

“From Development Aid to Development Policy”

Following the Norwegian guidelines and criteria set for main partners of development cooperation - the choice of Mozambique and Sri Lanka in 1977



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Master's thesis in History

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Spring 2020

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www.duo.uio.no

Print: Representeren, The University of Oslo

Abstract

After the Second World War, international relations changed, tensions evolved, and the era of modern foreign aid was on the rise. Norway entered the international community of foreign aid through multilateral channels, such as the United Nations, and on a bilateral level through the Kerala project in India in 1952. As a small country, with limited funds in the start-up phase, the Norwegian Government decided in 1967 that the aid had to be concentrated towards a limited amount of countries, referred to as main partners of development cooperation, for it to be as efficient as possible. When choosing these partner countries, specific guidelines and criteria were made, and to some extent, followed.

This thesis explores the Norwegian Government's choice to make Mozambique and Sri Lanka main partners of development cooperation in 1977, and to which degree the guidelines and criteria for main partners were followed and respected in this regard. The choice of these two new main partners led to tensions in the Norwegian political landscape in the field of foreign aid, a field which had previously based itself on consensus.

The guidelines and criteria can be summed into five categories; 1) Geographical location; 2) Norwegian resources and business; 3) The recipient country's domestic policies; (4) That the recipient country would implement and practice the UN guidelines on economic, social and civil rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, and; 5) The Norwegian main partners of development cooperation should be amongst the least developed and poorest countries for Norwegian aid to help those who needed it the most.

The main question, which is discussed throughout the thesis, is whether the practice of foreign aid to the main partners followed the rhetoric's used by the Norwegian Government and representatives both on a national and international level. This cannot be answered with a simple yes or no, as the finding shows that the interpretation of these guidelines was very much connected to each partner country's unique situation.

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Daniel Maul for being my supervisor in the period between autumn 2018 till today. Thank you for the support and the constructive and helpful feedback throughout this process. I would also like to thank the University of Oslo, and especially the administration at the Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History for their handling and facilitation of the last semester regarding the Covid-19 virus, which provided unforeseen challenges and limitations to this process.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support. To Mamma and Pappa, Lida and Mille – thank you for always having my back and for the endless love and laughter. To Karoline, Sindre and Claus – thank you for all the fun we have and for being there for me throughout my up's and down's. And finally, to Celine – thank you for these past two years, for believing in me and for being my friend.

Oslo

June 12, 2020

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List of Abbervations

CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPTA	Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FORUT	For Utvikling
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (The Mozambique Liberation Front)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
LSSP	Lanka Samasamaja Pakshaya
MDPC	Main partners of development cooperation
MFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NGU	Norges Godtemplar Ungdomsforbund
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NOK	Norwegian kroners (currency)
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNP	United National Party – Sri Lanka
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

PAIGC	Partido Africano para a Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde (The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
SEK	Swedish kroners (currency)
SIDA	The Swedish Agency for Development Association
YCAH	Youth Campaign Against Hunger

Maps

1. Map of African countries receiving Norwegian development assistance in 1977, with emphasis on the main partners of development cooperation:



Source: NORAD, «Norsk bistand i tall»: <https://norad.no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/?tab=partner>

2. Map of Asian countries receiving Norwegian development assistance in 1977, with emphasis on the main partners of development cooperation:



Source: NORAD, «Norsk bistand i tall»: <https://norad.no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/?tab=partner>

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

When it comes to choosing a partner country, or other partners of development cooperation, including support for national and social movements in dependent areas, the government believes that the country's authorities should implement and pursue development-oriented and socially fair policies to the benefit of the whole population.¹

The quote above was first presented by the Norwegian Government in White paper no. 29, *Om enkelte hovedspørsmål vedrørende Norges samarbeid med utviklingslandene* (1971-72). This particular quote is notable because it represented the shift in the Norwegian foreign aid policies from the traditional state-to-state transfers aiming at the recipient country's economic growth, to new international relations aiming to improve policies and living standards for the people in partner countries. By the end of the 1970s, Norway had nine main partner countries of development cooperation, with the eighth and ninth country being Mozambique and Sri Lanka in 1977.² Both Mozambique and Sri Lanka had been receiving either official Norwegian aid, or aid from Norwegian companies or organisations for the past decade, and therefore, these relations became increasingly relevant on the political agenda concerning foreign aid and development. However, the choice of making these two countries partners of development cooperation lead to rising temperature in the Norwegian foreign aid debate.

¹ [Når det gjelder valg av samarbeidsland eller annen samarbeidspartner, herunder også støtte til nasjonale og sosiale folkebevegelser i avhengige områder, bør det etter Regjeringens oppfatning legges vekt på at landets myndigheter fører en utviklingsorientert og sosialt rettferdig politikk til beste for alle lag av folket.] White paper no. 29 (1971-72) *Om enkelte hovedspørsmål vedrørende Norges samarbeid med utviklingslandene*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 04.02.1972: 8.

² Uganda was chosen as main partner in 1968; however, the country was later removed from the list in 1973 due to the policies of the country's president and dictator Idi Amin. Therefore, in 1977 when Sri Lanka and Mozambique were added to the list of main partners, they became main partners number eight and nine. See: Jarle Simensen, *Norsk Utviklingshjelps Historie. 1952-1975. Norge møter den tredje verden*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2003: 118-119.

Presentation of thesis and research question

Three Norwegian administrations contributed to the making of White paper no. 29 (1971-72): the Conservative/Centre administration³ under Prime Minister Per Borten, which started the draft in 1970-71; the Labour administration under Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli, which developed the document further following the guidelines from NORAD in 1970; and the central administration⁴ under Prime Minister Lars Kornvald, which published the White paper in 1972, unchanged from the previous administration's draft.⁵ This can be seen as an example of how unified the Norwegian policies on foreign aid were, despite different administrations, during this period.

This White paper was the first to present some fundamental guidelines and criteria for partnerships concerning development. The late 1960s and 1970s marked a change in the international landscape of foreign aid, which also reflected the essence of White paper no. 29 (1971-72).

In these previous decades, both the distribution and welfare views has been standing in the shadow of the considerations of economic growth. Economic growth alone, cannot better the conditions for the wide range of the population in the developing countries. The social sides of development cooperation will therefore gain importance in the years to come.⁶

Furthermore, three years later, White paper no. 94 (1974-75), *Norges økonomiske samkvem med utviklingslandene*, was published. This White paper included extended formulations of the official guidelines and criteria for main partnerships from White paper no. 29 (1971-72). The

³ Political coalition of: Christian Democratic Party, Centre Party, Liberal Party.

⁴ Political coalition of: Conservative Party, Christian Democratic Party, Centre Party, Liberal Party.

⁵ Simensen, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie. 1952-1975 Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 244; King Olav V appointed Per Borten's Government in 1965, and the Government sought resignation, due to internal disagreement between the Government on Norway's relationship with the European Community (EC). The dismissal application was granted by King Olav V to the Cabinet on March 16, 1971, with effect from March 17, 1971. On the same day, Trygve Bratteli's (first) Government was appointed, with immediate effect. Trygve Bratteli's (first) Government sought a resignation after the referendum on Norwegian membership in the EC, September 25, 1972, gave a majority against membership. King Olav V granted the dismissal application in the Cabinet on October 17, 1972. On the same day, Lars Kornvald's Government was appointed with an immediate effect. <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/om-regjeringa/tidligere-regjeringer-og-historie/sok-i-regjeringer-siden-1814/historiske-regjeringer/regjeringer/trygve-brattelis-forste-regjering-1971-1/id438723/>

⁶ [I de tiår som er gått, har fordelings- og velferdssynspunkter kommet til å stå i skyggen av de økonomiske vekstbetraktninger. I erkjennelsen av at økonomisk vekst alene ikke vil bedre forholdene for de brede folkemasser i utviklingslandene, vil de sosiale sider ved utviklingssamarbeidet bli tillagt økende vekt i årene fremover]. White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 1.

essence of these guidelines can be summed into five categories: (1) Geographical location; (2) Norwegian resources and business; (3) The recipient country's domestic policies; (4) That the recipient country would implement and practice the UN guidelines on economic, social and civil rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, and; (5) The Norwegian main partners of development cooperation should be amongst the least developed and poorest countries for Norwegian aid to help those who needed it the most.⁷

Mozambique and Sri Lanka found themselves in two vastly different situations in the 1970s. Mozambique became an independent country in 1975 after centuries under Portuguese colonial rule. During the last decade of the colony, Norway supported the liberation movement through aiding the Marxist-oriented Frelimo, which became the country's government post-independence. The ideology of Frelimo led to tensions in the Norwegian foreign policy debate, which will be a topic of discussion later in this thesis. Sri Lanka had been independent of British colonial rule since 1948 and had established a democratic political system, and additionally, gained international attention for its welfare system.⁸ However, the 1970s brought financial difficulties which struck the Sri Lankan economy hard and forced the country to request increased foreign aid.

This thesis aims to discuss and analyse the factors, debate, and background for the choice of these two countries as main partners, and whether the official guidelines and criteria from White paper no. 29 (1971-72) and White paper no. 94 (1974-75) were followed and respected by the Norwegian Government when making these choices. Did the rhetoric of the white papers, and the Norwegian voice in the international community, such as the UN, match the practice concerning foreign aid?

International framework: Modern foreign aid

Each country's history is unique, but it should, at the same time, be understood as a specific encounter with global historical processes. Broadly speaking two quite contradicting reasons can be identified as to why development emerged as a policy field of its own in the immediate postwar years. On one side, European countries worked on maintaining their position and power

⁷ White paper no. 94, (1974-75), *Norge økonomiske samkvem med utviklingslandene*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25.04.1975: 24.

⁸ Gunnar Sørbo, *Sri Lanka Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review*. Bergen: University of Bergen, 1987: 38.

in the colonies, and on securing the continuum of the colonial system by aid and measures of development in the colonies. On the other side, we find the United States, who worked against the colonial system by supporting the liberation of the colonies through aid and measures of development to remake the global setting.⁹ Another essential aspect of development and foreign aid, as it progressed from the immediate postwar period and into the following decades, especially concerning the U.S. and the Soviet Union, was the Cold War. This was especially evident in Southern Africa, where the Marxist orientation of many African liberation movements made both Moscow and Washington take notice of their significance. To the U.S., the fear of radical, Soviet-oriented regimes taking power in the so-called "Third World" increased; to the Soviet Union, they hailed the beginning of a new stage of "Third World" social development, in which African leaders acknowledged the superiority of socialism and Marxism.¹⁰

The Second World War strongly affected how colonial powers considered the colonies. During the war, European countries had drawn heavily on their territories abroad to secure the resources and food they needed to fight, survive, and eventually, win the war.¹¹ However, during the post-war period and into the following decades, the European countries were under increasing pressure to end the colonial system.¹² This will be a subject of discussion later in this thesis through the case of Mozambique's struggle for liberation from Portugal. In this case, Norway had to take a stand as to which side to support – either their fellow NATO and EFTA member country, Portugal, or the struggling Mozambique in great need of foreign aid.

Shortly after the immediate post-war period, the increasing international tension and pressure led to the era of decolonisation, which changed the international landscape as a whole. As countries in Africa and Asia became independent, the newly liberated countries started to join

⁹ Unger, *International Development. A Postwar History*. London: Bloomsbury, 2018: 49.

¹⁰ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007: 207. "Scientific Marxism" or socialism, refers to a method of understanding and predicting economic and material phenomena by examining their historical trends through their use of the scientific method in order to derive probable outcomes and probable future developments. For more on this see: Paul Thomas, *Marxism and Scientific Socialism. From Engels to Althusser*. Oxon: Routledge, 2008.

¹¹ Unger, *International Development*, 2018: 49.

¹² In the early phase of the process, the former colonial powers wanted to reform the colonial system so that colonialism was not to end, but rather evolve into a relationship more efficient and modern. Also, colonial- and late colonial- development became a popular term in this regard. In a historical view, late colonial development helped establish development measures as progressive and forward-looking activities, especially against the background of war and destruction. Late colonial policies and practice shaped how development was perceived and conducted, not only by European imperial powers but also by the United States. For more on this see: Unger, *International Development*, 2018: 50-52.

forces and created a unified voice in the international community.¹³ The political independence that most of the developing countries gained during the 1950s and 1960s did not bring about corresponding economic independence.¹⁴ In order to break free from the chains of the colonial powers, the developing countries argued that trade was more important than aid, and therefore, they demanded equality, not charity. During this period, the well-known phrase “trade not aid” became a slogan, and at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)-conference in 1964, questions about a new division of power and labour in the world economy were raised. Nonetheless, the reform requirements did not gain practical importance until the following decade. The unstable international currency system in 1971-73, the oil shock in 1973, and the fear of a more general resource crisis gave birth to a belief that commodities could be used to gain market power. Against this background, the UN's 6th Special Session was convened in 1974 to discuss issues related to raw materials and development. According to Group-77, the international framework was designed to benefit the industrialised countries.¹⁵ The source of the problems of the developing countries was therefore believed to be external, rather than internal, which, in turn, resulted in the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).¹⁶

A New International Economic Order

In the 1960s, Norway was sceptical of significant interventions in the international economic system. As a small country with large foreign trade, Norway was a firm supporter of the existing liberal trade within a rule-based international system. Also, Norway was initially critical of tariff preferences, which was one of the main requirements of the developing countries at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)-conference in 1964.¹⁷ However, the increasing Norwegian efforts in the developing countries combined with the shift in governance from Conservative/Centre to Labour in 1971, led to a more openminded attitude

¹³ Hallvard Kvale Svenbalrud “FN og kollektiv sikkerhet” in *Krig og Fred i det lange 20. århundre*, edited by Hilde Henriksen Waage, Rolf Tamnes and Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, p. 235-258. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2016: 244.

¹⁴ Tamnes, *Oljealder*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997: 413.

¹⁵ The newly independent states had great needs, and several of them were led by outgoing leadership that made their voices and demands prevail in international forums. The G-77 consisted of 77 (and counting) developing countries and was designed to give the developing countries a voice on the international arena. Led by countries such as Tanzania, India, Algeria, and Mexico, the group played an important role in the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the UN General Assembly. The group formulated specific demands for changes in the world economy to improve trade conditions for developing countries, and with this, they found support in many of the Western countries and public opinion. Ruud and Kjerland, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie: Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer. 1975-1982*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2003: 17.

¹⁶ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 414.

¹⁷ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 414.

towards NIEO. In essence, the requirements of NIEO revolved around the domain over its resources, higher prices for exported raw materials, increased industrialisation, and greater access for the developing countries to goods on the market in the industrialised countries. An essential requirement was either tariff reductions or tariff preferences, that is, imports with particularly favourable tariffs for the developing countries on the markets of the industrialised countries.¹⁸ Also, the requirements for financial support for developing countries were set to the equivalent of one per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the individual industrialised countries.¹⁹

In the case of Norway, the political opposition, with the Labour party in the front, embraced the idea of an internationally organised planning economy as a long-term goal for Norwegian foreign policy in 1969, and already the following year, Norway and the Netherlands were the only industrialised countries who accepted the UN's action program for the developing countries without reservations. However, the domestic breakthrough in Norway came with the NIEO-message in April 1975, whereas one of the very first industrialised countries, Norway, under the Brattli Government, designed unified and welcoming policies towards the developing countries.²⁰ The essence of the NIEO-message was the desire for an extended, mutual exchange of goods between the North and South. Norwegian businesses should be stimulated to engage in the so-called “Third World”, while at the same time trying to facilitate opportunities for increased imports of foods from developing countries.²¹ However, this support did not come without challenges. The debates in the Storting concerning UNCTAD and NIEO largely agreed to the requirements in theory, but not in practice, and the rhetoric shows how difficult it was to be faced with real demands when it had consequences for Norwegian business life. Should domestic industries be protected to the detriment of developing countries? If not, should imports from developing countries create unemployment and difficulties for the Norwegian business community? Questions such as these led to a rise in temperature in the debate as it was argued that it was easier to provide development aid where the donor country was in charge of the use, rather than to provide conditions for expanded trade and industrialisation where the developing countries themselves had full control of both resources and income.²²

¹⁸ Randi Rønning Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 2016: 63.

¹⁹ More on this in Chapter two: 23-24.

²⁰ Unger, *International Development*, 2018: 90-91; Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 415.

²¹ [«en videreføring av utviklingen av kolonisystemet, som Norge i sin tid hadde støttet som en historisk nødvendig prosess»]. Frydenlund 1982. Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 415.

²² Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 64.

In a more theoretical context, the Norwegian support for the NIEO-process was partly due to tactical considerations. Norway had been a firm supporter of decolonisation, and Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund emphasised that NIEO was a continuum of this process to free developing countries from their ties and dependence on the industrialised countries:

Assistance to the least developed countries is a prerequisite for economic growth, however, it is not sufficient to initiate fast increasing economic development. It is necessary to implement support measures in several fields – including easier access for developing countries' markets, a more equitable exchange of goods between developing and industrialised countries, as well as greater use of private investments.²³

The 1970s: New perspectives and new voices

Before the mid-1960s, few had questioned the assumption that development was the state's prerogative, and donors preferred to channel their assistance through statutory institutions or multilateral organisations such as the UN.²⁴ The 1970s, however, are generally regarded as a decade where the development order established in the postwar years became an object of growing criticism, and where older assumptions about development became increasingly challenged.²⁵ The investments of donor countries and organisations did not deliver corresponding results, which led to a growing dissatisfaction with stately bureaucracies, both in the donor and recipient countries.²⁶ Nevertheless, it would be misleading to speak of a concerted attack on mainstream development ideas, as it was instead a multiplicity of different, and sometimes overlapping, types of critique with various suggestions of change and alternatives.²⁷

²³ [Bistand til de fattigste utviklingslandene er en forutsetning for økonomisk vekst, men slik hjelp er ikke tilstrekkelig til å få i gang en raskere økonomisk utvikling. Det er nødvendig å sette inn støttetiltak på flere felter – blant annet lettere adgang for u-landenes varer til industrialiserte lands markeder, et mer rettferdig bytteforhold i vareutveksling mellom de to grupper land og større bruk av private investeringer.] Arne Arnesen, «Legg om u-hjelpen» in *Utviklingshjelp i 25 år: 1962-1987*, edited by Ole Bernt Frøshaug. Oslo: Ministry of Development Aid. 1987: 9.

²⁴ Sørbø, "Norsk antropologi og utvikling", in *Norsk Antropologisk Tidsskrift*, No. 29, 1-2. Universitetsforlaget, 2018: 14.

²⁵ Unger, *International Development*, 2018: 127.

²⁶ Sørbø, "Norsk antropologi og utvikling", 2018: 14.

²⁷ Unger, *International Development*, 2018: 127.

The general dissatisfaction²⁸ with the economy-focused development approach and their emphasis on industrial projects that left out a large part of the population, reflected the “basic human-needs”-concept. The poor conditions of the people in the developing countries continued, and a country’s economic growth alone was not sufficient to save the overall population from diseases, poverty, and hunger. Why focus on urban prestige projects when so many people were living in dire poverty, infant mortality rates were so high, and education and sanitation a luxury? To establish economic growth in the developing countries, the theories of the 1950s and early 1960s had to be challenged, and therefore, new ones were on the rise. On this backdrop, many development strategists advocated doing the ‘first things first’.²⁹ Development had to implement that the standards and conditions for living improved, even for the poorest in society, and therefore, it could not be equated with economic growth. Due to this, the questions of economic growth evolved from the consideration of total numbers to considerations of how these numbers were distributed, in which the state had a central role. In line with this, the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) made fewer loans to projects involving infrastructure and significantly increased support for housing, health, and education.³⁰

This development strategy also left its mark on Norwegian aid due to growing interest in the field of “basic needs”. NORAD engaged in rural development programs in several countries, including Kenya, Tanzania, and Sri Lanka, and people with backgrounds in social sciences and researchers were employed in management positions in both NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³¹ In the late 1960s, the OECD announced that all member states were recommended to set up research policy bodies with an aim to give their governments advice on expanded research policy in the field of development. This process helped to redefine the societal task of research in the field of foreign aid. For the future, it was said that research should promote national goals set by the political authorities, and in particular focus on priority objectives; they should be planned and organised; and there was a need for interdisciplinary rather than disciplinary knowledge to solve complex practical-political problems, which further led to a reorganisation within the university structure.³²

²⁸ This dissatisfaction will be further discussed under the “Theoretical framework” section below. Research and new ideas gave the study of development a new framework as other aspects of growth were explored.

²⁹ Unger, *International Development*, 2018: 140.

³⁰ Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 62.

³¹ Sørbø, «Norsk antropologi og utvikling», 2018: 14.

³² Olav Stokke, “Utviklingsforskning i Norge gjennom 50 år: Rammevilkår, praksis og diskurs», in *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 4, p. 495-568. Universitetsforlaget 2010: 503; For an analytic overview see: Edgeir Benum, «Ett nytt

Scandinavia

In the early 1960s, the governments of Norway, Sweden and Denmark – all Social Democratic-appointed committees to explore and come up with proposals for how development assistance should be governed in terms of organisation, objective and guiding principles.³³ Norway's foreign policy traditions are closely linked to those of its fellow Scandinavian countries – especially Sweden and Denmark. The rising post-war insecurity resulting from the emerging Cold War made Norway join NATO in 1949. From then on, NATO became the main pillar of Norway's security policy, carrying a strong influence also within other areas of foreign policy. The UN became another international arena for Norway's post-war foreign policy, initially also with a bearing on the security policy. Efforts were made to establish and fortify an obligatory system of conflict mediation, to expand the sphere of international law and to establish an economic and military system of sanctions against states violating the peace. These efforts were partly driven by the smaller states, with Norway and the other Nordic countries playing an active role.³⁴ If NATO and the UN were seen as two pillars of Norwegian foreign policy, the third pillar was the Nordic, and particularly the Scandinavian identity and cooperation. During the formative post-war years, Scandinavian governments had a basis in Social Democratic "sister" parties. This gave added impetus to close foreign policy cooperation, both formal and informal, and particularly involving aid and development policy.³⁵ An example of this is found in Mozambique, where the Scandinavian countries, including Finland, joined their aid contributions to specific development projects.³⁶

Theoretical framework

It is not a great oversimplification to say that 'development theory' was initially just theory about the best way for colonial, and the ex-colonial, states to accelerate national economic growth in this international environment.³⁷

forskningspolitisk regime? Grunnforskning, OECD og Norge 1965-1972», in *Historisk Tidsskrift*, 86 (4), p. 551-74. 2007: 552-56.

³³ Olav Stokke, *International Development Assistance. Policy Drivers and Performance*. Cham: Springer Nature AG, 2019: 121.

³⁴ Stokke, *International Development Assistance*, 2019: 123.

³⁵ Stokke, *International Development Assistance*, 2019: 124.

³⁶ More on this in Chapter three: 74-79.

³⁷ Colin Leys, «The Rise and Fall of Development Theory» in *Anthropology of Development and Globalization: From Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism*, p. 109-126, edited by Marc Edelman and Angelique Haugerud. Blackwell Publishing, 2005: 110.

The goal of development was economic growth; the agent of development was the state, and: the means of development were macroeconomic policy instruments. These were taken-for-granted presuppositions of 'development theory' as it emerged as a field of research in the 1950s.³⁸ Development was not seen as particularly difficult, and local populations were viewed as recipients, not participants. Therefore, to modernise a country, both capital and expertise were needed. The state's role was important, primarily through development plans disaggregated into projects and increasing development economics.³⁹ For over ten years, well into the 1960s, 'development theory', so conceived, progressed with modest steps. Then, partly due to disappointment with the results of policies based on 'development theory' (especially in Latin America and India), and partly to the general reaction of the 1960s against industrialised countries interfering in the so-called "Third World", the theoretical temperature rose. The ahistorical, unself-critical and politically one-sided nature of 'development theory' was put in question by the 'left'. One way to understand the heady debates that followed throughout most of the 1970s is as a struggle between those who tried to keep 'development theory' within its original parameters, and critics who were trying to extend them and place the issues back into the framework of the historically orientated and ethical tradition of general development theory founded by Hegel and Marx.⁴⁰

The Neo-Marxist theory on underdevelopment and dependency theories emphasised that underdevelopment is intrinsic in a world trading and power systems in which the developing countries made the backward raw-material producing periphery, and the developed countries the modern industrialised centres.⁴¹ In this context, it was argued that the development of a neo-colonial system of exploitation of ethnic classes associated with foreign capital was replacing the previous colonial system.⁴²

³⁸ Leys, «The Rise and Fall of Development Theory», 2005: 110.

³⁹ Gunnar M. Sørbø, «Norsk antropologi og utvikling», 2018: 14.

⁴⁰ Leys, «The Rise and Fall of Development Theory», 2005: 110.

⁴¹ This was an issue Hans Singer, and Raúl Prebisch explored in their Prebisch-Singer thesis. The two economists concluded that different trade relationships between commodities and processed goods globally indicated that international trade did not promote development in states where industrialisation was poorly developed. Singer and Prebisch defended import substitution strategies (ISS) where the states sought to produce for their consumption rather than rely on imports. A problem with the ISS, however, was that each state developed a strong alliance between the economic and political elite, and thereby monopolies developed, which suffocated the country's economy. Hans Morten Haugen, *Kampen om utviklingen. Teorier, strategier og globale utfordringer*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2015: 32-33.

⁴² Erik Thorbecke, «The evolution of the development doctrine and the role of foreign aid, 1950-2000» in *Foreign Aid and Development. Lessons Learned and Directions for the Future*, edited by Finn Tarp, p. 17-48. London: Routledge, 2000: 30.

Which trends and perspectives have characterised research on the history of development aid? The subject of history is first and foremost an empirical science in which the production is based on questions that seek answers in sources. However, with new ideas and research in the academic environment of the 1960s onwards, like inspiration from the social science disciplines, the perspective and goals concerning the sources were questioned and criticised. Professionals in the social and humanist sciences in the latter half of the twentieth century were preoccupied with the postcolonial perspective, emphasising the consequences of the colonial past with a critical perspective on how the "white man rules".⁴³

Postcolonialism

It can be argued that all history is contemporary history, in the sense that the questions posed will always characterise the interest of the period the historian herself lived or lives in.⁴⁴ Interest in the world outside Europe has been present for centuries, and historians have come to identify this interest and field of research as global history. Global history can be seen as a reaction to the eurocentrism, which has dominated the subject of history, and it is characterised as a multicultural expansion of perspectives where also other parts of the world receive attention.⁴⁵ The decolonisation process designed a fundamental ground for the need of a non-European perspective and understanding. Edward Said claimed, in his book *Orientalism* from 1978, that the Western perspective of the "non-western" based itself on a definition that the "non-western" was to be opposite of the West. Although Said received some criticism, one cannot deny that this statement does somewhat reflect the conceptualisation of the "non-western", even in today's society. Said has been influential in the studies of postcolonialism, in which the subordinated relationship between colonies and forms of colonial powers were to be thematised. The postcolonial studies are, in many ways, a continuum of the postmodern focus on discourse, power, and knowledge. Also, the postcolonial perspective shines a light on world-system analysis, which has had great importance in widening the perspective on a global scale.⁴⁶ Postcolonialism has also contributed to a more critical view at the Norwegian actors and projects in the historiography on Norwegian foreign aid. This view of the world is, therefore, important for this thesis. The historiography written on the subject of Norwegian foreign aid has been influenced by postcolonialism, and will therefore also influence this thesis. When

⁴³ Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 16-17.

⁴⁴ Tore Linné Eriksen, «Fortida er ikke som før: Globalhistorie og utviklingsstudier» in *Utvikling*, edited by Tore Linné Eriksen and Karen Brit Feldberg, p. 37-60. Kristiansand: Cappelen Damm, 2013: 39.

⁴⁵ Eriksen, «Fortida er ikke som før: Globalhistorie og utviklingsstudier», 2013: 38-39.

⁴⁶ Leidulf Melve, *Historie: Historieskriving frå antikken til i dag*. Oslo: Dreyers Forlag, 2010: 337-8.

analysing the choice of Mozambique and Sri Lanka as main partners of development cooperation, the view of postcolonialism plays an important role. Both Mozambique and Sri Lanka are former colonies of European countries, and they, alongside their continents, struggled in the aftermath of colonialism with the Eurocentric perspective on history and culture. When reading both secondary and primary sources for this thesis, the problematic "us-and-them" perspective has been evident. The primary sources often refer to developing countries as submissive like "them" and the "recipients", while secondary sources have set light to this problem of terminology. Other theories which question the established forms of aid were the centre-periphery theories and the "Dependency-school" of the 1960s and 1970s, which has been prominent in both primary and secondary sources. These theories stated that Western hegemony in world politics and the economy largely hindered the development of the poorer countries.⁴⁷

Dependency theory

From the mid-1960s and into the 1970s, it became increasingly clear that the results were not in proportion to the investments regarding economic growth and development. Researchers such as Samir Amin, Andre Grunder Frank, and Walter Rodney began to study and write about the dependency and underdevelopment facing the so-called "Third World". Most of the researchers in this field were macro-sociologist arguing that social and political change had to be placed in a broader global context where underdevelopment led to unevenness which in turn created dependency. The economy's "trickle-down" theory, where the idea was that the financial assistance given through foreign aid would trickle down into society and thereby benefit even the lower ranks of society, was seen as problematic, and although the influence of policy formulation was limited, the World Bank, under the presidency of Robert McNamara, expressed its strategy in favour of a greater emphasis on poverty and "basic needs".⁴⁸ Scholars from, not only economics but also other disciplines focused on cultural, sociological, political, and psychological barriers of development, providing a more complex framework.⁴⁹ Dependency studies use a structural approach with a focus on how imperialism, as a part of the western capitalistic system, forces non-western countries into a relationship based on dependence. The world was seen in a pattern in which the centre (the industrialised countries), provided the premises for a world trade in which those who exported commodities were an

⁴⁷ Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 17.

⁴⁸ Sørbø, «Norsk antropologi og utvikling», 2018: 14.

⁴⁹ Olav Stokke, *The UN and Development. From Aid to Cooperation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009: 132.

inferior periphery, dependent on the centre. Therefore, the dependency theory argues that it became difficult, if not impossible, for developing countries to develop within such structures.⁵⁰

One can argue that dependency was a pressing issue for Norway herself already in the post-war years before the theories surrounding this issue were established, and on this backdrop, the issue became prominent in Norwegian foreign policies. A thread to Norway's dependency in the post-war years can be seen through the Labour party's statement that "to engage in an idealistic venture those many Norwegian 'intellectuals' who find that Norway apparent dependence on capitalist American gives them breathing problems".⁵¹

In the following decades, numerous works from the dependency school were published, with arguably the most important being *Underutvikling* edited by Tore Linné Eriksen in 1974. This literature soon developed to become an important reference for the radical turn⁵² in the foreign aid policies and the consideration of the developing countries.⁵³ It is also apparent when reading the White papers and other governmental documents from the 1970's, that the shift in focus from economy to social development was a prominent factor in the choices made by the Norwegian Government.

In the decade that has passed, attention has primarily been directed to the growth problems and how developing countries' productive capacity should be expanded to enable them to finance the continued development. Distribution and welfare views were placed in the shadow of economic growth considerations. A reorganisation is now underway that has its roots in two primary conditions. First, increased growth alone will not improve the conditions for the broad population in developing countries. There is a need for radical changes in social and economic structure that can ensure that the results of growth will not only benefit smaller and privileged social groups but are distributed in a socially responsible way.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 61.

⁵¹ Olav Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations – A History*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001: 258.

⁵² When referring to the 'radical turn', I refer to the shift from an economy-focused view of development policy, towards a focus on social development, increasing living standards, and poverty reduction.

⁵³ Simensen, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie. 1952-1975 Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 246.

⁵⁴ [I de tiår som er gått har oppmerksomheten i sterk grad vært rettet mot vekstproblemene, og hvordan utviklingslandenes produktive evne skal utbygges med sikte på å sette dem i stand til selv å finansiere den fortsatte utvikling. Fordelings- og velferdssynspunkter kom til å stå i skyggen av de økonomiske vekstbetraktninger. Det er nå i ferd med å skje en omlegging som har sitt utspring i erkjennelsen av to grunnleggende forhold. For det første vil økt vekst alene ikke bedre forholdene for brede folkemasser i utviklingslandene. Det er nødvendig med gjennomgripende forandringer i sosiale og økonomiske strukturer som kan sikre at resultatene av veksten ikke kommer bare mindre og privilegerte samfunnsgrupper til gode, men blir fordelt på en sosialt forsvarlig måte.] White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 4.

Furthermore, in White paper no. 94 (1975-75) it was uttered that even though the developing countries were now free from colonial rule, they were still trapped in an economic relationship based on dependency with the industrialised countries through the economic power structure.⁵⁵ Because dependency theory was already established as a factor in the political landscape when the choice of Mozambique and Sri Lanka as main partners was made, the theory poses great importance to the choice. For example, when giving aid to Sri Lanka, it was uttered that the help went to a project where the local population could take over production sooner rather than later and that the aid would not create further dependence. However, the practice did not live up to this goal, which will be further discussed in chapter four.

Post-development theory

Postmodern theory entered the field of development studies in the late 1980s. This post-structural critique of institutional development's idiom and empirical field, known as post-development theory, draws on the extends of Michel Foucault's reconceptualization of power-knowledge formulations and discourse. The essential idea of post-development theory "is to see the discourse on development articulating "First World" knowledge with power in the "Third World".⁵⁶ Development can here be seen as a destructive self-serving discourse propagated by bureaucrats and aid professionals that "permanently entraps the poor in a vicious circle of passivity and misery".⁵⁷ Some scholars and activist also interpret the post-development era as an era where community and "indigenous" knowledge become a reservoir of creative alternatives to development.⁵⁸ This theory is not as important when analysing the choices of Mozambique and Sri Lanka as main partners, as the theory evolved after these choices were made. However, the perspective of post-development theory is helpful to have in mind when reading the historiography in the field of foreign aid, as much of the literature was written after this perspective was introduced, and to various degrees are affected by this perspective.

Historiography

The contributions of Norwegian development aid have, in international literature and research, largely been regarded as of positive character, and various authors have applauded Norwegian

⁵⁵ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 8.

⁵⁶ Jon Harald Sande Lie, "Post-Development Theory and the Discourse-Agency Conundrum", in *Social-Analysis: The International Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 52, No. 3, p. 118-137. Berghahn Books, 2008: 118.

⁵⁷ Marc Edelman and Angelique Haugerud, «Introduction: The Anthropology of Development and Globalization» in *Anthropology of Development and Globalization: From Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism*, p. 1-75, edited by Marc Edelman and Angelique Haugerud. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005: 2.

⁵⁸ Edelman and Haugerud «Introduction: The Anthropology of Development and Globalization», 2005: 2.

efforts.⁵⁹ In the book, *Between Principle and Practice. Human Rights in North-South Relations* written by David Gillies, Norway, alongside the Netherlands and Canada, were singled out as countries that based their development aid on both ethical and moral grounds, such as human rights. Furthermore, Corinna Unger wrote in her book, *International Development. A postwar history*, that “economic interest did not play a decisive role in Norway’s decision to engage in development aid”.⁶⁰ However, both Norwegian authors and the Norwegian Government have only been too prepared to play along with this uncritical tendency, which has led to a situation where the practice has not matched the rhetoric. This is an issue Terje Tvedt, has acknowledged numerous times with his self-made term ‘*The goodness regime*’ regarding Norwegian foreign policies. Tvedt’s argument was based on the Norwegian Government’s justification for its actions by claiming to represent the conscience and compassion of the nation. Furthermore, the argument led to the statement that development aid has been an aspect of politics that gathers ‘the whole nation’ behind a political mission in the spirit of compassion and charity.⁶¹

The essence of this statement can also be found in White paper no. 94 (1974-75). The white paper included some fundamental values in the Norwegian foreign aid policy. These included solidarity, Christianity, morality, and duty: “the fights against poverty on a world scale is such a great task, which cannot be achieved through individual efforts. The duty of helping is the responsibility of the whole of the Norwegian people”.⁶² Simultaneously, White paper no. 94 (1974-75) also stated that foreign aid should not be given as charity, because it would be problematic to establish a relationship between Norway and the developing countries based on

⁵⁹ David Gillies, *Between Principle and Practice. Human Rights in North-South Relations*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1996: 278-79.

⁶⁰ Unger, *International Development*, 2018: 90.

⁶¹ Terje Tvedt, «Det norske samfunnet og det nasjonale godhetsregimet» in *Det Norske Samfunn* edited by Ivar Frønes and Lise Kjølørød, p. 245-270. Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2016: 245. Tvedt has been and continues to be, an important voice in the debate and historiography on Norwegian foreign aid. Tvedt has, throughout his active years in the historiographical debate, highlighted the fact that Norwegian society beses a great deal of emphasis on its foreign aid and development work. Tvedt has published books, chapters and articles within this field of research for the past three decades. For example: Tvedt, *Bilder av «de andre». Om utviklingslandene i bistandsepoken*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1990; Tvedt, «De private organisasjonene som kanal for norsk bistand: En analyse av utviklingstrekk mellom den norske staten og den tredje sektor» in *En studie av frivillige organisasjoner i norsk bistand*, Tvedt (ed.). Bergen; Universitetet i Bergen, 1993; Terje Tvedt, *Den norske samaritan: Ritualer, selvbilder og utviklingshjelp*. Oslo: Gyldendals Pamfletter, Gyldendals Norske Forlag, 1995; Tvedt, Nr. 8, 1996: *The NGO’s role at the end og history; Norwegian NGO-Policy and the “New Paradigm”*. Bergen: Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen, 1996; Tvedt, *Verdensbilder og Selvbilde: En humanitær stormakts intellektuelle historie*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2002; Tvedt, *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2003; Tvedt, *Det internasjonale gjennombruddet – fra ettpartistat til flerkulturell stat*. Oslo: Dreyers forlag, 2017.

⁶² [Kampen mot fattigdommen i verdensmålestokk er en så enorm oppgave at den sprenger rammene for hva som kan oppnås gjennom gaver fra enkeltmennesker. Hjelpeplikten trer fram som et ansvar for hele det norske samfunn.] White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 15.

gratitude. Furthermore, the recipient country was to use foreign aid in such a way that it would strive to provide social equality. In the long run, the goal was to establish a relationship based on trade and thereby leave behind the recipient-donor relationship which foreign aid often establish.⁶³ The essence of this goal can also be based on the theories presented above. The Norwegian Government argued in both White paper no. 29 (1971-72) and White paper no. 94 (1974-75) that the recipient-donor relationship should be replaced with partnerships, and that these partnerships would be fruitful for business in both countries. With doing so, it was believed that a reduction in dependency would occur. Also, by creating partnerships, the flow of goods, services and culture would open up, leading to closer relationships and a reduction of views such as “the West and the rest”.

The history written later on, in the 1980s onwards has somewhat been affected by the approach called "the linguistic turn". Here, the research emphasises that language and linguistic expressions are constructed and influenced by changing social context in both time and space. With a greater emphasis on linguistic expressions, "discourse" became a central issue, and with it came sharpened awareness of how changing linguistic expressions about the same phenomena also reflect the changes in action. An example of this is how the understanding of the relationship between those who provide aid and those who receive aid, has changed. In the 1950s, the countries which needed aid were simply viewed as recipients, and development aid was a shorter term for "help to the underdeveloped countries". However, later, the term has evolved to reflect "help to developing countries".⁶⁴

On the national level, as the transfers of foreign aid increased, so did the need for knowledge in the field. Several hundred Norwegian researchers, at universities, colleges, and research institutions, especially in the field of social science, have been involved in research, evaluation, and follow-up results related to Norwegian aid for the past 30 years. Norwegian expertise in the field was largely built through funds that the Research Council of Norway received from the annual national aid budget. The Council announced funding for programs related to aid, such as economic growth and poverty reduction, resource management, women, governance, human rights, conflict, and migration. However, due to hermeneutics and political ideology,

⁶³ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 15.

⁶⁴ Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 18.

problematic aspects of the research were revealed in a rapport presented by an international committee assigned by the Research Council in 2007.⁶⁵

Historical writing on Norwegian development assistance began towards the end of the 1960s with a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the debates in the Storting on development assistance between 1952-1965, which was later followed by a study of the debates before 1974.⁶⁶ More people became interested in the history of the wider world, outside Europe. This interest was somewhat inspired by the opening up to the world represented by the UN membership and development aid. Shortly afterwards, all university departments of history got positions related to overseas history. Also, students started to write their thesis' based on source material from NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁷

The subject of history makes extensive use of research from other social disciplines which are interlinked with thematic narratives over extended periods. Helge Pharo's doctoral dissertation from 1986 on the Kerala fisheries project and the start-up of the history of Norwegian development aid has often been regarded as the basis for the history of Norwegian foreign aid as an academic field. Shortly after Pharo's pioneering work, several articles and research work were published in the field.⁶⁸ In 1997, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie* came in six volumes, where the last two volumes, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1945-1965* (Eriksen and Pahro, 1997) and *Oljealder 1965-1995* (Tamnes, 1997), both involved Norwegian aid as an essential part of foreign policy. Rolf Tamnes' study of Norway's relations to Mozambique and Sri Lanka concerning human rights has been essential for this thesis. Tamnes also dives into the political debate regarding these two countries as main partners of development cooperation. However, *Oljealder* is a book that covers a tremendous amount of information, and therefore the analysis of the choice of Mozambique and Sri Lanka does not play a large part in the overall finding. In this thesis, the aim is to build a more in-depth analysis of these choices.

Three volumes of the history of Norwegian development assistance came in 2003 and marked the fiftieth anniversary of the first commitment in development aid; the fisheries project in

⁶⁵ For more on this see: Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 11-12.

⁶⁶ Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 12.

⁶⁷ Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 13.

⁶⁸ For example: Tore Linné Eriksen (ed.) *Den vanskelige bistanden: Noen trekk ved norsk utviklingshjelps historie*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987.; Jarle Simensen, *Utdanning som u-hjelp: NORAD og Ghana Nautical College 1964-1980*. Oslo: ad Notam, 1991.; Jarle Simensen «Den tredje värden efter 1945» in *Historisa vägval: Historia B*, Göran Graninger og Sven Tägil (ed.). Uppsala: Almqvist och Wiksell, 1997.

Kerala, India. The three-volume series, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie*, consists of 1952-1975, *Norge møter den tredje verden* (Jarle Simensen), 1975-1989, *Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer* (Arild Engelsen Ruud and Kirsten Alsaker Kjerland) and 1989-2002, *På bred front* (Frode Liland og Kirsten Alsaker Kjerland), whereas the first two volumes, will be of importance for this thesis. The three volumes of *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie* tells a chronological story with particular pervasive perspectives related to the humanitarian and moral foundations of development aid, international relations of the fifty years, international trade, Norwegian trade, and shipping policy. Furthermore, it also raises questions about self-interest and what lies in the idea of development and how it can be achieved.⁶⁹ The findings of the first volume, *1952-1975, Norge møter den tredje verden*, show that Norway, in the formative phase, was generally optimistic about aid and that, although the administrative framework took time, it still worked relatively well. This volume also shines a light on "the radical wave of the 1970s", where Norwegian foreign policies saw a turn to the left. For this thesis, the first volume has been essential for the conceptualising of the landscape of Norwegian policies, both domestic and internationally. Fewer chapters have been considered in the second volume of the trilogy, *1975-1989, Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer*, because this the years after 1977 are not the main focus of this thesis. In this second volume, the findings showed that the foremost feature of this period was the economic gaps between the different countries. East Asia rode the wave of economic development, while much of Africa remained in stand-still or decline. The two main regions of Norwegian foreign aid were still facing difficulties in terms of economy, politics and conflicts.⁷⁰

For the source material of this thesis, some historians and researches have played an important role in paving the way. Amongst them is Olav Stokke, who has contributed to the research and historiography on Norwegian foreign aid throughout the second half of the twentieth century, and continues to do so even today. Stokke has put emphasis on the rhetoric versus practice in the field of foreign aid, alongside other researchers such as Rolf Tamnes and Hallvard Kvale Svenbalrud, which has been literature of great importance for this thesis. In 2010, Stokke published the article *Utviklingsforskningen i Norge gjennom 50 år: Rammevilkår, diskurs og praksis*, which gave an overview of the last fifty years of Norwegian history and research in the field of foreign aid.⁷¹ Stokke has also published books such as *UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation* (2009) and *Norsk Utviklingsbistand* (1975), which has been an essential

⁶⁹ For a more detailed analysis of *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie*, see: Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 15.

⁷⁰ Ruud and Kjerland, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie 1975-1989 Vekst velvilje og utfordringer*, 2003: 261; 263.

⁷¹ Olav Stokke, «Utviklingsforskning i Norge gjennom 50 år: Rammevilkår, diskurs og praksis», 2010.

material for this thesis. Additionally, Stokke also contributed to *Den vanskelige bistanden. Noen trekk ved norsk utviklingshjelps historie* edited by Tore Linné Eriksen in 1987. This book was one of the first of its kind; an overview of Norwegian aid history, including its challenges and outcomes. Eriksen's research has also brought relevant material to this thesis, especially through his study of Africa, and the relations between Norway and liberation movements in *Norway and the liberation of Southern Africa* (2000).⁷²

When reading the historiography of the main partners of development cooperation and the framework of Norwegian development aid in the 1970s, I found mentions of the choice of Mozambique and Sri Lanka in a considerable amount of the literature, including many of the mentioned publications above. However, I could not find an in-depth analysis of why these two countries were chosen. On the backdrop of these two countries being in different situations in terms of economy, politics and administrative framework, I wanted to do an analysis of whether the guidelines and criteria set for this period were followed in the choice of making these two countries main partners of development cooperation.

Methodological framework: choices, challenges and limitations

This master thesis is based on two case studies: Norway's choice of Mozambique and Sri Lanka as main partners of development cooperation. The purpose of a case study is to develop a holistic understanding of the subject in question. In social science, case studies do not necessarily need to be studied as part of a larger universe.⁷³ However, for this historical analysis, I have chosen to consider the context of the political landscape in Norway and the international trends with a focus on foreign- and especially development-policies as a means to fully grasp the complexity of these choices. The two case studies will not be of a plain comparing character but rather used to understand if the guidelines and criteria were followed in each case, which guidelines were emphasised and why they might have differed.

After it was established in White paper no. 29 (1971-72) that aid could also be provided for liberation movements, and that aid should be given to countries that pursued development-oriented and socially just policies, the aid became, in many bourgeois' eyes, greatly radicalised.

⁷² Tore Linné Eriksen (ed.), *Den vanskelige bistanden. Noen trekk ved norsk utviklingshjelps historie*. 1987; Eriksen (ed.), *Norway and the liberation of Southern Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000.

⁷³ Sigmund Grønmo, *Samfunnsvitenskapelige metoder* (2nd Edition). Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2016: 105.

From the Conservative party, it was argued that aid had to be provided according to need, and not according to political criteria.⁷⁴ However, without following a formal guideline for development aid, how was the aid to be distributed and administered? The arguments from the political left, with the Labour party in front, agreed that aid had to be provided according to need, but within the framework of White paper no. 29 (1971-72) and White paper no. 94 (1974-75). Keeping in mind the five guidelines above, the aim of this thesis is to analyse the background and debates leading to the choice of the Marxist-oriented Mozambique and “welfare” Sri Lanka main partners of development cooperation.

Both in the primary and secondary sources, the relationship between Norway and Mozambique has provided more information and analysis than the relationship between Norway and Sri Lanka. The groundwork for the case of Mozambique was, therefore, more solid than in the case of Sri Lanka. For this thesis, the primary sources used consist primarily of a wide range of documents from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry's archive from the late 1960s and 1970s. These documents include reports, debates, notes, and budgets. Working with these sources proved challenging at times, given that the purpose of these documents was to communicate between governmental agencies where the wording sometimes contained 'inside' language and terminology not aimed at the public reader. Some documents were also written by hand and were, therefore, challenging to interpret. Also, at the time of research, the documents were not characterised systematically within the file series, which made it challenging to require a complete overview.

The primary sources for this thesis was acquired from the MFA's archive mainly in the case studies of Mozambique and Sri Lanka. The sources provided inside information from the Government and their relation to, and interactions with the two countries in the time before 1977. This information has been imperative to the research of this thesis. The MFA's archive also provided information of the broader international community to a large extent, with information about cooperation's with both Sweden and Denmark, and also towards NATO and the UN. White papers, Propositions to the Government and debates are collected from the Storting archive, which is found online. Also, primary sources has also been acquired from *Stortingets statsarkiv* where documents such as white papers, recommendations and

⁷⁴ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 402.

propositions to the Storting is available. A larger part of the material retrieved on case study of Sri Lanka is from NORAD's Evaluation Report on the Cey-Nor Development Foundation.

CHAPTER TWO: NORWEGIAN FOREIGN AID AND THE GUIDELINES FOR MAIN PARTNERS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

This chapter will shed light upon the guidelines and criteria which laid the basis for Norway's selection of main partners of development cooperation. The ten countries chosen as main partners of development cooperation by 1977 were India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Uganda (1968-1973), Botswana, and Mozambique.⁷⁵ However, the guidelines and criteria for Norwegian main partners were mostly formalised after a bulk of the main partners were already chosen. Therefore, it has been argued that these guidelines and criteria were somewhat elastic and unimportant for the choices of main partners.⁷⁶ As for Mozambique and Sri Lanka, however, both countries were chosen after the formalisation of the guidelines and criteria, and therefore this argument does not fully apply in these two cases. This chapter will focus on what emphasis was put on these guidelines and criteria, what they included and the degree of which they were upheld in the decision of making Mozambique and Sri Lanka as main partners of development cooperation.

Foreign aid

Norway was the first non-colonial country, after the U.S., to engage in bilateral development aid, which was a major public relations coup for the country. Domestically, as foreign aid emerged as a political field, the more conservative quarters were more critical of the initiative due to the large sums that would be leaving country borders, however, in Norway, there was little debate on the matter considering. The parties in the centre of the political spectrum saw the initiative as serving the "missionary impulse", which drew much of their support from districts whose voters traditionally supported the various Christian missionary organisations

⁷⁵ Uganda was chosen as main partner in 1968; however, the country was later removed from the list in 1973 due to the policies of the country's president and dictator Idi Amin. Therefore, in 1977 when Sri Lanka and Mozambique were added to the list of main partners, they became main partners number eight and nine. See: Simensen, *Norsk Utviklingshjelps Historie. 1952-1975. Norge møter den tredje verden*. 2003: 118-119.

⁷⁶ Stokke, «Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper» in *Den vanskelige bistanden. Noen trekk ved norsk utviklingshjelp*, edited by Tore Linné Eriksen p. 34-56. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987: 48; Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 401.

with financial donations. The Labour movement, in its turn, saw the initiative as a brilliant expression of traditional social democratic ideals of international solidarity and humanitarian concern. Additionally, a pressing matter-of-fact motive for all Norway political parties, and the Western world, in the landscape of foreign aid, was to eradicate the poverty that communist expansion fed on.⁷⁷

The term foreign aid, or development aid, has been used for Norwegian financial support for projects and programs in poor or disadvantaged countries, often referred to as developing countries, to create economic growth, increase living conditions, and to promote political and social development. There are many different ways of defining development aid, and both in the Norwegian and international context the concept has changed in line with political objectives. In 1961, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) established within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was established. The committee defined the term ‘development assistance’ to include the state transfers – Official Development Assistance (ODA). The following definition of foreign assistance became applicable:

(...) transfers to developing countries, either directly or through international institutions, to promote 1) economic development, and 2) welfare. It had to be either 1) direct gifts or 2) favourable loans, with a gift element of at least 25 per cent.⁷⁸

The Western member countries of DAC thus agreed on a system for calculating the type of transfers to developing countries that could be regarded as ODA.⁷⁹ DAC had a significant impact on Norwegian foreign policy, which led to a rapid increase in the total amount of foreign aid.⁸⁰ The international goal of DAC was that the aid should reach 1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the long term. This goal was set the same year as Norway joined DAC, in 1962, and Norway reached this goal in 1982 when the total aid amount of foreign aid reached

⁷⁷ Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations – A History*: 257.

⁷⁸ [... overføringer til utviklingsland, enten direkte eller via internasjonale institusjoner, for å fremme 1) økonomisk utvikling og 2) velferd. Det måtte dreie seg om enten 1) direkte gaver eller 2) fordelaktige lån, med et gaveelement på minimum 25 prosent.] Simensen, *Norsk Utviklingshjelps Historie. 1952-1975. Norge møter den tredje verden*. 2003: 281.

⁷⁹ Synniva Engh and Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, «Utviklingshjelp – idealisme og stormaktspolitikk», in *Krig og fred I det lange 20. Århundre*, edited by Hilde Henriksen Waage, Rolf Tamnes and Hanne Hagtvedt Vik, p. 333-357. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2013: 343.

⁸⁰ Norway went from being one of the lowest ranking countries in DAC in terms of foreign aid according to GDP in the early 1960s to one of the best in the 1970s. For more on this see: Stokke, *The UN and Development. From Aid to Cooperation*, 2009: 301-313.

1.03 per cent of GDP.⁸¹ For the Scandinavian countries (and the Netherlands), the attainment of 1 per cent ODA of GDP became a central subject of aid in both foreign aid policies and discourse.⁸²

Multilateral and bilateral aid

Multilateral development assistance strengthens the international organizational structure. However, with this form of aid, we also help fulfil another main objective in Norwegian foreign policy; namely to strengthen the UN.⁸³

In the early 1970s, it was decided that Norwegian aid should be distributed on a 50-50 basis between bilateral and multilateral assistance. When Norwegian development aid was first established in the 1950s, all Norwegian aid was distributed through international organisations, primarily UN agencies. However, throughout the 1960s, bilateral assistance started to replace the multilateral, which, in turn, led to the principle decision of equalising the two channels of foreign aid.⁸⁴

The broader reason for the decision to divide the foreign development aid, through the lens of foreign policy, was the growing wish for internal control of the funds and the developing relations with countries outside Europe. However, Foreign Minister Frydenlund argued that through multilateral assistance, the entire so-called "Third World" could be seen as one and thereby, the resources could be deployed where they were needed the most, whereas a small country like Norway, had to concentrate on specific countries or particular areas to make the aid efficient. Frydenlund also believed that, from an administrative perspective, it would be easier for the recipient country to relate to fewer international organisations, rather than a larger number of different donor countries, each with unique conditions.⁸⁵ The importance of strengthening the UN-system was also a solid argument in letting the percentage of multilateral aid stay at approximately fifty per cent. It has been argued that by keeping the multilateral

⁸¹ Helge Ø. Pharo, «Side show to centre stage: the transformation of Norwegian development aid» in *Saints and sinners. Official development aid and its dynamics in a historical perspective*, edited by Olesen, Thorsten Barring, Helge Ø. Pharo and Kristian Paaskesen. Oslo: Akademika Forlag, 2013: 83.

⁸² Stokke, «Utviklingsforskning i Norge gjennom 50 år. Rammvilkår, diskurs og praksis», 2010: 505.

⁸³ [Multilateral utviklingshjelp styrker den internasjonale organisasjonsstrukturen. Men med denne type hjelp medvirker vi også til å oppfylle en annen hovedmålsetting i norsk utenrikspolitikk; nemlig å styrke FN.] Knut Frydenlund «Et internasjonalt arbeid som blir stadig viktigere» in *Utviklingshjelp i 25 år: 1962-1987*. edited by Ole Bernt Frøshaug. Oslo: Ministry og Development Aid. 1987: 11.

⁸⁴ Knut Frydenlund «Et internasjonalt arbeid som blir stadig viktigere», 1987: 11.

⁸⁵ Knut Frydenlund «Et internasjonalt arbeid som blir stadig viktigere», 1987: 11.

percentage on a high level through the UN, it also strengthened the system and thereby its ability to obtain peace, which would benefit ‘small nations’ such as Norway.⁸⁶ Supporters of bilateral aid, on the other hand, claimed that the developing countries clearly stated that they preferred to receive the aid directly from Norway to reduce the bureaucratic operations.⁸⁷ However, this cannot be regarded as a consensus on the developing countries part. An essential reason for bilateral assistance, for the donor country, was the commitment to, and involvement in the developing countries. Additionally, the bilateral assistance became a vital function for Norwegian nationality and a broader perspective on international relations.⁸⁸ Table 1 below presents a timeline including the percentage of multilateral and bilateral aid, as well total aid and the 1 per cent goal set in 1962.

	1962	1965	1970	1975	1980	1983	1985
Total aid (mill. NOK)	37	85	263	986	2 331	4 362	4 946
% of GNP	0,14	0,16	0,33	0,66	0,85	1,06	1,00
Bilateral (%)	25,7	33,5	39,2	55,4	57,5	56,9	53,8
Multilateral (%)	74,3	66,8	60,8	42,5	42,5	43,1	46,2

Table 1: “Norwegian Development Aid, 1962-1985”⁸⁹

Formal guidelines and criteria – motives behind foreign aid

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the formal guidelines and criteria from White paper no. 29 (1971-72) and White paper no. 94 (1974-75) can be summed into five categories. In this chapter, the aim is to clarify the content of these categories, as well as to discuss them with regard to the choice of Mozambique and Sri Lanka as main partners of development cooperation. However, before going into the guidelines and criteria, a short clarification of the motives behind them has to be accounted for. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, and even still today, the balance between principles and pragmatism as well as altruism and self-interest has strongly affected the Norwegian aid assistance towards developing

⁸⁶ Stokke, «Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper», 1987: 36-37.

⁸⁷ Knut Frydenlund «Et internasjonalt arbeid som blir stadig viktigere», 1987: 11.

⁸⁸ For more on this see: Terje Tvedt, «Det internasjonale gjennombruddet», 2017: Chapter one; Frydenlund, «Et internasjonalt arbeid som blir stadig viktigere», 1987: 12.

⁸⁹ Simensen, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie, 1962-1975. Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 251.

countries.⁹⁰ In the 1950s, the earliest stage of modern foreign aid, the issue of the Soviet Union became an essential aspect of the foreign aid debate, both in the international and national sphere.⁹¹ Western contributions to developing countries were viewed as an act of peace, which would limit the risk of political tension and potential war in the respective regions. The outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, made anti-communism an aggressive issue which had to be defeated, especially viewed from an American perspective, but also for its allies, including Norway.⁹² Financial aid was thereby connected to the safety of 'the west'. After the 1950s, this aspect became less crucial in the Norwegian foreign aid debate. However, it appeared from time to time when politicians would find the argument useful, like for instance, when Norwegian aid assisted liberation movements in South-East Africa, and when Mozambique was chosen as main partner of development cooperation. It was, in this case, argued that cooperation between developing countries fighting for their national liberation, and western countries promoting democratic policies, would benefit the 'west' and thereby limit the influence of the Soviet Union. When an argument such as this was used, it was mostly to justify the support of Marxist-oriented movements to the Norwegian allies, first and foremost the U.S.⁹³ Issues such as international political and economic stability were important considerations in the pro-aid-assistance arguments. *Engen-utvalget*⁹⁴ stated, in 1961, that economic and political progress was both necessary conditions in creating the political stability needed for peaceful development, both in developing countries and the wider world. The aid assistance was also an essential contribution in obtaining the peace policies UN countries were committed to.⁹⁵ The late Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen addressed the importance of upholding peace already in 1949:

After this last war, we thought in this country that it was possible and right to obtain a special Nordic peace, without regard to development in the rest of the world. We believed that we could

⁹⁰ Knut Helle, Ståle Dyrvik, Edgar Hovland and Tore Grønlie, *Grunnbok i Norges Historie. Fra Vikingtid til Våre Dager*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013: 380.

⁹¹ Stokke, «Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper», 1987: 36.

⁹² Helge Pharo, «Norge og den tredje verden» i *Vekst og Vestland. Norsk Politisk Historie 1945-1965* (2nd edition), Trond Bergh and Helge Pharo (red.). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981: 293.

⁹³ Stokke, «Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper», 1987: 36.

⁹⁴ When the institution *Norsk Utviklingshjelp* (later Norad) was established in 1962, the MFA had a desire to sit in its headquarters as this new area served great importance in the broader picture of Norwegian foreign policy. Thus, a committee was formed in 1960 – Engen-utvalget – under Chairman Hans Engen. Engen-utvalget was characterised by a sobering foreign policy sense: the world became more closely linked, and the newly independent countries were part of this community. Therefore, it was in everyone's interest that they were helped towards their industrial revolution. More information about Engen-utvalget: Simensen, *Norsk Utviklingshjelps Historie, 1952-1975. Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 106, 108, 116, 174.

⁹⁵ Stokke, «Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper», 1987: 36.

assure peace and security through neutrality. What happened taught us a major lesson: There was no possibility for an exclusive Norwegian peace in a world on fire.⁹⁶

In 1975, The Bratteli Government accentuated the moral duty to alleviate distress in foreign parts of the world and stressed the fact that compassion should not be limited within Norwegian geographical borders.⁹⁷ The motive behind the recipient country's well-being has traditionally been an argument promoted by the donor countries to claim that compassion and solidarity were the main reasons for giving aid.⁹⁸ However, it can also be argued that the rhetoric of foreign aid does not reflect its motives, at least to some degree. Even though donor countries use humanitarian ideals and peace in their official statements, the self-interest often lures in the shadows. Historians and researchers from various fields in social science disciplines, has argued that there is no doubt that aid assistance to developing countries has been used to open new doors for the donor country's investments and businesses.⁹⁹ *Engen-utvalget* stated already in 1961 that there was nothing wrong in financial gain for donor countries if the aid also gained the recipient countries interests: "Through capital transfers of various kinds, the industrialised countries can, amongst other things, secure beneficial export markets and promote their economic expansion."¹⁰⁰ The Bratteli Government specified this view in 1967 when it was stated that the regional development banks in Africa, Asia and Latin-America could provide favourable opportunities for Norwegian businesses. Later on, *Onarheim-utvalget*¹⁰¹ argued further that bilateral aid should hold a larger share of the total aid because it could more easily be linked to Norwegian goods and services.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ [Etter siste krig trodde vi her i landet at det var mulig og riktig å skaffe oss en særskilt nordisk fred, uten omsyn til hvordan verden ellers utviklet seg. Vi mente at vi kunne skaffe oss en slik fred og sikkerhet gjennom nøytralitet. Det som har skjedd lærte oss med ettertrykk at det ikke fantes mulighet for noen særskilt norsk fred i en verden som var kommet i brann.] Olaf Solumsmoen and Olav Larsen, *Med Einar Gerhardsen gjennom 20 år*. Oslo: Tiden Forlag, 1967: 73-76.

⁹⁷ Stokke, «Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper», 1987: 36.

⁹⁸ Tore Linné Eriksen and Oddvar Smukkestad, «Bistand og utvikling i et nytt landskap» in *Utvikling*, p. 287-313, Tore Linné Eriksen and Karen Brit Feldberg (red.). Kristiansand: Cappelen Damm, 2013: 289.

⁹⁹ Eriksen and Smukkestad, «Bistand og utvikling i et nytt landskap», 2013: 289-290.

¹⁰⁰ [Gjennom kapitaloverføringer av forskjellige slag kan de industrialiserte land bl. a. sikre seg eksportmarkeder og fremme sin egen økonomiske ekspansjon.] Stokke, «Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper», 1987: 37.

¹⁰¹ The Center-Right government under Prime Minister Per Borten appointed Onarheim-utvalget, under Chairman Onar Onarheim, in 1966. The main motive for the committee was to connect development assistance to business. This was a striking contrast to the Ministry-dominated composition of Engen-utvalget 5 years prior. More information about Onarheim-utvalget: Simensen, *Norsk Utviklingshjelps Historie, 1952-1975. Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 114, 126, 132, 200, 205, 248.

¹⁰² Stokke, «Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper», 198: 37.

One: The Principle of Concentration

The choice of regions will be determined by the general objective of Norway's cooperation with the developing countries, by the developing countries' own desires and by Norwegian specialities and opportunities to provide effective assistance in various disciplines.¹⁰³

As mentioned above, some historians have claimed that the guidelines and criteria presented in the white papers did not process much influence over the choice of main partners.¹⁰⁴ However, the exception appeared to be the principal of concentration which was first formulated in 1967. This principal was drawn on the backdrop of Norway being a small and inexperienced country in the field of foreign aid. Therefore, it was argued that to make the aid as efficient as possible it had to be concentrated on specific regions with long-term development co-operations in a smaller number of what was called low welfare countries, defined as such based on the human development index (HDI).¹⁰⁵

It is rather difficult to establish the background for the choices of main partners in the 1960s before most of the criteria and guidelines were officially formulated. However, practical considerations were, in all probability, a valued priority. Language, political stability, and geographical location were all factors that weighed heavily into the decisions.¹⁰⁶ *Engen-utvalget* and later on, *Onarheim-utvalget* both stated that the most attractive regions for Norwegian assistance were located in South Asia and South-East Africa. A strong argument for the principle of concentration was the administrative benefits. The long-term governmental plan for 1970-73 stated how the principle of concentration was to unfold: the bilateral concentration of aid towards South Asia and South-East Africa were to continue and increase. However, the geographical concentration of official assistance did not exclude individual government measures or public support for the activities of private organisations and the business community in other countries or regions.¹⁰⁷ The fact that the Norwegian aid was concentrated on specific regions did not necessarily indicate that all aid was aimed towards the selected

¹⁰³ [Valget av bistandsområder vil bli bestemt av den generelle målsetting for Norges samarbeid med utviklingslandene, av utviklingslandenes egne ønsker og av Norges spesielle muligheter for å yte bistand på forskjellige fagområder.] MFA, White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 10.

¹⁰⁴ Stokke, «Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper», 1987: 48; Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 401.

¹⁰⁵ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 401

¹⁰⁶ Olav Stokke, *Norsk Utviklingsbistand Historie*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1975: 42.

¹⁰⁷ Stokke, *Norsk Utviklingsbistand Historie*, 1975: 43-44.

regions. The picture below highlights the countries that were receiving Norwegian assistance within the timeframe of 1967 to 1977.¹⁰⁸




Fig. 1: “Norwegian assistance geographically distributed, 1967-1977”

Figure 1 highlights more than the ten main partner countries. In 1974, the seven main partners were receiving about two-thirds of the total Norwegian bilateral aid, and additionally, fifty-five countries also received support in various fields.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, figure 1 also highlights countries located outside the regions of South Asia and South-East Africa. Both in White paper no. 29 (1971-72) and White paper no. 94 (1974-75), the Government advocated that Norway's two-sided aid activities should be based on the principle of concentration. However, it was also emphasised that one should be able to depart from this principle when special considerations took place. This was evident when concerning technical assistance, especially in areas such as maritime transport and family planning. Following the Foreign Affairs Committee's statement in Recommendation S. No. 135 (1972-73), the Government would also consider exceptions in other areas where Norway had special conditions for providing technical assistance.¹¹⁰ Further exceptions to the principle of concentration would only be acceptable in particular situations, such as through support for newly independent areas, like reconstruction assistance for Nigeria and Vietnam. The Government felt that it was appropriate to continue to concentrate the

¹⁰⁸ NORAD, «Norsk bistand i tall». Available at: <https://norad.no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/?tab=geo>.

¹⁰⁹ Ruud and Kjerland, *Norsk Utviklingshjelps Historie. 1975-1989: Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer*. 2003: 230.

¹¹⁰ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 23.

increasing foreign aid on a certain number of countries to achieve more significant impact in these countries, rather than spreading the aid in a broader range of countries. A proliferation would also require more extensive expansion of the administrative framework both at home and abroad.¹¹¹

When Norway chose main partners of development cooperation, one might have expected that countries with established Norwegian relations, such as Madagascar, would be the logical choice. Madagascar had known Norwegian business, and Norwegian missionaries had been operating with development aid in the country for the past century. However, missionary work was not a field the Norwegian Government wished to act on, as the new guidelines urged Norwegian aid to be neutral to religion. Additionally, Madagascar was a former French colony, and therefore, the European language spoken was mainly French, which was impractical for both Norwegian relief workers and the NORAD administration. Another country with longstanding relations with Norway was South Africa. South Africa would make a more natural choice considering the English language. However, the country was not evaluated as a choice for main partner because the Norwegian Government found it morally impossible to cooperate with the apartheid regime in the country.¹¹² By the late 1960s, South Africa found that it had fewer and fewer friends in the pan-European world who were willing to overlook its industrialised radical oppression in the name of white solidarity or economic profit.¹¹³

However, from the mid-1970s development cooperation was initiated with many better-developed developing countries, without the status of main partner country. This broke with both the principle of poverty and concentration. Several of these countries were also mainly economically motivated choices which aggravated the political left. An example of this can be found in the so-called Indonesia-case. In 1976, a shipyard in Ålesund was awarded a contract for the construction of more than 30 ships to Indonesia, thanks to the temptation of Norwegian authorities favourable credit terms, and assistance of NOK 70 million in co-financing with the World Bank, which was more than what many main partner countries received during that year. Indonesia did not belong with the poorest developing countries, nor within Norway's chosen regions. Moreover, the country had also recently occupied East Timor with great brutality. The prospect of securing a substantial contract for the Norwegian shipyard industry and thus

¹¹¹ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 23-4.

¹¹² Balsvik, *Norsk bistandshistorie*, 2016: 69.

¹¹³ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 2007: 209.

employment was still the decisive factor in the decision.¹¹⁴ As presented through Figure 1, in reality, the erosion of the concentration principle began early on, with an increasing number of countries and sectors being factored with Norwegian support. A 1967 phrase emphasising elasticity and adaption to changing needs and circumstances was used for all its worth.¹¹⁵

Nonetheless, some countries were formally chosen as main partners of development cooperation, while others were not. The possibility of a long-term partnership of development cooperation was highly attractive to the Norwegian authorities, due to inexperience in this rather new field of bilateral relations.¹¹⁶ The countries that received the most aid during the ten years between 1967 and 1977 were Tanzania (NOK 469.8 million), India (NOK 388.1 million), and Kenya (NOK 316.4 million). The total aid within this decade is estimated at approximately NOK 6.3 billion, with Tanzania, India and Kenya receiving approximately 1/6 of the total aid within this timeframe.¹¹⁷ Table 2 shows the bilateral aid assistance distributed amongst the ten main partners of development cooperation in the years between 1968 to 1980.

	1968	1970	1975	1980
Bangladesh	--	--	10,0	8,6
Botswana	--	--	5,6	4,7
India	26,7	18,0	8,8	8,2
Kenya	22,9	17,7	9,1	7,8
Mozambique	--	--	--	3,9
Pakistan	0,1	21,2	6,0	6,1
Sri Lanka	--	--	--	4,2
Tanzania	6,4	9,7	17,0	16,3
Uganda	9,6	6,8	--	--
Zambia	2,3	4,8	4,7	3,9
MPDC	68,0	78,2	61,2	63,7
Others	32,0	21,8	38,8	36,3
Sum	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 2, "Aid to main partners of development cooperation, 1968-1980"¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 403.

¹¹⁵ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 403.

¹¹⁶ Tore Linné Eriksen, «Fakta om Norsk Utviklingshjelp» in *Den Vanskelige Bistanden. Noen trekk ved den Norske Utviklingshjelpens Historie*, p. 11-17, Tore Linné Eriksen (red.). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987: 12-13.

¹¹⁷ NORAD, «Norsk bistand i tall».

¹¹⁸ Eriksen, «Fakta om Norsk Utviklingshjelp», 1987: 13.

Observing the numbers above, the percentage that the main partners of development cooperation were the main focus of bilateral aid within this period, regardless of the elastic interpretations of the guidelines. In 1970 the percentage of Norwegian bilateral aid assistance towards the main partners peaked at 78.2 per cent, which shows that the Norwegian aid was indeed concentrated within the regions of South Asia and South-East Africa. Being a main partner country entailed some so-called privileges. Norwegian representatives were present in the partner country with knowledge and competency which the partner country did not yet possess of their own. As mentioned above, one of the reasons behind the Norwegian wish for concentrating the aid was so that the aid policies would be a long-term commitment for aid disbursements, which, in turn, was also beneficial for the recipient countries.

South Asia

The two regions of South Asia and South-East Africa needed slightly different forms of aid. The Norwegian aid assistance in South Asia was concentrated towards the countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, all of which became independent from European colonial rule in the late 1940s. These countries had already established administrative systems with an emphasis on democracy, and the aid needed in the Indian sub-continent were therefore not political, but rather in forms of goods and services, especially artificial fertiliser.¹¹⁹ However, choosing South Asia also served political interest. The choice of India as a country of priority for Norwegian aid assistance can be understood as a demonstration of solidarity with the so-called 'Third World' as a whole. India portrayed a progressive "Third World" country in terms of politics and economy. It was the world's largest democracy, they spoke English, and they had a workable administrative apparatus. The focus on fisheries also seemed an obvious one, as the field was one of Norwegian expertise.¹²⁰ Additionally, the country was chosen because of sympathy towards Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy on peaceful development and non-violence.¹²¹ Later on, Pakistan was chosen as main partner in 1969 on the backdrop of the country's need for assistance through goods, especially artificial fertiliser which Norsk Hydro was a large supplier.¹²² Through the perspective of the Cold War, Pakistan was allied with the US, which made the country strategically crucial to 'the West', including Norway, especially

¹¹⁹ NORAD, «India», 03.07.2014. Available at: <https://norad.no/landsider/asia-og-oseania/india/>; NORAD, «Pakistan», 03.07.2014. Available at: <https://norad.no/landsider/asia-og-oseania/pakistan/>; NORAD, «Bangladesh», 03.07.2014. Available at: <https://norad.no/landsider/asia-og-oseania/bangladesh/>.

¹²⁰ Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations – A History*, 2001: 258.

¹²¹ Stokke, *Norsk Utviklingsbistand Historie*, 1975: 42.

¹²² Simensen, *Norsk Utviklingshjelps Historie*, 2003: 118-19.

when concerning the tension between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.¹²³ Before 1971, the country of Bangladesh did not exist. The war between East- and West-Pakistan was a massive bloodshed, which eventually ended when India interfered on behalf of Bangladesh - former East-Pakistan - later that year. It seemed natural that Norwegian aid assistance continued in the new state of Bangladesh due to the already established relations with the region. The country became a main partner of development cooperation in 1975.¹²⁴ Sri Lanka became a main partner in 1977 and thereby concluded the list of main partner countries within this region. As will be discussed below, all the main partner countries were in different situations concerning politics and economy when establishing relations with Norway, however the guidelines and criteria were the same. Throughout the research done on the matter, it can be argued that interpretations of the guidelines and criteria were not so pinned down, and rather based on unique assessments in each case.

South-East Africa

The choice of South-East Africa tells a different story. On the African continent, European rule lasted well into the 1970s in some countries. During this period, the Norwegian assistance was concentrated in the countries of Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique, all of which became independent during the period of Norwegian aid involvement. Norway was a firm supporter of national independence and supported the African liberation from colonial rule.¹²⁵ Another critical issue of the Norwegian development assistance towards South-East Africa was the issue of human rights. In the postwar period, the international interest in human rights increased rapidly. However, this did not indicate that the donor countries automatically aborted their partnerships with developing countries which were considered authoritarian, corrupt, and undemocratic. The issue of human rights has been a rather sensitive and conflicted part of foreign aid, especially concerning the complex colonial period and the aftermath of it. It was argued that the developing countries could not be evaluated on the same basis as the Western countries on the issue of human rights, and therefore many

¹²³ NORAD, «Pakistan», 2014.

¹²⁴ Simensen, *Norsk Utviklingshjelps Historie*, 2003: 119.

¹²⁵ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 402; In White paper no. 29 (1971-72), under the section of «Støtte til nasjonale og sosiale folkebevegelser», it was stated that Norway would support the General Assembly's Resolution 1514 (1960) which declared the end of colonization. Special emphasis was put on the former Portuguese colonies – Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau – due to limited funds. Also, Norway would consult OAU in their choice of support, in order to make the aid more efficient in the countries selected. The states which gained their independence before the 1970s did not receive aid and support in the same manner as Mozambique, as Norway did not yet have policies and guidelines on the matter. White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 8-10.

got away with situations relating to human rights violations.¹²⁶ The issue of human rights will also be further discussed later in this chapter.

Norwegian assistance also contributed to infrastructure and education. During these early years, most Norwegian professionals did not work as traditional advisers, but rather as employees in ordinary executive positions within the state administration of the respective countries. Norwegian engineers were responsible for multiple infrastructures such as buildings, roads, and the development of water systems. Norwegian businesses also assisted in the development of infrastructure, which led to a beneficial situation for both recipient and donor country.¹²⁷ In the field of education, the local population was to, over time, replace the foreign employees within the state administration, and therefore, they had to receive some formal education to execute various tasks. White paper no. 29 (1971-72) stated multiple goals concerning technical assistance, and teachers, doctors, engineers, and scientists contributed to development in the countries of South-East Africa, both through bilateral and multilateral channels.¹²⁸

Two: Norwegian resources

For Norwegian aid to be efficient, it was argued that it to be drawn on Norwegian resources and expertise. In White paper no. 29 (1971-72), some main sectors in which Norwegian aid would contribute were presented. Firstly, it was stated that about half of the expenditure on bilateral aid was aimed at agriculture and fisheries, and emphasis was placed on district development of various kinds, including measures that could help increase rural employment and, on the whole, promote the economic and social development of the agricultural population. Secondly, the field of foreign aid was education and teaching became prominent in this regard. Here the main emphasis was on various forms of vocational training. Thirdly preventive health care was presented, also including mother and child care as well as family planning.¹²⁹ The importance of family planning for the Norwegian Storting can be partly understood by this statement from White paper no. 29 (1971-72):

¹²⁶ Deabtes in the Storting (St. tid. Bind 7b) (p. 2732-2800) (1975-76), 1) *Norges økonomiske samkvem med utviklingslandene*. 2) Riksrev. *Antegnelser til statsregnskap. For 1974 vedtak Utenriksdepartementet*, Oslo: Centraltrykkeriet. March 3, 1976: 2772.

¹²⁷ Simensen, *Norsk Utviklingshjelps Historie. 1952-1975 Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 145-6.

¹²⁸ White paper no. 29, (1971-72): 13-14.

¹²⁹ White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 10.

The Storting has unanimously endorsed increased Norwegian assistance for family planning within the framework of the extended family planning concept. As an expression of the importance attached to this area, for planning purposes, a preliminary aim has been to use approximately 10 per cent of the total aid grants to support family planning.¹³⁰

However, because family planning was challenging to implement as an isolated measure it had to be integrated into an expanded health service for mother and child, which, in turn, resulted in increased efforts in preventative health care over the 1970s.¹³¹

Some new arenas of Norwegian development assistance, including industry and maritime transport, were also presented in White paper no. 29 (1971-72). It was believed that support for the development of small industries, especially those in rural areas, and for the development of productive measures in other areas of the business sector, would create increased susceptibility opportunities and contributed to the economic and social development for the larger part of the population. In the field of maritime transport, close cooperation was initiated with the shipping industry to extend Norwegian aid involvement. The main objective was that Norwegian aid in the shipping sector should generally aim to create efficient and competitive fleets in the developing countries. Therefore, careful attention was paid to assistance to the training and education of qualified maritime, technical and administrative personnel. The expanded Norwegian aid activities in industry and maritime transport were developed following the Action program set for the UNs Second Development Decade, where these two industries were given great importance.¹³²

Forms of aid

The more substantial part of the Norwegian bilateral assistance before 1970 was given through gifts, as loans seldom occurred, and in White paper no. 29 (1971-72) it was stated that the Government should continue to follow the line of gifts rather than loans. Studies (carried out by, among others, the World Bank) showed that a comprehensive softening of international credit considerations would be necessary if negotiations on payments disbursements and debt moratorium were not to be constantly recurring elements of international cooperation.

¹³⁰ [Stortinget har enstemmig gitt sin tilslutning til økt norsk bistand til familieplanlegging innenfor rammen av det utvidete familieplanleggingsbegrep. Som et uttrykk for den betydning en tillegger dette område, har en for planleggingsformål foreløpig tatt sikte på å bruke rundt 10 pst. av de samlede bistandsbevilgninger til støtte til familieplanlegging.] White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 11.

¹³¹ White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 11.

¹³² White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 10-11.

Additionally, the UN Action program for the Second Development Decade also recommended that 80 per cent of the ODA should be given in the form of gifts.¹³³

In White paper no. 29 (1971-72) it was further stated that the conditions for Norwegian aid should be determined based on a general assessment of the recipient country's overall financial situation or their presented development plans. Also, it should not have any impact on the terms of assistance if the recipient county used Norwegian financial aid for investments in revenue-generating projects (such as small-scale industry), or basic investments (such as roads and infrastructure). The three main forms of Norwegian bilateral assistance to developing countries were divided into (1) project assistance; (2) program assistance, and; (3) technical assistance.¹³⁴

Project and program assistance

Most of the Norwegian bilateral assistance took the form of project assistance, i.e. financial support for specific projects planned or implemented under some form of cooperation between Norway and the recipient country. Through project assistance, Norway retained quite extensive control of the work until the project was completed. This form of assistance, which involved a considerable administrative burden on the donor country, was particularly relevant in countries and areas where it was evaluated that the authorities themselves did not have sufficient capacity to plan and implement their development programs.¹³⁵ As the recipient county's capacity to plan and execute development projects increased, opportunities would open to expanding aid cooperation to new forms of assistance, primarily program assistance. Program assistance revolved around support for a specific sector within the framework of a development program, i.e. financial support to the beneficiary country's development program in a specific area such as agriculture or health care.¹³⁶ In the region of South-East Africa, project assistance and technical assistance would dominate the Norwegian aid throughout the 1970s, with the opening of some sectoral assistance. On the Indian sub-continent, where several areas had progressed further, assistance would increasingly be provided to support the implementation of ongoing development programs, either as assistance through goods or as financial assistance, supplemented with technical assistance in selected sectors.¹³⁷

¹³³ White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 11.

¹³⁴ White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 11.

¹³⁵ White paper no. 29, (1971-72): 11.

¹³⁶ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 22.

¹³⁷ White paper no. 29, (1971-72): 11.

Technical assistance

The very first Norwegian development project, the fisheries project in Kerala in 1952, began with the active interest of the launch of the UN's Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA) in 1949.¹³⁸ Technical assistance included Norwegian expertise and personnel. An example of a partner country which received a large amount of technical assistance was Sri Lanka. Assistance was specially provided in the shipping and fisheries sector, including harbour development, boatbuilding and education. The Norwegian Government provided technical assistance in both bilateral and multilateral channels, and the need for qualified personnel continued to rise in White paper no. 29 (1971-72).¹³⁹

Tied aid

Few questions arose more controversy in Norwegian aid policy than what role the business sector should take. The main reason for this was the double starting point: the aid should not be tied and given on gift terms and simultaneously promote ordinary commercial cooperation between Norway and the developing countries.¹⁴⁰ Norway was one of the few donor countries who aimed to commit to the principle of untied aid, as a large part of the loans and aid donated to developing countries by industrialised countries were tied to the purchase of goods and services in the donor country, as so-called "tied aid".

In the Government's view, there should be no ties on the purchase of goods and services in Norway regarding loans granted within the framework of Norwegian bilateral assistance. The same applies to grants provided in the form of program assistance of a purely financial nature. Deliveries of equipment connected with project assistance and program assistance in the form of goods should – when appropriate – be included as part of Norway's bilateral assistance. In such cases, however, Norwegian deliveries, in terms of price and quality, should not be significantly less advantageous to the recipient country than similar deliveries from elsewhere.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Carl Marklund, «Neutrality and solidarity in Nordic humanitarian action» in *HPG Working Paper*. London: Overseas Development Institute, January 2016: 10.

¹³⁹ White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 13.

¹⁴⁰ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 397.

¹⁴¹ [I Regjeringens oppfatning bør det ikke forekomme binding til innkjøp av varer og tjenester i Norge i forbindelse med lån som gis innenfor rammen av norsk to-sidig bistand. Det samme gjelder gavebistand som ytes i form av programbistand av rent finansiell karakter. Leveranser av utstyr i forbindelse med prosjektbistand og programbistand i form av vareleveranser bør – når det finnes hensiktsmessig – kunne inngå som en del av Norges to-sidige bistand. I slike tilfeller bør imidlertid norske leveranser når det gjelder pris og kvalitet ikke være vesentlig mindre fordelaktig for mottakerlandet enn tilsvarende leveranser fra andre steder.] White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 12.

In practice, however, it proved difficult to uphold the good intentions of untied assistance. For the sake of business and jobs, the principle was interpreted as extremely elastic, and many exceptions were soon introduced. Thus, grey zones emerged where it was difficult to distinguish between ideals and business interests.¹⁴² The business community argued that it was necessary to soften the particular Norwegian principles of untied aid, geographical concentration and equal distribution between bilateral and multilateral channels concerning foreign aid. As long as other industrialised countries did not adhere to these principles, it was argued that Norwegian business was affected without serving the developing countries. The traditional aid policy majority, for the most part, stuck to the ideals. However, when Norwegian industry and jobs were at stake, all parties were elastic in interpreting these principles.¹⁴³

Three: From development aid to development policy

Long-term planning was required to manage the growing aid appropriations properly. This included, among other things, fixed procedures in cooperation with the authorities of the recipient country, both concerning politics and administration. From the beginning of the 1970s, the most crucial instrument regarding this cooperation was the four-year country programs for each partner country. The country programs were ever-changing, as was the overall framework for the entire development aid, in the sense that new discussions were taken up every year debating the next four-year period, with opportunities for continuous adjustments.¹⁴⁴ Also, in order to ensure the best possible contact with, and knowledge of the political, economic and social situation in the main partner country, it was important to maintain permanent representation in the country.¹⁴⁵

Both White paper no. 29 (1971-72) and White paper no. 94 (1974-75) stated that, in the long run, the goal for the relations with the main partners was to reach cooperation that did not involve direct assistance, but was rather based on mutual exchange of goods and services between countries aiming at closer cultural, political, and economic relations. However, with the significant disparities in prosperity and income that prevailed between industrialised and

¹⁴² Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 397.

¹⁴³ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 397.

¹⁴⁴ Simensen, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie, 1952-1975. Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 124-5.

¹⁴⁵ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 23; 41.

developing countries, and the distress and shortcomings of the latter, considerable financial, professional, and humanitarian assistance were primarily needed.¹⁴⁶

Throughout White paper no. 29 (1971-72), it can be argued that Norwegian foreign aid evolved from development aid to development policy – a concept that took a greater interest in internal conditions in recipient and partner countries, as the assistance aimed to promote a more even distribution of income, and to reduce corruption.¹⁴⁷

Gigantic sums of development aid disappear in developing countries in corruption, wastefulness and failed investments, because it has been left to the recipient country (which are a priori underdeveloped) to administer the aid itself to an excessive extent. The same project in a developing country may be supported by five different foreign sources without any coordination, neither on the donor's or the recipient's part. Instead of increased aid, which the developing countries so desperately request, the requirement of increased efficiency and control of the aid that is already provided is much more evident.¹⁴⁸

In the choice of main partners countries, it was decided that Norway should give priority to countries where the authorities led development-oriented and socially fair policies, a formulation which has become an essential guideline for Norwegian aid policies onwards. In assessing each development project or program, it would be a crucial criterion that the Norwegian assistance helped to promote development and welfare for the broader part of the population and especially for those in most need.¹⁴⁹ The criterion of development-oriented and socially fair policies is mentioned in nearly all literature concerning the first decades of Norwegian foreign aid. However, it is difficult to find a specified explanation of what the Government emphasised within the principle of development-oriented and socially fair policies.

¹⁴⁶ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 34.

¹⁴⁷ Simensen, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie. 1952-1975. Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 243; White paper no. 29 (1971-72).

¹⁴⁸ [... gigantiske summer av utviklingshjelp forsvinner i U-landene i korrupsjon, ødselhet og feilinvesteringer. Det skyldes utelukkende at man i altfor høy grad har overlatt til disse land (som jo a priori er utviklet, underutviklet eller ikke-utviklet) selv å administrere hjelpen. Det er eksempler på at samme prosjekt i et U-land får støtte fram fem forskjellige utenlandske kilder uten noen som helst ko-ordinering enten på giverens eller mottakerens hånd. I stedet for en økning av hjelpen som U-landene så høyrøstet krever, er det langt mer påkrevet med en effektivisering og kontroll av den hjelp som alt ytes.] Norges Handels og Sjøratstidende. Oslo: 25.06.1964.

¹⁴⁹ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 37.

The principle was formulated shortly after Norway chose to withdraw from the partnership with Uganda, due to Idi Amin's suppressive and violent regime. It seems like this criterion has been interpreted based on a complex evaluation of the countries' domestic situation. To break it down, the first part – development-oriented – could be interpreted from the countries' various development projects and programs in terms of, among other things, education, health or infrastructure. As mentioned above, Norway made long-term plans with each partner country to ensure that the Norwegian aid was efficient. Also, the recipient country was rarely in charge of the total allocation given, and all, or parts of the aid were planned for specific programs or projects in which the donor country had a say. The second part of the criterion – socially fair policies – is even more challenging to pin down. To what standard did Norway hold developing countries? How were socially fair policies interpreted? What did this include? There is no clear answer to these questions neither in the white papers nor in the literature on the matter. If the governmental documents are written vaguely intentionally or not is difficult to say, however, it leaves the phrase open to interpretation in each case.

A new contribution to development aid, in White paper no. 29 (1971-72), was that Norway opened for assistance to armed liberation movements in southern Africa. This meant that one would deviate from the principle that development aid should be transferred from one state to another. Emphasis was placed on measures that would reach directly to the population as a whole, regardless of economic or social status.¹⁵⁰

The Government would like to emphasise that, concerning the situation in Africa, – more specifically the remaining Portuguese colonies (Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau), Rhodesia and Namibia (formerly South-West Africa) – the UN and the UN Member States have exclusive responsibility, because these dependent areas have not yet been allowed to exercise their right to self-determination, nor achieved independence following the UN Charter as well as the various UN Resolutions.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ Simensen, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie. 1952-1975 Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 244; White paper no. 29 (1971-72).

¹⁵¹ [Regjeringen vil understreke at når det gjelder situasjonen i Afrika – nærmere bestemt de gjenværende portugisiske kolonier (Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau), Rhodesia og Namibia (tidligere Sør-Vest-Afrika – har FN og FN's medlemsstater et spesielt ansvar, fordi det her dreier seg om avhengige områder som ennå ikke har fått anledning til å utøve selvbestemmelsesrett og oppnå uavhengighet i samsvar med FN-pakten og FN's forskjellige resolusjoner.] White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 9.

Furthermore, The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) were to keep Norway informed on which liberation organizations they recognized and where they urged Norwegian support. When it came to the question of whether aid should be given directly to liberation movements or through multilateral channels, such as the UN or OAU, this had to be considered in each case.¹⁵²

In White paper no. 94 (1974-75), it was uttered that it was an important task to raise public awareness of Norway's responsibility towards developing countries. It was argued that the idea of solidarity and cooperation had strong roots in Norwegian society, and it would be a central goal to gain an understanding of the living standards of many developing countries.¹⁵³

Four: The issue of human rights as a criterion for aid

Implementations of economic and social human rights represents particular challenges for developing countries. Large parts of the population of these countries are currently living in a state of economic and social distress. Underdevelopment is thus in itself a decisive obstacle to the implementations of human rights. The problems of providing the people of these countries with sufficient food, work, education, etc. appear so urgent that the work for economic and social development is characterised by an overall goal.¹⁵⁴

The importance of human rights has been a common thread in modern Norwegian policies of foreign engagement, and the interest for human rights issues increased, during the 1970s, in line with the interest of foreign policies in general. In addition to this interest, a debate concerning the principles of human rights arose alongside new institutions and organisations, which both illuminated and monitored such issues. However, the increased engagement of human rights was not unique for Norwegian policies, but rather, very much influenced by the international landscape.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 10.

¹⁵³ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 11.

¹⁵⁴ [Gjennomføringen av de økonomiske og sosiale menneskerettigheter representerer en særlig stor og vanskelig utfordring i utviklingslandene. Store deler av befolkningen i disse land lever i dag i en tilstand av økonomisk og sosial nød. Undertutvikling utgjør således i seg selv et avgjørende hinder for gjennomføringen av menneskerettighetene. Problemene med å gi befolkningen i disse land tilstrekkelig mat, arbeid og utdanning etc. fremstår som så påtrengende at arbeidet for økonomisk og sosial utvikling får karakter av et overordnet mål.] White paper no. 93 (1976-77), *Om Norge og det internasjonale menneskerettsvern*. Oslo: Ministru of Foreign Affairs, June 1, 1977: 13.

¹⁵⁵ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 370.

Norway in the UN: rhetoric versus practice

The Norwegian bilateral policies on human rights was designed as universal, however characterized by selectivity in practice. This contrast was particularly noticeable during the 1970s, as the international dividing line in human rights issues separated both north and south, and east and west. Human rights were seen as a significant part of foreign policy, and the U.S. emphasized the issues as civil and political rights such as democratic elections and freedom of assembly, an attitude which served as a propaganda weapon against the Soviet Union. Developing countries, for their part, increasingly emphasized the economic human rights that matched their demands for greater transfers from industrialised countries. Here, the Soviet Union won many supporters amongst developing countries with their support in these issues.¹⁵⁶

During the debates concerning human rights in the UN during this period, Norway sought to act as a bridge builder. The Norwegian position was that civil, political and social, economic and cultural rights together constituted the unified human rights. Nevertheless, in several areas there is a clear gap between words and action if one compares the Norwegian human rights rhetoric in the UN and Norwegian human rights policy.¹⁵⁷ The universal mindset that dominated Norwegian speeches in the General Assembly concerning the importance of human rights has not characterized Norwegian bilateral practice to the same extent. Rather, Norwegian human rights policy vis-à-vis cooperative countries in both developing and industrialised countries has been characterized by discretion and indifference, rather than the uncompromising defence of human rights visibility and universality that characterized Norwegian rhetoric in the UN.¹⁵⁸

At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), perhaps the most significant event in the field of human rights throughout the 1970s, Norway maintained a similarly low profile, partly in fear of the Soviet Union's reaction to the consequences of implementing laws and policies. As far as aid policy is concerned, several research work on Norwegian and Nordic assistance in recent years has highlighted cases of acceptance of human rights violations against vulnerable groups in partner and recipient countries in order to achieve overarching system goals such as population control in India or the establishment of cooperatives in Tanzania.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ Hallvard Kvale Svenbalrud, «Fundament of ornament: FN som «hjørnestein i norsk utenrikspolitikk», 1970-2005» in *Internsjonal politikk*, 2012 (2). Universitetsforlaget.: 169-70.

¹⁵⁷ Svenbalrud, «Fundament of ornament: FN som «hjørnestein i norsk utenrikspolitikk», 1970-2005», 2012: 170.

¹⁵⁸ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 372.

¹⁵⁹ For more information on Norwegian and Scandinavian aid to population control, see: Sunniva Engh, *Population Control in the 20th Century: Scandinavian Aid to the Indian Family Planning Programme*. D. Phil dissertation. Oxford: Oxford University, 2006. For more information on the establishment of cooperatives in Tanzania, see:

This tension between bilateral and multilateral human rights policy has at times made the Norwegian human rights rhetoric in the UN at risk of appearing as hypocritical or cynical.¹⁶⁰

The national debate and discourse of human rights and partner countries

Human rights have, in the tradition of Norwegian policy towards the South, been fundamentally perceived as universal, and as a "common pool of mankind". Terje Tvedt has argued that this idea has, implicitly, rested on some kind of evolutionary, biological model of development, and uses the example of an embryo in an organism, hence, these values lie in the womb of society.¹⁶¹

Efforts to win support of the idea of human rights in developing countries will have the best chance of success by using the expanded concept of human rights. In such a perspective, development policy becomes a human rights issue (...) To the extent that developing policy contributes to raising economic and social living conditions in developing countries, it can at the same time help to create the conditions for safe grounding the full range of human rights.¹⁶²

The increased engagement surrounding human rights issues can be illustrated by the fact that roughly half of the questions regarding foreign affairs in the Storting's Question Time in 1976-77, were questions about concerning different aspects of human rights issues. Reconciling principles with practice, however, remained challenging also on a national level, leading to two conflicting underlying attitudes which caused tension in the debate. On the one hand, we find an unconditional moral imperative which uttered that any abuse had to be condemned irrespective of time and place. On the other, a more result-oriented attitude where the conclusion was sometimes to be that low-level diplomacy was better than sustained public criticism, or that Norway had to exercise some caution for the sake of their interests. More specifically, we can identify four cross-sectional problem areas in the discussion of human rights: Did the political colour of the regime have any bearing on the Norwegian willingness to accept abuse? Which requirements could be imposed on poorly developed countries? How should Norway behave when the choice was clearly between two evils? Moreover, how

Kristian Ravn Paaskesen, *A Bleak Chapter in Nordic Development History? The Nordic Co-Operative Assistance Project in Tanzania*, in *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 35 (4), 2010: 451-470.

¹⁶⁰ Svenbalrud, «Fundament of ornament: FN som «hjørnestein i norsk utenrikspolitikk», 1970-2005», 2012: 170.

¹⁶¹ Tvedt, *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt*, 2003: 265.

¹⁶² [Arbeidet med å vinne oppslutning i utviklingslandene om menneskerettstanken vil ha størts muligheter til å lykkes ved at man legger det utvikdede menneskerettighetsbegrep til grunn. I et slikt perspektiv blir utviklingspolitikken en menneskerettighetssak (...) I den grad utviklingspolitikken bidrar til å heve de økonomiske og sosiale levekår i utviklingslandene, kan den samtidig bidra til å skape forutsetninger for en trygging av hele spekteret av menneskerettigheter.] White paper no. 93, (1976-77): 14.

expedient was it to criticise great powers regarding this matter?¹⁶³ In the case of Mozambique and Sri Lanka, the first two questions are of significant interest.

The issue of political colour was highlighted in 1977 when the Labour Party proposed to make Mozambique a new main partner country. The Conservative Party, however, pleaded gross human rights violations in the country. The criticism also reflected an irritation over the Labour Party's regrettable tendencies to favour communist regimes during the distribution of development aid, and the problem became more profound, as it was not only left-wing partner countries that neglected and violated human rights. A more extensive study from 1983 revealed that human rights were indeed neglected in almost all the main partner countries, and due to this neglect, it was difficult to make human rights a formal condition for assistance. The Department for Development Aid uttered that if human rights were to be a criterion written in stone, Norway would be stuck without any main partners of development cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also called for caution on the matter. A reconsideration should only take place when, over time, it became clear that the assistance did not help meet the main objectives of the aid, or when conditions in the country made it irresponsible or impossible to maintain meaningful cooperation.¹⁶⁴ In politics, attitudes were coloured by whether the parties were in position or opposition. This was particularly evident in the case of the Labour Party. In the 1970s, the party was in principle sceptical of the idea of imposing requirements of good behaviour on recipient countries. It was argued that poverty and lack of development implied that the same goals could not be achieved in respect of human rights in these countries in the same way as in more developed countries. However, the party became more sceptical to countries not upholding the UN guidelines on human rights in the 1980s when they were in political opposition.¹⁶⁵

The human rights issues also affected the partnership between Norway and Sri Lanka. It can be argued that the neglect of human rights in Sri Lanka was not as critical or as substantively researched as in other partner countries. Additionally, the issues in respect of human rights also became more severe later on alongside the increasing ethnical conflicts in the country.

¹⁶³ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 370-71.

¹⁶⁴ The situation unfolding in Uganda, under the leadership of Idi Amin, created a challenging cooperation on life for Norwegian personnel stationed in the country. After careful considerations of the country's leadership and the further development cooperation, it was decided that the relationship were no longer fruitful, and Norway withdrew from the partnership. For more on this, see: Simensen, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie, 1962-1975. Norge møter den tredje verden*, 2003: 181-184.

¹⁶⁵ Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 371.

However, following into the early 1980s, the Willoch-government chose to continue close cooperation with Sri Lanka regardless of the continuous reports of violations against the Tamil population in the country.¹⁶⁶

In 1977, White paper no. 93, *Om Norge og det internasjonale menneskerettighetsvern*, was published on the backdrop of two main reasons: 1) the increasing role of human rights in the international landscape and 2) that the UN published two Conventions on human rights in 1976, one concerning civil and political rights and the other concerning economic, social and cultural rights. This represented a milestone in the history of people's rights, especially regarding development. Norway ratified both Conventions.¹⁶⁷

The increasing role of human rights in the international landscape forced the Norwegian Government to explore and research the concept further. The Government received multiple inquiries regarding increased criteria and efforts in the field of human rights, especially in international relations, which lead to difficult debates on the subject.¹⁶⁸ The human rights idea was defined in White paper no. 93 (1977) as “the idea that every human being has certain inalienable rights that limit the state's intervention over individuals and therefore secure the individual's right to participate in the social process.”¹⁶⁹ However, the White paper also underlined that the idea of human rights was not a static concept, but rather a dynamic one. The perception of the content and scope of human rights has undergone and continues to change as society evolves.¹⁷⁰

A vital issue in the debate on human rights has been to what impact the principle of non-interference should have in a state's internal affairs. To which degree should international society criticise internal affairs? The White paper concluded that, in light of both international law and foreign policy on development, there has been growing recognition that at least gross, systematic and persistent violations of human rights had to be seen as an international case and not as a purely internal matter for the country in question. It was nevertheless clear that many

¹⁶⁶ However, restrictions were placed on aid in 1985. Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 1997: 371.

¹⁶⁷ White paper no. 93, (1976-77): 3.

¹⁶⁸ White paper no. 93, (1976-77): 3.

¹⁶⁹ [Menneskerettsidéen – tanken om at ethvert menneske har visse umistelige rettigheter som setter grenser for statens inngrep ovenfor enkeltindividene og sikrer individets rett til å delta i samfunnsprosessene] MFA, White paper no. 93, (1976-77): 3.

¹⁷⁰ White paper no. 93, (1976-77): 4.

governments would not recognise this view, or at least not recognise consequences for their actions.¹⁷¹

The UN received several complaints of human rights violations which lead to some intense discussions about how detailed and concrete such complaints needed to be for the organisation to intervene or to discuss matters that were essentially part of the internal affairs of the member states. In Norway's view, the General Assembly and other UN bodies had the competence to discuss gross human rights violations, and therefore it could be stated that the non-interference principle did not constitute a legal obstacle to the UN bodies for interfering in such matters. However, the experience had shown that it was only the seldom cases where the broader world's opinion took a firm stand, and where leading states or groups felt that their interests were threatened, that specific complaint was addressed.¹⁷² Another difficult aspect in this regard was the challenges of pursuing a policy that was consistent in the sense that the same human rights violations in any country should give rise to the same reaction.¹⁷³

An important variable to consider in the context of human rights is that the situation was quite different in the 1970s compared to today. In the 1970s, the foreign aid policies were not as well established as today. Official administrations and private organisations had not been in the game for too long, and research of the political and social challenges in the developing countries was a rather new field of study. Therefore, it cannot be expected that either the international society, the Norwegian Government, nor private organisations were as consequent in the question of human rights as they have been later on. In other words, we have more knowledge and experience today, and our moral standards cannot judge the past to the same degree as the present.

Similarly, in White paper no. 93 (1977) it was uttered that in other countries, especially in the developing countries, Norwegian criticism of civil and political rights violations could easily be seen as expressions of moralisation and self-indulgence. Many developing countries were primarily concerned with securing an economic and social subsistence minimum for their population. Therefore, one could not set the same goals for human rights compliance in these

¹⁷¹ White paper no. 93, (1976-77): 4.

¹⁷² White paper no. 93, (1976-77): 8.

¹⁷³ White paper no. 93, (1976-77): 27.

countries as in a modern welfare state. However, it was also important that this did not lead to failure to respond in the case of gross and persistent human rights violations.¹⁷⁴

Internationally, new emphasis was directed on *individual* needs as it was embodied in the basic needs approach, which gained popularity in the late 1970s, and received philosophical backing from scholars like Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum argued that a dignified life was one in which individuals enjoyed a minimum standard of fundamental principles which translated into capabilities, which all human beings shared regardless of their gender, religion, geographical background, or social status.¹⁷⁵

Five: The least developed countries

Following the UN action program for the second development decade, the Norwegian Government would seek, through both bilateral and multilateral channels, to benefit the least developed countries primarily. In these countries it proved to be challenging to get the process of development started, and even more generally, these countries have had less growth per capita than the average of developing countries. It was also in these countries that the needs were most significant and where the direct emergencies seemed to be most imminent. Therefore, there was a close connection between development work and disaster or emergency assistance. In reality, there were larger groups within many of the poorest countries that lived in a permanent state of emergency or disaster.¹⁷⁶ Which still is the case today.

The poor have a right to justice not charity. [...] To get out of poverty, it is necessary for the developing countries, and thus the aid organizations, to use more instruments to contribute to faster growth. [...] Simultaneously, one seeks to take care of the basic needs of the population – such as food, housing and education – through an active distribution policy.¹⁷⁷

Arne Arnesen, Director NORAD (1975-1982)

¹⁷⁴ White paper no. 93, (1976-77): 5.

¹⁷⁵ Unger, *International Development*, 2018: 140.

¹⁷⁶ White paper no. 94 (1974-75): 37-8.

¹⁷⁷ [De fattigste har krav på rettferdighet ikke veldedighet (...)] For å komme ut av fattigdommen, er det nødvendig for u-landene, og dermed bistandsorganisasjonene, å ta i bruk flere virkemidler for å bidra til en raskere vekst. (...) Samtidig søker man å ta vare på befolkningens grunnbehov – mat, hus og skoler – gjennom en aktiv fordelingspolitikk.] Arne Arnesen, «Legg om u-hjelpen», 1987: 9.

“The poor” – who were they?

White paper no. 94 (1974-75) describes developing countries as countries that differed from the rest of the world, primarily due to the widespread poverty. Statistics from the period showed that, in 1970, the average national product per capita in developing countries was \$250, while the equivalent in industrialised countries was \$2,750.¹⁷⁸

Seen with Norwegian eyes, countries in distant parts of the world will rarely get their own identity to the same degree as the countries in Europe. This indicates that the developing countries, which in terms of population, constitute approximately 70% of the world, is often generalised. However, there is reason to emphasise that although the developing countries are similar in comparison with the industrialised countries, the variation between them, historically, geographically, economically and culturally, are greater than those among the industrialised countries.¹⁷⁹

This paragraph from White paper no. 94 (1974-75) represents the problematic views which Edward Said discussed in *Orientalism* from 1978, presented in chapter one of this thesis. Through this paragraph, the postcolonial view is clear, in the sense that it acknowledges that developing countries were different and in need of different aid and support. It seems as if the Norwegian Government had an ideology claiming that it was not sufficient for donor countries or organisations to regard all developing countries as one if they wished to reach economic growth. However, the paragraph simultaneously puts forward the separation of them and us. Even though the Norwegian Government acknowledges that the developing countries could not be seen as one, they are regardless put in the same category, where they are the opposite of the industrialised countries. Hence, they are all different, yet the same compared to "us".

This can also be illustrated through the cases of Mozambique and Sri Lanka. The aid donated to the two countries were to some degree the same in terms of financial support to education, health and infrastructure. However, the relationships Norway had with these two countries were different, and support to a liberation movement and a fisheries project proved to provide different challenges and administrative operations.

¹⁷⁸ White paper no. 94, (1974-75): 148.

¹⁷⁹ [Sett fra Norge vil land i fjerne verdensdeler sjeldent få sin egen identitet i samme grad som landene i Europa. Dette fører til at utviklingslandene, som befolkningsmessig utgjør ca. 70% av vår verden, ofte betraktes som et noenlunde likartet hele. Det er grunn til å understreke at selv om utviklingslandene i mange henseende er like ved den måten de skiller seg fra industrilandene på, er variasjonene mellom dem, både historisk, geografisk, økonomisk, sosialt og kulturelt, langt større enn blant industrilandene.] White paper no. 94, 1975: 148.

A perspective to these disparities was demonstrated when oil prices increased sharply in late 1973. For the relatively few oil-producing developing countries, this increase in prices implied a sharp increase in income, which, in turn, led to some of these countries eventually being able to provide, or increase, financial aid to other developing countries. For the oil-importing developing countries, however, this increase in prices implied further pressure on an already strained development economy. In 1971, the UN made a list of the 25 least developed countries. These countries had a gross national income per capita of less than \$100, industrial output of less than 10 per cent of the gross domestic product, and illiteracy (for those over 15 years) of over 80 per cent.¹⁸⁰ The 25 least developed countries are listed below:

Africa	Botswana, Burundi, Dahomey (now: southern Benin), Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Tanzania, Uganda, Republic of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).
Asia	Afghanistan, Bhutan, Laos, the Maldives, Nepal, Sikkim, West-Samoa, Yemen.
South-America	Haiti

Table 3: "The 25 least developed countries, 1971."

As we can see from Table 3, neither Mozambique nor Sri Lanka is to be found. However, the list shows other main partners, such as Botswana, Uganda (1968-1973) and Tanzania. After the oil shock in 1973, the UN made a new list. This time, the list showed the countries most affected by the increase in oil prices, which, in turn, lead to an increase in prices for several foods as well as inflation. This formed a separate group that went by the name "Most Severely Affected Countries".¹⁸¹ This list included:

Africa	Cameroon, The Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey (now: southern Benin), Ghana, Guinea, The Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).
Asia	Bangladesh, India, Khmer Republic (now: Cambodia), Laos, Pakistan, Yemen, Sri Lanka.
South-America	El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras.

Table 4: "Most Severely Affected Countries"

¹⁸⁰ White paper no. 94, (1974-75): 148.

¹⁸¹ White paper no. 94, (1974-75): 148-9.

In the list of most severely affected countries, we can see a larger number of Norway's main partners of development cooperation: Kenya, Tanzania, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and, most importantly for this study, Sri Lanka. Mozambique, however, cannot be found on either the least developed countries nor the most severely affected countries. The case of Mozambique, was different from many of the countries presented above, as the country did not become independent until 1975. After independence, the new Government and country were fragile and in great need of help to rise after a decade of liberation struggles and bloodshed. When looking at cases through broader perspectives, one can understand that a country's growth cannot be understood in economics alone.

CHAPTER THREE: NORWAY AND MOZAMBIQUE – A STORY OF “THE LEFT”

During the centuries between 1498 and 1975, Mozambique was under Portuguese colonial rule. This era saw Mozambican culture, history, and traditions as strongly oppressed, and the indigenous population both discriminated against and exploited by the Portuguese regime.¹⁸² On this backdrop, the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frelimo) was founded in 1962 under the presidency of Eduardo Mondlane. Frelimo followed the ideology of Marxism, and the organization quickly became a counter alternative to the colonial regime that based its hierarchy upon ethnical background and social status. Marxism, especially in its Leninist form – had this one great advantage in countries where the authorities increasingly used different kinds of racist ethnic categories to split the population and perpetuate their own rule. By subdividing people into their productive roles, as peasants, workers, or intellectual, rather than into, for example, Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, Shona, or Ovambo, Marxism helped create at least the perspective of a united front against the regimes. It also fuelled the hope of generating future states that were modern and just for all – without racial oppression, but with the advantages that the Europeans then enjoyed.¹⁸³ For the following decade, Frelimo fought for the national liberation of Mozambique - a fight supported and assisted by Norway and the fellow Scandinavian countries.

The international landscape of the 1960s often referred to as the era of decolonization, had a decisive influence on the liberation movement in Africa. In 1958, the United Nations consisted of 83 member-states, with only 10 representing the African continent. However, only five years later, in 1963, 33 African countries were represented among the 113 member-states.¹⁸⁴

Within the African continent, Frelimo and its cause had many supporters, such as Tanzania, Zambia, Egypt, Ghana, and Somalia. Support also came from outside the African continent, from socialist and communist countries like China and the Soviet Union. China aided Frelimo through finances and materials, but most importantly, through practical knowledge of guerrilla

¹⁸² Mona Gleditsch, *Mosambik: kampen fortsetter*. Oslo: Fellesrådet, 1978: 2.

¹⁸³ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 2007: 207-8.

¹⁸⁴ Witney J. Schneidman, «FRELIIMO’S Foreign Policy and the Process of Liberation” in *Indiana University Press*, (1978): pp. 57-67. Jan. – Mar. 1978: 58.

strategy. The Soviet Union's most significant support to Frelimo was both political and diplomatic through their membership in the UN.¹⁸⁵

Regardless of significant support from friendly countries, Mozambique and Frelimo still faced a difficult situation due to the Portuguese colonial regime. Mozambique was one of the last colonies remaining in Africa, and Portuguese colonial rule illustrated the significant international background of the decolonization in Africa; when the will of the colonial power remained, even one of the poorest European countries could resist international pressure as well as the African liberation front for more than a decade.¹⁸⁶ However, the liberation front grew more potent by the support and aid from a growing number of countries and organizations. Before 1971, Russia was the only permanent member of the Security Council to vote consistently with the Afro-Asian bloc in condemning Portugal. However, later on, the Scandinavian countries joined Russia in their support of the growing liberation front.¹⁸⁷

Five years prior, in 1966, Sweden became the first Western country to lend support to a national liberation movement through direct humanitarian aid to Frelimo's Mozambique Institute.¹⁸⁸ Earlier support from Western countries was channelled through voluntary agencies. The Swedish aid included educational facilities, medical supplies, and other materials necessary to support the civilian population of Mozambique. The part of the aid, which included financial assistance, was distributed by the Swedish International Development Association (SIDA), and the items were selected by Frelimo officials and bought from the international market at the lowest prices.¹⁸⁹

Shortly afterwards, Denmark and Norway joined Sweden in their support of Frelimo. An essential effect of this assistance was to raise awareness of the donor countries' populations as to the conditions in the Portuguese colonies. A result of this can be found in both the political and public pressure put on the Swedish firm ASEA to withdraw from the Cahora Bassa Dam

¹⁸⁵ Schneidman, «FRELIMO'S Foreign Policy and the Process of Liberation», 1978: 58.

¹⁸⁶ Jarle Simensen, *Afrikas Historie*. Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 2009: 320.

¹⁸⁷ Witney J. Schneidman, «FRELIMO'S Foreign Policy and the Process of Liberation» in *Indiana University Press*, pp. 57-67. Jan. – Mar. 1978: 59.

¹⁸⁸ Many donor countries, including the Scandinavian countries, saw it as problematic to support the armed struggle with means of financial and material aid. Therefore, to receive humanitarian assistance, Frelimo chose to deliberately run the Mozambique Institute's education and health activities as a separate unit. See: Tore Linné Eriksen, "The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975" in *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, edited by Tore Linné Eriksen, p. 9-90. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2000: 45.

¹⁸⁹ Schneidman, «FRELIMO'S Foreign Policy and the Process of Liberation», 1978: 60.

project in Mozambique.¹⁹⁰ Additionally, it gave Frelimo an inroad to the western world, which could be used to exert pressure on Portugal, and it was proof to Frelimo that their struggle could be understood in a global context.¹⁹¹

Norway and Portugal – alliance and disagreements

Before going into Norwegian support of the liberation movement, the issue of NATO-membership has to be accounted for. Prior to the problems of Portuguese colonies, Norway was facing similar situations in other relations. As an example, Norway was at the forefront of efforts both inside the UN and in other forums to make the fascist Franco regime in Spain an outcast of the civilized world. Still, it was in the fields of decolonization and development aid that Norway, often but not always, together with her Nordic neighbours, eventually came to see herself as a natural spearhead. Before Portugal set the centerstage in Norwegian debates on decolonization, France had the spotlight. Internationally, Norway's criticism was tempered by concern for both France and later on Portugal's status as Norway's allies in NATO. Therefore, the criticism was, in the early stages, more often than not expressed in the closed chambers of the alliance instead of through public diplomacy in the UN or elsewhere. However, public opinion in Norway became agitated about France's war in Algeria, and the government was pushed to take a more open stance on the matter. The view was more divided towards the war in Indo-China because this situation could be seen as part of the containment of a broader communist offensive against western interests and position. In fact, in 1952, Norway supported a unanimous NATO resolution that declared the French struggle in the Indo-China as being entirely consonant with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic community. However, the debate that this created on the domestic front persuaded the government to take a firmer line in the future against anything that could be construed as making Norway "guilty by association" in the colonial wars of her NATO allies. This was also influenced by the growing importance of the non-aligned states in the UN, which expected Norway to "stand up and be counted" in the struggle for independence of the former colonies.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ For more information on the Cahora Bassa project, see: Jeune Afrique, «Why AESA Quit Cahora Bassa» in *African Development*. London, October 21 1969.

¹⁹¹ Schneidman, «FRELIMO'S Foreign Policy and the Process of Liberation», 1978: 60.

¹⁹² Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations – A History*, 2001: 256-7.

The NATO military alliance was, to some extent, considered a tool for imperialism, as it did not condemn the colonial system. In both Norway and Denmark, the memberships were questioned concerning Portuguese colonial rule. In the Western world, the Nordic countries were viewed as frontrunners due to their support to individuals, organizations, and refugees, struggling to end institutionalized colonialism and racism and alleviate their humanitarian consequences. Nordic assistance was both humanitarian and civilian, and to no small extent, given to refugees and the educational sector. Increasingly, it came to involve national liberation movements and financial support to their civilian activities, at a time when these movements were politically and militarily struggling against the regimes in their countries – such as the government of Portugal, a NATO military partner of Norway and Denmark.¹⁹³

Danish support developed differently from that of the other Nordic countries. Official support was never given directly to liberation movements. Preferably, Danish NGOs were employed to advise on Danish allocations and distribute them as well as to carry out activities, using their capacity or through their international networks.¹⁹⁴

Bilateral financial support, to humanitarian organizations, and later also to national liberation movements struggling against apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa, became a trademark for Nordic assistance. The Nordic countries also played a politically and financially active role in establishing and funding UN initiatives to support victims of apartheid. In a global context, the Nordic countries stood apart from the other Western countries as they were in contact with, and even to some extent collaborate with, liberation movements engaged in armed struggle against internationally recognized governments of other countries. In diplomatic terms, it was close to being involved in military activity against these governments.¹⁹⁵ As will be discussed later on, Mozambique was less than impressed by both Norwegian and Danish memberships in NATO and EFTA, which led to debates on the pros and cons of the situation, both in parliament and in the public sphere.

In the international landscape, despite its NATO membership, the Portuguese dictatorship found it increasingly difficult during the 1960s to man, supply, and finance its colonial wars.

¹⁹³ Christopher Munthe Morgenstierne, *Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Afrika. A Flexible Response*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2003: 11

¹⁹⁴ Morgenstierne, *Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Afrika. A Flexible Response*. 2003: 11.

¹⁹⁵ Morgenstierne, *Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Afrika, A Flexible Response*. 2003: 13.

Its European NATO partners considered Lisbon's wars to keep its colonies a diversion at best, and a disgrace at worst, and the Johnson administration in the U.S. was hardly won over by Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar's arguments that Portugal's mission in Africa was to fight Communism. However, despite Washington's internal concerns over Portuguese "incompetence" and "bungling", it was not able to disentangle itself from indirect support of Portugal's colonial wars. As Secretary Dean Rusk attempted to explain to Salazar's successor, Marchello Caetano, in 1968, "the US was not leading a crusade on the African question and had no interest in the disappearance of Portuguese presence from Africa ... we had to express our views, which were not always the views of our Portuguese friends ... A great deal depended on the expression of the authentic views of peoples in states like Angola and Mozambique".¹⁹⁶

The Mozambican liberation movement, Frelimo, was not only reasonably united in its struggle, but it also had strong secret links to the U.S. and the West. Despite Mondlane being a dedicated socialist, he believed that a broad united front both domestically and internationally would be for the best of the cause of liberation, even if it slowed down the process of social transformation.¹⁹⁷ It is reasonable to assume that the fact that Mondlane was open to "softer" socialism, and his links to the West through his background, both professionally and personally, made it easier for Norwegian authorities to emphasize with Frelimo's cause.¹⁹⁸

Norway takes a stand on Portuguese colonialism

A dilemma that has been subject to numerous historical research and academic texts concerning the post-war Norwegian foreign policies and the recurrent theme of the 1950s and 1960s was the conflict between the UN principles of decolonization and the expression of solidarity with Norway's partners in NATO.¹⁹⁹ In the 1950s, these conflicting interests came to the surface as a result of the French colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, while the U.S. war in South East

¹⁹⁶ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 2007: 209-10.

¹⁹⁷ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 2007: 210.

¹⁹⁸ Eduardo Mondlane completed his education in Social Anthropology at Harvard University, after that he worked as a lecturer at Syracuse University. Mondlane continued his career in the UN before he moved back to Mozambique in 1961. Throughout his time in the U.S. and his career in the UN, Mondlane established a stable network with Western countries, as he argued in the case of Mozambique. For information about Mondlane, see: Tore Linné Eriksen, preface in Eduardo Mondlane's, *Kampen om Mocambique* (translated by Haakon Børde), Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1969: 7-12.

¹⁹⁹ Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1945-1965. Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie* (bind 5). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997; Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 46.

Asia and the Portuguese colonial wars in Africa were among the most contentious issues during the 1960s and early 1970s. Apart from being partners in NATO from 1949, Norway and Portugal were also both founding members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) from 1960.²⁰⁰

In the 1950s, the Norwegian government publicly condemn the colonial system. However, this was a matter of delicate diplomacy where a striving solution would be an agreement between the colonial power and colony, and to avoid further conflict. Realistic resolutions needed to be made by the UN considering decolonization, and that idealistic ideas would be discussed critically. Therefore, when the issues of colonialism were brought up at the 8th UN General Assembly in 1953, the Norwegian spokesman on foreign policies, Finn Moen, stressed that such complex problems could not be solved through moralization.²⁰¹

The UN and the principles of the UN Charter were frequently referred to as a cornerstone in Norwegian foreign policies²⁰²Therefore, the flagrant Portuguese rejection of the 1960 UN Declaration on Decolonization was met with sharp criticism and outright condemnation from most Norwegian political parties. Following the uprising and the Portuguese massacres in Angola in 1961, “the Portuguese question” (as it was often euphemistically referred to) formed an essential part of the UN agenda. Resolutions calling for African independence and strong measures to force Portugal to stop its colonial wars were introduced to every single General Assembly. With some modifications, the Norwegian position did not substantially change during the 1960s. Norwegian governments, irrespective of their political colours, did not accept resolutions that called for economic sanctions of Portugal, which were regarded to run contrary to the principles of EFTA membership. Therefore, Norway routinely abstained when the Afro-Asian countries introduced resolutions at the UN that were passed with a vast majority. It was also unacceptable to a Norwegian government to support resolutions that implied a NATO responsibility for the colonial wars or called for a military embargo. From a Norwegian point of view, it was essential to block any measures that could make it difficult for Portugal to secure the necessary equipment for the country to fulfil its obligations within the NATO collective security framework. However, in 1968, a changed view on the matter took place when the

²⁰⁰ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 46.

²⁰¹ Helge Pharo «Norge og den tredje verden», 1989: 383-84.

²⁰² Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations – A History*, 2001: 256. For more on this, see: Hallvard Kvale Svenbalrud, «Fundament or ornament: FN som “hjørnestein i norsk utenrikspolitikk”, 1970-2005», 2012; Olav Stokke, *The UN and Development: from aid to cooperation*, 2009.

Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN decided to vote in favour of an Afro-Asian draft resolution to avoid part from the other Nordic countries and Canada. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo had initially found it "very unfortunate" to give its support to the resolution.)²⁰³

During the 1960s, neither the Labour Party government nor the Conservative/Centre coalition (1965–71) raised the Portuguese colonial issue at either the NATO or EFTA council meetings. It was officially stated on many occasions that the UN was the only appropriate forum for this issue. The change of policy at the official level did not take place until the beginning of the 1970s. In Jan Grøndahl's thesis, *Portugal-saken. Norge og Portugals kolonipolitikk 1961-1974*, Grøndahl was concerned with how this "move to the left", especially among the youth, also came to be reflected within the Labour Party while in opposition from 1965 to 1971. Seen in this perspective, the shift towards a more hostile attitude to the Portuguese regime was consistent with a more strongly pronounced anti-colonial and anti-imperialist opinion (as in the case of Vietnam during this period) and mounting criticism of NATO partners on issues involving democracy and human rights. The question of the Portuguese colonial wars combined these two issues. A detailed investigation of the deliberations at the Labour party's annual conferences and of the Party Committee on international affairs, also revealed that the more "conservative" sections of the Labour Party were increasingly worried that the Portuguese colonial policy would increasingly become a liability to the alliance. It was also argued that the frequent attacks on Portugal in the Norwegian mass media would weaken the support enjoyed by the NATO alliance as such. It is also reasonable to assume that the Labour Party wanted to attract younger and more radical voters after losing the general elections in 1969. Therefore, moral challenges, as well as more opportunistic reasoning, became instruments in need of reformulating the party position.²⁰⁴

The breakthrough for a more "activist" position took place in 1970/71. During the general debate on Norwegian foreign policy in parliament in late autumn 1970, the prominent spokesperson from the Labour party urged John Lyng, the Conservative Foreign Minister, to raise the issue of the colonial wars in both NATO and EFTA. In late 1970 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Norwegian Storting unanimously adopted the same position. This debate

²⁰³ Jan E. Grøndahl, *Portugal-saken. Norge og Portugals kolonipolitikk 1961-1974*. Thesis. Oslo: University of Oslo, Department of History, 1997: 36-37; Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 46-47.

²⁰⁴ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 47-48.

coincided with a visit to Norway by the FRELIMO leader, Joaquim Chissano, who publicly criticised the Norwegian position in the UN.²⁰⁵

At February 24 1971, MP Liv Aasen asked the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Svenn Stray, the following question in the Storting: “*Would the Foreign Minister consider the expediency of boycotting NATO’s forthcoming Lisbon Ministerial Council Meeting in order to highlight the Norwegian view on Portugal’s colonial policies in Africa?*”²⁰⁶ This question indicated that a common opinion by the Norwegian authorities and people were indeed negatively loaded towards the Portuguese colonial rule in Africa by 1971. This indication is further supported by Foreign Minister Stray’s answer in the Storting.

Stray answered the question by explaining that the Norwegian discontent with Portuguese colonial policies was widely known in the international landscape, primarily through the Norwegian attitude on the matter uttered in the UN. Furthermore, Stray stressed that for the military alliance of NATO to continue, the member countries, including Portugal, had to follow policies that were acceptable to the rest of the alliance.²⁰⁷

Considering Portuguese colonial policies, Norway was in favour of moving the Ministerial Council meeting to a different country. This suggestion was voted against by the larger share of the NATO-member countries, and in the light of democracy, Norway did not oppose this majority. The Ministerial Council meeting in Lisbon was considered too important to boycott, as matters about the East-West-relationship, the Berlin-situation, and the preparations for the European Conference on Safety were on the agenda. Therefore, the meeting was, in Stray's opinion, due to the circumstances, vital in order to push the Norwegian voice on the matters in question. In a broader view, the issues concerning Norwegian interest and safety weighed heavier than the discontent of the Portuguese colonial policies.²⁰⁸

The very next day, February 25, 1971, the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs delivered a recommendation to the government regarding Norwegian attitude at the

²⁰⁵ Recommendation to the Storting (Innst S.) no. 126 (1970-71), *Innstilling fra utenriks- og konstitusjonskomitéen om forslag fremsatt av Guttorm Hansen på verne av Arbeiderpartiets stortingsgruppe vedrørende Portugals kolonipolitikk*. Oslo: Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 25, 1971. For this thesis, “Innstillinger til Stortinget” has been translated to “Recommendation to the Storting no. xx”.

²⁰⁶ “Vil utenriksministeren vurdere formålstjenligheten av fra norsk side å boikotte NATOs kommende ministerrådsmøte i Lisboa for med det å markere det norske syn på Portugals kolonipolitikk i Afrika?». Debates in the Storting (St. tid.) (1970-71) no. 277. February 24, 1971: 2208.

²⁰⁷ Debate in Parliament, (St. tid. 1970-71) no. 277, February 24, 1971: 2208.

²⁰⁸ Debate in Parliament, (St. tid. 1970-71), no. 277 February 24, 1971: 2208.

forthcoming Ministerial Council meeting in Lisbon: “*The Storting requests that the government raise the issue regarding Portugal’s colonial policies in Africa both at the NATO and EFTA Minister Meetings. Particular emphasis must be placed on influencing the Member States providing military and financial support to Portugal to suspend their assistance.*”²⁰⁹ Furthermore, the Committee referred to the 15th UN General Assembly in 1960. It reminded the Government that on this occasion, the assembly adopted Resolution 1514 that stated the abolition of colonial rule. The resolution argued that forcing foreign dominion over a people was a violation of human rights and, indeed, the UN as an organization. Additionally, it would further hinder the development of worldwide peace and cooperation. The resolution also stressed an input that was particularly important in the case of Mozambique; insufficient political, social, and educational preparations should never be used as an argument to delay independence for the colonies. In the areas which had not yet gained independence from the colonial powers, measures had to be taken to speed up the process of handing the power to the local population, which were to happen without conditions and in compliance with the local people will, regardless of ethnicity or religion.²¹⁰

The Committee also referred to the UN Security Council's resolution of July 31, 1963, which took a critical stance on the Portuguese colonial policies and stated that Portugal's rhetoric and procedures were in opposition with the principles of both the General Assembly and the Security Council. Furthermore, the 23rd and 24th General Assembly of 1968 and 1969 did both condemn the Portuguese colonial policies. In contrast, the latter went as far as to encourage all states, especially the NATO member states, to abstain from, or cease, from giving further aid, both military and financial, that would assist Portugal in continuing its colonial wars.²¹¹

At the Lisbon Ministerial Council Meeting, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Andreas Cappelen (L), ended his general intervention by asking the Portuguese Government “to reconsider its colonial policies”. Since this did not come as a surprise to the other NATO partners, it was hardly commented upon by other speakers. The speech was, however, given broad coverage by

²⁰⁹ [Stortinget anmoder Regjeringen om å ta spørsmålet om Portugals kolonipolitikk i Afrika opp i NATOs og i EFTAs Ministerråd. Særlig vekt må legges på de medlemsland som gir militær og økonomisk støtte til Portugal, til å innstille denne støtten.] Recommendation to the Storting (Innst S.) no. 126 (1970-71): 193.

²¹⁰ Recommendation to the Storting (Innst. S) no. 126, (1970.71): 193.

²¹¹ Recommendation to the Storting (Innst S.) no. 126, (1970-71): 193.

the Norwegian mass media, and internationally, especially among the Afro-Asian countries, where the speech was hailed as a most courageous action.²¹²

The issue of the Mozambican liberation movement enters Norwegian debate

Before 1972, the Norwegian aid assistance to developing countries was concentrated on either a bilateral agreement with a recipient country or through multilateral channels, like the UN. This principle changed during the early 1970s when the Norwegian government increased the amount and range of foreign aid, thereby including national liberation movements. In White paper no. 29 (1971-72), the Norwegian Storting stressed that "based on Norwegian ideals and values, the Norwegian government is committed to providing humanitarian and other economic aid to the people of southern Africa who are fighting for their national liberation."²¹³

The liberation movements of Southern Africa caught the attention of many Norwegians due to the involvement of both NATO and EFTA countries in backing Portuguese colonialism. Also, the public opinion on the matter formed a discontent with the situation on the backdrop of the issue being more visible on the political agenda, a growing flow of information through news channels. Tore Linné Eriksen, argues that in the second half of the 1960s, Frelimo and Mozambique's fight came to symbolize the struggle against racism, colonialism, and social injustice for many Norwegians.²¹⁴ Later on, the modest financial support given to Mozambique proved to be an essential step along the road to more extended cooperation with Frelimo during the following decades. Eriksen also stressed that the case of Frelimo illustrated that the relations between the Norwegian government and the liberation movements – without exception – were initiated by these movements themselves, and often acting in close cooperation with the Norwegian anti-apartheid and solidarity organizations.²¹⁵

Eduardo Mondlane visits Norway

Eduardo Mondlane visited Norway, for the first time, in September 1965, in the context of a Scandinavian tour. Mondlane was elected president of Frelimo at the inaugurating congress in 1962, and as mentioned above, he enjoyed a good international reputation based on his

²¹² Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-197», 2000: 49.

²¹³ White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 9.

²¹⁴ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 42.

²¹⁵ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 42.

American education and work in the UN. During his brief stay in Norway, Mondlane met with representatives for youth organizations, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Crisis Fund for Southern Africa, the Council of Ecumenical, and International Relations of the Norwegian Church (*Mellomkirkelig Råd*). He was also received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a rather junior level.²¹⁶ Oddly enough, the fact that Mondlane was the leader of Frelimo seemed to be unknown in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the report written after his visit, it was uttered that it was not clear which position he held in the movement, but that it seemed as if he was in charge of external affairs and 'did a lot of travelling'.²¹⁷ Also, according to the report, Mondlane 'made a very favourable impression'.²¹⁸

During his visit to Norway, Mondlane appeared on television and gave several interviews with the national press. He did not, however, in contrast to his stay in Sweden, meet with cabinet members, nor was he invited to lectures at the universities. A reason for this might be that Mondlane's visit took place around the final days of the Norwegian election campaign, which led to a change in government from the Labour Party to a coalition of the four 'non-socialist' parties – the Conservative/Centre administration.²¹⁹

After the visit, according to the press reports, Mondlane was far from impressed by the Norwegian stand on Portuguese colonialism, which he suspected was a consequence of both Norway and Portugal being members of the same military alliance. On the other hand, the fact that Norway was a member of NATO, allowed the Norwegian spokesmen to raise the issue from within the military alliance itself.²²⁰

Frelimo took advantage of their situation in means of financial and material support from other nations. Aid came from China in the East to America in the West. However, responding to the inevitable question of the sources of their military equipment, Mondlane made it clear that he

²¹⁶ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 42-43.

²¹⁷ Memo from the meeting with Mondlane, written by Kaare Sandegren for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs September 10, 1965 Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 43.

²¹⁸ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 43.

²¹⁹ The new government, including the Liberal Party, Centre Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Conservative Party under the Prime Minister Per Borten; Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 43.

²²⁰ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 43.

welcomed support from all quarters, but preferred West European arms due to the convenience that their soldiers could use the ammunition confiscated from the Portuguese.²²¹

Throughout Mondlane's visit, the Norwegian authorities and public were informed and updated about the situation unfolding in Mozambique through both domestic and international news channels. Mozambique's struggles on the battlefield and the need for material support for the education and health projects within the country were some of the urgent matters which the Norwegian authority and people had to grasp. Mondlane presented the needs of his country to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and stressed the situation.²²² However, putting Mondlane's requests in perspective, by 1965, the Norwegian foreign aid was still in its earlier stage of establishment, and the total amount of assistance given consisted of only NOK 26.4 million.²²³ Resources such as oil and gas, which have been two essential elements in Norway's road to becoming an international actor in foreign aid, were still yet to be found in 1965.

Mondlane came back to Norway for a second visit in October 1967. This time around, it attracted more extensive attention than the visit two years prior. It has been argued that this could be seen as a reflection of a mounting solidarity campaign in Norway, which was not unrelated to a more general radicalization amongst youth organizations. The public knew more about the situation in the Portuguese colonies and the poorly treated local population through the news in papers and on television.²²⁴ Many youth organizations were eager to hear the leader of Frelimo speak, and had therefore invited Mondlane to address a public meeting – *Møte med den tredje verden* (Encounter with the Third World) – organized by an ad hoc committee. The Committee consisted of fifteen political and cultural youth organization, supported by the Trade Union Council of Oslo. Several MPs were invited to the meeting; however, only one, Finn Gustavsen from the Socialist People's Party, accepted the invitation.²²⁵

During his visit, Mondlane took the opportunity, once again, to raise the issue of material support to the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam, which at the time was already receiving

²²¹ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 43.

²²² Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 43.

²²³ NORAD, «Norsk bistand i tall». Available at: <https://norad.no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/?tab=history>.

²²⁴ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 43-44.

²²⁵ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 44.

support from Sweden.²²⁶ Also, great emphasis was, like in 1965, put on the links between Portuguese membership in NATO and its capacity to conduct warfare in three African territories, and the responsibility of Norway as a NATO and EFTA member, which was not favourably received by the political establishment. Neither was his argument, presented to *Arbeiderbladet* during his visit, that Portugal was encouraged in its colonial wars by the voting patterns of Norway at the United Nations.²²⁷

In retrospect, it can be concluded that the two visits by Eduardo Mondlane in 1965 and 1967, respectively, can be regarded as an essential factor in the opening of a new chapter in the history of the Norwegian support to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.²²⁸ Mondlane's visits might also have opened for further discussions in the Norwegian Storting regarding the situation in Mozambique, which in turn, led to Norwegian assistance to the Mozambique Institute.

Norwegian support to the Mozambique Institute

In 1969, the Mozambique Institute received NOK 200,000 in humanitarian aid from Norway through the Special Committee for Support to Refugees from Southern Africa (*Utvalget for hjelp til flyktninger fra det sørlige Afrika*), following the example set by Sweden four years prior. The amount was earmarked for the school in Bagamoyo and the education of nurses at the hospital in Mtwara. Both the school and the hospital were located in Tanzania but operated by the Institute.²²⁹ This was the first time in the history of Norwegian foreign aid that public funds were granted directly to a liberation movement. Frelimo consistently maintained a critical stance towards the separation between humanitarian assistance and the armed struggle. However, many donor countries, including Norway, saw it as problematic to support the armed conflict with means of financial and material aid. On this backdrop, to receive humanitarian assistance, Frelimo chose to deliberately run the Institute's education and health activities as a separate unit.²³⁰ However, founded in 1962, the Institute was indeed a branch of Frelimo's

²²⁶ Eriksen specified in a footnote that the Mozambique Institute had, for instance, received SEK 150,000 from the Swedish "refugee million" in 1965, and in the 1965-68 period, SEK 1,7 million had been disbursed. Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 44.

²²⁷ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 45.

²²⁸ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 45.

²²⁹ Proposition to the Storting (St. prp.) no. 14. (1971-72) *Om tilleggsbevilgninger på statsbudsjettet for 1971 under kap. 143 og om nedsettelse av bevilgningen under kap. 146*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1. October 1971: 1. In this thesis "Stortingsproposisjoner" is translated to "Proposition to the Storting".

²³⁰ Eriksen, «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 45.

operations. It was also supported by the Ford Foundation with a purpose to aid refugees, especially youth, in their education. Later on, the Institute extended its activities to include health, welfare, and developing projects for Mozambican refugees both within the country and in Tanzania.²³¹

In 1971, the Mozambique Institute requested NOK 700.000 for the purchase of new machines and the operation of the Institute's printing press. Furthermore, the Institute needed contributions to maintain the new hospital building in Mtwara, as well as for maintenance of the educational sector.²³² It was thereby suggested by the Parliamentary Committee of the Foreign Ministry in St. prp. no. 14 (1971-72) that the Storting should grant NOK 700.000 to the Mozambique Institute. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Constitutional Committee joined in on this proposal, and the allocation was adopted in November 1971. Half of the allocation, NOK 350.000, was earmarked for goods purchased in Norway. NOK 175.000 were to be directly transferred to the Mozambique Institute, while the remaining NOK 175.000 were to be transferred after the bill for the directly transferred amount was delivered to the Norwegian Storting.²³³ The decision to increase the aid towards the Mozambique Institute was unanimous, and the recommendations from the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs clearly indicated that the support to the Mozambique Institute went far beyond educational assistance to refugees: "The Committee has also noticed that the Institute has now widened its activities to include the liberated areas of Mozambique. The Committee assumes that the activities in the liberated areas will necessarily be more difficult and more expensive to maintain than outside Mozambique, and will underline the importance of Norwegian support to the Institute being upheld and of the aid being increased under the changed conditions."²³⁴ The actual transfer of NOK 175.000 was delayed for a year due to the internal problems affecting Frelimo in the aftermath of the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in early 1969.²³⁵

In addition to the grant given to the Mozambique Institute, by 1971, NOK 1 900 000 had been granted by the Special Committee for Support to Refugees from Southern Africa in consultation

²³¹ Proposition to the Storting (St. prp.) no. 14 (1971-72): 1.

²³² Proposition to the Storting (St. prp.) no. 14 (1971-72): 1.

²³³ MFA, File 37.1/11. *Støtte til Mozambique-Instituttet i Dar-es-Salaam*. November 16, 1972.

²³⁴ Eriksen «The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960-1975», 2000: 45.

²³⁵ MFA, File 37.1/11 *Disponering av bevilgningen til Mozambique-Instituttet*. October 18, 1972.

with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help refugees in southern Africa in assisting their education.²³⁶

Assistance to liberation movements – priorities and guidelines

When the Norwegian authorities chose to support liberation movements, new challenges and questions quickly arose, such as: Which liberation movements should Norway support? What selection criteria should be used – the perception of their efficiency, public support, their representativeness in terms of the people's desires, their development programs, their ideology, or an assessment of the opponents' degree of stagnation policy and oppression? Should the assistance be provided directly to the organization behind the liberation movement or via private organizations on either international or national level?²³⁷

The intensification of the liberation struggle that took place during the early 1970s – an escalation that partly sprang from a more conscious African policy – gradually made it more desirable to give Norwegian aid a more organized form. Therefore, issues of assisting liberation movements were soon introduced in discussions in the Storting. The discussion was primarily concerned with the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau and an issue that emerged in the debate was the extent to which the individual liberation movement could be said to have actual control over large parts of the area. Another was the exploration of liberation movements in independent countries compared to colonies.²³⁸

In April 1970, the Council of the Directorate for Development Aid (*Direktoratet for Utviklingshjelp*) dealt with the Norwegian development policy guidelines. The issues surrounding aid to the liberation movements came to occupy most of the Council's attention and discussions.

The Council also believes that support for educational measures, etc. for citizens of countries that have not yet reached independence, or refugees from other states (i.e., South Africa) should be given a flexible and appropriate form. The Council believes that Norway should provide

²³⁶ Proposition to the Storting (St. prp.) no. 14 (1971-72): 1.

²³⁷ Jon Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene» in *Forum for Utviklingsstudier*, no. 10, NUPI, 1978: 6.

²³⁸ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 6.

active support for such measures, as has been done in part through Norwegian grants to Frelimo's Mozambique Institute in Tanzania.²³⁹

In White paper no. 29 (1971-72), the Government stated that Norway was prepared to make available both humanitarian and other forms of financial aid to the people located in dependent areas fighting for their national liberation.²⁴⁰ It was emphasized by the government that due to limited resources, it was necessary to choose an area and of which liberation movements to support within the region.²⁴¹ As the principle of concentration was already established in the Norwegian aid policies, the choice of the region was more or less a given due to the existing relations in South-East Africa.²⁴² However, with respect, the government considered it appropriate to rely on an organization within the region that was recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Therefore, the decision provided by the government, based itself on a visit by a delegation from the OAU in October 1971, where it was agreed that OAU was to keep the Norwegian authorities oriented on which liberation organizations they recommended that Norway should support.²⁴³

In the selected areas, the government placed crucial emphasis on the OAU's progress plan for the liberation of southern Africa. According to this progress plan, the liberation of the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique was the first step on this road. Only when these areas had achieved their independence, should efforts be concentrated on Rhodesia, then on Namibia and finally on South Africa. Concerning the channelling of aid – directly to the individual liberation movement or via international organizations such as the UN and the OAU – it was found that this matter should be considered in each case.²⁴⁴

Aid to Mozambique was included in the Directorate of Development Aid's annual report from 1973, under the section of assistance to liberation movements in Africa. In 1973, NOK 5 million was allocated for humanitarian and other forms of financial assistance to the people of southern Africa who fought for their national liberation. Negotiations were made with PAIGC, FRELIMO and MPLA to assist each of these organisations with NOK 1.5 million. Also, approximately NOK 225,000 was donated to cover expenses in connection with an international

²³⁹ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 7.

²⁴⁰ White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 9.

²⁴¹ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 7.

²⁴² White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 9.

²⁴³ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 7.

²⁴⁴ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 8.

expert conference on support for victims of colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa organised in Oslo by the UN in collaboration with the OAU.²⁴⁵ In 1974, the aid for humanitarian and other forms for financial assistance to the people of southern Africa who fought for their national liberation increased from NOK 5 million to 12 million. Following the guidelines, support via the liberation movements was provided in the form of goods and assistance or support for civilian buildings such as health centres and schools. Additionally, it was decided that the assistance should continue even after the area in question became independent.²⁴⁶ Frelimo received goods and assistance for approximately NOK 3.5 million, especially for the sectors of agriculture, health care and transport. The organisation also received NOK 400,000 for educational purposes.²⁴⁷ Allocations for humanitarian aid and other forms of assistance to people in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau who fought for national liberation increased to NOK 15 million in 1975.²⁴⁸

It was emphasized that all support in the form of weapons or the financing of armed struggle had to fall outside the scope of any Norwegian aid when it came to assistance to the population of countries or areas under foreign control. In this connection, reference was made to the strict guidelines which, based on the Storting's decision, were designed for Norwegian exports of weapons and military equipment. The government also emphasized that the various liberation movements had made no requests for such assistance.²⁴⁹

In Recommendation to the Storting no. 135 (1972-73), it was uttered by the Committee of Foreign Affairs that financial support for movements operating in dependent areas and fighting for national liberation should continue. The Committee further advocated that this assistance should be extended in line with recommendations from competent UN bodies. However, the Committee found it difficult to draw up specific guidelines for direct Norwegian aid to national liberation movements. Therefore, in the opinion of the Committee, such assistance should be based on a particular assessment in each case. The guidelines set out in White paper no. 29

²⁴⁵ White paper no. 34 (1973-74), *Årsmelding og regnskap for Direktoratet for utviklingshjelp for 1973*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. March 8, 1974: 26.

²⁴⁶ White paper no. 55 (1974-75). *Årsmelding og regnskap for Direktoratet for utviklingshjelp for 1974*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. March 14, 1975: 27.

²⁴⁷ White paper no. 55, 1975: 27-8.

²⁴⁸ White paper no. 63 (1975-76). *Årsmelding og regnskap for Direktoratet for utviklingshjelp for 1975*. March 26, 1976: 30.

²⁴⁹ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 8.

(1971-72) were unanimously adopted by the Storting, and have subsequently been the basis for the benefit of Norwegian aid to the liberation movements in southern Africa.²⁵⁰

A vital element of the debate on Norwegian assistance to the liberation movements in southern Africa was the exploration of dependent and independent areas. These were internationally recognised states with a repressed population that fought for equal rights and majority rule. In this context, dependent areas were areas that had not been allowed to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence.²⁵¹ As some of the former African colonies became independent in the mid-1970s, these situations had to be handled delicately due to the history of oppression.

The countries, which have only recently gained independence from a former colonial power, will generally respond particularly strongly to outside attempts which they regard as interference in the internal affairs.²⁵²

When it came to the political and legal basis for Norwegian support for the liberation movements, this distinction had been the subject of debate, to a considerable extent, along clear political divides. The issue of support for national and social movements in dependent areas in southern Africa had its roots in the UN Charter and several resolutions passed by the General Assembly and the Security Council.²⁵³ As mentioned in chapter two, concerning the then Portuguese colonial areas of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, as well as Namibia and Rhodesia, the Norwegian government emphasized in White paper no. 29 (1971-72), the UN and the UN Member States had an exclusive responsibility. These were dependent areas that had not yet been granted the opportunity to exercise self-determination and achieve independence in accordance with the UN Charter and the various resolutions. The 1972 guidelines were tailor-made for the then Portuguese colonies that gained their independence in 1975.²⁵⁴

²⁵⁰ Recommendation to the Storting no. 135 (1972-73), *Innstilling fra utenriks- og kontitusjonskomitéen om enkelte hovedspørsmål vedrørende Norges samarbeid med utviklingslandene. (St. meld. nr 29 for 1971-72)*. Oslo: The Foreign Affairs and Commission Committee, January 25, 1973.

²⁵¹ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 9.

²⁵² White paper no. 93 (1976-77): 13.

²⁵³ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 9.

²⁵⁴ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 9-10.

Attitude towards assistance to liberation movements

In the 1970s, the practice of direct assistance to liberation movements in southern Africa was a new phenomenon within the landscape of Norwegian foreign aid. Before, foreign aid had been an area of more or less consensus in the political landscape. This new practice, however, was about to change that. From the political left-wing, it was argued that Norway did not give enough assistance to liberation movements in southern Africa. From the opposite political wing, it was uttered a dissatisfaction with the assisting of liberation movements altogether. Arguments from the right-wing stated that by giving aid to liberation movements, one also supported Communism, terrorism, and extremism.²⁵⁵

In 1971, *Fellesrådet for det sørlige Afrika*²⁵⁶ made two demands towards the Norwegian government: (1) In NATO, Norway had to use its veto to stop the support of arms and military supplies from NATO to Portugal, and (2) Norway had to condemn all military and economic assistance to Portugal formally.²⁵⁷

According to an interview survey from 1977 on Norwegian's attitude to development aid compiled by *Statistisk Sentralbyrå*, 40 per cent were favourable to Norway providing development assistance to areas in southern Africa where armed liberation movements had taken power. 27 per cent of those polled were against, while 14 per cent answered that their support would depend on the policies of the liberation movements and the area in question. Divided by parties, the survey showed that of the Labour Party voters, 40 per cent were for and 26 per cent against; for the Conservative Party, 35 per cent were for, and 34 against; The Christian Democratic Party 44 per cent were for and 17 against; the Centre Party 38 per cent for and 29 against; the Socialist Left Party 92 per cent for and 2 against; and the Liberal Party 49 per cent for and 17 against.²⁵⁸ The percentage shows that disagreements did not only exist between the political parties, but also within them. This is especially evident in the case of the

²⁵⁵ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 2.

²⁵⁶ *Fellesrådet for det sørlige Afrika* consisted of six political youth organizations: *Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking*, *Kristelig Folkepartis Ungdom*, *Kommunistiske Ungdom*, *Norges Unge Venstre*, *Senterungdommens Landsforbund* og *Sosialistisk Folkepartis Ungdom*.

²⁵⁷ Fellesrådet for det sørlige Afrika, «Portugal og NATO, Nr. 1» in *Studie-hefter om det sørlige Afrika*. Oslo, April 2, 1981: 2.

²⁵⁸ The remaining persantage in each case answered that they did not have a clear opinion on this matter. Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 2.

Conservative Party where the divide is almost equally parted between those who were for, against and neutral.

The background to this disagreement regarding assistance to the liberation movements can partly be seen as a conflict between the *development objective* and the *peace objective*. For those who believed that the goal was to promote development and growth in the developing countries, it seemed logical to support efforts to remove significant barriers for development. This included support for liberation movements that aimed to overthrow regimes that sought to preserve a status quo oriented social and economic structure, and at the same time, had a program of development, as well as the will and ability to implement this program. From the development objective, it was also emphasized that the liberation movements were forced into armed struggle because of the repression and institutionalised violence in the areas controlled by the colonial powers. In this context, material and moral support for the liberation commanders were regarded as essential to shorten the liberation struggle and to provide peace and stability in the area more efficiently. On the other hand, supporters of the peace objective felt that such support was conflicting with the already established principle of interpersonal relations, such as the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Direct support to liberation movements would thus conflict with Norway's priority or endeavour to find peaceful solutions to conflicts in the international community.²⁵⁹

It was clear that the Norwegian authorities prioritised the development objective and focused on direct support to the liberation movements and organisations. UN Resolution 1512 of 1960 played particular importance behind this attitude. The resolutions contained the so-called Declaration of Colonial Abolition, and stated that undermining a people's sovereignty by imposing foreign rule, violated human rights, the UN Charter, and hindered the development of peace and cooperation in the world. The declaration required that immediate action had to be taken in all areas which had yet not reached independence, which had to happen without reservations and conditions following the peoples freely expressed will and desire, and without making any further differences based on ethnicity or religion. The resolution involved legitimizing support for liberation movements that emphasised decolonisation or elimination of racial minority regimes in their political program. Following this declaration, the General Assembly passed several resolutions urging the UN Member States to provide moral and

²⁵⁹ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 3.

material support to the peoples and the liberation movements in the respective areas. Humanitarian aid to national and social movements in colonies and the dependent regions were given in the same category as humanitarian aid to other groups, whether the need for assistance was due to natural disasters, war or other conflicts and challenges. Internationally, it had to be seen as a commonly accepted obligation that the outside world would, on humanitarian grounds, provide various types of assistance where the aim of which was to help reduce distress and human suffering. Humanitarian aid to national and social movements coincided with the general view of the Norwegian authorities in the 1970s when it came to the development of international humanitarian law. Against this background, it seemed clear that aid for humanitarian purposes in a broad sense – such as medicine, health, care, clothing, food, transport, education, etc. – was in line with UN commitments and the principle view on humanitarian relief work.²⁶⁰

Within this context, the Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa were in a unique position due to the late liberation from the colonial powers. Therefore, the non-intervention principle, which might have precluded support for liberation movements, did not seem to have swayed its influence. However, the motives for Norwegian assistance to liberation movements in southern Africa was not based on a purely moral and humanitarian nature. The desire to avoid a conflict in Southern Africa, which would affect the tension between East and West, was crucial when assessing direct Norwegian support for the liberation movements.²⁶¹ To put this in perspective, the speech given by Prime Minister Odvar Nordli on this matter is presented below:

As African states now shake off the colonial era's last ties, it is an important task to help replace the hatred of the colonial era with understanding and cooperation. This is a commitment for the entire Western world. One must work out from African reality if one hopes to succeed in this task. We can see events and methods in the liberation struggle in Africa, which we regret. With that, it is important to be aware that Africa's struggle has been about freedom and independence. There has *not* been a struggle between democracy and Communism. The ideological battle between democracy and Communism originated in countries *outside* the African continent. Should the Western world choose to leave it to the communist countries to stand by the liberation movements – because they do not meet our demands for democracy – the result would already be given. For large groups of Africans, Western democracies still represent economic activity during the colonial era. It is this image of the Western world that must now be removed. It is the West itself that must ensure that the newly independent African states are not dominated by

²⁶⁰ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 4.

²⁶¹ Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 4-5.

communist powers in other parts of the world. This must happen through sensible behaviour. The road to peace and stability in Africa does not seem easy. The liberation struggle, and the building of the new states in Africa, must be evaluated based on Africans' background – historically and culturally. More important than exporting *our* ideals and principles to Africa, is to listen to the opinion of the large African people's groups on how they will shape their future.²⁶²

Political tensions concerning Mozambique as a main partner country

Kåre Willoch, leader of the Conservative party, was sceptical to the evaluation of Mozambique as a new main partner country. Willoch pointed out that he had not had the opportunity to study the Mozambican policies and economy at large, but from what he did know, he argued that he would evaluate Mozambique's situation with little optimism in regard to the guidelines and criteria set for Norwegian partnerships of development cooperation. In his appeal, Willoch does not go further into these guidelines in regard to Mozambique, but continues to talk of the Conservative party's view on development aid in general, which reflected the Norwegian principles of development aid in general, with an emphasis on Norwegian businesses, presented in chapter two of this thesis.²⁶³ Finn Gustavsen, member of the Socialist Left Party, on the other hand requested a more extensive amount of assistance to Mozambique, and argued that Willoch would study and judge a country which had barely had the opportunity to establish a government and to build a framework after the independence.²⁶⁴ Willoch responded by putting an emphasis on human rights, and questioned the Mozambican government's handling of human rights issues, a statement which Gustavsen reacted to in disagreement. Once again, Gustavsen defended Mozambique with the argument of the state's newly independence, and the lack of an established framework for effective policies as a whole. Human rights issues were not the main priority as the state needed administration and the means to fulfil the needs of the people as the groundwork for further policy development.²⁶⁵

²⁶² Bech, «Norsk bistand til frigjøringsbevegelsene», 1978: 5-6; Oddvar Nordli's speech at Vestfold Arbeiderparti, March 20, 1976.

²⁶³ Debates in the Storting (St. tid. Bind 7b, s. 1565-3022) (1975-76), 1) *Norges økonomiske samkvem med utviklingslandene*. 2) *Riksrev. Antegnelser til statsregnsk. For 1974 vedk. Utenriksdep.* Oslo: Centraltrykkeriet. March, 23, 1976: 2744.

²⁶⁴ Debates in the Storting (St. tid.) Bind 7b (1975-76): 2753-54.

²⁶⁵ Debates in the Storting (St. tid.) Bind 7b (1975-76): 2755.

Gustavsen further argued that the causes of development in many poor countries were overwhelming. Developing countries inherited, to various extents, the colonial pattern and were more or less bound by relations with the same foreign economic interests that previously dominated. New Western investments on a commercial basis and according to the technological pattern of the industrialised countries contributed and thus created a social structure that served a small number of the broad strata of the population.²⁶⁶

Erik Gjems-Onstad, member of the Anders Lange's Party (now the Progress Party) raised concerns of the policies in the South-East African countries, including already, or soon to be, main partner countries, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique. Gjems-Onstad asked Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund how Norway could support dictatorships, who did not allow democratic elections and severely oppressed the opposition. Also, how could Norway support governments who initiated guerrilla warfare. Foreign Minister Frydenlund responded with a defuse answer where he stated that "there are very clear rules and guidelines for Norwegian aid to liberation movements, which have been adopted by the Storting, and which the Government adheres to, and they assume that the aid should be of humanitarian nature. We do not provide aid used in warfare".²⁶⁷

Sigbjørn Johnsen, member of the Labour Party, responded to the debate by putting the question of Mozambique as a main partner country in the context of the UN. Johnsen uttered that;

Some speakers have argued in the today's debate that the government should reassess its support to Mozambique. In light of the UN Security Council's decision, on March 17 this year, to provide financial assistance to reduce the loss Mozambique has suffered by following the UN sanctions decision against Rhodesia, I find such an attitude as these speakers have, very strange.²⁶⁸

In this debate, there is a clear division of those who supported the assistance to Mozambique, and those who were more critical. Both the Socialist Left Party and the Labour Party requested

²⁶⁶ Debates in the Storting (St. tid.) Bind 7b (1975-76): 2754.

²⁶⁷ [Det eksisterer meget klare regler og retningslinjer for norsk hjelp til frigjøringsbevegelser, som er vedtatt av Stortinget, og som Regjeringen holder seg til, og de går ut på at hjelpen skal være av humanitær art. Vi gir ikke hjelp til krigføring.] Debates in the Storting (St. tid.) Bind 7b (1975-76): 2761.

²⁶⁸ [Enkelte talere har i debatten i dag tatt til orde for at Regjeringen bør revurdere støtten til Mosambik. I lys av det vedtak FNs sikkerhetsråd fattet 17. mars i år om å yte økonomisk hjelp for å redusere det tap dette landet har lidt ved å følge opp FNs sanksjonsvedtak mot Rhodesia, finner jeg en slik holdning som disse talerne har hatt, svært merkelig.] Debates in the Storting (St. tid.) Bind 7b (1975-76): 2784.

a larger amount of assistance to the country and argued that the judgement of a newly independent state could not be too critical, while the Conservative Party and Anders Lange's Party had a difficult time accepting the terms of the aid to Mozambique, especially concerning the guidelines and criteria set for Norwegian main partners.

Joint Nordic assistance to Mozambique

The idea of joint Nordic assistance towards Mozambique started to take form in the political discourse of foreign aid in 1975. As presented above, Sweden began to assist Mozambique through the Mozambique Institute during the late 1960s, an example soon followed by the other Nordic countries. Because all the Nordic countries gave aid to Mozambique in the 1970s, a Nordic board (*Fellesnordiske Bistandsprosjekt*) started to evaluate the possibilities of collaborating the Nordic assistance to the country. Shortly afterwards, a delegation that represented the Nordic countries travelled to Mozambique to map out the needs of the country and the Mozambican government's policies and plan for development.²⁶⁹ In October 1975, the board met for further discussions on the matter. At this point, a considerable political will to expand the Nordic cooperation within the Nordic countries was developing at high speed. Therefore, the next step was to consider the Mozambican attitude on the matter. It was decided that the Nordic governments would expediently bring the subject up to the government of Mozambique.²⁷⁰

The idea of a collaborated Nordic assistance indicated that all Nordic transfers to Mozambique, both goods and financial, would form a joint unit, which, in turn, meant that only one of the Nordic countries would be responsible for this process.²⁷¹ In the context of joint Nordic aid, it was important for the Norwegian government that, even though SIDA was chosen as the administrative organ of the assistance, Norway's contributions should be of Norwegian character simultaneously as being part of a Nordic fronted aid.²⁷² This led to rising problems concerning a Swedish administrative process, and that the initiative and "goodwill" from Norway would diminish, and that Mozambique would perceive the aid as mainly Swedish.²⁷³

²⁶⁹ MFA, File 313, *NORAD, Samordning av de nordiske lands bistand til Mocambique*, August 21, 1975.

²⁷⁰ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Møte i Styret for nordisk bistandsprosjekt*, October 2, 1975.

²⁷¹ MFA, File 37.3/13, *NORAD, Samordning av de nordiske lands bistand til Mocambique*, August 21, 1975.

²⁷² MFA, File 37.3/13, *Møte i Styret for nordisk bistandsprosjekt*, October 2, 1975.

²⁷³ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Samordning av de nordiske lands bistand til Mocambique*, September 12, 1975.

Concerns about a weakening relationship between Norway and Mozambique were also expressed by Frelimo's vice president, Marcelino dos Santos, to Per Thee Nævdal, the Norwegian ambassador in Tanzania (as there was not yet a Norwegian ambassador stationed in Mozambique). Dos Santos was sceptical of joint Nordic assistance due to the political interest of Frelimo to keep their friends in the West. A Nordic collaboration, in Dos Santos' view, would strengthen Mozambique and Frelimo's relationship towards Sweden, and simultaneously weaken their relationship with the other Nordic countries.²⁷⁴ As for Sweden, it was also politically beneficial to keep a bilateral relation due to the bond between the two countries, and Mozambique's importance to Swedish aid policies, especially for the political left-wing.²⁷⁵ Due to these circumstances, Sweden was initially sceptical of Nordic collaboration. This was a concern for the other Nordic countries because the collaboration of aid could not take place without Sweden, due to their long experiences and significant contributions to the region of South-East Africa.²⁷⁶

By November 10, 1975, Norway, Denmark, and Finland all agreed to further pursue joint Nordic assistance to Mozambique. The Swedish authorities, however, remained somewhat sceptical.²⁷⁷ In 1975, Norway gave SEK 5.5 million in aid to Mozambique, and Denmark donated SEK 7,5 million, while Sweden aided the country with SEK 32,5 million.²⁷⁸ Furthermore, in 1976, the Swedish government planned to increase its aid to Mozambique with SEK 38 million, making the total Swedish assistance to Mozambique SEK 70 million in 1976. Due to the significant Swedish contributions, the Swedish Foreign Ministry feared that the volume of Swedish aid would absorb the whole collaboration. Additionally, how a Nordic collaboration of assistance from the outside would look, especially for other developing countries receiving support, had to be discussed carefully. It would be unfortunate if other developing countries saw this as an initiative that would diminish their relationship with the Nordic countries due to the size and effort put into the joint Nordic assistance to Mozambique compared to other countries.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁴ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Samtale med Dos Santos – Frelimos vice-president*. September 19, 1975.

²⁷⁵ MFA, File 37.3/13. *Mocambique – felles nordisk bistand*. November 12, 1975.

²⁷⁶ MFA, File 37.3/13. *Bistand til Mocambique – Spørsmålet om felles-nordisk samarbeid. Sveriges holdning*. November 25, 1975.

²⁷⁷ MFA, File 37.3/13. *Mozambique – Felles Nordisk bistand*. November 10, 1975.

²⁷⁸ MFA, File 37.3/13. *Förslag rörande samnordiskt samarbidsprogram med Mocambique*. September 24, 1975.

²⁷⁹ MFA, File 37.3/13. *Mocambique – Felles nordisk bistand*. November 12, 1975; Recommendation to the Storting (Innst. S.) no. 41 (1976-77) *Innstilling fra utenriks- og konstitusjonskomitéen om tilleggsbevilgninger på statsbudjettet for 1976 under kap. 165, Bilateral bistand, post 86, Tilskudd til Mocambique, kan overføres (St. prp. nr. 191 for 1975-76)*. Oslo: The Foreign Affairs and Commission Committee. October 27, 1976.

Nordic cooperation in the field of development assistance took two primary forms; (1) as concrete project cooperation, and (2) as the coordination and exchange of opinion and experiences with the aim of Nordic cooperation in international organizations and maximizing the efficiency of the ongoing aid assistance. Nordic cooperation on projects in developing countries started in 1962 and was found mainly in Kenya and Tanzania. The total Norwegian funding for such Nordic projects amounted, in 1975, at approximately 1 per cent of the Norwegian aid budget. The Nordic projects were not particularly popular, because such joint projects were no longer considered appropriate. This form of aid started to evolve at a time when the individual countries had little experience and small allocations in the area, therefore it was beneficial for all parties to pool resources. By 1975, these conditions had changed, and such joint projects lead to multiple administrative challenges for both donor and recipient countries. Therefore, it was argued in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry that the starting point for Nordic development collaboration was to design the system so that it would serve the interests of the developing country, in this case, Mozambique, at all times.²⁸⁰ On this backdrop, it was assumed by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry that Nordic cooperation in the years ahead would concentrate upon the second form, presented above, namely exchange of experiences and coordination of votes in international forums. Increased exchange of expertise could be an essential contribution to the individualization of the Nordic countries' efforts, and continued concerted conduct internationally could emphasize the Nordic views in the landscape of international development aid.²⁸¹

The Norwegian Department for International Economics and Social Development raised some questions about the joint Nordic aid to Mozambique, which led to the debate on the forms of such cooperation. Norwegian principle views remained that a collective Nordic representation in Mozambique could represent an appropriate and effective form of Nordic cooperation. On the other hand, Norwegian authorities were negative to the idea of a purely Swedish-led aid representation, and one could not see that a joint Nordic single project represented any fruitful alternative. The Department argued that the crucial aspect of this matter had to be Mozambique's priorities. However, at this point, the Mozambican government had still not been considered on the topic. The Department further argued that from a Norwegian point of view, the best solution would be to request opinion and preference from Mozambique and pursue the

²⁸⁰ MFA, File 37.3/13. *Nordisk bistandssamarbeid og bistand til Mozambique*. November 20 1975.

²⁸¹ MFA, File 37.3/13. *Nordisk bistandssamarbeid og bistand til Mozambique*. 20. November 1975.

work based on a mutual understanding.²⁸² Before the Nordic board would meet again to discuss the matter further, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summarized the situation:

Both Finland and Denmark were favourable to joint Nordic assistance in Mozambique. Sweden viewed the collaboration as an obstacle for their policies, while Norway fears that their contributions will become anonymous within the collective unit.²⁸³

At a Nordic board meeting on December 9, 1975, Sweden, once again, uttered its negative view of joint Nordic aid assistance. Both Finland and Denmark did not hide their disappointment in the Swedish attitude and argued that Sweden was too concerned with self-interest and that this would, in the long run, lead to colder Nordic relations. However, both countries were still favourable to joint Nordic assistance, with or without Sweden.²⁸⁴

The Swedish Minister of International Development, Gertrud Sigurdson, uttered discontent about the public discussion of joint Nordic assistance to Mozambique, regarding the fact that the Mozambican government had not yet been consulted on the matter. Sigurdson further stated: “All of us Nordic countries agree on the importance of significant assistance to Mozambique. The issue we find ourselves debating about is which form this assistance should take”.²⁸⁵

From the Swedish perspective, joint Nordic assistance could be accepted if it took the form of collective financial and administrative aid to a specific project in the interest of the Mozambican government, as it was not in Swedish interest to join all Nordic assistance into one collective unit. Sigurdson argued that this stance did not fail the other Nordic countries, rather the opposite. In contrast, it coordinated with the Oslo-convention of 1968 which were still applicable.²⁸⁶ The agreement concluding the Oslo-convention was that the Nordic countries would be able to cooperate on specific development projects, simultaneously as further the bilateral cooperation with developing countries.

²⁸² MFA, File 37.3/13. *Nordisk bistandssamarbeid og bistand til Mozambique*. November 20 1975.

²⁸³ MFA, File 37.3/13. *Nordisk samarbeid om bistands til Mozambique. En oversikt*. November 20 1975.

²⁸⁴ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Sammendrag av debatten om felles nordisk bistand til Mocambique*. December 9, 1975.

²⁸⁵ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Svenskene svigter ikke de øvrige nordiske land i utviklings-samarbejdet*. December 12, 1975.

²⁸⁶ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Svenskene svigter ikke de øvrige nordiske lande i utviklings-samarbejdet*. December 12, 1975.

SIDA was quick to send a delegation to Mozambique to evaluate the country as a possible receiver of joint Nordic assistance. During this visit, the Mozambican government gave significant priority to the matter of a dam plant project, which would cost approximately 250-300 million Swedish kroners. This was a project in which the Mozambican government welcomed joint Nordic assistance.²⁸⁷ Both Norway and Sweden wanted to continue their bilateral aid assistance with Mozambique simultaneously as they cooperated with the rest of the Nordic countries on collective assistance towards the dam plant project. For Norway, it was still to be decided whether Mozambique should become a main partner of development cooperation. However, this decision had yet to wait until after White paper no. 94, *Om Norges økonomiske samkvem med utviklingslandene* (1975), was fully processed by the Storting.²⁸⁸

With the information given by the delegation (SPES) sent to evaluate the possibility of joint Nordic assistance to Mozambique, the Nordic board recommended numerous actions that the Nordic governments should approve. Norwegian authorities agreed on the recommendations made by the Nordic board in November 1976. It was also officially concluded that the best solution was to have SIDA as the acting executive on behalf of the Nordic countries.²⁸⁹

During the following months, SIDA, in cooperation with the Mozambican government, FAO, and other representatives from the Nordic countries, completed general facilitation of the program based on the information given by professionals and the further recommendations by the Nordic board. A final draft was presented for the Nordic board on May 2, 1977, where it was decided that:

- Nordic assistance to the agricultural sector in Mozambique should reach \$50 million between 1978 and 1980. Assistance to the agricultural sector would be considered as program aid and would, therefore, be regulated as stated in the Oslo convention of 1968.
- To make SIDA the executive organ of the aid, labouing all assistance as Nordic aid.
- The detailed business plans and budgets for the actions drawn by the Ministry of Agriculture are discussed during a review twice a year between Mozambique's authorities and SIDA.

²⁸⁷ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Spørsmålet om fellesnordisk bistand til Mocambique*. February 25, 1976.

²⁸⁸ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Spørsmålet om fellesnordisk bistand til Mocambique*. February 25, 1976

²⁸⁹ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Mozambique – Finansiell og faglig bistand til landbrukssektoren, Nordiske program*. November 10, 1976.

- The Nordic board determines the Nordic assistance on the recommendations of the Mozambican government.²⁹⁰

Furthermore, the assistance was distributed between the Nordic countries as the following²⁹¹:

Denmark	23.42%
Finland	15.24%
Island	0.74%
Norway	15.99%
<u>Sweden</u>	<u>44.61%</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>100%</u>

Table 5: “Joint assistance to Mozambique distributed between the Nordic countries”

Why Mozambique?

At the Economic and Social Council meeting in Geneva on July 27, 1977, the issues in Mozambique were on the agenda, and the Nordic countries were to present their joint assistance. The introduction of the Nordic statement in the UN by the Norwegian representative was uttered as:

The Nordic countries are major contributors to the UN and other multilateral programmes which assist the independent countries of southern Africa. The Nordic countries have also expanded substantially their bilateral programmes of development assistance to the front-line states bordering South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Our aim is inter alia to assist these countries in breaking their traditional dependence on the economic power of the white racist minority regimes in the region. We also want to contribute to the building of societies with social and economic justice.²⁹²

It was further uttered that the Nordic countries had followed the developments in Mozambique closely during the past years. When the state decided to close its borders with Rhodesia and impose mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia following Security Council resolution

²⁹⁰ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Mosambik – Finansiell og faglig bistand til landbrukssektoren, 1977. Nordisk program.* June 13, 1977.

²⁹¹ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Mosambik – Finansiell og faglig bistand til landbrukssektoren, 1977. Nordisk program.* June 13, 1977.

²⁹² MFA, File 37.3/13, *Agenda Item 6: Assistance to Mozambique. Statement by the Norwegian representative, in plenary, on behalf of the delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.* July 27, 1977.

253 (1968), it was an act of solidarity incurring great sacrifices. It was argued that the action was, in fact, detrimental to the economy of the newly independent state. The action taken by the government of Mozambique was considered by the Nordic countries to be an essential contribution towards the isolation of the illegal Smith regime. However, it was a long-held view by the Nordic countries that it was the joint responsibility of the world community to end the vestiges of colonialism and minority regimes, practising racial discrimination. The Nordic countries, therefore, welcomed the Security Council's resolution 386 (1976), calling for the financial, material, and technical assistance to Mozambique.²⁹³

Although the international community responded positively to the appeal, the report of the second review mission to Mozambique, contained in document A/32/96, stated that the assistance offered so far in the context of sanctions amounts to 102 million dollars. In contrast, the first review mission to Mozambique estimated that the country would require 175-200 million dollars annually to carry out its healthy development. Hence, the assistance offered by 1977 was far below what was needed for healthy growth. The report further states that the foreign aid offered fell far short of what was needed, particularly in the light of setbacks suffered by the Mozambican economy, among other things from the challenges opposed by nature and from the influx of refugees from Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly, increased grants of financial assistance were urgently needed, as well as aid in carrying out several emergency and high priority development projects.²⁹⁴

The bold stand taken by Mozambique also made it the target of repeated acts of aggression by the illegal Smith regime, which caused extensive damage to the country's economic and social infrastructure. On the request of the Mozambican government, the Security Council started to discuss the acts of aggression carried out by the Smith regime against the People's Republic of Mozambique. The Mozambican Minister of Development and Economic Planning, Marcelino dos Santos, gave the Council a detailed account of the substantial damage caused by the Rhodesian aggression and appealed to the international community to pursue its efforts to make available the financial, material and technical aid, as called for in Security Council resolution 386 (1976), adopted on March 17, 1976. An appeal was also made for the grant of social

²⁹³ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Agenda Item 6: Assistance to Mozambique. Statement by the Norwegian representative, in plenary, on behalf of the delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.* July 27, 1977.

²⁹⁴ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Agenda Item 6: Assistance to Mozambique. Statement by the Norwegian representative, in plenary, on behalf of the delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.* July 27, 1977.

assistance for reconstructing areas devastated by the aggression. The request was later reflected in the unanimous adoption by the Council on June 30 of resolution 411 (1977).²⁹⁵

In the speech given by the Nordic countries in the UN on July 27, 1977, it was also uttered that the Nordic governments had started their bilateral relations with Mozambique even before the country's independence. Later on, these bilateral relations and programs expanded substantially to multilateral assistance programs supplemented by considerable Nordic contributions. Nordic assistance took part in raising food production through approximately 28 agricultural projects that were financed by, among others, the joint efforts of the Nordic governments.²⁹⁶ The Norwegian representative, speaking on behalf of the Nordic governments, last words to the UN during the meeting of July 27, 1977, was:

In concluding we would like to express the hope that the actions taken by the international community in support of Mozambique to strengthen her independence and to protect her freedom also will be instrumental in putting an end to colonial domination and institutionalized racism.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Agenda Item 6: Assistance to Mozambique. Statement by the Norwegian representative, in plenary, on behalf of the delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.* July 27 1977.

²⁹⁶ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Agenda Item 6: Assistance to Mozambique. Statement by the Norwegian representative, in plenary, on behalf of the delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.* July 27 1977.

²⁹⁷ MFA, File 37.3/13, *Agenda Item 6: Assistance to Mozambique. Statement by the Norwegian representative, in plenary, on behalf of the delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.* July 27 1977.

CHAPTER FOUR: NORWAY AND SRI LANKA – AN ATTEMPT TO BREAK DEPENDENCY

Norwegian bilateral assistance to Sri Lanka started with the first allocation to the NGO implemented Cey-Nor Development Project. Subsequent project assistance up to and including 1976 was limited to this project. Also, a few scholarships were provided, and an expert in the training of marine merchant cadets was financed. The total annual allocations for this period were small, as they did not exceed one million Norwegian Crowns (NOK) for any of these years. However, during this period, several requests were made by Sri Lankan authorities for assistance within various fields – mainly fisheries, shipping and supply of fertiliser.²⁹⁸ As mentioned in Chapter two, Sri Lanka was one in the pool of countries most severely affected by the 1973 oil crisis, which led to both political and economic challenges for the country.

The political situation in Sri Lanka in the 1970s

In contrast to Mozambique, Sri Lanka did not experience any revolutionary elements in the transfer of power after independence in 1948. Sri Lanka had enjoyed a large degree of internal self-government, which since 1931, had been based on a State Council elected by universal suffrage. In this respect, Sri Lanka was unique throughout the contemporary colonial world.²⁹⁹ The Country study and Norwegian Aid Review of Sri Lanka published by the University of Bergen in 1987 stated that:

Sri Lanka, which was considered a developing country, has an extraordinarily good history of public provision of social welfare. Income has been shared relatively equally. Public programmes for distributing health care, education and subsidised food and state land has fairly successfully provided 'basic needs' for most of the population.³⁰⁰

Furthermore, following the early establishment of parliamentary democracy in 1931, the population constituted a significant political force to which politicians had to relate. From the

²⁹⁸ Gunnar Sørbo, *Sri Lanka Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review*, 1987: 85.

²⁹⁹ James Jupp, *Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy*. London: Frank Cass, 1978: 1.

³⁰⁰ Sørbo, *Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review*. 1987: 79.

independence, the Sri Lankan public administration system, while increasingly politicised, remained relatively efficient and effective.³⁰¹ However, the 1970s brought challenges that were impossible to withstand alone.

In 1970 the political system was divided into two blocks, one mildly reformist and the other socialist. This led to economic issues becoming increasingly important in the political landscape.³⁰² Sirimavo Bandaranaike's electoral victory in 1970 fully justified the decision taken six years before to forge a permanent alliance between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the Samasamajists and the Communists. Never before had there been so many officially committed Marxists in parliament. Also, a strong contingent of socialists and admirers of Russia and China were found within the governing party. The new government strengthened the friendly ties with China which had existed since 1953 and began to look towards Eastern Europe for technical assistance. In general, the political atmosphere was more sympathetic to the Communist world than previously, even though the reality of Sri Lanka's trading position made it very much dependent on the Western capitalist system.³⁰³

This political coalition remained until 1977 under the provision of the new Constitution which made the electoral interval a maximum of six years.³⁰⁴ The coalition was intended to be something more than the guardian of Sinhalese interests, and it moved progressively towards achieving the socialist objectives which had attracted the Lanka Samasamaja Pakshaya (LSSP) and the communists. The primary remaining private sector of the economy was progressively nationalised, culminating in 1975 with the final extinction of British-ownership of the plantation sector. Sri Lanka had more of the characteristic features of a socialist society than any other non-communist state in Asia, while still retaining a functioning parliamentary democracy. Within the governing coalition, as in the opposition parties, there were widely differing views on the extent to which democracy and socialism were to be maintained or even extended.³⁰⁵

The new society was thus socialist and democratic, yet under the control of still-anglicised politicians and public servants, with the governing party more firmly dominated by the

³⁰¹ Sørbo, *Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review*, 1987: 79.

³⁰² Jupp, *Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy*, 1978: 14.

³⁰³ Jupp, *Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy*, 1978: 17-18.

³⁰⁴ Jupp, *Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy*, 1978: 20.

³⁰⁵ Jupp, *Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy*, 1978: 21.

Bandaranaike and Ratwatte families than ever before, which had enjoyed the most important political positions under the British colonial rule since the middle of the nineteenth century. The government did little to rectify the economic problems revealed at the beginning of the 1970s. International indebtedness increased, particularly with the increasing cost of fuel, while the levels of unemployment rose steadily in line with trends in the developed world on which Sri Lanka dependent for most of its markets.³⁰⁶

[...] the Republic of Sri Lanka which was inaugurated under the new Constitution on 22 May, 1972, had much less to be optimistic about than the new state of Ceylon created in 1948.³⁰⁷

Growing political tension and economic crisis

Norwegian authorities reported, already in 1972, on the growing economic challenges Sri Lanka was facing: "The internal political situation in Sri Lanka must be characterised as labile. The country is currently in an economic crisis, which seems to be a continuous source of political turmoil."³⁰⁸ Furthermore, it was reported that Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government was steadfast in parliament, even though her party – Sri Lanka Freedom Party – had suffered some defeat. However, the party still held more than 50 per cent of parliamentary seats, and the left-wing coalition still had an absolute majority in the national assembly.³⁰⁹

In order to ease the economic crisis and to reduce the increasing unemployment, the government of Sri Lanka announced a 5-year plan (1972-76). However, the plan showed too ambitious compared to the lacking recourses. Additionally, the ongoing economic crisis in the country led to further political turmoil, especially in rural areas. An extensive uprising was abolished in the spring of 1971; however, the more in-depth causes of the uprising remained, and thus continued to smoulder beneath the surface. Fear reached the government as their concerns about a new uprising with significantly stronger support in the people grew. The uprising of 1971 led to a state of emergency in the country, which had not yet been abolished by 1972.³¹⁰

As presented in Table 4, the UN announced a list, in 1974, of twelve countries, including Sri Lanka, which suffered the most from the increase in oil prices.³¹¹ The crisis was further brought

³⁰⁶ Jupp, *Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy*, 1978: 22.

³⁰⁷ Jupp, *Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy*, 1978: 23.

³⁰⁸ MFA, File 37.4/18. *UD: Forholdene i Sri Lanka*. December 14, 1972.

³⁰⁹ MFA, File 37.4/18. *UD: Forholdene i Sri Lanka*. December 14, 1972.

³¹⁰ MFA, File 37.4/18. *UD: Forholdene i Sri Lanka*. December 14, 1972; For more information about the uprising see: Jupp, *Sri Lanka – Third World Democracy*, 1978: 18-20.

³¹¹ Arne Fjærtøft, *Alarm 1974. Rapport frå Afrika, Asia og Latin-Amerika*. Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1974: 9.

to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry's attention through a request for assistance from NGU, including a detailed description of some of the challenge's Sri Lanka faced due to the food, oil, unemployment and currency crisis:

The Republic of Sri Lanka, with its 13 million inhabitants, faces a national famine. The import of food is more or less stopped due to the economic crisis in currency. [...] During the last year, the food crisis has become more severe, and urgent help is needed in order to save as many lives as possible.³¹²

Arne Fjørtoft addressed the oil crisis in Sri Lanka in his book "*Alarm 1974. Rapport frå Afrika, Asia og Latin Amerika*" from that very same year, 1974. In his book, Fjørtoft told a story about Kumar Shanmugan and his situation due to the oil crisis, reflecting so many of his countrymen. Shanmugan never owned a car nor a motorbike, and therefore, he had never bought a drop of oil during his 42 years long life. The only relationship Shanmugan had to oil was through his previous two trips with the local bus and the small amount of paraffin he bought for a lamp in his hut. Nonetheless, the crisis affected both Shanmugan and his country as it did not take long before the oil crisis developed into a food crisis.³¹³

Before 1974, the government of Sri Lanka had given out free rations of rice. For the very poorest, which was a necessary means for many to keep from starving. In the parliamentary election of 1970, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party led by Bandaranaike promised to increase the rations by double if they were to win the election. This was a popular campaign manoeuvre which secured the win for Bandaranaike and her party. However, after the election, the extra rations had to wait, and when it finally arrived, they arrived with a price tag. The treasury was empty, exhausted by the expenses of the first rice ration which had drained the last pennies from the bucket. In only 25 years, the population of Sri Lanka had increased from seven to thirteen million, meaning more mouths to feed with fewer resources. As previously mentioned, unemployment increased, and the prices of export fell, especially on tea which comprised 65 per cent of the total export. This was partly due to large British companies using a monopoly on the goods. The companies with monopoly bought the tea at cost from their plantations, and

³¹² MFA, File 37.4/18. NGU: *Søknad om støtte fra katastrofebudsjettet til kunstgjødsel for ungdomsprosjekt i Sri Lanka*. May 31, 1974.

³¹³ Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 9.

thereby the local people were left with next to nothing, which led to the devastating fact that the profit of Sri Lankan goods went to Britain and the international market.³¹⁴

Failing income from foreign currency as well as increasing prices on imported goods were factors in pushing the economic power out of the country borders. When Sri Lanka became independent from Britain in 1948, their resources and economic status were sufficient enough to aid their former colonial power during the post-war period. However, by 1974 there was next to nothing left. This was partly because Sri Lanka paid even more in interest on their debt to the industrial countries than the amount they received in development aid.³¹⁵

One of the most significant economic problems facing Sri Lanka in 1974 was inflation. Sri Lanka needed to export four times as much as in 1960 to get the equivalent reward. The problem of inflation was rooted in the industrial countries' utilisation of the developing countries. By purchasing cheap goods from developing countries, industrial countries were profiting, while leaving the developing countries with next to nothing in return. Due to the monopoly of large foreign companies, the tea plantation could not increase the cost of tea, leading to no increase in salaries for the workers. The Sri Lankan government struggled to import enough goods for the population. Loans for import was challenging to obtain due to the policies of the government, such as the rice rations. International experts were sent and stressed that the rice rations had to go because it would be difficult to get loans when they would, literally, be eaten up. The experts stressed that loans should be used to more productive aspects of development. This was also a demand by the World Bank. However, with a large percentage of the population starving, it would be political suicide to abolish the food rations.³¹⁶

So, where did Norwegian development aid play into the complex situation in Sri Lanka? The Norwegian aid assistance to Sri Lanka started in 1967 with the Cey-Nor Development Foundation, which was the start of a long relationship between the two countries.

³¹⁴ Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 9-10.

³¹⁵ Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 10.

³¹⁶ Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 10-11

The Cey-Nor Development Foundation

The origin of the Cey-Nor Development Foundation dates back to 1967 when a group of Sri Lankan youth living in Norway got in touch with *Norges Godtemplar Ungdomsforbund* (NGU), which was an independent youth organisation based on the beliefs of peace, solidarity and sobriety, in order to start a fisheries development project in Karainagar in the Jaffna district of Sri Lanka. With the money raised by NGU through fundraising campaigns and supplements by NORAD, they purchased land in Karainagar and commenced boat building activities. At first, the undertaking was managed as a private company, Malu-Meen Enterprises. However, following objections raised by NGU, who expected the enterprise to be run on a cooperative basis, the management was handed over to the Sri Lanka Freedom from Hunger Campaign Committee. Furthermore, The Cey-Nor Development Foundation came into existence as an independent non-profit foundation in 1971.³¹⁷

The objective of the founders, on the basis of which the fundraising campaign was conducted, was "the economic development and social upliftment of certain economically depressed and socially oppressed groups, through the development of small-scale fisheries and the execution of community development programs for the improvement of living conditions and nutritional standards".³¹⁸

On this backdrop, the first activities were geared towards the production of modern fishing craft and the training of young men's careers as fishermen. However, it was soon realised that the aims of the founders could not be achieved through such a simple strategy. The production of boats proved easy enough; the challenge, however, was putting them to use. Therefore, it was decided to extend the scope of the project to include other income-generating activities to employ the target groups.³¹⁹ Shortly afterwards, large storages keeping the fish cool was established in the village, alongside knowledge and education of the business. The Cey-Nor Development Project also got engaged in further social development in the village where the goal was to include all inhabitants.³²⁰ Progressively, besides boat building, the project began to undertake the processing of shrimps for the export market, the production and sale of ice and

³¹⁷ NORAD, *Evaluation Report 1.81. The Ceynor Development Project, Sri Lanka*. Oslo: NORAD, December 1980: 7.

³¹⁸ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 7.

³¹⁹ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 7

³²⁰ MFA, File 37.4/18. Arne Fjørtoft, «U-hjelpen må gå direkte til menneskene i u-land». February 1, 1971.

trawler fishing.³²¹ Soon, the fisheries complex provided storage facilities which held 85 tons of fish; deep-freezing facilities for storage of 2 tons per day and production of 5 tons of ice per day.³²²

Community development

In addition to the Cey-Nor fisheries project in Karainagar, particular community development projects were carried out independently. The concept of community participation and development is ideals which have applied to a wide range of programs and projects. Community and social development in developing countries have often encountered greater challenges than in industrialised countries, and a crucial difference between industrialised and developing countries has been that the latter often lack systematic statistical material. Therefore, the developing countries were required to develop long-term plans when cooperating with Norway in the field of development aid.³²³

The benefits aimed at, in this respect, was housing, water supply, health and hygiene, primary education and social improvements. Some smaller handicraft-projects was also initiated to employ younger women.³²⁴ Cey-Nor's main contribution towards community development in the district was the provision of a health centre where the villagers could seek treatment for minor ailments.³²⁵ Included in the health centre was also a maternity clinic - providing safety, food and health care for both mother and child. Additionally, the health centre also acted as a research facility for medicine, economics and sociology.³²⁶

NORAD assisted the establishment of the health centre with a support investment of NOK 266.872 on the request of Sri Lanka and NGU. Shortly afterwards, Sri Lanka and Save the Children made a new request for additional financial support of NOK 197.929. This was,

³²¹ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 7

³²² MFA, File 37.4/18. *External Recourse Division*. December 19, 1970.

³²³ Olav Stokke, «Introduksjon: Utviklingsplanlegging og samfunnsutvikling i u-land – prioriteringer og problemfelter» in *Utviklingsplanlegging og samfunnsutvikling – En antologi*, p. 9-39, edited by Olav Stokke. Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1975: 10.

³²⁴ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 21.

³²⁵ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 66.

³²⁶ MFA, 37.4/18, Direktoratet for Utviklingshjelp, «Ceynor-prosjektet». July 16, 1973

however, declined by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry due to the extravagance of the project, which was viewed as unnecessary.³²⁷

The Norwegian Health Centre in Sri Lanka was soon becoming a subject of harsh criticism both by people in Sri Lanka and by Norwegian experts as it was argued that the Centre was becoming a prestige project rather than a necessary and helpful means for the local population. It was further argued that money should preferably be used to obtain latrines and clean water for the population. Representatives from Save the Children, on the other hand, argued that the Health Centre was necessary and that it was especially sought out by the low-caste population who could not afford the cost of travelling to other hospitals further from home.³²⁸

The NORAD report of the Cey-Nor project informed that the operations of the Centre were handed to Save the Children in 1974 and that efforts were made to improve general health conditions in the target villages by emphasising preventive health. Health education was undertaken in the villages as well as in the schools. However, it was felt that the response was not very encouraging, and in 1976 the curative section of the Health Centre closed down. Soon after, the maternity section too closed due to too few deliveries per month. The report further stated that the villagers, however, seemed to be dissatisfied with this, as they felt it was their right to have access to such facilities both in Karainagar and in the nearby town of Kayts.³²⁹ In 1980, the Health Centre was taken over by the Sri Lankan Government which put particular emphasis on the maternity clinic, and therefore, gave it new life, which was crucial to the growing numbers of undernourished children.³³⁰

Education was regarded as a means by which caste barriers could be broken down. In the latter part of the 1970s, the Cey-Nor Development Project provided kindergartens and paid the teachers who conducted the school classes. However, this was a project that had to be handed over to the Sri Lankan Education Department because the necessary means by the government was not given to the sector while the schools obtained Cey-Nor support. The Cey-Nor Development Project lacked cooperation with the educational system of Sri Lanka, which led

³²⁷ MFA, 37.4/18. *Søknad om investeringsstøtte til helseprosjekt på Karainagar, Sri Lanka*. October 5, 1973; White paper no. 60, (1972-73), *Direktoratet for utviklingshjelp. Årsmelding og regnskap for 1972*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. March 23 1973: 22

³²⁸ MFA, File 37.4/18. «Prestisjesykehus dårlig u-hjelp». 1975.

³²⁹ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 66.

³³⁰ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 66.

to the continuum of the status quo – children, and adults, already receiving education stayed in school, and those who did not have the same opportunity to start an education were left outside the system.³³¹

The spirit of Norwegian foreign aid, the belief of a partnership free from dependence, and the crucial goal of community development projects was to generate self-reliance among the target groups and communities. It was believed that the development of self-reliance would be a result of the mobilisation of human and natural resources from below, and not from above. Therefore, external assistance had to have a catalytic effect and be limited to a specific period in time. It was essential to achieve help to self-help and not to create new relations of dependence.³³² An example of this is the argument of fishnet factories which will be explored later on.

The NORAD's Evaluation Report of the Cey-Nor Program from 1980 found some problematic outcomes when it came to the social distribution of the project's benefits. An initial aim of the project was to create more social equality among the different social classes in the region. The small-scale fishery development strategy is chosen, where the poorest groups should be given special attention, was indeed the spirit of the project's objective. Doubtlessly, the Cey-Nor Development Program made great efforts in this area, especially in the initial stage. The establishment of shrimp sales opportunities is a clear example of the important place given to the anti-poverty struggle. However, the NORAD Evaluation Report shed light upon the considerable constraints this work faced, of a financial as well as a social and political nature. One problem was that instead of a conscious target group strategy, the programs tended to have an open-offer nature, where the beneficiaries were those financially and socially capable of acquiring the products. Even though the products, for instance, the 17,5 ft. vessel, aimed at low-class fishers, it was not sufficiently understood that even this small vessel had a capital demand of a magnitude which was beyond the means of the least well-off fishermen. The 28 ft boat program was an even further step away from the anti-poverty strategy since the owners of such vessels usually belonged to the top social level of the society and seldom did practical fishing themselves. Additionally, since the nets produced were dependent on vessels for their use, net production also contributed to a strategy which departed from the small fishermen support. The report argued that it did not underestimate the value of the boat and net programs; it simply

³³¹ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 67-8.

³³² NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 70.

pointed at the biased distribution of the impacts from them. Neither did it underestimate the positive impact of the welfare programs on the least well-off groups. The Evaluation Report stated that, for the future strategy to implement a more concentrated and dedicated attitude to these problems, and it was argued that a basic understanding of the fact that the poorest groups can never be lifted out of their poverty by the better-off classes, and that for this project, the specific direct support to the least well-off should govern its strategy.³³³

Frequent approaches from Sri Lanka for assistance: two examples

In November 1972, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a letter from the Youth Campaign Against Hunger (YCAH) on behalf of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Fisheries, asking for financial support for the purchase of fishing nets worth \$200 000.³³⁴

Sri Lanka found itself in an acute currency crisis, which led to the Sri Lankan government not meeting the country's most vital import needs. Following a delegation trip to Sri Lanka in October 1972, the YCAH experienced that import difficulties had also been reflected in fishing production - due to a lack of fishing nets, a smaller amount of fish was caught. Throughout the coastal line of Sri Lanka, the delegation experienced constant complains of fishers about the lack of nets for their fishing industry.³³⁵

Considering that fish is one of the most important sources of protein in the country, there is reason to look with concern at the growing decline in production. The country's authorities are aware of the situation but have many urgent requirements to consider when it comes to the use of foreign currency for imports, that one has not yet been able to make the necessary funds available for import of fishing nets.³³⁶

This was the backdrop for the Sri Lankan authorities' appeal to the YCAH for them to use their influence to raise funds as emergency aid to prevent fishery production from declining further. In order to make their request more attractive, they presented a precautionary approach to the

³³³ NORAD, *Evaluation Report 1.81*, 1980: 122-23.

³³⁴ MFA, File 37.4/18. *Letter from The Youth Campaign Against Hunger to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. November 9, 1972.

³³⁵ MFA, File 37.4/18. *Letter from The Youth Campaign Against Hunger to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. November 9, 1972.

³³⁶ MFA, File 37.4/18. *Letter from The Youth Campaign Against Hunger to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. November 9, 1972.

situation; The conditions were not yet hopeless, and assistance from outside country borders would have an important stimulating effect on business. It was estimated that nets worth \$200,000 would, in three years, result in fish catches worth \$34.8 million (based on average catches per net according to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Fisheries). Therefore, it would be considered beneficial to give the country opportunities to import fishnets in 1972 rather than possibly sending food as a relief when the time had allowed the problems to become more severe.³³⁷

Norwegian authorities and NORAD agreed that assistance to Sri Lanka in the fisheries sector should increase, however, it was viewed as more prudent to assist through funds for fishing net production facilities rather than fishing nets that would soon need to be replaced and by this creating relation of dependence. Before assistance could be sent in direction Sri Lanka, it had to, as always, go through a professional assessment.³³⁸

After frequent requests³³⁹ from Sri Lanka throughout 1972 and 1973, and some indecisiveness by Norwegian authorities, the request for fishing nets was, in the end, declined by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, because it was viewed as inexpedient. However, instead of assisting Sri Lanka with fishing nets, it was decided that assistance for a fishing net factory would be a better solution. The Norwegian Directorate for Foreign Aid, therefore, donated NOK 430.000 to the establishments of a fishing net factory in 1973.³⁴⁰

By 1975, the building of the fishing net factory was put on ice. However, a closed tobacco factory, Malayalam Tobacco Co-operative Sales Society Ltd., was rented for the purpose and machines for making fish nets was installed in the factory. Due to this change in the plans, large amounts of money were saved on the facilities for making fishing nets.³⁴¹ However, with the limited resources and the lack of raw material for production, the food crisis increased, and assistance from outside country borders became necessary. Therefore, NGU requested an

³³⁷ MFA, File 37.4/18. *Letter from The Youth Campaign Against Hunger to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. November 9, 1972.

³³⁸ MFA, File 37.4/18. *Direktoratet for Utviklingshjelp. «Fiskegarn til Sri Lanka»*. November 11, 1972.

³³⁹ MFA, File 37.4/18. *Embassy of Ceylon*. December 27, 1972; MFA, File 37.4/18. *Embassy of Sri Lanka*. April 2, 1973. (101); MFA, File 37.4/18. "Embassy of Sri Lanka". April 12, 1973.

³⁴⁰ MFA, File 37.4/18. *Direktoratet for utviklingshjelp. «Råmaterialer til fiskegarnproduksjon i Sri Lanka-søknad om bistand til vanskeligstilte fiskere fra NGU»*. February 3, 1975; White paper no. 34 (1973-74), *Årsmelding og regnskap for Direktoratet for utviklingshjelp for 1973*. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. March 8 1974.

³⁴¹ MFA, File 37.4/18. *Direktoratet for utviklingshjelp. «Råmaterialer til fiskegarnproduksjon i Sri Lanka-søknad om bistand til vanskeligstilte fiskere fra NGU»*. February 3 1975

additional NOK 500.000 for the import of raw material. Once again, in order to evaluate if this assistance was expedient, the professional assessment had to be made.³⁴² The assessment concluded that NOK 500 000 would be sufficient to secure full capacity of the fishnet factory from the opening in May and throughout the remaining part of 1975.³⁴³ On this backdrop, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and the Directorate for Foreign Aid decided to assist the fishnet factory with the requested financial support.³⁴⁴

In May 1974, the Sri Lankan ambassador in Stockholm³⁴⁵ requested 15 000 tons of fertiliser from the Norwegian government for food production. There were two main factors for the Sri Lankan request to Norway (and Scandinavia) for aid towards the growing food shortages in the country: (1) Norway already exported fertiliser to the sub-continent, and (2) had a goal to increase their foreign aid contributions.³⁴⁶ Before the oil crisis of 1974, Norway exported and bought large amounts of fertiliser to both India and Pakistan. However, the crisis affecting Sri Lanka also affected Norway, and even though Sri Lanka claimed that they could import the fertiliser by themselves, NORAD would not issue the money.³⁴⁷ Arne Fjørtoft, who were critical to the Norwegian stand on the matter, wrote in his book, *Alarm 1974*, that:

We give ourselves first priority of the resources. This is also the norm for fertilizer. In times of abundance, we share. In shortness we, first and foremost, secure ourselves. This is how deep cooperation and solidarity with the economic oppressed goes.³⁴⁸

During the 1960s, initiatives were taken so that food production in the developing countries would be more efficient. Alongside experts and technology, fertiliser became necessary in the production of food. This led to developing countries depending on fertiliser, and with the global food crisis at hand, it was, as always, the developing countries which suffered the most.³⁴⁹ In

³⁴² MFA, File 37.4/18. *Direktoratet for utviklingshjelp. «Råmaterialer til fiskegarnproduksjon i Sri Lanka-søknad om bistand til vanskeligstilte fiskere fra NGU»*. February 3, 1975.

³⁴³ MFA, File 37.4/18, *Rapport fra konsulent Einar Rørstadl's besøk ved Cey-Nor Development Project, 4-6 mars, 1975*. April 11, 1975

³⁴⁴ MFA, File 37.4/18. *Råmaterialer til fiskegarnproduksjon I Sri Lanka – søknad om bistand til vanskeligstilte fiskere fra NGU*, April 29. 1975.

³⁴⁵ Sri Lanka did not yet have an ambassador in Norway, and therefore, one was sent to Oslo in order to ask for aid. See: Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 14.

³⁴⁶ Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 15

³⁴⁷ Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 16.

³⁴⁸ «Vi gir oss sjølve førsteretten til ressursane. Slik er det også i spørsmål om kunstgjødsel. Når det er overflod, kan vi gi. Når det er for lite, bruker vi det i første rekke på oss sjølve. Så djupt stikk samarbeidstanken, solidariteten med dei økonomisk undertrykte». Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 18.

³⁴⁹ Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 16-17.

1974, NGU provided NORAD with a detailed description of the situation in Sri Lanka, which included the shortages of fertiliser in the country:

It is estimated that Sri Lanka had a deficit of about 15 000 tons of fertiliser in 1974. [...] It is also estimated that one-kilo fertiliser is equivalent to approximately ten kilos of food. Therefore, the lack of fertiliser will lead to a large deficit in national food production. The import of food is also a matter of grave uncertainty at this point. However, the food crisis can be mitigated if fertiliser is obtained. [...] The percentage of children with clear malnutrition has risen from 2% in the Cey-Nor Development Project to an extreme 24% only within the last year.³⁵⁰

Out of all the problems of shortages facing Sri Lanka, the government had to prioritise the import of oil. Without oil for electricity, transport and production, the industry would collapse. The increase in oil prices was unaffordable for Sri Lanka, especially adding to the growing food shortages. Approximately fifty per cent of the rice consumption of the population were also imported. The food shortages could partly be relieved by higher food production within the country; however, due to the prices on both food and oil, the price for fertiliser also increased. This led to a new problem of not being able to grow food for oneself. Also, the demand for fertiliser grew, and the price increased from \$146 per ton in 1971 to \$300 per ton in 1974.³⁵¹

The other countries of the Indian sub-continent; India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, also faced the increasing food shortages due to the lack of fertiliser. NORAD addressed this issue in 1974 and forwarded a request of aid in the field to the producer of fertiliser, Norsk Hydro, which at this point had already sold off the whole production and uttered that to increase the production of fertiliser would be near to impossible. Despite this, Norsk Hydro agreed to deliver 40 000 tons of fertiliser through NORAD to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, NORAD could not stretch as far as to deliver the requested amount of fertiliser to Sri Lanka. The main partners of development cooperation had to be prioritised.³⁵²

³⁵⁰ MFA, File 37.4/18. NGU: *Søknad om støtte fra katastrofebudsjettet til kunstgjødsel for ungdomsprosjekt i Sri Lanka*. May 31, 1974. (139)

³⁵¹ Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 12-13.

³⁵² Fjørtoft, *Alarm 1974*, 1974: 17.

The Cey-Nor Development Project in crisis

In 1974, the Cey-Nor development Project was on the road to catastrophe. The reasons behind this were the oil and energy crisis which brought a significant increase in the price of polyester, which was used in both boat and fishing net production. Additionally, there was a severe food and unemployment crisis alongside a decreasing export market for shrimp.

On this backdrop, Consult Einar Rørstad were sent to visit the Cey-Nor Development Project in 1975 in order to give the project a professional assessment., which resulted in a plan to improve the situation. For example, it was emphasised that a 3-year plan to consolidate the position around existing components had to be drawn, and it was after that decided that no new measures would be implemented.³⁵³

In order to run the project in an economically sound matter, it had to follow business principles; hence, for the project to survive, it had to be financially viable. However, even though business principles marked the project, Rørstad concluded that there could be no doubt of the project's goals and ideals and that without the Cey-Nor Development Project the situation in Karainagar would have taken a turn for the worse. However, some departments within the project thrived, while others struggled.³⁵⁴

Some of the struggles which faced the project were the shortage of water. In 1974 the rain season brought unusually small amounts of rain, which lead to an unusually long period of drought, poor harvest and the increase in food prices. Therefore, the professional assessment concluded that the need for more and upgraded wells was a matter of urgency. Upgraded wells would make the saving of water more manageable, and increase the use of groundwater so that the region would not depend only on rain. Also, an upgrade of toilet facilities was much needed. Amongst 600 households, it only existed ten toilets, thereof three public. Both these upgrades were evaluated as urgent because of the severe risk of infection. Another issue facing both the project and the country was unemployment. The problem was not the lack of industry, but

³⁵³ MFA, 37.4/18, *Rapport fra konsulent Einar Rørstads besøk ved Cey-Nor Development Project, 4-6 mars 1975*, April 11, 1975.

³⁵⁴ MFA, 37.4/18, *Rapport fra konsulent Einar Rørstads besøk ved Cey-Nor Development Project, 4-6 mars 1975* April 11, 1975.

rather, the lack of demand. As previously mentioned, the export market was somewhat limited.³⁵⁵

Another aspect of the struggles facing the project was the political changes in the country. In 1977, the left-wing government had been replaced by a more conservative government, with the United National Party (UNP) in front. The Jaffna district is located at the very north of Sri Lanka, and the population of the district has been almost exclusively Sri Lankan Tamil. Some Tamil communities in the Jaffna area argued that Cey-Nor showed the possibility to achieve independent economic development in northern Sri Lanka, albeit with foreign aid. Cey-Nor was exploited by separatist communities, which in turn led to reactions in nationalist communities in Colombo. Within this context, a newspaper which characterised Cey-Nor as a project supporting Tamil separatists. Such accusations and arguments led to a pressure on the Cey-Nor project to spread its efforts to other areas on the island. In 1977, plans were drawn for the establishment of development projects in three areas in Sinhalese districts. However, this expansion took place without any security for financial obligations.³⁵⁶ Goods and equipment were financed through assistance, mainly from NORAD and SIDA, but with insufficient coverage for the operating costs. Within a few years, the Cey-Nor Development Foundation accumulated a cumbersome debt that brought the organisation to the brink of bankruptcy. Since then, the project was further ripped into the escalating ethnic conflict and the large installation in the north, where it all began, was destroyed in the war starting in 1983.³⁵⁷

The Cey-Nor Development Project – a foundation for the future

The industrial activities of the Cey-Nor Development Project created a substantial amount of employment. The factories in Karainagar and Gurunagar employed nearly 700 persons, which secured almost as many families their source of living. This result was impressive against the background of the modest resources available at the outset. However, the extensive employment could also be viewed as a factor for dependence on the project, which was a complete opposing result following the initial intent.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁵ MFA, 37.4/18, *Rapport fra konsulent Einar Rørstads besøk ved Cey-Nor Development Project, 4-6 mars 1975* April 11, 1975.

³⁵⁶ Ruud and Kjerland, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie 2, 1975-1989: Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer*, 2003: 206.

³⁵⁷ Ruud and Kjerland, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie 2, 1975-1989. Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer*, 2003: 206.

³⁵⁸ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 144.

Perhaps the most impressive impact of the Cey-Nor Development Project was created by the boat production activity. In the Jaffna District alone, it gave employment to approximately 4500 fishers and 800 engaged in post-harvest fisheries. The production of nets and ice meant a quantitative as well as qualitative step forward for the fishing industry in the district. The NORAD Evaluation Report concludes that all together, there is no doubt that the Cey-Nor Development Project contributed substantially to the modernisation and rationalisation of the fisheries in Jaffna and Sri Lanka for that matter.³⁵⁹

When we evaluate the social distributions of these benefits, one can conclude that the crucial objective of social and economic upliftment of the most oppressed and depressed coastal groups has only been achieved to a small degree. However, an important note to this is the limitation of what an individual development program in this respect, independently of the trends in society at large, actually could do.³⁶⁰

An issue which was initially an important objective of the project was the improvement of nutritional standards among the undernourished sections of society. Thus, the issue did, however, not receive much attention in the end. The delivery of boats and nets undoubtedly led to a substantial increase in catches, but a conscious policy of social distribution was indeed absent from the project. This was partly due to difficulties of combining it with other objectives, and the commercial needs of the Company. Also, it was found to be too ambitious a task for the Cey-Nor Development Foundation alone to break through the well-established and profound distribution system.³⁶¹

On the social development front, the level of health, hygiene, housing, primary education and culture was considerably lifted through Cey-Nor assistance. The problem, however, was that the target communities were not able to generate sufficient self-reliance, where they could take over the institutions that were established and then develop them further on their own. This was indeed a significant shortcoming of the program.³⁶²

³⁵⁹ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 145.

³⁶⁰ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 145.

³⁶¹ NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980: 145.

³⁶² NORAD, *Evaluation Report*, 1980. 146.

Even though the Cey-Nor Development Project came to an end due to political tension and the ethnical conflict, NGU continued its work on Sri Lanka through the new organisation, FORUT, which became one of Norway's most well-established development organisation.³⁶³

Why Sri Lanka?

In the Country Study and Norwegian aid Review of Sri Lanka from 1987, published by the University of Bergen, some factors for the choice of Sri Lanka were presented. These factors included 1) frequent approaches from the Sri Lankan authorities for assistance; 2) location of the country in the South Asian subcontinent, where India, Bangladesh and Pakistan were already holding the status of main partner countries; 3) the equality-promoting policy of the Government in power up to mid-1977, and; 4) the increasingly oppressed state of the Sri Lankan economy, particularly in the early 1970s.³⁶⁴

Throughout this chapter and thesis this far, there has been a focus on factors one, two and four presented above. Therefore, some consideration also has to be put on factor number three. The First Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka was adopted in 1972 and has been considered a symbolic affirmation of nationalism. However, the Constitution abolished minority safe grounds, stipulating majoritarianism, granting Buddhism foremost prominence and enhancing the Sinhala language as the sole official language made this a populist constitution. It was a significant landmark in the process of national disintegration, and further limited the scope for communication between communities.³⁶⁵ Even though the Constitution made favourable conditions for only parts of the population and weakened the position of the minorities, it also included fundamental rights of freedom. These included, among other things, that "all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law; every citizen have the right to freedom of speech and expression, including publication and; every citizen shall have the right to freedom of movement and of choosing his residence within Sri Lanka".³⁶⁶ The fact that the First Republican Constitution included these fundamental rights, which were the same, or close, to those of the Western Countries, including Norway, did not automatically impact the

³⁶³ Ruud and Kjerland, *Norsk utviklingshjelps historie 2*. 2003: 206.

³⁶⁴ Sørbo, *Sri Lanka. Country Study and Norwegian Aird Review*, 1987: 85.

³⁶⁵ Thamil Venthana Ananthavinayagan, *Sri Lanka, Human Rights and the United Nations. A Security into the International Human Rights Engagement with a Third World State*. Dublin: Springer, 2019: 71.

³⁶⁶For the full list of the fundamental rights and freedoms see: Ananthavinayagan, *Sri Lanka Human Rights and the United Nations*, 2019: 73.

Sri Lankan population, as the fundamental rights were subject to restrictions and limitations whereas the individual rights could be denied and impeded if they contradicted with the governmental agenda.³⁶⁷

In the Norwegian political landscape, the choice of Sri Lanka made far less tension and debates in the Storting. A reason for this might be that Sri Lanka could to some extent please both the political left- and right-wing. The Government of Sri Lanka was influenced by socialism and even communism for some members of Parliament. However, due to the advanced political administration and the attitude towards human rights, it was an appealing country for the choice of main partner country.

If we are to designate new main partner countries, I believe that the Committee's formulated criteria should prove useful guidelines, in other words, that this choice should include the degree of poverty, the opportunities to accommodate the broad strata of the people, the social spirit of the Government in question and its attitude to fundamental human rights in the review. When the Committee cautiously suggests the appropriateness of linking contacts with one of the smaller countries in Asia, I think this, translated into clear text, must indicate a country like Sri Lanka.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁷ Ananacinayagan, *Sri Lanka Human Rights and the United Nations*, 2019: 74-75.

³⁶⁸ [Hvis vi skal utpeke nye hovedsamarbeidland, tror jeg at jomiteens formulerte kriterier burde kunne gi brukbare rettningslinjer, med andre ord at både graden av fattigdom, mulighetene for å tilgodese de bredere lag av folket, vedkommende regjerings sosiale sinnelag og dens holdning til fundamentale menneskerettigheter tas med i vurderingen. Når komiteen forsiktig antyder hensiktsmessigheten av å knytte kontakter med et av de mindre land i Asia tror jeg at dette oversatt i klar tekst må bety noe slikt som Sri Lanka.] MP Tor Oftedal, Debates in the Storting (St. tid. Bind 7b) (1975-76): 2741.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Were the guidelines and criteria for the main partners followed and respected by the Norwegian Government when choosing Mozambique and Sri Lanka as main partners of development cooperation? Moreover, did the rhetoric, both nationally and internationally, reflect the practice of Norwegian foreign aid? After analysing the relationships and background between Norway and these two countries, we find that this cannot be sufficiently answered with a simple yes or no. These complex choices of main partners were assessed individually in each case. To systematically answer the question, we need to go into each official guideline and evaluate them in accordance with the situation of Mozambique and Sri Lanka.

One: The Principle of Concentration – pinned down

This is arguably the most uncomplicated principle to pin down. It was argued that to make the aid as efficient as possible, it had to be concentrated upon a limited amount of countries and areas. The two regions chosen as areas of concentration regarding foreign aid were South-East Africa and South Asia.

The Norwegian Government started to channel development assistance to Mozambique when the country was still under Portuguese colonial rule. Concerning Norwegian main partners, Mozambique was the last former colony to become independent, and the newly independent state faced political, economic and social challenges. Norwegian relation to the region of South-East Africa made it a natural choice for Mozambique to join the ranks of main partner countries. The relationship between Norway and Tanzania, neighbour country of Mozambique, was long-established, and the cooperation between the two neighbours made it easier also to establish relations with Mozambique. The administration of the Mozambique Institute, which was the receiving institution of the first Norwegian allocations to the country, was located in Tanzania, which made the situation more straightforward because Norwegian administrators were already located nearby.

On the Indian sub-continent, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were already chosen as main partners, with Sri Lanka being the fourth country added to this list in 1977. Sri Lanka, an island surrounded by an ocean full of maritime life, needed technical assistance, especially in the

fisheries sector. Therefore, Norway, as a rather advanced fisheries nation, was there to do its part in fulfilling this need. Long-standing relations with the region of South Asia made Sri Lanka a natural choice of partner when concerning the principle of concentration.

To conclude this section, the principle of concentration was indeed followed in the choice of Mozambique and Sri Lanka as main partners of development cooperation. The same can, however, not be said about the larger scale of Norwegian foreign aid as it rapidly spread around the world.

Two: "To help with what you have got" – the need for Norwegian resources

Another argument for making the Norwegian aid as efficient as possible was that Norway should use her resources to the best of ability. A Norwegian character trait and resource was her rhetoric, in the UN and the international community at large, and to generally stand with the oppressed concerning the complex and problematic questions of colonisation. However, it is questionable if the practice matched this rhetoric. This will be further discussed below. The Norwegian take on colonialism was that this practice was outdated, and emphasis was put on the right of a sovereign state and self-governance. This led to the choice to stand with the liberation movement in Mozambique in their fight for national liberation from the Portuguese colonial regime. However, a tendency of Norwegian foreign policy and aid during this period, and after, was that the practice did not necessarily follow the rhetoric. Portugal was a fellow NATO and EFTA member country, which made it difficult to condemn the country's activities. Discontent with the colonial regime was expressed time and time again. However, relations between Norway and Portugal within both their memberships in NATO and EFTA continued.

In its formative years, Frelimo received aid from the Soviet Union and China. However, the liberation movement sought closer relations to the West, concerning both agreements on development aid, but also for political support in their struggle. Norway, and the fellow Scandinavian countries, were some of the first countries to act upon this request, both in the form of a supportive voice in the UN and as direct assistance to the Mozambique Institute, and later on, to different branches of Frelimo's activities.

In Sri Lanka, where the need was not of political, but instead of technical assistance, it is more straightforward to conclude on the Norwegian role. In this period, Norway aided Sri Lanka in the fisheries sector through the Cey-Nor Foundation. The fisheries program was a field in which Norwegian resources were most relevant. Nonetheless, this project was initiated in the late 1960s and continued into the 1970s, as one of the first programs of its kind. Therefore, the technical and administrative parts of the program were not yet optimal, which led to challenges in the effectiveness and results of the program. Norwegian assistance also took place in community development. Funding for education, health care and increased living standard for the region of Karainagar, was also essential Norwegian contributions to Sri Lanka.

In the 1970s, the developing countries formed a unified voice in the international community through the Group-77. With this voice, they demanded better conditions on the international market, so they too had a chance to trade with, and not only receive aid from, the industrialised countries. After some time and debates on the matter, Norway supported this request and made efforts both on the national and international level to live by the slogan "trade not aid". However, as in so many other fields, the practice did not match this rhetoric, and when Norwegian businesses were affected, the Norwegian interpretation of this slogan became increasingly elastic.

Three: The interpretation of development policy – an undefined term

The phrase "development-oriented and socially fair policies" appears time and time again in both governmental documents and the historiography of Norwegian development aid. What this phrase includes is, however, a mystery yet to be solved. In the 1970s, there was, to some degree, a change in the Norwegian rhetoric of partner countries, and the interest and criteria towards the national policies in these countries increased. It was drawn long-term plans for each partner country so that the Norwegian assistance would promote and help all ranks of society, not just the elite. The Cey-Nor Development Program was a clear example of a long-term program to a specific sector and region. The program focused mainly on the fisheries sector and community development through aid to the education and health services in the Karainagar region. The program aimed at aiding the region with both educational, financial and technical support so that the local population could take over the work and administration, and thereby

not rely on dependence from foreign aid. This was a well-intended plan which proved challenging in practice.

As the modernisation theories of the 1950s and early 1960s were under a wide range of criticism during the 1970s, and the "trickle-down" theory proved to be unsatisfactory in practice, the focus on the "basic needs" principle and doing the "first thing first" was rising in popularity. Therefore, it was argued that Norwegian aid should focus on education, health, infrastructure and community development to increase living conditions for the whole population.

How did the Norwegian Government evaluate the domestic policies of the partner countries? This is rather difficult to answer because there is no clear definition of what was emphasised in this regard. Before Mozambique and Sri Lanka became main partners, the line was drawn only once – with the withdrawn of the partnership with Uganda due to Idi Amin's regime. There was not drawn reports of this extent in either Mozambique or Sri Lanka. However, situations, including violations and oppression by the governments, undoubtedly occurred in each country based on both ethnicity and social status. This led to debates in the Storting, especially in the case of Mozambique where both the Conservative Party and Anders Lange's Party uttered their scepticism on the choice of Mozambique as a main partner country.

Four: Human rights – the gap between rhetoric and practice

The UN has been seen as a cornerstone in Norwegian foreign affairs, and approximately fifty per cent of the total Norwegian aid was channelled through multilateral agencies, mostly under-organisations of the UN. It is easy to go along with the uncritical perception of Norwegian rhetoric and practice in the field of foreign aid and human rights. In a global context, the Norwegian rhetoric on foreign aid and human rights has generally been on a higher level of moral and ethical character. However, the practice did not always follow the rhetoric in this aspect. It seems like, in the principle of human rights, there was also room for some interpretations and elasticity. Norwegian authorities and representatives were eager to promote and speak of the principles and practice of human rights, simultaneously as aiding governments violating these practices. However, it is essential to note that many of the developing countries were primarily concerned with securing an economic and social subsistence minimum for their population and that human rights were therefore not evaluated as the most efficient starting point in this regard. If Norway demanded the same level of respect for human rights in the

developing countries as within own country borders, she would be left without any main partners. For example, in Sri Lanka, the foundations of human rights were impaired in the First Republican Constitution, however, not successfully carried out in practice. Still, the country was viewed as one of the most progressed “Third World” country in terms of human rights. In White paper no. 93 (1976-77), it was emphasised that the situation in a partner country could be unsatisfactory in the beginning, therefore, a long-term perspective had to be built, and hopes that the general economic and social development of partner countries would lead to better human rights protections.³⁶⁹ Also, an essential aspect of the international context in the regards of human rights, was that many of the European countries had recently, or were still in colonial relations, which were not famous for their respect of human rights.

Five: To help where the help is needed

The last principle analysed in this thesis is that the aid should go to the least developed countries. In table 3, neither Mozambique nor Sri Lanka was at the list of the least developed countries at the beginning of the 1970s. Nonetheless, both countries were dependent upon foreign aid to survive economically and socially. As presented through the theories of the 1970s, a country's development cannot be seen exclusively through economic growth, but through a broader context including political and social aspects, as well as the overall living standard of the population.

Mozambique was facing severe economic difficulties, especially in the second half of the 1970s as the country followed the UNs restrictions against South Rhodesian. Also, the political situation in Mozambique was underdeveloped due to the newly independent state, and the start-up phase of the new Government. Because the economy, politics and society are closely linked together, if one branch were in decline, it often became a slippery slope for the remaining two branches. In Mozambique's case, all three branches were in a poor state, which made the country desperate for foreign aid.

Sri Lanka, on the other hand, was seen as a "Third World Democracy" with an input of welfare standards in various fields, such as health care and education. However, the oil crisis and financial difficulties of the 1970s were severe for the economy and thereby left the country with

³⁶⁹ White paper no. 93 (1976-77): 15.

debt and challenges they could not face alone. The UN published a list of the countries that were most severely affected by the oil crisis in 1973, which included Sri Lanka.

The level of need is difficult to determine due to the complexity of a country's situation. Even though Mozambique and Sri Lanka were not necessarily amongst the very least developed countries in terms of economy, both countries relied on foreign assistance for development.

The choice of Mozambique and Sri Lanka

So far, it has been concluded that the guidelines and criteria for main partners of development cooperation were only followed to a certain extent. Both Mozambique and Sri Lanka were undoubtedly evaluated according to these guidelines and criteria, however, interpreted differently. The case of Mozambique led to increased political tension, and the debates in the Storting showed that disagreements existed both between political parties and within them. The guidelines which created the most tension in the debates of partner countries were number 3) the domestic policies of the Government in the partner country, and number 4) the implementation and practice of human rights in the partner countries. These two guidelines are, therefore, also the most curious. Why establish guidelines and criteria for partner countries with the knowledge that these would not be fulfilled? It was uttered in White paper no. 93 (1976-77) that partnerships concerning human rights and foreign aid should be viewed as a long-term process, and not as a condition for aid. It was not expected that developing countries would practice human rights at the same level as Norway. In both of these two cases, emphasis can be put on the term guideline and not criteria. Both human rights and the domestic policies of the partner country was a road that could develop alongside the partnership with Norway. If the intention and efforts to improve were there, it seemed good enough for Norway, regardless of its moral rhetoric in the international community.

The research for this thesis indicates that the guidelines and criteria made in the 1960s- and 1970s were based on an overall desire to help, as this was viewed as the morally responsible thing to do. As a small country with a rapidly increasing economy, this was a field in which Norway could thrive in the international landscape. Like the Government and institutions working with development assistance in the 1970s, I too believe that a framework for this newly established field of foreign relations was needed for the convenience of the administrative

aspect and to make some limitations for the range of assistance. Today, foreign aid is a well-established field with professionals handling every aspect of it; however, the same cannot be said for the earlier phase of modern foreign aid.

After analysing the guidelines and criteria in regard to the cases of Mozambique and Sri Lanka, there is a distinctive connection between Norwegian aid policies and the international landscape as well as the trends of development aid. Norwegian emphasis was put on helping the least developed, and even though neither Mozambique nor Sri Lanka was on this list of countries, Norwegian policies aimed at aiding the least developed areas and the poorest of people within these countries through economic and social development for the broader part of the population and especially among the most disadvantaged groups of the population.³⁷⁰ This is seen in the case of Mozambique by Norway aiding the refugees within the region, and in Sri Lanka through the community development initiatives such as increasing living standards. In the 1970s, the Norwegian foreign aid evolved from development aid to development policy, as it was no longer a transfer of funds from one state to another, but rather the establishment of new international partnerships based on a complex assessment with guidelines and criteria which had to be respected. The international trends regarding development and foreign assistance in the 1970s were the basic needs principle, social development, and developing countries breaking free from the chains of the colonial era. The 1970s, both on a national and international level, laid the foundation for the critical outlook on foreign aid and development, and the period introduced new approaches to both the rhetoric and practice of development, which is still relevant in today's foreign aid.

There is much yet to discover within the field of Norwegian foreign aid in the 1970s, and the relations between Norway and its main partners. Also, the internal policies of the governments in partner countries in regard to Norwegian guidelines and criteria leaves a considerable gap in the historiography of main partnerships in this period. Some countries have received a large amount of research, while others are almost forgotten. Sri Lanka's early relations to Norway is a clear example of a country deserving more research, especially in the field of human rights. This thesis lays a groundwork for the guidelines and criteria regarding the Norwegian partnerships with Mozambique and Sri Lanka; however, there is much more to research regarding these relations. Another aspect of these choices that deserve more in-depth research

³⁷⁰ White paper no. 29 (1971-72): 8.

was whether Mozambique and Sri Lanka were made main partners of development cooperation as a compromise pleasing both the political left- and right-wing, or if it was a unified choice.³⁷¹

The relations between Norway and these two countries are still relevant in the context of foreign aid. Mozambique is still receiving a large amount of Norwegian assistance (NOK 509.1 million in 2019) including funds for conflict prevention, environment and energy, emergency assistance, production and trade.³⁷² While the conflicts and warfare in Mozambique declined, ethnical conflicts in Sri Lanka increased from the 1980s and remains today. Norway is still assisting Sri Lanka with a considerable amount of money (NOK 73.6 million in 2019) with over half of the allocations given as assistance to the improvement of governance, civil society and conflict prevention.³⁷³

³⁷¹ The initial goal of this thesis was to include a section for the research of this question, however, due to limitations of the research facilities such as Riksarkivet and Nationalbiblioteket due to the Covid-19 virus, the gathering of sources proved difficult.

³⁷² Norad, «Mosambik», 03.07.2014: Available at: <https://norad.no/landsider/afrika/mosambik/>.

³⁷³ Norad, «Sri Lanka», 03.07.2014: Available at: <https://norad.no/landsider/asia-og-oseania/sri-lanka/>.

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