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‘Is imperialist nationalism an oxymoron?’

For decades, students of nationalism have been trying to define their key terms (see e.g. Connor 1994). ‘Nationalism’ is firmly established as an indispensable concept in the study of modern history and in the social sciences, but no agreement has been reached as to exactly which phenomena ought to be subsumed under it. Although some might dismiss the quest for definitional consensus as futile, establishing meaningful debate is undeniably difficult unless we can know that the other participants understand the issue at hand in basically the same way as we ourselves do. So the quest continues.

Here I make no attempt to address this huge question in all its facets. I simply want to discuss whether it is meaningful to stretch the concept of nationalism to include ‘imperialist nationalism’ as well. This may sound like an oxymoron: however defined, an empire is not the same as a ‘nation’ or a ‘nation-state’. Yet, in the literature we find articles and books in which imperialism and nationalism are treated in the same breath, even as two sides of the same coin. Does this result from muddled thinking and sloppy terminology? Or do these authors accurately capture how some people have thought and acted in the past, perhaps also today – people who may equally well be described as both ‘nationalists’ and ‘imperialists’?

I am a professor of Russian studies, and my interest in this question started when I read Professor Alexander Motyl’s 1990 book Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR. Motyl is a political scientist deeply interested in questions of theories, concepts, and definitions. His chapter with the title ‘The myth of Russian nationalism’ caught my attention. Here

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1 I would like to thank Helge Blakkisrud and John Breuilly for very helpful comments on draft versions of this article.
Motyl starts out by asking: *why are there so few Russian nationalists?* The question may seem surprising, as we are used to thinking that there are and have been quite a few of them. When Motyl posed this question, at least a dozen books and scores of articles had discussed various aspects of Russian nationalism (Barghoorn 1956; Besançon 1986; Boro-Petrovich 1956; Carter 1990; Dunlop 1983; Dunlop 1985; Kohn 1960; Sarkisyanz 1955; Seton-Watson 1986; Szporluk 1989; Yanov 1978). In Motyl’s view, however, these venerable scholars had not understood, or not properly described, the movements and personalities they had studied, for the following simple reason: Russian nationalism must be defined as a political ideal that aspires to *statehood for the Russians*. But neither the Soviet Union nor the preceding Russian Empire was a Russian nation-state: both were huge, conglomerate, multinational states, or empires. The litmus test of a genuine Russian nationalist must be whether that person would countenance the dismemberment of this state in order to create a nation-state on the territory dominated by ethnic Russians. Very few Russians, historically and at the time when Motyl was writing, have been prepared to accept this (Szporluk 1989; Hosking 1998; Tolz 2001). The vast majority of those commonly thought of as Russian nationalists were in fact ‘imperialists’, Motyl maintained: as logical categories, ‘nationalism’ and ‘imperialism’ are diametrically opposed: ‘nationalists desire a state for their nation alone, whereas imperialists want the state to extend beyond their own nation’ (Motyl 1990: 162).

Motyl’s text was an original and fresh contribution to the debate on Russian nationalism, and on nationalism in general, but it failed to trigger much debate. However, ten years later David Rowley picked up the baton in an article in *Nations and Nationalism*, ‘Imperial Versus National Discourse: the Case of Russia’. Siding with Motyl, Rowley maintained that since the historic Russian state was imperial, ‘Russia’s political and intellectual elites were not nationalists but *imperialists*’ (emphasis in the original). No tsar showed any interest in creating a Russian nation-state (Rowley 2000: 25).

Rowley sought to flesh out the consequences of this interpretation in greater detail; like Motyl, he was interested in how this could improve our understanding not only of Russia and Russian history, but also of nationalism in general. Since in Rowley’s view all the preconditions normally deemed
necessary for the emergence and development of nationalism had been present in Russian history, the failure of Russian nationalism to develop meant that we must go back and reassess the basic premises of nationalism theory.

Motyl and Rowley represent a minority among students of Russian history and society, but that does not mean that their views should be lightly dismissed. Their strength lies in their willingness and ability to define certain premises, and draw logical inferences. Their starting point is the definition of nationalism given by Ernest Gellner, which, as Rowley points out, is the most concise and widely accepted definition available: ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner 1990: 1). Rowley may be exaggerating when he claims that ‘the field of nationalism studies universally accepts this basic definition’, but Gellner’s definition does enjoy widespread recognition. Moreover, it follows logically from this definition that nationalism and imperialism are indeed incompatible – if we accept Motyl’s definition of imperialists as people who ‘want the state to extend beyond their own nation’.

To my knowledge, Gellner never discussed the relationship between imperialism and nationalism. However, Michael Hechter, a political scientist working within this paradigm, in his fine little book Containing Nationalism provides an elegant typology of possible nationalisms that lucidly shows, if not the impossibility then at least the extreme difficulty of envisioning ‘imperialist nationalism’ within the framework of consistent Gellnerianism. Hechter distinguishes four logical ways of achieving congruence between the nation and the state (see figures 1, 2, 3, and 4, adapted from Hechter 2000, 16)

*Figure 1 in here*

*Figure 2 in here*

*Figure 3 in here*

*Figure 4 in here*
In *state-building nationalism*, one nation begins by dominating the territory and culture of only a part of a given state, and then strives to expand this dominance. This nationalism entails deliberate efforts by central rulers to make a multicultural population culturally homogeneous – the prototypes here being England and France. With *peripheral nationalism*, or what some might call ‘secessionist nationalism’, a culturally distinct territory within a state breaks out in order to create a new state. Northern and Eastern Europe exhibit numerous examples of such nationalism, as explained by Miroslav Hroch (1985). Third, with *unification nationalism*, several smaller political units whose dominant populations see themselves as belonging to the same nation, join in one common state. German and Italian unification are the best-known examples of this, while Italy has also provided the name of the fourth type of nationalism, *irredentism*. Irredentism means that the creators of a nation-state believe they have some unfinished business to be completed: certain territories lying outside their nation-state are defined as ‘naturally’ – culturally and ethnically – belonging to ‘their’ state.

Interestingly, but logically consistent, Hechter excludes patriotism from his typology of nationalisms. Patriotism, as he defines it, occurs where the nation and the state are already congruent. The nation-state has been achieved: there is no need to design political programmes or organize movements to fight for it.

*Figure 5 in here*

Hechter recognizes that his typology may not be exhaustive, and mentions nationalism resulting from migration of religious groups to distant promised lands as one possible extension. He adds, however, that such cases are ‘extremely rare’, and thus does not regard a study of them as worth pursuing. But if we should try to develop his model in another direction we might ask: what would ‘imperialist nationalism’ look like in terms of Hechterian charts? What would be the difference between nationalism in a nation-state and in an empire?

Firstly, the ‘pie’ in the imperialist pie chart would normally be larger, but size cannot be a definitional criterion. Brazil is one of the largest states in the world today, but few would dispute that it is a
nation-state. Conversely, some rather small states have been described as empires. In 1989, Andrey Sakharov famously claimed that Georgia was a mini-empire (quoted e.g. in Raffass 2012: 317), since certain territories within that state – or at the time, that Soviet republic – were striving to rid themselves of Georgian overlordship. Today, when South Ossetia and Abkhazia have achieved de facto independence, might we argue that Georgia has moved closer to being a nation-state?

Secondly, cultural or ethnic heterogeneity cannot be what distinguishes an empire from a nation-state. All states have national minorities in their populations. Some, like Japan and Norway, are occasionally noted as ethnically homogeneous states (e.g. Connor 1994: 155), but also they have distinct indigenous groups within their territories.

Bruce Parrott defines empire as ‘the dominant society’s control of the effective sovereignty of two or more subordinate societies that are substantially concentrated in particular regions or homelands in the empire’ (1997:7, quoted in Motyl 1999: 121). I find this a sensible, workable criterion, as it defines the distinction between nation-states and empires in political, not cultural, terms. Moreover, in common parlance the term ‘empire’ covers two quite different political constructions: overseas colonial empires, like the French and the British, on the one hand, and on the other hand, territorially contiguous, land-based empires like those of the Romanovs, the Habsburgs, or the Ottomans, as well as more modern phenomena like the Soviet empire. Parrott’s definition fits all these entities.

Modelled on Hechter’s charts, these two varieties of empires could be presented in this way:

*Figure 6 in here*

*Figure 7 in here*

The smaller entities are subjugated to the larger, ‘blue’ nation-state.

If these are the two varieties of *empire*, what would *nationalism* in these empires look like? Also here we should distinguish between two principally different kinds that cut across the first distinction. In
the first variety, imperialist nation-builders will try to introduce their national culture as the
dominant culture throughout the empire, and include all denizens of the imperial state in their
concept of ‘the nation’. Theoretically, such a deliberate programme of nation-building can be found
in both overseas and territorially contiguous empires, but in practice it seems far more common in
land-based empires.

Figure 8 in here

Figure 9 in here

Here we can note a weakness in Motyl’s line of reasoning. If a programme for complete overlap
between the ‘state’ and the ‘nation’ (defined as a cultural group) is a necessary criterion for genuine
nationalism, then such overlap can be achieved in empires not only by reducing the size of the state
to fit the territory of the dominant national group, as Motyl assumes – by also by expanding the
boundaries of the dominant national group to fill the entire space of the state.2 This would yield an
assimilationist variety of nationalism similar to the state-building nationalism of France and other
Western nation-states. This variety of nationalism is often found in some empires, less often in
others. Long neglected by scholarship, it has now been thoroughly studied by a team of historians
under the editorship of Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller. They call their excellent huge volume

Nationalizing Empires, using the same term as Rogers Brubaker does in discussing nation-building in
the new and newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after the fall
of communism (Brubaker 1996). ‘Nationalizing Empires’ is a felicitous choice of terminology, since it
brings out the close resemblance between nation-building in nation-states as described in the
standard literature, and in large conglomerate states – in empires. It would be hard to come up with
a definition of empire which would exclude, for instance, France and Spain prior to the 19th century.
The only reason why we regard France as a nation-state today and not as an empire is that nation-

2 Cultural homogeneity can also be achieved by expelling all those who are culturally different, or killing them. While both expulsion/ethnic cleansing and genocide have been committed by nationalists and imperialists throughout history (Mann 2004; Naimark 2016) I will not pursue this line of enquiry any further here.
building there has been successful (Aldrich 2015). (We used to think that also Spain had been successful, but after the recent turmoil in Catalonia that is not so certain anymore). Conversely, as Mark Beissinger (2005: 270) remarks, ‘the dominant view of the collapse of the Soviet Union today is that the Soviet Union was an empire and therefore its dissolution was inevitable. However, it is now routinely referred to as an empire precisely because it did break up.’ As long as the USSR existed, most of us regarded it as a federate state and not an empire and would probably have continued to do so, if the centripetal forces during perestroika had prevailed. Valerie Kivelson and Ronald Suny (2017: 77) have argued that we may think of a nation-state and an empire as two state formations on a continuum, each of which represents an ideal type that never exists as such in the real world. ‘Whether a state is in the process of nation-state building or empire-building can only be determined after the fact.’

Moreover, nationalism in empires need not be nation-building or assimilatory. Imperialist nationalists can also leave intact the culture in the imperial exclaves – the colonies – or the enclaves in land-based empires – the separate polities within the state. Here, the nationalism is exclusionist rather than inclusionist; nationalists are content to secure the political control of the entire empire for their nation, with no programme for expanding the boundaries of that national group. This I refer to as ‘ethnocratic imperialism’, and will attempt to show how it can be found in both overseas and land-based empires. It could be noted that ethnocratic imperialists often employ not only cultural but also biological arguments in support of their right to rule over other peoples. To the extent that they do, they act as racists. Racist imperialism can be found in most or all empires, but most egregiously when Europeans rule over non-Europeans (Arendt 1968 [1951]; Balibar 2005 [1991]; Tolz 2012)
If you are convinced by the documentation (below) of why it is necessary to include imperialist nationalism among the main types of nationalism, then you will also have to accept that Gellner’s definition must be jettisoned. This may seem a drastic step, but is in fact not quite so earth-shattering. We won’t even have to come up with a brand-new substitute, as there are several good alternatives already, defining nationalism in sensible terms without postulating any rigid one-to-one relationship between ‘the nation’ and the territorial state. One such definition is provided by Gellner’s colleague and former student at LSE, Anthony Smith, as formulated in National Identity: ‘I shall define nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential “nation”’(Smith 1991: 73, italics in original). This definition is surely wide enough to accommodate also the phenomenon of imperialist nationalism. We note that Smith here does not refer to a ‘nation-state’ and does not prejudge the question of whether or not claims to nationhood correspond to the actual qualities of any state.

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3 I could perhaps have distinguished between ‘imperialist’ (or ‘imperialistic’) policies aimed at creating a new empire or expanding an already existing empire, and ‘imperial’ policies aimed at holding onto an already existing empire. However, it would be very difficult to do so consistently, and might create as many problems as it solves.

Table 1. Typology of imperialist nationalisms

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<th>Nation-building imperialism</th>
<th>Ethnocratic imperialism</th>
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<td>Contiguous empires</td>
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Imperialist nationalism in Western colonial empires

The 19th century is regularly referred to as ‘the century of nationalism’, but also of imperialism – in addition to several other descriptions, like the century of industrialization and of capitalism. These characteristic aspects of the era are interconnected: the rapidly developing industry became the main arena for capitalist investment, and, as Lenin argued, imperialism could be seen as ‘the highest stage of capitalism’. Also, more immediately relevant to our topic, nationalism was among driving forces behind empire-building and colonial expansionism (Malakhov 2010: 173; Berger and Miller 2015). There was no necessary connection here: imperialism could be driven by greed, megalomania, pure lust for power, or ‘in a fit of absence of mind’, but quite often nationalist arguments were employed to justify the subjugation of other peoples and territories. The establishment of new colonies was hailed as a national feat enhancing the glory of the nation. A great nation worthy of the name should have its own colonies, even if they were not particularly lucrative –, if for no other reason, then since other great nations had them.

Several scholars have noted the close connection between nationalism and colonial imperialism in 19th-century Europe. Concerning the relationship between British empire-building and English nationalism, Krishan Kumar (2006: 4) argued in his 2006 Ernest Gellner lecture: ‘the gap between nation and empire appears narrower than normally conceived. Imperial peoples may develop a consciousness that has many parallels with national consciousness’. This is corroborated by the German historian Hagen Schulze (2001: 243), who found that, in the view of many British politicians of the 1890s ‘imperialism, national interests and democracy seemed to be only different aspects of the same overall endeavour: to save the nation from the decline that was threatened by class

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4 I have excluded from this study premodern empires like the Roman, the Persian, Carolingian, and so on. As John Breuilly (2017: 11) points out, premodern empires ‘did not have a national core and non-empires were not national’. 
antagonisms and socialism at home, and growing competition from Germany, France and Russia abroad’. Schulze quoted the Duke of Westminster, who claimed that ‘imperialism has become the very latest and the highest embodiment of our democratic nationalism. It is a conscious expression of our race’. Schulze concludes that in this period in British history ‘imperialism and nationalism were merely two sides of the same coin’ (ibid). Another historian, Steve Attridge (2003: 7) in his

*Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture* holds that the ideology of imperialism expressed in Cecil Rhodes’ dictum ‘expansion is everything’ exposed the contradictions of the nation-state of the time. It required ‘a form of nationalism which leads indissolubly to imperialist designs.’

Students of French nationalism have made similar observations. Discussing Hans Kohn’s pioneering book *The Idea of Nationalism*, Craig Calhoun (2007: 137) recognizes that ‘Kohn is right not to shrink from the direct connections between nationalism and imperialism’, but in Calhoun’s view Kohn too often simply opposed these isms against each other, ‘as though France were only imperialist when formally an empire rather than a republic.’ In fact, Calhoun claims, the emerging national states in Europe were themselves imperial powers – ‘even France, and even France in its most republican phases.’ Calhoun therefore believes that scholars of nationalism ought to discuss ‘the extent to which nationalism should be recognized as almost always interwoven with empire’ (Calhoun 2007: 33–34).

Similarly, in his aptly titled *The French Imperial Nation-state*, Gary Wilder notes that under the Third Republic advocates of the Republic identified colonialism with patriotism, ‘thereby linking imperial expansion to the national project’ (Wilder 2005: 29). ‘Such discussions of Greater France were meant to instill in the French public a sentiment of belonging to and having a stake in an empire on which the future of the nation depended’ (ibid.: 32). Wilder quotes Léon Archimbaud, a Radical deputy in the *parlement*, who as late as in 1928 claimed that ‘colonies cannot be sold because a nation cannot alienate itself’ (idem.). Without its colonies, France would no longer be France.

Stefan Burger and Alexei Miller (2015: 1–2) point out that Ernest Renan in his famous lecture in 1882 on ‘What is a Nation?’ cited four *empires* – France, England, Germany and Russia – as prime
examples of nations. His lecture contributed to making the nation-state the dominant form of thinking about nation, sidelining what was at the time ‘the dominant state form in Europe – the imperial state.’ Intriguingly, Burger and Miller remind us, also the latecomers to the European family of nation-states – Italy and Germany – moved almost directly from the stage of national ingathering in the 1860s and 1870s, respectively, to imperial expansion and imperialist thinking (Burger and Miller 2015: 4). We are accustomed to thinking of nations as emerging from dissolving empires (Emerson 1960) – normally by seceding from them as ‘Ruritania’ did, or by ‘megalomanias’ (to use Geller’s terms) morphing into nation-states. However, as Italy and Germany show, the evolution can also go in the other direction, from nation-state to empire. The imperialist nation-state was not an exception but the rule in 18th and 19th-century Europe.

Historians, then, treat the nationalist character of European imperialism as a matter of course. Most of them do not find this puzzling, but some do, especially those who are concerned not only with idiographic history writing but also with theory-building. For instance, a few scholars who straddle the disciplinary divide between historians and political scientists not only detect nationalism in the imperialist endeavour but also point out the paradox inherent in this. Hannah Arendt (1968: 33), in her 1951 volume on Imperialism, remarked on the ‘inner contradiction’ between this ideology and that of nationalism. She did not take credit for this ‘discovery’ herself but referred to J.H. Hobson (2011 [1905]) as ‘the first [in 1905] to recognize both the fundamental opposition of imperialism and nationalism and the tendency of nationalism to become imperialist’ (ibid.).

Some authors are uneasy that the variety of nationalism they are studying does not conform to the Gellnerian model. Burger and Miller note that Gellner’s definition ‘does not fit the case of nationalism in the imperial core’ (Burger and Miller 2015: 3; see also Miller 2008, 164), but leave it at that. They do not draw the conclusion that a definition which omits such an important part of the phenomenon that it purports to embrace, must go. Likewise, in his Ernest Gellner lecture in 2005 Krishan Kumar recognized that a theory seeking to be faithful to Gellner cannot really account for the
phenomenon he had encountered: that the English had built an empire by using nationalist rhetoric. Perhaps Kumar did not see his lecture as the proper occasion to attack this great scholar, in whose honour he was speaking, by debunking a core ingredient of his theory. However, we should acknowledge that the ‘congruence of nation to state’-thesis is a straitjacket that hampers the development of nationalism studies, or, more precisely, prevents joining nationalist theory to the historical study of nationalisms.

*Imperial nationalism outside Western Europe*

The nationalisms in 19th-century Europe presented above are ethnocratic rather than nation-building. True, in a few cases a colony was collapsed into the metropolitan state, as when Algeria was formally integrated into the French state in 1848. The vast majority of the Arabs in Algeria, however, were not included into the ‘French nation’ as *citoyens*. And even if all residents in four Senegal trading towns, including the black Africans, in principle enjoyed full French citizenship, no one expected that the colonies would (or should) become fully French. ‘Complete Gallicization will destroy the very bases of racial and civilizational inequality on which the foundations of colonialism rested’ (Aldrich 2015: 160). French imperial nationalism remained basically ethnocratic. As Aldrich makes clear, the ultimate reason why Africans or other non-Europeans could not become a member of the French nation was not that they were not ‘ethnically’ French, but that they belong to different ‘races’ and allegedly inferior ‘civilisations’. The same, one could add, was the case for British, Spanish and Portuguese imperialisms.

Perhaps these examples are not wholly convincing. They stem from a specific period of European imperialism and might not be generalized. It is not so difficult to understand that an Englishman or a Frenchman in the 19th century and early 20th century could be both a nationalist and an imperialist at the same time. The nation-state and the colonial empire were separated by vast stretches of water, and could mentally be kept in separate compartments.
However, also in other periods and in other parts of the world many examples of what can be described as imperialist nationalism can be found. Nationalism can be the twin brother not only of classical imperialism but also of contemporary neo-imperialism. (see e.g. Lieven 2004: 28). Also here, however, the targets of imperialist hegemony and aggression were located on other continents, making these two prongs of the American ideology relatively easy to keep apart. So it is perhaps even more puzzling to find imperial nationalism – in both the nation-building and the ethnocratic varieties – also in territorially contiguous empires, as in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

Discussing the phenomenon of ‘empires into nations’ Anthony Smith argued in *National Identity* (1990: 101) that nationalism outside the West can be subdivided into two categories, which he labelled the ‘colonial’ and the ‘imperial’ route. The first route refers to nation-building in European colonies that received independence after World War II, when the new indigenous leaders emulated their former colonial masters in forging, with varying success, a heterogeneous population into ‘nations’ with a common purpose and a constructed common history. These processes are brilliantly studied by Rupert Emerson in his pioneering *Empires into Nations* (1960) but, as Anthony Smith rightly emphasizes, this is not the only variety of nation construction outside Europe. In the second, ‘imperial,’ route, the political unit in question is formally sovereign and independent. ‘It requires not a movement of liberation from alien rule but rather a transformation of its political system and cultural self-definition’ (Smith 1990: 101). Smith’s examples include China, Japan, Russia and Ottoman Turkey. These states share many characteristics with the classic nation-states of Western Europe: they have or are in the process of getting a culturally consolidated elite in control of the state apparatus intent on building a modern state. To the degree that they are bent on, and succeed in, suffusing their culture and identity throughout the entire population of the state, they will be repeating the experience of European nation-building in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Smith (1990: 101) asks: ‘how was, or is, it possible to transform states and empires like Russia, China, Japan, Russia, Ottoman Turkey and Ethiopia into “compact” political communities and “territorial
His treatment of this issue is rather rudimentary but, from the discussion above I see two answers to his question – a fork in the road of ‘the imperial route’ towards the nation-state. Continental empires could achieve cultural homogeneity by divesting themselves of much of their outlaying, culturally differentiated territories – or they could homogenize the entire population of the entire former empire. Some of these empires, like Russia and Ottoman Turkey, followed the first route, but China has not. Unfortunately, Smith did not specify whether he considered China as belonging to the ‘was possible’ or ‘is possible’ category: whether China – which is formally still an ethnic federation of the same kind as the USSR was (Connor 1984) – will have to get rid of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and other non-Han provinces in order to become a nation-state, or whether he regarded it as such a state already.

Nationalism in China, Japan, and Ottoman Turkey has been discussed by scholars far more knowledgeable about these countries than I am (Eissenstat 2015; Unger 1996; Zhao 2004; Zürcher 2010). I will use the remainder of this lecture to discuss imperialist nationalism in another continental empire, Russia – both because I can then rely on primary sources, and also because Motyl and Rowley base their claims that imperialist nationalism is a contradiction in terms on the Russian experience. If I can prove that the concept of ‘imperialist Russian nationalism’ makes sense, these claims will have been seriously weakened.

Russian imperialist nationalism

Until recently, historians discussing Russian nationalism in the Tsarist Empire have tended to concentrate on the topics and issues which participants in the Russian identity debates themselves were concerned about and thematized. These were questions of political authority – the relationship between the state, society and the people; of culture and religion: what are genuine Russian values, and what is the importance of Orthodoxy for Russian civilization; and of course the relationship between Russia and the West: how has Russia’s course through history diverged from the
mainstream European path? In these debates, the early Slavophiles in the 1840s took what are commonly regarded as typically nationalist positions (Riasanovsky 1965). Yet, among the pre-Revolutionary Russian intelligentsia, not only the Slavophiles but virtually all participants in the identity debates, also the ‘Westernizers’, took the territorial integrity of the tsarist state for granted (Szporluk 1989; Yanov 1999: 46). Russia was an empire; indeed, ‘Empire’ was part of the official name. However, Russian historiography conventionally understood the country as a nation-state – no less of a ‘national state’ than other European states (Kappeler 1993: 9-18; Miller 2008: 173; Kivelson and Suny 2017: 123). In her introduction to an important volume on the history of Russian nationalism, Vera Tolz (2001: 18) points out that when Russians before the Revolution talked about the Russian Empire ‘they thought they were talking about the Russian nation-state. Therefore, the word nationalism in a neutral sense, as it is used in Western scholarly literature, is applicable to the Russian case.’ Tolz explicitly rejects the argument that the expression ‘Russian nationalism’ is a misnomer.

British historian Hugh Seton Watson regarded Colonel Pavel Pestel, one of the leaders of the Decembrist rebellion in 1825, as a pioneer in this debate. Pestel’s underground manifesto, *Russkaia Pravda* (‘Russian truth’), outlined the political system of the Russian state as he envisioned its future after the fall of the tsarism. Pestel was a consistent Russifier who insisted on the dominance of Russian culture and language over all other cultures in the Empire. The non-Russians must ‘completely fuse their nationality with the nationality of the dominant people’ (Seton-Watson 1986: 19). ‘The inhabitants of the entire space of the Russian state [must] be all Russians […] All these different names [of the various ethnic groups in that state will] be annihilated and everywhere fused in a single Title of the Russians’ (Pestel, *Russkaia Pravda*, quoted in Miller 2015: 319–320).

Another central Russian 19th-century nationalist was the second-generation Slavophile Iurii Samarin. Like Pestel, Samarin in the 1860s insisted on ‘the subordination of the other nations of the empire to the Russians’ (Seton-Watson 1986: 19). However, Pestel was a radical Jacobin, while Samarin was a
liberal reformer: Seton-Watson regarded this as the major difference between them. If we try to classify them by nationalisms, another equally important difference emerges. With his authoritarian, forced-assimilation programme, Pestel comes across as a nationalist of the imperialist nation-building variety, while Samarin, who would leave the non-Russians alone as long as they bowed to Russian political dominance, was closer to the ethnocratic imperialist type.

In the last decades of the 19th century, Valerie Kivelson and Ronald Suny point out, ‘a robust Russian nationalism – a fervent love for ethnic Russia and its imperial ambitions – inspired both conservative intellectuals and many state officials.’ This, they maintain, could be called alternatively ‘imperial nationalism’ or ‘national imperialism’ (Kivelson and Suny 2017: 199). Several intellectual heirs of the Slavophiles developed Russian imperialist nationalism in increasingly aggressive and expansionist directions. In his Russia and Europe (1869) the leading pan-Slavic theoretician Nikolai Danilevskii outlined a programme for Russian domination over not only the Russian Empire but the entire Slavic and Orthodox world (Danilevskii 2003; Shenfield 2001: 28). The pan-Slavist idea had originated among the Western Slavs as a democratic programme, a defensive strategy against German and Habsburg cultural expansion and political dominance. In Danilevskii’s version it became a blueprint for authoritarian centralism and imperialism (Boro-Petrovich 1956). Initially, Danilevskii’s message fell on deaf ears, but after the 1876–77 Russia-Ottoman War his ideas caught on. Dostoyevsky was among those who praised it, and, echoing Danilevskii, insisted that ‘sooner or later, Constantinople must become ours’ (see Kolstø 1982; Yanov 1999: 12).

In tsarist Russia, such imperialist nationalism was generally confined to the intellectual debate. It did not percolate into the corridors of power in St. Petersburg, and had scant impact on foreign policy (Tuminez 2000). Few tsarist statesmen were enthusiastic about pan-Slavist ideas. Emanuel Sarkisyanz concluded that ‘even at this zenith of the Age of Imperialism, tsarist imperialism was not propelled to the same peaks of national feeling or nationalist ideology of the middle classes as its Western counterparts, for instance British and German imperialism’ (1974: 57). Not every imperialist policy is
an expression of nationalist imperialism: imperialism pure and simple can be found at various junctures in history.

True, after around 1880, some selective Russification of non-Russians took place, but this was largely a policy for serving the security and integrity of the multi-ethnic imperial state. ‘The chief goal of russification for the tsarist monarchy was to preserve the Russian empire and its own prerogatives within it, rather than nurture a sense of nation in the way that French and German nationalizing rulers did’ (Tuminez 2000: 39). The state identity of tsarist Russia remained premodern, at least until Alexander III, who decided to promote the nationalization of the dynastic state. ‘Instead of the ethnically inclusive liberal nationalism of 1860–70, an exclusive nationalism with clear racial motives, accentuated by Orthodox faith and a conservative political agenda, moved to the forefront of Russian politics’ (Miller 2015: 335).

This new nationalist turn found resonance also at the societal level. Many books and articles with a nationalist-cum-imperialist message were now published in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and enjoyed increasing popularity. Some Russian pre-revolutionary nationalists pursued an inclusive nation-building programme; others must be categorized as typically ethnocratic imperialists. Around the turn of the century the ‘Union of the Russian people’ and other ‘Black Hundred’ organizations were the best-known/notorious in the latter category, but the most eloquent and coherent expressions of this trend were found in the writings of the prolific journalist Mikhail Menshikov (1859–1918), the leading ideologue of Russian ethnocratic imperialism at the twilight of the Empire. Completely forgotten during the Soviet era, Menshikov today enjoys a certain renaissance – so a discussion of his ideas has more than just historical interest.

A collection of Menshikov’s most popular articles were republished in 2004 under the telling title National Empire (Natsional’naia imperiia). ‘National’ should here be understood in narrowly ethnic terms. In the 19th century, ‘the Russian people’ were customarily regarded as consisting of two small branches – the White Russians (the Belarusians), the Little Russians (malorossy, today’s Ukrainians) –
and one big branch: the Great Russians (velikorossy). Among Menshikov’s contemporaries, most nationalists would automatically subsume the two smaller branches under the same umbrella as the Great Russians, but not Menshikov (Men’shikov 1999: 67; 2004: 182). He was fighting for the rights of the Great Russians only, and among their most important rights was control over the Russian Empire. They had been deprived of this birth-right by Germans, Poles, and other non-Russians who filled the most prestigious positions in the tsarist bureaucracy, and by greedy Jews who made life miserable for the indigent masses of the Russian people (Men’shikov 2004: 157–159 passim).

The Russians must insist that they are the rightful owners of the Russian Empire, Menshikov declared:

> We, the Great Russians, must firmly insist on the historical facts and define our state nationality (gosudarstvennaia natsional’nost’) the way it actually was brought about. We already are in possession of an Empire, we are the ones who created it and we will not concede our right to it to anybody. Insofar as Russia is a unified state, she must also be one nation and that nation is the Great Russians (Men’shikov 2004: 182).

As Vera Tolz (2012: 178-182) points out, like many Russian imperialist thinkers at the time Menshikov defined the nation in biological just as much as in cultural terms.

Not only reactionaries such as Menshikov but also moderates like Petr Struve discussed the future of the Empire in nationalist terms, but Struve’s message was in important respects very different. Struve distinguished between two types of nationalism: one which he called ‘closed and defensive’, the second ‘open and conquering’ (zavoevatel’nyi). The first was typical of small nations like the Jewish; the second, of large nations, Struve’s example being the Anglo-Saxons. The Russians belonged, or ought to belong, to the second category. ‘The Russians have created this very state and played the most important role in it.’ While this might sound similar to Menshikov’s ethnocratic programme, the main difference was that Menshikov wanted to achieve this superior status for the Russians by suppressing the other nations in the country, while Struve wanted to assimilate them.

With the exception of Poland and Finland, such assimilation in his view was quite realistic: for all
other national groups in the Empire, absorption into the Russian culture ‘would raise them to a higher level’ (Struve 1997: 171, first published in 1910). As Alexei Miller explains (2015: 344), ‘Struve’s ideal is, of course, a gradual expansion of the nation-state to fill the boundaries of the imperial state’ – in other words, imperialist nation-building. While Struve does not state it in so many words, his admittance that the Poles and the Finns could not be assimilated implies that he might be willing to countenance a certain contraction of the Russian state in order to achieve his objective.

The 1917 Revolution meant that neither Menshikov’s nor Struve’s ideals would be realized. The Bolsheviks took over the reins of the Russian state in the name of an internationalist ideology and, as Robert Conquest and others have emphasized, it would be ridiculous to accuse Lenin of ‘ethnic exclusivism’ or ‘nationalism’ (Conquest 1979: 14). Lenin fully recognised the political force of minority nationalism and was willing to compromise with it by establishing the Soviet Union as an ethically defined federation (Gleason 1990). Somewhat later, ethnicity was also institutionalised on the individual level when every Soviet citizen was required to carry a passport at all times in which his ‘natsional’nost’ (ethnicity) was recorded (Brubaker 1996).

During high Stalinism, however, the Soviet regime increasingly harked back to tsarist-era traditions, and during and after the Great Patriotic War openly appealed to Russian nationalism (Brandenburger 2002). Alain Besançon has claimed, ‘The state formed a necessary alliance with nationalism and used it to implant a Soviet state within the old frontiers of the Russian Empire’ (1986: 5). Frederick Barghoorn even opined that ‘the Soviet Union is in fact the most highly integrated and centralized nation-state that has yet existed in the world. Like all extreme forms of nationalism, that of the Soviet Union is imperialistic’ (1956: 4). Unfortunately, Barghoorn failed to define his key concepts clearly, and his claim was at the very least an exaggeration that should probably be understood in the Cold War context of Soviet/Western competition.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, nationalism again came into vogue in Russia. In the 1990s and the early Putin era much of this was propelled by phantom-limb pains for the lost Soviet state, or the
‘Empire’, as it was now increasingly referred to. However, it would be erroneous to characterize all Soviet nostalgia as nationalism. As in the tsarist era, some ‘imperialists’ focused almost exclusively on state power, military prowess, and territorial expansion, with scant interest in ethno-cultural issues. A case in point would be Alexander Prokhanov, one of the ideologues behind the failed coup attempt in August 1991, who later emerged as an important leader of the anti-democratic opposition in Russia. Prokhanov has written numerous articles and books extolling the virtues of Empire. In 2007 he published *The Symphony of the Fifth Empire*, presenting a vision for present-day Russia as a new Empire, a successor to the Kievan, Muscovy, and St. Petersburg empires as well as the Soviet Union. In this Fifth Empire there would be no ‘imperial nation’, but a symphony of national cultures woven together in a precious imperial tapestry (kovior) (Prokhanov 2007: 65). Thus, I find it misleading to describe Prokhanov and those who think like him as ‘nationalists’, as some do (e.g. Clover 2016). He simply does not belong anywhere in my typology of imperialist nationalisms.

Many other Russian neo-imperialists, however, do conform to what I call imperialist nationalism. Astrid Tuminez (2000: 187–198) distinguished five currents within the new nationalist movement in Russia: Westernizing nationalism, nativism, moderate statism, aggressive statism, and ‘extremist national patriotism’. Of these, the last group is basically covered by my concept of ethnocratic imperialists. ‘Russia’s mission, according to national patriots, is to restore the Great Russian imperial state under the ethnic Russian leadership’ (Tuminez 2000: 198).

Marlene Laruelle (2010: 3), writing on contemporary Russian nationalism, argues that ‘there can be no question here of excluding from “nationalism” so-called imperialist or statist currents as some authors have repeatedly suggested be done’. Another leading authority on Russian imperialist nationalism, Emil Pain, who has studied this phenomenon perhaps more than any others (Pain 2007; 2014; 2016; 2018), points out that in most contemporary sociological theory it is common to juxtapose nationalism to imperial consciousness and an imperial political system – but, he argues, ‘under contemporary Russian conditions these phenomena are combined and complement each
other’ (Pain 2007: 336). He sees ethnic nationalism as ‘the last prop of the imperial system’ (ibid.: 350).

There has been some discussion in the scholarly literature about whether to categorize Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his Liberal-Democratic Party as imperialists, nationalists, fascists, or all three (Shenfield 2001: 85–96). While Aleksandr Ianov (1995: 114–151) places Zhirinovskii in the ‘nationalist-imperialist’ tradition of Danilevskii, Laruelle (2009: 100) writes that ‘the LDPR cannot be legitimately classified as an “imperialist” or “ethnonationalist” movement’. Zhirinovsky is in fact not particularly interested in ideology and allows the members of his party to have divergent opinions on such issues as what kind of nationalism they support. One of the Liberal Democrats to deal extensively with the relationship between Empire and nation was Evgenii Mikhailov, whom Shenfield refers to as one of the party’s ‘most coherent ideologists’ (Shenfield 2001: 91). In 1995 Mikhailov wrote a brochure with the intriguing title The Burden of an Imperial Nation, lamenting that the Russians were doomed to carry the burden of the Russian State on their shoulders:

We are an imperial nation [...] The historical form of the formation and development of the Russian nation has been the Empire, therefore, we were formed and exist as an imperial nation and outside the Empire we cannot exist. While other nations want to destroy the Russian Empire in order to create on her territories ‘independent’ states, for the Russians as an imperial nation such destruction would lead only to the loss of our own statehood (Mikhailov 1995: 53, 58).

This was not to say that the Russians had been any kind of Herrenvolk in Russia; on the contrary, ‘they never enjoyed any privileged position and the Russian Empire was never an ethnic Empire of the Russians’ (Mikhailov 1995: 58). That should be rectified, not by elevating the Russians above the other nations in the state, but by assimilating the non-Russians into Russian culture. However, Mikhailov ruled out forced assimilation, and therefore came closer to Struve’s liberal model of nation-building imperialism than to Pavel Pestel’s forced-assimilation variety (Mikhailov 1995: 53).
Also Menshikov has his adherents in Russia today. In a review of the seven volumes of his various writings published in Russia since 1991, V.M. Kamnev (2009: 84) notes how, in remarkably short time, the assessment of his journalistic legacy has undergone a complete reversal: ‘from being a “reactionary”, “black hundredist” and “obscurantist”, Menshikov has become one of the leading philosophers of the ‘Russian idea’.

Mikhail Smolin, a historian and the compiler of several editions of Menshikov’s writings, has faithful expounded the ideas of his intellectual hero. According to Smolin, each and every nation which has grown into the role of a world power will strive to build its own Empire, and ‘Russians are born imperialists (imperialisty)’ (Smolin 1999: 9). He sees the Empire as the ideal state formation, the via media between globalism and ethnic seclusion. In the first of these two extremes, the nation loses its national face and its distinct life; in the other, it will make no great historical breakthroughs. ‘It will gradually wither away, burying its national talent in the earth for the sake of an illusionary tranquillity’ (Smolin 2004: 8). By contrast, the Empire gives the nation the chance to become a creator of world history. All other nations are either stateless or create only small states, and must remain content with the role as extras in the drama of world history.

For the Russians to regain their position as an imperial nation will require enormous efforts. They will have to overcome fierce resistance from alien peoples (inorodtsy) as well as from ‘asocial elements’ within. And Smolin draws the logical conclusion: this can be achieved only by introducing dictatorship in Russia (Smolin 2004: 12-15).

Ideas that overlap partially with Smolin’s can be found also in Sergei Kortunov’s The Establishment of National Identity: What Kind of Russia Does the World Need? (2009). Kortunov claims that empires are the locomotives of history, but not all large nations can aspire to an imperial role. The United States for instance, is not an empire and cannot become one, for two reasons: this state is based on liberal ideas; and, since liberalism is individualistic, ‘it does not resonate with the imperial ideas of the common good’. Secondly, the USA has no imperial nation (Kortunov 2009: 260–262). By
contrast, the Russians, who during the Kyiv period were not an imperial nation, have gradually become one. Today’s Russians are a super-ethnos, consisting of Great Russians, *malorossy* (Ukrainians), and White Russians. The resurrection of Russia within the borders of this Russian super-ethnos is the national idea of the new Russia (Kortunov 2009: 270–272).

However, Kortunov vehemently denies that the Russians are *imperialistic*. He scrupulously distinguishes between ‘imperial’ and ‘imperialistic’, and insists that only slanderers could come up with the idea that the Russians’ imperial nature makes them imperialists. ‘How can one talk about the “imperialism” of a country which voluntarily and without any prior conditions dissolved the Soviet Communist Empire?’ (Kortunov 2009: 268). The practical consequences of Kortunov’s imperial vision are therefore rather different from Smolin’s. In Kortunov’s view, the future Russian Empire not only can be democratic – it *must* be. Smolin’s and Kortunov’s respective preferences for political systems are quite logical: if ethnocratic domination needs dictatorship an assimilationist program may be compatible with democracy.

Around 2010, Russian imperialist nationalists were challenged by a new current of Russian ethnonationalists (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2016; 2018). Among them there were, on the one hand, anti-Western fascists, semi-fascists, and other xenophobes; and on the other, people who believed that nationalism was fully compatible with democratic values (Kolstø 2014). These two groups share an emphasis on the importance of protecting the interests and values of the ethnic Russians, rather than extolling the might and glory of the Russian state. According to the leading ethnonationalist ideologist Konstantin Krylov, his group and the old *impertsy* do not see eye to eye: they are ‘at daggers drawn’ (Krylov 2011; see also Sviatenkov 2006). However, a few Russian nationalists who basically belong in the new ethnonationalist camp disagree with Krylov here, and reject the need to forsake the Empire. Dmitry Volodykhin (2006), for one, has declared, ‘I decided that I remain the same as before: a nationalist of culture, an Orthodox, and an imperets [a supporter of empire]. I still did not see these three paradigms as contradicting each other in Russian politics.’ Another
ethnonationalist, Igor Artemov, agrees: ‘I’m in no way against Empire. But for me the national principle is always unconditionally higher than the Imperial one. I am not against the kind of Empire in which the Russian people, my people, would not be the object of merciless exploitation’ (Artemov 2012).

Yes, the ideal of the Empire is alive and kicking among contemporary Russian nationalists of various hues. Many Russians do not see any contradiction between empire-building and nationalism. The practical consequences they draw from this with regard to what kind of political system Russia ought to develop are often very different, but, with the exception of most new ethnonationalists, they do not regard empire as a dirty word or something to be shunned.

Returning to my Michael Hechter-inspired typology, we can note that some contemporary Russian imperialist nationalists clearly fall into the category of ‘nation-building imperialists’ who strive to develop a unified national culture embracing all members of society under a common Russian cultural umbrella. Others are ethnocrats, whose ideal is a state dominated politically by ethnic Russians and where relations between the hegemonic nation and the minorities retain an imperial quality.

Conclusions

There is no such thing as a correct definition or a wrong one: definitions can only be more or less adequately suited for the issue at hand. They ought to cover all relevant aspects and exclude all irrelevant or extraneous phenomena. The most widely accepted definition of nationalism, Gellner’s criterion of congruence between nation and state, is in my view rather unhelpful since it excludes many phenomena that would normally be regarded as nationalism, not only by the public at large, but also by many scholars working on specific historical nationalisms.

This is not to say that all the elements of Gellner’s theory of nationalism are misconceived. On the contrary I regard, for instance, his explanations for why and how minority elites in a province of
‘Megalomania’ called ‘Ruritania’ tried to make their province into a separate, independent state is illuminating and convincing. And his insight that nationalism is a modern phenomenon remains valid even though the emergence of modern state clearly cannot be linked as intimately to industrialisation as he assumed. But while his theory explains very well many of the dynamics leading up to the establishment of nation-states, it does not capture the phenomenon of nationalisms which do not have a nation-state as their final aim.

In 1988 a distinguished group of nationalism experts met for a seminar devoted to a discussion of Gellner’s ideas on nationalism. In the contributions to their published book several weaknesses in his theory were pointed out, first and foremost its reliance on functionalism. Curiously, the usefulness of his definition of nationalism was not challenged (Hall 1999 [1988]). Later, Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1993: 99) has criticized Gellner’s definition, but not for being too narrow but for a certain circularity, since ‘nationalism’ is defined in terms of ‘nation’.

The problems with Gellner’s insistence that we should include in nationalism studies only movements and programmes that demand congruence between the nation and the state have been pointed out by several practising historians, like Krishan Kumar, Alexei Miller and Stefan Berger. Finally, we can note that Anthony Smith took issue with this aspect of Gellner’s definition (without referring to him by name), when he argued that ‘nationalism cannot be reduced to the uniform principle that the cultural unit must be made congruent with the political unit. [...] This omit[s] a number of other vital nationalist tenets...’ (Smith 1995: 13). Smith did not specify precisely which other nationalist tenets ought to be covered by a definition of nationalism, and there are several candidates for inclusion. A case could be made for including patriotism – an ‘ism’ that Michael Hechter, as we saw, believes must be left out since, as he defines it, this is a phenomenon found in states in which congruence between the nation and the state has already been achieved. In everyday usage, however, the difference between patriotism and nationalism is often more normative than substantive. As the concept of ‘nationalism’ has negative connotations in many languages, people
may prefer to call themselves patriots rather than nationalists. At the same time, they have no inhibitions about calling others nationalists, also when the latter exhibit the same attitude towards their country as they have towards their own. For Aviel Roshwald, the quintessential elements of nationalism include the ‘country as the ultimate good and death for one’s homeland as the ultimate sacrifice that wipes out all stains’ (Roshwald 2006: 25). They could certainly also be said to be crucial characteristics of patriotism as well. That, however, is a huge topic beyond the scope of this talk, and much more research will be needed before any conclusions can be drawn.

I argue for the inclusion of another phenomenon, what I call imperialist nationalism. Many researchers and political actors and thinkers freely combine two terms, ‘Empire’ and ‘nation’, and imperialism and nationalism, to cover the same entities, attitudes and actions. However, here we stumble across another instance of linguistic normativism: many of those who embrace both an empire and a nation prefer to label themselves ‘imperial nationalists’ rather than ‘imperialist nationalists’; some, like Sergei Kortunov, explicitly distance them from ‘imperialism’. This terminological problem is recognized also by Roman Szporluk, who in an important article on the difference between Russian ‘nation-builders’ and ‘imperial nationalists’ in the late perestroika period, called the latter ‘empire-savers’, since the term imperialists ‘now has become one of abuse’ (Szporluk 1989: 17).

Delving deeper into the problematique of imperialist nationalism, I gradually came to realize the importance of distinguishing between two varieties within this phenomenon: ‘nation-building imperialism’ and ‘ethnocratic imperialism’. In the first case, the imperialists want to turn the Empire into a homogeneous state in which one culture dominates throughout; in the second case, the defenders of the imperial state want it to be controlled by a specific nation or ethnic group, without combining this with any desire to spread their national culture to the entire population of the state. The distinction boils down to the difference between assimilationist/inclusive and segregationist/exclusive nationalism, well-known from the study of nationalism in many states and
societies. All examples of imperialist nationalism in Western colonial empires appear to belong to the second, ethnocratic category; ‘nation-building imperialism’ can be found, mainly, or only, in territorially contiguous empires in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

Luckily, we will not be left rudderless if we jettison Gellner’s definition of nationalism; there are several alternatives out there. In deference to the great scholar in whose name I am talking today I would like to recommend Anthony Smith’s definition, quoted above: ‘I shall define nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential “nation”’.

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