Civil Society and Land in the Colombian Peace Accord

A Case Study of Alternative Approaches to Peace Building

Silje Syvertsen

Department of Sociology and Human Geography

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

May 27th 2019
Civil Society and Land in the Colombian Peace Accord
A Case Study of Alternative Approaches to Peace Building
Copyright Silje Syvertsen

2019

Civil Society and Land in the Colombian Peace Accord. A Case Study of Alternative Approaches to Peace Building

Silje Syvertsen

http://www.duo.uio.no

University of Oslo

IV
Abstract

The Colombian Peace accord is much praised due to its innovative frameworks of addressing victim’s rights and transitional justice, structural issues in the rural areas and the inclusion of a gender perspective. To what extent does the Colombian Peace Accord provides a new and different approach to peace building, a bottom-up approach addressing local consent and social justice? This thesis is a qualitative case study that focuses on the first agenda item on Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR), which concerns the structural problems in the rural areas. My primary source of data has been in-depth interviews with civil society organizations in Colombia. The research is two-folded, the first part is an investigation of the mechanisms established for the participation of civil society. I found that the indirect participation though the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development involved a broad representation of civil society, but was perceived as insufficient by various actors in regards to inclusion, participation and local ownership in the peace process. The second part involves a comparison between the proposals from civil society organizations and the final content of the accord. I find that the needs and wishes of peasants have been more emphasized in the accord than the ones from the ethnic groups, and that various elements in the accord on CRR seem to respond to the rural populations’ demands for access to land and development. However, the issue of unequal access to land, which has been at the heart of the conflict for decades, is yet to be resolved though the peace accord on CRR.
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my informants who took their time to share their thoughts and experiences with me. Without your participation it would not have been possible to write this thesis. I hope I do you justice in the presentation of your views and reflections.

I would to thank my supervisor, Jemima García-Godos for guidance and in-depth knowledge. I am very grateful for your support and motivation throughout this process.

Thank you to the Department of Sociology and Human Geography for the stipend to conduct my fieldwork. Thank you to fellow students at Human Geography for friendships, laughter’s and lunch breaks.

Thank you to my friends in Colombia for insightful conversations and support. Your motivation and hope is inspiring.

To my girls, thank you for always believing in me, you have been of great support through this process.

Finally, Reidar, thank you for the support, caring and patience. You are the best!
# Table of Contents

1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 13  
1.1 Aim and Research Questions ............................................................................. 14  
1.2 The Structure of the Thesis ................................................................................ 16 

2 Background ........................................................................................................... 19  
2.1 The Origin of the Conflict .................................................................................. 19  
2.2 The First Attempt at Peace ................................................................................ 21  
2.3 The Second Attempt at Peace ............................................................................. 22  
2.4 The Third Attempt at Peace ................................................................................ 25  
2.5 The Agrarian Question ....................................................................................... 26  
2.6 Neoliberal Policies of Land Legislations ............................................................... 28 

3 Methods and Methodology .................................................................................... 31  
3.1 Research Design .................................................................................................. 31  
3.2 Choice of Case and Thematic .............................................................................. 31  
3.3 Qualitative Research .......................................................................................... 33  
3.3.1 Subjectivity and Positionality ....................................................................... 34  
3.3.2 Ethical Considerations .................................................................................. 36  
3.4 Conducting a Fieldwork ..................................................................................... 37  
3.5 The Qualitative Research Interview ................................................................... 39  
3.6 Analysis of Data .................................................................................................. 42 

4 Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................... 45  
4.1 The Origin of The Liberal Peace Theory .............................................................. 46  
4.2 Conceptualizing Liberal Peace .......................................................................... 49  
4.3 Does Liberal Peace Foster Positive, Lasting Peace? .......................................... 53  
4.4 Hybrid Peace – The Interaction of Bottom-up And Top-Down ......................... 56  
4.5 Towards an Emancipatory Model for Civil Peace ............................................ 58 

5 Case: Negotiating the Accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform .......................... 68  
5.1 Setting the Terms for Negotiations .................................................................... 68  
5.2 The Dynamics of the Peace Negotiations ......................................................... 69  
5.3 Participation of Civil Society in the Accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR) .................................................................................................................. 72  
5.4 The National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development .......................... 73  
5.5 The Final Accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform .......................................... 75 

6 Participation of Civil Society – Bottom-up Peace Building? ................................. 80  
6.1 Voices of CSOs – The Experiences from the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development ........................................................................................................... 80  
6.2 Proposals from the CSO in the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development ........................................................................................................... 89  
6.3 The Ethnic Groups’ Demand for a Direct Dialog – The Impressive Effect of CSO Mobilization ............................................................................................................. 95 

7 Social Justice and Root Cause of Conflict .............................................................. 101  
7.1 Recognition of Peasants and Ethnic Groups in the Accord in CRR ................... 101  
7.1.1 Recognition of Peasants .............................................................................. 101  
7.1.2 Recognition of Ethnic Groups ...................................................................... 104
7.2  Root Cause of Conflict – Towards Structural Transformation for Positive, Lasting Peace? ................................................................. 110
  7.2.1  The Land Fund and Formalization of Land Titles ........................................... 111
  7.2.2  Landowners and Transnational Companies .................................................. 114

8  Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 122

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 129

Appendix 1 ..................................................................................................................... 132
Appendix 2 ..................................................................................................................... 134
Appendix 3 ..................................................................................................................... 136
List of Abbreviations

ANZORC: The National Organization for Peasant Reserved Zones
AUC: The United Self-Defense Force
ANUC: The National organization for Peasant Users in Colombia
CELAC: Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CNA: The National Agrarian Coordinator
CODHES: Advisory Board for Human Rights and Displacement
CRR: Comprehensive Rural Reform
DPS: Democratic Security Policy
DPTS: Development Programs with a Territorial-Based-Focus
ELN: Popular Liberation Army
EU: European Union
FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
Final Peace Accord: Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build Stable and Lasting Peace
FENSAUGRO: The National Organization of Agricultural Workers
IMF: International Monetary Fund
MP: Marcha Patriótica
NGO: Non-governmental organization
ONIC: The National Indigenous Organization of Colombia
PCN: Process of Afro-Colombian Communities
PRZ: Peasant Reserved Zones
RPM: Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres
SAC: The Agricultural Society of Colombia
UN: United Nations
UNAL: National University of Colombia
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UP: Union Patriótica
U.S: United States
USD: US dollars
WB: World Bank
1 Introduction

The Colombian peace accord between the Colombian government and the guerrilla group FARC has been described as ‘groundbreaking’ and ‘as a new model for ending conflicts’. The peace process rapidly gained the interest of the international media when former President Juan Manuel Santos said that the peace accord was ‘probably something that has never been achieved in any peace negotiations’ (Vulliamy, 2015, p. 1). Although my interest for Colombia started years before this statement, the thought of a groundbreaking peace accord quickly got my attention. When the peace accord was publicly announced in August 2016, the innovative framework of the peace accord was highly emphasized. Herbolzheimer (2016, p. 1) argues that the accord ‘is a major milestone in the process of settling one of the world’s most protracted and violent conflicts’ and that ‘Colombia is becoming a global reference for identifying political solutions to apparently intractable conflicts’. The innovative framework highlighted by the parties themselves, by the media and by experts, included victim’s rights and transitional justice, the establishment of a Gender Sub commission, addressed of the structural problem of rural development and plans for implementation. Could it be possible that the Colombian peace accord presented something entirely new and different, and provided the foundation to tackle inequality and injustice?

These questions came to be the motivation for my master thesis. After having visited the country for several periods of time since 2010, I was well aware of the devastating humanitarian crisis the conflict has caused. To imagine a peace accord that could facilitate structural change, especially for the marginalized, rural population, was inspiring, to say the least. This thesis examines the first agenda item of the peace accord regarding Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR). Unequal access to land and land dispossession has been identified as one of the root causes of the conflict, and needs to be addressed in order to resolve the root cause of conflict (Herbolzheimer, 2016, Brett, 2013).
1.1 Aim and Research Questions

Most research regarding the final Colombian peace accord has focused on victims’ rights, transitional justice and the emphasis on women, due to the innovative inclusion of these topics in a peace accord. The final peace accord consists of more than 300 pages, and the inclusion of victims and women is only one part of the story. Richmond and Frank (2009) argue that there has never been observed a peace building approach based on bottom-up collective action with a strong concern for local consent and social justice to resolve the underlying root causes of conflict.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the Colombian Peace Accord provides a new and different approach to peace building, a bottom-up approach addressing local consent, local ownership and social justice. In order to do this I focus on the Accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR), which concerns the structural problems in the rural areas. My interest is to develop a deeper understanding of alternative approaches to peace building by investigating the case of the accord on CRR. I opted to apply qualitative methods to conduct my research and carried out fieldwork in Colombia among civil society organizations in order to develop an understanding about their role as local actors in the peace process, and what the content of the accord on comprehensive rural reform entails in terms of social justice for the rural population. I have employed an emancipatory model for civil peace as the main analytical framework, which is conceptualized by local participation, local ownership and social justice.
The overall research question in this thesis is:

*To what extent does the Colombian peace accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform reflect a new approach to peace building?*

In order to answer this question I have divided it into three sub-questions:

a. What forms of mechanisms were put in place to facilitate the participation of civil society?

b. Have the proposals from civil society organizations been included in the CRR accord?

c. How does the CRR accord address structural transformation, and does it provide the foundation to resolve unequal access to land as the root cause of the conflict?

The first sub-question will be addressed in chapter 6, where I discuss how the main participation mechanism for civil society organizations functioned in the peace process, and which proposals the civil society organizations sent to the negotiating table in terms of the accord on CRR. The second and third sub-questions will be addressed in chapter 7. The chapter focuses on a comparison between the proposals from the civil society organizations and the final peace accord on CRR, and discusses the content of the final accord in terms of the structural issues in the rural areas of the country.

The two analysis chapters use the concept of social justice as the main pillar of the emancipatory model for civil peace. Social justice is conceptualized by Fraser (1995, 2009, Fraser and Olsen, 2008, in Stokke, 2017) though politics of representation, politics of recognition and politics of redistribution. These dimensions of social justice provide the main pillars of the analytic framework to adequately address the process of participation of civil society in the accord on CRR and the comparison of the proposals from civil society organizations and the content of the accord. The following figure visualizes the structure of the analysis chapters in regards to the dimensions of social justice and the empirical findings in this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis chapters</th>
<th>Dimensions of social justice</th>
<th>Empirical findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Dynamics of participation process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The topic of my thesis is highly relevant in terms of peace building research and participation of civil society actors in peace negotiations. Brett (2018, 2013) observes that the inclusion of local actors in peace processes, such as victims and civil society organizations, has gradually been recognized as more important since the beginning of the 1990s. However, few peace building projects in recent times have properly included local participants and addressed social justice as means to provide the foundation for structural transformation. Stokke (2012) has observed that in peace negotiations where Norway has been involved, which is also the case in the Colombian peace process, the process often fails to include actors of civil society and tend to prioritize elites searching for peace accords rather than addressing structural transformation for positive, lasting peace. The inclusion of local actors in peace negotiations is both relevant in terms of peace building projects aiming to involve local actors and to assure that the voices of the realities on the ground are included. Thagaard (2013) argues that within social research the goal is to study issues that can benefit society by providing a deeper understanding of phenomenon. This thesis is relevant for society as it addresses important elements of peace, local agency, social welfare and rural development. It also addresses topics relevant within the discipline of Human Geography, especially in regards to political geography. Local participation, bottom-up mobilization, decision-making processes and neoliberal policies are topics that are discussed in this thesis.

1.2 The Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 1 introduces the topic, the case, the aim and relevance of the thesis, and the research questions.
Chapter 2 presents the background of the armed conflict in Colombia. The chapter provides a historical overview of previous attempts at peace in the country, with the intent of explaining how unequal access to land always has been in the heart of the conflict. The last part of the chapter provides a brief introduction to the ‘agrarian question’ to facilitate a background of the contested issue of land in the rural areas.

Chapter 3 presents the methods and methodology that I have used in this thesis. I discuss the qualitative methods used for data collection in this case study and explain how I conducted my fieldwork in Bogotá. I also discuss the implications regarding subjectivity and my positionality as a researcher, and present reflections in terms of interpretation of data and ethical considerations.

Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. It introduces the liberal peace thesis and concepts regarding approaches to peace building and forms of peace. The chapter emphasizes an emancipatory model for civil peace as the main analytic framework, which in this thesis is regarded as a new and different approach to peace. The concepts of participation and social justice provide the main aspects of this approach.

Chapter 5 presents the case. The chapter presents the dynamics of the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC, and the participation mechanisms established to include civil society in the peace accord on comprehensive rural reform. It also presents the content of the accord under investigation.

Chapter 6 is the first analysis chapter. The first part discusses the main participation mechanism established for inclusion of civil society. The aim is to develop an understanding about how civil society organizations perceived the mechanism in terms of representation and indirect participation. The second part of the chapter explores how the ethnic groups used bottom-up mobilization in the demand for a direct dialog with the negotiating table. The third part presents the proposals from civil society organizations to the negotiating parties.

Chapter 7 is the second analysis chapter, which compares the proposals from civil society to the final content of the accord on comprehensive rural reform. The first part of the chapter discusses the recognition of peasants and ethnic groups in the accord, while the second part of the chapter discusses how the accord addresses redistribution to resolve unequal access to
land as the root cause of the conflict, and how it facilitates structural transformation in regards to this issue.

**Chapter 8** is the concluding discussion. I present a summary of the thesis, final reflections and suggestions to further research.
2 Background

This chapter introduces the context relevant for understanding the case at hand. The aim is to provide an understanding of the contested issue of land in Colombia, and factors that have contributed to shape the process and the content of the accord on CRR. A deeper knowledge about the case and how it relates to the society is an important insight that benefits both the researcher and the reader. The chapter will first give a brief introduction of the origin of the armed conflict in Colombia. Then I will describe the historical context of the conflict through the three attempts at making peace between the two parties. In the last part of the chapter, I will describe how the conflict is related to land rights and distribution, an issue that is emphasized in the accord on CRR and which remains an essential root cause of the conflict today.

2.1 The Origin of the Conflict

The armed conflict in Colombia has mainly been understood by the establishment of the guerrilla groups the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 1964 and the Popular Liberation Army (ELN) in 1967. However, there are various actors involved in the conflict, ranging from paramilitary organizations, other guerrilla groups, state forces, criminal groups to drug-traffickers (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013). The guerrilla groups essentially emerged as a response to Colombia’s historically unjust system of land distribution, extreme poverty and the lack of access to formal political channels (Ramirez 2006, p. 121–168; Vargas 2004, p. 155–168 and Petras and Chomsky 2002 in Brett, 2013, p. 258). The Colombian conflict is often described as ideologically driven, and the guerrillas of the FARC often trace their roots back to a liberal self-defense militia created during the civil war in 1948-1958, known as La Violencia. The militia was founded by 21-year-old Pedro Marín, better known as Marquetalia. The group changed its name from Southern Block to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in 1966, but kept their left-wing agenda (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013). Marquetalia’s agrarian program remained as their political and social foundation, and the group is often described as an armed rural organization rather than an armed political force.
The roots of the FARC go back to armed peasant movements in the beginning of the 1960s. In 1964, the small and scattered groups joined forces (Herbolzheimer, 2016). The FARC’s goal was to achieve a revolutionary rural reform, where land was to be owned by those who used it. Protection of property for the peasants was emphasized in their political program, and their aim was to build a revolutionary government that would protect peasants and indigenous communities who lacked property (Restrepo and Morales, 2014). Their self-image as protectors of the rural poor from the Colombian oligarchy was demonstrated through the use of military skills and resilience, and a complete overthrow of the Colombian government became their main goal (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013).

The Colombian state has without a doubt played its part in the conflict. Lack of social and political rights, inequality, poverty, threats and assassinations of political opponents is historically rooted in Colombian. As Browit explains:

“Colombia has been a republic based on authoritarian rule, controlled since the mid-19th century by a rigid two-party system dominated by Liberals and Conservatives, both representing the Colombian oligarchy. Whenever this situation has been threatened, democracy has gone out the window and assassinations and repression of civilians replaces the comforting image of a modern nation-state based on the rule of law and fair and open electoral politics. This has historically bred contempt for constitutional laws and human rights among the more ruthless and self-serving elements of Colombian society and has fostered a mentality according to which violence is the most effective way to win power and silence one’s critics. It has also bred apathy, despair and abstentionism among the general populace, only too well aware that their political leaders, indeed practically the whole political class, speak with forked tongues and view public office as a chance to enrich themselves at all costs” (Browitt, 2001, p. 1070).

The Colombian state has historically dismissed its citizens, especially marginalized groups, in their everyday struggles. These struggles are essentially what drove peasants movements to cooperate for an armed revolution in the country, and the state’s legitimation of violent means towards it citizens rose as the guerillas grew. During the 1960s and 1970s, the FARC was a relatively small guerrilla group amongst at least seven other left-wing rebel groups in the country. However, from the beginning of the 1980s to the late 1990s, the group grew in size and spread from distant, rural parts to medium-sized cities in Colombia. They increased their income by deciding to become involved in the emerging drug trade in Colombia. Taxation and ensuring that coca farmers were paid fair wages was initially the FARC’s tactic, and over time the group became involved in the trade process as well (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013).
2.2 The First Attempt at Peace

During this period, the FARC grew from about 2,000 to estimated 12,000 militia-members and 18,000 full-time members and began to be viewed as a threat by organized criminal groups who aimed to control the drug trade. They were not only viewed as a threat by the criminal groups, but as they became stronger militarily, the country’s traditional elite became worried about the group as well. Wealthy rural landowners started funding private militants, better known as paramilitary organizations, to protect their property from the guerrilla. Therese organizations were characterized as legally recognized self-defense groups who gradually started operating autonomously, but also as allies with the state to combat the guerrillas. They are typically described as right-wing groups due to their links to elites and their aim at protecting liberal interests (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013). As a result, a series of paramilitary groups emerged in diverse regions of Colombia to guarantee and monitor security in the rural parts of the country. Nevertheless, the paramilitary groups did not only target members of the guerilla, but has frequently been involved in gross human rights violations in collaboration with police and military operations (Brett, 2013).

As the conflict intensified and the violence increased, especially due to the growth of paramilitaries and drug trafficking within the country, the newly-elected government of Belisario Betancur Cuartas (1982-1986) led the first attempt to build peace in Colombia. At this time, no formal peace negotiations had previously taken place between the Colombian government and the left-wing guerrillas. The government and the FARC signed an agreement in 1984 known as the La Uribe agreement. The agreement is not to be confused with the surname of former president Uribe (2002-2010), but was given the name of the place it was signed, in the municipality of La Uribe, Meta (province). This accord provided for ceasefire, a procedure of reincorporating members of the FARC to civilian life, various development initiatives in rural areas affected by violence and commitment by the state to combat paramilitarism. The negotiations were in a sense revolutionary as the government allowed the FARC’s political expression into the mainstream politics through the establishment of the Union Patriótica (UP) party. However, the state lacked experience and capacity to implement the accord, and trust between the two parties was low. The government argued that the FARC used the ceasefire to mobilize military, and the armed forces of the state did not honor the ceasefire (Díaz Pabón, 2018). The armed forces escalated their war against the guerilla
groups, but also attacked and massacred their perceived civilian supporters in local communities. They killed thousand of members of the UP and the peace process was not successful. Nevertheless, about 5 000 combatants from five other guerilla groups were demobilized during the 1990s in different peace processes and thereby broadened the national peace. These processes were yet incomplete as they failed to include the ELN and the FARC (Díaz Pabón, 2018 and Herbolzheimer, 2016).

In 1996, the paramilitary organization the United Self-Defense Force (AUC) was established. The organization had broad technical and operational support provided by the Colombian state security forces, and extended its activities and infrastructure beyond combatting the guerrilla. Alliances with landowning elites, drug-trafficking organizations and local and national government officials contributed to an internal conflict characterized by a massive use of force against the civilian population, especially in the rural parts of the country (Brett, 2013). The FARC responded by increased use of violent means during the 1990s. The guerrilla group has throughout the years shown great resilience and adaptation, and their troops were successful both against paramilitary forces and government troops. During the 1990s, the FARC overran a number of police and military outposts and took countless military and police hostage. This period highlights the guerrillas’ military strength and in the end of the 1990s there was a general impression that the group would win the military conflict, and that the country would possibly face state failure (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013).

2.3 The Second Attempt at Peace

In 1999, a second attempt to peace negotiations between the government and the FARC was made. The negotiations between the FARC and the government of president Andrés Pastrana took place in a demilitarized zone in Caguán, southern Colombia. However, the negotiations fell through within a couple of years, and have been described as doomed from the start as neither of the parties honestly pursued a peace settlement (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013). In contrast to the first peace process, the negotiations were held without a ceasefire. The time-frames and the logistics between the parties clashed several times, and even though the actors sought to achieve peace, their logics around peace and their vision for an end were completely different (Díaz Pabón, 2018). The FARC froze the negotiations several times and used the demilitarized zone on multiple occasions to recruit members, expand coca
cultivation, conduct military training and to plan attacks in other regions of the country (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013). The parties were unable to address any of the substantive issues and their attention was primarily in discussions about procedure. They had trouble reaching an agenda and lacked commitment and knowledge of the management of a negotiation process (Herbolzheimer, 2016 and Díaz Pabón, 2018). In the period of the negotiation, the level of trust was also very low. The government was not perceived as committed to the negotiations, especially by the FARC, as they simultaneously negotiated with the U.S on Plan Colombia (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013). Plan Colombia was a multi-billion U.S aid package to upgrade military and police training, equipment, command and control structures in Colombia. The aim was to combat the guerrilla groups in the country by ensuring improved mobility, reaction time and intelligence. Between 1998-2002, the size of the state’s armed forces increased by 60 per cent to 132 000 as a result of the collaboration and aid from the U.S (International Crisis Group, 2012).

The negotiations fell apart in 2002 when FARC hijacked an airplane and kidnapped a member of Congress who was aboard. The peace process influenced the electoral campaign, and particularly one politician rose to the occasion of giving voice to the frustration towards the FARC (Díaz Padón, 2018). In August of the same year, the politician with name Alvaro Uribe, was elected president on his hard stand towards the guerrilla. Uribe relied on funding’s from Plan Colombia, that were put part in place before his presidency. His “Democratic Security Policy” (DSP) aimed to defeat the guerrillas, recover territory under control of illegal groups by military means, clear roads of guerrilla roadblocks, increase the size of the armed forces and the intelligence and cut narcotic production. Uribe was a right-wing controversial president who did not believe in security, peace and reconciliation through negotiations with the guerrilla. He prioritized military means to establish control, and thereby broke with the conflict resolution strategy of governments since the 1980s (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013 and International Crisis Group, 2012). His policies funded a doubling of army and police to approximately 450 000 and developed insurgency skills for special operations and intelligence analysis. There have also been various speculations about the relationship between the Uribe-government and right-wing paramilitary organizations throughout the years. There is a general consensus that these organizations, like the AUC, have close ties to security forces and politicians.
Nevertheless, the AUC was demobilized under the government of president Uribe. Formal
demobilization was facilitated though the Justice and Peace Law in 2005. The law offers
dramatically reduced sentences to demobilized members of paramilitary organization
(Human Rights Watch, 2018) but unfortunately the success of this process is highly
questionable. The implementation the law has been very slow and many groups transformed
instead into criminal bands or other groups with paramilitary activity (Brett, 2013). It is
estimated that more than 4000 demobilized members of paramilitary organizations entered
the special proceedings, but as of July 2016, only 182 out of the 30 000 demobilized
members have been sentenced under the law (Human Rights Watch, 2018). One year later,
Alvaro Uribe’s brother was sent to trial by the Attorney General Office’s on charges of
murder for his alleged role in a paramilitary group in the 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Uribe was reelected in 2006, and during his presidency his policies yielded results: the FARC
was driven out of the urban centers and main roads by the police forces and lost control over
strategic corridors. They were forced to withdraw to even more rural areas and their size and
capability for armed action was severely reduced, both by paramilitary groups and by state
forces. From 2003 to 2007, the FARC lost 1 500 member annually. More than 12 000 FARC
members were killed between 2002 and 2007 by security forces, another 12 000 were
captured between 2003 and 2009 and over 17 000 were demobilized between 2002 and 2012
their presence in the country and also dismantled the FARC’s most important military and
financial unities. The DSPs strategy, where Juan Manuel Santos served as the defense
minister, was largely successful to combat the guerrilla. With the support of the U. S and Plan
Colombia, the number of FARC fighters had by 2009 been reduced from 17 000 to about 8

Nevertheless, there was a darker side to their strategy. Not only did local communities suffer
by the extravagant military forces that tried to gain control of the countryside, but some
military units also executed civilians, to later present them as FARC members killed in
from superiors to show good results, military units started body counts in the war against the
guerrilla. Victims were lured under false pretenses to remote locations by soldiers and
officers, and were killed and reported as members of the guerrillas killed in action as a
measure of successful warfare. These brutal episodes were publicly exposed in 2008, and
became known as the ‘false positive’ scandal (International Crisis Group, 2012). The Attorney General’s Office has investigated more than 3,600 alleged unlawful killings from 2002 through 2008, whereas 1,200 mid and low-level soldiers have been convicted (Human Rights Watch, 2018). However, persecutions of senior officers involved in the executions have failed, and many of them have instead been promoted through the military ranks (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

2.4 The Third Attempt at Peace

Uribe’s military strategy triggered the third attempt at peace negotiations between the FARC and the government. The FARC had shown great ability to resist the government attacks, and although the strategy of DSP and Plan Colombia severely reduced their capabilities and the number of combatants, the government was unable to defeat the guerrilla. Nevertheless, the FARC also realized that they would never achieve their ultimate goal of overthrowing the state by military victory. The FARC were also influenced by the fact that leftist politicians, and even guerrilla combatants, in neighboring countries became leaders of government by democratic participation: Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Dilma Rousseff in Chile, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Eva Morales in Bolivia and José Mujica in Uruguay. Their historical leader Manuel Marulanda also past away from natural causes; their top commander, Alfonso Cano was killed in 2011, and a new leadership who reconsidered their options emerged. They had the internal leverage and a new vision to make a historical shift in the movements thinking (Herbolzheimer, 2016).

Despite the government’s successful development on the battlefield and the turnover of public opinion against the FARC, the government observed that the targeting of high-ranking guerrilla leaders could become counterproductive. The FARC could be left without the political capacity to engage in future peace negotiations, which could deepen the humanitarian situation. There was a moral pressure to prevent further suffering of thousands of victims of human rights violations and loss of lives from both parties to the conflict (Herbolzheimer, 2016). More than 4000 civilians had been killed by the Colombian armed forces during the period of the DPS strategy, which significantly reduced the legitimacy of the state (Human Rights Watch, 2015, in Nasi, 2018). The government had also adopted a reform and modernization agenda that included addressing the long-delayed structural
reforms of political participation and rural development, which were issued that would almost guaranteed be part of an peace negotiations with the FARC. (Herbolzheimer, 2016).

In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was elected president, and during his first term in office it was expected of him to continue former president Uribe’s strategy towards the guerrilla, given that he previously served as Uribe’s Minister of Defense. However president Santos started a negotiation process with the FARC two years after taking office, which was heavily criticized and provoked a furious reaction by the former president and several right-wing politicians. President Santos stood his ground, and promised the population early on in his presidency that he would achieve a peace accord with the guerrillas. He concluded that the timing was right after Alfonso Cano died, and approached the new top leader of the FARC, Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, better known as Timochenko (Nasi, 2018). Six years later, president Santos’ promise was accomplished. Nevertheless, the time limit was extended, the negotiations almost fell through several times and the process demanded prominent figures in both the government and the FARC to take significant political risks along the way to overcome barriers for negotiations (Herbolzheimer, 2016). The peace negotiations, the actors involved and the dynamics of the peace talks will be further explained in chapter 5 and chapter 6.

2.5 The Agrarian Question

“Despite being one of the core root causes of multiple armed conflicts around the world, the issue of land reform and rural development is hardly ever given the attention it has received in Colombia” (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p. 5). Colombia is one of the few countries in Latin America that has never experienced a comprehensive rural reform and its inequality index is one of the highest in the world. Land inequality and a failed rural model have for decades affected violence in the rural parts of the country (Herbolzheimer, 2016). In the 19th century, Colombia failed to develop an efficient state capacity to collect taxes and extract rent. Production of commodities and sale of vacant land were the governments respond to collect revenues, and the country struggled to define, organize and guide its agriculture. As a result, private parties gained control to organize and define land in the countryside. (Tilly, 1990, LeGrand, 1984, Molano, 1989, Bejardo, 1985, Parson 1949, Villegas 1978 in Peña Huertas, 2018). Rural elites and large businesses have been able to acquire land due to the states’ lack
of management, which have led peasants and settlers dispossessed of land. “This indifference to organize is in fact a structural cause of disputes over land rights, which have been in the heart of the conflict and violence suffered by Colombians over the last 70 years” (Peña Huertas, 2018, p. 87).

Since the 19th century, agricultural businesses and large landowners have appropriated the most productive land through violent means, which was in a sense permitted by the Colombian government. Exclusion of peasants and settlers from public policies is historically rooted in Colombia, and persist even today in the design and implementation of public policies aimed at rural development (Peña Huertas, 2018). Weak state management, the use of violent means to acquire huge land tracts, lack of rights to own and use land and exclusion of peasants and settlers in public policies has caused systematic forced dispossession of land from the Colombian people. It is estimated that Colombia has the second largest displaced population in the world after Syria, at 7.9 million people (UNHRC, 2017). The Monitoring Committee on Public Policy on Forced Displacement estimates the dispossession of land to total 6.6 million hectares (the size of Ireland) and is equivalent to 15 per cent of the country's agricultural surface (Garay, 2011 in Peña Huertas, 2018). Leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties have historically used violence for the dispossession of land, and in the last decade’s legal instruments of dispossession have also been used by paramilitaries and drug traffickers (Gutiérrez Sanín and Vargas Reina, 2016 in Peña Huertas, 2018).

This horrifying development has affected millions of lives, and the inequality associated with the dispossession of land also defines the legal and political access of rights, resources and opportunities of peasants and ethnic groups. The poor citizens in the countryside face structural violence from the state and physical violence from illegal groups. The unequal society of Colombia provides state’s protection, justice and resources for the wealthy and powerful, leaving poor and dispossessed citizens with limited, if not non-existing, protection and justice (Bowles, 2012 in Peña Huertas, 2018). This inequality does not only affect land ownership, but it limits the access to state institutions to those who already have access to information, knowledge about the system and contacts with local and national authorities (Peña Huertas, 2018). The inequality in Colombia explains why land dispossession has gone so unnoticed by the state and its institutions, despite being so widespread (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014 in Peña Huertas, 2018).
2.6 Neoliberal Policies of Land Legislations

“Throughout Latin America by the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, practically all governments had agreed to the stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank. These programmes included the drastic reduction of tariff protections for local industries, a reduction of government spending and the privatisation of state-owned corporations. But the ‘modernisation of the state’ has generally meant the selling of public utilities and other government corpora-ions to foreign investors beholden only to their shareholders” (Browitt, 2003, p. 1068).

Such neoliberal policies have also been implemented in Colombia and the country still has a liberal political system and market-led economic structures. These policies have gone hand in hand with a increasingly authoritarian state structures and were first introduced by the Samper-government (1986-1990), even though the country’s leading policies through the Liberal and the Conservative party have had a long tradition of cooperation with the U. S. Economic development have generally been an affair restricted to presidents, their advisors and representatives of leading institutions like the IMF and the World Bank (Browitt, 2003). The UN Development Program focused on the agrarian issue of Colombia in its 2011 National Human Development Report on rural development. The publication gave diagnostics of the obstacles and opportunities for an inclusive modernization of the rural economy, and later became a guideline for the peace accord in Havana on CRR (Herbolzheimer, 2016). The comprehensive rural reform in the accord will further be presented and discussed in chapter 5 and chapter 7.

It is increasingly acknowledged that violence in rural parts of the country has thrived on inequality and a failed model for rural development. The access and use of land is a highly contested issue and the legislation that regulates the rules, the distribution and the access is complex and difficult to navigate. (PBI, 2018). The legislations in regard to access to land are often heavily debated, and courts and judges also give different interpretations of the law and how it should be applied (PBI, 2018). In general, there are two main perspectives that generate confusion as well as social and juridical tension: one which recognizes the small-scale peasants rights to the land they use and cultivate, and the other that favors the concentration of land through private property titles. These perspectives also reflect the general populations view on political and economic development. Reforms and legislation
have in general mirrored neoliberal tendencies for economic growth and liberal development (PBI, 2018).

The Contested Legislation of Land Rights

There are three legislations that are worth mentioning to understand the complexity of access and rights to land in Colombia. Law 160 of 1994 marks an attempt to combine the two opposed perspectives on the issue of land rights. The law promotes rural development by creating the Peasant Reserved Zones, which legalize the peasants’ rights to land. However, the law also facilitates the state’s neoliberal vision by providing for rural development without the commitment of a full agrarian reform (PBI, 2018). One of the essential elements of the law is the use of baldíos. Baldíos are unoccupied land in rural or urban parts of the country, owned by the state. According to Law 160, these areas can be granted to farmers who have no land to cultivate. Law 177 of 2016, known as Zidres Law, drastically challenges the understanding of the use of unoccupied land as described in Law 160. The law permits the State to grant unoccupied land to companies, as long as the land fulfills the criteria of being remote and of low productivity. Critics of this law claim that the law favors large scale capital investment and agribusinesses over the protection of farmer communities and environmental preservation (PBI, 2018).

The third legislation is Law 1448 of 2011. As the previous policies failed to recognize the unequal use and rights to land and properties within the country, the Colombian state developed a public policy to resolve the situation of dispossessed and displaced people. The law is known as the Victims’ Law and focuses on the victims of the conflict and their process of reparation (Peña Huertas, 2018). One of the most important objectives of the law is land restitution for citizens whose properties have been forcibly dispossessed during the armed conflict. The law aims to establish specific standards and procedures for the restitution of properties of people who were forced into exile or displaced. However, for many displaced people in Colombia returning to the land they possessed before they were displaced is meaningless. Victims of forced displacement might have lived in extreme poverty before, and lack legal recognition of their property due to the high degree of informal land tenure. Most of the victims of forced displacement and dispossession only have informal claim on the land, and thereby have the status as occupants rather than owners (Obervatorio de Tierras, 2015, Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014 in Peña Huertas, 2018). The law has been heavily criticized for its
slow and bureaucratic processes, where cases often take years to resolve. More than 3000 requests have been resolved by the Land Restitution Unit, which corresponds to about 25 percent of the requests received by the entity (PBI, 2018). Many victims have also been prevented from making applications because of the high risk and threats from illegal groups to reclaiming their lands (PBI, 2018).

Summary

In this chapter I have presented the three attempts at peace in Colombia, the contested rural issue and legislations regarding land rights. The issue of land has for decades been in the heart of the conflict, and is yet to be resolved. The Colombians have been left without a comprehensive rural reform and with neoliberal policies that have affected and transformed the conflict, deepened the inequality and increased displacement and dispossession. Does the accord on CRR between the FARC and the government bring something new to the table? More importantly, could the accord provide lasting peace for the rural population? These questions will be discussed in chapter 7.
3 Methods and Methodology

In this chapter, I will explain the research design conducted in this thesis, and account for the method and methodology used to enable an answer to my research questions.

3.1 Research Design

My thesis falls into the category of a case study. “A case study usually involves investigating one or more phenomena in some depth in one place, region or country” (Castree, 2005, p. 1). This methodological approach is a study of a singular or multiple units to understand the totality, and is used in social science to test hypothesis and for theory development (George and Bennett, 2005). A case study is often conducted through research that explores the depths of the particularity or the uniqueness (Baxter, 2016). Ragin and Amoroso (2011) explain that the qualitative research strategy includes a variety of aspects to adequately study the depth of the case selected. Choosing qualitative case study approach allows the researcher to get in-depth knowledge and the opportunity to investigate the complexity within the case, while at the same time contribute to a wider understanding of a social phenomenon. Castree (2005) argues that the case may be unique, but not singular. In-depth knowledge of the case seek to develop understanding about the social phenomenon, and the case might therefore be unique, but not singular as it viewed as an example of a class within the social phenomenon investigated. As such, it is important to note that research through case studies cannot be statistically generalized to other contexts. Ragin and Amoroso (2011) explain that qualitative research involve the researchers ability to clarify the research topic and concepts related to the social phenomenon under investigation, and that the case has to be embedded in the topic and the research strategy. The case in this research is the Colombian Peace Accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform, which is a case of the phenomenon alternative, bottom-up approaches to peace building.

3.2 Choice of Case and Thematic

My interest in Colombia started when I first visited the country in 2011, and later lived in the city of Cartagena by the Caribbean cost for a period of time in 2012. I worked voluntarily as
an English teacher in a small rural town called Punta Canoas during my stay, and was astonished by the difference of inequality in the two places. Cartagena is known as a beautiful colonial city, which is inhabited by some of the richest people in the country and provides an atmosphere like an old town in Spain. Punta Canoa on the other hand reflects the struggles of poor fisherman and marginalized Afro-Colombian communities. After having spent a lot of time in Colombia, I felt a genuine interest in getting a deeper understanding of the country and started following the peace negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government, which was publicly announced shortly after I left the country.

I decided to study whether the Colombian peace accord reflects a new and different approach to peace building and to what extend the third attempt at peace in Colombia reflect a bottom-up approach with the involvement and participation of civil society organizations (CSO). Having focused on peace building in my bachelor thesis, I gained a better understanding of the rarity of bottom-up approaches to peace and participation of civil society in peace building processes worldwide. Nilsson (2012, p. 255) observed that within 83 peace accords in the years 1989-2004, only ⅓ of them involved some level of CSO participation. This generated an interest to investigate to what extend the Colombian peace building project offered a bottom-up approach to peace, especially since when I started the master program the peace accord was signed, and a variety of actors, including former president Santos and the Norwegian delegation (Zambrano and Gómez Isa, 2012, and Nylander, 2018) emphasize the uniqueness of the participation process and the content of the accord.

When I had decided on the aim and the topic of the thesis, I considered the possibilities within the different issues presented in the final peace accord between the FARC and the Colombian government. The accord is 310 pages long and is divided into six issues: Comprehensive Rural Reform, Political Participation, Ceasefire and Demobilization, Drug Trafficking, The Victims and Implementation. Considering the limitations of time and word limit in this master thesis, I decided to focus on one of the six issues in order to adequately investigate the peace building process and the content in the final peace accord. I found it both useful and necessary to delimit the scope of the thesis, and since CSOs have been involved in all six issues of the negotiation process I reflected on the issue that would be the best fit for my study. Three of the chapter were more technical in nature: the Cease Fire, the Drug Trafficking and the Implementation, and I therefore considered them less interesting to investigate in a study about what kind of peace approach the accord reflects.
The accord on Victims, as I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, was very interesting considering that 48 victims participated to share their proposals directly at the negotiating table. Nevertheless, over the few years from this process started, there has been substantial research on transitional justice and victims’ participation in the Colombian peace process. I therefore decided to investigate the process of an issue that has attracted less attention and research, in order to also contribute to a deeper understanding of what sort of peace approach the process has facilitated. The two remaining issues were of high interest because they both have been pointed out as underlying causes of the armed conflict. The exclusion of political rights to participate in decision-making processes was very relevant, but in respect to the issues focus on the democratic principle of transforming the FARC into a political party, the analytic unit for investigation would also have included political parties in Colombia. The issue on Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR) on the other hand highlights peasants and ethnic groups as the main actors, or ‘beneficiaries’, as described in the final peace accord, and provided the basis to investigate both the approach to peace building and what kind of peace reflected in a topic concerning one of the root causes of conflict. The fact that the issue has been in the heart of the conflict for decades made it very interesting to study. It concerns injustice and inequality related to access to land and rural development, which is arguably necessary to address in order to establish a foundation for positive, lasting peace in Colombia. For this reason, I chose to specifically look at the issue concerning Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR).

3.3 Qualitative Research

Since the aim of my research was to develop an understanding of how actors of civil society felt included and listened to in the peace process and in the content of the issue regarding Comprehensive Rural Reform, the most natural choice for my thesis was to use a qualitative approach rather than a quantitative approach.

“In a broad sense, qualitative research is concerned with elucidating human environments and human experiences within a variety of conceptual frameworks” (Winchester and Rofe, 2016, p. 5) Winchester and Rofe (2016) define the term research as the whole process from developing a research questions to analysis and interpretation of the material collected. The techniques of data gathering in qualitative research differ from the quantitative research,
which often employs questionnaires. The technique I found most appropriate to use in order to investigate my research questions was semi-structured in-depth interviews. I also used secondary sources of textual material as supplement to the data collected through the interviews. According to Winchester and Rofe (2016), there are two fundamental questions addressed by qualitative researchers: social structures and individual experiences. They argue that geographers balance the line of investigating individual experiences on the one hand and structures and process on the other. Structures constrain individuals and their behavior, but individuals can also have the capacity and agency to break rather than replace the structures. As individuals are constrained by these powerful structures embedded in society, individuals do not have the full will and ability to challenge them. These structures might be social, cultural, economic, environmental and political, and Winchester and Rofe (2016) point to patriarchy, capitalism and racism as structures that cast long shadows over human opportunities and experiences. This thesis is primarily concerned with the individual experiences of civil society actors who participated in the peace process embedded within the structures of a neoliberal political and economic model.

3.3.1 Subjectivity and Positionality

Social science research is conducted in a social context, where gathering data through qualitative techniques might involve personal interactions. The methods conducted can never be fully separated from the structures in society, and social norms, individual expectations and power structures embedded in for instance an interview will thereby influence the interaction and the interpretation of data material collected (Dowling, 2016). The researcher should therefore be aware how the social process can have implications on the data collected. Critical reflexivity is a process of self-conscious analysis of how the research process and technique used in a social context might have influenced the data collected (Dowling, 2016). I have strived to carefully consider the nature of the interaction of the interviews conducted and the influence of social relations by being aware of subjectivity and positionality.

Dowling (2016) explains that objectivity is impossible to achieve through qualitative methods used for data collection because of the social process of the research. The dialogues conducted between a researcher and an informant do not happen in a social vacuum, and elements of subjectivity, such as social position and personal characteristics, are impossible to fully control. Dowling (2016) point out that personal interaction between the participants
in the study and the researcher is an important element of qualitative research. Subjectivity is to insert yourself in the situation of this interaction, which is important in order to communicate with informants and establish rapport. The interaction between the researcher and the informant produce the social context of the research process through meaning and interpretation of the world, which will therefore shape the data collected.

This is called intersubjectivity, and it was evident in the interview I had with the CSO representative from PCN, an organization for the Afro-Colombian communities. Although I had sent an explanation of the thesis and a consent form beforehand, as will be further explained in the next part of this chapter, she asked many questions about why I wanted to study this topic, who I had talked to, what the aim of the study was. I was a bit thrown off guard and had not before interpreted other participants as critical towards my interest in the topic. Right away I felt like an outsider, and it was the only interview I felt I had difficulties of establishing rapport. However, participants who interpret the researcher as an outsider can also make more of an effort to clearly articulate circumstances and events (Dowling, 2016), which I felt the social process of the interview did.

Before I left to conduct my fieldwork, I worried about how the culture of male chauvinism, or machismo in Spanish, could affect the social context of the interviews, as it is prominent in the Colombian society. I have experienced machismo previously in Colombia and was therefore concerned about how this might affect the intersubjectivity between myself as a young, European female researcher, and a male Colombian informant. However, all of my informants were very professional and respectful during the interviews, and it was not an issue.

Positionality regards the acknowledgement of the researcher’s own position towards the topic being researched, and geographers often declare their own personal subjectivity in order to critically reflect upon the value-laden nature of the research. Views about the structure, measurement and order of a phenomenon might be part of this positionality and linked to methods the researchers choose to use (Winchester and Rofe, 2016). Although my aim has been to be conscious about my positionality throughout the process, it has necessarily shaped parts of the process. My interest in the topic has emerged through various travels to Colombia, where I have been astonished by the power, hope and agency of the locals who are victimized and criminalized in their struggling for peace and social justice. My personal
beliefs are rooted in political and economic equality and sovereignty, and although I acknowledge that the global market-oriented economic model has contributed to lift millions of people out of poverty, I also critically view and fear the consequences of the structural powers of neoliberalism, such as increased inequality, centralized public sector control and environmental damages. I view these topics as important for social welfare and development, and this positionality will have affected my research concerning my interest in the topic, how I have been interpreted by the informants and how I have interpreted the data collected through the interviews conducted.

3.3.2 Ethical Considerations

Thagaard (2013, p. 26-31) identifies three ethical guidelines in order to provide for ethically justifiable social science research: informed consent, confidentiality and consequences of participating in a research project. The principle of informed consent is the starting point for any research project, which provides the basis for individuals’ rights over their own lives and their autonomy, and control over information that might be shared with others. The informants should be informed about what the research project entails, and be free to choose to participate without facing external pressure. Nevertheless, there are some challenges in qualitative research in terms of informed consent. There will be limitations to how much the researcher can provide of information about the research project as very detailed information can have impact on the informants’ behavior and response.

The principle of confidentiality entails that the researcher anonymizes the informant in the research project when the final results are presented. This is to ensure and protect the rights of personal privacy. The researcher might experience dilemmas in regards to the considerations of informants’ anonymity and the consideration of presenting the results within the standards of validity and verifiability. Ethically it is important to anonymize the informants’ identities, especially in small and transparent social contexts, although it methodically benefits the researcher to present the informant in the way they were perceived during the process of data collection. The researcher also has to carefully consider how information is saved and for how long it is necessary to store the data collected.

The third ethical guideline regards the possible consequences for informants participating in the research project. The researcher has to consider the consequences the research project
might entail for the informants, and has an ethical responsibility to protect the informants' integrity by seeking to avoid negative consequences of involvement in the research project.

The three ethical guidelines that Thagaard (2013) identifies aim to ensure ethically justifiable social science research by emphasizing the researcher’s responsibilities and the informants’ rights. All the participants in my study were sent a written description of the project before the interviews were conducted. The consequences of being involved in political and social work and human rights in Colombia can be severe, so I sought to inform the participants about how the information collected would be used and made it clear that participation in the study was voluntarily, that they at any time could withdraw from the project and that they would be anonymized. This information was repeated before each interview and the participants agreed to the conditions and signed the written consent form. Although none of the participants said it was necessary to be anonymized, and rather expressed that being visible and spread the work of their organization would have a positive affect, I still chose to anonymize my informants in regards to the security issue. I have therefore used pseudonyms based on typical Colombian names.

3.4 Conducting a Fieldwork

Before my fieldwork in Bogotá, I had submitted my research design to the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). My application was approved, so my study was in line with the university's ethical guidelines for conducting research. I spent eight weeks in Bogotá, between 25th of August 2017 and 25th of October 2017.

Conducting in-depth interviews with a small number of the “right” people will provide significant insight into a research issue (Stratford and Bradshaw, 2016, p. 123). When I left to conduct my fieldwork I had already an idea of what kind of actors I wanted to talk to. Thagaard (2013) explains that the researcher has to define the sample of informant the research project is based upon in order to decide who it will be relevant to get information from. My aim was to research how actors of civil society had participated in the peace process of the accord on CRR, and how they felt included in the content of the accord. I therefore started mapping out civil society organizations who would be relevant for the study and I also talked to various representatives from civil society organizations and academics in
Oslo before I left, to get some input of who it potentially would be relevant to talk to. Qualitative studies are based on participants who have qualifications or qualities that are strategic in regards to the research project, also called strategic sampling (Thagaard, 2013). There were three groups of actors emphasized in the accord on CRR, also called beneficiaries in the accord: peasants, Afro-Colombians and indigenous peoples. I therefore started to send written inquiries with descriptions of the thesis by e-mail to several civil society organizations who work particularly for and with these groups, and who had been part of the peace process of the accord on CRR.

Initially when I started my fieldwork in Bogotá, I was open to travel to other places in the country to conduct interviews with civil society organization in the rural parts of the country, especially since the accord specifically highlights rural reform and rural development. I was invited by some friends to participate in a gathering for civil society organizations in the department of Villavicencio, which took place in relation to the visit of the Pope. I decided to go to the gathering to get to know different civil society organizations, to consider my options, and to map out some of the CSOs in Colombia. There were several organizations and social movements from different department that participated, and after having conversations with various actors, it became clear that my main challenge would be to find participants with the right qualifications. My aim was to talk about processes that had happened a few years back in regards to the accord on CRR, while most of the actors I talked to emphasized the ongoing election and failure of the state to address the contemporary rural situation. The place to conduct the study depends on the researchers access to the environment and where the people relevant for the research project are (2013). I returned to Bogotá in the search for informants who new the peace process of the accord on CRR well, who remembered the channels for participation, which took place five years earlier, and who were familiar with the specifics of the content of the accord on CRR. I also had most of my contact network in Bogotá, and therefore found it more efficient to talk to civil society organizations at the national scale in the capital where I easier could gain access.

Although I had submitted inquiries via emails to several civil society organizations for peasants, Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups, few answered. I concluded that I had to contact the organizations by other means, and I eventually got the phone numbers of key actors in the organizations relevant to my study through the interview process and my own contacts. I sent them written descriptions about the research project via WhatsApp, and this
proved to be a much more efficient way to contact the people of interest. In total I conducted 12 interviews during my fieldwork. The interviews lasted for approximately 45 minutes to one hour each, and all of them, except the one with the representative from SAC, were conducted in Spanish. I speak Spanish and did therefore not need the help of a translator, which provided a more relaxed atmosphere in the social process of the interviews and contributed to establish rapport.

Eight of them were with representatives from peasant organizations with rural focus, where I sought to include a diversity of voices by selecting organizations on the politically left both incline with the FARC and less supportive of the FARC, and organizations with a less clear political line. I also conducted one interview with a private rural organization with sympathies on the political right because several of the other informants specifically mentioned this organization. The representative interviewed from this organization also had the topic of civil society as one of his main responsibilities, and I therefore found it useful to include his view in the study. Two of the interviews conducted were with representatives from ethnic organizations, one for Afro-Colombians communities and one for Indigenous communities. I also conducted an interview with a women’s organization and an interviewed with an academic expert in the topic of the rural situation regarding displacement who also had close ties with the ethnic communities. Six of the informants are female and six are male, and they generally have relatively high positions within the organizations. The informants are between the age of approximately 35 and 75 and have been part of the organizations for several years. A list of the informants and the organization they represent is described in appendix 1.

### 3.5 The Qualitative Research Interview

Research interviews are used as qualitative methods to fill a knowledge gap, to investigate complex behaviors and motivations, to collect a diversity of opinion and experiences and to empower the informants that provide the data (Dunn, 2016). The aim of the interview is to gain sufficient information about the informants view and perspectives on the topic of research. The data collected through an interview reflects the informants’ experiences and understandings of the topic (Thagaard, 2013). Interviews therefore provide data through the social process of a dialog that other methods might be unable to, and is an excellent method
to acquire information about opinions, events and experiences. It is however important to recognize that experience and opinions vary enormously, and the researcher has to be aware that the data neither provides a universal claim to public opinion or a the discovery of the truth.

There are three major forms of interviewing: structured, unstructured and semi-structured (Dunn, 2016, p. 150). In qualitative methods, the most used form of interviews are semi-structured. This form of interviewing makes room for flexibility as well as some degree of predetermined order of the questions. The topics of the questions are established before the interview, but the order might change in regards to how the informant addresses the answers. The informant can also provide information about a topic that was not predetermined, although the interview itself is steered by the topics the researcher wants information about (Dunn, 2016, Thagaard, 2013).

“One of the major strengths of the interviewing is that it allows you to discover what is relevant to the informant” (Dunn, 2016, p. 151). Compared to questionnaires, a semi-structured interview allows the informant to respond openly, and the researcher to investigate other aspects of the topic. In my research I found it useful to use semi-structured interviews where most of the topics were predetermined, but I also made room for the informant to elaborate on topics in particular interest or in topic where the informant had special in-depth knowledge and experience.

The Interview Guide

In my interviews, I used semi-structured questions though a mixture if an interview guide and an interview schedule. An interview guide is general topics, issues and questions you want to ask the informant. The guide might contain a simple list of concepts and words to remained the researcher of the issues to be addressed when conducting the interview, and are usually topics drawn from existing literature on the issue for discussion. One of the major strengths of using an interview guide when conducting an interview is the flexibility it provides. The researcher can allow a natural flow of the social dialog while at the same time redirect the discussions to cover relevant issues. One of the disadvantages is that the researcher has to formulate questions in the setting of the interview, which requires both confidence and communications skills. A first-time interviewer can therefore benefit from using an interview
schedule, which consists of carefully worded questions. An interview schedule can provide
the researcher with greater confidence and a more structured comparison between the
informants’ answers. Nevertheless, reading out a predetermined question in an interview
might be perceived formal and out of place for the informant, and a mixture of both structures
questions and topics of issues the researchers want covered in the interviews proved the
strengths of both methods (Dunn, 2016, p.152-153).

In my interviews I used an interview schedule with well-prepared questions as a basis to
cover all the relevant topics for discussion. Well-worded questions might be part of a guide
and used as topic areas, and can provide the researcher with a safety net if articulating
questions on the spot becomes difficult (Dunn, 2016, p. 154). As a first time interviewer, I
found it useful to have prepared questions in the interview guide, while at the same time have
space for flexibility to explore other aspects the informant emphasized as relevant and
important. I used the same interview guide/schedule for all my informants, but changed some
of the questions and the topics in regards to the organization's agenda. I started the interviews
with broad and general questions about the informants’ organization and general concepts
related to the peace accord on CRR in order to establish rapport. As the interview progressed
I moved on to more narrow questions concerning the informants’ experiences with the peace
process and the content of the peace accord. In some interviews I found it difficult to steer the
conversation as several of the CSO representatives interviewed emphasized the contemporary
political situation regarding rural development. This might also have affected my
interpretation of data as several of the informants stressed the unwillingness of the state to
resolve the contemporary rural situation, considering murders of ingenuous people and
community leaders that occurred during the time of my fieldwork. Nevertheless, we often
changed the conversation to a topic more relevant for the thesis or ended up covering the
topics of the interview guide. The general interview guide used is presented in appendix 3.

Document analysis

In my research on the peace accord on CRR, I have also used reports and public documents
to supplement the data collected through the fieldwork. Document analysis differs from the
data the researcher has collected through interviews, and refers to texts written for another
purposed than the one researched in the project, and can therefore be used as supplement to
the data collected in through interviews (Thagaard, 2013). The reports and public documents
are written by academics and public institutions, such as the National University of Colombia, in regards to the Colombian peace process and the accord on CRR. The main document I have used in the analysis of this research is the final peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC.

3.6 Analysis of Data

All the interviews conducted in this research have been audio recorded, except from one, which was in writing sent to my UiO email account. The informant received the description of the project and the informed consent form through email, and agreed to participate and answered the questions in the interview guide in writing. The rest of the participants in the study agreed to have the conversation recorded. I used my mobile phone to record the interviews, and immediately transferred the audio record to my computer after the interviews were conducted. I also took notes during the interview in order to capture the substance of what was being said. Using audio recording might inhibit the informant to answer naturally and may make the informant less forthcoming (Dunn, 2016, p. 169). I did not interpret that this was the case during my interviews, which may be because the participants in the study are very used to articulate their opinions and experiences in public.

“The record of an interview is usually written up to facilitate analysis. Interviews produce vast data sets that are next to impossible to analyze if they have not been converted to text” (Dunn, 2016, p. 170). I transcribed each interview and uploaded the text into the program NVivo for coding. The process of transcribing the interview was very time-consuming considering that I translated the interviews word by word, from Spanish to English. However, it was very useful to translate the interviews while conducting the process of transcribing in order to write the thesis in English. Most of the interviews were conducted in the organizations’ offices, but due to the loud noises of the traffic in Bogotá, some parts of the interviews were difficult to hear and comprehend. Parts that I did not understand or that were unclear were left out of the data material for coding.

The aim of analyzing data from interviews is to seek meaning from the data. In order to analyze the data collected through interviews, a coding system is used to sort the data material through the use of concepts and word that describe the content of different parts of
the text (Dunn, 2016, p. 173-175 and Thagaard, 2013, p. 158). The categories of codes appeared through the interview and transcribing process. Some of the codes directly related to the questions and topics in the interview guide, and some more narrowly referred to the experiences and opinions of the informants. The codes I used had low abstraction level, meaning they referred to concrete description of the content of the text (Thagaard, 2013, p. 159). Examples of codes I used are ‘the Land Fund’, ‘representation’, ‘indirect participation’ and ‘rural development’. I used codes such as these to structure the collected data by sorting out different categories and topics in regards to the process for participation and proposals from civil society. The accord on CRR is 23 pages long and divided into three main sections, so I systematized the data material from the interviews though codes in regard to the content of the accord, in order to compare the data collected to the content of the accord on CRR. Proposals from civil society organizations interviewed that were not part of the accord were coded with ‘not part of accord’ and thereafter structured into topics.

The Quality of the Data

Reliability concerns whether the researcher has conducted the research project in a reliable and credible matter. The concept of reliability is based upon the notion that if another researcher conducted the research project, the conclusion of the study would be the same (Thagaards, 2016). Seale (1999, in Thagaard, 2016, p. 202) calls this notion ‘external reliability’, which refers to the replicability of the research. External reliability is therefore based on a research logic that emphasizes neutrality, which is difficult to achieve in qualitative research. His concept of ‘internal reliability’ is more relevant in qualitative research, which is the degree of compliance in data collection between researchers within the same project. I have attempted to achieve internal reliability by explaining my approaches for data collection and analysis.

Validity concerns the researchers’ interpretation of data, and refers to the extent to which the results of the research represent the reality that has been observed. The researcher strengthens the validity of the research by providing critical reflection regarding the process for analysis. I have sought to be aware of my positionality throughout the process and focused on transparency in order to critically reflected upon how my positionality might have affected the results in this thesis.
Qualitative research aims at developing understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Thagaard, 2013, p. 210). This thesis does not search for a causal link between the proposals from the local organizations that participated in the peace process and the content of the accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform. It rather focus on the informants opinions about the level of participation and inclusion, and whether their experiences from the process and understanding of the accord reflect a bottom-up approach and civil peace. The interpretation of the data collected to understand a phenomenon provides that basis for transferability, where these interpretations developed within frame of the research project might be relevant in other contexts (Thagaard, 2013, p. 210). Most of the informants interviewed are representatives in civil society organizations, and the reach is therefore limited to their own understanding of the process and the accord. The thesis does not present the objective truth about local level participation in a peace negotiation, but rather presents an interpretation of representatives from civil society’s own understanding of the peace process and the final accord. The research conducted in this thesis provides an understanding on how civil society organizations interpret the link between the negotiating parties and the local actors in a peace process. The topic is highly relevant in other contexts regarding approaches to peace and the importance of local consent and ownership in decision-making processes. The research provides a contribution to further research regarding inclusion and participation of civil society organizations in peace building projects.

**Summary**

In this chapter I have accounted for my methodological choices and the fieldwork conducted in this research project. I have also explained my interest in the case and the choice of topic. I have conducted the qualitative case study though semi-structured in-depth interviews and used document analysis as supplement to the data collected through the fieldwork. My position as a researcher and how this might have impacted my data collection and analysis has also been discussed.
4 Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I introduce theoretical perspectives that will frame the study and be used to analyze my empirical data. The theories that I have applied are from Human Geography and other disciplines within social science. My focus is on civil society organizations and the thesis aims to explore how these groups participated in the process of the peace accord on CRR, and whether their voices and wishes have been emphasized in the accord. The case makes it necessary to include perspectives on peace and peace building in order to analyze whether the design and the content of the peace accord reflect a bottom-up approach.

In order to discuss to what extent the accord on CRR reflects a new and different approach to peace building, I will first introduce the theory that has provided the framework for the dominant forms of peace building worldwide, and which historically has failed to emphasize local consent, social justice and structural transformation for positive, lasting peace. In order to discuss whether the accord on CRR reflects a bottom-up approach, I will suggest a framework for an emancipatory model for civil peace to conceptualize what inclusion and emphasis of local actors in the peace process and the content of the accord on CRR can entail. The framework suggests participation for local consent and ownership and dimensions of social justice as pillars for a bottom-up peace building approach.

This chapter includes five sections. I begin the chapter by introducing the background of the liberal peace theory and how it became the dominant form of thinking within peace building projects after the Cold War ended. The second part discusses the liberal peace theory. The theory is often described as an agenda, a thesis and a discourse, and can thus be problematic to grasp due to its broad character. My aim is to give an overview of the principal ways of understanding peace and approaches to build peace within the theory. Thereafter, in the third section of the chapter, I will introduce the main critique of liberal peace agenda and thereby discusses the necessity of emphasizing an emancipatory peace for conflict resolution. I will also explain the concept of hybrid peace as a way of understanding how peace building can be a contested process between local actors and parties at the negotiating table. The last section of the chapter will suggest an analytic framework for an emancipatory model for civil peace. First, it will discuss the participation of civil society organizations for local consent in decision-making processes, such as the process of making the accord on CRR, which will be
discussed and analyzed in chapter 6. Secondly, I will introduce the concept of social justice as an analytic tool to address underlying causes of conflict. These theoretical assumptions will be used to analyze the content of the peace accord on CRR in chapter 7.

4.1 The Origin of The Liberal Peace Theory

The liberal peace framework has emerged though a complex development of specific economic, political, social, conceptual and methodological events. The liberal peace theory has a universal ambition and has gained a dominant position when it comes to conflict resolution and peace building the last decades (Richmond and Franks, 2009). In the context of the Cold War, the U.S and most of its allies promoted liberal democracies and market-oriented economies whereas the Soviet Union encouraged a different version of democracy - communist ‘people's democracy’ - which emphasized public rather than private ownership. The ideological differences made it impossible for the United Nations to promote any particular model of democracy as the ‘proper’ model, and many officials therefore distanced themselves from questioning domestic policies (Paris, 2004). When the Cold War ended in the late 1980 and the early 1990s, many of these conditions suddenly changed and thereby allowed international organizations, including the UN, to become more directly involved in efforts to bring an end to conflicts.

In the period after the Cold War, the UN engaged in a wide variety of missions, and the term ‘peace operations’ emerged. The norm in peace building operations during the 1990s was to pursue the same general strategy for promoting stable and lasting peace in intra-state conflicts through democratization and marketization (Paris, 2004). Broader projects of engagement with conflict through the construction of a liberal state were driven by agencies like the UN, assistance donors, the World Bank, other financial institutions and experts, in the global South. Liberalization as a solution for civil conflict involved promoting liberal democracies, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalized markets and neoliberal development to states suffering from internal conflicts (Richmond and Franks, 2009). Planning for elections and comprehensive marketization programs were therefore usually initiated immediately in every operation (Paris, 2004). Promoting transitions from intra-state conflicts to liberal marketalized democracies became a key concern for the US-lead ‘international community’, often described as international organizations and like-minded liberal states, in the post-Cold
War period. Concerns for human security and state failure justified development aid and state intervention as tools for liberal peace building (Richmond and Franks, 2009).

**Democratic Peace Thesis**

The liberal conception of peace stems from the democratic peace thesis that holds democratic governments to be more peaceful than non-democratic regimes, where liberal democracies are seen as a universal strategy for ending conflicts (Stokke, 2011). Such liberal peace is best created through institutional economic and political liberal reforms, achieved through elite negotiations supported by economic aid and international facilitation. The democratic peace thesis and the liberal peace theory is often traced back to Immanuel Kant's work on liberal democracy for security and president Woodrow Wilson's principles for foreign policy at the end of the World War I (Stokke, 2011). “Wilson viewed the American model of market democracy as the apogee of political development, and believed that the spread of this model would promote peace in both domestic and international affairs” (Paris, 2004, p. 40). Paris (2004) further describes that Wilson traveled to France and participated in the Versailles peace conference in 1919 and shared his ideas on a world order based on democratic principles and thereby became the first statesman who articulated what is now known as the liberal peace theory. Paris (2004) observes an interesting parallel between the post-World War I period and the years after the Cold War: the international community faced a security threat and responded with a Wilsonian approach to achieve world peace. The rise of the U.S as a super nation and the involvement of the international community in international relations and conflict resolutions during the 1990s contributed to the growth of discourses and practices of liberal peace building. Richmond (2007, p. 85) argues that a new consensus on liberal peace building emerged in the US-led liberal world order where “conflict is viewed as a problem to be solved and provides opportunity to export liberal peace”. There is however one clear distinction between Wilson’s emphasis on liberal democracies and the post-Cold War peace discourse; the inclusion of neo-liberal development, especially in aid-receiving countries (Stokke, 2011).

**Market-Led Development**

When the liberal peace theory was articulated by Wilson, the international concern for conflict resolution was mainly driven by inter-state conflicts. In the last decades, general
research of the relationship between liberal forms of government and civil and international conflicts has concluded that market-democracies rarely go to war against each other (Paris, 2004). Several analysis of civil conflict have also concluded that market-democracies are generally less vulnerable for intrastate conflicts. These findings further developed the liberal peace discourse that holds political and economic liberalization as promising strategies for domestic peace in states that are emerging from civil wars. (Paris, 2004). The increased international attention on intra-state conflict resolution since the Cold War has thereby sought to address the links between peace and market-led development. The international community embraced the liberal peace building discourse of development for peace and also gained influence within international finance institutions, especially the WB. In 2003, the WB, which generally has had a narrow focus on economic development, published a special report that emphasized this link (Stokke, 2011, p. 326). The introduction of the study states the main argument:

“This report argues that civil war is now an important issue for development. War retards development, but conversely, development retards war. This double causation gives rise to virtuous and vicious circles. Where development succeeds, countries become progressively safer from violent conflict, making subsequent development easier. Where development fails, countries are at high risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war” (Collier et al, 2003, p. 1)

The broader engagement projects for conflict resolution in the post-Cold War period have also emphasized this link, and practical development aid shifted from being ‘conflict-blind’ to offering humanitarian and development aid in a conflict-sensitive manner. Development assistance was increasingly used as a tool for peace building and conflict resolution, thereby letting external actors to become active stakeholders in peace processes in the global South (Stokke, 2011). The international community directed the promotion of democracy, rule of law and neo-liberal development based on the recognition that conflicts is to be seen as obstacles to successful development and development is an instrument for peace (Duffield, 2007, Paris, 2004 in Stokke, 2011).

**Geopolitical Shift**

The link between peace and development was strongly emphasized in the 1990s, and intra-state conflict resolution became a key concern for international development cooperation. Peace was presented as both a precondition and a product of development where peace and
development was assumed as mutually reinforced. The international attention to intra-states conflicts in the global South was driven by concern for underdevelopment and human security, but was not seen or treated as a security issue for the aid-donor countries in the global North (Stokke, 2011). The international agenda for peace building projects changes however in the beginning of the 2000s. Growing fear that local wars could generate long-distance threats became a main concern after the Al Qaeda attack in New York City on September 11th 2001. Insecurity marked the change of geopolitics in western states and conflict resolution and peace building in intra-state conflicts became a matter of global security. The new geopolitical context in the beginning of the 2000s gave increased attention to ‘new wars’ and their transnational links. The US-led international relations shifted from liberal internationalism to a new focus on homeland security and ‘war on terror’, where the political space for peace negotiations and peace building was replaced by support for armed intervention to combat terrorism and provide state security (Kaldor, 2006, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2005, Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005, in Stokke, 2011).

4.2 Conceptualizing Liberal Peace

Despite the contextual geopolitical change since the 1990s, the liberal peace theory still holds the principle reference frame for peacemaking and peace building today. Mac Ginty (2010, p. 392) argues that given the dominance of Western states, institutions and technologies in contemporary projects for peace and development, the liberal peace thesis is legitimate to use in studies that aim at addressing the combination of international and local peacemaking. “The liberal peace is taken to mean the dominant form of internationally supported peacemaking and peace building that is promoted by leading states, leading international organizations and international financial institutions” (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 393). The term aims to capture the totality of internationally sponsored peace, especially in the aftermath of a civil war, within the consensus of liberalism, and is described as the dominant form of peace building, peacemaking and development in this era (Mac Ginty, 2010). Paris (2004, p. 38) explains that peace making can be understood as an attempt at resolving conflicts either through peaceful means, such as peace negotiation, or by authoritarian military forces. He defines peace building as “action undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peace building mission involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international
agencies, with the mandate to conduct peace building in a country that is just emerging from a civil war.” In this thesis, peace building is viewed in broader terms and also involves the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC. The term peace building refers to the whole peace process in Colombia in this thesis, and the term peacemaking will not be employed.

**Liberalism**

Mac Ginty (2010) argues that the core elements of liberal peace are stabilization and security, reinforcing statehood, democratic governance and extension of the free market. The liberal peace theory is based on the notion of liberalism, and peace building projects within the discourse often reflect “the primacy of the individual, the belief in the reformability of individuals and institutions, pluralism and toleration, the rule of law, and the protection of property.” Liberalism in the contemporary world can be operationalized as commitment to practices and principles of individual responsibilities and rights in the context of equal opportunities, freedom of expression, the rule of law, a market driven economy and multi-part free elections (Herring, 2008, in Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 393). It includes the notion of development, responsibility and common interests, and the liberal peace thesis is often referred to as ‘liberal institutionalism’ due to the liberalization of political and economic policies. This, he argues, is most visible in societies in transition from a civil war, but can also be observed in developing states that have not experienced war in recent years, through ‘good governance’, ‘poverty reduction strategies’ and ‘reforms’. In the post-Cold War period, the ability of the liberal ideas have gained a dominant position to save the world, and offers salvation against war, disease, poverty and terrorism (Mac Ginty, 2010). In peacemaking and peace building projects, the liberal peace thesis offers transformation towards economic and political liberalization in both interstate and intrastate conflicts. Liberal democracy and neoliberal development are seen as universal tools for conflict resolutions, but demand comprehensive operations at both social and state level, and cannot be achieved without significant resources (Richmond and Franks, 2009).

**Forms of Peace and Approaches**

Richmond and Franks (2009, p. 5) identifies four main ways of thing about peace, and three approaches to peace building that derive from these ways of understanding peace. These
understandings of what peace entails and how peace best can be achieved are useful tools to analyze if the accord reflects a different approach than generally emphasized within the liberal peace agenda in chapter 6 and chapter 7.

Richmond and Franks (2009, p. 5) identify four main ways of thinking about peace within the liberal peace framework. Stokke (2011) refers to Richmond and Frank (2009) and describes these four ways of thinking about peace as sub-discourses of liberal peace, in other words, how peace is understood within the liberal peace theory. In this thesis, these four ways of thinking about peace, or sub-discourses of liberal peace, are referred to as forms of peace.

The first form is described as the Victor’s peace, and is based on the belief that military victory is more likely to succeed and last than negotiated peace agreements. The hegemony or the domination of that victory is central, and refers to the realist argument in international relations.

The second form is the institutional peace, which stems from idealists and liberals demands for international norms, institutions and laws to enforce and determine states individual behavior.

The constitutional peace is the third form and rests upon Kant's democratic security argument about the importance of state reforms towards political and economic liberalism for peace. Democracy, trade and a set of cosmopolitan values are the main principles to achieve peace and security. These three forms has been the most influential discourses within top-down peace building projects, and aim to foster liberal peace through institutions of political and economic liberalization.

The fourth less influential form is the civil peace, which emphasizes civil society, direct action, citizen advocacy and consent, and citizen mobilization rather than state and international actors as in the three forms above. Civil peace emphasize defense of basic human rights and needs, often for reasons of social justice, emancipation and self-determination. The liberal peace agenda is often associated with the constitutional and institutional peace, especially within the international community (Richmond and Franks, 2009, p. 5 and Stokke, 2011, p. 325).
Richmond and Franks (2009) further observes three main approaches that derive from these forms of thinking about peace within the liberal peace framework: the conservative, the orthodox and the emancipatory model. These approaches reflect strategies employed in peace building and conflict resolution (Stokke, 2011).

**The conservative approach** is described as the most authoritarian, and rests upon the notion of victor’s peace. It is characterized by top-down interventions to peace building by dominant and hegemonic techniques. The approach often reflects non-UN peace operations, and tends to be implemented through military intervention or political sanctions and conditions. In the Colombian context, this approach can be observed in the DPS strategy of former president Uribe, where military means were used to combat the guerrilla.

**The orthodox approach** on the other hand, describes peace building through peace negotiations and liberal reforms, and therefore resembles the constitutional and institutional strand of liberal peace. The model emphasizes a state-lead peace through liberal institutions, involvement of international organizations and NGOs, and is also more sensitive of local ownership. The aim is to create the mechanisms of democracy, the free market, development, human rights and the rule of law. It has mainly emerged from the UN family, and offers a top-down and bottom-up approach at the same time, although it tends to emphasis a top-down dimension though conditional models and practices of donors, institutions and organizations. This approach to peace also reflects major states and donors’ interests. The international community has provided unwavering support to the third attempt at peace in Colombia, which will be explained in chapter 5.

**The emancipatory model** in contrast, is presented as a more critical stance that emphasizes a much closer relationship with local actors, focusing on local consent and local ownership. It differs from the first two by offering a bottom-up approach that presents a stronger concern for social justice, people’s’ need and local agency. This model equates the form of civil peace and emphasizes locally negotiated requirements from various actors. Inclusion of a variety of actors is central, especially local organizations in association with major agencies and state donors. This alternative model is shaped by local actors and social movements rather than international agencies and governments. (Richmond and Franks, 2009, Stokke, 2011). It can be observed that the second attempt to peace in Colombia aimed to include an emancipatory model considering a broad range of civil society organizations were included in the process.
However, as the FARC and the government failed to agree on basic logistics and expectations, and the involvement of civil society organizations made the process even harder to manage. The negotiations fell apart before the parties even reached a substantial step towards agreeing on anything (Johnson and Jonsson, 2013, and Díaz Padón, 2018).

4.3 Does Liberal Peace Foster Positive, Lasting Peace?

Most of the criticism towards the liberal peace agenda is directed towards the conservative and orthodox approach and the understandings of peace often applied in the international community lobbies. “Proponents of liberal peace interventions suggest that the core elements of the liberal peace (security and stabilization, reinforcing states, democratic governance, and marketization) bring the ability to emancipate people” (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 395). To achieve the core elements of the liberal peace, significant resources both at a social and state level are needed. The power to do so, the resources and the control of the processes have become the new site of power and domination in post-conflict societies (Richmond and Franks, 2009). Richmond and Franks (2009) raise the question of how this can be while at the same time remaining true to the emancipatory claims. They observe that liberal peace agencies within the international community generally show great commitment to the countries they work in, but are at the same time deeply aware of the problems of the liberal peace model.

The Questionable Links Between Liberalism and Peace

There has become an increased awareness of the limits within the liberal peace framework, and studies have questioned the effect of political and economic liberalization in countries that recently have experienced civil conflict. Paris (2004, p. 44) He observes that there has been a great deal of research about the relative peacefulness of liberal states, however, these debates have often overlooked the relationship between conflict and liberalization. The promotion of liberal peace includes transformation of a state into a market democracy, and this transformation is often ignored as most of the research often focus on states that have already made this transition. The liberal peace theory has therefore not stressed the transition phase for states in the process of becoming market democracies. The promotion that democracy will foster peace through liberal institutionalism has often addressed only part of the story, whereas post-conflict states in transition often experiences both positive and
negative effects. The transition towards economic liberalization during a peace process is however not the case in Colombia. Colombia had liberal policies long before the peace accord was signed, but could the accord CRR strengthen the country’s neo-liberal policies? This question will further be discussed in chapter 7.

Paris (2004) argues that there are reasons to doubt that liberalization will foster peace as different liberal scholars have suggested that states in transition to market democracy may be prone to internal conflict. He stresses that there is little agreement on the relationship between liberalization and internal conflict, as the liberal peace framework traditionally has emerged from research based on the premise that market democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies on an international level. However, the international community has portrayed political and economic liberalization as a solution for internal conflict in the post-Cold War period, whereas some studies have concluded that democratization can enhance civil violence. There is also little precise knowledge about the connection between internal conflict and marketization.

While there is a general assumption that well-established market democracies are prone to domestic peace, some studies suggests that marketization has increased civil unrest in a number of states. Paris (2004, p. 46) refers to Walton and Seddon (1994, p. 3) who conclude that there is a clear “relationship between widespread popular unrest in the cities of the developing world… and the process of economic and social transformation… associated with a renewed emphasis on liberalization and the promotion of the ‘free markets’ ” after examination food riots in several counties in the global South. Paris (2004) argues that the strategy of liberalization as a mean to foster peace is uncertain, even though the actors that promote marketization and democratization for internal peace rarely acknowledge it.

**Top-down and Elite-Driven**

Given the uncertain connection between liberalization and peace in internal conflicts, especially in the global South, it is not surprising that the main critique of the liberal peace thesis holds that the framework reflects the ideological and practical interests of the Global North (Mac Ginty, 2010). As it draws on the Wilsonian tradition, its critics argue that it deploys liberal rhetoric’s to justify peacemaking and peace building interventions, thereby using illiberal means to promote liberal values (Williams, 2005, in Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 394).
They observe that the liberal peace thesis is based on a conservative and realist philosophy that have tended to be imposed from the outside of the donor recipient states through alliances with national elites that favors their own interest (Mac Ginty, 2010 and Brett, 2013).

“In this view, the liberal peace is equated with negative peace, or forms of peace that address conflict manifestations but avoid structural change. The liberal peace is criticized for its alleged ethnocentrism – its promotion of essentially Western values and its belief in the universalism of liberal goals. Critics also point to the unbending belief in the liberating abilities of the free market shown by the international financial institutions and leading states in their postwar reconstruction strategies. In a sense, the liberal peace becomes a neoliberal peace and engages in ‘aggressive social engineering’, whereby the private sector is privileged over notions of the common good, often with profound human consequences” (Pugh, 2006, p. 153 in Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 395).

The critics of the liberal peace thesis stressed that so called ‘norm entrepreneurs’ from the UN system, regional organizations and donor governments bring a top-down peace building that limits the capacity of local non-elite collective agency to exert leverage and impact over the process. These peace building projects are often described as being ‘one dimensional’, characterized by lack of ownership for local actors (Richmond, 2006). Mac Ginty (2010) describes that according to its critics, these peace-supported interventions fail to engage adequately with the embedded causes of conflict and are ineffective in addressing structural transformations and therefore fails to prevent unrest and conflicts in the future. Scholars have observed that peace building projects within the liberal peace framework have prioritized ending formal hostilities and contributed to civil and political rights within the liberal ideology, whilst focusing less on economic rights and social injustice violations that often are embedded in the original causes of conflict. Brett (2013, p. 2) concludes that “Consequently, settlements have tended to exclude demands for the right to land, land reform, socio-economic inclusion and structural transformation that seeks to address causal factors of conflict, as was the case in Colombia and Central America, focusing rather on neo-liberal policy-based solutions.”

**Lack of Emancipatory Model for Civil Peace**

The liberal peace framework has struggled to communicate, and create consensus, with those involved at the civil level and to adequately respond to various types of feedback. Richmond and Franks (2009, p. 7) observe that civil peace often is invisible in the liberal peace building projects, even though it may be emphasized by non-state actors motivated by concerned for
human security and social justice. According to their findings from various examples of contemporary peace building, a conflict zone is often entered by a conservative approach of liberal peace with the aim of moving towards an orthodox model. Richmond and Franks’ (2009, p. 12) further describe that most of the various approaches organized with the support of international actors claim to be emancipatory. However, it can be observed that peace processes where international actors have been involved tend to produce a form of quasi-liberal statehood that represents a compromise of the international version of the orthodox liberal peace. The emancipatory model of liberal peace claimed by the actors involved has therefore not emerged in practice.

In the post-Cold War era, it can be observed serious defects of social justice, socio-economic well-being and development though internationally supported peace building. These processes have often produced ‘negative forms of peace’ - absence of physical violence and dissolution of direct hostilities, often characterized by bureaucratic and economic basis of state governmentality. ‘Positive peace’ on the other hand refers to a long-time process with absence of direct, indirect and structural violence, characterized by dimensions of social justice and resolution of underlying causes of conflict (Galtung, 1967, in Brett, 2013, p. 261).

Although liberal peace building claims to support a positive and emancipatory form of peace, the process often fails to address equality, social justice and reconciliation and skirts citizens rights to determine their own peace, especially in the global South. This stems from the belief that institutions need to modernize and develop both internally and externally in regards to the liberal ideology and by the facilitation of external actors. (Richmond, 2014 and Brett, 2013).

4.4 Hybrid Peace – The Interaction of Bottom-up And Top-Down

Mac Ginty (2010) reflects upon the criticism of the liberal peace by introducing the concept of hybrid peace. He states that it is more favorable to visualize peace and developmental processes that are a composite of exogenous and indigenous forces rather than hegemonic peacemaking and peace building processes of an all-powerful liberal institutionalism of the liberal peace. Therefore, his aim is to illustrate the interactions of various international and local actors that combined produce hybrid peace. He states that international and local actors
rarely are able to operate autonomously and in a real world scenario all actors are compelled to act in a space shaped in some way by others.

“While international interveners (principal liberal peace agents) may devise comprehensive peace building or development strategies, these will become distorted as they contend with the strategies and reactions of local actors. The hybrid peace is a result of a series of distortions and reminds us of the lack of autonomy on the part of actors in peacemaking contexts” (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 392).

The author describes that various agencies both unify and disagree on different issues and cooperate and compete on different agendas. This process where local actors often are more engaged with reconciliation while international actors rather relates to the structure of the economy, produces a hybridized peace. Mac Ginty (2010, p. 396-409) introduces the agency of local actors to resist, ignore and adapt liberal peace interventions as a main factor to produce hybrid peace.

The Agency of Local Actors

*The ability of local actors to resist, ignore and adapt liberal peace interventions* is stressed by Mac Ginty as an important factor to remind us of the agency of actors in host societies. “Rather than being mere passive actors (victims, recipients, beneficiaries, etc.), local actors may be capable of considerable autonomous action. By pushing back against ‘the echoes of colonialism’, local actors may have power to hybridize peace” (Richmond, 2009, in Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 402). The power and space to resisting of course varies in context, and so in some places structures, network and actors dominate, and leave minimal space for local agency, other places offers more freedom to exert their influence. Mac Ginty observes that the extent to which traditional and indigenous norms and structures are intact is crucial, as they may have been eroded by conflict. The extent to which local actors retain power during liberal peace transition, the extent to which the institutions at national and local level are intact and the extent to which local actors can mobilize resources are important factors for local agency.

The resistance to liberal peace may be subtle, for instance non-cooperation in government programs, and local actors may cooperate with certain aspects of liberal peace. According to Mac Ginty, this produces a hybrid peace though contestation and cooperation. He also
stresses the ability of local actors structures and networks to present and maintain alternative forms of peace and peacemaking. As the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ promote liberal peace as the only option, and with its economic powers and convenience, liberal peace minimizes space for alternative versions of peace. Nevertheless, Mac Ginty argues that local forms of resolution and reconciliation do exist, that draw on traditional and indigenous norms and practices, and that liberal peace agencies have incorporated some of these mechanisms as part of wider liberal peace projects. There have also been attempts to create this form of peace by the international community, but then not referred to as indigenous peace, but rather a hybrid one. Mac Ginty concludes that hybrid peace is a continuous dynamic process influenced by these factors. The power of the liberal peace often dominates the peacemaking environment, but one should not underestimate the agency of local actors.

The power of local agency and the contested process of hybrid peace can be observed in the third attempt at peace in Colombia. Several indigenous and Afro-Colombian organizations mobilized though a bottom-up initiative, and challenged the established power structures of the negotiating table. This turned out to have a modifying affect on the final peace accord, which will be discussed chapter 6 and chapter 7.

4.5 Towards an Emancipatory Model for Civil Peace

As the limitations of the liberal peace have been emphasized the last decades, growing attention has been drawn to emancipatory elements of peace for democratic participation in peacemaking and peace building processes. Several scholars have argued the need to emphasis a bottom-up approach for peace unlike the top-down conservative and orthodox approach of liberal peace that tends to fail addressing social justice, needs, local agency, consent and the root causes of conflict (Brett, 2013). Over the past two decades, peace building practices have also evolved from pre-eminently top-down processes led by national and international actors, towards processes that increasingly aim at including the participation of local-level actors in their design (Shaw, 2010 and Mac Ginty, 2011, in Druliolle and Brett, 2018).

In order to investigate to what extent the Colombian Peace Accord on CRR reflect a new and different approach to peace than previously peace building projects, I have constructed an
analytic framework of an emancipatory model for civil peace. Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015) explain that one of the critiques towards the critique of the liberal peace is that the emancipatory model for civil peace is not outlined. Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015) however argue that the ideas of locally driven policies have been developed and that the importance of local consent, processes across scale and the local scale of bottom-up perspective has been addressed. They further argue that “Positive peace in an emancipatory form cannot be achieved without a recognition of, and support for, subjects’ rights, representation and material situation” (Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 178) and that justice and redistribution are key factors if peace is to be emancipatory. I have used concepts regarding the emancipatory model for civil peace that Richmond and Franks (2009), Brett (2013) and (Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015) identify in order to construct an analytic framework. The first part of this section addresses participation of civil society as a mean for processes across scale, local consent and local ownership. The second part of the section addresses dimensions of social justice as the main pillar of the analytic framework. The dimensions of social justice emphasized are redistribution, recognition and representation. These concepts will provide the analytic framework of an emancipatory model for civil peace in this thesis.

**Participation**

Brett (2013, p. 2) argues that emancipatory peace building should seek to transfer the structural conditions and the embedded root causes of conflict, rather than being framed within the logics of liberal peace. “From this perspective, peace building should be understood as a set of long-term interrelated and deeply transformative processes oriented towards changing the relations of power and structural exclusion that are molded and strengthened by existing local initiatives”. He further describes that it is crucial to have local-level participation in the design and the implementation of the peace building initiatives, to secure a less determined top-down, elite-led process. Brett (2013) argues that the emancipatory peace thereby should differ from the orthodox approach of the liberal peace framework.

Participation of local actors is described as crucial to obtain emancipatory element of peace, by for instance victims and civil society groups. According to Brett (2013), participation of local actors in peace building seek to empower citizens and allow the state, government and
society to respond directly to their cultural values, needs and priorities. Lederach (1997, in Brett, 2013) claims that participation of local collective groups can lead to the establishment of network between and throughout state and society, and open up space for individual and groups to propose effective alternative for conflict transformation, peace building and reconciliation. New social relationships between local, regional and national actors may be a key role in construction peace from below rather than being a process subject to external solutions imposed by actors exterior of the local context. In the third attempt at peace in Colombia there were established three mechanisms for participation of civil society. These mechanisms will be explained in chapter 5.

**Civil Society and CSOs**

To understand how individuals and local actors from collective groups can participate in decision-making processes, such as peace building projects, it is useful to conceptualize these actors. Civil society can be defined as the totality of communities, institutions and voluntary social relations in the public sphere between the private realm, the state and the market (Castree, Kitchin and Rogers, 2013). It can be understood as a broad range of organizations operating in the political space between individual citizens and the state, such as community organizations, trade unions, religious institutions and non-governmental organizations and business organizations (Kew, Wanis-St. and John, 2008). These civil society organizations may promote issues of universal terms, such as human rights, or represent issues related to a limited sector of the populations, such as ethnic peoples rights and interest. Nevertheless, they differ from political parties as they do not seek to apply to neither the scope of the population or to the state in the same manner as a political party does. Although they may raise funds as income to their activities and operations, they are not primarily driven by profit (Kew, Wanis-St. and John, 2008).

Paffenholz (2014) explains that civil society organizations (CSO) conduct voluntary collective action around shared propose, values and interests that differ from those of the family, the state and the market. This definition of CSOs is relevant for this thesis as it distinguish these organizations from the political, the economic and the individual spheres. Kew, Wanis-St. and John (2008) explain there might however be gray areas in civil society, links might be blurry between organizations and political parties, and organizations and groups can evolve into becoming a political party. In Colombia, there is a high degree of
politicization of civil society, often because of organizational links between parties and CSOs. For instance, several of the CSOs representatives’ interviews said that they cooperate and have alliances with political parties, such as the Communist Party.

Civil society organizations can contribute to peace processes through indirect participation and direct participation (Kew, Wanis-St. and John, 2008). Mohan (2007, p. 779) argues that participatory models claim that ‘the people’ are included in new ways, and that this popular inclusion is believed to reverse the ‘top-downism’.

“In both south and north, there is growing consensus that the way forward is found in a focus on both a more active and engaged civil society that can express demands of the citizenry, and a more responsive and effective state that can deliver needed public services. Part of this creative re-engagements is, as we will see, presented in terms of ‘new spaces’ of participation, which invites a geographic approach” (Kesby 2005 in Mohan 2007, p. 780).

This new anticipation of an active and engages civil society also raises the issue of opportunities and restrictions for participation. Mohan (2007) argues that for participation of civil society to be meaningful it is necessary to understand people's realities and the political channels open to them. Participation is therefore embedded in places, which are interconnected, but at the same time contextual and differentiated. Corwall (2004) claims that new arenas for public participation will offer more direct forms of citizen engagement. To understand these new arenas, she introduces the concept of space of institutionalized participation. She uses the terms ‘invited spaces’ and ‘claimed spaces’ to relate to different approaches of participation and different potentialities of power.

**Invited Spaces**

Invited spaces are described as more formal events established for targeted groups to participate and ideally reach consensus (Mohan, 2007). In most counties, this form for participation has become a common practice, especially in terms of development, where citizens are invited in to participate in decision-making process of plans and policies (Robins, Cornwall, Von Liers, 2008). Invited spaces are often created by governmental or donor-driven actors, and often function as community groups or co-management institution (Cornwall, 2004). Although these forms of spaces seem well organized so secure participation of citizens and civil society, there have been several problems observed when
conducting these spaces in practice. Cornwall (2004) explains that one of the main challenges concerning invited spaces is to ensure that people actually participate, and to construct spaces that recognizes poor and magnetized people’s agency and knowledge. She also obverses that there often are lack of information regarding the function of these spaces, limited responsibilities given within them, and reluctance to question the actions of the states. State and donors who organize these forums often formulate the aims of participating unclearly, and actors who participate often lack a sense of ownership to the process.

The problem of representation often arises within these spaces when CSOs have been invited to participate. Understandings regarding who the participant represents in the invited space can be confusing, which may cause instability and distrust to the processes. It has been observed that invited spaces also usually carry trances of both embedded power relations and forms of conduct associated with them (Cornwall, 2004). Consequently many who have engaged in these spaces for participation might perceive them as hostile and culturally unfamiliar. To engage in institutions organized by state and donors requires knowledge of the official discourse, and seems to function better for elites who already speak the power-laden bureaucratic state language than popular classes from civil society (Robins, Cornwall, Von Liers, 2008). Although actors of civil society are invited in to participate, the well-established structural political dynamics can be very hard to transform. When state and donor-officials set the terms for participation, the process often produce lack of local consent and ownership for civil society. In the case of Colombia, a national forum was established as the main mechanism for participation of civil society in the process of making the accord on CRR. The forum reflects Cornwall’s (2004) definition of invited space, and the dynamics of the forum will further explained and discussed in chapter 5 and chapter 6.

Claimed Spaces

Civil society organizations may use other spaces outside the established ones when institutionalized spaces fail to provide popular inclusion and representation. To generate political opportunities and public policies, CSOs often create claimed spaces. Cornwall (2004) distinguishes claimed, or popular spaces, from invited places in that sense that they function as “arenas within and from which people are able to frame alternatives, mobilize, build arguments and alliances and gain the confidence to use their voice, and to act” (Cornwall, 2004, p. 6). Social groups and poor people can generate claimed spaces by
seeking to influence political process without being invited in, and instead take control though bottom-up collective action. To challenge hegemonic norms and power-laden structures requires strategies and practices, and the alternative participation though claimed spaces is often visible through engagement of individual, groups and alliances for political alliances (Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto, 2007).

Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto (2007) highlight the importance of spatiality through scale as a strategy to gain influence. Actors may use the power-laden and contested construction of scale to challenge exiting power dynamic. It is often a contested process of negotiations and struggles between various actors with different agendas and strategies, and manipulation of power relations and authority is central. Social movements and civil society organizations often use scalar strategies to challenges these relations, and to expand their voice and power by turning local into regional, national or global movements. When the FARC and the government negotiated in Havana, civil society organizations collectively mobilized to gain more direct influence in the process, without being invited by the parties. Several civil society organizations demanded their right to be heard and recognized in the accord, and their collective action strategy as a form of bottom-up participation will further be explained in chapter 6. Routledge (2003) and Featherstone (2005) in Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto (2007) explain that recent works have emphasized the importance of trans-local networks as strategies to engage and connect activist, individuals and institutions in different places for the possibility to scale jump and gain influence at a higher scale.

Local Ownership

The issue of ‘the local’ and local ownership in peace bulging projects have in recent years been an impotent debate. The debate regarding local ownership emerged as a response to the increased understanding of the weaknesses of dominant peace building projects (Westendorf, 2018). Local ownership was primarily related to ideas on ‘peace from below’ and became embedded in the UN discourse regarding peace operations during the 2000s. ‘The local turn’ refers to a parallel shift in peace building research and academic debates where the discussion regarding how peace building projects supports by the international community should address ‘the local’, with greater emphasis on inclusion and empowerment of local actors. The emerging literature related to the concept of hybrid peace, as already discussed in the previous section of this chapter (Westendorf, 2018, p. 232). “At its heart, a commitment to
local ownership puts local actors and perspectives at the forefront of peacebuilding decision-making, and asserts that the role of the international community should be to facilitate local ownership and follow the lead of local actors” (Westendorf, 2018, p. 232).

Mac Ginty (2015) reflects upon the concept of ‘the local’ in peace building by suggesting that ‘the local’ not necessarily only exists in traditional, static, territorial forms, but also as “de-territorialised, networked and constituted by people and activity rather than place” (Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 841). According to Mac Ginty (2015), ‘the local’ should not just be understood as a term for the international community to use to rescue peace building projects, but that the most insightful way to address localism in peace building is to understand where the power lies. While projects might have a local face and be enabled by local personnel, the power tends to lie with external actors. Mac Ginty (2015) also argues that the bottom-up approach to peace and the turn to civil society and participation can be interpreted as an understanding that the top-down centralized approach to peace needs to be changed into a more sensitive approach to localism. The third attempt at peace in Colombia is perhaps the peace building projects in contemporary times where local ownership has been most stressed and emphasized. The peace process was a local initiative by the government and the FARC, and has primarily been led by Colombians. In this thesis however, local ownership is understood as ownership to the peace process by actors of civil society, primarily though the activity of the forum established for participation, and will be discussed in chapter 6.

Social Justice and the Three R’s

Lambourne (2006, p. 28–48, in Brett 2013) has argued that in order to resolve a conflict and achieve lasting peace, the process requires both a negative peace and a positive peace, by conditions of social justice to address underlying root causes of conflict. Stokke (2017, p. 201) reflects upon the remedies for injustice and refers to Fraser’s conceptions of justice as an analytic framework. Fraser (1995, 2009, and Fraser and Olsen, 2008, in Stokke, 2017, p. 201) emphasizes three dimensions of cultural and economic injustice that gives rise to various social groups and struggles for social justice: politics of redistribution, politics of recognition and politics of representation.

The first category, politics of redistribution, is based on economic injustice and is rooted in political-economic structures that involve marginalization, exploitation, deprivation and class
division. It seeks to eliminate economic barriers or reallocate resources, thereby reducing socioeconomic inequalities (Stokke, 2017, p. 201). Contemporary debates regarding the issue of land in development strategies center on redistributive versus ‘market-led’ agrarian reforms. ‘Land reform’ is usually defined as the redistribution of property or rights in land (Hall, Saturnimo and White, 2014, p. 260). Intended beneficiaries of the land reform can be small-scale peasants, landless farm workers and the ‘rural poor’, and the reform is an effort to correct historical distortions of land ownership. Land reforms seek to reduce socioeconomic inequalities though redistribution and aims at generating a class of market-oriented ‘middle-peasants’ (Hall, Saturnimo and White, 2014, p. 261). Hall, Saturnimo and White (2014) explain that a comprehensive rural reform differs by also promoting access to inputs to the rural populations, such as credit, market and knowledge.

The second category, **politics of recognition**, is rooted in cultural injustice of symbolic representation expressed through disrespect, non-recognition and cultural domination. This dimension of social justice differs from the dimension of redistribution, as redistribution seeks to eradicate inequality and thereby erode class categories, while recognition aim at acknowledging cultural differences and rights and thereby strengthening identity groups (Stokke, 2017, p. 202). Although recognition differs from redistribution by enhancing identity groups, such as indigenous peoples, it also relates to the issue of land in terms of cultural and ancestral rights. Bulkan (2013) observes that one of the main struggles of recognition for the indigenous peoples in Guyana’s is their rights and needs in terms of access to historically important land. In the Colombian context, rights and access to land is highly contested in terms of variations of cultural practices and needs of different groups, such as *campesiones* (peasants), indigenous and Afro-Colombians. To what extend their needs and cultural and ancestral rights have been recognized in the accord on CRR will be discussed in chapter 7.

Fraser introduced **politics of representation** as a third form of injustice later on to address political misrepresentation. Stokke (2017) argues that misrepresentation is a political dimension of justice, and refers to Tornquist (2009) that claims that political injustice can originate from political misframing, where groups are excluded from participating in decision-making processes, and from flawed political representation failing to establish effective mechanism for popular control over public affairs. Fraser (2009, in Stokke, 2017, p. 203) argues that flawed political processes for representation often are characterized by
misframing. This can be observed in scalar mismatch of global processes shaping injustice and territorial states failing to address injustice because of the transnational political and economic structures that perpetuate injustice. The dimension of representation for social justice in the peace process of making the accord on CRR will be discussed in chapter 6.

Faser (1995, in Stokke, 2017) explains that there are two types of principle remedies to achieve social justice. In my understanding, these remedies can also be understood as approaches to which social justice can be achieved: through affirmative or transformative means. Isin and Woods (1999, in Stokke, 2017, p. 203) explain that in short, affirmative means aim at removing inequalities without changing the underlying structures of injustice, while transformation suggests fundamental changes in the structures of injustice. Affirmative redistribution thereby seeks to address inequitable outcomes without changing the political-economic structures, often associated with the liberal welfare state. For instance, privatizing land reforms that focus on improving the technical, legal and institutional land ownership has emerged since the 1990s to ensure a more efficient working of land markets. Such market-based approach to land reform also promotes registration and titling of land, which Hernando de Soto (2000, in Hall, Saturnimo and White, 2014) argues can provide rural poor who lack land tenure security and possibilities of acquiring credits. Such an approach for redistribution has been emphasizes in the Colombian peace accord on CRR, and resembles affirmative means for redistribution as will further be discussed in chapter 7. Transformative redistribution on the other hand seeks to change structural power relations for unequal distributional outcomes and is often associated with social democracy and socialism. Several scholars, such as Brett (2013) Galtung (1967) and Lambourne (2006) have argued the necessity for structural transformations in order to resolve the root causes of the conflict and generate positive, lasting peace. Whether the content of the peace accord regarding access to land and distribution provides the foundation for structural transformation will be discussed in chapter 7.

Summary

In this chapter I have explained the dominant position of the liberal peace theory for peace building projects, and the main critique directed towards the liberal peace. In order to investigate whether the Colombian peace accord on CRR reflects an alternative, bottom-up
approach, I have also constructed my own analytic framework of an emancipatory model for civil peace by conceptualizing elements identified by several scholars. The main concepts within the framework are participation (though invited or claimed spaces), local ownership and the three dimensions of social justice: redistribution, recognition and representation. These concepts provide the framework for discussions in chapter 6 and chapter 7, where the dimensions of social justice provide the main pillars for analysis.
5 Case: Negotiating the Accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform

This thesis examines the first part in the final peace accord, which emphasizes the topic of a Comprehensive Rural Reform. The aim of this chapter is to present the case under investigation. It starts with a short introduction of the third attempt at peace and the dynamics of the peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and the FARC. The inclusion of civil society in the design of this agreement will be presented in the second part of this chapter and further discussed and analyzed in chapter 6. In the last part of this chapter, I will present the main elements in the content of the accord on CRR. I will discuss what the content entails for the rural population in chapter 7.

5.1 Setting the Terms for Negotiations

In the negotiation between the Colombian government and the FARC, Nasi (2018) identifies five rules created to avoid obstacles experienced in the previous peace negotiations. First, the parties agreed on locating the negotiations abroad because of the failed attempt at the most recent peace negotiations between the parties, which were held in Colombia. Santos wanted to avoid the costly concession for the government to demobilize an area within the country, and the FARC agreed that the peace negotiations could be conducted in a country respected by the rebels. Cuba was thereby chosen as the site for further negotiations between the parties. Second, the parties agreed in limiting public participation and media involvement. Little attention had been paid to the role of civil society in previous negotiations, although proposals from so-called public hearings were included in the most recent attempt at peace of the Pastrana government. However, the Pastrana government and the FARC had never defined how the proposals would be included in their agenda and how they would possibly lead to peace, and the public hearings only produced further delays and created confusion in the peace talks. The negotiation team of the Santos government and the FARC therefore clarified from the start that inputs from citizens would be allowed, but they would only play a secondary role. The Colombian government and the FARC would share the main responsibility of conflict resolution. The negotiations would also be confidential and public disclosure would only occur on due time. Third, the parties agreed on the risky decision to
conduct negotiations without a ceasefire. Santos argued that a premature ceasefire potentially could give the FARC a military advantage and strengthen the accusations of opposing politicians. The armed forces of the state therefore continued to fight the guerrilla during the peace talks, though creating severe tension at the negotiation table. Fourth, the parties decided that the negotiations would develop under the principle ‘nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed’. This implied that the final peace accord would be a comprehensive package, and although partial agreements on different agendas were reached throughout the process, the norm provided an incentive to reach a complete agreement for all topics. This decision was based on the fifth rule, that the negotiations would only include a limited agenda. During the failed peace negotiations of the Pastrana government, there was not set a limit to the agenda. The parties included 67 topics for social, political and economic transformation, which made it impossible to negotiate and reach consensus.

Even before sitting at the negotiation table, president Santos therefore agreed with the FARC that the agenda only would include a limited number of issues and that the peace negotiations not would entail a ‘negotiated revolution’. The agenda included six issues: 1) comprehensive rural reform, 2) political rights, 3) drug trafficking, 4) victims and transitional justice, 5) end of the conflict, and 6) implementation of the accord (Nasi, 2018). The overall aim of the negotiations was to end the conflict and establish a stable and lasting peace. The parties agreed that it would not include discussions of all ills in the Colombian society. Therefore, these topic issues were selected as strictly necessary elements to end the conflict and to build peace (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018).

5.2 The Dynamics of the Peace Negotiations

In late 2012, the peace negotiations between the Santos government and the FARC officially started. The negotiation ended with the signing of a peace accord in Cartagena, Colombia, on September 26th 2016. Throughout the process, the parties stayed in a gated area in Havana called ‘El Laguito’ and had talks within, or close to, the area. By living in walking distance to each other, the parties could also meet outside of the scheduled meetings. The FARC delegation permanently stayed in the area throughout the five years of the talks, while the government delegation return to Bogotá in between rounds. On October 18th 2012, the peace process was formally launched in Oslo. Although the heads of the two delegations knew each
other from previous attempts at peace, most of the members of the two delegations were new to peace negotiations (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018). Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt (2018) claim that the launching of the negotiations outside of Colombia was useful to demonstrate that the peace process was supported by the international community, and also emphasized the seriousness of the talks, in particular because the FARC still were listed on U.S and the E.U terrorist lists. The talks moved back to Havana after the launch in Oslo and the parties agreed on a high-intensity work schedule. The meetings were divided into sessions of 11 days, and the parties had a short period for internal consultation and preparation in between each round. The parties could appoint up to ten delegates and would also be assisted by a team made up of about 20 people. The FARC delegation was mainly composed exclusively by combatants and led by Ivan Márquez, the second-in-command. During the process, the FARC would rotate some of its commanders to ensure broad ownership and to provide the guerrilla movement in Colombia up-to-date knowledge of the peace process in Havana. Several-government delegates were carefully chosen as representatives from the security and private sector to ensure the commitment of these key stakeholders in the peace process. One retired general from the police and one from the armed forces, together with a former peace minister and peace commissioner and one prominent business leader accompanied the chief negotiator (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018, and Herbolzheimer, 2016).

Although the FARC expressed an interest in inviting other guerrilla groups into the negotiations, it became clear early on in the process that the negotiations in Havana, would be a closed process between the two parties. No journalist or recorders would be allowed in the room, and the only participants would be the Santos government and the FARC with the support of their trusted facilitators and guarantors (Salazar and Morales, 2014). Herbolzheimer (2016) claims that the negotiations have essentially been driven by the parties themselves, discussing directly with each other without external mediation. There were however four countries asked to play a formal role in the negotiations. Norway and Cuba operated as guarantors, while Venezuela and Chile participated as accompanying countries (Salazar and Morales, 2014). These countries were selected to indicate a regional emphasis and to balance political inclinations. The regional dimension was further highlighted when the parties agreed that the UN Mission to Colombia would be composed of countries from Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). There have been two external delegations attending the negotiations, one from Cuba and one from Norway. Their
support has primarily been to facilitate the logistics, trust building, capacity building and problem solving during problematic times in the negotiations. Other international supporters also joined the peace process: the United States, the United Nations Germany and the European Union (Herbolzheimer, 2016). Throughout the process, various international and local experts have also been invited in as advisors. The FARC received legal advice from a Spanish lawyer, while president Santos relied on expertise from a former commander in El Salvador and a retired senior government official from the U.K. There were a number of people from various peace processes called in as experts and the negotiations have been heavily supported by international states and organizations (Herbolzheimer, 2016).

A month before the parties met for official dialogs in Cuba, the FARC released a statement saying that their first agenda issue in the peace negotiations would emphasize the territorial situation, the socio-historical relations and the environment. After the negotiations started, the FARC revealed new information about the agenda and the process, stating what they called ‘diagnostics of the disastrous rural situation Colombia suffers’ (Salazar and Morales, 2014, p. 188). The guerrilla primarily criticized the contradictions of Law 1448, known as the Victims Law, of year 2011. They criticized that law for benefitting the landowners and the concentration of land and called it an ‘inconvenient law that works against the victims of the conflict’ (Salazar and Morales, 2014, p. 188). The negotiations were a political process between two ideologically different parties that had very different views on the rural issues. Although it was clear from the start that the political and economic system would not be up for discussion, the parties seemed to reach some sort of middle ground when the first document about the accord was released to the public 21st of June 2013 (Salazar and Morales, 2014).

The first three topics of the agenda (comprehensive rural reform, political rights and drug trafficking) each took about six months of negotiations and the processes of these topics have been described as going relatively smoothly (Herbolzheimer, 2016). Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt (2018) argue that the peace talks were led entirely by Colombians, which thereby strengthened the process and ensured national ownership. They stress that the interaction and support of the international community also has been extremely important throughout the process, which indicated a strong international commitment to peace in Colombia. Herbolzheimer (2016) claims that even though the Colombian peace process between the FARC and the government is supported externally, the process has emphasized local
ownership. Although it is clear that the Colombian peace process has emphasizes national ownership throughout the process (Colombian initiatives, Colombian actors etc.) the concept of local ownership for local actors on the ground is more complicated. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter.

5.3 Participation of Civil Society in the Accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR)

“Colombia has a thriving civil society that has impressive levels of experience in monitoring human rights violations and promoting peace at multiple levels. However, in terms of the peace negotiations in Havana, civil society participation has essentially been of a consultative nature” (Herbolzheimer, 2016 p. 8). Brett (2018) argues that the participation mechanisms were established as a response to the historic demand of Colombian civil society organizations to be included in the process, and these mechanisms were thereby created to facilitate the participation of civil society in the negotiations. The parties eventually decided to incorporate a broader set of actors with the aim to build a more representative and sustainable peace settlement.

There were three formal consultation mechanisms for civil society in Colombia to formally participate in the peace process. The first channel for formal participation was the establishment of an Internet website where the public could submit written proposals regarding the different agenda topics. Thousands of suggestions from the public were sent to the negotiating table through this mechanism (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018). The website was established in December 2012 and the documents from the negotiating table published to the public throughout the process were also uploaded on the website. By 2014, the website had been visited 34 101 times, 24 878 had visited the site for the first time, and out of the total number of visits, 24 013 visits were from Colombian residents. The remaining visits came from other countries such as Spain, the U.S, Canada, Venezuela and Argentina. In 2013 and 2014, it is estimated that 25 proposals from the civil society were sent each week through the website (Salazar and Morales, 2014).

The second channel for formal participation was that the parties decided that each delegation could invite two external experts to provide suggestions and proposals on the six topics.
These experts included former peacemakers from both the outside and inside of Colombia, prominent academics and politicians. The third and main channel for participation was the establishment of a national forum, which will be presented in the next section of this chapter. The negotiating table received important and valuable proposals and input from civil society through all three of these mechanisms (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018).

It is worth mentioning that the third attempt at peace in Colombia is the first time in history where negotiating parties included the victims of the conflict to present their proposals directly to the negotiating table. In 2014, the parties announced a Declaration of Principles that emphasized their commitment to victim’s rights to reparations, truth, justice and the guarantees of non-repetition. Five groups of 12 victims were carefully selected by the UN to represent the diversity of victimization in Colombia between August and December 2014. These victims traveled to Havana and met the parties of whom had committed the crimes against them. For the first time in the history of the Colombian conflict, the victims were participants in the decisions-making process (Herbolzheimer, 2016). Nevertheless, the direct inclusion of civil society and victims only took place in the fourth issue of the peace accord regarding transitional justice for victims of the conflict. The forums remained the main channel for formal participation of civil society actors in other parts of the accord, such as the issue of a comprehensive rural reform.

5.4 The National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development

The third and main channel for formal participation was public forums organized in Colombia for each topic on the agenda. The Colombian government and FARC considered the possibility that a third part could organize spaces for participation related to the peace negotiations. As a result, the UNDP and the National University of Colombia (UNAL) convened six national forums for each topic on the agenda for peace (Brett, 2018). The forums included thousands of stakeholders and the Congress also convened several meetings with civil society in various regions of the country. The government was involved in the forums, but did not have a prominent role, while the FARC never participated directly (Herbolzheimer, 2016 and Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018).
“On paper, the forums represented an innovative mechanism through which to incorporate Colombian civil society into the peace process and to contribute directly to the content of the peace agreement, thus reflecting the border demands of civil society” (Brett, 2018, p. 273).

The issue of a comprehensive rural reform was the first item on the agenda in the peace accord and thereby established the first round of national forums taking place for the participation of civil society. The forum was called ‘The National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development’ and was held in Bogotá for three days: the 17th, the 18th and the 19th of December 2012. During these days, 1 314 citizens from 522 organizations from 32 departments of Colombia participated in the forum. The organizations represented a wide range of the rural populations: peasants, entrepreneurs, indigenous peoples, women, victims, human right defenders, trade unions, afro-descendants and a series of network initiatives for peace, amongst other sectors (Camilo Restrepo and Bernal Morales, 2014). The main sector who participated in the forum was peasants, with a total of 239 representatives, followed by enterprises and trade unions who participated in forum with 182 representative (The National University of Colombia, 2012).

During the first two days there were organized 21 mesas (work tables) where the organizations could present their proposals for the accord on comprehensive rural reform and development. The workshops were divided into different topics of the accord, and the various civil society organizations participated in workshops related to their own agenda (Camilo Restrepo and Bernal Morales, 2014). The 21 mesas (work tables) were divided into 6 topics: 1) access and use of land - unproductive land, formalization of property and protection of reserved zones, 2) development programs in rural areas, 3) infrastructure and territorial adjustments, 4) social development - health, education, livelihood and eradication of poverty, 5) agricultural production and economic solidarity - substitution, technical assistance and credits, 6) food security. On the third and last day of the forum, all of the proposals were presented in plenary. In total, there were 546 proposals presented in writing from the citizens in the forum and proposals from 411 persons that were delivered orally to the workshops. As a result, 14 publications were produced and delivered to the parties at the negotiating table in Havana. Ten of these publications were direct proposals from the 21 workshops and the remaining four documents were from a social committee established at the forum and a systematized summary of the proposals written by the third parties who organized the form,
the National University and the UN (Camilo Restrepo and Bernal Morales, 2014, and The National University of Colombia, 2012).

Herbolzheimer (2016) argues that despite the limited number of formal communication channels between the public participation of civil society and the negotiating table in Havana, the channels have had a stronger impact than anticipated. Each issue in the peace accord has led to heated discussions in Colombia and produced a sophisticated discourse and proposals to the negotiating table in Havana, which is rarely seen in peace processes. He stresses that this is most notable in the topic of victims’ rights and reconciliation, but that all public discussions of the accord have had a strong influence on the negotiations and affected the direction of the topics when they were negotiated. How actors from civil society organizations experienced the participation channel of the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development will be discussed in chapter 6.

5.5 The Final Accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform

The peace negotiations between the Colombian government of Santos and the FARC ended with the signing of a peace accord in September 2016. President Santos decided to demonstrate the embeddedness of the peace accord in the Colombian society through a referendum that was held one week after the signing. The peace negotiations were heavily criticized by former President Uribe and other right-wing politicians who questioned the legitimacy of the accord, and the referendum was intended to foster the legitimization of the peace process and the accord. However, a small majority of the Colombians who voted rejected the accord, and parties decided to renegotiate in order to preserve the legitimacy of the process. The concerns of the actors opposing the accord was introduced, and the government's negotiation team met with former president Uribe, various politicians and religious and social leaders in order to consider their perspectives to the accord. After a very tense and uncertain period, the government of Colombia and the FARC signed a renegotiated peace accord in Bogotá on 26th of November 2016 without a new referendum taking place. (Nasi, 2018). This thesis examines the renegotiated accord on comprehensive rural reform, as this is part of the final peace accord that will be implemented in Colombia.
Nasi (2018, p. 41) argues that topic of comprehensive rural reform in the final accord is “a modest-albeit very important-agrarian reform”. The topic is significant because of the FARC’s history as a rural phenomenon and because an agrarian reform program always has been central to the guerrillas’ identity and politics. The aim of the accord is to close up the differential that exists between the rural and urban areas of the country and to lay the foundation for a structural transformation and thereby contribute to the building of a stable and long-lasting peace. In the introduction, the accord states:

“Comprehensive rural development is a decisive factor in driving forward regional integration and equitable social and economic development of the country. The CRR must successfully achieve an in-depth transformation of the rural situation in Colombia: greater inclusion at a regional level, eradication of poverty, greater equality and guaranteed full enjoyment of citizens’ rights and, as a result, guaranteed non-recurrence of the conflict and eradication of violence. A genuine structural transformation of the countryside requires the adoption of measures to promote appropriate use of the land in accordance with its suitable purposes an to stimulate the titling, restitution and equitable distribution thereof, by guaranteeing progressive access to rural property to those who live in the countryside, and, in particular, to rural women and to the most vulnerable communities, and by legalising and democratizing property and promoting broader ownership of land, so that it fulfills its social function” (The Colombian government and the FARC, 2016, p. 10).

The accord on Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR) introduces three topics. I will now present the main elements in the topics to adequately analyze what the content of the accord entails for the rural population and if the proposals from civil society have been included in the peace accord. This will be discussed in chapter 7.

1) Access and Use of Land (The final peace accord, section 1.1-1.1.10)

The main element of the accord stressed the need to democratize access to land to benefit the small-scale farmer communities and those who have no land or those without insufficient land in rural areas most affected by the conflict, poverty and neglect.

1.1) The Land Fund

The National Government is to create a Land Fund for free distribution of land in order to reverse land concentration and promote a fair distribution. The Land Fund (known as Fondo de Tierras) will be permanent and will have three million hectares of land available during the first 12 years of existence to be given for those in need. The land available in the Land
Fund will be gathered from the legal cessation of land ownership, from unoccupied land (baldíos), from the updating and strengthening of Forest Reserve Areas, from the unexplored land, and from donations of land to the Fond. The government will also grant a comprehensive subsidy for the purchase of land by beneficiaries (male and female farm and agricultural workers without land or with insufficient land), will provide a special purchase credit to the same beneficiaries, and will pass a law to promote other forms of access to land such as allocations of rights of use. The National Government will make support programs available for those benefiting from the Land Fund, which will entail training, technical assistance, land improvement and soil recovery, marketing and access to the means of production and will scale up public goods and services within the context of Development Programs.

1.2) Formalization of Land Titles
To avoid violence as a method to resolve land disputes, the government will, according to the accord, legalize and protect small and medium-sized rural property rights. The accord emphasizes large-scale titling of all small and medium-sized rural property in Colombia. The government will therefore title 7 million hectares of small and medium-sized rural properties in the country through a large scale-titling plan where there will be no charge for the titling of small rural properties. The titling of properties that are very small can also benefit from the Land Fund. The government will also provide an information system that can be used to collect taxes by local authorities, promote comprehensive rural development and social investment, stimulate deconcentration of unproductive rural property and provide a transparent regularized land ownership. The accord also stresses the need to protect reserved areas, such as areas for special environmental interest, meaning areas which require proper environmental management (forest reserved areas, fragile ecosystems etc) to safeguard biodiversity and also to balance between what is good for the environment and that which contributes to well-being and quality of life for the rural population currently living alongside or within these areas.

1.3) The Peasant Reserved Zones
The accord emphasizes the importance of Peasant Reserved Zones (Zonas de Reservas Campesina - ZRC, hereinafter PRZs). PRZs are described as agricultural initiatives that are conducive to peace building, and for guaranteeing economic, political, social and cultural rights for rural communities, which provide a development based on socio-environmental and
food security. The government will therefore promote access to land and its planning through PEZs, and provide support for development plan for the existing zones and the ones to be setup in response to initiatives of the rural communities. The aim is to promote the small-scale farmer economy, boost food production and the protection of Forest Reserved Areas. These processes are to be implemented alongside the titling procedures.

2) Development Programs with a Territorial-Based-Focus (DPTFs) (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial) (Final peace accord, section 1.2-1.2.6)

The aim of this part of the accord is to provide a structural transformation of the countryside and the rural environment. The accord is said to provide the foundation for the well-being and quality of life for all people living in the rural areas and emphasize the development of small-scale farmer and farmer-based economy and the protection of the multi-ethnic and multicultural richness of the country. This topic stresses the need to develop particular production methods of the indigenous and Afro-descendant communities through comprehensive access to land and to social and productive goods and services, and to make effective progress towards development with the emphasis on inter-ethnic and inter-cultural spaces. The structural transformation of the countryside will cover all the country’s rural areas, while priorities will be given to the zones most urgently in need according to poverty levels, degrees of affection by the conflict, weakness of management capacity and administrative institutions and the presence of crops for illegal use and unlawful economies. To achieve this regional transformation, the accord describes the need for an action plan for each prioritized zone. The action plan is to be made as a result from a participatory process and dialog between the communities and the local authorities and must include all levels of territorial planning and take into account local needs, socio-historic elements, environmental, productive and cultural characteristics of the territory. The accord describes that forums will be setup as participation mechanisms to guarantee citizens participation in the decision-making process to develop the action plan and the development programs with territorial-based-focus.

3) National Plan for Comprehensive Rural Reform (Planes Nacionales para la Reforma Rural Integral) (Final peace accord, section 1.3-1.3.4)

The last topic in the accord stressed the need to eradicate poverty by adequately providing the rural population access to public goods and services. The accords presents a national plan for comprehensive rural reform to eradicate extreme poverty over a fifteen year transition phase,
reduce rural poverty in all its dimensions by 50 percent and reduce inequality in the country. To achieve this plan, and develop trends towards a better quality of life in the cities and the rural areas, the government will according to the accord develop and provide road infrastructure, irrigation infrastructure, electricity infrastructure and connectivity, social development through better access to health services, education, housing and drinking water. The last part of the accord on CRR introduces the plan for agricultural production and solidarity and cooperative economy. The government will set up and implement a national plan to foment the different associative forms of work for and between small and medium sized producers.

The accord seems in many ways to reflect law 160 of 1994 in its attempt at combining the two opposed perspectives on land rights; the one which recognizes the small-scale peasants rights to the land they use and cultivate, and the other that favors the medium and large producers. The accord seems to emphasize the possibilities for development through efficient and productive manners for the various actors in the rural areas of Colombia. Although the accord highlights a solidarity economy, it also stresses the need to provide technical assistance and training, subsidies and credits for small and medium producers with lower income levels to boost the production though suitable conditions for marketing goods.

**Summary**

In this chapter I have presented the dynamics of the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC. I have explained the three channels for participation of civil society in the peace process, with emphasis on the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development. In the last part of the chapter the content of the accord on CRR has been presented. The main element of the accord is the Land Fund, formalization of land titles, the Peasant Reserved Zones, development programs and access to public goods and services, such as housing, education, technical assistance, credit and substitution. The process of making the content of the accord with input from civil society will be discussed in chapter 6. What will the accord on CRR entail for the rural population in Colombia? Are there any substantiation topics and proposals from the civil society that have been left out of the accord? These questions will be discussed in chapter 7.
6 Participation of Civil Society – Bottom-up Peace Building?

In this chapter I will explore the process of the participation mechanism to include CSOs in the peace process of the peace accord on comprehensive rural reform. The CSO representatives interviewed explained the participation of the civil society in the design of the peace accord on CRR occurring on three fronts: The National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development as a mechanism, the proposals that were initiated by the CSO representatives through the forum, and the direct promotion of proposals to the negotiating table in Havana. The discussion in this chapter is based on these three lines of analysis, and does not include the other two mechanisms for participation that were identified in chapter 5 (proposals through the website and inclusion of experts) due to the limited scope of the thesis and because the forum was established as the main mechanism for CSO participation. The first part of the chapter explores how the CSO representatives interviewed experienced the participation mechanism of the forum: this refers to the first dimension of social justice - the politics of representation – which will be discussed later on. The other two dimensions of cultural and economic injustice - the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution - will provide the analytical framework in the next chapter. The second part of this chapter discusses the main proposals developed by the CSOs to be presented through the forum to the negotiating table in Havana. The third and final part of this chapter examines a case of CSO participation in which the ethnic organizations collectively mobilized and went beyond the established mechanisms for participation when they delivered their proposals to the negotiating table.

6.1 Voices of CSOs – The Experiences from the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development

Zambrano and Gómez Isa (2013) argue that due to the fragmented regional composition of Colombia’s civil society, peace requires participation mechanisms that include various actors, raging from community and local level up to national and institutional levels. Peña (2001, in Zambrano and Gómez Isa, 2013, p. 3) suggests that
“Regarding the weapons issue, there is no question that those who must negotiate are those who hold such weapons, i.e. the army, state and guerrillas. But concerning the issue under discussion, if what is being debated is a future model for the country, for the society we all wish to achieve, I believe that neither the government nor the guerrillas should be granted the role of representative of the entire nation”.

At the first glance, the third attempt at peace in Colombia seems to reflect Richmond and Franks (2009) definition of an orthodox approach to peace. The process was heavily supported by the international community and most of the decisions were made by the parties themselves, reflecting a top-down driven approach to peace. However, the process also reflects sensitivity to local input by creating participation mechanisms for local consent through various channels. The National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development was established as the main mechanism for enabling the civil society to participate in the peace process of the accord on CRR, and was arguably organized by both the UNDP and UNAL to create a stronger emphasis on local ownership (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018). In this respect, an attempt at offering a bottom-up approach with a stronger concern for local agency, local consent and local ownership can be observed. Has the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development been an efficient and including mechanism for participation of CSOs in the peace process, and thereby emphasized an emancipatory approach to peace in the accord on CRR?

**Local Agency - the Broad Representation of CSOs**

The informant from the organization Advisory Board for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES) explained that their organization took part in the forum in order to be part of the decision-making process and because of their specialized knowledge of some of the topics that would be discussed. He is the leader of the commission for ethnic groups in the organization and will be referred to as Alfonso in this thesis. The organization participated in the *mesas* (work tables, which will be referred to as mesas in this thesis) that emphasized ethnic groups, specifically the rights of Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples. Alfonso argues that to participate in an effective manner is to influence and be part of decisions and that the forum reflects one dimension of participation as it functioned as a formal space for participation. They constructed proposals and presented them in the forum with the director of the CODHES, who is also part of UNAL. He further argues that political changes in
policies for transformation should be made through democratic participation where the voices of the people are heard.

“In reality, the forum was interesting because it presented the central presentation of the proposals, and the opinion of the different types of organizations, for instance indigenous and Afro-descendants. So the forum contributed to multiple perspectives in a context where people didn’t think it would generate rural development and transformation of the country” (Alfonso, my translation).

Alfonso further explained that the forum functioned as a space where several central actors in terms of agrarian production and the issue of land distribution came together. As such, Alfonso’s description of the forum reflects Cornwall's (2004) concept of ‘invited spaces’, where governmental or donor driven actors organize forums for targeted groups to participate and contribute in decision-making. The president of the private organization Agricultural Society of Colombia, who will be referred to as Rodrigo in this thesis, also emphasizes that all of the different CSOs concerning rural development were included in the peace process. Rodrigo argues that all the vices from the rural sectors have been heard, and that it was like a little country was represented in terms of the various sectors participating.

This broad participation and representation of CSOs in the forum demonstrates that it is in fact possible to overcome the challenges Cornwall (2004) observes in invited spaces; the most salient being how to get people to actually participate. As I explained in chapter 5, the forum had an impressive number of participants from all parts of the rural sector. 1,314 citizens from 522 organizations localized in 32 departments of Colombia participated. The organizations represented a wide range of the rural populations: peasants, entrepreneurs, indigenous, women, victims, human right defenders, trade unions, Afro-descendants and a series of network initiatives for peace, amongst other sectors (Camilo Restrepo and Bernal Morales, 2014). After my interviews with the CSO representatives, my impression is that all the organizations had received sufficient information about the function and aim of the forum, which generated an interest to participate – even though Alfonso argued that many representatives did not believe the result would lead to transformation. However, the will to participate in the forum can also be explained through Colombian CSOs long tradition of taking part in mesas. The informant from the organization Federación Nacional Sindical Unitaria Agropecuaria (Fensuagro), who will be referred to as Paula in this thesis, emphasizes this tradition: “Historically we have had mesas because one of the things that has
preoccupied the peasants in Colombia and the social movements in general is that we always had to fight permanently. And everyone who is part of a mobilization, either on national level, regional level or at the department level, is always part of mesas to negotiate with the government” (Paula, my translation). She further argues that these types of forums are necessary because they allow the local people to fight for an economic and social resolution, and they enable people to maintain contact with the institutions in Colombia. Lastly, she emphasizes that proposals from these mesas have to be articulated at the national level, because many of the political and social problems cannot be solved at the department level. She concludes that the struggles and the reality in the departments have to be made known and articulated, and only then can these struggles be resolved at the national level.

The Consultation of Local Actors

Alfonso explains that the accord on CRR is a result of negotiations between the two parties of the conflict: the Colombian government and the FARC. Nevertheless, he argues that the space in the forum seemed like an attempt at promoting justice through a consultation mechanism.

“In the international analysis of transnational justice, one of the central topics is public consultation. And I think the forum, the structure, and the presentation of the proposals demonstrates an attempt to do that kind of consultation” (Alfonso, my translation).

He further stresses that the space for participation that have been promoted through the leading institutions of the peace accord, have not facilitated inclusive and efficient participation. It has not been a process that demanded an inclusive peace, he argues, and emphasizes that it is not the actors of the CSOs who have made the resolutions presented in the accord on CRR. The participation of CSOs in the forum thereby resembles the lack of local consent that Robins, Cornwall, Von Liers (2008) observes can occur when state and donor-officials set the terms for participation in invited spaces. Although a broad set of actors from the rural sector have been included in the forum, the process of making the decisions in the peace accord on CRR seems to reflect a top-down approach, from Alfonso's point of view.

Although the content of the accord was negotiated between the two parties, Alfonso claims that the FARC had the ability to listen to the locals and was able to represent the position of
the civil society. He argues that the FARC’s commission in Havana actually listened to the proposals from the forum and that in between the two parties, the most similar proposals were the ones from the civil society and the FARC. Several of the CSO represented in the forum are organizations that from a political point of view belong to the left. The peasant organizations, the social movements, the indigenous, Afro-Colombian communities, the trade unions and the human right defenders principally oppose the neoliberal policies instituted by the government and advocate for profound changes in the country's economic and social structure (Zambrano and Gómez Isa, 2013). The ideological agenda of various CSOs that participated in the forum share many similarities with the FARC’s political perspective on the rural areas in the country. Alfonso’s claim that the FARC was more of a representative for the actors who participated in the forum than the government at the negotiating table is therefore not surprisingly. The FARC has for decades claimed to represent the voice of the Colombian people (Nasi, 2018). However, as this argument reflects an extremely narrow view of the Colombian people, the decision to include the local actors in the peace process was also to prevent representational misframing of the FARC as the leading representative of the rural population (Nasi, 2018).

On the other hand, several of the CSO representatives interviewed argued that the participation mechanism of the forum led to an inclusive process of the peace accord on CRR. “The proposals that were negotiated in Havana, were not only initiated by FARC, but by the whole sector of the agrarian social movements” (Antonio, my translation). The informant from Marcha Patriótica, one of the leading political social movements in Colombia and more political incline with the FARC, further explains that the actors who participated in the forum collaborated in constructing the proposals that were sent to the negotiating table and that the broad involvement of actors thereby contributed to the accord on CRR. The informant from the National Organization for Peasant Users in Colombia (ANUC), who will be referred to as Eduardo in this thesis, explains that they decided to participate in the forum because they have always searched for a resolution to the conflict. He adds that they saw the forum as an opportunity to promote peace and to resolve the peasants’ problematic access to land. They wanted to raise the issues regarding the rural situation to also motivate the population.
“When the first part (the accord on CRR) was finished, before the entire final peace accord, in the very beginning, I said in a meeting with the Department of Agriculture that we won! If they sign, or if they don’t sign the accord, we won!” (Eduardo, my translation).

Eduardo claims that the process facilitated inclusion and that the actors of the civil society were listened to. He states that he felt that the rural sector already had won before the accord was signed because for decades these actors have been called crazy and utopian, and during the peace process their proposals and knowledge of the rural situation have been listened to and acknowledged. Paula from Fensuagro also stresses that their organization feels included in the peace process of the accord on CRR, and that the participation of people has been one of the main pillars of the final peace accord. According to Eduardo and Paula, the participation mechanism of the forum has offered a bottom-up approach where local proposals and consent have been emphasized through an inclusive participation process.

The informant from The Peasant Organization of Rio Sinitarre and the organizations delegate in ANZORC, the National Organization for the Peasant Reserved Zones, regarded the forum more as an informative space for discussions in between the actors themselves. He, who will be referred to as David in this thesis, states that some of the traditionally big actors in the rural sector in the country got a lot of space to present their ideas, which seems to resemble Corwall's (2004) observation about how these invited paces often have traces of embedded power relations and therefore often function better for actors who already know the official discourse and speak the language, than popular classes from civil society. David explains that they listened to the visions of SAC, which he refers to as one of the big actors, and whom I also had an interview with, but that they also had some interesting ideas in the discussions, and that the forum in general had interesting proposals and discussions between the actors involved. When I asked Rodrigo from SAC about how he saw the inclusion and participation of the civil society in the peace process, he replied that, “I think the government and the accord made a huge effort to create an institution or an environment to have the discussion about peace. As with many other things, it could have been better, but it was better having it that way than not having it at all”.

Indirect Participation - the Insufficient Mechanism

Several of the CSO representatives interviewed expressed that the process should have facilitated a form of direct participation to strengthen the voices of the actors of civil society
in the accord. The other representative from ANZORC, who will be referred to as Joaquin in this thesis, explains that the participation in the forum functioned as an indirect form of participating in the peace process of the accord in CRR. He explains that they had delegates in the different *mesas* in the forum, that their proposals were written down in all parts of the process, and that the proposals from the different *mesas* were sent to the negotiating table in Havana. “That was the mechanism of indirect participation, because the government refused to let us participate directly” (Joaquin, my translation). He further argues that when the final proposals from the forum were sent to the negotiating table in Havana, the proposals were read by the FARC, but probably never by the Santos government, and frustratedly laughs when he expresses his distrust in the government. The CSO representative from Coordinador Nacional Agrario (CNA), referred to as Ana Maria in this thesis, also questioned the government's involvement in processing the proposals from civil society. She argues that out of the hundreds of papers that were delivered to the negotiating table, most of them were probably never read by the government’s delegates and commissions.

Joaquin argues that in the end, the FARC ended up representing the rural sector in the negotiations, as they were the only ones who took the proposals from civil society seriously.

“When the guerrillas talked about the rural reform, they did not only negotiate the reform for them, but they negotiated the accord on behalf of all the rural Colombians. The rural organizations should have been there, but they were refused. They were refused” (Joaquin, my translation).

He concludes that in the end the government did not do anything to include them, and even though they used a lot of pressure to be directly involved in the negotiations, the government only told them that they could read the proposals about the reserved zones for the peasants, which was the topic that concerned them the most.

“So what kind of participation is that? In the final proposals there were a lot left out when it came to the Peasant Reserved Zones. The government refused. So the participation did not have an effective implication. If we could have participated in a direct manner, but no” (Joaquin, my translation).

Joaquin's observation does not correspond to Brett’s (2013) argument about how the government should respond directly to the population's needs and priorities in the emancipation peace approach, and thereby resembles more of an orthodox approach, where
participation is viewed as a mechanism to include pupils in an indirect manner. Joaquin’s experiences also resemble Törnquists (2009) argument about how political misframing can occur when groups are excluded from participating in decision-making processes. Although ANZORC participated in the forum, the limitations of this indirect participation did not seem to generate proper representation according to Joaquin.

On the other hand, Eduardo from ANUC argues that there was no need for the CSOs to be directly involved in the peace process of the peace accord on CRR. He says that they did not feel represented by the parties in the negotiations in Havana, but that they neither felt it necessary to be represented at the negotiating table.

“And why not? Because the negotiating table was organized as a dialog to end the conflict, and we are not actors in the conflict. The peasants are victims of the conflict, not actors. The negotiations were between the actors of the war, right? That is not us” (Eduardo, my translation).

However, he emphasizes that this changed in the moment of the implementation of the accord, because the implementation process is a process of constructing peace, and that has to be a process of participation for all the actors touched by the conflict. According to Eduardo, a bottom-up approach for making the accord on CRR was not necessary, but perhaps this is because they already felt included, represented and listened to in the forum as previously explained. The CSO representative interviewed from the National Organization for Indigenous People in Colombia felt very differently, however. The informant, who will be referred to as Alice in this thesis, explains that:

“The biggest critique of the forum from ONICs point of view, is that the forum invited a lot of directors and leaders that we had never heard of before, and in the forum they talked on behalf of the indigenous people” (Alice, my translation).

She argues that even though they probably did their best, this was not a proper representation of the indigenous organizations. Her experience reflects one of the main obstacles that can occur when civil society organizations are invited into spaces for participation according to Cornwall (2004): the problem of representation, which can create uncertainty and lack of trust in the process. Rodrigo from SAC also mentioned that even though the organizers did their best, the question that remained was whether all the people who participated represented whomever they say they did.
Alice further explains that they therefore saw the participation mechanisms of the forum more as an informative social dialog, much like David from the Peasant Organization of Rio Sinitarra and ANZORC explained, but never considered the forum as a mechanism to gain influence in the accord on the issues related to the indigenous communities. These experiences resembles Törnquists (2009) and Frasers (2009) observation that political misframing can occur from flawed political representation failing to establish effective mechanism for popular control over public affairs, and the forum seemed to fail to include proper representation for social justice in the peace accord in CRR. Alice further explains that they contributed in the discussion and in the proposals sent to the negotiating table in Havana, but that the topic was very narrow and mostly centered on the issues of a rural reform. This experience resembles Cornwalls (2004) observation of the well-established structural political dynamics that often exist in invited spaces, and that it can be very difficult to influence and transform the agenda and the issues debated.

Alice argues that many indigenous communities consider the topic of development very differently, and even though they respected the methodology of the proposals sent to Havana, the forum was insufficient as a participation mechanism for the indigenous community. The CSOs representative from the Process of Afro-Colombian Communities (PCN), who will be referred to as Ligia in this thesis, also argues that the forum functioned more as a relational meeting between the national, regional and local organizations that participated. She claims that they tried to change the methodology in the forum, but that the request was denied, and that the majority of the Afro-Colombian communities would rather discuss the proposals from the forum between each other and reflect upon what that would entail for their territories. They did their diagnostics together with the majority of the ethnic communities, with indigenous and with peasants, and in the end they sent their proposals directly to Havana together with organizations such as ONIC. Alice from ONIC explains that they decided to set aside the entire process from the forum and instead demand a direct dialogue with the Colombian government and the FARC. The insufficient participation mechanism of the forum lead to one case of direct participation in the process of making the accord on CRR. This participation resembles Cornwall’s (2004) concept of ‘claimed space’, where several ethnic groups, communities and organizations mobilized to incorporate a chapter about ethnic groups in the final peace accord. This process will be discussed in the third and last part of this chapter.
6.2 Proposals from the CSO in the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development

Most of the CSO representatives interviewed stressed the need for a comprehensive rural reform and proper access to land for all of the rural population, especially the ones who have been forcefully displaced and who lack property titles to live on and to cultivate for production. Nevertheless, the CSO representatives interviewed emphasized different needs, and in this section I will explain their main proposals sent from the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development to the negotiating table in Havana. The CSO representatives interviewed stressed a wide range of needs and wishes to achieve positive, lasting peace in the rural parts of the country and political rights and recognition. I have categorized their proposals into four main categories: a) Comprehensive Rural Reform and Development, b) Peasant Reserved Zones, c) Vivir Bien and Intercultural Territories, and d) The Economic Model and Redistribution. The first three categories will be discussed in the first part of the next chapter in relation to how the content of the accord on CRR recognizes the needs, wishes and rights of peasants and ethnic groups. The proposals by the ethnic groups, which were delivered directly to the negotiating table, will not be included, due to the fact that these are part of a different section of the final peace accord than the one explored in this thesis. The proposals made by them the forum for the peace accord on CRR will however be explained under topic c) Vivir Bien and Intercultural Territories, in this chapter. The last category of proposals examined in this chapter, d) The Economic Model and Redistribution, will be discussed in the last part of the next chapter, where the dimension of redistribution for social justice will be used as the main analytic tool to discuss whether the accord emphasizes the root cause of conflict and provide the foundation for structural transformation and positive, lasting peace.

A) Comprehensive Rural Reform and Development - the Peasants Needs and Wishes

All of the peasant organizations interviewed emphasized the need for a comprehensive rural reform and development, which the informant from Marcha Patriótica, Antonio (my translation), refers to as “the minimum conditions for life in the countryside”. Eduardo from ANUC explains that their main proposal in the forum comes from a historically important
perspective of, which is that rural reform that provides access to land for the peasants also emphasizes the concept of comprehensive development, thereby also providing a clear line for credit, tactical assistance, and commercialization. They also raised the necessity of a development plan for the communities and the peasant organizations, and in particular the topic of substitution. This, he argues, is especially important in the accord on drug trafficking, because the rural families have to receive substitution to be able to change their crops. David from the Peasant Organization of Rio Sinitarre and ANZORC says that in his view, rural development is to include all the actors in the rural territories. He says that it was important for them to raise the issue of a public policy that includes the small producers, the medium producers and the big producers in the same manner. “It should be a politic of inclusion and that guaranties all factors of rural development; technology, scientific development, recognition, technic assistance, credit, recognition of production, transformation and commercialization” (David, my translation). He claims that rural development in Colombia traditionally has assisted the small producers, but provided money, training and technology to the big ones.

His observation regarding the concept of development in Colombia corresponds to one of the general perspectives on territories which favors concentration of land and private properties, as explained in chapter 2. David also explains that construction of basic infrastructure was an important proposal from the peasant organizations.

“If there is no basic infrastructure, the same will happen, the same that always happens. The peasants will not be able to deliver their products, and will therefore not have equal prices because it all goes to transportation” (my translation).

He further explained that it is very important to recognize that the peasants manage transformation, and that technical assistance would permit the peasants to get access to equipment that would provide transformation in production and give the peasants better opportunities. He says that their proposal therefore emphasized the inclusion of the peasants and the small producers so that they can be part of the market, deliver their products and provide food security for their families.

Rodrigo from SAC also highlights that all that can be considered as public goods for real development in Colombia, such as education and infrastructure, is necessary. However, he on the other hand argues that rural development should make the rural sector more compatible
rather than sustainable in the long term, and that a liberal form of development would benefit the citizens and provide food security.

“I think it’s a long discussion between competitiveness, rural development, inclusion, inequality, but at the same time I strongly believe that you could bring all the pieces together, and to make it real good, and a real difference in a country like mine”.

As I will argue in the next chapter, the accord on CRR seems to favor this perspective, as an attempt to both recognize the small producers, those who do not own land and the actors who favors neoliberal policies for development. The peasant organizations interviewed also say that their proposals stressed the need for food security and food sovereignty, and Alfonso form CODHES stresses that the displaced people of the conflict first and foremost need the protection of food security rather than production for commercialization. He explained that their proposals emphasized a comprehensive rural reform and development which guarantees the right to food and land for both peasants, Afro-Colombians and indigenous.

B) The Peasant Reserved Zones (PRZs) - Access to Land and Recognition of Peasants

The Peasant Reserved Zones (PRZs) are specified areas of land designed to prevent the expansion of agricultural frontiers, provide peasants ownership to land and security in regard to prevent land robbery and stabilize the peasants’ economy. The PRZs were first established through the Law 160 of year 1994, to create rural areas for the small-scale peasants to protect them from the territorial conflict and provide them with benefits for rural development (Sales, 2013). The first six PEZs were established between 1997 and 2002, but the establishment of new ones and development of the exiting ones stopped during the tenure of former president Uribe. The legal recognition of these zones was suspended as several political figures, including the president himself, linked the rural areas to the guerrillas and the project was therefore dismissed. Although the legal suspension was lifted in 2011, the public stigmatization of the peasants living within these zones has been difficult to change (Marshall, 2012).

The CSO representatives interviewed from ANZORC, ANUC, Marcha Patriótica and the Peasant Organization of Rio Sinitarra all explain that one of their main proposals in the forum was the implementation of Law 160 of 1994, where the Peasant Reserved Zones (PRZs) are
emphasized. Antonio from Marcha Patriótica stresses the importance of incorporating these zones in the accord on CRR because there are so many PRZs that have not yet been fulfilled.

“It is very absurd that we have to remind that state to complete the law. So we have to create processes of pressure from the territories and from the national and international level to make sure they complete the law” (David, my translation).

David from the Peasant Organization of Rio Sinitarra and ANZORC further explains the significance of these zones. The zones represent food production and development for the peasants, and they also reflect an agrarian reform and distribution of land within the territories. He explains that there are limitations to how big of a property you can buy and own, and that large landowners who run illegal businesses cannot by a property within the zone. Therefore, the establishment of more zones will contribute to distribution of land and secure peasants’ rights to land. The other representatives from ANZORC, Joaquin, stresses that not only was the PRZs the central topic in their proposal in the forum, but that these zones also have to be linked to a national plan for development. This, he argues, was overall their proposal to the accord on CRR.

C) Vivir Bien and Intercultural Territories - the Recognition of Ethnic Groups

The representatives interviewed from PCN, ONIC and CODHES all emphasized the need to recognize ethnic groups’ struggle for land, their needs and their culture. Their proposal in the forum raised the issues concerning their way of life and the recognition of the territories where they live. Ligia from PCN argues that the Afro-Colombians have very few land rights and that they therefore do not have the same rights for participation, to produce and to reach the market as other actors in the rural sector do. Alfonso from CODHES also highlights that rural development should not only depend on the capacity of the peasants, the indigenous and the Afro-Colombians, but provide a comprehensive rural reform which aims at improving the agricultural production and have the capacity to commercialize and reach external markets through infrastructure necessary for production. Alice from ONIC argues that even though the proposals from the peasant organizations on a comprehensive rural reform for production and commercialization are important, she also proposed a greater discussion on the concept of development. For the indigenous communities, she argues, the concept of rural development is very broad, and the concept most similar to development for some indigenous groups is the concept of vivir bien (live well). It is not necessarily though technical support or
monetary development, but rather the quality of life, the quality of resources and the quality of institutions, which therefore differs from the development model of the productive peasant. Alice stresses that their main proposal however regarded the ethnic peoples’ access to land, communities that are in need of enormous territorial help. She explains that ethnic groups’ access to land is a historical conflict, and that they have conflicts with the government, with the peasants who are located within their territories through the Peasant Reserves Zones and with companies. Nevertheless, there are a lot of people from different groups in the contested territories who would like to share land, and Alice highlights that this was their main proposal: the establishment of intercultural territories. Their argument was that in the process of establishing a framework for displaced land though the peace negotiations, the process should also address intercultural territories. She explains that the government should fulfill the implementation of Law 160 and the PRZs, and recognize and land for Afro-Colombian communities, while at the same time let the communities themselves be able to agree on intercultural territories, where all the groups have a right to live which would thereby prevent territorial conflicts.

D) The Economic Model and the Redistribution

One topic that most of the CSO representatives stressed was that recourses and richness in the Colombian territory should benefit the entire Colombian population. Ana Maria from CNA explains that the peace accord should recognize the small family producers and not only represent the big economic and industrial projects as the valid producers in the economic model of the country. She emphasizes that if it had not been for the peasant economy, the country would have great difficulties with providing food security for its citizens. The big economic projects does not benefit the majority of the Colombian people, she argues, and that redistribution of land to the traditional small producers is necessary to make the everyday life of the rural population better. Ana Maria argues that one of their main proposals regarded distribution of land, was that territories are to be divided fairly and that the people who live in there actually have access to them. She says that this was their main proposal in respect to how Colombia should organize its rural land. The rural populations are the ones that should be in control, not transnational companies, foreigners, or armed and illegal groups.

“We have to understand the social causes in the country to be able to solve the conflict. One of the main causes of the armed conflict is for instance the poor distribution of land, right?
And the exclusion of the people's social, economic and cultural rights. So we say that peace in this county is very dependent on overcoming of these obstacles” (Ana Maria, my translation).

She concludes that in order to resolve these issues, the country needs to change politics in terms of redistribution, access to land and peoples’ rights. Carla from Asucingo, a local organization for those affected by hydroelectric projects and part of the international movement Rios Vivos, also emphasizes that they saw it necessary to discuss the economic model to promote proposals to the negotiating table.

“Peace goes through the territories. That means that what is defined as the politics of territorial development, in a clear matter, could bring peace. So, since peace goes through the territories, it is absolutely necessary to discuss what kind of model that is being implemented in the territories, which today is a model of dispossession and extractions” (Carla, my translation).

She explains that their main motivation of participating in the forum was to have a discussion about this topic, but as I will explain in the next chapter, the economic model was not up for discussion.

Several of the peasant organizations interview also stressed redistribution as one of the central topics in their proposals. Both Joaquin from ANUC and David from The Peasant Organization of Rio Sinitarre and ANZORC expressed the need to redistribute land in order to create sustainable and lasting peace. David says that the structure of land has to be addressed, and that is why formalization of land titles and the land of the baldíos were essential in their proposals to the negotiating table in Havana. Alfonso from CODHES explains that due to the large number of people who do not have land or not sufficient land, the central topic of their proposals was formalization of land titles and refund of land to those most affected by the conflict. Antonio for Marcha Patriótica also highlights that to give land back to those 8 million people who have been forcefully displaced was one of their main proposals, as well as providing those people not only with land, but with resources in order to live and cultivate. Eduardo (my translation) also emphasizes this argument, and claims that

“When it comes to land, land for everybody will also complete a social function. And the land is concentrated in very few hands and exploited or used in a manner that is not productive. So that is one of the problems. Here in Colombia, we are exploiting 45 percent of potential land. Access to land is not just for having land, but because in the hands of the peasants the land is used productively. Now land in used as an instrument for accumulation of richness”.
Access to land has always been central in discussions about rights, equality and development in Colombia. The two opposite perspectives on land rights substitute the different land legislations in the country. Which perspective is emphasized in the accord on CRR? Does the accord provide the foundation for civil peace with structural transformations to solve the issues in regard to rights and distribution as root causes of the conflict? The content of the accord on CRR and the recognition of the peasants’ and ethnic groups’ rights, needs and wished for conflict resolution will be discussed in chapter 7.

6.3 The Ethnic Groups’ Demand for a Direct Dialog – The Impressive Effect of CSO Mobilization

“One of the most visible and impactful mechanism proved to be the direct dialogue between victim of the conflict and the parties. The visits of the victims connected the peace table with the realities on the ground in Colombia and the transformed dynamics between the parties” (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018, p. 12). In contrast to the accord on Victims, direct dialog was not part of the established mechanisms for participation in the accord on CRR, and the forum did not seem to facilitate a proper bottom-up process. One of the main critiques of the forum was the limited local ownership it generated. Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt (2018) argue that the aim of forums was also to domestically anchor the negotiations, but that they probably would have benefitted from a stronger engagement with grass root organizations, local authorities and businesses to generate local ownership for the local population.

The Lack of Local Ownership

Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt (2018) argue that the participation mechanisms for civil society in the peace process were important and provided valuable input. However, there was criticism from the civil society in Colombia that these mechanisms were too limited, which was based upon the notion that the talks took place outside of Colombian borders. The criticism of the location of the peace negotiations emphasized that the distance between the realities on the ground and the negotiating table in Havana was too great, and that formal participation channels between the public and the two parties in Havana were necessary.
Joaquin from ANZORC argues that one of the most serious mistakes was the decision to have the negotiations outside of the country. He claims that one of the reasons they were not allowed to participate directly in the process of the accord on CRR was because the government believed that the participation of CSOs would ultimately benefit the FARC. Strengthening the FARC was not in the government's interests, so therefore no direct participation channels were established for the CSOs.

It is worth mentioning that as the peace talks progressed, and the negotiating table started to address the agenda issue on victims, the parties decided to include various stakeholders in a direct manner based on the criticism from the civil society in Colombia (Nylander, Sandberg and Tvedt, 2018). Nevertheless, the peace accord on CRR failed to ensure local ownership and kept the actors of civil society on the side, with little knowledge about the process.

“That was a serious error. Right? Because a lot of the topics stayed in secrecy. In Cuba! An Island! To prevent people from coming there. But they could not prevent the flights from staying open!” (Joaquin, my translation).

Joaquin further claims that even though they were not invited to take part in the negotiations, a lot of people went to Havana as an attempt to be closer to the peace talks and with the hope of achieving a direct communication with the parties. The attempts were mostly without any success and the decision-making between the parties remained in secrecy. Joaquin argues that this secrecy ultimately gave room for a lot of rumors, and he was not surprised when the people voted no in the referendum in relation to the final peace accord. He stresses that there were a lot of rumors concerning rural territories being given away to previous FARC combatants, broadcasted over the local radio. The peace process felt external, distant and unfamiliar to many Colombians, and the content of the accord was little known by the general population. Joaquin highlights that this mistake gave former president Uribe and his supporters room to undermine the peace accord and to spread untrue rumors about its content and what it would entail for the average Colombian. The lack of local ownership in the accord in CRR demonstrates a failed attempt at establishing mechanisms to ensure an emancipatory approach to peace. During my fieldwork and interviews, I came across one case where the distance between the negotiating table and the realities on the ground did not prohibit civil society to influence the content of the accord. However, this was not due to the
will of the parties at the negotiating table, but rather because of a strong and influential mobilization of ethnic groups in Colombia.

**Direct Participation in the Peace Accord**

Alfonso from CODHES explains that despite the limited political space for influence and power, the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities have an impressive political power and a great logistical ability to organize, and thereby still manage to participate in public decision-making processes. Ligia from PCN says that mobilization has always been a part of their political strategy to achieve changes for the future. Alice from ONIC explains that the indigenous communities never viewed the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development as a space for them to properly participate. They produced their proposals and had their discussions with the other organizations in the forum, but after the forum ended they decided to discuss the issues related to a comprehensive rural reform with the Afro-Colombian communities, and consolidated with the Ethnic Commission for Peace and the defenders of territorial rights. She explains that they still thought it was necessary to not be excluded in the process of making an accord about access to land; one of the main issues the ethnic groups experience in their everyday life.

Ligia from PCN also explains that this process reflects the strength of the ethnic communities, which had a huge impact. Alfonso stresses the impressiveness of this process, because the groups that have been most affected by the conflict, and that are the most marginalized and vulnerable in Colombia, managed to start this process shortly after the forum in 2012, and kept the pressure up for years in order to participate in the negotiations. He argues that various actors in Colombia have tried to be part of the negotiations, such as Joaquin described in a previous section in this chapter, but very few managed to actually have a direct dialog with the parties at the negotiating table. Alfonso claims that the victims participated because of the international pressure, but that the ethnic groups were the only ones who succeeded in getting the attention and recognition of the UN Human Rights Commission in order to be part of a direct dialog.

Alfonso stresses that throughout the process, the indigenous and the Afro-Colombians to be included, and time after time they were dismissed. “And I think they did one of the most beautiful things when it comes to the peace accord, they united to achieve participation”
The ethnic groups came together as one strong, unified social mobilization, and after two years and eight months of mobilizing and insisting, they were invited to present their proposals at the negotiating table in Havana. Alfonso explains that in 2016, the Commission for Rights to Land and Territories was configured by the Ethnic Commission for Peace who brought with them the proposals for the ethnic chapter and who got the parties at the negotiating table to listen to them. Two or three days after the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC ended, the Ethnic Commission for Peace achieved to incorporate an ethnic chapter in the sixth and last part of the final peace accord.

Alice from ONIC was one of the representatives who participated in the Ethnic Commission for Peace at the negotiating table. She argues that the commission functioned as a third party in the negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government, and that they won that space because of their mobilization between the indigenous and the Afro-Colombians. “We were the only sector in society that achieved a special chapter in the accord” (my translation). She explained that the final peace accord also emphasized women, but that the topic of women was negotiated between the mechanisms of the bilateral talks between the parties, not by a third party invited in to the negotiating table. Alfonso (my translation) enthusiastically calls the inclusion of the ethnic chapter “one of the most revolutionary things is the accord” and that the ethnic groups “are one of the most important groups when it comes to modifying the peace accord”.

This process clearly demonstrates how bottom-up collective action can occur in Cornwalls’ (2004) descriptions of ‘claimed space’. The process also reflects Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto’s (2007) observation of the importance of spatiality through scale as a strategy to gain influence, and how CSOs and social movements can collaborate to use scalar strategies to challenge power-relations and expand their voice and scale-jump in decision-making processes. In this case, the ethnic groups managed to challenge the established power-relations in the negotiating table and achieved incorporation of their proposals through the highest level of the negotiations. Alice from ONIC explains that in her view, the discussions and the proposals made in the forum were mostly cast aside due to the fact that they were able to scale-jump from the forum to the negotiating table in Havana. Ligia (my translation) from PCN stresses that there was not a process of participation of ethnic groups in the process of making the pace accord on CRR. “It is an important starting point to reflect upon.
If had been a process of participation we would not have to knock on the door for the inclusion for the ethnic chapter”.

The lack of local ownership and the flawed established participation mechanism of the forum, especially in relation to the ethnic groups, do not reflect Brett’s (2013) vision of an emancipation peace process where proper participation of civil society is a decisive factor to ensure a less determined top-down, elite-led process. The process of the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development rather reflects and attempt at including actors of civil society, and can be understood as a mechanism to secure both a bottom-up and a top-down approach of the orthodox model for peace. While some rural peasant sectors of the country express satisfaction of this participation mechanism, other parts of the rural Colombia do not. It is perhaps due to the fact that most of the CSO representatives in the forum were peasants, and the content of the accord mostly reflect their needs and priorities, which will be discussed in the next chapter. However, as Lederach (1997, in Brett, 2013) argues, the participation of local collective groups in peace processes can lead to the establishment of network between and throughout the state and society, and open up spaces for individual and groups to propose effective alternative for conflict transformation, peace building and reconciliation. The participation mechanism of the forum did not seem to ensure a bottom-up approach, but the mechanism might have contributed to generate a forceful network of ethnic groups mobilization, which ultimately resulted in a bottom-up collective action and strong influence in the decision-making process of the final accord.

Summary

The participation mechanism of the Nation Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development as the dimension of representation for social justice in an emancipatory approach has been explored in this chapter. The forum had a broad representation of the civil society actors, and can be understood as an innovative initiative to include civil society in the process of making the accord on CRR. Several of the CSO representatives interviewed expressed however that the indirect form for participating in the forum was an insufficient mechanism to influence the decision-making process of the accord on CRR. The issue of misframing was emphasized of several CSO representatives, especially by the ethnic organizations. Several CSO representatives also perceived the FARC as the main representative of the rural civil society at the negotiating table, considering the fact that the CSOs were not permitted to participate
in a direct manner. Although the forum was organized by the UNPD and UNAL as a national initiative, various actors of the civil society expressed lack of local ownership to the process, in regards to the indirect form for participation in the invited space of the forum. Nevertheless, the ethnic groups achieved inclusion of a special chapter in the accord. This was however not because of established mechanisms for participation in the peace process on CRR, but rather through massive mobilization and bottom-up collective action of various organizations though claiming space. It seems like the participation mechanism of the forum was an attempt at providing an emancipatory model for peace, but according to the CSO representatives interviewed, the forum functioned more as a consulting mechanism of civil society, which failed to provide for proper participation of local actors. The process of making the accord on CRR thereby resembles the orthodox approach to peace, where both bottom-up and top-down approached have been employed.
In this chapter I will explore the content of the peace accord on CRR and compare it with the main proposals from the CSO representatives interviewed. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part of analysis discusses the proposals from the CSOs and the content of the accord on CRR in relation to recognition of peasants and ethnic groups, while the last part of the chapter explores the content of the accord in respect to redistribution for access to land and socioeconomic equality. It also addresses whether and how the accord on CRR provides a foundation to resolve root causes of conflict and structural transformation for positive, lasting peace in Colombia. As explained in chapter 4, emancipatory peace building and civil peace can be characterized by conditions of social justice with the aim of addressing underlying root causes of conflict (Brett, 2013, Galtung, 1967, in Brett, 2013). While the aspect of representation already has been discussed in chapter 6, this chapter addresses the aspects of recognition and redistribution as dimensions of social justice for civil peace in the accord on CRR.

7.1 Recognition of Peasants and Ethnic Groups in the Accord in CRR

Eduardo from the peasant organization ANUC explains that the comprehensive rural reform on one hand implies access to production through land, water, technology and capital. He calls this the dimension of productiveness. Nevertheless, there is also a political claim of rights in terms of a comprehensive rural reform, which entail human rights, recognition and protection of various rural actors. The productiveness and the public goods described in the accord reflect the economic and social dimension of the comprehensive rural reform. He stresses that these dimensions are also linked to the political dimension of a comprehensive rural reform, which regards political claims and rights for recognition of the actors in the rural sector. The first section in this part of the chapter addresses recognition of the peasants in the accord on CRR, while the next section addresses recognition of the ethic groups.

7.1.1 Recognition of Peasants
“I think that all of these processes (of the accord on CRR) have given rise to the phenomenon of recognition of many actors and sectors, and the importance of the rural areas, especially the importance of the peasant sector and the peasant economy, which contributes to security, food, and the national economy” (Eduardo, my translation).

He elaborates by explaining that there has been a tendency in Colombia to think of the peasant as poor and in need, and that the accord on CRR has contributed to change the discourse of peasants as lost and dependent. Now, with the peace process and the accord on CRR, he argues, the peasants’ contribution to the country is gradually recognized and the assistance of credit, infrastructure and the possibility of reaching the national market is crucial for that to happen. This was one of their main proposals regarding rural development in the forum, as explained in category a) Comprehensive Rural Reform and Development in chapter 6.

As explained in chapter 5, the accord emphasizes the small producers and the medium producers, and states that these groups will be provided with technical assistance, credit, substitution and infrastructure to improve their productivity, access to the market and food security. Most of the CSO representatives interviewed stressed the need for a comprehensive rural reform, which is included in the last part of the accord on CRR. The rural reform described seems to reflect the peasants’ needs and wishes and their understanding of the concept of development. It mostly emphasizes elements such as access to water, infrastructure, training, technical assistance and credits, with the “aim of supporting small-scale family-run agricultural production and boosting the rural economy in general” (the Colombian government and the FARC, 2016, p. 25). The accord recognizes the needs of the peasants by providing the foundation of productiveness for commercialization and the coexistence of producers of various sizes in the rural sector. The peasants’ economic dimension of CRR seems to be adequately recognized in the accord, as well as the social dimension. The accord on CRR stressed the need for poverty eradication, as well as the reduction of inequality though food security, health, education and housing. Eduardo further states that he feels that the rights, need and wishes of their organization have been recognized and included in the accord on CRR. The accord explicitly includes technical and financial support to small-scale farmers, as all of the peasant organizations interviewed emphasized in their proposals. The political dimension of the CRR is a bit more complicated considering that most of the rural actors claim their right to land in their proposals. This will be further explored in the second part of this chapter, regarding redistribution.
In terms of recognition of property rights it is clear that the peasants have been heard. David from the Peasant Organization of Rio Sinitarre and ANZORC explains that they feel recognized and included in the accord on CRR because their main proposal and objective regarding the Peasant Reserved Zones was included (Chapter 6, category b) Peasant Reserved Zones (PRZs)). He argues that the emphasis on the PRZs in the accord on CRR make them feel that the forum was an efficient participation mechanism for representation and inclusion. All the peasant organizations interviewed expressed relief that the importance of these zones for the peasants has been recognized in the accord. David further explains that even though the PRZs are part of Law 160 of 1994, it was extremely important for them that these zones were part of the accord on CRR because of the government's failure to complete the law. He argues that even though 12 processes of PRZs have been established in the country, the government has for a long time refused to create new ones, because previously the government considered the territories within the zones to be related to the FARC. Nevertheless, he stresses that the peace accord on CRR has provided a new context and understanding of the conflict, and that the PRZs are now recognized as territories for peasant’s rights to land and development.

The other CSO representative interviewed from ANZORC, Joaquin, stresses that they achieved their main proposal, but that the PRZs to a greater extent should have been linked to a national development plan. He argues that their overall proposal of this relation is not part of the accord regarding the PRZs. Although the accord presents Development Programs with a Territorial-Based-Focus (DPTFs), the accord does not reflect an overall national plan for development where both the PRZs and the DPTFs are part of a larger project, he argues. In the accord on CRR, the aim to boost the rural economy in general and shrinking the gap between the urban and rural areas of Colombia is highlighted several times. However, Joaquin highlights that there should have been a greater emphasis on a national plan since the topic of rural development regards the quality of the institutions and the rural projects in the country. He claims that the politicians and the elite in the country do not have a national project in mind, and that they hand over territories to developers of carbon and hydroelectric for the economic benefit. “To be rich and have resources, and without having a project for the nation, that is terrible. That is the history that we have, that benefit the politicians and the elites in this country” (Joaquin, my translation). He stresses that it is very serious that the accord on CRR lacks a national projects for rural development and for the nations
sovereignty, and argues that the power has to be in the hands of the actors living in the rural parts of the country. Joaquin's argument also relates to the topic of redistribution, which will be discussed in the next part of this chapter.

Nevertheless, the content of the accord reflect Frasers’ (1995, 2009, Fraser and Olsen, 2008, in Stokke, 2017) concept of recognition as a dimension for social justice, at least for the peasants. The accord on CRR highlights the importance of the PRZs, and thereby provides recognition of peasants’ rights to land and production for the small-scale producers. It is important to acknowledge however that the peasant organizations had most of the representatives in the forum, compared to other sectors, groups and organizations. To an extent, they were also better represented directly at the negotiating table through the FARC, a former peasant movement, as Alfonso explained in chapter 6. Several of the elements for development and production described in the accord on CRR also seems to be in the interests of the government, due to the similar understandings of these concepts within the liberal policies of the state. To address poverty reduction, economic development and productivity through elements such as housing, food security, market, generated income, credit and technical assistance, also reflect liberal policies within the already existing Victims Law of the year 2011 (Herbolzheimer, 2016).

It can be observed that even though the accord on CRR have included several of the peasants’ proposals, the commitment to economic development also resembles a constitutional peace where solutions to rural development are provided through liberal policies and institutions. It was probably not such a huge leap for the Santos-government to address and incorporate these issues in the accord on CRR, such as technical assistance, credit, the market and the PRZs, which is already part of the Law 160 of the year 1994. Nevertheless, the content of the accord on CRR recognizes peasants and include their main proposals, and thereby also resembles Richmond and Franks (2009) concept of civil peace, where the voices of the peasants have been included and recognized by the negotiating table.

### 7.1.2 Recognition of Ethnic Groups

For various ethnic communities, the concept of development and food production differs greatly from the economic development of productivity and production that the peasant communities have highlighted in their proposals. Alice from ONIC explains that the
indigenous and the Afro-Colombian communities often consume the food they produce, and that their voices are rarely emphasized in national policies regarding commercialization. As I explained in chapter 6, in the category of proposals c) Vivir Bien and Intercultural Territories, the ethnic organizations proposed a greater discussion on the concept of development for ethnic people, considering the great diversity of ethnic communities in the country. Alice explains that the topics of development and food production have to be addressed with a lot of consideration since there are communities with very different views on these concepts. She stresses that they do not have the capacity to be part of a larger production system with access to infrastructure, stores and the market like the peasants do. She further claims that the definition of development in the accord is based on a monetary economic model, while the ethnic groups use an economic model based on exchange, which she refers to as the forest economy.

“They (the ethnic communities) don’t want commercializing; they want their proper resources. The forest economy is very different from the peasant economy. I don’t want to say that they don’t need money, but if you have a community exciting of 16 people, walking in areas without infrastructure, well, you can have a lot of money in the rural areas, but the money doesn’t give you anything. The money does not serve you; it is only what your produce in the forest that you can exchange for food, for medicine, for transport. It is another way of thinking about economy” (Alice, my translation)

Although she respects the peasant figures of production and development, which are presented in the accord, she argues that in general, also in the process of making the accord on CRR, there is little knowledge of the ethnic communities and their everyday lives. Political decision-making needs a careful consideration of the ethnic groups in Colombia, which should have been more emphasized in the accord on CRR.

The accord on CRR did not survey the ethnic communities’ needs, culture and values accordingly, and thereby failed to adequately recognize these groups. For instance, the last part of the accord on CRR presents the topic of food security, but fails to directly address the indigenous groups or the Afro-Colombian communities. The topic presents solutions through the establishment of food councils, development plans, production and market, technical assistance and campaigns. Although these solutions are to be established through close cooperation with local communities and with concern for ‘culturally appropriate food and nutrition’ (The Colombian government and the FARC, 2016, p. 33), special attention concerning their vulnerability and cultural distinction has not been emphasized in the accord
Nevertheless, because of the incredible strong mobilization and cooperation of the ethnic groups, a special chapter regarding ethnic groups was included in the sixth part of the accord on implementation. “The indigenous and the Afro-Colombians have achieved a level of visualizing their situation; the protection of their rights in the final accord” (Alfonso from CODHES, my translation). Despite the lack of recognition in the accord on CRR, the ethnic groups achieved elements of civil peace through bottom-up mobilization and direct action. “So yes, our proposals were included in Havana, but that was because we included ourselves directly. It was not through the forum” (Alice, my translation).

This form of participation and local agency, where local actors challenge decision-making processes resembles Mac Ginty’s (2010) definition of hybrid peace, where local actors have the power and space to contest and cooperate with actors who produce the framework of the liberal peace process, such as the international community, the Colombian government and the FARC in this case. Mac Ginty (2010) also observed that the extent to which traditional and indigenous norms and structures are intact is crucial, as they might have been eroded by conflict, which thereby reduces the space and power of local agency. In this case of the unified mobilization of ethnic groups, it is clear that even though they have been greatly affected by the armed conflict and represent the most vulnerable and marginalized parts of the rural population, their agency, will and power is intact, demonstrated through the contested process of producing hybrid peace by achieving a special chapter for the ethnic communities in the final peace accord.

Ligia (2017) from PCN stresses that the historic struggles of the Afro-Colombians have not been recognized in the accord on CRR. She explains that the historic struggle for land goes back to when the Africans were enslaved and brought to Colombia, and that the Afro-Colombian people today often live in the same places where their ancestors settled. However, she claims that their territories never have been recognized by the Colombian government, but rather categorized as baldíos, which is unoccupied land, owned by the state, as explained in chapter 2. “So you can find land in the northern parts of Cauca were they live, where Afro-Colombian communities have been since 1736. For four centuries! The administration says that these are new settlements of Afro-Colombian people. But they have lived there since 1736! (Ligia, my translation). She further argues that the negotiating table in Havana did not include or address the struggle for land for the Afro-Colombian communities. Her argument
goes hand in hand with one of the main proposals from the ethnic groups in the forum: the inclusion of intercultural territories.

Intercultural territories are described by several of the CSO representatives interviewed as one of the fundamental lacks in the accord on CRR. Paula from Fensuagro claims that the accord failed to address the necessity of constructing intercultural territories where Afro-Colombians, peasants and indigenous peoples can coexist and share territories. Alice from ONIC explains that the struggle for land for the ethnic groups is historically rooted because a large part of the rural land is in the hands of very few wealthy landowners, while the remaining land therefore have been central in territorial conflicts amongst the peasants, Afro-Colombians and the indigenous communities. In several cases, these groups claim the right to the same land. She respects that the accord on CRR promote the PRZs, but that in many cases these zones are established in the indigenous communities territories, thereby occupying their rightful land.

The accord on CRR presents the need to develop particular production methods for the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities through comprehensive access to land with the emphasis on inter-ethnic and inter-cultural spaces (The Colombian government and the FARC, 2016). However, the topic concerning inter-ethnic and inter-cultural spaces in the accord on CRR does not include the necessity of shared territories between the rural actors, and does not address the historic struggle of the ethnic communities. Paula argues that this is a fundamental lack of recognition of the rural population, because Colombia is a multicultural country. David from the peasant organization ANZORC also explains the necessity of the incorporation of the intercultural territories in the peace accord. He stressed that for decades the peasants, the indigenous and the Afro-Colombians have fought each other with machete for their claim over territories, and that it is necessary to understand this reality of the rural areas to be able to create intercultural territories as a resolution for multicultural harmony. “That does not exist in the constitution or in the laws in Colombia. But today that is the reality of the life we have” (David, my translation).

It is difficult to see how the accord on CRR will provide for Galtung’s (1967, in Brett, 2013) concept of positive peace with conditions of social justice for the ethnic communities when their historic struggle for land is not addressed in the accord. Several of the CSO representatives interviewed expressed concern regarding the failure to recognize the
vulnerable position of the ethnic communities, and argued that an inclusion of intercultural territories in the accord could have provided the foundation for territorial conflict resolution amongst the rural population. Alice from ONIC argues that one of the main challenges in the rural parts of the country is the cooperation between the ethnic groups and peasants, and that is why they proposed intercultural territories as a main factor for rural conflict resolution. The failures to neither address nor recognize the ethnic groups historic struggle for land or the contemporary rural situation between the rural sectors, where the ethnic groups often are the most vulnerable, is a fundamental lack of social justice in the accord on CRR.

Nevertheless, Alice from ONIC also stresses that many of their proposals were included because of their unified mobilization and demand for a direct dialogue.

“So for instance, they (the parties at the negotiating table) wanted to reduce the Land Fund for the peasants. For that reason, we also went to Havana to include an ethnic chapter that introduces very general principles about access to land. It is impotent to get the normative perspective of both the peasants and the ethnic groups to resolve the problems of access to land” (Alice, my translation).

Because of their demand for a direct dialog with the negotiating table, a special chapter about ethnic groups is included in the sixth part of the peace accord on implementation. The accord stresses the need to include a special mechanism of consultation of the ethnic groups in the implementation process of the DPTFs and highlights that the indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians are included as beneficiaries in terms of access to land.

“It shall be understood for the case of ethnic peoples that the ecological function of property and their own ancestral forms of relationship with the territory take precedence over the notion of non-exploitation. The ethnic peoples and communities will participate with their representative organizations in creating mechanisms to resolve disputes about land tenure and use, and about strengthening of food production, when the disputes concerned compromise their rights’ (The Colombian government and The FARC, 2016, p. 219).

Alice from ONIC stresses that if they had not managed to include an ethnic chapter, they would not have achieved an incorporation of their proposals in the final peace accord. In this regard, the indigenous communities and the Afro-Colombian community’s needs, wishes and rights have been recognized in final peace accord, but only because of their own will and determination. The recognition of ethnic groups has not been through an established
mechanism in the peace process, but rather through bottom-up collective mobilization through claimed space.

The final peace accord regarding ethnic peoples’ right to land therefore resembles Mac Gintys (2010) concept of hybrid peace, where local actors and actors of the liberal peace in the negotiating table together have produced a foundation to peace through cooperation and contestation. Although the process of direct action and collective mobilization resembles an emancipatory approach for civil peace, the inclusion and exclusion of proposals from the ethnic groups rather resembles a hybrid form of peace. Recognition of ethnic groups has been addressed due to collective action outside of the established mechanism for participation, which challenged the decision-making processes in the negotiating table. The ethnic groups managed to include their proposals for recognition, but the accord on CRR still seems to reflects a constitutional form of peace that fails to emphasize local consent and recognition of the ethnic groups in Colombia.

**Summarizing Recognition of Peasants and Ethnic Groups in The Accord on CRR**

According to the representatives from the peasant organizations interviewed, their main proposals regarding rural development and production, such as credit, substitution, technical assistance, housing and the market, has been included in the accord on CRR. The content of the accord seems to recognize the peasants’ needs, wishes and everyday struggles, especially by including the Peasant Reserved Zones, which thereby facilitates one dimension of social justice for civil peace for the peasants. The elements presented in the accord regarding the peasants’ demands also coincide the liberal policies of the state to some extend, and several of the proposals from the CSO representatives interviewed are already part of legislation in the country. The content regarding the peasants in the accord on CRR thereby also resembles Richmond and Franks (2009) concept of constitutional peace, where liberal policies for food production, development and poverty eradication is presented as elements for conflict resolution. The experiences of the representatives from the ethnic organizations differ greatly from the representatives from the peasant organizations. Their main proposal regarding intercultural territories to address their historic struggle for land and promote multicultural co-existence was not included in the accord on CRR. The accord on CRR thereby failed to
address the dimension of recognition for social justice for the ethnic communities. Although the accord on CRR seems to reflect a top-down process and constitutional peace for the ethnic groups, the ethnic organizations managed to incorporate a special chapter in the final peace accord. Due to bottom-up collective action, a hybrid form of peace was produced through the contested process with the parties at the negotiating table and an incorporating of their proposals.

7.2 Root Cause of Conflict – Towards Structural Transformation for Positive, Lasting Peace?

“Before the peace negotiations, the Colombian government publicly signaled its readiness for peace talks by acknowledging the root causes of the armed conflict and initiating a process of legislative changes to address structural problems of land dispossession and victims” (Herbolzheimer, 2016, p. 7). However, when the negotiations started it became clear that the negotiations would not substitute the country's democracy with some sort of a socialist regime, nor would the capitalist economic model be changed. Discussions about abolition of private property and changes in the financial sector were excluded from the negotiating agenda (Nasi, 2018). Antonio from Marcha Patriótica explains that the contested issue of access to land is the root cause of the conflict. He argues that redistribution of land and a comprehensive rural form has been a historic demand from the communities.

“The domestic conflict that we have has been because of unequal access to land. So when you ask me that question, obviously because it is in the accord, but that is the fundamental cause of the conflict. And during the conflict, these differences have been deepened. So the signing of the peace accord is for us a signal of will” (Antonio, my translation).

Most of the CSO representatives interviewed highlighted the need for redistribution and proper access to land to resolve the rural conflict in Colombia. Several CSO representatives interviewed referred to the contested issue of unequal access to land as ‘the other conflict’.

Alfonso from CODHES explains that the formalization of land titles and the refund of land through the Land Fund in the accord on CRR, are responses to the demands from the rural populations who have been victims of dispossession and lived in juridical insecurity.
“So if you see the first part of the accord (on CRR), it is like a response to the failed structures in the rural areas of Colombian. It is not the response that we hoped for, but it is a product of the rooms for participation and it is fairly correct when it comes to the problems in the campo” (my translation)

He argues that it raises awareness of the rural problems and addresses elements such as credits, substitution, infrastructure and irrigation systems, although it does not present the full picture of the rural situation.

‘When the peace process started, one of the premises was that the economic model was not to be touched, especially when it came to the part about development, and what kind of development we could have’ (Alfonso, my translation).

He further argues that the resistance towards the peace process was especially targeted the first part of the accord on CRR, despite that the accord articulates very important factors for the rural sectors. Antonio from Marcha Patriótica highlights that the Land Fund and the formalization of land titles in the accord presents an important basis in regards to the unequal access to land in Colombia. This part of the chapter explores the dimension of redistribution for social justice in the content of the peace accord, and discusses whether the accord on CRR addresses structural transformation for positive, lasting peace in Colombia.

7.2.1 The Land Fund and Formalization of Land Titles

Alice from ONIC explains that together with 29 other lawyers, she established an office called the Community of Justice to demand a process of access to land for the indigenous communities. They were asked by the parties in Havana to study the accord and the effect it could have on the rural areas.

“And while reading it, it occurred to us that in reality the government won the pulse of the FARC in the first part of the accord (on CRR). That is to say, nothing in the accord is illegal or de-constitutional. There are things that were part of Law 160 of the rural agrarian reform. In reality, the process of discussing the first part is not different than other agrarian reforms that have been established in the country. Almost all of what is in the accord is the same as the agrarian reforms that have been constructed by the right-wings before” (Alice, my translation).

She further claims that the accord emphasizes the formalization of land titles for the small-scale producers and peasants, but that in general the accord does not provide redistribution
and a comprehensive rural reform for the rest of the poor population in the country. “Not at all” she says several times. So she stresses that the accord represent a legal and constitutional perspective, and that in her view, it is an attempt at resolving a problem for the peasant communities, especially the ones living within the PRZs.

Alfonso from CODHES explains that it is very difficult to estimate if the proposals from the CSO who participated in the forum are included in the accord, especially the ones regarding redistribution, which I presented in chapter 6 in the proposal category d) *The Economic Model and Redistribution*. Alfonso further explains that it is impossible to view the proposals precisely in the accord, but that the Land Fund and the formalization of land titles are responses to the proposals regarding access to land for the rural population who do not have land or have insufficient land. However, he also points out that the demands from CSO are so profound that it is an asymmetric situation between the necessity and the reality of possibilities.

David from the Peasant Organization of Rio Sinitarre and ANZORC is one of the CSO representatives interviewed who emphasizes that the three million hectares of land in the Land Fund and the seven million hectares for formalization of land titles are insufficient. He argues that the 7 million hectares of formalization of land is a good start to provide stability and security for the peasants who live without property titles. Nevertheless, the number of both hectares of land for the formalization process and the Land Fund should be larger in order to secure sufficient redistribution, he argues. He concludes that the totality of land that has been dispossessed through the conflict will not be given back to the rural population according to the accord. “We consider that 40 million hectares would be sufficient. We have the dream that there will be a structural transformation in regards to land” (David, my translation). He also stresses that if the country does not redistribute the land, it is going to be very difficult to resolve the conflict. Ligia from PCN also emphasizes that these number of hectares are insufficient in order to redistribute the concentration of land and to resolve that rural conflict. She claims that the Land Fund even can generate more tension between the organization working to defend the territories, which depends on how the Land Fund will gather and distribute land.

The accord on CRR describes that the Land Fund will gather territories from the legal cessation of land ownership, from *baldios*, from the updating and strengthening of Forest
Reserve Areas, from the unexplored land and from donations of land to the Fund. However, as Ligia explained in the previous section of this chapter, many Afro-Colombians live without titles in the territories, which the government has characterized as *baldíos*. The implementation process of the Land Fund therefore depends on the mapping of these areas. She also emphasizes that the numbers of hectares of land presented in the accord will not solve the inequality in the rural parts of the country.

“So we can ask ourselves, what is the role of the industries, of the big landowners, the ones from the rich businesses? There are always companies that should have to compromise more so that the situation in Colombia actually could be different, but it is not like that” (my translation).

According to David and Ligia, the Land Fund and the formalization of land titles in the accord on CRR does not reflect Frasers (1995 and 2009, in Stokke, 2017) concept of redistribution for social justice, which is rooted in the political-economic structures with the aim of reducing socioeconomic inequalities. The role of landowners and transnational companies as Ligia points out will be discussed in the next section.

However, it is important to acknowledge that the inclusion of the Land Fund and the formalization of land titles can be considered as an attempt at addressing the root cause of the conflict. It is quite remarkable that a distribution plan is part of the accord, and the content of the accord regarding access to land thereby resembles an emancipatory model for civil peace. Antonio from Marcha Patriótica argues that the accord on CRR presents a great opportunity for the country and that the 10 million hectares of the Land Fund and the formalization of land titles are important factors for a comprehensive rural reform and access to land. “We are talking about 20-30 percent of productive land in our country” (my translation) he argues, and emphasizes that this land will be distributed to people in need of land and who lack property titles. Joaquin from ANZORC also highlights that even though the accord CRR does not reflect any more than a reform, as Alice from ONIC pointed out, the inclusion of a Land Fund is ‘profoundly revolutionary for the country’. He explains that many actors from civil society have directed a lot of criticism towards the Land Fund because in their view the three million hectares of land is very little and will not make much difference. But there has never been a Land Fund before, he stresses, and that is something that would not have been part of the Colombian society if it had not been included in the accord on CRR. He concludes that the inclusion of the 10 million hectares of the Land Fund and formalization of land titles, as
well as other elements, such as infrastructure, the peasant sector and food security, can produce an effective change in the rural areas of the country. Antonio from Marcha Patriótica also enthusiastically argues that the achievement of the inclusion of access to land signifies hope for social and political change. He says that the inclusion of the Land Fund is fundamental, and that the accord on CRRs’ emphasis on access to land and the DPTS’s are going to provide for changes in the countryside.

In this regard, the accord on CRR is quite revolutionary due to its inclusion of the topic of access to land, which could generate security for the rural population who lacks land and property titles. It is clear that the inclusion of these plans is an attempt at generating civil peace, where the needs of the rural population have been listened to at the negotiating table. Although the accord on CRR presents processes for distribution of land, it still fails to adequately secure proper redistribution of the concentrated land in the country. Alfonso from CODHES explains that the rural model presented in the accord is good, but it is not complete. The problems of land are so profound and go throughout the history of the country, especially since 45 percent of the most productive land is in the hands of a very small percentage of the population. He argues that the resolutions presented in the accord on CRR cannot respond to the problems, and that one of the main reasons for the flawed resolutions presented in the accord concerns the exclusion of the economic model in the peace negotiations. This argument will be discussed in the next section.

### 7.2.2 Landowners and Transnational Companies

Although the accord on CRR emphasizes access to land, the issue of concentrated land for redistribution and structural transformation was excluded from the accord. Alfonso from CODHES argues that the land in Colombia will not be redistributed through the peace accord because the peace process did not touch upon the neoliberal economic model in the country. He argues that there is a re-registration of land through the formalization of land titles and the Land Fund, but that it does not provide for structural transformation of the rural areas. “It is like a makeup for the current situation! So in reality there is not a politic of redistribution, which could have impacted the politics of the accord in a more positive manner” (my translation). Rodrigo from SAC, the private peasant organization, also emphasizes that the accord on CRR will not change the market oriented economic model Colombia has today, but
stresses that it will provide security and reduce the inequality in the country. It can be observed that the accord on CRR reflects Rodrigo’s point of view, where neoliberal policies for economic development are emphasized as means for conflict resolution and peace in the rural areas, thereby resembling the constitutional form of peace within the liberal peace framework. Several of the CSO representatives interviewed stressed that the economic model for development presented in the accord has to be changed in order to resolve ‘the other conflict’ and provide for positive, lasting peace.

Carla from Asucingo claims that the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development never could have contributed to peace, because the economic model was off limit from the start. As explained in chapter 6, she argues that peace goes through the territories, and that the possibility of creating peace is restricted by the developmental model, which today exploits resources and provide transnational companies and hydroelectric projects access to land, which should have been prioritized to the rural population. This, she argues, generates increased tension between the different sectors that already struggle to claim their rightful land. She stresses that the market-oriented model for development has to be up for discussion in order to create peace in the territories.

‘We say that the national government is not interested in creating peace, because in reality they don’t want to meet the communities or the organizations to discuss the topic of development’ (Carla, my translation).

Alfonso from CODHES also argues that the economic model for market production is going to reduce the food security and the social security, and that the peasant, indigenous and the Afro-Colombian communities should be emphasized as key actors in the economic, social and political construction of the country. Carla stresses that this is not the case in the accord on CRR, and that it is clear that the developmental model will facilitate macro-projects for foreign investments and developmental plans for business. Although the accord on CRR recognize the different rural sectors, especially the small-scale producers and the peasants, it is fair to say that in a country where access to land is so contested and characterized as one of the root causes of conflict, a discussion about how the rural areas will be used and distributed according to the economic model for development, should have been part of the peace process in order to facilitate social justice. It is clear that the establishment of the Land Fund and the formalization of land titles aim at contributing to past injustices, but these plans do
not represent radical rural reform programs for redistribution and resolutions to the root cause of conflict (Nasi, 2018). Therefore, it not surprisingly that the main critique of the accord on CRR, according to the CSO representatives interviewed, is the failure of not including the land of large landowners and transnational companies.

**The Exclusion of the Properties of the Large Landowners**

Paula from Fensuagro claims that Colombia always has had politics for privatization, and her argument refers to one of the general perspectives on land rights, which favors the concentration of land through private property titles as explained in chapter 2. She explains that the huge concentration and privatization of land has historically caused the armed conflicts and therefore has to be redistributed from the private sector to the general population. Alice from ONIC also stresses the exclusion of the concentrated land in the accord on CRR:

“One of the main critique of the accord from Havana is that it never touched upon the topic of the landowners! Never! And it thereby places some of the conflict of access to land between the poor people, between the peasants, the indigenous peoples and the Afro-Colombians. But it was never focused on the land of the landowners, and the very big displacement they have caused, which is the root of the conflict, the cause of why the guerrilla took to the weapons. They did not touch upon that. So, practically, we still have a conflict when it comes to the topic of land distribution between the poor” (Alice, my translation).

Alice’s argument clearly demonstrates that the accord on CRR will not provide the foundation for redistribution to the rural population. Although it is an attempt at addressing the root causes of conflict, it is difficult to see how the accord can provide for social justice and civil peace as long as a small percentage of the population still owns 45 per cent of the most productive land in the country.

Nevertheless, Alfonso claims that the accord could never have included redistribution involving the land of large landowners, who have very close ties to the elites. He believes that the FARC understood the rural situation in the country, and accepted the maximum of what they could expect to achieve in a peace accord. He explains that even this version of the accord on CRR has generated furious resistance from the political class of the large landowners who are not at all interested in any form for redistribution of land or a formalization process of land titles for the general rural population. This, he argues, is
because a lot of the land they possess are due to land robbery of peasants, indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians and that they depend on the weak land rights and flawed legislation for the rural population in order to preserve and expand their accumulation of land. He explains that their agenda is overall against the peace process and that their resistance towards any form of rural transformation is ruthless.

Joaquin from ANZORC also stresses that the large landowners do not want a resolution to ‘the other conflict’ because they already have protection of their land, and that redistribution and formalization of land titles only would limit their possibilities of land possession. The resistance towards the peace accord was clearly demonstrated when the political opposition, with former president Uribe in the front run, managed to change the political discourse of the peace accord, which ultimately led to its rejection in the referendum a week after it was first signed by the parties, as explained in chapter 5. It is important to acknowledge that even though the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance of an emancipatory peace approach for social justice and civil peace, the rural reality in Colombia is extremely complex and diverse, and an attempt at creating a foundation for proper civil peace would probably never have reached any settlement.

The Pressure of the Global Market

In the long term, most of the CSO representatives interviewed stressed the need to change the national politics regarding economic development in order to secure access to land and to provide structural transformation in the countryside. Alfonso from CODHES claims that the insertion of Colombia into the global market has generated enormous pressure on the already contested rural areas. First the situation of the large landowners, and now the situation of the transnational food companies, the mining industry and the energy companies, he explains, has generated super projects which have dispossessed vulnerable families and peasants of their land. The reasons of conflict are not only the armed war between different groups, but now also because of structural inequality due to macro projects that strip the land of the rural small-scale peasants. The conflicted domestic situation is produced by inequality and the global pressure for production, he argues.

Carla from Asucingo also stresses that this sort of economic development, which was never up for discussion throughout the peace process and therefore not restricted in the accord on
CRR, will not provide any guarantee for the rural communities and is not directed towards securing the small producers. In her view, the accord on CRR is in favor of the big agro-businesses and the transnational companies. Paula from Fensuagro explains that the formalization of land titles is extremely important in the accord on CRR, but that one of the greatest problems that the peasants face today is the discrimination of land in favor of the multinational companies, the exploitation of mines, petroleum, and the construction of hydroelectric projects. She also points out that it was not possible for the FARC to target this reality in the peace negotiations with the government, but that it is necessary to address in order to resolve the rural issues.

Antonio from Marcha Patriótica argues that even though Colombia has had liberal policies for decades, the territorial pressure has increased due to broader neoliberal economic openings in recent times. He explains that the laws and legislations has provided the peasants with a lot of rights that they did not have before, but that they also have opened the door for the multinationals. Today, these interests are very strong and have a lot of power in terms of influencing decision-making processes, he argues, and stresses that while president Santos negotiated the peace accord in Havana in 2016, the Congress past the Zideres Law. The decision to pass this law, which permits the State to grant unoccupied land to companies, as explained in chapter 2, is highly provocative to all of the CSO who participated in the forum and proposed a comprehensive redistribution of land in order to guarantee the rights of peasants, indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians, and resolve the contested rural conflict. It is fair to say that the government's decision to not including even a discussion about the transnational companies in the peace process while at the same time passing a new law which permits an even stronger presents of these companies in the rural areas does not reflect an emancipatory approach to peace. It rather reflects a top-down approach with little regard for the everyday life and needs of the peasants and the ethnic groups.

Joaquin argues that it was a serious mistake to not include the topic of the transnational companies in the peace accord on CRR, and to have a peace accord and legislations that permits these companies access to the baldíos. He frustratingly explains some of the devastating consequences of these policies, and emphasizes that parts of the rural population cannot drink the water of the rivers they have consumed for centuries, because today they are filled with chemicals.
“That is happening in all the territories; in the indigenous communities, in the Afro-Colombian communities and in the peasant communities. They consume the water that comes from the mines. That is very serious and it is happening all over Colombia, and still it is like nothing is happening! A lot of the land also turns into deserts. In the indigenous communities, there is no water. It's a desert!” (Joaquin, my translation).

Carla from Asucingo also explains that in their municipality, companies have flooded thousands of hectares of the most productive land, leaving the rural population without access to land and with limited opportunities to cultivate for production.

“So I have seen people fighting for an agrarian reform, the people fought to have their land, and the state took it away to submit it to the transnational companies. That is what is happening here. So, we think that there is no access or guarantees for land for the peasants. All to the contrary. Those few that have access to land are stripping away land for the developmental politic of the national government” (Carla, my translation).

She further argues that the DPTS in the accord on CRR should have included a section about how land in the rural territories is given away to the transnational companies. She stresses that this creates uncertainty and is one of the biggest worries of the peasants.

“The government is not concerned about land in the first part of the accord, not for the interests or the necessity of the people and the peasants, no, to the contrary, taking a big step towards a business development” (Carla, my translation).

Ligia from PCN also argue that the accord on CRR strengthens the view of land as a tradable resource, making it into a commodity, something that can be bought and transformed. She claims that they do not have a peace accord regarding comprehensive rural reform, but rather an accord that favors politics that merchandises land. From this point of view, the peace accord on CRR reflects a constitutional foundation for peace, where the liberal peace agenda still influence the belief in economic development for conflict resolution and peace in Colombia.

The accord on CRR emphasizes the principle of “structural transformation: that is to say, the transformation of the rural reality, through fairness, equality and democracy” (The Colombian government and the FARC, 2017, p. 12). Several of the CSO representatives interviewed argue that this is not the case. The peace accord seems to facilitates affirmative transformation though development plans, the Land Fund and the formalization of land titles, but it is difficult to see how the accord on CRR emphasizes structural transformation when
the accord excludes the concentrated land of the large landowners and the transnational companies. Structural transformation of the rural areas would rather entail proper redistribution of concentrated land in order to address the root cause of the conflict. The accord on CRR provides many important elements, such as technical assistance, credit, substitution, access to land and formalization of titles. However, the unequal structures regarding access to land and the unequal rights and recognition that entails, seems yet to be resolved. The heart of the conflict and one of the root causes of the devastating humanitarian situation remains an issue in the everyday lives of peasants and ethnic groups. Their voices have been included, but not emphasized adequately for the peace accord on CRR to provide the foundation for positive, lasting peace by addressing the root cause of conflict. Antonio (my translation) from Marcha Patriótica concludes: “the politics over land will lead to another type of war. If we don't reach a resolution, we will return to the beginning of what was the armed conflict”.

Summarizing Redistribution for Resolution to The Root Cause of Conflict

The content of the accord on CRR aims at addressing the root cause of conflict by providing plans for distribution through the Land Fund and the formalization of land titles. This seems to be a response to the peasant and ethnic groups’ demands for access to land which can provide rural population who lacks land or do not have sufficient land security and stability. As such, the content of the accord reflects the proposal from local actors, which thereby resembles the emancipatory model for civil peace. However, the economic model was never up for discussion, and the peace accord on CRR excludes the concentrated land of the landowners and transnational companies. It is therefore difficult to argue that the accord on CRR will provide the foundation for redistribution for social justice and civil peace. The heart of the conflict lies in the contested unequal access to land due to large concentrations of land in the hands of a small percent of the population. The affirmative means presented in the accord for access to land do not seem to provide for structural transformation necessary to properly address this issue. The accord rather reflects an attempt at combining the two opposite perspectives regarding land rights in the country, and thereby resembles Law 160 of 1994. The neoliberal policies have not been restricted in the accord, and it fails to address what kind of development the territories should provide for. In this regard, the accord on CRR reflects a top-down constitutional peace where development rest upon neoliberal policies that most of the CSO representatives interviewed argued would generate more
pressure on the ‘other conflict’, and prevent the foundation for positive, lasting peace in the rural areas of Colombia.
8 Conclusions

The aim of this thesis has been to investigate whether the Colombian Peace Accord on CRR provides a new and different approach to peace building, a bottom-up approach addressing local consent and social justice. The accord on CRR addresses issues regarding access to land and development, which have been at the heart of the conflict for decades. In order to investigate this case, I applied qualitative methods and carried out fieldwork in Bogotá. I conducted semi-structured interviews with various representatives from civil society organizations in order to develop an understanding about their role in the peace process and how they view the content of the accord on CRR in regard to what it entails for the rural population. I have employed an emancipatory model for civil peace as the main analytic framework, where the three dimensions of social justice (representation, recognition and redistribution) have been applied as the main pillars for analysis.

Studying CSO Participation in Peace Negotiations

The research has been two-folded: one part investigated the mechanism established for the participation of civil society; the other compared the proposals from the civil society organizations to the content of the peace accord on CRR.

There were three participation mechanisms put in place to include civil society: proposals through a website, inclusion of experts at the negotiating table and the National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development. The forum was established as the main mechanism and was organized by UNDP and UNAL with the aim of ensuring local ownership and broad representation of civil society in the process. The inclusion of civil society has also been emphasized as important in order to avoid misrepresentation of the FARC as the main representative of civil society in the negotiating process. In many ways, the forum functioned as an informative invited space for the rural sectors participating, where a broad variety of actors and representatives could discuss and present their proposals. The establishment of the forum seems like an attempt at including an emancipatory model for peace building in the peace process of the accord on CRR. However, several CSO representatives interviewed, especially the ethnic groups, questioned the legitimacy of actor representation and expressed distrust in the process due to misrepresentation. Although most of the proposals from the
forum were sent to the negotiating table in Havana, various CSO representatives expressed that the indirect form for participation though the forum was not an adequately sufficient participation mechanism to facilitate inclusion and gain influence in the content of the peace accord. The National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development seems to function more as a consultation mechanism rather than a bottom-up participation mechanism for civil society in the process, and the peace building approach therefore resembles an orthodox approach to peace. I found that the most efficient way for inclusion was bottom-up direct action through mobilization and claimed space. This was however not a mechanism facilitated by the parties at the negotiating table, but rather through broad mobilization of ethnic groups in the demand for direct participation.

The main categories of proposals sent to the negotiating table from civil society organizations interviewed were: comprehensive rural development, Peasants Reserved Zones, intercultural territories and comprehensive rural reform through redistribution and access to land. Most of the CSOs representatives also emphasized the necessity for a discussion about the economic model, and how rural areas should be used in regards to development policies. However, it was clear from the start that the economic model characterized by neoliberal policies for development was not up for discussion.

The accord on CRR emphasized several of the proposals from the peasants: elements such as housing, technical assistance, credit, substitution and the market are part of the accord. The coexistence of small-scale peasants, medium producers and large producers have been highlighted several times in the accord, and productivity for development is included several places. In this regard, various of the peasants’ proposals also relate to the neoliberal policies of the state, and the content of the accord resembles civil peace with concern for local consent and recognition of the peasants’ needs, with resolutions to rural problems through neoliberal policies. The content provides a combination of the two opposed perspectives regarding land rights and development: one that recognizes the small-scale peasants’ rights to land, and the other that favors the large producers. In this regard, the accord also reflects Law 160 of year 1994. The inclusion of the peasant’s main proposal - the Peasant Reserved Zones (PRZs) - provides recognition of the peasants’ right to land and promotes the peasant economy. Although the PRZs already are part of Law 160 of 1994, it is a very important recognition of the peasants considering the slow implementation and the stigmatization of these areas. The inclusion of this proposal reflects a civil peace with recognition of the
realities on the ground and the peasants’ needs and wishes. The experiences of the ethnic groups were however quite different, as their main proposals regarding intercultural territories were excluded. According to the ethnic organizations interviewed, the accord on CRR also fails to address the historic struggle, culture and identity of the ethnic groups, and thereby reflects a constitutional peace with little regards for the rural realities. Nevertheless, the ethnic groups managed to incorporate a special chapter in the final peace accord, in the last part regarding the issue of implementation. They therefore expressed that they have been recognized in the final peace accord, which resembles a hybrid form of peace, but not in the accord on CRR.

Most of the CSO representatives interviewed emphasized the need for redistribution and structural transformation of the rural areas in order to provide the foundation for positive, lasting peace. The content of the accord includes the PRZs, the Land Fund and formalization of land titles as responses to these demands from the rural population. The inclusion of a plan for distribution of land and a formalization process reflects an attempt at civil peace and is an innovative framework in the peace accord and quite revolutionary in respect to the content of a peace accord. The response to the rural populations’ need for access to land reflects a new peace building approach which emphasis the concern for social justice and people's’ needs.

Although the inclusion of these elements in itself reflects a new and different approach to peace building, the elements do not provide radical transformation of the rural areas. The accord on CRR failed to touch upon the concentrated land of the large landowners and transnational companies, and redistribution to resolve unequal access to land is therefore not included. The content of the accord seems to provide affirmative transformation, much like The Victims Law, rather than structural transformation for positive, lasting peace. The content regarding access to land therefore resembles a constitutional peace, where top-down decisions have been made in terms of neoliberal development. In a context where the issue of land is so contested, and neoliberal policies generate more pressure on the rural areas, the decision to exclude a discussion about what kind of development the rural areas should provide for does not resemble an emancipatory approach to civil peace. The unequal access to land as the root cause of conflict seems yet to be resolved through the affirmative transformations the accord on CRR provides – not through structural transformation of the concentrated land for socioeconomic equality and positive, lasting peace.
Implications

The findings of this thesis bear important implications for a number of issues. CSO representatives and experts referred to in this thesis express that direct participation of civil society in a peace negotiation is a more efficient way to include proposals from local actors, by linking the negotiating parties with the realities on the ground. Although the established participation mechanism of the forum was an innovative mechanism that facilitated participation of a broad range of actors in the process and the inclusion of various proposal in the accord, the direct participation of the ethnic groups proved to be more efficient in terms of adjustments in the accord. Although the peasants have been recognized more in the accord on CRR than the ethnic groups, the effect of the ethnic groups’ achievement to scale jump and present their proposals directly at the negotiating table had a huge modifying effect. They managed to share their proposals directly with the negotiating parties, which ultimately resulted in an incorporation of a special chapter pertaining directly to ethnic groups in Colombia. This seems to also be evident in the accord on Victims, where 48 victims presented their proposals directly to the negotiating table.

Although the organization of such mechanisms might be more time-consuming and logistically challenging, direct forms of participation might also provide for better representation and stronger local ownership to the process and the final result. Several of the CSO representatives interviewed explained that they had to do everything in their power to be listened to by the parties at the negotiating table, which seemed to result in distrust and frustration with the whole process. Perhaps the peace building process would ultimately have benefited from a stronger presence of civil society actors directly involved in the decision-making process, generating local ownership, representation and greater faith in the process. The lack of local ownership of the process may also have affected the outcome of the referendum, as the process of the peace accord felt distant and external to many Colombians. A stronger emphasis on direct involvement of civil society could possibly have generated a better outcome for the negotiating parties as well.

As mentioned, the accord on CRR includes a range of very important elements as mentioned. One of the key factors for the exclusion of the concentrated land was the resistance from influential landowners with close ties to elites and right-wing politicians. The opposition to the peace process, led by former president Uribe, has generated furies resistance even to this
peace accord on CRR. To create a peace accord that includes radical reforms towards structural transformations in the rural areas would at the time of the peace process have been utopian, or at least it would never have reached a settlement. The agenda of right-wing politicians and landowners does not involve increased access and use of land to the rural population, all to the contrary, and their voices have astonishing power in political decision-making. The complexity of interests and agendas regarding the rural areas in Colombia generates contexts where the agrarian question will remain contested, as it has been for decades.

Considering this context, the possibility of creating a new and different alternative approach to peace building, a bottom-up approach with strong concern for local consent, local ownership and social justice, is quite limited. The Colombian peace accord on CRR does in many ways reflect an attempt at facilitating a new approach to peace, which is rather significant in regard to the rural and political context. The establishment of the forum for participation of civil society, the creation of the Land Fund, the formalization of land titles and the inclusion of PRZs do reflect innovative frameworks in the peace accord on CRR. The process of making the accord on CRR and its content do therefore in several aspects resemble an alternative approach to peace building with stronger concern for bottom-up participation and local input than other peace building projects in recent times. However, it is difficult to see how the accord on CRR may provide positive, lasting peace when the heart of the conflict still remains an issue. It is also important to acknowledge that the final peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC does not represent a complete peace. The guerrilla group ELN has not been involved in the negotiations, and other illegal groups and criminal gangs are highly active in the country. The foundation to peace building in the peace accord therefore reflects an agreement between two of the parties in the conflict, while there is still ongoing conflict between the state and other groups.

**Further Research**

In relation to the peace process in Colombia and approaches to peace building, there are various issues that ought to be explored, both in regard to the final peace accord, the peace processes in Colombia and the study of peace building within Human Geography.
Concerning the final peace accord, it would be interesting to investigate other agenda issues. Particularly he issue on political participation, which is also identified as one of the root causes of the conflict. Has the CSOs experiences the process and content differently than the one regarding CRR? It would also have been useful to examine the other mechanisms established for civil society participation in order to develop a deeper understanding of the proposals in respect to the content of the accord.

In the topic of bottom-up peace building approaches, an important aspect that would be interesting to research is how the ethnic groups managed to incorporate a special chapter in the final peace accord. What strategies did they emply in order to scale jump from the forum to the negotiating table? How did they cooperate and mobilize in such a broad manner? How was the experience of participating at the negotiating table in Havana?

There have been several civil society networks and initiatives emerging through the peace process in Colombia. Cumbre Agraria, a network of peasant organizations and movements initiated after the Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development, is one example. Networks and initiatives such as Cumbre Agraria would also be interesting to investigate in order to develop a deeper understanding of how they mobilize and generate pressure towards the government to uphold laws, legislations and elements in the peace accord with respect to the implementation process.

Bottom-up peace building is also highly relevant for research within the discipline of Human Geography in terms of decision-makings processes, scalar strategies, spaces for participation and local agency. There is much potential for research regarding the topics of peace building and peace negotiations within the discipline of Human Geography. Discussions regarding ‘the local’ and locality of peace building approaches have received greater attention in academic circles and the international community in recent years. Research focusing on the aspect of locality in alternative peace building approaches offers an interesting entry-point.
Bibliography


Castree, N., Kitchin, R., & Rogers, A. Dictionary of Human Geography. Oxford University Press. 61


Mohan, G. 2007. Participatory development. From epistemological reversals to active citizenship. *Geography Compass*. 1, 4. 779-796

National University of Colombia. 2012. Sistematización propuestas de ciudadanía. Available at: https://issuu.com/manuelpaz69/stacks/e535d67f2bd54fffd9bcfe77177ca33fe


Sales, M. 2013. What is a rural peasant reserve zone? *Colombia Reports*. Available at: https://colombiareports.com/what-is-a-rural-peasant-reserve-zone/


Zambrano, L, Gómez Isa, F. Participation of civil society in the Colombian peace process. *NOREF report*. Available at: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/166561/ab5b7f705279f72c3dee76a00eafdfda.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/166561/ab5b7f705279f72c3dee76a00eafdfda.pdf)
Appendix 1

Organizations and Representatives Interviewed

All interviews were conducted between 25th of August 2017 and 25th of October 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of organization</th>
<th>Short description</th>
<th>Informant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANZORC</td>
<td>National Organization for the Peasants Reserved Zones. Agenda is to implement Law 160, to secure peasants access to land, distribute territories, and provide sustainable development and recognition of peasants’ economy.</td>
<td>The informant is one of leading figures in the organization and has been part of the organization for more than 20 years. He is referred to as Joaquin in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Peasant Organization of Rio Sinitarre</td>
<td>A local organization in North Oriente in Colombia. Is one of the organizations in ANZORC and has approximately the same agenda.</td>
<td>The informant is the local delegate in ANZORC, and has been part of the organization for more than 10 years. He is referred to as David in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONIC</td>
<td>National Organization for Indigenous Peoples in Colombia. Agenda aims to defend the rights of indigenous peoples in regard to their diversity, especially in terms of land rights.</td>
<td>The informant has been an lawyer for the indigenous people since 2007. Has been an advisor in regards to the issue of land for 10 years, and previously worked with issues regarding gender and peace. She is referred to as Alice in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANUC</td>
<td>National Organisation for Peasant Users in Colombia. Agenda is to promote a comprehensive rural reform and access to land for the peasants.</td>
<td>The informant has been part of the organization for 45 years, and is one of the leaders. He is referred to as Eduardo in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODHES</td>
<td>Advisory Board for Human Rights and Displacement. The organization monitors social processes, especially in regards to displacement. Has closes tied to academia and provides expertise in the topics.</td>
<td>The informant is one of the leaders for two commissions: the topic of international relations and the topic of ethnic groups. He has been part of the organization for 7 years, and is referred to as Alfonso in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fensuagro</td>
<td>National federation of Agricultural Workers. Is a union-based peasant organization. Agenda is to promote a comprehensive agrarian reform and secure workers and peasants’ rights.</td>
<td>The informant is an office manager who primarily works with the political agenda of the organization. Has been part of the organization for 21 years and she will be referred to as Paula in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcha Patriótica</td>
<td>One of the leading social movements in Colombia. The agenda is to find a structural resolution to the political, economic and social issues in Colombia.</td>
<td>The informant is on the national board committee and has been part of the movements for 19 years. He will be referred to as Antonio in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>Process of Afro-Colombian communities. The agenda is to protect Afro-Colombians territories, their cultural and ancestral identities and civil rights.</td>
<td>The informant is one of national coordinators who primarily work with the implementation of the peace accord in regards to Afro-Colombians’ rights. She has been part of the organization since 2012, and will be referred to as Ligia in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Informant Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asucingo</td>
<td>Local organization for those affected by hydroelectric projects in the department of Huila. Agenda is to defend territories and inform about consequences of mega projects.</td>
<td>The informant one of the coordinators and has been part of the organization for 10 years. She will be referred to as Carla in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Agricultural Society of Colombia. Leading private organization for agriculture. The agenda is comprehensive development.</td>
<td>The informant is one of leaders in the organization and was appointed in 2017. He has the responsibility of civil society and will be referred to as Rodrigo in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>National Agrarian Coordinator. The agenda is to promote the recognition of peasants and a structural change of the rural areas.</td>
<td>The informant is one of the national delegates in the organization and also a spokesman for the organization Congreso de los Pueblos. She will be referred to as Ana Maria in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM</td>
<td>Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres. Agenda to promote women's rights, especially the ones affected by the conflict.</td>
<td>The informant is a regional coordinator who has been part of the organization for 7 years. She will be referred to as Claudia in this thesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2

Invitation to participate in the research project (in Spanish)

INVITACIÓN AL PROYECTO DE INVESTIGACIÓN

El primer punto del acuerdo final.
Una investigación sobre el énfasis del participación local y paz civil.

Objetivo

El propósito del estudio es investigar el modelo de desarrollo que surge a partir del primer punto del acuerdo final del proceso de paz en Colombia y cómo las organizaciones de la sociedad civil han participado en el proceso.

Desarrollaremos un análisis sobre si las organizaciones campesinas, indígenas y afro descendiente se sienten incluidos en el proceso del diseño del primer punto sobre las reformas integrales y reformas políticas del desarrollo rural que se presenta en el acuerdo final y si los intereses de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil se consideran reflejados en el acuerdo final.

Ahora bien, también abordaremos en la investigación el papel de Noruega en cuanto sus posturas y la forma en que ellos buscaron la inclusión de la sociedad civil colombiana en el primer punto del acuerdo.

¿Qué implica la participación en el proyecto?

La investigación es parte de mi proyecto de maestría en la Universidad de Oslo, Noruega. Estoy buscando personas que son parte de organizaciones de la sociedad civil que han participado en las mesas regionales de trabajo y en el foro de política de desarrollo integral rural en 2012, y que han entregado sus propuestas a las negociaciones entre el gobierno y FARC en La Habana.

La investigación se basará en entrevistas con participantes y análisis del documento. Las preguntas tratarán temas de la agenda política, la misión y visión del organización, y cómo la organización entiende el concepto de desarrollo, participación, servicios sociales y la producción de alimentos.

Además, habrá preguntas sobre la participación de la organización en el proceso del primer punto del acuerdo, y sobre el resultado del acuerdo final. Las entrevistas serán registradas con grabaciones de sonido y notas previo consentimiento del participante.
¿Qué pasa con la información?

Toda la información personal será tratada confidencialmente. Solo yo y mi supervisora tendremos acceso a la información personal y los datos recogidos para la investigación. Todos los participantes serán anónimos.

El proyecto terminará en junio 2018, tiempo en el cual la información personal y la grabación de sonido serán borrados.

**Participación voluntaria**

La participación en el proyecto es voluntaria, y los participantes pueden retirarse cuando lo deseen. Si usted se retira, toda la información personal será borrada.

Si usted tiene preguntas sobre el proyecto, por favor ponerse en contacto con Silje Syvertsen (celular: 300 6407426 correo electrónico: siljesyv@gmail.com) o mi supervisora de tesis, Profesora Asociada Jemima García-Godos, Universidad de Oslo (celular: +47 48216138).

Esta investigación está registrada en el Centro Noruego de Datos de Investigación Académica.

**Consentimiento para participar en el estudio:**

Yo he recibido la información sobre el proyecto, y quiero participar

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Firma del participante, fecha)
Appendix 3

Interview Guide/Schedule

Questions regarding the organization
- What is the name of the organization you represent?
  - In what parts of the country (which departments) is the organization active, and does it operate nationally?
  - Are other organizations connected to the organization, or do you have alliances with other organizations?
- Which individuals make up the majority of your organization? (campesinos, afro, indigenous, activists?) Other groups’ part of the organization?
- Can you give a short description of the most important principles in your political agenda?
- Can you give a short introduction of your participation in the organization? (which role do you have in the organization)
- For how long have you been part of the organization?

The political agenda
- What are your organizations principles for access to land?
- Does your organization use the term “rural development” in your political agenda? (if relevant)
- What are the organizations principles for participation? (if relevant)
- What are the organizations principles for food production? (if relevant)
- What are the organizations principles for social services? (Health, school, access to water, infrastructure)

The National Forum on Comprehensive Rural Development
- In which forums did your organization participate in 2012?
- How many representatives from your organization participated in the forums?
- Can you give a short description of the process for participation? (How you were invited, how many representative allowed etc.)
- Did you feel included in the process before the proposals were sent to Havana?
- How was your proposals organized in the forum? (the process of different mesas, which mesas, what themes?)
- What were your main proposals?
- Did you feel that you your proposals were included in the forum, and in the proposals that were sent to Habana?
- Have your organization been involved in other forums for making proposals to Havana about the first accord after 2012?

The content of the final accord on CRR
- How do you perceive the description of the model for rural development presented in the final peace accord?
- Some of the main principles in the accord described access to land (land fund, formalization, PRZs) social services and food production. How do you perceive the description of these principles in the accord?
- How are the proposals from the forums reflected in the final peace accord, including the proposals from your organization?
  - If yes, what propositions are reflected, in what way?
  - If no, why not?
- Are there any proposals in particular that has not been included in the accord, but that you wish were? (Lacks in the accord)
- Do you perceive that your organizations mission and vision about rural development is reflected in the accord?
- How does your organization feel recognized in the first accord on CRR?
- How do you think that demands from different parts of the civil society in Colombia have been included in the accord?
- How can the accord differ from earlier rural reforms (ley)?

Implementation (if relevant)
- What do you think about the implementations process of the first accord?
- How do you experience the situation in rural parts of the country today?
- How can the peace accord on CRR contribute to improvements for farmers, indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians?