Naming and shaming - A double-edged sword for human rights

Rethinking the Western human rights promotion approach

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Abstract

In the following study, I challenge a popular Western human rights promotion approach, which suggests criticism and “naming and shaming” strategies as an effective way of promoting human rights worldwide. Furthermore, I examine the limitation of adopting criticism and “naming and shaming” strategies for promoting human rights in environments where cultural, social and political circumstances differ significantly from the West. I argue that actual improvements for human rights conditions involve more elements than just the implementation of international human rights norms in a domestic legal context. My goal is to constructively contribute with an approach for promoting human rights internationally that will be acknowledging the mosaic of cultural, social and political differences of our world. Primarily, this should be a realistic approach, recognizing the delicate balances between the different cultures of our world. An approach, which will have as its main goal the establishment of stable and honest international relations, beyond strategies that could result in misunderstandings, confusion and further decline of international support for the universal concept of human rights.
1. Study Introduction

The tragic experience of the Second World War (WWII) encouraged and motivated 48 nations of the newly established United Nations Organization (UN, 1945) to come together and ratify the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. That Declaration came to proclaim all human beings, all over the world, regardless of their ethnicity, culture and race must be entitled to certain rights and liberties:

“ALL HUMAN BEINGS ARE BORN FREE AND EQUAL IN DIGNITY AND RIGHTS. THEY ARE ENDOURED WITH REASON AND CONSCIENCE AND SHOULD ACT TOWARDS ONE ANOTHER IN A SPIRIT OF BROTHERHOOD.”

The UDHR came to be acknowledged as one of humanity’s most inspirational moments. Nations that until a few years ago were fighting against each other, sat together and agreed not to allow anything again to cause a similar disaster in the future. Yet, even though the UDHR came in 1948 in the form of a non-binding international agreement, eight member-states of the UN decided not to sign it, expressing their reservations. Reservations that were mainly based on cultural, social and political reasons. Today, we can look back at that very incident and recognize a repetitive pattern of lack of international understanding that has been plaguing the international community on human rights related issues for over 70 years. Consequently, one can easily understand the role of different cultural, social and political traditions on determining relations between nations and influencing international developments on human rights related issues.

Persuading the nations of our world to put aside their differences and work together for humanity’s common and peaceful future, could be considered as one of the most fundamental challenges for achieving universal human rights. Thus, one can realize that the success of this whole achievement, relies on persuading nations and their governments about the significance of the idea of universal human rights. For several decades, various actors with an active role in the international promotion of the idea of universal human rights, have been relying on the application of various strategies in order to accelerate the expansion of this concept. The way to further the concept of human rights

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2 Rehman (2010) pgs. 77-78.
3 Ibid. pg. 79.
4 Ibid. pg. 76. The eight countries which decided to be absent from the UDHR vote: Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, USSR, Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.
for many governments of liberal and mainly Western nations and as well human rights institutions and organizations, is based on the application of criticism through international exposure of wrongdoings. The concept of criticism is seen by many as the strategy that could be applied in order to put pressure and force the change of behaviors that are not compatible with international human rights norms. The operationalization of the practice of criticism and ways that this practice could become more effective have been examined in several human rights related studies.

The application of *naming and shaming*, as introduced by Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink through the concept of the *socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices*, is representing today one of the most thorough efforts for the promoting of the idea of universal human rights. The main idea of *naming and shaming* as described by the aforementioned scholars in their work *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (1999), has had a significant impact in the West on how the promotion of human rights could be achieved more successfully. For several decades, this has been an essential part of the instructive material in many human rights related studies and has influenced human rights advocates in the West.

1.1 Research Question

Arguably, different perceptions based on different cultural, social and political traditions can be seen through history as the cause of many of the disagreements between countries on various human rights issues. Massive socioeconomic and geopolitical changes during the last two decades have also contributed in the creation of a more fragile international environment, able to affect human rights conditions all around the world. Governments of many nations are increasingly prioritizing their geo-strategic and economic interests ahead of the respect for human rights and

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5 Ropp, Risse, Sikkink (1999) pg. 1.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
the implementation of human rights reforms that they have already accepted in the past.\textsuperscript{12} In many countries, the sudden rise of political powers favoring isolationist and protectionist policies could be also seen as a side effect of these massive international changes.\textsuperscript{13,14}

Taking into consideration the currently very unpredictable and unstable international environment, I am aiming to examine ways that we can revive the dialogue for universal human rights, setting the idea of universal human rights again, as a first priority for the whole of the international community. My goal throughout this research is to contribute to a proposal for a more inclusive and less conflictual approach for the promotion of the idea of universal human rights. How to inspire positive changes and promote human rights without damaging the delicate balances between different cultural, social and political traditions, is what I am ultimately aiming to elucidate with my research.

I argue that if we believe in human rights as a universal concept, we need to find a way that this concept can be equally promoted throughout the world. A concept that every different culture of the world can embrace, as a concept that is representing part of its own heritage. Yet, in order to reach my objective and develop my proposal, I have to identify and present the negative implications coming from today’s established perception in the West about the international promotion of human rights. To what extent could human rights promotion campaigns based on criticism and \textit{naming and shaming} strategies accelerate social and political change and bring long-lasting human rights reforms in societies far beyond the West?

1.2 Focus of study and methodology

One can arguably agree that the topic of my study can be controversial, as in fact examining the effects of cultural, social, political and historical elements on the human rights progress is a challenging subject. Still, my goal is to present an alternative approach beyond the cultural, social and political implications of this topic. For the purposes of my study, I am relying on analyzing

\textsuperscript{12} Amnesty International Report 2017/18, pgs. 12-14, 15-17.
\textsuperscript{14} Democracy Index 2017 - Free speech under attack, pgs. 3-4.
quantitative data from important studies that have measured the long term effects of criticism and *naming and shaming* strategies in human rights promotion campaigns. I am considering the importance of these findings as vital, as this can assist me in determining the level of influence that criticism but important *naming and shaming* strategies has had on different cultural, social and political backgrounds. Additionally, I am examining theories from works of prominent scholars known for their socioeconomic, sociopolitical and geopolitical analysis and I am testing the impact of these theories on international developments and human rights conditions.

Furthermore, I am not aiming to examine or present an opinion about the studied topic from a legal perspective and as a result, I am not considering a legal structure for my research. Nonetheless, I am including legal elements in my study. I am including international law perspectives, international court decisions and interpretations of elements of international law by from UN institutions, UN agencies and international law and human rights scholars. Basically, I am analyzing the study topic from a multidisciplinary approach. The basic principles of empirical science and theoretical analysis are focuses highly considered throughout my research. For the purposes of my study, I find the social sciences approach and the sociological research perspective of textual analysis and secondary data analysis to be the most suitable.\(^\text{15}\) Finally, I make use of existing findings from quantitative research studies on the application of *naming and shaming* strategies and I compare and evaluate theories from academic works, which I consider as relevant to my study topic.

1.3 Structure of study

In chapter 1 of my study, I introduce my research topic, I develop my research question and I explain the focus of my study and its limitations.

In chapter 2 of my study, I introduce the analysis of the general role of criticism in promoting human rights and how *naming and shaming* strategies work in practice. In the sub-chapter 2.3, I describe the phenomenon that encouraged my research. I also include my observations about the

current state of affairs in relation to the challenges for the concept of human rights internationally. This part includes an actual example of how a regime deals with criticism today. I also analyze opinions about issues that could affect the effectiveness of criticism and in general how these issues could shape domestic sociopolitical developments. Basically, I emphasize the challenge of promoting human rights through criticism and naming and shaming strategies in a non-Western society that struggles with serious social and political problems.

In chapter 3 of my study, I analyze the research findings that are challenging the criticism-based methods and naming and shaming strategies in regards to their efficiency in promoting human rights. I also test arguments through the introduction of my own hypothesis, in an attempt further analyze and examine perspectives from these research findings.

In chapter 4 of my study, I include alternative academic approaches and arguments, which could be used for explaining the reasons that international criticism and naming and shaming strategies fail in delivering the expected results. As in chapter 3, in this chapter I also include my own hypothesis in order to further test and analyze these alternative academic approaches and arguments.

In the next part of the study, which is chapter 5, I conclude my study with the presentation of my answer to the research question and my recommendations about the studied topic.

The final chapter 6, is including my bibliography.

1.4 Limitations

It is important to mention that my study is limited to the level of the examination of the available relevant literature and the already available relevant research studies and their data. As this study is limited in resources and time, my aim is to make use of the most suitable theoretical framework relevant to the subject, which can assist me in developing my contribution to the studied topic. I aim to provide the reader with a concise, yet comprehensive overview of the challenges for human rights promotion strategies that are aiming to promote the human rights concept as a universal idea. Furthermore, as the study is following a rather philosophical argumentation line, in some
cases, the strict boundaries of the traditional methodological patterns are crossed and mix-mode designs are used. A method important for the better approaching of the interdisciplinary in nature study question. Finally, the use of the findings from existing quantitative research studies have been selected for enhancing the analysis and for assisting in the better understanding of the study topic.

2. Criticism - the Western approach for promoting human rights

For over 70 years and the end of the WWII, the international community through the UN system has been gradually introducing important legislation in an attempt to extensively define human rights. Today, we can basically source definitions of human rights in international conventions and declarations, charters of international organizations, international court decision, international customary practice and the works of qualified human rights publicists.\(^{16}\)

Arguably, one can observe that despite defining human rights in legal terms, the international community has not been successful in defining in the same precise way, the ways of promoting the concept of universal human rights. Actors of the international community, institutions and international or small-scale organizations have been promoting human rights selectively. In this regard, scholars have been discussing for decades whether there is a human rights hierarchy and how one could define this hierarchy.\(^{17}\) Reviewing a historical example of this issue, one can see that during the period of the Cold War, Western countries were favoring the importance of civil and political rights, while the Soviet Union and the other Eastern Bloc countries were putting their emphasis on promoting economic, social and cultural rights.\(^{18}\) Likewise, the methods of promoting human rights have been also different and largely dependent on the established cultural, social and political perceptions. Traditionally, in the West, civil and political rights were seen as the most fundamental ones.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{16}\) Rehman (2010) pg. 19.
\(^{17}\) See as example: Farer (1992).
\(^{18}\) Rehman (2010) pgs. 9-10, 84.
\(^{19}\) Ibid. pgs. 9-10.
Today in the West, how to generally promote human rights is among the main topics of research for several policy-making and human rights related study centers. For them, the systematic application of criticism against human rights perpetrators is seen as the most efficient way to deal with human rights violations.\textsuperscript{20} Primarily, they support that a vital element for successful human rights promotion strategies, is establishing good communication between all the involved human rights related actors.\textsuperscript{21} After all, the whole process involves active engagement of several human rights actors through a procedure that could include several stages.\textsuperscript{22} According to human rights specialists, through the application of criticism, a network of human rights actors can generally aim in achieving three goals.\textsuperscript{23} Firstly, criticism attracts attention. Various actors (like NGOs and the media) are getting involved in the gathering and reporting of information about the seriousness of the human rights abuse that took or is still taking place. Secondly, criticism encourages further monitoring of an alarming situation by all national and international human rights observers, aiming to eventually engage legitimate actors (like political opposition and international organizations). Finally, the very engagement of a wide network of actors in a case of human rights abuse, aims to the creation of essential pressure, so that the official authorities are forced to implement measures for the amelioration of a critical situation.

\textit{“The core of our methodology is our ability to investigate, expose, and shame”}\textsuperscript{24}

Nonetheless, international actors, like governments of countries, have been also relying on criticism as a method of soft intervention in the affairs of countries that have bad human rights records.\textsuperscript{25,26} For foreign governments that are favoring intervention in political affairs of countries though the application of criticism, the justification can be seen as both morally and legally genuine. At the moral level, intervening is justified by the fact that domestic actors (like political opposition, human rights and other civil society groups) can be either very weak, completely

\textsuperscript{20} Ropp, Risse, Sikkink (1999) pg. 2.
\textsuperscript{21} Alston, Goodman (2013) pgs. 295-296.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Kenneth Roth as \textit{Executive Director of Human Rights Watch} in Alston, Goodman (2013) pg. 295.
\textsuperscript{25} Hafner-Burton (2008) pg. 697.
\textsuperscript{26} The concept of \textit{soft intervention} here is related to the definition of \textit{soft power} as given by Joseph S. Nye. He defines as hard power, the direct intervention through military and economic means in order the force the change of behavior of a state, while as \textit{soft power}, the intervention that is aiming though cultural, ideological, and institutional means, in achieving the same result. Nye (1990) pgs. 180-181.
unorganized or even totally restricted from taking part in political procedures.\textsuperscript{27} At the legal level, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 1945) has, through its judgments from several decades ago, supported the view that states, in general, have legal interests to be concerned about the human rights obligations of other states. According to this interpretation, human rights obligations of states are obligations \textit{erga omnes} (towards all). Therefore, a state (a human rights violator), is legally bound by its human rights obligations to the entire international community (to all the other states):

"...an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole... In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations \textit{erga omnes}"	extsuperscript{28}

Still, this “break-through” court interpretation, although exclusive and multi-referenced in human rights affairs, is not the only example in international law justifying international intervention for the sake of protecting human rights. The Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter, 1945) provides additional legal ground for \textit{humanitarian intervention}, whenever a situation consists of a threat to “international peace and security”.\textsuperscript{29} In this regard, the Security Council of the UN also has the right to decide on necessary actions or measures when needed for the amelioration of a critical human rights situation.\textsuperscript{30} Finally, various forms of international intervention have also been discussed on an international level during recent decades. The concept of the \textit{responsibility to protect} (“R2P” or “RtoP”) is another typical example that has sparked more than just an international discussion. As an initiative that engages the UN Security Council, the concept of the R2P is related to the development of an international mechanism that could be enabled whenever it is needed and measures to be activated, for the prevention of very serious human rights violations:

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} UN Charter (1945), Chapter VII, Art. 39, 40, 41.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. Art. 39.
Effective atrocity prevention means doing everything possible to help countries to avert the outbreak of atrocity crimes. This requires the prioritization of early warning and early action.\textsuperscript{31}

2.1 Naming and shaming “in a nutshell”

In their work \textit{The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change}, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink present a thorough approach of the global influence of international human rights norms, while Risse and Sikkink analyze in detail, how utilizing the features of criticism through \textit{naming and shaming} can have a major effect on domestic practices. For them, the utilization of criticism through \textit{naming and shaming} can have a major impact in the domestic practices of international norm violating states.\textsuperscript{32} Apart from criticizing and exposing the wrongdoings of abusive regimes, the main goal of \textit{naming and shaming}, according to Risse and Sikkink, is gradual and peaceful regime reform.\textsuperscript{33} In broad terms, the approach of \textit{naming and shaming} is representing an action plan for engaging civil society, political opposition and international actors in order to achieve significant improvements in human rights conditions of norm violating states.\textsuperscript{34}

Beyond obstacles from turbulent social conditions and other complications coming from strict cultural, social and political traditions that might not be leaving much room for reforms to governments, Risse and Sikkink support that a \textit{liberalization} process could always be initiated with the systematic application of \textit{naming and shaming}.\textsuperscript{35} Mentioning \textit{liberalization}, Risse and Sikkink refer to a general process of progressive and liberal sociopolitical reforms, which will aim to the introduction of significant advancements for improving human rights conditions.\textsuperscript{36} In general terms, social and political liberalization of states and democratic reforms signify for Risse

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{32} Ropp, Risse, Sikkink (1999) pg. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid. pgs. 28-29.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Ibid. pg. 29.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
and Sikkink the ultimate goal of *naming and shaming*. After all, they see this as the only way to secure the permanent implementation of international human rights norms in domestic legal contexts.\(^{37}\)

Still, for Risse and Sikkink, the initiation of the *liberalization* process in non-free regimes is highly depending on the successful synchronization between various domestic and international human rights related actors. For them, regardless of the cultural, social and political implications, it is the successful synchronization between domestic and international human rights advocacy networks that will define if a successful process of regime reform could be introduced.\(^{38}\) Small-scale and national level NGOs, civil society groups, transnational advocacy networks and domestic opposition are actors playing a significant role in monitoring, exposing and questioning abusive practices of abusive regimes.\(^{39}\) Additionally, a special mention is given to the role of actors of the international community. The contribution from liberal and democratic states, intergovernmental organizations and international NGOs is considered very important. These actors, having major roles in international development, can influence regimes through the institutions of the international system.\(^{40}\)

In more practical terms, democratic reforms and *liberalization* for Risse and Sikkink, will signify that norm violating states will eventually start to respect the international human rights standards and the basic the principles of *rule of law*.\(^{41}\) A process of complete *liberalization* could be considered successful for Risse and Sikkink, after the establishment of a domestic system under the principles of *rule of law*, where peaceful and democratic processes are carried out without the constant pressure of international monitoring and supervision.\(^{42}\) Yet, for Risse and Sikkink *naming and shaming* applications are equally important for states that have already domestic systems where the *rule of law* is fully respected. In this case, *naming and shaming* works as a useful tool

\(^{37}\) Ibid. pgs. 31-33.  
\(^{38}\) Ibid. pgs. 15-16.  
\(^{39}\) Ibid.  
\(^{40}\) Ibid. pg. 9.  
\(^{41}\) Ibid. pg. 3.  
\(^{42}\) Ibid. pg. 4.
in the constant monitoring of the progress of a state and as mechanism that could prevent future derogations from international human rights obligations.\textsuperscript{43}

Inspired by observations in social sciences, Risse and Sikkink claim that states interact within the international community similarly to the way that individuals interact within their social environment.\textsuperscript{44} Risse and Sikkink support that the behaviors of states are influenced by the international community and the rules of the international system in the same way that individuals are influenced by their social environment and its social norms.\textsuperscript{45} As states express their interest to start interacting with the international community, it will be required from them to gradually become accustomed to international norms.\textsuperscript{46} As a matter of fact, Risse and Sikkink support that there can be a lot of potential in requiring states to adjust their behavior in accordance to the international human rights standards, as an exchange for the perks of using of the institutions of the international system:

\textit{“They might release political prisoners or sign some international agreements, for example, in order to regain foreign aid, to overcome international sanctions, or to strengthen their rule vis-à-vis domestic opposition.”}\textsuperscript{47}

The whole procedure of interaction between states and the international community and the changes in the behaviors of states by this procedure is referred by Risse and Sikkink as the process of \textit{socialization of international norms} in domestic contexts [Figure 1].\textsuperscript{48}
The process of socialization of international norms in domestic context could be also observed as a “step by step” model, resembling the different levels of interaction. Risse and Sikkink describe the model of socialization of international norms process as a three-stage development. On the first level of this process, states are considering the features of the international system and can estimate their future obligations. On the second level, states are getting accustomed to international norms and are called to start gradually adapting to the international standards within specific timeframes. The third level represents the “institutionalization” process of states and is defined by the “norms respecting habit” that is expected from states to have already developed. Eventually, states are expected to manage on their own and in a democratic and transparent manner the necessary liberal and human rights reforms. The whole process can be considered successful, when these reforms are achieved without any involvement from the international community and its institutions.

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49 Ibid. pg. 16.
50 Ibid. pg. 15.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. pgs. 15-16.
53 Ibid. pgs. 16-17.
2.2 “Modus operandi” of naming and shaming

The actual operational concept of *naming and shaming*, according to Risse and Sikkink, could be seen as a practice that is generating a “boomerang” effect [Figure 2]. In more practical terms, one could imagine that the domestic actors in an abusive regime are sounding an alarm to the international community, waiting for the eventual assistance from abroad to start confronting the oppressive government (put pressure on an abusive government “from below” and “from above”) [Figure 2]. In this example, one could summarize on one side (as domestic actors putting pressure “from below”) small-scale and national level NGOs, national advocacy networks, political opposition parties and civil society groups. On the other side (putting pressure “from above), one could summarize international NGOs, transnational organizations, international institutions and foreign governments. This process of interaction between domestic and international actors to put pressure on oppressive governments, is referred to as the “boomerang model” by Risse and Sikkink [Figure 2].

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54 Ibid. pg. 18.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid. pgs. 18-19.
Furthermore, Risse and Sikkink refer to a series of repeated collaborative events (interactions) that are repeatedly carried out between domestic and international actors in an attempt to gradually tear down an abusive government, as the “spiral model” [Figure 3].\textsuperscript{58} The spiral model is in fact the sequential and methodical engagement of a chain of boomerang attempts between various domestic and international actors. Aiming to gradually and progressively topple abusive governments, the spiral model resembles the more realistic example of a fully operational naming and shaming strategy plan. In this regard, abusive governments could be challenged in five different stages by domestic opposition and international community actors [Figure 3].\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{spiral_model.png}
\caption{The spiral model and its five stages according to Risse and Sikkink.}
\end{figure}

I. The first level of the spiral model (“repression and network activation”) involves the very basic formation of a domestic human rights actors’ network. That could include the collaboration of

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. pgs. 18-20
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid pg. 20.
collectively organized citizens or weak political opposition parties and other small-scale local networks and local NGOs. Nonetheless, apart from information gathering and networking, the second most important goal for networks at this stage, is to attempt to establish connections with some international actors. However, it can be extremely difficult for any information to reach international actors at this stage, as an abusive government may be completely restricting the operation of any domestic network of human rights actors [Figure 3]. As a matter of fact, it may take a significant amount of time at this stage, until the possibilities for engaging the international actors to initiate actions against an abusive government increase:

“The phase of repression might last for a long time, since many oppressive states never make it on to the agenda of transnational advocacy networks.”

II. The second level of the spiral model (“denial”) describes the first actual “return” of a boomerang effect. On this level, a human rights network of domestic actors has already established some connections with a few international human rights networks (mainly regional INGOs and smaller scale international organizations and institutions) [Figure 3]. That could include the first publications of examples of serious human rights violations that are taking place and further information about the abusive practices of a government. As a result of this action, some first signs of international pressure through international criticism could be already evident (the first actual “return” of a boomerang effect). Nevertheless, seeking greater international attention and actions from foreign governments is not yet something that could be realistically expected. An abusive government will most likely express furiously its denial of any human rights abuse reports, rejecting the validity of the provided evidence. Additionally, since human rights networks of domestic actors are in their early stage of formation, they are most likely lacking the capabilities

60 Ibid. pg. 22.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. pgs. 22-24
65 Ibid. pg. 22.
66 Ibid. pg. 23.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid. pg. 24.
to counter domestically their abusive government. Backlash and oppression from an abusive government are very likely to increase at this stage.

“The norm-violating government charges that the criticism constitutes an illegitimate intervention in the internal affairs of the country. The government may even succeed in mobilizing some nationalist sentiment against foreign intervention and criticism.”

III. On the third and probably most crucial level of the spiral model (“tactical concessions”), an abusive government is facing requests from the international community to explain the domestic situation. Similarly, the international calls for immediate improvements on human rights conditions are becoming frequent [Figure 3]. This is the stage where criticism against an abusive government becomes a “daily-routine” for the networks of international human rights actors. Intergovernmental organizations, transnational institutions, foreign governments and INGOs, are constantly receiving updates about the domestic situation and start joining their efforts to put pressure on the abusive government.

At that stage, Risse and Sikkink describe two possible scenarios. An abusive government might actually take few relatively conscious and responsible measures by adopting some improvements and by accepting some degree of responsibility for their wrongdoings. However, the tactical concessions by the abusive government might simply resemble strategic moves. Through such moves, an abusive government may aim to lessen the intensity of international pressure and also avoid closer international monitoring of the domestic situation. The other possible scenario at that stage, according to Risse and Sikkink, is that the domestic networks of human rights actors can now be seen in the eyes of international community, as those who can become a possible alternative for the administration of the country. Significant parts of the society can now openly

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69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid. pg. 23.
72 Ibid. pg. 25.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. pgs. 27-28.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid. pg. 27.
express their disapproval of the government and its practices, and it is also possible that an abusive government at that stage may lose part of its control.\textsuperscript{78}

Still, despite the efforts of an abusive government to control and restrict the operation of networks of domestic actors and mainly the political opposition (in the likelihood of first scenario), Risse and Sikkink support that eventually the domestic opposition will be successful at some point in challenging the authority of the abusive government. The level of international pressure on the third level of the spiral model and the mobilization of the society by the opposition will eventually force an abusive government to adopt fundamental changes.

\textit{“The additional repression is costly to the government in terms of domestic legitimacy... Toward the end of the tactical concession phase, norm-violating governments are no longer in control of the domestic situation.”}\textsuperscript{79}

IV. On the forth level of the spiral model (“prescriptive status”), Risse and Sikkink describe that an abusive government has already accepted its responsibility for the abuses that took place and has largely compromised by accepting the implementation of important reforms [Figure 3].\textsuperscript{80} An abusive government at this stage, whenever fails to perform in accordance to the international standards faces the strong domestic and international criticism (pressure “\textit{from below}” and “\textit{from above}”). Additionally, the government is also constantly called on to reassure its dedication to change by adopting further reforms.\textsuperscript{81} The international community and international human rights networks should by now have a full picture of the scale of human rights violations that occurred and they should be expecting certain results from the government – thus the phrase \textit{prescriptive status} in the title of this stage by Risse and Sikkink.\textsuperscript{82}

Yet, Risse and Sikkink do not exclude the possibility that an abusive government is pretending that is now ready to adopt reforms. This can happen because an abusive government wants to take temporary advantage and benefit from the lift of sanctions and other economic agreements in

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid. pg. 26. \\
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid. pg. 29. \\
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid. pgs. 29-30. \\
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid. 

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exchange for reforms. However, as the whole process of international monitoring is becoming more intense and sophisticated, political and social changes are becoming a one-way street for an abusive government. The internal opposition at that stage is already establishing itself as a serious alternative to the abusive government and certain liberties are already granted to them. As a certain timeframe for changes has been imposed by the international community and its institutions, there is not much room for an abusive government to take “backward steps”, but to continue with the liberal transformation of the country.

“We expect the communicative behavior between the national governments and their domestic and international critics to closely resemble notions of dialogue, of argumentation and justification.”

V. On the fifth and last stage of the spiral model (“rule consistent behavior”), Risse and Sikkink describe the international community, its institutions and international networks of human rights actors to be examining the reliability of a newly established administration [Figure 3]. It is possible that several individuals who are responsible for terror, abuse and crimes are still in important positions in the new administration of the country. Close monitoring is important to ensure that abusive practices cannot happen again. Despite the optimism for the achieved improvements in the human rights conditions of the country, the networks of international human rights actors should be still aware that the complete transformation has not yet been fully completed. Thus, the competence of the new government will be constantly and closely examined and periodically reviewed by international institutions (like through “good governance” criteria).
“We argue that sustainable change in human rights conditions will only be achieved at this stage of the process when national governments are continuously push to live up to their claims and when pressure “from bellow” and “from above” continues.”

2.3 Issue: The chronicle of a major shift in international politics

“Populist, protector, punisher and problematic” are the first words mentioned by a journalist in a video report of an online news channel with millions of subscribers, when describing the president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte. Besides, in the same video report, the journalist has been holding a quite critical stance towards the approaches of the president, mentioning his overall attitude as “brutal” and “authoritarian”. After all, emphasizing the eccentric behavior of the Filipino president, the rhetorical question that the journalist is posing to the audience is:

“How did Rodrigo Duterte rise to power?”

Thanks to modern technology, right under the video report in thousands of interactive responses, it is possible for one who is interested to observe, what the main public views on this situation are. Surprisingly, one can actually witness that the vast majority of the responses from the viewers, did not seem to agree with the strong criticism against the president Rodrigo Duterte and his policies. In fact, many express supportive opinions for the president and his policies and blame international media for being unable to understand the complicated domestic issues of the country. Nevertheless, it is not only international media intensely criticizing the Filipino president and his policies, but also a wide range of actors related to human rights. International NGOs, media, human rights organizations and representatives of UN institutions have been actively criticizing Rodrigo Duterte

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93 Ibid. pg. 33.
or his policies and the human rights performance of the Philippines since he took office in 2016.\textsuperscript{95,96}

Could criticism from human rights actors make Rodrigo Duterte change the way he runs his country? Several international observers who have been analyzing socio-political issues in the Philippines for years are talking about the president’s rather controversial attitude and his tendency of introducing “iron fist” policies to deal with the country’s social problems.\textsuperscript{97} Still, they also mention his interesting “record-breaking” public support rates, as he is in fact one of the most popular presidents that the country has ever had.\textsuperscript{98,99} While trying to suggest possible explanations for the radical turn in the politics of the Philippines, observers and analysts never forget to mention the complex nature of country’s social issues:

“Most Filipinos believe that Duterte’s war on alleged drug users and pushers is a draconian but necessary response to a serious social problem”\textsuperscript{100}

However, could one perceive this phenomenon observed in Philippine politics as merely a unique example internationally? Probably, one could argue that the domestic situation in the Philippines could explain the polarization and radicalization of the country’s politics. Yet, that could only be the case if we simply isolate that particular example and study it separately from the rest of the world. Analyzing the broader picture of sociopolitical developments in the world over the last few years, one can clearly see that this situation is not just a separate example or an isolated phenomenon. In fact, this example could actually also be indicative of a reoccurring pattern, which many analysts of international politics have observed to be happening in many countries in the

\textsuperscript{97} Timberman (2019).
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Timberman (2019).
recent years. Through the analysis of relevant research studies one could notice that there is a global trend towards more authoritarian and abusive governments all over the world.\textsuperscript{101} Globally, human rights violations are more frequent now than ten or fifteen years ago:

“\textit{In 2018, Freedom in the World recorded the 13th consecutive year of decline in global freedom.}”\textsuperscript{102}

In addition to the unanticipated supportive reactions for the controversial president Rodrigo Duterte, a search for similar reviews regarding the public support of other world leading figures, who are leaning towards radical and populist politics, reveals the existence of an unusual pattern. All over the world, over the past decade, emerging political figures with radical and populist characteristics are “upsetting” the traditional political establishments.\textsuperscript{103,104} Undeniably, from a historical perspective, one could also argue that protectionism, isolationism, ethnocentrism and populism are as old as politics itself. However, this time, in the short span of a few years, an unprecedented and unexpectedly large number of societies, have shifted towards politicians who represent extreme and polarizing political views. Many scholars have been suggesting several possible reasons that could explain that phenomenon:

“\textit{The first is the populist threat to democracy. While this is a complex phenomenon, much of the problem is linked to post-9/11 era security concerns, some of which have blended seamlessly into an actual or constructed fear and hatred of foreigners or minorities}”\textsuperscript{105}

Yet, even by acknowledging the complexity of the global developments that could have assisted in the escalation of the phenomenon of political radicalization, it is not possible to ignore a self-evident truth. The established policies for promoting or defending the human rights ideals seem to be completely unsuitable for encountering the new challenges that are globally arising. It is not only in the Philippines where international criticism against the controversial policies of the president are failing to mobilize the society and force the president to change his ways. This is in fact a rather general worldwide phenomenon affecting all types of societies. Besides, this time,

\textsuperscript{102} Freedom in the World 2019, pg. 1.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{104} Alston (2017) pg. 1.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid. pg. 4
the issue of extreme political radicalization, does not seem to be simply affecting societies that have been generally struggling with serious domestic sociopolitical problems. Large-scale surveys are indicating that this is now a global trend, affecting even the societies, which were traditionally leaning towards quite liberal and progressive governments.\textsuperscript{106,107}

Unexpected election victories of candidates and political parties representing ideologies of extremes might have caught many off guard a few years ago.\textsuperscript{108} Nevertheless, the extent of this phenomenon has now reached a different level, where no one can really claim to be astonished anymore, when such developments in international politics occur today.

\textit{“It has happened so quickly that we have not yet had time to be astonished”}\textsuperscript{109}

These developments in international politics have raised serious concerns about the future of human rights.\textsuperscript{110} Many human rights advocates have been sounding the alarm on the rise of political radicalization and its effect on human rights internationally.\textsuperscript{111} Prominent academics and intellectuals known for their dedication to human rights have also addressed the issue, while calling for a potential re-evaluation and re-thinking of the broadly established human rights promotion policies and strategies:

\textit{“human rights proponents need to rethink many of their assumptions, re-evaluate their strategies, and broaden their outreach, while not giving up on the basic principles”}\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{107} Democracy Index 2017 - Free speech under attack, pg. 22.
\textsuperscript{109} The prominent American political scientist Graham Allison in his latest publication \textit{Destined for War} (2017) is paraphrasing an old phrase of the former Czechoslovakian president, Vaclav Havel, while writing about the massive sociopolitical and socioeconomic changes that are taking place during the last decade. Allison (2018) pg. XVIII.
\textsuperscript{110} Alston (2017) pgs. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{112} Alston (2017) pg. 2.
3. Academic Debate

Through the years, the general approach suggesting the application of criticism-based strategies as a method to promote ideas like universal human rights, democracy and generally liberal values has generated various academic reactions. There is significant research in that regard and there are also findings that challenge the efficiency of criticism-based strategies. My main emphasis is on the analysis of the studies that are testing naming and shaming as a method that could influence state behavior on human rights issues.

3.1 A first review of criticism and naming and shaming strategies

An extensive research report by the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) on the use of naming and shaming strategies for human rights promotion purposes in the European Union (EU), suggests that this practice today represents the most broadly applied policy for the promotion of human rights within the EU. The report concludes that the popularity of this method can be explained by its effectiveness for promoting human rights within the EU. Still, the same report also recognizes significant variations in the results of applying naming and shaming strategies, due to several issues, primarily related to variation on cultural, social and political traditions of the targeted countries. The authors of the report, Kinzelbach and Lehmann, identify that results from the application of naming and shaming might significantly vary, as in general terms, the practice appears to be much more effective when exposing human rights abuse in liberal and democratic, rather than authoritarian regimes:

“Because the effectiveness of shaming is highly context-specific, there cannot be a universal protocol for when – and when not – to shame. Authoritarian states seek to remain unpredictable”

114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. pg. 6.
116 Ibid.
Yet, Kinzelbach and Lehmann also notice in their research the importance of a certain background, so that naming and shaming strategies can actually be effective. In this regard, they mention the function of independent institutions and the unlimited operation of networks of human rights actors. Ultimately, they notice that basic elements of rule of law and the administration’s will to implement reforms, can ensure that naming and shaming strategies will produce results, when that is needed:

“...whether these mechanisms work depends on numerous external factors. They include a state’s material and social vulnerability to shaming, the systemic differences of democratic and authoritarian regimes, and a state’s institutional capacity and constitutional makeup (states that lack effective administrative structures cannot enforce decisions)”

In a similar manner, other scholars have also detected the positive influence from naming and shaming when the international circumstances encouraged human rights actors to expose unfair and abusive practices. In this respect, the successful application of criticism and naming and shaming could be seen through examples like the broad adoption of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. This is an international process of certification that was established after international pressure from various human rights related actors, to restrict unethical mining of diamonds and exploitation of resources in the African continent.

Nevertheless, my goal is not to challenge naming and shaming strategies for their results in countries or international environments, where networks of human rights actors have at least a basic level of freedom and independent institutions can question the legitimacy of the actions of governments. Since naming and shaming practices are applied today by many human rights actors worldwide, the results that are more relevant for my research come from the performance of these practices in countries with few independent institutions and where there is limited freedom to question government practices. The reason behind my emphasis on these results, comes from the

\[\text{117 Ibid. pg. 14.} \]
\[\text{118 Ibid.} \]
\[\text{119 Haufler (2015) pg. 57.} \]
\[\text{120 Ibid pgs. 57-58.} \]
findings that show backlash from authoritarian regimes to be the most common response to *naming and shaming* practices.\textsuperscript{121}

“Consider, for instance, the global campaign that unfolded in support of Nigerian woman Amina Lawal, who had been sentenced by a Sharia court to death by stoning for the crimes of adultery and conceiving a child out of wedlock. The campaign triggered a cascade of negative consequences, including security concerns for local women’s rights activists, who were accused of acting as the pawns of Western governments and of exposing the country to criticism in the international arena.”\textsuperscript{122}

One could also provide a valid argument in order to challenge the approach of Risse and Sikkink in regards to the process of *socialization of international norms* in domestic contexts [Figure 1]. Driven by observation in social sciences, Risse and Sikkink conceptualized the *socialization of international norms* process, picturing the international community to influence the behavior of states, so that states can eventually start acting in accordance to the international standards.\textsuperscript{123} Though, results from several social studies could be used here to challenge the dynamic impact of the *socialization of international norms* process. If one can imagine states to act in the same way as individuals do, one should also consider the risk of the unpredictability of result, as individuals do not always react in a foreseeable way.

For over a century, the influence of criticism on human behavior is a popular topic for studies in the field of psychology. In fact, the discipline of psychology has always been pointing the dangers of reckless criticism on individuals from their social environment.\textsuperscript{124} Scholars from that field, have traditionally been separating the general practice of criticism into constructive and destructive.\textsuperscript{125} Accordingly, as constructive criticism, they perceive the practice of moderate criticism that includes acknowledgment of positive progress and encouragement for further improvements.\textsuperscript{126} On the other hand, they perceive as destructive criticism, the practice of reproach that emphasizes

\textsuperscript{121} Kinzelbach, Lehmann (2015) pgs. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. pg. 20.
\textsuperscript{123} Ropp, Risse, Sikkink (1999) pgs. 11-12.
\textsuperscript{124} See: Baron (1988).
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid. pgs. 199-200.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid. pgs. 202-203
only the negative sides and in an exemplary, yet rough manner, exposes behaviors publicly.\textsuperscript{127} Findings from studies in psychology are also showing that negative criticism, as a rule, is the main cause of conflict and confusion in interpersonal relationships within various social environments:

\textit{“poor use of criticism was perceived as a more important cause of conflict and received higher ratings than did competition over resources or disputes over jurisdiction”}\textsuperscript{128}

While many could argue that the adoption of criticism-based policies is providing us with a non-violent method of promoting and defending human rights, democracy and liberal values, there are still additional limitations for this practices that cannot be underestimated. Upholding the concept of international human rights certainly requires a high level of international cooperation. Besides, despite all the different traditions of the peoples of our world, international actors are foremost obliged to conduct international relations in\textit{ good faith} and with mutual respect for the different cultural, social and political characteristics.\textsuperscript{129} I can identify a challenging issue when cultural practices are examined internationally and governments criticize each other on their human rights performances:

\textit{“…respect for the diversity of cultures, tolerance, dialogue and cooperation, in a climate of mutual trust and understanding are among the best guarantees of international peace and security”}\textsuperscript{130}

Applying criticism towards a certain cultural, social and political tradition, while also trying not to provoke an international political crisis, sounds almost as impossible as the Sisyphean task.\textsuperscript{131} The maintenance of delicate balances in a very fragile international environment is a high-risk operation. Scholars well known for their dedication to the concept of universal human rights have acknowledged that people of different cultural, social and political backgrounds may interpret the whole idea of human rights in very dissimilar ways.\textsuperscript{132} After all, one can also agree that the

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid. pg. 199.
\textsuperscript{130}UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), Preamble.
\textsuperscript{131}A Sisyphean task, ”Sisyphus, a king in Greek mythology, was condemned for eternity to roll a huge rock up a long, steep hill in the underworld, only to watch it roll back down”, 2019. \textit{Merriam-Webster}. Retrieved from: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Sisyphean. Accessed on: Jan. 20, 2019.
\textsuperscript{132} Nickel (1987) pg. 69.
international community has always been a mosaic of different cultural, social and political characteristics. In this regard, theories of cultural and moral relativism can always provide us with “food for thought”. Still, can all the people of our world eventually unite under the concept of a “common set” of certain standards? For James W. Nickel, the answer is that it is possible for our world to see the development of a “universal culture” in regards to human rights. However, the prominent human rights scholar also recognizes that there might be a challenge in coordinating the whole world towards the same direction in this global change:

“The question for our era is not whether rapid cultural change should occur - it is occurring - but rather what direction such change should take.”

The application of criticism on cultural, social and political issues from foreign governments has been a source of controversy in international politics several times through history. One can identify historical incidents, where previously achieved international progress was at stake, due to the fact that some countries felt threatened by international pressure against them. For example, a large controversy that started from criticism between the governments of the USA and the USSR came to give birth to one of the most discussed political notions of the Cold War era. In the late 1950s, the idea of "peaceful coexistence" was introduced in order to solidify the potentials of international cooperation and overcome the obstacles posed by criticism targeting cultural, social and political issues either by the USA and its Western allies or by the USSR and its Eastern Bloc allies. During probably the tensest period of the Cold War era, the two biggest powers of the world at that time, the USA and the USSR, mutually agreed that they cannot allow criticism to harm their international cooperation potentials and put the whole world at a risk of an international crisis:

“There may be two ways out: either war - and war in the rocket and H-bomb age is fraught with the most dire consequences for all nations - or peaceful co-existence. Whether

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133 Ibid. pg. 79.
134 See as example: Khrushchev in Foreign Affairs (1959) pg. 1-3.
136 Ibid.
137 Kennan in Foreign Affairs (1960) pgs. 171 - 172.
What is the main challenge for actors that exclusively rely on naming and shaming strategies for promoting human rights?

Hypothesis I: Considering the observations of Kinzelbach and Lehmann, one can argue that naming and shaming strategies can in fact be a “double-edged sword” when promoting human rights. Clearly, according to the results of their study, naming and shaming strategies can be effective in regimes where human rights actors and their networks have the freedom to question the authorities. However, naming and shaming is also a method that can put in great danger actors of human rights networks in authoritarian regimes, and without the guarantee for any positive results.

Additionally, one can also notice historical examples where major actors of the international community applied strategies to criticize each other, but that lead to the escalation of an international crisis. Thus, since naming and shaming cannot be effective at all times and under all circumstances, the main challenge in adopting this human rights promotion strategy, is to identify in advance, the cultural, social and political background in which this method will be applied.

3.2 A consequentialist approach for criticism and naming and shaming strategies

From a consequentialist view, the description of a strategy as successful, requires the evaluation of measurable results. Regardless of conclusions that might have been drawn about the initial intentions or goals of a strategy, measurable results can always be used in an attempt to improve

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138 Khrushchev in *Foreign Affairs* (1959) pg. 1.
140 Ibid.
141 See Kennan in *Foreign Affairs* (1960).
potential flaws of an initial draft. The progressive adoption of *naming and shaming* strategies by human rights networks in the West in the past decades, can be seen in several relevant studies [Figure 4].

![Graph showing the number of countries that have been "named and shamed"](image)

Figure 4. Observing the increasing adoption of *naming and shaming* strategies.

Some of the strongest criticism against *naming and shaming* have been driven by the fears that the strategy could trigger indeterminable backlash. Yet, it should be mentioned that even the proponents of the application of *naming and shaming* have to some degree addressed these risks. While there is research supporting that this method of promoting human rights, democracy and liberal values has in various cases been successful (Kinzelbach and Lehmann, 2015), there is also plenty of evidence to support the opposite. As the high risk of backlash appears to be the main

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142 Hafner-Burton (2008) pg. 690.
143 Adapted from: Hafner-Burton (2008) pg. 690.
144 Ibid. pg. 689.
145 Reference to the possible risks of crackdown from abusive governments on human rights networks and their actors, which were addressed by Risse and Sikkink, in the *spiral model* example on the stages 1, 2 and 3.
issue in the application of *naming and shaming*, scholars like Hafner-Burton have characterized the overall belief that *naming and shaming* can bring results as “*anecdotal*”.\(^{147,148}\)

In her research, Hafner-Burton, has studied applications of *naming and shaming* that were initiated by official institutions and agencies of the UN, national and international level NGOs and the media in 145 countries, in the period 1975 to 2000.\(^{149}\) According to her extensive analytical study regarding the efficiency of the application of *naming and shaming*, no concrete correlation could be established between the general application of *naming and shaming* strategies and an overall improvement of human rights conditions.\(^{150}\)

In fact, Hafner-Burton is supporting that results might very much vary and be contradictive, depending on several variables.\(^{151}\) Primarily, she is considering the seriousness of the human rights violations as one of the most important of these variables. In reality, she suggests that *naming and shaming* is more likely to have some positive effects, when applied to counter violations and abuses of civil and political rights.\(^{152}\) For such cases, her hypothesis suggests that one might actually be able to observe some sort of periodic improvement of human rights conditions.\(^{153}\) According to her hypothesis, the reason could be that the majority of the abusive regimes find it easy to simply adopt some legislative improvements for civil and political rights, in order to avoid further international criticism.\(^{154,155}\) For Hafner-Burton, though, the practical implementation of these legislative improvements, is still very uncertain.\(^{156}\)

Furthermore, Hafner-Burton is also arguing that in several cases, the escalation in the seriousness of the human rights violations have been observed right after the application of *naming and shaming* strategies. When it comes to severe human rights violations, like extrajudicial killings and torture, Hafner-Burton is supporting that application of *naming and shaming* is more likely to

\(^{147}\) Hafner-Burton (2008) pg. 689.  
\(^{148}\) See also: Wachman (2001).  
\(^{149}\) Ibid. pgs. 689-690.  
\(^{150}\) Ibid. pg. 713.  
\(^{151}\) Ibid.  
\(^{152}\) Ibid. pg. 707.  
\(^{153}\) Ibid.  
\(^{154}\) Ibid.  
\(^{155}\) An issue also addressed by Risse and Sikkink in the example of the *spiral model*, a special mention on stage 3.  
\(^{156}\) Hafner-Burton (2008) pgs. 707, 710.
result in an increase in both the number and severity of the human rights violations. An explanation for this phenomenon, according to her hypothesis, could be that abusive regimes are usually following a very dogmatic policy, which is to systematically commit cruelties and terrorize, in order to ensure (or prolong) their stay in power through the wide spread of fear. In such situations, even a “soft” type of criticism against violations of civil and political rights, could eventually provoke an abusive government to commit crimes that are even more serious than it ever had committed before. Hafner-Burton also supports that when an abusive regime with a long history of terror is controlling all aspects of domestic power, the risk is very high of making the domestic opposition a target after naming and shaming strategies by the international community and other international human rights related actors. One explanation, according to Hafner-Burton, is that under the excuse of calling the domestic opposition responsible for the exposure and supposed “unfair” shaming of the country, abusive governments might eventually attempt to silence completely all opposition voices. Additionally, for such cases, Hafner-Burton also argues that abusive governments could act with excessive cruelty, after perceiving international criticism as a potential threat to their undisputable authority.

Another observation from Hafner-Burton’s research is that naming and shaming could also provoke deterioration in human rights conditions in cases, when not all of the human rights violations within a country are connected to governmental actions. Criticism of human rights violations against governments that do not exercise exclusive control over their own territories, could actually result in internal turmoil. As some governments might be very weak, actions and measures that are contributing to their further weakening, can result in further violence caused by internal conflict over power and control. In fact, Hafner-Burton suggests that in such cases, it is also observed that various shadow and criminal organizations and terror networks, have been aiming to provoke chaos for their own advantage. In such examples, terrorist groups and

157 Ibid. pgs. 691-692.
158 Ibid. pg. 692.
159 Ibid. pg. 693.
160 Ibid. pg. 692.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid. pg. 692.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
criminal networks responsible for causing severe human rights violations, have been seeking international attention for the purposes of “profile raising” or the “demonstration” of their ideologies on an international level.  

“Some want to deflect policing of illicit behaviors, such as drug smuggling. Others use acts of violence to attract global publicity. This may help explain why terrorist organizations rush to take responsibility for atrocities, such as the 7 July 2005, bombing attacks in London, where multiple groups claimed the blame to get the world’s attention”

Taking into consideration these observations, one could also generally agree that when naming and shaming is applied against countries with very weak institutions, it will most likely result in deterioration of human rights conditions, rather than any improvement. After all, as we can also see in the report by Kinzelbach and Lehmann, naming and shaming is found to be effective when targeting countries where the implementation of reforms is already an existing structural characteristic of the system and the government authorities can be openly challenged by independent human rights actors and their networks. These observation can contradict the general belief of Risse and Sikkink that after the third stage of the spiral model, the implementation of international norms and human rights reforms, even though slowly, could be eventually expected to be achieved [Figure 3]. According to the hypothesis of Risse and Sikkink, abusive governments, after a period of tactical concession, will not be able to perpetually avoid domestic and international pressure for human rights improvements:

“While such actions can temporarily nip an incipient domestic opposition in the bud, this rarely suspends the spiral indefinitely, but mostly delays it. The additional repression is costly to the government in terms of its domestic legitimacy, and may validate international criticism by revealing more clearly the coercive power of the state.”

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167 Ibid. pgs. 692-693.
168 Ibid. pg. 692.
Moreover, another interesting insight that one can get from Hafner-Burton’s research, is that the whole international system around human rights is far more decentralized and anarchic than what one could have expected. That could actually explain some of the reasons that a “consensus” for a certain approach or method or strategy towards human rights violations (even for violations of the same type) between all the involved human rights actors is very difficult to achieve. Hafner-Burton also reports that there are several other serious factors, which can limit much of the potentials of naming and shaming strategies. The majority of them could be simply found in the structural restrictions of the international human rights system. Principally, she notices, since governments can easily decide to ignore criticisms and accusations of human rights violations, the international human rights institutions are practically unable to authorize official procedures against the government – human rights violator – other than criticism.\textsuperscript{171} Hafner-Burton points out that many of the human rights actors involved in naming and shaming only focus their actions against very specific types of human rights violations or are targeting very few countries or just focus on investigating a specific region.\textsuperscript{172} As a result, one can observe that countries are very unevenly exposed, even for cases of very similar types of human rights violations:\textsuperscript{173} One can see that as a fundamental structural weakness of the system. A weakness that contributes to the development of a general sense, which is expressed by many countries that are exposed and shamed that naming and shaming is a selective process, serving political motives and not human rights:

\textit{“Organizations - whether NGOs, news media, or the UN - shine the spotlight selectively. Some countries guilty of horrible abuses never draw much publicity, while others responsible for lesser abuses draw much attention.”}\textsuperscript{174}

To what extent can a large group of international actors influence a single member of the international community through criticism on human rights issues?

\textsuperscript{171} Hafner-Burton (2008) pg. 691.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid. pgs. 697-698.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid. pgs. 694-695.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid. pg. 694.

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Hypothesis II: Summarizing this chapter, I am considering three general issues raised by the observations in Hafner-Burton’s research (some also addressed by Kinzelbach and Lehmann) that could provide the answer to this question.

Firstly, the implementation of reforms in a legal context and the practical implementation of these reform in the social life are two very different things. Governments are adopting reforms due to criticism, but that can easily be the product of “tactical concessions” for avoiding further international supervision or criticism. Whether the period of “tactical concessions” will last for long, it is very uncertain and there is no evidence to prove how fast human rights conditions will actually improve in such cases.¹⁷⁵

Secondly, systemic problems of countries can restrict governments from exercising control even over their own territories. Non-governmental actors can also be responsible for human rights violations and international pressure towards a weak government can result in the eventual surrendering of power to disruptive forces, which will most likely result in internet turmoil or even conflict and thus further human rights violations.¹⁷⁶

Thirdly, a major issue is regarding the uneven exposure of the human rights violations by the actors applying naming and shaming strategies. Surely, the decentralized character of the human rights system is allowing the various actors related to human rights to remain independent from each other and work on different causes. However, this element is also making the whole international human rights system (of all the networks of human rights actors and institutions), appear arbitrary in its reactions. When a large number of international community members alongside with various human rights related networks are orchestrating naming and shaming campaigns against a single government, if the operation does not fail in its coordination process, this uneven exposure of this government can make the whole operation appear as unfair *per se*.¹⁷⁷,¹⁷⁸ As a result of this, abusive governments could become even more abusive than before and terrorize to a greater extent than before the domestic opposition and the domestic networks of human rights actors.¹⁷⁹ After all, this

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¹⁷⁵ Ibid. pg. 712.
¹⁷⁶ Ibid. pgs. 711-712.
¹⁷⁷ Ibid. pg. 711.
¹⁷⁸ Regarding failures in the coordinating actions between actors see: Wachman (2001).
could result in an additional cost in terms of reputation for all the involved international community members and drop in public support for the job of networks of human rights actors, international institutions and organizations and the whole idea of promoting human rights internationally.180

Ultimately, identifying the limitations of naming and shaming strategies and in general international criticism practices is only one part of my study. Whether the international community, international organizations and their institutions and actors dedicated to promote human rights can rely on other approaches for achieving improvements on human rights conditions worldwide, is something that I am aiming to explore in the next chapter.

4. Alternative approaches regarding social and political change and state behavior

In this part of my study, I emphasize the analysis of theories that could provide answers on why some countries have better human rights performances than other countries. Ideally, conclusions from this part could be used for the development of my final proposal in the end of the study. So, what can we learn from countries that do best in terms of human rights, what are the elements behind their “success stories” and is there a way to export the “secrets” of their success to those who do not so well?

4.1 Economic development as a prerequisite for social change

For a large part of scholars associated with the field of economics, it is rather progress in economic terms that is responsible for liberal and progressive social and political changes. In this regard, the school of economic liberalism is probably the most active one, in advertising the positive effects of economic development in social and political terms. For several scholars representing this school of thought, achieving economic development, is seen as the most essential element in order for a society to set an overall course to a general social and political liberal and progressive

advancement.\textsuperscript{181} These scholars mainly support, that if we want to motivate societies to adopt reforms for sociopolitical liberalization, we should firstly aim to assist them in achieving a basic level of economic development.\textsuperscript{182}

While acknowledging the possibilities for potential exceptions, they still argue that in general, higher levels of economic development and economic modernization are indicative of societies that are having higher levels of liberal and progressive sociopolitical characteristics.\textsuperscript{183} In fact, they support that the higher levels of economic development contribute in the development of better democratic procedures and better conditions for human rights.\textsuperscript{184} Today, one can find through several studies the evidence to support the arguments correlating economic development and overall better conditions in terms of democratic procedures and human rights:

"Economic freedom is a critical element of human well-being and a vital linchpin in sustaining a free civil society."\textsuperscript{185}

"Economically freer countries that open their societies to new ideas, products, and innovations have largely achieved high levels of social progress."\textsuperscript{186}

"The almost complete predominance of OECD countries among those ranked as full democracies suggests that the level of economic development is a significant, if not a binding, constraint on democratic development."\textsuperscript{187}

Arguably, findings from several studies support the hypothesis that economic development is a fundamental element for democracy and human rights.\textsuperscript{188} Driven by similar observations, many scholars have suggested that modernization coming from economic development, could actually be the key to assist an oppressed society in getting more freedoms. In fact, scholars support that
economic development could provide an oppressed society with the confidence to gain power and demand more liberties and freedoms from its government.\textsuperscript{189}

“By empowering people to exercise greater control of their daily lives, economic freedom ultimately nurtures political reform by making it possible for individuals to gain the economic resources necessary to challenge entrenched interests or compete for political power, thereby encouraging the creation of more pluralistic societies.”\textsuperscript{190}

Moreover, for scholars of the same school of thought, it has been rather the higher levels of economic development that eventually assisted several societies to overcome their serious social and political problems.\textsuperscript{191} Besides, they also support that the adoption of a sustainable democratic model cannot be guaranteed only with the adoption of reforms for civil and political liberties.\textsuperscript{192} They perceive economic development as a fundamental element to maintain an adequate level of social cohesion and a liberal and democratic political system.\textsuperscript{193} Thus, many scholars today support that economic development could be the single most important element to inspire large-scale social and political liberal and democratic revolutions.\textsuperscript{194}

Trusting the potentials that economic development could bring in regards to liberal and progressive sociopolitical changes, scholars also suggest, that reforms in this direction should not simply be judged by their immediate results.\textsuperscript{195} Examining the findings of several studies on the economic performance of authoritarian regimes, shows that economic development cannot immediately mobilize an oppressed society to demand liberal and democratic reforms.\textsuperscript{196}

“Structural factors such as economic development shape political regimes, but not immediately and every year.”\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{189} Wilson quoted in Ropp, Risse, Sikkink (1999) pg. 37.
\textsuperscript{190} 2018 Index of Economic Freedom, pg. 24.
\textsuperscript{191} Friedman pgs. 108-110.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid. pgs. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{194} See: Obaid (2013), pgs. 203-207 about Acemoglu and Robinson.
\textsuperscript{195} Treisman (2013), pg. 927.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid. pgs. 928-929.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid. pg. 940.
Besides, the argument of economic development has also been used by oppressive governments in order to demonstrate their “success” and thus prolong their stay in power.¹⁹⁸ Yet, even if in some cases the results of overall social and political liberalization from economic development require a significant amount of time, there is still enough evidence to support the strong link between economic development and liberal and progressive sociopolitical advancements.¹⁹⁹

“Reactionary leaders can delay the impact of economic development, but not forever. And their efforts to prolong their own tenure often prepare the unexpected breakthrough that will follow their demise.”²⁰⁰

Beyond the discussion about the benefits of economic development in domestic sociopolitical developments, interesting results can be also observed from its effects on international cooperation and global peace efforts. In this regard, on can also find the evidence to support that historically, economic development has encouraged the closer international cooperation:

“The enhanced trade among nations that has accompanied the growth in economic freedom has also proven to be a powerful force for peace”²⁰¹

An example of how shared economic development has greatly assisted countries to overcome their problems, cooperate and eventually progress together in both economic and democratic terms, could be witnessed in the model of the EU. Committed to leave behind their devastating past and overcome the severe wounds and traumas of two World Wars, European countries joined efforts and started working closely for achieving the common goal of shared economic development. This inspiring plan for conjointly achieved high economic development levels laid the foundations for a new era of cooperation in Europe, right after the end of the WWII. Long lasting differences between several European nations that had been enemies and fought against each other in the two World Wars were eased, under the concept of commonly achieving high levels of economic development:

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. pg. 936.
¹⁹⁹ Ibid. pgs. 936, 940.
²⁰⁰ Ibid. pg. 940.
²⁰¹ 2018 Index of Economic Freedom, pg. xv.
The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.²⁰²

In this regard, as one can observe, the significance of a common objective for economic development between several countries, gave birth to the closest cooperative union in the history of Europe.²⁰³ The foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1952) encouraged the counties that were previously fighting against each other to eventually re-establish their relations, cooperate and economically succeed. The aftermath of this achievement could still be witnessed today, as the EU is globally acknowledged as the place where the principles of liberal values, democracy, human rights and peace are respected more than anywhere else.²⁰⁴

The progressive development of the ECSC into the European Economic Community (EEC) and finally into the EU came only to verify the generally positive influence of internationally shared economic development. An ambitious plan based on economic development some 70 years ago, brought today in Europe the emergence of a common monetary union, the free movement of people and goods, a common standardized legal system, and ultimately assisted the EU to become recognized as a “human rights leading actor in the global arena”.²⁰⁵ Besides, the respect for liberal values, human rights, democracy and peace are today the main elements that the EU is aiming to promote internationally:

*The European Union is founded on a shared determination to promote peace and stability and to build a world founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.*

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²⁰² Schuman (1950).
²⁰³ See as example: The Treaty of Paris (1951) preamble.
²⁰⁵ Ibid.
These principles underpin all aspects of the internal and external policies of the European Union.  

How can one identify the positive influence of economic development on human rights conditions and are there any challenges that could be mentioned?

Hypothesis III: Considering the circumstances in Europe during the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and the conditions that lead to the two World Wars, one could certainly realize the significance of the EU achievement. Economic development is undeniably a key factor for progressive social and political change and also a key factor that could be used for promoting international peace.

Can people think about human rights when they have not yet covered their basic needs in terms of food and shelter? Definitely, the answer to this question can be easily understood. Economic development is significant for several reasons. It can provide the tools for a country to improve the literacy levels of its people, to establish a better healthcare system and to create jobs that can deliver wages high enough to maintain an adequate standard of living. Several scholars have studied the significance of economic development in assisting countries to eventually become more democratic.  

Yet, an important issue for economic development is that for the first positive results to become evident we might actually need a significant amount of time, as at least it has been historically observed in several cases (as mentioned by Treisman). Furthermore, the main challenge for economic development is related to the inclusivity of its results. Whether non-inclusive results of economic development can create challenges for societies and threaten human rights conditions and democracy, is an issue that I am examining in the next section.


\footnote{See for example: Acemoglu, Robinson (2012).}
4.2 Economic development and the challenge of inclusive results

For some schools of thought associated with the study of economics, the effect of economic development on social and political change is still debatable. Adopting a much more critical approach, scholars with influences from the school of Marxian economics, argue that economic development, when not centrally planned and controlled, cannot have positive effects for societies.\textsuperscript{208} In fact, these scholars are arguing that a central authority (a government) must have the full control of all the aspects of economic development, in order for significant improvements to be achieved, for the whole of a society.\textsuperscript{209}

The belief of the scholars influenced by Marxian economics that a governmental should be exclusively controlling all aspects of economic development, is based on the fears that the massive economic development in societies, when not centrally controlled, will eventually benefit only a small minority and not the largest part of a society.\textsuperscript{210} Furthermore, they identify the existence of a “vicious circle” in societies where economic development is not strictly controlled by a central authority. In this regard, they argue that the role of a central authority is to control the equal distribution of the wealth, which is coming in by the economic development.\textsuperscript{211} For the scholars of Marxian economic, economic development when not centrally controlled is a zero-sum game, where the few will constantly benefit on the expense of the many that will be constantly losing.\textsuperscript{212}

Still, for the scholars of Marxian economics, the “vicious circle” of non-inclusive economic development in societies can eventually only result in failure. In fact, they argue that the creation of unfair social conditions shaped by unconstrained economic development will only lead to economic depression and eventually social revolution.\textsuperscript{213} They also identify these elements as a unique feature of every “free market” socio-economic model.\textsuperscript{214} Nevertheless, they also support that the “vicious circle” of economic failures is a process that can be observed through history in

\textsuperscript{208} Savchenko (2007) pg. 1036.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. pg. 1033.
\textsuperscript{213} Munro (2008) pg. 2.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
all human societies, which have followed the “free market” socio-economic model of development.\textsuperscript{215}

These scholars also view the current international order with skepticism and disbelief. They believe that under the current global financial system, which is basically representing either completely or partially a form of a “free market” economic model, it is impossible to sufficiently and fairly distribute the wealth among the nations and the peoples of our world.\textsuperscript{216} Thus, they argue that unconstrained economic development is the cause of unfair social conditions and global turmoil all over the world.\textsuperscript{217} After all, this school of thought does not trust that any fair and sustainable social model can ever develop under any concept of “free market” economics:

\begin{quote}
“The dominant motivations in this society are bound to be egoistic - not as a result of the corruption of human nature - but because of the character of the economic system, which is inevitably conflict-laden.”\textsuperscript{218}
\end{quote}

As a matter of fact, they also hold a very skeptical view on the established international human rights system, as they view with disbelief the purposes behind the idea of universal human rights:

\begin{quote}
“The idea of the individual rights, Marx explains, implies a society in which the interests of each person is naturally and inevitably opposed to the interests of others, a society incurably torn asunder by the clash of private aspirations.”\textsuperscript{219}
\end{quote}

Risse and Sikkink also express reservations about the significance of economic development and its role in inspiring liberal and progressive sociopolitical advancements for societies. They argue that a “modernization” process in one or several aspects of a society, cannot automatically guarantee the start of an evolutionary process that will bring improvements for human rights, liberal values and democracy.\textsuperscript{220} Still, they acknowledge the role of economic development as a factor that can accelerate some sociopolitical improvements, but only up to a certain degree. Yet,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{215}{Ibid. pg. 3.}
\footnotetext{216}{Bellamy (2018) pgs. 2-3.}
\footnotetext{217}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext{218}{Kolakowski (1983) pg. 84.}
\footnotetext{219}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext{220}{Ropp, Risse, Sikkink (1999). 37.}
\end{footnotes}
they are skeptical toward the idea that economic development alone can be the ultimate factor to inspire social and political changes. After all, they refer to several empirical examples, where high levels of economic development and modernization in various domains of a society, have been observed as the distinctive characteristics of abusive and authoritarian regimes. Today, one can see that the issue on economic development has also started an international discussion about its side effects. After the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, several prominent scholars of economics have been analyzing the risks of non-inclusive economic development, as they consider economic inequality to be the biggest threat to democracy and human rights internationally.

To which extent should actors related to the promotion of human rights include the importance of economic development in their human rights promotion agendas?

**Hypothesis IV:** One can arguably acknowledge the remarks about non-inclusive economic development posed by scholars of the Marxian school of economics. Additionally, one can also consider the valid reservations of Risse and Sikkink about economic development and modernization, as these elements alone cannot always guarantee immediate improvements for human rights. However, can one afford to ignore the powerful impact that economic development can have on empowering citizens with the resources to challenge their governments?

Definitely, there are good arguments to support the importance of economic development. Economic development has the power to inspire or accelerate social and political changes and that is something that has been historically observed. Economic development has also the power to determine developments around global peace. Nevertheless, the challenge for countries is not to simply achieve any form of economic development, but also to achieve inclusive economic results. Thus, suggestions on how economic development can become more efficient and more inclusive should be seen as top priorities, in the agendas of all the involved actors with the promotion of human rights.

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221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
Still, regardless of the question of economic development, actors aiming to promote human rights internationally should also consider the existence of greater barriers that could be responsible for postponing improvements for human rights. Although, the extent to which the combined roles of economic, cultural and political elements should be studied for their influence in the overall progress of human rights, is an issue that I am examining in the next section.

4.3 Conditions for human rights and economic, cultural and political influences

Scholars from the field of political science often discuss the impact of economic development in regards to social and political change. However, they also include in their analysis the impact of cultural traditions, historical events and the general state of global affairs as elements that have the power to influence the behaviors of states. As two generally representative figures of two very different approaches in the academic study of political science, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, have extensively debated over these issues in their literature.

For Fukuyama, as for the scholars of economic liberalism, the economic development of a country is fundamental for achieving overall social and political improvements. Fukuyama argues that in general, the economic development of a country can create the momentum for the introduction of democratic reforms and civil and political liberties. However, he also argues that the essence of “liberal values” is similarly important for a society in order to achieve a sustainable economic development and to secure permanent democratic procedures. Further, Fukuyama argues that the idea of economic liberalism is something more than just a model of economic development. He sees this idea as an essential pillar for achieving the democratic, liberal and progressive transformation of a society.

Economic liberalism, for Fukuyama, is representing the idea of granting equal opportunities to all members of a society and making sure that the economic evolution of a society will benefit the majority of its members. He also argues that popular sovereignty (in the sense of democracy)

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224 Fukuyama (1992) pg. 41-42
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
and *individual freedoms* (in the sense of human rights) can only be secured under the spirit of *economic liberalism*. Yet, he also argues that *popular sovereignty* and *individual freedoms* without *economic liberalism* create a combination that is not sustainable. Using examples like the mass mobilization in Iran during the period 1978-79, where a popular revolution took place to remove the monarchy and establish a more representative and democratic form of governance, he expresses his skepticism for the idea that social mobilization alone can bring progressive and liberal sociopolitical changes. Fukuyama focused on the analysis of examples from Asian countries during the period of the second half of the 20th century, where he observed the sociopolitical developments in many East Asian nations (and especially Japan). In his writings, he argues that adopting liberal values through *economic liberalism* could be seen as most important element that assisted many Asian nations in becoming essentially more liberal and progressive in sociopolitical terms.

Fukuyama linked the relation between *economic liberalism* and liberal sociopolitical advancement in societies, suggesting that the overall improvements in the living standards through *economic liberalism*, are the ones inspiring societies to demand more rights and more freedoms from their governments. After all, he also expressed the belief in the early 1990s that a good test for this hypothesis could be seen in the future development of many eastern and central European countries, which were former members of the Eastern Bloc. His suggestion was that if those countries could succeed in adopting the spirit of liberal values and the essence of *economic liberalism* from their Western European associates, then a progressive and democratic sociopolitical evolution could follow and eventually transform them to very promising examples of *liberal democracies*.

Ultimately, for Fukuyama, the indicator that a society has the potential to achieve a higher level of human development, is how successfully that country can establish a *liberal democratic* sociopolitical model. Fukuyama’s prediction for the future was that the combination of

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228 Ibid. pg. 42.
229 Ibid. pg. 44.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid. pg. 41.
232 Ibid. pgs. 42, 47-49.
233 Ibid. pgs. 47-49.
234 Ibid. pg. 51.
economic liberalism and liberal democracy would eventually become the most general characteristics for the majority of countries of our world. Something, which according to him, could eventually lead humanity to its most prosperous and peaceful era:

“I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as such constituted the “end of history.””\(^\text{235}\)

At this point, one could argue that Fukuyama’s view on the prevalence of economic liberalism and liberal democracy, resembles the general optimism that was observed to have influenced many scholars in the West during the latest period of the 20th century. In fact, the economic advance of many countries, the gradual emergence of a “global democratic trend” and eventually the end of the Cold War, increased the confidence of those, who believed that the principles of democracy, free market economics and the liberal values, as seen from the Western perspective, were about to flourish worldwide.\(^\text{236,237}\) In fact, even scholars, who were traditionally known for adopting more skeptical views on global affairs, were now found to be more positive about the future. Huntington for example, called these global sociopolitical developments as the “Democracy's Third Wave”:

“Between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world. Were these democratizations part of a continuing and ever-expanding “global democratic revolution” that will reach virtually every country in the world?”\(^\text{238}\)

For many scholars, these historical events were now resembling elements from a very romantic philosophical idea.\(^\text{239}\) That was the very idea of Immanuel Kant, which was describing the future of our world with cosmopolitan features in his work the *Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* (1784).\(^\text{240}\) According to this influential idea of the prominent German philosopher, human societies are destined at some point in the future to leave behind the centuries of authoritarianism

\(^{235}\) Ibid. pg xi.  
\(^{237}\) Fukuyama (1991) pg. 51.  
\(^{239}\) See for example: Fukuyama (1992) pg. 70  
\(^{240}\) Ibid. pgs. 58-59.
and abusive rule. Furthermore, Kant’s prediction was that all societies will eventually leave behind their old differences and emerge as a single civilization. After all, Kant imagined humanity to achieve a state of universal peace, where “moral rationalism” and “pure reasoning” will be its defining characteristics.241

Still, Risse and Sikkink approached these global developments from a completely different perspective. For them, the element that had mostly contributed towards a prolonged era of gradual sociopolitical improvements all around the world during the latest part of the 20th century, had nothing to do with the general global democratic trend and the “prevalence” of economic liberalism. For them, it was the increased involvement of human rights networks in social mobilization efforts, which helped achieve these improvements in many countries around the world.242

Nevertheless, despite the general positivity of the latest part of the 20th century in the West, some scholars kept expressing their doubts on whether more positive sociopolitical developments were about to take place worldwide. Samuel Huntington, as a main figure of this “movement of skeptics”, restrained his optimism and expressed a more doubtful view on whether economic evolution and liberal sociopolitical modernization, as seen by the West, were about to illustrate the future of our world. His interpretation about the end of the Cold War was that the end of it symbolized the end of an era, when ideological and economic reasons where basically dividing the world into two parts.243 In fact, for him, the international order of the future could most likely be more divided than ever before. His approach was that the influence of culture in the future will become greater.244 Thus, he argued, most of the global tensions in the future will now be due to the elevated role of cultural differences.245

In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural. 246

244 Ibid.
245 Ibid.
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.\textsuperscript{247}

Furthermore, Huntington also argued that one should view economic development and liberal sociopolitical advancement separately.\textsuperscript{248} His suggestion was that examples of successful economic modernization in regimes that are neither liberal nor democratic would be more frequent in the future.\textsuperscript{249} He also argued that the example of non-liberal regimes being economically developed will most likely pose the biggest challenge for the model of \textit{Western liberal democracy}.\textsuperscript{250} Likewise, he argued that the overall importance of \textit{Western liberal democracy} could be challenged, if authoritarian regimes manage to become successful in achieving high levels of economic development and modernization.\textsuperscript{251} For him, as a number of developing non-Western countries will eventually fail to establish a stable form of democratic or liberal governance, the general optimism about the democratic and liberal future of the world that was developed during the last part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in the West, will gradually fade.\textsuperscript{252} Likewise, Huntington argued that the Western influence in the world will follow a downward trend, which would negatively affect all of the values associated with the Western way of life:

\begin{quote}
"As Western power declines, the ability of the West to impose Western concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy on other civilizations also declines and so does the attractiveness of those values to other civilizations"\textsuperscript{253}
\end{quote}

Huntington also suggested that the future emergence of influential non-Western international actors will be indicated, most likely, with the appearance of different approaches in regards the general belief about universal concepts. In fact, he argued that the global support for concepts behind communal or cultural rights will be greater than the support for individual rights, individual liberties and democratic principles.\textsuperscript{254} In general, though, on can observe that emphasizing on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{247} Huntington (1993) pg. 22.
\item \textsuperscript{248} Huntington (2002) pg. 66.
\item \textsuperscript{249} Ibid. pgs. 66-67.
\item \textsuperscript{250} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{251} Ibid. pgs. 72-74.
\item \textsuperscript{252} Ibid. pgs. 54-55.
\item \textsuperscript{253} Ibid. pg. 92.
\item \textsuperscript{254} Ibid. pgs. 318-319.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
communal and cultural rights is not an uncommon approach among non-Western scholars, who have been criticizing the established concept of universal human rights in its current form.255 For them, the main issue with the established human rights concept comes with the demonstration of the concept as of a universal, while in its hierarchical order, it prioritizes individual rights over communal, cultural and economic rights. After all, for many Asian cultures for example, the idea of group or communal rights is seen as far more important than any idea about individual rights and individual liberties.256

Huntington also argued that for many non-Western societies the era of colonialism has stigmatized the Western influence, as something that only had negative consequences for them. Therefore, he suggested that challenging non-Western cultures in the future for their moral values could cause big international controversies:

“western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world”257

In this respect, Huntington argued that the international order of the future will most likely be "multipolar".258 Thus, he favored a multi-cultural approach in regards to universal concepts.259 He also supported that the only way of eliminating the possibilities of future conflicts could be achieved by eliminating all aspirations, by all sides, for universal concepts:

“Multiculturalism at home threatens the United States and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world...The global monoculturalists want to make the world like America. The domestic multiculturalists want to make America like the world...The security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality”260

255 See as example: Se, Karatsu (2004).
256 Ibid.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid. pg. 318.
Huntington also argued that behind strong and stable international alliances, one could identify strong common cultural characteristics. He supported that a set of common cultural characteristics is the catalyst in the process of achieving a successful international cooperation. Nevertheless, according to his hypothesis, successful alliances among nations rely predominately on the existence of common cultural features. Such common features, for him, are the elements of shared religion, history, language and way of life. He explained his hypothesis, with the argument that commonly shared features among nations, like shared cultural characteristics, help in the development of the feeling of trust among different peoples. Therefore, for Huntington, cultural differences determine the limits and the potentials of international understanding and international cooperation:

In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war.

Eventually, Huntington argued that strategic and economic influences could be important in the process of persuading nations to subscribe to international concepts, which embody elements unfamiliar to their traditions. Nevertheless, he saw the results from such actions to be extremely uncertain. For Huntington, the spread of Western values globally over the past century was the result of the strong economic and strategic influence that the Western powers had. Thus, a possible decline in the future of Western economic and strategic influences will automatically signify the beginning of the decline of global support for these Western values:

“Today China's economic power,” Richard Nixon observed in 1994, “makes U.S. lectures about human rights imprudent. Within a decade it will make them irrelevant. Within two

261 Ibid. pg. 318.
262 Ibid. pgs. 41-42.
263 Ibid. pg. 42.
264 Ibid. pgs. 42-43, 319.
265 Ibid. pg. 321.
266 Ibid. pg. 310.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid. pgs. 310-311.
To what extent are cultural differences an obstacle to the universal concept of human rights?

Hypothesis V: Arguably, many can present various arguments to challenge many of Huntington’s views. Nevertheless, one cannot underestimate the realistic difficulties for the realization of a universal concept of human rights in a world that has so many and so different cultural characteristics. One can observe through history how cultural differences and concerns about the preservation of the cultural identities have played a role in delaying the progress of universal concept of human rights. After all, the level of controversy that might exist in promoting the concept of human rights to non-Western societies, has been discussed by many influential personalities of the international human rights system:

“Listening carefully I discerned two different strands to these complaints. The first alleged that the agenda of human rights amounted to finger pointing by Western countries, largely at developing countries, for their failure to uphold civil liberties, and that this was done selectively.”

One could definitely acknowledge the basis of non-Western concerns as cultural, social and political conditions in many societies might very often depend on delicate balances. Western actors might not always be able to identify and understand the circumstances under which conditions in non-Western societies develop in the way that they develop. Adding to this argument, one cannot ignore the generally accepted fact that societies evaluate human rights largely according to their own needs:

“The second strand concerned the narrow emphasis of this finger pointing exercise. Human rights was seen to be largely confined to civil liberties - such as, fair trial, freedom of expression, association, and religion, and the absence of torture - and ignored economic

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269 Ibid. pg. 195.
and social and cultural rights, such as the right to food, to education, to basic health care.”

One can also notice that the two main issues that challenged the concept of human rights over 70 years ago have not yet been resolved. Both of these issues are culture-related. There is still disagreement over the hierarchical order of rights, namely, one part of the world sees the importance individual rights as greater than communal rights and another part of the world that believes exactly the opposite. Finally, even if a part of the world sees the whole idea of human right as an idea that exclusively represents Western values, is there a way to convince otherwise those who believe so?

“How can the proposed Declaration be applicable to all human beings, and not be a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and America?”

How can cultural features define social change?

Hypothesis VI: The study of the cultural impact on the sociopolitical development of societies has always been at the epicenter of social research. In this regard, over a century ago, the prominent German sociologist and economist Max Weber concluded that it is cultural features, which are mainly influencing the sociopolitical development of societies. In his research, Weber studied and analyzed the conditions that shaped the sociopolitical and socioeconomic order of the northwestern part of Europe in Protestant and Calvinist societies, during the era of the industrial revolution. According to the conclusions of Weber, the most fundamental cultural characteristics of these people, like their religious traditions, were the ones responsible for shaping the overall course of their socioeconomic and sociopolitical development. Weber saw the successful economic evolution and bureaucratic modernization of many northwestern European societies not as a random occurrence, which was simply following the results of the industrial revolution. Weber

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271 Ibid.
272 The Executive Board, American Anthropological Association (1947) pg. 539.
274 Ibid. pg. 55.
argued that the socioeconomic evolution of these societies and moreover the great success of the industrial revolution in these societies, was due to the fact that it was not in inconsistent with the very basic belief and traditions of these people.\textsuperscript{275}

4.4 A geopolitical perspective on developments related to human rights

After having discussed how internal influences related to the domestic social and cultural characteristics shape state behaviors, in this section, I am introducing an analysis about external influences and their effect on state behavior. The general study of geopolitics involves the examination of influences from features of human and physical geography on state behavior and sociopolitical developments.\textsuperscript{276} Particularly, the discipline of geopolitics examines how broader international economic, political and strategic phenomena can affect behaviors of states.\textsuperscript{277} In this regard, I will emphasize the analysis of the dynamics created by global geostrategic and geopolitical influences and their effects on global developments and behaviors of states.

For scholars coming from the neo-realist and the neo-Marxist schools of thought in regards to the study of international relations, it is rather a combination of strong strategic, political and economic interests of major international actors that is affecting the sociopolitical changes in societies and ultimately any state behavior in general.\textsuperscript{278,279} In fact, one can consider this approach when analyzing the outcome of many international developments in Europe over the last three decades. In this period, major international changes have greatly influenced developments related to sociopolitical changes and the domestic conditions for human rights in many countries. As an example to that, one can simply consider the aftermath of the Cold War era.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 signified the end of the Cold War and at the same time the end of the division in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries. For many

\textsuperscript{275} Ibid. pgs. 124-125.
\textsuperscript{276} Hagan (1942) pg. 478.
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid. pg. 479.
\textsuperscript{278} Some further clarification here. The value of geopolitical analysis in highly important in the study of international relations. See: Starr (1991)
\textsuperscript{279} Ropp, Risse, Sikkink (1999) pgs. 35-36.
eastern European countries this event marked the end for their old geopolitical and geostrategic alliances. A large number of Eastern Bloc countries establish new relations with their old ideological and strategic “rivals” from the West.\textsuperscript{280} That event alone brought massive changes in the domestic social and political conditions of these former Eastern Bloc countries. One can realize the great impact of this major international change simply by observing that former Eastern Bloc countries were officially welcomed to join the EU by the late-1990s.\textsuperscript{281} This is something that could have been easily described as an unthinkable scenario just a decade before.

The principal idea, adopted by the EU after the end of the Cold War era for a broader and strategically stronger Union that would eventually allow it to develop into a major global actor, attracted the interest of many former Eastern Bloc countries.\textsuperscript{282} These nations were now challenged to re-establish their foreign policy and strategic objectives, fundamentally change their domestic sociopolitical structure and take part in a very enthusiastic idea for a cross-European, transnational, democratic and human rights oriented alliance.\textsuperscript{283} These developments encouraged a massive expansion for human rights and democracy on the European continent, as several Eastern European countries came to subscribe to the EU’s democratic and human rights ideals. This era could be also marked as one of the most vibrant periods in regards to geopolitical changes since the end of the WWII. The results from these massive geopolitical changes could be seen in both the sudden growth in the number of UN members, as many new countries gained their independence at that time, and also in the beginning of the biggest expansion era in the history for EU.\textsuperscript{284} Ultimately, these events came to prove how international developments can influence major sociopolitical changes in domestic and international affairs and affect regime changes and conditions for human rights.

Today, one can observe that the general optimism that was present in the West after the end of the Cold War era is mostly gone. The astonishing political and economic changes that have been taking

\textsuperscript{280} Huntington (2002) pg. 126.
\textsuperscript{282} See: European Commission. AGENDA 2000 - For a stronger and wider Union.
\textsuperscript{283} Huntington (2002) pg. 126.
place over the last two decades made many very skeptical, about how peaceful and how promising towards liberal ideals the future of the world is going to be. Some scholars are arguing that the current international order, built in the aftermath of the WWII, already is in a process of a major change. They observe that new world powers (or old re-emerging ones) are leveraging their great economic and strategic influences in order to maximize their gains and protect their interests. For them, these possible future changes in the international order will create big challenges for the concepts of global peace, human rights and democracy.

Samuel Huntington expressed his skepticism three decades ago that a potential change of the established international order will indicate dramatic consequences for Western interests and values. In a quite similar manner, Graham Allison, is also expressing his skepticism nowadays about the potential negative consequences from a sudden radical change of the established international order. Presenting the concept of The Thucydides Trap, Allison aims to exemplify and demonstrate how fragile the current international world order is. He mentions how important is for the international community to work together in order to maintain the positive legacies of the current global order and improve its negative features, in order to avoid the mistakes of the past in the future. The American scholar thought his study expresses the fear that the rough competition between the “great powers” can bring dramatic sociopolitical changes for the rest of the world. He also argues that the antagonism for global influence between these powers can trigger conflicts and have a very negative impact on global peace. Besides, for Allison, the relationship between the world’s great powers is the single most important element that can determine the conditions for global peace and the way that sociopolitical changes will develop around the world.

\[285\] Allison (2017) pgs. 3-4.
\[286\] Allison (2017) pgs. 3-5.
\[287\] Ibid pg. XIV.
\[290\] Ibid. pgs. XIV-XVI.
\[291\] Allison adopts the traditional term “great powers” describing the permanent member-states of the UNSC, but his main emphases is on USA, Russia and China.
\[292\] Ibid.
\[293\] Ibid.

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Can we determine the consequences of the antagonism between the great powers on the progress of human rights and how should human rights actors react in the occurrence of this scenario?

**Hypothesis VII**: The fierce rivalry between *great powers* and the involvement of several other regional powers that have expressed their intentions to antagonize them, is an issue that has puzzled many scholars during the last years:

“I am not describing a world necessarily on the brink of a war, but a world that is more crowded, nervous and anxious than perhaps as any moment in history.”

Undoubtedly, the consequences by an increasing level of international antagonism between *great powers* can have a catastrophic impact for the rest of the world. The effects, not only from the direct involvement of *great powers* in major international conflicts like the two World Wars, but also their “indirect” competition through proxy wars, can be seen as the biggest threat to human rights and global peace. Despite the fact that international law and the UN system provide the tools for humanitarian intervention for the sake of ending severe human rights violations, we can see in the case of the civil war in Syria that this cannot happen effectively, unless the *great powers* come to an agreement. Therefore, one can acknowledge the important role of *great powers* in maintaining the peaceful and *social international order* and how important is that to the whole concept of international human rights:

“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”

Arguably, one could also notice that most of the challenges posed today on the concept of universal human rights are related to issues caused by the competition between *great powers*. It has also been observed that *great powers* alter their agendas on human rights issues, only to serve their

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strategic purposes.\textsuperscript{297} There are several examples to prove that the concept of human rights and democracy have been cynically used as foreign policy tools and means only to serve the temporary interests of great powers.\textsuperscript{298} These incidents can have huge costs for the whole concept of human rights and put in great danger the progress than has been previously achieved by human rights actors on raising awareness about the importance of human rights and democracy worldwide:

\begin{quote}
“Non-Westerners also do not hesitate to point to the gaps between Western principle and Western action. Hypocrisy, double standards, and "but nots" are the price of universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power; nonproliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for Israel; free trade is the elixir of economic growth but not for agriculture; human rights are an issue with China but not with Saudi Arabia,”\textsuperscript{299}
\end{quote}

In this respect, the greatest challenge for human rights actors, especially for those actors who wish to remain independent of governments and politics, is to preserve their independent character by avoiding double standards and ensuring that their actions do not make them look like they act as pawns of great powers.

\section*{5. Study Conclusion}

My ultimate goal in this study is to come up with an approach that could open a debate on a new way of promoting human rights internationally. Having discussed the concept of criticism and naming and shaming strategies in promoting human rights and the arguments that can challenge this idea, I will conclude my research by providing the answer to my research question and by presenting my recommendations.

Overall, there are research findings to show that criticism and naming and shaming strategies could be effective in environments where questioning the authorities is a generally accepted practice. In


\textsuperscript{298} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{299} Huntington (2002) pg. 184.
countries where basic democratic principles are respected, opposition voices are not silenced or censored and independent institutions can examine the actions of governments, mobilizing the civil society and applying naming and shaming strategies against government abuse can in fact be very effective.\textsuperscript{300} Similarly, on an international level, there are many findings to prove how criticism and naming and shaming strategies have positively influenced the international human rights progress. As an example, criticism and naming and shaming strategies and the interaction between local NGOs, human rights activists and INGOs convinced the international community to adopt the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and enforce more control over the extraction of resources in Africa.\textsuperscript{301}

Nevertheless, there can be grounds for serious concerns about the success of criticism and naming shaming strategies, when the practice is not applied in environments that resemble these examples mentioned above.\textsuperscript{302,303,304} In fact, one can argue that the efficiency of criticism and naming and shaming strategies cannot be proven through sporadic evidence. As noted in Hafner-Burton’s research, the general application of these two concepts in many non-Western environments has fueled cycles of violence, exposing civil society actors and political opposition to the mercy of abusive governments.\textsuperscript{305} Can criticism and naming and shaming really transform a corrupt and abusive government into an actor that will automatically start respecting international human rights norms? Obviously, there are limits to how much of “state behavioral change” could be objectively expected through criticism and naming and shaming. An important issue that I can identify through my study, is that it is impossible to predict the risks of exposing civil society, opposition and other actors of human rights networks to abusive governments. After all, a plethora of historical examples can also show how easily international peace can be threatened when criticism and methods that resemble naming and shaming practices are applied between governments.\textsuperscript{306,307}

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid. pg. 14.
\textsuperscript{301} Haufler (2015) pg. 57.
\textsuperscript{302} Hafner-Burton (2008) pg. 713.
\textsuperscript{303} Kinzelbach, Lehmann (2015) pgs. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{304} Also see: Wachman (2001).
\textsuperscript{305} Hafner-Burton (2008) pg. 710, 711.
\textsuperscript{306} See: Khrushchev in Foreign Affairs (1959).
\textsuperscript{307} See: Kennan in Foreign Affairs (1960).
Risse and Sikkink, inspired by observations in social sciences, as mentioned in their study, conceptualized for the purposes of their research the socialization of international norms process.\textsuperscript{308} For Risse and Sikkink, as individuals are influenced by their social environment, states can also be influenced by the whole international community and its institutions.\textsuperscript{309} Thus, for them, the application of criticism and naming and shaming strategies can influence state behavior.\textsuperscript{310} Nevertheless, individuals, as mentioned in Baron’s psychology research, cannot be expected to start performing better after having been harshly criticized.\textsuperscript{311} Furthermore, individuals may also require the special care of their society and perhaps some adjustment period.\textsuperscript{312} Can we treat individuals or countries that have very different characteristics the same way? I argue that the biggest challenge for international actors, when orchestrating or participating in criticism and naming and shaming strategies in non-Western societies, is failing to fully understand the cultural, social and political issues at play in these societies.

As the world is changing, new challenges for human rights are constantly emerging. International sociopolitical and socioeconomic changes are affecting domestic development and human rights conditions in many countries. As an example of that, one can see how the non-inclusive results of economic development and the conditions of inequality are challenging democracy and human rights in societies all over the world.\textsuperscript{313} The need to “rethink” the methods of promoting human rights is arguably not a new idea and I am certainly not the first to introduce it.\textsuperscript{314} After all, this was the ultimate point of Hafner-Burton’s research, as she aimed to point out the negative implications of “subjecting” governments to “global publicity”.\textsuperscript{315} Also, this was one of the aspects of the report by Kinzelbach and Lehmann.\textsuperscript{316}

I argue that again approaching the issue of promoting human rights internationally from a perspective that will not allow the increase of tensions, either domestic or international, has the potential to bring significant results. I also argue that actors aiming for the promotion of human

\textsuperscript{308} Ropp, Risse, Sikkink (1999) pg. 11.
\textsuperscript{309} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{310} Ibid. pgs. 11-12.
\textsuperscript{311} Baron (1988) pg. 199.
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{313} See for example: Piketty (2014).
\textsuperscript{314} See for examples: Alston (2017).
\textsuperscript{315} Hafner-Burton (2008) pg. 713.
\textsuperscript{316} Kinzelbach, Lehmann (2015) pgs. 22-23.
rights internationally should not only focus on putting pressure on governments to implement international human rights norms in their domestic legal systems. The practical implementation of the human rights reforms is far better achieved when a society has fully understood and is convinced about the importance of the universal human rights principle. Thus, I argue that the focus should be shifted from the governments to the societies. Trying to persuade, shaming or even forcing, through international sanctions, a government to implement human rights reforms has no value, unless the society is also convinced that these changes are important. At the same time, creating tensions and endorsing domestic actors to revolt against abusive governments without firstly having the popular support, is both unnecessary and ineffective. More martyrs worldwide is not what the universal concept of human rights is in need for. In this respect, I see no better way to promote human rights internationally than discussing openly and honestly with the societies about the importance and the benefits of human rights. Changing public perceptions can be a lengthy process, but there is no better way to effectively influence political changes internationally.

I also argue that inspiring societies to set an overall course towards a more prosperous, liberal and democratic future with better human rights conditions is not something that can be solely done by external influences or through criticism and naming and shaming. After all, if that was all that was needed, it would have already been achieved through the established practices. In addition, I also maintain that the level of economic development and the inclusiveness of its results, the existence of cultural issues and other greater influences from international socioeconomic and sociopolitical developments, are all equally important in the development of the right conditions, so that human rights can flourish.

The conclusion of this study is that it is not necessary to “criticize”, “name” or “shame” any country for beliefs or practices neither of its people nor of its government. The world has always been a mosaic with different cultural, social and political characteristics and will likely remain so in the future. I argue that international community, institutions, organizations and actors dedicated to the promotion of human rights should patiently aim for open, honest and respectful discussions about cultural, social and political differences and about different human rights perspectives. My opinion is that having a picture of the issues and the concerns of all sides, can be very significant in the attempt to provide realistic and lasting solutions.
Researching the diplomatic tradition one can find remarkable examples of how approaches primarily emphasizing respectful dialogue and easing of tensions, have brought real progress and massive improvements for human rights. Max van der Stoel (also known as “minority man”) was one of the most prominent European diplomats during the second part of 20th century and his legacy can give us a valuable example. He assisted during periods of tension and conflict in establishing social peace in many countries all across Europe.\textsuperscript{317} Through his conciliatory approach, he demonstrated that achieving results does not require tensions, polemics and bringing up mistakes from the past.\textsuperscript{318} Similarly, I argue today that the main objective for actors aiming to promote human rights internationally should be to achieve results without putting anyone in the negative spotlight. Avoiding high tensions and divisiveness on cultural, social and political issues and patient negotiations, can give us the key to unlock the potentials for a broader international implementation of the idea of universal human rights:

"I try to avoid making headlines"\textsuperscript{319}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{318} Ibid.
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6. Bibliography


