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How does political freedom affect social happiness?

A quantitative study of how Maslow can help explain the link between political freedom and social happiness

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Master Thesis - Department of Political Science
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Spring 2021

Word count: 17367

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Håvard Strand for his many valuable comments and ideas which helped raise my thesis considerably. His knowledge and ability to take complex theories and boil it down to relatable examples, was something I really appreciated.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my wife Agata and my dog Yoda for giving me love and support during a very lonely period of trying to write a master thesis during a global pandemic.

Abstract

This study investigates how political freedom affects social happiness. By analyzing quantitative data, it finds support for a new perspective on the relationship. The Maslowian perspective assumes that political freedom is important if basic needs have been met. For the group assumed to have basic needs met, countries with higher political freedom, have higher well-being levels compared to countries with lower political freedom. On the other hand, for the group not assumed to have basic needs met, the findings indicate a negative relationship. For this group, countries with higher political freedom is predicted to have lower well-being compared to countries with low political freedom.

1. Introduction

In a political context, we are not accustomed to hearing the happiness term being discussed in great length. It is seemingly more of a path of personal discovery rather than a goal for politicians defining underlying values of policy. This is so even though the “pursuit of happiness” is defined as an individual right in one of the most important political documents, the American Declaration of Independence. Here we may find three natural human rights that we should all have access to, and which government is put in place to defend: “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” (US, 1776). Thus, happiness is included as a fundamental aspect and represents an integral piece of the value system that the state is responsible for promoting. “The pursuit of happiness” stems from the political philosopher John Locke as he coined the term in his book *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Zuckert, 1996, pp. 73-85). Locke writes the following, “... the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness, so the care of ourselves, that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty” (Locke, 1824 p. 252).

Locke raises an intriguing link here between freedom and happiness, which he gives a thorough reason for. He claims that the realization of an individual’s will is central to happiness. A willful act is motivated from within, and it will be found “by reflecting on his own mind” (Locke, 1824 p. 236). A willful act gives root to the idea of individual preference (Chappell, 2007, p. 140). Freedom and liberty are synonymous for Locke (Chappell, 2007, p. 142), which he defines as the power a man has to think or not to think, to move or not to move, “according to the preference or direction of his own mind” (Locke, 1824 p. 224). Individual freedom of choice becomes, in Locke’s understanding, a fundamental building block in order to create happiness, as what ultimately determines the will is happiness, or in his own words “that we call good” (Locke, 1824 p. 216). What is good or evil is in reference to pleasure and pain (ibid.), which makes Locke’s understanding of happiness resonate with hedonistic principles.

According to Locke’s logic, whether or not a person is going to be able to achieve happiness in her life, is greatly dependent on the availability of freedom of choice, so she may choose the path that will lead to her maximizing her happiness. In her life she will encounter a great number of decision-making scenarios with several possible outcomes. All these outcomes will lead to varying degrees of satisfaction or levels of happiness,

which means that a person needs to evaluate all these possible outcomes based on a happiness criteria and choose the outcome that represents maximized happiness. This is seemingly a very internal process. The subject uses his or her sensory system to feel what gives him or her the most pleasure.

As individuals we face these decision-making scenarios perhaps as often as daily which may have an impact on our level of happiness. There is a strong individual component here that is clearly implied. However, we may also view it as a plea to policy makers to allow for individual pursuit of happiness which can only take place in a society that allows for a strong expression of freedom. In this perspective, happiness becomes relevant on a political and social level as it may depend to a strong degree on political dimensions.

Ideas of promoting social happiness are not new. Social happiness refers to a shared social state of the term, as opposed to a person as an individual going to the pond for an afternoon's fishing, an activity that might be of great importance for his personal happiness. The focus is rather on a general and shared state of happiness. In this sense, Plato argued for the commonwealth to be responsible for "securing the greatest possible happiness for the community as a whole" (White, 1988, p. 402). In addition to the American Declaration of Independence stating that the pursuit of happiness should be made available to every citizen, the French constitution of 1793 state explicitly that the goal of society is common happiness and that the government is elected to ensure this goal (article 1). Another example is Jeremy Bentham who defined as his "fundamental axiom", "it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong" (Bentham et al., 1977, p. 393)

Despite this philosophical and constitutional push for happiness promotion, few nations have explicitly stated happiness goals as part of their policymaking. Even if governments stated an interest in doing so, it is unclear what that actually would imply as definitions of happiness are still to some degree vague. There is no consensus definition of happiness. Instead we may find a number of different versions of happiness that seemingly pull in different directions and are to some degree conflicting concepts. These reasons may give some explanation as to why governments may find it difficult to put happiness on the agenda. Many are probably still asking the fundamental question of whether or not happiness is an appropriate political goal (Mulgan, 2012, p. 518).

In the latest adaptation of the French constitution of 1958 the article stating that political institutions should be directed towards happiness for all, has been removed (France, 1958), indicating an interest decline in the view upon the importance of this matter. This skepticism may be rooted in the idea that happiness is regarded more as a personal matter, as opposed to a social matter, that can be influenced through mechanisms under political control. This is pointed out by Mulgan (2012) who argues that the hegemonic view among key political actors is in line with the modern liberal position of Benjamin Constant. According to Constant's perspective, governments should "confine themselves to being just. We shall assume the responsibility of being happy for ourselves" (Mulgan, 2012, p. 518), which creates the expectation of happiness being more of a private endeavor, rather than a public one. This point may create resistance towards making happiness a legitimate goal for policy. In a situation where there is no common definition or understanding of the term, the skepticism is understandable.

Furthermore, the philosophical support for the promotion of freedom expands that of Locke, which many consider to be the "father of liberalism" (Hirschman, 2008, p. 79). Many philosophers have advocated the importance of freedom. Among the prominent ones we find Hobbes liberal perspective (Hobbes, 2008), and Pettit's republican perspective (Pettit, 2012). They differ in their respective understanding, but the common ground they seem to agree on is that freedom is imperative.

In addition, Amartya Sen points to the importance of a more holistic understanding of social development as an alternative view to the economic-centric perspective, driven by GDP. The typical developmental path concerned with economic development should be complemented by dimensions of personal freedom in a measure of successful development, is among Sen's main claims (Sen, 1999). "Development, in this view, is the process of expanding human freedoms", and the expansion of freedom is itself the primary end (Sen, 1999, p. 36). Sen thus represents the view that freedom holds intrinsic value.

An alternative to Sen's view would be to argue for the strengthening of freedom, because it promotes happiness, which is in line with John Lock's perspective. People enjoy having decision-making powers themselves, because it realizes his or her will and releases the path to happiness. However, once we start unpacking that logic even further, we realize quickly that what we just said is not as clear as we may have assumed initially. There is a

number of different perspectives, not just connected to happiness, but also connected to freedom. The freedom philosophers are referring to different perspectives of freedom in their respective theories. Thomas Hobbes is known for a liberal perspective on freedom, while Locke's freedom perspective is difficult to place (Hirschman, 2008, p. 79). In a political context, Pettit's republican perspective is intriguing, as it connects freedom to institutions and claim that the path to freedom on a state level comes through the emergence of a strong institutional presence.

Furthermore, we can identify several sources of freedom that may impact happiness. Inglehart et al. (2008) argue for three sources of freedom that in tandem lead to increased freedom of choice. These sources include material prosperity, political institutions, and a liberal cultural climate. There is an existing argument that political institutions are paramount for happiness. According to Frey and Stutzer (2000), institutional dynamics is one of the major sources of happiness. They broadly classify the determinants of happiness into three categories (Frey & Stutzer, 2000, p. 919). The first source is labeled personality and demographic factors. These are factors frequently studied by the psychological field. The second source studies the impact of resource availability on happiness levels. The third source considers institutional conditions such as democratic differences that may cause variation in average citizen well – being. In the context of social happiness and political science, source two and three stand out as more relevant. Source one is more connected to individual happiness and psychology. In addition, these two latter factors are, at least to a certain degree, under political control and subjected to manipulation through political mechanisms. Budgets can be redistributed to make an impact, and the institutions can be restricted or encouraged under different political regimes.

A previous study finds that the contribution political institutions and freedom have on happiness, is found to be positive in the sense that strong institutions lead to increased happiness (Haller & Hadler, 2006). However, as pointed out by Potts (2016) this does not apply in all contexts as Eastern Europe saw a great decline in well-being following a wave of democratization processes. I will argue that by employing Maslow's theory of human needs, it allows for a new way of looking at the relationship that creates a more nuanced approach, as the Maslowian perspective will expect a different impact to increased political freedom based on the baseline well-being of the country in question.

This provides an intriguing perspective that may be put to a quantitative test, and which leads to two partially competing hypotheses which will be evaluated in this study. This study will aim to answer the following research question:

How does political freedom affect social happiness?

Firstly, I would like to present some more background information that will help place the study in a bigger scientific context. Secondly, I will present relevant definitions as well as theoretical perspectives that create a foundation for two hypotheses. After a short summary of previous research, the process of operationalizing the theoretical concepts and discussion of research design will follow. The results of the quantitative analysis, a discussion and then finally concluding remarks will round it up.

2. Background

The idea of promoting social happiness has seen increasing interest over the last decade. Some states have even implemented policy directed towards happiness related goals. Firstly, the little Asian nation of Bhutan can be considered influential in this development as they inspired the 2011 UN General Assembly resolution “Happiness: towards a holistic approach to development”. It encourages other states to learn from the knowledge and the experience that Bhutan, as a pioneer in the field, has collected after their implementation of GNH (Gross National Happiness) as the main objective of new policy (UN General Assembly Resolution, 2011). For Bhutan, the promotion of happiness is protected by the constitution. Article 9, which presents principles of state policy, states “The State shall strive to promote those conditions that will enable the pursuit of Gross National Happiness” (Bhutan, 2008, p. art 9.2).

Few nations have currently dedicated themselves so strongly to happiness as Bhutan, but some countries have taken some steps in the same direction. New Zealand recently implemented changes towards a more “well-being budget”, as Prime Minister Ardern calls it (Ellsmoor, 2019). This makes New Zealand the first western country to construct its budget around well-being goals. Furthermore, this priority extends the financial sector into other ministries who are instructed to mold public policy to meet goals of well-being (Ellsmoor, 2019). Among other noteworthy cases, former Prime Minister David Cameron allocated in 2010 £2M to measure the nations happiness level. A happiness measure “could give us a general picture of whether life is improving”, said

Cameron (BBC, 2010). Since then, the UK office for National Statistics have been actively measuring happiness in the Measuring National Well-being program. In addition, former French President Nicholas Sarkozy showed an openness for similar development in the report that he commissioned regarding development measures. Among the key recommendations here is the implementation of a well-being dimension as part of a multidimensional development index (Stieglitz et al., 2010, pp. 92-93). These are signs that may indicate a new era for policy and research on social happiness.

Simultaneously, there has been an increase in happiness related research in the last few decades, even though the area of research is relatively young. Modern happiness research is strongly influenced by a movement referred to as the positive psychology movement which aim it is to do research from the opposite side, as opposed to the psychopathology paradigm that had previously dominated the research literature (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). This shift marks a realization of the importance of not only the darker psychopathological side, but also the brighter and flourishing side to human psychology, or the positive side, which was thought to be a necessary means to create a more complete understanding of human psychology. It is simply not so that happiness is a result of the absence of mental illness, it is more complex than that (Niemiec & Ryan, 2013, p. 215).

Another pressing question becomes apparent, even if it was considered an appropriate goal for policy: Do we even know if happiness levels can be affected at policy level? There are sceptics to the effects of political happiness intervention. As a prominent example Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) argue that genetics is greatly responsible for variation in happiness levels. Individuals have a “set point” or “set range” of happiness that is genetically determined. This means that an individual’s level of happiness is assumed to be fixed, stable over time, and immune to influence or control (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005, p. 116). If we were to make this our operating understanding, happiness intervention at a political level would only be able to make small changes in happiness, if any at all.

On the other hand, several scholars point to relevant systemic factors of happiness. Helliwell (2003), considered an early influential study, compares happiness levels worldwide and finds support for societal level determinants of happiness. He finds evidence for an institutional component in explaining happiness variation. The quality of

institutions may be even more important in explaining happiness variation than economic factors (Helliwell, 2003, p. 357). Thus, their findings point to both institutional factors as well as economic factors as relevant for happiness levels.

This resonates with the findings made by Frey and Stutzer (2000) who broadly classify the determinants of happiness into three categories: personality/demographic, economy/resources and institutions/political (Frey & Stutzer, 2000, p. 919). For the purposes of social happiness in a political science perspective, the two latter sources stand out as more relevant. Among these two categories, most research has focused on resource availability and the effect of economic factors, where most studies have concluded that there is a positive correlation between economy and happiness (Haller & Hadler, 2006; Kahneman & Deaton, 2010; Weimann et al., 2015).

Given the considerable amount of studies on economic effects of happiness, the evidence is becoming compelling. Economy and resource availability are connected to happiness. In extension, this also gives support to the notion of systemic determinants of happiness and brings legitimacy to the field of political happiness intervention. United Nation's World Happiness Report is another legitimacy bringing source promoting similar systemic determinants. World Happiness Report, published annually, reports on the state of happiness and tries to identify changing global happiness trends. This report has been published since 2012, and its latest version (2020 at the time of writing) implements a multidimensional approach as it provides a comparative score of 156 countries. Each state is given a cumulative score derived from six different dimensions, such as GDP per capita, social support, health and freedom (Helliwell et al., 2020). Its findings are regularly reported on by well-respected news outlets such as New York Times and The Guardian, (see for example Cramer (2020), Collinson (2018)).

What we do learn from looking at UN's yearly happiness ratings is that it reports that happiness varies greatly from nation to nation and is seemingly strongly dependent on systemic conditions that vary between countries (Helliwell et al., 2020). This gives credence to the idea that systemic factors do indeed influence social happiness, and policy directed at manipulating levels of happiness may be effective.

All in all, the effects of economy are researched in depth, and many interesting conclusions have been made as this may be the most studied variable as far as happiness variates are concerned. However, the effects of political institutions have seen less

research. Therefore, this stands out as deserving more attention. Furthermore, considering the relatively young age of this research field, gathered with its relatively small amount of work, the causal relationships are still being debated.

3. Theory

3.1 Happiness: theoretical perspectives

There is no clear definition of happiness that have universal support, and neither is there a clear quantitative proxy to simply implement into our research model. Rather, one may readily observe a landscape of different terms referred to in the literature to describe, in broad terms, the same: an evaluation of the quality of our lives. (Veenhoven, 2013). Happiness is used in some cases, well – being and subjective well – being (SWB) by others, life satisfaction and quality of life are also in use. These terms seemingly blend into each other because at their core they are all connected to the same overarching theme of “how well are we doing?”. This may lead us to compare apples with pears, as Veenhoven (2013) points out.

How we choose to define and measure such an important concept may have major impact on the conclusions we draw from our research. This concern may be especially important for governments that measure policy success on the effect it has on happiness. Thus, empirical research needs to carefully consider what conceptual understanding of happiness the model builds upon.

As a first point of reference, a common perspective of happiness describes the presence of positive and desirable emotions, “I feel good, therefore I am happy”. In order to become happy, we need to prolong the presence of positive emotions and avoid going into the negative side of the emotional spectrum, as illustrated below (Crum & Salovey, 2013, p. 74). Emotions will be subject to change as the curve moves up and down according to different life experiences. However, many argue that this perspective of happiness should only be regarded as one aspect of a larger concept of happiness that draws from several strains, as many prominent voices do not support the assumption that happiness is limited to a simple chase of positive emotions.

United Nations *World Happiness Report* is an example where the use of happiness expands the sole focus on emotional state. This annually published report offer data on the state of happiness in 153 (in 2020) countries. They all receive a total score based on their performance within six dimensions: GDP, social support, life expectancy, freedom to make life choices, generosity and perceptions of corruption (Helliwell et al., 2020). These factors are considered as important sources of happiness, which in and of itself is a very important question. However, the question “What is happiness?” needs to be addressed first.

3.2 Definitions of happiness

3.21 Happiness

The Oxford Handbook of Happiness defines happiness as an umbrella term. Concepts such as well-being, subjective well-being, psychological well-being, hedonism, eudaimonia, health, flourishing and more, fall under the happiness umbrella (David et al., 2013, p. 3). This makes the term cover a whole set of concepts that have some overlap in their understanding, but differ in other aspects. Thus, the term happiness may imply a whole set of different things which makes it important to clarify the meaning that is intended in each specific case. As a good starting point, philosophical accounts of happiness are generally divided into hedonism and eudaimonia (Niemi & Ryan, 2013, p. 215). This dichotomy is also visible in more psychological theories of happiness, but the boundaries between the two become less apparent here. Before digging further into this separation, it may be helpful with some more clarity of terms used and definitional differences.

3.22 Quality of Life

Starting off, quality of life (QOL) stands out as a term mostly relevant for the health care sector. For the health care sector, its usage was implemented to ensure consideration of a patient’s well-being in opposition to the sole focus on survival at all costs that came to be criticized. Veenhoven (2013) points out that the term came to prominence with the health care sectors collective realization that sole survival alone is not enough. The development marks a shift where emotional aspects became relevant in determining the appropriate treatment plan for different patients. Questionnaires to determine the emotional aspects of the patient became broadly adopted in the medical field. However, for other fields such as psychology, philosophy, economy, public policy and other

branches of social science, it has been concepts of well-being that has been at the forefront.

3.23 Well-Being

Well-being is a term that has more academic support than happiness does. In psychology it is regarded as the more scientific version of happiness. On a broader level, well-being is regarded to be an umbrella term for a number of concepts on human wellness (David et al., 2013, p. 3). In many cases well-being and happiness are often used synonymously. It is in reference to more specific concepts such as hedonism, eudaimonism, or subjective well-being (will be discussed later) that the implications of the term become clearer. Typically, well-being research focuses on mental states which generally implies three types: pleasure, emotional well-being, and life satisfaction (D. M. Haybron, 2016, pp. 347-348). Ryan and Deci (2001) defines well-being as optimal psychological functioning and experience.

The emergence of well-being research was strongly influenced by a movement referred to as the positive psychology movement (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Instead of focusing on the disease side of human life, well-being research tries to identify what factors lead to human fulfillment and well-being. The assumption that if we cure all disease then well-being will follow, is a false perspective, as pointed out by Niemiec and Ryan (2013, p. 215). There is more to it than that.

Some of the differences in the findings reported by scholars of well-being originate from the fact that research has largely been derived from two different perspectives, the hedonic approach and the eudaimonic approach (Ryan & Deci, 2001, p. 141). These form two different camps that philosophically disagree on what path leads to well-being. Some prominent theories of well-being take an eudaimonic approach, while others, like John Locke, take a hedonistic approach. The hedonistic approach focuses on pleasure and avoidance of pain in order to create well-being. On the other hand, the eudaimonic approach is focused on creating meaning, self-realization, and the actualization of human potential (Ryan & Deci, 2001, p. 141). A more in-depth discussion of these perspectives will follow in the next paragraphs.

3.24 Hedonism and Eudaimonia: A philosophical divide

Eudaimonism and hedonism represents the most important philosophical divide between happiness theories. Generally, theories take a stand as either hedonistic or

eudaimonic (Niemi & Ryan, 2013, p. 215). However, some views on happiness such as the Subjective Well-Being (SWB) perspective can be argued to have a foot in both camps. A more in-depth discussion on SWB will follow later.

Hedonism has already been alluded to in the introduction as Locke's perspective on happiness can be categorized as a well-being hedonistic account. As a moral principle, people should choose "pleasure over pain" where choosing the path of pleasure will lead to well-being. An individual's path is found through the realization of pleasure, and the balance of unpleasurable vs pleasurable experiences will determine your level of happiness (D. M. Haybron, 2016, pp. 349-350).

Its historical origin can be traced back even further than Locke. The Greek philosopher Aristippus of Cyrene argued that the experience of pleasure is the only good. Schwarz et al. (1999) are important in the solidification of the psychological hedonistic well-being movement. They argue for a broad conceptual hedonic understanding based on pleasure attainment and pain avoidance, and furthermore defines hedonic psychology as the study of what makes experiences and life pleasant and unpleasant (p. ix). Hobbes and Bentham are two more examples of philosophers that can be categorized within the hedonic sphere (Ryan & Deci, 2001, p. 144).

This process differs from the Lockean hedonistic process to well-being as it is not as much driven by the search of an emotional state of well-being, but rather it is a path that leads to the discovery of a deeper meaning and personal fulfillment.

On the other hand, eudaimonia can be traced back to ancient Greece and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* who understand the term to mean "living well" (Kraut, 2018). Living well, according to Aristotle, means pursuing excellence and virtue in accordance with our own reason that leads to happiness. Aristoteles did not invent eudaimonia as, for example, the Stoics were known to also refer to well-being as living with virtue (D. Haybron, 2016, p. 28).

However, ancient Greece is only one contributor to an extensive library of eudaimonic literature. Firstly, newer definitions are similar. Eudaimonia promotes self-realization as a means for happiness. You should live in "accordance with the *daimon* or your true self" (Waterman, 1993, p. 678). Eudaimonic theories of well-being build on principles of nature-fulfillment (D. Haybron, 2016, p. 27). Ryff (1989) claims that well-being should

be understood as objectively realizing one's potential and flourishing: well-being is not about feeling good, but rather about personal growth, purpose in life, autonomy, environmental mastery, positive relations with others and self-acceptance.

Several renowned theorists stem from an eudaimonic line of thinking. Maslow is a prominent example of an eudaimonic approach to well-being (D. Haybron, 2016, p. 29). In his theory of human needs, Maslow puts the need to strive for something great in life, and developing our own talents is ranked at the top. Once the more biological and security concerns are met, self-realization or self-actualization comes into attention (Maslow, 1987). Another example is Jung's individuation process, which is also linked to an eudaimonic philosophy (Huta, 2012, p. 204). The individuation process calls for the strengthening of the individual self. Becoming aware and autonomous, and being led by the inner self as opposed to by external influence, is at the core of Jung's individuation process (Jung, 1976).

Furthermore, Kashdan et al. (2008) discuss the link between hedonic and eudaimonic well-being, and argue that they are interconnected more than separate. The core argument is that they find that emotional happiness and meaning correlate strongly with each other. We may understand emotional well-being as an epiphenomenon of finding meaning. When meaning and purpose is found, an emotional reward will come as we start to feel good about our lives. Thus, in the eudaimonic view we should not seek pleasure to feel good, but rather seek meaning and purpose.

3.25 Subjective Well-Being

Within the psychology field, Subjective Well-Being (SWB) is the most prominent version of well-being that has seen the most use in studies (David et al., 2013, p. 3). SWB is also a multidimensional concept containing different aspects, but its content is more clearly defined compared to the concepts of happiness and more general well-being. More specifically, SWB contain both affective as well as cognitive elements (Diener et al., 1999, p. 277). Moods and emotions make up the affective dimension of SWB. Here the focus is to get a measure of the subjects' range of emotions. Are they feeling joy and contentment or are they experiencing sadness, stress and depression? Obviously, many will go through the emotional spectrum of shifting moods, but the long-term mood rather than

the momentary state, is what the measure should target. What is the general balance between pleasurable and unwanted emotional states? is another way of expressing it.

The cognitive dimension captures another key element of SWB. This dimension is meant to uncover the “how we think” components of SWB. How do we rate our own lives? How do subjects perceive their lives compared to own ideals, and what they believe they deserve (David et al., 2013, p. 4). This is an important second dimension according to Lucas et al. (1996) who claim that the affective dimension alone is insufficient. Although traditionally, many studies have only been based on the affective component alone, there is mounting evidence of a cognitive evaluation as being a separate distinguishable construct as cognition plays a major role in the experience of emotion (ibid.).

Building off of this model, Huppert et al. (2009) argue for a broader understanding of Subjective well-being. The life satisfaction and affective dimension should be complemented by an eudaimonic dimension to create a more holistic measure of SWB. Using the European Social Survey as an example, Clark (2016) points out the overall hedonic dominance of the ESS. The two questions that have dominated the SWB research have been questions relating to “happiness” and “life satisfaction”, two staple questions of the ESS. Both these dimensions are related to hedonic well-being, while the eudaimonic dimension is absent.

3.3 Freedom, institutions and well-being

3.31 Freedom of choice

Simply put, we may view freedom of choice as the set of opportunities with mutually exclusive alternatives (Verme, 2009, p. 147). A restaurant menu with ten alternatives provides a bigger freedom of choice than one with five courses available (ibid.) Thus, if freedom of choice is to be emphasized, the first menu would be the preferred option.

Similarly, as explained by Pettit (2012), freedom of choice is characterized by a set of mutually exclusive options. A choice in this context means that you can choose to do X, Y or Z, but you may only choose one of those options and there are no other alternatives than X, Y or Z available. The options are available if two conditions are met. Objectively, it has to be true that you can choose all options and nothing else. In addition, cognitively, this truth has to register (Pettit, 2012, p. 26).

3.32 Philip Pettit and republican freedom

There are several perspectives on freedom, including Pettit's republican freedom perspective. Pettit (2012) distinguishes between different types of what has previously been regarded as freedom, and questions whether or not they all represent actual freedom. He differentiates between robust versions of freedom from versions that are not robust. Imagine a scenario where an elite has unchecked power within state borders. There may very well be a high level of freedom enjoyed by its citizens, but if the foundation of that freedom rests at the fingertips of an actor whose will can arbitrarily choose to limit your freedom of choice, you are not free. If a woman's freedom rests at the hands of her husband's will, she is not free, according to Pettit's republican version of freedom. The fate of her freedom is rather dependent on her husband's will. This is the key difference between Pettit's republican version of freedom and the Hobbesian liberal version of freedom which states that your freedom of choice is violated in the instance where your preferred option is subject to a hindrance (Hobbes, 2008, p. xxi). Thus, if you live in a state where women are not allowed to enter the local stadium to enjoy a soccer match, Theresa's freedom is violated only if she is a soccer fan and desires to go. If she rather desires to stay at home and cook dinner or watch tv, she is in a Hobbesian view, by definition, free. Pettit disagrees strongly with this take on freedom, as he does not put the weight of determination on what the individual wants and desires which is subject to change.

Pettit would conclude that in this instance Theresa's freedom is violated because of the presence of a dominating influence that limits her set of available choices. In a slightly altered scenario, Theresa's husband, Frank, possessed the cultural and judicial power in their marriage to decide whether or not she could be invited to the stadium or not. If she was invited, able to go, and wanted to go, Hobbes would determine her free. In contrast, Pettit would not deem Theresa's ability to go as a robust type of freedom as her "freedom" to go or not rests on her husband's will and he may arbitrarily choose to revoke this freedom depending on his mood. She is thus subject to domination, and Pettit defines freedom as an absence of domination, or as he writes "freedom as non-domination" (Pettit, 2012, p. 50). It is not of importance whether or not a dominating actor chooses to interfere in Theresa's set of choices or not, as both of these scenarios consist of domination and thus, loss of freedom. Whether or not a particular situation is deemed a violation of freedom or not, rests with the presence of dominance.

A situation of interference without domination does not constitute loss of freedom in Pettit's republican freedom perspective. There are plenty of situations where government interference in individual freedom of choice is necessary, but it does not mean loss of freedom in a republican perspective, because domination is not present. The interference is not applied arbitrarily and uncontrolled on to the subject (Pettit, 2012, p. 58). It is not applied according to the interferers will or changing mood. Thus, it is not loss of freedom.

For dominance to take place, a certain set of criteria must apply. "Domination is defined by reference to interference but is distinct from it" (Pettit, 2012, p. 50). If Theresa's husband has the unvitiated and uninvaded capacity to interfere in her choice, and that interference is not controlled by Theresa, she is dominated. She does not control the terms imposed by her husband, so that the interference does not happen according to a pattern that Theresa can influence. Thus, she is a victim of domination (ibid.).

Dominance can be of both a public as well as of a private character, but in this context public dominance is even more relevant. I will come back to discussing public or state dominance in a later section.

3.33 Different ways of appreciating freedom of choice

As touched upon in the introduction, one of Locke's main claims is that freedom of choice is fundamental in order to create happiness. Freedom of choice will increase by creating a bigger pool of alternative choices or opportunities in which an individual can make a choice based on. This increases the opportunity to maximize utility and thus maximize happiness. The premise that Locke makes here is that maximizing freedom of choice is something everyone will benefit from. Thus, it should be regarded as a desirable state. However, it is important to note that this assumption is not a universally accepted perspective.

As argued by (Verme, 2009), there are at least four different ways in which people may appreciate freedom of choice. The first view claims that the size of the choices available to an individual does not matter, as this is not where the importance lies. What really matters is whether or not the set of available choices contains the utility maximizing solution. Neoclassical utility theories focus on maximizing utility and does not view freedom of choice to have any intrinsic value. If two sets of choices both contained the maximum utility solution, it would not matter if one set has twenty options, while

another set has three. They are considered of equal value. Moving on to the second view, it claims that freedom of choice is always good for individuals. The larger the set of available choices, the better, as it always leads to more utility and applies to all individuals. This second view is near Locke's take on freedom of choice as he also views increased freedom of choice as always leading to increased utility and an integral part to happiness. The third view, proposed by Verme (2009), is similar as it views increased freedom of choice as something that is always positive, but differs in the impact it has on different individuals. Some may benefit a lot, while others benefit less. A fourth view distinguishes between individuals and groups that experience increased utility, from those individuals and groups that experience negative consequences from increased freedom of choice. Some may prefer ease of choice above freedom of choice, and for this group limitations on freedom of choice is linked to higher utility. One potential explanation for this may be the increased computational costs for individuals. Another potential explanation is that with increased freedom of choice comes increased likelihood of disappointment from making the wrong choice, or the choice that is not linked to maximized utility (Bell, 1985). In addition, various experiments indicate that consumers prefer not to make choices if the set of possible choices is too big (Sethi-Iyengar et al., 2004). In essence, the important point here is that there are several ways in which people may relate to and appreciate differing levels of freedom of choice.

3.4 Hedonic hypothesis

By considering these different approaches to how individuals may appreciate freedom in light of the well-being perspectives, we gain some interesting insights and empirical predictions. The Lockean take, which also represents a hedonic philosophical take, has a positive view on increasing freedom of choice. By increasing freedom of choice, the opportunity an individual has to maximize utility, increases as well. Thus, increased political freedom is expected to positively correlate with well-being. We may define the hypothesis leading from this as follows:

H1: Increased freedom of choice will lead to increased well-being

3.5 Eudaimonic hypothesis

Alternatively, the eudaimonic take on well-being will predict a somewhat different relationship. Firstly, the eudaimonic theory spectrum is large and diverse, and in order to approach this analysis with more refined tools, it may be helpful to base the discussion by primarily referring to one theory. The prominent eudaimonic theory by Maslow on the hierarchy of human needs, may provide a natural such starting point as he provides a very detailed description of the steps to well-being. Some theories stand out as unclear on how to promote well-being. Aristotle, for example, encourages us to find our inner daemon which to the contemporary reader may seem difficult to grasp. In comparison, Maslow is refreshingly detailed in how he defines the path to well-being as a step by step process. Furthermore, his theory may be considered very relevant even to this day as his theory is being further tested and refined. Most recently, Columbia University professor Scott Barry Kaufman, based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, has studied how self-actualization affects health, creativity and performance (Kaufman, 2020).

3.51 Maslow

Firstly, according to Maslow and his theory of human needs, the motivations that drives behavior changes depending on what level of the hierarchy an individual is positioned. The ultimate goal is to reach the level of self-realization, but that requires the lower level needs to be satisfied first. At a base level we are driven by physiological and security related motivation. We need food, water, basic shelter and safety at this stage. When these needs are met, motivation will shift to satisfy the need for love, friendship and esteem. This includes the development of intimate relationships and the need to feel a level of accomplishment. These needs are what Maslow refers to as D-needs (deficiency needs). The lack of satisfaction of our deficiency needs are actually a health risk (Maslow, 1968, p. 27). Being unsatisfied of the d-needs is a tough position to be in, and the most important transition occurs when one is able to step out of the d-realm and into the b-realm (the being-realm), or the growth realm (Maslow, 1968, p. 41). Being in the d-realm is linked to illness, and satisfaction of the d-needs is linked to health. In the d-realm, all motivation will be focused on satisfying these, and freedom of choice will not be of importance. Entering the growth realm is similar to going from childhood to maturity, one passes into the other and phase one is a prerequisite for phase two

(Maslow, 1968, pp. 30-31). Growth is defined as the various processes which bring the person towards self-actualization (Maslow, 1968, p. 30).

When all these “d-needs” or deficiency needs are met to a satisfactory degree, the path to self-realization can start which is considered the top-level, ultimate, goal. The common presentation of Maslow’s theory is the pyramid of human needs as shown below.




Illustration 1

The illustration may serve as a simple and clean illustration of Maslow’s theory. However, it should be noted that Maslow never actually defined a pyramid of needs as is commonly understood. As found in the paper tracing study of the origin of the pyramid by Bridgman et al. (2019), the origin of the pyramid can be traced back to a group of management consultants who invented the pyramid as a quick reference guide to Maslow’s theory. Among the pyramid’s major flaws, as pointed out by Kaufman (2020), is the implication that one level needs to be completely satisfied in order to embark on

the next one in a process similar to a video game's progression. It is simply not so that there are hard barriers for each level, but rather there are softer borders and one may simultaneously be working on several areas at the same time. Thus, the order of needs in the pyramid should be regarded less strict than what it seemingly illustrates.

Consequently, the Maslowian perspective will expect freedom of choice to have a different impact on well-being depending on the situation of the group in question. Whether or not someone will benefit from increased freedom of choice or not, will largely be determined by where on the hierarchy of needs they presently find themselves. According to the Maslowian needs hierarchy, well-being at primary /lower level needs are driven by satisfying more basic needs. When these primary needs are met, secondary needs take over as drivers of further increased well-being. For groups motivated by primary needs such as food, security, shelter and building meaningful connections, freedom of choice is of lesser importance. On the other hand, to satisfy growth needs is where freedom of choice becomes interesting.

Maslow's needs




Illustration 2

Alternatively, we may consider it as illustrated above, separated into three levels.

Self-realization is the final stage of the individual growth process. To achieve this state of personal fulfillment, the person must first reach a satisfactory level in the preceding levels. A core component of the third level of self-realization, claims Maslow, is a strong level of autonomy (Maslow, 1987, pp. 135-136).

“Just as the tree needs sunshine and water and food, so do most people need love, safety, and the other basic need gratifications that can only come from without. But once these external satisfiers are obtained, once these inner deficiencies are satiated by outside satisfiers, the true problem of individual human development begins, namely self-actualization” (Maslow, 1987, p. 136).

The self-actualized individual displays a strong need for freedom to be able to develop the internal process of self-actualizing. Self-actualized individuals are characterized by self-decision, self-government, and being a “deciding agent rather than a pawn” (Maslow, 1987, p. 135). This in turn creates a Maslowian empirical prediction. Freedom of choice becomes important for those who have already satisfied the prerequisite steps in the individual growth process. To achieve the base level needs, freedom of choice is not considered of great importance. It becomes important for individuals embarking on level 3 needs. Translated into terms more in line with the discussion above, freedom of choice is important for those already possessing a high base level of well-being.

3.52 Maslowian hypothesis

Thus, on an aggregated level, freedom of choice will be important for countries where the average level of well-being is already high. The average citizen here is not worried about where her next meal is coming from, or where she will get shelter for the upcoming night. If those concerns were present, the need for freedom of choice and autonomy would be trumped by these basic needs. However, if she, in addition to having these basic physiological needs covered, have a set of strong relationships that provide love, friendship and esteem, the two lower level needs would be satisfied. In states with these conditions in place for the average citizen, we would expect the need for freedom of choice to be of importance. Further progression in well-being would, to a strong degree, depend on the expansion and presence of a certain amount of freedom of choice. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H2: Freedom of choice matters to a population’s level of well-being when they already possess a high base level

3.6 Pettit on controlled interference and institutions

Then the question that becomes relevant is: what promotes freedom on a state level?

From the Pettit discussion earlier, the key aspect of the republican freedom perspective separates interference into two categories: interference without domination and interference with domination. There can even be domination without interference, a capacity for domination is what constitutes a violation of republican freedom. Most importantly in this context, though, is the difference between controlled interference and uncontrolled interference (Pettit, 2012, p. 50). In a political context, uncontrolled interference can be represented by a political elite who dictates all the rules themselves, leaving citizens with no say in the rules they are being subjected to. Therefore, the interference they are forced to conform to, represents a loss of freedom. Freedom as non-domination on a macro level is thus built on possibilities for citizen participation through democratic procedures.

To achieve this state of controlled interference, citizens will be subjected to state coercion while still enjoying freedom (Pettit, 2012, pp. 148-179). Although Pettit (2012) brings forward a number of potential aspects and concerns regarding this matter, most prominently we may identify three overarching principles to be emphasized. Firstly, it is necessary for a level of individual or sub-group contestation to governmental laws, proposals and decisions (Pettit, 2012, pp. 213-215). This allows for impartial judgement on a matter that is of great importance to a section of the population. Secondly, governments should stem from electoral processes (Pettit, 2012, p. 304). Lastly, powers of government should be divided as opposed to centered at one individual or one group (ibid. p.305).

All in all, these three institutional variables are presumed to be important:

1. Ability to contest government decisions
2. Electoral ability to affect government direction
3. Avoid concentration of power at one group or individual

Pettit's republican freedom perspective in a political context is how political freedom is defined in this study.

4. Previous research

There are several research studies that already focus on the same or similar topics. Surveying the previous research, the overall impression is that there is a positive relationship between democratic institutions and well-being. However, not all findings seem to point in that direction. For example, Potts (2016) refer to the UN World Happiness report and its report showing two non – democratic regimes, United Arab Emirates and Vietnam, are significantly happier than several democratic regimes. In addition, Eastern Europe saw a great decline in well-being following a wave of democratization processes. This supports the notion of the relationship being more complex than simply strengthened political freedom leads to increased well-being.

On the other hand, Haller and Hadler (2006) find that political freedom, based on data from Freedom House on the strength of political institutions, is of importance for well-being. Political freedom is one of the most important macro social factors for social well-being, is among their central claims.

Furthermore, Inglehart et al. (2008) studied freedom and well-being quantitatively and found that perceived sense of freedom, measured in self-report surveys, was an important factor for well-being. Furthermore, they suggest three sources of freedom that feed into each other to create a strong freedom of choice. Material prosperity, political institutions, and a liberal cultural climate, are all playing a role in the personal freedom realm. They do, thus, suggest a link between political institutions and well-being.

In a similar finding, a study comparing data from 63 countries found that autonomy was an important predictor of well-being. By measuring well-being through anxiety, burnout and general health condition, autonomy is a more consistent predictor than national wealth (Fischer & Boer, 2011).

Frey and Stutzer (2000) find support for political institutions leading to increasing well-being in a Swiss context. They argue especially that mechanisms of direct democracy are of great importance. In a later study, the same findings are supported. Stutzer and Frey (2006) approached the topic from a local and smaller scale. They studied democracy and happiness in Switzerland comparing different regions based on the ability to demand

referendums. The citizens of cantons with stronger mechanisms of direct democracy through referendums were significantly happier.

5. Research Design

5.1 Well-being: Operationalization

This analysis will be based on Subjective well-being data (SWB). There are several reasons for this. Firstly, it is a long tradition for SWB as it has become the preferred proxy of well-being in most research. It is how most studies operationalize the concept of well-being, which makes data over a long time period readily available, which for the purpose of this study is a major advantage. Secondly, subjective rating of the state of well-being can be considered more feasible than more objective ratings such as for example physiological objectively measurable reactions such as heart palpitations, pulse, or similar that may represent the inner life dimensions in question. These may, furthermore, only represent one dimension of a more comprehensive concept of well-being, whereas SWB data collected through surveys where individuals rate themselves represent a more holistic approach. In addition, Subjective Well-being, meaning the rating is done by the subject himself or herself, has shown to correlate well with other measures of well-being (Schneider & Schimmack, 2009).

When it comes to databases of SWB there are three different ones that should be noted: World Values Survey (WVS), Gallup World Poll and the World Database of Happiness. These vary in what dimensions of well-being they include. WVS include the two hedonic aspects of SWB from the Diener et al. (1999) model which is the affective as well as life satisfaction. The World Database of Happiness are built on only one of these dimensions, life satisfaction. The Gallup Poll which provides the data for UNs World Happiness Report also has these two hedonic dimensions included, in addition they have questions that are interesting from an eudaimonic point of view. However, access to this database is restricted to only a few institutions. Therefore, the Gallup Poll database has been excluded from consideration here. The WVS has a more extensive database than World Database of Happiness, and therefore stand out as the preferred choice.

The WVS database provides panel data of SWB from many countries in the world based on a standardized questionnaire. How many countries that are included, varies from one wave (one period of data collection) to another. The last wave (7th) had 80 countries

included, and covered a broad specter of different topics, such as education, cultural values, social trust and tolerance, to name a few.

Furthermore, the WVS database is to be considered an unbalanced panel where every unit is not measured at every time unit, T (wave). Among its main weaknesses is the fact that not all specific items have been part of every wave, creating an issue of missing values.

In the latest wave of the World Values Survey, the question aimed at measuring the affective component, called happiness in WVS, is Q46. Here the respondent is asked the following:

“Taking all things together, would you say you are”

1. Very happy
2. Rather happy
3. Not very happy
4. Not at all happy

In addition, the WVS have a question targeting life satisfaction (Q49):

All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Rate from 1 which means, you are “completely dissatisfied”, to 10 which means you are “completely satisfied”, where would you put your level of satisfaction with your life as a whole?

Life satisfaction covers a wider dimension of well-being than the happiness component. In addition, it has a much larger range and therefore more sensitive in measuring change than the ordinal happiness variable. Therefore, well-being has been operationalized by life satisfaction in this study.

Furthermore, it should be noted that one important piece of critique of the Diener et al. (1999) SWB model, is that it does a much better job at capturing the hedonic aspect, than it does capturing the eudaimonic aspect (Clark, 2016). Life satisfaction capture primarily hedonic well-being. Huppert et al. (2009) argue for a wider understanding of Subjective well-being. As earlier models focus on the hedonic aspects, this basis should be complemented by an eudaimonic dimension to create a more holistic measure of SWB.

However, the availability of eudaimonic data in the World Values Survey is lacking. One question that touches upon eudaimonic values is, “how often, if at all, do you think about the meaning and purpose of life?”. How often one thinks about something is not a good enough measure of eudaimonic well-being. It only measures how interested you are in the topic, not the expression of purpose, or the ability to choose a purposeful path. In addition, eudaimonic well-being measures a wide range of dimensions. At the time of writing, seemingly no good eudaimonic index made for global comparison is readily available, which puts an end to the ambition of an eudaimonic data integration. Even the UN World Happiness Report points to the lack of available eudaimonic indexes (Helliwell et al., 2020).

5.2 Subjective Well-being: Validity

One might argue that SWB has strong validity by considering several important aspects of validity. Face validity evaluates the operationalized measure and how well it reflects the concept in question from an intuitive standpoint. On the face of it, how well does it measure the underlying concept? (Bryman, 2016, p. 159). One potential roadblock to face validity, considering this metric is generated from survey data, is whether or not the respondents understood the questions being asked to them. To avoid that, clear and concise formulations are important. Questions of subjective well-being are usually easy to understand. SWB questionnaires have very low non-response rates (Rässler & Riphahn, 2006). This indicates that these questions are easily understood and thus strengthens face validity.

To further analyze validity, we may assess the convergent validity. To measure the convergent validity, we gauge the measure by comparing it with the results from other measures of the same concept (Bryman, 2016, p. 159). In more statistical words, how well does it correlate with other measures? In this particular instance we may compare SWB data to data collected by family, friends and interviewer in addition to biophysical data (OECD, 2013, p. 48). Several studies find a positive correlation between self-reported measures of well-being and reports from family and friends. For example, in a meta-analysis of studies that reported the correlation between self-rating and informant rating, the average correlation of 44 independent samples was $r = 0,42$ (Schneider & Schimmack, 2009).

Furthermore, several studies have looked at correlation with biophysical data. One interesting study finds a difference in cortisol levels between self-reported happy people versus self-reported unhappy people. Cortisol is a hormone responsible for increased blood pressure, increased heart rate and other symptoms of stress, and it is generally assumed to be inversely related to positive emotions (Steptoe et al., 2005, p. 6508). For persons considered “unhappy” by self-reports had 32% higher cortisol levels than the group that rated themselves “happy” (ibid., p. 6511). In sum, these studies collaborate in supporting SWB’s convergent validity. All support findings from the SWB data as they all correlate positively with SWB.

Construct validity forms another aspect of considering the overall validity. To pass this test the measure should to a strong degree resonate with theoretical expectations for it (OECD, 2013, p. 49). For example, Sacks et al. (2010) research the connection between SWB and income. They find that individuals with higher income have higher SWB. This is also true on a macro level as richer countries have a higher average SWB. In terms of employment, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), find that unemployment have a strong negative impact on SWB. In terms of health status and education, Dolan et al. (2008) find support for both being important determinants of SWB. Thus, considering at least these studies we find support for a construct validity for SWB.

5.3 Political freedom: Operationalization

There are several indexes that measure the performance of political institutions. Notable examples of prominent democracy indexes include Freedom House, Democracy Index and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). Given the nuanced and multidimensional approach of the V-Dem project, I have chosen to implement V-Dem data here. The different political institutions that meant to be captures here, benefit from the multiple facets of V-dem, rather than a more general state of approach to democracy. The V-Dem database consists of many different expert generated indexes and indicators, which makes it easier to implement the measure that fits the institutional dimensions that are in focus.

To repeat the theoretical goals from above, the democratic measure aims to capture the following three institutional dimensions. Firstly, we find contestation. How strong is the ability to contest government decisions? Secondly, how strong is the electoral ability to affect government direction? Lastly, to what degree is power contained in the hands of one group or one individual?

Looking at the V-Dem Codebook, one of the main overarching indexes implement all these the dimensions, namely the liberal democracy index (v2x_libdem). Firstly, it aims to measure the “quality of democracy by the limits placed on government which is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power” (V-Dem, 2021, p. 43). Thus, the liberal democracy index measures the ability to contest government decisions and limit executive power (ibid.). Strong civil liberties, an emphasis on the rule of law, and an independent judiciary are all important mechanisms to strengthen the ability to contest government decisions and avoid concentration of power by putting in place barriers for the executive who must rule within a strict framework of boundaries.

Furthermore, the liberal democracy index also takes into account the level of electoral democracy by also including this dimension (V-Dem, 2021, p. 43). This dimension aims to capture to what degree political leadership is responsible to its citizens. This is done by measuring electoral competition, extensive suffrage, to what degree that political and civil society organizations can operate freely, to what degree are elections clean, and the executive position(s) being filled based on election results. In addition, it measures key conditions for the period in between elections such as freedom of expression and independent media capable of presenting alternative views (V-Dem, 2021, p. 42).

5.4 Table of all variables

Table 1

Name	Range	Polarity	Source
Life Satisfaction	1 - 10	1 “completely dissatisfied” 10 “completely satisfied”	World Values Survey
Liberal democracy index	0 – 1	Higher number equals higher lib-dem	V-Dem Dataset - Version 11.1
GDP per Capita (logged base 10)	Interval	Higher number equals higher GDP per Capita	The Maddison Project Database (2018)
Subjective income	1 – 10	1 Lower step 10 Higher step	World Values Survey
Health	Interval based on age	Age of how long an individual is expected to live	Several sources (see footnote 1) ¹
Unemployment	Dummy	0 Not unemployed 1 Unemployed	World Values Survey
Education	Interval	Average years of education among citizens older than 15 years	Several sources (see footnote 2) ²

5.5 Control variables

To reduce issues related to omitted variable bias, control variables have been included. These are variables that have been shown to be sizeable and robust determinants of well-being in previous studies.

5.51 Economic variables: GDP and Income

Several studies argue the importance of economy for well-being. Both income and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have been argued to play important factors for SWB. Kahneman and Deaton (2010) argues for a strong link between GDP and well-being. Their findings show that life satisfaction is very sensitive to economic growth, where life satisfaction rises in a significant way in response to economic growth.

In addition, subjective economic situation has been shown to be of great importance. It is not necessarily objective level of income that is most important, but a subjective financial satisfaction level has proven to be an important factor for life satisfaction (Haller & Hadler, 2006, p. 192). Furthermore, a similar finding is supported by Sacks et al. (2010) who find that income significantly impacts well-being.

GDP per capita data included stems from the V-Dem dataset (variable named `e_migdppln`). Subjective economic situation data stems from WVS database and self-reported level of income (variable `X047`).

5.52 Unemployment

Unemployment has been found to be an important predictor of well-being in several studies. Being unemployed has been found to significantly lower well-being (Helliwell, 2003; Oswald, 1997). Thus, self-reported unemployment status has been implemented and recoded from the WVS database (variable `X028`)

5.53 Education

Some support exists for education being a factor for well-being. Diener et al. (1993) find support for education as a determinant for well-being. Helliwell (2003) suggests that this to some degree may be a result of indirect effects, as education is known to improve other factors, such as income, but a small direct effect seems to exist. Based on this, I have chosen to include educational level as a control variable. Education data exist from self-reported education level from WVS database (variable `X025`). However, the missingness (missing values) of this variable is very high as 126 146 of the total N of over 426 000 have a missing education variable. Therefore, I have chosen to implement data from the V-Dem dataset (variable `e_peaveduc`).

5.54 Health

Diener and Seligman (2004) argue for a strong link between health, longevity and well-being. However, the causal pathways here are not completely understood as some evidence point to health being an important cause of well-being. Dolan et al. (2008) argue that especially psychological, but also physical health impact well-being. Furthermore, Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) finds that disability reduces life satisfaction significantly for individuals with no prior disability, while individuals with two years of disability and three years of disability show a lesser decline in life satisfaction as they gradually adapt to a new life situation.

There are several measurements of health. The UN's Human Development Index uses a simple operationalization of health, life expectancy, which can be seen as a summary measure of mortality in that specific population. It is calculated from age specific death rates, and can be interpreted as a summary of these, and is often used as a simple measure of general public health, despite its limitations (Modig et al., 2020).

Data on Life expectancy is gathered from the V-Dem dataset (variable named e_pelifeex).

5.55 Potential of a variable measuring social contact

Another potential variable which unfortunately is not included is here, is a measure of social contact. This is central to Maslow's second level needs, and is part of the base level needs that needs some level of satisfaction before self-actualization can begin. In addition, Haller and Hadler (2006) also find support for social contact as an important predictor of well-being. However, data measuring social contact from the WVS is not implemented because it would lead to a great number of missing data. Social contact data is only available from two waves, and no imputation technique would be able to make up for this limitation.

5.6 Number of observations, missing data and merging dataset issues

There are some instances where data seem to be present in one of the datasets only, and not the other. In most cases these issues boil down to naming differences, due to the fact that matching occurs based on names. These issues are easily alleviated when the same name enters both datasets. In other instances, these issues are not solved as easily. There are some countries which are only included in the WVS database, but not present in the V-Dem dataset. These cases include Montenegro, which has V-Dem data available from 1999 onwards, while WVS has a 1996 survey in Montenegro which cannot be matched to any V- Dem data. This 1996 datapoint has therefore been matched to the 1999 V-Dem data. In addition, some countries have only WVS data and no available V-Dem data. These are Palestine, Czechia, Andorra, El Salvador and Puerto Rico. They are, for that reason, not included in the analysis.

Furthermore, for the WVS database there are some issues relating to missing data, as not all items have been part of every wave. Therefore, it is worth going through the number of observations of each variable, and how many missing values there are.

Table 2

Name	Number of observations	Missing values
Life Satisfaction	420669	5783
Affective component	417862	8590
Subjective Income	389150	37302
Unemployment	413683	12769

All in all, the issue of missing values is present. For the analysis based on life satisfaction as the dependent variable, the total amount of observations where all variables of interest have values, is 373 486 out of a total database number of 426 452. Not all items have been part of every wave of the WVS, which causes some level of missingness in the dataset.

5.7 Plot of bivariate relationship

I have attached a plot showing the relationship between the dependent variable Y and the main independent variable x, which indicates a lot of spread. The spread is especially true for countries with lower political freedom while it is less for countries with high levels of political freedom.




Illustration 3

5.8 Descriptive statistics

The histogram below provides a visual representation of the distribution of life satisfaction.




Illustration 4

The histogram below provides a visual representation of the distribution of the political freedom variable.




Illustration 5

5.9 Summary statistics of all variables

Table 3

Variable name	n	mean	SD	median	min	max
Life satisfaction	312962	6,706482	2,413469	7	1	10
Unemployed	312962	0,089171	0,28499	0	0	1
Income	312962	4,649226	2,303591	5	1	10
Political freedom	225	0,493533	0,275893	0,464	0,038	0,885
GDP per Capita (log)	225	9,394356	0,930722	9,45	7,1	11,22
Health	225	72,92622	7,010743	74,4	46,2	83,6
Education	225	8,819578	2,80936	8,87	1,265	13,61

5.10 Considerations for model choice

The relationship between political freedom and life satisfaction will be tested by analyzing within unit variation as well as between unit variation. By employing fixed effects estimation, within unit variation can be analyzed, and by employing a Pooled OLS model, the between unit variation can be studied. This will allow for analysis of the hypothesized positive association and analyze if there is a difference between the groups of interest in line with hypothesis two.

Several considerations go into the choice of panel data modelling. From a simplistic point of view, there are two main choices for panel data modeling: fixed effects estimation and random effects estimation (Worrall, 2010, p. 183). Random effects estimation is more efficient, but it has stronger assumptions that in many cases will not uphold. A Hausman test will provide a quick indication of whether random effects can even be considered. By testing whether or not there is correlation between the error terms and the independent variables, the Hausman test provides valuable information. If this type of correlation is found, random effects modeling is excluded as it assumes no correlation of this type (Worrall, 2010, p. 185). According to the applied Hausman test, result here is that this type of correlation is present. A fixed effects model is thus preferred.

A fixed effects model analyzes only the intra unit variation, and excludes the information of variation between units. The fixed effects dummy variables for each country captures the unobserved differences between each country. Thus, the model focuses on the variation that occurs within each unit. If unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be a major issue, then a Fixed effects model will control for this issue. However, fixed effects

require there to be observations at more than at one point in time, and for several countries this is not the case (see illustration 4).

Another concern for fixed effects estimation is that there needs to be sufficient variation in the dependent variable as fixed effects will not work well with data for which within unit variation is small, or for variables that slowly change over time. In this context one does not necessarily expect life satisfaction to change quickly as a response to change in political freedom. There is an argument to be made that life satisfaction may actually change slowly over time and in response to changes in political freedom. If institutional reform were to take place that significantly change political freedom, those changes may not manifest themselves in increased life satisfaction during the same time period. It may happen later as the effects of the institutional change is starting to manifest themselves in citizen's lives. If one expects the change in Y to be delayed, and slowly changing over time, fixed effects may not be the best choice. One approach that would solve a possible delayed effect is a model with Y lag, but that approach would require longer time series data than what is the case in this study.

To analyze whether or not there is change in the dependent variable, we may analyze how the two main variables change within a unit graphically, which is provided below:




Illustration 6

Firstly, there is a lot of single dots on the plot, indicating several units with only one observation, which would in a fixed effects model be excluded, as there is no change to measure. Secondly, one may observe there is a lot of variation on the left side of the plot and little variation on the right side with a high level of political freedom, especially for the countries located in the upper right corner. Overall, there seems to be a significant amount of variation.

Furthermore, there is few countries that have a longer time series available. Several of the countries have only data for one time T, while others have two or three time periods which ideally should be longer to experiment with a lagged Y variable and perhaps register an effect that may be delayed. To illustrate these points further, I have provided a histogram of the number of time periods in the data per country below:




Illustration 7

As shown here, the majority of countries have data available for either one or two time periods. By estimating an FE model, all the countries that have available data for one time T only, will not be included in the analysis, as FE relies on change from t1 to t2. By having so many countries with only one observation in time, takes away a large amount of data from the analysis. In addition, having a dataset with a small T and large N, which is the case here, increases the chances of biased estimates related to the Nickell bias. T

should be much higher, typically 30 – 40 in order to avoid biased estimates stemming from the Nickell bias (Beck et al., 2014). These issues weaken the FE model's ability to make efficient estimation.

Despite the control variables representing dimensions of a wide spectrum, there will be unobserved variables that account for variation in SWB. The obvious such candidates are personality factors, genetical factors and cultural factors. I will argue here that these are factors that are relatively constant over time, at least considering the time span covered in this model. Thus, these factors will be captured by the country specific dummy variable and will be controlled for.

To also measure the variation between countries and to address the issues of the fixed effects model, a pooled OLS model may be a better approach. A pooled OLS model treats all observations as independent observations, where country X in time = 1 is treated independent from country X in t = 2 and so on. By doing this we are ignoring the panel structure of the dataset and treating all observations as independent.

Modelling for hypothesis two is more complicated than modelling for hypothesis one, which is more straight forward. Hypothesis two states that a high base level well-being, is a prerequisite for political freedom to have a positive impact on well-being. This hypothesis assumes a different relationship, depending on whether or not the country in question is part of the high or low base level group.

One approach to this issue is to divide the whole sample into two subsets. The issue then becomes at what point the cut off between high and low should be set. We would certainly expect a country that has the base level needs met to be in the upper part of the scale. Since the life satisfaction variable ranges from 1-10, the middle is marked at 5,5. To be in the upper part of the scale we would expect a ranking above 5,5 which means that we would assume a life satisfaction ranking that level in order to be established on the upper level of the scale. One approach to this is to create subsets. By dividing into two groups, one high base level and one low base level, and testing each group separately, we may model for hypothesis two. This could be done by separating on the average life satisfaction to avoid observations of a hypothetical country X to have observations in both the big and the small group. Therefore, the two subsets are separated based on average life satisfaction above and below 5,5 life satisfaction score.

Another possible approach in order to avoid dividing the sample is to implement an interaction term. This however is not a straightforward task because the assumed interaction involves the dependent level. Hypothesis two assumes that the effect that political freedom has on life satisfaction is dependent on the base level of life satisfaction. In order to test this, we need to include life satisfaction in the interaction term, but this however may cause a big issue of biased estimates something that is not easily worked around. Therefore, a split sample may be preferred to an interaction term.

5.11 Unit of observation

Some of the variables included here are variables on an individual level, while other variables are units at country level. For the pooled OLS model it is possible for the model to analyze all the individual level variables at the individual level with the connected country level controls, but for the fixed effects model these numbers have to be averaged up to country level. This is because the same individuals are not sampled each time, so it would not be possible to at this point to establish an intra unit change for every individual. Therefore, for the fixed effects models the unit of observation is country level, but for the pooled OLS model I have included models on both individual level as well as at country level.

Here is an overview of variable levels of all variables:

Table 4

Variable name	Level
Life satisfaction	Individual
Unemployed	Individual
Income	Individual
Political freedom	Country
GDP per Capita (log)	Country
Health	Country
Education	Country

6. Results

6.1 Pooled OLS models

For the pooled OLS models there are two main approaches, pooled OLS at country level and pooled OLS at individual level.

6.11 Pooled OLS: Individual level

The three following models represent the all model, the high base model and the low base model on an individual level. The country level variables have been given to all individuals within that country:

OLS Models for All, High and Low on individual level

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Life Satisfaction		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Freedom	0.80 ^{***} (0.02)	0.80 ^{***} (0.02)	-1.47 ^{***} (0.09)
Income	0.19 ^{***} (0.002)	0.19 ^{***} (0.002)	0.33 ^{***} (0.01)
Unemployment	-0.40 ^{***} (0.02)	-0.40 ^{***} (0.02)	-0.12 ^{***} (0.04)
GDP per Capita	0.17 ^{***} (0.01)	0.17 ^{***} (0.01)	0.41 ^{***} (0.04)
Health	0.04 ^{***} (0.001)	0.04 ^{***} (0.001)	-0.02 ^{***} (0.004)
Education	-0.08 ^{***} (0.003)	-0.08 ^{***} (0.003)	0.09 ^{***} (0.01)
Constant	1.78 ^{***} (0.07)	1.78 ^{***} (0.07)	1.21 ^{***} (0.20)
<i>n</i>	312962	281167	31795
<i>Note:</i>	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01		

Model 1

1: All model 2: High base level 3: Low base level

OLS Models for All and High on country level

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Life Satisfaction	
	(1)	(2)
Political Freedom	0.86 ^{***} (0.24)	0.63 ^{***} (0.22)
Income	0.24 ^{***} (0.07)	0.20 ^{***} (0.07)
Unemployment	-0.44 (0.98)	0.64 (0.98)
GDP per Capita	0.51 ^{***} (0.14)	0.19 [*] (0.11)
Health	0.04 ^{**} (0.01)	0.04 ^{***} (0.01)
Education	-0.18 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.07 [*] (0.04)
Constant	-0.68 (1.04)	1.46 (1.00)
<i>n</i>	225	201
<i>Note:</i>	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01	

Model 2

1: All model 2: High base level

The pooled OLS models can give insights for both hypotheses. From the models including all observations hypothesis one may be evaluated. Hypothesis one assumes that political freedom is of importance for life satisfaction for all countries. From both the country level model as well as the individual level model one would expect there to be a positive correlation between political freedom and life satisfaction, when all control variables remain constant. In both models that includes all countries, this seems to be the case. The coefficients of 0,8 for individual level and 0,86 for country level is in support of this hypothesis. A coefficient of 0,8 indicates an expectation of a moderate rise in life satisfaction when comparing a country with low political freedom to a country with high political freedom. So, when all other variables are kept constant, the model expects a country x with a political freedom score of 1 to have a 0,8 units higher life satisfaction than country y with a political freedom score of 0.

However, a growth from 0 – 1 is a very large change in political freedom, as the variable only scales from 0 to 1. To get a real world understanding of what that change represents, looking at the V-Dem liberal democracy index, in recent history we can point to Eritrea and its 2012 lib-dem score of 0,005, or perhaps an even more well-known example, North Korea. North Korea have a 2018 political freedom score of 0,014. On the other side of the scale Sweden's political freedom score of 0,885 for the year 2011. So, the best real world example of a change from low to high on the liberal democracy index, is going from the democratic institutions of Eritrea or North Korea, or rather the lack of democratic institutions of these two countries, to the strong democratic institutions of Sweden. That is a massive gap.

Furthermore, the separation into two subsets provides valuable information for hypothesis two. It should be noted that the low model on country level is excluded because of a lack of observations here. For the individual level on the other hand there is enough observations to include both the low and the high models. For the high model on individual level gives the same result as in the "all model". The model predicts a 0,8 units life satisfaction rise when comparing a 0 country to a 1 country on the political freedom scale. However, the model predicts a negative relationship between political freedom and life satisfaction for the group that have low base level life satisfaction. So, for this group the model predicts life satisfaction to be higher for a country with low political freedom compared to a country with high political freedom. This goes against to the

assumption of hypothesis one, but is interesting in light of hypothesis two. Hypothesis two assumes that political freedom is important for life satisfaction if the base level needs are met. When the base level needs are not met, which is assumed to be the case for this low group, political freedom is not assumed to have the same positive relationship to political freedom. The findings of the low model here seems to support this as the coefficient of -1,47 indicates a substantial drop in life satisfaction from a country with low political freedom to a country with high political freedom. For the low base level group the economic variables, GDP per capita and income, are in contrast to political freedom, as important positive predictors of life satisfaction.

It should be noted that by testing for heteroskedasticity in the pooled ols models it indicated that it was present, and robust standard errors was implemented. Testing for multicollinearity showed all vif numbers at or under 5 indicating no issues related to multicollinearity.

6.2 Fixed effects models

Fixed Effects Models for All and High		
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Life Satisfaction	
	(1)	(2)
Political Freedom	0.29 (0.49)	0.57 (0.51)
Income	0.18*** (0.06)	0.15*** (0.05)
Unemployment	-1.57 (1.03)	-1.89* (1.00)
GDP per Capita	0.66** (0.33)	0.74*** (0.28)
Health	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
Education	-0.08 (0.16)	-0.14 (0.17)
<i>n</i>	225	201
<i>Note:</i>	* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$	

Model 3

1: All model 2: High base level

The model presents the results of the two fixed effects models for all countries and the high base level. The low base model has been excluded, because only 14 observations belong to this group. The fixed effects model measures how a change in the political freedom variable, causes a change in life satisfaction. The idea of fixed effects is to move beyond the between country correlation and investigate the variation that occurs within a country from $t=1$ to $t=2$.

The only variables that stand out as being able to explain variation in life satisfaction based on the FE models, is the economic variables which both (income and GDP) are predicted to increase life satisfaction in the event of economic growth. Political freedom is not found to be a significant predictor of life satisfaction based on the FE models. However, there are several issues with the FE approach. Issues that can be resolved in the future by collecting more data

6.3 Heteroskedasticity and influential observations

Testing for heteroskedasticity indicated that heteroskedasticity is present. Therefore, robust standard errors have been implemented for all models.

Furthermore, testing for and removing influential observations is not found to significantly change these results.

7. Discussion

This study aims to test the relationship between political freedom and well-being. By looking at the within country variation over time and the variation between countries in the pooled ols models, there are interesting findings to be reported. In the fixed effects models, the economic variables, income and GDP per capita, stand out as the most important predictors of life satisfaction. As income and GDP per capita increases they are expected to increase life satisfaction both in the all model and in the high base model. However, the FE model has significant weaknesses when applied on the data studied here.

Because of these issues, the pooled OLS models may be able to provide more insight into the available data. Both the country level as well as the individual level pooled OLS models indicate a positive relationship when all available countries are sampled. These findings support hypothesis one, and the assumption that political freedom correlate positively with life satisfaction.

Based on hypothesis two, we would expect that there is a difference in the effect that political freedom has on life satisfaction between the low and high group. For the pooled OLS models on an individual level we observe a large difference in the low and high group lending support to hypothesis two. When comparing two countries in the high base level group country A with high level of political freedom to a country B with low

level, the model expects country A to have a significantly higher life satisfaction. These findings are turned upside down when comparing two countries in the low base level group. The model predicts that here country B with a low political freedom score would have a higher life satisfaction. This finding supports the perspective that political freedom may have different impact in different contexts. The model would predict North Korea (0,014 political freedom score) to have a higher life satisfaction than Sweden (0,885 political freedom score), given that they both would be in the low base level group and keeping all other variables constant. In this hypothetical situation, the model would predict Sweden to have a 1,3 units lower life satisfaction score than North Korea. These findings support hypothesis two where political freedom is assumed to be of importance only for countries that have climbed past first level needs motivation and embark on some level of self actualization needs where political freedom becomes an enabling factor. These findings also weaken hypothesis one.

However, these findings come with weaknesses. One important weakness of pooled OLS is that we cannot control for omitted variable bias. Considering the complexity of well-being, and the number of different factors that may be of relevance here, we cannot completely rule out that the findings reported here may stem from the variation in a variable that we do not have data on. May the findings here stem partly from unobserved factors of well-being? It cannot be completely ruled out.

To further validate these findings, more data should be collected over a larger time frame to allow for the use of models controlling for unobserved variables that may cause variation in well-being. Furthermore, this study relies only on hedonic data, and could benefit from eudaimonic data for a more holistic measure of well-being. A sole focus on the hedonic side of well-being could be argued is an oversimplification of reality as one risks not capturing changes in well-being that may be of great importance.

8. Conclusion

This study set out to answer the research question of how does political freedom affect social happiness. In doing so, two hypotheses were defined. Hypothesis one is linked both to Locke's hedonic perspective as well as linked to previous research, where the assumption is that political freedom increases well-being. The Maslowian hypothesis brings a new perspective to the debate that allows for political freedom to have a

different impact depending on the environment in question. If base level needs are not met, political freedom will not be of importance for increasing well-being. It is when base level needs are met that political freedom becomes important for well-being. At this stage, a need to self-actualize becomes activated, a process in which political freedom will be promoted.

The findings here support the Maslowian hypothesis. By separately analyzing data of groups assumed to have some level of satisfaction of the basic needs, from those that do not, a difference in political freedom appreciation is found. The group assumed to satisfy base level needs has a positive relationship between political freedom and well-being. A country with high political freedom is expected to have higher life satisfaction compared to a country with low political freedom. For the group not assumed to have the basic needs satisfied, this is not the case. Here the findings show that political freedom impacts well-being negatively. These findings support the Maslowian hypothesis, and bring questions of the “one size fits all” approach of hypothesis one.

These findings should be regarded with caution as it cannot be excluded that they, to some degree at least, are influenced by omitted variable bias. This is why more data over a longer time period is necessary to further strengthen the findings made here.

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10. R-script

The R-Script is provided upon request as per the instruction stated in the course description.

11. Appendix

11.1 All countries and their respective average life satisfaction score

Country name	Avg life satisfaction	Country name	Avg life satisfaction
Albania	4,951288322	Lithuania	4,951247166
Algeria	5,978988827	Malaysia	6,987073408
Argentina	7,268962136	Mali	6,172541744
Armenia	4,753192886	Mexico	8,00084485
Australia	7,537228025	Moldova	4,578610914
Azerbaijan	6,042088821	Montenegro	5,884328704
Bangladesh	6,618386484	Morocco	5,565961659
Belarus	5,225342348	Netherlands	7,611974282
Bolivia	7,490452261	New Zealand	7,68995363
Bosnia & Herzegovina	5,632656867	Nicaragua	7,943333333
Brazil	7,506941004	Nigeria North	6,382185266
Bulgaria	4,898920935	Macedonia	5,354206199
Burkina Faso	5,548987854	Norway	7,836245806
Canada	7,801818359	Pakistan	6,646926873
Chile	7,214305022	Peru	6,903322659
China	6,952094099	Philippines	7,117652095
Colombia	8,294690057	Poland	6,896969103
Croatia	6,181431005	Qatar	8,01240458
Cyprus	7,007910606	Romania	6,093732498
Dominican Republic	7,255591054	Russia	5,713433235
Ecuador	7,848256303	Rwanda	5,801844679
Egypt	5,500385497	Saudi Arabia	7,348082596
El Salvador	7,461538462	Serbia	5,974666268
Estonia	5,607431	Singapore	7,110360303
Ethiopia	5,377663617	Slovakia	6,049622438
Finland	7,79726904	Slovenia	7,318564487
France	6,853575482	South Africa	6,617778539
Georgia	5,194980104	South Korea	6,487448543

Germany	7,244512084	Spain	6,953906587
Ghana	6,248667584	Sweden	7,767891357
Greece	6,18221831	Switzerland	8,085427437
Guatemala	7,750545975	Taiwan	6,808587429
Haiti	5,553626782	Tajikistan	7,949166667
Hong Kong SAR			
China	6,619784905	Tanzania	3,815968841
Hungary	5,877973113	Thailand	7,121227541
		Trinidad &	
India	6,157004966	Tobago	7,378819165
Indonesia	7,127702849	Tunisia	5,543265495
Iran	6,308477282	Turkey	6,598675433
Iraq	5,018155694	Uganda	5,781021898
Israel	6,838777661	Ukraine	5,463429184
Italy	6,922960725	United Kingdom	7,571302227
Japan	6,685500635	United States	7,53311973
Jordan	6,355851491	Uruguay	7,395498376
Kazakhstan	7,104527826	Uzbekistan	7,877564979
Kuwait	7,186607143	Venezuela	7,100200144
Kyrgyzstan	7,280238433	Vietnam	7,210465893
Latvia	4,879003559	Yemen	5,908900524
Lebanon	6,595675105	Zambia	6,091853035
Libya	7,257043994	Zimbabwe	4,979748735

11.2 Time and number of observations of each country

Country name	Years observed	Number of times observed
Albania	1998, 2002	2
Algeria	2002, -14	2
Argentina	1991, -95, -99, 2017	4
Armenia	1997, 2011	2
Australia	1981, -95, 2005, -12, -18	5
Azerbaijan	1997, 2011	2
Bangladesh	1996, 2002, -18	3
Belarus	1990, -96, 2011	3
Bolivia	2017	1
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1998, 2001	2
Brazil	1991, -97, 2006, -14, -18	5
Bulgaria	1997, 2006	2
Burkina Faso	2007	1
Canada	1982, -90, 2000, 06	4

Chile	1990, -96, 2000, -06, -12, -18	6
China	1990, -95, 2001, -07, -13	5
Colombia	1997, -98, 2005, -12, -18	5
Croatia	1996	1
Cyprus	2006, -11, -19	3
Dominican Republic	1996	1
Ecuador	2013, 18	2
Egypt	2001, -08, -13, -18	4
El Salvador	1999	1
Estonia	1996, 2011	2
Ethiopia	2007, -20	2
Finland	1996, 2005	2
France	2006	1
Georgia	2009, -14	2
Germany	1997, 2006, -13, -18	4
Ghana	2007, 2012	2
Greece	2017	1
Guatemala	2004, 2020	2
Haiti	2016	1
Hong Kong SAR China	2005, -14, -18	3
Hungary	2009	1
India	1990, -95, 2001, -06, -12	5
Indonesia	2001, -06, -18	3
Iran	2000, -07, -20,	3
Iraq	2004, -06, -13, -18	4
Israel	2001	1
Italy	2005	1
Japan	1981, -90, -95, 2000, -05, -10, -19	7
Jordan	2001, -14, -18	3
Kazakhstan	2011, -18	2
Kuwait	2014	1
Kyrgyzstan	2003, -11, -20	3
Latvia	1996	1
Lebanon	2013, -18	2
Libya	2014	1
Lithuania	1997	1
Malaysia	2006, -12, -18	3
Mali	2007	1
Mexico	1981, -90, -96, 2000, -05, -12, -18	7
Moldova	1996, -02, -06	3
Montenegro	1999, 2001	2
Morocco	2001, -07, -11	3
Netherlands	2006, -12	2
New Zealand	1998, 2004, -11, -20	4

Nicaragua		2020	1
Nigeria	1990, -95, 2000, -12, 18		5
North Macedonia	1998, -01		2
Norway	1996, 2007		2
Pakistan	2001, -12, -18		3
Peru	1996, 2001, -06, -12, -18		5
Philippines	2001, -12, -19		3
Poland	1989, 2005, -12		3
Qatar		2010	1
Romania	1998, 2005, -12, -18		4
Russia	1990, -95, 2006, -11, -17		5
Rwanda	2007, -12		2
Saudi Arabia		2003	1
Serbia	1996, 2001, -06, -17		4
Singapore	2002, -12		2
Slovakia	1990, -98, 2005, -11		4
Slovenia	2005, -11		2
South Africa	1982, -90, -96, 2001, -06, 13		6
South Korea	2001, -05, -10, -18		4
Spain	1990, -95, 2000, -07, -11		5
Sweden	1981, -96, -99, 2006, -11		5
Switzerland	1989, -96, 2007		3
Taiwan	1998, 2006, -12, -19		4
Tajikistan		2020	1
Tanzania		2001	1
Thailand	2007, -13, -18		3
Trinidad & Tobago	2006, -10		2
Tunisia	2013, -19		2
Turkey	1990, -96, 2001, -07, -11, -18		6
Uganda		2001	1
Ukraine	1996, 2006, -11, -20		4
United Kingdom	1998, 2005		2
	1981, -90, -95, -99, 2006, -		
United States	11, -17		7
Uruguay	1996, 2006, -11		3
Uzbekistan		2011	1
Venezuela	1996, 2000		2
Vietnam	2001, -06, -20		3
Yemen		2014	1
Zambia		2007	1
Zimbabwe	2001, -12, -20		3