Dissertation submitted for the PhD degree

Neoliberal Fantasies, Favela Realities:

Contentious politics of urban citizenship in pre-Olympic Rio de Janeiro

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Vila Autódromo, February 2016.
A single house remains standing amidst the rubble of houses demolished for the Olympic Park (in the background to the right).

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Abbreviations and Glossary

Bolsa Familia: A conditional cash transfer program

Carioca: A Rio native

Esculacho: Bashing or humiliation

FIFA: *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* - International Federation of Association Football

IOC: International Olympic Committee

MST: *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra* - Landless Workers' Movement

Morar Carioca: Municipal program that pledged to upgrade and socially/spatially integrate all of Rio's favelas by 2020

PAC: *Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento* – Growth Acceleration Program

MCMV: Programa *Minha Casa, Minha Vida* – My House, My Life Program

PMDB: *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* - Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (MDB since 2017)

PT: *Partido dos Trabalhadores* - The Workers' Party

UPP: *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* - Police Pacification Unit

Summary

This dissertation studies the political consequences of Rio de Janeiro's hosting of sports mega-events through the lens of citizenship. The backdrop for the dissertation is Rio's ambitious double-take of arranging both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games within a timeframe of two years. I have two focal points for my research. The first regards what sports mega-events do to the social and political geography of host cities. Urban political and economic elites behind bids on such events portray them as opportunities for international investments, growth, and development. Others, however, view the hosting of mega-events as an excuse to push forward an opportunistic neoliberal development agenda with high social costs.

Critical scholars and concerned citizens have contended that Rio's mega-event preparations legitimized forced evictions of poor urban dwellers, increased militarization of security politics, and criminalization of social protests – accentuating and intensifying deeply rooted structures of exclusion and segregation. The making of Rio into an 'Olympic City' therefore spurred a growing politicization of urban questions, which is the second and main focal point for my research. I examine how the contested process of mega-event driven, neoliberal urban transformation was met with multifaceted forms of contestation and resistance, whereby popular actors pursued their demands for more inclusive urban development and citizenship both through engagement with the state and through more autonomous forms of activism.

The dissertation is based on longitudinal fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro and one favela (Rocinha) and employs perspectives from citizenship theory, critical urban and neoliberalization theory, scholarship on social

movements and contentious politics, post-foundational, political theory and gender/masculinities theory. It consists of five papers that approach the overarching research focus on the social and political consequences of Rio's mega-events from different angles. A common denominator is that they place the analytical focus on the forms and places of encounter of favela residents, public authorities, and third parties that engaged in contentions over the mega-event driven urban developments and their implications for urban citizenship.

The main conclusion drawn is that Rio's mega-events were used as a leverage for a neoliberal reconfiguration of the city in a way that was de-politicizing - as the urgency and exceptionality of the mega-events opened up for suspending legal norms and bypassing political contestation - yet, did not render the city 'post-political'. In contrast, it triggered popular politics and protests that challenged de-politicized urban development and politicized urban citizenship. As this politicization was messy and multifaceted, the dissertation argues for the necessity of a contextual and grounded analysis that places analytical focus on dynamics of contention between different actors that engaged with the mega-event developments, following such contentions over time. This way, the dissertation studies the contentious politics of urban citizenship in pre-Olympic Rio de Janeiro.

Acknowledgements

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Celina M. Sørbøe

February 2021

Part I

1. Introduction

1.1. Research objectives and relevance

This dissertation studies the political consequences of Rio de Janeiro's hosting of sports mega-events through the lens of citizenship. Citizenship has, over the last decades, increasingly become an axis of political struggles. The concept has been appropriated by different segments of society to encompass a variety of meanings, ranging from a buzzword in neoliberal agendas and governmentality 'from above' to a slogan for struggles 'from below' for social and political justice (Isin & Turner, 2002; Kurtz & Hankins, 2005; Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006; Painter & Philo, 1995; Staeheli, 2011; Stokke, 2013, 2017). Different conceptualizations of citizenship have been contested in Brazil since the 1980s and were at stake in the lead-up to the country's hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. Through a

contentious politics approach, which entails taking a dynamic, relational, and open-ended approach to the processes involved in collective action, claims-making, and institutional politics from the perspective of social actors (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2013), this dissertation examines the contentious politics of citizenship in pre-Olympic Rio[1].

The backdrop for the dissertation is Rio's ambitious double-take of arranging the two largest sports spectacles in the world within a timeframe of two years. The hosting of sports mega-events is known to accelerate and intensify localized social, political, and economic processes (Bajc, 2016; Boyle & Haggerty, 2009; Gaffney, 2010; Lehrer & Laidley, 2008; Poynter & Viehoff, 2015). Rio's preparations for the World Cup and the Olympics catalyzed large-scale urban interventions transforming both the material city and its political economy. Tied to what Richmond and Garmany (2016) call a 'post-Third-World City' narrative of urban renewal, the Olympics were presented as an opportunity for sustained growth after two decades of economic stagnation and instability. Furthermore, urban officials pledged to use the Games to leave a 'social legacy' for the city (Girginov, 2012). Unprecedented amounts were invested in the areas of infrastructure, transport, social housing, and security in the years preceding the Olympics, targeting the city's *favelas*[2] in particular.

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[1]The study is part of a wider research project called 'Insurgent Citizenship in Brazil: the role of mega sports events', financed by the Norwegian Research Council (2015-2019, Project No.: 241089/F10). The project was led by Einar Braathen, the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR, Oslo Metropolitan University) with the Institute of Urban and Regional Research and Planning (IPPUR) at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) as a project partner.

[2]There is no agreed-upon definition of the term 'favela'. In the city constitution, it is defined as "an area predominantly used for housing, characterized by the occupation of lands by a low-income population, precarious urban infrastructure and public

Despite promises of comprehensive urban development, social inclusion, and expanding citizenship, the mega-event driven transformations proved a disillusionment to most of Rio's citizens. Critics contend that urban officials harnessed the mega-events to push forward a neoliberal agenda and policies benefiting the interests of capital while subjecting marginalized communities and populations to displacements and dispossessions (Freeman, 2014; Richmond and Garmany, 2016). Furthermore, they argue that the sense of urgency and exceptionality of the mega-events opened up for overruling or circumventing existing institutional frameworks, with consequences for democratic city governance (Gaffney, 2010, 2014; Sánchez & Broudehoux, 2013; Vainer, 2011). Such de-politicizing aspects of hosting mega-events is a common focal point for critical analyses of mega-events also beyond Brazil (Horne & Whannel, 2016; Lehrer & Laidley, 2008; Poynter & Viehoff, 2015).

Meanwhile, much less attention has been granted how mega-events can potentially have positive and/or lasting political consequences in the form of increased political awareness and engagement. In Brazil, popular culture around soccer is central to the national identity and people perceived the World Cup to be 'their' event. The profile of the mega-event preparations thus became highly politicized. During the FIFA Confederations Cup in June 2013 (the test run for the World Cup) Brazil experienced the largest street demonstrations in its history. A main parole was the requirement of 'FIFA standard' public services, which clearly juxtaposed the spending on sports events and the actual

services, narrow pathways with irregular alignments, lots of irregular size and shape, and unlicensed constructions in violation with the legal patterns" (art. 234, § 3º see http://www.camara.rj.gov.br). In international literature it is often translated to 'slum', a translation criticized by Brazilian scholars for failing to capture the complex constitution of these communities. I favor the term favela due to its specificities in the Brazilian context, however, we use 'slum' in Paper 3 to engage with the wider academic production on sub-standard settlements and the 'politics of slums' (Dupont et al., 2016).

needs of the population. In addition to these large-scale, spectacular outbursts of dissent, other forms of everyday activism and popular politics by favela residents and broader social movements were also defending people's right to exist in the city. Examining the contentious interactions of state, market, and social actors on the mega-event developments can help untangle the political effects of Rio's mega-events, especially how they triggered popular politics and protests that sought to challenge de-politicized urban development and politicize urban citizenship.

This study employs a qualitative methodological design which includes ethnographic fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro's largest favela (Rocinha) and in-depth interviews with community activists, urban planners, architects, technocrats, politicians, and police. The overarching research question guiding the dissertation, is: *What are the political consequences of Rio's hosting of sports mega-events?* To examine this question, I have two focal points for my research:

(i) *How did the mega-events influence the political organization and management of the city?* Here, I focus on the political-economic structures of the Olympic city project in Rio. Sub-questions include: What are the economic, political, and elite interests that drive cities to host mega-events? What social and spatial consequences of Rio's mega-events can be observed?

(ii) *How did those marginalized and dispossessed by Rio's mega-event developments contest such processes?* Here, I focus on the mobilization and organization of resistance to the mega-event driven urban transformations. Sub-questions include: What forms and spaces of encounter did favela residents and other

concerned citizens turn to in order to impact the mega-event developments? What have they been able to accomplish?

Centrally, these two points of entry into the material 'from above' and 'from below' are not dichotomic but rather overlapping and interrelated. Building on the contentious politics-literature, my theoretical-analytical approach emphasizes the necessity of a relational and contextual analysis of the multi-scalar processes of urban social, spatial, and economic transformation during Rio's Olympic era. I place the analytical focus on dynamics of contention between public authorities, popular actors, and third-party actors and institutions (e.g. the media, the courts, the public defenders' office, academics, real estate) that engaged in contentions over the mega-events and their associated urban transformations. This way, I seek to provide a contextualized account of the interwoven processes of neoliberal urban development and popular mobilization, analyzed as contentious politics of urban citizenship, in the city's pre-Olympic years.

1.2. Structure of the dissertation

This dissertation is structured in two parts, where Part I clarifies the background and context of the five papers that constitute Part II.

The rest of Chapter 1 first, gives a brief overview of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro's recent political and social developments and situates the hosting of sports mega-events within this context. Subsequently, it introduces Rocinha as the empirical focus of the study and the case through which the research problem has been explored. It ends with brief summaries of the five papers. Chapter 2 presents the dissertation's theoretical framework, drawing together citizenship theory (section 2.1.), critical neoliberalization theory (section 2.2.), and scholarship on

social movements and contentious politics (section 2.3.). Chapter 3 accounts for the methodological design and research methods, reflecting on the advantages, disadvantages, and ethical challenges of the ethnographic fieldwork the dissertation is based upon. Chapter 4 presents longer summaries of the five papers and clarifies their contributions to the overarching research agenda. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings and contributions of the dissertation and its relevance for wider debates on cities, citizens, and urban processes.

1.3. Brazil's recent political and social developments

The backdrop of the study is one of the most unequal societies in the world (Medeiros, 2016), and inequalities are particularly evident in Brazilian cities. From 1950 to 1980, Brazil underwent a rapid and intense urbanization process transforming the country from predominantly rural to predominantly urban (Costa & Monte-Mór, 2015). Housing policies were not able to accommodate the mass influx of migrants, who innovated and constructed their own homes in the urban informal settlements known as favelas. In Rio de Janeiro, public authorities responded with favela removal campaigns carried out on a large scale in the early 1970s. These policies proved incapable of halting the growth of favelas as they did not address the root causes of Rio's housing shortage. Over the following decades, favelas continued to grow, and they currently house 22 percent of Rio's population (Dupont et al., 2016: 36).

Despite the favelas' central physical presence in Rio's unique topography; wedged between rich neighborhoods in the south zone and sprawling into the peripheries, they hold the space of the violent and

threatening 'other' in the social imaginary of *carioca*[3] elites (Perlman, 2010; Valladares, 2016; Zaluar & Alvito, 1998). Favelas have been presented as diseases on the social body, as marginal sites of insecurity, and as the epitome of all urban problems (Alves, 2018; Caldeira, 2000; Chalhoub, 2018; Magalhães, 2019). Stereotypical and racialized notions of the favelas as inherently violent, poor, and uncivilized were exacerbated as armed drug traffickers found a stronghold in these communities in the 1980s, much due to public policies of neglect (Holston, 2009; Perlman, 2010; Valladares, 2006) and state complicity (Arias, 2006). This has justified specific forms of state management of these communities and their populations while reproducing dynamics of segregation in the city.

In the face of pressing (urban) inequalities, Brazil has over the last decades institutionalized a framework to enhance the social, economic, and political inclusion of its citizens. From the late 1970s, an 'urban reform movement' - whose principal agents were urban social movements, favela dwellers, and middle-class professionals (architects, planners, lawyers) - became central in setting the agenda for Brazil's re-democratization after decades of military dictatorship (1965-1985) (Dagnino, 2005; Fernandes, 2008, 2011; Rolnik, 2011). The fruits of the movement's struggles were manifest in the 1988 'Citizen Constitution', whose nickname nods to its recognition of social and economic rights such as housing, employment, education, and health. The Constitution further incorporated new ideas about the 'social function' of cities and urban property and the right of all urban residents to participate in urban planning (Caldeira & Holston, 2015).

[3] Carioca is a Rio native

The 1990s was a time of intense debate on urban politics and the role of citizens and their organizations in governing cities (Maricato, 2011). A myriad of mechanisms was introduced to institutionalize citizens' participation in public decision-making, such as policy councils and conferences at different scales and participatory budgeting. These experiments consolidated Brazil's international reputation as a 'laboratory of participatory democracy' (Avritzer, 2009; Baiocchi, Braathen, & Teixeira, 2013; Coelho, 2007). Meanwhile, local-level laws and policies as well as the 2001 City Statute - a federal law that consolidates and expands the constitutional provisions for urban reform and provides guidelines and tools for their implementation - recognized the 'right to the city' (Friendly, 2013; Maricato, 2011; Rolnik, 2011).

In 2002, the election of the Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* - PT) candidate Inácio Lula da Silva as President brought hopes of further urban social and economic transformation. The PT had a strong foundation in both workers' unions and an array of social movements, such as the landless workers' movement (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores sem Terra* – MST). This has been highly unusual in the Brazilian context where close relationships between political parties and social movements have been quite scarce. The election of Lula – as da Silva is universally known – thus led to a changing relationship between social movements and the state. From having antagonized the state, social movements engaged directly with it (Hochstetler, 2008). Under Lula, the PT formulated a social democratic approach that attempted to combine social concerns for the poor with economic concerns for growth. Centered around the persona of Lula himself, this political platform came to be known as *lulismo* (Singer, 2012).

The PT did take steps to strengthen the diffusion and implementation of an urban reform agenda under Lula. In 2003, a Ministry of Cities was

established to be the locus for designing and implementing urban policies. The Ministry's objective was to fight social inequalities, transform cities into more humanized spaces, and extend the access of the population to housing, sanitation, and transport (Maricato, 2003; Rolnik, 2011). Meanwhile, Lula's second term (2007-2010) launched an ambitious development agenda for industry, infrastructure, and welfare. This would lead to unprecedented investments in favela upgrading and social housing through the federal Growth Acceleration Program (*Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento* - PAC) and My House, My Life Program (*Minha Casa, Minha Vida* – MCMV). Further, Lula and his handpicked successor Dilma Rousseff (2010-2016, also from the PT) incentivized increased access to employment while minimum income improved. Initiatives such as the cash transfer program Bolsa Familia helped reduce monetary poverty, bringing 50 percent of the population into the alleged 'new middle class' (Class C) - an income-based approach to determining social classes (Neri, 2010).

However, prior to and in parallel with this democratic, participatory project of extension of citizenship taking place, Brazil saw the rise of a neoliberal offensive. The deepening of political democracy in the 1980s had coincided with an era of debt crisis and fiscal austerity. The administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) deepened the neoliberal economic reforms first initiated by President Fernando Collor de Mello (impeached in 1992). Neoliberalism thus replaced the developmentalist import-substitution-industrialization policies of the dictatorship as a new 'system of accumulation' (Saad-Filho & Morais, 2018). The neoliberal reform agenda that penetrated the Brazilian state in the 1990s had profound repercussions for the urban domain. As Maricato (2011) notes, it led to deregulation of the real estate market, privatization of public services such as sanitation and transport,

and a move towards strategic planning and urban entrepreneurialism. Furthermore, the country's neoliberalization had far-reaching implications for citizenship. Social rights enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution – such as labor rights - were being progressively eroded on the grounds that they impeded the freedom of the market and restricted economic development and modernization. These changes influenced also the PT. Lula and Dilma's presidencies continued the neoliberal macroeconomic framework of Cardoso and increasingly prescribed to neoliberal notions of citizenship and participation (Dagnino, 2010; Hochstetler, 2008; Singer, 2012).

Despite comprehensive policies to reduce extreme poverty and urban inequalities, the PT years failed to significantly challenge entrenched inequalities. While monetary extreme poverty was halved between 2000 and 2010 (Neri, 2010), non-monetary poverty remained almost at the same level (Braathen et al., 2013). The basic living and housing conditions in Brazilian cities did not improve significantly. One of the reasons was that the ambition of combatting inequalities had largely been oriented towards piecemeal social and economic change. Key issues such as land reform, security politics, and the governing of cities had been addressed under Lula's first period but faded away as progressive items on the public agenda due to the PT's dependence on conservative coalition partners from his second term[4] (Singer, 2012, 2018). Therefore, multiple deprivations and exclusions from basic sanitation networks, lack of housing entitlements, and inadequate public transport, health, security, and education services continued to characterize the lives of large segments of the Brazilian population, leaving Brazil in an 'urban crisis' (Maricato, 2001; Rolnik, 2011).

[4] I expand on this in Paper 2.

In this situation, the hosting of costly sports mega-events would increase people's political engagement, in particular given the close connection between sports – especially soccer - and popular culture in Brazil (Gaffney, 2016; Mascarenhas, 2007; Wisnik, 2006). As the host city for both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, these issues were particularly pressing in Rio de Janeiro.

1.4. Rio de Janeiro and sports mega-events as an urban development strategy

Rio de Janeiro had been strongly affected by the economic crisis in the 1980s. Lack of public funding led to massive disinvestment, which created serious urban problems such as rising trends of poverty and insecurity. This tarnished the national and international identity of the city known as the *cidade maravilhosa* – the 'marvelous city' (Broudehoux, 2001). The city government therefore embraced urban entrepreneurialism and embarked on a massive image-making program in an attempt to accelerate the city's economy and restore its reputation (Vainer, 2000). The hosting of sports mega-events became a central aspect of this strategy. Inspired by the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, Rio's city government saw the potential of sports mega-events in branding Rio as a destination for tourists and foreign investors and transforming Rio into a 'global city' (Sassen, 1991). Rio politicians invited Catalan consultants to elaborate a strategic plan for the city, which followed the 'Barcelona model' of regenerating run-down, post-industrial areas (Sánchez & Broudehoux, 2013: 133-4; Vainer, 2009).

Rio won the right to host the 2007 Pan-American Games, the 2014 FIFA World Cup (as one of 12 host cities), and – to complete the hat trick - the

2016 Olympic Games (after two failed candidatures). Receiving the news that Rio had won the bid on the Olympics in 2009, President Lula stated that "Brazil has left its 2nd class status behind and has joined the 1st class, today we received respect".[5] Hosting the largest sports spectacles in the world constituted a huge step in the direction of restoring the country and city's battered self-esteem. The hope was that the Olympics would crown Brazil's remarkable rise during the first decade of the new millennium to become an economic and political power to be reckoned with and situate Rio de Janeiro as a 'global city' (Richmond & Garmany, 2016; Gaffney, 2010).

Hosting events of this scale requires massive investments and public expenditure. Leaving a positive legacy is therefore one of the recent concerns of the Olympic system as a way of legitimizing itself (Horne & Whannel, 2012). Emphasizing legacy plans has been an important aspect of candidate cities' bids on the Olympics since the 1990s, inspired by the 'best case' of Barcelona that was able to use the Games as part of a conscious long-term development strategy that radically transformed the city (Gold & Gold, 2016). Rio's bid on the 2016 Olympics proposed to use the Games to improve the living conditions of the poor and improve security in the city. The Sustainability Management Plan of the Olympics, developed by the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, stated that one of the strategic objectives of the municipal planning department was to organize inclusive Games that would leave the city's population with 'a positive social balance' (Girginov, 2012). A series of programs were either developed or realigned to achieve this objective, targeting the city's favelas in particular. The historically unique political-ideological alignment of elected authorities at the municipal, state, and federal

[5] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VkYolwdU37g

levels (see Paper 2) was central for the political will and capacity to see through large-scale urban transformations.

At the federal level, the PAC and MCMV programs invested unparalleled amounts in large-scale infrastructural development and social housing. At the municipal level, the Morar Carioca program was launched in 2010 to upgrade all of the city's favelas and integrate them with the 'formal' city by 2020 as a lasting legacy of the mega-events. Meanwhile, at the state level, a new police program called UPP (*Unidade de Policia Pacificadora* - Units of Pacifying Police) was developed as an alternative to the militarized and notoriously violent policing of favelas. UPP was designed as a combination of proximity policing and a social component, the municipal program UPP Social (later re-named Rio+Social) that would provide social services like job trainings and cultural activities. The stated goal of this package of interventions was to take back state control over territories controlled by drug traffickers to give back to the local population peace and public safety and promote the 'full exercise and development of citizenship' (Henriques and Ramos, 2011). Seen together, these programs represented the most ambitious investments in favela upgrading in Brazil's history. They denoted an apparent commitment to combatting socio-spatial inequalities and tackling the pressing social and environmental issues these communities faced and, as such, a step towards overcoming the negative social and physical legacies of Rio's rapid urbanization.

With the Barcelona Games as the one notable exception to confirm the rule, hosting sports mega-events rarely gets a medal as an urban development strategy. Host efforts tend to be over-promised and under-funded, and seldom achieve the goals local organizers set out to fulfill (Krohe Jr., 2010). In Rio, high expectations of socially oriented

development were gradually replaced with increasing disillusionment among social movements, favela residents, and other concerned citizens. The above-mentioned programs' implementation became increasingly linked to delivering the mega-events, causing strategic priorities to shift and significant distortions of the stated aims. Forced evictions of poor urban dwellers, rising costs of living without significant improvements to basic public services, and increasing militarization of security politics, are some of the issues that have been raised (Gaffney, 2010; Freeman, 2012, 2014; Sørbøe, 2013).

In understanding why, scholars have critically examined the processes of political and urban change that accompanied the making of Rio into an Olympic city. Mega-events are once-in-a-lifetime opportunities for cities with 'global' ambitions to position themselves on the international scene. In order to ensure the events' success, a 'state of exception' (Agamben, 2005; Poulantzas, 1977) is created where the state suspends established laws to push through the necessary preparations (Stavrides, 2016). According to Vainer (2017; see also Oliveira et al., 2020), the mega-events in Rio deepened the already-authoritarian tendencies of the entrepreneurial, competitive city. The prospected benefits of the events legitimized an opportunistic mode of governance where political and economic elites exploited the event-related sense of urgency to remake the city in their image (see also Freeman, 2012; Gaffney, 2010; Sánchez & Broudehoux, 2013). As the Olympic bid books became the de-facto urban planning documents in Rio, illegalities and exceptions to the institutional order multiplied in the 'city of exception' (Vainer, 2011).

As a challenge to democratic governance and citizenship 'from above', this type of de-politicized city-making led to growing insecurities and inequalities. Tensions were building up, and in 2013 millions of people took to the streets in protests. These 'June uprisings' started in the

beginning of June but lasted long beyond the month they take their name from, thus becoming the largest street demonstrations in a generation. One of the catalysts for the demonstrations was the lavish spending on sports stadiums and other mega-event constructions over more pressing needs for investments in public transportation, health, and education (Harvey et al., 2013). The demonstrations raised issues in the public debate in Brazil regarding citizenship; how to listen to the 'voice of the street', take the grievances of ordinary people seriously, improve the quality of democracy, and defend people's right to demonstrate and feeling secure from police abuse. These spectacular protests, building on longer-term struggles and more mundane forms of popular politics and resistance (Gaffney, 2016), thereby challenged the state of democracy and citizenship 'from below'.

1.5. Rocinha: a paradigmatic case of Rio's contested mega-event developments

This dissertation examines how mega-event driven 'global city' developments in Rio de Janeiro accentuated and intensified deeply rooted structures of exclusion and segregation, which led to multifaceted forms of contestation and resistance. The analytical focus is on the forms and places of encounter of favela residents, public authorities, and third parties that engaged in contentions over the mega-event driven urban developments and their implications for urban citizenship. The dissertation looks at these encounters through the lens of Rocinha, Brazil's largest and most densely populated favela. Rocinha's approximately 150'000 residents live in one of the most privileged areas of Rio in terms of location, a hillside wedged between the city's richest neighborhoods in the upscale South Zone. Its socio-economic indicators

are however a different story. The fragmentation or dualization of urban social space has created deep divides between Rocinha and its neighbors. For example, in 2007 the average monthly salary was R$ 214[6] in Rocinha and R$ 2,042 in neighboring Gávea (Leitão, 2007).

Figure I: Location of case study areas



Rocinha was a recipient of several of the high-profile interventions connected to the mega-events. It was targeted by two rounds of infrastructure investments through the PAC Growth Acceleration Program between 2007 and 2013 and received a UPP police unit in 2012. Furthermore, the government in 2010 promised decisive action to resettle people living in areas of environmental risk after a deadly landslide in the sub-neighborhood Laboriaux. These resettlements were however denounced by residents as a 'favela thinning' strategy (Freeman & Burgos, 2017); an attempt to evict favelas located on valuable land. Residents also disputed the profile of PAC's infrastructure projects and the racialized police violence reproduced within the UPPs. In response to these contested interventions, residents

[6] The exchange rate in 2007 was approximately 1 BRL – 0.6 USD.

organized large-scale popular protests in 2013 during the June uprisings. Rocinha is, as such, a paradigmatic case of the general and interwoven processes of urban development and popular mobilization in pre-Olympic Rio. The five papers that make up the dissertation explore these processes from different angles. Figure II illustrates the dissertation's research focus and the different papers' situatedness within this landscape.

Figure II: Contentious politics of urban citizenship in pre-Olympic Rio



The first contribution; 'Urban Development in Rio de Janeiro During the 'Pink Tide': Bridging Socio-Spatial Divides Between the Formal and Informal City?' gives a broad overview and introduction to the themes explored in the dissertation. It reflects on how the PT years made

notable advances in reducing poverty and inequality through programs of redistribution and social inclusion. However, it also emphasizes that the 'Pink Tide' in Brazil was marked by continuities as much as ruptures and therefore failed to significantly challenge entrenched inequalities. Through an account of *lulismo's* promises of social and economic development and the implementation of the PAC and UPP programs in Rocinha, the chapter first, reflects on advancements and limitations of the PT years for more inclusive and substantive citizenship. Second, it turns to how Rocinha residents took to the streets in June and July of 2013 in protest against the profile of the PAC and UPP interventions and the limitations to their social mobility. Third, it turns to how a 'revanchist' counter-reaction to the gains that were, in fact, made by poorer segments of society during the PT years, can be observed by the traditional middle class, represented by residents of Rocinha's middle-class neighbor São Conrado.

The next three papers go deeper into how different interventions 'from above' into favelas in the pre-Olympic years - respectively the PAC program, the favela 'thinning' interventions, and the UPP police program - were met with contestations 'from below'. The **second paper;** 'Politics of Urban Transformation in pre-Olympic Rio de Janeiro: Contentions and confluences between citizen- and market-centred agendas', focuses on the PAC program's promise of participatory upgrading of favelas. The planning of upgrading interventions in Rocinha took place through the drafting of a bottom-up, participatory Master Plan developed between 2004-2006. This Plan was connected to the PT's citizen-centered agenda for urban transformation during Lula's first term and represented a best-case scenario for socially oriented development. However, the materialization of planned works through PAC from 2007-2013 took place within Rio's neoliberal, entrepreneurial

urban governance and development. The article examines how contentions and 'perverse confluences' between citizen- and market-centered agendas influenced the trajectory of PAC. This narrative presents a perspective 'from below' and insights into the contested and contradictory nature of politics of urban transformation in pre-Olympic Rio.

The **third paper;** 'Contentious Politics of Slums: Understanding different outcomes of community resistance against evictions in Rio de Janeiro', moves focus to the city's agenda of 'thinning out' or evicting favelas located close to touristic areas and sports arenas. It analyzes and compares the structures and processes of mobilization against evictions in three favelas; Laboriaux (a sub-neighborhood of Rocinha), Morro da Providência, and Vila Autódromo during what we identify as three distinct moments or political opportunity structures in Rio's urban governance between 2010-2016. The first, the City of Exception, draws on Vainer's thesis of mega-event induced exceptional governance. It is when threats of evictions were launched. The subsequent City in Revolt refers to the 2013 June uprisings, while the City in Crisis represents the 2013-2016 period when political and economic crises enveloped the city and country. We present an analytical-theoretical framework of 'contentious politics of slums' that helps us examine (i) how the three cases found different openings and limitations during the three changing 'City moments', and (ii) how and why the outcomes of the resistance (material, social, political-symbolic forms and/or degrees of 'success') varied in the three cases.

The **fourth paper;** 'Eluding the 'Esculacho': a masculinities perspective on Rio's police', focuses on the UPP program. As noted, this community policing program pledged to improve security and contribute to the development of more inclusive citizenship in favelas marked by high

levels of police and urban violence. In spite of the promise of a softer approach, police ethos and practices remained permeated by logics of violence. To understand why, in addition to placing the UPPs within Rio's neoliberal urban context and securitization agenda ahead of the Olympics, the article shows the value of looking at social and gender dynamics in the organizational, occupational, and street working environment of the police.

Finally, **the fifth paper; '**Urban Uprisings Between Revolutionary Openings and Reactionary Outcomes: Making sense of the 2013 'June days' in Brazil'**,** returns to a more overarching perspective on Brazil and Rio's Olympic era by examining the political dynamics of the June uprisings as a counter-reaction to disillusionments with the PT years. It engages with two overarching narratives on the uprisings' emergence and significance; (i) a narrative of June's 'Revolutionary Openings' which, drawing on post-foundational theoretical notions of the political as an agonistic rupture with an established social order, views the June uprisings as a sociopolitical opening that politicized Brazilian society by bringing into being new political actors and imaginaries, and (ii) a narrative of June's 'Reactionary Outcomes' which, building on critical social theory, analyzes the class politics and social reactionary aftereffects of the June uprisings. On the basis of an in-depth account of a demonstration originating in Rocinha, the article nuances and transcends these two narratives, seeking to add new understanding both to contemporary debates on the political significance of June and to wider debates on how to assess the transformative politics of contemporary urban uprisings.

2. Theorizing Contentious Politics of Citizenship

This chapter presents the theoretical underpinnings of the dissertation and is organized into three sections. The first examines citizenship as a contested concept and an axis of political struggles in Brazil. The second turns to critical scholarship on neoliberalism to frame the political-economic structures that shaped the Olympic city project and that challenged the content and extent of citizenship 'from above'. The third focuses on scholarship on contentious politics and social and political movements to make sense of the different forms of resistance and claim-making mobilized 'from below' in response to the mega-event driven urban transformations. The chapter concludes by arguing that contestations between neoliberal and popular agendas for the city and for urban collective life constitute a contentious politics of citizenship that needs to be examined through a relational and contextual approach.

2.1. Citizenship: Contested and Political

The etymology of the word 'citizenship' reveals its urban origins. Deriving from the Old French *citeien*, from cite', or city, there are clear connections between citizenship and what we in English call city-state (Varsanyi, 2006:231). Since the 18th century, the national has however trumped the urban in our everyday usage of the word. The conventional liberal model of citizenship foregrounds the juridical status of individuals within an assumed-to-be bounded, homogenous, and stable territorial state as the pivot of citizenship (Desforges, Jones, & Woods, 2005; Stokke & Erdal, 2017). With the 'third wave' of democratic transitions in the 1980s, the reach of formal liberal democracy and citizenship was extended to all four corners of the world. However, the liberal model and the assumptions upon which it rests has been contested.

In this section of the chapter, I first, outline how cultural and global 'turns' have challenged and politicized liberal conceptualizations, before I second, turn to urban citizenship and struggles over the right to the city. Third, I turn to a contextualized theorization of citizenship in Brazil, before I forth, outline contested notions of citizenship as an axis of political struggles. Seen together, this section forms the backdrop for framing and understanding how and why citizenship politics were at stake in pre-Olympic Rio.

2.1.1. Broadening and politicizing citizenship: the cultural and global 'turns'

Classic liberal theorizations of citizenship have conceptualized the acquisition of Marshall's (1950) famous trilogy of civil, political, and

social rights as a linear, cumulative process whereby citizenship rights are successively endowed members of the nation-state in conformity with the principle of formal equality. The liberal model as such rests on a notion of universality whereby all members of the political community are supposed to be granted citizenship on the same terms and where laws, rules, and rights apply equally to all (Young, 1990, 1998). Ethnic, cultural, and sexual minorities have however charged that behind the veil of 'universal citizenship' and 'equality before the law' there lay systematic forms of domination and oppression (Isin, Wood, & Wood, 1999). Differential and unequal citizenship rights are inscribed in or assigned to bodies depending on racial and cultural markers, places of origin or residence, as well as differences of gender, education, property, and occupation (Isin, 2002; Lister, 1997; Yuval-Davis, 1997). This is particularly prominent in the global South, where colonial social identities and relations continue to shape inclusions and exclusions and, as such, people's experiences of citizenship (Chatterjee, 2004; Holston, 2009; Mamdani, 2018; Nyamnjoh, 2007). As Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar (2018: 1) note of Latin America, the rigid social hierarchies of class, race, and gender that have typified social relations since colonial times "have prevented the vast majority of de jure citizens from even imagining, let alone publicly claiming, the prerogative to have rights".

Against such a backdrop, there has been an increase of citizenship politics around the construction of political communities and the recognition and extension of rights. Some have raised the need for group-differentiated rights to address the difference between equality before the law and equality in rights (Fraser, 1995; Kymlicka, 1995; Young, 1998). Others, like Mouffe (1991), have advocated for a non-essentialist understanding of identity, where integration should be found in the political sphere rather than in the conception of community. These

debates, part of the so-called 'cultural' turn in social theory and citizenship studies, have broadened citizenship by questioning assumptions of universality and bringing attention to diversity.

A second, 'global' turn has come with the last decades' neoliberal economic globalization, which has destabilized the political centrality of the nation-state and opened up for multi-scalar forms of governance and citizenship (Desforges et al., 2005; Stokke, 2013). On the one hand, neoliberalization has meant that membership, rights, and participation are no longer defined only by citizens' relations to the state but also to the market and even civil society (Stokke, 2017: 199). As will be expanded on in the next section of this chapter, neoliberalism narrows down the scope of affairs that are to be controlled by the state. The transition towards a marketized economy has spurred a retrenchment in the capacity and willingness of national governments to support the social rights of citizenship (Staeheli, 2011; Ward & Gleditsch, 2004). As the state withdraws from its role as a provider of services and guarantor of rights, the market is offered as a surrogate instance of citizenship (Campbell & Marshall, 2000; Clarke et al., 2007; Dagnino, 2007). Increasing attention has also been given to civil society and the role of communities in fostering 'active citizenship'. By granting people responsibility and accountability, they are assumed to be transformed from passive recipients of services into self-relying 'active citizens' who take part in and contribute to their communities (Jessop, 2002; Marinetto, 2003; Robins, Cornwall, & Von Lieres, 2008).

Economic globalization has also challenged the spatiality of the nation-state model of citizenship by giving rise to new scales and domains of belonging. Citizenship is being rescaled upwards above the nation-state through the emergence of supranational organizations and institutions like the EU and the UN, which provide a higher jurisdiction in which

citizens can press claims and define belonging (Dobson, 2013; Martiniello, 2000; Rumford, 2003). The increase in international migration means that migrants may develop binational conceptualizations of citizenship (Smith & Bakker, 2008; Soysal & Soyland, 1994) while new transnational citizenships are emerging based on ethnic, cultural, or religious identities and promoted by diasporic communities and faith groups (Grewal, 2005; Isin, 1997; Nagel & Staeheli, 2004). International human rights regimes are by some argued to be the basis for an emerging postnational citizenship (Benhabib, 2008; Sassen, 2002). Others again advance the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship as the 'duties of solidarity that human beings have towards others across state borders and national identities' (Bauböck, 2009: 475) or global citizenship as a political membership under a world government (Davies, 2006; Schattle, 2009). Furthermore, and of particular interest for this dissertation, the increased political and economic centrality of the city has revitalized scholarly debates on urban citizenship.

2.1.2. Urban citizenship and the right to the city

The scholarship on urban citizenship sees the city as the principal loci of belonging and claim-making in a world cross-cut by global processes (Douglass & Friedmann, 1998; Holston, 1999; Varsanyi, 2006). Rather than a status derived from blood, territorial or matrimonial bonds (*jus sanguinis*, *jus soli* and *jus matrimonii*; acquired respectively on the basis of parents' citizenship, being born within the territory, or marrying a citizen), urban citizenship denotes a form of identification with the city and a political identity (Dikeç, 2009). Holston (2011: 336) defines it as "a citizenship that refers to the city as its primary political community and concerns an agenda of rights-claims that address city living at its substance". Cities are sites where identity, politics, and power interact

to create access to political, civil, and economic rights (Purcell, 2002; Sanyal & Desai, 2012). In the words of Isin (2002: 50), cities have therefore become battlegrounds "through which groups define their identities, stake their claims, wage their battles and articulate citizenship rights and obligations".

Claims to urban citizenship have increasingly been linked to demands for the 'right to the city' (Blokland et al., 2015; Harvey, 2008, 2012; Holston, 1999; Mayer, 2009; Mitchell, 2003). The term was coined by Henri Lefebvre (1968) as a call for a radical re-appropriation of everyday life by social and political actions against the forces of capital and state power. The right to the city acknowledges all city residents as 'rights holders' with a collective right to access the opportunities a city has to offer. It has two central components; the right to appropriate urban space and the right to participate centrally in its production (Purcell, 2002, 2003). The right to appropriate urban space involves the right to live, work, play, and occupy urban space in a particular city. In direct opposition to capital's imperative to continuously turn urban space into new exchange values, this affirms a counter-right to appropriation, occupation, and use. Meanwhile, the right to participation underlines that urban residents have a right to participate in the very definition of society and its political system, to define what kind of city to construct for the future. As emphasized by Harvey (2012: 4), the right to the city is "far more than a right of individual or group access to the resources the city embodies: it is the right to change and reinvent the city more after our hearts' desire". This underlines the political aspects of the right to the city as "the right to claim, to struggle and to redefine the relation between domination and appropriation" (Gilbert & Phillips, 2003: 316-17).

To summarize the points raised thus far, the cultural and global 'turns' have broadened and politicized citizenship by recognizing difference and by rescaling and requalifying the sites and relations through which citizenship is constructed. As a consequence, citizenship has become a focal point for political struggles, struggles that in Brazil have emerged from discrepancies between the assumed universality of national citizenship and hierarchical degrees of membership and inclusion.

2.1.3. Brazil's history of 'differentiated citizenship'

While all Brazilians have formal citizenship as members of the nation-state, substantive citizenship; the distribution of rights, duties, and resources this formal status entails and which people actually exercise, has not been uniformly accessible. Holston (2009: 7) claims that Brazil is characterized by a citizenship that is "universally inclusive in membership and massively inegalitarian in the distribution of rights and resources". He points out that a range of socio-economic, political, racial, and cultural markers have constituted means through which to include people in the polity while maintaining their exclusion from substantive rights.

Throughout the last century, scholars have conceptualized this differentiated access to citizenship rights under banners like 'concessioned' citizenship (Carvalho, 1991; Sales, 1994) and 'relational' citizenship (Matta, 1987). Consessioned citizenship refers to the social and political practices of *coronelismo* in the late 1800s, where the lower strata of the population were granted civil rights not from the state, but rather as a 'favor' from the landed elite. This 'culture of gift' (*cultura da dádiva*, Telles, 1994) relied on a conception of rights as mediated by power relations characterized by rule and submission. It has seen its continuation within clientelist practices, whereby social programs to the

poor have been presented as a favor from benevolent benefactors (Burgos, 1998; Caldeira, 1984).

Even when the twentieth-century urbanization and industrialization made the political incorporation of the masses unavoidable, citizenship rights have continued to be shaped by oligarchic conceptions of politics and power. This is illustrated by Matta's (1987) conceptualization of 'relational' citizenship, which points to how rights have been defined by the power relationships present in a given circumstance and an individual's social standing relative to others. This is manifest in the common Brazilian question 'do you know whom you are talking to?' and high-status (i.e. white, male, educated) individuals' expectations that the law will differentiate and reward them (Holston, 2009; Mitchell & Wood, 1999)[7].

In contrast, Fisher's (2008) analysis of the urban poor's weak legal status in 20th century Rio shows how being poor has meant not only to experience economic or material deprivation but also a 'poverty of rights'. To be poor has been seen as a sign of inferiority and incivility; a form of existence that denies people recognition as subjects and bearers of rights. As such, they have been left without a claim to the guarantees inscribed in Brazilian laws, seen for example in their weak protection against illegal evictions (expanded on in Paper 3). This provides key insights into how urban poverty cannot be understood exclusively in material terms, but also as a limited citizenship. However, the characterization of heterogeneous populations as the 'urban poor' has been criticized for underplaying the significant role that other overlapping axes of difference – like gender and race - play in fundamentally shaping subjectivities and inclusions/exclusions (Ystanes

[7] For example, university graduates had the right to a private jail cell up until 2009 while the poor cram into some of the world's most overfilled prisons.

& Salem, 2020). This is particularly manifest in the relationship the urban poor have had with the security apparatus of the state.

Within the 'war on drugs', a militarized approach to combatting drug trafficking, the policing of Rio's favelas from the 1980s onwards became increasingly violent. As I explain in further detail in Papers 1 and 4, favela residents have been viewed as accomplices of drug traffickers due to neighborhood relations, kinship, or economic and political ties. As the police have seen no innocents in favelas (Leite, 2012) residents have been rendered what Agamben (2005) would call 'bare life' - free to be killed with impunity. Rio's police are responsible for one-third of the unnatural deaths in the city the last decade, and the overwhelming majority are young, black men from favelas whose killings are never investigated (Amnesty International, 2015). These statistics, denounced by residents, activists, and academics (e.g. Alves, 2018; Cardoso, 2018; Rodríguez, 2018) as a state-sanctioned genocide or 'necropolitics' (Mbembe, 2003) on black males, stand in glaring contradiction to the long-standing notion of Brazil as a 'racial democracy'[8]. The racial democracy's discourses of miscegenation and assimilation have served to paper over the reality of everyday racism that the black population suffers in Brazil and foreclose critical debate and protest (Fry, 2000; van Leerzem, Nuijten, & de Vries, 2016).

2.1.4. Contested notions of citizenship as an axis of political struggles

Against the legacies of centuries of inequality and uneven distribution of privileges, the working classes and urban peripheries in Brazil from

[8] This notion is grounded in the idea of the *mestiçagem* or 'mixture' of races as the majority of Brazilians have a mixed racial heritage and Brazil has not had formal racial segregation since the 1888 abolition of slavery (Guimarães, 2002).

the late 1970s constructed a civic force that confronted the entrenched and contested their right to inclusion. Dagnino (2007; 2010) points out that citizenship became a common reference point among a range of social movements such as those of favela dwellers, women, workers, the landless, LGBT, Afro-Brazilians, as well as urban movements working with concrete issues like decent housing, health, education, water, and sewage. The general claim for equal rights already embedded in the conventional concept of citizenship was expanded and connected to contemporary concerns with subjectivities, identities and the right to difference (Dagnino 2007: 549). Demands for the right to the city were also central, which, as Holston (2011) underlines, represented a shift from a framework of declaring needs to a framework of demanding those needs as rights (see also Rolnik, 2011).

Holston (2009; 2011) focuses particularly on how residents of urban peripheries contested their right to universal inclusion through an 'insurgent citizenship'. He argues that they came to understand their basic needs not only in terms of their inhabiting and suffering in the city but also in terms of building it – 'of building homes and neighborhoods and making the city's landscape, history, daily life, and politics into a place for themselves'. He claims that this insurgent agenda of city-making through day-to-day struggles coalesced into a sense that they had a right to what they produced—a right, in sum, to the city itself (Holston, 2019: 125-26).

The redefinition of citizenship undertaken by social movement sectors not only served as a weapon in their specific struggles against social and economic exclusion and inequality. As Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar (2018) note, it confronted existing boundaries of the political arena and who were to be the players of the political game. Rather than passive recipients of a set of pre-defined rights within the existing political–

judicial system, this insurgent citizenship 'from below' envisioned citizens as active social subjects and participants in the political arena (J. Friedman, 2002). As noted in the introduction (and expanded on in Paper 2), these idea(l)s influenced Brazil's re-democratization process and were recognized in the 1988 Constitution as well as by local-level legal frameworks.

However, as also noted, Brazil's democratization coincided with a process of neoliberalization and these processes have intertwined in paradoxical ways (Caldeira & Holston, 2015). The building of democracy and citizenship in Brazil has been what Caldeira and Holston (1999: 692) call a 'disjunctive' process; "a mix of progressive and regressive elements, uneven, unbalanced, and heterogeneous". As democratization disrupted "established formulas of rule and their hierarchies of place and privilege" (Holston 2009: 14), a neoliberal counteroffensive has sought to curtail the advancements that had been made and the possibilities of continued democratic transformation (Cornwall, Romano, & Shankland, 2008; Dagnino, 2007). As noted above, neoliberalism also focuses on citizenship. However, in contrast to the collective understanding citizenship had been given by social movements, neoliberalism engineers the social in the direction of greater individualized responsibility (Harvey, 2005). This would de-politicize the meaning citizenship had taken as a unifying battle cry of the marginalized and excluded in their struggles for social and political inclusion.

One way in which this can be observed is in the structures and processes of participation. Popular participation has become mainstreamed in different types of neoliberal development projects. While the active involvement of target populations is encouraged, neoliberal structures of participation and inclusion tend to contain collective action within

sanctioned 'invited' spaces (Cornwall, 2002). In contrast to bottom-up, 'invented' (Miraftab, 2004) spaces where grassroots actors challenge dominant power relations in the hope of societal change, in invited spaces terms are defined from outside and from above. Along with Arnstein's (1969) 'ladder of participation', the focus of these spaces is often more on tokenistic 'listening' and 'dialogue' than agonistic debate, and the target populations' room for influencing the overall project is often limited. Such participatory spaces and practices have therefore been described as a form of de-politicizing 'tyranny', reproducing dominant hierarchies of power and fragmentizing collective action rather than encouraging empowerment (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Roberts, 2004). Along a parallel line, an extensive body of work drawing on Foucauldian explorations of governmentality points to the 'civilizing' project inherent in neoliberal participatory practices, whereby involving the 'dangerous popular classes' in such efforts is supposed to transform them into law-abiding, obedient subjects (Marinetto, 2003; Nuijten, 2013). This type of community involvement is seen as an effective means of social regulation and depoliticization.

These are different examples of how the citizenship discourse has become 'perverse' (Dagnino, 2007, 2010; Nijiten, 2013). In Brazil, insurgent and neoliberal conceptualizations of citizenship coexist and make similar references to the centrality of an active civil society and popular participation. However, they grant different meanings to these terms, which Dagnino (2007: 550) calls a 'perverse confluence'. She underlines that the common vocabulary and institutional mechanisms conceal contradictions by displacing dissonant meanings, with critical implications for how poverty and inequality is addressed.

This shows the contentious and political nature of citizenship. Rio's hosting of sports mega-events would exacerbate contestations between

such different understandings and utilizations of citizenship, making Rio's Olympic era a pressure cooker of politics of citizenship. In the next two sections of the chapter, I go deeper into theories that frame the neoliberal urban restructuring 'from above' and popular politics and protests 'from below'.

2.2. Neoliberal Urban Transformation

This section looks at the ongoing processes of neoliberal urban transformation that are rapidly and profoundly changing the meaning of the city and of urban space. Neoliberalism mobilizes urban space as an arena for market-centered economic growth and elite consumption practices. In so doing, it also transforms the politico-economic setting in which public plans and projects are implemented, narrowing down the scope of what is subjected to public insight and debate (Sager, 2011: 149). By examining these processes, this section provides the theoretical backdrop for addressing the dissertation's focus on how Rio's neoliberal, entrepreneurial governance and mega-event preparations influenced the social, spatial, and political organization and management of the city.

First, I give an account of what is meant by neoliberalism, and second, its 'actually existing' forms. Third, I turn to recent debates on 'decentering' the Euro-American centricity of critical urban neoliberalization theory, before I forth, turn to scholarship on urban entrepreneurialism. Finally, I discuss the alleged de-politicized or 'post-political' nature of neoliberal urban governance.

2.2.1. Defining neoliberalism

The world-encompassing economic decline of the 1970s induced a lengthy process of restructuring politics and the economy towards neoliberalism. The processes, rationalities, and governmentalities of neoliberalism amount to a set of paradigmatic changes in the relations between the economy, state bodies, society, and the natural world (Castree, 2010). In general terms, neoliberalism is seen to designate an approach to the conduct of human affairs in which the so-called free market is given priority and where non-market spheres of activity are colonized by the logic of commodity exchange (Ibid.; Harvey, 2005). While the concept of neoliberalism has become commonplace among critical researchers in reference to the current state of capitalism[9], there is no single agreed-upon definition. Furthermore, what scholars actually refer to when deploying the concept is diverse and diffuse, ranging from an ideology to a policy regime to a distinctive form of governmentality (Larner, 2000). It is worth dwelling on these different dimensions before I turn to neoliberalism's 'actually existing' forms and how it shapes urban politics and governance.

As an ideology, neoliberal ideas trace back to the revival of economic liberalism in the mid-twentieth century through the work of protagonists such as Friedrich von Hayek (1944) and Milton Friedman (1962). These scholars had a strong antipathy towards centralized state planning and argued that the post-second world war order with communist and Keynesian welfare states constituted an attack on the freedom of the individual (Castree, 2010; Harvey, 2005). In the 1970s and 80s, the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, Thatcherism in the U.K.,

[9]Others again refer to the same overarching tendencies under labels such as contemporary capitalism (Sassen, 2014), late capitalism (Luisetti, 2019) and absolute capitalism (Rancière, in Schismenos, Ktenas, & Tarinski, 2017: 13).

and Reaganomics in the U.S. dissolved Keneysian orders and made the move towards a new mode of accumulation. The novelty of the 'neo' in neoliberalism refers to the recapitulating of classic liberal capitalism's belief in civic, political, and economic freedoms towards what Castree (2010) criticizes as an 'unhealthy preoccupation' with the latter. Furthermore, it was novel in being a truly global project. In the 1980s and 90s, neoliberalism was diffused through economic globalization, international finance institutions, and the so-called Washington Consensus which prescribed a set of economic policy recommendations for developing countries.

In using neoliberalism as a way of describing specific policies that mark a shift away from Keynesian welfarism, it in a first instance refers to a series of 'roll-back' programs that expand the frontiers of the market. This includes moves towards privatization of hitherto government, communally, or unowned property, deregulation of government controls or rules, trade liberalization, and a marketization that renders exchangeable things that may not previously have been subject to monetary transactions (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Larner, 2003). As a continuation and proliferation of such practices, Harvey's (2001, 2003) theory of 'accumulation by dispossession' describes the forceful opening-up of new avenues for capital accumulation through expanding into territories under-saturated with capital[10]. The roll-back programs have been supplemented by roll-out versions that entail new regulatory relations and institutions. Peck and Tickell (2002: 388-89) argue that the roll-out phase reconstitutes neoliberalism in more socially interventionist forms by introducing new

[10] Forced evictions of poor urban dwellers is one example of accumulation by dispossession, see e.g. Freeman (2014).

modes of social and penal policymaking that seek to regulate, discipline, and contain those marginalized or dispossessed by the aggressive roll-back efforts. Thus, neoliberal policies have not removed state power, but rather allowed for new technologies of governing to emerge (Ong, 2006).

Finally, when denoting a rationality of governance, neoliberalism is used in reference to the extension and dissemination of market logics into all aspects of life (Brown, 2003). While neoliberalism aspires to create a utopia of free markets liberated from all forms of state interference, Brenner and Thodore (2002: 352) note that it in practice has entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention that seek to impose market rule upon the production of personhood, identity, and social life (see also Keil, 2002; MacLeod, 2002). As noted in the last section, this includes moves towards the creation of 'self-sufficient' individuals and communities by cultivating individual responsibility and less reliance on state-provided services.

2.2.2. 'Actually existing' neoliberalism: hybrid and contextual

Whether the focus is on its ideological dimensions, its set of policies, or as a rationality of governance, neoliberalism has been one of the key objects of analysis in human geography in the last decades (e.g. Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Ferguson, 2010; Harvey, 2005; Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2009; Springer, 2010; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002). As a critics' term, it is worth noting that neoliberalism is used more often by its outsiders and opponents than it is by those who advocate and support the ideas, institutions, strategies, and policies it is said to denote. Centrally, as scholars have neglected to distinguish between its multiple and tangled meanings, the slipperiness of the term has raised debate.

On the one hand, the use of the neoliberalism as a catch-all variable explaining most social phenomena has been the object of considerable criticism (Barnett, 2005, 2010; Castree, 2006; Ferguson, 2010; Goldstein, 2012). The tendency to discuss neoliberalism in grand and polemical terms, seen in presentations of a 'global creep of neoliberalism as a totalizing governmentality' (Schwegler, 2008: 684) 'ruling undivided across the world' (Anderson, 2000: 17) has been criticized for presenting neoliberalism as omnipresent and omnipotent, thereby downplaying issues of difference, path dependency, and contingency as neoliberalism is implemented unevenly across geographical space and scales. As I come back to below, such presentations also undermine possibilities of dissent and resistance.

In contrast to monolithic presentations, geography as a field has foregrounded the territorial variations and spatial effects of the spread of neoliberalism. Castree (2005: 541) notes that geography 'matters'; not for its own sake, but because it has constitutive effects on processes that are stretched out over wide spans of space and/or time. Neoliberalism is thus never realized in a 'pure' form but combines with other processes to produce local and variegated outcomes. Key contributions in raising this point include Larner (2003, 2005), who argued for a conceptualization of neoliberalism that is attentive to its different variants, their hybrid natures, and "to the *multiple and contradictory aspects* of neoliberal spaces, techniques, and subjects" (2003: 509, emphasis in the original). The focus on hybridity and particularity could however potentially lead to a situation of 'endless variants' of neoliberalism where it is unclear in what specific sense they are cases of a general, common phenomenon (Castree 2006; Barnett, 2005). This has led scholars to take a process-based approach.

Peck and Tickell (2002), for example, called for a process-based analysis of neoliberalization as a historically specific, ongoing, and internally contradictory process of market-driven socio-spatial transformation. Brenner and Theodore (2002; Peck, Theodore et al., 2009), on their part, emphasize that processes of neoliberal restructuring are always embedded within given politico-institutional contexts. As neoliberal discourses and strategies mobilized in different settings interact with inherited institutional and spatial landscapes, they argue that it generates path-dependent outcomes and inherently hybrid forms of 'actually existing' neoliberalism (see also Guarneros-Meza, 2009; Peck, 2004; Peck et al., 2009; Saad-Filho & Morais, 2018).

2.2.3. 'Decentered' urban theory - leaving cities 'beyond compare'?

While Brenner et al. (2010a, 2010b) do insist on neoliberalization as a 'spacio-temporally specific' process that is always 'contested, incomplete, discontinuous and differentiated', they argue that this 'does not provide a sufficient basis for questioning the neoliberalized, neoliberalizing dimensions' of the more generalized search for a regulatory fix to the crises of contemporary capitalist urban development (2010a: 315). In analyzing the complex circulatory geography through which 'best practices' are exported to a wide range of cities, they argue that we are seeing a convergence of wide-ranging policy innovations into a 'syndrome' or wider tendency of neoliberalization at the urban scale (see also Hackworth, 2007; Leitner et al., 2007; Peck et al., 2009, Peck, 2010; Sager, 2011). This insistence on a generalized tendency towards neoliberalization has been challenged by recent calls to 'decenter' and 'provincialize' critical theorizations of (urban) neoliberalism.

Post-colonial scholarship has long critiqued how universal understandings have been built on the basis of a few central cases in Europe or North America and their explanatory use forced onto different contexts and environments (Chakrabarty, 2000; Parnell & Oldfield, 2014; Robinson, 2002; Simone, 2011; Spivak & Said, 1988). Parnell and Robinson (2012) argue for the necessity of granting more space to reflect on the variety of processes that are shaping cities in the global South and which contribute to more than just a hybridization of urban neoliberalism. As they note, in the global South "traditional authority, religion, and informality influence in ways that are different from the North" (Ibid.: 596). If this is not taken into account, they argue that critical neoliberalization theory with roots in the global North risks 'concealing more than it reveals'. Along a similar line, Guarneros-Meza and Geddes (2010) underline the centrality of focusing on the different contexts in which neoliberalization takes place. Much of the critical scholarship on neoliberalism has in common its roots in the global North. While neoliberalization in e.g. the U.K. constituted a process of disembedding the social democratic state, the transition to neoliberalism in Latin America took place within authoritarian or post-authoritarian state forms. This has implications for how the state is conceptualized. Thus, whereas critical theories of neoliberalism in the global North denounce the minimization of the state, in the global South, greater state involvement by no means leads automatically to more equal public benefits (Bezmez, 2008; Escobar, 2011; Moncada, 2013).

Such reflections are behind calls for deconstructing and 'provincializing' urban theory and granting space to divergent circumstances and localized complexity (Amin & Graham, 1997; Robinson, 2011; Roy & Ong, 2011; Sheppard et al., 2015; Sheppard, Leitner, & Maringanti, 2013). While this has brought fruitful debates on the necessity of

challenging the centrality of Euro-American theories and experiences, the focus on uniqueness and particularity can risk a situation of over-privileging the micro-practices of singular urban sites in all their full-spectrum complexity. Peck (2015) raises this idiographic pitfall in his critique of what he views as a moment of a 'deconstructive splintering' in urban theory due to the rising influence of post-colonial and post-structural critiques. While he applauds the richer plurality of voices present in the knowledge production on cities and urban tendencies, he fears that the praising of particularisms may leave urban studies in a situation of 'cities beyond compare'.

What I take from these debates, is an understanding of neoliberalism as an ongoing and evolutionary process of adapting to market-oriented logics that always compounds with local institutions and political processes to produce hybridized and contextual forms. While recognizing its variegated and localized nature, I agree with Peck (2015) that the particularities of place must be read in 'dialectal dialogue with theoretical understandings' and speak to something larger than themselves. This necessitates combining a broadly defined political economy framework that recognizes common or connective practices, with fine-grained analysis that pays respect to local particularities (Ibid., Harding & Blokland, 2014; Storper & Scott, 2016). The theoretical-empirical project this entails runs through the papers that make up this dissertation. They all, in different ways, examine how neoliberal policies and practices in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil have intersected with the country's patrimonial-clientelist state structures and historically embedded relations between the state and capital. While as such foregrounding the forms and dynamics of

neoliberalization in Rio as shaped by contextual conditions[11], the cases presented in the papers also seek to speak to something larger than themselves. The key debate they engage with is, as noted, how the hosting of sports mega-events can be harnessed to push forward a neoliberal urban agenda with far-reaching implications for citizenship.

2.2.4. Urban entrepreneurialism and mega-events as a place marketizing strategy

The globalized world has driven cities toward new forms of urban boosterism and entrepreneurial policy making in order to compete for increasingly flexible and fluid capital (Jessop, 2002; MacLeod, 2011). With urban entrepreneurialism, Harvey (1989) refers to how local ruling elites operating within new institutional configurations articulated around public-private partnerships increasingly have turned to enterprising, risk-taking, and profit-motivated governance (see also e.g. Cox, 1993; Hall & Hubbard, 1996; Soja, 1989). Urban entrepreneurialism comes with a new set of planning practices that moves focus away from questions of political administration and service provision towards strategies of marketizing the city. Efforts include flexibilization of labor markets to attract employers, privatization of infrastructure to appeal to investors, and regeneration of run-down neighborhoods to cater to the so-called 'creative class' (Evans, 2005; Peck, 2005; Smith, 2002).

Through such efforts, cities strive to reach the aspirational category of 'global city' - which Sassen (1991; 2002) defines as 'partially denationalized platforms for global capital'. Enhancing a city's urban competitive advantage is, according to Swyngedouw (2007: 62), largely

[11] Centrally, 'context' is neither a synonym for all things empirical or concrete, nor for the place or local scale. It is necessarily multi-scalar. See e.g. Massey (2005).

seen as “dependent on improving and adapting the built environment to the accumulation strategies of a city’s key elites and plugging the city into cutting edge transnational economic and cultural elite networks”. A physical overhaul of the urban landscape through large-scale urban development projects has therefore become commonplace (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008; Orueta & Fainstein, 2008; Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Iconic infrastructure projects and neo-Haussmannian regeneration efforts are used to channel investments into the built environment with the hope of attracting capital and consumers, spurring on development, and generating future growth (Merrifield, 2014; Plaza & Haarich, 2009). The hosting of hallmark events in sports and culture has also become a common place-making and marketizing strategy (Greene, 2003; Hiller, 2014; Poynter & Viehoff, 2015).

When arranging mega-events, host cities are at the center of the world’s attention. Media coverage of both the event itself and its surroundings reach a global audience, presenting unique opportunities to advertise the city. Hosting mega-events not only enhances a city’s global visibility, they often also serve as engines in a neoliberal reconfiguration of the city (Hayes & Horne, 2011). Sports mega-events are of a magnitude that requires new urban infrastructure like access roads, airports, arenas, public transport systems and lodging - projects that can channel private-sector resources and which promote the privatization and commodification of urban space. Such large-scale projects and priorities often have to be pitted against already planned municipal projects and plans and tend to face strong opposition. Such contradictions and trends have been leading to a process whereby sports mega-events and so-called ‘emerging economies’ grow closer. These countries tend to combine three crucial elements: availability of resources; an ambition to strengthen their image as an emerging power worldwide; and relative weakness of

institutions that protect the environment and human rights (Braathen, Mascarenhas, & Sørbøe, 2016: 261-2).

Scholars using Agamben's (2005) concept 'state of exception' and working on the Rio de Janeiro case have argued that the mega-events allowed authorities to govern through a variety of semi-legal jurisdictions, suspending legal norms and bypassing political contestation in the 'collective interest' of the city (Oliveira & Gaffney, 2010; Sánchez & Broudehoux, 2013; Vainer, 2011). Legitimized by prospected long-term benefits for the city and aided by the sense of urgency (the timeframe from winning the bid on the Olympics to hosting the event is seven years), the 'Olympic state of emergency' (Stavrides, 2016) was instrumentalized to realign the urban agenda. Decision-making was moved away from regular democratic processes as coalitions of business groups and politicians, along with representatives of international capital like the IOC and FIFA, made policy decisions without public accountability.

2.2.5. A post-political city?

A large and growing body of work argues that contemporary forms of techno-managerial governance as seen in pre-Olympic Rio implies a systematic foreclosure of politics (Deas, 2014; MacLeod, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2011; Tarazona Vento, 2017). In a fast-paced world marked by urban competitiveness over footloose international capital and investments, urban governance is framed as the domain of experts with the necessary knowledge to rapidly respond to changing external circumstances. It is urgent action that is required, not democratic decision-making - associated with bureaucracy and, as such, economic and social inefficiency (Vainer, 2011). As a consequence, "politics proper is progressively replaced by expert social administration" (Žižek, 2005:

117), where "politics is shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests" (Crouch 2004: 4). Different scholars call this overarching trend a form of 'de-politicized democracy' (Stokke & Törnquist, 2013) 'post-democracy' (Crouch, 2004; Rorty, 2004), or 'post-politics' (Swyngedouw, 2007).

Swyngedouw's (2007, 2009, 2010) 'post-political city' thesis, which draws inspiration from the post-foundational political theorizations of scholars like Jacques Rancière (1999, 2006)[12], has been particularly influential. Swyngedouw argues that neoliberal urban policy (or 'police') orders function as a consensual arrangement around the conditions that exist (the 'partitioning of the sensible' in Rancièrian terms) and the necessity of becoming more competitive, creative, innovative, and global. These 'endlessly repeated mantras' (Davidson & Iveson, 2015: 544) are seen to lead to a situation where anyone complaining about the measures put in place to achieve such a status, is denounced of placing their own parochial interests ahead of the city's interests. In other words, disagreement is rendered deviant rather than political.

The post-political argument gives an important conceptual understanding of what is going on in contemporary capitalist cities and societies. As I discuss in several of the papers, it is highly useful for

[12] A key tenant of Ranciére's work is how he conceptualizes what is normally referred to as politics or policymaking, as the 'police'. The 'police' is however broader than a state apparatus, it refers to society's inevitable need to distinguish and ground a social order and distribute advantages and entitlements accordingly (Rancière, 1999: 29-30). It is an order that 'partitions the sensible' by distinguishing between parts that are 'visible' and 'invisible' and categories of people that are 'audible' or dismissed as 'noise'. As such, the 'police' inevitably allows some subjects, values and opinions to emerge at the consequence of others. This partitioning serves to legitimize particular forms of authority and 'titles to govern' on the basis of differences like wealth, age, educational qualifications, and so on (for more thorough overviews of Ranciére's work, see e.g. Chambers (2013) or Tanke (2011)).

understanding how ruling elites in Rio used the sense of urgency and exceptionality of the mega-events and the prospect of benefits for the city to circumvent social and legal norms. However, as Davidson and Iveson (Ibid.: 546) note, the labeling of cities and urban processes as 'post-political' risks treating de-politicization as a condition that has been realized, rather than a tendency that has taken hold. Thus, it may have the perverse effect of reinforcing rather than undermining the perception that no alternative to the neoliberal hegemony is possible. This connects with how presentations of neoliberalism as omnipotent and omnipresent can overlook possibilities for resistance and change and, as such, be passivizing. Meanwhile, the last decade has seen multiple contestations against de-politicizing neoliberal urban orders that are (potentially) re-politicizing the urban.

2.3. Contentious politics, social movements, and urban uprisings

The restructuring of urban space and politics to accommodate a fluid, globalized economy described in the last section, has deepened urban inequalities. Cities have therefore emerged as strategic arenas of struggles over access to services, rights, and political decision-making (Holston, 1999; Miraftab & Wills, 2005; Sheppard et al., 2015). Cities provide the relational networks and sites of encounter that enable activists from different movements and sectors of society to engage with one another's struggles (Castells, 1983; Miller, 2016; Miller & Nicholls, 2013). This has made the city an 'incubator' of counter-hegemonic movements that challenge both the state and the state of capitalism (Dikeç & Swyngedouw, 2017; Harvey, 2008, 2012; Mitchell, 2003).

In theorizing such movements and their role in urban politics, I overarchingly take a contentious politics-approach. Contentious politics is an interdisciplinary field of study that calls for a broad and synthetic approach to theory and empirical research on a variety of non-routine or unconventional politics, including social movements, protests, rebellions, and revolutions. It was raised by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) and builds on their decades-long academic production on social movements. In this section of the chapter, I first, give a broad overview of some key paradigms in social movement scholarship. Second, I turn to how contentious politics tries to synthesize these paradigms while also shifting focus from studying what social movements do and why to examining the broader episodes of contention of which they are part. Third, I turn to literature that grapples with making sense of the last decade's seemingly spontaneous and unorganized urban uprisings – like the 2013 June uprisings in Brazil - through a post-foundational theoretical lens. I conclude by raising a broadly defined contentious politics-framework as a fruitful theoretical-analytical approach to examine the different kinds of collective action and resistance mobilized 'from below' in pre-Olympic Rio and their impact on urban politics.

2.3.1. Theories of social movements

Theories of social movements seek to explain why social mobilization occurs, its forms of manifestation, and potential social, cultural, and political consequences. Different scholars and traditions define 'social movement' in different ways, but it is overarchingly seen to entail a sustained and organized public effort on behalf of a significant amount of people – on the basis of organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities - to achieve a particular goal, typically a social or political one (Della Porta & Diani, 2015; Tilly & Wood, 2020).

The first references to social movements trace back to the 1800s (e.g. LeBon, 1896). At that time, and well into the 20th century, scholars placed focus on socio-psychological aspects of the collective behavior of crowds. Social movements were seen as a form of collective behavior that emerged in response to significant social and cultural breakdowns. Movement participation was thus largely viewed as the result of an emotional and frustrated reaction to grievances rather than a rational attempt to improve one's situation (Blumer, 1957; Smelser, 1963; Turner and Killian, 1957), and social movements were viewed as ephemeral, deviant, and potentially destructive (Couch, 1968). From the 1950s, major social and political upheavals led to a growth of social movement activity. The civil rights movement in the U.S., students' movements in Europe, environmental and ecological movements, peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements, and women's movements organized around new grievances and changed aspirations within a context of social change. With their concrete goals and articulated values, these movements shattered the intellectual viability of the collective behavior-tradition's understanding of movement participation as a nonrational reaction to external forces (Della Porta & Diani, 2020; Morris, 2000; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009).

Even though there were many similarities in these new movements across the Atlantic, the explanations that were developed in Europe and the United States to understand them, were different. The European 'school' focused primarily on how intangible values related to e.g. environment and peace, as well as questions of culture and identity such as ethnicity, gender, and sexuality, motivated collective action (Castells, 1983; Melucci, 1996; Offe, 1985a; Touraine, 1981). This led to the emergence of what were dubbed 'New Social Movements' (NSM) (Melucci, 1980; Offe, 1985b). European scholars granted prevalence to

interpretive analyzes of how these movements created shared meanings around collective identities and alternative lifestyles in the age of post-industrial, complex societies (Kriesi, 1995; Pichardo, 1997). Meanwhile, the North American school was more politically and empirically oriented, examining how characteristics of the social and political context enabled or hindered collective action. Three key concepts in the North American context – which are still central to the contentious politics literature - were political opportunity structures, ideological framing, and resource mobilization.

Political opportunity structures derive from a structuralist paradigm and looks at the structural field in which a social movement operates. Generally speaking, scholarship on political opportunities aims to describe how structural relations make possible, impact or obstruct social movements' possibilities for political action (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978). Opportunity structures are constituted both out of static features of government as well as the dynamic events that reshape them. Theorists of opportunity structures tend to highlight the role of specific events or changes that provide windows of opportunity for protesters in achieving collective action by capitalizing on an observed decline in state strength. As such, movements are seen as likely to emerge only when favorable changes occur in the external political system (Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, 2010 [1982]; Tarrow, 1996, 2011 [1994]).

Resource mobilization, on the other hand, derives from a rationalist paradigm and rational choice theory (see Olson, 2012 [1965]). A key article was McCarty and Zald (1977), whose principal argument was that grievances cannot in themselves explain social movements as they are a constant element in any society and, as such, have limited explanatory power for understanding the emergence of collective action. McCarty and Zald instead foregrounded the mobilization of a

discontented group as a matter of effective leadership and organizational building. Resource mobilization focuses on the processes by which social movement organizations are formed, analyzing movements' social networks, organizational structures, and strategies and repertoires of action. The central premise of this work is that for movements to be successful, participants must have organizational capacity and resources (both material and non-tangible) available for their cause (Klandermans, 1989; John David McCarthy & Zald, 2017; Piven & Cloward, 1977).

Finally, ideological framing originates in the school of constructivism and focuses on the ideological fundament and orientation of social movements. Snow and colleagues (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986) argued that dissatisfaction must be formulated and interpreted before giving rise to protest and activism. Inspired by Goffman's (1974) concept of framing, they focused on how movements and activists communicate their definition of a situation to the public at large in order to achieve resonance for their requirements. Ideological frames were defined as 'schemata of interpretation' that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large (Snow et al. 1986). Central themes included how different ideological orientations could mobilize, socially and politically, and how concrete movement-ideologies fit with more general cultural patterns.

2.3.2. Contentious Politics: from social movements to wider episodes of contention

Contentious politics was born of an explicit critique of the 'paradigm warfare' (Tarrow, 1999) between different research paradigms on social movements in the 1980s and 90s. Early synthesizing efforts were found

in political process theories, which examined the relationship between the activities and strategies of social movements and structural features of the political context (see e.g. McAdam, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1989). However, these theories were denounced of promoting explanations that were too static and structural and for containing rationalistic biases (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999; Jasper, 1998). Further, they were limited by centering the focus on the specific field of social movements, and mainly on reformist movements in democratic countries in the global North. In order to overcome such weaknesses in their own work, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) launched contentious politics as a broader and more synthetic approach to theory and empirical research not only on social movements but also other kinds of contention. They took with them the concepts of political opportunities, mobilizing structures (from resource mobilization), and framing processes to analyze collective actors' capacities and strategies of engagement.

Contentious politics blends three dimensions: contention, collective action, and politics. Following Tilly and Tarrow (2015: 7-8), contention involves "making claims that bear on someone else's interests", collective action denotes "coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests and programs", and politics is a realm of interaction in which at least one of the actors is an agent of the government. Thus, they define contentious politics as involving "interactions in which actors make claims bearing on other people's interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties". It occurs when some segment of society organizes around the desire to produce social change, whether through riots, protests, or more organized forms of social movement actions (Ibid.; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001).

A central argument is that different forms of contention, from social movements to strikes, protests, and revolutions, result from similar mechanisms and processes. Mechanisms are defined as "delimited sorts of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations" (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001: 24). For example, the mechanism of 'brokerage' entails the linking together of two or more previously separate social entities by a mediating unit, while 'diffusion' is the spread of a contentious performance, issue, or interpretive frame from one site to another (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2009: 142-43). By processes, they mean regular combinations and sequences of mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements (e.g. 'mobilization'). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly wage that one can learn more about different forms of contention by focusing on such mechanisms and processes than by studying them separately. The strength of this type of analysis is that it allows for capturing how contention can evolve and take on different forms in time and space.

Centrally, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) advocate the study of how individuals and groups shape, perceive and act upon structurally based opportunities, rather than seeing opportunities for activism as structurally given. This shifts focus towards contextualized understandings of how people come to engage in contentious politics. Contentious politics further brings relational elements to the fore, encouraging a dynamic, interactive understanding of contention. Finally, contentious politics moves focus beyond the social movement scholarship's focus on the organization and mobilization of movements towards attempting to grasp the outcomes and consequences (both institutional and non-institutional) of contentious collective action.

Contentious politics contributes fruitful concepts and analytical tools for examining the contentious interactions between state, market, and civil society actors in pre-Olympic Rio over the trajectory of urban transformation and the form and reach of citizenship. However, I want to emphasize that I take a pragmatic approach to the contentious politics literature, using it as a heuristic device rather than a set-in-stone recipe for research. The explicit agenda of deconstructing episodes of contention into mechanisms and processes is not present in more than one of the papers (Paper 3). What I take from contentious politics is primarily the centrality of taking a contextual, relational and process-based approach to examining dynamics between subjects, objects, and claims of contention within the wider social and cultural context in which they are embedded.

2.3.3. A re-politicizing city?

Social mobilizations for more inclusive and substantive citizenship in Rio's Olympic era took different forms, ranging from the more organized activism found in e.g. favela-based anti-eviction movements to the seemingly spontaneous insurrectional activity of the 2013 June uprisings. The latter started as a small protest against the 20-cent increase to the bus fare in São Paulo, but quickly spread to express wider discontent with the governing of cities and with the social and economic costs of the mega-events. These events are part of a recent wave of urban uprisings that has upheaved cities as diverse as Athens, Madrid, Tunis Kairo, New York, London, Paris, Istanbul, and Rio de Janeiro.

As urban uprisings are not political in the narrow sense, in terms of being consciously planned with defined political goals and clear targets, some have delegated them to the explanatory frame of urban violence and riots (e.g. Briggs, 2015; Waddington, 2013). I would characterize

this as a continuation of what Pieven and Cloward (1977: 5) once denounced as 'the intellectual error' of equating movements with movement organizations and thereby consigning political unrest without a clear leader, constitution and legislative program to 'the more shadowy realm of social problems and deviant behavior'. Contentious politics offers a framework for approaching urban uprisings as a political rather than a psychological phenomenon. However, it is an empirical approach that is contextual and material in emphasis, and I am interested also in more overarching theoretical debates on the role of such events in urban transformative processes. In Paper 5 I therefore engage with scholarship that situates the 21st century's urban insurrectional activity within a theoretical-philosophical debate on the urban as a political domain.

While heterogeneous in character, the last decade's 'global articulation of urban protest' (Mayer, 2009) 'shares a range of uncanny affinities' (Karaliotas & Swyngedouw, 2019). Undoubtedly urban, these insurrections have struck at the city itself and its spaces of circulation and assembly. Further, they have brought protesters together around a broadly mobilized sense that the conditions and determinations of urban life have failed them, and around a corresponding demand for a different kind of city that is free and just (Holston, 2019). More than requests for the state to extend existing rights and resources, they articulate alternative sources and conceptions of rights. Protesters have experimented with and enacted alternatives to the legitimated consensus of rule through mobilizing a politics of direct democracy via open assemblies and social media (see Douzinas, 2013) and through challenging neoliberalism with proposals for a new economy, decommodification, and use of resources (Holston, 2019: 133). In so doing, scholars like Dikeç and Swyngedouw (2017) argue that they are

politicizing the urban landscape in new and innovative ways, urging us to move beyond narrow definitions of politics as decision-making and centered on the state-form.

This argument builds on an engagement with post-foundational theorizations of the political. Post-foundational scholars (e.g. Jacqués Rancière, Alain Badiou, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe) argue that mainstream accounts of politics are too focused on the creation and maintenance of orders of rule and governance, ignoring the possibility of a fully ordered society. The basis of post-foundational thought is the division between two distinct logics: the 'police' (*la politique*) and 'the political' (*le politique*)[13]. According to Rancière (1999), the former "refers to an established order of governance with everyone in their 'proper' place in the seemingly natural order of things" (in Dikeç 2005: 174). Such orders can however only ever be contingent, due to the antagonistic differences that cut through any social order. 'The political' occurs when an excessive, unaccounted-for supplement to the social order makes itself apparent and asserts its axiomatic equality to the whole. The political, in this view, is more than mere contention - it is a disruptive affair that challenges the very frame through which we perceive the world as given and which has a revolutionary potential for re-ordering the social.

This conceptualization of the political as a performative staging and acting of equality in the face of in-egalitarian practices embodied in the instituted order opens up an avenue for interrogating 'a return of the political' as manifested by urban uprisings (Swyngedouw, 2014). By

[13] There are different ways of naming and understanding the distinction between the logics of the 'police' and 'the political', but post-foundational scholars share the view that the latter marks the antagonistic differences that cut through the social and which signal the absence of a foundational or essential point on which to base a polity or a society (Swyngedouw 2011: 373).

taking equality as the starting point of politics and by arguing that it can potentially emerge from anyone and anywhere, Ranciére offers a framework for studying ruptures that come as a surprise in a given social order. This opens up for studying urban uprisings as politics "even when, or perhaps especially when, … [they] fall outside institutional forms or lack the organizational form or legitimacy of social movements" (Dikec & Swyngedouw, 2017: 1). Such a theorization draws attention to how these movements have posited new sources, scales, and subjects of what counts as legitimately political, preventing us from overestimating the hegemony of neoliberalism and declaring the city as 'post-political'.

However, events like the June uprisings are inevitably met by efforts to de-politicize them – whether in the form of direct violence against protesters to evacuate the streets or through efforts to de-legitimize protesters as vandals and trouble-makers (i.e. painting them as deviants rather than legitimate contenders). 'The key political question', according to Dikeç and Swyngedouw (2017: 12), therefore "centres on what happens when the squares have been cleared, the tents removed, and the energies dissipated, when the dream is over and the dawn of 'ordinary' everyday life breaks again". Abstract theorizations of the political as a ruptural logic struggle to capture the messiness of 'actually existing' urban politics (Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016) and the aftermath of given uprisings. An evental view of politics should therefore not divert attention from more sociologically grounded analyses of sedimented power relations and conditions in given urban settings.

To grasp the dynamics of urban politics and resistance in pre-Olympic Rio, I therefore argue for taking a relational, processual approach to the dialectic of the neoliberal production of urban space and the production of insurrectional citizens that are shaped by, and act to transform, the urban. A broadly defined contentious politics-approach allows for

conducting a contextualized analysis of the particular processes, structures, and dynamics at stake in Rio while relating such situated contentions to a broader and more universal 'battle' between a 'post-political' and a 're-politicizing' city. In the next section, I explore the methodological implications of such an approach.

3. Methodology and Data Collection

In qualitative research, our data material is always tainted by who we are as researchers and what decisions and choices are made during the data collection, organization, and analysis. In order to provide the necessary transparency into the research process that resulted in this dissertation, this chapter discusses the methodology and data collection. I first, present the case study research design before I second, elaborate on the methods of data collection. Third, I turn to the process of analysis, before I forth, discuss ethical considerations. Finally, I consider validity in the sense of the trustworthiness of the study.

3.1. Research design: qualitative case study

Case study research seeks to generate in-depth, multi-faceted understandings of complex phenomena within their real-life context (Yin, 2009). Stake (2005: 246) defines case studies as "a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case)

or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of evidence". Creswell (2007: 73) similarly defines it as "the study of an issue that is explored through one or more cases within a bounded system".

In this dissertation, my aim is to study the political consequences of Rio's hosting of sports mega-events through the lens of citizenship. My analytical focus is on the encounters between the mega-events and citizens. I opted for a qualitative case study that uses one primary case – the Rocinha favela[14] - to approach the research problem, as this allowed for looking at such encounters up close. As noted in the introduction, Rocinha is a paradigmatic case of the general and interwoven processes of mega-event developments and resistance in pre-Olympic Rio. My selection of Rocinha was thus a purposive one; it was chosen as it offered "useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest" (Patton, 2002: 40).

3.2. Data collection and material

The primary data material was collected during twelve months of fieldwork in Rio in 2016. The dissertation is also informed by ten months of fieldwork in 2012 (Braathen et al., 2013; Sørbøe, 2013), a six-month stay in 2014, and a month-long visit in 2019. The main focus has been on Rocinha, where I lived for four of the twelve months in 2016 (I also lived there in 2012) and visited frequently throughout the rest of the year. The study combines data from participant observation and other field-ethnographic methods with in-depth interviews as well as

[14] In Paper 3, which I write together with the project leader of the wider research project this study was part of, we focus also on two other favelas: Vila Autódromo and Morro da Providência. My fieldwork has however been centered on Rocinha.

document, media, and policy analysis. It applies data triangulation; the use of "unrelated pieces of information to get a better fix on something that is only partially known or understood" (Ragin and Amoroso, 2011: 131). I will go through the different data collection methods in turn.

3.2.1. Ethnographic fieldwork

Ethnographic fieldwork has not been a mainstream methodology in geography (Herbert, 2000). It however gained greater legitimacy with the cultural turn in the 1990s as a relevant approach for geographers interested in gaining 'thick' (Geertz, 1973) qualitative insights into how social processes, institutions, discourses or relationships work in particular contexts (Crang and Cook, 2007; Escobar, 2001; Katz, 1994). One of its defining characteristics is participant observation, whose main purpose is "to gain access to 'the insider's point of view', (…) learning what it is like to be differentially situated and living with different constraints and preferences" (Wind, 2008: 80). Anthropology has a strong sense of ownership to ethnographic fieldwork as a method and to participant observation in particular. Some hold strict requirements as to what can be considered 'proper' ethnography, so it is worth noting that I use the term in a broad sense as this is not an ethnographic study of Rocinha per se. Rather, as noted above, I use the case of Rocinha as a lens through which to examine the dissertation's broader focus on the social and political consequences of Rio's sports mega-events.

My motivation for conducting ethnographic fieldwork was shaped by the fact that I did not feel comfortable with simply going to the favela and conducting quick interviews. As noted in Chapter 1, sensationalized ideas of favelas as violent, uncivilized, and unsanitary places have permeated representations of these communities. The fascination with

'myths of marginality' (Perlman, 2010) has driven what Larkins (2015) describes as a commodification of the 'spectacular favela' through the reproduction of urban marginality and armed violence in films, music, the tourist industry, and crude popular and academic literatures. Any work focusing on questions of inequality and violence in favelas inevitably risks reiterating such ideas. I was conscious of wanting to gain and bring forward more nuanced understandings of these places, which requires the kind of contextualized understanding that can only come through engaging with the field over time. It was also deeply important to me to show the people I talked to and whose stories I would personally capitalize on in the form of writing this dissertation, that I was genuinely interested in their perspectives and experiences.

The idea that it is somehow less exploitative to conduct ethnographic fieldwork than quick interviews, is not straightforward. As Stacey (1991: 135) points out, fieldwork is intrusive and can expose subjects to far greater danger and exploitation than more positivist and abstract research methods. Nevertheless, Stacey also holds that fieldwork can achieve the kind of 'contextuality, depth, and nuance' that are unattainable through more remote research methods (Ibid.: 136). Thus, as long as the researcher is conscious of ethical pitfalls, it is a valuable approach.

Figure III: Images from the fieldwork



The images on page 61 show different aspects of favela life: (1) the strong sense of community as residents of Laboriaux get together to paint façades and create a communal leisure area; (2) the view of the city from a Sunday afternoon barbeque in Laboriaux; (3) Rocinha's dense construction and self-made houses; (4) a façade riddled with bullet holes; (5) a staircase typical of the internal labyrinth of pathways within favelas; (6) the contrast of Rocinha's architecture and the high-rises by the beach in São Conrado.

3.2.1.1. Accessing the field and (participant) observation

One of the first tasks during fieldwork is to secure access (Crabtree, Justiss & Swinehart, 2012). In my case, the fieldwork area was already familiar as I had conducted fieldwork in Rio and Rocinha previously. During the first six months of 2016, I lived in Copacabana (a middle-class neighborhood in the South Zone, see map on page 16). Through the wider research project my study was part of, I had a connection with the Institute of Urban and Regional Research and Planning (IPPUR) at the Federal University of Rio (UFRJ). The first semester I took two classes at IPPUR/UFRJ while focusing on getting reacquainted with the political climate and conditions in Rio. I participated in seminars, events, and research encounters taking place across the city, which were good opportunities to connect with academics and activists from favela-based and city-wide movements. I also visited Rocinha frequently during this period, picking up contact with former informants and friends.

In June of 2016, I rented a small apartment in Laboriaux, one of the around 20 sub-neighborhoods in Rocinha. It lies at the very top of the community bordering with the Tijuca forest and has spectacular views of the São Conrado beach from the one side (image 6) and the Lagoon on the other (image 2). While the period I lived in Rocinha was relatively

calm, tensions between drug traffickers and the police would sporadically lead to shoot-outs (which would intensify towards the end of my fieldwork, becoming an everyday occurrence). Such happenings were more common in the lower parts of Rocinha, and I chose Laboriaux both due to security concerns and because I knew people living in this area.

When I asked people about their life in Rocinha, the strong sense of community is something people would frequently highlight. They connected it with the community's history of fending for itself. As a life-long resident of Laboriaux puts it;

> "Nobody chose to live in a favela, in an area without infrastructure. People ended up with this alternative due to the failures of the housing politics. It was not by choice but by necessity that we came to live in a favela, and in the favela we created bonds with the territory, roots, sociability, and a life that is close to the workplace, school, kindergarten, and cultural relations and productions. Everything is here, and no money can compensate for that. It could be the greatest house in the world in a different place, but nothing can replace the socio-cultural roots"[15].

'Valéria' in this quote underlines both the challenges that come with living in an area neglected by public authorities for decades, where the available infrastructure is largely an outcome of self-made efforts by residents themselves, and the close-knit bonds that are developed by sharing such experiences. Living in Laboriaux allowed me to experience both the sociability she describes and the more frustrating aspects of favela life. I was invited to Sunday afternoon barbeques, birthday parties, carnival celebrations, and other social events, which allowed for getting to know people and discuss Brazilian politics and local affairs in

[15] Interview with resident of Laboriaux, female, 28, 10/21/2016.

an informal manner. I also got a first-hand experience of the electricity or water being cut off for days, the blistering heat of ascending endless steep steps by foot to get home - or alternatively a painfully slow ride on an overcrowded bus or a hazardous motorcycle taxi ride - and the fear as the sounds of an intense shoot-out comes ever-closer to one's doorstep. Such experiences underline the type of intimate knowledge one can only gain through lived experiences and, as such, the validity of ethnographic methods for uncovering the processes and meanings that undergird socio-spatial life (Herbert, 2000).

A central part of ethnographic fieldwork is the establishment and negotiating of friendships. Drawing on Browne (2003) and M. Friedman (1989), Einagel (2018) defines friendship as a culturally constituted and socially situated practice that is navigated and negotiated in the living of everyday lives. One community activist in particular would come to serve as a good friend and a key informant during the fieldwork. As a 'knowledgeable insider' (Weiss, 1995: 20), he also served as a door opener that introduced me to other people and helped me navigate the social arena.

Forging friendships during fieldwork is however a complicated process. While I had many things in common with my main informants, such as similar political views, there were undeniable differences of age, class, ethnicity, gender, religion, education, and mobility between us. While not necessarily explicitly talked about, these differences shaped our interactions. Many of my friends in Rocinha were deeply religious, and I felt hesitant to share my atheist views or talk about my romantic relationship at that time, which was with another woman. I feared that such information would overshadow other aspects of my personhood and compromise the common ground we had found. As friendships rely on trust, withholding information was uncomfortable - in particular as

people so openly shared intimate aspects of their personal lives with me. This underlines some of the difficulties involved in navigating the dual role of researcher and friend.

Another aspect of friendship I was conscious of, was becoming over-identified with a particular group of people. Rocinha has a vibrant civil society and being too closely associated with one group inevitably risked distancing me from others. When participating in public events in the community I was therefore conscious of who I was seen talking to. I also took care to nurture relationships with people that had different positions and opinions in the community than those I spent the most time with in order to be exposed to a broader range of opinions.

I took field notes throughout the fieldwork, ranging from short notes to longer texts, which documented the daily logistics of the research. These notes included my thoughts about the events of the day, interpretations of relevant books and articles, as well as reflective accounts of the research process (Tobin & Begley, 2004). Upon returning from fieldwork these notes have been used to recount events and how and why choices were made. While the data from participant observation is not always explicitly visible in the papers, it has contextualized and complemented the answers and information I received in the interviews or through other means.

Conducting fieldwork is a messy and far from straightforward process (Hyndman, 2001: 265). I had intended to live in Rocinha from June until my return to Norway in late December. However, I had some health issues that would change this plan. After my fifth round of progressively stronger antibiotics, I with resignation realized that the damp, moldy apartment I had rented was not an ideal place with my inclination to get severe strep throat. Being constantly sick was robbing me of valuable

research time, and I moved back to Copacabana in October, resuming the arrangement I had had during the first semester of visiting Rocinha frequently. This experience also underlined my privileged mobility. I could partake in favela life when it was convenient to me and move out when it risked my health, which many locals cannot.

3.2.2. Qualitative interviews

This dissertation relies heavily on information gathered through semi-structured, in-depth interviews. Interviewing gives opportunities to ask about people's perspectives, feelings, experiences and/or motivations on specific matters (Gill et al., 2008: 292; Kvale 1997: 41; Patton 2002: 341), and I conducted interviews with the aim of better understanding how key informants understood and evaluated the programs and interventions I was focusing on. While I only quote directly from a few interviews in the papers, all have informed my interpretations.

Table I: Overview of interviews

Type of informants	Number of informants
Group 1: Activists	
Community activists	17
Community politics	3
Community media	6 (one group interview with two people; one with three people)
Favela-based NGO's	4
Life-story interviews	2
Group 2: Critical professionals	
Academics	3
Architects/planners	3
Civil Society	4 (one group interview with two people)
Group 3: Government officials	
Technocrats	2
Politicians	2
Police	5
Total	**51 informants in 48 interviews**

As noted in Table I, I conducted 48 interviews with 51 people. The average duration of the interviews was around one hour. As I speak Portuguese, I had no need for an interpreter. I did, however, get help from an assistant with transcriptions. 40 interviews were taped, and of these, 23 were transcribed. A lot of information aside from the conversation itself surges in an interview setting, and an advantage of taping interviews is that it gives the researcher flexibility to concentrate on the reaction of the informant and the surrounding setting (Thaagard

2009: 102). The reason for some of my interviews not being taped was that they took place in locations inapt for recording (e.g. background noise). I took note of key words and quotes during all interviews regardless of whether or not they were taped. After the interview was done, I would write down everything I remembered from the conversation including my reflections on non-verbal communication, the informant's reaction to questions, and the interview setting. I did this immediately after the interview when possible, or when returning home in the evening if not. This provided important context to the interviews that I could return to when analyzing them later on. The interviews that were taped but not transcribed, did not provide enough information that I felt it relevant to transcribe them. Instead, I relied on my notes knowing I could return to the audio recording if there was something I wanted to listen to again.

Qualitative interviews can take various forms depending on the type of information the researcher is looking for. The interviews I conducted were all in-depth interviews, which Yin (2009: 107) defines as an interview where the researcher asks key informants about the facts of a matter as well as their opinions about events. They were also generally informal interviews according to Thagaard's (2009: 89) definition of being a conversation between the researcher and the informant, and semi-structured in terms of consisting of several key questions while allowing for divergences (Gill et al., 2008: 291). While I had prepared some topics and questions beforehand, there would be a relatively free flow of conversation that was adapted according to the information that surged.

As presented in Table I, my interviews can roughly be divided into three groups of informants. The first consisted of community activists and

members of favela-based movements (including community media, local NGOs and some life-story interviews). The second was professionals working with the mega-event driven urban transformations in Rio from a critical and often oppositional perspective (academics, architects, urban planners), while the third group refers to government officials and actors working directly with the public interventions studied (police, politicians, technocrats). Some informants were pleased by the opportunity to talk about topics they cared deeply about, mainly informants from the two first groups. In these cases, informants' openness and willingness to talk meant that I took on the role as a listener, attempting to be engaged but unobtrusive, nondirective but committed (Gill et al., 2008: 292-93). That does not mean that I did not intervene with critical follow-up questions, but generally I allowed them to talk quite freely. Others were more to-the-point in their answers, typically informants from the last group. This meant that I would end up asking questions more actively.

The majority of the interviews were one-to-one, based on the idea that it is easier to create a safe environment and build trust with just the two of us present. Three interviews were with 2-3 people. In these cases, I knew one of the informants from before and met them for a second interview together with other people at their suggestion. The aim of these interviews was to allow conversation around a given topic to flow more freely.

3.2.2.1. Sampling informants

Informants were selected through various sampling strategies, although overall characterized by a 'purposeful sampling' (Overton & van Diermen, 2003) in that I made clear judgments concerning what kind of informants I wanted to interview. Particularly for the first group of informants I relied heavily on the so-called snowball method, which

refers to drawing on the assistance of established contacts to identify relevant new informants (Weiss, 1994). As people tend to be more receptive to people that have been vouched for by an acquaintance, snowballing tends to increase the number of respondents (Small, 2009). Another consequence is that the interviewees are more likely to know one another than would be the case had they been selected at random. Such in-network selection is by some considered to be 'more biased' than a 'random' sample (Ibid.). However, as my aim with these interviews was not some kind of 'objective' truth but rather qualitative insights from key informants, this was not an issue. I would continue until reaching the 'point of saturation' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) where new interviews did not provide much new information.

I also used a more strategical sampling strategy, particularly when reaching out to informants in groups 2 and 3. I conducted a mapping of relevant institutions and actors before and during the early phases of the fieldwork and reached out to informants I had identified as important to talk to (Sumner and Tribe, 2008; Thagaard, 2009). Personal connections and vouching would prove central factors also in these cases. The police serve as an example. Whereas I during my first round of fieldwork for my Master's in 2012 had been able to schedule interviews with the police simply by showing up at the local UPP station, the situation in 2016 was different. The legitimacy of the UPP Program had suffered several serious blows, and the willingness of the police to talk to researchers had cooled decisively. Arranging interviews proved far more complicated, as I now needed formal permission from the main quarters of the Military Police. Months of attempts had led nowhere, before I by chance was introduced to 'Coronel Lima', a former leading figure within the UPP Program, through a common connection. With the Coronel's support I finally got the paperwork in order the last week of

my fieldwork and suddenly found myself with *carte blanche* to talk to whomever I wanted in the institution.

3.2.3. Secondary sources

Using primary sources to access data on certain issues about the economic and political climate in Brazil is difficult, in particular when it comes to issues like corruption, clientelism, and state structures. This made it important to contextualize the primary data with secondary sources. Daily newspapers, weekly political magazines and reports published by international and local civil society organizations and NGOs served as major secondary literature sources. I also analyzed policy documents on current and previous government policies and the city's strategic plans. This was helpful for clarifying how governmental bodies framed the mega-event driven developments and compare and contrast this with findings in the cases under study.

3.3. Data analysis

Qualitative case studies with a long fieldwork such as this one, result in voluminous and detail-rich data. This data needs to be organized and coded in order to allow key issues to emerge.

I did a thematic analysis of the data material, which according to Braun and Clarke (2006:79) entails "identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data". In other words, the researcher closely examines the data to identify topics, ideas, and patterns of meaning that come up repeatedly. It is a useful method "for examining the perspectives of different research participants, highlighting similarities

and differences, and generating unanticipated insights" (Nowell et al. 2017: 2).

I would read and annotate interview transcriptions adding remarks and questions. As I worked my way through each transcribed interview (and the notes from untranscribed ones), I ended up with some central themes and concepts that served as conceptual tools for further interpreting and structuring the data material. All interviews were analyzed and interpreted in conjunction with insights gained from the fieldwork and secondary sources. Moreover, I drew connections also with relevant academic literatures. This has been an ongoing process both during fieldwork and after returning home, as I have relied on an abductive analytical strategy.

Abduction is often described as an interplay between inductive and deductive approaches. Whereas the former work from specific observations to broader generalizations and theories, deductive approaches work the other way around (Alvesson and Skjöldberg 2009; Thagaard 2009). Meanwhile, the process of analysis in abductive studies is characterized by an alternation between the study of previous theory and empirical data, and both are continually reinterpreted and adjusted in the light of each other (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 4). In other words, it adapts a cyclical logic of inquiry that allows for a double movement between the abstract and the concrete as the foundation for theory building. With this approach, it follows that my analytical framework has continuously evolved throughout my time working on this dissertation. Initial theoretical propositions were challenged by what I encountered in the field, which inspired further research on other theories and created new categories of analysis.

Paper 4 on the UPP police program serves as an illustration. While I had planned to write about the program, the current theoretical approach was not planned. I thought I would write about the UPPs' situatedness within the city's neoliberal urban agenda and community resistance to the program and conducted many interviews with favela residents with this focus in mind. However, from the interviews I conducted with the police during the very end of my fieldwork, an alternative point of entry to the material emerged. These interviews drew attention to a masculine 'culture of honor' as a central explanatory factor for understanding police-community interactions. It is not the only, and also not the most central, explanation for the reproduction of police violence in Rio, but it is a central and often overlooked one. I found this illuminating, and these interviews would therefore force forward a different focus for the fourth paper than I had planned. This illustrates how I did not go into the field with a set of hypotheses that I systematically looked for validating proof for. Rather, I took a more open approach, one that was ever-changing based on the direction the data material steered me (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1994). This does however not mean that I had no direction, as my fieldwork was shaped by what I had read, who I chose to talk to, and what I chose to look for.

3.4. Ethical Considerations

Through critically examining society, social research can help promote the value of human life. It can, however, also threaten it. Research must therefore be held to certain standards to safeguard research subjects against harm or other suffering. The Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) has approved the data collection in this study, and it has

been carried out in compliance with the guidelines for research ethics in the social sciences, humanities, law, and theology (NESH, 2016).

3.4.1. Informed consent and confidentiality

Informed consent is a fundamental principle for ethical research in the social sciences. It means that the research project is only initiated after one has obtained the research participants' 'free and informed consent' (NESH 2016). That consent is free, means it was issued without external pressure. Being informed means that the participant was provided adequate information about the project in question, what the information they give will be used for, and the potential consequences of participating (Thagaard 2009: 26). Participants should also be informed that they have the right to withdraw at any time, or to refuse permission for the researcher to use the information they have made available (NESH, 2016).

During my fieldwork, informed consent was dealt with in different ways depending on the informant in question and the context of our interaction. When talking to people more informally, I would explain my research project and make sure that informants knew the information they provided would be confidential. In the more formal interviews, I would start by outlining the purpose of the research project before the interview started. Some informants would also have been presented with a project outline in advance when I approached them by email, WhatsApp, or on Facebook to request the interview. We would start the interview with a brief discussion of the project, where I would stress that participation was voluntary and that they could stop participating at any moment they might wish to do so. I would then receive their oral consent to conduct the interview before asking permission to start the tape recorder. At the end of the interview, I would make sure that

informants had my contact information and let them know they could get in touch if they had anything to add or if there was something they wondered about.

Another central principle for ethical research is confidentiality. Confidentiality means that those participating in the research project are entitled to trusting that all information they provide will be treated confidentially (Thagaard 2009). In order to ensure this, the research material has to be anonymized, except for public figures that speak on behalf of their role in society. However, "regard for the self-determination and freedom of such people nevertheless entails that they should be informed about the purpose of the research when they participate as informants" (Ibid., 13). I have anonymized most participants with a few exceptions. In these cases, the informants are publicly known figures and their statements reflect opinions they have expressed publicly on other occasions.

The issue of confidentiality leads to the question of whether the research project will have negative consequences for those who choose to participate in it. While I do not grant much focus to issues of crime and corruption in this dissertation, shady relationships between drug traffickers, politicians, and community leaders in Rio's favelas are common (Burgos, 1998). Discussing such relations could potentially have serious consequences if overheard by the wrong people. Thus, whenever I talked with favela residents about their thoughts on the police and the role that drug traffickers played in the community, I would make sure that they were comfortable discussing the subject and that we were in a place where no one could overhear our conversation. Sometimes people would bring up it up on their own accord in a public setting like a bar, which could lead to people on tables next to us looking

at us with skepticism. In these cases, I would suggest that we talk about something less sensitive.

I feel a heavy burden of responsibility to those who helped me with the fieldwork and confided me with their stories. Aware of my indebtedness to them, I have made my uttermost to ensure the principle of 'do no harm' is upheld and that the information they have provided has been handled in a sensitive and respectful manner.

3.4.2. Positionality

Researchers never enter the field as neutral or impartial observers; the 'self' we bring is always gendered, sexual, racial, occupational, and located in time and space (Coffey, 1999; Katz, 1994; Sultana, 2007). According to Sæther (2006), positioning in the field becomes 'an interplay of difference and sameness'. She notes that "the difference is necessary as it legitimates the observation and the questions the fieldworker asks, while the construction of sameness, of some kind of common ground, is necessary because it enables communication" (Ibid.: 44). This approach to understanding positionality underlines how positioning is constantly negotiated and renegotiated in field encounters. While not uncomplicated (ref. the section on friendship above), the difference aspect has mostly felt productive in that it provoked mutual curiosity and allowed me to take on the role of a learner. In the interviews I relied on my foreignness to ask basic questions without annoying my informants, who would explain with detail things they might not have explained in the same manner to someone with a similar background. In fact, some Brazilian colleagues argued that they likely would have had a harder time to get access and gain trust than I did, especially in the favela. I cannot neatly be placed within the hierarchical and stratified carioca social hierarchy and thus

eluded certain preconceptions favela residents may have had of a white, middle-class academic from Rio. My gender also played a role, in particular in my interviews with the police. I doubt that the police officers' willingness to discuss the vulnerability of positionality and masculinity within the institution had been the same had I been male.

3.5. Trustworthiness

How best to achieve and account for research quality in qualitative research is a disputed topic. Some rely on the conventional quantitative criteria of reliability and validity as assessment tools. However, it has been argued that such terms are ill-fitted with the nature of qualitative inquiry (Creswell, 2007: Stenbacka, 2001: 552). I instead draw on the concept of 'trustworthiness', which largely relies on the extent to which the researcher has problematized their positionality in the research (Cousin, 2010).

One of the key elements of trustworthiness is, according to Lincoln and Guba (1985), dependability, which entails ensuring that the research process is logical, traceable, and clearly documented so that others can examine and judge its quality (Tobin & Begley, 2004). This chapter has sought to provide the necessary transparency on how data has been collected and analyzed and how the social nature of the research process has influenced research findings.

Trustworthiness also depends on the credibility of the findings, which has to do with the 'fit' between respondents' views and the researcher's representation of them (Tobin & Begley, 2004). In order to enhance credibility, I have relied on prolonged engagement with the field, persistent observation, and data triangulation. I have collected data from multiple sources, cross-checking consistency in information

provided by informants with information provided by other informants, official documents, media, and academic literature. This way, I have sought to combine 'sayings' with observations of 'doings' (although usually not of the same informants).

Finally, another element of trustworthiness is confirmability, which relies on demonstrating that findings emerge from the data and not the researcher's own predispositions (Shenton, 2004). Researchers are never neutral observers, and my data to a large degree relies on my own interpretation of a reality different from my own. This interpretation is shaped by my personal biography and the baggage of theoretical considerations and past experiences I brought to the field. While qualitative research never can present any 'objective' truth, confirmability can be enhanced by involving other actors in the research process. Throughout the process of writing this dissertation, I have discussed my interpretations both with informants in the field and with a larger research community through engaging actively with theories and literature, presenting drafts of papers at conferences, and exposing my work to the peer-review process of the journals I have published in. Seen together, I argue that these strategies have ensured a rigorous review of the data material informing the five papers presented in the next chapter.

4. Summary of the Papers

This chapter presents longer summaries of the five papers in Part II, which are based on the theoretical and methodological frameworks discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Before the summaries, I will briefly reiterate the papers' relation to each other and to the dissertation's overarching thematic focus and theoretical-analytical approach.

As noted in the introduction, the election of Lula da Silva as president brought hopes of a 'new Brazil' (top box in Figure II on page 17). The PT's leftist political platform pledged social and economic development and moves towards more inclusive and substantive citizenship, with a particular focus on cities. In Rio, this was connected to the promise of a 'social legacy' after the Olympics. While notable advancements did take place, the PT years failed to significantly challenge entrenched inequalities. In response, frustrated segments of society took to the

streets in the 2013 June uprisings (bottom box of Figure II). The protests started as a leftist critique of the PT years, but dissatisfaction was gradually largely transformed into an anti-left sentiment. Drawing on citizenship theory, the first paper represents a 'first cut' attempt to make sense of this overarching field, which is further developed in the subsequent papers.

Papers 2, 3, and 4 go deeper into different aspects of how the PT's developmentalist agenda materialized through the local-level governments' neoliberal, market-centered urban agenda and mega-event preparations. Urban upgrading (PAC, paper 1), forced evictions (paper 2), and community policing (UPP, paper 3) represent three disputed strategies towards favelas during Rio's pre-Olympic years. The papers examine what happened when these interventions 'from above' met the grounded reality, following dynamics of contention between public authorities, favela dwellers, and third parties involved (e.g. the media, real estate sectors, police, the courts). Paper 5 lifts the gaze back to the outer square of Figure II and strives to make sense of the 2013 June uprisings as a reaction to disillusionments with the 'new Brazil'. The promises of social and economic development and more substantive citizenship had become a de-politicizing 'police' order, an order ruptured by the June uprisings.

Common to all five papers is that they emphasize the complexity of actors and interests at stake. Furthermore, they all take the temporal dimension into account, examining how interests and power relations changed over time and how this shaped the different stakeholders' room of maneuver. Finally, the papers all share a methodological concern with going in-depth and up-close in order to provide a contextualized and bottom-up understanding of the phenomena of interest.

4.1. Paper I: Socio-Spatial Divides in Rio de Janeiro and Urban Development during the 'Pink Tide'

The first contribution gives a broad overview and introduction to the themes explored in the dissertation. It examines the advancements and limitations of the socially oriented policies and promises of the PT years through the lens of Rocinha's relations with its upper-middle-class neighbor, São Conrado.

The PT years brought a rapid and profound change to the composition of the Brazilian society through redistributive policies, affirmative action and anti-poverty legislation. However, the 'pink tide' in Brazil was marked by continuities as much as ruptures. While the inequality-reducing measures eased the lives of the poorest whilst there was economic and political will to uphold these policies, they were less successful in building a lasting foundation for inequality reductions beyond economic concerns. The chapter draws on citizenship theory and uses empirical material from Rocinha to reflect on these issues.

First, it gives an account of the PAC and UPP programs' implementation in Rocinha. While these interventions pledged to bridge socio-spatial divides between the favela and the 'formal' city, thus contributing to more substantive and inclusive urban citizenship, the chapter shows that these programs had significant limitations. Second, the chapter moves to the 2013 June uprisings and how Rocinha residents organized large-scale protests against the profile of PAC's infrastructure projects and the violence of the UPP police. It interprets these protests as expressions of frustration that the PT years did 'not go far enough' in enabling social mobility for poor urban dwellers and more substantive citizenship. Whereas the June uprisings initially expressed frustration

directed 'upwards' against economic and political elites, with time street demonstrations were organized by progressively whiter and richer segments of society and increasingly expressed anger directed 'downwards'. The chapter third, interprets these protests as expressions of frustrations that the PT years went 'too far'. It frames them as a revanchist counter-reaction on behalf of the middle and upper classes to the strides forward that had, in fact, been made by poorer segments of society. It uses a protest organized by São Conrado residents in 2016 as an illustration. The protesters demanded that a bus stop in São Conrado, mostly used by residents of Rocinha, would be removed. Rocinha residents interpreted the protest as permeated by a discourse of revanchism and emboldened by the right-wing political context of the post-PT years.

In spite of such limitations, the chapter underlines that we cannot ignore the advancements that did take place during the PT years. The symbolism of having an uneducated ironworker (Lula) and a woman (Dilma) as presidents cannot be ignored in a country where the majority of the people have not seen themselves reflected in the traditional class of white, middle-aged, male politicians. The chapter thus concludes that this has helped place citizenship on the agenda and create a climate of debate on the structural foundations of inequality.

4.2. Paper II: Politics of Urban Transformation in pre-Olympic Rio de Janeiro between citizen- and market-centered agendas

The second paper uses the case of PAC in Rocinha to study participatory urban upgrading in pre-Olympic Rio as a site of contentions between a

bottom-up, participatory, citizen-centered agenda of urban transformation and a top-down, neoliberal, market-centered agenda of urban transformation.

The federal PAC Growth Acceleration Program was launched in 2007 to respond to the PT's ambitious development agenda for industry, infrastructure, and welfare. The sub-program PAC Favela pledged participatory, in-situ urban upgrading (*'urbanização'*) of favelas as a mechanism of social inclusion. This was part of the citizen-centered urban agenda outlined by the Ministry of Cities during Lula's first term (2003-2006). The article also shows that a local, bottom-up process in Rocinha of developing a Master Plan for the upgrading of the community during this period also had had a significant influence on the federal program. PAC's interventions in Rocinha (2007-2013) were to be based on this Master Plan, which raised hopes of citizen-centered development. However, the materialization of PAC works took place through a public-private partnership that assigned oversight to a group of local politicians and private entrepreneurs in Rio who adhered to a market-centered, neoliberal urban paradigm. These actors also supported favela upgrading, but primarily based on urban branding concerns ahead of the Olympics. The article presents a multi-scalar case study of how social and economic interests and actors at the community, state, and federal levels engaged with PAC in Rocinha, and implications for the trajectory of interventions.

The case study is used to dialogue with the 'city of exception' thesis that has contended that Rio's entrepreneurial governance and mega-event-induced state of exception pushed forward a de-politicized and socially exclusionary neoliberal urban agenda. The article argues that this thesis tends toward a generic presentation of the governing forces without paying sufficient attention to the internal workings of the Brazilian

state and its complexities. Drawing on critical neoliberalization theory, the paper underlines the necessity of paying close attention to how neoliberal, entrepreneurial city development is shaped by inherited political and institutional landscapes and contested by diverse social forces.

The case of PAC in Rocinha shows the dynamics and forms of neoliberal urban development and participation in pre-Olympic Rio as shaped by complex state structures and politico-institutional arrangements. Building on Evangelina Dagnino's notion of a 'perverse confluence' between neoliberal and democratic citizenship projects, the paper argues that citizen- and market-centered agendas had a perverse confluence of interests in participatory favela upgrading. This enabled support from a wide range of actors to the upgrading interventions but also implied that different actors had different ideas of what participatory upgrading was to mean. With time, the market-centered agenda gradually won ground. While the outcomes of upgrading interventions in Rocinha appear as a clear case of neoliberal, market-centered urban branding, the article shows that they are better understood as inherently hybrid.

By giving a central place to these elements of complexity, the paper illustrates the necessity for contextual analyses of perceived de-politicized neoliberal entrepreneurial urban governance. It, as such, contributes both to the literature on urban transformation during Rio's Olympic era and to the broader literature on 'post-political' cities and neoliberal restructuring.

4.3. Paper III: 'Contentious Politics of slums': understanding different outcomes of community resistance against evictions

The third paper focuses on favela evictions in the years preceding the Olympics, when close to 100,000 poor urban dwellers were forcefully removed. We analyze and compare the structures and processes of resistance against disputed public interventions and evictions in three favelas (Laboriaux, Morro da Providência, and Vila Autódromo), which were all relatively successful in mobilizing resistance and contesting removals. However, both the processes and outcomes were different, which called for contextual comparative analysis.

The article identifies and draws on two overarching narratives on the 'politics of slums', by which we mean encounters between efforts from above directed at slums and efforts from residents to secure housing and improve living conditions (drawing on Dupont et al., 2016). On the one hand, we outline a top-down perspective of the 'City against slum dwellers'. Work within this narrative seeks an understanding of the political and economic drivers of the demolition, upgrading, and/or relocation of slums in cities across the global South. It focuses on how global city ambitions and the development of entrepreneurial 'cities of exception' has led to efforts of cleansing cities of undesired elements (such as slums) to boost their image. On the other hand, we identify a bottom-up perspective of the 'slum dwellers against the city'. Scholars operating within this narrative are more actor- and action-from-below-oriented. They explore the daily-life resistance against the limitations imposed on poor people's citizenship and rights, and foreground marginalized urban spaces as sites of political agency that question and

challenge the neoliberal order. While both narratives provide valuable insights into the politics of slums, we identify certain weaknesses and blind spots and combine and expand on them in a relational framework of *Contentious Politics of Slums*.

A key dimension in our approach is to understand how collective actors situated in slums acted upon changing political opportunity structures. We identify three opportunity structures in the period of interest (2010-2016): what we call the City of Exception, the City in Revolt and the City in Crisis, which presented different openings and limitations to the case communities. While changing political opportunity structures are central to our analysis, they did not determine outcomes. To understand how and why outcomes were different in the three cases, we show the necessity of focusing on the dynamics of contention between favela actors and external forces – both public authorities and also third parties like the courts, the media, and real estate - in the context of changing political spaces for confrontations and negotiations.

We conclude that our contentious politics of slums-approach fruitfully combines and extends on narratives that approach the politics of slums respectively 'from above' or 'from below'. By bringing relational elements to the fore, and by underlining the key role played by different third-party actors and institutions, our approach captures the dynamic, interactive process through which the contentious politics of evictions and resistance unfolded. We show that multi-dimensionality is needed when assessing outcomes, using not only material but also social and political-symbolic criteria in a complementary manner. This way, we argue that the contentious politics-framework stands to be highly fruitful to uncover politics of slums in any city in the global South.

4.4. Paper IV: A Masculinities Perspective on the Enduring 'Warrior Ethos' of Rio's police

The fourth paper examines security politics in Rio's favelas and the UPP police program. Literature on the UPPs tends to situate this program within the context of a securitization agenda ahead of the city's hosting of the Olympics. The program has been denounced for focusing more on the security of tourists and residents of surrounding 'formal' neighborhoods than improving security within targeted favelas. These dynamics are examined in Paper 1, and also raised in this paper. However, from interviews I conducted with the police, social dynamics within the police culture emerged as a complementary explanatory factor to the neoliberal securitization agenda in understanding the (re)production of police violence within the program.

The paper employs perspectives from gender and masculinities studies to understand the enduring 'warrior' ethos and practices of the police. It argues that it is fruitful to focus on the performative aspects of gender and how people 'do gender' in interactions with others within the context of larger social structures and institutions. In spite of the UPP program's praising of softer and more 'feminine' police functions, the paper shows that the police culture and work environment continued to deem 'masculine' capacities for violence critical elements of police work and important features of the construction of police officers' identity.

The paper underlines social positionality as central for officers' room of maneuver to 'undo' normative gender role performances in the police culture and adhere to the UPP approach. Centrally, and often overlooked, patrol officers tend to share a similar socioeconomic background as the victims of police violence. It is overarchingly young

men from underprivileged backgrounds that turn to the high-risk, low-pay job of being patrol officers, and the majority self-declare as black or brown. UPP patrol officers were therefore at the bottom of the police hierarchy both due to rank and file and due to social markers such as age, race, and socio-economic background. In-depth interviews with police officers suggested that if patrol officers adhered to the softer UPP approach it would place them at risk of being bashed ('esculachado') by their peers, superiors, and also by citizens with whom they interacted in the streets. Fear of such bashing provides central insights into the enduring warrior ethos and practices of the police.

While the paper's theoretical approach may seem on the sideline of the wider dissertation, the thematic focus on the UPPs is securely placed within its research agenda. Furthermore, the paper provides important insights into the classed, gendered, and racialized dimensions of urban inequality and (in)security in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil that complement the other contributions to the dissertation. Patrol officers are both the police that most kill and the police that most often are killed in service. By drawing attention to their racial and socioeconomic background, the article underlines that the Brazilian state involves the population it targets with necropolitics in its very execution - a central and at times overlooked dimension in work examining questions of citizenship, democratization, and security politics in Brazil. This adds important nuance to the understanding of the actors and interests at stake in pre-Olympic Rio.

4.5. Paper V: Making sense of the 2013 'June uprisings'

The fifth and final paper moves the focus to the 2013 'June' uprisings, the largest street demonstrations in a generation. While the uprisings started as a leftist movement, right-wing actors gradually took over the streets - and the role of these events in the last years' political developments remains contested. Through an in-depth case study of the mobilization and aftermath of a demonstration originating in Rocinha during June, the article seeks to confront and transcend two overarching narratives on the June uprisings' emergence and significance.

On the one hand, a number of scholars have portrayed the June uprisings as a sociopolitical opening that politicized Brazilian society by bringing into being new political actors and debates. This overarching narrative, which I call June's 'Revolutionary Openings', draws on post-foundational-inspired theorizations of the political as an agonistic rupture with de-politicized socio-political orders that brings new political subjectivities and imaginaries to the field. Such a theorization highlights the inagurative dimension and emancipatory politics of the uprisings. On the other hand, an alternative narrative has foregrounded the 'Reactionary Outcomes' of June. Scholars within this overarching narrative have drawn on critical social theory to analyze the class politics and consequences of the June uprisings, foregrounding how structural weaknesses in the protesters' organizing capacities made them easy targets of co-optation by an opportunistic political right. Underlying this narrative is a privileging of organized social movements as the protagonists of progressive change, and, thereby, an inherent

wariness of uprisings as disorderly disturbances with little transformative potential.

The paper argues that these meta-perspectives need to be nuanced by closer attention to the contextual complexity of emerging actors and actions. It presents a case study from Rocinha that follows four protagonists from their participation in the June uprisings in 2013 to their reflections on the aftermath of the protests three years later. The paper highlights first, that the June uprisings acted as a catalyst for the political awakening of these protagonists. Through June, they would be propelled into a position as a 'new generation' of leaders and become interlocutors with the state government regarding public interventions in the community. Post-foundational theorizations are well suited to frame this political subjectivization. In drawing attention to the extended political processes and consequences of the June uprisings, the paper second, shows how these activists were met by a state machinery that mobilized to de-politicize and co-opt them which they were ill-equipped to stand up against. The concrete outcomes of the June demonstration left much to be desired, and several of the protagonists were seemingly co-opted into a patron-client relationship with powerful politicians. Critical social theory helps place this within an embedded analysis of sedimented structures of power.

However, the article underlines that the activists cannot simply be dismissed as easy prey of co-optation and de-politicization. While activists did not revolutionize local (or urban) politics, they were changed by the lived experience of subjectivizing change during June. This is an experience they carry with them and which can be drawn on in future events. In this sense, the article argues that June can be seen as remaining an open source of emancipatory politics. The article concludes by arguing for the fruitfulness of establishing a dialogue

between post-foundational political and critical social theoretical perspectives in trying to grasp the role of urban uprisings in urban transformative processes.

5. Conclusion

The research objective of this dissertation has been to study the political consequences of Rio de Janeiro's hosting of sports mega-events through the lens of citizenship. The main conclusion drawn is that the mega-events were used as a leverage for a neoliberal reconfiguration of the city in a way that was de-politicizing, yet, did not render the city 'post-political'. In contrast, it triggered popular politics and protests that challenged de-politicized urban development and politicized urban citizenship. Centrally, this politicization was messy and multifaceted. I have therefore argued for the necessity of a contextual and grounded analysis that places analytical focus on dynamics of contention between different actors that engaged with the mega-event developments, following such contentions over time.

In this chapter, I expand on this argument and explore implications. The chapter is structured in four sections. First, I address the dissertation's research question of how the hosting of sports mega-events influenced the political organization and management of the city. Second, I turn to the research question of how those marginalized and dispossessed by mega-event developments have contested such processes. Third, I discuss contentious politics of urban citizenship as a fruitful theoretical-analytical framework for examining the interwoven processes of urban development and resistance in pre-Olympic Rio. Finally, I present some concluding reflections on the relevance of the study for contemporary debates on cities, citizens, and urban processes.

5.1. The 'post-political' city against slum dwellers

The first research question for this dissertation was how the hosting of sports mega-events influenced the political organization and management of the city. To address this question, I have focused on the political-economic structures of the Olympic city project, engaging with post-foundational theorizations of the urban as a (post)political domain.

The so-called 'post-political city' thesis presented in section 2.2.5. underlines how ideals of 'global' city-ness are being pursued by urban elites in ways that place substantial constraints on the scope of legitimate political contestation and deliberation. The only conflict viewed as worthy of engaging in, is allegedly the inter-urban corporate competitive conflict over international capital and investments. This leads to democratic debate being replaced by techno-managerial forms of consensus-oriented governance and 'expert' administration. In Rio, critical scholars like Vainer (2009, 2011) have drawn on this literature

to argue that the city's hosting of sports mega-events served as a leverage for de-politicized governance. They claim that in the lead-up to the Olympics, legal norms and frameworks were circumvented in the name of the 'necessity' of the events and with the prospect of long-term benefits for the city. The different papers of the dissertation engage with this argument to frame and understand the market-centered urban transformation in pre-Olympic Rio.

Centrally, urban officials argued that the mega-events would bring economic growth and development to the benefit of all of Rio's residents. Legacy programs invested unparalleled amounts in urban upgrading and security, targeting favelas in particular. This was presented as a unique opportunity to confront the history of differentiated citizenship and leave a social legacy for the city. While the interventions did provide certain opportunities for inclusion, the different papers show that they were marked by notable limitations when it came to substance and questions of power and redistribution. The interventions into the case favelas were guided more by the interests of the wider city than by local needs. Contrary to the claim that the mega-event developments were enacted in the interests of the city 'as a whole', this shows that they in practice privileged particular interests: property developers over favela dwellers, real estate holders over households, and so on.

In understanding why, Paper 3 identifies a 'city against slum dwellers' narrative that underlines how the drive for global competitiveness involving image-building often is accompanied by efforts of 'cleansing' cities of slums and other alleged undesirable elements. Rio's favelas have long been seen by political and economic elites as 'stains of misery' ruining the image and functionality of the city. Furthermore, they represent a security predicament. Rio's reputation as unequal and insecure – largely associated with favelas - was a hindrance to the city's

'global' ambitions. Thus, the package of upgrading interventions and policing that targeted Rio's favelas can be interpreted as a way through which elite interests sought to mend the city's reputation by 'beautifying' the physical environment by means of urban upgrading and/or removals (Papers 2 and 3) and 'pacifying' and 'civilizing' unruly populations (Papers 1 and 4). The interventions into favelas in Rio's pre-Olympic years thereby largely continued rather than challenged the racialized and classed hierarchies that for centuries have served to maintain structures of privilege and limit the social and economic opportunities of the urban poor.

The post-foundational theoretical approach frames and understands such tendencies by emphasizing how neoliberal policy (or 'police') orders constitute a socio-spatial ordering that renders certain populations and opinions invisible and inaudible. Even when there was 'participation' and 'dialogue', favela residents were largely left without a voice in decision-making on the trajectory of urban transformations. The post-political argument as such provides valuable insights into how ruling elites could use the sense of urgency and exceptionality of the mega-events to circumvent legal norms and side-line dissent. However, I have argued that focusing excessively on these de-politicizing dynamics is overly deterministic and overlooks opportunities that existed for resistance and for claiming more citizen-centered urban transformation. After all, a post-political end to antagonism is impossible (Mouffe, 2005; Rancière, 1999).

In that regard, an important backdrop to keep in mind is the political context in the pre-Olympic years. As noted in the introduction and expanded on in Paper 2, the federal government and the PT's promise of a 'New Brazil' from the early 2000s had opened a unique window of opportunity for efforts to secure more inclusive and substantive

citizenship. The administrations of Governor Cabral (from 2007) and Mayor Paes (from 2009) were allied with the federal government led by President Lula. While their administrations increasingly prescribed to urban entrepreneurialism, politics is not just about the grand visions - it is also a game of securing votes and power. In Brazil, such games have been tied to patrimonial-clientelist state structures, where favelas play an important role as large voter bases. While their interests in favela interventions were arguably tied primarily to the issues of image outlined above, neither Mayor Paes nor Governor Cabral fully abandoned the pro-poor line. This is illustrated by how the Morar Carioca and PAC programs made promises to 'their' electorates. Papers 2 and 3 in particular show these contradictions in the state and municipality's politics towards favelas. Therefore, as we conclude in Paper 3, the political opportunity structure of Rio's Olympic era was more open and dynamic and presented larger opportunities for resistance and revolt, than a static and deterministic account of a 'post-political city' would suggest.

5.2. The re-politicizing efforts of the slum dwellers against the city

My second set of research questions regarded how those marginalized and dispossessed by mega-event developments have contested such processes. To address this question, I have focused on the forms and spaces of encounter favela dwellers and other concerned citizens turned to in order to impact the mega-event developments, and the outcomes and consequences of their efforts. In so doing, I have engaged both with scholarship that focuses on organized forms of struggles as well as interpretations of the seemingly spontaneous outbursts of dissent that were the June uprisings.

Brazil has a unique history of citizenship politics 'from below'. The urban peripheries and broader social movements have engaged in a struggle to establish a city that recognizes universal inclusion and substantive rights like housing, education, and basic health. In understanding such struggles, Paper 3 identifies a 'slum dwellers against the city' narrative that foregrounds the political agency and capacity of insurgent citizenship movements. The different Papers employ this bottom-up perspective to frame and understand how the case communities were able to deconstruct and delegitimize the City's arguments for forced evictions (Paper 3) and how they through mobilizing on legal frameworks and alliances both in government and in civil society managed to get some of their claims for a more citizen-centered urban transformation heard (Papers 1 and 2).

In addition to these organized struggles, the June uprisings also contested and disrupted the mega-event driven urban transformations. In Paper 5, I draw on post-foundational political theory to examine the politicizing dynamics of June. While urban uprisings have been denounced as mere irrational, emotional and deviant disturbances both by neoliberal consensus ideals and in certain social movement literatures[16], I have argued for the necessity of viewing them as a political rather than a psychological phenomenon. Post-foundational theory opens up for conceptualizing urban uprisings as an agonistic rupture with the instituted order through which new political subjectivities and imaginaries are brought into being.

This shows that Rio's mega-events did not simply contribute to a 'post-political' city. Rather, the preparations for these events politicized the city by making manifest social inequalities and conflicts, thereby

[16] Both the collective action-tradition and more contemporary scholarship on urban riots as urban violence, see chapter 2 pages 47 and 53.

mobilizing various forms of resistance and dissent. Both the insurgent citizenship literature and post-foundational theorizations of a 'return of the political' through urban uprisings provide valuable insights into such a politicization 'from below'. However, I have argued that some of this literature is at risk of romanticizing the politics of resistance. The insurgent citizenship-scholarship largely locates political agency in the urban margins as if autonomous from society around it. Meanwhile, as a binary conceptualization of the 'police' and 'the political' permeates and frames much of the literature that views urban politics and resistance through a post-foundational lens, this work also has a tendency to locate political agency at 'a distance' from the state, associated with the logic of the 'police'. By consequence, political subjects are seen as ceasing to be subjects of politics when they engage with the realm of power as they by so doing accept a place within the order of things. This idea of political purity is both acontextual and atemporal.

As noted in Papers 1, 4 and 5, Rio's Olympic era culminated in the current crisis of Brazilian democracy, characterized by the rise of a revived, authoritarian right, an increasing militarization of security politics, exclusionary urban governance, and a reduction of social programs. Such 'Reactionary Outcomes' – as I call it in Paper 5 - underline how a narrow focus on the 'political purity' of insurgent movements or the 'Revolutionary Opening' of June, is of little value if we want to understand the last years' political developments. Resisting actors can only be understood in relation to other actors and interests at stake. In other words, the 're-politicizing city' needs to be contextualized in longer-term struggles. I have therefore argued for a relational, contextual and process-based approach to the political agendas and strategies 'from above' and the popular politics 'from below' on the mega-event transformations and their implications for urban citizenship.

Figure IV: Theorizing the contentious politics of urban citizenship



5.3. Contentious politics of urban citizenship

Figure IV outlines the theoretical-analytical approach of the dissertation. The outer square represents the more overarching theoretical-philosophical confrontation between a 'post-political' and a 're-politicizing' city. While not losing sight of these broader political logics, my analytical focus has been on the inner square of Figure IV; on dynamics of contention between the 'city against slum dwellers' using mega-events as a leverage for market-centered urban transformation and the 'slum dwellers against the city' demanding citizen-centered urban transformation. In examining these contentions, I have argued for the necessity of also recognizing the role played by allies and opponents among third-party actors like the public defenders' office, the courts, real estate, business sectors, academics, broader social movements, and the media (right box in Figure IV). Finally, I have stressed that interactions between these actors and agendas take place in a context shaped by classed, racialized, and gendered social hierarchies inherited from colonial times (left box in Figure IV).

In these confrontations, different visions for the city and for urban collective life were at stake. While different actors made similar references to citizenship – e.g. in the form of foregrounding their support to inclusive development and popular participation – this was what Dagnino (2007, 2010) calls a 'perverse confluence'. The similar references obscured how neoliberal and insurgent formulations of citizenship had different understandings of what inclusive development and popular participation were to mean. The dissertation thus shows that the meaning and politics of urban citizenship – already a matter of contentions between different actors, interests, and agendas – was further politicized by the hosting of sports mega-events.

A broadly defined contentious politics-approach has proved fruitful for approaching and making sense of this politicization. It has underlined the centrality of a relational approach to the interwoven processes of neoliberal urban development and resistance in pre-Olympic Rio, one that that places analytical focus on dynamics of contention between different actors that engaged with the mega-event developments. It has further emphasized the contextual complexity of actors and interests at stake, drawing attention to the mediating level of city politics and power coalitions involving third-party actors and institutions (only marginally considered by the top-down and bottom-up approaches). Finally, it has shown the centrality of an in-depth, process-based analysis to capture how interests and power relations changed over time and how this shaped the different stakeholders' room of maneuver. This focus on grounded complexity has, however, not entailed reduction to an idiographic analysis of the local and particular in and of itself: the in-depth accounts of particular processes in the five Papers have been points of entry to engage with and speak to broader urban tendencies and debates.

5.4. Concluding reflections

The period of interest for this dissertation was at the height of the liberal era, dominated by liberal ideas such as free markets, limited government, individual civil and human rights, and globalization. This era was also an urban era, as the 21st 'urban century' has granted ever-increasing centrality to cities. In the last years, Brazil and the world seems to have moved in a post-liberal direction with the revival of reactionary conservatism and electoral politics that combine nationalism and economic dirigisme with hostility to social liberalism.

While the liberal era appears to be ebbing, the dissertation's findings still resonate with contemporary debates on cities, citizens and urban processes.

On the one hand, the urban age continues. Cities have emerged as key places that generate economic growth in contemporary capitalism, and accumulation dynamics will continue to affect cities for the foreseeable future. The mega-event driven urban transformation in Rio epitomizes neoliberal growth agendas and how cities have turned to urban megalomania in order to claim strategic positions in the world economy. While often accompanied by promises of progress and prosperity, this type of urban development has been implemented in ways that perpetuate and deepen urban inequalities – leading to rising tensions. The discrepancies between neoliberal fantasies and favela realities of mega-events examined in this dissertation provide insights into such tensions.

In response, cities have also become key sites of social mobilizations and movements that challenge the propagation of global urban norms. New actors have emerged to claim voice and present alternative visions for the future, using a variety of strategies ranging from alternative livelihood practices to street protests and occupations to engagement with formal institutional spaces. Rio and Brazil are a case in point. Building on decades of struggles for the right to the city and urban reform, the social mobilizations examined in this dissertation have disrupted dominant urban governance regimes and influenced debates on urban policy both in Brazil and beyond. In other words, just as top-down neoliberal agendas will continue to shape our cities, bottom-up struggles for urban citizenship and the right to the city are also here to stay.

The actual impact of counter-hegemonic resistance movements on urban policies and practices is not always immediately visible, and many have apparently been demobilized after being confronted by countervailing agendas and strategies of restoring order. However, as underlined in this dissertation, it is necessary to understand processes of mobilization within a long-term perspective. Contention evolves through different modalities, and different forms and phases of mobilization can be seen as alternating in a dynamic process. Even short-lived experiments in the formation of movements can therefore be considered important as they build experiences that can shape future mobilizations and eventually bring about the desired change. In this way, the idea inaugurated lives on as an open source of politicization.

Further, despite the perseverance of neoliberal governance practices and their fusion with authoritarian modes of government, more progressive political-economic discourses, norms, and practices are also gaining ground. Experiments with urban communing and protests over the past decade have been accompanied by a rise of different types of progressive parties and politicians (e.g. Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, Bernie Sanders' popularity in the United States, and PSOL in certain Brazilian cities). At the sub-national level, progressive city governments and experiments with radical municipalism is playing an important role within the emerging urban countermovement. Meanwhile, at the supra-national level, the 21st century's challenges of rapid urbanization, climate change, and high levels of inequality has led to debate on the necessity of creating more sustainable and just cities. International organizations, civil society networks, and policy agendas - such as the UN's 'New Urban Agenda' and the Sustainable Development Goal 11 on Sustainable Cities and Communities – raise the need to address urban grievances and conflicts. With these debates, slums and favelas are

being recognized as more than mere abbreviations to be eradicated. Rather, they are acknowledged as flexible, adaptable settlements that have allowed people to carve out social, economic and political spaces for themselves (Braathen et al., 2016; Roy, 2011). While international agendas and organizations may have technocratic tendencies, they grant legitimacy to subaltern forms of urbanism and citizenship by acknowledging that such voices and experiences must be taken into account if we are to build more sustainable urban futures.

In other words, in spite of the revival of anti-liberal tendencies, certain opportunities do exist for urban resistance and reform movements. This goes to show that proclamations of our age as 'post-political' are greatly exaggerated. This dissertation has provided key insights into the contradictions and tensions that have riddled the liberal, urban era and the political potential inherent in such contradictions. It has done so from a grounded perspective, presenting an in-depth study involving specific local, national, and global circumstances. While underlining that localized and contextual dynamics matter, the dissertation has also emphasized that these dynamics are situated within broader tendencies and debates. This way, the dissertation arguably presents findings with relevance for a wide range of discussions on urbanization, neoliberal growth agendas, democratization processes and reforms, as well as the role of citizens and their organizations in the governing of cities.

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Part II

Paper I

Urban Development in Rio de Janeiro During the 'Pink Tide': Bridging Socio-Spatial Divides Between the Formal and Informal City?

CHAPTER 5

Urban Development in Rio de Janeiro During the 'Pink Tide': Bridging Socio-Spatial Divides Between the Formal and Informal City?

Celina Myrann Sørbøe

Introduction

A few weeks after the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, residents from the upper middle-class neighbourhood São Conrado organised a protest. The combination of 'Rio residents', 'sports events' and 'protests' has appeared in countless headlines since June 2013, when millions of Brazilians took to the streets in mass demonstrations. A cacophony of demands, from broad citizenship issues to state inefficiency and corruption to protesting the disproportionate spending on the hosting of mega sports events, were fronted. Demonstrations have continued to bring Brazilians to the streets, but the agendas of protesters have radically changed character:

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> Away with the bus stop! São Conrado does not accept a final stop/bus stop. Disorder for the residents of the neighbourhood. Noise, filthiness, occupied lanes, traffic. The municipality does not listen to us!!! We demand action.

The above message appeared on several banners that were draped on buildings in São Conrado in September 2016, demanding that the local bus stop would be removed. The City obliged to the demand, and according to one of its users, the bus stop was moved to:

> A dark, one-way street behind an old hotel that has been abandoned for decades. It is a deserted street, with no sidewalk, next to a forest (…) unlit, and without a shelter for people to sit and wait for the bus.

Anyone who has travelled on the over-crowded, under-air-conditioned buses in Rio's blistering summer heat knows that they are not the prioritised means of transportation for those with alternatives. The majority of the users of the bus stop are not the residents of São Conrado, but those of neighbouring Rocinha, Rio and Brazil's largest *favela* (urban informal settlement). While only metres away from each other, the two neighbourhoods seem worlds apart. In a 2016 Social Progress Index measuring human development, Rocinha scored 44.9 on a scale from 0 to 100. That ranked Rocinha in 29th place of 32 administrative regions in the city. São Conrado's region ranked second with a score of 85.18 (IPS 2016). This contrast between São Conrado and Rocinha illustrates the prevalence of uneven urban development and socio-economic differences in the city. The recent protest in São Conrado also testifies to a deep-rooted class struggle that has resurfaced in later years.

With the 2002 election of the Worker's Party's (PT) Inácio 'Lula' da Silva as President, many hoped Brazil's entrenched inequalities could be confronted. Lula placed Brazil at the forefront of the centre-left 'Pink Tide' in Latin America. The socially oriented policies introduced in Lula's first term increased minimum wages and strengthened worker's rights. Cash transfer programmes helped keep children from underprivileged families in school, while affirmative action granted their elder siblings access to universities. Lula's second term operationalised an ambitious developmentalist agenda, implementing national development programmes in industries and infrastructure. In Rio, these programmes were connected with the city's preparations for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. The City pledged to use the unique opportunity of the mega sports events to

respond to the legacy of socio-spatial inequalities, and targeted favelas with investments in infrastructure, security and social housing. Rocinha was one of the favelas at the receiving end of investments.

The PT years did bring a profound change to the composition of the Brazilian society through the programmes of redistribution, social inclusion and poverty reduction. As argued throughout this book, the 'Pink Tide' in Brazil was however marked by continuities as much as ruptures. The inequality-reducing measures introduced may have eased the lives of the poorest while there was economic and political will to uphold these policies. But they were less successful building a lasting foundation for inequality reductions beyond economic concerns. From 2013 onwards, PT became the scapegoat for the deepening political and economic crises enveloping the country, and the party's reign ultimately came to a brutal end with Dilma's impeachment in September 2016 (Jinkings et al. 2016). Advancements that did take place in terms of efforts at addressing social justice and constructing citizenship are currently being rolled back in what can be termed a revanchist (Smith 1996) counter-reaction to the gains made by the poorer segments of society. This chapter will reflect on these issues through the case of Rocinha.

Part 1: Decades of Change

The Divided City

The name Rocinha means 'little farm' and stems from the initial occupation of the territory in the 1930s by small-scale farmers. Rocinha's growth accelerated from the 1950s, a period when rapid urbanisation brought millions of rural workers from the agricultural states in the northeast to the large industrial centres in the centre-south, such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (Leitão 2009). Unable to find affordable housing, the migrants innovated and built their homes on the steep hillsides wedged between the middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods lining Rio's shoreline. According to the latest census (IBGE 2010), one quarter of Rio's population resides in favelas. Rocinha's privileged location, between São Conrado and Gávea, two of the most affluent neighbourhoods of the city, has for good and for bad continually placed the spotlight on the community.

Urban informality is often associated with marginality, precariousness, socio-economic vulnerability and conflict in what Ananya Roy (2011, 224) has termed an 'apocalyptic and dystopian narrative of the slum'

(see, e.g. Neuwirth 2005; Davis 2006). Urban informal settlements have often been presented as 'diseases on the social body', providing urban reformers justifications for razing them (Stepan 1991; Holston 2009). In the 1960s and 1970s, the government initiated forced removals in many of the centrally located favelas in Rio, and Rocinha was no exception. The community suffered three partial removals in this period, but residents returned to Rocinha because of its location. The removals therefore did not stall the favela's growth. Rather, it accelerated as the construction boom in Rio's infrastructure and real estate sectors provided work opportunities, including in the construction of São Conrado. The latter expanded in the 1960s, and is today a high-end neighbourhood of gated communities and luxurious shopping centres.

In the decades that have passed, starch differences have consolidated between the two neighbourhoods. The favela's narrow, winding pathways contrast with the formal city's straight streets and avenues. The favela's makeshift economy, where everything from basic services such as sewage, water and electricity to transportation, commerce and security has largely been arranged informally, differs from the urban economy of the formal city. There, business is mainly on the books and workers' wages and working conditions conform to labour laws and standards. A 33-year-old man born and raised in Rocinha takes it so far as to claim that "there is a frontier here, where all that is missing in order to prevent people from crossing is border customs". Perhaps more important than material differences, he refers to symbolic, behavioural and cultural barriers that have excluded favela residents from mainstream society (see also Larkins 2015). A perception of favela residents as a dangerous 'other' (Said 1979) representing a threat to 'civilised society' has prevailed since the favelas first appeared over a century ago (Valladares 2005; Leite 2012). This perception was reinforced when the international drug trade found a stronghold on the unmapped, unpatrolled hillsides of Rio's favelas from the 1980s onwards. Drug traffickers often had the resources to maintain order and provide social assistance in areas where public services were limited at best. As armed drug gangs started filling the vacuum of the weak state presence, regular residents within these territories were seen as accomplices of the drug traffickers because of neighbourhood relations, kinship or economic and political ties. The police took a militarised approach to combating the drug trafficking in Rio's favelas, and the social conflict in the city became formulated as a 'war' (Machado da Silva and Leite 2008). This war has legitimised illegalities in the state's handling of the favelas.

In his writings on what he terms a 'state of exception', Agamben (1998) describes a condition under which normal principles of law and order are superseded by exceptional acts or displays of force in the name of protecting citizens. Judith Butler (2004, 98) points out that this can produce a state of 'desubjectivation' where "certain subjects undergo a suspension of their ontological status as subjects". Drug traffickers were envisioned not merely as common criminals but as enemy combatants at war with the state. Due to their perceived connection with drug trafficking, regular favela residents also became a kind of nonperson stripped of citizenship, a condition Agamben calls 'bare life' (1998, 11). An illustrative occurrence is a large police operation in Rocinha on May 20, 2016. Around 3:30 pm on that Friday afternoon, the BOPE special police force entered Rocinha with military helicopters and trucks in an intense shoot-out with local drug traffickers. Rio's largest newspaper *O Globo* reported on the event under the headline "*shoot-out in Rocinha scares students at PUC* ", the catholic university in the nearby upper-class neighbourhood Gávea (see Papo Reto 2016). The angle of the article, focusing on the fear of upper middle-class students in an adjacent neighbourhood rather than the fate of Rocinha residents caught in the crossfire, is telling of how favela residents have been rendered as 'bare life'.

Politics of Citizenship

There are still stark socio-spatial differences in Rio and Brazil, entrenched inequalities do not erase easily. But since the 1980s, Brazil has come a long way in establishing a legal framework and institutions that work to promote a more inclusive society. Citizenship has been a key concept.

With the end of the military dictatorship in the mid-1980s, social movements of all sorts, including favela, workers', landless', urban, health, feminist, black and student movements, emerged as protagonists of a new kind of politics. The reference to citizenship was not only a tool in their specific struggles but also a powerful link among them. The notion of citizenship in terms of 'cultural' inclusion, political representation and especially social rights (see Stokke forthcoming), became the mean through which the traditionally excluded masses gained a voice in the public sphere. The fruits of their struggle were manifest in the 1988 Constitution, often referred to as the 'Citizen Constitution' (Dagnino 2010). It recognised social and economic rights such as housing, employment, education and health. In terms of specifically urban challenges, it also incorporated new

ideas about the 'social function' of cities and urban property. The 2001 City Statute further recognised the 'right to the city' (Lefebvre 1968; Harvey 2008; Júnior 2005), the right of all urban dwellers to appropriate urban space and to participate centrally in its production (Purcell 2003). As a result, the 1990s and 2000s saw important advancements in policies and politics towards the favelas. Favela residents called for public investments with the Constitution in hand, and removal policies were put to an end. The public debate shifted to concentrating on the necessity of integrating the favelas in the city (Burgos 1998). When Inácio Lula da Silva from the Worker's Party (PT) won the presidency on a pro-poor platform in 2002, many were optimistic that the old divides between the favela and the formal city could slowly be erased.

PT Under Lula: Combining Social Concerns for the Poor with Economic Concerns for Growth

The election of Lula represented an historic opportunity for significant change in Brazil. The worker's union leader, who was illiterate until the age of ten and did not receive much in terms of formal education, represented something radically new in Brazil and in Latin America. At the same time, there were powerful forces of continuity. As Strønen and Ystanes point out in the introduction to this volume, the scope of possibility the Pink Tide governments operated within was largely defined by traditional elites. The re-democratisation of Brazil was a gradual opening (*abertura* in Portuguese) rather than a rupture, and the country preserved the historic structures of an oligarchic-bourgeois political society (see Teles and Safatle 2010). Lula had previously run for president three times without success. In order to win in 2002, he modified his once radical socialist orientation and reached out to the conservative political and financial elites. In an open letter addressed to the Brazilian people, but whose intended audience was rather these elites, Lula promised to adhere to fiscal responsibility, make low inflation a priority, and generally play by the rules of the market (Singer 2012). A pragmatic dealmaker, Lula accepted the neoliberal reality but sought to address the downsides of those policies through redistributing to the poorer segments of society. The elimination of the previous radicalism of PT and the search for a broad government coalition mark a transition from *petismo* to *lulismo*—'the Lula way of governing' (Sampaio jr., 2012; Singer 2012).

Mega Sports Events and Entrepreneurial Governance

In Rio de Janeiro, both the governor from 2007 and the mayor from 2009 were from PMDB, the business-oriented party within Lula's broad governing alliance. The three levels of government were thereby aligned for the first time in decades and would converge around a common project: the hosting of mega sports events. Brazil and Rio de Janeiro bid successfully on both the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, the largest sports spectacles in the world. This would present a unique window of opportunity for investments in Rio's favelas.

Lula's great ambition was to take Brazil out of the shadow of being the eternal 'land of the future' (Zweig 2017) to becoming an economic and political power to be reckoned with. His hope was that the 2016 Olympics would become a stamp of approval on the South American giant's coming of age, just as the Beijing Olympics of 2008 marked China's revival as a world power (Broudehoux 2007). Rio's local level government, on the other hand, had its own interests in hosting these events. Compelled to compete on the global arena over increasingly mobile capital, cities have adapted entrepreneurial styles of action and communication (Harvey 1989). The summer Olympics is the 'holy grail' of the entrepreneurial city competition, and Rio has bid on the event since the 1990s as part of its entrepreneurial governance (Vainer 2011).

The marketing of Rio as a potential host city depended on constructing an image of an exotic but tame city. This required that Rio confronted the statistics where it exhibited poor rankings, such as indicators on crime, violence and inequality. These were all issues that to a large degree were associated with the favelas, which had become an 'anti-postcard' (Ventura 1994) for Rio de Janeiro and for Brazil. Public policies in the favelas had to be revised. Interventions in the favelas became a central part of the Olympic development plans. Rio's Olympic bid pledged to use the Olympics both to improve living conditions for the poor and improve security in the city, leaving the city with a 'social legacy' after the Games (Braathen et al. 2013). Programmes were developed at all three levels of government targeting the favelas in particular, the main references being the federal Program of Accelerated Growth (PAC), the state Police Pacification Program (UPP) and the municipal Morar Carioca (Rolnik 2011). An additional 'legacy' from these interventions would hopefully come in the form of 'branding' Rio within the entrepreneurial city competition. In the next section, we will look at how the PAC and UPP programmes have materialised in Rocinha.

Part 2: Towards Urban Integration?

Rocinha: From Favela to Formality?

With his long white beard and never-faulting khaki shorts and sandals, 70-year-old José Martíns de Oliveira is an easily recognisable resident of Rocinha. A member of the community for nearly half a century, Martíns has accompanied Rocinha's growth from a once-small community to a densely populated neighbourhood of nearly 200,000 residents. Rocinha today is a far shot from the ramshackle wooden houses Martíns encountered when he migrated to Rio from north-eastern Ceará in 1968, when he tells me "there was no water, no transportation, no banks, commerce or supermarkets". Today Rocinha offers all the services found in the formal city. While today's unfinished brick houses still may not look like much from the outside, appearances can deceive. Nearly all residents have access to electricity and running water. Inside, flat screen TVs, sound systems, and latest-model refrigerators and other domestic goods are common. The latter items are a visual confirmation of the improved material living standards brought on by PT's socially oriented policies. The family allowance *Bolsa Familia*, higher minimum wages and facilitated access to credit has allowed low-income families to purchase once unattainable goods. According to Meirelles and Athayde (2016), the average income of favela residents rose by 54.7 per cent between 2003 and 2013.

Different urbanisation programmes have provided improvements in Rocinha since the 1980s, but the largest one by far to reach the community is the federal Program of Accelerated Growth (PAC), initiated by Lula in the very beginning of his second term in 2007. PAC's main investments were large-scale projects within the areas of construction, energy, transport and logistics, but it also had a subprogramme called PAC-Favela that provided urban upgrading in some of Rio's favelas. Rocinha was promised investments for US$ 400 million through two phases of PAC. PAC's stated aim in Rocinha was to "transform physical interventions of urban upgrading (…) into processes of sustainable development" (EMOP 2007). PAC was to build on grassroots-driven struggles for urban developments in Rocinha that date back to the mid-2000s, when a 'Socio-Spatial Master Plan for the Sustainable Development of Rocinha' was produced. The architect behind the Master Plan, Carlos Luis Toledo, is well-known for his strong belief in participatory planning, and the Master Plan was the result of nearly 2 years of discussing Rocinha's needs with residents in a

bottom-up manner. According to a community leader, "[Toledo] did something that rarely happens, which was to hold assemblies, here in the community, discussing with the residents. It was democratic, there was participation". The process thus marked a step away from clientelist practices that have tended to steer interventions in Rio's favelas, where politicians have exchanged upgrading projects or other services for votes (Maricato 2000). The Master Plan's main proposals included completing infrastructure and facilities of basic sanitation, ensuring better accessibility, establishing limits on Rocinha's horizontal and vertical growth, and constructing a series of urban facilities, all while 'valuing Rocinha's culture and identity' (see Toledo 2011).

In the same period the PAC programme was being implemented in Rocinha, another initiative to intervene in Rio's favelas was developed at the state level: the Police 'Pacification' Program (UPP). UPP was designed as a combination of proximity policing with a social component, the municipal programme UPP Social (later re-named Rio+Social) that would provide social services like job training and cultural activities. The stated goal was to take back state control over territories controlled by drug traffickers to provide the local population "peace and public safety", seen as "necessary for the full exercise and development of citizenship" (Henriques and Ramos 2011, 243). It thus aspired to break with the logic of 'war' that had steered police interventions in favelas. The BOPE special police force occupied Rocinha in November 2011 to prepare for the implementation of the UPP, which was inaugurated in September 2012.

The combination of the improved security through UPP, the PAC investments in infrastructure, and policies that aimed at reducing income inequalities, presented a promise of significant changes in Rocinha. Together they constituted a politics of citizenship; that is, a pursuit of redistribution, representation and recognition as three interrelated dimensions of injustice and citizenship politics (Stokke forthcoming). How and to what degree did these programmes and policies live up to their expectations?

PAC and Participatory Development

PAC started as a prolongation of the Master Plan, and Toledo was hired to oversee the process. However, as the process went from the planning stage to the implementation of PAC works, it changed considerably. Toledo claimed "the government chose what was not our priority", and Martíns

lamented that "the PAC works were implemented from the top-down". While the Master Plan explicitly listed basic sanitation as the community's most urgent need, the State Company of Public Works (EMOP) cherry-picked for execution prestigious infrastructure projects such as a large sports complex and a footpath designed by the internationally renowned architect Oscar Niemeyer, which connects Rocinha and São Conrado. It is an 'architectonical masterpiece symbolically and physically bridging the formal and the informal city' according Ruth Jurberg, responsible for PAC-Rocinha at EMOP, while Martíns regards it an expensive 'white elephant' replacing an already existing, fully functioning bridge that had strong historic and cultural value for the community. Many residents have denounced the PAC projects of being 'for tourists to see': architectonical masterpieces that are doing a specific symbolical work with impacts that reach beyond the immediate locality. As one resident puts it,

> They are works that you can see, basic sanitation on the other hand you cannot. If you show off a cable car in a favela, the foreigners taking photos, it is something that calls attention. It is just that it is not what the resident needs.

The cable car he refers to was a proposal from the federal government when a second round of PAC investments were promised Rocinha in 2012. Local civil society groups rejected the idea of the cable car in several preliminary hearings, asking for the completion of works that had been contracted through PAC but stalled in 2011 when 70 per cent of the work had been completed yet the initial budget was overrun by about 35 per cent (Daflon and Berta 2011). They also asked for PAC 2 to prioritise basic sanitation. Nevertheless, when Dilma officially launched PAC 2 in Rocinha in June 2013, half of the budget was earmarked for the construction of a cable car.

UPP: 'Opening Up' the Favela

As for the UPP 'pacifying' police, it pledged to pacify police and drug traffickers. Of equal importance for the Olympic city, it also pacified the anxieties of the middle classes and tourists in adjacent formal neighbourhoods, who reported feeling safer as the drug-related violence was displaced out of centrally located pacified favelas into the peripheries of the city (Cavalcanti 2013, 205). Real estate prices in São Conrado increased by nearly 200 per cent after the pacification of Rocinha (Ibid., 2014).

The UPP police was however less successful in making residents of Rocinha experience increased safety. According to data from the Institute of Public Safety, the rates of crime increased significantly in Rocinha from 2011 to 2012 (Rousso 2012). The pacification also increased insecurity for residents in a different sense, through 'opening up' the favela for a range of outside actors.

While the hills and mountainsides of the favelas were seen as wasteland a century ago when the favelas first emerged, they are today considered prime pieces of real estate in central areas of the city (see Rolnik 2016). As areas to a large degree outside of the formal economy, they also represent areas of capitalist interest. As Governor Cabral bluntly put it in 2011, when commenting on the public interventions in Rocinha, "we have to keep doing construction projects, but capitalism has to enter more and more" (Schmitt 2011). On the heels of the BOPE special police force that occupied Rocinha in 2011 came another invading force, the so-called formalisation task forces that were to formalise businesses and real estate (Urani et al. 2011), along with corporate actors eager to tap into the lucrative favela market. Services like the *gato* networks providing affordable electricity, internet, cable TV and motorcycle taxi services were formalised with a resulting multiplication of costs. This is what Harvey (2003) has termed an 'enclosing the commons', a privatisation of services that used to be informally taken care of. Local business owners struggle to compete with national and international franchises that have established a local presence, offering 24-month down payments on credit-bought electronics. A resident interviewed in 2012 remarked the following:

> The big companies that enter ruin the local economy. A product in Casa Bahia [electronics store] might be 900 Reais [250 USD], while it is 500 Reais [130 USD] in a local store. But because you can pay in instalments there, a lot of people prefer it. Local business is not surviving…it is not better for the community, but people are short sighted.

Urban Entrepreneurialism and the Favela's Place in the City

The public interventions in Rocinha formed a three-part strategy focusing on urban infrastructure, security and formalisation of the informal economy. This package of interventions has provided security and the necessary infrastructure to attract market forces and investments into the favela. Rocinha today is among the top tourist attractions in Rio, and a range of

(mostly non-resident run) agencies provide 'favela tours' to give foreigners an exotic taste of the 'authentic' Rio (Larkins 2015). The UPPs have also made the city of Rio as a whole, and in particular areas of the city close to pacified favelas, safer (at least for a while). As a consequence, these interventions have helped with the rebranding of Rio as an Olympic city in order to attract international capital, tourists and investments. Along the way, the promise of enhanced citizenship for local residents seems to have lost focus in favour of other interests guiding the interventions.

In spite of the legal framework guaranteeing the 'right to the city' and popular participation in governance, the grassroots-driven struggles for urban development in Rocinha that led to the Master Plan in 2004–2006 were all but co-opted by elite interests. The visual prestige projects that have been completed, along with the proposed cable car, provide a branding factor far more favourable to the entrepreneurial city governance than invisible sewage improvements. Another likely reason for the large-scale projects is that they have good conditions for graft and super profits. The massive *Lava Jato* corruption investigation that exploded in 2014 has exposed the corrupt connections between politicians and domestic firms who gained lucrative contracts through state development programmes, and the PAC works in Rocinha have been connected to this scandal (Agência Brasil 2017).

As for the UPP, it constitutes a police practice that is exercised according to the spatial configuration of the city. While promoted as a programme to spur an approximation process between different parts and populations of the city, one can ask to what degree a differentiated policing of space can counter the differentiated citizenship in the city. Rather, it can be argued that such location-specific policing reinforces divides (Samara 2011). The logic steering the pacification programme can also be connected with Rio's entrepreneurial mode of governance. Rather than abandoning the logic of 'war', it installed a militarised state of exception in pacified favelas (Freeman 2014). It can thus be argued that the programme serves to protect the rest of the city, tourists and capital rather than ensuring increased security for favela residents. A 33-year-old journalist born and raised in Rocinha describes residents' disillusionment with the recent government interventions as follows:

> PAC entered with an absurd force, and the hope was that there would be a great change (…). Afterwards the pacification came, and we started believing in it (…) but we saw that everything that was being done was for the sake of the World Cup and the Olympics. We saw that if there were structural

> changes in Rocinha, it was for the sake of tourism. If security was to be improved, it wouldn't be for the favela but for the 'asphalt',[1] it is about securing the criminals within the favelas so they don't go to the asphalt. Everything was because of the World Cup and the Olympics. We always thought so (…) [and] we saw that it was exactly what happened, everything was very superficial. PAC didn't do half of what should have been done, UPP came in saying it would guarantee security and we did not get security, and the other services that were promised never came.

To summarise, the recent public interventions for enhanced citizenship in Rocinha have addressed economic inequalities through policies of redistribution. This has led to a degree of social inclusion through lifting people out of poverty and providing them entry into middle-class consumer markets. The interventions have however been less successful in building a foundation for addressing inequalities beyond economic concerns. While some residents have experienced material enfranchisement and heightened access to goods and services, one can ask, following Larkins (2015, 157), to what degree their new consumptive habits has bestowed them acceptance into the middle or upper classes or whether their skin colour and place of residence trump their increased purchasing power as a marker of class status (see Bourdieu 1984).

Part 3: Challenging Entrenched Inequalities

'Not Far Enough': The June Uprisings

On June 25, 2013, thousands of Rocinha residents marched roughly 5 kilometres to the upscale neighbourhood Leblon where they occupied Governor Cabral's home. The theme of the demonstration was 'Basic Sanitation, Yes! White Elephants, No!', a clear rejection of PAC's prioritisation of large-scale, visual projects over basic sanitation improvements. The demonstration happened in the midst of the massive 'June uprisings', an unprecedented wave of mass protest that rocked Brazil. When a small protest against the increase to the bus fare in São Paulo in early June was met with massive police repression, it became the 'last drop' of Brazilians' increasing frustrations with a deepening 'urban crisis' (Rolnik 2011), government inefficiency, corruption and overspending on mega sports events. By the end of the month, millions of Brazilians from across the socio-economic scale took to the streets in hundreds of cities all over the country.

Both the shape and demands of the 'June uprisings', as well as the responses to and consequences of them, varied across the cities in Brazil. In Rio, the demonstrations synthesised the increasing discontentment with the mega event-driven urban governance and a deep disjunction between the politicians and their vision for the city and the interests of the population they were supposed to represent. The prospect of the benefits of the interventions that would come with turning Rio into an 'Olympic city' allowed for stepping outside the institutional framework (Vainer 2011), and as seen through the case of Rocinha there was little or no dialogue with the population when it came to the selection of investments and projects. While the *Bolsa Familia* increased minimum wages and other federal programmes improved the living conditions of the poorest of the poor, this increased income, which enabled the growth of consumption, did not solve the precarious nature of public education, health care, security or public transport, nor did it address the fragmentation that characterises the duality of the urban landscape in Rio.

In addition to the demonstration on June 25, Rocinha had another large demonstration in July 2013, this time against the UPP police. On July 14 the UPP had taken local resident Amarildo da Souza Silva in for questioning, and he never returned home. It was later revealed that he was tortured, murdered and his body disappeared by the UPP police. His disappearance would mark a watershed for the UPP programme's legitimacy. Young favela men of Afro-Brazilian heritage, mainly those living in favelas and other marginalised communities, continue to be associated with violent crimes and are disproportionally targeted by extra-judicial executions and other human rights violations committed by the police in Rio's favelas (Amnesty International 2015). While it was far from the first case of its kind, the timing—in the midst of a city in revolt—spurred massive mobilisations that would gain international repercussion. People from around the world posted pictures on social media holding up signs demanding to know: 'Where is Amarildo?'

The two demonstrations in Rocinha, as part of the wider 'June uprisings', expressed frustrations with the limitations of the inequality-reducing measures introduced under *lulismo* and its alliance with urban entrepreneurialism in Rio. At the same time, they show some of the strides forward that had been made. As outlined in the introduction of this volume, the protests reflect how popular movements—building on decades of struggles for the citizenship rights people are granted in the legal framework but do not see reflected in their everyday lives (see Dagnino 2010)—managed to

take advantage of the political space opened up by socially progressive governments. The PT governments did have an important impact in terms of placing citizenship on the agenda and challenging entrenched inequalities. They did introduce policies and politics to contest the privileges of occupational status, of masculinity, of whiteness and of heterosexuality. The symbolism of having an uneducated ironworker and a woman as presidents can also not be ignored in a country where the majority of the people have not seen themselves reflected in the traditional class of white, middle-aged, male politicians. As a result, the traditional upper and middle classes have found themselves sharing universities, airports, shopping centres and other venues with the 'new' middle class (the so-called class C, see Ricci 2013) that grew from *lulismo* politics. As long as the PT governments answered also to the upper classes' interests through maintaining a strong economy and low rates of unemployment, they remained silent. With the deepening economic and political crises from 2014 onwards, elaborated on in the chapter of Costa (this volume), this would change.

'Too Far': Revanchism

According to Chaui (2016, 21), the traditional middle class in Brazil has always had a weak position, and has therefore substituted their lack of economic and political power for the search of symbols of prestige within the consumerist society. With the economic crisis, it became increasingly problematic to maintain this lifestyle. People who had accumulated debts with high interest rates in the consumption-led, credit-fuelled economy found themselves in a difficult position. This can result in frustrations pointing in different directions. In June 2013 it was expressed as an anger directed 'upwards', against the economic and political elites. Gradually, however, this has been replaced by an anger directed 'downwards'. Their position threatened, the middle class 'waged a war' (Ibid.) on people they perceived to have encroached on their privileges. The conflict has a clear class distinction and can be read in light of what Neil Smith (1996) terms revanchism; a discourse of revenge on behalf of the bourgeois political elite and their supporters against those who benefited the most from the redistributive policies, affirmative action and antipoverty legislation introduced under PT.

From 2014, an unremitting rejection of the PT governments took centre stage in street demonstrations. There is a clear class distinction between those who participated in the June 2013 protests and the anti-PT protests

from 2014 onwards. The grand majority were white with levels of income and education high above the average (Mello and da Costa 2017). In September 2016, after months of anti-PT demonstrations, Dilma was impeached (on highly questionable grounds, see Jinkings et al. 2016). Dilma's successor, former Vice President Michel Temer (PMDB), wasted little time before scaling back many of the social policies put in place by PT and unveiling an agenda of liberal economic reforms. These austerity measures were presented as necessary to tackle the budget deficit and restore market confidence in Brazil, arguing that PT and its extensive social welfare policies had drained the Brazilian economy. I will however argue they are best understood within a framework of revanchism, where the object is to reverse the victories and safeguards of the working class and the poor that were achieved during the 13 years of PT governments and to preempt further redistributive reforms.

As a result, those who rose to the 'new' middle class during the PT years now find their new class position to be quite uncertain. For the case of Rocinha, this chapter started with outlining a recent request to (re)move a bus stop in São Conrado. The protest is an illustration of how the strides forward of the poorer segments of society have been met with a revanchist counter-reaction on behalf of the middle and upper classes. The protest against the bus stop is just one among many situations where residents of Rocinha feel their rights violated or less respected than those of their neighbours. It is neither the most serious nor offensive one in a context of deep structural inequalities, rampant police violence and profound social and racial discrimination. Residents of Rocinha however explicitly place the protest against the bus stop within a context of class relations. "They want to take our buses. They treat us like crap, in fact, if they could put up a high wall so that they could not see us, it would be perfect [to them]," a 30-year-old man tells me. A 29-year-old female resident sees it as a "classic case of class struggles, not accepting the poor dividing the same territory". She also argues this protest would not have happened five years ago. The climate of protest that has characterised Brazil since June 2013 has given revanchist segments of society a newfound confidence in the streets as a place to raise their demands.

As to the other public interventions in Rocinha, PAC 2 is unlikely to materialise as the Temer government has abandoned state investment programmes in favour of privatisations. While this puts an end to the contested cable car, urgent needs for basic sanitation investments are also not

being responded to. The UPP police, on the other hand, have largely lost legitimacy and their presence has been scaled back due to the severe economic crisis of the State of Rio. The weakened police presence has opened up for drug traffickers from different factions reclaiming control over pacified favelas, and violence is resurging. Residents of Rocinha thus experience a sense of increased insecurity both in the literal sense and in terms of uncertainty as to what their future beholds.

Final Remarks

This chapter has taken the community of Rocinha and its relation to neighbouring São Conrado as the starting point for reflecting on the inequality-reducing measures introduced since Lula became president in 2003. Public interventions in Rocinha during the PT years came with the promise of reducing social and spatial divides between the favela and the surrounding city and enhancing citizenship rights. The generation of 20-something in Rocinha that became adults during the PT years has seen important changes in their lifetime, and many are better off than their parents and grandparents. At the same time, many are disillusioned with the PAC and UPP programmes' failure in living up to their expectations and frustrated with the limits of their own social mobility. The advancements that did take place in terms of a (limited) upward mobility of poorer segments of society is currently being rolled back, while 'cultural' discrimination is coming to the forefront through a revanchist counter-reaction.

To conclude, it must however be remarked that the last years have seen important advancements in terms of creating a climate of debate on the historical, structural foundations of inequality. When Dilma was impeached and her successor appointed a cabinet consisting of only elder, white men from the traditional political class, it spurred harsh criticism and clearly showed an elite that is out of touch with the strides forward Brazil has indeed seen these last decades. What we are left with is an increasingly polarised and politicised social landscape, with hard lines of debate, societal unrest and protests. This is unlikely to decrease in the years to come.

Note

1. The formal city is often referred to as the 'asphalt' because of the paved streets, as opposed to the narrow pathways in the favelas.

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Paper IV

Eluding the 'Esculacho': A masculinities perspective on the enduring warrior ethos of Rio de Janeiro's police.

Eluding the *Esculacho*

A Masculinities Perspective on the Enduring Warrior Ethos of Rio de Janeiro's Police

Celina Myrann Sørbøe

ABSTRACT: The Police "Pacification" Unit (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora—UPP) program in Rio de Janeiro pledged to pacify both militarized police officers and the communities they patrolled: favelas occupied by armed drug traffickers. While the UPPs promoted a softer approach, police practices remained permeated with logics of violence. In understanding why, this article examines how an enduring "warrior ethos" influences the occupational culture of the police. I frame this warrior ethos by reference to notions of masculinity and honor both in the police culture and in the favela, and approach the warrior as a masculine performance. This masculinities perspective on the ways in which policing activities are framed and enacted provides important insights into why it was so difficult to change police attitudes and practices.

KEYWORDS: hegemonic masculinity, police culture, Rio de Janeiro, urban violence, urban security, warrior ethos

It was early Sunday afternoon, and the streets were buzzing with life as the weekly vegetable market brought everyone out to do their shopping. I was walking down the main street at the bottom of the favela I had recently moved to, one of only a handful of streets that are wide enough for vehicles to pass. The rest of the favela is a seemingly endless maze of narrow footpaths winding their way up steep hillsides. Still, few cars attempt the patience-requiring task of navigating between the pedestrians, street vendors, and motorcycle taxis that crowd the street on a Sunday afternoon. I therefore jumped when a car honked behind me, and turned to see a police vehicle wanting to pass. In it sat four large policemen made even larger by their heavy gear of bulletproof vests, boots, and thick-fabricked uniforms that must be a nightmare in the Rio heat. The three passengers had their machine guns in their laps, fingers resting casually on the triggers, and the gun barrels protruding out the open windows as phallus symbols. As I stepped aside and the guns grazed by me, I made eye contact with one of the officers, who seemed to radiate a lazily arrogant "I dare you" attitude. This in-your-face, show-of-force is but one illustration of what the article views as a hypermasculine and militaristic "warrior" identity and ethos in the police occupational culture, drawing on the literature on warrior-based masculinity in favelas (Zaluar 1994, 2004) and in police cultures (Brown 2007; Gripp and Zaluar 2017).

The police officers were from the Police "Pacification" Unit (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora—UPP) program in Rio de Janeiro, one of the most debated public security projects in Latin

America in recent years. The program started as an ad hoc initiative in one favela in 2008, but was expanded over the following years to 39 UPPs covering 264 of the city's 900-plus favelas. In place of the former practice of sporadic militarized interventions, the UPPs promoted the permanent presence of police forces in targeted communities and "proximity" policing practices. This was defined by the police as a shift toward more preventive police work, and combined policing with projects of social inclusion (see Salem and Bertelsen, this issue). The city saw five years of decreasing levels of police and urban violence due to the expansion of the program, but the trend has since turned. Today, the UPPs are largely considered a failed policy. A substantial body of literature has analyzed this failure by pointing to the UPPs' situatedness in the political and social context of the city, securing centrally located favelas before the 2016 Summer Olympics (see, e.g., Freeman 2014; Leite 2014; Muniz and Mello 2015). This literature further draws on the wider academic production on police violence in Brazil that emphasizes how the police institution—against a backdrop of structural inequalities and a lingering authoritarianism from the military dictatorship—has served as a tool of "necropolitics" (Mbembé 2003) against young, black men from favelas (Alves 2018; Caldeira 2000; Wacqant 2003). Much less research has, however, focused on how the UPP program was received in the police culture and how police officers understood and adapted to changing role expectations in the context of proximity policing.

In this article, I therefore focus on the police culture, more specifically its gendered dynamics, which has been relatively under-examined in research on police violence in Brazil (Gripp and Zaluar 2017; Lopes et al. 2016). I apply a masculinities perspective to the ways in which policing activities are framed and enacted as I examine the social processes that endorse and reproduce a militaristic warrior ethos. I foreground one social dynamic in particular: the *esculacho,* which may refer to a physical or a psychological attack or humiliation. The way the police use and elude *esculachos* show the warrior ethos as tied to notions of masculinity and honor that are reproduced both in the police culture and in the favela. I thus situate the warrior ethos as a masculine performance shaped by gendered role expectations in the organizational, occupational, and street-working environment of the police. With this emphasis on the masculinized militaristic dispositions of the police, I aim to provide new understandings into why it was so difficult to change police attitudes and practices within the UPPs.

The data informing this text comes from 18 months of fieldwork conducted in Rio de Janeiro and a "pacified" favela: a favela with a UPP, between 2012 and 2016 (see also Sørbøe 2013, 2018). During eight of these months (four in 2012, four in 2016), I lived in the favela, which allowed for observing police-resident interactions over time and how this relationship evolved. The article foregrounds the perspectives of police officers who, in different ways, have been at the forefront of developing and implementing the UPP program. I draw primarily on four in-depth interviews conducted with key informants in 2016: "Coronel Lima," a former head of the UPPs; "Sergeant Oliveira," in charge of teaching recruits the sensitive topic of human rights; "Lieutenant Morais," the commander of a UPP Unit in a large favela, and "Soldier Silva," a patrol officer. In my analysis, excerpts from these interviews provide important qualitative insights into how and why it has been so difficult to change the police culture. My analysis is also informed by field observations and approximately 30 additional interviews with other police agents, favela residents, human rights activists, journalists, and academics on the topics of security politics and the UPPs.

First, I present a masculinities perspective on police culture to serve as a conceptual and analytical framework for examining gender dynamics in Rio's Military Police. The subsequent analysis is divided in three parts, examining (1) gendered role expectations patrol officers have faced; (2) the efforts the UPP program made to change the police culture; and (3) how and why it has been so difficult to change police attitudes and practices. It underlines the centrality of

officers' social positionality in understanding their room of maneuver to act outside of dominant and normative gender role performances within the hierarchical and authoritarian police institution. The article concludes by connecting with the special section's focus on gendered and racialized dimensions of urban (in)security in Rio de Janeiro.

A Masculinities Perspective on Police Culture

Police Culture

The literature on police culture[1] examines the set of values, beliefs, and informal rules that orient how the police see the world and how they should act in it (Skolnick [1966] 2011; see also Chan 1997; Loftus 2009; Reiner 2004). The police culture literature distinguishes between the organizational culture transmitted top-down within a police department and the occupational culture developed through officers' interactions with peers, superiors, and citizens in the streets (Manning 2007; Pauline and Gau 2018). In this text, I focus primarily on the occupational culture of patrol officers with street-level assignments, drawing on Eugene Paoline and William Terrill's (2014: 5) definition of the concept as "the attitudes, values, and norms that are transmitted and shared among groups of individuals in an effort to collectively cope with the common problems and conditions members face."

In Brazil, the police are divided between a Civil and a Military force; the former conducts investigative work, while the latter is in charge of ostensive policing. There are two points of entry to the Military Police: as a soldier or through the officer's school (six months' and three years' education, respectively). These two career paths attract people from notably different backgrounds. Whereas commanding officers have traditionally been recruited from families with higher social status, men from low-income households turn to the high-risk, low-pay work of being a patrol officer (Mena 2015). A 2014 survey found that 80 percent of UPP officers were between 24 and 33 years old, 90.3 percent were men, and 67.6 percent self-declared as black or brown. In terms of income, 83.2 percent affirmed that their salaries, including bonuses, were insufficient to sustain their families (Musumeci 2015).

"Doing Gender" and Hegemonic Masculinity

In order to discuss the gendered performances of police officers, it is first necessary to look at what is meant by gendered performances and masculinity. Gender identity development is as much a social process as it is a psychological one (Bussey 2011). As a social construction rather than a property of individual men, masculinity is defined by Deborah Kerfoot and David Knights (1996: 86) as "the socially generated consensus of what it means to be a man, to be 'manly' or to display such behavior at any one time." Multiple forms of masculinity exist because men (and women) construct masculinity in particular social and historical contexts (Connell 1995). Further, any form of masculinity is always intersecting with race, class, sexual orientation, and so on (Shields 2008). Thus, gender is not an individual attribute but an emergent property of social practice; people "do gender" in interactions with others within the context of larger social structures and institutions (Chan et al. 2010: 427; see also Martin and Jurik 2006; West and Zimmermann 1987).

Such a focus on the performative aspects of gender enables an analysis of the social processes that form "hegemonic masculinity." Hegemonic masculinity is based on two interrelated and inseparable dimensions: (a) dominance of men and oppression of women; and (b) a hierarchical

classification of masculinities. The concept describes dominant and normative forms of masculinity as holding an authoritative positioning "in relation to subordinate masculinities as well as in relation to women" (Connell [1987] 2003: 183). Hegemonic masculinity has been criticized for presenting certain expressions of masculinity as all-pervasive, and for being characterized by ambiguities in particular when it comes to power relations between men (Christensen and Jensen 2014). Robert Connell and James Messerschmidt (2005: 832–838) clarify that only a few (if any) men actually practice or enact hegemonic masculinity. While hegemonic masculinity is not the norm, it is certainly normative. It regulates masculinities as men strive to live up to the "ideals, fantasies and desires" embedded in hegemonic masculinity or are punished for practicing masculinity in forms perceived as different. As such, the concept can help make sense of how violent and oppressive forms of masculinity have come to be acceptable, and even encouraged, forms of behavior in the police culture.

Gendered Dimensions of Police Work

Literature on gender and policing draws attention to gender hierarchies both when it comes to the role of men and women actors within police organizations, as well as in the gendering of police practices (Chan et al. 2010; Martin 1980, 1996). Coercive crime-fighting tasks are often contrasted with more cooperative, problem-solving, and compassionate modes of police work, such as engaging with vulnerable communities to build trust relations and mentoring young people at risk of crime. The latter, softer policing activities have traditionally been considered feminine and inferior forms of police work compared to "proper" images of policing associated with masculine ideals of fighting crime (Fielding 2013; Reiner 2004; Westmarland 2001). Such gendered value systems and role regulations are seen to create an environment that is hostile to women and to subordinate masculinities (Brown 2007; Franklin 2007; Prokos and Padavic 2002).

Police culture is not homogenous, as different functions (patrol versus managerial work) levels of hierarchy (rank and file), in addition to racialized, gendered, and class distinctions between individual officers, will impact on role expectations and regulations (Manning 2007). Furthermore, it is not immune to change. The proportion of women officers has increased substantially in recent decades, and shifts toward softer forms of community and proximity policing have gained ground (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Despite substantial changes in operational policing and its management, however, research on police culture across different countries and contexts continues to find that it is pervaded by hegemonic masculinity (e.g., Brown 2007; Franklin 2007; Gripp and Zaluar 2017; Prokos and Padavic 2002; Sirimarco 2013). Rio de Janeiro's Military Police is no exception.

In Rio de Janeiro, the first women were accepted into the police academy in 1982. While no longer male by embodied default, the basic institutional masculinity of the Military Police continued to be rigorously defended. This institutional masculinity is shaped by the legacy of the military dictatorship (1964–1985) when the police was subsumed under the armed forces. During this period, a new brand of military masculinity was cultivated in militaries across the Americas. The anti-communist "New Man" was modeled on the guerilla warrior it sought to combat and promoted a masculinity without physical or moral restraints (Cowan 2014; see also Gardiner 2012). The police was not demilitarized with Brazil's return to democracy, thus maintaining the job description of combatting an enemy that is ingrained in the military logic (Calazans 2004; Lopes et al. 2016; Poncioni 2005). Rather than the communist threat, however, the police found a new enemy in the drug trafficker. Within the "war on drugs"—an international campaign to hinder the production, distribution, and consumption of drugs by means of

punitive policies and militarized intervention—the policing of favelas came to rely on street-sweeping and mass imprisonment that publicly dramatized the commitment to slay the monster of urban crime (Ahnen 2007; Wacquant 2003).

Hypermasculinity and the Warrior Ethos in Favelas

Rio's favelas and urban peripheries are marked by socioeconomic disparities and the misuse of firearms due to three decades of turf wars between rival drug "commands" and the police. Brazilian researchers have examined the relationship between urban poverty, violence, and male identity in Rio de Janeiro by highlighting how a "violent sociability" (Machado da Silva 2004) shapes the identity formation of men in favelas. Favela boys are exposed to multiple forms of violence in their households and communities from a young age (Alves 2018; Leite 2014; Machado da Silva 2004). Growing up in contexts marked by urban violence, young men may turn to hypermasculinity within competitions for reputation, recognition, honor, and prestige (Alvito 1996; Cecchetto 2004; Penglase 2010; Zaluar 2001). Hypermasculinity is a trait associated with the assertion of power through physically and sexually aggressive behaviors, competition, and dominance that despises the dearth of these characteristics as weak and feminine (Harris 1999; Mosher and Sirkin 1984). It can be understood as a coping response of males who fear assault or victimization by police or by gangs operating in their territory (Spencer et al. 2004). Alba Zaluar (1994, 2010, 2014) has written extensively on this destructive virility as a "warrior ethos." Within this ethos, she argues, a man cannot leave provocations or offenses unanswered, but instead is expected to react with a violent response toward his opponents. Joseph Vandello and Dov Cohen (2003) have described such tendencies as a masculine "culture of honor," where men use violence in competitions over honor and prestige and where insults require violence as a means of restoring social standing (see also Anderson 1999; Cohen and Nisbeth 1994).

The literature on the warrior ethos has focused mainly on what drives young men to join armed drug trafficking groups. However, Camila Gripp and Zaluar (2017) argue that studies on the UPPs would also benefit from focusing on this masculinity ethos. As their antagonists, the police have developed warrior-type ethos and practices within the war on drugs. While I follow Gripp and Zaluar in applying the concept to frame police practices, it is central to dwell on some of the criticism the warrior ethos literature has received. By arguing that violent forms of masculinity have gained a hegemonic position in favelas, it has been criticized for presenting hypermasculinity as a "culturally idealized form" of manhood these areas (Alves 2018). On the one hand, this invisibilizes struggles over hegemony and the presence of other culturally salient forms of masculinity. On the other, it leans toward asserting favelas and their "culture" as the source of urban violence, thereby obscuring the state's complicity in producing it. Through public policies of neglect that have allowed drug traffickers to take violent control over favelas, and through responding to this violence by means of war-oriented security policies, the state has been implicated in ways that deepen urban violence (Arias 2006). By drawing on Benjamin Cowan (2014), I wish to trace the warrior-type model of masculinity back to the military institution during the Cold War rather than favela culture, and, as such, underline the state's responsibility for hypermasculine forms of violence.

While not the only salient form of masculinity neither in favelas nor in the police, the warrior ethos can be seen as a dominant and dominating masculinity with appeal to men with few other available pathways by which to achieve and defend a sense of socially recognized manhood. Patrol officers and drug traffickers are thus united in a masculine community coded by similar

ideals, a context to keep in mind as the backdrop against which the UPP program was implemented. Before I get to that, the next section starts with looking at how patrol officers' warrior identity and practices have been shaped by gendered role expectations they have faced from superiors, peers, and favelas within the war on drugs.

The Masculine Warrior Ethos and the Policing of Rio's Favelas

The War on Drugs as "Necropolitics"

As noted initially, I spent an extended period of time living in one of Rio's favelas. While this text focuses on police perspectives, my initial interest in the UPP program was its implications for favela residents' sense of citizenship and security (Sørbøe 2013). When I talked with residents about their hopes for—and frustrations with—the program, an emblematic case that would often come up was the fate of Amarildo de Souza. On 14 July 2013, the bricklayer and father of six had been hanging out outside his home in the Rocinha favela when he was approached by UPP officers who mistook him for a drug trafficker. He was taken to the local UPP for questioning, his wife and children following right behind to demand his release. They were told he would be released the same afternoon, but Amarildo was never seen again. His disappearance could easily have joined the thousands of unsolved disappearances in Rio de Janeiro but ended up spurring massive outrage and an international campaign demanding to know, "Where is Amarildo?" It was eventually revealed that he had been tortured and killed, and his body disposed of, by the police. While favela residents would point to Amarildo as an example of how their rights are not protected and how the police mistreat black men from favelas, police officers I talked with framed it differently. Several suggested he was a "thug" that had surely been involved in the drug trade. Furthermore, they would argue that the real tragedy in this case was the consequences it had had for the police, as many "good" officers were arrested.[2]

The Amarildo case is just one example of how the police have conducted their work in Rio's favelas within the context of the "war on drugs." Between 2005 and 2014, 8,466 cases of police killings were recorded in the state of Rio de Janeiro, 5,132 of which occurred in the capital. In 2013, 99.5 percent of the victims were male, 79 percent were black, and 75 percent were between the age of 15 and 30 (AI 2015). Scholars, activists, and favela residents I interviewed have denounced these statistics as signifying a "necropolitics" on young, black men from underprivileged backgrounds (see also Alves 2018; Farias 2014). Achille Mbembé (2003: 11) defines necropolitics as concerning "the power and capacity of a sovereign power to dictate who may live and who must die." Drawing on Michel Foucault's writings on biopower and Carl Schmitt's concepts of sovereignty and exception, Mbembé emphasizes that so-called savage life—a segment of society beyond the line of civilization—is free to be killed without it representing a crime. Favela residents have been viewed as accomplices of drug traffickers based on neighborhood relations, kinship, or economic and political ties, and Marcia Leite (2012) argues that the police therefore have seen no innocents in the favelas. All are viewed as criminals, accomplices, or criminals in the making: "savage life" free to be killed with impunity.

Brazil's historically constituted inequalities are central for understanding both the context of the war on drugs and the profile of its victims. However, officers' embrace of a militaristic approach needs to be examined also by attentiveness to dynamics developed in the police culture—among patrol officers as they deal with the stressors it entails to be the agents of the state's necropolitics.

Police Occupational Culture as a Masculine Culture of Brotherhood

One officer who stressed the centrality of destructive dynamics in the police culture for understanding police violence was Lieutenant Morais, a UPP commander I interviewed in December 2016. Morais was is in his mid-thirties, and after years of climbing the police hierarchy, he was the commander of his second UPP at the time of our interview. A short, mild-spoken man with friendly eyes, he did not exude the kind of hypermasculine energy one could expect from a police commander in Rio. Perhaps these qualities were precisely what had taken him to a position of leadership within the UPPs, where he aspired to change the way the police worked in favelas. Describing what the war on drugs has demanded of police officers, he pointed out that "the institutional demand is that he goes there to arrest and kill, to capture the bad guys . . . and this is linked to skin color, origin, and social class because drug trafficking is not treated the same way in the *asphalto* [the 'formal' city]." The lieutenant explained the enemy image that patrol officers in turn have of drug traffickers, by pointing out that "you cannot—*not*—see the criminal or the drug trafficker as the worst of all evils, because he is the one that killed your friend, he is the one that is a threat to the police."

Jerome Skolnick's ([1966] 2011) pioneer research on police occupational culture defined it as a cognitive and behavioral response to three central elements of police work: danger, display of authority, and pressure for efficiency. He argued that a work environment characterized by the presence and potential for danger, where police officers are expected to create, display, and maintain their authority, stimulates behaviors such as suspiciousness and stereotyping based on appearance in order to deal with insecurities in interactions with strangers in the streets (see also Paoline 2003). Police officers that patrol Rio's favelas face an immanent possibility of deadly shootouts with drug traffickers, partially because of what Lieutenant Morais describes as an institutional demand to actively seek out confrontations. As the drug trafficker poses a real threat to police officer's lives, their perception of the trafficker as the "worst of all evils"—and the stereotyping of this figure on the basis of skin color, origin, and social class—can thus be interpreted as a coping mechanism to the stressors of the day-to-day working environment of the police.

Victor Kappeler and colleagues (1998) argue that danger has a unifying effect on police officers and that it works to separate them from the chief source of danger. Police officers therefore often display an extreme loyalty with fellow officers (Paoline 2003), which Angela Harris (1999: 794) describes as a masculine culture of brotherhood. This brotherhood rests on a division between "us" and "them"—our guys against their guys. In a working environment characterized by the ever-present possibility of being shot, officers will value the colleague—the brother—they trust to have their back and to revenge their death if killed in combat. An expression of this masculine brotherhood culture is the "warrior cop."

The "Warrior Cop" as a Masculine Performance

Solider Silva, a patrol officer at the UPP under Lieutenant Morais's command, had a few years of working experience when I talked to him in 2016. As we discussed the police culture and different forms of police work, he described a hierarchy of policing activities where, as he put it, "we return to the warrior cop, the one that fights the enemy. The female police officer is seen as a lesser officer, the police officer who works in the administration is seen as a lesser officer, and the police officer that works with proximity policing is seen as a lesser officer. Because while he is out there, giving his life to confront evil, the other is in a more comfortable position."

Silva here argues that the "warrior cop" with the capacity to confront "evil" is highly valued within the police culture, while women officers and softer policing functions are looked down

on (see also Gripp and Zaluar 2017; Mourão 2013, 2015). This warrior-type officer is imbued with what the police culture literature situates as masculine traits such as aggression, risk-taking, assertiveness, and courageousness (Brown 2007; Franklin 2005; Martin 1996; Prokos and Padavic 2002). Jennifer Brown (2007) emphasizes the identity formation aspects at stake in policing, arguing that demonstrations of bravery in the face of danger and physical prowess are ways of "doing" male gender that form police officers' identity. The "warrior cop" can thus be interpreted as a masculine performance that works as a mode of "self-making" in which officers define themselves through these images associated with the "masculine" (Martin 1996).

Centrally, "doing" gender is a different project depending on a person's gender, age, occupation, and so on (Chan et al. 2010; Martin 1996; Martin and Jurik 2006). Older, higher-ranking men possess authority and control through their positions of power within the police institution and may as such feel more relaxed about demonstrating and proving their masculinity, as illustrated by the figure of Lieutenant Morais. While both his persona and the softer policing practices he advocated were more "feminine" than the "warrior cop," he had access to (masculine) power through his position. Meanwhile, patrol officers are at the bottom of the police hierarchy because of their rank and function and often because of social markers such as age, race, and socioeconomic background (Mena 2015; Musumeci 2015). As such, they have few means by which to achieve and defend a position of (masculine) power. The "warrior cop" therefore constitutes a dominant and normative masculinity as it has granted recognition and prestige both within the organizational culture (due to the institutional demand to "arrest and kill" traffickers within the war on drugs) and the occupational culture (due to the "brotherhood" that values the colleague that has their back) (see also Gripp and Zaluar 2017; Mourão 2013; 2016).

While this illustrates the pervasiveness of stereotypically gendered role expectations, it is important to recognize that there are significant differences between UPPs based on the profile of given commanders, the history of drug trafficking in the favela in question, and the historical relations between the police and residents (Mourão 2013: 134). Such differences will shape the role expectations officers face, expectations that further vary according to individual officers' background and life experiences. Later, I return to how such differences shape officers' room of maneuver to "undo" gender. Centrally, gendered role expectations are shaped not only by the police culture but also by norms of masculinity in the wider society. I therefore first turn to how the warrior masculinity in favelas shape officers' role performances.

The Esculacho*: On Masculinity, Honor, and Humiliation in Favelas*

In my conversations with both police officers and favela residents, the concept of *esculacho*, which means something akin to "bashing" or "humiliation," was a frequent reference in describing dynamics between the police, drug traffickers, and favela residents. An *esculacho* can be a physical attack such as beating someone up or torturing them. It can also be a moral or psychological attack, in terms of disrespecting someone, extorting them, or betraying a deal. Either way, "being subjected to an *esculacho*, it is as if a guy's honor were affected," Lieutenant Morais explained:

> Drug traffickers will *esculachar* residents; the problem is that the police also act with *esculachos*. This is because the police officer is not a resident of Vieira Souto [street in the high-end Ipanema neighborhood]; he is born in the favela himself. He is from the West Zone, from the Baixada [Rio's working-class peripheries], from places where people have a similar behavior, a similar language. The police officer does not belong to a totally different social class, he belongs to the same social class. He knows how to *esculachar*.

This common social background and cultural grammar of the police and drug traffickers is worth noting. They are united in a masculine community and a culture of honor coded by similar ideals, one where respect must be paid or else violence will follow. The scholarship on masculinity and honor has argued that manhood is demonstrated for other men, and that men are constantly suffering from anxiety that other men will unmask them as insufficiently manly (Cohen and Nisbeth 1994; Kimmel 2017; Vandello and Cohen 2003). Thus, the warrior ethos and practices of the police are arguably shaped not only by role expectations within the police culture but also by perceived expectations of enacting the warrior from the street-working environment: from their trafficker antagonist and from favela residents accustomed to violent forms of masculine authority.

The police use different forms of *esculachos* in their interactions with (male) residents, such as random frisking in the streets on the pretext of searching for drugs, patrolling favelas with the finger on loaded machine guns to demonstrate power, actively seeking out confrontations, and using torture and other forms of violence. Such episodes constitute a form of "masculinity contest" (Cooper 2008) where officers bolster their masculine esteem by dominating male civilians. Engaging in such masculinity contests can thus be interpreted as a mode of self-making: a performance through which officers, by demonstrating their capacity and willingness to exercise violence, become intelligible to themselves and to others as dominant masculine subjects (Martin 1996). The UPPs were to limit officers' engagements in such masculinity contests and thereby reduce police and urban violence.

UPPs as a "Feminine" Police Program

Security Politics in Olympic Rio de Janeiro

The UPP program never had ambitions of ending drug trafficking, but sought to reduce its armed presence in the streets by focusing on prevention rather than ostensive and confrontational police work. As such, it challenged hegemonic masculinity within the Military Police. On the one hand, the UPP approach involved shifts in policing practices toward community engagement and more collaborative styles of policing, which emphasize skill sets such as empathy and mediation. These capacities are construed as feminine in the police culture literature and have been viewed with cynicism within the broader crime-fighting approach that has dominated the police culture in Brazil (Calazans 2004; Lopes et al. 2016; Poncioni 2005). Further, it had a larger proportion of women officers than the wider institution. The first commander of a UPP was a woman, and whereas women make up 4 percent of the Military Police as a whole, 14.3 percent of UPP officers in 2016 were women (Gripp and Zaluar 2017: 10).

The rapid expansion of the program was a result of the interests of politicians wanting to improve Rio's security before the 2016 Olympics[3] and certain reform-oriented leaders within the police (Salem and Bertelsen, this issue). One of these leaders was Coronel Lima, who played a key role in designing and implementing the UPP program in its first, ambitious years. When I interviewed him in July 2016, Lima explained that he had seen the program as a unique opportunity to change the course of Rio's security policies at a crucial time in the city's history. He praised the UPPs' ambitions of "recuperating legitimacy, reestablishing trust, and . . . diminishing violence and crime." However, he noted that these objectives had not been clearly defined when he took the position as coordinator of the program, as his predecessors "never actually designed a proximity policing program." He thus explained: "We started to do it in a very intuitive way. But we were using police officers that were trained within the former concepts of 'us

versus them,' of 'good versus bad.' I had to, in an improvised manner, create courses to try to modify this way of seeing the world of the police officer."

Next, I look at how the UPP program approached changing the police culture through training a new generation of police officers. Despite these efforts, the police culture would prove resistant to change.

Creating a New Police Culture? Human Rights and Positive Peers

Police culture is transmitted through rituals, symbols, ceremonies, and stories that are passed through the generations and influence officers' behaviors (Chan 1997). Over time, it becomes institutionalized to a degree that makes it difficult to challenge and question (Johnson et al. 2008). The initial training is therefore seen as central for police reform initiatives (Constable and Smith 2015; Haarr 2001; Palmiotto et al. 2000). The UPP program relied on what the literature calls a "philosophy of early intervention" (McCarthy 2013): it only accepted new recruits so that they would not be "spoiled" by the prevailing police culture. One of the key aspects of recruits' training was a course in human rights to modify the "us versus them," "good versus bad" dichotomies that have guided police practices.

Human rights is a contested issue both within the police and in wider debates on security politics in Brazil, regarded by some as a leftist ideology that protects criminals (Leite 2000, 2012). In a survey examining police attitudes to human rights in the state of Paraná, Cleber da Silva Lopes and colleagues (2016: 337) found that 67 percent of police officers agreed that "human rights are an obstacle in the fight against violent crime," while 85 percent agreed that "criminals use human rights to dodge criminal law enforcement." A survey examining Rio residents' perceptions of the framework found similar tendencies, with 56 percent agreeing that "whoever defends human rights are defending criminals" (Lembgruber et al. 2017: 17). This inherent skepticism needs to be contextualized by reference to the relationship Brazilians have with the law. While the Brazilian Constitution guarantees individual rights and freedoms, laws do not apply equally in practice. James Holston (2009: 19) argues that Brazilians have generally viewed the law as "providing special treatment to particular categories of citizens that the state differentiates, regulates and rewards." When I interviewed Lieutenant Morais, he said, "People do not see the state as a source of legitimacy, the law has a punitive function. Understanding this, you will understand the aversion of human rights; human rights are laws. We do not see the law as a guarantor of rights and freedoms . . . All human rights will do is arrest the police officer." Morais thus argues that the police do not see themselves as part of the population the law will protect. In the eyes of the police, the human rights framework and other laws will be used only against the police, in a punitive manner. They have therefore instead put their trust in their colleagues—the "brotherhood" that will have their back—and extrajudicial forms of "justice."

The officer in charge of teaching UPP recruits about human rights and confronting entrenched understandings of the framework was Sergeant Oliveira, whom I met at the UPPs' headquarters in late 2016. Oliveira told me that he had himself been highly skeptical of the human rights framework most of his career. However, after meeting Coronel Lima, he had been convinced that the police needed to change the way it worked which he himself had intimate personal knowledge from. Before he joined the UPP's central command, Sergeant Oliveira had been part of an operational battalion and conducted patrols in favelas for close to a decade. On one such patrol, he ended up in a shootout with drug traffickers and took two bullets. He recovered well, but, as he points out, the experience gave him crucial legitimacy to talk about human rights with prospering police officers:

> Because I am a solider, I had the legitimacy to talk to the soldiers; they did not see such a great distance, as I was not an officer coming from the institution. Moreover, as I had participated working in patrolling and been in conflicts, I had been shot, they knew that I understood the problems they went through, and it was easier for me to say that we had to change the way we work.

Sergeant Oliveira represents a "positive peer" approach, where positive peer pressure is exerted to influence officers' ethical decision-making (Zink 2015). He stressed that it was very difficult to teach the subject, particularly when a police officer was killed, but was passionate about his job and impressively optimistic given the daunting task he had been given.

Enduring Warrior Ethos and Practices

Hidden Curriculum

While the training academy may have a positive impact on police recruits' attitudes, research (e.g., Brown 2007; Haarr 2001; Prokos and Padacic 2002) shows that the transition from the police academy to a police unit is challenging. Anastasia Prokos and Irene Padaric (2002) point to a discrepancy between the values taught in the formal training environment and the informal ways through which values and norms are transmitted, what they call a "hidden curriculum." Arriving at a UPP, recruits would be exposed to an already existing unit culture and a hidden curriculum of values and norms. As the commander of a UPP, Lieutenant Morais commented:

> The police officer comes here listening to the officer who entered before him, who tells him stories about what he did and what happened, including how he got rich here by illicit means . . . The police officer, if he goes to a place and comes across a guy with a gun, drugs, and money, he will present the drugs and the weapon, but not the money, he keeps that. "War spoils" is the term the officer uses.

Even after the UPPs "occupied" favelas, armed drug traffickers remained within the territories. While officers were to prioritize proximity policing activities, some still thought that controlling criminals was their most important task. In other words, UPP recruits would face a working environment in which the war-oriented approach continued to shape the police culture (Gripp and Zaluar 2017; Mourão 2013; Musumeci 2015). Stories of "war spoils" and other cultural norms constituted a hidden curriculum that influenced what was seen as legitimate behavior. Lieutenant Morais lamented how hard it was to change this unit culture through a top-down approach, as "there is behavior that transcends the goodwill of a commander-in-chief. You can put all the best people in the world in charge in the state [in the wider Military Police institution], but you have a unit culture. I can change the commander here, but every unit has a culture which is passed on to the officers." Soldier Silva, the patrol officer in Morais's unit, also highlighted how cultural norms would condition officers into certain behaviors:

> It is not written down anywhere, but it is cultural. If you arrest someone they will congratulate you, give you a high five, you will get some time off, they cut you some slack. If you go on a proximity or assistance call, people will even bash you, but if you go on a call where you arrest the bad guy, people respect you. This conditions people into a certain kind of approach.

Occupational cultures serve as techniques of surveillance that sets boundaries for acceptable behavior (Chan 1997; Johnson et al. 2002). Not living up to dominant norms is socially risky,

in particular in a hierarchical institution like the Military Police. This underlines how social positionality shapes officers' room of maneuver to "do" or "undo" gender in terms of adhering to or resisting dominant role expectations (Chan et al. 2010). Officers like Lieutenant Morais and Sergeant Oliveira could "undo" gender by advocating softer police practices as their age, position, and experience ensured their masculinity was not in question. Meanwhile, as Soldier Silva's quote shows, younger, low-ranking officers conducting softer police work would expose them to the risk of being bashed by their colleagues. Recently arrived recruits were therefore not likely to be the protagonists of change (Brown 2007; Haarr 2001; Prokos and Padacic 2002). This parallels what Gripp and Zaluar (2017: 10) describe in their ethnographic study of a UPP, where they point out that police officers displayed "remarkable unity" in defense of traditional understandings of masculinity that served to disempower women and delegitimize alternative masculinities (see also Mourão 2013, 2015).

The "Smurfs" and Anxieties over Masculinity

The UPP police initially wore a light blue uniform that visually set them apart from the rest of the police's gray uniforms. This attire was part of the attempt to soften their image and distinguish the UPPs from the former policing of favelas, and constitutes a concrete example of how "doing" gender is an embodied performance. While the new image was intended, Sergeant Oliveira noted, "The fact that you had those blue clothes . . . people would see a different police. It gave the impression that it was a weak police officer, whereas when you wear the normal uniform, you are a normal police officer." In reference to this distinction, Lieutenant Morais claimed "the favela population called the police Smurfs because the uniforms were blue," and that "even the drug traffickers did not see the UPPs as police officers, because what they were doing was not police work." Morais explained the impact this could have on officers by arguing, "The police officer does not want to be disrespected, because being a police officer is his reason for being. This issue of respect is very important to the police, more so than any concern for the moral content of the law. He wants to be respected, just as the drug trafficker wants to be respected. He does not want to be *eschulachado*."

Favela residents' reference to the UPPs as Smurfs can be interpreted as a disrespect to their authority, and thereby an attack on their masculinity (see also Cooper 2008; Harris 1999; Scott 1970). Whether or not favela residents and drug traffickers did, in fact, perceive the UPPs as a weaker police is beside the point; the central issue here is that officers would notice such an attitude. This was perceived an *esculacho*—a humiliation. Letting such infractions to honor go unanswered would amount to jeopardizing both individual and collective masculinity (Cooper 2008; Harris 1999; Vandello and Cohen 2003). In 2015, the UPP police discarded the light blue uniforms for the gray attire of the rest of the Military Police. Sergeant Oliveira explained that they changed the uniform "in order to end this division, to show that that it was not a weak police, to show that it was the figure of the state."

"Masculinization" of the Program

The UPPs' legitimacy and image as a softer policing program has progressively weakened in later years. Coronel Lima explained this by reference to the context of the "Olympic exception" in Rio de Janeiro (Ystanes and Salem, this issue) and the political pressure to expand the program faster than the police had capacity for. By rapidly expanding to new areas rather than focusing on a few selected favelas, he argued that the leadership had lost control and oversight and that the police had returned to old sins: "The police started to arm themselves as if it were

the BOPE [the notoriously violent police special forces], the UPPs were transforming into a BOPE, which was not the intension . . . Everyone was becoming just like Rambo."

Comparing surveys with UPP officers conducted in 2010, 2012, and 2014, Leonarda Musumeci (2015: 7–10) reveals a progressive weakening of activities that can be characterized as proximity policing. In 2014, police officers reported doing less community outreach work than before, while there was a sharp increase in activities that resemble the traditional policing of favelas, such as "hunting down" drugs and drug traffickers. Musumeci argues that "proper" proximity policing has been delegated to a group of specialists, while most UPP officers understand proximity merely as the continuous and ostensive presence within favelas (8). Interestingly, she finds that while the number of UPP officers who would have preferred to work outside the UPPs remained at a steady 60 percent between the 2012 and 2014 surveys, officers' justification for wanting to leave differed (28–30). There was a sharp decline in officers whose motivation for wanting to work elsewhere was to do "real" police work or receive more respect.

This illustrates that as the UPPs increasingly resemble regular police battalions, their perception as a feminine police force has faded (Mourão 2015: 13). This "masculinization" of the program furthermore points to the ingrained masculinity culture of the police as a fundamental barrier for police reform.

Final Reflections

After I had my talks with Lieutenant Morais and Soldier Silva at their UPP, Morais offered me a ride to the Metro station at the bottom of the favela. I had lived in this particular favela previously and knew it well, but accepted the ride. We got into the back of a patrol car with two uniformed officers in the front. As we slowly navigated our way through the crowded streets, the change in perspective from the anecdote in the introduction struck me. Looking out on the favela through the car windows—as opposed to looking *in* on police officers on patrol—made me see the community in a different light, through the eyes of the officers I had spent the day with. When walking the streets, I knew this as a community populated by friends and former neighbors. From inside the patrol car I suddenly saw the favela as crowded by potential threats. As people looked at us with suspicion, I intimately connected with the police officers' fear of retaliation from drug traffickers. Such simple shifts in perspective illuminate the "us versus them" and "good versus bad" dichotomies at stake in security politics.

As Jaime Amparo Alves (2018) notes, police brutality is not random; it follows the vectors of power established in the wider society. The different contributions to this special section show that these vectors, deeply embedded in Brazil's social and political history, are configured around colonial structures of inequality and traditional gender norms. Analyses of security politics in Rio de Janeiro have focused on how the police, as an expression of these interests, enact a form of necropolitics on the "other" of the favela. This article shows that it is also worth paying attention to the subjects that have to exercise this violent work. The police that most kill are also the ones that most die: young, black patrol officers are overrepresented in the statistics over police killed in service. As such, the Brazilian state involves the population that it targets with necropolitics in its very execution, a central yet at times overlooked dimension of gendered and racialized urban (in)security in Rio de Janeiro.

This article has argued that the warrior-oriented ethos and practices of the police can be seen as a masculine performance, as a way of "doing gender" according to dominant and normative gender role expectations. As a more "feminine" police program, the UPPs challenged hegemonic masculinity within the police. Despite the formal change toward softer policing func-

tions, the article has shown that "male" capacities for violence continued to be deemed critical elements of police work and important features of the construction of police officer's identity. In understanding the pervasiveness of the masculine warrior ethos, I have foregrounded the social dynamic of the *esculacho* and how social positionality shaped officers' capacity to "undo" normatively gendered role expectations or risk being bashed as weak and feminine. This gender perspective on the police culture provides important insights into how and why police ethos and practices have remained permeated with logics of violence. The ingrained masculinity culture—reproduced through dynamics in the organizational, occupational and street working environment of the police—appear as a fundamental barrier for police reform.

Although my analysis has shown the pervasiveness of a warrior ethos within the police, it is important to note that not all patrol officers perform or support this masculinity. While the article emphasized that role expectations and performances vary along lines such as social class, rank, age, gender, and career time, more longitudinal research is needed on how such differences shape police performances. Furthermore, the article has concentrated only on the reproduction of the warrior ethos in male officers and more research is needed on the gender performances of policewomen and how and whether they reproduce the warrior ethos of their male colleagues.

Finally, although the qualitative evidence analyzed in this article points to a hegemony of a warrior-type masculinity, how police officers perform this masculinity and how it varies across different contexts and situations are central points of further research. While much remains partially unknown regarding how the warrior ethos manifests itself in practice, the article has shown the fruitfulness of focusing on gender dynamics in police culture to understand police and urban violence in Rio de Janeiro. The article is further a contribution to the wider policing literature by broadening our understanding of how police culture works and what consequences it produces in unequal and violent societies such as Brazil.

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NOTES

1. The police culture literature has been criticized for being overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon in focus, but Megan O'Neill and colleagues (2007), for example, argue that it has value also for scholars working in different countries and contexts.
2. Whereas the grand majority of police abuse of power is conducted with impunity, the Amarildo case resulted in 25 officers accused and 12 officers, including the UPP commander, being convicted for torture followed by death. They were, however, not exonerated by the institution and continued to receive salaries.
3. As critical literature on the UPPs has shown, the program prioritized favelas located close to touristic areas or sports arenas for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. The program has been criticized for being about the security of these areas, rather than that of favela residents (Freeman 2014).

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