinion polls, which may also influence an individual's perceived quality of the ruling regime. Sometimes, however, individual preferences are not reflected in the public discourse, which leads to poor information aggregation in public policy decisions (Lohmann, 1994). This is particularly true in autocratic contexts. Autocratic elections are often associated with high levels of fraud, or presence of electoral violence, which makes vote for the opposition a risky choice. Under such circumstances, information about the regime is often hidden, and the size of the opposition is unknown.

Information about the regime is dispersed within a society. Because experiences with the regime are private, a status quo-regime may be maintained by a large number of people with imperfect information. The popular support for a regime is expected to decrease dramatically if some, or all, of the negative information become publicly

know (Lohmann, 1994). Here, large-scale protests come into play. They can reveal new information that prompts regime supporters to update their evaluations of the incumbents. By being directly or indirectly witnessed by bystanders, anti-regime protests construct a reality that cannot be dismissed from the government propaganda (Tertychnaya, 2020). Opposition protests in electoral autocracies could therefore dampen the influence of the partisan cues in the formation of people's vote choices (Branton, Martinez-Ebers, Carey, & Matsubayashi, 2015)

Opposition protests do not only reveal information about the regime and its malpractices, but also about the size of the opposition. Thus, mass protests can also provide viable alternatives to the ruling elite, as they challenge the myths of regime omnipotence (Kadivar, 2017). Drawing on cascade theories, people are highly influenced by what they expect that other people will do. As anti-regime protests send signal that the grievance about the regime is widespread, and that the popular support for the opposition is increasing, mass protests may influence people's expectations on what other people will vote in the election. Pre-election protests may therefore also change the voters' opportunities to infer, whether political change is likely or not (Magaloni, 2006).

4.2.2 Preference falsification

Preference falsification means communicating a political preference in public, that differs from ones true and privately held preferences (Kuran, 1989). Preference falsification corrupts the public discourse, and hence, human knowledge. Structures held in place by preference falsification may, in the longer run, achieve genuine acceptance. Kuran (1989) argue that people who dislike their government are apt to hide their desire for change, if they believe that opposing the government is socially unacceptable (p.42). A privately hated regime may enjoy widespread public support, as no one takes the lead in publicizing their dissatisfaction. Because people hide the knowledge on which their true preferences rests, they make it difficult for others to obtain information about the drawbacks of the existing regime, as well as the merits, or even existence, of alternatives. This is often the case in autocratic contexts, which is characterized by scarce information about the opponents of the ruling regime, and in which messages from the state often passes unchallenged (Malagoni, 2006).

Kuran (1989) uses preference falsification to explain why major political revolutions, such as the French Revolution in 1789 and the Russian Revolution in 1917, occur unanticipatedly, although the revolutions, in hindsight, appear inevitable. When the support of the regime is highly contrived, it will crumble at the most minor shock. A suitable shock may activate a bandwagon process that exposes underlying social conflicts, generating major, yet unanticipated change. Opposition protests, especially in an electoral autocracy, could then work as a “shock” , leading to such processes.

Mass protests send signals to the opposition and to the voters that grievance against the regime is widespread, and that there are a considerable number of people willing to challenge status quo. During mass protests, people’s back-stage preferences may turn into their front-stage positions. The choice of going to the ballot boxes, and vote for the opposition, would then appear as a more reasonable option than a futile attempt that might even contribute to legitimizing an autocratic election (Kadivar, 2017). Voter turnout may therefore increase, among those who previously saw voting pointless, as they were unaware of the considerable number of people sharing their desire for political change. In such, pre-election protests can influence election outcomes, because they illustrate the breadth of grievances to the regime, which motivates and encourages voters to cast a ballot for the opposition (ibid).

4.3 Backfiring and the use of (non)violent tactics

Mass protests challenge the regime’s domination of political discourse by highlighting various grievances and blaming the regime for them. In addition, brutal crackdowns on the protestors can forge new grievances about the regime’s tactics in dealing with the opposition. Lindekilde and Olesen (2015) refers to this mechanism as a backfiring (p.167). Backfiring may occur if 1) the crackdowns on the protestors are perceived as unfair and excessive by the public, and 2) if the information about the crackdowns is public available and well-communicated (ibid.). Backfiring often leads to power shifts by increasing the internal solidarity with the anti-regime protestors, and demobilize the regime supporters (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008)

The opposition could use the new grievances in their electoral campaign against the incumbents, bringing the brutality of the regime to the public’s attention. Citizens

who are willing to risk punishment through public protests, also make the strength of the opposition very clear (Miller, 2015). Regime-sponsored violence can fuel further protests, but also lead to changing electoral behavior among the citizens, if they realize that voting could be an effective way, and a less risky way, of expressing their dissatisfaction with the regime (Kadivar, 2017).

4.3.2 *Violent vs. Nonviolent Protest Tactics*

Brutal crackdowns on protesters may lead to powershifts by creating elite dissents and increased sympathy with the protesters. However, these dynamics are more likely to occur when the protesters have publicized their commitment to nonviolent actions (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008, p.11). Just as brutal crackdowns by the government can form new grievances, a high level of protester violence may also influence the citizens' evaluations of the opposition. The internal and external costs for the regime of repressing nonviolent protests are higher than repressing those who are credibly labeled as "violent insurgents" or "terrorists". In such, backfiring at the protesters may also occur if the demonstrations are associated with high levels of violence, which may also legitimate the repression of the protestors (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

According to Lohmann (1994) and Kuran (1989), opposition extremists, who take political action regardless of their private information, turn out in the early stages of the social movement. Moderates may join later, but the political actions are conditional on their private information. When anti-regime protests escalate into violent confrontations, especially at early stages, it may damage the reputation of the opposition. The use of violence leads the public to view the protests group as less reasonable, which reduces the identification with the group. If the protesters are perceived as "radicals" or "extremists", the threshold of joining the protests will indeed increase among the moderates (Simpson et al., 2018). Violent protests may intimidate by-standing citizens by causing damage to their properties and direct negative experiences with violent protests groups may then reduce the support for the protestors, regardless of the protestors' political demands. In such, violent protests may undermine the electoral chances of opposition parties that are associated with the protests.

4.3.3 Critical Remarks: The Endogeneity of Protests and Repression

There is a scholarly consensus that authorities use repression as a tool to control elite dissent. This builds on an assumption that repression is a cause of elite dissent, and that the level of repression will increase as elite dissent increases (Ritter & Conrad, 2016). However, the relationship between protests and repression might not be that straightforward, as repression also can influence the level of elite dissent. An autocratic regime might violate citizen's rights and thereby prevent regime dissent before it occurs or becomes visible. In such, we observe repression without observing dissent (ibid.). On the other side, as the backfiring mechanism assesses, a regime might be unsuccessful in repressing the protestors, and thereby create new grievances and rather increase regime dissent (Kadivar, 2017). If dissent is a) unobservable, and/or b) endogenous to repression, it will be problematic to use straightforward linear analyses to draw causal interferences between repression, dissent, and in turn, voter behavior.

The issue of endogeneity is also present when discussing repression of violent vs. nonviolent protests. Governments may be more likely to engage in repressive tactics when the dissents become more violent or more directly threatening (Henderson & Davenport, 2000). However, violent protest may also be a response to, rather than a cause of, repression. It is reasonable to assume that protesters that are being beaten or fired teargas at act differently than those who do not face any forms of repression. Thus, the protesters and the regime may act in expectation of the other's behavior. The backfiring mechanism imply that nonviolent tactics should be more effective than violent tactics because a brutal crackdown of a nonviolent protests is likely to backfire at the regime, and thus increase the sympathy with the protesters. However, if violent protester tactics legitimate repression, we might as well assume that repression legitimate protester violence. Protester violence that are perceived as "self-defense", or a response to harsh repression, may carry different effects than unprovoked protester violence. How people process the information revealed from campaigns where both the protestors and the police engage in violence, may be influenced by a *confirmation bias*, which I now will discuss in the light of the increasingly conflicting relationship between the local "Hongkonger"-identity vs. the national identity as a "Chinese".

4.4 Protests, National Identity and Voter Behaviour

Because pre-election protests signal the spread of grievances, creates new grievances, and provide viable alternatives to the regime, we might expect that the support for the ruling regime will erode in periods of opposition protests. However, how receptive people are to this new information may vary from one individual to another. As we know from social psychology, there is a natural tendency for individuals to favour the information that confirms one's existing values or beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2020). How people respond to the protests, and who they blame for the social unrest and violent events, are assumeably influenced by who they identify themselves with in the first place. In the case of Hong Kong, this is closely related to the diversity in which people identify themselves as "Hongkongers" or as "Chinese" . I assume that protests, and repression of protests, carry different effects among those who identify themselves with the local, or with the national identity.

There is also a collective component behind national identity and the formation of vote choices, as individuals have a natural tendency to think in terms of the groups that they are affiliated with (Tajfel;1982, Levine & Campell;1972). As we know from the minority politics literature, resisting against political issues or platforms that are important to minority groups, may result in a "push-back" through increased political participation among the marginalized group (Pérez, 2015). Threatened groups may then take actions on behalf of those they identify themselves with, and according to Chan et.al (2021) political participation will increase among the group that perceive marginalization. If the anti-regime protests are strongly associated with the opposition parties, and the opposition parties are connected to specific groups in the society, the electoral response to the protests are expected to be influenced by the citizen's social identity.

While people's identity influence people's responsiveness to the protests and police brutality, the exposure to these events may also influence how people are identifying themselves. Protests may lead to an reinforcement of one's existing belief, or make people more aware of their group identity, by creating a sense of collective identity. This corresponds to Tilly's (1995) idea that identity are shaped and created through interactions between individuals. It is also possible that people fundamentally change their political attitudes, and thereby also the sense of national identity, as a result

of the new information revealed from the protest events. Thus, national identity and protests are reciprocally inter-correlated to each other. People’s sense of a national identity may influence people’s receptiveness of the information revealed from protest (and repression) events, while protests also create a sense of collective identity, with the common goal to protect the interests of the group they are affiliated with. I therefore assume that protests, and the sense of a “national identity”, influence voter behaviour, both alone and in interaction with each another.

4.5 Summary and Hypotheses

Nearby protests may influence political attitudes through several psychological and informational mechanisms. As cascade theories remind us, people’s political preferences are highly correlated with the observed preferences of others. Mass protests send signals that there are viable alternatives to the regime, and that there are a considerable number that are willing to change the status quo. This also influences the voters’ opportunities to infer whether political change is likely or not. Going to the ballot box and vote for an opposition party may then be perceived as a more reasonable choice, than a futile attempt that might even contribute to legitimize a “fake” election. In such, pre-election protests may motivate opposition supporters who previously saw voting as pointless, to cast a vote. However, this thesis also assesses whether violent and nonviolent protests carry different effects on the citizen’s voter behaviour. Violent tactics may backfire at the opposition, by damaging the reputation of the protesters, and the political parties associated with them. If the protesters are perceived as “radicals” or “extremists”, it might be difficult to mobilize support from the “moderate” citizen. Drawing on insight from social psychology, however, people’s sense of a “national identity” may also influence people’s responsiveness to the information revealed from the protests events, and the authorities’ responses to the protest events. This leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: The likelihood of changing voter behaviour from “not voting” in 2016, to “vote for opposition” in 2019 increases as the number of protests in the respondent’s district increases.

H1a) This effect is stronger among those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”, rather than “Chinese”.

H1b) A greater prevalence of protestor violence moderates the effects of protests on the

likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”.

Just as mass protests can motivate people who previously saw voting as pointless, it can also influence the voter behaviour of those who supported the regime in the past. By revealing new information about the regime’s malpractices, as well as the merits, or even existence, of alternatives, mass protests can prompt regime supporters to update their evaluations of the regime and its opponents. This leads to the second hypothesis:

H2: The likelihood of defecting from “Pro-Beijing” to “Pro-Democracy” will increase as the number of opposition protests in the respondent’s district increases

H2a) Those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”, rather than as “Chinese”, will be more likely to defect to opposition parties as the number of opposition protests increases.

H2b) A greater prevalence of protester violence moderates the effects of “protests” on the likelihood of defecting from “pro-Beijing” to “Pro-democracy”.

The final two hypotheses, H3 and H4, assesses police brutality in the respondent’s districts. As the backfiring mechanism suggests, brutal crackdowns of protesters may backfire at the regime by creating new grievances and increase elite dissent. In addition, repression may also increase the sympathy with the protestors. In the case of Hong Kong, the police officers’ use of teargas was clearly supported by the pro-Beijing parties, and can also be seen as a threat to those who were protesting against the perceived “mainlandization” of Hong Kong. Drawing on insights from social psychology, I also assume that the use of teargas carries different effects among those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers” and those who identify themselves as “Chinese”. This leads to the final two hypotheses:

H3: The police officers’ use of teargas in the respondent’s district will increase the likelihood that previous non-voters will change from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”.

H3a) Those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”, rather than as “Chinese”, will be more likely to change from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” as the frequency of

police brutality in their district increases.

H4: The police officers' use of teargas in the respondent's district will increase the likelihood that previous regime supporters will defect from "pro-Beijing" to "pro-Democracy".

H4a) Those who identify themselves as "Hongkongers", rather than as "Chinese", will be more likely to defect from "Pro-Beijing" to "Pro-Democracy", as the frequency of police brutality in their district increases

5 Data and Research Design

This chapter presents the data and research design applied in this thesis. First, I present the data used to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, followed by a discussion on the reliability and validity of public opinion surveys and event data. Thereafter, I will present the operationalization of the dependent- and independent variables, and the controls. Finally, I will present and discuss the model used to analyse the data.

5.1 Data Source: Hong Kong Election Study (HKES)

The public opinion data I analyse is the 2019 post-election survey from Hong Kong Election Study (HKES). The HKES team uses a professional survey company, Dynata, to implement an anonymous internet survey with its online panel members. The survey was conducted within one week after 2019 election, and was completed by 1515 respondents (S. Wong, Clarke, & Ho, 2020). The survey asks the respondents to state whether they voted in 2019, and whom they voted for. It also asks the respondents about their vote choices in the 2016 Super District Council Election, which allows me to investigate changes in voter behaviour between these two elections. Respondents who did not remember who they voted for, or whether they voted at all, are excluded from the analysis. In addition, the survey also asks the respondents several questions about their socio-demographic attributes. Hong Kong Election Study has been a publicly available source to public opinion data, but the webpage, hkelectionstudy.org, has been down since March 2021.

The hypotheses outlined in Chapter 4 primarily focus on how opposition protests influence the voter behaviour among those who *did not* vote for the opposition in the previous election. I therefore separate the data set based on the respondents' voter behaviour in the 2016-election. However, 458 of the respondents in the 2019-post election survey (HKES) voted for opposition parties in 2016, and 90,4% of these remained loyal to the opposition (6,6% defected to incumbent parties, while 3% abstained). As we do observe a greater variance in the vote choices of previous "non-voters" and previous regime supporters, the focus will be on these two groups.

Previous “non-voters” are respondents who did not vote, or did not register as voters, in the 2016 election, which gives a total of 492 complete observations. Previous regime supporters are the respondents who voted for a pro-establishment (pro-Beijing) list in the 2016 Super District Council Election. The dataset on previous regime supporters consists of 211 respondents, which is indeed quite few observations. Splitting the data based on previous vote choices will of course lead to losses of observations, and thereby increase the variance and make it difficult to produce statistically significant results. However, this was necessary to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter.

5.1.2 Reliability and Validity of Online Public Opinion Surveys

In this section, I will discuss the reliability and the validity of the public opinion data that I analyse. In short, reliability concerns the overall constituency of a measurement, meaning that the test produces similar results under consistent conditions. Unreliable results are caused by unsystematic and random errors, related to the procedures of collection, coding and treatment of the data (Hellevik, 2002, p. 152). Internal validity will in this section be discussed in terms of measurement validity, concerning whether the operationalizations of the variables adequately reflect the concept that the researcher seeks to measure (Adcock & Collier, 2001). Finally, I will discuss the external validity of the survey, primarily focusing on the representativeness of online web surveys.

The post-election survey I analyse mainly consist of standardized and close-ended survey questions. This type of questions clearly moderates the threats of coding bias, as the coding is not dependent on the researcher’s own interpretation of the answers. Avoiding coding bias will increase the reliability of the study, meaning that the measurement of the operationalized variables is consistent (Bryman, 2016, p.156). However, these close-ended questions are also less nuanced, which may pose a threat to the internal validity, as they require that the respondents understand the questions in the same way as the researcher intend them to do. With that said, I argue that the questions from the 2019-post election survey (HKES) are relatively straightforward, asking the respondents who they voted for in the previous election, their district, age, income, gender, occupation, education, and self-perceived national identity.

While this thesis seeks to measure changes in voter behaviour, it is important to stress that self-reports of vote choices are *proxies* of voter behaviour, but there is always a possibility that people's self-reported voting differs from their actual voting. Internal validity issues may also occur when people are replying in ways that are meant to be consistent with their perceived desirability of certain answers, or because the questions are being perceived as threatening (Bryman, 2016, p.267). Asking people about their public opinion or political preferences may be problematic itself, especially in autocracies. If opposing the government is illegal, or comes with a great risk, it is reasonable to assume that people will be less likely to report that they support the regime's opponents. Although Hong Kong is considered as an electoral autocracy, it is important to keep in mind that the freedom of speech, press, and assembly was still high when the 2019 post-election survey was conducted, and that voting for the opposition was not associated with any considerable risk at that time. However, people may answer in ways that are consistent with what they perceive as the most "socially acceptable", or desirable answer, leading to an under-reporting of unconventional beliefs, views, and behaviour. For instance, people who now dislike the government, and do not want to admit that they supported the government in the past, may end up reporting that they voted for the opposition or that they did not vote in the previous election, although the 2019-survey is anonymous.

Over the past decades, there has been a massive growth in the use of online web surveys. When using web surveys, a significant concern is whether the sample is representative. Only people who are available online can be expected to participate in these surveys. Internet users may be a biased sample of the population, as they often tend to be wealthier, better educated and/or younger (Bryman, 2016, p.235). This has implications for the external validity of the study, concerning whether the findings can be generalized to the population as a whole. As of many internet surveys, young people are over-represented in the 2019 post-election survey. To control for the sample bias, HKES has created a post-stratification weight for each district observation by using ranking to match the population total over gender, age, and district.

5.2 Event Data: ACLED and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

5.2.1 ACLED

In order to track the violent and nonviolent protests in Hong Kong, I have chosen the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). ACLED tracks, among other events, real-time data on the occurrence of protest events on a day-to-day basis (Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, & Karlsen, 2010). ACLED uses four types of data sources: traditional media, reports from NGOs and international institutions, local partner data and the “new media” (social media) (ACLED, 2020). The data set I use in this thesis consists of a total of 1084 protest events that occurred in Hong Kong between the 1st of June to the 23rd of November 2019. As I will discuss in section 5.4, the dataset consists of events that fall under the ACLED-category “protests” and “violent demonstrations”, which is a sub-category of “riots” in ACLED’s codebook.

5.2.2 Anti-ELAB Research Archive

Data on the police officers’ teargas use, provided by The Anti-ELAB Research Archive, are used to track the independent variable “Teargas events”. The dataset contains 341 instances of teargas use, identified from 634 message extracted from five Telegram channels operated by news media (Teo & Fu, 2021). Teargas, “tg”, and the Chinese word for teargas, 催, (cuilei dan), were used as keywords for identifying messages that reported teargas-firing in real time. In order to exclude irrelevant messages, such as retrospective messages of teargas use, the researchers also created channel-specific “black-lists” of words. Since the teargas events were reported in real- or near time, the published date and time are set as the timestamp for each event. The dataset I use include teargas events between June 2019 and until the 23rd of November 2019. The researchers also used geocoding to identify the location of these events, and also compiled messages that reported use of teargas within the same time frame and location, in order to ensure that the same event was not coded as multiple events (ibid.).

5.2.3 Reliability and Validity of Media-Reported Event Data

Over the past decades, numerous of quantitative studies within the social movements field have relied on newspapers and media-reports to collect data on protest-

and collective action events. Using these data sources has several advantages, both theoretically and methodologically (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004). Newspaper data can be used to study more spontaneous forms of collective behaviour, and also moves away from a purely organizational perspective (ibid.). Such data are relatively easy to collect, and are sometimes also the only continuously available sources of event data. In such, many questions are made more accessible using newspapers and media-reported event data. The development of machine-learning techniques and automatization have undoubtedly eased the workload of scientists developing these datasets, although it might lead to a lack of nuance and details that requires human interpretation. This can pose a threat to the internal validity.

Although newspapers can provide invaluable information about protest events, many have criticized the reliability and validity of media-reported event data. Newspapers are not created for the purpose of conducting research, nor to sample all protests that occurs. Some events are more “newsworthy”, and therefore more likely of being reported. In such, media-reported event data may suffer from a “selection bias”. There are several factors that might lead to selection bias, but according to Chenoweth et.al (2017), there are four major sources to this problem; a violence-bias, an English-bias, an urban-bias, and a state-centric bias. Starting with the first, the media reporting of events is correlated with the intensity of events, meaning that nonviolent, or small-scale events are being underreported. In addition, developers of global data sources may not have the resources or staff to track local media reports on every different language, leading to an “English-bias”. These language barriers might also be related to the intensity of the events, as large-scale and/or violent events tend to be reported in international media more often than small-scale or peaceful events. The location of the events might also have implications for whether the events are being reported in media or not. Urban areas might be considered as more “newsworthy” because these cities often carry more political clout, or as a result of where the media houses are based. The selection bias may lead to measurement error in the independent variable, which can lead to biased estimated, both in terms of direction and strength.

One strength of ACLED is that the newspaper reports are supplemented with NGO and IGO reports and social media, and partnerships with local informants and

observations in under-reported cases (ACLED, 2020). This may reduce some of the potential reporting bias that might occur when media-reported data are being used. However, we should also keep in mind that the reporting of events by the newspaper, social media, local networks, and NGO-reports are dependent on country-specific variables such as the freedom of speech and press, types of violence, and the networks of the local informants. With that said, ACLED prioritize local media sources, and the researchers are hired from all over the world with relevant language skills (ACLED, 2020) . This may account for some of the bias in which less “newsworthy” events (i.e nonviolent, small-scale events in rural areas) are being under-reported in national, regional, or international media sources, and also account for the “English-bias” .

The Anti-ELAB Research Archive, is a local media source, which tracks teargas events from English and Cantonese-speaking messages extracted from telegram channels operated by the local news media (Fu & Teo, 2021). This has several advantages. First, drawing on sources on the local language will undoubtedly reduce the risk for an “English-bias” when reporting teargas events. Second, the data set do not only capture those events that were considered as “newsworthy”, as it relies on telegram messages, rather than the actual published newspapers or online articles. This can reduce some of the potential bias concerning the “intensity” of events, which may influence whether they are being reported or not.

5.3 Dependent Variable: Changes in Voter Behaviour

My dependent variables capture changes in voter behaviour among 1) previous non-voters following the 2016 election, and 2) those who voted for the regime in 2016. It relies on two questions from the HKES 2019 post-election survey, that asks the respondent who they voted for in 2016, and who they voted for in 2019. I specify a three-category outcome variable, as the voters have three different and mutually exclusive alternatives; a) vote for the opposition, b) vote for the incumbent and c) not vote. The first alternative, vote for the opposition, includes a vote for the pro-democracy camp, the localists or any independent candidate. Alternative b, voting for incumbent parties, is a vote for any party within the pro-establishment (pro-Beijing) camp. The final alternative, c, is to not vote, or throw a blanc vote. Because the dependent variable captures changes in voter behaviour from 2016 to 2019, the observations are separated into two different datasets based on their vote

choices in 2016 (see 5.1).

5.3.2 Voter behaviour among previous “non-voters”

When studying changes in voter behaviour among the previous “non-voters”, I use the dataset that only consists of the “nonvoters” following the 2016 election. Vote “opposition” will be coded as 1 if the respondent changes from a “no vote” in 2016 to “opposition vote” in 2019, and 0 otherwise. If the respondent changes from a “no vote” in 2016 to “incumbent vote” in 2019, the “incumbent”-category will be coded as 1. Finally, if the respondent remains a “nonvoter”, “no vote” would be coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. Table 2 reports the voter behaviour in 2019 of the previous “non-voters” following the 2016-election.

Table 2: Previous non-voters

	Incumbent	No vote	Opposition
Chinese	0.100	0.148	0.100
Hongkonger	0.059	0.250	0.343
Total	0.159	0.398	0.443

Source: HKES 2019

Almost 16% of the previous “non-voters” voted for the incumbents in 2019. Almost 2/3 of those voting for the incumbents were identifying themselves as “Chinese”. 44% of the previous “non-voters” voted for opposition parties, and a great majority of them were identifying themselves as “Hongkongers”. About 40% remained “non-voters” after the 2019 election, meaning that about 60% were changing their voter behaviour from “not voting” to “vote”. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 imply that the opposition was more successful than the incumbents in mobilizing previous “non-voters” to vote.

5.3.3 Voter behaviour among previous regime supporters

When studying changes in voter behaviour among the previous regime supporters, I use a dataset that only consists of those who voted for the regime in 2016. “Opposition” will be coded as 1 if the respondent defects from the “incumbents” to “opposition”,

and 0 if she remains loyal to the regime. In similar vein, “No vote” will be coded as 1 if the respondent changes from “incumbent vote” in 2016, to “No vote” in 2019, and 0 if she vote for the incumbents both in 2016 and 2019. Table 3 reports how those who voted for the regime in 2016 voted in 2019.

Table 3: Previous Regime Supporters

	Opposition	No vote	Loyal
Chinese	0.130	0.019	0.459
Hongkonger	0.140	0.010	0.242
Total	0.271	0.029	0.700

Source: HKES 2019

About 70% of the previous regime supporters remained loyal to the regime, while 27,1% decided to defect to the opposition. Only 2,9% withdrew their support by disengaging from voting, implying that “abstention” was not a common response to the protests. While most of the regime supporters remained loyal, a considerable number also decided to defect to the opposition, indicating that the opposition were successful in mobilizing some of the previous regime supporters to defect to opposition parties.

5.3 Differences between the Super District Council Election and District Council Election


When interpreting the results, we should keep in mind that I am investigating changes in voter behaviour by comparing two different types of elections, one legislative national election in 2016, and one local district council election in 2019. This might lead to some biased estimates, as we cannot ignore the possibility that people may have different political preferences in different types of elections. Also, as we know from theory (Blais, 2000) and by looking at statistics on voter turnout in Hong Kong and other places in the world, the turnout is usually lower in second-order elections than in national elections. In the case of Hong Kong, the turnout for the 2016 Super District Council Election was 57%, and the pro-democracy parties captured 58% of the votes. For the sake of comparison, the voter turnout of the 2015 District Council Election was 47%, while the opposition camp captured 45,4% of the votes. (Registration and Electoral Office Hong Kong, 2021).

Because the voter turnout was higher in the 2016 Super District Council Election than in the 2015 District Council Election, and the opposition parties also received a higher vote share in Super District Council Election, the portion of people either defecting to opposition parties or changing from a “no vote” to “vote” would assumably been higher if I were comparing the 2015 and 2019 district council elections. This may cause some bias estimates, as I may underestimate the effects of the main independent variables on the outcome. Given the data available, it is unfortunately not possible to compare voter behaviour in 2015 and 2019. On the other side, changing from a “no vote” in a legislative election to “vote” in a local election may send even stronger signals that people became more engaged in the electoral politics in Hong Kong in 2019. Furthermore, I will still be able to investigate whether a higher frequency of violent and nonviolent protests and teargas events increases the likelihood of changing voter behaviour.

5.4 Independent Variable: Protests

To test *H1* and *H2*, a measurement of the occurrence and frequency of protest events in each district is required. The main independent variable, “protest count”, captures the total count of protests in each of Hong Kong’s districts between the 1st of June 2019 and the 23rd of November 2019, the day before the 2019 District Council Election. ACLED tracks the occurrence of protests events on a day-to-day basis within a specific location. While protests can take many different forms, they are in this thesis limited to events in which individuals are taking to the streets in forms of public demonstrations. The variable “protest count” is operationalized by summarizing the total number of events coded as “protests” and “violent demonstrations” in the ACLED data, from the 1st of June to 23rd of November 2019 (see section 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). This gives a total of 1084 protest events. The map displayed in Figure 1 illustrates how the frequency of protest events vary among the different districts of Hong Kong:

Figure 1: Protest count in districts



Protest data provided by ACLED


From the beginning of June until the end of November 2019, all of Hong Kong's districts had experienced protest events, ranging from a total of 7 protests on the Islands, to 234 protests in the Central- and Western district. ¹

¹As illustrated in the maps, the Central and Western district has an outstanding number of protest events. To account for this skewness, I will also run the models with log-transformed event variables (protest count, violent protests, nonviolent protests and teargas events), which can be found in the appendix

5.4.2 Violent protests

In this study, “violent protests” are operationalized by using the sub-event type “violent demonstration” of the ACLED category “riots”. These protest events are characterized by their use of violence, defined as disruptive acts. Violent protests include, but are not limited to, events in which physical violence has been targeted at persons or properties. However, distributive acts such as vandalism, tire-burning and road-blocking are also coded as “violent”, even when no killings or serious injuries are reported (ACLED, 2019). In such, ACLED operates with a low threshold of violence, in line with Pickney’s (2016) broad definition of violence, presented in Chapter 2. In total, 433 protests event was coded as “violent demonstrations” in the data set. The frequency of violent protests in each district is illustrated in the map displayed in Figure 2:

Figure 2: Frequency of Violent Protests




Protest data provided by ACLED

All of Hong Kong’s districts have experienced violent protests in the time period between June and November 2019, but the frequency varies among the districts. The Islands only experienced 1 violent protest in the given time period, while the Yau Tsim Mong-district experienced as many as 66 violent demonstrations. In such, a high proportion of the violent demonstration is centred around the Yau Tsim Mong-district, followed by the Central and Western-district, who experienced a total of 44 violent protest events.

5.4.3 Nonviolent protests

Nonviolent protests are protests in which the protestors do not engage in disruptive acts and are thereby defined by the absence of violence. Nonviolent protests are operationalized by using the ACLED category “protest”, including the subcategories “peaceful protests”, “protest with intervention” and “excessive force against protestors”. Peaceful protests are either one- or two-sided protest events that are not met with any sort of force, and where the protestors do not engage in any violence. Protest with interventions are events in which protestors who are engaged in peaceful protests are met with an attempt to disperse the protests, for instance by police officers, but no serious injuries or killings are being reported. Excessive force against protestors are events in which the protestor does not use violence, but violence is being used against them, resulting in serious injuries or deaths (ACLED, 2019). 651 out of the total 1084 protest events are coded as nonviolent. Figure 3 displays a map illustrating the frequency of nonviolent protests in each of Hong Kong’s districts:

Figure 3: Frequency of Nonviolent Protests




Protest data provided by ACLED

The frequency of nonviolent protest varies among all districts of Hong Kong, from 6 nonviolent protest on the Islands to 187 protests events in the Central and Western districts from June to November 2019.

5.5 Independent Variable: Teargas Use

The “teargas”-variable captures the number of events in which teargas has been fired by police officers in each of the districts. It is important to note that the data do not say anything about the amount of teargas that has been used, it only tells whether teargas has been used or not (Fu & Teo, 2021). While the amount of teargas may be a more appropriate measurement of police brutality, this is not possible due to data availability. Figure 4 illustrates the frequency of teargas use in each of Hong Kong’s districts:

Figure 4: Frequency of Teargas Events



Teargas data provided by Anti-ELAB Research Archive, HKU

The count of teargas events ranges from 0 in the Southern district and on the Islands, to 95 in the Yau Tsim Mong district. Accordingly, the Yau Tsim Mong district has experienced even more events including teargas use by police officers, than events including protestor violence, although we should keep in mind that the two types of events are reported by different data sources. Related to the discussion on the endogeneity between protestor violence and police brutality (Chapter 4), we also see that the districts that experienced most protestor violence also are the districts that experienced most police brutality, which makes it difficult to isolate the effects of one or the other completely.

The use of teargas does not capture all of the police brutality related to the protest events. Another way of measuring harsh repression could have been ACLED's category of "protest with intervention" and "excessive force against protestors", which makes it possible to distinguish between soft and harsh repression of nonviolent protests. However, the ACLED data do not provide any opportunity to distinguish between soft and harsh repression of violent protests. As discussed above, ACLED has a low threshold for coding an event as "violent". The "excessive force against protestors"-category both require that a) the protests are nonviolent, and b) the repression leads to serious injuries or killings. For instance, an event including road-blocking by protestors, and teargas firing by police officers, will not fall under the category "excessive force against protestors". Actually, only 5 events were coded as "excessive force against protestors" in the ACLED dataset. Because exposure to teargas can have both short- and long term consequences for people's health, even when no injuries are directly linked to the specific event, I choose to use "teargas" from the Anti-ELAB Research Archive as the measurement of police brutality, rather than "excessive force against protestors", or the less nuanced "protest with intervention" or "repression of rioters" (interaction code 16 in ACLED) in the main models. However, the alternative operationalization of "police brutality", drawn from the ACLED-categories presented above, can be found in the appendix.

5.6 Independent Variable: Identifying as a Hongkonger

As discussed in the previous chapter, there are several expressive motivations behind voting in elections, and one of them is to vote as an expression of identity. Therefore, I assume that people's voting behaviour are influenced by whether they identify

themselves as “Hongkongers” or “Chinese”. The sense of a national identity is also assumed to influence the exposure to protest- and teargas events, either because people who identify themselves as “Hongkongers” are more likely to participate in the protests, or because they are more likely to search for, or favour the information that confirms their existing beliefs. Therefore, I include a dummy variable capturing whether the respondent is identifying him- or herself as a “Hongkonger” or as a “Chinese”. The dummy variable is constructed based on question *Q11* in the 2019 Hong Kong post-election survey conducted by HKES. The respondents are asked “*generally speaking, do you see yourself as...*”, followed by the alternatives 1) “Chinese”, 2) “Chinese, but also Hongkonger”, 3) “Hong Konger, but also Chinese”, and 4) “Hong Konger”. The dummy variable “Hongkonger” will in this analysis be coded as 1 if the respondent chose either alternative 3 or 4, and 0 otherwise. In such, “Hongkongers” are understood as those who identify themselves more as “Hongkongers” than as “Chinese”². Among the previous “non-voters”, about 65% identified themselves as “Hongkongers”, while 40% of those who voted the regime in 2016 were identifying themselves as “Hongkongers”.

5.6.1 *The interaction terms*

Based on the insight from social psychology, presented in section 4.4, I also assume that the effects of national identity, and (repression of) protests, on voter behaviour correlates with each other. I therefore include an interaction term between the “hongkonger”-variable and each of the other main independent variables (total protest count, count of violent- and nonviolent protests, and teargas events). In short, this means that I assume that the effects of each of these events on the outcome are dependent on whether the respondent identifies as a “Hongkonger” or as a “Chinese”.

²Models using the continuous operationalization of the “Hongkonger”- variable (1-4) are presented in appendix. There was also a fifth alternative, “*others*”, but only 6 of the respondents picked this alternative. They are excluded from the data set

5.7 Controls

In order to ensure that the estimated effects are not spurious, that is, that they are driven by confounding factors, controls will be incorporated in the models. I include socio-demographic controls on the individual level, that have been found to influence both people's voter preferences, and how many protests they are exposed to. The controls are operationalized by using questions on socio-demographics attributes from asked in the 2019 Post-Election Survey conducted by HKES.

5.7.1 *Income*

Voter behaviour is assumed correlate with income. Political scientists have, for instance, shown that richer people are more likely to participate in voting (Schlozman, Burns, & Verba, 1994). Scholars have also found that people who are struggling economically are more likely to support populist and/or authoritarian politicians that protect the “basic needs” of its own citizens, rather than post-materialistic values such as climate, civil rights, and democratic reforms (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Income also influences where people live, and thereby also how many protests they are being exposed to. I include “income” as a control in the models because it is assumed to correlate both with the dependent and the independent variables. The income variable is measured from the question: “*On Average, what is the monthly income of your household?*” and ranges from 1-8, in which one-unit increase equals a 10 000 Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) rise in income. The average monthly income is 49000 HKD among the previous “non-voters” and 55000 HKD among the previous regime supporters.

5.7.2 *Education*

In similar vein as “income”, education is assumed to influence voter behaviour. Scholars have shown that well-educated people are more likely to vote than those who has no, or little education. People with a higher educational level are also assumed to put a greater emphasis on post-materialistic values, such as civil rights and democratisation, which may influence their vote choices (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Some scholars also argue that the educational level influences access to opposition

narratives, especially in autocracies (Letsa, 2020). In addition, the educational level is generally higher in urban areas, and if education influences where people live, I also expect it to correlate with the number of protests that people are being exposed to. The 2019 post-election survey, conducted by HKES, asks the question “*what is your educational level?*”. Respondents who have a university degree are coded as 1, while respondents who do not have higher education is coded as 0. About 45% of the previous “non-voters” have obtained a university degree, while there is a higher educational level among the previous regime supporters (55% holds a university degree).

5.7.3 Age

“Age” is widely seen as a predictor of vote choices, as senior voters have been found to be more conservative, and therefore more likely to vote for political parties that promotes the status quo (Tilley & Evans, 2014). Younger generations also tend to be more receptive to post-materialistic causes, such as democratization and civil liberties, than their older counterparts (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Based on this, I assume that age is correlated with voter behavior. In addition, age may also correlate with the main independent variables, as the exposure protest- and tear gas events may vary among different age groups. Previous studies have shown that protests that rely on social media to mobilize supporters are more likely to attract the younger generations (F. L. F. Lee & Chan, 2016). In such, elderlies are less likely to share on-site information from the protests. Age is operationalized through the question “*what is your age?*” in the HKES 2019 post-election survey and is a continuous variable, ranging from 18 to 77 years old, with an average of 44,5 years among previous “non-voters” and 46,5 among the previous regime supporters.

5.7.4 Occupation

In social sciences, there is a growing consensus that class position influences voter behaviour. People from higher social classes are generally more socially liberal, but also more economically conservative (Langsæther, Evans, & O’Grady, 2021). In addition, certain occupations with certain political lenience may also shape people’s political preferences, which is particularly relevant in the case of Hong Kong, given

its union-system. Certain occupations are also more likely in certain areas, which in turn correlates with the number of protest- and teargas events that people are being exposed to.

Question *QB9* in the HKES post-election surveys asks the respondents “*What is your occupation?*”. The alternatives are drawn from ISCO-08’s ten main occupation categories ³. However, I follow Langsæther et.al (2021), and divide these ten alternatives into four major categories based on income level, employment relations, job security, career aspects and job autonomy. The working class are respondents who hold skilled – or unskilled manual occupations, as well as unskilled non-manual occupations. This includes skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery work, sales, and service work, craft and trade-related work and machine operations and assembles. The routine non-manual class is the clerical workers, while the respondents in lower service class held elementary occupations such as selling goods in the street, cleaning, washing windows, and unskilled maintenance work. Finally, the higher service workers are the managers, professionals, technicians, and the associate professionals. However, the question is only asked to the respondents who have reported that they are employees in a previous question, *QB6*, asking the respondents “*what is the best way to describe your employment status?*”. Based on this question, I also create dummies for being a student, being retired and being unemployed, in which the latter will be the reference category in the models. The respondents have value 1 on the occupation category they belong to, and value 0 on the remaining occupations.

³ISCO-08 ten categories: Armed forces, Managers, Professionals, Technicians and Associate Professionals, Clerical Support Workers, Services and Sales Workers, Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers, Craft and Related Trade Workers, Plant and Machine Operators and Assembles, Elementary Occupations

5.7.5 Female

A large body of research has also found that there are systematic differences between women and men when it comes to political preferences, and in turn, voter behaviour (Hatemi, McDermott, Bailey, & Martin, 2012). Gender also shapes many other socio-demographics patterns that can influence the exposure to protests and teargas events, that I may have missed. For instance, studies have shown that women are generally more risk averse than men (Halek & Eisenhauer, 2001), which may influence both voter behaviour and the on-site protest experiences. The respondents' gender is tracked from question in the HKES-post election survey, and has two alternatives; male or female. The "female"-variable is coded as 1 if the respondent is a female, and 0 if the respondent is a man.

5.7.6 Descriptive Statistics of Variables

Table 4: Summary Variables: Nonvoters

	vars	n	mean	sd	min	max	range	se
Dependent Variables								
Opposition	1	492	0.44	0.50	0	1	1	0.02
Incumbent	2	492	0.16	0.37	0	1	1	0.02
No Vote	3	492	0.40	0.49	0	1	1	0.02
Independent Variables								
Protest count	4	492	57.31	39.97	7	234	227	1.80
Violent	5	492	25.06	12.32	1	66	65	0.56
Nonviolent	6	492	32.25	32.24	4	187	183	1.45
Teargas events	7	492	14.57	18.46	0	95	95	0.83
Hongkonger	8	492	0.65	0.48	0	1	1	0.02
Controls								
Age	9	492	44.46	12.19	18	77	59	0.55
Income	10	492	4.88	2.02	1	8	7	0.09
Education	11	492	0.45	0.50	0	1	1	0.02
Female	12	492	0.60	0.49	0	1	1	0.02
Unemployed	13	492	0.10	0.30	0	1	1	0.01
Student	14	492	0.03	0.17	0	1	1	0.01
Working Class	15	492	0.12	0.32	0	1	1	0.01
Higher Service	16	492	0.42	0.49	0	1	1	0.02
Lower Service	17	492	0.08	0.28	0	1	1	0.01
Routine Nonmanual	18	492	0.19	0.39	0	1	1	0.02

Source: HKES 2019

Table 5: Summary Variables: Previous Regime Supporters

	vars	n	mean	sd	min	max	range	se
Dependent Variables								
Opposition	1	207	0.27	0.45	0	1	1	0.03
Incumbent	2	207	0.70	0.46	0	1	1	0.03
No Vote	3	207	0.03	0.17	0	1	1	0.01
Independent Variables								
Protest count	4	207	56.71	37.91	7	234	227	2.63
Violent	5	207	24.77	12.04	1	66	65	0.84
Nonviolent	6	207	31.93	30.68	4	187	183	2.13
Teargas events	7	207	15.60	17.67	0	95	95	1.23
Hongkonger	8	207	0.39	0.49	0	1	1	0.03
Controls								
Age	9	207	46.44	10.81	21	71	50	0.75
Income	10	207	5.53	1.91	1	8	7	0.13
Education	11	207	0.55	0.50	0	1	1	0.03
Female	12	207	0.48	0.50	0	1	1	0.03
Unemployed	13	207	0.07	0.25	0	1	1	0.02
Student	14	207	0	0	0	0	0	0
Working Class	15	207	0.10	0.30	0	1	1	0.02
Higher Service	16	207	0.55	0.50	0	1	1	0.03
Lower Service	17	207	0.06	0.24	0	1	1	0.02
Routine Nonmanual	18	207	0.18	0.39	0	1	1	0.03

Source: HKES 2019

5.8 Model Choice: Logistic Regression

The model choice is based on the characteristics of the dependent variable. As discussed in section 5.3, the dependent variable(s) consist of three alternatives in the choice set; vote for the incumbents, vote for the opposition, or abstain from voting. Thus, the independent and dependent variables share a non-linear relationship. I therefore choose to implement logistic regression models, rather than linear models such as OLS, as the logistic models provide the opportunity for the relationship to have a S-shaped probability curve (Christophersen, 2018, p.135). The dependent variable is nominal, meaning that the alternatives in the choice set cannot be ordered in any mathematically meaningful way (Ward & Ahlquist, 2018, p. 161). The characteristics of the dependent variable imply that a multinomial logistic regression model (MLM) is preferable.

Despite the characteristics of the dependent variable, I choose to run a set of binary logistic regression models as the main models. The MLM model is very demanding of the data, as it estimates $M-1$ parameters for every explanatory variable added to the model (Ward & Ahlquist, 2018, p. 164). Problems of “empty cells” will therefore arise more easily, especially when there are few observations, and when one of the outcome categories captures a “rare” event, which is the case in the data I use. For instance, only 6 of the respondents who voted for the regime in 2016 abstained in 2019. Although the previous regime supporters have more than two vote alternatives in the real world, it does not make statistically sense to treat “changes in voter behaviour” among previous regime supporters as a three-categorical outcome and run a MLM given the data at hand.

There are some more variation in the vote choices of the previous “non-voters”. When analyzing the vote choices of previous “non-voters”, I create one dataset that only includes observations that falls under “no vote” and “opposition vote”, another dataset that only includes those who falls under “no vote” and “incumbent vote”, and run binary logistic regression on each of these datasets, with “no vote” as the reference category. This follows the same logic as a multinomial regression, and produce more or less similar results ⁴

⁴The MLM model can be thought of as a set of binary logistic models. With K possible outcomes, we are running $K-1$ independent binary logistic regression models, in which one outcome is the “reference outcome”, and the other $K-1$ outcomes are separately regressed against the reference category. The difference from MLM and actually running a set of binary logistic regression models, is that we constrain the probabilities to sum up to 1 across the categories for each observations (Ward & Ahlquist, 2018, p. 164)

5.9 Model Assumptions

As already mentioned, the choice to use logistic regression models is based on the characteristics of the dependent variable(s). This chapter’s final section will present some of the underlying assumptions when implementing logistic regression models, and discuss them in light of this study. As already mentioned, logistic regression models allows a *s*-shaped probability curve between the dependent and independent variable, as the dependent variable is nominal. However, they do assume a linear relationship between the independent variable and the outcome on the *logit* scale. The purpose of the logit-transformation is therefore to transform *Y* into a continuous variable, first through odds (the relative relationship between negative and positive outcomes), and then end up at the log-odds by taking the natural logarithm of the odds (Ward & Ahlquist, 2018, p.47). This assumes that the effect is the same across the sample, which implies that the variables should be correctly specified, and transformations may be necessary, as I will be discussed later in this section. To sum up, although the model itself can be described as non-linear, the assumption of linearity in *parameters* is still present.

5.9.1 Omitted Variable Bias and Fixed Effects

Similar to all regression analysis, logistic regression requires that there are no omitted variables. The exclusion of relevant variables increase the risk of type-1 errors, that is, concluding that the findings are significant, when they in fact have occurred by chance (Christoffersen, 2018, p. 31). Including all potential cofounders is, however, rarely possible in social sciences. Although the choice of controls is based on theoretical assumptions, there is always a risk that the models suffer from omitted variable bias. For instance, the size of the protest will assumeably influence how widespread the grievance of the regime is perceived to be, and the degree of perceived threat that they pose to the regime. Unfortunately, ACLED does not report any detail data on the protests size, only an open-ended text field with instances such as “more than 1000(...)”, or “many protestors (...)”. In addition, there might be some unobservable individual attributes that could shape voter behaviour, such as risk aversion. Given the data available, testing hypotheses related to risk aversion is unfortunately not possible in this study, although risk aversion is assumed to be related to other socio-demographical attributes such as gender and age (Halek & Eisenhauer, 2001)

Although it is impossible to control for all potential variables that may correlate with the independent and the dependent variable, including fixed effects (FE) can reduce some of the potential bias from omitted variables. I include FE on the graphical constituencies in all of the models presented in Chapter 6. I include fixed effects because I assume that there are fixed differences between the geographical areas. FE-models are considered as conservative tests, as they have the potential to control omitted variables that are static within each area (Worrall, 2010). However, FE-models are also less efficient, as the inclusion of a dummy variable for each geographical constituency also reduces the degrees of freedom. As robustness checks, I will also run the models with random, rather than fixed, effects (Table B1-B4). I will turn back to this in section 6.4.

I also highlight that I am only able to capture local (*district-based*) effects on protest- and teargas events on voter behaviour, although I assume that these events also have a global effect on Hong Kong as a whole. However, since all the national signals, such as the media coverage of these events, effects all the districts equally, I may underestimate the full effect of protest- and teargas events on changes in voter behaviour.

5.9.2 Multicollinearity

Similar to other regression models, logistic regression also assumes that there is no perfect multicollinearity, meaning that the independent variables in the models are not highly correlated with each other. A high level of multicollinearity can lead to incorrect significance-values and unstable coefficients (Christophersen, 2018, p. 144). I have detected multicollinearity with Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), and the results imply that the assumption of no perfect multicollinearity are being met (Table F1-F3 in Appendix).

5.9.3 Influential observations and log-transformation

Outliers can be problematic, because we can get results that are driven by a few observations. As already mentioned, the number of protests in the Central and Western-district is considerably higher than in the other districts. To account for this, I run all the models with log-transformed versions of the event variables as robustness

checks. By doing this, the effect of each additional protest- or teargas event become weaker as the number of protest in the district increases, as I rather estimate the changes in Y when the event variable increases with 1%. Besides controlling for the skewness in the data, there are also theoretical reasons for log-transforming. There are reasons to assume that each additional protests or teargas-firing become less remarkable in a district that has already experienced a high number of such events. If that is the case, the effects of each additional protest event are not the same across the sample, which may favours log-transformation. I will turn back to this when discussing the robustness of the results (section 6.4).

6 Results

In this chapter, I present the empirical analysis of the data. Section 6.1 focuses on the previous “non-voters”, while section 6.2 focuses on the previous regime supporters. In 6.3, I turn to the authorities’ responses to the protests, and investigate whether the police forces’ use of teargas in the respondent’s district influence the voter behaviour of previous “non-voters” (Section 6.3.1) and the previous regime supporters (Section 6.3.2). In section 6.4, I will run various logistic regression models to check whether the results are robust across different model specifications. Finally, I will discuss whether the results can be interpreted in causal terms. This chapter first and foremost presents the empirical results and test their robustness, while Chapter 7 provides a more in-depth discussion on the findings and their implications.

The coefficients will first be reported as log-odds. A positive coefficient indicates an increased likelihood of changing voter behaviour to a certain vote choice, while a negative coefficient indicates a decreased likelihood. The log-odds are, however, not very intuitive for interpretation. Therefore, I will also reverse the log-odds transformation, via odds, and back to predicted probabilities.

I will present the models with and without controls, but the extended models are first and foremost constructed in order to test the explanatory power of the main independent variables, and will not be discussed in detail. The standard errors are clustered on geographical constituency, in order to reduce problems related to interdependency between respondents living in the same area. In addition, the models also include fixed effects on geographical constituencies, which can reduce potential bias from omitted variables that are static within each geographical area .

6.1 Protests and changes in voter behaviour among previous “non-voters”

This section studies how those who did not vote for any candidate in the 2016 Super District Council Election, voted in the 2019 District Council Election. Drawing on cascade theories, the first hypothesis, *H1*, anticipates that *the likelihood of changing voter behaviour from “not voting” in 2016, to “vote for opposition” in*

2019 increases as the number of protests in the respondent's district increases. To test this hypothesis, I analyse the overall relationship between protests and changes in voter behaviour among the previous “non-voters”. However, the-sub-hypothesis, *H1a*, also specifies that the effects of protests on the outcome are dependent on whether the respondent identifies him- or herself as a “Hongkonger” or as a “Chinese”. In order to test this sub-hypothesis, I include an interaction term between the number of protests in the respondent's district and identifying oneself as a “Hongkonger”. Finally, the theoretical argument also emphasizes that violent and nonviolent protests carry different effects on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”, as formulated in *H2b*. To test this hypothesis, I also run logistic regression models that distinguish between violent and nonviolent protests.

6.1.1 Baseline models: previous non-voters

Table 6 reports the results from the baseline models, only including the main independent variables. In Model 1 and 2, the dependent variable captures a change from a “no vote” in 2016 to “opposition vote” in 2019. In Model 3 and 4, the dependent variable captures the change from a “no vote” to “incumbent vote” . The baseline category of the dependent variable is therefore “no vote” in all the models. The odd-numbered models (1 and 3) estimate the effects of the total number of protests, while Model 2 and 4 distinguish between violent- and nonviolent protests.

Table 6: Voter Behaviour of previous non-voters

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	opposition		incumbent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Protestcount	-0.026*** (0.007)		-0.004 (0.004)	
Nonviolent		-0.041** (0.018)		-0.011*** (0.002)
Violent		-0.002 (0.013)		0.017 (0.010)
Hongkonger	-1.031* (0.618)	-1.095** (0.534)	-1.027 (0.705)	-0.506 (0.958)
Protestcount:Hongkonger	0.032*** (0.008)		-0.002 (0.011)	
Nonviolent:Hongkonger		0.041** (0.018)		0.009* (0.005)
Violent:Hongkonger		0.026** (0.013)		-0.037 (0.028)
Constant	0.668 (0.525)	0.828* (0.446)	-0.380 (0.345)	-0.543 (0.402)
Fixed effects				
<i>Geographical Constituency</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	414	414	274	274
Log Likelihood	-271.044	-270.141	-154.550	-153.594
Akaike Inf. Crit.	558.088	560.282	325.099	327.188

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Baseline category is set to no vote

Robust SE on geographical constituency

Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED

Starting with the effect of the total protest count in the respondent's district, Model 1 estimates a negative and statistically significant effect of "protest count" on the likelihood of changing from a "no vote" to an "opposition vote". However, as the positive, and statistically significant interaction term implies, this effect is dependent on whether the respondents are identifying themselves as "Hongkongers" or as "Chinese". Model 1 suggests that each district-based protest increases the likelihood of changing from a "no vote" to an "opposition vote" among those who are identifying themselves as "Hongkongers". At the same time, the estimated effect of changing from a "no vote" to "incumbent vote" is slightly negative, yet not statistically significant (Model 3).

Turning to the effects of violent vs. nonviolent protests, Model 2 in Table 6 estimates that nonviolent protests have a negative, and statistically significant, effect on the likelihood of changing from a "no vote" to "opposition vote" among those who identify themselves as "Chinese". By adding this coefficient to the coefficient of the interaction term between "nonviolent" and "Hongkonger", nonviolent protests appear to have no influence on the likelihood of changing to an opposition vote, among the previous nonvoters, who identify themselves as "Hongkongers". Violent protests, on the other hand, appear to increase the likelihood that "Hongkongers", will change from a "no vote" to "opposition vote", while they appear to have little influence on the likelihood of changing from a "no vote" to "opposition vote" among those who identify themselves as Chinese.

When it comes to violent vs. nonviolent protests and the likelihood of changing from a "no vote" to "incumbent vote", Model 4 suggests that that nonviolent protests reduce the likelihood of voting for incumbent parties among the previous "non-voters" who identify themselves as Chinese, while it has little impact on the likelihood of changing to an "incumbent vote" among the "Hongkongers", who did not vote in 2016. Violent protests, on the other side, appear to increase the likelihood that those who identify themselves as Chinese will vote for the incumbents, while it reduces the likelihood of changing from a "no vote" to "incumbent vote" among the "Hongkongers", but the interaction term in Model 4 is not statistically significant.

6.1.2 Extended models

As discussed in section 5.7, there are several cofounders that are assumed to correlate with both the dependent variable, and the independent variables. Thus, the results presented in Table 6 may be spurious, meaning that they are driven by confounding factors. Because omitted variable bias poses a great threat to the internal validity, I include controls on individual socio-demographical attributes of the respondents that are assumed to correlate with both the dependent and the independent variables. As already mentioned, the extended models are first and foremost constructed in order to test whether the explanatory power of the main independent variables remain robust, and the coefficients of the controls themselves will not be discussed in detail.

Table 7: Voter behaviour previous non-voters

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	opposition		incumbent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Protestcount	-0.026*** (0.008)		-0.002 (0.005)	
Nonviolent		-0.038*** (0.015)		-0.010*** (0.003)
Violent		-0.006 (0.011)		0.022** (0.009)
Hongkonger	-1.136* (0.680)	-1.236** (0.623)	-0.780 (0.770)	-0.071 (1.023)
Education	0.497** (0.239)	0.483** (0.237)	-0.221 (0.338)	-0.263 (0.356)
Income	0.136*** (0.032)	0.138*** (0.033)	0.168 (0.138)	0.158 (0.146)
Age	-0.032*** (0.012)	-0.032*** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.011)
Female	-0.161 (0.157)	-0.124 (0.148)	-0.213* (0.122)	-0.213** (0.101)
Working Class	0.490*** (0.182)	0.470** (0.183)	0.880 (0.842)	1.012 (0.856)
Higher Service	0.145 (0.342)	0.140 (0.307)	-0.179 (0.934)	-0.034 (0.937)
Lower Service	-0.290 (0.216)	-0.327 (0.241)	0.047 (1.262)	0.142 (1.307)
Routine Non-manual Work	0.057 (0.468)	0.031 (0.438)	-0.213 (1.106)	-0.199 (1.127)
Student	0.164 (0.299)	0.155 (0.314)	-0.219 (2.203)	-0.116 (2.359)
Retired	1.307* (0.750)	1.300* (0.753)	1.669 (1.149)	1.786 (1.124)
Protestcount:Hongkonger	0.034*** (0.009)		-0.004 (0.013)	
Nonviolent:Hongkonger		0.040** (0.016)		0.010* (0.006)
Violent:Hongkonger		0.032** (0.014)		-0.052 (0.032)
Constant	1.012 (1.016)	1.192 (0.930)	-1.308 (2.104)	-1.539 (2.339)
Fixed effects				
<i>Geographical Constituency</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	414	414	274	274
Log Likelihood	-252.611	-251.788	-145.072	-143.774
Akaike Inf. Crit.	541.223	543.576	326.145	327.547

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Baseline category is set to no vote
 Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED
 Robust SE on geographical constituency

By comparing the baseline models presented in Table 6, with the extended models in Table 7, the coefficients of the main independent variables appear to be robust when including controls. The control variables “income”, “education”, “age” and “working class” are all estimated to have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” (Model 1 and 2). However, they do not appear to influence the explanatory power of the main independent variables or the interaction term considering the likelihood of voting for opposition parties among previous “non-voters” (Model 1 and 2). In similar vein, the estimated effects of the main independent variables and the interaction terms, on the likelihood of voting for incumbents, do not change considerably when including controls (Model 3 and 4). However, the coefficient of “violent protests” in Model 4 became significant after including controls, implying that each violent protest increase the likelihood of changing to an “incumbent vote” among previous non-voters who identify themselves as Chinese. The interaction term between “Hongkonger” and “violent protests” remains negative, implying that violent protests refrain “non-voters” , who identify themselves as “Hongkongers” , to vote for incumbent parties, but the coefficient is not significant.

6.1.3 Protests and voter behaviour of previous “nonvoters”: predicted probabilities

Although the models presented in Table 6 and 7 give some indications on how the frequency of nearby violent and nonviolent protests influence the voter behaviour of previous “non-voters”, the logodds-character makes it difficult to interpret the findings in an intuitively meaningful way. Therefore, I reverse the transformation via odds, and back to predicted probabilities, which provides a more substantially meaningful interpretation of the results. Figure 5-7 illustrate how the predicted probability of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” changes along with different numbers of total protest count (Figure 5), nonviolent protest count (Figure 6), and violent protest count (Figure 7). Figure 8-10 illustrate the predicted probabilities of changing from a “no vote” to “incumbent vote”, as the frequencies of total protests (Figure 8), nonviolent protests (Figure 9) and violent protests (Figure 10) increase. As the interaction terms in the models presented in Table 6 and 7 tell us that the effects of (violent and nonviolent) protests are dependent on the “national identity” of the respondents, I compare two scenarios, one with “Hongkongers” (red line), and the

other with those who identify themselves as Chinese (blue, dotted line). The controls are kept at typical values such as mean or mode. The color-shaded areas indicate the bounds of the 95%-confidence-intervals in all of the figures.

Figure 5: “No vote” to “Opposition” - total protest count




Figure 6: “No Vote” to “Opposition” - nonviolent protests





Figure 7: “No Vote” to “Opposition” - violent protests



Starting with the overall effect of protests count, Figure 5 illustrates that the total number of protests in the respondent's district increases the predicted probability of changing from a "no vote" to "opposition vote", among the "Hongkongers", while it has the opposite effect among those who identify themselves as "Chinese". As illustrated in Figure 6, previous "non-voters", who identify themselves as "Hongkongers", are quite unaffected by the number of nonviolent protests in their district. Among those who identify themselves as "Chinese", on the other side, each nonviolent protest reduces the predicted probability of changing from a "no vote" to "opposition vote". Contrary to my expectations, violent protests do not appear to moderate the effects of protests on the likelihood of changing from a "no vote" to "opposition vote", as they have a positive effect on this outcome among the "Hongkongers". Section 6.4 and Chapter 7 will provide more in-depth discussions on these findings. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of how pre-election protests influence vote choices of previous "non-voters", Figure 8-10 illustrate how (violent and nonviolent) protests influence the predicted probability of changing from a "no vote" to "incumbent vote".

Figure 8: “No Vote” to “Incumbent” - total protest count




Figure 9: “No Vote” to “Incumbent” - nonviolent protests





Figure 10: “No Vote” to “Incumbent” - violent protests



Starting with the effects of the total protest count in the respondent’s district on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “incumbent vote”, each district-based protest reduces the predicted probability of voting for incumbent parties, both among those who are identifying themselves as “Hongkongers” and as Chinese, but these effects are indeed weak and not statistically significant. While protests refrain

those who identify themselves as Chinese to change from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”(Figure 5), it does not necessarily translate into a greater support for the incumbents either (Figure 10). Nonviolent protests reduce the likelihood that those who identify themselves as Chinese will change from a “no vote”to “incumbent vote”, while violent protests, on the other side, are predicted to increase the probability that those who identify themselves as Chinese will change from a “no vote” to an “incumbent vote”.

To sum up, these findings imply that violent protests increase the likelihood that “Hongkongers” will change from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” , and that those who identify themselves as Chinese will change from a “no vote” to “incumbent vote”. I will turn back to these findings, and also discuss the endogeneity between protestor violence and police brutality in Section 6.5 and Chapter 7.

6.2 Protests and changes in voter behaviour among previous regime supporters

This section investigates how those who voted for the regime in 2016 voted in 2019. Drawing on informational cascade theories, *H2*, anticipates *that the likelihood of defecting from “incumbent” to “opposition parties” will increase as the number of anti-regime protests in the respondent’s district increases*. *H2* is followed by the sub-hypothesis, *H2a*, specifying that *those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”, rather than “Chinese”, will be more likely to defect to opposition parties as the number of opposition protests in their district increases*. To test this sub-hypothesis, I keep the interaction term between the “Hongkonger”-variable and the protest variables in the models presented in this section. However, I also anticipate that violent anti-regime protests can harm the reputation of the opposition, and thereby moderate the effect of protests on the likelihood of defecting to opposition parties, as formulated in *H2b*.

Table 8 reports the results from the binary logistic regression models. The descriptive statistics in section 5.3 report that only 3% (6 observations) of the previous regime supporters changed from an “incumbent vote” in 2016 to a “no vote” in 2019. This implies that “abstention”was not a common response to the protests among the previous regime supporters. Thus, the models estimate the likelihood of changing to an “opposition vote”, compared to the likelihood of remaining loyal to the incumbents.

Model 1 in Table 8 estimates the effect of the total protest count on the outcome, while Model 2 distinguishes between violent and nonviolent protests. Model 3 and Model 4 are the extended models, including controls on individual socio-demographical attributes of the respondents.

Table 8: Voter behaviour previous Regime Supporters

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	opposition			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Protestcount	-0.006 (0.007)		-0.009 (0.009)	
Nonviolent		-0.012 (0.009)		-0.018* (0.010)
Violent		0.006 (0.008)		0.010 (0.013)
Hongkonger	-0.024 (0.476)	0.297 (0.614)	-0.285 (0.685)	-0.086 (0.735)
Education			-0.702* (0.414)	-0.716 (0.553)
Income			-0.085 (0.101)	-0.092 (0.083)
Age			-0.030* (0.018)	-0.030* (0.018)
Female			-0.480 (0.365)	-0.500 (0.324)
Working Class			-0.299 (0.833)	-0.243 (1.106)
Higher Service			-0.656 (0.744)	-0.607 (0.583)
Lower Service			-0.216 (0.870)	-0.187 (1.280)
Routine Non-manual Work			-1.076 (0.787)	-0.998 (0.742)
Retired			-0.738 (1.360)	-0.742 (1.454)
Protestcount:Hongkonger	0.013 (0.007)		0.017 (0.010)	
Nonviolent:Hongkonger		0.020** (0.008)		0.025*** (0.008)
Violent:Hongkonger		-0.009 (0.015)		-0.001 (0.019)
Constant	-0.998*** (0.356)	-1.080*** (0.384)	2.340 (1.489)	2.263 (1.437)
Fixed effects				
<i>Geographical Constituency</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	201	201	201	201
Log Likelihood	-115.044	-115.077	-108.762	-108.496
Akaike Inf. Crit.	246.087	242.153	251.525	254.992

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Baseline category is set to incumbent vote
 Robust SE on geographical constituency
 Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED

Starting with the overall effect of protests, Model 1 in Table 8 produces few statistically significant evidences on how the number of opposition protests in the respondent's district influence the likelihood of defecting to opposition parties among previous regime supporters. The model suggests that a higher frequency of protests reduces the likelihood of defecting from the incumbents to the opposition, but the effect is not statistically significant and relatively weak. The interaction term in Model 1, is positive and implies that "Hongkongers" will be more likely to defect from the incumbents to the opposition as the number of protests in their district increases, which is in accordance with *H2a*, but this coefficient also fails to reach the level of statistical significance. The extended model (Model 3) produces more or less the similar results as the baseline model.

Turning to the effects of nonviolent vs. violent protests, the coefficients reported in Model 2 imply that nonviolent protests have a negative impact on the likelihood of defecting to opposition parties among those who identify themselves as Chinese, yet not statistically significant. The interaction term between the "hongkonger"-variable and nonviolent protests, on the other side, implies that nonviolent protests have the opposite effect among those who identify themselves as "Hongkongers". This effect is significant at the 5%-level. The interaction term between "nonviolent" and "hongkonger" remains robust when including controls (Model 4). There are, however, few evidences on how violent protests influence the likelihood of defecting to opposition parties, as these estimates are not statistically significant.

6.2.2 Predicted probabilities: changes in voter behaviour among previous regime supporters

In this section, I will report the predicted probabilities of defecting from regime to opposition at different numbers of (violent) protests in the respondent's districts. The figures illustrate how the total protest count (Figure 11), the count of nonviolent protests (Figure 12) and the count of violent protests (Figure 13) influence the likelihood of defecting from "incumbent" to "opposition" - parties. I compare two different scenarios, one in which the respondent identifies as a "Hongkonger" (red line), and the other in which the respondent identifies as a Chinese (blue, dotted line). Other covariates are kept at either mean or mode. The color-shaded areas indicate

the bounds of the 95%-confidence intervals.

Figure 11: “incumbent” to “opposition” - total protest count




Figure 12: “incumbent” to “opposition” - nonviolent protests





Figure 13: “incumbent” to “opposition” - violent protests



The lines displayed in Figure 11 imply that each district-based protest increases the likelihood of defecting from “incumbent” to “opposition” among those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”, but has the opposite effect among those who identify themselves as Chinese. By comparing Figure 11 to Figure 12 and 13, it appears that this trend is mainly caused by nonviolent protests. Nonviolent protests are predicted to increase the likelihood that “Hongkongers” will defect from the regime to the opposition. Violent protests, on the other side, have a weak positive effect on the likelihood of defecting to opposition parties, both among the “Hongkongers” and “Chinese”, but this effect is not statistically significant.

6.3 The Authorities’ Responses to the Protests

So far, the focus has been on the protestors and how violent and nonviolent protests influence voter behaviour. In this section, I will focus on the authorities’ responses to the protest, and how this may influence the voter behaviour of the previous “non-voters” (section 6.3.1) and the previous regime supporters (section 6.3.3). Just as a high level of protestor violence are assumed to harm the reputation of the opposition, brutal crackdowns of the protests may also backfire at the regime, as formulated in $H3$ and $H4$. In section 6.1, I found that violent protests mobilize previous “non-voters”, who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”, to vote for opposition parties. However, the districts that experienced the highest number of violent protests are also the districts that experienced the highest reported numbers of teargas events, which makes it somewhat difficult to distinguish between the effects of protestor violence and the effects of police brutality. I will turn back to this in section 6.5 and Chapter 7.

6.3.1 Police brutality and changes in voter behaviour among previous “non-voters”

In this section, I investigate how teargas firing by police officers influence the voter behaviour of previous “non-voters”. As formulated in $H3$, I anticipate that a higher frequency of events including police brutality increases the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to an “opposition vote”. $H3a$ also specifies that the “Hongkongers” will be more likely to vote for opposition parties than those who identify themselves as Chinese, which is why I include an interaction term between “teargas events” and the “Hongkonger”-variable. Table 9 reports the results from the logistic regression models, using “teargasevents” as the main independent variable. Model 1 and 2 are

the baseline models, only including the main independent variables. Model 3 and 4 are the extended models, including socio-demographical attributes of the respondents. Because the number of nonviolent and violent protests are assumed to influence the police forces use of teargas, I control for the number of violent and nonviolent protests in the respondent's district. The odd-numbered models (1 and 3) investigate how teargas events influence the likelihood of changing voter behaviour from a "no vote" to "opposition vote", while the even-numbered models (2 and 4) estimate the likelihood of changing from a "no vote" to "incumbent vote" as the number of teargas events increases.

Table 9: Teargas use and Previous Non-voters

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	opposition (1)	incumbent (2)	opposition (3)	incumbent (4)
Teargasevent	-0.019 (0.014)	0.004 (0.020)	-0.021*** (0.007)	0.018* (0.010)
Hong Konger	0.189 (0.307)	-0.745** (0.330)	0.066 (0.505)	-0.605 (0.478)
Nonviolent			-0.002	-0.006** (0.002)
Violent			0.003	-0.009 (0.011)
Education			0.471	-0.199 (0.345)
Age			-0.034	-0.002 (0.010)
Income			0.147	0.165 (0.139)
Female			-0.157	-0.186* (0.102)
Working Class			0.498	0.913 (0.827)
Higher Service			0.080	-0.188 (0.933)
Lower Service			-0.382	0.074 (1.299)
Routine Non-manual Work			-0.037	-0.256 (1.110)
Student			0.049	-0.001 (2.164)
Retired			1.231	1.669 (1.141)
Teargasevent:Hongkonger	0.036*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	0.044** (0.018)	-0.032* (0.017)
Constant	-0.379 (0.306)	-0.754 (0.684)	0.194 (0.164)	-1.314 (2.062)
Fixed effects				
<i>Geographical Constituency</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	414	274	414	274
Log Likelihood	-274.883	-154.375	-255.346	-143.857
Akaike Inf. Crit.	565.765	324.751	550.692	327.714

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Baseline category is set to no vote

Robust SE on geographical constituency

Source: HKES 2019 and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

Model 1 suggests a negative relationship between teargas events and the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” in 2016 to an “opposition vote” in 2019, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. However, the interaction term in Model 1 is significant and positive, implying that each event including teargas-firing by police officers increases the likelihood of changing to an opposition vote among those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”. The estimates are robust when including controls (Model 3), providing support for *H3a*. In addition, teargas events also refrain “Hongkongers” from voting for incumbent parties, implying that state-led crackdowns of protests can backfire at the regime, as it both increases the likelihood of voting for opposition parties, and reduces the likelihood of voting for incumbent parties, among the “Hongkongers” who did not vote in 2016. However, Model 3 and 4 in Table 9 also imply that teargas events have the opposite effects among those who identify themselves as Chinese, in which teargas events refrain this group from voting for the opposition, and mobilize them to vote for the incumbents.

Again, the logodds-character of the estimates presented in Table 9 is not very intuitive for interpretation, which is why I reverse the transformation back to probabilities, as illustrated in the figures presented below. Figure 14 illustrates how the predicted probability of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” changes as the number of teargas events in the respondent’s district increases. Figure 15 illustrates how the predicted probability of changing from a “no vote” to “incumbent vote” changes at different numbers of teargas events. The red lines illustrates the effects of the independent variable on the outcome among the “Hongkongers”, and the blue, dotted, lines among those who identify themselves as Chinese. Other covariates are kept at mean or mode, and the color-filled areas are the bounds of the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 14: “no vote” to “opposition vote”-teargas events





Figure 15: “no vote” to “opposition vote”-teargas events



As Figure 14 illustrates, each event including teargas fired by police officers increases the predicted probability that those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers” will change from a “no-vote” to “opposition vote”. However, teargas events have the opposite effect among those who identify themselves as “Chinese”, in which each teargas event reduces the predicted probability of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”. Turning to the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to an “incumbent vote”, each-teargas event increase the predicted probability of changing to an incumbent vote with among those who identify themselves as “Chinese”, while it has a weak, negative effect among those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”. However, Figure 14 and 15 look quite similar to Figure 10 and 7 (section 6.1), implying that it is somewhat difficult to distinguish between the effects of protestor violence and police brutality on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”. I will turn back to this in section 6.5 and Chapter 7. Before that, I will investigate how teargas events influence the voter behaviour of previous regime supporters.

6.3.2 Teargas use and previous regime supporters

In this section, I investigate how teargas fired by police officers influence the voter behaviour of those who supported the regime in 2016. Thus, the dependent variable

captures a change from “incumbent vote” to “opposition vote”. The results are reported in Table 10:

Table 10: Teargas use and Previous Regime Supporters


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	opposition	
	(1)	(2)
Teargasevent	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.012)
Hong Konger	0.600 (0.444)	0.545 (0.571)
Nonviolent		0.002 (0.001)
Violent		0.017 (0.027)
Education		-0.661 (0.473)
Age		-0.025* (0.015)
Income		-0.079 (0.081)
Female		-0.558* (0.319)
Working Class		-0.098 (1.033)
Higher Service		-0.496 (0.508)
Lower Service		-0.122 (1.253)
Routine Non-manual Work		-0.860 (0.668)
Retired		-0.586 (1.344)
Teargasevent:Hongkonger	0.006 (0.022)	0.012 (0.030)
Constant	-1.172*** (0.172)	1.366 (1.287)
Fixed effects		
<i>Geographical Constituency</i>	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	
Observations	201	201
Log Likelihood	-116.124	-109.990
Akaike Inf. Crit.	248.248	257.979

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Baseline category is set to Incumbent vote
 Robust SE on geographical constituency
 Source: HKES 2019 and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

All of the estimates in the models presented in Table 10 fail to reach the 5% level of statistical significance. The coefficient in Model 1 suggests that each increase in the number of teargas events has a weak negative impact on the likelihood of defecting to opposition parties, but the estimates are not statistically significant. Because the risk of type-1 errors are higher than 5%, I am not able to conclude how teargas events influence the likelihood of defecting from incumbent parties to opposition parties.

Figure 16 illustrates how the predicted probability of defecting to opposition parties changes at different numbers of teargas events in the respondent’s districts. The red line illustrates the effects of the independent variable on the outcome among the “Hongkongers”, and the blue, dotted, line among those who identify themselves as Chinese. Other covariates are kept at mean or mode. The color-filled areas are the bounds of the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 16: “Incumbent” to “Opposition”-teargas events



Model 2 in Table 10 suggests that each event including teargas-firing by police officers reduces the likelihood that those who supported the regime in 2016 will defect to the opposition in 2019 both among the “Hongkongers”, and those who identify themselves as Chinese. However, as the huge confidence intervals illustrate, the effects are not statistically significant.

6.4 Internal Validity: Are the Results Robust?

In this section, I will discuss the results in terms of their internal validity. The validity of the results partly depends on the strength of the associations, and whether they are statistically significant at conventional levels of uncertainty, typically set to 5%-level in social sciences (Lund, 2002). In other words, there is a 5% chance that type-1 errors have been made among the results that were reported as statistically significant. Among the estimates that failed to reach the 5%-level of statistical significance, there is an even greater chance that type-1 errors have occurred, meaning that I am not able to reject the null hypotheses for these estimates. However, despite the significance of (some of) the results, there are several other threats to the internal validity of the results, including the choice of estimation techniques (model choice), the operationalization of the variables and the underlying assumptions about the causal relationships.

6.1.1 Alternative model specifications

In section 5.5, I argued that splitting the dataset to only include observations in the reference group and the outcome group (i.e splitting the data set of previous “nonvoters” into two datasets; one with “no vote” and “opposition vote” in 2019, and another with “no vote” and “incumbent vote” in 2019) and thereby run separate binary logistic regression models follows the same logic and will produce more or less the same results as the MLM-models. I have doubled-checked, and the general take away is similar to the models presented in Chapter 6. (Appendix Table A1-A2). In Table A2, “disengage” is also included as an alternative for previous regime supporters, but it does not appear to influence the estimates of the independent variables on the likelihood of defecting from regime to opposition.

The models presented in this chapter include fixed effects on the geographical constituencies. Including fixed effects on geographical constituencies can reduce bias from omitted variables that are static within each area, and thereby reduce the risk of type 1-error. However, the data I use consist of relatively few observations, and including a dummy for each geographical constituency reduces the degrees of freedom. This may increase the risk of type-II errors, if we fail to recognize a true effect. In such, there is a “trade-off” between unbiased estimates vs. efficiency (Worrall,

2010). I have also tried to run the models with random, rather than fixed, effects. In short, the random effect (RE) model assumes that the unobserved differences between the groups are random. Overall, the FE- and the RE-models produce the same results (Table B1-B4). However, I argue that the fixed effects are more suitable in this case, because the treatment is not randomly assigned between different districts.

6.4.2 Log-transforming the Event Variables

The models presented in Chapter 6 report the additive effects of the event variables on the outcome (i.e. absolute changes in the outcome as the independent variable increases with one scale unit). However, there are both theoretical, and statistical arguments that may favour a log-transformed version of the event variables instead. On the theoretical note, there are reasons to assume that each additional protests or teargas events becomes less remarkable in a district that has already experienced a high number of such events, and that the effect of each additional event on the outcome therefore becomes weaker as of the number of (violent) protest- and teargas events increases. Statistically, the rationale behind this is to account for some of the skewness in the event variables (Christophersen, 2018, p. 82). Therefore, I run similar models to those presented in this chapter, but with log-transformed versions of the main independent variables (total count of protest, violent protests, nonviolent protests, and teargas events). The results can be found in the appendix (Table C1-C4).

Overall, the results remain robust when log-transforming the event variables concerning the main findings. However, there are some differences I should comment on. First, the effect of “protestcount” on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” is still positive among the “Hongkongers”, but the strength of the association is weaker (Model 1, Table C1). This may be because log-transformation stabilize the very large number of protests, which may have influenced the estimates in the analysis presented above presented models. While the direction of the association is robust, it may be biased in terms of strength. In addition, the effects of violent protests on the likelihood of changing from “no vote” to “opposition vote” is also positive among those who identify themselves as Chinese, yet not statically significant. The interaction term is also slightly negative (but the estimated effects of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” remain positive among the “Hongkongers”, although it

is not significant (Model 2, Table C1). Another difference is, however, that the effects of violent protests on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “incumbent vote” is no longer significant, and also turns negative, implying that those who identify themselves as Chinese become less likely to vote for incumbent parties as the number of violent protests increases (Model 4, Table C1). In such, the effects of violent vs. nonviolent protests on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “incumbent vote” are not robust. Over all, the findings still imply that “protest count” has a positive impact on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” among the “Hongkongers”, while it also refrain non-voters who identify themselves as Chinese to vote for opposition parties.

6.4.3 Measurement validity and alternative operationalization of the independent variables

Measurement validity is concerned with whether the operationalization of the variables adequately reflect the concept that the researcher seeks to measure (Adcock & Collier, 2001). In such, the scores of a variable should capture the ideas contained in the correspondent concept in a meaningful way. To ensure the internal validity of the results, Christophersen (2018) argue that we should run the models with alternative operationalizations of the variables (p.144). In this section, I will run the models by using alternative operationalizations of the “Hongkonger”-variable, and of the “teargas event”-variable.

In the above presented models, “Hongkongers” are understood as those who identify themselves as “more Hongkonger than Chinese”. However, there is not necessarily a clear-cut between identifying oneself as a “Hongkonger” or as a “Chinese”, especially when it comes to the two mid-categories “Hongkonger, but also Chinese” and “Chinese, but also Hongkonger”. It is reasonable to assume that those who falls under these two-mid categories will have a greater sympathy with their counterparts, than those who identify themselves as purely “Hongkongers” or purely “Chinese”. Therefore, I also run the models using the original, continuous, “Hongkonger”-variable. The variable ranges from 1-4, in which the score 1 is given those who identify themselves as purely “Chinese”, and 4 those who identify themselves as purely “Hongkongers”. The results can be found in the appendix (Table D1-D4). While the general take out is the same,

there are some changes in how the results should be interpreted, as illustrated in figure 17-19

Figure 17: "no vote" to "opposition"-
total protest count
continuous "Hongkonger"




Figure 18: "no vote" to "opposition"-
nonviolent protests
continious" Hongkonger"





Figure 19: "no vote" to "opposition"-
violent protests
continious" Hongkonger"



As figure 17 illustrates, each scale-unit increases in the “Hongkonger”-variable moderates the negative effect of “protest count” on the outcome, but the effect only becomes positive when the respondent has the value “4”, on the continuous “Hongkonger”-variable. This means that the number of protests in the respondent’s district only increase the likelihood that those who identify themselves as purely “Hongkongers” will change from a “no vote” to an “opposition vote”, and not all of those who identify themselves as “more Hongkonger than Chinese”, as the initial operationalization would have suggested. By looking at Figure 17 and 18, it still appears that nonviolent protests moderate the effects of nearby protests on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”. However, contrary to what the initial operationalization of «Hong Konger» would have suggested, nonviolent protests have a negative impact on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” among those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers, but also Chinese”, and a weak positive effect among those who purely identify themselves as purely “Hongkongers”.

In the main analysis from section 6.3, I also use “teargas events” as a measurement of police brutality. While teargas is undoubtedly a form of police brutality, police brutality can happen in many other ways. I also test the models by using the operationalization of repression drawn from ACLED. Because ACLED only distinguish between “harsh” and “soft” repression of nonviolent protests, and not violent protests, I use the total count of repression events, found by summarizing the sub-categories “protest with intervention”, “excessive force against protestors” and violent demonstrations coded with interaction term 16: “Military vs. Rioters” (see section 5.4). Overall, the results remain robust.

Related to the discussion of violent vs. nonviolent protestor tactics, we should also keep in mind that ACLED operates with a low threshold of violence (see Chapter 5). One potential test would have been to increase the threshold of violence. However, only two of the protest events in the ACLED data reports fatalities. Assumably, some of the events that are coded as “violent” in ACLED would have been coded as “nonviolent” in other databases that operates with higher thresholds of violence. In similar vein, the Anti-ELAB movement may would have been coded as ”nonviolent” if we were coding the campaign as a whole, rather than each protest on a day-to day

basis. However, there are few datasets available on the 2019 Hong Kong protests, that tracks protest events on a day-to-day basis at the district-level, but we should at least keep in mind that the great majority of the violent events in this study, do not include fatalities.

6.5 Validity and Causality

In section 6.4, I argued that, overall, the results from the model presented in Chapter 6 remain robust across various model specifications. The robustness of the results is, however, not an evidence of causality between the independent and dependent variables. An underlying assumption of any regression model is that there is no omitted variable bias. The control variables allow for controlled comparisons between different units, and the fixed effects controls for omitted variable that are assumed to be static within groups, but there are no ways to perfectly control for omitted variable bias. One relevant aspect of protests that were not considered in the analysis is the protest size. Large-scale protests do arguably send different signals than small-scale protests on the prevalence of elite dissent in the voters' districts. In addition, large-scale protests may also pose a greater threat to the regime, which may influence the probability of state-led repression of the protests. Assessing protest size is beyond the scope of this study, and also difficult due to the given data structure, but this is one avenue for further research on protests, repression, and voter behaviour.

Causality implies that X leads to Y through a causal mechanism. This is not only a question of the strength of the relationships, but also the direction, as X should cause Y, rather than being a response to Y. The interpretation of the results in this thesis relies on an underlying assumption that protests and teargas events leads to changes in voter behaviour. However, there is also a possibility that areas where people already had changed their political preferences had more momentum for mobilization. While we cannot ignore this possibility, we should keep in mind that the election outcome in a district (more or less) reflects the preferences of the people living in that district, while this is not necessarily true for protest frequency in each district. Protests often take place in the most central areas, and people may therefore participate in protests outside of their living district. In such, people who changed their political preferences

prior to the protests, do not necessarily arrange, or participate in protests in the district where they are registered as voters. In addition, the Anti-ELAB movement also framed the district council election as a way of signaling dissatisfaction with the regime, and also brought attention to the significance of voting in elections, which gives reasons to believe that the protests did influence voter behaviour.

In section 6.1, I found that violent protests have a positive effect on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to an “opposition vote” among those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”. However, the findings from section 6.3 imply that police brutality also increase the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to an “opposition vote” among this group. Because the districts that have experienced the most violent protest events also are the districts that has experienced most teargas events, it is somewhat difficult to distinguish between the effects of protestor violence and police brutality. One could argue that teargas use is post-treatment to protests, as the repression of a protests requires that a protest actually takes place. On the other side, the use of teargas in the districts can also influence the number of protests, either by increasing the costs of protesting, or, as in the case of Hong Kong, create new grievances about the regime that fuels further protests. In addition, protestors may change their tactics from nonviolent to violent if they are met by brutal crackdowns, either as an act of self-defence, or because they become angrier at the police or the regime. The endogeneity of protestor violence and police brutality makes it difficult to conclude whether it is protestor violence or state violence that increase the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to an “opposition vote”. One avenue for further studies is to address the chicken-and-egg problem with regards to protestor- and regime violence and its effects on public opinion and voter behaviour.

4.5.2 Further limitations

As discussed throughout this thesis, there are also several limitations in the data set. For instance, I was only able to track changes in voter behaviour from the 2016 Super District Council Election, which is a part of the legislative elections, and not the previous district council election. Although the data allows me to investigate whether changes in voter behaviour are more likely to occur in districts that have experienced a high level of police brutality and protest events, we should not ignore the possibility

that people may have different preferences in different types of elections. This may also lead to some bias estimates regarding the strength of the associations, as the voter turnout, and the vote share for the pro-democracy camp, are usually higher in the super district council elections than in the district council elections. In addition, it is not possible to estimate the full effect of protests and teargas events on voter behaviour, as I am not able to capture the national signals that are the same for all of Hong Kong's citizens, for instance the media coverage of the protest events.

Another limitation in the data is indeed the low number of observations, especially among the previous regime supporters. This can lead to poorly estimated models with high standard error, and the data may be insufficient to detect significant associations between the independent variables and the outcome (Type-II errors). Despite these limitations, this thesis constitutes one of few attempts to systematically connect protests to individual voter behaviour, which may have theoretical implications for studies of mass protests and elections in non-democratic regimes.

7 Discussion and Conclusion

In this thesis, I have studied *how pre-election protests, and the authorities' response to the protests, influence voter behaviour* with Hong Kong as the case. The main focus has been changes in voter behaviour among those who *did not* vote for the opposition in the 2016 Super District Council Election, either because they voted for the regime, or because they did not vote at all. In this final chapter, I will summarize the main findings and discuss their implications. This also includes suggestions for further research.

7.1 Main findings and Implications

Drawing on cascade theories, I anticipated that nearby opposition protests mobilize previous “non-voters” to vote for opposition parties. In accordance with the expectations formulated in *H1a*, the findings suggest that nearby opposition protests mobilize previous “non-voters” who identify themselves as “Hongkongers” to vote for opposition parties. An interesting finding is, however, that protests also refrain previous “non-voters”, who see themselves as “Chinese”, from voting for the opposition, but this did not result in a greater support for the incumbents either.

The results imply that the effects of protests on voter behaviour are dependent on the respondent’s sense of a “national identity” , and that protests can mobilize electoral support for the opposition among those who *do not* identify with the national state. In such, protests have a polarizing effect between the “Hongkonger” and the “Chinese” people, concerning the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition”. These findings may have implications for theories of expressive voting in electoral autocracies, as they do indicate that protests can mobilize people to cast a vote as an act of “protest”, even if symbolic. As Letsa (2020) points out, voting in electoral autocracies are often motivated by expressing patriotism or loyalty to the national regime. This *may* explain why pro-Beijing parties have enjoyed high electoral support in the previous district council elections, that are first and foremost considered as a “symbolic election”. However, greater access to opposition narratives may motivate people who *do not* identify themselves with the national state to cast a vote for expressive reasons, but first and foremost as an act of “punishing” the regime (Letsa,

2020). In accordance with Letsa (2020), the findings from this thesis imply that those who not identify with the national state (the “Hongkongers”), become more likely to vote for the opposition as the total number of protests in their district increases. Interestingly, “protest count” also had a negative impact on the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to vote for the incumbents, among those who identify themselves as Chinese, which may imply a form of *preference falsification* among those who identify with the national regime. These effects are, however, not statistically significant and also weak.

These findings also have practical implications for opposition parties participating in autocratic elections. They imply that opposition parties can benefit from pre-election protests, if there are untapped voters they can rally. In the case of Hong Kong, these “untapped” voters are those who *do not* identify with the national state. This may also have implications for the democratic (or autocratic) development of the regime in the longer run. Voter apathy can contribute to the resilience of a non-democratic regime (Tertytchnaya, 2020), especially if the only ones who participate in voting are those who supports the regime or vote as an act of “national patriotism”. If protests can mobilize people who do not support the regime to actually go to the ballot box and cast a vote for the opposition, the election may no longer serve as a tool for the regime to legitimize its power. However, incumbent defeats in autocratic elections do not necessarily result in democratic reforms, as they may also provoke the regime to pose further restrictions on the electoral system, or to violate the citizen’s civil rights, which is the case in Hong Kong. *If, and under what circumstances, incumbent defeats lead to democratic transitions* is one avenue for further studies.

While the findings suggest that opposition protests can mobilize previous “non-voters”, who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”, to vote for the opposition parties, I found few (statistical significant) evidences on how nearby pre-election protests influence the voter behaviour of previous regime supporters. The findings suggest that those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers” are more likely to defect to opposition parties as the number of pre-election protests increases, while it also increases the probability that those who identify themselves as Chinese remain loyal to the regime. However, because the risk of type-1 error is greater than 5%, I am not able to confirm *H2* and *H2a*.

This thesis has brought attention to how nearby protests can influence voter behaviour, but it also raises another question. Contrary to the expectations formulated in *H1b*, the findings imply that violent protests increase the likelihood that “Hongkongers” will change from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”, and reduce the likelihood that they will change to an “incumbent vote”. At the same time, and in line with *H3a*, they also suggest that a higher frequency of police brutality increases the likelihood of changing from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” among the “Hongkongers”. Because the districts that have experienced the most protestor violence also are the districts that have experienced most police brutality, it is somewhat difficult to determine what causes what. The theoretical argument presented in this thesis suggests that this is driven by a *confirmation bias*, in which those who identify themselves with the national regime put a greater emphasis on the negative information about the regime’s opponents, and thereby blame the protestors for the chaos and unrest. Those who *do not* identify themselves with the national regime, on the other side, will search for, and favour, the negative information (i.e the police brutality) that confirms their pre-existing attitudes towards the regime. These psycho-social mechanisms are, however, not tested directly. Further researches could, for example, in greater details examine how confirmation biases (for instance from national identity or political affiliation) influence people’s support for political violence, either by the protestors or by the regime.

Finally, the results imply that nonviolent protests have a positive, and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of changing from an “incumbent vote” to an “opposition vote” among those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”. On the other side, none of the estimates of “violent protests” or “teargas events” were significant (or robust) among the previous regime supporters, which means that *H2b* and *H4a* are not supported. Overall, the findings do imply that violent protests, either caused by protestor violence, or police brutality, increase the likelihood that previous “non-voters”, who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”, will change from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”. On the other side, nonviolent protests have a positive impact on the likelihood of defecting to opposition parties among previous regime supporters who identify themselves as “Hongkongers”. One explanation of this could be, that violent protests are more intense and gain more attention, and thereby awaken people

who usually do not engage in politics, or because it provokes anger that encourage people to vote as an act of “protests”, even if symbolic. Among those who already engage in voting, shifting to a peaceful opponent may be perceived as more reasonable than shifting side to someone who is seen as radicals. It might also be that those who supported the regime in the past actually identified themselves as Chinese at that time, but fundamentally changed their sense of the national identity during the protests, and that people are more likely to identify with someone they perceive as “peaceful protestors”, rather than “violent radicals”. Testing changes in self-reported national identity is unfortunately not possible in this study, but may be one avenue for further research.

7.2 Concluding Remarks

Extensive research has been done on how protests can contribute to the fall or rise of autocratic regimes, but we know less about the micro-level processes that underpin these two macro-level phenomena. This thesis has sought to fill this gap, by systematically studying micro-level processes that connects opposition protests to voter behaviour at the individual level. This thesis seeks to answer the following research question: *How do nearby opposition protests, and the authorities' response to the protests, influence voter behaviour in the case of Hong Kong?*

Drawing on cascade theories, I argued that people tend to hide their privately held preferences, if these preferences are considered as “socially unacceptable”. In such, a privately hated regime may enjoy widespread public support. Protests send signals that the grievances about the regime are widespread, which may motivate those who dislike the regime to cast a vote for the opposition (Kadivar, 2017). In accordance with these theoretical arguments, the findings imply that “Hongkongers” who live in districts where the grievances about the regime are more visible (in terms of more opposition protests), become more likely to change from a “no vote” to “opposition vote”. On the other side, it also refrained those who identify themselves as Chinese from voting for the opposition parties, who became more likely to remain “nonvoters”, as the numbers of opposition protests in their district increased. This may imply a form of *preference falsification* among those who identify themselves as Chinese. It also implies that protests can mobilize previous “nonvoters”, who *do not* identify themselves with the national regime, to cast a vote for the opposition. While the theoretical argument also emphasizes that opposition protests can prompt previous regime supporters to change their opinions about the regime, and thereby defect to opposition parties, I found few statistical significant evidences on how pre-election protests influence the voter behaviour of previous regime supporters. However, the findings do imply that nonviolent protests have a positive impact on the likelihood of defecting from the regime to the opposition.

The findings also imply, that violent protests mobilize people who *do not* identify themselves with the national state, to cast a vote for the opposition. At the same time, those who identify themselves as “Hongkongers” also become more likely to change from a “no vote” to “opposition vote” as the number of teargas events increases. This

thesis also highlights the difficulties to distinguish between the effects of protestor violence and police brutality on people's voter behaviour. The theoretical arguments in this, emphasize that individuals have a tendency to favour information that best fits their pre-existing beliefs, which may influence whether they perceive the violence, either by the police or by the protestors, as legitimate. Whether people supported the police's heavy-handed approach may be reflected in their vote choices. However, these psycho-social mechanisms are not tested directly.

One could ask how generalizable these findings are, given Hong Kong's unique status as Chinese SAR, and the high level of media freedom compared to other electoral autocracies. The case of Hong Kong may, however, be applicable in contexts in which voting first and foremost is considered a symbolic act, rather than an expectation of political change. Related to voting as a symbolic act, Hong Kong also provides a unique case to study how identity, in correlation with protests, influence voter behaviour. This, in turn, may provide useful insight when studying independence movements in other places in the world, or in highly diverse societies.

Understanding how protests can mobilize citizens in electoral autocracies to participate in voting, is of utmost importance, as disengagement from politics often contribute to the resilience of authoritarian regimes. Despite its limitations, this study constitutes one of few attempts to directly study how protests and repression of protests influence voter behaviour at the individual level. If opposition protests can mobilize people or prompt regime's supporters to update their evaluations of the regime, the elections may no longer work as a tool for the regime to legitimize its power. While incumbent defeat in an autocratic election do not necessarily result in democratisation, it does signal changes in the dynamics between the ruling elite and its opponents. This may have implications for the democratic (or autocratic) development of the regime in the longer run. I therefore encourage others to use this approach and, if possible, apply it to other contexts.

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A Multinomial Models

Table A1: Multinomial and "non-voters"

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	opposition (1)	incumbent (2)	opposition (3)	incumbent (4)	opposition (5)	incumbent (6)
Protest count	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)				
Teargas events					-0.018 (0.017)	0.011 (0.016)
Nonviolent			-0.042** (0.021)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.009)
Violent			0.010 (0.024)	0.022 (0.020)	0.005 (0.019)	-0.0004 (0.026)
Hong Konger	-0.877* (0.531)	-0.874 (0.569)	-0.874 (0.578)	-0.352 (0.692)	0.126 (0.314)	-0.664 (0.409)
Education	0.515** (0.251)	-0.148 (0.343)	0.497** (0.251)	-0.153 (0.344)	0.472* (0.250)	-0.136 (0.345)
Age	-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.034*** (0.011)	0.0004 (0.015)
Income	0.124* (0.063)	0.160* (0.084)	0.127** (0.064)	0.157* (0.084)	0.141** (0.064)	0.164* (0.084)
Female	-0.187 (0.232)	-0.201 (0.305)	-0.160 (0.234)	-0.199 (0.309)	-0.167 (0.232)	-0.175 (0.307)
Working Class	0.450 (0.470)	0.969 (0.619)	0.454 (0.469)	1.072* (0.626)	0.446 (0.470)	0.965 (0.624)
Higher Service	0.126 (0.401)	-0.170 (0.580)	0.149 (0.403)	-0.073 (0.587)	0.074 (0.402)	-0.208 (0.588)
Lower Service	-0.298 (0.511)	-0.012 (0.659)	-0.316 (0.511)	0.040 (0.664)	-0.399 (0.511)	-0.010 (0.663)
Routine Nonmanual	0.037 (0.414)	-0.194 (0.602)	0.019 (0.414)	-0.177 (0.605)	-0.054 (0.416)	-0.215 (0.604)
Student	0.128 (0.767)	0.038 (1.308)	0.137 (0.770)	0.139 (1.313)	0.046 (0.765)	0.165 (1.310)
Retired	1.163* (0.636)	1.609** (0.718)	1.209* (0.638)	1.688** (0.722)	1.144* (0.634)	1.614** (0.720)
Protest count:Hongkonger	0.030*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.009)				
Nonviolent:Hongkonger			0.043** (0.020)	0.012 (0.013)		
Violent:Hongkonger			0.016 (0.026)	-0.040 (0.031)		
Teargas events:Hongkonger					0.042*** (0.016)	-0.024 (0.026)
Constant	0.824 (0.890)	-1.478 (1.128)	0.955 (0.913)	-1.795 (1.171)	0.214 (0.821)	-1.632 (1.126)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	954.306	954.306	957.478	957.478	963.049	963.049

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B RE Models

Table A2: Multinomial: Previous Regime Supporters

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	opposition	disengage	opposition	disengage	opposition	disengage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Protest count	-0.009 (0.009)	0.014 (0.041)				
Teargas events					-0.018 (0.023)	-0.617 (0.514)
Nonviolent			-0.018 (0.018)	0.087 (0.225)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.429 (0.322)
Violent			0.010 (0.029)	-0.065 (0.257)	0.017 (0.031)	0.880 (0.661)
Hong Konger	-0.298 (0.686)	3.749 (3.316)	-0.089 (0.858)	-2.457 (9.554)	0.551 (0.483)	-1.962 (4.135)
Education	-0.713* (0.413)	3.827* (2.017)	-0.729* (0.415)	3.666* (2.154)	-0.678* (0.410)	4.011* (2.342)
Age	-0.081 (0.101)	-0.632 (0.431)	-0.089 (0.103)	-0.544 (0.488)	-0.074 (0.102)	-0.869 (0.577)
Income	-0.030* (0.018)	0.079 (0.071)	-0.030* (0.018)	0.061 (0.071)	-0.025 (0.018)	0.075 (0.083)
Female	-0.467 (0.363)	1.298 (1.514)	-0.490 (0.364)	0.971 (1.692)	-0.550 (0.360)	1.539 (1.917)
Nonviolent:Hongkonger			0.025 (0.017)	-0.898 (1.278)		
Violent:Hongkonger			-0.001 (0.033)	0.862 (1.318)		
Teargas events: Hongkonger					0.011 (0.021)	0.309 (0.306)
Working Class	-0.301 (0.829)	12.730*** (1.333)	-0.248 (0.834)	11.344*** (1.509)	-0.106 (0.828)	10.737*** (2.236)
Higher Service	-0.664 (0.744)	10.939*** (1.413)	-0.610 (0.748)	9.307*** (1.647)	-0.496 (0.744)	10.571*** (1.622)
Lower Service	-0.220 (0.869)	-12.037*** (0.000)	-0.191 (0.875)	-13.610*** (0.000)	-0.119 (0.871)	-12.154*** (0.000)
Routine Nonmanual	-1.058 (0.787)	11.478*** (1.473)	-0.980 (0.797)	10.037*** (1.481)	-0.832 (0.782)	10.494*** (1.819)
Retired	-0.747 (1.344)	13.512*** (1.850)	-0.715 (1.356)	12.469*** (2.157)	-0.506 (1.363)	13.357*** (2.093)
Protestcount:Hongkonger	0.017 (0.010)	-0.037 (0.059)				
Constant	2.336 (1.494)	-42.745*** (3.407)	2.258 (1.546)	-33.261*** (3.456)	1.324 (1.393)	-26.716*** (4.826)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	315.302	315.302	321.021	321.021	323.311	323.311

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B1: Voter behaviour previous nonvoters: RE models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	opposition		incumbent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Protestcount	-0.026*** (0.008)		-0.004 (0.005)	
Nonviolent		-0.041*** (0.015)		-0.014*** (0.003)
Violent		-0.003 (0.011)		0.024** (0.009)
Hongkonger	-1.085 (0.680)	-1.258** (0.623)	-0.799 (0.770)	-0.272 (1.023)
Education	0.494** (0.239)	0.470** (0.237)	-0.225 (0.338)	-0.266 (0.356)
Income	-0.032 (0.012)	-0.031** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.011)
Age	0.125 (0.032)	0.141*** (0.033)	0.152 (0.138)	0.146 (0.146)
Female	-0.151 (0.157)	-0.081 (0.148)	-0.194 (0.122)	-0.159 (0.101)
Working Class	0.523*** (0.182)	0.492*** (0.183)	0.910 (0.842)	1.043 (0.856)
Higher Service	0.235 (0.342)	0.221 (0.307)	-0.168 (0.934)	0.013 (0.937)
Lower Service	-0.219*** (0.216)	-0.253 (0.241)	0.065 (1.262)	0.153 (1.307)
Routine Non-manual Work	0.144 (0.468)	0.099 (0.438)	-0.141 (1.106)	-0.128 (1.127)
Student	0.208 (0.299)	0.209 (0.314)	-0.143 (2.203)	-0.030 (2.359)
Retired	1.241*** (0.750)	1.324* (0.753)	1.573 (1.149)	1.753 (1.124)
Protestcount:Hongkonger	0.033 (0.009)		-0.004 (0.013)	
Nonviolent:Hongkonger		0.042*** (0.016)		0.009 (0.006)
Violent:Hongkonger		0.031** (0.014)		-0.041 (0.032)
Constant	1.438 (1.016)	1.180 (0.930)	-0.757 (2.104)	-1.231 (2.339)
Observations	414	414	274	274
Log Likelihood	-255.224	-253.092	-146.494	-144.991
Akaike Inf. Crit.	540.448	540.183	322.987	323.983
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	600.836	608.623	377.184	385.406

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
 Robust SE on geographical constituency
 Baseline category is set to no vote
 Random effects
 Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED

Table B2: Voter behaviour previous Regime Supporters:RE Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	opposition	
	(1)	(2)
Protestcount	-0.007 (0.009)	
Nonviolent		-0.012 (0.010)
Violent		0.006 (0.013)
Hongkonger	-0.160 (0.685)	0.116 (0.735)
Education	-0.581 (0.414)	-0.599 (0.553)
Income	-0.029 (0.018)	-0.029 (0.018)
Age	-0.078*** (0.101)	-0.079 (0.083)
Female	-0.487 (0.365)	-0.501 (0.324)
Working Class	-0.332 (0.833)	-0.290 (1.106)
Higher Service	-0.690 (0.744)	-0.644 (0.583)
Lower Service	-0.277 (0.870)	-0.262 (1.280)
Routine Non-manual Work	-1.079** (0.787)	-1.006 (0.742)
Retired	-0.813 (1.360)	-0.758 (1.454)
Protestcount:Hongkonger	0.015 (0.010)	
Nonviolent:Hongkonger		0.022*** (0.008)
Violent:Hongkonger		-0.004 (0.019)
Constant	2.030 (1.489)	1.818 (1.437)
Observations	201	201
Log Likelihood	-109.551	-109.342
Akaike Inf. Crit.	247.102	250.684
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	293.348	303.537

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds
Baseline category is set to no vote
Random intercepts
Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED

Table B3: Teargas use and Previous non-voters:RE Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	opposition	incumbent
	(1)	(2)
Teargasevent	-0.030* (0.016)	0.008 (0.014)
Hong Konger	0.079 (0.316)	-0.589 (0.435)
Nonviolent	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.010 (0.008)
Violent	0.017 (0.015)	0.006 (0.021)
Education	0.454* (0.250)	-0.224 (0.347)
Age	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.015)
Income	0.146** (0.063)	0.151* (0.090)
Female	-0.110 (0.233)	-0.150 (0.310)
Working Class	0.521 (0.466)	0.931 (0.623)
Higher Service	0.181 (0.393)	-0.138 (0.597)
Lower Service	-0.299 (0.506)	0.064 (0.666)
Routine Non-manual Work	0.048 (0.409)	-0.201 (0.607)
Student	1.236* (0.644)	1.654** (0.731)
Retired	0.090 (0.765)	-0.045 (1.326)
Teargasevent:Hongkonger	0.044*** (0.016)	-0.033 (0.029)
Constant	0.211 (0.789)	-1.083 (1.029)
Observations	414	274
Log Likelihood	-257.286	-144.997
Akaike Inf. Crit.	548.572	323.994
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	617.012	385.418

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds
Baseline category is set to no vote
Random Effects

Source: HKES 2019 and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

Table B4: Teargas use and Previous Regime Supporters:RE Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	opposition
Teargasevent	-0.018 (0.020)
Hong Konger	0.598 (0.474)
Nonviolent	0.004 (0.006)
Violent	0.014 (0.022)
Education	-0.576 (0.399)
Age	-0.025 (0.018)
Income	-0.073 (0.101)
Female	-0.545 (0.358)
Working Class	-0.130 (0.824)
Higher Service	-0.510 (0.733)
Lower Service	-0.184 (0.862)
Routine Non-manual Work	-0.853 (0.773)
Student	-0.517 (1.370)
Retired	0.010 (0.021)
Teargasevent:Hongkonger	1.061 (1.329)
Observations	201
Log Likelihood	-110.464
Akaike Inf. Crit.	252.927
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	305.780

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds
Baseline category is set to Incumbent vote
Random Effects
Source: HKED 2019 and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

C Models with log-transformed event variables

Table C1: Voter behaviour previous non-voters:log-transformed

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	opposition		incumbent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log(Protestcount)	-1.245*** (0.429)		-0.371 (0.366)	
log(Nonviolent)		-1.185** (0.486)		-0.200 (0.518)
log(Violent)		0.108 (0.491)		-0.158 (0.507)
Hongkonger	-4.597** (1.833)	-2.988** (1.416)	0.891 (2.102)	0.488 (1.610)
Education	0.483* (0.254)	0.476* (0.255)	-0.243 (0.349)	-0.281 (0.355)
Income	0.128** (0.064)	0.124* (0.064)	0.177* (0.091)	0.179* (0.092)
Age	-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.030*** (0.011)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.015)
Female	-0.170 (0.233)	-0.173 (0.234)	-0.187 (0.315)	-0.203 (0.317)
Working Class	0.424 (0.470)	0.403 (0.471)	0.920 (0.627)	0.984 (0.635)
Higher Service	0.107 (0.395)	0.136 (0.397)	-0.137 (0.593)	-0.068 (0.610)
Lower Service	-0.411 (0.514)	-0.385 (0.516)	0.071 (0.665)	0.156 (0.679)
Routine Non-manual Work	0.039 (0.411)	0.037 (0.412)	-0.254 (0.613)	-0.201 (0.618)
Student	1.200* (0.647)	1.203* (0.650)	1.812** (0.750)	1.888** (0.760)
Retired	0.196 (0.771)	0.235 (0.772)	-0.130 (1.340)	-0.094 (1.348)
log(Protestcount):Hongkonger	1.365*** (0.469)		-0.513 (0.548)	
log(Nonviolent):Hongkonger		1.175** (0.485)		0.031 (0.576)
log(Violent):Hongkonger		-0.024 (0.499)		-0.544 (0.574)
Constant	4.650** (1.882)	3.429** (1.522)	0.001 (1.751)	-0.525 (1.576)
Observations	414	414	274	274
Log Likelihood	-255.464	-254.887	-142.578	-142.200
Akaike Inf. Crit.	546.928	549.775	321.156	324.400

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds
Baseline category is set to no vote
Fixed effects on geographical constituency
Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED

Table C2: Voter behaviour previous Regime Supporters:Log-transformed

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	opposition	
	(1)	(2)
log(Protestcount)	-0.245 (0.425)	
log(Nonviolent)		-0.320 (0.559)
log(Violent)		0.196 (0.595)
Hongkonger	-2.699 (2.287)	-1.824 (1.892)
Education	-0.682* (0.411)	-0.741* (0.415)
Income	-0.094 (0.102)	-0.104 (0.104)
Age	-0.031* (0.018)	-0.030 (0.018)
Female	-0.491 (0.363)	-0.485 (0.367)
Working Class	-0.197 (0.823)	-0.107 (0.837)
Higher Service	-0.563 (0.726)	-0.364 (0.747)
Lower Service	-0.147 (0.857)	-0.084 (0.878)
Routine Non-manual Work	-1.007 (0.770)	-0.767 (0.791)
Retired	-0.616 (1.349)	-0.451 (1.368)
log(Protestcount):Hongkonger	0.870 (0.576)	
log(Nonviolent):Hongkonger		1.523** (0.647)
log(Violent):Hongkonger		-0.799 (0.642)
Constant	2.851 (2.273)	1.794 (2.100)
Observations	201	201
Log Likelihood	-109.052	-107.041
Akaike Inf. Crit.	252.105	252.083

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds
Baseline category is set to incumbent vote
Fixed effects on geographical constituency
Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED

Table C3: Teargas use and Previous non-voters:log-transformed

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	opposition (1)	incumbent (2)
log(Teargasevent+1)	-0.352 (0.299)	0.513 (0.333)
Hong Konger	-1.011 (0.717)	0.403 (0.871)
log(Nonviolent)	-0.246 (0.275)	-0.170 (0.403)
log(Violent)	-0.121 (0.400)	-0.663 (0.528)
Education	0.487* (0.254)	-0.225 (0.354)
Age	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.003 (0.015)
Income	0.134** (0.064)	0.174* (0.091)
Female	-0.181 (0.233)	-0.192 (0.319)
Working Class	0.473 (0.473)	0.975 (0.635)
Higher Service	0.090 (0.397)	-0.125 (0.598)
Lower Service	-0.439 (0.515)	0.158 (0.673)
Routine Non-manual Work	-0.033 (0.414)	-0.244 (0.617)
Student	1.162* (0.648)	1.900** (0.758)
Retired	0.119 (0.767)	0.140 (1.343)
log(Teargasevent+1):Hongkonger	0.719** (0.288)	-0.636* (0.364)
Constant	1.910 (1.169)	-0.585 (1.435)
Observations	414	274
Log Likelihood	-256.579	-140.955
Akaike Inf. Crit.	553.158	321.909

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Coefficients reported in logodds

Baseline category is set to no vote

Fixed effects on geographical constituency

Source: HKES 2019 and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

Table C4: Teargas use and Previous Regime Supporters: Log-transformed

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	opposition
log(Teargasevent+1)	-0.494 (0.417)
log(Hong Konger)	0.850 (1.022)
log(Nonviolent)	0.263 (0.502)
log(Violent)	0.473 (0.631)
Education	-0.656 (0.410)
Age	-0.022 (0.018)
Income	-0.079 (0.101)
Female	-0.567 (0.362)
Working Class	-0.025 (0.823)
Higher Service	-0.464 (0.729)
Lower Service	-0.213 (0.857)
Routine Non-manual Work	-0.770 (0.762)
Retired	-0.412 (1.346)
log(Teargasevent+1):Hongkonger	-0.043 (0.392)
Constant	0.343 (1.864)
Observations	201
Log Likelihood	-109.075
Akaike Inf. Crit.	256.150

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds

Baseline category is set to Incumbent vote

Fixed effects on geographical constituency

Source: HKES 2019 and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

D Continious "Hongkonger"-variable

Table D1: Voter behaviour previous non-voters: Continious Hongkonger

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	opposition		incumbent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Protestcount	-0.054*** (0.019)		-0.0002 (0.013)	
Nonviolent		-0.089** (0.037)		-0.006 (0.020)
Violent		-0.007 (0.047)		0.015 (0.040)
Hongkonger	-0.416 (0.276)	-0.420 (0.303)	-0.419 (0.315)	-0.382 (0.378)
Education	0.509** (0.258)	0.498* (0.260)	-0.219 (0.347)	-0.223 (0.348)
Income	-0.029** (0.011)	-0.029** (0.011)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.015)
Age	0.139** (0.065)	0.136** (0.066)	0.165* (0.091)	0.157* (0.092)
Female	-0.188 (0.238)	-0.152 (0.241)	-0.180 (0.314)	-0.170 (0.315)
Working Class	0.532 (0.478)	0.524 (0.479)	0.870 (0.621)	0.915 (0.631)
Higher Service	0.151 (0.402)	0.162 (0.403)	-0.142 (0.593)	-0.086 (0.604)
Lower Service	-0.315 (0.519)	-0.352 (0.520)	0.074 (0.663)	0.091 (0.670)
Routine Non-manual Work	0.067 (0.419)	0.043 (0.418)	-0.169 (0.610)	-0.151 (0.613)
Student	0.143 (0.784)	0.150 (0.788)	-0.216 (1.323)	-0.180 (1.325)
Retired	1.302** (0.659)	1.314** (0.663)	1.680** (0.741)	1.717** (0.744)
Protestcount:Hongkonger	0.016*** (0.005)		-0.001 (0.005)	
Nonviolent:Hongkonger		0.023** (0.009)		-0.0002 (0.008)
Violent:Hongkonger		0.009 (0.013)		-0.003 (0.015)
Constant	1.423 (1.307)	1.619 (1.383)	-0.518 (1.367)	-0.549 (1.474)
Observations	414	414	274	274
Log Likelihood	-248.127	-246.777	-144.760	-144.596
Akaike Inf. Crit.	532.254	533.554	325.521	329.192

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds
Baseline category is set to no vote
Fixed effects on geographical constituency
Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED

Table D2: Voter behaviour previous Regime Supporters: Continuous Hongkonger

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	opposition	
	(1)	(2)
Protestcount	-0.028* (0.017)	
Nonviolent		-0.032 (0.024)
Violent		-0.033 (0.051)
Hongkonger	-0.436 (0.348)	-0.607 (0.466)
Education	-0.635 (0.410)	-0.590 (0.416)
Income	-0.034* (0.018)	-0.034* (0.018)
Age	-0.096 (0.101)	-0.115 (0.104)
Female	-0.419 (0.362)	-0.414 (0.365)
Working Class	-0.484 (0.836)	-0.552 (0.849)
Higher Service	-0.884 (0.753)	-0.991 (0.773)
Lower Service	-0.448 (0.873)	-0.494 (0.875)
Routine Non-manual Work	-1.222 (0.787)	-1.315 (0.807)
Retired	-0.862 (1.349)	-1.069 (1.386)
Protestcount:Hongkonger	0.011** (0.005)	
Nonviolent:Hongkonger		0.010 (0.007)
Violent:Hongkonger		0.019 (0.019)
Constant	3.685** (1.853)	4.320** (2.125)
Observations	201	201
Log Likelihood	-109.124	-108.831
Akaike Inf. Crit.	252.247	255.662

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds
Baseline category is set to incumbent vote
Fixed effects on geographical constituency
Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED

Table D3: Teargas use and Previous non-voters: Hongkonger continuous

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	opposition	incumbent
	(1)	(2)
Teargasevent	-0.054* (0.028)	0.012 (0.025)
Hong Konger	0.159 (0.150)	-0.503*** (0.188)
Nonviolent	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.010)
Violent	0.004 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.026)
Education	0.480* (0.257)	-0.189 (0.347)
Age	-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.006 (0.015)
Income	0.156** (0.065)	0.162* (0.091)
Female	-0.181 (0.238)	-0.148 (0.317)
Working Class	0.539 (0.478)	0.944 (0.627)
Higher Service	0.092 (0.403)	-0.073 (0.595)
Lower Service	-0.399 (0.521)	0.107 (0.669)
Routine Non-manual Work	-0.010 (0.420)	-0.160 (0.609)
Student	0.058 (0.779)	-0.012 (1.332)
Retired	1.236* (0.653)	1.716** (0.740)
Teargasevent:Hongkonger	0.020** (0.008)	0.002 (0.009)
Constant	-0.452 (0.991)	-0.309 (1.263)
Observations	414	274
Log Likelihood	-250.859	-144.043
Akaike Inf. Crit.	541.718	328.086

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds
Baseline category is set to no vote
Fixed effects on geographical constituency
Source: HKES 2019 and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

Table D4: Teargas use and Previous Regime Supporters: Hongkonger Continuous

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	opposition
Teargasevent	-0.066 (0.042)
Hong Konger	-0.113 (0.254)
Nonviolent	-0.0004 (0.009)
Violent	0.020 (0.031)
Education	-0.606 (0.414)
Age	-0.030* (0.018)
Income	-0.098 (0.103)
Female	-0.523 (0.362)
Working Class	-0.338 (0.839)
Higher Service	-0.784 (0.763)
Lower Service	-0.415 (0.881)
Routine Non-manual Work	-1.132 (0.796)
Retired	-0.843 (1.406)
Teargasevent:Hongkonger	0.022 (0.014)
Constant	2.513 (1.663)
Observations	201
Log Likelihood	-109.984
Akaike Inf. Crit.	257.969

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Coefficients reported in logodds

Baseline category is set to Incumbent vote

Fixed effects on geographical constituency

Source: HKES 2019 and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

E ACLED Repression

Table E1: Repression and Previous non-voters: ACLED

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	opposition (1)	incumbent (2)
Repression Events	-0.010 (0.044)	0.056 (0.055)
Hong Konger	-1.012* (0.585)	0.299 (0.783)
Nonviolent	0.0002 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.010)
Violent	-0.031 (0.050)	-0.041 (0.065)
Education	0.537** (0.256)	-0.233 (0.351)
Age	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.004 (0.015)
Income	0.141** (0.064)	0.158* (0.092)
Female	-0.136 (0.236)	-0.180 (0.317)
Working Class	0.471 (0.473)	1.003 (0.628)
Higher Service	0.016 (0.399)	-0.122 (0.597)
Lower Service	-0.366 (0.515)	0.099 (0.668)
Routine Non-manual Work	-0.029 (0.414)	-0.245 (0.611)
Student	0.051 (0.778)	-0.002 (1.340)
Retired	1.152* (0.643)	1.760** (0.742)
Repression Events:Hongkonger	0.067*** (0.022)	-0.053* (0.031)
Constant	0.776 (0.944)	-1.738 (1.199)
Observations	414	274
Log Likelihood	-254.037	-143.076
Akaike Inf. Crit.	548.074	326.152

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Coefficients reported in logodds

Baseline category is set to no vote

Fixed effects on geographical constituency

Source: HKES 2019 and Anti-ELAB Research Archive

Table E2: Repression and Previous Regime Supporters:ACLED

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	opposition
Repression Events	-0.137* (0.071)
Hong Konger	0.481 (0.846)
Nonviolent	-0.006 (0.010)
Violent	0.157* (0.085)
Education	-0.734* (0.416)
Age	-0.023 (0.018)
Income	-0.073 (0.104)
Female	-0.486 (0.366)
Working Class	0.058 (0.861)
Higher Service	-0.301 (0.759)
Lower Service	0.095 (0.885)
Routine Non-manual Work	-0.522 (0.813)
Retired	-0.372 (1.375)
Repression Events:Hongkonger	0.008 (0.029)
Constant	1.494 (1.521)
Observations	201
Log Likelihood	-108.347
Akaike Inf. Crit.	254.694

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Coefficients reported in logodds
Baseline category is set to Incumbent vote
Fixed effects on geographical constituency
Source: HKES 2019 and ACLED

F VIF Tests

Table F1: VIF total protest count

	GVIF	Df	$GVIF^{1/(2*Df)}$
Protest Count	1.279	1	1.131
Hongkonger	1.043	1	1.021
Education	1.383	1	1.176
Income	1.418	1	1.191
Age	1.523	1	1.234
Female	1.150	1	1.072
Geographical Constituency	1.417	4	1.045
Working Class	2.119	1	1.456
Higher Service	3.737	1	1.933
Lower Service	1.686	1	1.298
Routine Non-Manual	2.584	1	1.607
Student	1.488	1	1.220
Retired	1.680	1	1.296

Table F2: VIF violent and nonviolent

	GVIF	Df	$GVIF^{1/(2*Df)}$
Nonviolent	2.886	1	1.699
Violent	2.492	1	1.579
Hongkonger	1.044	1	1.022
Education	1.383	1	1.176
Income	1.421	1	1.192
Geographical Constituency	2.813	4	1.138
Age	1.525	1	1.235
Female	1.161	1	1.078
Working Class	2.115	1	1.454
Higher Service	3.731	1	1.932
Lower Service	1.684	1	1.298
Routine Non-Manual	2.581	1	1.607
Student	1.486	1	1.219
Retired	1.680	1	1.296

Table F3: VIF teargas events

	GVIF	Df	$GVIF^{(1/(2*Df))}$
Nonviolent	2.908	1	1.705
Violent	5.107	1	2.260
Teargas Event	4.302	1	2.074
Hongkonger	1.046	1	1.023
Education	1.385	1	1.177
Income	1.423	1	1.193
Geographical Constituency	4.127	4	1.194
Age	1.523	1	1.234
Female	1.162	1	1.078
Working Class	2.118	1	1.455
Higher Service	3.745	1	1.935
Lower Service	1.683	1	1.297
Routine Non Manual	2.585	1	1.608
Student	1.487	1	1.219
Retired	1.685	1	1.298