Keep Them Isolated, Keep Them Down!

*Patterns of (Non-)Militarisation among Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*

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Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies

Department of Political Science

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ABSTRACT

Camp-based refugee populations are regularly connected to the phenomenon of refugee militarisation under certain circumstances. Rather surprisingly, Lebanon has not generally been subject to refugee militarisation among Syrians residing in informal tented settlements (ITSs). An exception to this national pattern is found in the area of the border town Arsal. There, some ITSs have been militarised by extremist groups. Following this deviance, the research question is: “Which factors determine militarisation – or a lack thereof – among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon?” I pursue two goals: First, I aim at understanding the case of camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon, which I treat as a deviant case, with the help of an implicit within-case comparison with Arsal. Second, I want to bring nuance to the existing body of literature, by examining the dynamics that distinguish militarisation from non-militarisation and formulating new hypotheses that can inform further research on various categories of militarisation. The basis for this study is an eclectic theoretical framework which consists of six groups of militarisation risk factors: origin of the refugee situation, host state response, socioeconomic situation, humanitarian aid, political rights and camp characteristics. The research data was collected through semi-structured interviews with humanitarian workers involved in the refugee response in Lebanon during three weeks of fieldwork. This evidence was combined with a review of documents and other literature. My findings show that five dynamics between the selected risk factors, three multi-causal and two mono-causal, determined the outcome of largely non-militarisation on the national level. Accordingly, the pattern of (non-)militarisation among the studied refugee population is most importantly determined by a low initial militarisation potential and the special role of refugee camp leaders, as well as by keeping the refugee settlements isolated from each other and keeping their political activism and socioeconomic means down. Based on my findings, I generated seven hypotheses for further research.
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All remaining mistakes and inaccuracies are my own.
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>(I)NGO</td>
<td>(International)Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAESH</td>
<td><em>al Dawlah al-Islameyah fi Iraq wal-Sham</em> (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham)</td>
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<td>FSA</td>
<td>Free Syrian Army</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham</td>
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<td>ITS</td>
<td>Informal Tented Settlement</td>
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<td>JN</td>
<td>Jabhat al-Nusra</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces (army)</td>
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<td>LCRP</td>
<td>Lebanon Crisis Response Plan</td>
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<td>LSF</td>
<td>Lebanese Security Forces (army and police)</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
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<td>PRS</td>
<td>Palestinian Refugees from Syria</td>
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<td>SCW</td>
<td>Syrian Civil War</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION: REFUGEES - VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS OR BOTH?

An entire underclass is being created across the region. Insufficient international aid and the policies of host governments make it next to impossible for Syrian refugees to live in the Middle East. Refugees are losing hope. The seeds of future unrest are being sowed, (Egeeland in Balouziyeh 2016: 25).

Refugees are often perceived as the civilian victims of armed conflict, persecution or other circumstances that force them to leave their origin countries. As they flee from violence over international borders, they need special protection and are assumed to be unarmed civilians. This picture might not always be accurate as indicated by the warning raised above by Jan Egeland, former head of the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The presence of refugees can impede both the security of the host state, the origin state, the refugees themselves, and even the international community – inducing a transnational spread of civil war (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006). In fact, the distinction between civilian refugees and combatants is not as clear as commonly assumed. Armed individuals might arrive together with civilian refugees in a host state. They often live among their family members and other unarmed refugees. Other refugees might join violent groups in exile and sometimes, entire refugee populations become militarised over time. Refugee camps might serve as sanctuaries for rebels, recruitment grounds, access points to resources needed for fighting, or weapon storages. Such refugee militarisation might happen through exploitation of the refugee situation by other groups or states or it might be an active choice of refugees (Lebson 2013: 134).

Examples are frequent: Especially during the Cold War period, refugee militant groups were actively or tacitly supported by superpowers with similar ideologies or aims, e.g. the United States of America’s (USA) support for Cambodian Khmer Rouge refugees in Thailand and the militarisation among Afghan refugees in Pakistan, which are often referred to as a prime example of the concept of ‘refugee warriors’ – the mujahedin (Muggah & Mogire 2006: 11). Another example are Namibian refugee camps in Angola administered by the Namibian liberation movement. The 1990s are described as the ‘peak’ of refugee militarisation (Muggah 2010: 172) with a mix of voluntary and forced mobilisation of refugees mainly by infiltration of refugee camps in, for example, Guinea, Uganda and Kenya. In Rwandan camps in former Zaire genocide perpetrators were able to cooperate with the humanitarian sector, administer the camps, exploit resources and then perform raids in Rwanda (Adelman 2003). Palestinian refugees in the Middle East are a prime example of refugee militarisation as armed factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)
militarised their camps and used them as bases for attacks against Israel and played a crucial role in the Lebanese Civil War.

As a major current humanitarian crisis, the Syrian Civil War (SCW) (2011-ongoing) has so far produced 5.6 million refugees and 6.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UNHCR 2019b). They thus comprise the biggest share of the world’s refugee population. As an easy-to-access neighbouring country with long-standing social ties, Lebanon soon became a favoured destination for Syrian refugees (Knudsen 2017: 137). After initially welcoming the Syrian neighbours, their presence became increasingly unbearable for Lebanon as the conflict dragged on and the refugee population grew to ever larger numbers. Despite some returns to Syria lately, it is estimated that 1.5 million Syrian refugees and about 470 000 Palestinian refugees live in Lebanon (HRW 2019; UNRWA 2019a, 2019b). With a total population of about 6 million, refugees constitute a third of Lebanon’s inhabitants – the highest number of refugees per capita worldwide. Living conditions for Syrian refugees in Lebanon are dire as there are no official refugee camps, almost no legal work and renting possibilities, a huge number of unregistered refugees and strained public services, economy and infrastructure. Thus, tensions between local inhabitants and refugees are rising. Lischer (2017: 95) therefore assesses that Lebanon might be the host state for Syrian refugees with the highest risk of becoming unstable and sliding into armed conflict.

A number of other factors make refugee militarisation and the spread of the Syrian conflict to Lebanon rather likely. Many refugees live in peripheral border areas among impoverished host communities that miss social and economic support, do not have an official refugee status and are subject to anti-refugee legislation (Sude et al. 2015: 2). Other factors are Lebanon’s experience with severe militarisation among its Palestinian refugee population (Lischer 2017: 89); an abundance of pre-existing sectarian militant groups; and the fragile balance of Lebanon’s many religious groups, which is upset by the sudden presence of many Sunni refugees (CEP 2019b: 1). Furthermore, Lebanon can be characterised as a politically and economically fragile state with porous borders to Syria that easily facilitate the trafficking of arms and fighters. The terrorist group Hezbollah is a strong political party and is deeply involved in the Syrian conflict (Young et al. 2014: 26, 29-30). Moreover, Lebanon and Syria share a long and conflictual history with parallel fault lines and social interconnectedness (Gade 2017: 188).

All in all, Lebanon suffers from an unprecedented crisis around an especially vulnerable refugee population. It is therefore not surprising that some scholars predicted that the presence of a large refugee population increased the risk of a civil war by around 54%
Already in 2012, Lebanon was deemed to be at the brink of breakdown (Salem 2012: 4). Considering these preconditions and developments together with the sheer amount of Syrian and other refugees in the country, it is astonishing that Lebanon remains remarkably resilient towards a spread of both the Syrian conflict to its territory and refugee militarisation. The exceptional local situation in the northern border town, Arsal, where both the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS or DAESH - *al Dawlah al-Islameyah fi Iraq wal-Sham*) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) militarised the refugee situation, adds to the peculiarity of the case. Gade (2017: 190) assesses the limited jihadi recruitment among Syrian refugees as paradoxical when considering Lebanon’s previous experiences with refugees. Masterson & Lehmann (2018: 11) and Khoury (2017: 37) predicted, but did not find, Syrian refugee militarisation in Lebanon. Lebanon therefore constitutes a puzzle – an outlier – for dominant theories on refugee militarisation. This is a case that is worthwhile exploring as it could yield more nuanced insight into the dynamics behind the phenomenon of refugee militarisation that could be helpful for both host governments and the humanitarian aid sector.

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND DELIMITATION

Based on the considerations described above, my research question for this thesis reads as follows:

*Which factors determine militarisation – or a lack thereof – among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon?*

This thesis has a primary and secondary ambition. First and foremost, my goal is to understand the case in question – which of the many factors that increase the risk of refugee militarisation can help explaining the pattern of (non-)militarisation among the camp-based Syrian refugee population in Lebanon, where the national level generally was not subject to militarisation, while the local subpopulation in Arsal experienced this phenomenon.

My second objective is to enrich the existing theory by formulating new hypotheses based on my research that add nuance to the study of refugee militarisation. By implicitly comparing Arsal to the national situation, I wish to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics that distinguish refugee militarisation from cases of non-militarisation. I do not assume that there is one theory or one set of factors that determines militarisation patterns, but rather several combinations of factors and their interactions. The hypotheses I generate
can hopefully inform a categorisation of refugee militarisation based on different types of militarising groups.

I approach these issues by conducting a case study of camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon between January 2012 and January 2019. The case represents a large (≥ 25,000) refugee population in a capability-wise weak neighbouring host state to which they have strong transnational ties, living in camp-like settlements without a secured refugee status and depending on humanitarian aid. Data was collected through a three-week fieldwork in Beirut and the Central Bekaa Valley in Lebanon in February 2019. The semi-structured interviews I conducted with humanitarian workers during this period are supplemented by a review of documents and other literature.

The case selection leads to the first limitation of this thesis. I only include Syrian refugees living in refugee camps, so-called informal tented settlements (ITSs). This has a practical reason as those refugees are more easily identifiable and consequently the impact of selected risk factors is easier to assess, but this is also a theory-informed choice. Even though the general impact of refugee encampment on militarisation is unclear, many scholars (e.g. Crisp 1999; Terry 2002) argued for several problematic features of encampment. Furthermore, many prominent cases of refugee militarisation took part in camp situations which justifies a focus on camp-based refugees. I exclude Syrians living in Palestinian refugee camps because the complexity of inter-group dynamics in these sometimes already militarised camps would not allow a meaningful analysis in the boundaries of this thesis.

Another limitation is the exclusion of Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS). Palestinians who first fled to Syria experience now a second displacement as they continue their flight to Lebanon. They impact the refugee situation in Lebanon crucially as they often move into existing Palestinian refugee camps. However, they succumb to different social, political and humanitarian dynamics and would thus constitute a different case.

At this point, it is important to clarify that I do not intend to portray refugees as a general risk for hosting states. I rather aim to contribute to a better understanding of how conditions in exile impact the development of a refugee population and thus their militarisation potential. Through emphasising structural factors, which decisively shape the life, interests and agency of refugees, I hope to contribute to an increased comprehension of this complex phenomenon among political and humanitarian actors. Moreover, the majority of refugees abstains from violence and should therefore not be considered a threat per se (Beehner 2015: 162).
1.2 POSITIONING IN THE FIELD

Existing research on refugee militarisation often focuses on single factors or a specific set of factors to explain the phenomenon. Examples are political circumstances of the refugee movement and the refugees’ reason for flight (Zolberg et al. 1989; Lischer 2005) or socioeconomic factors, such as humanitarian aid (Barber 1997; Adelman 1998; Terry 2002). Exceptions from this one-sided approach are Mike Lebson (2013) with a “comprehensive theory of refugee militarisation” and Loescher and Milner (2007) who study the multifaceted impact of protracted refugee situations. Consistent among most researchers is that they do not differentiate between different pathways that could lead to militarisation. That is, they do not account for the possibility that one set of factors that could be crucial only under certain conditions but not under others, or that different factors can foster different types of militarisation (i.e. characteristically different groups emerge and militarise under different circumstances). I follow Muggah (2010: 175) and Lebson (2013: 133, 135) in their understanding that besides refugees being manipulated into joining or tolerating armed groups, their own interests and needs – their own agency – is crucial for understanding why refugee militarisation can occur. Thus, I assume that varying interests of refugees facilitate militarisation by different armed groups who can convince at least parts of a refugee group that they act and fight for their interests. Therefore, I additionally look at what kind of group, defined by its goals, was able to militarise in Arsal and argue that this is caused by the conditions of the refugee situation and the resulting interests of the refugees. This focus on the type of militarising group might inform a tentative categorisation of refugee militarisation based on multi-causal pathways. Most authors do not include the possibility for such nuanced multi-causal pathways and equifinality. An exception in this regard is Robert Muggah (2010) who distinguishes between the two, partly overlapping, concepts of outward and inward militarisation in his study of refugee and IDP populations.

Applying what Ragin (1989) calls multiple causation – that a phenomenon or different types of a phenomenon occur depending on varying sets of factors – as the basis of thought, it is not surprising that so far, no clear set of necessary and sufficient conditions for refugee militarisation has been offered (Masterson & Lehmann 2018: 6). Multiple causation is a likely mechanism behind this phenomenon as refugee situations are complex. Because I therefore assume that relevant factors interact with each other and cannot be examined each for themselves, I build an explanatory framework that combines different macro- and meso-level variables in an eclectic manner. I include the origin of the refugee situation, the host state
response defined by its capacity and will, the socioeconomic situation of refugees, humanitarian aid, the refugees’ political rights and camp characteristics. The interaction dynamics and combination of these factors are what I am interested in and which I expect to explain the pattern of refugee militarisation in Lebanon.

Another limitation of existing research is the popular focus on extreme cases of largescale refugee militarisation against a neglect of cases where it surprisingly did not happen. One exception is Lischer’s (2005: 73-117) study of Rwandan refugees in the Great Lake region. Such studies are important to understand the mechanisms behind rare events and are therefore suggested by several scholars in order to counteract an exaggeration of this phenomenon (Lischer 2005: 15; Gerring 2007: 102; Leenders 2009; Masterson & Lehmann 2018: 54).

Despite the intrinsic value of studying the most pressing refugee situation of our time, some other elements warrant the chosen approach to examining Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The literature on security risks in Lebanon in the studied period does not often include refugees as a critical factor but concentrates on explaining resilience of conflict spread in general, emphasising the political system and the proximity to the civil war in Syria. The scholarly literature on Syrian refugees in Lebanon instead concentrates on singular factors, such as non-violent protests (Clarke 2018), host state response as inaction (Mourad 2017), host community resentments (Ghosn et al. 2019), the public opinion of Syrian refugees (Corstange 2019), socioeconomic conditions (Balouziyeh 2016) and how they impact the life of refugees without connecting them to militarisation risk (Gade 2016: 6). Others focus on the lingering risk of militarisation rather than asking why militarisation has not been an issue so far (Young et al. 2014; Sude et al. 2015; Lischer 2017). Masterson & Lehmann (2018) stand out by studying the occurrence of refugee militarisation in connection with humanitarian aid. A study that focuses on the non-occurrence of the phenomenon and the actual manifestation of the risk factors thus is an important endeavour.

1.3 KEY CONCEPTS

A common understanding of the key concepts of this thesis – refugees and refugee militarisation – is crucial. When talking about refugees, I apply a broad definition of the term which includes victims of general conflict, civil war, genocide or other attacks or who are not directly persecuted but suffer from the negative effects of conflict like the immediate danger of destruction and indiscriminate violence. This group is often treated as de-facto refugees
by scholars, aid agencies and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The narrow legal definition would entail only those who fall under the 1951 UNHCR Refugee Convention. According to this convention a refugee is a person who,

owning to well-funded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owning to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owning to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, (UNHCR 1951: Article 1).

A refugee situation refers to the presence and influx and the respective impact of a substantial number of refugees from one country to another.¹

The refugee status entitles its bearers to special international protection and access to resources outside the country of origin (Zolberg et al. 1989: 3). An essential aspect of this definition is that only civilians can be regarded as refugees. Refugees fleeing from violent conflict are assumed to be unarmed and are therefore treated as apolitical and civilian, which also applies to their camps (Terry 2002: 27, 29). However, (camp-based) refugees have been taking part in political violence in many instances. Given the purpose of this study it is not logical to exclude those from my definition of refugees as it is exactly this phenomenon that interests me.

I apply Mike Lebson’s definition of refugee militarisation as “the involvement of groups of refugees in militaristic activities, including political violence, armed resistance, military training, explicit support for combatants, storage and diffusion of weapons, and/or military recruitment” (2013: 134). Such instances should be “persistent”, i.e. occurring over consecutive years, and/or “intense” which he bases on “casualties and narrative descriptions” (ibid.). For the cause of this thesis, I modify this definition by adding the presence of ex-combatants (following Fisk 2018: 534) and the use of refugee camps for cross-border attacks and as access points to resources for militants (following Muggah & Mogire 2006: 28-29). I do not focus on radicalisation of individuals, but on how conditions in exile enable militant groups to be present among refugees and for refugees to build militant groups. Thus, I define refugee militarisation as a phenomenon where either groups of refugees themselves build armed groups or such groups arrived with unarmed refugees in the host country and live as an intrinsic part of the refugee population among the same, or where external groups, militarise the refugee population. Militarisation among refugees can entail recruitment of

¹ By using the term refugee situation instead of refugee crisis, I want to avoid the negative connotation of the latter.
refugees into armed groups, seizure of refugee camps and/or the delivered humanitarian aid to conduct attacks, finance armed struggle, store weapons and conduct military training and build sanctuaries for fighters and/or their families and dependents. It is challenging to assess the prevalence of militarisation, as militants try to hide their activities, relief agencies may not to recognise respective indicators and state agencies are absent from refugee hosting areas or exaggerate its occurrence.

1.4 THESIS OUTLINE

The next chapter presents a literature review, before introducing the theoretical framework of my research. It establishes six main risk factors for refugee militarisation that I analyse in the case of camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The third chapter presents the research design and methods applied. It clarifies the implications of choosing a case study, as well as my methodological approaches, choices, and limitations. The fourth chapter introduces Lebanon’s history with refugees, the historical relationship with Syria, impacts of the Syrian war on Lebanon and the state of Syrian refugee militarisation in Lebanon. This lays the ground for the fifth chapter, where I analyse the findings of the semi-structured interviews and other material in light of the selected risk factors and unanticipated insight. I then discuss these in the sixth chapter, where I present the determining and non-determining factors for refugee militarisation pattern in this case, why Arsal could develop as an exception and develop hypotheses of limited generalisability. Finally, the conclusion summarises my findings and establishes prospects for future research.
2 WHY DO REFUGEES MILITARISE?

The scholarly field of refugee militarisation has so far examined many causes for the phenomenon’s occurrence. This chapter therefore starts with a literature review before establishing the theoretical framework that I apply in my analysis of camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The chapter’s second part includes assumptions on how the interaction of various factors contributes to the risk of refugee militarisation conducted by different types of militant groups.

2.1 REFUGEE MILITARISATION LITERATURE

The rather narrow field of refugee militarisation theory developed roughly 30 years ago as a part of forced migration studies. Caused by the dominant assumption of refugees being inherently civilian, the study of refugees in connection with political violence and conflict spread reached its peak in the 1990s (Harpviken 2009: 4-5). Major questions of the field are how international migration can threaten global and domestic stability and security (Weiner 1992; Salehyan 2008) and how it can be used as a pretext for international interventions (Dowty & Loescher 1996). Similarly, Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) found in a quantitative study that the presence of refugees from a neighbouring country increases the risk of subsequent conflict in both the origin and the host state, especially if a refugee population destabilises a fragile demographic, religious or ethnic balance.

Zolberg et al. (1989) are among the first to describe the phenomenon of refugee warriors – refugees engaged in violent political actions. In their seminal work, they identify reason of flight as determining the violent potential and distinguish three types of refugee populations with a varying militarisation risk. Accordingly, refugees with fundamental political grievances against their country of origin and state-like structures in exile are most likely to become militarised. Based on a similar differentiation, Lischer (2005) builds a more encompassing theory, that emphasises the national and international political context of a refugee situation, answering to the dominance of socioeconomic explanations for refugee militarisation during the 1990s and early 2000s.

Adelman (1998: 63) had challenged Zolberg et al. by stating that refugee warriors were the result of unfavourable conditions in exile rather than of their reason for fleeing. Other factors discussed by the pertinent literature include: shortcomings of the humanitarian sector (Barber 1997; Terry 2002), the role of displacement management (Hyndman 2004),
settlement patterns and encampment (van Damme 1995; Black 1998; Crisp & Jacobsen 1998; Fisk 2014, 2018), risks through legal status and poverty (Bailey 2004; Jacobsen 2014), the presence of an abundance of bored young men (UNSC 1998), future prospects, education and vocational training as well as social activities (Crisp 1999), and social ties (Harpviken 2009). Also, the legal and physical protection of civilians in refugee camps (Jannmyr 2014) and through UNHCR (Loescher et al. 2009) were examined.

While some argued that refugees are manipulated to take part in a conflict (Stedman & Tanner 2003), others underscored their agency (Long 2014). Long and Hanafi (2010) found that a lack of political and administrative participation contributes to refugee militarisation.

Loescher and Milner (2007) studied the impact of protracted refugee situations, in which over time political and socioeconomic factors deteriorate – increasing militarisation likelihood. In this line of combining various explanatory strings depicts Lebson’s “comprehensive theory of refugee militarization” (2013) the most prominent attempt to study the interaction of political and socioeconomic factors for determining militarisation risk.

Terrorism groups and refugees are studied only by a few who concentrate on individual radicalisation (Milton et al. 2013: 623). With a focus on refugee youth, education (Martin-Rayo 2011) and, to a lesser degree, unemployment (Mikhael & Norman 2018) were identified as two relevant factors. In a cross-national analysis, Choi and Salehyan (2013) examined how refugee presence and humanitarian aid impact domestic and international terrorist groups. Likewise, Milton et al. (2013) found a correlation between camp conditions and host state neglect of refugees on one side and terrorist attacks on the other.

Muggah (2010) introduced the distinction of different types of refugee militarisation. He differentiates between outward and inward militarisation. Outward militarisation refers to instances of mobilisation internal to the refugee population and directed at goals outside the population. Inward militarisation instead, describes situations in which refugees are exposed to violence directed against them or infiltration of camps and forced recruitment (Muggah 2010: 168, 178-179).

2.2 SELECTED RISK FACTORS

Risk factors for refugee militarisation are multifaceted but their joint occurrence is less studied, as demonstrated in the literature review. In this section, I therefore build an eclectic theoretical framework by selecting six prominent explanatory risk factors which allows me
to study the expression of various factors systematically. I touch upon possible interaction effects and how they might profit different militant groups.

2.2.1 Origin of the Refugee Situation

The origin of the refugee situation, defining the initial militarisation potential, was prominently developed by Zolberg et al. (1989) and Lischer (2005). According to these authors, reason for flight indicates potential violent developments and is thus the first crucial factor for understanding refugee militarisation.

As mentioned above, Zolberg et al. (1989: 269) distinguish between three groups of refugees: activists who are part of and contribute to the conflict in the origin country; targets who are persecuted for their belonging to a certain group; and victims who are randomly affected by war externalities and general violence. Activists are most likely to turn into refugee warrior communities who are described as “conscious refugee communities with a political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for a political objective” (Zolberg et al. 1989: 275). Examples are refugees in Cambodia, former Zaire or Pakistan who created ‘pseudo states’ where militant groups treated refugees as their subjects through establishing conscription, taxes, information and justice systems (Stedman 2003: 170).

For determining this initial potential, I apply Lischer’s development of this categorisation. Lischer deems state-in-exile refugee populations, which resemble refugee warrior communities, as being the most likely to turn violent because their reasons for flight are fundamentally political, e.g. defeat in a civil war. They have a well-organised political and military leadership which pursues goals of radical political change in their origin country and they typically do not return voluntarily until this change has occurred (Lischer 2005: 19, 24-25). Lebson (2013: 138-139) adds that these goals can be economical. The two other types of refugee populations are persecuted and situational refugees. Persecuted refugees flee from oppression based on group characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, nationality or political orientation and return if security for their respective group can be guaranteed. Despite less initial militarisation potential, these populations can develop state-in-exile-like structures over time through identity politics. Situational refugees flee from general war and deprivation caused by a conflict they have no direct part in. Lischer assumes that they have a lower propensity for participation in violence since they have no shared political goal or grievance against the origin state. Their return is contingent on sufficiently secure and peaceful
conditions to continue their pre-conflict lives, instead of a specific political outcome (Lischer 2005: 19-22).

Zolberg et al. define refugee warriors as rebels who pursue goals in their country of origin. Recognising this and the emphasis on conditions for return, I assume that this factor is specifically relevant if mobilisation is pursued by groups that (pretend to) target the origin state. Conversely, Adelman states that: “[the refugee warriors’] character and their operations have little to do with the original cause of instability that made them flee,” (1998: 63), and instead concentrates on factors that characterise the exile experience such as the following factors.

2.2.2 Host State Response

It might be that the host state is too weak to prevent militarisation or that it possesses the necessary capabilities but might not want to forestall refugee militarisation. This interplay between the host’s capability and will determines how it responds to refugee presence, which is an important factor during all stages of displacement.

Capability is the host’s ability to protect its borders, maintain internal security and demilitarise arriving refugees (Lischer 2005: 28). Such military capacities can be indicated by the Lebanese state executing border controls, screening and managing arriving refugees, a unified military, and a strong security presence and nation-wide monopoly of violence in order to identify and prevent militants from settling with refugees. Economic, organisational, and human capabilities can likewise be utilised to manage the arrival and alleviate the impact on host communities. This helps preventing hostilities between local and refugee populations as well as the accumulation of socioeconomic grievances on the refugees’ side and subsequent militarisation (Eleftheriadou 2018: 10). To understand its organisational and economic capacity, I consider the functioning of administration, corruption, and state penetration, because peripheral and marginalised areas have reduced resources to alleviate the costs of refugee presence.

Additionally, it matters whether the host is capable of protecting the refugee population through measures like policing in and around refugee camps and providing access to justice mechanisms. Without effective protection, refugee situations give space to security and protection vacuums that militant groups can fill. Host states are rather involuntarily responsible for refugee protection as no other institution can provide it. While legal refugee protection (right to seek asylum, norm of non-refoulment) is guarded by international treaties
and advocated for by international governmental organisations (IGOs) like UNHCR, physical protection is only reluctantly addressed by the same agencies (Janmyr 2014: 14). Due to this gap, (inter-)national non-governmental organisations ((I)NGOs) often perform refugee protection as a secondary task that they are not suited to carry out. Unarmed aid workers can hardly enforce measures like extracting armed militants and are not equipped to deal with largescale violence (Sude et al. 2015: 10). What is more, they might be unwilling to perform such tasks. Terry (2002: 19) identifies the humanitarian imperative of (I)NGOs – to help every person in need impartially and without considering the political background – as contributing to mobilisation efforts. They might regard it as unethical to separate armed individuals from unarmed family members who depend on them (Muggah 2010: 187-189).

Thus, if the host does not provide refugee security or even increases their insecurity through predatory behaviour, like arbitrary arrests or violent raids, refugees might search for other security guarantors. Every militant group that can offer such alternative protection can then occupy this position (Muggah 2010: 186).

The host state’s willingness to prevent militarisation is equally important. Even though the host might be capable of asserting the necessary measures to prevent militarisation, it might have an interest in not doing so. Conversely, it might want to prevent militarisation, but does not have the means. Four aspects determine and indicate the host’s will. First, the relationship with the origin state is vital. The host potentially promotes militarisation because it has a conflictual relationship with the origin state either from before or because of the refugee-producing conflict, and thus builds an alliance with the refugees against the origin state (Lischer 2005: 30). Such scenarios contribute to militarisation by groups that target the origin country. For example, the governments of Pakistan, Thailand and former Zaire actively supported refugee rebel groups in their fight against their origin states through providing weapons and ignoring or assisting military training (Stedman 2003: 173). Additionally, the host might promote militarisation implicitly if it allies with the origin state in a way that it either allows cross-border attacks by the origin state or that both states jointly attack refugees. Refugees might then militarise out of self-defence or seek another armed group’s protection (Lischer 2005: 30-31).

Second, host states might want to manipulate refugee populations to use them in other national or international conflicts that the host is engaged in (Muggah 2010: 183). This risk increases if refugees share the same ethnicity or religion with significant parts of the host community. Allegations against Kenya of recruiting and training Somali refugees into anti-al-Shabaab militias exemplify this (Janmyr 2014: 16).
Third, if the host state is weak and susceptible to international incentives or pressure, its will can be influenced by third-party states with strong military agendas if they encourage or coerce it to support refugee populations, facilitate cross-border attacks or attack refugees themselves if this is in the third-party states’ (geo-)political interests (Lischer 2005: 32-33). Indeed, Adelman argues that refugee warriors are often the product of international political and military relations as seen during the Cold War when Thailand tolerated the militarisation among Cambodian refugees because this was in the USA’s interest (Adelman 1998: 51). Consequently, the interest of a respective third-party state might determine which kind of group can militarise. For example, if it is in an alliance with the origin state and promotes attacks against refugees, this can foster militarisation efforts by groups who can offer protection or who target the origin state.

Finally, Sude et al. (2015: 8) found that in all studied cases of refugee militarisation, the hosts had implemented inconsistent or even punitive refugee legislation or reduced socioeconomic assistance. Therefore, if the host pursues a general anti-refugee policy and attitude, this might lead to implicit reluctance to prevent militarisation as it does not want to provide for basic needs or security among refugees. This can become problematic when host states willingly neglect refugee camps in order to discourage permanent settlement, securitise refugees and when the refugees suffer from poor socioeconomic conditions and depend on humanitarian aid that can be exploited, as explored below (Fisk 2018: 537). Such conditions profit groups that can, again, provide protection or alleviate other grievances that develop through neglect by host state authorities.

2.2.3 Socioeconomic Situation

A common condition for camp-based refugees is poverty. The link between poor living conditions and militarisation is based on the ‘greed and grievance’ theory, which states that structural poverty creates needs and grievances that can translate into militant action in order to capture economic resources (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 2004). Following this theory, militarisation likelihood increases if there are resources to gain from challenging the host state. Jacobsen claims that poverty can foster refugee militarisation since “economic desperation drives refugees in and outside camps to pursue highly risky livelihood strategies […] including […] being recruited by gangs and militias” (2014: 105). Restrictive national legislation on areas like freedom of movement, housing availability, work and business possibilities may force refugees into precarious living conditions. Illegal stay and missing
legal status pose a critical risk for refugees and force them into vulnerable positions. Without legal papers, exploitation by employers or landlords is more likely since refugees often abstain from reporting such behaviour out of fear of being arrested themselves (Jacobsen 2014: 104-105). Thus, I look at empirical indicators such as unemployment, bad housing and sanitary conditions, the legal status of refugees including the share of undocumented refugees, and access to public services like health provisions to determine the risk posed by poverty. However, less capable countries with low central state authority in the periphery can actually be positive for refugees as the importance of personal relationships between host and refugee population increases and opens up for solutions despite the refugees’ illegal status (Bakewell 2014: 132). Based on this reasoning, poverty can incline refugees to militarise in order to capture resources, or it opens for militarisation through groups that can offer the resources needed.

Furthermore, militarisation can be forestalled through availability of individual, socially rewarding experiences and quality education (Martin-Rayo 2011) as well as employment and social activities which increase the actual and perceived future prospects for refugee youths (Crisp 1999: 27; Sude et al. 2015: 13, 15; Eleftheriadou 2018: 13). For example, a 1990s increase in Islamist groups in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon was linked to missing alternative occupation possibilities for the local youth (Knudsen 2005: 221). Mikhael & Norman (2018: 57) find that refugee youth poverty itself is not a sufficient explanatory factor for being recruited into extremist groups. Therefore, I include the access to quality education and recreational, socially rewarding activities as indicators.

In a second step of analysing the socioeconomic situation, I look at how refugees and the host population compare their living conditions to each other. Such socioeconomic comparisons indicate relative deprivation, which Lebso (2013: 140) deems to be more crucial than poverty itself. Relative deprivation refers to an individual or group-based discontent that is not based on how little one has but on a want that is created through implicit or explicit comparison to other individuals or groups (Morrison 1971: 675). Translated to a refugee situation, this means that the motivation behind refugee militarisation stems from the self-perception of a refugee group as being structurally disadvantaged in comparison to its former position in the origin state, the host population, or another refugee population.

2 Previously, this explanation was based on an abundance of ‘bored young men’ among refugees because those were believed to generally be more attracted to violent activities, particularly if they have nothing else to do. This is not a contemporary explanation (Lischer 2005: 37-38).
3 For relative deprivation theory and militarisation in general see of Gurr (1970).
Refugees might then exert violence towards the respective entities that they hold responsible for their position in order to fulfil their needs. This could be both the host and the origin state or the local population. Consequently, militants who target the entity made responsible for their situation can exploit this feeling. For example, if the origin state is made responsible for the disadvantageous position, it is likely that refugees mobilise against it.

Relative deprivation can also work the other direction. Actual or perceived negative economic externalities accompanying the refugee population, like increased competition for jobs, land or accommodation, can, in combination with aid delivery and other services for refugees that are unavailable for locals, lead to a feeling of neglect in the local population. This can empower anti-refugee attitudes and spark violence directed against them, or foster local anti-refugee legislation like evictions, curfews or other discriminatory behaviour which increase the refugees’ insecurity (Loescher & Milner 2007: 32; Milton et al. 2013: 624). Refugees might then militarise in self-defence or accept another group as protection providers. This risk is higher in areas where the host population already suffers from high levels of poverty and state neglect. The state’s capacities therefore crucially influence this factor. I use indicators like curfews, anti-refugee demonstrations and evictions, as well as reported group-based feelings of envy along with actual differences to capture respective feelings of relative deprivation because opinion polls that capture the actual feelings are beyond the scope of this thesis.

Social and family ties among refugees are a final socioeconomic aspect that influences the militarisation risk. Strong pre-displacement ties among refugees and/or between them and the host population can act as internal social regulators and important resources for integration into the host society. They decrease the need for alternative sources of income, accommodation and social appreciation, which in turn increases resilience against recruitment into militant groups. (Harpviken 2009: 32,176). Yet, if the pre-flight militant potential is high, as for state-in-exile refugee populations, strong social ties can have a contradictory effect and increase the militarisation risk as they might be utilised to pressure friends and family members into joining a militant group (Harpviken 2009: 167). The pre-displacement relationship between Lebanese and Syrians is portrayed in the background chapter, while inter-refugee ties are discussed in the analysis.
2.2.4 Humanitarian Aid

The presence of humanitarian aid, despite often being crucial for an adequate response to a refugee situation, can have adverse effects. These go beyond the humanitarian technical approach to aid with a focus “first and foremost on meeting material needs of refugees” (Terry 2002: 220), while not reflecting upon the political implications of this apolitical focus.

The underlying problem of the technical relief approach is that militant groups can co-opt aid deliveries if (I)NGOs do not distinguish between unarmed civilian refugees and militants among them. Therefore, I focus on the extent to which refugees depend on aid deliveries, and how this aid is organised and structured. Humanitarian organisations can involuntarily support refugee militarisation if they work together with refugee-leadership structures and refugee focal points. Positions in the relief effort often grant refugees power inside their camps as they can influence the distribution of and access to resources. They can create a loyalty-based access to aid for fellow refugees (Terry 2002: 50). Therefore, the organisation of refugee relief is crucial. An indicator for aid potentially contributing to militarisation is the cooperation of aid agencies with camp leaders and focal points which base their positions on weapons and intimidation or on special connections instead of being elected or having other useful qualities. If refugees in such positions are part of a militant group, they can use access to relief goods to punish and reward individuals who rely on these resources (Terry 2002: 39). Such selective incentives stimulate recruitment and loyalty as well as fostering interdependence between militants and refugees, which is needed to gain the support of usually civilian refugees. Besides food and other relief items, useful resources can include anything from housing to jobs (Terry 2002: 50; Harpviken & Lischer 2014: 93-94, 119).

The most prominent example of unintended militarisation support through collaboration with refugees are Rwandan refugee camps in former Zaire. Relief organisations were initially content with existing pre-flight structures that simplified aid distribution but realised too late that these structures were used for recruitment and intimidation by genocide perpetrators who controlled among other things, food distribution and access to hospitals (Barber 1997: 10). Militants can instrumentalise the humanitarian sector and gain control over vital resources through stealing, taxation, inflating beneficiary numbers or demanding payments by (I)NGOs. Accordingly, the role of humanitarian aid becomes potentially problematic when refugees suffer from host state neglect and actual or perceived poverty, i.e. when they depend on humanitarian aid to fulfil their basic needs.
Humanitarian aid is also useful for sustaining the militia’s armed struggle, particularly when delivered in the confined space of a refugee camp (Terry 2002: 9; Lebson 2013: 136). It does so because it relieves militants from finding resources themselves and thus directly and indirectly finances them; dependents are taken care of and militants can focus on fighting; and it grants international legitimacy to a group’s goals and thus helps to find allies (Lischer 2005: 6-9). Barber (1997: 11) suggests that the prospects of refugee camp resources can seem so lucrative that some groups might actively force civilians to flee in order to then seize control over the new refugee camp and the provided aid.

Another important aspect of the organisation of humanitarian aid is the coordination between various agencies and aid sectors. A badly structured humanitarian response can give space to unnoticed or ignored militarisation. Inefficient camp administration, competition among agencies and confusion regarding responsibilities can facilitate manipulation and co-option of aid delivery by militants. A good indicator for missing coordination is a fractionalised humanitarian response and a high number of aid agencies on the ground. Mostly, a range of organisations with different, sometimes conflicting agendas operate in the same refugee situation. As they all depend on limited funds, over which they compete, they are incentivised to concentrate on successful aspects of their work and ignore anything negative (Lischer 2005: 143). Private and public donors can influence who benefits from relief, which can become problematic if they are allies to, and have an interest in supporting militants (Eleftheriadou 2018: 11). In general, all types of militant groups, regardless of their goal, can profit from humanitarian aid. All can utilise theses resources for ensuring the refugees’ obedience and to sustain their struggle. However, aid might be easier manipulated by groups that are directly part of the refugee population or arrived with them, as they are less likely to stand out.

2.2.5 Political Rights
Long (2014: 478) argues, based on Hannah Arendt’s work on totalitarianism (1967), that political exclusion as the inability to access citizenship and the rights connected to it, is the central problem of displacement. Citizenship is linked to a set of political rights, such as voting, organising politically or access to public services and provisions, that are otherwise inaccessible for foreigners. Katy Long expresses the effect of political inclusion which often is inaccessible under illegal residence or because of anti-refugee legislation: “realizable rights, providing the possibility of leading a dignified and autonomous life: physical security,
a livelihood, opportunities for education and development” (Long 2014: 478). Some host governments and (I)NGOs tolerate the existence of political or even militant groups that assist them in administrating refugee camps. Nevertheless, they often discourage general political organisation and activity among refugees (Lebson 2013: 141). To determine the severity of political deprivation, I study if Syrian refugees have access to citizenship and thus to political rights, as well as the availability of alternative forms for engagement that enable voicing concerns and being active agents, e.g. forming social and political non-violent groups or being included into camp-intern decision-making processes.

A lack of political participation and representation, in other words a lack of voice and grievance mechanisms (Haider 2014: 2), for refugees in the host country might not be crucial initially, since refugees often have closer political ties and demands to their origin country. Yet, as the refugee crisis drags on, more political demands towards the host country may grow and refugees might find other, more violent, political outlets to express them if they suffer from political deprivation in the host country. Therefore, notably protracted refugee situations feature a high militarisation risk. As such situations involve large, non-static, long-standing or recurring refugee populations, they give space for several of the before-mentioned factors (Loescher & Milner 2007: 14). UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations as situations where refugees are not in immediate danger, but find themselves in a “long-lasting and intractable state of limbo” where “basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile” (2004: 1). The crucial element is the state of limbo. They can neither repatriate nor integrate into the host society and socioeconomic grievances become a permanent instead of a temporary reality (Eleftheriadou 2018: 13). The situation is worsened as donor fatigue sets in, aid deliveries dry out and resource competition with the local population consequently increases. New or old political violent groups can fill the developing political and social vacuum. They can encourage refugees who look for a sphere of political action to engage in more radical and violent behaviour (Milton et al. 2013: 628). Militancy becomes socially meaningful as it increases refugee self-awareness and lifts them from being victims of circumstances to political activists (Lebson 2013: 137). Accordingly, groups that mobilise due to this factor are likely to stem from the refugee population and target the host country or entities within it, which they want to influence and which they regard as being able to respond to their grievances. They might also target the origin state in the hope that they can return and pursue a better life there. This factor might gain in importance with the situation of the Syrian refugees becoming protracted from 2017 onwards. For this operationalisation, I follow UNHCR’s (2004: 2)
characterisation of protracted refugee situations of a (fluctuant) population larger than 25 000 which stayed for at least five consecutive years in exile.4

2.2.6 Camp Characteristics

Refugee camps can benefit militants in several ways: They protect and legitimise militants under international law through the humanitarian status of refugees; they attract humanitarian aid; they can serve as recruitment grounds; they are often neglected and impoverished areas with high crime rates and missing security provisions and state presence; and, as a confined space, they are easy to control (Terry 2002: 9-10; Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006: 343). In combination with the in 2.2.4 examined co-option of humanitarian aid, such a confined space with clear boundaries is useful for controlling a population. Particularly in situations where the refugee community does not depict a state-in-exile population, this is needed to ensure (involuntary) support for violent groups. Therefore, refugee camps present welcome opportunities for militancy entrepreneurs (a group or individuals), who are needed to bridge the gap between motivation and militant action, through exerting effective control (Lebson 2013: 137). Closed and isolated camps are useful for this purpose. They are sometimes described as ‘areas of limited statehood’ where government functions are performed by non-state actors like relief organisations or militant groups. In such areas, central state authorities do not provide public goods and services and are unable to implement and enforce their rules and/or lack the monopoly on violence (Lisher 2017: 93). Thus, the risk factors of bad socioeconomic situation and the performance of humanitarian organisations gain in importance as they are easy to exploit for militarisation purposes.

Camp structures can vary considerably. For example, they can be small, peripheral makeshift-camps or open urban settlements which are hard to distinguish from the surrounding host community or even form cities themselves (Black 1998: 4; Bakewell 2014: 130). The factor ‘size’ illustrates how ambivalent some of these structural elements are regarding their impact on militarisation likelihood. On the one hand, large camps provide various opportunities for militants, like Kenya’s Kakuma and Dadaab camps with 75 000 and 100 000 inhabitants and dire security situations demonstrate. They are more likely to be attacked, pose administrative challenges, are associated with crime and arms trafficking, and provide hiding opportunities for militias (Crisp 1999: 29; Muggah 2010: 182). On the other

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4 Recently, UNHCR (2019d) noted that also smaller refugee populations, spread over several host countries, and shorter displacement situations can qualify as protracted refugee situations.
hand, militants have difficulties controlling large premises, and camp-launched cross border attacks can happen independently from size (Crisp 1999: 29; Lischer 2005: 34-35). Muggah (2010: 173) demonstrates, using the example of Burundian refugees in Tanzania who train close to, but not inside camps, that the sheer existence of camps is more important because they can serve as safe havens for the militants’ family members or they can live there themselves while storing weapons and conducting training outside.

The proximity of camps to the border with the origin state is another important factor (Sude et al. 2015: 6). This is especially the case for understanding militarisation soon after arriving in exile. Rebel groups from the origin state then have easier access to the camps and use them as sanctuaries and bases for attacks against the origin state. Likewise, the likelihood of cross-border attacks from the government of the origin state rises, endangering the host population and increasing the risk of retaliation attacks by the host and thus of spreading civil war (Salehyan 2007). This factor is therefore more important for refugees with high initial militarisation potential and thus groups that target the origin country. Host states often locate makeshift camps close to borders and in peripheral areas in the hope that refugees repatriate soon (Crisp 1999: 28). The resulting semi-permanent camp structures are tolerable for some time but exacerbate socioeconomic grievances after a while and foster social isolation from and subsequent difficult integration into the host community (Lischer 2005: 36-37; Beehner 2015: 161). Semi-permanent camp structures thus contribute to militarisation by any group that can alleviate resulting grievances. Therefore, I consider general characteristics like size, openness and location, as well as the suitability of camp structures for long-term displacement. Indicators for suitability for long-term displacement are for example connection to waste management, sanitary facilities, and weather-resistant housing. Furthermore, it is important to which degree UNHCR and other (I)NGOs take upon them the organisation, management, and planning of camps, particularly when they were established by refugees themselves (Crisp & Jacobsen 1998: 28).

2.3 BRINGING IT TOGETHER

This chapter provided the basis for the thesis by presenting the factors I selected, the manifestation of which I examine for the case of camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Therefore, the respective questions and analysis are framed around these six main factors:

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5 UNHCR recommends that camps do not exceed 20 000 inhabitants (UNHCR 1999: 137).
the origin of the refugee situation and thus the initial militarisation potential; the strength and will of the host state, including its presence in refugee hosting areas and its perception by refugees; the refugees socioeconomic situation including their relationship to the host population; the organisation and demeanour of the humanitarian aid sector; and questions related to camp structure and location.

The various factors arguably contribute to militarisation efforts by distinct armed groups based on different refugee problems and interests that impact the likelihood of militarisation by either building armed groups themselves or by being subject to militarisation efforts of external groups. Refugee militarisation can thus be tentatively categorised based on the primary targets of these groups. Rebel groups that primarily target the origin state are likely to militarise if the circumstances of displacement indicate a state-in-exile refugee population. Such groups profit from border camps and a hostile relationship between host and origin state. Likewise, groups that behave aggressively towards the host country can militarise if the host state neglects refugees and their communities and refugees suffer from socioeconomic and political deprivation or need protection against a hostile local population or a predatory state. In this case, resentments grow in exile and are caused by the conditions of displacement, which is why the initial militarisation potential is less important. Militarisation can then be achieved by groups that promise access to power for refugees or can alleviate socioeconomic and protection grievances. Both types profit from the presence of a weakly organised humanitarian relief, refugee encampment and/or isolation and a militarily weak host state because this facilitates effective control of a predominantly civilian refugee population. However, these factors seem particularly crucial for groups that have transnational aspirations, like global jihadi groups, as their need for control is even higher. Support and recruitment for violent actions that are not in the direct interest of the refugees, like transnational and non-discriminatory violence, is more difficult for primarily civilian and non-violent refugees. It is important to keep in mind that these groups can appear as hybrids. For example, a transnational oriented group can pursue local goals as Levant7 explains for jihadi groups in Tripoli: “[They can] present themselves as an alternative source of authority capable of solving people’s immediate concerns” (2015: 27). In chapter six, I discuss why the specific groups that militarised in Arsal were able to do so under the present conditions. Before that, the following chapters deal with the methods and evidence used for this study.
3 METHODS: HOW TO STUDY MILITARISATION DYNAMICS

Several conditions have to be kept in mind when studying refugee militarisation, which will be explored in this chapter. The thesis is based on a case study for which I conducted three weeks of field research in Beirut and the Central Bekaa in Lebanon. The data consist of semi-structured interviews, as well as informal conversations and observations made during this period. This is supplemented by a document and literature review. This chapter explores the process of data collection, the ethical considerations, and the challenges that emerged. It starts with a discussion of the research design and the study’s validity and reliability. Finally, it discusses the implications of the three methods used for data collection and ethical considerations.

3.1 THE CASE STUDY APPROACH

The qualitative case study approach is advantageous for investigating which factors determine the pattern of refugee militarisation among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon, where the primary interest in understanding this specific case. I address this question through an in-depth study of the ITS-based Syrian refugee population in Lebanon, covering the period from January 2012 to January 2019. Additionally, I want to gain insight into the causal mechanisms behind refugee militarisation on a more general level. Through studying the conditions and interactions that cause this phenomenon, I look inside the ‘black box’ of the correlation between identified risk factors for militarisation and its pattern of occurrence (George & Bennett 2005: 31; Gerring 2007: 5, 44).

According to Levy’s typology (2008: 3), I conduct a case study that is theoretically informed, as the presented theoretical framework indicates. This case study seeks to enrich that framework through the insights yielded. This dualism is one of the specialities of case studies as they provide for identifying new variables and generating hypotheses to nuance existing theory (Ragin 1989: 35), which is what I aim for.

I want to enrich the theoretical discussion through drawing limited generalisations as I formulate new hypotheses based on my findings that might inform a categorisation of refugee militarisation based on different types of militarising groups. This is based on Charles Ragin’s (1989) argument of multiple causation. Multiple causation, also known as equifinality, means that one outcome can have multiple causes none of which can be specified as a necessary or sufficient cause (Ragin 1989: 37; King et al. 1994: 87). Some aspects that
are relevant for the occurrence of a phenomenon in one situation are not relevant in another, given varying accompanying conditions (Ragin 1989: 48). This is closely connected to typology building in the way that different sets of conditions are relevant to different types of outcome instead of concluding that no examined condition is significantly causal. Thus, case studies are useful for both identifying causes and examining potential types and subtypes of a phenomenon based on different relevant sets of variables (Ragin 1989: 43-44). The in-depths analysis of case studies allows one to examine various independent variables in context and thus “to determine how different combinations have the same causal significance” (Ragin 1989: 48-49).

3.2 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY

Validity is an important judgement criterion for all research. It refers to the “integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of research” (Bryman 2016: 41). It is conventionally distinguished between internal validity (sometimes constrained to the causal relationship in question), meaning the accuracy of the specific analysis, and external validity, understood as the sample’s representativeness for the imagined universe of cases (Gerring 2007: 43). In this subchapter, I thus discuss the strengths and weaknesses of my research concerning the two concepts of validity.

Case studies are considered to be strong in upholding internal validity. Due to their thick description, they usually offer cohesive and consistent causal explanations for the manifestation of the studied phenomenon in a specific case (Gerring 2007: 49). This criterion is important when studying the complex phenomenon of refugee militarisation, as a wide array of interacting factors impact its occurrence. Through focusing on one refugee population in one country, I can achieve a deep understanding of the dynamics at play. Interviewing (I)NGO employees from various sectors concerned with Syrian refugees in Lebanon provides detailed knowledge of the realities on the ground. The different sectoral and geographical backgrounds of the participants increase the completeness of the study and the confidence in my findings. My three-week long fieldwork improved my understanding of the context, expressions and interlinkages of various factors. Furthermore, it allowed for supplementing the collected interview data with observations and informal conversations. Interviewing Syrian refugees in Lebanon themselves would have maximised internal validity. However, out of practicality (I do not speak Arabic) and ethical considerations (elaborated on below), I refrained from this approach.
“External validity is concerned with the question of whether the results of a study can be generated beyond the specific research context” (Bryman 2016: 42). Such generalisability is limited for case study results because the few cases are rarely selected randomly. They can, however, apply to subtypes or focus on differences across cases (Gerring 2007: 43, 76). This study primarily sheds light on the case of camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon itself. Possibly, the interaction and presence of political and social factors are unique for this case and generalisations beyond it are therefore difficult. Specifically, the hypotheses I generate are at most applicable to refugee populations living in refugee camp-like structures. The interplay of factors for refugees in urban areas or official refugee camps could be different. Generalisations that go beyond the case characteristics stated below, and thus the tentative universe of cases, are potentially limited due to the complex and unique interplay between factors.

However, case studies can generate useful insight into rare outcomes, such as refugee militarisation, which are difficult to study in statistical cross-case approaches due to lacking useful variation (Gerring 2007: 56). Congruently, case studies are well-disposed for explaining cases that behave unexpectedly given their attributes and thus for refining existing theories and adding new explanatory variables (Levy 2008: 5). This study examines such an unexpected behaviour of a case: According to the presented theories, camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon have a rather high likelihood of becoming militarised. Masterson and Lehman (2018: 11) present Lebanon as a striking case where they expected to observe militarisation among Syrian refugees. Similarly, Gade (2016: 4) detects that the Syrian conflict surprisingly has not (yet) spread to Lebanon while mentioning the presence of several risk factors for refugee militarisation: weak state structures, strong socio-political Syrian-Lebanese connections, similar political and religious cleavages and an unprotected border. Based on these considerations, camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon present a deviant case in the realm of large (≥ 25 000) refugee populations in capability-wise weak neighbouring host states to which they have strong transnational ties, living in camp-like settlements without a secured refugee status and depending on humanitarian aid. The universe of cases is, however, difficult to define as there is no common definition of at-risk-refugee populations that are likely to be subject to militarisation. Gerring defines deviant cases as cases that, “by reference to some general understanding of a topic (either a specific theory or common sense), demonstrate […] a surprising value” (2007: 105). By utilising this deviant case selection technique, I circumvent the problem of non-random case selection and bias through selecting on the dependent variable. Through this procedure of anchoring the case in
the existing literature it is possible to extract causal processes behind the militarisation pattern among Syrian refugees in Lebanon that are potentially applicable to cases with similar attributes (Gerring 2007: 88, 106).

The application of a within-case analysis of Arsal is a useful strategy to further increase the possible scope of inferences, opening a scope for spatial comparison guided by different scores on the dependent variable of militarisation (Bryman 2016: 399). Thus, localising the theory by applying the theoretical framework to the subnational level strengthens the explanatory leverage of a case study. Additional findings on subnational levels where the same conditions were applied, increase confidence in the proposed causalities (Tarrow 2010: 252). Therefore, I include evidence from within-case variation through implicit comparisons with the local manifestations of the selected risk factors in Arsal. Against the general backdrop of limited refugee militarisation on the national level, jihadi groups could utilise the refugee situation to generate local occurrences of Syrian refugee militarisation in Arsal.

3.3 RELIABILITY

Reliability, as another important evaluation criterion for research, refers to whether gathered information and therefrom derived inferences are trustworthy and whether concepts are measured consistently.6 Therefore, the researcher should present the research design, methodological choices and research advancement in detail. This is especially important for qualitative research, since social concepts are constantly changing and will not be the same for following studies (Bryman 2016: 41, 383). This chapter serves therefore the purpose of providing transparency. Interview transcripts and fieldnotes are available, and the interview guide and codebooks are attached to this thesis.

Reliability is difficult to achieve in qualitative research because it substantially depends on the researcher’s subjective preconceptions and notions, influencing data collection and interpretation. Furthermore, a less structured research design and data collection, as well as an overlap of data collection, interpretation and analysis hamper reliability (Grønmo 2015: 248). This overlap became apparent in my research process as

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6 Some scholars, e.g. Moravcsik (2014), consider replicability an important aspect of reliability, while qualitative methodology, particularly fieldwork, puts less emphasis on this concept as it follows different laws of inference.
preliminary analysis in the field informed successive data collection after identifying important elements and possible gaps.

Additionally, I achieved reliability through critical questions to and rigorous judgement of the data material and its sources. I assessed possible bias, like the interviewees’ position and agenda and the origin of documents. Another strategy employed is triangulation. The application of a variety of methods and sources for answering the same research question (from different perspectives) increases the reliability of findings (Tarrow 2010: 250). Therefore, this thesis combines qualitative semi-structured interviews, a review of documents and literature, and observations to bolster and cross-check findings and achieve information density.

3.4 RESEARCH DATA

The following sub-chapters present the generation processes for the utilised sources of research data and the considerations taken. The combination of semi-structured interviews, a review of documents and literature, and additional fieldwork material enabled a triangulation of evidence. This importance of triangulation shows when looking at the premise of the studied case being a deviant case. For chapter 4.3.3, it is difficult to determine the level of refugee militarisation in any context and thus to be sure that militarisation is as marginal as indicated. Gade (2016: 17) based her assessment on an interview with the Lebanese refugee expert Nasser Yassin, and Masterson and Lehmann (2018: 3) focused on refugees that returned to Syria for fighting purposes. They thus excluded militarisation that takes place inside Lebanon. Therefore, I did not take these statements at face value but built my own understanding of the pattern of this phenomenon among camp-based Syrian refugees. Thus, I read reports of (I)NGOs, UNHCR, the Lebanese government and newspaper articles. Additionally, I included questions about insecurities and militant groups in my interviews to see if the interviewees had inside knowledge about hidden militarisation efforts. Furthermore, triangulation is important because aid workers are arguably a problematic choice of interview participants due to the crucial role humanitarian aid has in refugee militarisation and they might answer biased about their sector. It is important to remember that, despite triangulation increasing the reliability and validity of the findings, different methods to gather data about the same empirical aspects entail different perspectives on these empirics and thus alter comparability (Atkinson & Coffey 2003: 421).
3.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

Qualitative semi-structured interviews are a favourable data source for this study as they facilitate a deep understanding of the experiences, feelings and impressions of interviewees (Rubin & Rubin 1995: 6). In contrast to unstructured open interviews without questions that evolve around a presupposed theoretical framework, my interviews were more focused, or what Rubin and Rubin (1995: 29-30) call topical interviews. The questions covered the specific situation of ITS-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the personal experiences that the interviewees encountered in their work with those refugees. The questions of the interview guide (Appendix II) essentially span the six factors specified in chapter 2.2. They were non-leading questions to avoid bias and they were organised around the preliminary selected risk factors. The flexibility of semi-structured interviews was advantageous for my project. It allowed for some degree of comparability between interviews and the possibility to code the interview transcripts. I maintained control over the overall topics, while being able to customise the order and content of questions according to the knowledge of the individual interviewee. At the same time, I remained open to initially unconsidered insights, and dynamics. This proved essential for finding an answer to my research question. Furthermore, this approach allowed me to collect data and analyse them preliminary while I was in Lebanon, thus, I could refine and add questions for later interviews. This is important because researches cannot have exact knowledge about which social processes are most significant before the interview process has started (Charmaz 2003: 311-312). The impact of the non-camp policy and the dispersed location of camps are such themes that emerged through the interview process.

Coding is essential for making the interview data comprehensible and applicable for the analysis. The coding process included several steps and was performed with the help of the NVivo software for qualitative data analysis. After the fieldwork, I developed an initial codebook with help of note-taking during transcribing. It consisted of main nodes evolving around the six factors of the theoretical framework. Due to my deductive approach, codes are rather analyst- than data-driven (Braun & Clarke 2006: 84). Each of them consisted of a set of sub-nodes, mirroring the various concepts under each factor, e.g. capability and willingness under host state response. Those again combined another set of sub-nodes that specified the actual manifestations and indicators for concepts, like housing and illegality for

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7 Initial and final code book: Appendix III.
the socioeconomic situation. After a first rough coding, I revisited the data more closely as I developed and revised nodes and their hierarchy. Particularly the third level of sub-nodes changed throughout the coding process. Themes that I was previously unaware of crystallised and new indicators, like scattered camp location, developed. Such a review and revision process of codes and their reapplication to data is important because it re-focuses the analysis and first significant themes can be identified (Braun & Clarke 2006: 89).

It is important to discuss the question of whose story is told through the interviews. Instead of collecting first-hand experiences by interviewing Syrian refugees themselves, I chose to interview aid workers and other people involved in the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee situation in Lebanon. As mentioned above, to interview knowledgeable persons about my study objects instead of interviewing them themselves, interferes with internal validity. However, aid workers arguably perform a double function as interviewees. They are both informants who present facts and observations about Syrian refugees and respondents (Grønmo 2015: 134) who present their own perceptions and experiences in the camps and with the humanitarian response. My interviews thus displayed another structured interview feature: A considerable part of the questions reflected the researcher’s interests rather than the interviewee’s story or point of view (Bryman 2016: 466-467).

I interviewed 16 aid workers from different humanitarian sectors. The selection of respondents was strategically, based on their knowledge and experience and their ability to fulfil the criteria of my theoretical framework to gain a comprehensive overview. I varied both the sectors of the aid workers and the type of organisations they were employed at to cover various experiences from national and international organisations of different sizes. Most of them worked in INGOs (12), while two worked in IGOs (UN organisations) or Lebanese NGOs. However, one respondent studied the water and sanitation sector independently and lived for several months with Syrian refugees in an ITS in Central Bekaa. He therefore had special insight into the socioeconomic situation of refugees and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Finally, I varied the geographical area of operation of the interviewees. Most worked in the ITS-rich Central Bekaa (8), while others provided experience from Arsal (4), Tripoli (1), Palestinian camps (1) or a general overview (5). I contacted some aid workers from various sectors before going to Lebanon who could, comparable to the snowball method, provide me with further contacts. However, the sampling was to some degree determined by availability and language barriers. Therefore, insights from faith-based Islamic

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8 List of respondents with work sector and geographic area Appendix IV.
charities are missing. The interviews took place either in person or via internet calls. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, except for one where I took written notes. Most interviews were one-time encounters, but I sent follow-up questions via email to some respondents. Some received a shortened interview guide beforehand, which included the main questions for preparation.

Since interview material does not simply convey truth, it has to be interpreted and analysed (Atkinson & Coffey 2003: 422). During the research process, I therefore reflected upon several sources of bias and hidden meanings. For example, young aid workers were more careful to present their work as positive, while more experienced respondents helped putting the replies into perspective. Against my apprehension that the aid organisations would not talk negatively about their own sector, they were rather critical about the humanitarian response.

In post-conflict settings, it is important to include meta-data, like rumours, inventions, denials or silences, in the interpretation of interview material (Fujii 2010: 232). For this study, silences might be a problem. The non-reporting of armed violence, militant groups among refugees, and other indicators for refugee militarisation, could not only mean that militarisation is marginal, but also that humanitarian organisations do not want to be aware of this phenomenon and abstain from reporting them. I tried to avoid this problem by not asking about militarisation directly.

3.4.2 Document and Literature Review

The choice of interview partners, and generally to conduct interviews, influences validity and reliability of my research, which makes a thorough review of literature of various kinds an essential supplement for my evidence gathering. The use of documents which have not been produced for research purposes is especially advantageous in combination with interviews because, in contrast to interviews, they are non-reactive sources (Bryman 2016: 546). Consequently, the primary focus is on these documents - newspaper articles, annual and official reports, and briefs from humanitarian organisations. I also include scholarly works like journal articles which are more credible and less biased sources.

When consulting documents without performing a rigid qualitative content analysis, it is important to scrutinise them thoroughly. I assessed the trustworthiness of the acquired information through Trachtenberg’s (2009: 58-60, 151, 157) advice to pay attention to a document’s context, read the text actively, detect the author’s point of view, purpose of
writing and intended audience, the source’s used, and if the arguments made are supported by evidence. For example, official documents deriving from private sources, like (I)NGO reports, can be problematic because their authors often have the specific perspective of the respective organisation (Bryman 2016: 553-555). It is likely that their reports are overly positive and downplay refugee militarisation as they need to secure funding. Conversely, local newspaper articles would mention refugee involvement in violent actions as the public climate towards Syrian refugees is rather hostile. Generally, it is difficult to determine the level of involvement of Syrian refugees when documents mention fights between extremist groups and the Lebanese Security Forces (LSF). Based on these considerations, I tried to avoid dubious internet sources or unauthored articles. That being said, this was not always possible because the refugee situation in Lebanon is fluctuant and facts and chains of action are specifically difficult to verify in cases of refugee-related violence and militarisation.

3.4.3 Additional Fieldwork Material

Fieldwork in Lebanon provided me with valuable additional material that supplements the interview-based findings. The material consists of observations made in everyday life, a visit to ITSs, and informal conversations. This can hardly qualify as ethnography or participant observation (Bryman 2016: 423). Saved in fieldnotes and coded the same way as the interview transcripts, these insights are nevertheless valuable. They yield a more comprehensive understanding of the political, social, cultural and historical context in which the Syrian refugee situation in Lebanon unfolds, which cannot be achieved by simply reading about it. Thus, they increase the validity of the claims made. Especially the combination of interviews and (participant) observations is a popular and useful approach to methodological triangulation (Atkinson & Coffey 2003: 420). Particularly, the visit to the ITSs close to the city of Barr Elias in Central Bekaa improved my comprehension of how much socioeconomic conditions can vary from settlement to settlement and helped comprehending the impact of camp characteristics.

During the visit to the ITSs, I spoke informally to two respondents, which provided important insights. I engaged in non-formal conversations with people of interest that did not fit into my sample: two Syrian refugees not living in camps but popular neighbourhoods of Beirut, one researcher on refugee-related violence in Lebanon (Armenak Tokmajyan) as well as one member of diplomatic staff in Syria.
3.5 Ethical Considerations

In fieldwork-based research, ethical considerations should crucially inform methodological choices. This is particularly so when vulnerable groups like refugees and sensitive topics, such as militarisation, are the objects of study (van Liempt & Bilger 2012: 453). In other words, ethics played a crucial role in developing my research design and performing data collection, particularly as I chose not to interview ITS-based refugees.

The first imperative of fieldwork is *do no harm*, which means that my research and my behaviour in the field should not have negative consequences for study objects and participants. If refugees participated, I could not ensure this imperative. The interviews could reenact traumatic experiences, especially when the focus is on conflictual aspects of refugee life. Participation could have negative legal consequences and increase vulnerability and insecurity if authorities, camp managers or other persons upon who the refugees depend, disapprove of participation (Krause 2017: 1).

Additionally, informed consent to participation is a central aspect in social science research (Krause 2017: 10). All study participants were informed about their rights regarding withdrawing from the study, insight into the data stored in connection with them, voluntary participation and getting sufficient information about the study’s purpose before the interviews. I managed this through an information letter, including a consent form, which detailed how data was processed and stored and the participants’ rights. The upholding of these protection standards was ensured through the project’s assessment by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data. Such informed, voluntary consent is difficult for refugees since “economic, social and legal vulnerability [could] compromise their ability to make informed voluntary decisions to participate in research” (Masterson & Mourad 2019: 3).

Finally, anonymity is important, especially in research on such sensitive issues (Masterson & Mourad 2019: 4). The respondents’ anonymity was a critical condition for my interview partners. Several of them indicated that they could only speak openly while they remained anonymous. Therefore, I anonymised all data in the transcription process by only using broad categories as ‘protection sector’ or ‘shelter’ and ‘(I)NGO’ This increased openness and thus the credibility and internal validity of the interviews. For the informal conversation partners, I got the consent to use their names.

This chapter presented both my research framework, the applied methods of fieldwork, semi-structured interviews and use of documents and literature, how they are suited to answer my research question and to achieve the goals of this study, as well as their
limitations. Before moving forward with the application of my methods, I present in the following chapter the background to the Syrian refugee situation in Lebanon.
4 LEBANON, REFUGEES AND THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Syrians are not Lebanon’s first experience with large refugee populations. The current refugee situation takes place in a preloaded environment that impacts how the country handles the Syrian refugee presence. This chapter provides a brief background for understanding the situation under study. It begins with Lebanon’s previous experiences with militarised Palestinian refugees, before moving to the Syrian-Lebanese relationship. It then deals with the impact of the Syrian Civil War (SCW) on Lebanon and provides an overview of militarisation among Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

4.1 MILITARISED PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

Lebanon appears haunted by its experiences with militarised Palestinian refugees. While other refugee populations in Lebanon, like Armenians or Iraqis, did not have a significant impact on the country’s current refugee response, the Palestinian refugee experience certainly did (Hanafi 2014: 591; Yahya & Muasher 2018: 89). Parts of the Palestinian refugee population in their refugee camps were involved in various destabilising forms of political violence – first outside, later inside Lebanon. They can be characterised as state-in-exile refugees with political parties and military wings, using Lebanon as a sanctuary for attacks against their origin state Israel. They caused a lasting split in the Lebanese society and political sphere and finally became crucial stakeholders in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) (Brynen 1990: 159; Stedman & Tanner 2003: 4; Lischer 2005: 26-27).

After being defeated by Israel in 1948, many Palestinians fled to neighbouring states. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), started operating in Lebanon in 1952. As a service provider, UNRWA could improve socioeconomic prospects, but not provide protection or political solutions to the displacement (Hanafi 2014: 587). Political activism developed with the re-establishment of Palestinian societal organisations in the 1950s (Brynen 1990: 1). Over several decades, Palestinians became increasingly politicised. From 1968 onwards, militant Palestinian groups launched attacks at Israel from border camps in Lebanon’s South, tolerated by the Lebanese state. Such militaristic activities intensified with the Cairo Agreement (1969) and the arrival of the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) leadership, which had been expelled from Jordan during the ‘Black September’ of 1970 (Lischer 2017: 88). The Cairo Agreement placed Palestinian refugee camps under PLO jurisdiction and allowed their residents to bear
arms and engage in their struggle against Israel (Rabil 2016: 74). Thus the PLO became a surrogate state for Palestinians in Lebanon (Brynen 1990: 2). During Lebanon’s civil war, Palestinian factions, and later more general Muslim groups, fought against Lebanese militias. Additionally, Israel repeatedly shelled Lebanese territory in response to Palestinian cross-border attacks (Brynen 1990: 47). In 1978 and 1982, Israel invaded and occupied southern Lebanon to eradicate Palestinian “terrorists”. However, Israel was complicit in the 1982 massacres committed by Lebanese militias in which more than 3 000 refugees were killed in their camps, Sabra and Shatila (Cleveland & Bunton 2018: 392-394). This was followed by the ‘War of the Camps’ (1985-1987) where armed Palestinian groups in Beirut refugee camps fought against the Amal militia, supported by parts of the Lebanese army and which resulted in the death of more than 2 500 Palestinians (Brynen 1990: 187-190).

After the civil war ended with the Taif Agreement (1990), the Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah and several Palestinian militias did not disarm (Knudsen & Gade 2017: 7). During the post-war period, religiosity grew and PLO lost support among Palestinians. Consequently, the Palestinian militia landscape fractionalised, and in-camp clashes occurred (Hanafi 2012: 108). Not surprisingly, the first jihadi groups in Lebanon appeared in Palestinian refugee camps, especially in Ayn al-Hilweh, in the 1990s (Rougier 2007; Zelin 2016: 50). In the 2000s, the international Islamist terrorist network al-Qaeda and ideologically similar Lebanese groups operated in Palestinian refugee camps (Knudsen 2005: 228; CEP 2019b: 7). The most prominent jihadi group in Lebanon, Fatah al-Islam, militarised the Nahr al-Bared camp close to Tripoli in 2006 despite harsh rejection by the camp’s inhabitants. The Lebanese army destroyed the camp and many civilians and soldiers died during the three months of fighting in 2007 (Picard 2012: 102).

Today, more than half of the Palestinian refugees live in twelve official refugee camps, which are among the poorest neighbourhoods in Lebanon. Segregated from Lebanese society, they are overpopulated, largely outside the control of Lebanese authorities and security agencies. Palestinians neither can nor will naturalise and accordingly maintain the legal status of foreigners after more than 70 years of exile. They continue to suffer from largescale refusal of civil rights (Hanafi 2014: 591).9

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9 For details on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’s civil war and PLO’s utilisation of Lebanon as a sanctuary, see Brynen (1990) and Hütt (2004). For the pre-SCW situation see Knudsen (2005); Peteet (2005); Hanafi and Long (2010).
4.2 THE SYRIAN-LEBANESE RELATIONSHIP

The outbreak of the SCW changed the historically difficult transnational relationship between the neighbouring countries Syria and Lebanon. Particularly, interpersonal relationships such as family and social ties are strong and confessional groups like Sunni, Shia, Druze, Christian and Alawí maintain tight cross-border relationships. Therefore, they feature highly in the border areas of the Bekaa Valley and the North in form of cross-border engagement in Syrian parties, tribal-patronal relations and a high intake of Syrian workers (al-Masri 2015: 20). Transnational ethnic, sectarian and tribal identities in the border areas are so prevalent that the border appears to be insignificant and nationalities seem blurry in places such as Wadi Khaled or El-Hermel (Chatty et al. 2013).

The economic spheres are deeply intertwined and interdependent. Lebanon has attracted Syrian capital and low-skilled workers since the 1940s. Despite the reliance on the up to one million (seasonal) labour migrants from Syria, this labour policy fosters negative perceptions among the Lebanese who accuse Syrian workers for fostering unemployment among Lebanese (Chalcraft 2009). Also corruption spanning both Lebanese and Syrian elites, as well as trafficking of drugs and other goods across the porous borders, connect the two (in-)formal economies (ICG 2013: 19; Gade 2015: 58-59).

The political spheres are interwoven as well. As parts of the Syrian elite perceive Lebanon as a lost part of ‘Greater Syria’, Syria did not recognise Lebanon’s independence after the French Mandate ended in 1943 and thus established diplomatic relations as late as 2008 (Dawisha 1984: 229). Its political influence over Lebanon increased during Lebanon’s civil war, motivated by the Bekaa Valley’s strategic importance (Avi-Ran 1991: 8). The PLO’s nationalist position contradicted Syria’s pan Arabic aspirations. This caused Syria to send its troops to Lebanon in June 1976. It thus became part of the mandated Arab Defence Force. While the other parties to this force left Lebanon in 1979, Syria remained present until 2005. Thus, Lebanon remains vital to Syria’s regime stability and political economy (Gade 2015: 24, 26-27). The Syrian-Palestinian conflict dynamic found its Lebanese proxy in the Tripoli neighbourhoods of Bab al-Tebbaneh and Jabal Mohsen, known as the ‘Syria Street Conflict’. Bab al-Tebbaneh was one of the few areas not immediately under heavy Syrian military presence during Lebanon’s civil war because a local PLO-friendly militia intervened. The Syrian army eventually pushed through from Jabal Mohsen and performed attacks and sieges that affected the neighbourhood’s civilian population, fostering anti-Syrian attitudes.
The relationship between pro- and anti-Syrian militias in the area remains tense and fights still break out irregularly (Gade 2015: 38-39).

With the end of the civil war, Syria affirmed its supremacy over Lebanon by keeping a strong military presence and establishing a ‘special’ relationship between the two countries in the Taif Agreement, fostering a political and military Syrian hegemony (Cleveland & Bunton 2018: 396). This special relationship was enshrined in the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination (1991) (Knudsen & Gade 2017: 6). The treaty established a permeable Syrian-Lebanese border that enabled the exchange of goods and people with little administrative efforts and no visa requirements (Dionigi 2017: 24). Syria repressed ruthlessly Lebanese anti-Syrian opposition, mostly from Christian or Sunni groups, which created lasting sentiments against Syrians. This pro- and anti-Syrian split peaked with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. In its wake, pro-Syrian groups mobilised in largescale public rallies under the leadership of Hezbollah, followed by similar demonstrations by mostly Sunni anti-Syrian groups that blamed Syria’s Assad regime and Hezbollah for Hariri’s death some days later (Cleveland & Bunton 2018: 514). The latter requested a public investigation of the attack and an end of Syrian hegemony. Syria finally withdrew in April 2005 which is celebrated as the success of the ‘Cedar Revolution’ (Knudsen & Kerr 2012: 4). The two political camps still define Lebanon’s political sphere as the pro-Syrian March 8 movement and the anti-Syrian March 14 movement (named after the days of their respective rallies). Thus, they comprise the growing Sunni-Shia divide (Itani & Grebowski 2013: 1).

4.3 SYRIAN WAR IMPACTS

Based on the outlined transnational and bilateral ties it is unsurprising that the SCW (2011 – ongoing) affects Lebanon versatilely. Impacts became apparent in mid-2012 when the Syrian popular uprisings connected to the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ escalated into a full-fledged civil war (Knudsen 2017: 136). The war exacerbates existing Lebanese challenges in the political, social and security sphere. In combination with a democratic and economic decline as well as rising tensions between host and refugee communities, it endangers the country’s stability.

4.3.1 Social, Economic and Political Effects

One of the war’s main impacts is on transnational, inter-personal connections. Lebanese citizens have become the stronger part in this relationship: Cross-border trafficking changed
directions to sending weapons and goods to Syria and Lebanese provide shelter for Syrians. Without the long-standing personal interconnectedness, it would be more difficult for Syrian refugees to integrate in Lebanon. Those linkages cause that actions against or committed by one group in Syria or Lebanon, directly affects the related group in the neighbouring state. Thus the Syrian war contributed to an increased sectarian divide in Lebanon (ICG 2013; Young et al. 2014: 31). While parts of Lebanon’s Shia population support the Alawite sect of Syria’s president Assad, Sunnis support the Syrian opposition because they had suffered more under Syria’s presence in Lebanon. The re-intensified Syria-Street Conflict into a Syrian proxy conflict between 2011 and 2014 illustrates how the war tightens the link between confessional divisions in both countries (Al Jazeera 2014; Gade & Moussa 2017: 30). Religious fault lines increased due to the Syrian refugee presence. Sunnis now compose the largest sect in Lebanon which has not been met with respective political representation. This added to the prevailing Sunni feeling of disenfranchisement and gave way to extremist Sunni Salafi groups and a fragmentation of the Sunni scene (Gade 2016: 7; Gade & Moussa 2017: 39).

The economic externalities of the war challenge Lebanon as Syria is an important economic partner. Soon after the war’s breakout, Lebanon suffered from an economic crisis due to decreasing tourism because of the war, decreased public revenues and taxes as well as less financial aid from Arab countries which focused their grants on Syria (ICG 2013: 10). Moreover, the refugee arrival has increased the share of Syrian workers in Lebanon’s labour force to 27-36% already in 2014, which increased Lebanese unemployment (ACAPS 2014: 11). Higher competition has reduced wages and pushed rent prices. Furthermore, the largescale Syrian refugee arrival has amplified the deterioration of infrastructure and pressure on resources and strained public services (Gade 2016: 19).

The SCW emphasized weaknesses of the Lebanese political sphere and contributed to a political crisis. Lebanon’s government disassociated itself from the conflict with the Baabda Declaration (2012), primarily because the political sphere is split and almost mirrors the pro-and anti-Assad fault lines in Syria (Salem 2012: 3). Because of the consensus-based political system, the level of disagreement on Syrian issues led to several government deadlocks, postponed elections and government creation, and premature resignations of politicians, which increased power for singular sectarian leaders and municipal governments (Bernard 2013; Gade 2016: 13-14).
4.3.2 Syrian Refugee Presence

Early on, Lebanon became a favoured destination for Syrian refugees because of its geographical proximity, open border policy, and similar culture and history. The first refugees, arriving from April 2011, settled in northern Lebanon where cross-border ties are particularly strong. Many found refuge with Lebanese families (Rabil 2016: 11-12). With the war escalation, the pace of arrival increased drastically: from around 110,000 refugees registered with UNHCR at the end of 2012, to around 1.2 million in April 2015. Numbers dropped to around 950,000 in February 2019 (UNHCR 2019c). However, as many Syrian refugees remain unregistered their actual number is estimated to still be 1.5 million (HRW 2019). The reason for this discrepancy between registered and actually present refugees is examined under 5.3.1. Together with refugees of other nationalities, the total number of refugees in Lebanon is close to 2 million, equalling a third of Lebanon’s population (Rabil 2016: 4).

Lebanon’s handling of the arrival can be described as ad hoc and chaotic. After 2011, arrivals were not monitored by authorities anymore and control was soon lost with refugees scattered across the country (ICG 2013: 6). In May 2015, the government stopped the registration with UNHCR (Dionigi 2016: 9). Simultaneously, the Bekaa (Valley) emerged as the preferred refugee destination. In contrast to North Lebanon, where many refugees lived with locals, the majority of refugees settling in the Bekaa found accommodation in overcrowded community shelters or makeshift camps known as informal tented settlements (ITSs) (Rabil 2016: 12). Even though only 19% of the Syrian refugees lived in camps in 2018, they are the most common shelter type in the peripheral governorates with the highest refugee-density, Bekaa and Baalbek-El Hermel, where 51% and 42% respectively live in such non-permanent shelters (UNICEF et al. 2018: 41). Out of fear of a repetition of the experience with militarised Palestinian camps, the Lebanese government rejected any official refugee camps for Syrians (ICG 2013: 17).

The initial welcoming of Syrians transformed into resentments and tensions as the Syrian war continued, refugee numbers increased and critically impacted the socioeconomic sphere. The high number of Syrian refugees strained Lebanese infrastructure and public services as well as the job and housing market, specifically in peripheral, impoverished areas.

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10 Shelter types: Residential = apartment/house, room in residential building; Non-residential = factory, workshop, farm, construction side, shop, agricultural/engine/pump room, warehouse, hotel, school; Non-permanent = tent, prefab unit (UNICEF et al. 2018: 41).
11 Map of where Syrian refugees settled Appendix V.
where municipalities lack the capabilities to respond appropriately to negative externalities (ICG 2013: 9). Tensions between refugee and host communities are rising, their scale remaining unclear as many incidents are unreported by Syrians (al-Masri 2015: 27).

In December 2014, the government adopted the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), a joint plan of the Lebanese government and its (inter-)national humanitarian partners to target both “displaced” Syrians, vulnerable Lebanese and Palestinians, 2.8 million vulnerable people in total, in ten socioeconomic sectors (GoL & UNHCR 2019). However, Rabil (2016: xiii) criticises it as not functioning due to funding gaps, the amount of vulnerable people, and protection risks, among other things.

Besides humanitarian concerns, political and security issues shape the public debate. Lebanese attitudes towards Syrian refugees often depend on the religious affiliation, e.g. Sunnis are more positive towards the Syrian opposition. Thus, Syrian refugees settle mostly along sectarian lines with Sunnis moving to predominantly Sunni areas and Christians and Alawites to Christian and Shia areas. Also, the economic status and personal preferences of individual mayors impact the level of welcoming (ICG 2013: 9; Betts et al. 2017: 2). Community leaders use the change in the confessional balance as a pretext to call for self-armament in order to prevent a reignition of the sectarian conflict (Khatib 2014).

A special subgroup of Syrian refugees are Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS). At the time of writing, 31 000 PRS displaced by the SCW live in Lebanon (UNRWA 2019a). This number has decreased from over 41 000 in December 2014 (UNRWA 2018). Many of them left Syria because their primary residence, the Yarmouk camp, has been under siege by the Syrian government since 2012, controlled by DAESH since 2015, and as a result bombed by the Syrian army (Al Jazeera 2018). PRS were welcomed by Palestinians from Lebanon who helped them to adapt, find work, and accommodation. Thus, many moved to one of the twelve existing refugee camps (Knudsen 2017: 148). However, the situation for PRS in Lebanon is precarious: 90% of them live under the poverty line and 95% experience food insecurity (UNRWA 2018). They are also exposed to stricter visa and work regulations than Syrian nationals (Morrison 2014: 41).

4.3.3 War Spill-Overs and Militarisation among Syrian Refugees

Despite affecting Lebanon’s security situation in several respects, the SCW has not yet provoked a largescale conflict spill-over. One widespread worry in this regard is that both Palestinian and Syrian youth join new or existing militant groups (Rabil 2016: 8). While
presenting the pattern and geographical distribution of militarisation among Syrian refugees in Lebanon so far, I include other instances of Syrian war spill-over that impact this phenomenon.

In the SCW’s beginning, rather limited refugee militarisation was notable in Lebanon. However, rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) built rather small safe havens in supportive Lebanese communities from where they could perform attacks against Syria. They also clashed with other armed Syrian opposition groups and Hezbollah in northern Lebanon (Dakroub 2013; Sude et al. 2015: 18). In retaliation, Syria’s army shelled, raided and sniped into Lebanese border towns (Salem 2012: 12). The April 2013 al-Qusayr Offensive in Syria has special importance for Lebanon’s security. It was Hezbollah’s first overt support for Assad as they engaged together with the Syrian army in a victorious attack against rebels in al-Qusayr (Betts et al. 2017: 17). It thus undermined the Baabda Declaration of disassociation. Since then, Hezbollah has been involved in Syria to varying degrees, sending 6 000-10 000 fighters (Gade & Moussa 2017: 24). Hezbollah’s active conflict involvement contributed to a periodical political vacuum, which highlights the dysfunctionality of Lebanon’s political system in crisis management (Dionigi 2016: 18; Knudsen 2017: 140).

Based on this open military allying with the Syrian regime, various Syrian opposition groups attacked Hezbollah inside Lebanon (ICG 2016: 8). DAESH and the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra performed several car bomb and suicide attacks inside Hezbollah strongholds such as Beirut’s southern suburbs and the Bekaa Valley and abducted members of the LAF (Daily Star 2014). In 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra moved into northern Bekaa to “protect the Sunnis of Lebanon” and to pressure Hezbollah from within the country. DAESH established itself in the same area which enabled its engagement in warfare in the Lebanese-Syrian border-mountains but also resulted in fights between itself and JN on Lebanese territory (Zelin 2016: 57-59). Since Lebanon lacks a coherent defence strategy, it was vulnerable to such attacks by militant groups arriving from Syria (Gade & Moussa 2017: 29). Besides using ITSs as operational bases and shelters, these transnationally acting organisations utilised the Syrian refugee situation in Lebanon to create recruitment networks, get access to health services and other resources, and to perform attacks in Hezbollah strongholds (Young et al. 2014: 34; al-Masri 2015: 18; Zelin 2016: 57; CEP 2019b: 7). This would be possible through infiltrating ITSs. In 2015, the Lebanese minister of education claimed that about 20 000 jihadists are hiding in refugee camps and settlements (Schmid 2016: 34).

Particularly the town and surrounding terrain of Arsal stand out with regards to militarisation among Syrian refugees. The town in northern Bekaa near the Syrian border,
developed into a stronghold for both DAESH and JN as it offers them resources, recruitment grounds and sanctuaries (Rabil 2016: 97-98). The militants’ arrival is closely connected to the aforementioned al-Qusayr offensive, which took place in Arsal’s vicinity and drove many rebels into Lebanon. From August 2 to August 7, 2014 the ‘Battle of Arsal’ took place. JN and DAESH attacked a LAF checkpoint, besieged a police station and kidnapped police men and soldiers which sparked a LAF counteroffensive. Five days of fighting ended with a ceasefire during which both militant groups retreated behind the Syrian border, taking with them 39 Lebanese hostages. This conflict left 50 civilians, 60 militants and 19 Lebanese soldiers dead and 400 people wounded. The hostage situation resulted in a long-term confrontation between the LAF and the militias. Clashes, with the participation of Hezbollah, continued in Arsal and the neighbouring Baalbek region until 2017. Finally, on July 20, 2017 Hezbollah and the Syrian military preformed a large offensive against Jabhat al-Sham (previously Jabhat al-Nusra), forcing many militants to lay down their weapons. The ceasefire with Jabhat al-Sham allowed its fighters to return to Syria with their families. At the same time, some militants hid in Arsal’s ITs, which leaves the possibility of sleeper cells or other forms of militarisation among the camps’ inhabitants. Already in June 2017, Syrian refugee camps in Arsal were the scene of five suicide attacks and one hand grenade attack during LAF raids which resulted in the arrest of 50 suspected terrorists among the Syrian refugees (Lebanon Support 2019b). Accordingly, the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2016: 10) reported that militant groups continue to be present in the outskirts of Arsal that turned into some kind of no-man’s land, and that DAESH could establish parallel judicial structures inside some local ITs. Some refugees were accused of fighting for DAESH and JN during the battle of Arsal (ICG 2016: 12). Local refugee camps functioned as safe havens for families of high-ranking militants while the militants themselves could concentrate on the armed struggle. For example, the family members of DAESH-leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi lived among the refugees in Arsal (Rabil 2016: 7). In addition, a growing number of Arsal’s refugees is pushed towards the extremist groups as they are in need for protection against arbitrary LAF behaviour (ICG 2016: 12). In line with this, the jihadi groups in Arsal, especially JN, presented themselves several times as speakers on behalf of the Syrian refugee community, demanding that the LAF protect them and the jihadis’ family members (al-Masri 2015: 19).

Another area of where extremist Islamist groups operate among refugees in the wake of the SCW, are Palestinian refugee camps. They are among the preferred hiding places for groups like DAESH and al-Qaeda to fight Hezbollah and gather fighters and material for
Syria. Several of the suicide and terror attacks in Lebanon in the studied period can be traced back to Palestinian refugee camps. For example, the 2015 twin-bombings in Beirut’s Bourj al-Barajneh neighbourhood were planned and performed by Syrians living in a Beirut Palestinian refugee camp (Rabil 2016: 94-96, 100-101). The presence of the extremist groups is particularly tangible in Saida’s Ayn al-Hilweh camp. There, al-Qaeda members were arrested for smuggling bomb material into Syria, and DAESH and Jabhat al-Sham members hide there. The situation in the Palestinian camp worsened considerably with the arrival of PRS, which challenged both Lebanese security forces and the Palestinian camp leadership. The camp shelters too many factions, overcrowding complicates extracting jihadists and tensions between PRS, Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon, and Syrians develop (Mahmoud & Roberts 2018: 8). Additionally, pre-SCW extremist groups in the camp increasingly cooperate with DAESH and Jabhat al-Sham (CEP 2019b: 8). In particular, former members of Fatah al-Islam and of Jund al-Sham are involved in the training of new fighters in Palestinian camps who are vital to the Syrian opposition, as are some of the Lebanese jihadi groups fighting in Syria (Rabil 2016: 94-95).

Other areas experiencing refugee-related violence in the wake of the SCW are Tripoli and Akkar in northern Lebanon. The previously described conflict in Tripoli’s impoverished neighbourhoods Bab al-Tebbaneh and Jabal Mohsen, for example, experiences a reignition with the arrival of Syrians (Young et al. 2014: 28). Between 2014 and 2017, 20 rounds of conflict erupted, killing about 200 people. Furthermore, Tripoli saw an increase in activities of other jihadi groups (Knudsen & Gade 2017: 17). However, many refugees settled individually in the fighting neighbourhoods and it remains unclear to which extent they participated.

Essential for the remaining part of this thesis is that these three areas, Arsal, Palestinian refugee camps and Tripoli, appear as exceptions in regard of militarisation among Syrian refugees. Of these, Arsal is the only place where Syrian ITSs became significantly militarised. Tine Gade states that “the phenomenon of ‘refugee warriors’ – combatants hiding among refugees – is limited” (2016: 17) among Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Clarke (2018: 624) finds that in comparison to Turkey and Jordan, Syrian refugees in Lebanon stage few protests, which would indicate militarisation by groups targeting the host state. Finally, Masterson and Lehmann (2018: 42) are astonished that less than 2.5-5% of all returnees go back to Syria to fight in the civil war. Moreover, as early as 2014, the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS 2014: 7) communicated that a high risk of inter-communal violence between Syrians and Lebanese was present, but despite high tensions, organised militarisation or
largescale confrontations between communities remain absent. Moreover, militarisation among Syrian refugees so far appears to be limited to jihadi groups which also target the refugees’ origin state. This contrasts with the absence of militancy entrepreneurs who could try to rally based on socioeconomic or political grievances (Gade 2016: 18).

Importantly, these patterns of national non-militarisation and local militarisation correspond with the results of my interviews. Most respondents stated that militarisation among Syrian refugees was not an issue. However, several were worried about growing tensions between Syrians and Lebanese. According to them, the deteriorating social cohesion between both groups is likely to lead to refugee militarisation in the future. The interviewees commonly mentioned Arsal as an exception regarding refugee militarisation. Respondents with Arsal-related insight also described the ITSs of the area as weapon storages, recruiting grounds, sanctuaries for militants and their families and access points to health services. Furthermore, the interviewees portrayed the refugee population as dominated by JN and DAESH. These groups imposed Sharia law, were largely present among the ITS populations, installed sleeping cells, pressured (I)NGOs and determined the organisations’ access to the area, and appointed camp leaders. The respondents agreed that militants continue to be present among the refugees.

This chapter presented the background for the analysis. Notably, not all refugee hosting areas in Lebanon remain free of refugee militarisation and the geographic and group-wise limitation of refugee militarisation is striking. Thus, especially differences in the manifestation of the risk factors between Arsal and the general ITS-based Syrian population indicate which factors cause the militarisation pattern in Lebanon. Lebanon’s experience with the long-standing and militarised presence of Palestinian refugees, the complicated relationship between Lebanon and Syria, and the multiple effects of the SCW on Lebanon profoundly impact the treatment of Syrian refugee. The analysis will show how this determined to some degree national and local refugee militarisation.
5 ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARISATION RISK

Which risk factors determine militarisation – or a lack thereof – among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon? To answer this question, I examine the manifestation and interaction of the selected factors for the case in question in this chapter. I present my findings from the interviews with humanitarian workers in Lebanon and additional fieldwork material like observations and informal conversations. These data are supplemented by evidence from written sources. The structure of the chapter follows the structure of the theoretical framework as laid out in chapter two.

5.1 SITUATIONAL AND PERSECUTED REFUGEES

The initial militarisation potential is an important indicator for the likelihood of refugee militarisation. Depending on the origin of the refugee situation, this potential can vary substantially. Most interviewees indicated that group-based persecution or direct participation in the conflict was not the most common motivation for fleeing from Syria for most refugees. Simultaneously, one informant pointed out that one of the main differences between the Syrian and the Palestinian refugee population was the lack of armed factions that sought refuge in Lebanon and could build a military leadership. Furthermore, Clarke (2018: 626) demonstrates that the informal refugee leaders of the hierarchical structured ITSs do not constitute a political or military network that could function as an exile government for Syrian refugees. Hence, the material does not indicate that the Syrian refugees in Lebanon are a state-in-exile refugee population.

Several participants expressed that the return expectancy is high among Syrians and that some already had returned voluntarily. Moreover, a Syrian refugee, writing for a large international newspaper explained that most Syrians do not care much about the political outcome of the war, but simply want to return to a Syria that is safe enough to continue their pre-war lives (Khattab 2019). Another interviewee described that most Syrian refugees fled from nearby fighting that endangered their lives. Those were primarily relieved that they escaped safely. Syrian activists, however, moved to other countries than Lebanon (Kaghadou 2019). However, three informants and two Syrian refugees mentioned that many fear to return because of their oppositional activity or the awaiting military service. This indicates that some persecuted refugees are present in ITSs. This impression is mirrored in political reports and research articles. Hamadan (2017: 33) states that Syrian resistance entrepreneurs found
refuge in other countries than Lebanon. While there are many Syrians in Lebanon who support the opposition, many of them are silent, non-active supporters. Furthermore, the refugee population appears rather heterogenous with about 40% supporting the Syrian government (Corstange 2019: 198). Thus, the share of Syrian refugees in Lebanon who hold negative views about their government is much lower than in Turkey and Jordan, both of which suffer from higher levels of refugee militancy (Dionigi 2016: 14). This heterogeneity indicates that the Syrian refugee population can largely be characterised as situational refugees who fled from negative war externalities rather than from direct persecution. The Syrian refugee population therefore has a limited pre-flight militarisation potential. A considerable number of Syrian refugees escaped from general war and destruction and sought safety, which makes militarisation by groups targeting the origin state unlikely.

For Arsal, however, it was clarified that many refugees in this area came from strong opposition areas in Syria and fled because they were defeated by the Syrian army. Particularly, the 2013 and 2014 battles close to the Lebanese border, in al-Qusayr and Qalamoun, forced many rebels to flee into the Arsal territory (ICG 2016: 9; Betts et al. 2017: 17; Gade 2017: 198). Thus, the share of persecuted refugees is much higher there.

5.2 AMBIGUOUS HOST STATE RESPONSE

The host state response consists of its capability and willingness to prevent refugee militarisation. Their interaction is crucial for the development of refugee militarisation. To examine how these subfactors impact the militarisation risk in Lebanon, I analysed various aspects of both factors in relation to each other.

5.2.1 Lebanon, a Weak State

Lebanon appears as a weak host state with limited capabilities for several reasons. First, the presence of LSF is restrained. According to the respondents and to border control officials (Kullab 2015), effective border control was missing, enabling militants to cross together with refugees without being disarmed. Additionally, even though Lebanon did not pursue an official open-border policy, it did not change the pre-war arrangement of free travel for Syrians until its closing of borders for refugees in October 2014 (Montgomery 2014). Several informants indicated that the state monopoly of violence is not upheld all over Lebanon, but that non-state actors conduct security measures: armed clans established parallel security and administration systems in the Bekaa, local youth groups conduct policing and the private
firearms are prevalent. Security is therefore provided by a ‘hybrid system’ of local formal and informal security actors, including private security companies, citizen groups and militia wings (International Alert 2016: 3). The armed Shia militia Hezbollah presents the most serious challenge to the state’s monopoly of violence, as it is militarily superior to the LAF. Not only was the LAF unable to prevent Hezbollah’s cross-border engagement in Syria, it acts in several parts of Lebanon, particularly in the Bekaa, as an alternative government that provides security, schooling and other public services. The LAF even needed the militia’s help during the military operations in Arsal (Salem 2012: 4; Gade & Moussa 2017: 27; Knudsen 2017: 140; CEP 2019b: 2). The LAF’s capabilities are generally rather limited, caused by a security sector suffering from internal rivalries, capability overstretch, insufficient equipment, inadequate training, missing security strategy, disputed mandate, and increasing confessional disintegration (Picard 2012; Knudsen & Gade 2017: 10; Masterson & Lehmann 2018: 14).

At the same time, some respondents experienced that the LSF were present and successful in some respects. They mentioned raids and extraction of sleeper cells in refugee camps as demilitarisation efforts after arrival. However, the efficiency of these raids remains unclear as they were linked to arbitrary arrests of refugees and were perceived as symbolic actions that were taken after major events like suicide bombings (Lebanon Support 2019a). Moreover, many interviewees stressed the impact of numerous army checkpoints which prevented free movement of many refugees, and thus of potential militants, between camps. At checkpoints, they risk being harassed or arrested if they lack legal status (NRC 2016: 5; Clarke 2018: 626). Positive for the LAF’s ability is that it was able to contain the dominance of extremist groups and refugee militarisation to Arsal. However, this and the actual expulsion required the help of non-state actors and the Syrian army (Lebanon Support 2019b).

Second, due to its weak economic and organisational capabilities, Lebanon is unable to alleviate social, economic and infrastructural pressure exerted by the refugees’ arrival. Several respondents stated that it cannot finance the refugee response adequately, because government funds for municipalities are not distributed based on their vulnerability (Yahya & Muasher 2018: 92). Thus, many refugee-hosting municipalities receive marginal support. Additionally, foreign funding for humanitarian purposes is partly embezzled by national and local politicians (Shibli 2014: 7). Lebanon lacks organisational capacities and suffers from administrative shortcomings like missing person registers or unenforced labour regulations, which complicate the aid delivery. Also, the cooperation between the (I)NGOs and state authorities was described as haphazard: the relationships of local authorities to Syria the local
organisation of aid, municipal jurisdictions were unclear, and the Ministry of Social Affairs, the governmental focal point for the humanitarian response, lacked knowledge and necessary infrastructure (Dionigi 2016: 10; Yahya & Muasher 2018: 92). As a result of the described dysfunctionality of the political realm, Lebanon ignored the refugee situation until it was out of control. It already stopped monitoring refugee arrivals in 2011 (ICG 2013: 5-6). This further obstructed a cohesive response to the Syrian refugee presence.

These capability shortcomings were increased by missing state penetration in peripheral areas which was expressed by half of the interviewees. Missing state penetration showed mostly through coordination discrepancies between the national and the local, as well as various administrative levels (e.g. application of illegal curfews and evictions), the missing state monopoly of violence and marginalisation of peripheral areas. This fostered regional differences in the humanitarian response and the availability of services (Khatib 2014; van Vilet 2016: 95). Many respondents portrayed their geographical areas of operation, major refugee-hosting areas, as traditionally deprived and marginalised. In their areas refugees and locals compete for limited resources. One Lebanese respondent explained: “[E]verything is in Beirut and everything else doesn’t matter. […] It’s centralised, it means like it’s centre and then everything else is like sometimes even forgotten” (R2 2019). However, it is argued that these individually operating local authorities contributed critically to the stability of the Bekaa Valley, as some of them have more sufficient organisational capacities than the central state (Zapater 2018: 13).

A final relevant aspect of the state’s capability is its ability to provide protection for refugees. A few interviewees answered positively to questions concerning the presence of state authorities in and around ITSs. For example, they sometimes guarded aid distribution and conducted raids. Indeed, coordination and assistance to relief work and organisation of camp localities are responsibilities of local protection schemes. The respectively tasked municipal police even seem accessible to Syrian refugees (International Alert 2016: 3, 6). However, most aid workers experienced that the police do not process allegations filed by refugees and abstain from policing inside the ITSs. Refugees therefore have to provide for their protection themselves and cannot access justice mechanisms. Two respondents from the protection sector indicated that this protection vacuum opened for recruitment among refugees by militants. Based on the interviews, the refugees’ perception of the state is mixed. While some perceive it as a useless authority, the perception of the state as a predatory threat dominates, as the numerous references to arbitrary raids, arrests, evictions and increasing fear of forced repatriation indicate. Furthermore, Syrian refugees report that LAF perform random
raids where army personal mistreated refugees and confiscated property (al-Masri 2015: 14; International Alert 2016: 5). Especially since the events in Arsal, Syrian refugee communities face municipal blanket curfews, forced mass evictions, and abuse by security forces (HRW 2015). At the same time, some respondents did not perceive the security situation in the ITS as so dire that policing or other protection forms were needed.

In Arsal, the incapability of the Lebanese state is particularly clear. It was pointed out that before the military operation against DAESH and Jabhat al-Sham in 2017, security presence was minimal. One aid worker, who was in Arsal during DAESH’s and JN’s rule, explained that those groups were not constrained by any state security: “They all withdrew. And so did the police and so did the army. […] There was a lot of weapons stored in the camps. […] Because they [the militants] were moving freely in and out of the town. And the police of course, they were nowhere to be seen, and neither was the army” (R16 2019). The Lebanese military had isolated the area through checkpoints around the town’s premises and treated it as a place not under Lebanese jurisdiction. This was illustrated by an INGO that had to officially export their relief goods from Lebanon when they went to Arsal. Also, the local border to Syria is porous and features hidden pathways. This, and the Hezbollah’s initial neglect of this border section enabled the trafficking of both rebels, and assistance material between Syria and Lebanon at least until March 2017 (Gade 2017: 198-199). During the 2014-clashes, Lebanese security forces reportedly prevented Syrian refugees from fleeing the town, and exposed refugees and Lebanese civilians to indiscriminate fire (HRW 2015). This explains why Arsal’s refugees at first reportedly welcomed DAESH and JN as their protectors. However, two respondents explained that the refugees were happy about the expulsion of these groups in 2017. Moreover, non-military capabilities were poor. Arsal was portrayed as an “island of injustice” (R2 2019), being out of sight of the central state with a lack of jobs, security presence, water facilities and other basic infrastructure, and a split, even hostile local government. The connection between Arsal and the central state is characterised by mistrust and estrangement. These century-lasting grievances were increased by the refugees’ arrival and intensified by the subsequent military isolation (ICG 2016: 2, 4).

5.2.2 Uncertain Willingness
Lebanon’s willingness to prevent refugee militarisation is secondary as the postulated limited capacities might not allow for the prevention of refugee militarisation. However, based on the four main factors that define the state’s will, the same seems uncertain. First, the
relationship to the origin country Syria is complicated as pointed out in chapter 4. The two states are neither official military allies nor enemies. Despite the Baabda Declaration, the Lebanese government cooperates with the Syrian regime in some sectors. The LAF fought jointly with the Syrian army against Jabhat al-Sham and DAESH in Lebanon through, for example, air assistance during raids. They also arrested and deported known anti-regime activists who fled to Lebanon. Furthermore, they allowed attacks, shelling and raids by the Syrian army against the FSA on Lebanese territory (Itani & Grebowski 2013: 3; ICG 2013: 7; Young et al. 2014: 33). While this covert cooperation with the origin state implies that Lebanon wants to prevent refugee militarisation, it does counteract this aim, if refugees feel too insecure through the aggressive behaviour of both states and search for alternative protection providers. It has to be remembered that the political leadership is split on the position towards Syria and the Assad-regime. Thus, the will of ‘the’ Lebanese state is hard to identify because it consists of the combination of the interests of various factions. To present all these interests exceeds the boundaries of this thesis, which is why I focus on these tangible security actions.

Second, nothing indicates that Lebanon has use for militarised refugees for other conflicts and would therefore promote militarisation. On the contrary, there is a rare unity across the leading political factions that civil unrest and a conflict spill-over must be prevented (Salem 2012: 13; Dakroub 2013; Gade 2016: 7). Besides the lingering memory of the Lebanese Civil War, fear of terrorist attacks was a reason that generated this consensus throughout the split political sphere (Rabil 2016: 7). A governmental priority was therefore to prevent any joint militarisation efforts between Syrian and Lebanese Islamists (Lefèvre 2014). Many interviewees shared this impression.

Third, Lebanon’s politics have traditionally been influenced by international powers that act as financial backers, and strong states misused Lebanon’s territory for fighting for their own purposes (Brynen 1990: 159; HRW 2015). Nevertheless, the importance of third-party states is limited for the risk of refugee militarisation. None of the militarily strong Western or regional powers, have an interest in militarised Syrians. Instead, grants from Western powers were targeted at strengthening Lebanon’s capabilities in order to contain the Syrian refugee situation from reaching the financing countries, and states like Iran and Russia miss the capacities for another conflict in the region (HRW 2015; Betts et al. 2017: 18; Knudsen & Gade 2017: 19). The Arab league collaborates with Western powers in the International Support Group for Lebanon. Russia, USA and the United Kingdom pledged
additional military aid for the Arsal crisis, while Qatar assisted in negotiating with the militants (Lebanon Support 2019b).

Contrastingly, the Lebanese state displays an anti-refugee attitude that could indirectly foster militarisation. The interviews captured this in several ways. Authorities and politicians securitise refugees through curfews, evictions and raids with mass arrests that foster a public perception of refugees as a security threat. For example, the Minister of Interior blamed the Syrian refugee presence for a 50% growth in the crime rate (Torbey 2013). Such securitisation means are increasingly mentioned in reports and analyses (ACAPS 2014: 10; al-Masri 2015: 13; Balouziyeh 2016: 57; International Alert 2016: 3; Betts et al. 2017: 19). The push for the return of refugees to Syria on both national and local level (Papadopulos 2019) was a topic that emerged in every interview. The return pressure was portrayed as increasing the refugees’ insecurity and vulnerability. Several interviewees experienced a neglect of the humanitarian response by Lebanese state actors. It pushes the responsibility to municipalities or the humanitarian sector and neglects the refugee situation on a national level. This was based on misused funding, non-appearance of state officials around ITSs, and the prohibition of any permanent structures in refugee settlements. This led to an overall inconsistent refugee policy. Moreover, Dionigi observes: “The UNHCR and its partner agencies were given a great deal of autonomy over a situation in which the Lebanese government was fundamentally unwilling to act, fearing that taking a stance would have destabilising effects” (2016: 10). This absence of the central state and focus on cooperation with local authorities was also reported by most interviewees.

The will of the Lebanese state is therefore uncertain. It wants to prevent refugee militarisation through respective direct security efforts. Simultaneously it is unwilling to act against indirect militarisation causes like socioeconomic grievances. Its disengagement from the refugee situation thus aggravates socioeconomic hardship for refugees. In addition, it is unwilling and unable to provide refugee protection and even increases the need for someone to fill this vacuum in ITSs as it is a threat to refugees. While it wants to prevent militarisation, this is undermined by a military, economic and organisational incapability which makes it dependent on the help of other stakeholders. In sum, the host state response is ambiguous.

5.3 POVERTY AMONG REFUGEES AND THE HOST POPULATION

Several elements of the socioeconomic situation impact refugee militarisation. First, I look at the general level of poverty among ITS-based refugees by examining their living
conditions and education opportunities. Then, I turn to indicators of relative deprivation of Syrian refugees and Lebanese citizens. Finally, I observe the refugees’ social ties.

5.3.1 Severe Poverty in ITSs

The socioeconomic situation of Syrian ITS-based refugees in Lebanon is dire. This is indicated by the interviewees who directly experience the daily life of refugees and by documents like vulnerability reports. Geographical variation and variation between individual ITSs are high, but the general trend is similar.

90% of the Syrian refugee households in ITSs, find themselves below the poverty line of $3.84 per person per day (UNICEF et al. 2018: 44). All respondents emphasised this high level of poverty and the resulting inability to meet basic needs. Interviews and written reports entailed the same recurring themes that indicate high socioeconomic vulnerability: One, food insecurity (UNICEF et al. 2018: 134); two, ITS infrastructure – caused by the governmental prohibition of any permanent structures in ITSs, refugees are exposed to harsh weather conditions like (snow) storms, flooding, and heat (ACAPS 2014: 3), and to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions, e.g. overshared latrines, no handwashing facilities, and no waste management (UNICEF et al. 2018: 55-56);12 three, no financial resources and growing debts; and four, restricted legal employment to the three sectors agriculture, construction and environment, and high rates of exploitation and unemployment (ACAPS 2014: 7; Khatib 2014; Knutsen 2015; Janmyr & Mourad 2018: 20).

Due to the limited legal work possibilities, informal employment is widespread, with only 25% of the 43% working refugees being formally employed (Akram et al. 2015: 45; UNICEF et al. 2018: 5). As mentioned by several interviewees, many refugees resorted to negative strategies, such as criminal activities, domestic violence and child marriage for, coping with poverty and social-psychological pressure (Zetter & Ruaudel 2014: 9; Amnesty International 2015: 22-23). Interestingly, while Syrian refugees generally are poor, Syrians supporting the opposition are poorer (Corstange 2019: 180).

ITSs are presented as the worst shelter option. Refugees have to pay rent and maintain tents themselves (Amnesty International 2015: 22; Balouziyeh 2016: 51), which is an explanation for why ITS-households are the most likely to be indebted (UNICEF et al. 2018:

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12 According to the interviews, any structure can be interpreted as permanent. The landowner decides what is allowed, as there is no official regulation besides that anything ‘permanent’ is forbidden. Containers, drainage and sewage systems, boreholes and gravel on the ground to prevent flooding are examples for what can be forbidden. These conditions combined with missing insulation and heating possibilities, foster diseases.
Positively, based on experiences of aid workers in the health sector, ITS-residents seem to be covered decently by humanitarian and public health services, despite some special services being unavailable and there being high costs for secondary health care (Amnesty International 2015: 22). However, other relief and basic needs services seem not sufficient as explored under 5.4.

Legal residency is lacking for 73% of Syrian refugees aged 15 or older, which thus are undocumented (UNICEF et al. 2018: 2). As missing legal status is a main cause for refugee poverty, it is unsurprising that this was mentioned as a widespread source of problems. Officially, Syrians in Lebanon are not referred to as ‘refugees’, but as ‘displaced’, which is a less historically and legally loaded term. Syrian refugees thus have the same unprotected status as any other Syrian nationals (Janmyr 2016: 61-62). This has two reasons: the protracted and violent experience with Palestinian refugees, and Lebanon not having signed the 1951 Refugee Convention. It thus is without an official refugee policy, but is part to individual humanitarian treaties, e.g. the principle of non-refoulment, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (2003) with UNHCR that grants protection and services to refugees under the IGO (Janmyr 2016: 59). Since the nationwide registration stop in May 2015, Syrians can only ‘record’ with UNHCR which denies them the de facto refugee status and thus legal protection (Amnesty International 2015: 11). Syrians have restricted access to public services, birth and marriage certificates and free movement (NRC 2014: 12). Resident permits are hard to obtain or renew as they require rigid documentation and often unaffordable fees between $200 and $630 (NRC 2014: 15-17; Amnesty International 2015: 14-15). To obtain a residency permit, Syrians additionally have to sign a pledge to abstain from working, which in turn increases poverty (NRC 2016: 4). These regulations led to a drastic increase of Syrians without valid legal status and facilitates exploitation in the informal sector (Janmyr 2016: 71, 75).

This severe level of poverty can serve as a basis for refugee militarisation, if armed groups can provide income or other resources, or if refugees mobilise in order to capture respective resources from the Lebanese state. However, the downturn of Lebanon’s economy and banking sector does not indicate that this would be a promising and thus likely approach (The Economist 2018).

Education was portrayed as the only service that is largely provided by local governments for free, which therefore could reduce susceptibility to recruitment efforts. While education generally is available, its quality seems problematic. Language problems, gap-filling by unregulated faith-based education providers, overstretched capacities, and
unaffordable transportation and material were reported by many interviewees and respective reports as limiting education quality (Akram et al. 2015: 48; Culbertson & Constant 2015: 17; UNICEF et al. 2018: 62–68). Enrolment rates are low, particularly for adolescents. In 2018, 68% of Syrian children aged 6 to 14, but only 23% of children aged 15 to 17 visited Lebanese schools (UNICEF et al. 2018: 3). Two recurrent issues in the interviews can explain this high drop-out rate: child labour and early marriage. In the Bekaa, many children are required to work in the fields all day, as the additional income is needed. In 2018, five percent of Syrian children were working, and the share of married girls aged 15 to 19 increased to 29% (UNICEF et al. 2018: 3). Moreover, former Syrian university students struggle to pay the high fees and get hold of the required documentation to continue previous studies (Addam El-Ghali et al. 2017). The impact of missing education and training is exacerbated by a scarcity of meaningful social activities, particularly in ITSs to which refugee youths are confined. This leads to boredom and harms psychological wellbeing, as an ITS-based informant noted. Based on this, Syrian refugee youths (in ITSs) lack future prospects and provide a lucrative recruitment ground for militants, if they can offer income and a socially rewarding occupation to the 61% of Syrians aged 15 to 24 falling into the category “not employed, not in education and not attending any training” (UNICEF et al. 2018: 3, 104).

5.3.2 A Relatively Deprived Host Population

Alongside actual deprivation, relative deprivation can contribute to refugee militarisation. Several relative deprivation dynamics could be at work in the Syrian refugee situation in Lebanon. First, the previous sub-chapter illustrates the dire living conditions of ITS-based Syrians, which are usually worse than the conditions of the host population. This indicates that Syrians could feel relatively deprived. More than half of the respondents, however, pointed out that Lebanese people themselves suffer from high levels of poverty, unemployment, homelessness or substandard housing conditions. Three mentioned that solid houses are often the only advantage for Lebanese in comparison to Syrian refugees in many peripheral areas. Similarly, Mercy Corps (2014: 8) found that refugees and their hosts often have the same pressing needs: Employment opportunities and access to public services. Thus, there is little evidence that Syrians might feel relatively deprived in comparison to the hosts. Accordingly, many mentioned a high level of compliance with and acceptance of every injustice among Syrians as they perceive themselves not in a position where they can change anything.
Second, in contrast to this, a feeling of relative deprivation among the host population in comparison to the refugee population was indicated during every interview and every informal conversation. Tensions that originated from the Lebanese were always a topic. One reason for the host’s feeling of structural disadvantage is the deterioration of the socioeconomic sphere and service proliferation with the arrival of Syrian refugees. The (I)NGOs’ focus on Syrians aggravates those negative externalities of the refugee situation (Itani & Grebowski 2013: 4). These effects are underscored when explaining the situation in the already deprived Arsal, as it suffered extraordinarily from a quadrupled population and a total neglect during the extremists’ presence. Furthermore, the military containment policy during this period, increased Arsal’s grievances, as the LAF closed local quarries and prohibited farmers to cultivate their land which left many Arsalis and refugees without income. This increased the negative perception of refugees (ICG 2016: 11,13; Lebanon Support 2019b). A second reason for this relative deprivation dynamic is humanitarian services for refugees. Several respondents experienced a widespread envy among Lebanese who accused refugees of doing nothing to “earn” these benefits, while the Lebanese received no state or non-state support. Two respondents even reported that Lebanese people pointed guns at them to stop them from distributing relief aid. Such a hostile atmosphere is illustrated by a survey on social tensions in Lebanon: 77.8% of the Lebanese participants “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that violence might be necessary when personal interests are threatened (ARK 2018: 24). This happens despite the change by the Lebanese state and humanitarian organisations to a joint refugee response that targets Lebanese and Syrian communities simultaneously, stipulated in the LCRP (UNHCR 2019a). All organisations I talked to follow this approach. The participants mentioned further that the host population benefits from the refugee presence through job creation, more customers and more tenants that generate income for the Lebanese. In ITS areas, refugees would both pay rent to the landowner and often function as cheap labour on their fields (Zapater 2018: 13). Yet, tensions and attacks against refugees based on the prevalent feeling of relative deprivation are reportedly growing. This could lead refugees to taking up arms themselves or search for other, militant, protection providers.

Third, Syrian refugees do not seem to foster a feeling of relative deprivation in comparison to their pre-refugee lives that would encourage violent action to achieve this standard again. Although several respondents referred to a hopelessness and a longing for return among Syrians, nothing indicates that they act to accelerate this process through aggressive behaviour. Conversely, they do not want to risk anything shortly before leaving.
A few indicated even that for some refugees, life improved in Lebanon in comparison to Syria and that many realised that there might be nothing to return to due to the war’s destruction.

5.3.3 Mixed Impact of Pre-Flight Social Ties

Pre-flight social ties among refugees and to the host population are important networks. The relationship to the informal camp leader – the Shawish – is crucial. He is often someone who arrived early in the refugee situation or has been living in Lebanon for a long time, most likely as an agricultural worker. Shawish is a new word for Wakis who were informal leaders in pre-war Syrian work camps, which were the home to foreign seasonal workers while they were in Lebanon. When the refugees arrived, they turned into ITSs as explained by R15 (2019). Many of the inhabitants of these ITSs are former seasonal workers who brought their families as the war broke out. Shawishes therefore often have a special knowledge about the local situation and are connected in the Lebanese society. Hence, they can find work and accommodation for other refugees. Shawishes can thus increase the resilience of refugees against militarisation. All but one respondent problematised this position of the Shawish. They experienced Shawishes who enriched themselves at the costs of dependent camp inhabitants through their exploitation and power abuse. According to the interviews some Shawishes have been clan leaders in Syria. Other ties among the refugees appear to be varying. They reported that some ITSs are inhabited by refugees from a single village, while others are mixed and feature a reduced sense of community. In general, the social ties among refugees can increase the resilience against militarisation. For Arsal, they reported that a huge clan from Homs constitutes the refugee population, which is a Syrian city with “dense tribal structures” and a prominent connection to the Syrian uprisings (Clarke 2018: 627). Thus, strong social ties among refugees existed, which became evident through active refugee committees that cooperated with the few (I)NGOs. Simultaneously, some of the Shawishes there were connected to DAESH and JN.

More than a quarter of the Syrian refugees report pre-flight relations to Lebanon (ARK 2018: 30). Yet, as described in the background chapter, Syrians and Lebanese have a historic and sometimes difficult connection with each other that transferred into the refugee situation. This complexity became apparent in the interviews where both Syrian occupation, pre-war seasonal work and marriages across borders were mentioned by respondents. Five respondents pointed out strong pre-war family relations through marriage and a sense of closeness in Arsal, and other similarly marginalised areas that are close to the often-invisible
Syrian border. On the background of an absent national state, Arsal developed an extra-territorial relationship based on personal ties with its Syrian neighbours (Hautefeuille 2014). Thus, before the number of refugees exceeded the capacities, the majority of the refugees coming to Arsal, Baalbek and Wadi Khaled were hosted by Syrian families, and Arsali residents participated in anti-Assad demonstrations and supported Syrian opposition fighters (Naufal 2012: 2; ICG 2016: 5-6). Local support for the Syrian revolution was additionally strong because many feared the rising Shiite power in Lebanon and around their Sunni enclave Arsal (ICG 2012: 3; Hautefeuille 2014; ICG 2016: 7).

5.4 HUMANITARIAN AID: “PROBABLY GOOD ENOUGH”

Several aspects concerning the humanitarian aid sector are crucial for the comprehension of refugee militarisation patterns. First, some of the interviewed aid workers indicated through their statements a technical approach that could give space for militarisation. Example statements are an indifference towards politics, indiscriminate help for everyone, cooperation with militias and an exaggerated overall positive attitude towards their sector. Although only two of the 16 interviewees did not reflect upon any political implications of their work, these reflections evolved predominantly around the importance of not empowering Shawishes and the necessity to cater for both refugees’ and locals’ needs in order to prevent future conflict. They were concerned about maintaining social cohesion, and the switch to a two-fold humanitarian approach that includes refugee needs and long-term stabilisation projects (Pantuliano & Metcalfe-Hough 2017: 57). Other possible militarisation contributing behaviour of the humanitarian sector remained unrecognised. An (I)NGO-independent respondent criticised correspondingly that many organisations, particularly charities, only care about immediate results and their own reputation instead of considering negative consequences. Likewise, Pantuliano and Metcalfe-Hough (2017: 57) found that agencies, funds and programmes included conflict awareness only as a secondary goal.

The second aspect is dependency on humanitarian aid. The socioeconomic hardship indicates that many refugees rely on aid deliveries in order to fulfil their basic needs. Despite providing work opportunities, ITSs are the shelter type with highest dependency on humanitarian assistance (UNICEF et al. 2018: 44). However, remote areas and small ITSs were reportedly difficult to include into (I)NGO portfolios and transportation costs and checkpoints prevented access to certain services. Additionally, aid deliveries are insufficient to satisfy basic needs (ALEF 2016: 16). This combination makes both the co-option of aid
and the provision of assistance attractive for militarisation efforts. This is particularly problematic in Arsal, as the level of poverty is high and income sources scarce. This suggests high dependence on aid, but there was little aid to receive since many organisations left during the militants’ rule (Lebanon Support 2019b).

The third aspect is the inclusion of refugees in the agencies’ work. Based on the interviewees’ reports on how they and others organise their work, a majority of aid agencies worked together with Shawishes, at least in the beginning of their engagement, which had negative repercussions for the ITS-residents. Since access to the ITSs was only possible with the Shawish’s permission, many (I)NGOs developed strategies to inform but not empower him. Even though this cooperation might be problematic because fellow refugees were exploited, it did not entail a militarisation risk: None of the Bekaa-based interviewees indicated that Shawishes were members of militant groups, with Arsal being an exception where some Shawishes were appointed by DAESH and JN. Besides the Shawishes, all organisations reported that they depend on cooperation with refugees who act as focal points and multipliers for their service provision. This is similarly unproblematic in the understanding of this thesis, since those who co-opted or diverted aid, solely did so to improve their own situation, not to help militants. Meanwhile, three organisations indicated that they directly cooperate with or provide services to militants: One worked with Palestinian factions in the Palestinian camps, one in Arsal with DAESH/JN, and one with Hezbollah. All interviewed organisations that operated in Arsal claimed that militants tried to influence their aid delivery. One large INGO withdrew after death threats to its employees because their project interfered with the militants’ weapon storage, while another one reported that the militants tolerated them because they could access their hospital. Islamic charities are sometimes affiliated to Salafi groups and reportedly have Syrian fighters among their beneficiaries. They can operate in a less monitored environment than UN-affiliated organisations and aid delivery seems to be partly based on sectarian affiliation, clientelism and political loyalty, at least in Arsal (ICG 2013: 24-25).

Finally, missing cooperation and too much competition between various aid agencies and sectors, as well as an excessive focus on positive results can lead to that aid providers overlook or ignore militarisation indicators because they want to stand out as successful or are preoccupied with managing coordination challenges. Based on the interviews, there is some evidence for coordination and cooperation problems in the humanitarian sector in Lebanon. The majority of the interviewees had a positive attitude towards the cooperation with other agencies and reported long-standing partnerships, standard operating procedures,
monitoring, cluster and sectoral meetings and a shared professional attitude. Nonetheless, many reported at least some difficulties in the daily coordination of tasks, particularly between INGOs and local NGOs. More open senior workers problematised duplication of services, referral gaps, different priorities and approaches and a competition between large INGOs and which thus focus on meeting numerical targets instead of service quality. They portrayed the sector as fragmented with too many organisations that were organised in individually operating UN-led sectors. The sector fragmentation was identified as a major impediment for a comprehensive response which leaves gaps that militants could fill (OXFAM 2018: 8). However, no organisation portrayed these as essential problems, but as something normal and unavoidable: “It is not a perfect system […]. I would not even say that it is very good, but it is probably good enough” (R1 2019, translated by author). Observers are more critical, especially towards the early refugee response as the emergency relief lacked common monitoring mechanisms and a cohesive plan (OXFAM 2018: 8). They further criticise the self-monitoring of the sectors activities (Pantuliano & Metcalfe-Hough 2017: 58). Furthermore, the faith-based Coalition of Islamic Charities introduced a parallel, even less monitored aid system, funded by Arab countries and organisations that support the Syrian opposition (Shibli 2014: 8; Gade 2016: 18). In Arsal however, the coordination was described as unproblematic because there were so few organisations.

Apart from coordination problems, most respondents pointed to an increasing donor fatigue that amplifies competition among aid agencies and tempt them to only report successes while ignoring problems to avoid shrinking funding. Hence, it is not surprising that the respondents presented an overly well-functioning refugee response, which stands in contrast to the critical assessment by outsiders.

5.5 POLITICAL VS HUMANITARIAN ACTIVISM

In a protracted refugee situation, the availability of political rights is important to forestall refugee militarisation. The Syrian refugee situation in Lebanon is protracted since 2017. It fulfils the UNHCR (2004) criteria of being long-standing (≥ 5 years), large (≥ 25 000 refugees) and seemingly intractable. Since the end of UNHCR registration, Syrian refugees find themselves in the characteristic state of limbo (Sude et al. 2015: 16). Many organisations felt likewise, using terms like “prolonged humanitarian crisis” (R12 2019) or “protracted nature of the crisis” (R2 2019). Simultaneously, they criticised the Lebanese government for ignoring the reality of protraction and focusing on refugee return instead of integration. Thus,
the availability of political rights, representation and mechanisms to voice grievances gains in importance.

It is difficult for Syrians to achieve such political participation. Citizenship, and thus political rights, is out of reach for most refugees in Lebanon. Lebanon does not even offer the possibility to seek asylum, since an ‘asylum seeker’ is defined in the 2003 MoU as a person who applies for asylum in another country than Lebanon (Janmyr 2016: 63), and naturalisation is a rarely granted opportunity (el-Helou & Antara 2018: 11). Citizenship is most likely also inaccessible for future refugee generations as only 21% of the Lebanon-born Syrian refugee children have their birth registered, which is a conscious strategy of the government. Hence a majority is at risk of becoming stateless (UNICEF et al. 2018: 27). No interviewee touched upon this topic.

Political activism by Syrians as a non-violent way to find representation and voice in political matters of both the origin and the host country is forbidden and has little space in Lebanon. Regarding political engagement in the origin country, respondents reported that young men who have been politically active either in Lebanon or in Syria or who came from areas where the opposition was strong, faced detention in Lebanon. Indeed, every act of Syrian political activism is forbidden. Syrian political displays were banned (Bernard 2014) and activists were intimidated by the LSF (ALEF 2016: 9). As a result, activists put great effort into self-censorship, and depoliticise their tolerated humanitarian work by strictly separating it from any political elements (Smallwood 2014: 22; Ruiz de Elvira 2019: 47). Aid workers reported some low-level activism like communication and information sharing among Syrians or activities on an international, intellectual level, which then does not take place in ITSs. One member of the intellectual refugee population explained that Syrian activists left for Europe and the utmost activism in Lebanon is to be found on a humanitarian level (Kaghadou 2019). Similarly, ICG (2013: 13) found few political activists in Lebanon, who additionally keep a low profile. However, Syrian-to-Syrian humanitarian work, e.g. collection and distribution of relief goods or cultural work is more widespread than indicated, though this is hard to quantify due to its informal nature (Ruiz de Elvira 2019: 37). Such initiatives are mostly rather small individual grassroot activities (Smallwood 2014: 21-22). Refugees can legally be founders of NGOs, but face recognition difficulties (el-Helou & Antara 2018: 12). These restrictions can be problematic, if violent outlets stand out as the only possibility to voice grievances in the host country.

Strikingly, some respondents indicated that political participation is, after all, not desired by most refugees. This is because Syrians have little pre-war experience with civic
activism and are unfamiliar with organising themselves politically as this was forbidden in Syria (Smallwood 2014: 22; Corstange 2019: 178). Based on this, political participation might not be craved to a high extent by Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Moreover, Syrians seem even less interested in participation in the host country’s politics than in Syrian issues. Even though they could join pan-Arab parties, like the Baath party, their confined focus on Lebanese constituencies made them uninteresting for Syrians. Instead, Syrians are preoccupied with their socioeconomic situation (el-Helou & Antara 2018: 13-14). The interviewees explained this indifference with a short expectation horizon, a hope to return soon, and a hopelessness regarding improvement of displacement conditions. Therefore, humanitarian activism and the inclusion in camp-intern decision-making processes through working for (I)NGOs might be enough to satisfy the refugees’ need for participation possibilities. Two interviewees stated that this was a popular opportunity for refugees to take part in a socially rewarding activity. Furthermore, several respondents indicated that this engagement is mainly motivated by prospects of monetary compensation and increased power in the community, which again indicates a higher political indifference. Nevertheless, in regard to the advancing protraction of displacement, an UN employee deemed the lack of representation and the minimal freedom of expression as a massive issues that could contribute to future militarisation.

5.6 SCATTERED NON-CAMPS

Lebanon has 1 500 to 2 000 ITSs which vary between 1 and more than 200 tents with several thousand residents. However, even the largest ITSs are small compared to refugee camps in other host countries in Syria’s vicinity, as Jordan’s Zaatari Refugee Camp with about 78 800 inhabitants exemplifies (UNHCR 2018). The structure and location of refugee camps are two factors that impact the likelihood of refugee militarisation. The interviews generated important insights into both. I first look at the ITSs’ structure and the effect of their unofficial status, before turning to location aspects.

5.6.1 The Structure of Non-Camps

Lebanon’s ITS are not official refugee camps. The Lebanese government refused to open any official camps as they saw them as a security threat based on violent experiences with Palestinian camps and because this was supposed to have more positive economic and social effects (Turner 2015: 391). Also, both UN and Hezbollah were wary about border camps as
they feared their militarisation (ICG 2013: 17). Indeed, this approach was appraised as more humane by both researchers and the humanitarian community (Fleming-Farrell 2013; Rainey 2015). However, this approach resulted from political disagreement rather than from humanitarianism and did apparently not forestall the establishment of de facto refugee camps (Knudsen 2017: 138). Knudsen describes the ITSs therefore as non-camps: “While non-camp was meant as no-camp, it has in practice come to include irregular settlements with limited service provision, located in fringe border areas. Non-camps function as temporary collection centres” (2017: 141). Yassin et al. (2015: 32) agree that ITSs are de facto camps as they confine freedom of movement, feature high dependence on aid and overcrowding. As a consequence of their unofficial character, ITSs are not externally managed or monitored by either the Lebanese government, UNHCR or another (I)NGO, but are self-managed by the refugees. Most of the interviewed senior aid workers stressed that the lack of external management poses severe difficulties to aid delivery and resident control. In their experience, usually the standard of living in official camps is much higher and Shawishes would have a less prominent role. This is a reason for why camp structure and socioeconomic conditions are contingent on the individual landowner’s will and therefore vary widely. Hence, the non-camp/non-camp policy and the prohibition of any permanent structures turned makeshift ITSs into permanent solutions for their residents, which are unsuitable for the reality of long-term displacement.

The camps are open and unprotected from infiltration of any kind as they can be found next to highways, on fields and in backyards and are usually not fenced, as the participants report. Additionally, security forces are absent inside the camps, as explained above. In other studies, aid workers expressed their concerns in regard to unguarded camps as breeding grounds for extremism and that if DAESH or JN would offer money to camp inhabitants, they would join them (Yassin et al. 2015: 60). This explanatory impact of informal, not externally managed refugee camps emerged during the data-generating process.

5.6.2 Scattered and Isolated Camps

Several aspects of the location of refugee camps crucially impact militarisation likelihood in Lebanon. First, the border proximity arguably is high everywhere in Lebanon due to its small size, but especially ITSs in the Bekaa, Baalbek-El Hermel and Akkar are often located within a distance of 20 kilometres to the Syrian border, which is too close to prevent militarisation for UNHCR standards (Knudsen 2017: 147). Still, not all ITSs close to the border experienced
problems with militants. The respondents differentiated between Arsal on the one hand and central Bekaa, Wadi Kahled and Hermel on the other hand, where the latter areas were rather peaceful. Arsal shares 50 km of mountainous border with Syria, across which many illegal passages lead to rebel strongholds on the Syrian side from where many fled to Lebanon (Lebanon Support 2019b).

Second, many ITSs are placed in peripheral, marginalised and poor areas. Arsal, a Sunni enclave in a Shia area, was portrayed as an extraordinary case of state neglect, and not being Lebanon: “It’s not like in Lebanon in Arsal. I can’t describe it to you” (R16 2019). Crucially, isolation increased after the 2014 fights against jihadi militants in the town. Afterwards, both Arsali residents and refugees found themselves in the described siege-like situation. Hautefeuille clarifies: “About two thousand Syrian families are trapped beyond Arsal’s checkpoint without supplies and medical services, while refugees inside the town’s encampments are unable to travel to other areas without risking arbitrary detention at the main army checkpoint” (2014). This increased the susceptibility to militarisation efforts and the ability for militants to operate uninterruptedly. Arsal essentially became one large camp, segregated from the rest of the country.

Third, ITS-based Syrians are often segregated from the host population, i.e. they have minimal contact with each other. This form of isolation was reported to be especially problematic in small camps, where Syrians rarely interact with Lebanese. Social segregation was not mentioned as a characteristic of the ITS landscape in Arsal, as elaborated on above.

Finally, most respondents noted that the scattered distribution of ITSs impedes both the connection to the host community, accessibility of humanitarian and social services and network-building among refugees. The effects of the dispersion of refugee settlements are apparently amplified by the presence of numerous checkpoints that confine freedom of movement to a small area. Together with the sheer amount of ITSs and their usually small size, this pattern prevented the development of dens informal refugee networks, unlike in larger Syrian camps in other countries. Thus, no network of Shawishes emerged and they only have control over their own, individual camp. They therefore lack both a broad support base and a network needed to mobilise refugees for any political cause (Clarke 2018: 626-627).
5.7 Further Insight – No Interest in Militarised Syrians

Militarisation among Syrian refugees is not only outside the interest and the will of the Lebanese state, but also of any relevant and violent non-state actor. All of them appear to agree on the national consensus mentioned in 5.2.2. Most prominently, Hezbollah does not attack, but rather welcomes Syrian refugees in Lebanon, despite its breach of the Baabda Declaration and its engagement on behalf of the Syrian regime (ICG 2013: 12). One of the main reasons for its engagement in Syria was to prevent an active front in Lebanon since it feared the political and sectarian consequences (Itani & Grebowsk 2013: 2). This is an explanation that evolved during the research process.

Such dynamics were not voiced explicitly during the interviews but can be interpreted from the reactions I got when presenting the interview’s topic. Most respondents were at first confused and pointed to other, more pressing violence-prone areas: First and foremost, Palestinian refugee camps were presented as highly problematic recruitment grounds. The level of militarisation and rising extremism in those camps is a recurring topic in Lebanon-related research (e.g. Rougier 2015; Sogge 2018). Aid workers from organisations which operate in Palestinian camps pointed towards the lawless character of those camps without the presence of Lebanese authorities. Refugees in the Palestinian camps suffer from degrading conditions as UNRWA and (I)NGOs reduced their services for Palestinians as their focus shifted to Syrians (Knudsen 2016: 446). As a result, Palestinians must compete with Syrian refugees for limited resources and the (I)NGOs’ attention as some interviewees reported. Even some of the organisations I spoke to and that have been active in Lebanon before 2012, shifted from supporting Palestinians to Syrians. This created a hostile environment and resulted in clashes in Palestinian refugee camps where many Syrians settled. This indicates that relative deprivation dynamics are present in the Palestinian camps and could be utilised by armed groups (Andersen 2016: 36). Thus, existing Islamist organisations, like the Lebanese al-Qaeda affiliates Fatah al-Islam, Usbet al-Ansar and Jund al-Sham, invested progressively in those camps, particularly in Ayn al-Hilwe which is seen as a “space of exception” (Hanafi 2008: 82) and the birth place of Lebanon’s first jihadi groups (Rougier 2007). The current refugee situation was then instrumentalised by DAESH, al-Qaeda and JN to infiltrate the Palestinian camps to recruit and perform terrorist attacks from there (Andersen 2016: 31-32). Their inhabitants seem to be more attractive for mobilisation efforts of different militant groups than the ones in ITSs. According to a social cohesion expert, it was clear that DAESH recruited both Palestinians and Syrians inside Palestinian camps.
However, despite growing importance of religion among Palestinians, jihadi extremism remains relatively contained (Gade 2017: 190). A reason for this is the prominent position of the traditionally ruling Palestinian factions, which have other primary goals than global jihad and are preoccupied with their own national struggle and social responsibilities inside the camps (Knudsen 2005: 228). These factions are vital to the camps’ structures which was demonstrated by one interviewed organisation, stating that without the permission of the ruling factions, they cannot conduct any projects.

According to the interviews, the impoverished and hostile Tripoli neighbourhoods Bab al-Tebbaneh and Jabal Mohsen are a second problematic area from where Syrian and Lebanese children were recruited by armed groups. Tripoli generally features a strong jihadi presence (Gade 2017: 195). Caused by the city’s historic links to the Assad regime, the occurrence of Syrian Sunni-Alawi clashes reignited similar hostilities in Tripoli. However, the Tripoli clashes did not transcend into more general Sunni-Shia fights, because Tripoli’s Sunnis Salafists do not want to risk fights with Hezbollah due to unrealistic national ambitions (Salem 2012: 14). Lebanese Islamists even distanced themselves from the jihadism of DAESH and JN (Gade 2017: 199-200). Thus, major confrontations are avoided and largescale Sunni mobilisation, and subsequent Syrian refugee recruitment, are unnecessary. However, the Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict, and thus Sunni Islamism, grow in importance since the SCW’s beginning (Levant7 2015; Gade 2017: 193-195).

The third mentioned problematic area consist of urban settled refugees. One respondent concerned with preventing violent extremism noted that refugees who reside in non-residential shelters in urban areas are easier to isolate from the host and refugee community and thus easier to control and manipulate by extremists. This coincides with reports by aid workers that they have difficulties reaching those refugees.

Accordingly, there are several reasons why both state and non-state actors want to prevent conflict outbreak in Lebanon and thus rather externalise their conflicts on Syrian territory than to militarise ITS-based Syrian refugees: First, Lebanese state and non-state actors are aware of the lingering memory of the long Lebanese Civil War and are therefore wary of any action that could cause its reignition. Second, Palestinians are preoccupied with their own national identity and the struggle for their land. Third, hostile Lebanese factions concentrate on domestic affairs, and solidarity with Syrian groups is side-lined. They therefore externalised the Lebanese conflict to Syrian soil, which becomes evident through Lebanese foreign fighters in Syria who did not want their respective groups to openly engage in Lebanon but instead used the opportunity to fight Hezbollah outside their fragile home
country (Gade 2017: 188, 198-199). Fourth, the militarisation in Arsal appears not to have been motivated by the spread of radical Islamism to Lebanon but rather as a rear base to regain Syrian positions and to get access to health services (Zelin 2016: 57; Gade 2017: 198-199). Finally, other areas than ITSs seem more attractive for refugee militarisation through such non-state actors.

5.8 CONCLUDING THE ANALYSIS

This chapter shows that ITS-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon, particularly in Arsal, find themselves in difficult positions regarding all six examined risk factors. Some of them seemingly have a larger impact on the Arsali refugee population than on the national level: the origin of the refugee situation, the host state’s capability, socioeconomic deprivation, the demeanour of the humanitarian sector and the structure and location of camps. The missing interest in militarising ITS-based Syrian refugees from other militant groups in Lebanon, the state’s willingness and poverty are important aspects for the militarisation pattern. Which factors determine and explain the Lebanese patterns and how these insights can inform existing refugee militarisation theory are the subjects of the following discussion.
6 DISCUSSION: FACTORS OF REFUGEE MILITARISATION IN LEBANON

The analysis shows that camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon struggle in various ways and the situation in Arsal appears particular dire. In this chapter, I interpret the presented findings in the light of my theoretical framework to understand which factors determine the militarisation – or the lack thereof – among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The discussion proceeds in three steps. First, I discuss the present factors that indicate an increased risk of refugee militarisation. These factors do not cause the absence of militarisation on the national level and are thus non-determining. Second, I present the factors that determine the general absence of refugee militarisation among ITS-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon. During this part, I specify hypotheses which can be tested in further research. These hypotheses can add more nuance to refugee militarisation theory. Third, I discuss how the studied factors played out in Arsal to find support or discouragement for the hypotheses. The implications of these insights and the hypotheses are only applicable to similar cases of large (≥ 25 000) refugee populations in capacity-wise weak neighbouring host states to which they have strong transnational ties, living in camp-like settlements, without a secured refugee status and depending on humanitarian aid.

6.1 NON-DETERMINING FACTORS

Several expressions of the selected risk factors suggest a high likelihood for militarisation among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon. However, this refugee population did not experience militarisation. Therefore, these factors do not determine the pattern of non-militarisation on the national level. The first factor is the host state response defined by its capability and will. Lischer (2005) described how the state might be willing to prevent militarisation but misses the required capabilities, or, even though it would be able to prevent it, its will obstructs this either directly or indirectly. The Lebanese state’s capability and willingness produce a mixed impact. As a weak state, Lebanon has limited capabilities itself, as it depends on the support of the armed non-state actor Hezbollah to overpower extremist groups and on international donations and (I)NGOs to manage the refugee situation. Lebanon is not able to protect its porous borders as it did not monitor or even demilitarise arriving refugees. Militants could enter easily due to the open-border policy in the first years of the refugee situation. The LSF do not possess the monopoly of violence in some of the ITS-rich areas in Bekaa where instead Hezbollah or clans provide security and infrastructure. Thus,
these non-state actors are crucial for internal security. The abundance of checkpoints in the Bekaa certainly obstructs the refugee’s movement and ability to create a strong network. Security presence is flawed by missing coherence and equipment problems, and the efficiency of their raids is uncertain. Lacking economical and organisational capability and pursuing an inconsistent refugee policy, added to the loss of control over the Syrian refugee population and undermined the possibility to alleviate the impact of the refugee situation in most communities. Thus, the resulting socioeconomic hardship for refugees and deteriorating standard of living for local citizens fed into long-term grievances and hostilities between the local and the refugee population.

The physical protection of refugees is another weak point regarding Lebanon’s capabilities as it indicates a protection gap for refugees. Lebanon’s security forces are rarely present around ITSs, do not conduct policing and refugees rarely have access to justice mechanisms due to their irregular status. Refugees often perceive state authorities as threatening due to harassment, arbitrary arrests and the increasing return pressure. The resulting missing protection leaves a vacuum that militant groups could fill as alternative protection providers.

Lebanon’s will to prevent refugee militarisation seems uncertain. On the one hand, the state wants to prevent direct militarisation. This shows through the reputation-harming cooperation with Hezbollah and with Syrian intelligence services to prevent violent spillovers from Syria. However, this unofficial alliance with the origin state decreases the refugees’ security and thus presents a militarisation opportunity for protection providers. On the other hand, Lebanon is unwilling to engage in the refugee presence in a way that would forestall militarisation risk through indirect militarisation factors like socioeconomic neglect, inconsistent (anti-)refugee policy and insecurity. Lebanon’s unwillingness to cater adequately for the refugees’ needs, e.g. through prohibiting any permanent structures, pushing responsibility to municipalities and the humanitarian sector and securitising instead of integrating refugees. This state behaviour obstructs Lebanon’s will to prevent direct militarisation, leading to an ambiguous host state response which is unable to prevent refugee militarisation.

Pre-war social ties between refugees and the host population, as an aspect of the refugees’ socioeconomic situation, are strong in the border areas. As religious connections are tight and refugees settled in sectarian-wise (thus often more welcoming) similar neighbourhoods, plus that they changed the fragile sectarian balance, conflict outbreak
between Lebanese Sunnis and Shiite groups and subsequent recruitment of refugees is a probable scenario. The role of Shawishes in connection with social ties is discussed below.

Relative deprivation, as another aspect of the refugees’ socioeconomic situation, can foster refugee militancy if they perceive themselves as being worse off in exile than they were in Syria or in comparison to another population group in exile. Conversely, the local Lebanese population can foster a collective feeling of neglect based on both actual and perceived negative externalities that accompany the refugee presence. The perceived disadvantage in comparison to the refugee presence fosters hostilities and refugees could respond to resulting attacks against them through militarising for purposes of self-defence. Lebanese people feel structurally disadvantaged in comparison to Syrian refugees and project their dissatisfaction with public services and infrastructure on the refugee presence. Their living conditions deteriorated in many areas and some humanitarian services are not accessible for Lebanese people, e.g. free quality medical treatment. They therefore express a feeling of unfair preferential treatment. The growing openly hostile attitude, tensions, attacks, harassment, curfews and evictions increased the refugees’ insecurity and thus their need for protection.

Other forms of relative deprivation seem less problematic. There is no evidence that some Syrian groups feel marginalised in comparison to other Syrians. They feel (and are) worse off in Lebanon than in pre-war Syria, and the host population, though conditions can vary between individual ITSs. This is related to severe poverty and a lack of quality education, which could provide a militarisation basis. In fact, an expert on child recruitment mechanisms stated that besides personal experiences with violence, Syrian children in Lebanon join militant groups because of individual or group-based grievances and poverty. Likewise, Arsal-experienced interviewees noted that one of the reasons for DAESH’s success in refugee recruitment in the particularly poor and neglected Arsal was that they gave them a sense of power and something socially rewarding to do, as well as that they were the almost exclusive source of income and food security.

Humanitarian aid can contribute to militarisation if: the sector has a technical approach and thus allows armed individuals to live among civilians; aid agencies cooperate and include existing refugee leadership structures in their work; or if the sector is fragmentised, has cooperation problems and focuses on positive results only which leaves space for militarisation indicators to be overlooked or ignored to secure funding. Lebanon features all of these elements to varying degrees.
In order for control mechanisms through aid provision to work, it is crucial that aid dependence among refugees is high. This is the case for the majority of ITS-residents. Likewise, humanitarian aid is abundant and can be used by militants. Furthermore, the sector has a semi-technical approach. (I)NGOs reflect on issues connected with one-sided aid that benefits refugees only and increasingly include projects that strengthen social cohesion which antagonises the spread of feelings of relative deprivation. However, aid agencies seem unaware of other political implications of their work as some even cooperate with militant groups. Additionally, the impact of faith-based Islamic charities appears problematic but remains unclear due to the selection of interviewees who agreed on participating. The cooperation of aid agencies with existing leadership structures – the Shawishes – is problematic if those are connected to militant groups. Even though many organisations try to circumvent Shawishes, they still occupy a central position in the humanitarian response. The structural organisation of the humanitarian sector is another challenge. The described problems in inter-agency coordination, disconnected sectors and many involved organisations, competition between agencies for areas to operate in and fulfilling target numbers, as well as the difficulties to secure funding leaves room for that militarisation efforts are easily overlooked or ignored by humanitarian workers.

Missing political rights can increase militarisation likelihood if the refugee situation becomes protracted and the refugees’ need for voice and grievance mechanisms and political participation increases. If citizenship and thus political rights seem inaccessible and non-violent political participation is not available, disempowered refugees might turn to violent alternatives to prove their agency. Syrian refugees lack voice and grievance mechanisms besides working with (I)NGOs, especially as their situation has become protracted. This is because political activism is forbidden and access to citizenship is unlikely.

Finally, the ITS-structure caused by their non-camp character, increases the likelihood of militarisation. They are open and unprotected, so militants can easily enter and stay. The missing external management and thus lacking control and monitoring increases the militarisation risk. Therefore, they are easy to control for the militants. Moreover, the no-camp/non-camp policy turned makeshift camps into unsuitable permanent solutions which increases poverty levels and thus decreases the ability for refugees to mobilise. Furthermore, many ITSs are found in peripheral and isolated areas where Lebanese state and security authorities are absent, and they are segregated from the host population. Also, their proximity to the border of the origin state allows easy access for rebels who need a sanctuary and base for attacks against their opponent, the origin state.
6.2 Determining Factors and Hypotheses

The above-mentioned factors would suggest more widespread militarisation among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon. As this is not the case, other factors must determine the national pattern where Arsal is an exception. This means the factors listed below must generally occur in Lebanon in a way that they counteract militarisation, while they behave differently in Arsal. Here it becomes important to look at what type of group militarised the refugee situation.

First of all, the origin of the refugee situation is important as it defines the initial militarisation potential. Looking at Jordan and Turkey, which have higher shares of persecuted refugees than Lebanon and which suffer from higher levels of refugee militancy directed at the origin country (Dionigi 2016: 14), the importance of the factor becomes apparent. The analysis shows that this potential is low for ITS-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon as they can largely be characterised as situational refugees who fled from war externalities and destruction but were not direct part of the conflict. Additionally, many hope to return soon as fighting is abating. This factor interacts with the political rights factor. As political activism was forbidden from the beginning of the refugee situation and Syrian opposition activists were both inexperienced as well as threatened, intimidated and surrendered to Syrian authorities, the small part of this population that could have had an interest in attacking the origin state from exile was discouraged in an early phase of the displacement, as they lacked support and as activists emigrated onwards to other countries. Thus, even though the refugee population is heterogenous regarding supporters of the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition, the persecuted character of refugees is not dominating, and militancy entrepreneurs who bridge the gap between motivation and action are lacking. Moreover, even though militarisation likelihood should increase throughout the later years of the refugee situation, as it becomes protracted and Syrians therefore have an increased need for political rights and participation, they seemingly lack the interest and desire for (non-)violent political activism. This is not only caused by the predominantly situational character, but also because of their limited experience in political participation and social activism. For them, the provided possibilities by (I)NGOs to be included in camp-intern decision-making and service provision might satisfy the wish for voicing grievances and co-deciding on one’s own fate. Therefore, my first hypothesis is:

H1.1: If the initial militarisation potential, defined by the origin of the refugee situation, is low, restrictions on the refugees’ political rights can prevent
refugee militarisation as they discourage the few activists and the support of passive bystanders.

This explains why there is no largescale mobilisation by groups that pursue the original Syrian opposition goals and primarily target the Syrian origin state to continue their struggle from exile. Therefore, militarisation could only happen through groups that answer to grievances that develop during the refugee experience. Consequently, factors that determine the militarisation likelihood throughout the refugee situation gain importance, e.g. poverty. Militarising groups then can have primary goals that do not necessarily mirror the refugees’ interests as long as they answer to some of their grievances. Thus, I hypothesise:

H1.2: If the initial militarisation potential is low, e.g. because the refugee population consists largely of situational refugees, militarisation is based in grievances that developed during the exile experience.

Based on this reasoning, the importance of socioeconomic factors increases. As shown above, both relative deprivation and socioeconomic hardship suggest a high militarisation potential for camp-based Syrian refugees. However, despite some marginal recruitment by existing militant groups that can offer something to do, an income or other material compensation, camp-based Syrian refugees do not seem to mobilise on respective demands. In fact, they lack the means to organise militant protest against their deprivation. This is confirmed by Armenak Tokmajyan (2019), a researcher affiliated with the ICG, who stated that Syrian refugees are too poor to organise politically. Largescale militarisation among ITS-based Syrians is unlikely in future, as the poorest are predominantly occupied with their own survival instead of rebelling (Gade 2016: 18). The high level of compliance despite assaults and exploitation in combination with the high return expectation among ITS-based Syrians support this interpretation. This poverty-level explains why it is difficult for refugees to organise a revolt against any of their in-exile-grievances if there is no other militant group that either already existed in the host country or came with the refugees from the origin country, and that can provide necessary means. Additionally, it makes little sense for them to attack the host state to gain resources as the greed theory suggests, as nothing indicates that they could gain substantial resources from such an endeavour. Thus, while bad socioeconomic conditions are not a crucial factor for what Muggah (2010) calls outward refugee militarisation by refugee rebel groups, they can increase susceptibility to or tolerance
of other groups that can create access to these resources. Militarisation then becomes a coping mechanism as Jacobsen (2014: 105) describes it. Therefore, my next hypothesis is:

**H2: Extreme poverty prevents refugees from building militant groups themselves that target the origin state to improve their situation. However, it does not prevent that other militant groups that can alleviate respective grievances recruit refugees or militarise camps.**

Social ties among refugees themselves and among refugees and the host population can increase the resilience against militarisation efforts as they can facilitate integration into the host community. Especially in ITSs, this is an important mechanism. With their specific knowledge, Shawishes can provide work (even though exploitative), accommodation and other necessary resources to new arrivals. As the camps are often former working camps and their inhabitants are former seasonal worker who stayed permanently, the intra-communal ties can be strong. If the Shawish would be part of or connected to militant groups, this position would be more problematic. But I found no evidence for that. The cooperation of humanitarian organisations with strong and exploitative Shawishes or their frequent use of refugee focal points and other refugee leadership structures can and does have negative remedies for ITS-inhabitants. However, two crucial implications derive from refugee leaders not being connected to militant groups, and therefore abusing their position not to ensure loyalty to some militants, but to enrich themselves personally. The first implication is thus that Shawishes (and other powerful refugees) find themselves in comfortable positions which are founded on their position as refugee leaders. Therefore, there is little reason for them to start a rebellion themselves as this would endanger their current position. In line with this, Masterson and Lehman (2018: 44) found that humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees in Lebanon decreases the risk of militarisation, probably because it increases the stakes for militant refugees. The second implication is that through the exploitation of the camp inhabitants by the Shawish, the ITS-inhabitants’ individual means to rebel are reduced, which falls into the ‘too-poor’ explanation. Thus, I propose:

**H3: If refugee leaders are not connected to militant groups, they will not abuse their position to militarise refugee camps, given that their personal socioeconomic situation and power-position is founded on this camp leadership position.**
This dynamic is connected to one of the main determining reasons: the location of camps. In the theoretical framework for this study, I considered both the isolation and the border proximity as problematic aspects of camp location. The scattered placing of ITSs, instead, emerged during the research process as an aspect that impacts militarisation. The militarisation preventing function of this factor evolves in combination with many checkpoints and the refugees’ legal status. Together they prevent largescale refugee mobilisation because no potentially violent refugee network can develop as camps are isolated. The military capacity of Lebanon is not strong enough to prevent general refugee militarisation. But the checkpoints control refugee movement because they function as a blockade for refugees without legal status as they are numerous. They prevent refugees and militants from travelling freely between ITSs and subsequently building networks that would be necessary for largescale mobilisation when camps are as dispersed as in Lebanon. Thus, it is difficult for Shawishes or other militancy entrepreneurs mobilise if refugee-intrinsic militarisation potential builds up and refugees themselves want create armed groups, and/or to join existing militant groups. Any respective efforts therefore remain confined to individual camps and because they are rather small, no largescale mobilisation is possible.

Based on this, I argue:

H4: A weak host state can prevent largescale refugee militarisation by installing rather small and dispersed camps and preventing meaningful interaction between individual and, through these efforts, isolated camps, e.g. through checkpoints and illegalising refugees.

Finally, it is important, if there are authorities that would benefit from and thus support refugee militarisation. The host state’s will is crucial in this regard. Despite the ambiguous host state response, the Lebanese state has no interest in militarised refugees as it can neither use them in another conflict, nor is it in conflict with the origin state of Syria which would leave room for passively allowing or actively supporting militarisation. Furthermore, third-party states do not incentivise the host state to allow refugee militarisation, as monetary and material assistance to Lebanon remains contingent on efforts in improving the Syrian refugee situation. Crucially, the consensus of preventing refugee militarisation in Lebanon exceeded the realm of the central state: “There was a Lebanese domestic agreement to avoid fighting inside the country, as well as consensus among international players and Syrian fighters to avoid spillover [sic!], as this went against the interests of all. Those who wanted, could, however, go to Syria” (Gade 2017: 200). This consensus ensured that militarisation was
prevented in ITS-rich areas, where state and security authorities lack the monopoly of violence and law and order depend on non-state stakeholders. Therefore, I hypothesize:

H5.1: In a weak host state where state and security authorities lack the monopoly of violence in refugee-hosting areas, it is not only the willingness of the state but the will of all relevant (non-state) actors that determines if militarisation among refugees can occur.

Furthermore, neither DAESH and JN, nor pre-existing Lebanese jihadi groups or Palestinian factions have an interest in destabilising Lebanon by militarising ITSs, generally recruiting Syrian refugees or incorporating Syrian interests and grievances into their causes. Rather they utilise the SCW through externalising their Lebanese conflicts to Syrian territory as shown by both Hezbollah and Sunni jihadists fighting there. Moreover, actors who are still interested in recruiting refugees or seeking sanctuary have other opportunities in Lebanon which require less effort than ITSs. ITSs are hard to reach due to the checkpoints and provide a relatively small number of recruits. Refugees in Palestinian camps and in urban areas/non-residential shelters seem to be more attractive. They are easier to manipulate as they are in a higher demand of aid. Palestinian refugees have been increasingly neglected since the beginning of the Syrian refugee situation. They suffer from growing poverty and reduced humanitarian services and could thus develop feelings of relative deprivation in comparison to Syrian refugees. This is possibly a relevant factor for mobilisation in Palestinian camps. Palestinians could be more susceptible to groups that can offer material compensation and other services. Their camps can be interpreted as preferable recruitment grounds for external groups, like DAESH and JN, because Lebanese state authority is even less present there than in most ITS-regions, insecurity is high, they are large and armed non-state groups are commonly present there. Therefore, my final hypothesis is:

H5.2: Refugee militarisation is unlikely to occur, if the refugee population is situational and lacks the means to create violent groups themselves based on in-exile grievances, unless existing groups have an interest in and capabilities for militarising refugees.
6.3 EXPLAINING ARSAL

Discussing why the pattern is different in Arsal compared to other major refuge-hosting areas provides a preliminary test for the established explanatory dynamics and hypotheses. Most refugees came to Arsal after military operations in rebel strongholds on the Syrian side of the border (ICG 2016: 8). Together with them came fighters from DAESH and Jabhat al-Nusra and/or their families which indicates that the share of persecuted refugees among Arsal’s refugee population is higher than in other ITS-regions. Therefore, the initial militarisation potential of this population was higher and militancy entrepreneurs were present among the refugees from the start. This thus supports my first hypothesis.

Furthermore, the refugee population in Arsal is rather homogenous with most refugees belonging to one tribe from the Homs-area. The resulting communal strength can be seen in the active engagement in humanitarian activism by various relief committees. While such communal strength usually increases the refugees’ resilience against militarisation efforts, it can facilitate militarisation in cases where fighters are among the refugees. In this context, it is important to note that reportedly some Shawishes in the Arsal ITSs were appointed by militant groups and are thus a part of a militant network that is missing in other areas. Their position of power does not result from their special knowledge of their area but is dependent on the militants’ will. Therefore, it is likely that they abuse their position not only for personal enrichment, like they do in other ITSs, but to allow a militarisation of the camp. Even though it remains unclear if the remaining aid organisations cooperated with Shawishes involved with militants, this structural difference supports H3. Also, strong social ties to the Lebanese host community – the extra-territorial relationship – helped refugees to integrate. As the Arsalis therefore supported the Syrian opposition initially, this might have helped militants to establish among the refugees. This is therefore another aspect to how social ties can have a negative effect.

Clarke (2018: 627) already found that region of origin, i.e. the refugees’ connection to the Syrian opposition, alone cannot explain why refugees in Lebanon protest. Thus, other factors are necessary. The most important difference between Arsal and other ITS-areas is its segregation in combination with no security presence. Before the 2014-clashes, security forces were even less present in Arsal than in other areas of the country and the border was neither sealed off nor were refugees demilitarised as they arrived via secret pathways penetrating the mountainous border area. However, this is also true for other peripheral border areas in the North and North-East of Lebanon. What is different is the level of isolation
of ITSs. The camps in Arsal were not isolated from each other or from the host population. Instead, between 2014 and 2017, rigid checkpoints segregated both populations from the rest of the country. This isolation enabled militants to exert unmonitored and unchecked control over the inhabitants of the quarantined area. Inside this segregated area, the scattered placement of the ITSs as well as their small size became less important as residents and militants could move freely between them. This facilitated network-building and infiltration of the camps, as well as provided a larger recruitment pool of tens of thousands of Syrian refugees. Thus, Arsal became an area which was both easier to militarise and control than other ITSs and the effort put into the area made sense to DAESH and JN. It can therefore be argued that Arsal is one closed camp which presents an area of limited statehood (Lischer 2017: 93). Arguably, the state policy of not establishing any official large refugee camps had to some degree the intended effect of preventing refugee militarisation. But this was rather coincidental than a deliberate choice of strong state authorities. This supports H4, related to camp-location. Arsal is also a subcase that indirectly supports H5.1 as relevant non-state actors, JN and DAESH, had an interest in refugee militarisation.

Next, it is useful to pay attention to what kind of group militarised the refugee situation in Arsal. JN had the replacement of the Assad-regime with an Islamic state as its primary goal and used Islamic rule as a means to win authentic support of the population. It can therefore be seen as a group which primarily targeted the origin state. This can be argued even though JN started targeting civilian centres in Lebanon to increase the Lebanese sectarian divide. These attacks were a response to Hezbollah entering the SCW on the government side (CEP 2019c: 2-3). Such attacks can therefore be seen as attacks on allies of the origin state with the aim to weaken the same. This explains why refugees initially actively supported this group. For the persecuted refugees, it provided a possibility to continue the struggle against the Syrian regime and Hezbollah from exile. Likewise, DAESH aimed from the beginning at a global Islamic caliphate and only recently changed its strategy from holding territory to insurgencies against the Syrian state (CEP 2019a: 2-3). However, both DAESH and JN are extremist Salafi jihadi terrorist groups with transnational aspirations. Such goals that go beyond genuine Syrian matters and include largescale violence against civilians and other countries, are likely to be repellant for most refugees and it is therefore difficult to secure their long-term support. In fact, several respondents reported that the refugees’ support changed to welcoming the extremists’ expulsion in 2017. This development of the groups’ goals, for which it becomes increasingly difficult to gain the support of civilian refugees, could explain why the jihadi extremists in Arsal are more known for installing
sleeper cells, weapon storage, family accommodation and using health services in Arsal, than for direct recruitment.

Because those groups can be seen as hybrids between groups that pursue goals towards the origin state and groups that pursue goals that potentially are not in the direct interest of the refugees, I argue that other factors have to play a role in order to ensure militarisation among Arsali refugees. This is supported by the statements of some interviewees that young refugees joined these groups to have an income, a place to live and something to do, as this was their only opportunity. The socioeconomic situation is even more pressured in Arsal than in other Lebanese areas due to the severe state neglect and deprivation of the town. The therefore marginal capability to alleviate the impact of the refugees’ presence and to accommodate their needs is not sufficient. The anti-refugee policy and the makeshift camps impact the lives of camp-based Syrians essentially in Arsal, as winters are harsh, and snowstorms regularly destroy ITSs (Najjar 2019). Furthermore, while the dependency on humanitarian aid is high due to this marginalisation, it was largely absent during the militants’ occupation. This in turn increased the susceptibility to groups who can offer a mitigation of the suffering. The militants could use the humanitarian sector in another way to control the refugee population. Their intimidation of (I)NGOs, which caused several organisations to leave the area, increased the refugees’ need for alternative resources. Thus, the situation in Arsal supports hypothesis H2. As these two groups apparently have some resources at their disposal – jobs, other material compensation, protection and agency – they can recruit in Arsal based on poverty and marginalisation. In other ITSs, where militants did not arrive with the refugees and brought these resources, those are lacking as recruitment incentives. Furthermore, the feeling of relative deprivation is likely to be more widespread in Arsal in the recent years, as the local population holds the refugees responsible for the military siege that deprived them from their livelihoods. This has shown through recently exceptionally high tensions between the Lebanese and the Syrian inhabitants (ICG 2016: 11). This might have increased the refugees’ need for protection.

6.4 CONCLUDING THE DISCUSSION

Based on this discussion, five factors and their interaction dynamics (three multi-causal, two mono-causal) stand out in determining the pattern of (non-)militarisation among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon: One, the predominantly situational character of the refugee population and the therefore dominant political indifference in combination with prohibited
political rights; two, the social ties among refugees and the host population and the resulting special position of the Shawish in connection with humanitarian aid; three, the dispersed location and isolation of the ITSs in combination with checkpoints and the refugees’ legal status; four, the extreme poverty amplified through the no-camp/non-camp policy, the position of the Shawish and the state’s anti-refugee attitude; and five, the lack of willingness of not only any state, but also any non-state actor to exploit the refugee situation for their own causes and the availability of alternatives. These five dynamics expressed differently in the Arsal region and explain the different outcome there.

The hypotheses that I developed during this discussion of determining and non-determining factors, can hopefully inform further research on refugee militarisation, striving for a more nuanced theory. They give insight into the causal mechanisms that distinguish militarisation from non-militarisation. Moreover, by looking at what type of group militarised in Arsal, and why this was not happening in other regions, this might inform a categorisation of refugee militarisation. Also, none of these hypotheses can be seen as necessary nor sufficient causes for refugee militarisation which relates to Charles Ragin’s (1989) argument of multiple causation. None of the identified factors alone explains the pattern of militarisation among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon. For example, the general non-occurrence of militarisation is a product of the origin of the refugee situation, the political repression, poverty and camp location. Also, the established factors work differently under varying circumstances. While social ties among refugees and between refugees and the host population generally increase resilience against militarisation and the position of the Shawish helps to maintain a civilian character of the ITSs, this dynamic is adverse in Arsal, where militants are present, initial militarisation likelihood is higher, the populations are segregated, and humanitarian aid is scarce.
7 CONCLUSION: PATTERNS OF (NON-)MILITARISATION

Refugee militarisation is a rare phenomenon that challenges the common perception of refugees as being unarmed civilians. However, several studies that seek to understand the occurrence of such a development focus on cases where militarisation happened and which factors were present, without putting them under systematic scrutiny by applying the same factors to cases where militarisation has not occurred. A main goal of this thesis is to identify which factors distinguish cases of militarisation from those of non-militarisation. It therefore examined the puzzle that camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon did not experience largescale militarisation on a national level, while the local case of Arsal depicts a striking exception from this pattern. There, refugees where subject to militarisation by the extremist groups DAESH and Jabhat al-Nusra. Therefore, the research question - which factors determine militarisation – or a lack thereof – among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon - guided my study.

7.1 CASE-SPECIFIC FINDINGS

To understand which of the commonly cited risk factors determine this specific case, I first developed a theoretical framework that was applied to both the national and the local level. It consisted of six groups of macro- and meso-level factors that are commonly cited as increasing the risk of refugee militarisation: the origin of the refugee situation; the host state’s response (capability and will); the refugees’ socioeconomic situation; the organisation and demeanour of the humanitarian sector; the refugees’ political rights; and camp characteristics.

The study of these factors through semi-structured interviews with humanitarian workers in combination with field research in Lebanon, facilitated examining the manifestation of these factors while being open to additional explanations. For example, the dispersed location of camps and restricted movement were not considered prior to the research process. The document and literature review provided comprehension of aspects of the refugee situation that aid workers were less qualified to inform about and helped to verify and put into context the interviewees’ experiences and information. Through this analysis, five dynamics that explain the lack of refugee militarisation could be identified. Three of them are based on interaction dynamics between the selected risk factors while two are mono-causal. These are:

(1) The origin of the refugee situation in combination with political rights and political indifference: As predominantly situational refugees, the initial militarisation potential
is low, and the repression of political activism discouraged the few militancy entrepreneurs that would be needed to ensure support and mobilisation for any political cause. Moreover, the apparent political indifference of Syrian refugees and their focus on the origin country reduces the impact of needed voice mechanisms in the later phase of displacement.

(2) Social ties in combination with humanitarian aid: The social interaction among refugees and the position of the Shawish which is based on his ties to the local population and the status quo refugee situation increased militarisation resilience of camp-inhabitants. Furthermore, the Shawish profits personally from the presence of humanitarian aid and rebelling or joining a militant group would endanger his position.

(3) The dispersed location of small camps in combination with numerous checkpoints and no legal stay for most refugees: This interaction of factors enabled the security-wise weak state to prevent largescale militarisation as free movement is barred and refugee and militant networks consequently have difficulties to develop as ITSs are isolated from each other.

(4) Poverty: Caused by extreme poverty, the studied population lacks the means to rebel against their situation and is pre-occupied with fulfilling their basic needs. It is increased by the state’s neglect of the refugee situation, the position of the Shawish and the unofficial camp character.

(5) A lack of nation-wide interest in refugee militarisation or destabilising Lebanon: Not only does the host state want to prevent refugee militarisation but so do all other relevant and violent non-state actors, as they pursue other goals or have other recruitment pools. This is important in a weak state where central state authorities are absent in major refugee-hosting areas.

These five dynamics explain the absence of largescale refugee militarisation despite the presence of several factors associated with a high militarisation risk. The first selected factor suggesting more militarisation among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon is the ambiguous host state response. Although Lebanon not being interested in militarising refugees, it lacks the military, economic and organisational capabilities to prevent militarisation. Moreover, it fails to protect refugees, and is unwilling to alleviate indirect militarisation factors. Another factor is the refugees’ poverty which could motivate violent behaviour. Also, feelings of relative deprivation among the host population manifest in
growing tensions and attacks against refugees. Also, strong *social ties* can ignite local sectarian conflicts and motivate refugee recruitment. Furthermore, the fragmentation of the *humanitarian sector*, the semi-technical approach, increasing donor fatigue and the accompanying growing inter-agency competition leave space for militarisation efforts going unnoticed or being ignored. Additionally, some (I)NGOs cooperate with militant groups and refugee leaders in their service provision. Moreover, this is a *protracted refugee situation*, which increases the importance of *political participation* opportunities to voice refugee grievances in the host country. Restricted political activism could make violent outlets more attractive. Finally, *refugee camps* are often located in peripheral border areas with limited state presence, easy to infiltrate and sometimes isolated from the host society. Because, these factors were not sufficient to cause refugee militarisation on the national level, they do *not* determine the Lebanese pattern of militarisation.

Arsal has a different trajectory, explaining the different outcome on the local level. First, the share of persecuted refugees was larger, and several fighters arrived in Arsal together with unarmed civilians. Thus, the initial militarisation potential was higher and militancy entrepreneurs were present. Additionally, the social connection among refugees was strong as they came from similar areas and had family connections to the local population which was at least initially supportive to the cause of the Syrian opposition. Both factors increased the populations’ backing and thus tolerance of the extremist groups. Also, the special position of the Shawish played out differently. As some were appointed by militants and humanitarian aid was largely absent, their power depended on the militants. They might therefore have used their power not only to improve their own position but to ensure the militants’ presence. Social ties thus had an adverse effect on the national level. Furthermore, poverty levels could be exploited to recruit on the basis of respective grievances as other sources for jobs and income were rare. Between 2014 and 2017, Arsal experienced a specific level of isolation, as the area was sealed off from the rest of Lebanon. No security forces, neither state nor non-state, were present. DAESH and JN could therefore do as they pleased. In this area, the small ITSs were no longer isolated from each other and military networks between them would be possible. Arsal can therefore be seen as one large, border camp, segregated from the remaining country.
7.2 Broader Insights

Arguably, the focus on camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon allows for added nuance despite the study primarily shedding light on the case itself, as it presents a deviant case due to the unexpected non-militarisation. Through this case selection technique, the identified causal processes can carefully be generalised to the universe of similar cases of large (≥ 25,000) refugee populations in capability-wise weak neighbouring host states to which they have strong transnational ties, living in camp-like settlements without a secured refugee status and depending on humanitarian aid. The results are only applicable to cases where the risk factors take on similar values to this case. Moreover, as the structure and the location of the ITSs is so specific and has a crucial impact, it has to be tested further if the propositions apply to respective populations in both official camps and camp-like structures or only to the latter.

Through the implicit comparison of the national level in Lebanon to the local exception of Arsal, I sought insight into the dynamics that distinguish militarisation from non-militarisation among refugees. As I based my research on the assumption that refugee militarisation depends on to the interests and agency of the respective refugees which is needed for armed groups to get support, recruits or simply being tolerated in a refugee camp, the respective group’s (pretended) goals are a promising starting point for developing a tentative categorisation of refugee militarisation based on different types of militant groups. If there are different types, there is not one factor or one set of factors that explains the occurrence of the phenomenon, but the interaction of factors and accompanying conditions become important and different pathways can lead to militarisation. None of the selected risk factors alone can explain the pattern of occurrence/absence of the phenomenon. In other words, this is an example of multiple causation. Gaining insight into these dynamics was another ambition of my thesis. In the eclectic theoretical framework, I argued for some possible interaction dynamics and how they might impact the militarisation through different types of armed groups, mainly distinguishing between groups that primarily target the origin state, the host state, or have transnational targets. The militarisation in Arsal was arguably conducted by militant groups that targeted both the host state and transnational aims, which is why the developed propositions can only apply to such groups. Because I aim at informing future research into more nuanced militarisation pathways, I generated a set of seven hypotheses based on this case study that can be a starting point for this. The scope conditions of the hypotheses are as the ones specified for the universe of cases.
H1.1: If the initial militarisation potential, defined by the origin of the refugee situation, is low, restrictions on the refugees’ political rights can prevent refugee militarisation as they discourage the few activists and the support of passive bystanders.

H1.2: If the initial militarisation potential is low, e.g. because the refugee population consists largely of situational refugees, militarisation is based in grievances that developed during the exile experience.

H2: Extreme poverty prevents refugees from building militant groups themselves that target the origin state to improve their situation. However, it does not prevent that other militant groups that can alleviate respective grievances recruit refugees or militarise camps.

H3: If refugee leaders are not connected to militant groups, they will not abuse their position to militarise refugee camps, given that their personal socioeconomic situation and power-position is founded on this camp leadership position.

H4: A weak host state can prevent largescale refugee militarisation by installing rather small and dispersed camps and preventing meaningful interaction between individual and, through these efforts, isolated camps, e.g. through checkpoints and illegalising refugees.

H5.1: In a weak host state where state and security authorities lack the monopoly of violence in refugee-hosting areas, it is not only the willingness of the state but the will of all relevant (non-state) actors that determines if militarisation among refugees can occur.

H5.2: Refugee militarisation is unlikely to occur, if the refugee population is situational and lacks the means to create violent groups themselves based on in-exile grievances, unless existing groups have an interest in and capabilities for militarising refugees.
7.3 FURTHER RESEARCH

The developed hypotheses provide a starting point for further research. It would be fruitful to test them under other, but similar, conditions in order to see if they hold true for the tentative universe of cases. An example would be to apply them to case studies of Syrian refugee populations in other, rather weak neighbouring countries to Syria. The scope conditions can be tested by applying the hypotheses not only to refugees in camp-like structures such as the Lebanese ITSs but also to larger, official refugee camps.

Another important future study would entail Syrian refugees and PRS in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. As stated in the introduction, the dynamics in these camps are different due to the interaction of three refugee groups, which is why I excluded them from my research. However, an examination of how my theoretical framework manifests and the factors interact under these conditions would generate a deepened understanding of refugee militarisation, as this phenomenon is more common in those camps. Moreover, this would provide a test of the fifth identified determining dynamic: that non-state entities have no interest in committing to the Syrian cause or recruiting Syrians ITS-based refugees because Palestinian camps provide more attractive recruitment grounds and bases of operation.

As I identified the origin of the refugee situation and thus the initial militarisation potential as well as the political indifference and focus on the origin country as a main explanatory factor, the interest of the refugees is indeed important in explaining which kind of group is able to militarise the situation. It is therefore useful to study militarised refugee situations where the mobilising groups have other targets than the origin country, for example where they provide protection against attacks from the host population or fight for a better situation in exile, in order to add to a more nuanced categorisation of refugee militarisation.

Moreover, despite protection gaps, anti-refugee policy, host population attacks, severe and relative socioeconomic and political deprivation and exclusion and a protraction of the refugee situation, so far, no group that behaves aggressively primarily towards the host country has developed. Such groups would function as a political outlet in response to discriminatory conditions or conflicts with the local population, in absence of non-violent alternatives. Many respondents worried about growing tensions between the Syrian and the Lebanese population as Syrians mostly do not react and just accept attacks and harassment. Experts deemed this non-reaction as problematic in connection with the ongoing crisis and the realisation that returning to Syria might not be a viable option soon. When this realisation
occurs, the situation in Lebanon becomes more important to them and they might develop more interest in voicing their grievances towards the host country. If this is then not possible and if they deem that they need to organise protection or armed defence against attacks by the host population, militarisation could occur. Thus, relative deprivation might soon develop into a determining factor and the factor political rights might have another impact than it has currently.

Finally, it would be useful to repeat this study but to interview refugees themselves instead of aid workers in order to get first-hand experience and their true perceptions, political affiliations, and feelings towards Lebanese authorities and society and, more importantly, their feelings and experiences in Arsal. Therefore, studies on the micro-level, especially among the refugee population in Arsal, are warranted.

This thesis explained the pattern of (non-)militarisation among camp-based Syrian refugees in Lebanon determined by the manifestation of various risk factors and their interaction dynamics, most importantly by the low initial militarisation potential and the thus high civilian character of the refugee population in question. As long as this is given, refugee militarisation can be prevented by keeping the refugee settlements isolated from each other and keep their political activism and socioeconomic means down.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: MAP OF LEBANON

(UN 2010)
APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW GUIDE

*Italics: Political questions – difficult to ask*
Indented questions: Possible follow-up questions
*Bolt questions: Questions which the informants received if asked for seeing questions beforehand.*

Transition (10-15 minutes)

**Can you describe for me how you and your organisation were/are involved with Syrian refugees?**
- What tasks?

**How would you describe the general situation/life in the refugee settlements?**
- Differences btw. different kind of settlements?

Key questions (50-60 minutes)

**Could you describe to me how [insert service/good of organization] could be accessed and how its distribution is organised?**
- What kind of difficulties did you face in exerting your tasks?
- How are refugees involved in the distribution/delivery process?
- Is there collaboration with refugee leaders? Could you expand on the collaboration? *How representative are they? E.g. traditional, elected, (military strength)*
- Did you ever hear of limited access? What was limitation based on?
- Did this lead to any consequences on the side of the organisation? Which?

**How would you characterise the cooperation with other NGOs/IGOs?**
- Did you ever hear of or experience situations with unclear responsibilities or conflicting agendas between different organisations? Can you give me an example?

**How would you characterise the (socio-)economic situation of Syrian refugees (in informal camps)?**
- Are there any differences between groups or to refugees living outside the camp?
- Do you know of differences to the local Lebanese population?

**How would you describe the relationship between refugees and the population in the refugee hosting area?**
- Do they take part in the social life?
- *Does the local population express sentiments against refugees? E.g. posters, slogans, refused interaction, demonstrations*
- Did you ever witness or know of aggressive situations between refugees and the local population (based on anti-refugees believes)?

**In which position do you see the Lebanese state in the response to the refugee situation?**
- Do you know of instances of articulated local refugee-related grievances that it responded to? *E.g. financial problems, pressure on welfare services?*
- *How, do you think, does (missing) state support impact the relationship between refugees and the local population?*
- *How are state authorities present in refugee hosting areas?*
- Do they contribute to security or aid delivery?
- What was your impression of how refugees perceive the host state? Threat?

**Can you give examples of when refugees organized politically or engaged in political activities?**
• Do they have alternatives for engagement?

How would you assess the security situation inside and around the refugee settlements? Which insecurities do Syrians face?
• Have you ever heard about any kind of armed group living or operating inside or close by a refugee settlement?
• Can you tell more about this? What do they do? E.g. train, store weapons, give material support
• Do you know what kind of group this was? What were their goals?
• How would their presence be felt?
• Were/are they popular? Why?
• Did/do they influence the delivery of goods? Are they (in)formally involved in the distribution process?
• How do you think was it possible that they entered the camp?

Closing of interview (10 minutes)
• Is there anything that you would like to add?
• Is there any other question I should ask? Do you have any more questions? Did something come to your mind during the interview that you think I should have asked about but didn’t?
## Initial Codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arsal</strong></td>
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<td>Settlement patterns of refugees</td>
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<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Structure of camps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Make-shift</td>
<td>Rudimentary make-shift camps (vs permanent settlements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Camps are open, everyone can enter, no guards, no fence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitable long-term</td>
<td>Camps suitable for long-term displacement e.g. connected to water, waste and electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Host state response</strong></td>
<td>Way the host state responds to refugee presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capability</strong></td>
<td>Indicators for a weak state, ability to prevent refugee militarisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion government</td>
<td>Government agrees on how to respond to refugee situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion security forces</td>
<td>Military and police are acting as cohesive units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demilitarisation</td>
<td>Refugees are demilitarised upon entry into Lebanon, i.e. fighters/weapons not allowed in camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No cohesion security forces</td>
<td>Parts of security forces act differently, not completely under government control, defections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No econ. capital</td>
<td>No economic capital to alleviate the costs of accommodating refugees, poor state/area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No human capital</td>
<td>No human capital for organising refugee situation, e.g. no experience/no knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No monopoly of violence</td>
<td>State doesn’t have monopoly of violence. Non-state actors responsible for security, law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No orga. capital</td>
<td>State/municipality not able to organise adequate response, e.g. missing state penetration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No refugee protection</td>
<td>Refugees not protected by state authorities, e.g. no policing in or around camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No security forces present</td>
<td>Police and/or military not present at given place, e.g. no checkpoints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porous borders</td>
<td>Borders (to origin state) not demarcated, secured or monitored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predatory state</td>
<td>Refugees experience arbitrary arrests, raids and maltreatment by security actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protected borders</td>
<td>Borders (to origin state) are completely secured and monitored, control over who enters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security forces present</td>
<td>Military or police are present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security forces well equipped</td>
<td>Police and military are well enough equipped to counteract militarisation efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split government</td>
<td>Government does not agree on how to respond to refugee situation. Working against each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State monopoly of violence</td>
<td>State actors (military, police) have monopoly of violence in given region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Willingness</strong></td>
<td>Willingness of host state to prevent refugee militarisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance with host</td>
<td>Host allies with origin state against refugees, e.g. allows origin to attack refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-refugee attitude</td>
<td>Host has general anti-refugee attitude/securitises refugees, anti-refugee legislation, neglect of refugee situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict with origin</td>
<td>Host and origin state have conflictual relationship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third-party state</td>
<td>Interests of third-party states regarding refugee situation and pressure host</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use in other conflicts</td>
<td>Host uses militarised refugees in other conflicts it is involved in</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Aid</strong></td>
<td>Impact of humanitarian aid sector on refugee militarisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-option of aid</td>
<td>Militants co-opt aid work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-option</td>
<td>Militants co-opt/infiltrate/pressure aid agencies to work in their favour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td>Aid agencies work with leaders or focal points with problematic source of power (not elected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stealing</td>
<td>Militants steal from aid agencies or aid recipients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>Militants tax aid deliveries (either agencies or recipients)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence on humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Refugees depend on aid delivery to fulfil basic needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Coordination and organisation of work between different aid organisations and sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor influence</td>
<td>Aid agencies focus primarily on donor requests; donors influence aid work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalised</td>
<td>Fractionalised humanitarian sector, with many organisations and many donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Cooperation</td>
<td>Aid agencies don't cooperate with each other, don't coordinate response of different sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turf battles</td>
<td>Aid agencies competing about responsibilities; focus on quantity (instead of quality) of aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical approach</td>
<td>Technical approach to aid delivery by aid workers</td>
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<td><strong>Militarisation</strong></td>
<td>Interviewees report about militarisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arsal</td>
<td>Reports about militarisation in Arsal</td>
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<tr>
<td>No militarisation</td>
<td>Unawareness of militarisation being an issue</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other instances</td>
<td>Referring to other instances of refugee militarisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New insights</strong></td>
<td>Additional codes and knowledge generated through interview process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin of refugee situation</td>
<td>Initial militarisation potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persecuted</td>
<td>Refugees are actively persecuted by origin state or actors in origin state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fled group-based persecution</td>
<td>Refugees individually persecuted because they are a member of a specific group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee identity</td>
<td>Refugees over time develop group-identity based on the refugee experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return if security guarantees</td>
<td>Refugees return if origin state guarantees safety of the group, they belong to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situational</strong></td>
<td>Refugee population consists of situational refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fled war externalities</td>
<td>Refugees fled negative war externalities like overall destruction (vs direct part of conflict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return when safe</td>
<td>Refugees express willingness to return to origin state as soon it is safe enough to continue life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-in-exile</strong></td>
<td>Refugee population represents a state-in-exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievances against origin</td>
<td>Refugees have extensive grievances against origin, e.g. want to govern, secession, more wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fled defeat</td>
<td>Refugees fled after defeat in civil war or similar situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>Political rights and situation of refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Refugees can (not) access citizenship of host country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Possibilities of political participation of refugees in host country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion camp admin.</td>
<td>Refugees are included in administration, management of and decision-making in camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-violent groups</td>
<td>Refugees have non-violent interest groups that they can engage in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polit. organisation allowed</td>
<td>Political organisations of refugees (not) allowed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protraction</th>
<th>Refugee situation is protracted.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long and large</td>
<td>Refugee situation lasts for ≥ 5 years and refugee population ≥ 25,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of limbo</td>
<td>Refugees in state of limbo – cannot repatriate or integrate, unfulfilled basic needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socioeconomic situation</th>
<th>Socioeconomic situation of refugees.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor living conditions</td>
<td>Refugees suffer from poor living conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>School enrolment, access to vocational training, quality of education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Access to health services/doctors/medicine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host resources</td>
<td>Host state has resources that refugees can gain by successfully challenging host.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Housing conditions are bad, e.g. no insulation, overpopulation, not legal to stay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegality</td>
<td>Refugees don't have papers or can't access them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No refugee status</td>
<td>Refugees are not registered as refugees and thus can't access internationally guaranteed rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Refugees are in general poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>Availability of socially rewarding, recreational activities, especially for refugee youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbalanced diet</td>
<td>Refugees don't have access to balanced diet; suffer from malnutrition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Poor water, sanitation and hygiene facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Spread of unemployed or illegal employment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative deprivation</th>
<th>Living conditions for one group are, or are perceived as, worse than for another.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worse among refugees</td>
<td>Living conditions are (perceived as) systematically worse for some refugee groups than for others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse for host</td>
<td>Living conditions are (perceived as) worse for the host population, feels threatened often expressed through anti-refugee rhetoric/demonstrations, curfews, evictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse for refugees</td>
<td>Living conditions are (perceived as) worse for refugees than for host population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse than origin</td>
<td>Situation of refugees (perceived as) worse than in origin country.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social ties</th>
<th>Social ties that help fostering or preventing militarisation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ties among refugees</td>
<td>Strong pre-flight social ties among refugees in a settlement, e.g. all from same village/area/clan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to host population</td>
<td>Pre-flight ties to host population through marriage, work etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Final Codebook

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<td><strong>Isolated</strong></td>
<td>Camps isolated from host community</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Friendly</strong></td>
<td>Refugees settled in refugee friendly area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peripheral</strong></td>
<td>Camps in peripheral, rural areas, neglected by central state</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Scattered</strong></td>
<td>Camps are dispersed, hard to reach other camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Structure of camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External planning</strong></td>
<td>Camps planned and operated by UNHCR or other (I)NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Make-shift</strong></td>
<td>Rudimentary make-shift camps (vs permanent settlements)</td>
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<td>Camps are open, everyone can enter, no guards, no fence</td>
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<td>Way the host state responds to refugee presence</td>
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<td>Indicators for a weak state, ability to prevent refugee militarisation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deprived area</strong></td>
<td>Refugee hosting areas neglected by central state, don't have capacities for taking care of refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Presence security forces</strong></td>
<td>Police and/or military (not) present at given place, e.g. checkpoints</td>
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<td>Refugees are demilitarised upon entry into Lebanon, i.e. fighters/weapons not allowed in camps</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment security</strong></td>
<td>Security forces (not) well enough equipped to counteract militant groups or criminality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missing security</strong></td>
<td>No security forces present in given area</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>No monopoly of violence</strong></td>
<td>State doesn't have monopoly of violence. Non-state actors responsible for security, law and order</td>
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<td>Refugees (not) protected by state authorities, e.g. no policing in or around camps</td>
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<td>Refugees experience arbitrary arrests and raids and maltreatment by security actors</td>
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<td><strong>Border control</strong></td>
<td>Borders (to origin state) not demarcated, secured or monitored</td>
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<td><strong>Econ capital</strong></td>
<td>(No) economic capital to alleviate the costs of accommodating refugees, poor state/area</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational Capital</strong></td>
<td>State/municipality (not) able to organise adequate response, e.g. missing state penetration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Admin. problems</strong></td>
<td>Administrative problems like corruption, no monitoring of policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government cohesion</strong></td>
<td>Government agrees/disagrees on how to respond to refugee situation, working against each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State penetration</strong></td>
<td>National state not present on regional level, discrepancies btw. nat. legislation and local behaviour</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regional differences</strong></td>
<td>State response differs in region or between national state and municipality</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Willingness</strong></td>
<td>Willingness of host state to prevent refugee militarisation</td>
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<td><strong>Relationship with host</strong></td>
<td>Host allies with origin state against refugees, e.g. allows origin to attack refugees; or has conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-refugee attitude</strong></td>
<td>Host has general anti-refugee attitude/securitises refugees, anti-refugee legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neglect refugee situation</strong></td>
<td>Host state doesn't care about refugee situation, leaves humanitarian sector alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive attitude</strong></td>
<td>Refugee positive attitude and behaviour of state officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Push for return</td>
<td>State officials encouraging that refugees return soon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to hum. aid</td>
<td>Relationship between state and humanitarian agencies (support, indifference, obstruction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securitisation</td>
<td>State officials connect refugees with crime and terrorism, impose evictions and curfews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-party state</td>
<td>Interests of third-party states regarding refugee situation and pressure host</td>
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</table>

**Humanitarian Aid**

- **Dependence on hum aid Organisation**
  - Coop. problems: Aid agencies don't cooperate with each other, don't coordinate response of different sectors
  - Donor influence: Aid agencies focus primarily on donor requests; donors influence aid work
  - Fractionalised: Fractionalised humanitarian sector, with many organisations and many donors
  - Turf battles: Aid agencies competing about responsibilities; focus on quantity (instead of quality) of aid
  - Positive cooperation: Positive cooperation between aid agencies, e.g. best practices, sector meetings etc.

- **Technical approach**
  - Problematic impl. work: Aid workers reflect upon possible negative implications of their work
  - Relief vs long-term projects: General realisation that more sustainable development projects are needed to secure social cohesion
  - Stereotyp. hum. behaviour: Humanitarian agencies think primarily about own position, how to secure funding, quantity-before-quality statements, better to do anything than nothing, ignoring (obvious) problems

- **Working with refugees**
  - Exploitation of aid: Militants/Problematic figures co-opt aid or exploit it for their benefit, pressure organisations
  - Positive coop. refugees: Refugees are positively integrated in work of aid organisations
  - Positive coop. leaders: Examples of positive cooperation with refugee leaders (no/mostly no problems)
  - Problematic leaders: Aid agencies work with leaders or focal points with problematic source of power (not elected)
  - Mentioned probl. leaders: Humanitarian agencies experienced general problems with refugee leaders

- **Militarisation**
  - Arsal: Interviewees report about militarisation
  - No militarisation: Reports about militarisation in Arsal
  - Other instances: Unawareness of militarisation being an issue
  - Other instances: Referring to other instances of refugee militarisation

- **New insights**
  - Compliance: Refugees comply and do not complain about grievances, exploitation or maltreatment
  - High presence weapons: Weapons in generally abundant in Lebanon or ITSs
  - Other extremism: Other groups/Non-Syrian extremism are more important
  - Return expectancy: Syrians and/or Lebanese expect Syrians to return soon to Syria

**Origin of refugee situation**

Initial militarisation potential
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Persecuted</strong></th>
<th>Refugees are actively persecuted by origin state or actors in origin state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fled group-based persecution</td>
<td>Refugees individually persecuted because they are a member of a specific group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppositional fear</td>
<td>Refugees fear to return because they participated in opposition activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee identity</td>
<td>Refugees over time develop group-identity which is based on the refugee experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return if security guarantees</td>
<td>Refugees return if origin state guarantees safety of the group, they belong to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Situational</strong></th>
<th>Refugee population consists of situational refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fled war externalities</td>
<td>Refugees fled negative war externalities like overall destruction (vs direct part of conflict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return when safe</td>
<td>Refugees express willingness to return to origin state as soon it is safe enough to continue life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>State-in-exile</strong></th>
<th>Refugee population represents a state-in-exile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grievances against origin</td>
<td>Refugees have extensive grievances against origin, e.g. want to govern, secession, more wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fled defeat</td>
<td>Refugees fled after defeat in civil war or similar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No voluntary return</td>
<td>Refugees don't want to return when conflict is over, crave defeat of origin state or other victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polit. &amp; milit. leadership</td>
<td>Refugee population has strong political and military leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Political rights</strong></th>
<th>Have state structures like public services and taxation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Refugee population has political and military leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polit. organisation allowed</td>
<td>Refugees can participate politically in host and origin country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protraction</td>
<td>Refugees are included in administration, management of and decision-making in camps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Refugee activism</strong></th>
<th>Refugees don’t want to organise politically</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion camp admin</td>
<td>Refugees have non-violent interest groups that they can engage in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No wish polit. participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-violent groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Socioeconomic situation</strong></th>
<th>The socioeconomic situation of refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor living cond.</td>
<td>Refugees suffer from generally poor living conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/neg. coping strategies</td>
<td>High crime rates among refugees, violence in ITSs, child labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>School enrolment, access to vocational training, quality of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early marriage</td>
<td>Children get married and therefore drop out of school/can’t use humanitarian services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Access to health services/doctor/medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host resources</td>
<td>Host state has resources that refugees can gain by successfully challenging host</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Housing conditions are bad, e.g. no insulation, overpopulation, not legal to stay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegality</td>
<td>Refugees don’t have papers or can’t access them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No refugee status</td>
<td>Refugees are not registered as refugees and thus can’t access internationally guaranteed rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Refugees are in general poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>Availability of socially rewarding, recreational activities, especially for refugee youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WASH</strong></td>
<td>Poor water, sanitation and hygiene facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work</strong></td>
<td>Spread of unemployed or illegal employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relative deprivation</strong></td>
<td>Living conditions for one group are, or are perceived as, worse than for another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worse among refugees</strong></td>
<td>Living conditions are (perceived as) systematically worse for some refugee groups than for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worse for host</strong></td>
<td>Living conditions are (perceived as) worse for the host population, feels threatened often expressed through anti-refugee rhetoric/demonstrations, curfews, evictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expressions of envy</strong></td>
<td>Host community expresses envy or non-understanding of why refugees receive services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive effects for host</strong></td>
<td>Positive effects of refugee presence for host population, e.g. more customers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worse conditions bc. refugees</strong></td>
<td>Living conditions worsened for host with refugee presence, e.g. straining infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worse for refugees</strong></td>
<td>Living conditions are (perceived as) worse for refugees than for host population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worse than origin</strong></td>
<td>Situation of refugees (perceived as) worse than in origin country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social ties</strong></td>
<td>Social ties that help fostering or preventing militarisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ties among refugees</strong></td>
<td>Strong pre-flight social ties among refugees in a settlement, e.g. all from same village/area/clan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ties to host population</strong></td>
<td>Pre-flight ties to host population through marriage, work etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX IV: OVERVIEW INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Work field</th>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>Organisation form</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>R1</strong></td>
<td>Medicine, Shelter, WASH&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>All Lebanon</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Country manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R2</strong></td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>All Lebanon</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R3</strong></td>
<td>Social Cohesion</td>
<td>All Lebanon</td>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R4</strong></td>
<td>Protection, Social Cohesion</td>
<td>Palestinian refugee camps</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R5</strong></td>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>Central Bekaa</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R6</strong></td>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>Central Bekaa</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Country manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R7</strong></td>
<td>Women and gender-based violence</td>
<td>Central Bekaa</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R8</strong></td>
<td>Women and gender-based violence</td>
<td>Central Bekaa</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R9</strong></td>
<td>Women and gender-based violence</td>
<td>Central Bekaa</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R10</strong></td>
<td>Relief, Shelter, Advocacy</td>
<td>North (Tripoli)</td>
<td>INGO, NGO</td>
<td>Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R11</strong></td>
<td>Protection/Preventing Violent Extremism</td>
<td>All Lebanon</td>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R12</strong></td>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>All Lebanon, Arsal</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Country manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R13</strong></td>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>Central Bekaa</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Former country manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R14</strong></td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Central Bekaa, Arsal</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R15</strong></td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Central Bekaa, Arsal</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R16</strong></td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Arsal</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>Field</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>13</sup> WASH = Water, Sanitation, Hygiene.
APPENDIX V: MAP OF WHERE SYRIAN REFUGEES ARE REGISTERED

SYRIA REFUGEE RESPONSE
LEBANON Syrian Refugees Registered
31 August 2016

Total No. of Refugees 1,029,039

UNHCR Lebanon - Beirut
Country Office

This map has been produced by the Info-Map Management Unit of UNHCR based on maps and material provided by the government of Lebanon for operational purposes. It does not constitute an official United Nations map. The designation employed and presented on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its boundaries.

Data Source:
- Syrian refugee population and location data by UNHCR as of 31 August 2016. For more information on refugee data, contact Data & Info Unit at info@unhcr.org
- GIS and Mapping by UNHCR Lebanon. For further information on map, contact Jen Green at jgreen@unhcr.org or Wainwright Baker at wbaker@unhcr.org

(UNHCR 2016)