Convergence, Centralization, and Change

Immigrant Integration Policies in Western Europe, 1997–2017

Vilde Hernes

PhD Dissertation

Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Oslo

© Vilde Hernes, 2020

Series of dissertations submitted to the
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo
No. 810

ISSN 1564-3991

Abstract

This thesis provides novel insight into different aspects of West-European integration policies, including recent policy developments, the central-local governance and the national horizontal governance of the field. It does so by answering two overarching research questions: 1) Are West-European integration policies changing, and if so, towards what? 2) What are the drivers of change and stability in integration policies?

The first article analyses if, how, and why Scandinavian integration policies converged as a result of the refugee crisis in 2015, focusing on policies of permanent residence, citizenship, family reunification, and access to social benefits. The analysis shows that in lack of a unified European solution to address the crisis, Scandinavian countries all introduced more restrictive integration policies through a mechanism of regulatory competition, or a restrictive ' race to the bottom'.

The second article challenges a recent claim that integration policies experience a 'local turn' or increased decentralization, by demonstrating that the local leeway to develop local integration policies is actually diminishing. Both Denmark and Sweden have moved from a decentralized to a centralized refugee settlement model in which the central government allocates refugees to municipalities, thereby limiting local governments' autonomy. This change implies a shift toward increased centralization of Scandinavian refugee settlement policies, with Norway as an exception.

The third article presents a novel dataset, the Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance (DIIG), which systematically documents how the integration issue has been organized at the ministerial level across 16 West-European countries from 1997 to 2017. The analysis shows that divergence and change characterize the ministerial structures of the integration issue in Western Europe. Furthermore, it demonstrates that right-oriented governments are more inclined to couple integration with immigration and/or justice than left-oriented governments are, reflecting the right's policy preferences for restrictive integration policies.

The introduction chapter combines the theoretical insights across the articles to explore the drivers of stability and change in national integration policies. The three articles test a selection of established theories in the general policy literature that has not been systematically applied in the integration literature, namely the role of crises, compromises and regulatory competition. The introduction chapter discusses how these 'new' theories supplement and moderate the scope conditions of the dominant theories of change identified in the current literature on immigrant integration: national path-dependency and party politics. The synthesizing analysis does not contradict that path dependency is an important explanatory factor for policy developments, but provides concrete examples of how (perceived) crises cause countries to diverge from former national paths. Party politics as an explanatory factor proves useful to explain changes in the horizontal governance of the integration issue, but fails to explain policy developments in times of perceived crisis. Furthermore, the thesis demonstrates that crises, compromises and regulatory competition lead political parties to diverge from ideological policy preferences.

Acknowledgements

If you read the comic strip 'PhD comics', you get the impression that the road to a PhD is a solitary, lonesome journey filled with obstacles and people who only focus on forwarding their own (academic) agenda. I am not claiming that my road has been free from obstacles, but luckily, it has exclusively been filled with amazing and supporting people, making these past years some of the most memorable and joyful of my life.

First and foremost, to my two supervisors Anton Steen and Jostein Askim: You both put prejudges and stereotypes about senior (male) supervisors to shame: You played a crucial role in recruiting me as a young female student to pursue a PhD, by actively encouraging and persuading me to apply for a PhD position. You have always been available when I have needed assistance, prioritizing my progress into your busy schedules. You have consistently provided constructive comments and suggestions not to further your own research agenda, but on the premises of what I wanted to pursue. You have always treated me as a colleague and not 'merely' a PhD student. Lastly, I genuinely felt that you cared, not only about my academic achievements, but also about how I was doing in general during the many ups and downs a PhD process (and two pregnancies) involves. I could not have done this without the two of you!

I also want to thank all my other colleagues at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, and particularly my fellow PPA colleagues. I have not once knocked on a door and asked for guidance (and I did so more often than most), and not been met with helping advice and concrete suggestions for the path forward. To Silje, Andreas H., Andreas K., Inga, Ida, Peter, Tarald, Torbjørg, Karl, Eirin, Simen, Leif, Nina, and the all the other PhD candidates at the department during the last six years: I think only people who has embarked on the same journey fully understands what it entails. Thank you for countless of conversations ranging from academic challenges and non-academic topics like what TV-series to binge. Both have been equally important. A special thanks to Kjersti and Solveig, two dear colleagues that developed into dear friends – thank you for challenging conversations, countless laughs and several relaxing visits at the Well.

This thesis would not have been possible without my amazing family and friends, who combine a perfect balance between being genuinely interested in what I do, and at the same time providing a much need break from the academic world. To my mom and dad: I almost feel like I cheated in life, because already from birth I was dealt the best hand possible, with an upbringing including the perfect balance of unconditional support and independence. This achievement is just as much yours as it is mine.

During my PhD period, I did not only produce an academic offspring, but also two biological ones. Dearest Cornelia and Edwin: You have made it easy to prioritize what is truly important, and to accept that some things had to be 'good enough'. You have not only filled my life with indescribable joy, but I truly believe that the breaks enforced by our daily routines have made me better at what I do. Lastly, thank you for mostly sleeping through the night.

Last but not least, dear Jon: Although you have no clue about the details of my PhD, you have been there every step of the way, celebrating my accomplishments and supporting me through my frustrations. You may not have contributed to the academic content of this PhD;

nonetheless, your overall contribution to my wellbeing and happiness during this process is by far the most valuable contribution of all.

Contents

Part I: Introduction

Part II: Articles

Part I
Introduction

1 Introduction

1.1 Studying Integration Policies – Why and How?

During the past 20 years, immigration to Western European countries has more than doubled. The international migrant population in Western Europe increased from 25 million in 1990 to more than 60 million in 2019, and in 2019, the migrant population constituted roughly 15% of the population (United Nations 2019). This increased immigration, particularly with the refugee crisis in 2015, has raised the successful integration of newcomers to the top of political agendas in the European Union (EU), nationally, regionally and locally (Bleich 2008, 510; Filindra & Goodman 2019, 499; Goodman 2015, 1906). Political solutions to address the challenges of increased immigration have substantial impacts on the lives of immigrants themselves and the populations living in the local communities where immigrants settle. Although debated (Ruist 2017), the successful integration of immigrants has also been presented as a precondition for the survival of the current welfare state in Western European countries (Djuve 2016; NOU 2017, 2). With increased immigration, the design, structure, and implementation of policies that promote integration of immigrants becomes crucial (Andersson Joona, Lanninger, & Sundström 2016).

With the rise of such a salient, impactful political issue, research on integration has become one of the fastest growing areas in political science (Goodman 2015, 1906), with scholars attempting to account for its political salience, myriad policy designs, and various policy effects (Filindra & Goodman 2019, 499). The immigration and integration literature traditionally has been dominated by scholars who have viewed themselves as specialists on immigration, citizenship, race, and ethnicity and have mostly spoken to their own fields. Several scholars have called for increasing synergies between the literatures on immigrant integration and public policies: 1) public policy generalists should incorporate integration-policy-related case studies; and 2) integration scholars should employ tested frameworks and theories from public policy studies (Bleich 2008; Filindra & Goodman 2019, 511).

This thesis answers this call by applying both approaches subsequently. The three articles in this thesis use selected integration policies to study general political phenomena, and each article addresses unique research gaps in the general policy and governance literature. In addition, this thesis aims to provide both empirical and theoretical contributions to the integration literature by combining the insights from the articles. This introduction chapter synthesizes the findings from the three articles to discuss how (selected) theories from the policy and governance literature advance the theoretical development in the integration literature. By taking this dual approach, the thesis aims to answer two overarching research questions, one descriptive and one explanatory:

1. Are Western European integration policies changing, and if so, towards what?
2. What are the drivers of change and stability in integration policies?

Although the exact wording of the research questions differs in each article, the articles essentially ask the same overarching research questions. However, the articles focus on different elements of integration policies and analyze different sub-policies (see Table 1, section 1.3). These differences mean that separately, each article makes unique contributions to the integration literature; however, combined, they also provide a broad assessment of whether Western European integration policies are changing. While the three articles' empirical foci differ, they test many of the same theories to explain why policy changes happen, making it possible to synthesize the findings from the three studies to address the second research question.

By answering the first research question, the thesis contributes to expand the empirical scope of cross-national analyses of Western European integration policies. It does so by: 1) analyzing recent empirical developments in Western European integration policies – including developments during the refugee crisis in 2015 – and discussing whether and how these recent developments alter current cross-national classifications and conclusions in the integration literature; 2) expanding studies on the central–local dimension of integration governance; and 3) presenting the first broad comparative analysis of the horizontal dimension of integration governance. By answering the second research question, the thesis makes theoretical contributions by testing a selection of established theories in the general policy and governance literature that have not been systematically applied in the integration literature: the role of crises, compromises, and regulatory competition. This thesis also discusses how these theories – formerly untested in the integration literature – supplement and moderate the scope of the dominant theories of change identified in the current literature on integration: national path dependency and party politics.

This introduction chapter proceeds with a clarification of the elements of integration policies on which this thesis focuses (section 1.2). Next, this chapter presents the current empirical and theoretical research gaps in the integration literature and the ways in which the three articles address these gaps (section 1.3). Then follows an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the articles' and the thesis's research designs (section 1.4). After a summary of each article (section 1.5), a discussion on how the empirical findings in the articles alter or moderate the current classifications and conclusions in the integration literature is presented (section 1.6). Finally, the theoretical findings from the articles are discussed (section 1.7) before suggestions for future studies on integration policies are outlined (section 1.8).

1.2 Integration Policies – Frames, Policy Measures, and Governance

Integration is "a word used by many but understood differently by most" (Robinson 1998, 118). This quote illustrates why it is both challenging and interesting to study integration policies. The essence of policies is the intention to guide and steer processes in society, and integration policies "are part of a normative political process in which the issue of integration is formulated as a problem, the problem is given a normative framing, and concrete policy measures are designed and implemented to achieve a desired outcome" (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas 2016, 20).

Following Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016), the study of integration policies include three branches, the study of: 1) *frames*, or how different political and social actors perceive integration, including the underlying assumptions of the causes and possible solutions of problems; 2) policy measures, or the programs and instruments in place; and 3) governance, including the vertical and horizontal organization of integration policies. The three articles in this thesis complement each other by focusing on different elements of integration policies. Article 1 studies policy measures, article 2 examines central–local governance, and article 3 analyses the horizontal governance of integration policies. The (national) frames of integration policies have been widely studied in the integration literature and are not the focus of this thesis (although changes in the national frames in Sweden are briefly discussed in section 1.7.6).

That integration is a wicked issue (Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017) adds to the complexity of operationalizing what integration policies are. A *wicked issue* is a term used to describe complex social problems that do not have an agreed upon problem definition or solution, cross traditional sectorial lines, and are transboundary, ambiguous, and uncertain (Rittel & Webber 1973). That integration is transboundary implies that it (can) encompass different sub-policies including housing, settlement, employment, discrimination, health, citizenship, education, and family reunification. This wicked nature indicates that conceptual decisions on which subfields to include and exclude when studying integration policies must be made. The conceptual scope of which sub-policies are analyzed differs across the articles. The following literature review identifies the research gaps in the current integration literature and argues why the selected sub-policies are useful for analyzing the phenomena studied in each article.

1.3   Research Gaps in the Integration Literature

The three articles were primarily written as contributions to the general public policy and governance literature, so they only include short explanations for how they fill gaps in the integration literature. This section thoroughly explains how each article fills empirical gaps in the current integration literature concerning the political phenomena and the specific sub-policies studied (for an overview, see Table 1). Lastly, this section presents theoretical research gaps in the integration literature.

Table 1: The Studied Political Phenomena, Research Questions, and Empirical Focus in Each Article

	Article 1 *Cross-national Convergence in Times of Crisis? Integration Policies Before, During, and After the Refugee Crisis*	Article 2 *Central Coercion or Local Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Policy Instrument Choice in Refugee Settlement Policies*	Article 3 *Policy Preferences and Ministerial Structures: Immigrant Integration Governance in Western Europe, 1997–2017*
General Political Phenomena Studied	Public policy	Central–local governance	Horizontal governance
Specific Phenomena Studied	Policy changes in times of crisis	Changes in policy instruments regulating central–local governance	Changes in ministerial structures
Specific Research Questions	Did the Scandinavian countries experience a change in national integration policies? Are converging cross-national traits apparent? What caused these changes?	What explains the introduction or absence of central coercive policy instruments toward municipalities in central–local governance?	How has immigrant integration been coupled with other issues and been signaled in the ministerial structure over time, and are there cross-national differences? Do government parties' issue and policy preferences explain cross- and within-country developments?
Sub-policies Studied	Permanent residence policies Citizenship policies Family reunification policies Social policies	Refugee settlement policies	Integration policies in general (not specific sub-policies)

1.3.1 Crises and Policy Convergence

One of the major ongoing debates in the integration literature questions whether there are patterns of convergence and divergence in national integration policies, including discussions on both national frames and policy measures. This debate was sparked by the work of Brubaker (1992) and Favell (1998), who introduced the idea of "national models of integration". This idea assumes that historical national legacies – of nationstatehood and different philosophies based on contrasting understandings of citizenship and nationality – affect the development of integration policies, causing cross-national divergence (Emilsson 2016). Several scholars have debated and challenged this idea in studies showing cross-national trends of both convergence and divergence (Baldi & Goodman 2015; Brochmann & Hagelund 2010; Carrera 2006; Goodman 2010; 2011; Joppke 2007; 2017). Most of these studies have included historical accounts going back to the birth of national integration policies in the countries studied.

During the refugee crisis in 2015, Western European countries simultaneously faced an exponential increase in the number of asylum seekers compared to previous years. How crises affect public policies has been a major topic in the public policy literature (Kingdon 1984; Thelen 1999; 2003), and the literature has shown that crises may result in social, political, and organizational change (Christensen et al. 2016, 887). Studies on policy change in times of crisis, though, have shown differences in the degree, direction, and mechanisms of change (Boin et al. 2009). However, the essential question of how crises affect national integration policies has received little systematic attention in the integration literature.

To analyze policy change in times of crisis, article 1 assumes that the link between immigration and integration can shift the focus of integration policies from measures to enable integration to measures to ensure migration control (Baldi & Goodman 2015; Joppke 2007).

Thus, the four selected sub-policies – permanent residence, citizenship, family reunification, and social benefits – are at the heart of the immigration–integration nexus. Previous research has mainly focused on the conditionality between civic integration requirements and paths to secure status (e.g., entry, permanent residence, and citizenship; Borevi, Jensen, & Mouritsen 2017), but legal status is only one subset of integration policies (Goodman 2015). Baldi and Goodman (2015) illustrated how different spheres of integration policies are interlinked and argued that an assessment of a country's overall direction is contingent on a comparative analysis of different sub-policies.

Article 1 contributes to the integration literature by investigating how crises affect national integration policies. Article 1 also expands the empirical scope of integration policies to include not only policies regulating permanent residence and citizenship but also other less-studied aspects of integration policies: family reunification (Bech et al. 2017) and immigrants' access to social benefits (Baldi & Goodman 2015).

1.3.2 Central–Local Governance

Studies on integration frames and policy measures dominated the integration literature in its early years, while the governance of integration gained less attention. However, since the 2000s, the multi-level governance of integration policies, including the central–local dimension, has received increasing academic attention. Studies on the central–local governance of integration have mainly analyzed how local governments – particularly large cities – develop their own integration policies. Scholars studying the "local turn" have shown that local governments do not merely implement national integration policies but increasingly formulate their own integration policies, which may diverge from the 'national models of integration' (Alexander 2003; Dekker, Emilsson, Krieger, & Scholten 2015, 2; Emilsson 2016; Jørgensen 2014; Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello, & Vertovec 2017). Another strain of literature including the central–local dimension is the mainstreaming literature, which has analyzed whether the integration field has a state-centric (centralized) or a poly-centric (decentralized) governance structure (Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017; Scholten & van Breugel 2017).

In the existing literature, empirical assessments of whether there is a centralized or a localized governance approach have mostly been based on two criteria: 1) whether local governments have their own integration policies; and, if so, 2) whether these policies comply with or contradict national integration policies. An alternative approach to studying the central–local dimension is to analyze how national policies regulate the leeway local governments possess to develop their own integration policies. Although some studies have mentioned constitutional and financial frames regulating the autonomy of local governments as contextual factors (e.g., Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas 2016), in-depth studies on how local leeway is regulated through national policies have been a road less traveled. However, there is one good exception. Emilsson (2016) studied how central governments can exercise power over local governments by examining how national governments use different instruments (coercive, remunerative, and normative) in national integration policies to regulate local leeway. He found what he called a "national turn" in Swedish and Danish integration policies: "Sweden and Denmark have diverged when it comes to integration policy measures and frames but converged

in a strong centralistic governance model (Emilsson 2016, 66) This finding contradicts much of the literature, which has concluded that there has been a "local turn" or increased decentralization in the central–local governance of the integration field. Article 2 takes a similar approach as Emilsson (2016) by exploring how Scandinavian national governments regulate local governments' autonomy concerning refugee settlement.

Refugee settlement policies may be seen as first steps in national integration policies (Askim & Hernes 2017, 106) because where individuals settle or are settled may affect the continuing integration process (Hernes, Arendt, Joona, & Tronstad 2019, 28). Refugee settlement policies allow refugees who have obtained residence permits but are not yet national citizens to be subject to certain policies regulating their right to free settlement within the country. These policies have long been infused with a combination of practical and moral considerations and combine trade-offs between individual choice and collective goods through public regulation, local autonomy and central steering, and efficiency and democratic accountability (Askim & Hernes 2017; Borevi & Bengtsson 2015). Refugee settlement policies have been used as a case for studying general questions of public policy and governance. For example, studies have focused on how administrative framing and political discourse influence local decision making (Steen 2016; Steen & Røed 2018). Scholars have also considered the outcomes of different national policies such as how different settlement models affect dispersed settlement and labor market outcomes (Bevelander 2011; Bevelander & Lundh 2007; Damm 2014; Edin, Fredriksson, & Åslund 2003; Hernes et. al. 2019). Extensive country studies and comparisons of national integration policies in the Scandinavian countries have often included settlement policies as one of many sub-policies in analysis (Borevi 2010; Brochmann & Hagelund 2010; Petersen & Jønsson 2010). Borevi and Bengtsson (2015) provided an extensive policy analysis of why the Scandinavian countries have developed different settlement models for refugees.

An essential question guiding refugee settlement policies is who should decide where refugees should live – refugees, the state, or municipalities (Askim & Hernes 2017). These decisions are based on two subsequent questions: First, should refugees be able to self-settle freely in a country after getting residence permits, or should there be an element of publicly steered settlement? Second, if there is an element of publicly steered settlement, which level of government should have the final say? This latter question directly addresses the phenomena studied in article 2: central–local governance and national regulation of local autonomy. Earlier studies often focused on the first question but did not investigate or discuss the latter question in much detail. For instance, Borevi and Bengtsson (2015) explicitly limited their study to not include an analysis of the central–local governance question.

Article 2 addresses the question of how political actors prioritize instruments promoting either central coercion or local autonomy. Thus, article 2 studies how national policies regulate the leeway local governments enjoy, which has been an understudied phenomena in the integration literature in general and in empirical studies on refugee settlement specifically.

1.3.3 Horizontal Governance

The governance literature has shown that the horizontal structure of a policy issue is both a political and an administrative tool (Christensen et al. 2014, 43; Davis et al. 1999; White &

Dunleavy 2010). Moreover, the horizontal structure may affect policy development (Egeberg 2012, 157–59; Hammond 1986). Nonetheless, the horizontal governance structure of immigrant integration has received remarkably little attention (Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017), with a few important exceptions. Desiderio and Weinar (2014) contributed with a cross-national descriptive analysis of the national ministries and ministers responsible for integration. Additionally, the literature addressing whether there has been a trend towards mainstreaming integration governance has included the horizontal dimension as one of several analyzed elements (Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017; Scholten & van Breugel 2017; Van Breugel & Scholten 2017; 2019; Westerveen & Adam 2019). A laudable aspect of these comparative case studies is that they have taken a broad approach to analyze different elements of horizontal governance: coordinating units, division of responsibility among ministries, and cooperation with external actors.

However, the integration governance literature could benefit from moving beyond comparative case studies and instead systematically analyzing the horizontal dimension with more observations in spatial and longitudinal analyses. For integration policy measures, such analyses have been enabled by the construction of several datasets documenting integration policies measures over time across medium and large numbers of countries. Such datasets include MIPEX (Huddleston, Bilgili, Joki, & Vankova 2015), CIVIX (Goodman 2012b), and IMPIC (Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, & Zobel 2017). As part of this thesis, I have constructed a new dataset, the Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance (DIIG), which systematically documents the horizontal structure at the ministerial level in the EU15 countries and Norway from 1997 to 2017.

Article 3 applies the DIIG dataset to study longitudinal and cross-national patterns of how integration is signaled in ministerial titles and whether integration and immigration/justice are coupled or decoupled in ministerial structures. Article 3 thus is the first broad comparative analysis of the horizontal governance of integration policies.

1.3.4 Testing Established and Emerging Explanations in the Integration Literature

The integration literature has unused potential to apply tested theories from the general public policy literature (Bleich 2008; Filindra & Goodman 2019, 511); however, some scholars have already applied this approach and contributed to and borrowed from the general public policy literature (Filindra & Goodman 2019). For example, Scholten, Collett, and Petrovic (2017) critically analyzed whether there is a trend toward mainstreaming integration policy and governance, and Breidahl (2012) tested how policy learning may explain convergent traits in the Scandinavian countries. In addition, Filindra and Manatschal (2019) used policy feedback theory to examine how state-level policies affect immigrants' political attitudes and behavior. This thesis continues on this synergetic path.

Theories may play different roles in different research designs. This thesis takes a dual theoretical approach. The three articles follow a classical deductive approach by testing hypotheses grounded in theories. This introduction, though, takes a more inductive approach by discussing how the findings from the three articles 1) alter the scope conditions of two

established explanations in the integration literature (path dependency and party politics) and 2) introduce alternative or supplementary explanations (crisis, compromise, and regulatory competition) to understand developments in Western European policy processes.

It is important to emphasize that the theories tested in the articles have been selected for their relevance to answer the specific research questions in each article. The selected theories, therefore, are not meant to represent all possible explanations of changes in national integration policies, nor is such a holistic theoretical approach the aim of this thesis. Instead, the thesis's overarching theoretical goal is to test the selected theories from the general public policy literature and to discuss 1) if they help explain changes within the integration field and 2) if and how they supplement or alter the scope conditions of the two dominant theories in the integration literature.

The three articles test hypotheses derived from many of the same theories, but they do not include all the same theories. Additionally, the articles differ in their research designs, not only in which theories they test but also how these theories are applied in the analysis. For example, article 2 lists four theories as possible explanations and discusses their interrelationships, while article 3 mainly tests one explanatory variable (party politics). However, article 3 also mentions path dependency as a premise for ministerial structures and controls for and discusses observations with high increases in immigration and asylum rates as a proxy for a crisis. Although these latter variables are not the main theoretical focus in article 3, information can be extracted from article 3 when trying to synthesize theoretical findings across the articles. The theories listed in Table 2 thus represent theories that each article either explicitly tests or discusses in the empirical analysis or discussion. The theories presented in parenthesis are included in their respective articles but are not further discussed in this introduction chapter.

Table 2: Theories Discussed in the Articles

	Article 1 Cross-national Convergence in Times of Crisis?	Article 2 Central Coercion or Local Autonomy?	Article 3 Policy Preferences and Ministerial Structures
Theories Discussed in the Articles	Path dependency Party politics Crisis Compromise Regulatory competition (Independent problem solving)	Path dependency Party politics Crisis Compromise (Expert and target group support) (Other political strategies: obfuscation and divide and rule)	Path dependency Party politics Crisis

This section briefly elaborates on the theoretical underpinnings of path dependency and party politics and situates how they have been used in the integration literature. Next, this section presents the three "new" theories discussed thoroughly in this introduction chapter: crisis, compromise, and regulatory competition.

Path Dependency

Historical institutionalism and path dependency build on the idea that once a path – a policy or an organizational structure – is chosen, the relevant actors adapt to the practice, which limits possibilities for radical change (Thelen 1999, 385; 2003, 219). Initial choices thus restrict future

leeway for change. The theory does not indicate that change is impossible but, instead, that changes will be incremental rather than radical. According to this logic, policies and structures are not radically altered by shifting political majorities but either are stable or follow incremental changes, complying with national traditions and philosophies on the integration issue.

In the integration literature, path dependency has been one of the most common explanations for (non-)change. The theory of path dependency has been used in a both a strict and a less strict way in the current literature (Breidahl 2017). The core idea in the argument for national models of integration follows the stricter version of the theory and focuses on how historical national legacies affect the development of integration policies (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998). Other scholars have applied the argument of path dependency less strictly, although the overarching idea remains that existing policies and structures limit politicians' leeway for (radical) change. As Goodman (2012a, 670) put it, the role of inherited policies matters because policies are not only outputs but also inputs in the political process. Numerous scholars have shown that both national traditions and existing policies and governance structures affect future developments (Baldi & Goodman 2015; Borevi 2014; Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017).

Party Politics

Integration is among the most pressing concerns in Western Europe today (Bleich 2008, 509), and it is high on the political agenda at all government levels (Hernes et al. 2019). Integration has also been shown to be one of electorates' major concerns and a politically salient issue (Koopmans & Statham 2000) infused with symbolic politics (Borevi, Jensen, & Mouritsen 2017; Joppke 2017). Although there are many national exceptions from this general rule, political parties' policy preferences regarding integration generally follow a left–right axis: parties on the right are more inclined to favor restrictive integration policies, parties on the left are more inclined to favor permissive integration policies, and parties in the middle are either more moderate or have more ambiguous positions (Akkerman 2012; Ennser 2012). Differing political positions on integration imply that changing governments and/or changing parliamentary majorities may explain changes in integration policies. Several studies have shown how this tendency has affected policy developments within the integration field (Akkerman 2012; Borevi, Jensen, & Mouritsen 2017; Goodman 2012a).

Crisis

Crises may cause social, political, and organizational change (Christensen et al. 2016, 887). Even historical institutionalism, which posits that incremental change is the rule, acknowledges that critical junctures constitute situations in which institutions may make radical change (Thelen 1999, 386–88). Indeed, crises are often portrayed as window[s] of opportunity for change (Kingdon 1984). While crises tend to demand strong central leadership, direction, and control (Christensen, Lægreid, & Rykkja 2016, 7), studies on policy change in times of crisis have shown differences in the degree, direction, and mechanisms of change (Boin et al. 2009).

The integration literature has lacked systematic analyses of how crises affect policy developments. In one exception, Jørgensen and Thomsen (2013) studied the impacts of economic crises in the early 1970s and 2000s and found that crises affect not only policy processes and content but also the social construction of target groups. Although the effects of crises on policy developments have been understudied in early comparative studies on Western European integration policies, the relevance of crises is impossible to ignore, especially after the refugee crisis in 2015.

Compromise

Whether a government is successful in getting a policy proposal accepted by a majority in parliament can depend on the advocating parties' political strategies. If the government or advocates within the government want to introduce a new policy, their strategies may be decisive for the outcome. For example, a minority government or the parties within a coalition government often need to persuade and negotiate with both their coalition partners and the opposition to ensure a majority in parliament. Blom-Hansen, Christiansen, Fimreite, and Selle (2012, 75) referred to compensation – or compromises, as it is henceforth called – as a classic political strategy. Political compromises can consist of an agreement in which the governing parties and opposing parties meet halfway on a policy issue or a compensation strategy intended to reduce the opposition's resistance by linking two or more issues in a package deal. Opponents may accept policies they would otherwise resist if they get their way in other areas as part of a larger reform or compromise. The government's use of such strategies may be decisive in why policy changes happen, particularly in multi-party systems where political advocates need to ensure a majority with all the coalition parties in government and/or the opposition parties in the case of a minority government.

The strategy of political compromises has been included in case studies of policy developments of integration policies (Djuve 2011). It has less commonly been considered in comparative analyses, which have often been limited to examining the correlations between governing political parties and policy changes (Akkerman 2012; Goodman 2012a) without analyzing how government parties manage to gain the majority necessary for policy changes.

Regulatory Competition

Regulatory competition focuses on how countries facing competitive pressures mutually adjust their policies, leading to policy convergence. The general assumption of regulatory competition is that when facing a common challenge, countries competitively adjust their national policies according to other countries' policies, leading to a cross-national "race to the bottom" (Holzinger & Knill 2005, 782). Although previous studies on regulatory competition have mostly focused on economic policies, particularly in international trade, this logic may also be applicable within the field of immigration and integration policies (Heichel, Pape, & Sommerer 2005, 831). The end goal of financial regulatory policies in international trade is to attract economic actors; however, when looking at immigration and integration policies targeting all migrants, there can be a dual logic with contrary objectives. While there can be a race for

countries to attract high-ability migrants, there can also be an opposite race to not be attractive destination countries to less attractive migrants (Damm & Åslund 2017, 14). In the migration literature, some studies have tested whether different drivers including regulatory competition lead to convergence in immigration control policies (Meyers 2002) and immigration policies for asylum seekers (Lavenex 2002). However, the mechanism of regulatory competition has not been applied to explain changes in integration policies.

1.4   Research Design

This section starts by presenting and evaluating the articles' methodological strengths and weaknesses by discussing their different approaches to what George and Bennett (2005, 31) called "the trade-off between the goals of attaining theoretical parsimony and establishing explanatory richness." This section continues to present how the thesis is intended to comply with requirements for good research ethics and follows a pragmatic epistemological approach by combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Finally, this section discusses the limitations on theoretical generalizations to other policy issues when using the integration issue to study general phenomena in public policy and governance.

1.4.1   Theoretical Parsimony or Explanatory Richness?

Table 3 summarizes the main aspects of the three articles' research designs.

Table 3: Research Designs of the Three Articles

	Article 1 *Cross-national Convergence in Times of Crisis?*	Article 2 *Central Coercion or Local Autonomy?*	Article 3 *Policy Preferences and Ministerial Structures*
Analytic Approach	Comparative case studies of 19 policy processes Cross-national comparison of policies before (2015) and after (2017) the refugee crisis	Comparative case studies of six policy processes	Descriptive spatial and longitudinal analysis of horizontal governance structures Quantitative analysis of the correlations between the horizontal structures and different types of coalition governments
Data	Legislation Government platforms Policy process documents Parliamentary debates	Legislation Policy process documents Public hearings Parliamentary debates Interviews	Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance (DIIG) Data on government parties from ParlGov Data on immigration and asylum applicants from Eurostat
Countries	Norway, Denmark, and Sweden	Norway, Denmark, and Sweden	EU15 and Norway
Period	2015–2017	1999–2016	1997–2017

Articles 1 and 2 are based on comparative case studies of policy processes in the Scandinavian countries. Both studies include within- and across-case analyses, which George and Bennett (2005, 18) argued are the "strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies." Borevi, Jensen, and Mouritsen (2017, 5) described Sweden, Denmark, and Norway as "ideal candidates for a 'most similar' comparative case study". The Scandinavian countries share strong political,

social, cultural, and economic similarities, making them suitable cases for cross-country comparison, as the Scandinavian comparative analyses keep important contextual factors (relatively) constant (Baldersheim & Ståhlberg 2002; Blom-Hansen, Christiansen, Fimreite, & Selle 2012). Their central-local structures, which include comprehensive welfare states where municipalities play a crucial role (Hansen & Klausen 2002), and their similar political systems (Blom-Hansen 1999), enable the examination of how other factors affect the outcomes of the policy processes. Despite these strong similarities, these countries approach immigrant integration quite differently (Migration Policy Group 2017). In all indices of integration policies, regardless of the indicators, Denmark and Sweden are at opposite ends, placing Denmark in the restrictive group, Sweden in the permissive group, and Norway somewhere between them (Borevi, Jensen, & Mouritsen 2017; Goodman 2010; 2012b). Additionally, the three countries have developed very different models of refugee settlement (Borevi & Bengtsson 2014, 2). Thus, the Scandinavian countries have variations in the dependent variables (integration policies and central–local governance structures of refugee settlement) but keep other important contextual factors (relatively) constant. Consequently, these countries are suitable cases to study different explanations for (non-)change.

Article 1 concentrates on changes in integration policies from 2015 through June 2017. During this period, the Scandinavian countries all experienced substantial increases in asylum seekers in 2015, followed by drops in 2016. Thus, during the period investigated, all three countries faced significant fluctuations in the number of asylum seekers, making them relevant cases to compare the governments' reactions to these fluctuations. The first part of the empirical analysis uses legislation and policy documents to compare each country's policies in 2015 and in June 2017 to determine if there were policy change and convergence across the three countries. The second part of the empirical analysis examines the mechanisms leading to change and (potential) convergence by studying the different steps of the policy processes, government platforms, cross-party conciliations, and parliamentary debates.

Article 2 studies five policy processes that included proposals to introduce a coercive policy instrument in the central–local governance of refugee settlement policies: legislation empowering a central authority to decide the allocation of refugees among municipalities. Additionally, the study includes one negative case based on Mahoney and Goertz's (2004) possibility principle on instances when there might have been windows of opportunity for change, but formal policy processes never took place. Policy documents and transcripts from public hearings and parliamentary debates constitute the data for the empirical analysis. The parliamentary debates provide information on political parties' positions in policy processes studied, including in-depth justification of these positions. The public hearings show how other experts assess the policy proposals and identify support and opposition in the target group: municipalities and their interest organizations. The two Norwegian policy processes resulting in no changes did not make it to parliament. This limited the formal documents available to understand why these processes did not result in change, creating a need to conduct interviews with administrative and political officials involved in both processes.

Articles 1 and 2, despite their many similarities, differently prioritize theoretical parsimony and explanatory richness. Article 1 tests four explanatory variables and discusses their interactions in detail but only focuses on one sub-policy: refugee settlement policy. In contrast,

article 2 analyzes four sub-policies but limits the theoretical scope to test two competing drivers of convergence (although path dependency and party politics are also discussed).

Article 3 follows a different methodological approach by testing two theoretical hypotheses on a wide selection of observations both cross-nationally and over time. This approach distinguishes this study from the traditional approaches in the machinery of government literature and the integration literature, which have favored longitudinal case studies in one or a few countries. This study presents a new dataset compiled by the author as part of this thesis: the Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance (DIIG), which documents the national structures of the immigrant integration field in 16 Western European countries from 1997 to 2017. Variables on national elections, governments, government parties, and their party family affiliations were extracted from the ParlGov database to classify different types of governments (Döring & Manow 2016). Article 3 presents statistical analyses testing the hypothesized correlations between different government types and horizontal structures for the integration issue and includes multivariate analyses as robust tests controlling for immigration and asylum application rates extracted from Eurostat. However, article 3 does not solely rely on statistical significant correlations but also qualitatively assesses the exact observations driving the results in the statistical analyses. Nevertheless, article 3 certainly prioritizes theoretical parsimony over explanatory richness because it mainly focuses on testing whether different government types correlate with different ministerial structures. In the article, this limitation is explicitly acknowledged. The article states that how decisive political parties' policy preferences are in determining ministerial structures cannot be revealed by quantitative analyses; it requires in-depth analyses of each process leading to ministerial changes or stability.

1.4.2 Research Ethics

The sources used to conduct the analyses in articles 1 and 2 are publicly available documents, so it is possible for others to replicate the analyses. For article 2, interviews with selected administrative and political officials were also conducted. The interviewees are anonymized in the article but were informed at the beginning of their interviews that they might be indirectly identified through the descriptions of their affiliated job and position. All the interviewees signed consent forms clarifying this information. Additionally, all the quotes used in the article were sent to the interviewees for approval before the article was sent to the journal for review.

The DIIG dataset was constructed based on publicly available sources. An appendix to the dataset provides a detailed list of all the references used to classify each country (see appendix 2 in article 3). In compliance with the recommendations of the *Guidelines for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences, Humanities, Law and Theology* (NESH 2016), the DIIG dataset will be made available with the future publication of article 3. It will be available online at https://dataverse.no/, along with all the appendices documenting the analyses conducted in article 3, providing the necessary information to replicate these analyses.

1.4.3 Mixed Methods

This thesis applies both qualitative and quantitative methods. By combining qualitative and quantitative methods to answer the overall research questions, this thesis follows what Rashakkori and Teddle (2003, 4) identified as a pragmatic perspective to research. Pragmatism is a practical research philosophy that presumes that combining qualitative and quantitative methods is possible and fruitful, although historically, the methods originated from different epistemological perspectives on what knowledge is (Maxcy 2003). One advantage of using multiple methods is that it enables 1) analyzing how specific independent variables correlate with dependent variables and 2) answering explanatory questions about the interactions of independent variables and the conditions of their explanatory power (Rashakkori & Teddle 2003, 4). These two aspects are especially relevant to the theoretical goals of this thesis, which includes a discussion on the scope conditions of the two dominant theories in the integration literature and the possibilities for new theoretical explanations to moderate or supplement their scope conditions.

1.4.4 Contingent Generalizations to Other Policy Issues

According to George and Bennett (2005, 30–32), "case researchers do *not* [authors' emphasis] aspire to select cases that are directly 'representative' of diverse populations;" instead, "they select cases with the goal of providing the strongest possible inferences on particular theories," for example, using most-likely or least-likely case selection. With this selection strategy, one should be cautious about making claims that findings are applicable to larger populations or phenomena except in contingent ways.

If integration studies aim to say something about public policies and governance more generally, they need to acknowledge that particular characteristics of integration might limit the possibility of generalizing findings to other policy issues. That integration is an especially salient (Koopmans & Statham 2000) and wicked issue (Rittel & Weber 1973) can make it a highly relevant policy issue to study, but these exact characteristics also necessitate caution when trying to generalize findings to larger phenomena.

As highlighted in articles 2 and 3, the salient, wicked nature of integration limits the possibilities to generalize the findings to other less salient and less wicked issues. For example, article 2 finds that expert opinions are not that important in explaining divergent outcomes in Scandinavian refugee settlement policies but also acknowledges that expert opinions could be more relevant to less salient policy issues. Article 3 highlights that political parties' policy preferences could be less important in determining the ministerial structures for less salient policy issues because political actors may be less inclined to use the top level of bureaucracy as a means to signal and prioritize issue and policy preferences. Additionally, as a wicked issue crossing traditional sectorial lines, integration has the potential to be coupled with multiple related issues, thereby opening more alternative structures than less wicked issues.

1.5   Summary of the Articles

Article 1: Cross-national Convergence in Times of Crisis? Integration Policies Before, During, and After the Refugee Crisis

This article analyzes if, how, and why Scandinavian integration policies converged as a result of the refugee crisis in 2015, focusing on the policies of permanent residence, citizenship, family reunification, and access to social benefits. It starts by clarifying how it assesses policy convergence. Two different approaches to assess convergence identified by Heichel, Pape, and Sommerer (2005, 831–834) are applied: 1) sigma convergence, meaning decreases in variation; and 2) delta convergence, meaning parallel moves in the same direction toward a model or on a continuum. This article also build on Hall's (1993, 278) separation of policies into three dimensions: 1) the overarching *goals* that guide policy in a particular field; 2) the techniques or policy *instruments* used to attain those goals; and 3) the precise *settings* of these instruments.

The research concludes that *goal* convergence is apparent according to the sigma definition of convergence (decreases in variation) because all three countries explicitly used integration policies to reduce the number of asylum seekers. Although the three countries had similar goals, they applied different instruments and settings to achieve the goals. Norway introduced new civic requirements for access to permanent residence and citizenship, while Sweden added residence and employment requirements for permanent residence and family reunification. Denmark had restrictive instruments in place before the crisis and sharpened the settings of those instruments, in addition to (re)introducing new restrictions on refugees' access to social benefits. The configurations of instruments and the settings of these instruments still differed across the countries, so for instruments and settings, sigma convergence is not evident. Nonetheless, all three countries took restrictive steps, so the analysis shows parallel moves in the same direction, implying convergence according to the delta definition.

The analysis illustrates how more restrictive policies are explicitly justified by politicians by referring to how national policies must be aligned with or, in some cases, more restrictive than those of neighboring countries. This finding demonstrates that the mechanism leading to more restrictive and conditional policies is cross-country regulatory competition. However, the continuing gap in the three countries' choices of policy instruments and their settings is better understood through the logic of path dependency because the existing policies clearly affected the degree of change in each country.

Beyond the empirical findings, the article contributes by discussing a severe challenge in the current integration literature: how an insufficient level of precision 1) concerning how to assess convergence and 2) concerning different dimensions of the policies could lead to inaccurate and even contrary conclusions when interpreting empirical analyses. First, clear definitions of how to assess convergence have been almost absent from the current literature on integration policies, and there is unexploited potential to build on the developed definitions in the policy convergence literature. Article 1 argues that it is essential to be clear how convergence is assessed, and demonstrates how different definitions may lead to different conclusions. Second, this article illustrates the importance of clarifying what policy dimensions are assessed when

studying cross-national policy changes and how focusing on different dimensions can lead to different conclusions. Furthermore, it shows how the lack of precision in previous studies concerning which policy dimensions were emphasized when reaching conclusions could lead to potentially false disagreements in the academic debate on convergence and divergence in national integration policies.

Article 2: Central Coercion or Local Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Policy Instrument Choice in Refugee Settlement Policies

This article examines explanations for the introduction or absence of central coercive policy instruments toward local governments. This comparative research includes six policy processes in Scandinavia where the introduction of policy instruments involving central coercion is put on the political agenda, focusing on refugee settlement policies. The study contributes to the central–local literature by addressing two insufficiently explored areas: 1) studies on how local governments are regulated within constitutional and financial frames; and 2) studies explaining cross-country differences.

Empirically, the analysis finds that both Denmark and Sweden have moved from decentralized to centralized settlement models in which the central government allocates refugees to municipalities, limiting local governments' autonomy. These changes implies a shift toward increased centralization of Scandinavian refugee settlement policies, with Norway as an exception. Theoretically, this article examines how political ideological positions, crises, external support, and the use of different political strategies explain the different outcomes in the six policy processes. Although the analysis supports earlier research stating that political parties have ideological preferences concerning central–local governance relationships, it illustrates how ideology is put aside in times of perceived crisis and because of political compromises entered into as part of larger reforms. Crises and political compromises thus largely explain why many Danish and Swedish political parties ideologically opposed to restricting municipal autonomy ultimately supported the central allocation of refugees. Additionally, the different political strategies used by central governments to present central allocation as a policy instrument greatly affected the outcomes, thus helping explain the cross-national differences in municipal opposition and support. While the Norwegian attempt to obfuscate the consequences of the coercive element failed, the Danish and Swedish advocates used a different tactic of divide and rule. They explicitly highlighted that the proposal would benefit some municipalities more than others compared to the status quo, so selected municipalities supported the proposed coercive element.

Regarding the regulation of local autonomy within constitutional and financial frameworks, an important finding is Norway's political reluctance to restrict municipal autonomy. Indeed, other studies have supported the observation that central–local government relationships are more politically salient in Norway than Denmark and Sweden (Arter 2008; Blom-Hansen, Christiansen, Fimreite, & Selle 2012). One might assume that cross-country differences in the political salience of local autonomy are reflected in constitutional and financial frameworks. However, the study reveals differences in the political salience of central–local governance in

these three countries that have been systematically categorized in the same groups in comparative central–local studies (Sellers & Lidström 2007). Consequently, this article argues that studies examining how and why local autonomy is regulated within these frameworks are necessary to understand the actual degree of autonomy local governments enjoy.

Article 3: Policy Preferences and Ministerial Structures: Immigrant Integration Governance in Western Europe, 1997–2017

Publication status: "Accepted with condition", Governance

That not only government parties' issue preferences but also their policy preferences can affect the horizontal ministerial structures has been an often-stated, but yet unexplored, assumption in the literature on the machinery of government changes. This study investigates this assumption by analyzing whether and how political parties' issue and policy preferences might explain longitudinal and cross-national traits in the ministerial structures of immigrant integration in 16 Western European countries. This study documents whether the integration issue is coupled with or decoupled from immigration and/or justice and whether integration is signaled in ministerial titles.

The descriptive analysis finds that divergence and change characterize the ministerial structures of the integration issue, driven by the increasing trend of signaling integration in ministerial titles and the fluctuating trend of coupling integration with immigration and/or justice. The analysis shows that right-oriented governments are more inclined to couple integration with immigration and/or justice than left-oriented governments are, reflecting the right's policy preferences for restrictive integration policies. However, governments that include radical parties are not more inclined to signal integration in ministerial titles.

This article challenges the generalizability of one of the most important identified drivers of ministerial changes in previous studies: internal party politics (Davis et al. 1999; Heppell 2011; White & Dunleavy 2010). It argues that internal party politics may be less relevant to coalition governments (the majority of Western European governments), and issue and policy preferences may play larger roles when coalition governments determine the ministerial structure.

1.6   Changing Integration Policies in Western Europe

Are national integration policies in Western European countries changing and, if so, toward what? This section answers the thesis's descriptive research question by focusing on the empirical findings in each of the articles, situating them in the current academic debate in the integration literature. Whether and how these findings alter or moderate the current classifications and conclusions in the literature is discussed.

1.6.1 Restrictive Policies in Times of Crisis

Article 1 finds that all three countries changed their integration policies during or after the refugee crisis, but they changed different sub-policies. Article 1's focus on several sub-policies makes it possible to extract findings on particular sub-policies. Although article 1 more broadly treats permanent residence and citizenship policies as sub-policies of integration policies (Goodman 2015), the literature on civic integration requirements in citizenship policies has been a major sub-field within the broader integration literature, warranting a summary of recent developments in the civic integration requirements in these three Scandinavian countries. This analysis shows that Norway and Denmark introduced or further restricted civic integration requirements for obtaining permanent residence and citizenship, while Sweden did not introduce any such requirements. Consequently, regarding civic integration requirements, Sweden still stands out from its neighbors, even more so since the crisis, and further supports previous findings pointing to Sweden as the ideal case for continuing national models (Borevi 2014): despite the enormous crisis it faced, Sweden did not walk down the civic path and diverge from its traditional model of integration.

Nevertheless, looking beyond civic integration requirements, Sweden did diverge from its traditional path in two important areas. First, it introduced residence requirements for obtaining permanent residence and family reunification for the first time. Second, it introduced employment requirements that could expedite the process to obtain permanent residence. Sweden thus introduced a conditional requirement for obtaining permanent residence for the first time, although the conditional employment aspect was not absolute. When assessing questions of changes in national integration policies, article 1, in alignment with Baldi and Goodman (2015), demonstrates the importance of including more than one sub-policy if the aim is to assess the overall direction of national integration policies. Although the three countries changed different sub-policies and policy instruments, they all introduced more restrictive integration policies.

1.6.2 Stability and Increased Centralization

Article 2 examines recent cases in which Scandinavian refugee settlement models have been debated and, in some cases, altered. Although article 2 restricts the analysis to central–local government relationships, the following discussion starts with a more general assessment of the overall direction of the Scandinavian settlement models.

This analysis of the Scandinavian settlement models shows that over the past 20 years, Denmark has had a stable settlement model with central allocation of refugees to municipalities. In Norway, the refugee settlement model founded on municipal voluntary agreements has remained stable despite frequent suggestions to alter it. Sweden has also kept the main principle of its settlement model, particularly individual autonomy for refugees who find their own accommodations. However, Sweden has a dual model because not all refugees find their own housing, and those who do not need public assistance. The settlement model for refugees who need public assistance to find accommodations has changed. From 2014 to 2016, Sweden

gradually moved from a settlement model prioritizing municipal autonomy (similar to the Norwegian model) to a model prioritizing central allocation (similar to the Danish model).

This summary suggests two conclusions. First, although some changes in the Scandinavian settlement models have occurred over the years, the main principle of each model has remained stable: Denmark has implemented central allocation over the past 20 years, Norway has prioritized municipal autonomy, and since 1994, Sweden's main principle has been self-settlement. Consequently, a broader assessment of these settlement models supports the conclusion that the Scandinavian countries have had rather stable refugee settlement models.

However, a specific focus on the central–local dimension shows that both Denmark and Sweden have moved from a more decentralized model to a more centralized model in which the central government allocates refugees to municipalities, thereby limiting local governments' autonomy. This change implies a shift toward increased centralization of Scandinavian refugee settlement policies, with Norway as an exception. In alignment with Emilsson's (2016) study on Danish and Swedish integration policies, this finding of increased centralization challenges the claim of a local turn or decentralization in integration policies (Alexander 2003; Dekker, Emilsson, Krieger, & Scholten 2015; Scholten & van Breugel 2017), because both article 2 and Emilsson (2016) indicate that local leeway to develop local integration policies is diminishing.

1.6.3 Change and Divergence in Ministerial Structures

The DIIG dataset is the first to systematically document how the integration issue has been organized at the ministerial level across multiple countries over time. Consequently, whether Western European countries have experienced changes in their ministerial structures and, if so, whether these changes have led to convergent or divergent cross-national structures for the integration issue have generally remained open questions. Documenting 1) whether integration is coupled with or decoupled from immigration and/or justice and 2) whether integration is signaled in ministerial titles, article 3 concludes that change and divergence characterized the ministerial structures of the integration issue in Western European countries from 1997 to 2017, and these structures have become increasingly diverse in the past 10 years.

First, only 6 of the 16 countries studied experienced no changes in whether integration was coupled to immigration and/or justice during this period. Three countries had decoupled structures for the entire period (Belgium, Luxembourg, and Portugal), and three countries had coupled structures for the entire period (Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom). The other 10 countries switched between coupled and decoupled structures at least once, with the Netherlands' four changes marking the most shifts during the period analyzed. In 1997, about half the countries coupled integration coupled with immigration and/or justice. Their number steadily rose until 2005–2006, followed by a fluctuating but decreasing trend through 2017.

Second, article 3 shows a cross-national trend of increased signaling of integration in ministerial titles over the past 20 years. In 1997, only one country included integration in a minister's title, but in 2007, around 40% signaled integration in their ministerial structures. This number dropped from 2012 to 2014 but rose again after the refugee crisis in 2015. Ten of the 16 countries signaled integration in ministerial titles during this period: five in ministry titles (Austria, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, and Sweden), while another five had ministers

responsible for integration who were affiliated with more generalized ministries (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands). In summary, the ministerial structures of the integration issue have become increasingly diverse in the past 10 years, driven by an increasing trend of signaling integration in ministerial titles and a fluctuating trend of coupling integration with immigration and/or justice.

Does Increased Signaling Contradict the Trend of Mainstreaming?

Article 3 documents that integration is increasingly signaled in ministerial titles in Western European countries, and briefly states that this finding challenges the claim that a trend toward mainstreaming exists in immigrant integration governance in Western Europe. This conclusion is further discussed in this section. First, the discussion concerns how a (too) broad conceptual scope of mainstreaming integration governance in existing studies has complicated clear analyses and conclusions regarding each sub-element of the concept. Second, the discussion turns to whether mainstreaming and signaling in ministerial structures constitute contradictions or can coexist.

A (Too?) Broad Scope of the Horizontal Dimension

The mainstreaming literature has taken an important first step to include the horizontal governance dimension as an object of analysis – an element generally absent in the integration literature (Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017). A laudable aspect of such research is that it has adopted a holistic approach investigating whether a trend of mainstreaming has emerged in policies, vertical governance, and horizontal governance. Narrowing the focus to horizontal governance, previous studies have analyzed different elements of horizontal governance: coordinating units, division of responsibility among ministries, and cooperation with external actors. The literature has also included studies on the horizontal governance dimension at the European, national, and local government levels. The conclusions have often been based on overall assessments of whether countries (and sometimes cities within countries) have moved toward mainstreaming governance and policies. The advantage of this broad approach is that it provides rich assessments of particular countries. The challenge is that this broad approach complicates systematic cross-national analyses of the separate elements of the horizontal governance dimension, making it hard for scholars to extract the main developments in the specific elements of interest (in this case, the horizontal structure at the ministerial level).

For example, in case studies of the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom, Scholten, Collett, and Petrovic (2017) named the departments responsible for integration but did not systematically document changes in this responsibility over time. They concluded that there has been a clear trend toward polycentric governance (Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017). However, their conclusion refers to different aspects of the governance of integration in various countries, including the local level, the ministerial structure, and cooperation with non-governmental actors. This broad conclusion indicates how the broad approach makes it hard to separately assess each element across countries.

Are Signaling and Mainstreaming Contradictory?

Article 3 does not challenge the conclusions in the mainstreaming literature concerning policies, vertical governance, and cooperation with non-governmental actors. However, this article questions whether there has been a trend of mainstreaming in horizontal governance at the ministerial level in Western Europe. Although the cross-national analysis shows that Western European governments increasingly signal integration in their ministerial structures, one question still needs to be answered: Is a mainstreaming approach contradictory to signaling an issue in ministerial titles, or can these two approaches coexist?

The mainstreaming literature has defined mainstreaming governance as a shift from state-centric to polycentric governance modes (Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017; Scholten & van Breugel 2017). In the horizontal governance structure, the question is whether responsibility for coordination of integration policies is concentrated or deconcentrated. Governance mainstreaming implies a deconcentrated governance structure, which distributes responsibility for integration policy across various stakeholders, including different government departments and non-governmental actors. In contrast, a non-mainstreaming governance structure indicates a concentrated, state-centric structure in which a central minister and/or one central department are responsible for integration policy.

With this definition, signaling integration in ministerial titles can be interpreted as a proxy for concentrated, state-centric responsibility, implying a non-mainstreaming governance structure. However, signaling integration in ministerial titles does not automatically mean that responsibility for different elements of integration policies is not distributed across ministries. One example of a dual approach is Denmark, which has "shifted significantly towards a more mainstreamed approach" (Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017, 12–15), moving from what the authors call state-centric to poly-centric governance both horizontally and vertically. In empirical evidence supporting this conclusion, Denmark established a dedicated Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants, and Integration (INM) in 2001, but in 2011, "there was an explicit decision to abolish the INM and to disperse the responsibilities of the ministry across various departments" (Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017, 12). However, although responsibility for integration was distributed across ministries, one ministry had overarching coordinating responsibility for integration policies, and this ministry's name included *integration*: the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration (Jørgensen 2014). This is an example of a structure that combines a mainstreaming approach with continuation of signaling integration in ministerial titles.

This dual approach raises the question: Does not signaling integration in ministerial titles function as a proxy for a concentrated, state-centric, horizontal governance structure? To answer this question, it is necessary to discuss one underlying principle of a mainstreaming approach: the role of (non)-targeted policies and governance structures. The mainstreaming literature has explicitly built on and referred to the literature on target group construction (Schneider & Ingram 1993; Scholten, Collett, & Petrovic 2017, 3). Targeting implies singling out immigrants as a group in need of specific policies as opposed to the rest of the population (Schneider & Ingram 1993). Targeting requires definition and recognition of a group, which accentuates ethnic and racial distinctions (Scholten & van Breugel 2017, 9). According to most definitions, a mainstreaming approach implies generic rather than targeted policies and

governance structures because policies should address society as a whole, not only immigrants as a targeted group. If generic, non-targeted policies and structures are set as criteria for mainstreaming, the increased signaling of integration in ministerial titles – the top level of bureaucracy – definitely weakens the argument for a mainstreaming trend in Western Europe.

However, the mainstreaming literature has complicated such a simple assessment. One main argument in the gender mainstreaming literature has been that a mainstreaming approach – implying that responsibility for a policy field (e.g., integration, gender, and disabilities) is taken up in all sectors – can (and should) be combined with targeted policies (Westerveen & Adam 2019, 24). Such a dual approach can imply that signaling and mainstreaming can coexist within the same structure. However, I argue that such a dual approach – where integration is both mainstreamed and signaled in the top level of bureaucracy – should only be classified as a partially mainstreamed approach because it clearly violates the principle of non-targeted policies and governance structures.

One option is to view signaling as only one sub-element when assessing whether integration is mainstreamed in the horizontal structure. Through signaling, targeted governance structures do not necessarily exclude the possibility of a supplementary mainstreaming approach in which responsibility for an issue is distributed across relevant departments. However, signaling clearly violates one of the main purposes of mainstreaming: to avoid target group construction, separating one sub-group from the rest of society.

1.7   Explaining Changing Integration Policies

How well do the dominant theories in the integration literature explain developments in Western European integration policies, and what are their scope conditions? What other explanations can help clarify the picture when these theories fail to provide satisfactory explanations? To discuss these questions, a review of whether and, if so, how path dependency and party politics explain policy and governance developments is presented. Cases in which path dependency and party politics fail to explain developments – when the empirical developments contradict the theoretical expectations of these two variables – are also identified. These contradictory cases are further investigated by examining three other explanations for change: crisis, compromise, and regulatory competition.

1.7.1 Continuing Path Dependency?

Partial Path Dependency in Policies

Comparing Scandinavian integration policies before and after the refugee crisis reveals examples of changes that both contradict and support a path-dependent logic. On one hand, article 1 shows that for the first time, Sweden diverged from its traditional path by introducing residence requirements for obtaining permanent residence and family reunification and employment requirements that could expedite the process to obtain permanent residence. These findings contradict a path-dependent logic. On the other hand, when comparing the

configurations and the settings of policy instruments cross-nationally, the gap persists because all three countries took restrictive steps, showing traits of path dependency. The Norwegian and Danish policies for obtaining permanent residence are illustrative examples of incremental steps. Before the crisis, the Norwegian language requirements only consisted of obligatory participation in a language course and attending (not passing) a test, but after the crisis, the country introduced a new requirement to pass an oral exam at level A1 (the lowest level). At the same time, Denmark, which already had a language requirement, raised the existing test requirement from level A1 to level A2. These policy changes are good examples of path-dependent patterns because the changes were incremental (e.g., Norway did not jump from obligatory courses to passing exams at level A2), and the cross-national disparities persisted despite policy changes in all the countries.

Strong Traits of Path Dependency in National Refugee Settlement Models

The Scandinavian settlement models can be interpreted as prime examples of stable path-dependent national policies. Denmark has kept the central model it introduced in 1999, and this model has not been up for political debate since its introduction. Although Norway's voluntary municipal settlement policy has been repeatedly challenged over the years, the strong Norwegian tradition of municipal autonomy has buried all proposals of centralization. The main principle of the Swedish settlement model since its introduction in 1994 has been self-settlement. Although the principle of self-settlement has been debated over the years, especially among local politicians (Borevi & Bengtsson 2015), the recent policy processes have retained the principle of self-settlement as a premise and only opened debate on the central–local governance of refugees who cannot find their own accommodations. The main principles in all three countries thus have remained strong, indicating path dependency.

Turning to the central–local governance in the Scandinavian settlement models, one can interpret the changes in the Swedish model in 2014 and 2016 as cases of incremental change in line with the logic of path dependency. In 2008–2010, a proposition to introduce central allocation for all refugees was not adopted. However, in 2014, the Swedish parliament introduced central allocation for a restricted group (solitary, underaged refugees) and then expanded the target group to include all refugees a few years later. These developments support a general claim in the logic of path dependency: radical change (e.g., the proposal in 2008–2010 to introduce central allocation for all refugees at once) is denied, but change can happen through incremental steps (e.g., the gradual introduction of central allocation in 2014–2016). However, as discussed later, supplementary explanations also help explain these developments.

Few Traits of Path Dependency in Horizontal Governance

In article 3, path dependency constitutes more of a premise than an explanatory variable because earlier studies have shown that ministerial structures in general are actually rather stable over time (Mortensen & Green-Pedersen 2014). Although ministerial structures for some issues are relatively stable, other issues experience instability, particularly those that are emerging or growing in salience (Davis et al. 1999, 30–31; White & Dunleavy 2010, 26). Consequently, in

article 3, the integration issue is presented as a most-likely case for ministerial changes. Article 3 concludes that stable ministerial structures are the exception rather than the rule because only 4 of the 16 countries did not change their structures during from 1997 to 2017. When not restricting the analysis to examining whether integration was coupled with or decoupled from immigration/justice as a dichotomous variable but instead including all changes, only two countries had completely stable structures. Although path dependency may be a plausible explanation for non-changes in a few countries, a clear majority of the countries experienced several changes during the period analyzed, implying that path dependency cannot sufficiently explain these developments. To understand these developments, I now turn to the other dominant explanatory variable in the integration literature – party politics.

1.7.2   Expanding and Limiting the Scope Conditions for Party Politics

Party politics has been a dominant explanatory variable for policy developments in the integration literature; however is it also relevant to explaining 1) the horizontal governance structure of the integration issue and 2) recent cases of integration policies and central–local governance.

The few earlier studies on the horizontal structure of the integration issue did not systematically explore party politics as an explanatory variable. Article 3 contributes to unwrapping the scope conditions for party politics by testing if it also has explanatory power in studies on the horizontal governance of the integration field. The article builds on the literature showing that party politics affects policy developments and investigating whether political parties' issue and policy preferences affect how integration is structured at the ministerial level. The analysis in article 3 shows that the political orientations of governments – whether they are left- or right-oriented governments – correspond with different horizontal structures for the integration issue. This finding indicates that party politics also has explanatory power for the horizontal structure of integration governance, thereby expanding the scope condition of party politics as an explanatory variable.

Although article 3 expands the scope condition for party politics, articles 1 and 2 give examples in which party politics fails to explain outcomes. Articles 1 and 2 indicate no clear correspondence between the outcomes of policy processes and the governments' hypothesized outcome preferences for the given issues. Article 1 shows how restrictive integration policies were introduced in all three Scandinavian countries even though Norway and Denmark had right-oriented governments, whereas Sweden had a left-oriented government. Similarly, article 2 hypothesizes that coercive instruments are introduced when left-oriented parties are in the government and, conversely, rejected when right- and center-oriented parties are in power. However, the analysis shows that the policy processes that led to increased centralization involved both left- and right-oriented governments. Thus, articles 1 and 2 limit the scope of party politics as an explanation because governments' political orientations did not explain policy developments. More importantly, most policy proposals that got the necessary majority in parliaments were passed with support from parties on both sides of the aisle. These two findings challenge party politics as an explanatory variable and lead to the question: If party politics was not the decisive factor in changes in these studies, what was?

1.7.3 Diverging from Paths and Ideology in Times of (Perceived) Crisis

All three articles show how political parties explicitly used perceptions of crises to justify policy and governance changes and to support changes that diverged from their ideological preferences. Article 1 documents that politicians in all three countries actively used the crisis to legitimize the restrictive policy changes and concludes that political parties ideologically opposed to the proposed restrictive policies set aside their ideological positions on integration policies during the crisis.

Article 2 shows that the perceived severity of the problem varied substantially across the analyzed cases, and a clear pattern emerges when separating the instances of change and non-change. In the three cases of increased centralization in the Scandinavian refugee settlement models, there was a unified perception of a crisis that necessitated change. The parties formerly opposed to central coercion explicitly justified their new position by arguing that the crisis called for change. In contrast, in cases of non-change (continuing decentralization), the opponents of coercive instruments either disputed the severity of the problem or actively used it as a counterargument. Article 2 also makes one important specification: the analysis shows that the actual number of refugees who needed settlement assistance was not the decisive factor in change; instead, the political actors' unified perception of the seriousness of the problem was.

This insight is relevant to interpreting the analysis of increased immigration and asylum rates in article 3. Article 3 includes statistical multivariate robust tests controlling for high increases in asylum and immigration rates, which can be interpreted as a proxy for a crisis. These analyses show mostly insignificant results on whether high increases in asylum and immigration rates affected ministerial structures (see appendix 3 to article 3). However, these results are not surprising when combined with the insight from article 1 that the decisive factor in change was not objective criteria (the increase in immigrants) but whether the political actors had a unified perception of whether the increase constituted a crisis. The perception of the severity of, for example, a 50% increase in asylum rates (one of the tested operationalization in article 3) may not have been equal across the countries, which could explain the insignificant and ambiguous results for these variables in the statistical analyses.

However, although the statistical analyses do not show a significant correlation between immigration and asylum rates and changes in ministerial structures, article 3 gives concrete examples of countries responding to the crisis by changing their ministerial structures. In Norway and Sweden, the governments took office before the refugee crisis and did not make changes in their ministerial structures. However, during the refugee crisis, both governments (re)introduced the term *integration* in ministerial titles, and Norway moved the integration field from a ministry dealing with equality and family policies to a ministry responsible for immigration and justice.

This meta-analysis of the articles shows political actors explicitly used the crisis as an argument to legitimize policy and governance changes, but the nature of this justification differed. In some cases, the political actors justified the need to change policies and structures as a response to the crisis itself, whereas in other cases, the crisis affected outcomes more indirectly by incentivizing 1) cross-partisan compromises and 2) cross-national regulatory competition.

1.7.4 Cross-partisan Compromises

Narrowing the focus to the cases of actual changes, articles 1 and 2 show that support across the political aisle for specific legislation was often part of larger reforms and compromises concerning immigration and integration policies. In article 1, most processes that led to changes were part of large cross-partisan compromises in which parties accepted certain elements to which they were ideologically opposed because they won in other areas. Similarly, article 2 finds that political parties' ideological positions concerning increased centralization (of refugee settlement policies) did not change, but parties ideologically opposed to centralization eventually agreed to such changes because they were part of larger compromises within the immigration and integration field.

The Norwegian policy processes during the refugee crisis described in article 2 provide further evidence supporting the importance of these large compromises. At the peak of the refugee crisis, all parties except the Socialist-Left party signed a cross-partisan conciliation introducing both specific restrictions and vague intentions to implement further restrictive policies. However, when the government proposed the new legislation to parliament, the right-wing Progress Party insisted that parliament would not vote on the policy proposals as a total package but would vote on each element separately. The opposition strongly criticized this approach, arguing that it was a political stunt to polarize the debate. This strategy also implied that some restrictions agreed upon in the cross-partisan conciliation would not get the necessary majority in parliament because the opposition parties no longer felt obligated by their commitments in the conciliation.

These cases illustrate how the use and non-use of compromises can enable and hinder changes as political parties support policies they ideologically oppose because they receive compensation in other issue areas.

1.7.5 A "Race to the Restrictive Bottom"

Article 1 tests the hypothesis that a crisis leads to convergent policies across countries by testing two opposing hypotheses. First, policy convergence occurs through a mechanism of independent problem solving, which gives rise to cross-national convergence due to similar but independent responses to parallel problem pressures. Second, policy occurs due to regulatory competition as countries facing competitive pressures mutually adjust their policies to other countries' policies. Analyzing the parliamentary debates, article 1 supports that restrictive integration policies were explicitly justified by referring to how national policies must be aligned with or, in some cases, more restrictive than those of neighboring countries. This argument was used, in particular, by political parties ideologically opposed to restrictive policies to legitimize their support for these policies during the crisis. For example, Swedish Social Democratic Member of Parliament Yilmaz Kerimo justified the government's restrictions on family reunification and residence permits, stating that:

> We are fully aware that temporary residence permits and restrictions on family immigra-
> tion are not in the best interests of each individual. But as long as EU member states do

27

not share the responsibility for asylum reception jointly but choose to hand the problem
over to some countries such as Sweden, we cannot have policies that are significantly dif-
ferent than those of our neighbors in the EU. (Author's translation)

1.7.6 Swedish Deviation from a Historic Path?

The effects of the crisis are especially interesting in the Swedish case, which has been used as the prime example of claims that national models of integration still persist (Borevi 2014). An interesting related question is whether the crisis only led to short-term changes or has had substantial long-term effects on policies (and polities).

Article 1 concludes that Sweden diverged from its historical path of not placing restrictions on permanent residence and family reunification. However, did this divergence indicate a deviation from the dominant ideological philosophy of integration in Sweden or reluctant policy changes "forced" on Sweden by the crisis? Analysis of the parliamentary debates leading to the restrictive policy changes in the three countries shows that the Danish and Norwegian governments justified these changes by arguing that they would also positively affect the integration process. This logic was in line with the dominant national logic in these countries that emphasized fulfilment of certain obligations as a path to integration (Borevi 2014, 717). In contrast, the Swedish government portrayed the restrictive changes as unfortunate and explicitly acknowledged that they could negatively affect refugees' future integration, but the government argued that they were necessary to prevent the collapse of the asylum system and other societal functions. The Swedish justification implies that even during the crisis, the Swedish government did not abandon the main principle of its national integration philosophy: integration requires that all citizens have equal, universal access to certain fundamental rights (Borevi 2014, 708). This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the policy changes were temporary laws.

However, article 1 recognizes the short-term perspective from 2015 to June 2017 as a methodological constraint and concludes that future studies must determine whether the crisis led to long-term policy changes in Sweden. In 2019, the Swedish parliament passed a new temporary law extending the 2016 changes concerning permanent residence, including employment requirements.[1] Certain changes were made concerning family reunification, including removing the absolute three-year restriction for family reunification. The national Migration Board, though, has written that it is still difficult for persons who have obtained asylum in Sweden to be reunited with their families because the new legislation sets high requirements for self-sufficiency.[2] This extended law indicates that the policy changes in Sweden during the crisis were not temporary deviations but have also had longer-term effects at the policy level. However, what have the long-term effects on the Swedish integration philosophy been? It is still early to draw conclusions, but Emilsson (2018, 17–18) argued that the refugee crisis has led to a new dominant policy paradigm on the integration issue in Swedish

[1] «Förlängning av lagen om tillfälliga begränsningar av möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige» 2019, link: https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/arende/betankande/forlangning-av-lagen-om-tillfalliga-begrans-ningar_H601SfU26
[2] https://www.migrationsinfo.se/flyktingar/den-tillfalliga-lagen/#fn-5095-10

politics. Emilsson (2018) showed that a majority of the political parties now support restrictive integration policies that would have been impossible before the refugee crisis.

1.7.7 How Emerging Theories Complement Established Theories

This thesis does not challenge that the theories that have dominated the integration literature – path dependency and party politics – remain important explanations for developments in Western European integration policies. Rather, this thesis discusses the scope conditions of these variables and proposes alternative explanations for when they fail to explain specific developments. The preceding discussion shows the persistence of path-dependent national traditions in some cases but also documents changes made in times of (perceived) crises. These findings do not necessarily contradict the theory of path dependency because the theory does pose that radical change is possible at critical junctures. However, these findings do provide concrete examples of how (perceived) crises cause countries to diverge from their former national paths.

   More importantly, the preceding synthesized analysis contributes to the integration literature by examining the scope of party politics as an explanatory variable by both expanding and limiting its scope conditions. It expands the scope of the variable by showing that it also has explanatory power for the horizontal governance of the integration issue. At the same time, the analysis across articles limits the scope condition of the variable by demonstrating how political ideologies fail to explain policy developments in times of perceived crisis. Additionally, the thesis demonstrates that crises, compromises, and regulatory competition lead political parties to diverge from their ideological policy preferences.

1.8   Future Research

An important empirical contribution of this thesis is the development of the DIIG dataset, which will be made publicly available. The dataset has unexploited potential, with its combination of detailed descriptive information and a scope including 16 countries and 21 years. First, the dataset contains information that could answer other research questions in studies that take the horizontal organizational structure of the integration and immigration field as the dependent variable. Second, the dataset's detailed descriptions of both spatial and longitudinal changes and the accompanying list of references used to compile the dataset provide great sources for selecting case studies. Third, the dataset enables quantitative analyses using organizational structure as an independent variable. The horizontal structure may affect policy processes and their outputs (Egeberg 2012, 157–159; Vestlund 2015), but there is a lack of quantitative studies examining the horizontal structure as an independent variable. Within the integration and immigration field, an especially relevant question is if and how the horizontal organizational structure affects actual policies. This question could be answered by combining this dataset with existing data on policy developments from datasets such as MIPEX (2015), CIVIX (Goodman 2014), and IMPIC (Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, & Zobel 2017). However, it is important to acknowledge that the ministerial structure is only one element of the horizontal

governance dimension. Systematic analyses of how governments manage to include and cooperate with non-governmental actors is another important area for future research.

This thesis applies the called upon approach to use general theories from the public policy literature to study integration policies (Bleich 2008; Filindra & Goodman 2019, 511). This synergetic path is proven to be highly useful, but the thesis tests only a handful of new theories and their relationships to the two dominant theories in the integration literature. Future integration research should continue to test established theories in the public policy and governance literature to theoretically advance the integration literature and to enable integration researchers to contribute to generic theoretical development within their disciplines.

Finally, George and Bennett (2005) argued that a chief goal of political science is to provide policymakers with generic knowledge that can help them form effective strategies. This thesis shows that integration policies have been subject to change, especially after the refugee crisis in 2015. Despite a vast literature on immigrant integration policies, systematic analyses of their effects have been lacking (Ersanilli & Koopmans 2011). As Goodman and Wright (2015, 1887) argued, "in light of massive changes observed across Western Europe to implement more obligatory integration policies, a systematic examination of policy effects is warranted." Future research should explore whether these changed integration policies have had the claimed effects and, just as importantly, whether these policies also have potential (negative) side-effects.

1.8.1 Integration Policies – What's in a Name?

"The careful steps of conceptualization and measurement matter: they often affect how scholars assess policies and program outcomes which can, in turn, inform future policy design."
(Filindra & Goodman 2019, 509)

Considering the aforementioned call for future research to assess the effects of (changing) integration polices, I want to end this introduction chapter with a reflection on scholars' definition power within this highly salient and politicized policy field. How we as scholars define and label the objects we study may affect how society and political communities view these objects and how our findings may be used politically. For example, as Filindra and Goodman (2019, 510) stressed, policy rankings (a major field within the integration literature) are both theoretically and politically important because politicians and officials may use them to highlight achievements or declines.

In particular, the nexus between immigration and integration policies is relevant in this respect. Several studies (Goodman 2010; Goodman & Wright 2015), including article 1, have found that what scholars have referred to as integration policies are often used to limit immigration rather than promote integration. However, what should determine whether a policy is classified within one category and not the other: the name, the intentions, the policy instruments, or the effects of the policy? For example, politicians may have the best intentions when introducing employment requirements for obtaining permanent residence and genuinely believe that they will increase immigrants' motivation to become self-sufficient, ultimately enhancing their integration into society. However, if studies show that this requirement does not enhance the integration of immigrants but instead prevents them from obtaining a secure legal status, would the academic community still be justified in defining this requirement as

part of an integration policy? If studies continue to reveal that what the scholarly community (and most European countries) define as integration policies are mostly used to deter immigration, do we as scholars legitimize a false framing? This question has no easy answer, but at least, the scholarly dialogue should not blindly continue to use such labels without critical reflection, particularly not on such a politicized topic for which our framing may legitimize particular political narratives.

1.9   References

Akkerman, T. (2012). Comparing radical right parties in government: immigration and integration policies in nine countries (1996–2010). *West European Politics, 35*(3), 511–529.

Alexander, M. (2003). Local policies toward migrants as an expression of host–stranger relations: a proposed typology. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 29*(3), 411–430.

Andersson Joona, P., Lanninger, A. W., & Sundström, M. (2016). *Reforming the integration of refugees: the Swedish experience* (IZA Discussion Paper No. 103070).

Arter, D. (2008). *Scandinavian Politics Today*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Askim, J., & Hernes, V. (2017). Bosetting av flyktninger: hvem bør få siste ord, kommunene, staten eller flyktningen selv? In J. Askim, K. Kolltveit, & P. G. Røe (Eds.), *Smartere styring*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Baldersheim, H., & Ståhlberg, K. (2002). From guided democracy to multi-level governance: trends in central–local relations in the Nordic countries. *Local Government Studies, 28*(3), 74–90.

Baldi, G., & Goodman, S. W. (2015). Migrants into members: social rights, civic requirements, and citizenship in Western Europe. *West European Politics, 38*(6), 1152–1173.

Bech, E.C., K. Borevi, and P. Mouritsen (2017). A "Civic Turn" in Scandinavian Family Migration Policies? Comparing Denmark, Norway and Sweden. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 5(7), 1-24.

Bevelander P. (2011). The employment integration of resettled refugees, asylum claimants, and family reunion migrants in Sweden. *Refugee Survey Quarterly, 30*(1), 22–43.

Bevelander, P., & Lundh, C. (2007). *Employment integration of refugees: the influence of local factors on refugee job opportunities in Sweden* (IZA Discussion Paper No. 2551).

Bleich, E. (2008). Immigration and integration studies in Western Europe and the United States: the road less traveled and a path ahead. *World Politics, 60*(3), 509–538.

Blom-Hansen, J. (1999). Policy-making in central–local government relations: balancing local autonomy, macroeconomic control, and sectoral policy goals. *Journal of Public Policy, 19*(03), 237–264.

Blom-Hansen, J., Christiansen, M., Fimreite, A. L., & Selle P. (2012). Reform strategies matter: explaining the perplexing results of regional government reforms in Norway and Denmark. *Local Government Studies, 38*(1), 71–90.

Boin, A., and P. 't Hart, and A. McConnell (2009). Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing Contests. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16:1, 81–106.

Borevi, K. (2010). Sverige: mångkulturalismens flaggskip i Norden. In G. Brochmann & A. Hagelund (Eds.), *Velferdens grenser*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Borevi, K. (2014). Multiculturalism and welfare state integration: Swedish model path dependency. *Identities, 21*(6), 708–723.

Borevi, K., & Bengtsson, B. (2015). The tension between choice and need in the housing of newcomers: a theoretical framework and an application on Scandinavian settlement policies. *Urban Studies, 52*(14), 2599-2615.

Borevi, K., Jensen, K. K., & Mouritsen, P. (2017). The civic turn of immigrant integration policies in the Scandinavian welfare states. *Comparative Migration Studies, 5*(1), 1–14.

Breidahl, K. N. (2012). *Når staten lærer: en historisk og komparativ analyse af statslig policy læring og betydningen heraf for udviklingen i den arbejdsmarkedsrettede del af indvandrerpolitikken i Sverige, Norge og Danmark fra 1970 til 2011* (PhD dissertation). Aalborg University, Department of Political Science.

Breidahl, K. N. (2017). Scandinavian exceptionalism? Civic integration and labour market activation for newly arrived immigrants. *Comparative Migration Studies, 5*(1), 1–19.

Brochmann, G., & Hagelund, A. (2010). Norge: landet for den gyldne middelvei. In G. Brochmann & A. Hagelund (Eds.), *Velferdens grenser*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Carrera, S. (2006). Integration of Immigrants versus Social Inclusion? A Typology of Integration Programmes in the EU. In T. Balzacq & S. Carrera (Eds.), *Security versus freedom? : a challenge for Europe's future*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Christensen, T., P.A. Laegreid, and L.H. Rykkja (2016). Organizing for Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy. *Public Administration Review*, 76:6, 887–897.

Damm, A. P. (2014). Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: evidence from quasi-random neighborhood assignment of immigrants. *Journal of Urban Economics, 79*, 139–166.

Damm, A. P., & Åslund, O. (2017). Forward. *Nordic Economic Policy Review*. TemaNord 2017:520. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.

Davis, G., P. Weller, S. Eggins, and E. Craswell. (1999). What drives machinery of government change? Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, 1950–1997. *Public Administration* 77 (1):7–50.

Dekker, R., Emilsson, H., Krieger, B., & Scholten P. (2015). A local dimension of integration policies? A comparative study of Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam. *International Migration Review, 49*(3), 633–658.

Desiderio, M. V., & Weinar, A. (2014). *Supporting immigrant integration in Europe?: Developing the governance for diaspora engagement.* Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Djuve, A. B. (2011). Introductory programs for immigrants—liberalism revisited, or changing ideas of citizenship? *Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 1*(3), 113–125.

Djuve, A. B. (2016). *Refugee migration—a crisis for the Nordic model?* Oslo: Fafo.

Döring, H., & Manow P. (2016). Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies.

Edin, P.-A., Fredriksson, P., & Åslund, O. (2003). Ethnic enclaves and the economic success of immigrants—evidence from a natural experiment. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118*(1), 329–357.

Egeberg, M. (2012). How bureaucratic structure matters: an organizational perspective. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of public administration.* London: Sage Publications.

Emilsson, H. (2016). *Paper planes: labour migration, integration policy and the state* (Phd dissertation). Malmö University.

Emilsson, H. (2018). *Continuity or change? The refugee crisis and the end of Swedish exceptionalism.* MIM Working Paper Series 3(18). Malmö: Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM).

Ennser, L. (2012). The homogeneity of West European party families: the radical right in comparative perspective. *Party Politics, 18*(2), 151–171.

Ersanilli, E., & Koopmans, R. (2011). Do immigrant integration policies matter? A three-country comparison among Turkish immigrants. *West European Politics, 34*(2), 208–234.

Favell, A. (1998). *Philosophies of integration: immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain.* Springer.

Filindra, A., & Goodman, S. W. (2019). Studying public policy through immigration policy: advances in theory and measurement. *Policy Studies Journal, 47*(3), 498–516.

Filindra, A., & Manatschal, A. (2019). Coping with a changing integration policy context: American state policies and their effects on immigrant political engagement. *Regional Studies*, 1–12.

George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.* London: MIT Press.

Goodman, S. W. (2010). Integration requirements for integration's sake? Identifying, categorising and comparing civic integration policies. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(5), 753–772.

Goodman, S. W. (2011). Controlling immigration through language and country knowledge requirements. *West European Politics*, 34(2), 235–255.

Goodman, S. W. (2012a). Fortifying citizenship: policy strategies for civic integration in Western Europe. *World Politics, 64*(04), 659–698.

Goodman, S. W. (2012b). Measurement and interpretation issues in civic integration studies: a rejoinder. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38*(1), 173–186.

Goodman, S. W. (2014). *Immigration and membership politics in Western Europe.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goodman, S. W. (2015). Conceptualizing and measuring citizenship and integration policy: past lessons and new approaches. *Comparative Political Studies, 48*(14), 1905–1941.

Goodman, S. W., & Wright, M. (2015). Does mandatory integration matter? Effects of civic requirements on immigrant socio-economic and political outcomes. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41*(12), 1885–1908.

Hammond, Thomas H. (1986). Agenda control, organizational Structure, and bureaucratic politics. *American Journal of Political Science.* 30 (2):379–420.

Hansen, T., & Klausen, J. E. (2002). Between the welfare state and local government autonomy. *Local Government Studies, 28*(4), 47–66.

Heichel, S., Pape, J., & Sommerer, T. (2005). Is there convergence in convergence research? An overview of empirical studies on policy convergence. *Journal of European Public Policy, 12*(5), 817–840.

Helbling, M., Bjerre, L., Römer, F., & Zobel, M. (2017). Measuring immigration policies: the IMPIC database. *European Political Science, 16*, 79–98.

Heppell, T. (2011). Departmental restructuring under New Labour. *The Political Quarterly,* 82 (3):425–34.

Hernes, V., Arendt Jacob, N., Joona, A., & Tronstad, K. R. (2019). *Nordic integration and settlement policies for refugees. A comparative analysis of labour market integration outcomes.* TemaNord 2019:529. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.

Holzinger, K., & Knill, C. (2005). Causes and conditions of cross-national policy convergence. *Journal of European Public Policy, 12*(5), 775–796.

Huddleston, T., Bilgili, O., Joki, A.-L., & Vankova, Z. (2015). *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015.*

Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics, 30*(1), 1–22.

Joppke, C. (2017). Civic integration in Western Europe: Three Debates. *West European Politics, 40*(6), 1153–1176.

Jørgensen, M. B. (2014). *Decentralising immigrant integration: Denmark's mainstreaming initiatives in employment, education, and social affairs.* Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Jørgensen, M. B., & Thomsen, T. L. (2013). Crises now and then—comparing integration policy frameworks and immigrant target groups in Denmark in the 1970s and 2000s. *Journal of International Migration and Integration, 14*(2), 245–262.

Kingdon, J. W. (1984). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Koopmans, R., & Statham P. (2000). *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics: comparative European perspectives.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lavenex, S. (2002). EU enlargement and the challenge of policy transfer: the case of refugee policy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28*(4), 701–721.

Mahoney, J., & Goertz, G. (2004). The possibility principle: choosing negative cases in comparative research. *American Political Science Review, 98*(4), 653–669.

Maxcy, S. J. (2003). Pragmatic Threads in Mixed Methods Research in the Social Sciences: The search for Multiple Modes of Inquiry and the End of the Philosophy of

Formalism. In C. T. Abbas Tashakkori. *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research. Thousand.* Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Meyers, E. (2002). The causes of convergence in Western immigration control. *Review of International Studies, 28*(1), 123–141.

Migration Policy Group. (2017). *International key findings*. URL: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/

Mortensen, P. B., & Green-Pedersen, C. (2014). Institutional Effects of Changes in Political Attention: Explaining Organizational Changes in the Top Bureaucracy. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 25(1), 165-189.

NESH. (2016). Guidelines for research ethics in the social sciences, Humanities, law and theology. *National committee for research ethics in the social sciences and the humanities* (NESH).

NOU 2017: 2. (2017). *Integrasjon og tillit—langsiktige konsekvenser av høy innvandring.* Oslo: Justis og Beredskapsdepartementet.

Penninx, R., & Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2016). The concept of integration as an analytical tool and as a policy concept. In B. Garcés-Mascareñas & R. Penninx (Eds.), *Integration processes and policies in Europe. Contexts, levels and actors*. Springer Open.

Penninx, R., Kraal, K., Martiniello, M., & Vertovec, S. (2017). *Citizenship in European cities: immigrants, local politics and integration policies*. London: Routledge.

Petersen, K., & Jønsson, H. V. (2010). Danmark: den nationale velfærdsstat møder verden. In G. Brochmann & A. Hagelund (Eds.), *Velferdsens grenser*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Rashakkori, A., & Teddle, C. (2003). Major Issues and Controversies in the Use of Mixed Methods in the Social and Behavioral Science. I A. Rashakkori, & C. Teddle (Eds.), *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research*. Thousands Oaks: Sage Publications.

Rittel, H. W., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. *Policy Sciences, 4*(2), 155–169.

Robinson, V. (1998). Defining and measuring successful refugee integration. In *Proceedings of the ECRE International Conference on Integration of Refugees in Europe, Antwerp*.

Ruist, J. (2017). The fiscal impact of refugee immigration. *Nordic Economic Policy Review*, TemaNord 2017:520. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.

Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction of target populations—implications for politics and policy. *American Political Science Review, 87*(2), 334–347.

Scholten, P., Collett, E., & Petrovic, M. (2017). Mainstreaming migrant integration? A critical analysis of a new trend in integration governance. *International Review of Administrative Sciences, 83*(2), 283–302.

Scholten, P., & van Breugel, I. (2017). *Mainstreaming integration governance: new trends in migrant integration policies in Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Sellers, J. M., and A. Lidström. (2007). Decentralization, Local Government, and the Welfare State. *Governance* 20 (4): 609–632.

Steen, A. (2016). Deciding refugee settlement in Norwegian cities: local administration or party politics? *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 29(4), 464–482.

Steen, A., & Røed, M. (2018). State governance or local agency? Determining refugee settlement in Norwegian municipalities. *Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration, 22*(1), 27–52.

Thelen, K. (1999). Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual Review Political Science, 2*, 369–404.

Thelen, K. (2003). How institutions evolve. In *Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences* In: Mahoney, J. and Rueschemeyer, D. (Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

United Nations. (2019). *International migrant stock 2019.* URL: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp

Van Breugel, I., & Scholten P. (2017). Mainstreaming in response to superdiversity? The governance of migration-related diversity in France, the UK and the Netherlands. *Policy & Politics, 45*(4), 511–526.

Van Breugel, I., & Scholten P. (2019). Governance by proxy: a comparative policy analysis of the mainstreaming of immigrant integration governance. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 1–19.

Vestlund, N. M. (2015). Changing policy focus through organizational reform? The case of the pharmaceutical unit in the European Commission. *Public Policy and Administration, 30*(1), 92–112.

Westerveen, L., & Adam, I. (2019). Monitoring the impact of doing nothing: new trends in immigrant integration policy. *Ethnicities, 19*(1), 20–43.

White, Anne, and Patrick Dunleavy. (2010). *Making and Breaking Whitehall Departments: A Guide to Machinery of Government Changes*. London: Institute for Government.

Part II
Articles

Article 1: Cross-national Convergence in Times of Crisis? Integration Policies Before, During, and After the Refugee Crisis

Abstract

This article analyses if, how and why Scandinavian integration policies converged as a result of the refugee crisis in 2015, studying policies of permanent residence, citizenship, family reunification and access to social benefits. The analysis of policy processes finds that a logic of regulatory competition led to goal convergence, as all three countries explicitly adapted their policies relative to other countries' policies. Nonetheless, when comparing the configuration of policy instruments and their settings, the cross-country gap persists as all three countries took restrictive steps, thus showing traits of path dependency. The conclusion discusses a severe challenge in the current policy convergence debate in the integration literature: how an insufficient level of precision 1) concerning different dimensions of the policies and 2) concerning how to assess convergence could lead to inaccurate and even opposite conclusions when interpreting empirical analyses.

Article 2: Central Coercion or Local Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Policy Instrument Choice in Refugee Settlement Policies

Abstract

Although existing literature on central-local governance includes comprehensive studies on how constitutional and financial frameworks regulate local government autonomy, this study seeks explanations for the introduction or absence of central coercion within these frameworks. The analysis studies six processes of policy instrument choice with different outcomes in Norway, Denmark and Sweden in the field of refugee settlement. It finds that a uniform perception of crisis and political compromises make political parties abandon their political-ideological standpoints relating to central-local governance. Additionally, the success and failure of political strategies of obfuscation and of dividing the opposition help to explain the different outcomes. The study reveals differences in the political salience of central-local governance in three countries that have systematically been categorized in the same groups in central-local studies. Consequently, more studies on how and why local autonomy is regulated within national frameworks are necessary to understand the actual autonomy that local governments enjoy.

Article 3: Policy Preferences and Ministerial Structures: Immigrant Integration Governance in Western Europe, 1997–2017

Abstract

This article tests an often-stated assumption in the "machinery of government" literature: that government parties' issue and policy preferences affect the ministerial structure. Using a new Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance (DIIG) that documents the ministerial structure of immigrant integration in 16 Western European countries 1997–2017, the analysis finds that divergence and change characterize the ministerial structure. The analysis finds that right-oriented governments are more inclined to couple integration with immigration and justice than are left-oriented governments, indicating different policy preferences. However, it does not find that governments with radical parties would be more inclined to signal "integration" in ministerial titles. The study's comparative approach challenges the generalizability of existing knowledge on drivers of ministerial changes. Additionally, it fills a gap in current immigrant integration literature: the study of the horizontal governance structure.

Single authored.

Introduction

The horizontal organization and reorganization of an issue matter; different organizational structures produce different policy outcomes. The horizontal structure – how tasks are distributed among the same hierarchical level, and how different issues are linked or decoupled from each other (Egeberg, 2012) – broadly defines interests and goals to be pursued, forms criteria on which to base comparisons of alternative polices, and influences which conflicts rise to the top level in the policy-making process (Hammond, 1986; Egeberg, 2012). Additionally, the horizontal structure is an opportunity for the government to express priorities, (re)frame an issue, and meet policy challenges and external pressure (White and Dunleavy, 2010; Davis et al., 1999; Christensen et al., 2014).

The ministerial structure encompasses the complexity and dilemmas of horizontal governance, and has been addressed by the literature on "machinery of government changes" (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2014). This literature identifies several drivers that affect both the number of ministries and the number of changes in the ministries' issue content, for example, administrative challenges and external pressure (White and Dunleavy, 2010), developments in the policy agenda (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2014), and internal party politics (Davis et al., 1999; Heppell, 2011; White and Dunleavy, 2010). Peter B. Mortensen and Christoffer Green-Pedersen (2014, 166) argue that although the literature on portfolio allocation has shown that the allocation of ministries is important to government parties, the political dynamic behind what determines the issue content of ministries deserves more theoretical elaboration and empirical investigation – not necessarily by identifying more explanations, but by unfolding the political logic behind explanations already identified. *Issue preference* has been important in previous studies of changes in ministries' issue content (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2014; White and Dunleavy, 2010), and stems from the idea of issue ownership, implying that political parties prefer high attention to some issues rather than others (Karlsen and Aardal, 2016, 262). However, that the government's *policy preferences*, that is, the actual policies that should be pursued on a given issue, might affect the ministerial structure is a constantly repeated, but yet unexplored, assumption (Heppell, 2011; Davis et al., 1999; Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2014).

This article addresses this gap by analyzing both elements, reflecting two dilemmas a government faces when designing the ministerial structure. First, whether an issue should be signaled or not in the ministerial titles, reflecting the government's issue preferences. Second, how the issue should be coupled with or decoupled from other related issues, reflecting the government's policy preferences. To exemplify using the integration of immigrants (hereafter immigrant integration[3]) as an issue: a government might express its *issue preference* for "integration" by either including it or excluding it from the ministerial titles, depending on whether the government wants to draw attention to or deflect attention from the issue. The government's *policy preferences* – whether it prefers restrictive or permissive integration

---

[3] Countries – and scholars - use different labels for policies that focus on the integration or incorporation of immigrants. European countries - and most scholars - often use the term 'immigrant integration' policies (or just 'integration policies'), while American scholars refers to either alienage, immigrant, integration or incorporation policies (Filindra and Goodman 2019). Since this study applies the Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance (DIIG), which documents the West-European ministerial structure, it uses the term 'immigrant integration'.

policies – might affect what other issues the government wants to couple integration with in the ministerial structure, for example immigration and justice (restrictive) versus social policy and inclusion (permissive).

To analyze whether and how issue and policy preferences affect the ministerial structure, it is necessary to move beyond the traditional approach in the machinery of government literature, that is, longitudinal case studies concentrating on changes in the ministerial structure as a whole in one or a few countries. This article studies how one single issue is structured at the ministerial level across countries over time. Glyn Davis et al. (1999, 13) argue that the literature needs comparative analyses to test if drivers of machinery changes are place specific in addition to time specific. This study will do so by analyzing the ministerial structure of immigrant integration, using a new dataset compiled by the author, the Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance (DIIG) that documents the national structure of the immigrant integration field in 16 Western European countries from 1997 to 2017.The article asks two question: First, how has immigrant integration been coupled with other issues and been signaled in the ministerial structure over time, and are there cross-national differences? The article focuses specifically on whether the integration issue is coupled with the immigration and justice field, as a contrast to other issues such as social affairs. Second, the article asks: Do government parties' issue and policy preferences explain cross- and within-country developments?

Immigrant integration – a politically salient and "wicked" issue infused with symbolic politics – constitutes a "most likely" case for observing issue and policy preferences manifested in the ministerial structure. First, it is more likely that political parties actively use the ministerial structure as a tool to draw attention to or deflect attention from a politically salient issue than they do for less salient issues. Second, it is more likely to identify policy preferences in the ministerial structure for "wicked issues." "Wicked issues" is a term used to describe complex social problems that have no agreed upon problem definition or solution, are transboundary, ambiguous, and uncertain, and cross traditional sectorial lines (Rittel and Weber, 1973). Thus, wicked issues have the potential to be coupled with multiple related issues, opening the possibility for multiple alternative structures. Third, immigrant integration policies often are infused with symbolic politics (Joppke, 2017; Borevi et al., 2017), thus it is also plausible to assume that political parties would be more inclined to make symbolic changes in the ministerial structure for this particular policy issue.

The empirical focus on immigrant integration and the DIIG dataset also contribute to fill a gap in the immigrant integration literature. Although research on immigrant integration has become one of the fastest growing areas in political science (Goodman, 2015, 1906), empirical studies have mostly focused on policy content (Goodman, 2012, 2015; Hernes, 2018; Joppke, 2007, 2017) or on vertical multi-level governance (Dekker et al., 2015; Hernes, 2017; Scholten et al., 2017). The horizontal governance structure, however, has gained less attention. While some qualitative studies mention the horizontal dimension when describing the governance structure of integration (Scholten et al., 2017; Desiderio and Weinar, 2014), this literature lacks spatial and longitudinal analyses that systematically explore the horizontal structure as the dependent variable.

The article starts with a description of the theoretical assumptions for how issue and policy preferences could affect the ministerial structure, and how these preferences could be reflected in four stylized horizontal structures. Then follows a presentation of hypotheses predicting

which types of ministerial structures different governments would prefer for the integration issue. Using the DIIG dataset, the descriptive analysis shows how divergence and change characterize the ministerial structures in Western Europe the last 20 years. The explanatory analysis finds that right-oriented governments are more inclined to couple integration with immigration and/or justice than left-oriented governments are. However, it does not find that governments that include a radical party are more inclined to signal integration in ministerial titles. The discussion elaborates on the study's limitations and advantages by applying a broader comparative approach than earlier studies of machinery changes and argues that the findings challenge the generalizability of existing knowledge on drivers of ministerial changes. Lastly, the conclusion presents ways to exploit the new DIIG dataset in future analyses to provide new insight not only for the literature on immigrant integration, but also for the public administration literature more generally.

Coupling and Signaling in the Ministerial Structure

Earlier studies show that the ministerial structure actually is rather stable over time (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2014). National traditions for how to organize the ministerial structure limit the possibility for radical change because relevant actors will adapt to the existing practice (Thelen, 1999). Additionally, ministerial changes have substantial costs, both financially and administratively (White and Dunleavy, 2010, 7). However, earlier studies show that while the ministerial structure is relatively stable for some issues, others experience instability (Davis et al., 1999, 30–31; White and Dunleavy, 2010, 26). In Western European countries, the authority to decide the ministerial structure lies with the government parties, and is usually the prerogative of the prime minister or the party leaders in a coalition government.[4] As a contrast, in the United States, the control over the federal administration is divided between the Presidency and Congress, and all US ministerial reorganizations must be approved by Congress (White and Dunleavy, 2010, 23). When deciding on the ministerial structure of specific issues, the governing parties must consider two elements. One is how the issue should be coupled with or decoupled from other related issues, reflecting their policy preferences. The other is whether the issue should be signaled in the ministerial titles, reflecting their issue preferences.

Policy Preference: The Coupling or Decoupling of Issues

Coupling as an analytical concept has often been used to study the vertical governance dimension, but Philipp Trein (2016, 420) argues that this concept has unexploited potential in the study of horizontal governance. The horizontal structure might express a government's alternative policy preferences by how an issue is coupled with or decoupled from other related issues. Coupling is particularly relevant for wicked issues that often cross traditional sectorial

---

4 In some countries, certain ministries have set titles (e.g., the Home Office), and cannot include "integration" in the ministry title. This restricts the government parties' prerogative to choose ministerial titles freely. Nevertheless, it is a political choice to place a specific issue within a ministry subject to such restrictions. If the government wanted to signal "integration" in ministerial titles, it could place the integration field within a ministry that was not subject to such restrictions.

boundaries and have the potential to be coupled with multiple issues. Issues within one organizational unit are more likely to be coordinated than are those belonging to different units (Egeberg, 2012, 159). An official in a particular unit is expected to consider only certain alternatives and their consequences, while leaving it to other units to consider their respective alternatives and consequences (Egeberg, Gornitzka, and Trondal, 2016, 33). Thus, the horizontal structure broadly defines the interests and goals to be pursued, and the considerations and alternatives that should be treated as relevant (Egeberg, 2012, 158). A reorganization of the ministerial structure by changing which issues are coupled or decoupled could portray the government's (new) framing of an issue (Christensen et al., 2014, 43), reflecting their policy preferences.

The coupling of policy issues might be a product of different types of structural changes (White and Dunleavy, 2010, 14): mergers of previously separate ministries; demergers by moving sets of functions previously carried out as a subcomponent in a broader ministry into a separate ministry; transfers of functions, where two or more ministries remain in being, but a set of responsibilities is transferred from one to another; and terminations, where a ministry is closed and its remaining activities are transferred to other ministries.

Issue Preference: Signaling in the Ministerial Structure

The government can use the ministerial structure to enhance or signal political priorities or to give extra weight to an issue (Heppell, 2011, 426). A government that wants to draw attention to an issue might include it in the ministerial titles, and a government that wants to deflect attention from a political issue might exclude it (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2014, 168, 172). Including an issue in the ministerial titles could reflect a real investment in the given issue, for example increased funding. Even without increased funding, it could also be a symbolic change intended to signal to the public that the government is tackling an issue. Either way, including an issue in ministerial titles is a tool for the government *to express their prioritized issues to the public*, irrespective of whether they actually follow up with increased funding. Not every issue can have its own ministry or minister; thus, the government must prioritize. Signaling an issue in ministerial titles is expected to be preferred by government parties that have a particular ownership of the issue and/or that would benefit from drawing a high level of attention to it (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen, 2014, 168, 172; Karlsen and Aardal, 2016).

Changes concerning the inclusion or exclusion of an issue in the ministerial titles could be made without relocation in the ministerial structure: the issue can remain within the same ministry, while the name is included or excluded from the title or a specialized ministerial position is established or abolished within a more generalized ministry. Intuitively, changing the ministry title seems like a more substantial change than creating a specialized minister within a generalized ministry. However, a change in the ministry's title could merely be a symbolic change (i.e., one involving no additional funding). If a specialized minister for integration is established within a generalized ministry, even though the new post involves no increased funding, it still has gained (one would assume) a dedicated high-ranking politician who will work on this issue. Additionally, ministers are mostly described in the media by their ministerial title, and not by the ministry's title. Thus, as a tool to signal to the public the government's prioritized issues, it is not clear whether a change in the ministry's title is more

profound than establishing a specialized minister would be. Consequently, the analysis does not make separate theoretical expectations for one or the other.

Four stylized horizontal structures

The two dilemmas that politicians face concerning if and how to signal an issue and couple an issue in the ministerial structure create four stylized horizontal structures, presented in Table 1. Table 1 distinguishes whether the main issue under study – *Policy A* – is signaled or not in the organizational title, and whether *Policy A* is coupled with or decoupled from (an)other issue(s) – *Policy B*. For integration, the coupling with or decoupling from immigration or social affairs is often of particular interest. For the energy field, it may be climate or transport. For disabilities, it may be health or employment. Which issues are substantially relevant to focus on will depend on the research question.

Table 1: Four stylized horizontal structures

	Policy A coupled with Policy B	**Policy A decoupled from Policy B**
Policy A signaled	Policy A in title and coupled with Policy B	Policy A in title and decoupled from Policy B
Policy A not signaled	Policy A not in title and coupled with Policy B	Policy A not in title and decoupled from Policy B

Classification of organizations within – and movement between – these categories capture changes both with and without relocations in the ministerial structure. Whereas vertical movement implies changes in how the government signals an issue, horizontal and diagonal movement also implies changes regarding how the issue is coupled with other issues.

Parties' position on integration policies and hypothesized structure preferences

If political parties that have a particular ownership of an issue would be expected to signal the issue in the ministerial structure, and to structurally couple the issue with other issues that support their policy preferences, changes in the composition of government parties could lead to changes in the ministerial structure if the new government parties have different issue and policy preferences than their predecessors did. Studies documenting political parties' issue ownership and positions on immigrant integration policies make it possible to derive hypotheses on how different (coalition) governments might manifest these positions in the ministerial structure. In a study of political parties' policy homogeneity across 17 European countries, Laurenz Ennser (2012, 162) found that political parties classified within the same party family have relatively similar preferences on integration policies (with the "liberal" party family as an exception). The parties' positions follow the classic left-right economic dimension: radical-

right parties are the most inclined to support restrictive integration policies; radical-left parties are the least inclined, and the other parties have positions that are more moderate and are distributed in-between. Additionally, several studies have shown that the government composition of political parties affects the direction of integration policies on the permissive-restrictive scale (Akkerman, 2012; Borevi, Jensen, and Mouritsen, 2017; Goodman, 2012). Thus, that parties within the same party family have relatively similar issue and policy preferences makes it possible to examine if governments that include the same types of political parties also have similar preferences for how to organize integration in the ministerial structure. However, for the integration issue, what structural logic might be derived from different issue and policy preferences?

First, turning to the question of coupling integration with or decoupling it from other issues: As a wicked issue, integration encompasses multiple other issues: immigration, health, education, employment, housing, crime, discrimination, etc. Thus, the issues it could potentially be coupled with are numerous. In the integration literature on public policies, the coupling of integration with immigration has received particular attention, because studies have shown that integration policies are increasingly used as means to limit immigration (Baldi and Goodman, 2015; Hernes, 2018). Although immigration and integration policies focus on the same target group, the policies focus on different areas. The focus of immigration policies is mostly on questions of access to the country, for example, migration, visas, asylum, and the process until an applicant is granted a legal residence permit. The focus of integration policies is often on the process after a residence permit is granted (e.g., the cultural, social, and economic integration into society). However, parties that want to use integration policies as mean to restrict further immigration could be more inclined to couple integration with topics like immigration, national security, crime, and terrorism in the ministerial structure – often responsibilities under a ministry of immigration and/or justice. Alternatively, integration might be coupled with welfare issues such as social affairs, employment and inclusion, or other issues that do not link integration directly with immigration and/or justice. The coupling of integration with or the decoupling of it from either of these two groups of issues could be related to the governments' general positions on the restrictive-permissive scale of integration policies. Right-oriented parties generally support more restrictive integration policies than left-oriented parties do (Ennser, 2012, 162; Akkerman, 2012), and thus, could be expected to couple integration with immigration and/or justice. Left-oriented governments could be expected to couple integration with issues they have particular ownership of, for example social affairs and employment policies, as opposed to immigration and justice – issues typically "owned" by the right (Petrocik, 1996, 831–32). Thus, the first hypothesis states that right-oriented governments will be more inclined to couple integration with immigration and/or justice in the ministerial structure than left-oriented governments will be.

Second, integration is a politically salient issue, and because of their opposing political positions, political parties could have different incentives to keep this issue on the political agenda. Both radical-left and radical-right parties generally have more radical positions than do parties closer to the center concerning immigrant integration (Ennser, 2012, 162); consequently, these parties might have a stronger incentive to express these positions in the ministry's and/or the minister's title than moderate parties do. The integration issue has great potential for both radical-left and radical-right parties to mark their ground with, for example, permissive or

restrictive policies regulating immigrants' access to general welfare benefits, liberal or restrictive requirements to obtain citizenship, etc. This is not only the case for radical-right parties where immigration and integration most often is the issue of greatest concern to their voters (Akkerman, 2012, 511), but also increasingly so for radical-left parties that can brand themselves as an opposition to the restrictive policies of the the right (Bale et al., 2010). Following this logic, the hypothesis would be that governments that include a radical party will be more inclined to signal integration in the ministerial titles than governments without such parties will be. However, an opposite hypothesis might also be presented. Although radical parties have more radical positions on integration, these positions may not lead to preferences to signal the issue in the ministerial titles. For radical-left parties an alternative logic supporting permissive policy preferences could be at play: Signaling integration in the ministerial titles implies singling out immigrants as a target group as opposed to the rest of the population (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Not signaling integration in the ministerial titles is more in line with a mainstreaming approach to organizing the integration field (Scholten et al., 2017), and avoids constructing immigrants as a group in need of targeted policies, dividing them from the majority population. Thus, this alternative logic would imply that radical-left parties would not signal integration in the ministerial titles. For radical-right parties, an alternative logic could be that because radical-right parties oppose immigration, they are less likely to signal integration because they do not want immigrants to come to the country in the first place, and do not want the state to use time and resources to integrate immigrants. Consequently, radical-right parties may be more inclined to signal "immigration" or other issues that signal their restrictive immigration policies, and not 'integration'.

Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance (DIIG)

This study presents a unique comparative dataset, DIIG, mapping the national structure of the immigrant integration field in 16 Western European countries from 1997 to 2017.[5] The following variables from the dataset have been used to conduct the analysis: country, year, descriptive account of structural change, title of ministry responsible for integration, title of minister responsible for integration, title of ministry responsible for immigration, type of change, classification of coupled issues (7 categories), classification of integration as signaled/not signaled, and classification of integration as coupled/decoupled from immigration and/or justice.

The main source to document historical developments in the ministerial structure has been annual country reports and cross-country analyses from the European Migration Network and the INTERACT project. In these annual reports, country experts and government authorities have reported systematically on the governmental bodies responsible for integration and immigration. Not all the countries have annual reports for the entire period of analysis; thus, findings from the reports are supplemented and validated by the following sources: 1) European Website on Integration and the EU Immigration Portal, 2) governmental webpages, 3) official historical online archives of ministries and ministers in government cabinets, 4) national

---

[5] Dataset will be published online at https://dataverse.no/ with a future publication of the article.

databases on state administration (for Norway and Ireland), 5) policy 6documents, and 6) academic books and articles with detailed case studies of the selected countries. For a detailed list of references for each country, see appendix 2.

Two researchers compiled the dataset. The first researcher documented the governance structure with specific references to the original sources, and identified observations that were unclear; for example, for a few countries, the sources on the historical structure differed concerning the exact years for ministerial changes or the exact titles of ministers. The second researcher surveyed all original references to validate the dataset, and thereafter, uncertainties on how to classify and code countries were discussed and decisions were jointly arrived at to ensure similar classifications across countries. For a detailed description of the variables' operationalization, see appendix 1: Codebook.

Data on Government Parties: ParlGov

The dataset also includes variables on national elections, governments, and government parties and their party family affiliation (according to their position in an economic (state/market) and a cultural (liberty/authority) left/right dimension), extracted from the ParlGov database (for information on the database, see Döring and Manow, 2016).[6] The hypotheses distinguish between four types of governments, according to whether the government 1) is right- or left-oriented and 2) includes a radical party or not. In his analysis of the party families' policy positions on immigration and integration, Ennser (2012) finds that parties in the center of the political spectrum also have a centered position on immigration and integration policies. Consequently, the inclusion of a centrist party in a government is not expected to affect the government's preferences in a particular direction. Thus, the eight party families identified by Holger Döring and Philip Manow (2016) will be further classified as described in Table 2 below.

---

6 The operationalization of government parties in the ParlGov dataset does not include parties supporting minority governments. However, because the prerogative to alter the ministerial structure ultimately lies with the prime minister or leaders of the coalition parties in Western Europe, supporting parties are less relevant when the ministerial structure is determined.

Table 2: Classification of party families

Party family (classified by ParlGov)	Classification in analysis
Communist/Socialist	Radical-left (RL)
Green/Ecologist	Radical-left (RL)
Social democracy	Left (L)
Liberal	Center (C)
Agrarian	Center (C)
Christian democracy	Right (R)
Conservative	Right (R)
Right-wing	Radical-right (RR)

The four types of governments could be either with or without a center party (C):
- Right-oriented governments with a radical-right party: R + RR(+ C)
- Right-oriented governments without a radical-right party: R(+ C)
- Left-oriented governments with a radical-left party: L+ RL(+ C)
- Left-oriented governments without a radical-left party: L(+ C)

Seventy-five per cent of the observations in the dataset (counting each year from 1997 to 2017) could be classified within these four types of governments. Centrist governments constitute the largest government type outside these four groups, including both a Social-Democratic party and a Conservative or Christian-Democratic parties (16%). Additionally, the remaining 9% represent other government types: caretaker cabinets, "rainbow governments" and Center-Right-Green governments. The article does not analyze and discuss these latter types of governments.

Methodological Challenges with the Comparative Perspective

The dataset has some methodological challenges that are important to specify. First, administrative traditions for political appointees in government differ across Europe (Dahlström, 2009), particularly at lower hierarchical levels under the respective ministers. The dataset is limited to documenting the top level, thus it includes only political appointees who were members of the government cabinet. Additionally, the countries use different titles to address the top political level (ministry, department, cabinet offices, etc.) and political appointees (e.g., minister, secretary general, secretary of state). This study applies "ministry" and "minister" as common terms for these top political levels.

Second, the focus of national integration policies may differ, both cross-nationally and over time within the same country. In relation to the nexus between integration and immigration policies described in the theoretical section, which subfields "belong" to one or the other may differ cross-nationally. For example, Hernes (2018) shows that while family reunification was framed as an integration issue in Norway during the 2015 refugee crisis, in Sweden this policy area was explicitly restricted to deter further immigration. Detailed analyses of where different subfields in the heart of this nexus are placed – within the body responsible for integration or

immigration – have not been conducted and compared cross-nationally. Thus, there are some differences regarding which subfields the countries delegate to the respective fields of immigration and integration. Because the dataset largely builds on official primary sources and secondary sources from country experts, these sources' descriptions of which bodies are responsible for integration and immigration form the basis for the classification.

Another challenge is that the focus of the integration policies may differ cross-nationally and over time, depending on the circumstances in each country (e.g., the number of refugees from one year to another) and the political and public debates. However, irrespective of the exact content of the integration policies, the hypothesis tested in this article is at a generic level, hypothesizing which ministerial structure political parties would prefer based on their respective positions on integration policies as restrictive or permissive. These positions could be argued to be quite similar irrespective of the exact content of the integration issues; for example, a radical-right party is expected to advocate for restrictive policies both concerning refugee integration policies and concerning civic integration policies. Thus, although the content of integration policies may differ, such variation is not very problematic for the theoretical hypothesis tested, which focuses on whether issue and policy preferences affect the ministerial structure.

Increasingly Divergent Ministerial Structures

How has immigrant integration been coupled with other issues and signaled in the ministerial structure over time, and are there cross-national differences? Table 3 describes which type(s) of ministerial structure(s) the countries had from 1997 to 2017, and shows that 75% of the countries changed their type of structure at least once. Thirty-one per cent (Italy, Greece, Finland, Germany, and Luxemburg) had two types of ministerial structures, another 44% (Austria, Denmark, France, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden) tested three types. Several countries also moved back and forth between different categories, both horizontally, vertically and diagonally. Thus, only four of 16 countries had the same stylized ministerial structure for the 21 years analyzed: Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Portugal. Belgium is a federal state and decentralized the responsibility for integration the entire period. The other three countries made minor changes in the organizational structure of the integration issue, but none that involved changes concerning if integration was signaled or not in the titles or concerning the coupling with or decoupling from immigration and/or justice. Thus, a stable structure is the exception rather than the rule.

Table 3: Countries classified under type(s) of ministerial structure(s), 1997–2017

	Coupled with "Immigration/Justice"	Decoupled from "Immigration/Justice"
Integration signaled	Austria 2011–2012 Denmark 2001–2010; 2014–2017 France 2007–2009 Germany 2005–2017 Ireland 2007–2009; 2016–2017 Italy 2011–2013 Netherlands 2002–2006; 2010–2011 Norway 2015–2017 Sweden 2002–2006	Austria 2013–2017 Denmark 2011–2014 Ireland 2010 Luxemburg 2004–2017 Netherlands 1998–2001; 2007–2009 Sweden 1997–1999; 2007–2013; 2016–2017
Integration not signaled	Finland 1997–2011 France 2010–2017 Greece 1997–2015 Ireland 1997–2006; 2011–2015 Italy 1997–2010; 2014–2017 Norway 1997–2008 Spain 1997–2017 United Kingdom 1997–2017	Austria 1997–2010 Belgium 1997–2017 Denmark 1997–2000 Finland 2012–2017 France 1997–2006 Germany 1997–2004 Greece 2016–2017 Luxemburg 1997–2003 Netherlands 1997; 2012–2017 Norway 2009–2014 Portugal 1997–2017 Sweden 2000–2001; 2014–2015

A Diverse Structure of Coupled Policy Issues

Western European governments have coupled integration with numerous different issues. During the last 20 years, integration has been coupled with 41 policy fields when counting unique words included in ministry or ministers' titles, including asylum, public order, employment, social affairs, equality, culture, international cooperation, and democracy. Coupling integration with or decoupling it from justice and immigration is of particular interest for analyzing government parties' policy preferences. So, has integration been coupled with or decoupled from immigration and justice the last 20 years?

Figure 1: Number of countries that coupled integration with immigration and/or justice (N = 16)*

* The countries that are not classified as coupled are either: 1) decoupled horizontally within different ministries, or 2) decoupled vertically between the federal and state levels (Austria before 2011 and Belgium).

Figure 1 describes the number of countries that coupled integration with immigration and/or justice in the same ministry. From 1997, about half the countries had these two areas coupled, and the number steadily rose until 2005–06, followed by a fluctuating and decreasing trend until 2017.

Increased Signaling of Integration in the Ministerial Titles

Ten of sixteen countries signaled integration in the ministerial titles during the period of analysis: five in the ministry title (Austria, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, and Sweden), and an additional five had a minister responsible for integration that was affiliated with a more generalized ministry (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands).

Figure 2: Number of countries with integration signaled in the ministerial titles, 1997–2017 (N = 16)

Figure 2 portrays a clear cross-national trend of increased signaling of integration in the ministerial titles the last 20 years. In 1997, only Sweden included integration in a minister's title; however, from 2007, around 40% signaled integration in the ministerial structure. This number dropped in between 2012 and 2014, but rose again after the refugee crisis in 2015. In the three countries that introduced "integration" in the ministerial titles after the refugee crisis (Norway, Sweden, and Ireland), all established a specialized minister within a more generalized ministry.

Increasingly Divergent Cross-National Structures

Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of observations when combining the two components of signaling and coupling into four stylized ministerial structures (see Table 1).

Figure 3: Distribution of countries across four stylized ministerial structures (N = 16)

Figure 3 shows that ministerial structures where *integration is signaled in the title and coupled with immigration and/or justice* did not exist until 2001, but by 2005, nearly 25% had this structure. However, after remaining relatively stable until 2011, it decreased the following years until 2014, but regained popularity after the 2015 refugee crisis. Structures that *signaled integration in the title and decoupled integration from immigration and/or justice* were less common the first years of analysis and have fluctuated during the entire period; however, from 2007, about 20% of the countries have had this type of structure. Turning to the observations where integration was not signaled in the titles, about 45% started in 1997 with a structure where integration was *not signaled and coupled with immigration and/or justice*, and this number remained stable until 2006, and then followed a 10–15% decline. The observations where integration was *not signaled in the title and decoupled from immigration and/or justice* have been the most volatile. In the late 1990s, around 50% had this structure. The percentage steadily decreased to about 20% in 2007; however, from 2011, the trend shifted, and approximately 35% of the countries have had this structure in recent years.

Summarized, the ministerial structure of the integration issue in Western European countries has become increasingly diverse the last 10 years, because the countries spread themselves across the four stylized ministerial structures to a larger degree than they did in the first 10 years of analysis.

Parties' Issue and Policy Preferences: Reflected in the Ministerial Structure?

The next question is if the government parties' issue and policy preferences help explain these general traits of change and divergence. Figure 2 shows that it was not common to include integration in the ministerial titles the first 10 years of analysis, but that that there was a steadily growth of countries that signaled integration from 1997 to 2007. The rise of integration on the political agenda could be caused by several factor; increased saliency of the integration field, the introduction of integration policies at the EU level from 1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam, etc. Because the objective of the analysis is to investigate if certain types of governments correlate with the different types of ministerial structures, it necessary to focus on a period in which all four structures had become "normal" alternatives. Thus, the subsequent analysis narrows the period to 2007–2017. Each observation (N = 108) refers to the ministerial structure for a given year.

The Decoupled Left and Coupled Right

The first hypothesis predicts that right-oriented governments will be more inclined to couple integration with immigration and/or justice than left-oriented governments will be, and arises from the assumption that parties with more restrictive positions on immigration and integration would prefer to couple these issues.

Table 4: Types of governments and a coupled/decoupled ministerial structure, 2007–2017.

Type of government	Coupled with immigration/justice	Decoupled from immigration/justice	N
Left-oriented government	36%	64%	45
Right-oriented government	65%	35%	63

Table 4 shows that right-oriented governments more often coupled integration with immigration and/or justice than left-oriented governments did and the observed difference is significant (p > 0.01), thus confirming the hypothesis[7]. Denmark is a prime example of this pattern, where the coupling and decoupling of integration and immigration has shifted back and forth depending on the political orientation of the government. The results are further supported by an analysis of the particular cases driving the results. Approximately half of the governments did inherit the hypothesized structure from the previous government (a decoupled structure for left-oriented governments and a coupled structure for right-oriented governments). Governments that inherit the structure are naturally not expected to change this structure, and there is only one case where a government inherited the expected structure and changed it (in 2007, a Swedish right-oriented government moved integration out of the Ministry of Justice and established a Ministry of Integration and Equality). For governments that did *not* inherit

---

[7] To test if the presented correlations where affected by increased immigration and asylum rates, multivariate robust tests were conducted (see appendix 3). The multivariate analyses controlling for immigration and asylum rates show the same main findings as the correlation analyses (Tables 4 and 5) and the t-tests.

the hypothesized structure from the previous government, however, six governments made changes in the hypothesized direction, including left-oriented governments that changed from a coupled to a decoupled structure (Norway in 2009, Denmark in 2011, and the Netherlands in 2012), and right-oriented governments that changed from a decoupled to a coupled structure (France 2007, Norway 2015, and the Netherlands 2010). This implies that only 36% of the governments that inherited a structure that contradicts the hypothesis chose to keep this structure, which corresponds well with the results presented in Table 4.

Signaling and Governments with Radical Parties

The theoretical section presents two competing hypotheses based on different logics for why governments that include a radical party will be more inclined or not to mention integration in the ministerial titles than governments without such parties will be.

Table 5: Types of government and ministerial structures with and without integration signaled in the title, 2007–2017.

Type of government	Integration signaled	Integration not signaled	N
Left-oriented government	4%	96%	24
Left-oriented government with a radical-left party	48%	52%	21
Right-oriented government	45%	55%	53
Right-oriented government with radical-right party	40%	60%	10

Table 5 shows that for right-oriented governments, there is no clear pattern: the discrepancy between right-oriented governments with or without radical-right parties is minor and the difference is not significant (p = 0.08). However, for left-oriented governments, Table 5 shows that left-oriented governments with a radical-left party is more inclined to signal integration than governments without such a party, and this difference is significant (p > 0.01). Nevertheless, when examining the specific cases that drive the results for left-oriented governments with a radical party, the support for the hypothesis is weakened. Governments with radical-left parties either 1) inherited the hypothesized structure from the previous government (Denmark and Luxembourg), or 2) made changes during their governing period as a response to the refugee crisis in 2015 (Sweden). Luxembourg has had a signaled structure since a center government introduced a Minister of Family Affairs and Integration already in 2004, thus the 2013 left-oriented government that included the Socialist Workers´ Party and the Greens inherited this structure when they took office. Similarly, Denmark has had a signaled structure since a right-oriented government introduced 'integration' in the Ministry title in 2001, and the left-oriented government including the Socialist People's Party that took office in 2011 merely continued this tradition. The last case driving the results is Sweden. The 2014 left-oriented government including the Greens, actually removed "integration" from the title when they took office in 2014, but reintroduced it as a response to the refugee crisis in 2016.

Consequently, combining these insights, the qualitative analysis weakens the empirical support the hypothesis expecting that governments with radical parties would be more inclined to signal integration, even for governments with radical-left parties.

It is important to emphasize that governments with radical parties constitute a limited number of observations, particularly those including radical-right parties, which brings high uncertainty to the results. Nevertheless, with this precaution in mind, the lack of evidence to support the hypothesis that radical parties would be more inclined to signal integration does not necessarily imply that the these parties do not have such preferences for signaling. One possible explanation for why preferences for signaling 'integration' is not manifested in the ministerial structure, may be that radical parties often are junior partners in coalition governments, and that they merely lost the battle when the ministerial structure was negotiated. In an analysis of radical-right parties' direct influence on the restrictiveness of immigration and integration policies, Akkerman (2012) found that the inclusion of a radical party in a right-oriented government does not lead to policies that are more restrictive. He points to possible explanations for the radical-right parties' lack of influence, for example, that the bargaining position of radical-right parties in coalition governments has been relatively weak because they have mostly been junior partners, and because of their organizational weakness (Akkerman, 2012, 512, 523). Additionally, the radical parties' radical position could have made other coalition parties hesitant to agree on a structure that would increase the attention to such a salient issue where especially the radical-right parties have such a strong issue ownership, providing them with a platform to broadcast their political views.

If the lack of empirical support for the hypothesis predicting that radical parties would be more inclined to signal integration is caused by the radical parties' position as junior partners, or that these parties merely prefer not to signal integration as stated in the alternate hypothesis, could be the subject of future in-depth analyses of each process for the respective countries.

New Insights and Limitations of the Comparative Approach

Demonstrating cross-national traits of how issue and policy preferences are manifested in the ministerial structure would not be possible without the study's comparative approach. The broader comparative approach applied in this analysis than has been applied in previous studies of machinery changes made it possible to focus on a new political context, where the majority of countries have coalition governments instead of single-party governments. Although the literature on machinery of government changes has identified several drivers of change, internal party politics has often been highlighted as one of the most important drivers – if not the most important – for ministerial changes (White and Dunleavy, 2010; Heppell, 2011; Davis et al., 1999). These studies mostly use empirical analyses of single-party governments; however, most Western European countries have multi-party systems, where coalition governments are the rule rather than the exception (in the DIIG dataset, approximately 80% of the governments were coalition governments). The political dynamic of machinery changes could be expected to work differently for single-party and coalition governments. In single-party governments, the ministerial structure is ultimately the prime minister's prerogative, and ministries could be established, abolished, and altered for internal political considerations. For coalition government, this dynamic might be quite different because the allocation of ministries amongst

the parties is subject to thorough negotiations. Although the party leaders of each coalition party can alter the personnel responsible for their party's ministries, it is less likely that internal party politics plays such a substantial role in altering the ministerial structure, because such changes need the acceptance of all coalition parties. Issue and policy preferences, however, might play a larger part for coalition governments, because parties could be expected to fight to ensure that the ministerial structure reflects their issue and policy preferences.

The broad comparative approach also challenges a new statement in the immigrant integration literature, namely that there is trend towards 'mainstreaming' in immigrant integration governance in Western-Europa – implying that the responsibility for integration policy is distributed across various units, contrary to having one specialized unit for integration (Scholten et al. 2016). Figure 2, however, shows an increasing trend of signaling integration in the ministerial titles, implying a more specialized focus on integration in the horizontal governance structure.

Still, the comparative approach applied in this study has its limitations. Which stylized structure political parties in each country prefer for particular issues, and how decisive this factor is when determining the ministerial structure as a whole, cannot be revealed by quantitative analyses, but must ultimately be answered by in-depth analyses of each process leading to ministerial changes and stability. Additionally, by expanding the comparative focus, the analysis was limited to investigating a single issue. Immigrant integration was chosen as a "most likely" case for detecting government parties' issue and policy preferences, because of its characteristics as politically salient and wicked. Consequently, these characteristics affect how the main findings could be generalized to issues of less salience and wickedness. Although the analysis found that only a few countries had stable structures for the integration issue, stronger traits of stability could be expected for less salient and wicked issues, because government parties might be less inclined to use the ministerial structure – the top level of bureaucracy – as a way to signal and prioritize issue and policy preferences.

The methodological approach in the analysis, dividing signaling and coupling into four stylized organizational structures (see Table 1), proved useful. The novelty of the approach was not that the question of policy preferences and coupling had not been touched upon in the existing literature, but the advantage is that it enables a systematic analysis of how policy preferences might affect how issues are coupled or decoupled, and how policy preferences might ultimately affect the overall ministerial structure. Additionally, the generic operationalization of the organizational structure into four stylized categories makes it transferable not only to other policy fields (e.g., energy, environment, disabilities), but also vertically to other governmental levels (international, regional, and local) in analyses where the organizational structure is the dependent variable.

Conclusion

That not only government parties' issue preferences but also policy preferences could affect the horizontal ministerial structure has been an often-stated, but yet unexplored, assumption in the literature on "machinery of government changes." This study investigated this assumption by analyzing whether and how issue and policy preferences might explain longitudinal and cross-

national traits in the ministerial structure of immigrant integration in 16 Western European countries.

The descriptive analysis found that stable ministerial structures were the exception rather than the rule. Divergence and change characterize the ministerial structure of the integration issue, driven by an increasing trend of signaling integration in the ministerial titles and a fluctuating trend concerning the coupling of integration with immigration and/or justice. The first hypothesis gained empirical support: the analysis showed that right-oriented governments were more inclined to couple integration with immigration and/or justice than left-oriented governments were, reflecting the right's policy preferences for restrictive integration policies. However, governments that included a radical party was not more inclined to signal integration in the ministerial titles. While internal party politics has been highlighted in previous studies as one of the most important drivers for ministerial changes (White and Dunleavy, 2010; Heppell, 2011; Davis et al., 1999), the article argues that this mechanism might be less relevant for coalition governments (that constitute the majority of Western European governments), and that issue and policy preferences might play a larger role when coalition governments determine the ministerial structure.

Why does the organizational coupling and decoupling of issues matter? The ministerial structure is a product of the government parties' evaluation of which structure will be the best overall solution to achieve the government's (often conflicting) goals. Still, current literature has focused more on the political aspect rather than on the actual policy implications of these choices. Although the manifestation of an issue in the ministry or ministers' titles might be important both symbolically and politically, the implications of how an issue is coupled with other issues might be just as – or even more – influential for the policy outputs. As Nina M. Vestlund (2015) concluded in her analysis of an EU pharmaceutical unit that shifted its affiliation from being coupled with "enterprise and industry" to "health and consumer": "the horizontal specialization systematically tips the scales in the direction of certain actors, solutions, interests and concerns in decision processes, eventually resulting in a change of policy focus." Still, the relative significance of the horizontal structure on policy outputs is debated in the public administration literature (Vestlund, 2015), and quantitative analyses with the horizontal structure as an independent variable are rare. Although this study concentrated on the horizontal structure as a dependent variable, the presented DIIG dataset could also be applied to examine the horizontal structure as an independent variable in future studies. The literature on immigrant integration has produced several comprehensive datasets on immigration and integration policy developments, for example datasets such as MIPEX (2015), CIVIX (Goodman, 2012), and IMPIC (Helbling et al., 2017). These datasets could be combined with the DIIG dataset to examine if and how different stylized structures have influenced the content of national integration policies, providing new insight not only for the literature on immigrant integration, but also for the public administration literature more generally.

Last but not least, knowledge on the policy implications of organizational changes is essential, because these types of changes consume public resources. Anne White and Patrick Dunleavy (2010, 7) demonstrate that ministerial changes have substantial costs, both financially and administratively, and that procedures of reorganizing the ministerial structure do little to minimize these costs. Thus, although it is the government's prerogative to design the ministerial structure, these costs make it legitimate to question the purpose of such changes. If the

government uses the ministerial structure to solve internal party conflicts or to communicate the government's issue and policy preferences as part of a political battle with the opposition to win the electorate, constant changes that consume public resources might be more criticized than if the changes were made to support the administration and implementation of actual policies.

References

Akkerman, Tjitske. (2012). Comparing Radical Right Parties in Government: Immigration and Integration Policies in Nine Countries (1996–2010). *West European Politics* 35 (3):511–29.

Baldi, Gregory, and Sara Wallace Goodman. (2015). Migrants into Members: Social Rights, Civic Requirements, and Citizenship in Western Europe. West European Politics 38 (6):1152–73.

Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Andrea Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter. (2010). If you can't beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe. Political studies, 58(3), 410-426.

Borevi, Karin, Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen, and Per Mouritsen. (2017). The Civic Turn of Immigrant Integration Policies in the Scandinavian Welfare States. Comparative Migration Studies 5 (1):1–14.

Brochmann, Grete, Anniken Hagelund, Karen Borevi, Heidi Vad Jønsson, and Klaus Petersen. (2012). Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State, 1945–2010. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Christensen, Tom, Morten Egeberg, Per Lægreid, and Jacob Aars. (2014). Forvaltning og politikk. 4.utgave ed. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Dahlström, C. (2009). Political Appointments in 18 Democracies. QoG Working Paper Series (18):1–19.

Davis, Glyn, Patrick Weller, Susan Eggins, and Emma Craswell. (1999). What drives machinery of government change? Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, 1950–1997. Public Administration 77 (1):7–50.

Dekker, Rianne, Henrik Emilsson, Bernhard Krieger, and Peter Scholten. (2015). A Local Dimension of Integration Policies? A Comparative Study of Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam. *International Migration Review* 49 (3):633–58.

Desiderio, Maria Vincenza, and Agnieszka Weinar. (2014). *Supporting Immigrant Integration in Europe?: Developing the Governance for Diaspora Engagement*. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Döring, Holger, and Philip Manow. (2016). *Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies*. http://www.parlgov.org/.

Egeberg, Morten. (2012). How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective. In *The SAGE Handbook of Public Administration*, edited by B Guy Peters and Jon Pierre. London: Sage.

Egeberg, Morten, Åse Gornitzka, and Jarle Trondal. (2016). Organization Theory. In *Handbook on Theories of Governance*, edited by Christopher Ansell and Jacob Torfing. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Ennser, Laurenz. (2012). The Homogeneity of West European Party Families: The Radical Right in Comparative Perspective. *Party Politics* 18 (2):151–71.

Filindra, Alexandra and Sara Wallace Goodman. (2019). Studying Public Policy through Immigration Policy: Advances in Theory and Measurement. *Policy Studies Journal*, 47(3), 498-516.

Goodman, Sara Wallace. (2012). Fortifying Citizenship: Policy Strategies for Civic Integration in Western Europe. *World Politics* 64 (04):659–98.

Goodman, Sara Wallace. (2015). Conceptualizing and Measuring Citizenship and Integration Policy: Past Lessons and New Approaches. *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (14):1905–41.

Hammond, Thomas H. (1986). Agenda control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics. *American Journal of Political Science* 30 (2):379–420.

Helbling, Marc, Liv Bjerre, Friederike Römer, and Malisa Zobel. (2017). Measuring immigration policies: The IMPIC database. *European Political Science* 16:79–98.

Heppell, Timothy. (2011). Departmental Restructuring under New Labour. *The Political Quarterly* 82 (3):425–34.

Hernes, Vilde. (2017). Central Coercion or Local Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Policy Instrument Choice in Refugee Settlement Policies. *Local Government Studies* 43 (5):798–819.

Hernes, Vilde. (2018). Cross-National Convergence in Times of Crisis? Integration Policies Before, During and After the Refugee Crisis. *West European Politics* 42 (6): 1305-1329.

Joppke, Christian. (2007). Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics* 30 (1):1–22.

Joppke, Christian. (2017). Civic Integration in Western Europe: Three Debates. *West European Politics* 40 (6):1153–76.

Karlsen, Rune, and Bernt Aardal. (2016). Political Values Count but Issue Ownership Decides? How Stable and Dynamic Factors Influence Party Set and Vote Choice in Multiparty Systems. *International Political Science Review* 37 (2):261–76.

Mortensen, Peter B, and Christoffer Green-Pedersen. (2014). Institutional Effects of Changes in Political Attention: Explaining Organizational Changes in the Top Bureaucracy. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 25 (1):165–89.

Petrocik, John R. (1996). Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study. *American Journal of Political Science*: 825–50.

Rittel, Horst W., and Webber, Melvin. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. *Policy Sciences*, 4 (2), 155–169.

Rochefort, D.A., and R.W. Cobb. (1998). Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy Choice. *Policy Studies Journal* 21 (1).

Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. (1993). Social Construction of Target Populations – Implications for Politics and Policy. *American Political Science Review* 87 (2):334–47.

Scholten, Peter, Elizabeth Collett, and Milica Petrovic. (2017). Mainstreaming Migrant Integration? A Critical Analysis of a New Trend in Integration Governance. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 83 (2):283–302.

Thelen, Kathleen. (1999). Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. *Annual Review Political Science* 2:369–404.

Trein, Philipp. (2016). A New Way to Compare Horizontal Connections of Policy Sectors: 'Coupling' of Actors, Institutions and Policies. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 19 (5):419–34.

Vestlund, Nina Merethe. (2015). Changing policy focus through organizational reform? The case of the pharmaceutical unit in the European Commission. *Public Policy and Administration* 30 (1):92–112.

White, Anne, and Patrick Dunleavy. (2010). *Making and Breaking Whitehall Departments: A Guide to Machinery of Government Changes*. London, U.K.: Institute for Government.

Appendix 1: Codebook

1. Data sorting order

1. Country
2. Year
3. Descr_of_change
4. Resp_Cent_Decent
5. Type_Change
6. Name_Ministry_Integr
7. Spec_Ministry_Integr
8. Name_Minister_Integr
9. Spec_Minister_Integr
10. Intgr_Sign_NotSign
11. Name_Ministry_Immigr
12. Coupled_Integr_Immigr
13. Stylised_Mins_structur
14. Coupled_Integr_Justice
15. Coupled_Integr_Interior
16. Coupled_Integr_Employ
17. Coupled_Integr_Social
18. Coupled_Integr_Equality
19. Coupled_Integr_Immigr
20. Coupled_Integr_Other
21. Government
22. Partyfam_Com_Soc
23. Partyfam_Gre_Eco
24. Partyfam_SocDem
25. Partyfam_Lib
26. Partyfam_Agr
27. Partyfam_ChrDem
28. Partyfam_Con
29. Partyfam_RigWin
30. Clas_Gov

Comment: Variables 1-19 are from the DIIG dataset. Variables 20-29 are from the ParlGov database.

2. Column information

Country = Name of country

Year = Year

Descr_of_change = Description of changes in the ministerial structure for the integration issue. If there are no changes in the year of observation, the value is classified as 'N/A'.

Resp_Cent_Decent = Classification: If the responsibility for integration is centralised at the national/ federal level, or decentralised to the state level. (Centralised/Decentralised)

Type_Change = Classification of type of change into nine categories:

   I.   *Demerger:* Observations where integration (along with other functions) went from being a subcomponent in a broader ministry, and parted into a separate ministry.
   II.   *Merger:* Observations where previously separate ministries are merged into one ministry.
   III. *Termination:* Observations where a ministry is closed and its remaining activities are transferred to other ministries.
   IV.   *Transfer of functions:* Observations where two or more ministries remain in being, but a set of responsibilities is transferred from one to another.
   V.   *Centralization:* Observations where the responsibility for integration was centralized from the state level to the federal level.
   VI.   *Ministerial post - minor name and portfolio change:* Observations where integration remains the responsibility for the same ministerial post, but where other minor functions where transferred.
   VII. *Ministry - minor name and portfolio change*: Observations where integration remains the responsibility within the same mother ministry, but where other minor functions where transferred.
   VIII. *Specialized ministerial post established*: Observations where the responsibility for integration remains in the same ministry, but where a specialized ministerial post for integration - that include 'integration' in the title – was established within the ministry.
   IX.   *Specialized ministerial post abolished*: Observations where the responsibility for integration remains in the same ministry, but where a previously specialized ministerial post for integration - that include 'integration' in the title – was abolished within the ministry.

Name_Ministry_Integr = English name of ministry responsible for integration policies. For countries that have decentralised the responsibility to the state level (see variable *Resp_Cent_Decent')*, the cell is classified as 'N/A'. The ministry names document the names described in the source material (see reference list), however, two alterations were made to improve comparability: Ministries that included the word 'Labor' were changed to 'Employment', and ministries labelled 'Home Office' were changed to Ministry of Interior. The variable documents the main organizational affiliation of the integration issue as described by the sources, but does not include all affiliated units. Inter-governmental units are included only if they are the sole unit responsible for the field (e.g., in Portugal.

Spec_Ministry_Integr = Classification: If the ministry responsible for integration had 'integration' in the ministry's title. (Yes/No)

Name_Spec_Minister_Integr = English name of minister responsible for integration policies. If there is no specialised minister of integration, the value is classified as 'N/A'. The minister names document the names described in the source material (see reference list), however, two alterations were made to improve comparability: Minister titles that included the word 'Labor' were changed to 'Employment', and ministers titles labelled 'Home Office' were changed to Ministry of Interior.

Spec_Minister_Integr = Classification: If the minister responsible for integration had 'integration' in the ministry's title. (Yes/No)

Intgr_Sign_NotSign = Classification: If the ministerial structure had 'integration' signalled or not signalled in the ministerial titles, meaning that 'integration' was mentioned in the ministry and/or minister's title. (Signalled/ Not Signalled)

Name_Ministry_Immigr = English name of ministry responsible for immigration policies. The ministry names document the names described in the source material (see reference list), however, two alterations were made to improve comparability: Ministries that included the word 'Labor' were changed to 'Employment', and ministries labelled 'Home Office' were changed to Ministry of Interior.

Coupled_Integr_Immigr = Classification: If the responsibilities for integration and immigration policies were located/coupled within the same ministry or not. If the responsibility for integration is divided between several ministries, and one of the responsible ministries also has responsibility for immigration, it is classified as coupled (e.g. the UK from 2006). (Coupled/Decoupled)

Stylised_Mins_structur = Classification of stylised ministerial structures into four categories.

   I.   Not Signalled & Coupled
   II.   Not Signalled & Decoupled
  III. Signalled & Coupled
  IV. Signalled & Decoupled

Coupled_Integr_Justice = Classification: If integration was coupled with justice or other related issues in the ministerial titles, see classification of related issues in Table 1. (Yes/No)

Coupled_Integr_Interior = Classification: If integration was coupled with interior or other related issues in the ministerial titles, see classification of related issues in Table 1. (Yes/No)

Coupled_Integr_Employ = Classification: If integration was coupled with employment or other related issues in the ministerial titles, see classification of related issues in Table 1. (Yes/No)

Coupled_Integr_Social = Classification: If integration was coupled with social affairs or other related issues in the ministerial titles, see classification of related issues in Table 1. (Yes/No)

Coupled_Integr_Equality = Classification: If integration was coupled with equality or other related issues in the ministerial titles, see classification of related issues in Table 1. (Yes/No)

Coupled_Integr_Immigr = Classification: If integration was coupled with immigration or other related issues in the ministerial titles, see classification of related issues in Table 1. (Yes/No)

Coupled_Integr_Other = Classification: If integration was coupled with issues that was not classified under the six categories, see classification in Table 1. (Yes/No)

Government = Name of government and list of government parties for the given year according to the ParlGov database. Format: '<name government>; party 1, party 2, party 3, etc.'. If there was changes in government during the year of observation, the new government is documented for that given year.

Partyfam_Com_Soc = Classification: If the government included a political party classified under the party family 'Communist / Socialist' according to the ParlGov database. (Yes/No)

Partyfam_Gre_Eco = Classification: If the government included a political party classified under the party family 'Green / Ecologist' according to the ParlGov database. (Yes/No)

Partyfam_SocDem = Classification If the government included a political party classified under the party family 'Social Democracy' according to the ParlGov database. (Yes/No)

Partyfam_Lib = Classification: If the government included a political party classified under the party family 'Liberal' according to the ParlGov database. (Yes/No)

Partyfam_Agr = Classification: If the government included a political party classified under the party family 'Agrarian' according to the ParlGov database. (Yes/No)

Partyfam_ChrDem = Classification: If the government included a political party classified under the party family 'Christian Democracy' according to the ParlGov database. (Yes/No)

Partyfam_Con = Classification: If the government included a political party classified under the party family 'Conservative' according to the ParlGov database. (Yes/No)

Partyfam_RigWin = Classification: If the government included a political party classified under the party family 'Right-wing' according to the ParlGov database. (Yes/No)

Clas_Gov = Classification of different types of governments into nine categories. (C+)L

    I.   (C+)L+RL
    II.   (C+)R
   III.   (C+)R+RR
   IV.   Caretaker Cabinet
    V.   Centre
   VI.   Centre-Green
  VII.   Radical Left and Right
 VIII. Rainbow

Table 1 – Categorization of ministerial titles in 7 categories

Justice	Interior	Employment	Social Affairs	Equality	Immigration	Other
Law reform, Public Security, Public Order	Community, Galtech Affairs, Kingdom relations, Local and Regional Government, Democracy, Cities	Economic Affairs, Enterprise	Children, Family, Social Security	Inclusion	National Identity, Refugees, Asylum, Migration	Culture, Europe, Foreign Affairs, Spatial Planning, Environment, Housing, Solidarity, Development, Knowledge, Church, Sport, Youth, Consumers, International, Cooperation, Living, Neighborhoods, Urban policies

Appendix 2: Sources for the Dataset on Immigrant Integration Governance:

Austria

Biffl, G. (2013). *Migration and Labour integration in Austria* (SOPEMI Report on Labour Migration Austria 2012-13). Krems: Danube University.

Desiderio, M. V. and A. Weinar (2014). *Supporting immigrant integration in Europe?: Developing the governance for diaspora engagement* (MPI report). Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Austria.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2015*). The Organization of Asylum and Migration Policies in Austria.* Brussels: European Migration Network.

European Migration Network. (2005-2016). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum- Austria.* Brussels: European Commission.

Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs. (2018). *Organizational Structure* (in German). Retrieved 15.02.2018 from: https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/the-ministry/organizational-structure-in-german/

König, K., & Perchinig, B. (2003). Austria. *In EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Belgium

European Migration Network (2004). *The Belgian Policy Report on Migration and Asylum: With a Special Focus on Immigration and Integration.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2005-2016). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum- Belgium.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Belgium.* Brussels: European Commission.

Gsir, S., Martiniello, M., & Wets, J. (2003). Belgium. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Denmark

European Migration Network. (2012-2013). *Country Factsheets: Denmark.* Brussels: European Commission.

Statsministeriet. (2018). *Regjeringer fra 1953 til i dag.* Retrieved 07.02.2018 from http://www.stm.dk/_p_7812.html

Stenum, Helle. (2003). Denmark. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Styrelsen for International Rekruttering og Integration. (2017). *Årsrapport 2016*, København: Styrelsen for International Rekruttering og Integration.

Finland

European Migration Network. (2008-2015). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum-Finland.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Finland.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2013). *The Organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies in Finland* (EMN Studies). Brussels.

Finnish Government. (2018). *Governments in Chronological Order*. Retrieved 11.02.2018 from http://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/government/history/governments-and-ministers/report/-/r/v2

Koskela, K. (2014). *Integration Policies - Finland Country Report* (INTERACT Research Report 2014/29, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.

Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. (2018a). *Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment.* Retrieved 11.02.2018 from http://tem.fi/en/history

Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. (2018b). *Departments and Units*. Retrieved 11.02.2018 from http://tem.fi/en/departments-and-units

Ministry of the Interior. Finland. (2018). *History of the Ministry*. Retrieved 10.02.2018 from http://intermin.fi/en/ministry/history-of-the-ministry

Salmenhaara, P. (2003). Finland. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

France

Allwood, G., & Wadia, K. (2010). *Refugee women in Britain and France*. Manchester University Press.

Blion, R., Wihtol de Wenden, C. and Meknache, N. (2003). France. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services LLP (United Kingdom). (2016). *Regulatory Framework on Employment and Funding for Migration and Integration Policies in the EU*. European Union, Committee of Regions.

Direction de l´information légale at administrative. (2018, 9th January). *Commissariat général à l'égalité du territoire (CGET).* Retrieved 24.02.2018 from http://www.vie-publique.fr/acteurs/commissariat-general-egalite-du-territoire-cget.html

Escafré-Dublet, A. (2014). *Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in France: Education, Employment, and Social Cohesion Initiatives* (MPI Report). Brussels: MigrationPolicy Institute Europe.

European Migration Network. (2008-2016). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum-France*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2010). *The Organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies in the EU Member States*. Brussels: European Migration Network.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: France.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2016). *Integration of Beneficiaries of International Protection into the Labour Market: Policies and Good Practices* (EMN Studies). Brussels: European Migration Network.

Ministry of Interior (2015, March 24th). *Politique nationale d'accueil et d'accompagnement des personnes étrangères nouvellement arrivées - Appel à projets 2015 – Actions nationales.* Retrieved 24.02.2018 from: https://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Les-archives-du-site/Archives-Integration/Appels-a-projets/Politique-nationale-d-accueil-et-d-accompagnement-des-personnes-etrangeres-nouvellement-arrivees-Appel-a-projets-2015-Actions-nationales

Ministry of Interior. (2018). *Preséntation La Direction Générale des Étrangers en France.* Retrieved 24.02.2018 from: https://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/La-Direction-generale/Presentation

Simon, P. (2012). *French National Identity and Integration: Who belongs to the National Community?* (MPI Report). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Germany

Bendel, P. (2014). *Coordinating Immigrant Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the Federal and Local Levels* (MPI Report) Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Cyrus, N. and Dita Vogel. (2003). Germany. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Germany.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2005-2016). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum-Germany.* Brussels: European Commission.

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2011, May 5th). *Federal Office.* Retrieved 26.01.2018 from: http://www.bamf.de/EN/DasBAMF/Chronik/Bundesamt/bundesamt-node.html

Rietig, V. (2016). *Moving Beyond Crisis: Germany's New Approaches to Integrating Refugees Into the Labor Market* (MPI Report). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Schneider, J. (2012*). The Organization of Asylum and Migration Policies in Germany.* Nürnberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

Greece

Anagnostou, D. (2016). *Local Government and Migrant Integration in Europe and in Greece.* Athens: Hellenistic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.

Desiderio, M. V. and A. Weinar (2014). *Supporting immigrant integration in Europe?: Developing the governance for diaspora engagement* (MPI report). Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Greece.* Brussels:European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2013). *The Organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies Factsheet Greece.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2005-2015). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum-Greece.* Brussels: European Commission.

Kanellopoulos, C. N., and Gregou, M. (2006). *Policy Report on Migration, Asylum and Re-turn in Greece*. Athens: Centre of Planning and Economic Research EMN Greek.

Lykovardi, K., and Petroula, E. (2003). Greece. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Magliveras, K. D. (2011). *Migration Law in Greece*. Alphen aan den Rijin: Kluwer Law International.

Manos, I., Papadopoulou, D., Makrygianni, V. and Kolovos., K. (2017). *Communities in Greece: Studying the Aspects of Albanian Migration to Greece.* Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe.

Triandafyllidou, A. (2009). *Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century. Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?*. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11(2), 168-174.

Ireland

Collett, E. (2011). *Immigrant Integration in Europe in a Time of Austerity* (MPI Report). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Department of Justice and Equality. (2018) *Our ministers*. Retrieved 13.02.2018 from http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/WP15000239

Department of the Taoiseach. (2018). *History of Government*. Retrieved 13.02.2018 from https://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Historical_Information/History_of_Government/

Desiderio, M. V. and A. Weinar (2014). *Supporting immigrant integration in Europe?: Developing the governance for diaspora engagement* (MPI report). Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Ireland*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2005-2016). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum-Ireland.* Brussels: European Commission.

Glynn, I. (2014). *An Overview of Ireland's Integration Policies* (INTERACT RR 2014/10, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute

Hardiman, N., MaCarthaigh, M., and Scott, C. (2018). *The Irish State Administration Database.* Retrieved from http://www.isad.ie

Horwath Consulting Ireland, Ramboll Management, and Matrix Knowledge Group. (2008). *Development of a National English Language Policy and Framework for Legally Resident Adult Immigrants* (Final Report to Office of the Minister for Integration and the Department of Education & Science). Dublin.

Interdepartmental *Working Group on the Integration of Refugees in Ireland. (1999). Integration - a Two Way Process.* Dublin: Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

MacVeigh, T. (2003). Ireland. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Quinn, E. (2009). *The Organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies in Ireland* (ESRI Research Series). Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute.

Reception and Integration Agency. (2010a). *Background.* Retrieved 13.02.2018 from http://www.ria.gov.ie/en/RIA/Pages/Background

Reception and Integration Agency (2010b). *Functions and Responsibilities.* Retrieved 13.02.2018 from http://www.ria.gov.ie/en/RIA/Pages/Functions_Responsibilities

Italy

Caneva, E. (2014). *The Integration of Migrants in Italy: an Overview of Policy Instruments and Actors* (INTERACT RR 2014/05, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.

Chaloff, J. (2003). Italy. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Desiderio, M. V. and A. Weinar (2014). *Supporting immigrant integration in Europe?: Developing the governance for diaspora engagement* (MPI report). Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Italy*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2005-2012). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum- Italy.* Brussels: European Commission.

OECD. (2014). *Jobs for Immigrants (Vol. 4): Labour Market Integration in Italy*.Paris:OECD Publishing.

Pojmann, W. (2017). *Immigrant Women and Feminism in Italy.* New York: Routledge.

Luxembourg

European Migration Network. (2012*). The Strength of Internal Employment and the Migratory Policy - Luxembourg* (EMN Studies). Brussels: European Migration Network.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Luxembourg*.Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2009-2016). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum- Luxembourg.* Brussels: European Commission.

Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. (2018). *Official Journal: loi du 27. Juillet 1993.* Retrieved 02.02.2018 from http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/1993/07/27/n1/jo

Kollwelter, S. (2003). Luxembourg. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the European Union. (2004, December 29th). *Marie-Josee Jacobs*. Retrieved 08.02.2018 from http://www.eu2005.lu/en/presidence/membres/jacobs/index.html

Luxembourg Reception and Integration Agency. (2014, January 8th). *History.* Retrieved 08.02.2018 from http://www.olai.public.lu/en/olai/historique/index.html

Pilati, M, Sheikh, H., Sperotti, F. and Tilly, C. (2015). *How Global Migration Changes the Workforce Diversity Equation.* Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Triandafyllidou, A., & Gropas, R. (2016). *European immigration: a sourcebook*. New York: Routledge.

Norway

European Migration Network. (2011-2012). A*nnual Reports on Migration and Asylum -Norway*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Norway*. Brussels: European Commission.

Norsk senter for forskningsdata. (2017). *Forvaltningsdatabasen.* Retrieved 08.02.2018 from http://www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/forvaltning/forvaltningsdatabasen.html

Regjeringen. (2018). *Integreringsavdelingen.* Retrieved 14.2.2018 from https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/jd/org/avdelinger/Integreringsavdelingen-/id589415/

Portugal

Chamie, J., Dall'Oglio, L., & Powers, M. G. (2006). *International Migration and the Global Community: A forum on the report of the Global Commission on International Migration.* Hammersmith Press.

Collett, E. (2011). *Immigrant Integration in Europe in a Time of Austerity* (MPI Report). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Cruz Beja Orrico Horta, A. P., and Goncalvez de Oliveira, M. P. (2014). *Integration Policies-Portugal Country Report* (INTERACT Research Report 2014/18, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.

Equinet. *European Network of Equality Bodies.* (2018). Portugal: High Commision for Migration.

Esteves, A., Fonseca, M. L. and Malheiros, J. (2003). Portugal. In *EU and US approaches to the   management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

European Migration Network. (2012-2015). *Country Factsheets: Portugal*. Brussels: European   Commission.

European Migration Network. (2006-2015). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum- Portugal.* Brussels: European Commission.

Henry, I. (2013). *Transnational and comparative research in sport: Globalisation, governance   and sport policy.* New York: Routledge.

Queen´s University. (2018). *Multiculturalism Policies in Contemporary Democracies: Portugal.* Retrieved 11.02.2018 from: http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant-minorities/evidence/portugal

Spain

Arango, J. (2013). *Exceptional in Europe? Spain's Experience with Immigration and Integration* (MPI Report). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Arango, J. (2016). *Spain: New Emigration Policies Needed for an Emerging Diaspora* (MPI report). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Carrera, S. (2009). *In Search of the Perfect Citizen?: The Intersection Between Integration, Immigration and Nationality in the EU*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Spain*. Brussels: European   Commission.

120

European Migration Network. (2007-2015). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum-Spain.* Brussels: European Commission.

Gobierno de Espana/Government of Spain. (2012) *Government Under 9th Legislature.* Retrieved 20.02.2018 from http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/bylegislature/Paginas/20140521_IX_Legislature.aspx

Gobierno de Espana/Government of Spain. (2016) *Government Under 10th Legislature.* Retrieved 20.02.2018 from http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/bylegislature/Paginas/20140521_X_Legislature.aspx

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (2012). *International Migration Outlook 2012.* Paris: OECD.

Pérez, N. O. (2003, February 1st). *Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy.* Retrieved 15.03.2018 from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/spain-forging-immigration-policy

Secretaría de Estado de Inmigracíon y Emigracíon. (2011). *II Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía E Integratíon* (2011-2014). Retrieved from: http://www.fundacionlengua.com/extra/descargas/des_38/INMIGRACION/II-Plan-Estrategico-Ciudadania-e-Integracion.pdf

Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration. (2009). *Migration Policy in Spain.* Madrid: Ministry for Labour and Immigration Retrieved from https://www.osce.org/eea/36284?download=true.

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2003). Spain. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2013). *Diversity management in Spain: New dimensions, new challenges.* Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press.

The Netherlands

Desiderio, M. V. and A. Weinar (2014). *Supporting immigrant integration in Europe?: Developing the governance for diaspora engagement* (MPI report). Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

European Migration Network. (2012). *The Organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies in the Netherlands.* Brussels: European Migration Network .

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Netherlands.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2005-2016). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum- the Netherlands.* Brussels: European Commission.

van het Loo, M., Spiegeleire, S. D., Kahan, J. P., Lindstrom, G., & Vernez, G. (2001). *A Comparison of American and Dutch Immigration and Integration Experiences.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.

Maan, X., van Breugel, I., & Scholten, P. (2014). *The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies* (UPSTREAM Project). Rotterdam: Erasmus University.

Magnée, I., and Gerritsma, E. (2003). The Netherlands. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Zincone, G., Penninx, R., & Borkert, M. (2011). *Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present.* Amsterdam University Press.

Sweden

Borevi, K. (2010). Sverige: Mångkulturalismens flaggskip i Norden. In G. Brochmann & A. Hagelund (Eds.), *Velferdens grenser*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

European Migration Network. (2005-2016). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum- Sweden*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: Sweden*. Brussels:European Commission.

Hernes, V. (2018). *When integration and immigration policies meet and compete – a comparative analysis of Scandinavian integration policies during the refugee crisis.* Working paper. Oslo: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.

Regjeringskansliet. (2018). *Regjeringskansliets årsbok*, 1998-2016. Retrieved 12.02.2018 from: https://www.regeringen.se/sokresultat/?query=Regeringskansliets%20%C3%A5rsbok&ct=Informationsmaterial&from=1997-01-01&to=2018-02-15

United Kingdom

Ali, S, and Gidley, B. (2014). *Advancing Outcomes for All Minorities: Experiences of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in the United Kingdom* (MPI Report). Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe.

Baldaccini, A. (2003). United Kingdom. In *EU and US approaches to the management of immigration* (eds.) J. Niessen, Y. Schibel, and R. Magoni. Brussels: Migration Policy Group.

Communities and Local Government Committee. (2008). *Community Cohesion and Migration.* London: House of Commons. Retrieved from https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmcomloc/369/369i.pdf

Department for Communities and Local Government. (2008). *Review of Migrant Integration Policy in the UK (including a feasibility study of the proposal for an Integration Agency).* West Yorkshire: Communities and Local Government Publications.

European Migration Network. (2012). *The Organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies in the UK*. London: Home Office.

European Migration Network. (2012-2016). *Country Factsheets: United Kingdom.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network. (2008-2015). *Annual Reports on Migration and Asylum- United Kingdom.* Brussels: European Commission.

Government of UK. (2018). *History: Past Prime Ministers*. Retrieved 17.02.2018 from https://www.gov.uk/government/history/past-prime-ministers

Jensen, Ole. and Gidley, B. (2014). *The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies: Case Study of the United Kingdom* (UPSTREAM project). Center on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) University of Oxford.

Saggar, S. and W. Somerville (2012). *Building a British Model of Integration in an Era of Immigration: Policy lessons for Government* (MPI report). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Zincone, G., Penninx, R., & Borkert, M. (2011). *Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*. Amsterdam University Press.

Appendix 3: Multivariate regression analyses

Table 1: Logistic multivariate regression analysis with coupling/decoupling (1/0) as a dependent variable

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Government: Left (0), Right (1)	1.132*** (0.405)	1.129*** (0.405)	1.122*** (0.408)	1.114*** (0.410)	1.168*** (0.418)	1.131*** (0.405)	1.130*** (0.405)	1.153*** (0.408)	1.149*** (0.413)
Immi 20 % increase (*t*)		-0.278 (0.616)							
Immi 20 % increase (*t or -t*)			-0.679 (0.498)						
Asylum 50 % increase (*t*)				-0.856 (0.534)					
Asylum 50 % increase (*t or -t*)					-1.048** (0.435)				
Asylum 100 % increase (*t*)						-0.0352 (0.691)			
Asylum 100 % increase (*t or -t*)							-0.112 (0.515)		
Asylum 150 % increase (*t*)								-0.619 (1.440)	
Asylum 150 % increase (*t or -t*)									-0.210 (0.954)
Constant	-0.534* (0.305)	-0.499 (0.315)	-0.385 (0.324)	-0.368 (0.322)	-0.185 (0.339)	-0.530* (0.314)	-0.512 (0.321)	-0.534* (0.305)	-0.534* (0.305)
Observations	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108	108

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Analysis of immigration rates with a 50 % increase could not be conducted because there was not enough variation (omitted variable).

Table 2: Logistic multivariate regression analysis with signaled/not signaled (1/0) as a dependent variable for right-oriented governments

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government, non-rad(0)/rad(1)	-0.174	-0.272	-0.172	-0.127	-0.0927	-0.0259	0.0468
	(0.703)	(0.711)	(0.715)	(0.721)	(0.736)	(0.727)	(0.739)
Immi 20 % increase (*t)*		-0.783					
		(0.888)					
Immi 20 % increase (*t or -t)*			-1.018				
			(0.725)				
Asylum 50 % increase (*t)*				-1.304			
				(0.838)			
Asylum 50 % increase (*t or -t)*					-1.306**		
					(0.601)		
Asylum 100 % increase (*t)*						-1.204	
						(1.164)	
Asylum 100 % increase (*t or -t)*							-0.875
							(0.756)
Constant	-0.232	-0.134	-0.0526	-0.0575	0.160	-0.172	-0.123
	(0.279)	(0.299)	(0.305)	(0.299)	(0.331)	(0.285)	(0.294)
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62	62

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Analysis of immigration rates with a 50 % increase and asylum rates with a 150 % increase could not be conducted because there was not enough variation (omitted variable)

Table 3: Logistic multivariate regression analysis with signaled/not signaled (1/0) as a dependent variable for left-oriented governments

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government, non-rad(0)/rad(1)	3.040***	3.076***	3.157***	3.160***	3.213***	3.019***	2.947***
	(1.111)	(1.116)	(1.127)	(1.142)	(1.154)	(1.113)	(1.118)
Immi 20 % increase (*t*)		-0.801					
		(1.269)					
Immi 20 % increase (*t or -t*)			-0.926				
			(0.976)				
Asylum 50 % increase (*t*)				0.844			
				(1.008)			
Asylum 50 % increase (*t or -t*)					1.271		
					(0.868)		
Asylum 100 % increase (*t*)						0.671	
						(1.172)	
Asylum 100 % increase (*t or -t*)							0.855
							(0.919)
Constant	-3.135***	-3.062***	-2.998***	-3.414***	-3.792***	-3.210***	-3.286***
	(1.022)	(1.025)	(1.028)	(1.108)	(1.177)	(1.036)	(1.047)
Observations	45	45	45	45	45	45	45

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Analysis of immigration rates with a 50 % increase and asylum rates with a 150 % increase could not be conducted because there was not enough variation (omitted variable)

126