Cumulative extremism: a misguided narrative?

Comparing interactions between anti-Islamists and radical Islamists in Norway and the UK

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Abstract
Recently, scholars, policy-makers and experts have applied the term cumulative extremism to describe an escalating conflict between radical Islamist and anti-Islamist groups in Britain. This thesis aims at reaching a more nuanced understanding of the interactions between the two adversary groups, identifying the underlying processes that drive the relationship. I propose an alternative concept to cumulative extremism that I have coined Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation (RIR) that I argue better captures the interactions between the adversary groups.

The research question asks which mechanisms fuel or contain reciprocal intergroup radicalisation (RIR), and what conditions facilitate or obstruct these mechanisms from unfolding. Drawing from the social movement literature, I have developed a theoretical framework consisting of six mechanisms that either fuel or contain radicalisation of interactions between anti-Islamists and radical Islamists.

I have combined a comparative analysis with process tracing, with Britain serving as a positive case and Norway as a negative case. Similar anti-Islamist and radical Islamist social movement organisations emerged around the same time in Britain and Norway, yet no violent interactions occurred in the latter case. The aim is therefore to understand this discrepancy. I collected a wide-ranging source material through document analysis and combined these sources with four semi-structured expert interviews. In the analysis, I demonstrate that the level of RIR is conditioned by a number of mechanisms that all interact together. I found that the level of repression, the absence of a radical right party, organisational strength, the organisations’ enemy images, and the narrative of the media all impact RIR to some extent. These findings have important implications for how law enforcement, the media, and policy-makers should approach the two opposing groups in order to avoid counter-productive measures that fuel rather than contain the conflict.
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<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>Cumulative Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDL</td>
<td>The English Defence League</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>NDL</td>
<td>The Norwegian Defence League</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>PEGIDA</td>
<td>Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident</td>
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<td>RIR</td>
<td>Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation</td>
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<td>SIAN</td>
<td>Stop Islamisation of Norway</td>
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<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social Movement Organisation</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

On the afternoon 22nd of May 2013, two radical Islamists assassinated the soldier Lee Rigby on the streets of Woolwich, Britain. The perpetrators remained on the scene, broadcasting to a bystander how the murder was political, intending to avenge British foreign policy in the Middle East (Sky News, 2013). The terror incident sparked flames to an already tense situation between anti-Islamists and radical Islamists in Britain, leading to numerous anti-Islamist protests and a spike in reported hate crimes against Muslims (Feldman & Littler, 2014). The murder of Lee Rigby and the turmoil that followed stand out as key symbolic events of what seemed to be a spiralling conflict between radical Islamist and anti-Islamist groups in Britain. Fiyaz Mughal from the organisation Tell MAMA, who measures anti-Muslim attacks, described the situation as: “These things are cumulative and I do not see an end to this cycle of violence” (The Guardian, 2013c).

Policymakers, scholars, and experts are concerned that anti-Islamist and radical-Islamist groups are engaging in what Eatwell (2006) has called Cumulative Extremism (CE). CE describes a process where two extremist animosities fuel each other, subsequently leading to spirals of violence (Eatwell, 2006, p. 213). Said differently, the underlying logic behind CE is how the actions by one side can be used as a legitimising force for actions taken by the other side (Ebner, 2017, p. 197).

There have been several publications supporting the claim that CE is indeed a real phenomenon and that we are witnessing inevitable spirals of violence unfolding on the streets of Britain and other European countries. Feldman (2012, p. 3) argues that Huntington’s (1993) Clash of Civilizations has become a self-fulfilling prophecy fuelled by the two adversary groups. Julia Ebner’s (2017) research has uncovered “reciprocal radicalisation hotbeds” in France, Britain, the US, and Germany – areas where radical Islamist and anti-Islamist organisations engage in tit-for-tat violence. Tell MAMA (2014) published a report claiming that CE occurred following the murder of Lee Rigby, showing to the sharp rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes – both online and offline. These are just a few examples where CE is used to describe the increasingly violent interactions between the two groups in recent years.
On the other hand, there is a concern that CE is becoming an all-encompassing term. Macklin and Busher (2015, p. 54) warn against fronting the narrative of CE as an inevitable process as it could, at worst, result in counter-productive policies, fuelling rather than curtailing such conflicts. In that regard, Busher and Macklin (2015) call for conceptual clarifications to establish a common framework for how we understand and analyse cumulative extremism. Are radical actions the same as radical thoughts? Do lone actors constitute a part of cumulative extremism? And are spikes of interactions noticeable, even if it falls short of accumulation? To put it differently, can we equate a ‘keyboard warrior’ with someone affiliated with a street movement and who commits violent acts?

Furthermore, Busher and Macklin (2015) advocate for research on cases with negative outcomes of cumulative extremism in addition to positive cases. Norway is a clear example of such a negative case. Similar to Britain, Norway also experienced an increase in both anti-Islamist groups (Norwegian Defence League, Stopp Islamiseringen Av Norge, and Patriotic Europeans Against The Islamisation of the Occident) as well as radical Islamist groups (Profetens Ummah). Notably, the NDL and Profetens Ummah belonged to the same transnational networks as its British counterparts, and they mobilised during the same period – from 2009 to 2015. However, whereas the interactions between the British groups were violent and at times lethal, there were little if any observed interactions between the two Norwegian adversaries during this same period. How can we explain this discrepancy?

1.1. Research design

In order to address the issues outlined above, I seek to develop a research design where I compare one positive and one negative case of cumulative extremism, namely Britain and Norway. As a first step, I apply an alternative concept to cumulative extremism that I have coined Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation (RIR), explained more in detail further below. RIR captures three crucial components that the term cumulative extremism leaves unclear. First, reciprocal defines it as a reactive form of violence, meaning that the actions taken by one side is intended to spark a reaction by the other side, and vice versa. Second, intergroup sets the scope of analysis to the organisational level, thus excluding civilians unaffiliated with any organisations. Third, radicalisation enables for a more dynamic flow of interactions than extremism, as non-violent groups may or may not become violent. Bearing this in mind, the thesis aims at investigating the following research question:

*Which causal mechanisms fuel or contain reciprocal intergroup radicalisation, and what conditions facilitate or obstruct these mechanisms from unfolding?*
My goal is to fill a knowledge gap through obtaining a more nuanced understanding of the interactions we are observing between the anti-Islamist and the radical Islamist groups, identifying the underlying processes that drive this relationship. Mapping and understanding these processes will also have practical implications for law enforcement and policy-makers. Through understanding the nature of this potential ‘spiral of violence’, we can avoid counter-productive measures, and perhaps even stop it from spiralling out of control.

Scope limitations are necessary within the framework of a master thesis. My analysis is centred on the period between 2009 and 2015. This was a period where two adversary social movement organisations (SMOs) were active on the streets in both Britain and Norway. In Britain, the English Defence League (EDL) had a massive street-success and repeatedly engaged in violent confrontations with its radical Islamist counterpart, the Bakri Network (traditionally referred to as Al-Muhajiroun). In Norway, I have chosen the two equivalents of its British counterparts, namely the Norwegian Defence League (NDL) and Profetens Ummah. All four organisations ceased or severely limited their street activism in 2015, and this year thus marks the end point of my analysis.

There are several theoretical approaches in which one can analyse the interactions between these groups, including social psychology, terrorism studies and social movement theory. Of these, I find the social movement literature to be the most conducive to explain RIR – or the lack thereof. In the social movement literature, violence is not treated as something unique or separate, but rather as one of several repertoires of actions. Violence is a relational and evolving process that has the potential of escalating through repeated interactions (della Porta, 2013). In other words, I consider RIR to be a process rather than a light switch that is turned on or off. In order to track the interactions between the groups in Britain and Norway, I have selected six structural conditions that are solidly anchored in the social movement literature. Each of these conditions activates different processes, referred to as mechanisms, which subsequently fuel or contain RIR.

I aim to investigate these mechanisms through the method referred to as process tracing, which gives the potential for a detailed and historical account of how the relationship between the groups unfolded during the period analysed. As process tracing is a time-consuming process, I found it useful to combine with a comparative approach, analysing no more than two cases. Additionally, there are no existing datasets that could be used to study RIR quantitatively. Therefore, I regard the comparative approach combined with process tracing as a suitable intermediary step catering both to depth and to width.
1.2. Key findings and implications

In the analysis, I will show that all but one of the investigated mechanisms appears to have an impact on RIR between the adversary groups in Britain and Norway – albeit in varying degrees. My main finding concerns the presence of a strong, competent leader and a share of militant activists willing and able to engage in violence. Another important finding is that if the groups regard each other as main enemies, we see more frequent counter-demonstrations and adaptations, which subsequently fuels RIR. Next, I will show how harsh police repression leads the groups to move underground where they radicalise further. My findings also indicate that the absence of an influential radical right party strengthens the demand and opportunity for anti-Islamist street movements, which in turn fuels RIR. The two conditions related to the role of the media exhibit contrasting results. On the one hand, we see that if the media elevates the groups, providing them with a public platform to communicate their message to potential recruits and adversaries, RIR would escalate. On the other hand, I do not find a link between the media echoing the “cumulative extremism narrative” and an increase in RIR. Instead, I found the framing by the media to be independent of the actual situation on the ground between the adversary groups.

Taken together, my findings indicate that in order to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the processes affecting RIR, we need to analyse the phenomenon from different entry points. This includes the internal working of the SMOs, the relations between them, as well as the impact of external actors. Last, I found that no mechanism alone could explain RIR. Instead, it is the combination of these and how they interact that is key. As the mechanisms are identified from the social movement literature, these findings are not necessarily exclusively valid for Britain and Norway. Indeed, they can be tested in other countries and between other adversary groups as well.

1.3. Disposition of the thesis

The thesis consists of six chapters. In chapter two, I show how the social movement literature can be applied to RIR before detailing the conditions and mechanisms I have selected for further investigation. In chapter three, I present a roadmap of which methods and data I have used, including the comparative approach, process tracing, document analysis and semi-structured interviews. Chapter four is the background chapter, where I describe the four different SMOs in Britain and Norway. This chapter is also used to demonstrate the different observed levels of RIR in each case. In the analysis chapter, I trace the different mechanisms
in the two countries, demonstrating how they have affected the interactions between the two adversaries. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I discuss the strengths and limitations of my findings as well as their theoretical and practical implications.
Chapter 2

Theoretical framework

The theory chapter is roughly divided into three sections. The first section elaborates on the concept of Cumulative Extremism (CE). As CE is a novel concept amongst researchers and policymakers, some of its conceptual shortcomings will be discussed. Following this discussion, I will introduce and operationalise a new concept that I believe more accurately describes the interactions between radical Islamists and anti-Islamists, namely Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation (RIR). In the second section, I will present concepts and ideas from the social movement literature that can facilitate our understanding of RIR.

In the third and last section, I introduce the conditions and related mechanisms that facilitate or constrain RIR in Britain and Norway. These conditions and mechanisms will serve as the guiding framework for my empirical analysis.

2.1. Cumulative extremism and its conceptual shortcomings

As stated in the introduction, policymakers, scholars, and practitioners are concerned that anti-Islamist and radical-Islamist groups are engaging in what Eatwell (2006) has termed Cumulative Extremism (CE). Recall that Eatwell (2006, p. 213) described CE as a process where two extremist animosities fuel each other. During the last few years, a number of publications have supported the claim that CE is a real phenomenon occurring between radical Islamists and anti-Islamists (See Ebner, 2017; Feldman, 2012; Feldman & Littler, 2014). CE is also referred to as cumulative radicalisation (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013), tit-for-tat radicalisation (Jackson & Feldman, 2011), and reciprocal radicalisation (Taylor, Currie, & Holbrook, 2013).

However, Macklin and Busher (2015, p. 54) problematise how CE is frequently presented as an inevitable process. Such frames can lead to risk-inflated policies that have counter-productive effects, fuelling rather than containing the conflict. The authors thus warn against applying CE indiscriminately before further conceptual clarifications, and propose five steps in this regard.

First, the concept cumulative can be misleading, as accumulation refers to a process of gradual escalation of interactions. Busher and Macklin (2015, p. 891) argue that the conflict in Britain is more accurately described as spikes centred on key symbolic events instead of a linear accumulation of the conflict level. Even though violent interactions intensified
following the murder of Lee Rigby by radical Islamists in 2013, activity fell back to the level preceding the incident shortly thereafter.

Second, there should be a clear definition of which types of activity constitute a part of CE. Do violent actions alone comprise CE, or are violent narratives, as proposed by Tell MAMA’s (2014) report, also a part of CE? Busher and Macklin (2015, pp. 887-888) problematise how a radical mind does not necessarily lead to radical actions. In other words, an increase in online hate narratives is not automatically correlated with an increase in violent interactions offline.

Third, the authors call for a clearer distinction between the two processes of community polarisation and cumulative extremism, a distinction that was not made clear by Eatwell (2006) when he first introduced the term. Whereas Eatwell (2006) links growing community polarisation to cumulative extremism, Busher and Macklin (2015, p. 890) argue that although interactions between opposing groups have increased in intensity and scale, polls indicate that the public fear of Islam and Muslims in Britain is declining. This development suggests that these two factors are not interrelated and that they should be analysed separately from one another.

This distinction leads me to the fourth issue, namely which actors constitute a part of CE? Should we only include organisations involved in violent actions? Alternatively, should we also look at organisations that rely on non-violent tactics, but share the same overarching goals as the violent groups? Furthermore, there is the question of lone actors. Whereas Feldman and Litter (2014, p. 5) regard the actions perpetrated by Anders Behring Breivik as the “most violent voice” in CE – and thus the end point of the process – he was only indirectly affiliated with an anti-Islamist group and can be categorised as a lone-wolf terrorist (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014, p. 2). This last consideration relates to the issue of people who commit hate crimes but are not affiliated with any organisations. Tell MAMA (2014) supports the claim of CE based on the sharp increase in hate crimes reported by Muslims following the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013. However, civilians perpetrated the majority of these hate crimes against other civilians. The existing literature on CE leaves it unclear whether this is a part of community polarisation, cumulative extremism, or both.

Finally, Busher and Macklin (2015, pp. 892-893) argue that the process of CE cannot be understood by only analysing interactions between two adversary groups. Instead, external actors such as the security apparatus, the media, political elites, and the public at large can directly or indirectly influence the dynamics of CE. Unjust repressive policies can intensify solidarity among the group members, encouraging and legitimising radicalised activities.
Furthermore, the discourse in the media, amongst elites, and in the public at large can impact the legitimacy of the groups and the dynamics between them (Ebner, 2017, p. 114). In other words, we need to study interactional effects that external actors may have on CE, rather than focusing exclusively on the two adversary groups and their interactions. Drawing on the points elaborated on above, I propose a new term: Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation. The aim is to capture the process better and define more clearly what should guide the empirical analysis.

2.2. Reciprocal intergroup radicalisation

The issues raised above illustrate the conceptual shortcomings of CE and how its applicability in practice can vary depending on how the researcher defines it. Reciprocal intergroup radicalisation builds on a master thesis written by Philippe A. Orban (2017), who used the term horizontal reciprocal radicalisation. There are several reasons for adopting RIR. Firstly, reciprocal delimits it to comprise of reactive forms of violence – meaning that the actions taken by one is intended to spark a reaction by the other side, and vice versa. Furthermore, intergroup defines the organisational level as the level of analysis. This is also where my concept differs from Orban’s (2017) definition. Thirdly, radicalisation allows for a more dynamic flow of the process of RIR, as non-violent groups have the propensity to turn violent. In other words, violence plays an emergent rather than a static role in RIR. The next pages will describe the concept in further detail. To explain RIR in a meaningful way, it makes more sense to specify the three different terms in the reverse order, by moving from radicalisation via intergroup to reciprocal.

2.2.1. Radicalisation

RIR excludes extremism, as the term can be misleading. Cas Mudde (2007, p. 31) differentiates radicalism from extremism by positing that the former is democratic, “even if they oppose some fundamental values of liberal democracies” (original emphasis). Opposing pluralism by being against immigration from Muslim countries may thus be categorised as radical, but not extreme. Extremism, on the other hand, is “in essence anti-democratic, opposing the fundamental principle of sovereignty of the people” (Mudde, 2007, p. 31 original emphasis). This distinction is relevant for the radical-Islamist and anti-Islamist groups. For instance, even though the anti-Islamist organisation, Stopp Islamiseringen av Norge (SIAN), has a goal to “prevent, stop and reverse the Islamisation of Norway”, they also claim to support “democracy, the rule of law, and the UN Declaration of Human Rights” (SIAN, 2018). This makes SIAN radical in the sense that they oppose the liberal democratic
norm of plurality, but it does not necessarily make them anti-democratic and thus extreme. Nevertheless, SIAN’s interaction with adversary groups such as Profetens Ummah, who can be categorised as extreme due to their romanticisation of and willingness to resort to violence, is highly relevant (Linge, 2013, p. 43). In other words, CE should not be confined to extremist groups, as radical, non-violent organisations may be playing an equally important role in RIR.

Hence, radicalisation replaces extremism, as the former concept encapsulates both radical and extremist groups. I rely on the functional definition of radicalisation proposed by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, p. 416), namely the “increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict”. Within radicalisation, a distinction between radicalised thought and radicalised action needs to be made. Whereas radical ideas entail justifying violence for a political goal, radicalised actions involve offline activity, ranging from legal activism to engaging in lethal violence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, p. 210). Former research has traditionally regarded the two as mutually interdependent. However, recent research has found that not everyone who participates in radicalised activity holds radical beliefs and vice versa. Hence, adhering to a radical or extreme ideology does not automatically translate to a willingness or ability to resort to violence (Berntzen, 2018b, p. 85). In other words, a rise in hate-speech online does not necessarily translate to a rise in mobilisation and a higher propensity for groups to engage in violent confrontations. Thus, the functional definition of radicalisation above focuses on radical actions – not radical minds.

2.2.2. Intergroup
The term intergroup captures the relevant actors involved in the process. The term is inspired by the civil war literature on horizontal inequalities. Østby (2013, p. 213) found that group identity is crucial for recruitment and retention to organisations involved in conflict. Affiliating with a group identity is not something one necessarily is born into, but rather something an individual actively chooses to self-identify as. This self-identification can become salient over time, often strengthened by in-group and out-group comparisons of haves and have-nots in terms of political, economic and social privilege (Østby, 2013, p. 217). Salient group identities can subsequently be turned into a catalyst for mobilisation against the ‘other’.

Thus, when the concept is fused with radicalisation, it identifies the relevant actors involved in RIR. Both movements have a pool of potential recruits it can draw from: Muslims in the case of radical Islamist groups, and people opposing Islamism or Islam in the case of anti-Islamist groups. Reciprocal radicalisation is thus delimited to those who are
either an active member of an organisation or shares an identity affiliated with the movement, and acts contentiously as a result of this identity affiliation. In other words, membership is not necessary, but one needs to identify with the movement and justify ones actions in accordance with the movement’s goals and principles. Actions perpetrated by individuals unaffiliated with any group or movement should thus classify as part of community polarisation, rather than RIR (Busher & Macklin, 2015, p. 890). Furthermore, the perpetrators’ target must be of symbolic interest or in direct affiliation with any adversary group. This implies that symbolic acts such as burning the Quran or burning poppies, with the intention of sparking a response from the adversary, should constitute a part of RIR.

2.2.3. Reciprocal

Finally, reciprocal replaces cumulative. By using the term reciprocal, spikes of interaction are included as a form of radicalisation even if it recedes back to normal levels afterwards. Peaks of interactions could have important implications even if it falls short of accumulation, in cases where spikes involve more radical and violent means than previous spikes. Furthermore, the term captures the type of violence I am interested in, namely reactive violence. This is why Anders Behring Breivik, who was not a member of any anti-Islamist groups at the time of the attack, should arguably not be regarded as a part of RIR. His actions were predominately against the incumbent Labour Party government, and those he considered Cultural Marxists (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014, p. 7). Furthermore, no radical Islamist group retaliated the attack. This implies that the 22/7 attack is perhaps more precisely regarded as an isolated event, where the violence was not directed against the counter-movement, and where the counter-movement did not retaliate.
2.3. Social movement theory

Although CE is a relatively novel concept, the study of movement-countermovement dynamics is nothing new within social movement literature. RIR resembles what della Porta (2013, p. 71) referred to as competitive escalation, which involves a gradual intensification of interactions between and within movements and countermovements. The concern that CE is studied too narrowly by only looking at movement-countermovement interactions is mitigated when applying social movement theory. Here, external actors such as the police, institutions and the elites are regarded as relevant actors in respect to competitive escalation (Carter, 2017; della Porta, 2013; Tarrow, 2011). The remaining section of this chapter will elaborate on why and how social movement theory can be applied to investigate the different levels of RIR in Norway and Britain.

2.3.1. What is a social movement?

Della Porta (2013, p. 14) defines a social movement as “networks of individuals and organisations that have common identities and conflictual aims that use unconventional means”. These networks can be heterogeneous and constitute a wide array of different actors. *Unconventional means* refers to tactics that are unorthodox, at times dramatic, and exist in the grey zone in terms of legitimacy (della Porta, 2013, p. 16). Social movement groups and actors rely on a repertoire of disruptive actions that may lead to violence (della Porta, 2013, p. 14).

Tarrow (2011, p. 9) supplements our understanding of social movements by defining it as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities”. In this definition, *collective challenges* and *common purposes* are what unite this “network of individuals and organisations”. Social solidarity can be rooted in issues such as religion, socialism, nationalism or feminism, and can be the driving force for risk-taking activities among activists (Tarrow, 2011). Lastly, “sustained interaction” is what sets a social movement apart from a one-time protest or incident.

In order to translate social solidarity and common purposes into sustained collective action, the social movement literature looks to framing instead of ideology. Framing involves the language and rhetoric that social movement organisations (SMOs) use to establish a shared understanding and interpretation of events amongst activists and sympathisers. Framing is applied in three steps: what is the problem and who is to blame (diagnostic framing), what can be done to fix it (prognostic framing), and what is the rationale for engaging contentiously (motivational framing) (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 617). As such,
successful framing mobilises and sustains contentious actions among individuals over an extended period. A more elaborate explanation of framing and how it relates to RIR will be discussed in this chapter.

2.3.2. Violence
Violence plays an essential role in RIR. Researchers within the social movement literature have traditionally studied peaceful and progressive movements, including the civil rights and student movements in the sixties, as well as peace movements and the feminist movement (Tarrow, 2011, p. 7). Recently, a few influential scholars have turned to other, non-traditional movements, such as the far right and religious extremism (Caiani, della Porta, & Wagemann, 2012; della Porta, 2013; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 2003). One overlapping trait between these movements is the role that violence plays in their protest repertoire. By protest repertoire, one refers to the different methods that SMOs rely on to achieve their collective goals (Tarrow, 2011, p. 7).

Caiani et al. (2012, pp. 79-80) have developed a useful typology of a protest repertoire in radicalised order. The typology starts with the least radical form of protest repertoire, namely conventional tactics. These involve electoral campaigns, lobbying and press conferences. Level two is demonstrative activities, and includes street demonstrations, petitioning, arranging public meetings and hosting festivals. Level three is confrontational tactics with the goal of disruption. These tactics are mostly illegal, including the occupation of public spaces, disrupting meetings held by adversaries, blockages and non-violent, illegal demonstrations. Level four includes violent actions and illegal acts against people or things. In other words, violent actions can be either symbolic or physical, where the former is regarded as a lighter form of violence (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 80). The typology is summarised in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: protest repertoire</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Forms of action</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy violence</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: (Caiani et al., 2012, pp. 80-81)

An important point on this typology is that social movement organisations rarely initially resort to the most radical forms of actions. Instead, violence is gradually adopted through
sustained interactions with counter-movements, the police, and the elites (Caiani et al., 2012, pp. 80-81). Inherent in this argument is the notion that violence is emergent and relational, and something that gradually becomes a part of a SMOs protest repertoire. In other words, a group’s chosen protest repertoire is not static and can turn more radical over time through interactions with adversaries and other actors, emphasising the dynamic nature of RIR.

2.4. What makes anti-Islamists and radical Islamists social movements?
Before applying the framework derived from the social movement literature on RIR, radical Islamist and anti-Islamist groups need to qualify as social movements according to a set of given criteria. Three criteria drawn from the two definitions by Tarrow (2011) and della Porta (2013) above are particularly relevant. This includes a groups’ framing, whether different groups constitute a network, and to what extent they rely on unconventional means. In the subsequent section, I will go through radical Islamist and anti-Islamist groups in relation to the three criteria to show how they can be categorised as social movements.

2.4.1. Radical Islamism
Before presenting radical Islamists’ collective challenges, methods and network, a short overview of the ideological field of Islamism is warranted, as it is a largely heterogeneous movement. Islamism is an ideology dating back centuries from the Middle East and North Africa. Recently, it has diffused to Western Europe through immigration and Islamic converts. As an overarching definition, Islamism can be defined as a political ideology characterised by organised groups whose aim is to establish Islamic states and to impose Islamic jurisdiction (Lia, 2018, pp. 94-95). This definition captures the distinction between Islam and Islamism, where the former is a religious faith, and the latter is a political ideology drawing its principles from that faith (Ebner, 2017, p. 45). Islamists are a wide-ranging group of actors, consisting of organisations that advocate for democracy and Islamism on one side of the spectrum. On the other side, we find groups viewing democracy and Islamism as diametrically opposite political systems, and thus incompatible (Lia, 2018, p. 95).

Radical Islamism deviates from Islamism in its belief that violence is a legitimate tool to obtain one’s goal (Moghadam, 2009, p. 38). Within radical Islamism, an increasingly influential branch called Salafism has gained traction over the last decades in Western Europe, consisting of both violent and non-violent groups. The common denominator is their objective to imitate the way Prophet Muhammad and the first four generations of Muslims lived (Lia, 2018, p. 95). Within some Salafi and other radical Islamist groups, terrorist attacks
are regarded as legitimate as it is a part of defending Muslim countries against what they perceive as an occupation (Lia, 2018, p. 97).

From the overview presented above, it is clear that the Islamist movement is far from monolithic. What the radicals and extremists have in common, however, are their collective challenges. They regard the threat of Western influence breaking down Muslim societies to be an imminent threat, and perceive the West to be at war with Islam (Moghadam, 2009, p. 47). Radical Islamists in Western Europe point to Israeli annexation of Palestinian land and the satirical Muhammad cartoons in Danish and Norwegian newspapers in 2005 as mobilising tools for their struggle (Lia, 2018, p. 96). They also look to Western involvement in wars in majority Muslim countries such as Afghanistan as a means of corroborating their claims that the West is indeed at war with Islam. Although the groups may differ in their protest repertoire, they agree on the rationale for engaging in collective action – namely the rejection of Western values and institutions, and the implementation of Islamic jurisdiction and norms (Moghadam, 2009, p. 61).

The radical Islamist movement in Western Europe is a loosely tied national and transnational network, where recruitment occurs both online and offline. Offline, mosques, kinship and friends play a crucial role in recruitment and retention (Kenney, 2018; Moghadam, 2009, p. 57; Nesser & Lia, 2016). Recruitment also occurs in the streets, where activists preach and hand out flyers to Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Lia, 2018, p. 102). Recently, online recruitment through the Internet and social media have become an increasingly powerful tool for networking (Linge, 2013). Islam Net and Profetens Ummah, two Salafi groups in Norway, have close ties with British Salafi activists, illustrating the movement’s transnational reach (Linge, 2013, p. 42).

The action repertoire of radical Islamists in Western Europe consists predominately of street marches and public prayers (Mozaffari, 2007, p. 24). Although the groups mainly rely on peaceful means, there have been instances of violence, both symbolic and physical. On a smaller scale, radical Islamists have engaged in symbolic violence such as burning remembrance poppies on Armistice Day in Britain (Macklin & Busher, 2015, p. 57). Further down in the action repertoire, there have been a number of violent terrorist plots and incidents. This includes the execution of Lee Rigby in 2013, and the 7/7 bombing in 2005 (Macklin & Busher, 2015, p. 57). A number of radical Islamists have in the last five years travelled to Syria as foreign fighters. In Norway, radical Islamist groups such as Profetens Ummah have actively recruited a number of these fighters and facilitated their journey (Lia, 2018, p. 102). This demonstrates how the movement’s aims and methods often transcend
national borders, and where social solidarity is grounded in a religious, rather than national identity.

2.4.2. Anti-Islamists
The anti-Islamist movement is a recent phenomenon that emerged from the blogosphere after the 9/11 attacks (Archer, 2013, p. 179). Their ‘collective challenge’ is centred on the ‘Islamification’ of Europe facilitated by immigration and high birth rates among Muslim immigrants. A number of activists support the Eurabia conspiracy introduced by Gisele Littman (goes under the pseudonym Bat Ye’or) (2011). Littman claims that the European cultural and political elites are in a secret pact with organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood to Islamise Europe (Goodwin, Cutts, & Janta-Lipinski, 2016, p. 7). The Eurabia thesis argues that the anti-Islamist movement has two threats and opponents: Islam as an existential threat to European civilisation, and the European elites who are in on the conspiracy (Archer, 2013, p. 174). Although the anti-Islamist movement can be placed on both the radical and extreme right of the political spectrum, they differ from other far-right groups in one important aspect: whereas the extreme right has a strong emphasis on immigrants and non-white people in general, the anti-Islamists’ collective enemy is Islam. Many anti-Islamist groups strongly oppose anti-Semitism, and non-white members such as Hindus, Sikhs and ex-Muslims are, at least on the surface, welcome to join the movement (Goodwin et al., 2016, p. 7).

The online discourse transformed into an offline network in April 2007 after the UK and Scandinavian Counterjihad Summit (Archer, 2013, p. 180). After this summit, the online anti-Islamist network transformed into formal organisations with overlapping ties, transcending national borders. From 2009, the anti-Islamist network consisted predominately of Defence Leagues and Stop the Islamisation networks. The Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) was established in 2015 and is the most recent contribution to the movement (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014, p. 4). However, the anti-Islamist movement still holds a more substantial presence online, where blogs such as Brussels Journal, Gates of Vienna, and Jihad Watch wield influence on the dominant discourses and ideas for the movement as a whole (Goodwin et al., 2016, p. 5). Facebook is also a favoured tool through which anti-Islamists find like-minded people in closed groups. Hence, although the anti-Islamist movement is a growing phenomenon, its presence still remains more prevalent online (Berntzen, 2018b, p. 84).

In contrast to the radical Islamist movement, the anti-Islamists have party allies in some European countries. Some of these radical right parties share overlapping goals with the
movement (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014, p. 4). The movement thus has a parliamentary and an extra-parliamentary branch. What sets the SMOs apart from the political parties is their protest repertoire, where the former relies on street marches and other unconventional tactics (Goodwin et al., 2016, p. 5). Furthermore, anti-Islamist demonstrations are predominately non-violent, as the movement regards it as prestigious to act in accordance with the law (Smedsrud & Berntzen, 2018, p. 35). However, there have been instances of both symbolic and physical violence during protests, including burning the Quran and clashes with adversaries (Berntzen, 2018b, p. 86; Kenney, 2018, p. 145; The Telegraph, 2011). Last, although Breivik had no known ties to any anti-Islamist organisations, acting in the name of an imaginary organisation labelled Knights Templar, he was indeed aware of and acted partly on behalf of the anti-Islamist movement (Berntzen, 2018b, p. 86).

To conclude, anti-Islamists and radical Islamist groups can be categorised as social movements. They are both, in essence, a loosely structured network with overlapping collective challenges that rely on unconventional means in order to achieve their objective. Last, their protest repertoire ranges from peaceful to violent. Still, the radical Islamists have engaged in far heavier forms of violence, including terror attacks. The next section will elaborate on relevant aspects from the social movement literature and linking it to RIR between radical Islamists and anti-Islamists.

2.5. Reciprocal intergroup Radicalisation and social movement theory

The social movement literature has traditionally looked to structural factors as a way of explaining why some SMOs resort to violence. Social and cultural preconditions, including economic crises or disenfranchised individuals searching for an identity, have been identified as explanatory factors (Berntzen, 2018b, p. 86). Scholars also hypothesise that closed political opportunities lead to smaller, yet more violent groups and protests (della Porta, 2013, p. 72). Recently, the structural approach has come under scrutiny for explaining the behaviour of a few with conditions that affect populations as a whole (della Porta, 2013, p. 72). Critics point to different large-N analyses that conclude differently on the correlation between economic strain and political violence, where some find a positive relationship (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2007), whereas others find a negative relationship (Krueger & Malečková, 2003). The structural approach is also criticised for leaving out the role of agency in emergent violence. Structural conditions are static, but groups and individuals resorting to violence are not.
Grounded in this criticism, the social movement literature has recently taken a relational turn as an alternative framework to structural conditions (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 12). Della Porta (2013, p. 19) describes the relational approach as:

Forms of actions emerge, and are transformed, in the course of physical and symbolic interactions among social movements and not only their opponents but also their potential allies.

This definition emphasises how violence is something that emerges through a more or less gradual process within a reciprocal relationship. Therefore, violence is not adopted overnight as an automatic reaction to the structural conditions present. Instead, violence emerges as part of a process, where increasingly confrontational interactions justify radicalisation of the protest repertoire (della Porta, 2013, p. 19). Interactions between potential allies can also lead to radicalisation, with individuals departing from SMOs to establish new, more militant groups (della Porta, 2014, p. 164). This vast network of interactive actors constitute a social movement sector, and the different pathways to violence are conditioned by agency (Tarrow, 2011, p. 190).

It is nevertheless essential to keep in mind that sustained interactions within a social movement sector do not inevitably lead to violence. To explain how violence emerges, scholars adhering to the relational approach look to causal mechanisms that may lead to violence. Della Porta (2013, p. 24) defines mechanisms as “chains of interactions that filter structural conditions and produce effects.” Mechanisms thus function as the intermediary step that links conditions to outcomes and sets contention into motion. To exemplify, closed political opportunities may answer why political violence occurs, but it is the process through which the causal mechanisms are activated that explain how this violence escalates. In other words, emergent violence is found in the process of mechanisms, not in the structures surrounding it.

A caveat to bear in mind is that one causal mechanism cannot explain RIR alone. Instead, different mechanisms will always be present in violent interactions, and it is the interaction and combination of these mechanisms that make them sufficient in explaining a violent outcome (Tarrow, 2011, p. 187).

So far, this chapter has introduced and operationalised RIR. I have linked the concept to the social movement literature with particular emphasis on the relational approach. The remaining part of this chapter will elaborate on a set of chosen conditions that will contribute to explain why and how RIR may or may not be fuelled. The aim is therefore twofold, explaining how RIR occurs, but also why RIR appears to be happening at a larger scale in
Britain than Norway. It is important to note that each condition and its related mechanism are neither necessary nor sufficient by itself to explain RIR. Instead, it is the combination of these that should be regarded as playing a part in explaining the larger puzzle of RIR.

2.6. Political opportunity structures

Political opportunity structures are frequently put forth as important explanatory factors for radicalisation within the social movement literature (Caiani et al., 2012; della Porta, 2013; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 2003). When acting contentiously, social movements are facilitated and constrained by political structures. Traditionally, democratic transitions, regime types, and degree of decentralisation have been emphasised as mitigating political structures (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 37). However, for anti-Islamist and radical Islamist groups, other conditions appear relevant: the level of repression and the presence or absence of a strong radical right party (Caiani et al., 2012; della Porta, 2013). The conditions and mechanisms are listed in figure 1 and explained in detail in the subsequent paragraphs.

![Figure 1: political opportunity structures](image)

**2.6.1. Repression activating isolation or moderation**

The extent of legal constraints imposed on anti-Islamist and radical Islamist movements varies between liberal democracies. Such constraints may involve an outright ban on groups or limits to their free speech rights (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 77; Tarrow, 2011, p. 166). By raising the cost of participation through repressive legal tactics, individuals and groups are constrained from acting contentiously. As such, RIR would be contained as the opportunity to engage in violent activity is constrained. However, research finds that if individuals and groups perceive repression to be unfair, a collective sense of injustice can increase recruitment and solidarity among group members, leading them to justify more violent means (della Porta, 2013, p. 38; Tarrow, 2011, p. 173). This implies that repression can cause the
opposite effect of containment, by driving the groups underground and subsequently enabling
the organisation’s involvement in more militant forms of activity (Tarrow, 2011, p. 209).

Depending on the level of repression, two possible causal mechanisms are activated: isolation
and institutionalisation. If the groups do not experience heavy repression, injustice grievances
will not be activated, and the groups can continue to operate openly and legally. This, in turn,
will inhibit radicalisation. In other words, it mitigates the intensification of interactions
occurring between the police and the SMO, subsequently constraining radicalisation.

Harsh repression, on the other hand, leaves an organisation with two options: go
underground (isolation) or moderate their claims and methods in order to avoid being banned
(institutionalisation) (Tarrow, 2011, p. 209). With isolation, an SMO will continue its
activism underground, which is an isolated and militarised arena. Without input from external
actors, their action repertoire will potentially radicalise (Busher & Macklin, 2015, p. 896).
Della Porta (2013, p. 150) argues that these isolated groups will initially engage in violent
activities on a lower scale, but subsequently radicalise their tactics as a response to
repression, potentially resulting in lethal violence.

However, while some groups choose isolation, other actors may decide to moderate
their claims and institutionalise. Through institutionalisation, an organisation adopts less
disruptive and more conventional forms of contention, securing their legal survival (Tarrow,
2011, p. 207). Importantly, these two mechanisms can co-occur, meaning that a repressive
legal context may reduce protesting and constrain some groups, while other groups within the
same movement may choose isolation and subsequently increase its militancy (Busher &
Macklin, 2015, p. 896). Usually, organisations that choose isolation and militarisation have
initially been part of a larger non-violent SMO, but split due to conflicts over which path to
pursue, isolation or institutionalisation.

I thus hypothesise that isolation will fuel RIR while institutionalisation will inhibit
RIR. It appears likely that higher levels of RIR can be observed if both SMOs isolate and
militarise. However, RIR can still escalate if one SMO institutionalises while the other
isolates if the latter sustains its attention at the other, more institutionalised adversary. Thus,
if one SMO isolates while the other institutionalises, RIR may increase, but potentially at a
lower scale. Such an instance is a potential outcome as a result of the following condition,
namely the presence of a strong radical right party.
2.6.2. Strong radical right parties and the pressure cooker theory

Whether one or both of the movements have a powerful institutional ally is the second political opportunity structure impacting RIR. By an institutional ally, I refer to a political party that overlaps in their framing and overarching goal with a social movement. In Western Europe, an institutional ally is more relevant for the anti-Islamist than for the radical Islamist movement, as there are no influential Islamist parties in any parliaments. Thus, the scope here is on radical right parties. A ‘strong’ radical right party is defined as having repeated electoral success with over four per cent of the vote in national elections (Minkenberg, 2018, p. 7). Minkenberg (2018) finds in a comparative study of countries in Western Europe that countries with a strong radical right party have a marginal radical right social movement, and vice versa. To understand why, we must turn to the mechanism termed the pressure cooker.

The mechanism connecting the presence or absence of a radical right party to RIR is what is referred to as the pressure cooker theory (Ravndal, 2018, p. 783). The underlying assumption behind this mechanism is that the presence of a strong radical right party removes some of the urgency for activists to engage in violent protest. Conversely, the absence of a strong political party enhances this sense of urgency, as the option to act conventionally is unavailable (della Porta, 2013, p. 34). By relating this to the protest repertoire by Caiani et al. (2012, pp. 79-80), we see that the lowest form of protest repertoire, namely conventional tactics, are present for the anti-Islamist actors where there is a strong radical right party. In practice, this would imply that these SMOs would not radicalise their action repertoire as they have other, more conventional channels available. Conversely, the absence of a strong radical right party removes the radicalisation ‘cap’ on the anti-Islamist SMOs, which could subsequently enhance RIR. In the case of Britain and Norway, there are no strong Islamist political parties, and we will thus always have one positive instance of the pressure cooker mechanism.

Hence, the assumption is that the absence of an institutional ally for both anti-Islamist and radical Islamist groups will fuel RIR. This is because there is no option to act conventionally and other tactics must therefore be utilised. In contrast, if one or both of the SMOs have an institutional ally, RIR should remain contained. With the two relevant political opportunity structures having been discussed, I will now proceed to the next overarching condition, which involves framing.
2.7. Framing

In order to mobilise activists and legitimise violence, social movement leaders resort to framing. Framing can be described as “the dominant worldviews that guide the behaviour of social movement groups” (Caiani et al., 2012, p. 13). The goal is to simplify the world out there through the creation of cognitive schemas. Within the vast literature on framing, I have selected two conditions that are of particular relevance for explaining RIR. These are adversarial framing and congruent media framing, as shown in figure 2.

![Figure 2: Framing](image)

2.7.1. Adversarial framing and mirroring

Adversarial framing is a sub-section of diagnostic framing. Broadly speaking, diagnostic framing involves identifying the problem at hand, the constituency affected, and who is to blame. With adversarial framing, the SMOs delineate a binary boundary between good and evil, situating one’s movement on the ‘good’ side, and the adversary on the ‘evil’ side (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). Thus, the latter is the one to blame and subsequently constitutes that SMO’s enemy image. Therefore, I am interested in whether the counter-movement is a central or peripheral part of the SMO’s enemy image. In other words, are anti-Islamists central to the radical Islamists’ enemy image, or are there other actors that occupy this space? Such alternative adversaries could be the government, all non-Muslims, or British and Norwegian soldiers deployed in the Middle East. Conversely, are the radical Islamists central to the anti-Islamists, or are they more preoccupied with the political elites or Muslims at large?

To what extent the two SMOs make up each other’s enemy image reveals essential information about their coupling configurations – the more central the enemy image, the
tighter the coupling configuration. *If* and *how* the opposing movements respond to one another can impact the propensity for violent interactions (Bush & Macklin, 2015, pp. 896-897). The level of RIR is thus manifested in three possible coupling configurations – tight, loose and asymmetrical.

If the SMOs are a central part of each other’s enemy image, we should expect to observe the mechanism called mirroring. This involves a scenario where both movements imitate, invert, or subvert the language and symbols of the counter-movement (Ayoub & Chetaille, 2017, p. 5). Two examples that stand out are anti-Islamists burning the Quran and radical Islamists burning poppies in Britain (Bush & Macklin, 2015, p. 897). Furthermore, I also use mirroring to describe an SMO mobilising and counter-demonstrating against the adversary.

If there is mutual mirroring, the SMOs’ coupling configurations are characterised as tight, and we should expect RIR to intensify. However, if they broadly oppose each other but remain a peripheral part of each other’s enemy image, we should expect to encounter far fewer instances of mirroring – if any at all. Consequently, this loose coupling configuration should contain RIR. Last, if one movement remains a central part of the opponent’s enemy image but not vice versa, it is characterised as an asymmetrical coupling configuration. Here, one movement may mirror the opponent, but as it is not reciprocal, we should expect RIR to remain relatively contained.

### 2.7.2. The media: RIR as a self-fulfilling prophecy

SMOs are not the only ones involved in the framing contest. One such external actor is the media, whose agenda may coincide with or directly oppose the narrative put forth by the SMOs (Bush & Macklin, 2015, p. 894). Related to RIR, two features of media reporting stand out as particularly interesting. The first concerns the type of media coverage each SMO receives. Movement leaders are often cognizant of how the media can inflate their importance, and they have an active strategy in seeking out the media’s attention (Bush & Macklin, 2015, p. 894). Thus, media reporting can elevate the SMOs, subsequently enabling the groups’ diffusion geographically and scale-wise (Tarrow, 2011, p. 192). In contrast, local protests that receive limited media attention tend to remain local (Meyer, 2004). Additionally, over-reporting of an SMO may mobilise and activate the counter-movement. Latent supporters may become activated, and mobilised supporters may become more rallied up. Conversely, if the media frames the SMO as a failure, the perception of urgency to mobilise diminishes for the other side, as the threat of the adversary appears less imminent.
Second, how the media frames the interactions between the SMOs can impact the propensity for violence (Busher & Macklin, 2015, p. 894; Tarrow, 2011, p. 149). RIR is impacted by whether the media echoes the adversarial framing put forth by the SMOs, by framing their interactions as two adversaries engaged in an inevitable spiral of violence (Macklin & Busher, 2015, p. 54). Both types of framing, namely elevating the groups and echoing their spiral-of-violence narrative, can activate a mechanism I have labelled the self-fulfilling prophecy.

The mechanism I have chosen to label the self-fulfilling prophecy describes a “false definition of the situation evoking a new behaviour which makes the originally false conception come true” (Merton, 1968). In other words, how the media frames the SMOs and the conflict between them can confirm the activists’ initial (false) belief. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, the activists fail to see how their initial beliefs contributed to constructing the reality that is being validated by the media. Consequently, they will believe it was true from the beginning (Biggs, 2009, p. 13). This confirmatory narrative can enhance the sense of urgency and legitimacy amongst the activists, fuelling the interactions between adversaries. Furthermore, it could also rally initially latent supporters who become persuaded that the struggle is urgent. Thus, if the mechanism of the self-fulfilling prophecy is activated through elevation of the SMOs or an inevitability-narrative, we should expect to see an escalation of RIR. Conversely, if the media abstains from elevating the SMOs or framing the conflict as ‘inevitable’, RIR should remain contained.
2.8. Organisational resources

Where framing and political opportunity structures have a more or less indirect effect on the propensity for RIR to escalate or remain contained, the last condition goes a step closer to the inner dynamics of the movements, looking into their organisational resources. Here, I will elaborate on the importance of militant supporters and strong, charismatic leadership.

![Figure 3: Organisational resources](image)

Engaging in violence is a tactical choice that is constrained or facilitated by the resources available to the groups (della Porta, 2013, pp. 16-17). Such resources include material, symbolic and human resources, which in turn impact the tactical choices an organisation makes. Research shows that the scale of violence increases if there are limited resources at hand, as the activists need to maximise their impact with the resources available to them (Caiani et al., 2012, pp. 88-89). However, smaller, more militant groups differ from large non-violent SMOs in one crucial aspect: the militant groups tend to become more violent the more human resources they have access to. By human resources, I refer to what Hewitt (2003, p. 46) labels mobilised supporters. The author uncovered a strong correlation between access to militant and mobilised supporters and the level of violence in smaller, militant groups. The assumption is thus that the number of activated militant supporters on both sides will impact the propensity for RIR to escalate. Another factor relating to human resources surrounds the demographic profile of the SMO activists. In this regard, age and gender appear particularly relevant, where young age and a disproportionate share of male activists might increase the propensity for violence and subsequently fuel RIR.

Hence, access to human resources has an impact on whether RIR is fuelled or contained. However, a faction of young, militant men needs to be activated into contention by a strong, competent leader. I hypothesise that the SMOs need a strong, charismatic leadership
that can unite different strands of people and beliefs under one banner. The ability and willingness to sacrifice time and resources to organisation building and sustaining collective action are key features of good leadership (Berntzen, 2019).

Put into context with RIR, it is apparent that the presence of activated supporters led by strong and charismatic leaders on both sides will impact the propensity for RIR to escalate, as hypothesised in figure 3. If there are significant numbers of activated militant supporters on both sides, we should see a positive outcome of RIR. However, if one side has a large number of human resources whereas the other does not, we should expect to see RIR relatively contained, as the latter will avoid violent confrontations. A similar logic applies for leadership, where strong leaders on both sides can strengthen the organisation, attract recruits and quell internal strife.

This chapter has situated RIR within the social movement literature, deriving specific conditions and mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. In the subsequent chapter, I will proceed by mapping out the methods and data I have selected.
Chapter 3

Research method

Throughout the process of writing this thesis, from formulating a research question, developing a theoretical framework, to conducting the analysis, I have continuously made conscious decisions of what methods and data to pursue. Each choice led me to a new set of options, and this chapter aims at explaining this path, taking us from the research question to the analysis.

3.1. Research question

The research question of this thesis asks which mechanisms fuel or contain reciprocal intergroup radicalisation and what conditions activate these processes. Terms such as mechanisms and processes emphasise the emergent and relational feature of violent interactions between the two SMOs, as explained in the theory chapter. To document such mechanisms and processes, I have opted for a qualitative research design, combining comparative analysis with process tracing. By combining these two methods, I can thoroughly investigate the mechanisms at play while also cross-checking my findings with a second case (Tarrow, 2010, p. 244).

Since most studies on cumulative extremism are single case studies (see: Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013; Carter, 2017; Eatwell, 2006), there are no relevant datasets that could be used to analyse RIR quantitatively, and I did not regard the creation of my own dataset to be a feasible option. Therefore, I find a comparative study to be the logical intermediary step catering both to depth and to width.

3.2. Case selection

Having developed my research question and operationalisation of RIR, I first identified the most relevant cases for comparative analysis. These were Germany, Denmark, Norway, France and Britain – countries where there had been anti-Islamist and radical Islamist street movements with varying degrees of interaction. Rather than comparing all five, I chose to delimit the scope to two cases. This is due to the rigorous work that process-tracing as a method demands (Gerring, 2007, p. 173). Therefore, due to time-and-space constraints, it was not a realistic option to include more than two cases.

Of these five countries, I found that Britain had higher observed levels of RIR relative to the other countries, while Norway had lower levels of RIR relative to the other countries.
Additionally, the two countries appear relatively similar in most aspects except for the outcome variable, namely the level of RIR. As such, I chose the two cases on the premise of the most similar systems design (MSSD). The inherent logic behind MSSD is that the two cases appear similar in almost all aspects except for the outcome variable (Teune & Przeworski, 1970, p. 34). I aimed to identify a set number of explanatory variables that may impact the level of RIR. Ideally, Norway and Britain should be as similar as possible in order to control for unmeasured conditions, referring to those conditions that I have not included in the analysis (Gerring, 2007, p. 131). Nevertheless, remaining cognizant of the differences between the two countries and how this may impact the uncertainty of my results can mitigate this problem (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 94). In the following paragraphs, I will go through the similarities and differences between Norway and Britain, and how this may impact the analysis.

The premise for choosing Britain and Norway is that they are relatively similar, yet exhibit different levels of RIR. First, both countries are consolidated liberal democracies with a long democratic tradition. Second, the Muslim population in proportion to the total population is similar, with 5.7 per cent in Norway and 6.3 per cent in Britain (Pew, 2017). The share of Muslim immigrants can explain the pool of human resources available for both anti-Islamist and radical Islamist SMOs. Radical right voters list immigration as the most salient issue when deciding whom to vote for (Jupskås, 2012, p. 118). When there is a perception of immigration to be high, anti-immigrant sentiments grow among certain segments of the population (Pew, 2017). This, in turn, enlarges the pool of human resources available for the anti-Islamist SMOs. The total share of Muslims in the country naturally conditions the pool of recruits available for radical Islamist groups.

Third, the Norwegian Defence League is an offshoot of the English Defence League. Similarly, Profetens Ummah is greatly inspired by the Bakri Network. In other words, we have two relatively similar SMOs on both the anti-Islamist and radical Islamist side that can be compared across the pond.

The period covered in my analysis was decided according to the organisational activities of SMOs under investigation. The EDL was established in 2009, marking the first year when the two British adversary SMOs operated simultaneously on the streets. 2009 is thus the starting point of my analysis. In Norway, the NDL and Profetens Ummah (formerly known as De Frivillige), were established in 2010. I mark the end of my analysis in 2015, which is when all of the four SMOs ceased most of their street activity. In other words, the SMOs were no longer present at the arena for RIR to escalate, namely on the streets.
The two countries do however differ in terms of the voting system, with proportional representation in Norway and first past the post in Britain. Proportional representation usually enables a greater variety of political parties, thus lowering the bar for radical right parties to achieve electoral success. By comparison, the first-past-the-post system usually results in two dominant political parties.

3.3. Mechanisms, indicators and process tracing

As I regard violence as emergent and relational, I found it fruitful to use mechanisms as the driving engine linking background conditions with RIR as an outcome. In other words, RIR is not a light switch that is turned on or off, but rather an emergent process that I seek to trace between 2009 and 2015.

The selection of mechanisms was a thorough process that involved narrowing the list amongst a vast number of competing options. In the end, five remained: institutionalisation/isolation, pressure cooker theory, mirroring, self-fulfilling prophecy and human resources. There were two prerequisites in the selection process. First, taken together, they should touch upon a broad aspect of possible influencing factors, including the internal workings of the SMOs, the relation between them, as well as outside actors that could indirectly affect RIR. Second, the mechanisms needed to be universal and not context-specific. This is related to the ability for future researchers to apply the same mechanisms to a broader set of cases (Tarrow, 2010, p. 239). This, in turn, enhances the external validity of the analysis, by moving beyond the findings of the two cases to potentially making broader generalisations about how violent interactions between adversary SMOs happen.

Next, I identified observable indicators for each mechanism. To illustrate why indicators are crucial for the analysis, let us use the example of police repression. Police repression does not in and of itself affect RIR. Instead, the level of repression may activate the mechanisms of isolation or institutionalisation. However, these two mechanisms are abstract and unobservable concepts, and it is necessary to identify empirical markers that can be used to trace them (Bennett & Checkel, 2016, p. 10). One such indicator concerns the legislative atmosphere, including whether the groups were proscribed and what level of surveillance they endured. The second indicator involves the police response at demonstrations, such as whether the police barred the organisations from protesting.

Some mechanisms, such as the pressure cooker theory related to radical right parties, are harder to observe empirically. In these instances, it is more complicated to dissect the causal chain. Therefore, these results bring with them more caveats, lowering the certainty of the causal inference. A full overview of the theoretical framework is listed in table 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>Police response to protests</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderation</td>
<td>• Banning specific protests</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Restrictions at protests</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Violent interactions between police and SMOs</td>
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<td></td>
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<td><strong>Repression outside demonstrations</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Proscriptions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radical Right Party</td>
<td>Pressure cooker</td>
<td>• Radical right parties’ + UK Conservative Party’s statements on Muslims/Islamists</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Compare above with statements with the EDL and NDL’s views</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The political parties’ electoral success</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy Image</td>
<td>Mirroring</td>
<td>• Counter-demonstrations</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• SMOs reference to adversaries</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Inverting adversary’s symbols and language</td>
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<td>Media Framing</td>
<td>Self-fulfilling prophecy</td>
<td><strong>Elevation</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Interviews with SMO leaders</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Media cycle – media attention compared with mobilisation success</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Media framing of the movement – success/failure</td>
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<td><strong>Cumulative extremism</strong></td>
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<td>• Tit-for-tat violence narrative</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Media assessment of the conflict between the two SMOs</td>
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<td>Organisational and Human Resources</td>
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<td><strong>Organisational resources</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Consistent leadership/frequent turnover in leadership</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Diffusion – establishing regional branches or marching in different cities</td>
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<td><strong>Human resources</strong></td>
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<td>• Former ties to violence</td>
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<td>• Violent interactions</td>
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<td>• Level of violence</td>
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The theoretical framework described in table 1, with conditions, mechanisms and indicators, is the essence of process tracing. Process tracing aims at uncovering how the mechanisms link the conditions to the outcomes – in this instance RIR (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 6).

As I have argued in the theoretical section, no condition or mechanism can alone explain the levels of RIR in Britain and Norway. Some mechanisms may be more consequential than others, but alone they are typically necessary but not sufficient unless combined with other mechanisms. Additionally, there may be different paths to the outcome in different cases. This form of complex causation, also known as equifinality and conjunctural causation, is one of the strengths of process tracing (Rohlfing & Carsten Q, 2018, p. 560). By investigating the mechanisms thoroughly, we can uncover how they interact and may be interdependent on one another, combined leading to different levels of RIR (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 207; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 232).

Developing a theoretical schema prior to collecting the data is what Bennett and Checkel (2016, p. 7) refer to as a deductive form of process tracing, and the purpose of the analysis is thus to test the hypotheses, rather than developing them throughout the analysis.

However, as with all forms of social science methods, process tracing does not lead to deterministic causal inferences (Bennett & Checkel, 2016, p. 12). Similar to other single case studies, I risk confirmation bias by not cross-checking the mechanisms with other cases. This is why I have complemented process tracing with a comparative approach. By analysing a second case with the same mechanisms, I hope to strengthen the confidence of my causal inferences. In other words, a second case can either reinforce my confidence that a particular mechanism impacts RIR, or it could lead to the mechanism being judged as less relevant than initially assumed (Caporaso, 2007, p. 6).

### 3.4. Data collection and research ethics

The next step involved selecting what types of data would be suitable for identifying and tracing my indicators. The data should cover a broad spectrum of actors, ideas, and narratives to attain a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms at play. Accordingly, I chose to complement a document analysis with four semi-structured interviews. An advantage of choosing Norway and Britain is language familiarity. By comprehending the languages, I have access to more data, such as content written or spoken by the SMOs themselves.

Prior to starting the interviews and collecting documents, I submitted the research project to Norsk senter for Forskningsdata (NSD). I have consciously avoided collecting personal information about the activists other than the leaders. In addition, this information is solely based on public statements made by the leaders themselves. These measures on data
collection are in line with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that governs the holding or using of personal data. Taken together, these measures are taken in order to uphold the primary ethical standard in research, namely not doing the participants any harm (Woliver, 2002, p. 677).

3.4.1. Document analysis
For the document analysis, I collected a wide array of sources, including content from the SMOs’ websites, news articles, governmental reports, NGO reports, as well as journal articles or books. Although it would have been valuable to use social media content, there are too many ethical considerations to take into account, especially with the GDPR guidelines. Firstly, there is the issue of whether social media posts are public or private data. A clear example of this is posts written on closed Facebook groups. Second, informed consent and anonymity is crucial in research, and could be challenging to obtain. Thus, social media is not part of the data.

By collecting a heterogeneous source material, I can mitigate the potential bias that exists in each source. This is because a government report, an opinion piece in a newspaper and a post from the EDL’s website will most likely frame the same incident differently. Using such a broad spectrum of data is conventional in process-tracing. Instead of standardised observations, the assumption in this thesis, and process tracing in general, is that every bit of evidence can together shed light on the mechanisms that link the conditions to the outcome (Gerring, 2007, p. 179).

News sources make up the majority of the data. Between 2009 and 2015, Norwegian and British media covered the anti-Islamist and radical Islamist groups extensively. The media covered protests, wrote opinion pieces, and published interviews with activists and experts. Therefore, I regard news sources as a valuable tool for tracking the mechanisms as they relate to the SMOs in Britain and Norway. I used Retriever, a database that monitors Norwegian news outlets, and Factiva, the international equivalent for British news articles. There was a different selection process for collecting Norwegian and British news articles. In Retriever, I conducted a broad search that included all Norwegian newspapers. This is because I am familiar with the Norwegian media landscape and able to judge their style and potential ideological leaning. In contrast, as I am less familiar with British news outlets, I delimited the search in Factiva to a set number of British newspapers. Of the ten daily newspapers with the highest circulation, I selected the three top tabloid outlets (Daily Mail, The Sun and The Daily Mirror) and the two top non-tabloid outlets (The Guardian and The Telegraph). Additionally, I included local newspapers for the three areas in Britain with the
highest reported levels of RIR: Luton (*Bedfordshire Luton*), Birmingham (*Birmingham Mail*) and Yorkshire (*Yorkshire Post*). In total, I downloaded 377 news articles.

Next, I collected material from the SMOs’ websites. What the groups wrote about and how they wrote about it gives me valuable insight into their worldviews. In contrast to news sources that are readily available through Factiva and Retriever, a significant portion of the SMOs’ websites was no longer available on the web. Fortunately, Waybackmachine, a database with snapshots of deleted websites, had archived a large portion of the SMOs’ websites. Not all websites were available through Waybackmachine, however. I thus relied on the work of other students, scholars and organisations that had captured and analysed SMOs’ websites before they were taken down. Some examples include an article written by Paul Woolwich for the Telegraph, who used the EDL and the Bakri Networks’ web pages. For Profetens Ummah sites, I reached out to a previous master student who sent me a vast number of web articles he had collected from the time their web page was still operating. I regard the source material presented by these two and the others as legitimate sources and have no reason to believe they have misconstrued the content.

### 3.4.2. Semi structured interviews

The majority of the sources collected for the document analysis cover one anti-Islamist group or one radical-Islamist group, rather than the interaction between the two. To obtain data that is more explicitly related to RIR, I have conducted four semi-structured interviews. An interview is, simply put, “a conversation with a structure and a purpose” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015, p. 5). The initial plan was to interview both experts and SMO activists. However, reaching out to the SMO activists was more complicated than initially assumed, and I therefore chose to focus my limited time on the experts. There is a potential problem by not including the activists’ accounts, and I risk missing relevant information. However, a large portion of the source material from the newspaper articles and the SMOs’ websites contain statements by the different activists and leaders, partly mitigating the problem of not getting first-hand accounts from the activists themselves.

Therefore, I interviewed three scholars and one journalist. All four had extensive knowledge about either one of the SMOs or on the interactions between them. One of my respondents is Lars Erik Berntzen, a postdoctoral fellow at C-REX (Center for Research on Extremism), who has conducted extensive research on the anti-Islamist movement in Europe. He provided valuable insights on both the NDL and the EDL. I also interviewed Lars Akerhaug, who in 2013 wrote a book about Profetens Ummah called *Norsk Jihad* (Norwegian Jihad). Akerhaug has an interesting background that is worth mentioning. He
was a left-wing activist before he started writing for the liberal-conservative publication, Minerva. In January 2019, he became the editor in Chief at Resett.no, an alternative online news outlet that positions itself to the right of mainstream news. *Norsk Jihad*, which received good reviews, served as the backdrop for our conversation. To cover the Bakri network in Britain, I interviewed Michael Kenney, an associate professor at the University of Pittsburgh, who has conducted ethnographic fieldwork of the network from 2010 to 2015. In 2018, he published the book, *‘The Islamic State in Britain’*, that functioned as the vantage point for our conversation. Lastly, I interviewed Graham Macklin, a postdoctoral fellow at C-REX, who together with Joel Busher has published articles about the conceptual issues surrounding cumulative extremism. Recall that these issues were problematised in the theory chapter and subsequently served as inspiration for the concept of RIR.

Each respondent was given a letter of consent, detailing the content and purpose of the conversation (see appendix I). I began each interview by explaining the topic and operationalising the different concepts. This laid the groundwork for a common vocabulary, mitigating the potential problem of low operational validity, i.e. whether we measure what we think we are measuring (King et al., 1994, p. 25). Therefore, I defined concepts such as RIR, human resources and discursive space in order to avoid us talking beyond one another.

I had an interview guide for each respondent that helped structure the conversation (see appendix II). The questions were centred on the SMO that the respondent had knowledge on, with topics relating to the five conditions and mechanisms derived from my theoretical discussion. The interview guide enabled me to stay on topic while avoiding the rigour of surveys, as I could ask the respondents follow-up questions to explore ideas and concepts exhaustively.

I avoided taking notes during the interviews in order to maintain a natural flow of the conversation. I did use a recording device and transcribed the interviews. As such, future researchers can replicate the study with the transcriptions to check if their findings coincide with mine. This ensures the reliability of my thesis (Mosley, 2013, p. 24). However, I experienced an unexpected challenge when the recording device stopped working during one of the interviews. To make sure I did not misrepresent his views or statements, I sent a summary of the conversation to the respondent the very same day.

3.4.3. Coding
The next and last step involved coding of the data. I coded the data with NVivo 12, computer software designed for coding and analysing qualitative data. As my approach is deductive, I categorised the data into five predefined codes that bore the labels of the conditions under
investigation. These included repression, radical right party, enemy image, media framing and organisational/human resources. I coded and analysed the material in three steps. I started with rough coding where the aim was to describe. The second phase involved refined coding with a causal inkling to the data, tracing how the processes have led to a specific outcome. Last, I wrote a one-page summary for each condition and mechanism for each respective SMO. These summaries provided the basis for causal inferences and comparisons across the cases. In sum, I went from descriptive to causal, to comparative coding, where new patterns were discovered for each step.

Nevertheless, as the analysis contains some form of interpretation, I do run the risk of misconstruing or misrepresenting the data. When coding the material, I tried to avoid confirmation bias caused by cherry-picking the data to fit my narrative, seeing what I wanted to see. To prevent this, I cross-checked the information with different sources to make sure that different accounts overlapped. This, in turn, gave me a more comprehensive picture (Mosley, 2013, p. 22). Additionally, I have remained cognizant of what I did not explicitly see in the data, as non-evidence is valuable information as well (Vennesson, 2008, p. 238). Lastly, the sources related to the Norwegian SMOs are predominately in Norwegian. This can pose a challenge in terms of missing the essence of the quotes when I translate them to English. I have attempted to stay as true to the quotes as possible by translating them close to its original form. Words or phrases that are distinctively Norwegian, such as Snikislamisering, are included in the quote in its original form in addition to the English translation.
Chapter 4

Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation in Britain and Norway

In order to understand how and why Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation (RIR) occurs, we first need to establish the level of interaction between the two groups in Britain and Norway. Thus, this chapter provides an empirical backdrop for the SMOs and the interactions between them. A brief explanation of their ideology, their transnational reach, and organisational composition will be accounted for, before mapping their interactions. As we will see, the scale and frequency of instances involving RIR are markedly higher in Britain than in Norway.

4.1. Britain

The situation in Britain between 2009 and 2015 can be characterised as contentious at best. The Bakri Network and the EDL frequently clashed at demonstrations, often ending with arrests. The interactions between them ranged from light, symbolic violence to physical clashes with lethal outcomes. However, as we will see, there appeared to be a lower threshold for the Bakri Network to turn to lethal violence, while the EDL mainly stuck to weapons that caused less harm. As such, the fatal incidents were all perpetrated by the Bakri Network while the lower scale of violence is equally distributed between the two groups.

4.1.1. The Bakri Network

The radical Islamist movement has been present in Britain for decades. The SMO that has garnered the most controversy and attention is Al Muhajiroun (from hereon called the Bakri Network, with reference to the groups’ undisputed leader, Omar Bakri). The network was founded in 1996 and adheres to radical Salafi ideology with the stated goal of establishing a Shariah state in Britain (Raymond, 2010, p. 8). Recall that the main principle within radical Salafism is to imitate the lifestyle of Prophet Mohammed and the first four generations of Muslims.

The Bakri Network and other radical Salafi groups deviate from Islamism in their belief that violence is a legitimate tool in order to reach one’s goal (Moghadam, 2009, p. 38). Still, engaging in domestic terrorist attacks is a contested issue within the Bakri Network. The leaders argue, at least publicly, that the group has made a covenant of security with Britain, making it illegitimate for them to conduct domestic terror attacks. However, respecting this covenant is an individual choice, and Anjem Choudary, one of the Network’s
most prominent leaders, argued that he understands why some of his activists perceive the covenant to be illegitimate (Choudary, 2011; Kenney, 2019). Thus, some members of the Bakri Network view terrorist attacks as legitimate as they constitute a part of militant Jihadism (Lia, 2018, 97).

Throughout the years, the Bakri network has arranged a number of provocative demonstrations and illegal activities, leading the British government to ban the group four times (HomeOffice, 2017). However, this has often had counter-productive effects, with the Bakri Network playing cat and mouse with law enforcement, establishing new spin-off groups after each ban.

This contentious relationship with the police has also made the group change its organisational structure, shifting from a centralised to a decentralised network. This, in turn, made it harder for law enforcement to decapitate the network as the arrest of one leader would only curb one part of the network while the rest could continue their activism (Kenney, 2018, p. 54). In addition, the group has proved adaptable to leadership changes. Following the departure of Omar Bakri to Lebanon in order to avoid arrest in Britain, Anjem Choudary took over as the head of the organisation. Despite these leadership alterations, the network upheld communicative channels with Bakri in Lebanon and continued its activism in line with its original goals and methods.

The Bakri Network mainly recruited on the street through *da’wah* stalls and on university campuses. Additionally, the activists were encouraged to recruit from their circle of kin and friends. Although the media portrayed the Bakri Network as influential and large, the SMO constituted of less than 40 activists between 2009 and 2015 (Kenney, 2018, p. 371; Raymond, 2010, p. 10). Despite its limited number of activists, it is important to bear in mind that the Bakri Network was connected to a large, transnational network of radical Salafi groups in Europe. Within this transnational movement, the Bakri Network has been an inspirational source to the European spin-off groups such as its Norwegian sister organisation, Profetens Ummah (Rolfsen, 2017).

4.1.2. The English Defence League
In contrast to the radical Islamists, the anti-Islamist movement is a relatively novel phenomenon in Britain. Tommy Robinson (whose real name is Stephen Yaxley-Lennon) established the English Defence League (EDL) in Luton in 2009, and the establishment marked the third wave of anti-Islamist movements in Europe (Berntzen, 2018). This was also

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1 *Da’wah* is an Arabic word that means to invite someone. It is used when Muslims share their faith with someone about Islam (The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, 2019)
the time when the anti-Islamists movement went from being a predominately online phenomenon to a street movement. Since then, similar groups with overlapping goals and methods have come and gone. Some of these include Casuals United, British National Party (BNP), Britain First, and PEGIDA (Busher & Macklin, 2015, p. 885). Nevertheless, the EDL remained the largest and most influential anti-Islamist organisation up until 2015.

The EDL was originally established as a counter-movement to the Bakri Network, with a goal of countering radical Islamism (EDL, 2009). However, throughout the period, they switched from focusing solely on radical Islamists to Muslim grooming gangs and Muslim immigration at large (Macklin 2019). Within the EDL framing, there were echoes of the Eurabia conspiracy, labelling both Islam and European elites conspiring to ‘Islamise Europe’ as an existential threat (Goodwin et al., 2016, p. 7).

In contrast to the radical Islamists, the anti-Islamist movement is predominately non-violent, as they regard it as prestigious to act in accordance with the law (Smedsrud & Berntzen, 2018, p. 35). This is a significant difference given that the Bakri Network does not recognise man-made law, whereas the EDL sees itself as protectors of democracy (Berntzen, 2019). Despite these principles, the EDL has engaged in repeated violent interactions with adversaries at protests (Berntzen, 2018b, p. 86). Their choice of weapons include fist fighting and throwing glass bottles, bricks and rocks, while abstaining from using lethal weapons such as guns and knives (Macklin, 2019).

The first three years of the EDL’s existence was marked by substantial growth in activists and turnout, and the organisation diffused through the establishment of regional branches. During this time, the EDL arranged over 50 demonstrations, where the most successful ones had over 3000 participants a (Berntzen, 2018a, p. 91). During the first four years, Tommy Robinson was the EDL’s undisputed leader with his cousin Kevin Carroll serving as his right hand. However, following a period of internal strife, Robinson and Carroll left the EDL in 2013, and the group’s street presence diminished around the same time. Today, the EDL is mainly an online movement with a significant presence on social media channels. Nevertheless, during its first four years of existence, the EDL inspired a number of Defence Leagues throughout Europe, including the Norwegian Defence League, demonstrating the transnational reach of the Defence Leagues that made up the third wave of anti-Islamism.

4.1.3. Reciprocal intergroup radicalisation in Britain
The Bakri network and the EDL frequently engaged in RIR on the streets between 2009 and 2015. Their first interaction is marked by the EDL’s establishment, which was in response to
the Bakri Network picketing funerals of returning British soldiers in Luton in 2009 (Ebner, 2017, p. 162). In this sense, we can label the anti-Islamists as a counter-movement to the radical Islamists. Throughout the time period, the EDL and the Bakri network frequently showed up to counter-demonstrate against each other. In 2010, the newest spin-off group from the Bakri network, Islam4UK, protested at a homecoming parade for British soldiers returning from Afghanistan. The group held banners reading, “butchers return” while burning British and American flags. The EDL protested across the streets, shouting slogans like “Muslim bombers off our streets” (Ebner, 2017, p. 158).

Additionally, the EDL and the Bakri network have utilised symbols and made tactical adaptations in response to one another. Anjem Choudary, one of the leading figures of the Bakri network, established the Islamic Emergency Defence (with the provocative acronym IED, referring to car bombs used against NATO forces in Afghanistan), closely resembling a vigilante group that operated under the EDL banner, with the stated aim of retaliating and preventing anti-Muslim hate crimes (Ebner, 2017, p. 164). We also see that both groups utilised the same verses from the Quran, referring to how Muslims need to kill unbelievers in order to underscore their narrative of an inevitable conflict (Ebner, 2017, p. 201).

Further up on the protest repertoire, both SMOs have resorted to symbolic violence. In addition to burning British flags, the Bakri Network burnt poppies on Armistice Day in November 2010 – a symbol of great patriotic importance in Britain. The EDL retaliated by painting a two-metre tall poppy on the wall of the Mosque where a number of the Bakri Network members were affiliated (Ebner, 2017, p. 166). Also, the EDL has occasionally set fire to the Quran during protests (Berntzen, 2018b, p. 86).

These acts of symbolic violence have sometimes been accompanied by violent clashes between the two groups. Symbolic days like Armistice Day and September 11th have proved to be exceptionally fertile ground for clashes, often ending with arrests (The Telegraph, 2011). Returning to Armistice Day in 2010, after the Bakri Network had burnt poppies, the two adversaries broke a police barricade and physically attacked one another (Kenney, 2018, p. 145). Clashes erupted again on Armistice Day the following year with the same intensity and scale (The Telegraph, 2011).

The Bakri Network has also resorted to lethal violence. In June 2012, six members of Muslims Against Crusades, a spin-off group from the Bakri Network, were involved in an unsuccessful bomb plot at an EDL rally. At trial, the judge labelled the plot particularly harmful as the perpetrator’s aim was “death, mayhem and a spiral of tit-for-tat violence”. In other words, they were trying to spark a spiral of violence (Birmingham Mail, 2013).
One year later, two radical Islamists hacked the British soldier Lee Rigby to death on the streets of Woolwich (Bush & Macklin, 2015, p. 885). This incident led to a surge in recruits to the EDL, who arranged large-scale demonstrations nationwide (Ebner, 2017, p. 159). The Woolwich attack also led to a sharp increase in anti-Muslim hate-crimes – both online and offline (Feldman & Littler, 2014). In addition, this also marked the time where the media started to frame the conflict between the two groups within the narrative of cumulative extremism (Macklin, 2019; The Guardian, 2011b). However, this peak of interactions quickly receded back to the levels prior to the incident (Bush & Macklin, 2015, pp. 885-886). After the spike in 2013 receded, the EDL experienced internal feuds and low turnout at their protests (EDL, 2014). Simultaneously, the Bakri Network was severely diminished after a number of activists had travelled to Syria and Iraq while key leadership figures were arrested in Britain (Kenney, 2018).

4.2. Norway

Although both the NDL and Profetens Ummah emerged around the same time, the two groups rarely engaged with one another. Compared to its British counterparts, the NDL and Profetens Ummah appeared to be operating in different spheres, seldom mobilising as a reaction to the adversary. As such, there were far fewer instances of interactions between the two, and the few that are worth mentioning can be placed on a markedly lower scale on the protest repertoire as compared to the British case.

4.2.1. The Norwegian Defence League

The anti-Islamist movement has operated in Norway for almost two decades. The first organisation can be traced back to the early 2000s when Arne Tumyr established Forum mot Islamisering (Forum against Islamisation). In 2008, Tumyr changed the name of the organisation to Stopp Islamiseringen av Norge (Stop The Islamisation of Norway), and subsequently became a part of the transnational Stop the Islamisation movement (Berntzen, 2018a, pp. 90-91). However, it was not until the EDL’s success in Britain that the Norwegian anti-Islamist movement gained traction, and in 2010, a group of activists established the Norwegian Defence League (NDL). In contrast to Britain, there were no radical-Islamist SMOs operating on the streets of Norway at the time, and the NDL’s main concern was Islamisation at large, rather than radical Islamists (Alte, 2011). Similar to its British counterparts, the NDL adhered to a non-violent approach, trying to act within the bounds of the law. What distinguished the NDL from the EDL was that they did, in fact, stay true to their principles, with no instances of violence during protests (Berntzen, 2019).
From its inception, the NDL was riddled with internal strife and poor organisational skills, lacking a leadership figure like Tommy Robinson to build momentum. An indicative example is how two competing NDL’s existed simultaneously at one point in time in 2011 (TV 2, 2011c). Furthermore, the turnout at NDL rallies was low, with their first demonstration attracting only ten activists (NRK, 2011b). During its first years, the NDL changed its leadership four times, three due to infighting (Dagbladet, 2011a; Dagen, 2012; TV 2, 2013c).

The influence that the EDL wielded on the NDL was evident when Tommy Robinson himself removed one of the NDL leaders through a vote of no confidence (TV 2, 2011a). This illustrates how the EDL held an influential position within the transnational Defence League movement at the time.

In contrast to Britain, Norway has an influential political party that fronts anti-Islamist rhetoric and policies, namely Fremskrittspartiet (The Progress Party). However, calling Fremskrittspartiet an ally to the NDL would be going a step too far, as their relationship was predominately characterised as tense and conflictual (Berntzen, 2019).

4.2.2. Profetens Ummah
In 2010, a new type of radical Islamist network emerged in Norway with Profetens Ummah (The Prophet’s Ummah). While Norwegian radical Islamist groups had traditionally consisted of ethnically homogeneous networks, Profetens Ummah was different in their multiethnic composition, consisting predominately of Norwegian nationals (Nesser & Lia, 2016, p. 121). By transcending ethnicity, the new network was able to draw in more recruits than former groups had been able to. Nesser and Lia (2016, p. 128) wrote that the network emerged following the Gaza Riots in Oslo in 2009. A few disenfranchised youths clashed with the police, which subsequently acted as a radicalising force. After the Gaza Riots, Moheylddeen Muhammad and Arfan Bhatti started recruiting and mobilising individuals, eventually solidifying a network known as Profetens Ummah. Recruitment happened predominately through kinship, friends and other close relationships (PST, 2014, p. 5). In addition, large Mosque communities functioned as a recruitment tool, especially in South Eastern cities like Oslo and Larvik (Østlands-Posten, 2013).

Similar to the Bakri Network, Profetens Ummah adhered to radical Salafi doctrine, and the group’s goal was predominately centred on ending Western intervention in majority Muslim countries (Lia, 2018, p. 100). From 2013 onwards, the Syrian civil war and the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate caught their full attention (Nesser & Lia, 2016, p. 130).
While the Bakri Network had influential and resilient leaders such as Omar Bakri and Anjem Choudary, the leadership structure of Profetens Ummah was more fragile, struggling with internal tensions. Ubaydullah Hussain was the group’s leader for a while, but his authority was contested when it became known that he received welfare benefits from the government, something which is frowned upon within radical Salafi circles (TV 2, 2013a).

The group arranged their first demonstration in 2010, protesting the Norwegian newspapers that had printed satirical cartoons of the Prophet – an incident that also sparked international outrage. However, it was Profetens Ummah’s protest outside Parliament in 2012 that gained them notoriety as radicals in the media. As the group was protesting the war in Afghanistan, some of the speakers uttered violent threats directed at the Norwegian government due to their involvement in the war (Lia, 2018, p. 101). There were also other occasions where the network legitimised violence, and there were frequent news reports about how the leading figures applauded international terrorist attacks (Dagbladet, 2013b; TV 2, 2013b). However, despite this violent rhetoric, the group never engaged in actual physical violence on the streets of Norway.

Similar to the NDL and the EDL, Profetens Ummah had close links with the Bakri Network in Britain, and we can regard the two as part of the same transnational movement (Aftenposten, 2013a). Despite staying in close contact with Choudary and other Bakri Network leaders and receiving advice, Profetens Ummah proved less resilient to police repression, unaware that the police had tapped the activists’ phones (Akerhaug, 2019). By 2015, several Profetens Ummah activists had travelled to Syria, and some of the central leadership figures had been killed in combat. The remaining leaders had been imprisoned in Norway for terrorist recruitment (TV 2, 2016). As a result of these developments, the group ceased to exist in 2015.

4.2.3. Reciprocal intergroup radicalisation in Norway

Compared to Britain, there were far fewer and less violent interactions between the two SMOs in Norway. Still, four instances are worth noting. The SMOs first direct contact occurred in January 2012, when the NDL turned up to counter-demonstrate at Profetens Ummah’s protest against the Afghanistan war (Aftenposten, 2012b). However, the groups did not directly interact with one another during the protest. A month later, Arfan Bhatti, a central leader in Profetens Ummah, sent a threatening letter to Ronny Alte, the NDL leader at the time. Bhatti said the letter was a response to a web-post about him on the NDL’s website, referring to Bhatti as a coward (ABC Nyheter, 2012). In December of 2012, the NDL held a demonstration at Grønland, a multiethnic neighbourhood in Oslo, where Profetens Ummah
showed up to counter-demonstrate. A few days before the rally, Profetens Ummah had warned the police on social media to monitor the NDL members for their own safety (TV 2, 2012a). The third and last interaction between the two groups happened in 2016. Although this is one year after the time analysed, it is worth mentioning as it concerns mirroring. A year earlier, former NDL members had established a street patrol group called *Odins Soldater* (Odin’s Soldiers). At the onset of 2016, Profetens Ummah announced that *Allahs soldater* (Allah's Soldiers) would be marching in the streets, countering anti-Muslim hate crimes. However, the two vigilante groups were marching in different cities, and they never interacted with one another (VG, 2016).

In sum, we see great discrepancies in terms of observed levels of RIR in Britain and Norway. With this in mind, the analysis will investigate why and how these supposedly similar SMOs have exhibited different levels of RIR. For a full overview of RIR incidents in Britain and Norway, see Appendix I.
Chapter 5

Analysis

This chapter sets out to present the findings from the empirical analysis. As we will see, all but one condition and mechanism impacts the levels of RIR, albeit in varying degrees. As hypothesised in the theoretical chapter, no condition or mechanism can explain the outcome alone. Some of the mechanisms operate as clear, connective tissues between the conditions and the outcome. Others are harder to discern, with a long, blurry causal chain.

Together, however, the conditions and mechanisms are interdependent and come a long way in explaining why we observe different levels of RIR in Britain and Norway. Starting with the internal workings of the SMOs, we will look at how organisational and human resources impact RIR. Next, I aim to discuss the impact external actors can have on RIR, namely law enforcement. The relational mechanism surrounding enemy image and mirroring will then be explained. Last, I will present the findings from media congruence and how this activated the mechanism of the self-fulfilling prophecy.

5.1. Organisational and human resources

The English Defence League (EDL) grew exponentially between 2009 and 2013, arranging weekly demonstrations with well over 1000 attendees at the most successful ones. By 2010, the EDL had established regional branches and inspired the creation of similar Defence Leagues all across Europe. It was common for violent confrontations to erupt between the EDL and adversary groups, and the activists were repeatedly arrested for public disorder. In contrast, the Norwegian Defence League (NDL) never managed to imitate the success of its British counterpart, with only a handful of activists showing up at their rallies. Additionally, the NDL would cancel demonstrations if they thought that violence could break out.

How can we understand this discrepancy between the EDL and the NDL in terms of organisational strength and attitudes towards violence? More importantly, what does this imply for Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalization (RIR) between anti-Islamist and radical Islamist SMOs? In the following sections, I will discuss how strong leadership and a militant faction enabled for RIR to escalate in Britain, whereas the absence of these two factors inhibited RIR in Norway. Together, these two conditions explain both the ability to sustain contention as well as discrepancies in the willingness and ability to engage in violent interactions with adversaries.
5.1.1. The Norwegian Defence League and its ten, leaderless disciples
The NDL was riddled with internal strife and poor organisational skills from its very inception. During the two first years, the NDL had four different leaders, with three of them leaving due to infighting (Dagbladet, 2011a; Dagen, 2012; TV 2, 2013c). The EDL and Tommy Robinson personally removed the second NDL leader, Lena Andreassen, in 2011 through a vote of no confidence. The EDL’s decision came after an unsuccessful demonstration where only ten NDL activists showed up. The EDL released a press statement, writing: “we will no longer affiliate with, or support this version of the NDL […] we feel that due to recent events we can no longer maintain our affiliation” (TV 2, 2011a).

A few years later, news outlets revealed that the Police Security Forces (PST) and activists from the far-left group SOS-rasisme, had infiltrated the inner circle of the NDL in 2011. These infiltrators made a covert effort to increase internal tensions within the leadership to weaken the organisation from within (PST, 2012). The NDL’s focus on quelling internal strife came at the expense of building a successful street movement. This is key in explaining why the NDL was mainly an online phenomenon as compared to the EDL that had a sizeable street presence. Also, due to the lack of strong and reliable leadership, the NDL never succeeded in its attempts to establish regional branches in other parts of Norway, making the NDL's street activism predominately Oslo based (Itromsø, 2012).

5.1.2. Anti-Islamist militant activists
However, numbers are not everything. Whereas organisational skills play a part in explaining why the EDL had a more substantial street presence, we need to turn to the human profile of the street activists in order to explain part of why the EDL was more prone to engage in violence with the Bakri Network than the NDL was with Profetens Ummah.

The EDL activists who resorted to violence were, in broad strokes, working-class men with ties to and experience with football hooligan firms, a community that is known for violence (Berntzen, 2019). A number of EDL leaders also had personal experience with hooligan firms, including Tommy Robinson (Pitchford, 2011). The EDL would encourage hooligans to join ranks at their protests by timing their demonstrations as to coincide with football matches (Ebner, 2017, p. 163). At protests, the hooligans could unite under one banner, just like they would do in international football matches, substituting slogans about France and Germany with Islam (Allen, 2011, p. 284).

The age range of the EDL activists varied from teenagers to middle-aged – mostly men. My initial assumption was that the younger members would be more risk-prone and
therefore more willing to engage in violence than the older activists. Contrary to my assumptions, I found that some of the middle-aged men who were involved in the hooligan culture in the 1980s were frequently engaging in violent confrontations (Macklin, 2019). The 1980s was a period characterised by higher levels of violence than today, and these experiences had socialised some EDL activists into violence. Thirty years later, these older activists had a lower threshold for engaging in violent confrontations when marching under the EDL banner.

The human profile of the EDL could not be further from the type of people who joined the NDL in Norway. Norwegian hooligan culture can be characterised as far less violent than in Britain, and the Norwegian hooligan community was thus no natural arena for activists to socialise into violence before joining the NDL. Besides, although there was some talk about overlapping ties between hooligans and the NDL in 2010, this never manifested itself into actual cooperation, and the football clubs actively distanced themselves from the SMO (Berntzen, 2019; VG, 2011a). In other words, the NDL activists were far removed from the British street hooligan culture, where violence plays a more integral part. Whereas the EDL stated that it was “naïve to guarantee no violence” (The Guardian, 2010) at their demonstrations, the NDL would cancel protests if there was a chance that violence could break out. We see this from an NDL press release after they cancelled a demonstration in 2011:

After receiving signals that extremist activists wish to create a violent counter-protest, and without sufficient signals that the police will be able to prevent violent events, we have for the time being decided to postpone our planned demonstration (NDL press statement) (Klassekampen, 2011a).

Furthermore, the NDL would often be escorted away by the police after demonstrations in order to avoid confrontations with adversaries, while British law enforcement frequently targeted and arrested EDL activists (Birmingham Mail, 2010b, 2012; The Sun, 2012).

5.1.3. The Bakri Network
Similar to the EDL, a strong and consistent leadership ran the Bakri Network. The group's first leader, Omar Bakri Mohammad, broke off from the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir in 1996 to establish Al-Muhajiroun (the Bakri Network). From 1996 to 2006, Bakri was the group’s undisputed leader, with Anjem Choudary operating as his right hand. Choudary took over as the head of the network after Bakri fled to Lebanon in 2004 in order to avoid arrest in Britain. Nevertheless, from his exile in Lebanon, Bakri upheld communicative channels with
the British network. In other words, despite leadership changes, the Bakri Network lived on and upheld its activism in line with its original doctrine.

After the British Home Office proscribed the Bakri Network in 2006, the group changed its centralised leadership structure into a decentralised structure, containing a limited number of sub-leaders all in charge of different hubs of activists (Kenney, 2018, p. 54). We will see in the section on repression how this decentralised network made the Bakri Network resilient. However, for the purpose of leadership, it is apparent that strong and adaptable leaders were key in explaining how the network continued its street activism despite leadership changes and government proscriptions.

5.1.4. Profetens Ummah
Just as the NDL was an offspring of the EDL in Britain, so was Profetens Ummah a branch of the Bakri Network. In contrast to the Bakri Network, Profetens Ummah never had one charismatic leadership figure holding the group together. Instead, there were a few prominent figures at the top, including Egzon Avdyli as a spokesperson, Arfan Bhatti as a charismatic recruiter, and Ubaydullah Hussain as the group’s leader (Akerhaug, 2019). Hussain’s leadership was internally disputed after the media reported that he was receiving welfare benefits from the Norwegian government – something which is frowned upon within radical Salafi circles (TV 2, 2013a).

Moreover, Profetens Ummah soon shifted their focus from building a street movement in Norway to the new caliphate in Syria and Iraq. By 2015, an estimated number of 90 Norwegian nationals had travelled to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters, with the majority having links to Profetens Ummah (Nesser & Lia, 2016, p. 129). By this time, some of the most central leadership figures, like Avdyli, had been killed in combat. Hussain and other remaining front-figures were imprisoned in Norway for terrorist recruitment (TV 2, 2016). In other words, the whole leadership structure of Profetens Ummah was eradicated within a few years, and the group’s activity was subsequently brought to a halt.

5.1.5. The human profile of the radical Islamists
The analysis shows that the Bakri network and Profetens Ummah’s recruits overlap in terms of their human profile. Both groups recruited people in their late teens and early twenties – mostly men. Young age appears to be correlated with lower risk aversion, as the two examples below illustrate: First, the majority of the foreign fighters connected to either the Bakri Network or Profetens Ummah were under 30 (PST, 2016, p. 6). Second, Kenney (2019) observed during his fieldwork that it was often the younger, more ardent activists of the Bakri Network who were willing to engage in violent interactions with the EDL.
Choudary and the other older activists would step back as soon as fighting broke out. The exception from this rule was the veteran activists in their 30s and late 20s who had been socialised into violence through years of confrontational interactions with adversaries, illustrating the relational character of violence. In addition to young age, it is apparent that both groups attracted some people with a criminal background who had violence convictions and a history of gang affiliation (Kenney, 2019; PST, 2016, p. 9). Hence, whereas some EDL activists had been socialised into violence through hooliganism, so did gang affiliation facilitate socialisation into violence for some of the radical Islamist activists. Thus, we are seeing the same pattern of young, male activists, in addition to veterans who had experience with violence in all three SMOs except for the NDL.

5.1.6. Strong leaders, militant activists and RIR
The elaboration above indicates that strong leadership and the human profile of the activists can explain part of why there have been higher observed levels of RIR in Britain. The Bakri Network and the EDL had strong and charismatic leadership that was able to build strong organisations and diffuse the street activism nationally. Furthermore, both the EDL and the Bakri Network recruited a large number of young activists or activists that had previously been socialised into violence – either through hooliganism or gang activity. In other words, when the two SMOs have strong organisational resources and a substantial portion of militant activists, it enables violent interactions to escalate. Interestingly, it appears that there was a ‘cap’ on the scale of violence the EDL was willing to engage in. There were no reports about the group using lethal weapons such as guns or knives. This stands in stark contrast with the most militant Bakri Network activists, who used machetes and explosives. Thus, it appears as if the EDL were uninterested in moving beyond their conventional protest repertoire of using bottles and engaging in fist fights, which could explain why they did not retaliate incidents such as the Lee Rigby attack with equally lethal weapons.

In Norway, on the other hand, it is clear that the lack of a strong leader, internal strife and the shifting focus to Syria and Iraq made Profetens Ummah short-lived. The fact that the SMO was established at a later time than the Bakri Network might have had an impact as well, as the most militant activists soon relocated to Syria and Iraq, rather than continuing their street activism in Norway. In the time frame where both the NDL and Profetens Ummah were active on the streets of Norway, the former never presented itself as a violent counterpart. This can be attributed to the NDL’s poor organisational skills, internal strife, and a human profile far removed from the other three organisations.
5.2. Repression

On Armistice Day 11\textsuperscript{th} of November 2010, the then spin-off from the Bakri Network, Muslims Against Crusades (MAC), and the EDL were shouting slogans at each other, only separated by a police barricade. As tensions rose, Robinson and a handful of EDL activists tore down the police barricade, and a physical confrontation erupted between the two groups. As the riot police intervened, the activists attacked them as well, with one police officer sent to the hospital with a head wound (Kenney, 2018, p. 145). On Armistice day the following year, fighting erupted again between MAC and the EDL, which resulted in the then Home Secretary Theresa May deciding to ban the Bakri spin-off group for the third time in less than a decade (Birmingham Mail, 2011). However, only a month later, the Bakri Network re-launched its activism under the new name, United Ummah, vehemently insisting that this was a different group than MAC (Kenney, 2018, p. 147).

What does this tell us? I argue that harsh repression did not moderate nor curb the activity of neither the Bakri Network nor the EDL, and that harsh repression instead activated the mechanism of isolation and militarisation. In Norway, the police responded differently to Profetens Ummah and the NDL, much attributable to the fact that there never was observed violence potential within the NDL. This, in turn, mitigated injustice grievances amongst the NDL activists, but not Profetens Ummah. Nevertheless, with only one SMO radicalising, RIR remained relatively contained in Norway.

5.2.1. The Bakri Network

For over a decade, British legislators and law enforcement played cat and mouse with the Bakri Network, implementing ad-hoc legislation trying to curb the group's activity. The Bakri Network has operated under more than ten different names, changing it each time the government banned them (HomeOffice, 2017, p. 6). British law enforcement also attempted to limit the influence of Choudary and other network leaders by restricting their access to public platforms, such as banning ‘hate preachers’ from appearing on television. This was an ad-hoc response to the BBC and Channel 4 airing an interview with Choudary following the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013 (Daily Mail, 2013). However, to each restrictive measure, the Bakri Network adapted, and it was only after the Home Office listed the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a terrorist organisation that they were able to charge Anjem Choudary and other prominent leaders for encouraging support for a terrorist group (The Guardian, 2015). The British public saw Choudary in jail as a turning point in the fight against the Bakri Network now that he was cut off from the remaining activists (Kenney, 2018, p. 207). However, previous incidents with imprisoning Bakri Network activists have shown that they
do not de-radicalise in prison. Instead, many returned to the organisation upon release with a higher standing within the network (Kenney, 2018, p. 54)

As laid out in the theory chapter, I hypothesise that overly harsh repressive police tactics can fuel injustice grievances and activate the militarisation and isolation of an organisation. This is what appears to be the case with the Bakri Network. Regardless of what repressive measures British law enforcement imposed, the Bakri Network adapted each time, proving to be resilient to repression. The change in the organisational structure was vital to how the network managed to continue its activism. The network became less vulnerable to arrests by restructuring the network from centralised, with one leader at the top, to a decentralised network. This decentralised structure was composed of several hubs with different sub-leaders – all in close contact and cooperation with one another. This structure meant that the arrest of one sub-leader did not demobilise the network as a whole (Kenney, 2018, p. 43).

Additionally, the Bakri Network put a strong emphasis on ideological indoctrination, which mitigated sub-leaders and activists from wandering off and establishing splinter groups (Kenney, 2018, p. 6). As law enforcement repeatedly limited the space the Bakri Network could operate in, either by banning them or by curbing their activity, the activists had to move underground in order to continue their activism. This move to the underground made the network isolated from the broader Islamic community in Britain (Kenney, 2018, p. 123). Without outside influence, the group could further militarise. An indication of this is seen in a study that found that 15% of all terrorism-related convictions in the UK were either members of or had links to the Bakri Network (Raymond, 2010, p. 11). One such former Bakri Network activist was Michael Adebolajo, who assassinated Lee Rigby in 2013 (Aftenposten, 2013c).

However, there are some examples of the Bakri Network moderating their tactics instead of isolating, but these measures were never at the expense of their overall goals. An example of this is how the group removed the most controversial content at their da'wah stalls after recurring violent interactions with the police. The network argued that it was better to stay in line with the restrictions imposed in order to avoid being shut down completely (Kenney, 2018, p. 164). In sum, we see that the network was able to circumvent repressive measures by the police and isolated, rather than institutionalised. When they did moderate, it was on smaller issues that did not undermine their overall goals. Thus, it appears as if banning the SMO and limiting their space had a counter-productive effect.
5.2.2. Trial and error with the English Defence League

The emergence of the EDL on the streets in 2009 presented a novel situation for the police, who were unaware of how to curb the violence that occurred at the protests. The police underwent a restructuring process in order to deal with the EDL, with the first few years characterised by trial and error. Macklin (2019) mentioned in our conversation that one such measure involved holding the EDL activists in lockdown during protests, denying them access to food and water while taking one by one out to photograph them. Berntzen (2019) mentioned another approach, which involved restricting the EDL's space to operate in, such as making it difficult for them to move from location A to B. There were also instances where the EDL and affiliate groups were not allowed to hold demonstrations, but such restrictions were always reactive as a consequence of violence breaking out at previous demonstrations (Luton Today, 2009). However, in contrast to the Bakri Network, the EDL was never proscribed by the Home Office and was never labelled an "extremist organisation" by the government (Birmingham Mail, 2010a).

Some of the repressive measures did fuel injustice grievances amongst some EDL activists, who argued that there were discrepancies in law enforcement’s handling of the Bakri Network and the EDL, stating on their website:

Anyone remember the horrific police brutality in Rochdale? Police officers assaulted young women and sent dogs into the crowd to attack people, who were peacefully standing on the grass as ordered by the police, whilst at the same time allowing the Muslim group opposite to wreak havoc and attack them (EDL, 2011a).

Nevertheless, a crucial distinction between the radical Islamists and the anti-Islamists lies in their ideology and attitudes toward the secular state. Whereas the Bakri Network viewed British laws as illegitimate, a vital feature of the anti-Islamist movement is that they are patriotic, proclaiming to be the true defenders of liberal democracy (Bush & Macklin, 2015, p. 898). In other words, it was in their tactical self-interest not to go beyond the bounds of the law. This is why the EDL, albeit grudgingly, often accepted the police's restrictions. When they did break the law, the EDL grounded it in their liberal democratic rights, as illustrated in the following statement:

When you let me out of court with any bail conditions that restrict my democratic right to oppose militant Islam, I will break them the minute I walk out of that courtroom (EDL, 2011b).

However, the relationship between the EDL and the police changed in 2012. According to Neil and Garland (2014, p. 136), the police started to take a more conciliatory approach at
demonstrations. Rather than barring the EDL from protesting, the police shifted their focus on keeping rival groups separate. The shift subsequently led to fewer arrests at EDL rallies. This can be indicative of how the shift in tactics by the police to a more conciliatory role facilitated a de-escalation of the interaction with the EDL—subsequently mitigating injustice grievances amongst the activists. More importantly, it can also explain why there were fewer violent interactions between the Bakri Network and the EDL.

5.2.3. Profetens Ummah and the witch-hunt

Nesser and Lia (2016, p. 128) argue that the interaction between Muslim youth and the police at the Gaza Riots in Oslo 2009 functioned as a radicalising force for some of those involved. What started as a peaceful demonstration against Israeli involvement in Gaza, ended with violent confrontations between Muslim youth and the police. This fuelled injustice grievances and a sense of victimhood amongst some of the participants (Nesser & Lia, 2016, p. 128). Shortly after the riot, Arfan Bhatti, Moheylddeen Mohammed, and a few other radical Islamists started recruiting disenfranchised youth to what was later going to be known as Profetens Ummah. In contrast to the Bakri Network, Norwegian police gave Profetens Ummah plenty of leeway, and none of the protests ended up with arrests—despite inflammatory rhetoric amongst some of the activists (ABC Nyheter, 2010). However, it is important to note that their demonstration style was far less confrontational than the Bakri Network, and we can thus interpret the police's response as reactive.

A more pressing concern for the Police Security Forces (PST) was related to a handful of Profetens Ummah activists who were travelling to terrorist training camps abroad, potentially posing a violent threat upon returning to Norway. At the time, there was no legislation forbidding this type of travels (PST, 2011). Consequently, instead of prosecuting the activists, they emulated a tactic used on right-wing extremists in the 1990s. This approach involved running a zero tolerance policy towards law violations committed by the activists, regardless of how minor the offences were (Aftenposten, 2012a). An example of this approach is when Ubaydullah Hussain was charged with three threats, two against journalists and one against Norwegian Jews (NTB, 2012). Other cases include raiding the activists’ homes and tapping their phones (Aftenposten, 2013b; Akerhaug, 2019). Similar to Britain, the emergence of ISIS became a turning point for Norwegian law enforcement, as the PST could now arrest activists for publicly supporting and recruiting activists to ISIS (Dagbladet, 2017). This led to, amongst other things, a nine-year sentence against Ubaydullah Hussain for recruiting activists to ISIS (NRK, 2018b).
The police tactics fuelled injustice grievances among the Profetens Ummah activists, who voiced discontent with how the PST was conducting what they perceived to be a witch-hunt. Akerhaug (2019) mentioned during the interview that it was mainly the frequent visits at the activists’ homes that led to injustice grievances. At a press conference, Profetens Ummah addressed the PST:

This witch-hunt that has taken place these last weeks, started by the PST, is not based on anything else than lies. The government and PST have been unanimous in fighting and stopping the radical Muslims. But we ask from what? Are they committing a crime? (Nettavisen, 2012)

As mentioned, Profetens Ummah shifted their attention from street-based activism to the emerging caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Their new cause involved transferring money to foreign fighters in ISIS and facilitate the travels for Norwegian foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq – activities deemed illegal by Norwegian authorities. Thus, this led the group to move their activism underground, remote from police surveillance.

Hence, during the time of analysis, there were no violent interactions with the police during demonstrations, as it was the activity that took place outside demonstrations that required law enforcement’s full attention. However, when comparing Profetens Ummah’s interaction with the police to the Bakri Network and the British police, it is essential to keep in mind that the Bakri Network existed for far longer and was engaged in more street protests. As argued in the theory chapter, violence is emergent and relational, and the more extended period of interaction thus enables for the radicalisation of interactions between the police and the SMOs. This helps explain parts of why there were no violent interactions between Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian police on the streets.

5.2.4. The Norwegian Defence League
In contrast to the three groups analysed above, the police imposed close to no restrictive measures against the NDL. We can attribute this to the human profile of the NDL activists, who, as shown earlier, was far less prone to engage in violence than the three other groups (Berntzen, 2019). In other words, the police’s response appears to be reactive, and the absence of violent tendencies by the NDL implies that it was not necessary for the police to apply repressive tactics. Instead, the NDL was continuously in close contact with law enforcement, and the activists frequently relied on the police to escort them away from the premises to avoid violent confrontations with left-wing activists (VG, 2011b).

The NDL rarely voiced injustice grievances, which can be attributable to the police refraining from repressive measures against the group. The only observed instance of
injustice grievances was when the court decided not to broadcast the testimony of some NDL members during the 22/7 trial, which led the former NDL leader Ronny Alte to say:

All the politically correct witnesses are broadcasted, while none of us on the other side are granted access. When I am dragged into this case, it is important to get my views across. I am therefore very disappointed with this decision (Dagbladet, 2012).

The interactions between the NDL and the police illustrate the relational character of violence. The NDL did not exhibit violent tendencies, which enabled the police to respond with facilitation and cooperation. This, in turn, mitigated injustice grievances amongst the NDL activists, and there was a radicalisation of interactions between the police and the NDL. Besides, similar to the EDL, it was also in the NDL's self-interest to act within the bounds of the law. This adherence to the law differentiates them from the traditional extreme right. An interesting paradox is how the EDL tried to stay within the bounds of the law but still ended up in violent confrontations. When contrasting this to the NDL, who adhered to the same nationalistic and patriotic principles, we can infer that the human profile of the activists may be a mitigating factor. Thus, the EDL consisted of activists more prone to engage in an intensification of interaction with the police, whereas this was never a feasible option for the NDL activists.

5.2.5. Repression and RIR
We see from the elaboration above that the police had an interventionist approach against the EDL and the Bakri Network and that the two groups chose militarisation to some extent. However, whereas repression led to isolation and militarisation for the Bakri Network, it did not push the EDL underground. The fact that the EDL never isolated during the most antagonistic years with the police could be attributable to the Home Office never proscribing the EDL. A proscription could have led some EDL activists to move onto more extreme, underground groups in order to continue their activism (Yorkshire Post, 2010).

Instead, they continued their street activism openly, intensifying the violent interactions with the police and adversary groups. However, when the police changed their approach in 2012 to keep the adversary SMOs apart, this contributed to inhibiting potential interactions, thus restraining RIR.

Except for the Gaza Riots, there were never any violent interactions between the police and Profetens Ummah. However, the repressive tactics unrelated to demonstrations did fuel injustice grievances and subsequently facilitated the group’s isolation. Concerning the NDL, the police had a far more conciliatory approach. We can thus infer that the role of the police and the level of repression had an indirect effect on RIR. The police's response was
reactive, but the tactical change against the EDL in 2012 illustrates that a more conciliatory approach can curb the escalation of violence. In sum, the groups’ interactions with the police in Britain facilitated RIR to escalate. However, following the tactical changes made in 2012, the EDL moderated, whereas the sustained hard-line approach against the Bakri Network led the latter to continue isolating and militarising. In contrast, the Norwegian SMOs interactions with the police had an inhibiting effect on RIR by enabling the groups to have a space to operate in on the streets, subsequently mitigating injustice grievances that could have led to escalation between the two SMOs.

5.3. Radical right parties and discursive space

If you are concerned with immigration, be it based on economic, cultural or security concerns, what channels are available for you to voice your opinion or to take action? In the last decade, immigration scepticism generally and anti-Muslim sentiments specifically have increased. This is manifested in the growth of radical right parties with an increased focus on anti-Islamism (Jupskås, 2012, p. 18) Additionally, a significant portion of voters list immigration as the most salient issue when voting for a political party (ESS, 2016). In 2014, as much as 56% responded that few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe should come and live in Britain, making the UK one of the most immigration sceptic countries in Europe. In Norway, a poll from 2014 found that 36% are negative to immigrants from a different race or ethnicity (Czaika & Di Lillo, 2018). So what channels were available in 2009 and 2010 for those who wanted to curb Muslim immigration or the presence of radical Islamism?

One potential explanation for why the EDL attracted far more activists than its Norwegian counterpart, can be attributable to what type of anti-immigration actors were already present – and the discursive space these actors occupied. In other words, what discursive space was up for grabs for the anti-Islamists in Norway and Britain when they emerged in 2009 and 2010? By discursive space, I refer to the positioning of a type of discourse on Muslims and Islamism that an SMO occupies, moving from moderate to radical. A caveat is warranted here, namely that there is a long, indirect, and blurry casual chain from the condition to the outcome. Therefore, the findings should be interpreted with caution, seen as a possible indication of causality. Secondly, there are also structural differences that condition the number of activists that the EDL and NDL could attract. This includes the sheer fact that Britain is a far more populous country with a larger working class, and it thus has a larger pool of possible recruits to draw from. Nevertheless, as we will see, the options
available for an anti-Islamist activist or voter were markedly different in Norway and Britain in 2009.

**5.3.1. “A dream for Disneyland”**

In Norway, the Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*) stood out as the main alternative, whose stand on immigration ranged from moderate to radical. In their party platform from 2010, they voiced a moderate stance:

> Norwegian immigration policy must be based on making demands to immigrants who settle in this country. Labour participation, language classes and respect for Norwegian laws are key elements in successful integration policy. Equal treatment of Norwegians and immigrants is crucial for preventing conflict, which means that special arrangements for immigrants must be discontinued. When accepting refugees, one should take into consideration people's ability and willingness to integrate. Resettlement refugees from the UN should be prioritised. When the need for protection is over, the individual should go home (FrP, 2010, p. 8).

By noting the need to differentiate between refugees who are able and willing to integrate, the Progress Party implies that it is harder for immigrants from different cultures to integrate and that this is problematic for the Norwegian state. However, the Progress Party has also fronted pure anti-Muslim sentiments, such as the party leader, Siv Jensen, arguing that opposing the Burka and Niqab is about liberating women from a totalitarian ideology (Aftenposten, 2010). Additionally, the then leader of Oslo Progress Party, Christian Tybring-Gjedde, wrote an op-ed termed “A dream from Disneyland” in 2010, which included the following statement:

> It is the Labour Party who gives us thousands of new Norwegians from different cultures and un-cultures every year. It is the Labour Party who makes sure that people with a Norwegian culture flee Oslo districts, leaving behind enclaves where Muslim dogmatism and intolerance grow stronger (Tybring-gjedde & Andersen, 2010)

What do these quotes above imply? They tell us that the Progress Party occupied a wide discursive space that included both moderate and radical anti-Islam sentiments. As such, it made them a potent force for a heterogeneous pool of supporters, which in turn caused the NDL and SIAN to position itself to the right of the Progress Party. The two SMOs would frequently refer to the Progress Party as too moderate and even traitorous, as exemplified by the leader of SIAN, Arne Tumyr, stating:

> Politicians accept that policies in our society is adapting to the Islamic society model to a larger extent. Even Siv Jensen is going to stop talking about Islamification by Stealth (*Snikislamisering*) (Dagbladet, 2011c).
Thus, the NDL and SIAN positioned itself in a discursive space to the right of the Progress Party and fronting an even more radical line, subsequently drawing in a more homogeneous pool of activists who did not find the Progress Party sufficiently radical. The NDL quote below illustrates this when juxtaposed with quotes from the Progress Party above:

In 2010 there were about 100 000 people registered in Muslim faith communities, or said differently, about 1 in 4 people who are not members of the State Church are members of Muslim faith communities. Since Norway has and is supposed to have freedom of religion, it is not only increased immigration that gives us a reason for concern. What is frightening is how Norwegian values, traditions and our culture is eroded by this political ideology, Islam (Alte, 2011).

Here, the then leader of the NDL does not distinguish between Islamism and Islam, equating the religion with a political ideology, which implies that radical Islamist groups such as Profetens Ummah were not their primary concern, but Muslims in general. This point will be further investigated in the section on enemy image.

5.3.2. The EDL and the discursive vacuum
Turning to Britain, there was no moderate anti-immigration party available for those holding anti-Islam sentiments. At the time, it was only the British National Party (BNP) that fronted anti-Islam views. As we see from the quote below, the BNP fronted a discourse that was far more radical than the Progress Party:

The BNP believes that the historical record shows that Islam is by its very nature incompatible with modern secular Western democracy [...] The BNP believes that there should be absolutely no further immigration from any Muslim countries, as it presents one of the most deadly threats yet to the survival of our nation (BNP, 2010, p. 30).

In contrast to the Progress Party, which started as an anti-taxation party, the BNP has a history of white supremacy, as shown in their party platform from 2010:

Being British is more than merely possessing a modern document known as a passport. It runs far deeper than that: it is to belong to a special chain of unique people who have the natural law right to remain a majority in their ancestral homeland (BNP, 2010, p. 23).

Here, nationality is associated with ancestry, rather than formal documents such as passports, providing the basis for why foreign cultures are unwanted in Britain. This implies that there was a larger discursive space for the EDL to occupy in 2009, located between the Conservative Party and the BNP. The Conservative Party does not mention Muslims or Islamists in their party manifesto from 2010, and immigration was not one of their top priorities (Conservatives, 2010). Thus, no influential party or organisation was fronting
concerns about the Bakri Network and other radical Islamists without distinguishing between these groups and ordinary Muslims. Just as the NDL and SIAN distanced itself from the Progress Party, so did the EDL detach itself from the BNP, writing on its website:

> While the EDL will share the same pavements with BNP supporters, our physical presence will be the only, the absolutely only way in which the EDL will ever “stand together” with the BNP. To even suggest that the EDL could ever stand together with the BNP or anything else is so far from the truth that it is almost libellous (EDL, 2013).

Furthermore, whereas the BNP was preoccupied with multiculturalism in general, the EDL’s sole concern was radical Islam – at least in the beginning:

> We’re not Nazis, we’re not fascists - we will smash Nazis the same way we will smash militant Islam. We are exactly about black and white unite, every single community in this country can come and join our ranks, fill our ranks. We don’t care if you arrived here yesterday; you’re welcome to protect our Christian culture and our way of life (Tommy Robinson in Garland & Treadwell, 2010, p. 28).

In the general election in 2010, the BNP got 1.9% of the vote. In contrast, the Progress Party received 22.9% of the vote in the Norwegian national election in 2009. This indicates that there existed an influential, potent force for individuals holding anti-Islamist sentiments in Norway, whereas there was no such legitimate alternative for Brits.

A second indication is that several BNP supporters left the party and fled to the EDL (Pitchford, 2011, p. 44). This implies that former BNP members did not perceive their goals to be attainable through BNP activism and thus wished to attempt a different approach. What we can infer from this is that there was a sizeable discursive vacuum between the Conservative Party and the BNP that the EDL was able to occupy, drawing in recruits who ranged from moderate to radical. In contrast, the NDL occupied a narrower discursive field to the right of an actor that enabled for both moderate and radical anti-Islam sentiments, namely the Progress Party. This meant that the EDL was better positioned than the NDL to attract a larger and more heterogeneous pool of activists who ranged from anti-Islamist to anti-Muslim, thus having a larger and more potent force of activists.

### 5.3.3. The Radical Right, discursive space and RIR

It is legitimate to raise the question as to whether the pressure cooker effect is too binary. Berntzen (2019) brings up in our interview an interesting point on how mobilisation to anti-Islamist movements happens on a local and transnational, rather than a national, level. For example, the EDL was established in Luton, an area with a sizeable Muslim population. Luton was also the home of the Bakri Network from 1996. Several EDL activists, including
Robinson, had attended school with some of the Bakri Network members, and there had been animosity between these groups dating years back (Macklin, 2019; The Telegraph, 2013).

Furthermore, the political parties and SMOs described above are not mutually exclusive. Several NDL and SIAN activists were also active in the Progress Party (Drammens Tidende, 2014; NRK, 2014). Also, SIAN and the NDL often aligned themselves with Demokratene (The Democrats), a political party with 1.8% of the vote in national elections (Valgdirektoratet, 2017), illustrating how the discursive space does not have to be occupied by one sole actor. Instead, we could view Demokratene in similar terms as the BNP, namely that their poor electoral success opened up a discursive space that other actors could supplement or replace.

Also, street activism and voting are different types of political activity, and one type does not exclude the other. To exemplify, Tommy Robinson and his cousin Carroll announced an alliance with the British Freedom Party, a splinter party from the BNP during their tenure in the EDL (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013, p. 15).

Lastly, the BNP has a past history with street activism. Although the BNP leadership decided to focus on electoral politics, it does not mean that all of its members had lost the desire for street activism, seeing the appeal of the EDL (Pitchford, 2011, p. 51). In sum, we should see these findings as indirect indicators of the different discursive spaces in Britain and Norway, and how this made the EDL such a potent force in Britain. As such, the absence of a strong radical party in Britain may have functioned as a pressure cooker, explaining part of the high number of activists joining the EDL as well as the level of contentious activism they were involved in. In contrast, the presence of the Progress Party made the NDL a less needed force for anti-Islamist actors in Norway, explaining their marginal mobilisation.

5.4. Enemy Image

On the 10th of June 2010, the newest spin-off group from the Bakri Network, Muslims Against Crusades (MAC), were protesting against British soldiers returning from military service in Afghanistan. While the soldiers paraded through the streets of Portsmouth, a handful of MAC activists held banners with captions reading, "butchers return", and burning British and American flags. Right across the street, 1500 EDL demonstrators had turned up, shouting slogans like, "Muslim bombers off our streets" (Ebner, 2017, p. 158). The day ended in clashes between the EDL and MAC, making headlines all across Britain. This, however, was not the first time they interacted – and it would not be the last.

The incident illustrates the partly symbiotic relationship between the EDL and the Bakri Network. What and who constitute a part of a movement’s enemy image reveals what
the movement mobilises against and subsequently who mobilises against them. In contrast to the British case, there were remarkably few interactions between anti-Islamists and radical Islamists in Norway. To understand parts of why this is so, we need to understand who constitutes their enemy image and how it might have changed between 2009 and 2015.

5.4.1. “You are entering a Sharia controlled zone – Islamic rules enforced”

Between 2009 and 2015, the Bakri Network rallied against two overarching issues, namely British involvement in the Afghanistan war and the implementation of a Sharia-governed regime in Britain. What these two cases have in common is how closely ingrained they were with local and national issues and symbols in Britain. Those preventing these overarching goals were central in the Bakri Network's enemy image:

The protest on the 29th April 2011 is intended to highlight the many atrocities which have been and are being committed against Muslims in Afghanistan and now in Libya by the British regime, its army and the British royal family, who have supported such crimes verbally and even physically by their active involvement including by Prince William (Choudary, 2011).

In the case of the Afghan war, we see that their enemy image was comprised of the British government and British soldiers, hence explaining the protest against the returning soldiers described earlier. The second goal reveals itself on one of Bakri Network's home pages:

Subsequently, living in Britain we target to convince the British public about the superiority of Islam and expose the fallacies of man-made law, thereby changing public opinion in favour of Islam in order to transfer the authority and power (from those with authority and power) to the Muslims in order to implement the Sharee’ah (here in Britain) (Islam4UK, 2009)

The network aimed at achieving this through actions like establishing a Sharia patrol in 2014 that put up signs, reading, 'you are entering a Sharia-controlled zone – Islamic rules enforced” in British neighbourhoods (Dagbladet, 2014). According to Kenney, those who actively opposed radical Islamist influence in Britain constituted a central part of the Bakri Network’s enemy image. This included Muslims who openly opposed the Bakri Network, as well as the Kuffar (non-believers) (Kenney, 2019). The Bakri Network distinguished between passive non-believers and groups who actively fought them, such as the EDL and Britain First. From 2013, the Syrian war and eventually the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate became the focal point for the Bakri Network, and the Western regimes that prevented Muslims from establishing the Caliphate became central in the network’s enemy image (Kenney, 2019).
5.4.2. Profetens Ummah
Although the Bakri Network was a great inspiration to Profetens Ummah, with Choudary functioning as an informal advisor for the Norwegian group, the two organisations mobilised on different issues. First, whereas the Afghan war mobilised the Bakri Network, it was the Caricature drawings of the Prophet that radicalised and mobilised several Profetens Ummah activists (PST, 2016).

We can attribute this to the fact that Britain has a long history in Afghanistan, with three wars in the 18th and 19th century (Barnett, 2007, p. 63). Also, Britain played a significant role in the current Afghan war, with 9000 troops deployed as compared to 485 Norwegian troops in 2009 (The Guardian, 2011a). Taking these two factors together, it is apparent that the Afghan war was a more effective mobiliser for British SMO than for the Norwegian SMO.

Another crucial distinction revolves around how Profetens Ummah rarely called for a Caliphate inside Norway. They did call for an Islamic caliphate inside Grønland once, a multiethnic neighbourhood, but did not follow up with offline activism in the area (Oslo Tingrett, 2017, p. 14). Similar to the Bakri Network in Britain, Profetens Ummah shifted their attention to the Syrian war in 2013 (Akerhaug, 2019).

To conclude, Profetens Ummah’s enemy image was more abstract and international, with less focus on local and national issues. This, in turn, manifested itself in the different issues they demonstrated against, refraining from mocking symbols of patriotic importance.

5.4.3. “This, then, led to the formation of the English Defence League”

For years we have sat and watched these Jihadists threaten us with slogans such as “Behead those who insult Islam” and “UK, your 9/11 is coming” to name just two of the thousands of such threats made against our country and way of life in recent years. The final straw came when the brave soldiers of the Royal Anglian Regiment returned to Luton from duty in Basra Iraq. [...] This, then, led to the formation of the English Defence League (EDL, 2009).

The formation of the EDL can be directly traced back to the Bakri Network’s contentious activism leading up to 2009. By this time, the Bakri Network had orchestrated numerous provocative protests targeting central British symbols. Moreover, the network was tied to domestic terrorist plots and attacks, including the 7/7 bombings in London (Raymond, 2010, p. 11). In other words, the moral shock following the picketing of funerals in 2009 functioned more as a catalyser, rather than the singular mobiliser for the EDL (Macklin, 2019). How central part the Bakri Network played in the EDL’s enemy image did however vary between 2009 and 2015. In 2012, the EDL shifted its attention from radical Islamism to Islam at large after a sex grooming scandal involving nine Asian men. From then on, the EDL drifted away
from solely focusing on the Bakri network and radical Islamism, to arranging protests against Islamification in Britain (Macklin, 2019).

5.4.4. The NDL, Islamification and the political elite

The interactions between radical Islamists and anti-Islamists in Norway occurred on a far more abstract level over a shorter period of time, and the groups did not engage in regular street confrontations. Firstly, Profetens Ummah started its activism after the establishment of the NDL. Secondly, Berntzen (2019) argues that whereas demonstrations against returning British soldiers functioned as a moral shock for EDL, it was 9/11 and the reactions after the Caricature drawings that pushed a number of anti-Islamists into street activism. Hence, in contrast to Britain, there was no interaction on a local or national level in Norway. Also, the Afghan war was less ingrained in the Norwegian consciousness. We can trace this to the large number of British troops deployed, meaning that the war directly impacted more British than Norwegian families. Lastly, in contrast to Britain, there had been no domestic terrorist attacks perpetrated by radical Islamists, and the threat of terrorism in Norway was therefore on a hypothetical level.

All of these factors mentioned above manifested itself in different enemy images for the NDL and the EDL. Whereas the EDL initially rallied against the Bakri Network and radical Islamism, the main enemies for the NDL were Muslims in general and the elites who facilitated the Islamification of Western societies, as illustrated in their mission statement:

There are some groups of immigrants who represent more pressing challenges. One of these groups is the Muslims/Islamists, and there exists vast literature explaining why it is bound to arise tension when attempting to integrate millions of Muslims in Western societies [...] Our criticism is mainly targeted towards media people, politicians, researchers and intellectuals in the West who systematically hide the truth, avoiding to openly and honestly inform about the consequences of an immigration politics that are on its way to going amok (NDL, 2011).

Their enemy image was thus twofold: Muslims living in Norway and the political elite who had facilitated immigration. According to Berntzen (2019), much of the NDL’s activism revolved around impacting immigration policies.

Another difference between the NDL and the EDL is how central far-left groups were in their enemy image. Bear in mind that a movement can have more than one counter-movement, and we see that the conflict between the radical left and the radical right that was at its peak in the 1990s, also increased between 2010 and 2015. In Norway, there was Antirasistisk Senter and SOS-rasisme, while the main adversary in Britain was Unite Against Fascism. These left-wing organisations did, almost without exception, show up at the anti-Islamist rallies to counter-demonstrate (see: Bergens Tidende, 2011; NRK, 2011a; PST,
The difference is how the NDL saw the far-left as their primary enemy, while the EDL perceived them to be more peripheral.

5.4.5. Mirroring and coupling configurations
Recall from the theory chapter that I hypothesised that we would observe mirroring if a counter-movement were a central part of an SMOs enemy image. By mirroring, I refer to a mechanism of where the counter-movement appropriates symbols and language as well as counter-demonstrate.

Initially, I assumed that burning the poppy and burning the British flag were manifestations of the Bakri Network mirroring the EDL. However, these are British, not EDL symbols, and I interpret this as mirroring the British government and the society at large, rather than the EDL specifically (Camber, 2011; Kenney, 2019). Additionally, the Bakri Network appropriated the term ‘Crusades’ in one of their spin-off groups, Muslims Against Crusades and referenced Saladin and the medieval Muslim caliphate on their website. The EDL, on the other hand, used imagery of crusader knights reclaiming Europe from armies of radical Islamists (Woolwich, 2012). However, although the EDL appropriated crusader symbolism, it is not a given that Muslims against Crusades targeted the EDL. As with the poppy and flag burning, I regard this as targeting British foreign policy in majority Muslim countries and not a manifestation of mirroring the EDL.

In contrast, there are several examples of the EDL mirroring the Bakri Network. For instance, the EDL frequently appropriated Arabic terms such as Kuffar (non-believers) (Berntzen, 2019). Additionally, they extrapolated elements from Islamic theology, often citing the same parts of the Quran as the Bakri network (Berntzen, 2019). Examples include verses 5 and 29 in chapter 9 of the Quran, with both sides arguing that these verses prove that Islam is inherently violent and that non-Muslims should be killed (Ebner, 2017, p. 201). A third and final example involves Britain First, another anti-Islamist actor. They established the Christian Patrol in 2014, a vigilante street group that bore striking resemblance to the Bakri Network’s Muslim patrol that had operated from 2013 (The Sun, 2014).

In Norway, there were far fewer instances of mirroring between the two SMOs. Both the NDL and Profetens Ummah each mentioned the other only once on their websites. My analysis shows few if any signs of Profetens Ummah mirroring the NDL. Here, the length of coexistence comes into play. Whereas the Bakri Network and the EDL interacted from 2009 onwards, Profetens Ummah started its activism in 2012. Less than a year after Profetens Ummah started marching in the streets, the Syrian civil war caught their full attention. Hence, the British groups coexisted and interacted over a more extended period. We will never know
if Profetens Ummah and the NDL would have mirrored each other were they to interact over a more extended period prior to the Syrian war. This also highlights the dynamic character of enemy images and mirroring, and how this can change over time, influenced by external events.

To sum up, Tommy Robinson and a few others established the EDL as a response to the Bakri Network’s activism. In Norway, on the other hand, the NDL and Profetens Ummah were established independently of one another, and the anti-Islamist group came before the radical Islamist group.

We also see that the type of actions taken by the Bakri Network was more provocative and directed at patriotic symbols such as British soldiers and the poppy. As such, there was a more potent reaction from the EDL. However, there are nuances within the British case, and it is apparent that the Bakri Network was more central in the EDL’s enemy image than vice versa, thus exhibiting an asymmetrical coupling pattern.

In contrast, we see that the two groups in Norway had more abstract enemy images surrounding the counter-movement. This manifested itself in far less symbiotic interactions between the two, mobilising and operating in different spheres. In Norway, the radical Islamists appear to have held a slightly more central position in NDL's enemy image than vice versa, but their coupling pattern was overall looser than in Britain. The enemy image appears to be a critical factor in understanding why there were higher levels of RIR in Britain than in Norway. The more central the enemy image, the more frequently we observe mirroring. In turn, mirroring is a manifestation of the groups’ coupling pattern, where the tighter the pattern, the higher levels of RIR.

5.5. The Media

In March 2015, a 17-year-old convert approached Ubaydullah Hussain, the leader of Profetens Ummah, on the streets of Oslo. He wanted to travel to Syria as a foreign fighter and hoped Hussain and Profetens Ummah could assist him. Over the next few months, Hussain was followed by a filmmaker, and the 17-year-old boy’s preparations for the travel to Syria is well documented in the film, Den Norske Islamisten (The Norwegian Islamist) (Rolfsen, 2017). In the summer of 2015, three months after their first interaction, Hussain and the recruit drove to Landvetter airport in Sweden. From there, the then 18-year-old would have travelled to Syria had it not been for the Norwegian police arresting him for planning to join a terrorist organisation.

Three years later, Hussain said in trial that the convert approached him after reading about Profetens Ummah in the media. Hussain said the SMO had a deliberate media tactic,
which involved making outrageous statements to news outlets that they knew would stir controversy. This strategy, he said, functioned as a recruitment tool by reaching out to potential recruits who would be intrigued by the coverage and wanting to join them (NRK, 2018a).

The media can affect the level of RIR in two ways. The first is by elevating the groups, portraying them as more significant and more dangerous than they actually are, as shown in the anecdote above. The second way is through framing the interactions between the two groups as two extremists fuelling one another, also referred to as cumulative extremism in the literature. Both instances can activate the mechanism I label the self-fulfilling prophecy, which in turn feeds into RIR.

However, as with the condition surrounding radical right parties and discursive space, the role of the media is challenging to observe empirically. Instead of understanding this process as a direct causal chain from media reporting to RIR, I argue that the two reinforce one another, implying that the level of RIR also impacts how the media reports on the groups and how they frame the conflict between them. In other words: it is reciprocal.

5.5.1. Media Jihad and the Bakri Network
Cultivating media relationships was a critical part of the Bakri Network's activism. Through conversations with the activists, Kenney (2019) found that the two reasons behind this Media Jihad strategy were to bring in recruits and to generate tensions with groups such as the EDL. For instance, following the killing of Lee Rigby, Anjem Choudary went on Channel 4, BBC news and ITV to share his views on the terrorist incident, where he to some extent legitimised the incident (BBC, 2014). Part of the problem with providing a public platform to Choudary and other radical Islamists is that they might have been perceived as representative figures of British Muslims. The Quilliam Foundation, an anti-extremism think tank, brought up this point, illustrating with a news headline reading, “Now Muslims demand full Shariah law” after an interview with Choudary (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013, p. 32). In addition to providing a platform for the Bakri Network leaders, the media also inflated the number of activists involved in the group, such as writing that “up to 5000 extremists were expected to take part in the march” (Bunglawala, 2009). The Bakri Network, who in reality only consisted of a few dozen activists, were fully aware of the discrepancy between the actual numbers and the numbers reported in the media, admitting to Kenney (2018, p. 5).: “You know and I know we’re not that many in number. But in the media we’re big, massive”

Why does it matter if the media inflated the actual size and impact of the Bakri Network? My findings reveal that it matters in the sense that it inflates the perception of the
threat at hand. In other words, if the Bakri Network was as significant as the media portrayed them to be, then the threat of radical Islamism in the UK was perceived as more pressing for the anti-Islamists. This, in turn, could facilitate the mobilisation of the EDL against the Bakri Network.

5.5.2. The EDL and media inflation
Similar to Choudary, the media provided a platform for the EDL leader, Tommy Robinson (Macklin, 2019). Besides, the media would frequently anticipate massive crowds and violence to occur prior to EDL rallies taking place. Examples of alarmist headlines include "The new wave of extremists plotting summer of unrest" (The Guardian, 2010). Additionally, the media would regularly quote concerned policymakers and scholars making statements such as:

This is a serious development, we just need one of these demonstrations to go wrong – for there to be a serious incident, and it won’t just lead to disorder in Dudley, Bolton or wherever, it will spread to towns and cities across the country (The Guardian, 2010).

In my interview with Berntzen (2019), he argued that the way the media framed a story about a march would impact the success of the next march. Following a sequence of unsuccessful rallies, the framing in the media shifted from alarmist to ridiculing the EDL, claiming that the anti-Islamist movement in Britain was dead (Berntzen, 2019).

Thus, there are indications that the elevation of the Bakri Network influenced the mobilisation for the EDL as well as the recruitment to the Bakri Network. An interesting finding is that the reporting on the Bakri Network had a more important impact on rallying the EDL than vice versa. This may be associated with the enemy image of the two groups. As mentioned earlier, the Bakri Network was more central to the enemy image of the EDL than the other way around. This could imply that the EDL was more responsive to media coverage surrounding the Bakri Network.

5.5.3. Profetens Ummah making a fuss

- No, it is not many (Norwegian Islamist extremists), seen in the context that we are about 5 million people. But they do make a lot of fuss, partly because you write about them (Interview with Lia in Dagbladet, 2013a).

There was an observed shift in Profetens Ummah’s media strategy during the timeframe analysed. The group initially threatened journalists for reporting on their activities, but eventually they started imitating the Bakri Network in terms of cultivating media
relationships (NRK, 2018a). As mentioned, Hussain later admitted this media tactic in court, claiming to actively cultivate media relationships in order to make the group appear more significant than they actually were. Similar to the Bakri Network, part of the aim was to recruit new members, and Hussain stated that the media tactic made future recruits approach Profetens Ummah after reading about them in the media (NRK, 2018a). The media facilitated this strategy, interviewing Hussain (TV 2, 2012b) and reporting about the tweets he posted, where he applauded international terrorist attacks (Dagbladet, 2013b; TV 2, 2013b). In other words, the media gave Profetens Ummah and its leader, Ubaydullah Hussain, a platform that elevated them into being far more significant and influential than they in reality were.

5.5.4. “Damn it, there are more press people than us”

When the NDL was first established, the media started drawing parallels to the EDL in Britain, pointing to the latters’ mobilisation success and violence potential (Klassekampen, 2011b; TV 2, 2011b). However, it did not take long after the first demonstration, drawing only a handful of people, that the media shifted the narrative to revolve around the NDL being a failure. Thus, the central narrative around the NDL in the media throughout its existence was that this was a failing organisation, with headlines reading; "Damn it, there are more press people than us" (Dagbladet, 2011b) and, “Helicopter and 100 police guarded few demonstrators” (Aftenbladet, 2012). The group still attracted the attention of the media, but the negative narrative did not elevate the group like the elevating narrative did to Profetens Ummah. In other words, the media ridiculing the NDL cannot have had a positive impact on mobilisation at their future rallies. However, as argued earlier, the NDL’s organisational resources were weak, riddled with internal strife. It is therefore unwarranted to point to media framing as the sole reason for its lacking ability to build a significant street movement. Still, media framing might have had an indirect effect on whether potential activists decided to join the subsequent demonstrations.

5.5.5. Cumulative extremism in Britain

These things are cumulative and I do not see an end to this cycle of violence (The Guardian, 2013c)

According to Kenney (2019), the media framed the conflict between the radical Islamists and the anti-Islamists in two competing narratives: one as seeing the two movements as far out from the mainstream and marginal, and the other narrative being that of cumulative extremism. Interestingly, it was the ‘liberal’ news sources that mainly echoed the threat of cumulative extremism, not the tabloids (Macklin, 2019). The media would regularly
anticipate violence to escalate, writing that the EDL “rubs its hands with glee”, following the grooming scandal by nine Muslim men in 2012 (The Guardian, 2011b). The tit-for-tat narrative was grounded in the idea that actions by the EDL would subsequently recruit Muslims to groups such as the Bakri Network (The Independent, 2010). Besides, there was often a binary portrayal of the two groups, regarding them as equally dangerous. However, the EDL was never involved in lethal attacks like the Bakri Network was.

An important point here is that external events conditioned the cumulative extremism narrative, and this framing was at its peak during two key incidents. The first involved the court case against the bomb plotters at an EDL rally, with headlines reading, “Their aim was death, mayhem and a spiral of tit-for-tat violence” (Birmingham Mail, 2013). The second peak came after the murder of Lee Rigby in May 2013. Several news outlets would report of a sharp spike in hate crimes against Muslims following the murder of Lee Rigby, often excluding the fact that 52% of these incidents occurred online (The Guardian, 2013a, 2013b). As I have mentioned in the theory chapter, there is a crucial distinction between online and offline interactions, where hate narratives are not included in the definition of RIR used here. Thus, these large scale events of lethal attacks helped build a narrative of ‘inevitability’ in the media.

5.5.6. Cumulative extremism in Norway
Whereas British media framed the cumulative extremism narrative as an already unravelling phenomenon, cumulative extremism was framed more as a possible threat in the Norwegian media. The PST repeatedly mentioned the potential for cumulative extremism to occur between anti-Islamists and radical Islamists in their annual threat assessments. However, whereas the British media pointed to actual events and how this could spark increasing violence, there never were similar events to point to in Norway. When the media did mention cumulative extremism, it was mainly about Profetens Ummah's activities rather than the NDL (Aftenposten, 2014; NRK, 2012a, 2012b). One potential reason could be that the NDL never posed as a realistic contender to participate in RIR with Profetens Ummah. Hence, a moral shock by radical Islamists, such as a domestic terrorist incident, was needed to rally the anti-Islamist movement. This brings up another difference in media framing, namely that the two groups in Norway were not treated as equally dangerous. The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ narrative that was occasionally brought forth in Britain was thus absent in the Norwegian media.
5.5.7. Self-fulfilling prophecy
I hypothesised that both the elevation of the groups and the presence of a cumulative extremism narrative in the media would lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy amongst the activists. This, in turn, would increase tensions as the perception of the adversary as a threat was elevated. This mechanism is hard to measure empirically, but the elaboration above shows that there are some indications that this facilitated RIR in Britain whereas it helped contain it in Norway. The level of reporting on the EDL and the Bakri Network did appear to increase the mobilisation potential for the groups. This, in turn, facilitated the turnout at subsequent rallies, thus enabling more interactions to occur that could fuel RIR. In Norway, on the other hand, the media reporting helped elevate Profetens Ummah and was an indirect factor in enticing recruits to join the group. Interestingly, the elevation of Profetens Ummah did not appear to affect mobilisation amongst the NDL. For the NDL, the media narrative of a failing organisation probably did not facilitate further recruitment to the SMO.

The effect that the narrative of cumulative extremism has had on RIR in Britain and Norway is hard to measure. It does appear that the cumulative extremism narrative was overstated in the UK, as the interactions between the EDL and the Bakri Network soon went back to normal levels following spikes of interactions (Busher & Macklin, 2015, p. 891). Thus, the narrative of spirals of violence did not manifest itself in reality. An important point to keep in mind is that the scale of violence and interactions were far higher in the UK than in Norway, which is part of why the media was more alarmist in Britain. Hence, rather than stating that the media narrative controlled the mobilisation potential for the groups, I argue that the groups and the media reinforced one another.

5.5.8. Summary of findings
As I have shown in the analysis, the conditions and mechanisms are interconnected, all playing a part in explaining the puzzle that is RIR. We have seen how internal factors such as the human profile and strong leadership facilitated the growth and persistence of the EDL and the Bakri network. External actors such as the role of law enforcement, the presence of a radical right party, and the media also play a part in explaining the different levels of RIR. However, as I have illustrated, media framing and the pressure cooker mechanism is difficult to observe empirically. Last, we have seen how the relational character of enemy image has played an important role in how the two SMOs mobilise more directly against one another in Britain as compared to Norway. The findings are summarised in figure 4.
**Figure 4: summary of findings**
Chapter 6

Conclusion

After the murder of Lee Rigby and the turmoil that followed in 2013, experts, law enforcement and policy-makers warned that anti-Islamists and radical-Islamists were spiralling into an inescapable violent conflict. Two radical Islamists, loosely affiliated with the Bakri Network, assassinated a British soldier on the streets of Woolwich. The English Defence League (EDL), which was the most significant anti-Islamist street movement at the time, responded by arranging heated protests nation-wide. Around the same time, anti-Islamist and radical Islamist groups, closely resembling its British counterparts, emerged in Norway. However, while Britain seemed to be unravelling into a spiral of violence, there were almost no interactions between the Norwegian Defence League (NDL) and Profetens Ummah.

To understand why these supposedly similar organisations interacted so differently in Norway and Britain, I have with this thesis investigated conditions and mechanisms fuelling or containing violent interactions between radical Islamists and anti-Islamists. As a first step in this analysis, I replaced cumulative extremism with a concept I argue better captures the type of actors and interactions involved, namely Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation (RIR). Reciprocal limits the scope to a reactive form of violence, intergroup implies that we look at interactions that take place at the group level – not the individual level, while radicalisation enables the study of dynamic waves of violence as well as accumulation. From this new concept, I identified structural conditions from the social movement literature that set in motion different processes, or mechanisms, that may affect the level of RIR.

In order to trace the mechanisms, I combined a comparative approach with process tracing. The combination of these two methods enabled me to trace and compare the trajectory of events that unfolded in one positive case and one negative case. This cross-checking across cases has, in turn, enhanced my confidence in the findings that were uncovered. Overall, I found that almost all of the mechanisms impacted the level of RIR, albeit in varying degrees.

First, my analysis indicates that the strongest explanatory factor for why RIR escalated in Britain concerned the presence of influential and capable leaders who attracted activists willing and able to engage in violence. This was present in both the Bakri network and the EDL. In contrast, the NDL was riddled with internal strife from the start and attracted activists far removed from the hooligan culture that had groomed several EDL activists into
violence. While Profetens Ummah did have a faction of militant activists, the NDL was never a realistic contender to engage in violent confrontations, subsequently containing RIR.

Another important finding is that the two SMOs in Britain perceived each other as its main enemy, as indicated by frequent counter-demonstrations and tactical and symbolic adaptations. Naturally, counter-demonstrating creates an arena for violent clashes to occur, as the two groups are in proximity to each other. In contrast, the Norwegian groups were far more peripheral to each other in terms of enemy image. This, in turn, limited the spaces where RIR could escalate.

My analysis also included external actors that indirectly impact RIR. Of these external actors, I identified harsh repression by law enforcement as the most vital condition. Banning the groups or restricting their space to operate in fuelled RIR. Harsh repression would lead the groups to move underground where they engaged in a self-radicalisation process, as external actors could no longer operate as a check on the organisation’s activities. This, in turn, lowered the threshold to engage in violent confrontations with adversaries. This was the case for all the SMOs except the NDL, who did not experience harsh repression and thus continued to operate in the open.

My analysis also suggests that the absence of an influential radical right party in Britain facilitated the street success of the EDL. In 2009, the British National Party was the only anti-Islamist voice, but, as indicated by their low electoral success, many perceived the party as too extreme and racist. In contrast, as the Progress Party in Norway already fronted immigration concerns and had a significant support base, the NDL positioned itself further to the right and fronted a more radical rhetoric. As a result, the NDL attracted a narrower group of activists who found the Progress Party too moderate, while the EDL was a more wide-ranging movement that attracted both moderate and radical activists.

Additionally, we saw how the media impacted the groups’ ability to mobilise and draw in recruits, something that the SMO leaders were cognizant of, and intentionally stirred media controversy. When the media elevated their importance, it would activate a self-fulfilling prophecy, mobilising new recruits and impact the success of their subsequent rallies. In contrast to the three other SMOs, the NDL continuously endured a negative media narrative that most likely impacted their limited ability to mobilise recruits.

Last, I hypothesised that if the media framed the conflict between the two groups as an inevitable spiral of violence, this could also function as a self-fulfilling prophecy amongst the activists, potentially fuelling RIR. Instead, I found that the media narrative was exogenous to the actual interactions on the streets, thus running contrary to my initial
assumptions. To conclude, we see that RIR is influenced by a number of factors, and that one process alone cannot explain the different levels of RIR in Norway and Britain.

It is also important to note that some of the mechanisms were harder to trace empirically, such as how the presence of a radical right party and the role of the media might affect RIR. It is possible that a different methodological approach would have been more appropriate in terms of uncovering their impact. For example, discourse analysis could be a suitable method to detect how the discursive space in Britain and Norway affects the success or failure of the two anti-Islamist movements. Alternatively, interviewing SMO leaders and activists could have given me better insight into how the media narrative affected the actual interactions between the groups. These alternative methodological approaches can serve as vantage points for future research.

Also, it is possible that the inclusion of a third or a fourth case would have led me to conclude differently, by either strengthening or weakening my findings. Therefore, I encourage future researchers to test these mechanisms in other cases. Additionally, although the scope of this thesis has been on anti-Islamist and radical Islamist SMOs, the same mechanisms could be traced in different constellations of adversary movements. This could also be a fruitful point of departure for future research. By tracing the mechanisms in different cases or different movement constellations, the universality of these mechanisms could be put to the test.

The topic of this thesis was inspired by Macklin and Busher’s (2015) article calling for a theoretical framework that could nuance our understanding of the processes behind cumulative extremism. In that sense, my findings are a contribution to the field of cumulative extremism, providing both theoretical and practical implications.

First, I have established a clear boundary of who and what constitutes a part of cumulative extremism by developing an alternative concept, reciprocal intergroup radicalisation. This concept focuses on reactive violence. For instance, it excludes the 22/7 attacks as the perpetrator did not act directly against Muslims and because no radical Islamists retaliated the attack. Additionally, the concept delimits a clear boundary between ‘keyboard warriors’ and movement activists who participate in street marches. This does not imply that online activism is irrelevant, but rather that it should be seen as part of a different phenomenon than increasingly violent clashes on the streets. Last, the concept includes the study of peaks of interactions even if they fall short of accumulation, which can be an equally interesting development of the relationship.
This thesis also demonstrates that building a theoretical framework to understand the processes behind cumulative extremism does not involve re-inventing the wheel. Instead, I have found that theoretical perspectives from the social movement literature, in particular, della Porta (2013), Caiani et al. (2012) and Tarrow (2011), serve as useful starting points for understanding RIR. First, by placing RIR in the context of the social movement literature, I have shown that it is not sufficient to analyse only the interactions between the two adversary movements. Instead, external actors are equally relevant for understanding how the groups end up interacting. Second, we see that the conditions and mechanisms that are used to describe one social movement can also, after slight alterations, be used to investigate the relationship between two adversary groups. This shows how the study of RIR should be broadened to include other actors in addition to the two SMOs. As such, RIR can be situated within the broader social movement literature on contentious activism, where my theoretical framework is a supplement to existing literature.

Importantly, these findings can also have practical implications in terms of how law enforcement, policy-makers and experts should approach an emerging conflict between anti-Islamists and radical Islamists. If we know what processes are set in motion, one can take active measures to de-escalate the situation or prevent it from unfolding in the first place.

For law enforcement, evidence from Britain suggests that banning groups with violence potential may have counter-productive effects. Although some level of repression against potentially violent protest groups can be necessary, too much repression can lead them to go underground and isolate, far removed from police surveillance. Additionally, experience from the changed police tactics against the EDL, which led to a marked decrease in violence, indicates that allowing the groups to operate in the open can function as a cap on further radicalisation.

Another important takeaway is that imprisoning activists does not necessarily deter them from re-joining violent groups upon release. Thus, it is imperative to focus on anti-radicalisation programs that can rehabilitate activists, especially those returning from Syria and Iraq with a violent baggage. Such programs would aim at deterring them from returning to contentious activism.

Last, it is vital that the media do not cross the line between shedding light on violent groups and inflating their influence. The SMOs use the media in order to increase mobilisation and entice recruits, and it is the responsibility of the media not to cater to this strategy by echoing their talking points.
Finally, an assessment of the future is warranted. From what I have presented in this thesis, it does not appear unlikely for a conflict between anti-Islamist and radical Islamists to re-emerge in Britain at a later point in time. In 2017 alone, ISIS-affiliates committed four terrorist attacks in Britain, including the Manchester bombing, the Westminster attack, the London attack, and a bomb explosion at Parsons Green (ISC, 2017). The same year, Britain experienced its first anti-Islamist terrorist attack, after Darren Osborne drove a van into a crowd of Muslims outside Finsbury Park Mosque, killing one and injuring twelve (The Guardian, 2018). These attacks on both sides could prove fertile ground for new adversary movements to mobilise around.

Additionally, Anjem Choudary, one of the leadership figures of the Bakri Network was released in 2018 after serving a three-year sentence for publically supporting ISIS, and time will tell whether he or other prominent figures will rebuild the Bakri Network.

The findings from this thesis also indicate that the potential for a future conflict to escalate in Norway remains low. The Progress Party still holds an influential standing in Norwegian politics, and there are no indications of Norwegian law enforcement changing its approach to anti-Islamist and radical Islamist actors as their tactics proved successful last time. Additionally, while several British anti-Islamists had been groomed into violence through the hooligan community, no such arenas are present for anti-Islamist activists in Norway, subsequently lowering the violence potential in the future.

For the Norwegian radical Islamists, they have lost their mobilising cause after the military defeat of ISIS. A new mobiliser, similar to the caricature drawings, the war in Afghanistan or the emergence of ISIS, is necessary in order to rejuvenate the Norwegian radical-Islamist milieu (PST, 2019). Still, even if a new radical Islamist movement were to emerge, RIR would remain relatively contained if the Norwegian conditions remain unchanged. These include the presence of an influential radical right party; low levels of repression by law enforcement; a media landscape that refrains from sensationalising the groups; and lower violence potential amongst anti-Islamist actors.

At the beginning of this thesis, I exemplified with literature by Matthew Feldman and Julia Ebner warning of a spiral of violence emerging across Europe. Due to the limited amount of research on cumulative extremism, particularly comparative approaches, it appears as if the narrative of a spiral of violence may be exaggerated. In one of the few academic works dealing directly with cumulative extremism, Julia Ebner ends on a note of concern for the future, writing that in the mutual breeding grounds of far-right an Islamist extremists, there emerges a vicious cycle of hate that translates into violence (Ebner, 2017, p. 195).
My findings warrant reasons for optimism. RIR did not escalate solely because of Tommy Robinson’s organisational skills, or because the Bakri Network endured harsh repression by law enforcement. Instead, several processes needed to co-occur, where no process alone was responsible for the outcome. This leaves me with reason to believe that if RIR is to escalate again in Britain or any other Western European country, there are ways of dealing with it in order to mitigate its impact. As such, the cautionary tale that followed after the murder of Lee Rigby appears to be unwarranted and we do wisely in abstaining from echoing an alarmist narrative. Where conflicts do emerge, it is vital to remain cognizant of which measures to take in order to de-escalate the situation. At this point, it remains unlikely that we will witness an endless ‘spiral of violence’ leading to a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in the near future, neither in Britain nor in any other Western European country.
Appendix I

Letter of consent

Would you like to participate in the research project: "Reciprocal intergroup radicalisation between anti-Islamic and radical Islamic groups in Norway and the UK"?

This is a question to you, (respondent) to participate in a research project with the intention to study mechanisms explaining reciprocal intergroup radicalisation (cumulative extremism) between anti-Islamist and radical Islamist social movements in Norway and the UK. This letter provides you with information regarding the purpose of the project and what your participation will entail.

Purpose

The purpose of this project is to identify and investigate mechanisms that can explain the different degree of interaction between anti-Islamist and radical Islamist groups in Norway and the UK between 2009 and 2015. The research project is a part of my master thesis.

Who is responsible for the research project?

University of Oslo

The supervisor for this project is Jacob Ravndal, research fellow at C-Rex.

Why are you asked to participate?

You are chosen because of your scholarly contribution to cumulative extremism and anti-Islamic groups such as EDL. The interview will consist of questions regarding interactions between anti-Islamic groups and radical Islamic groups in the UK. I am particularly interested in both movements’ organisational resources, especially human resources.

What does it entail for you to participate?

The interview will last for about an hour. I will record the interview, and your response will be transcribed and electronically saved.

It is not obligatory to participate

You participate at your own free will. If you choose to participate, you can withdraw your consent at any time without providing reasoning. It will not have any negative consequences for you if you choose not to participate or withdraw your consent at a later time.

Your privacy – how we contain and use your information

We will only use the information about you to the purpose that is explained in this paper. We treat your information confidentially and in accordance to privacy rules. The project leader, Jacob Ravndal and the Masters student, Sofia Lygren, will have access to your information. The sound recording and transcription will be saved in a document that requires password access.

What happens with your information when the research project is finished?

The project will according to the plan finish the 27th of May 2019. Personal information and the sound recording will be deleted after the project is finished.
Your rights
As long as you are identified in the material, you have the right to:
Get access to which personal information is saved about you
To have your personal information deleted
To receive a copy of your personal information, and send a complaint to personvernombudet or Datatilsynet regarding the treatment of your personal information

What is our mandate to treat your personal information?
We treat your personal information based on your consent
NSD has evaluated that the treatment of personal information in this project is in accordance to privacy rules

Where can I get more information?
If you have any questions regarding the study, or wish to make use of your rights, please contact:
Jacob Ravndal at C-Rex
NSD: personvernombudet@nsd.no or by phone: 55 58 21 17

Kind regards,

Jacob Ravndal                        Sofia Slang Lygren
Prosjektansvarlig                    Student
Veileder

Letter of consent
I have received and understood the information regarding the project “Reciprocal intergroup radicalisation between anti-Islamic and radical Islamic groups in Norway and the UK” and have had the occasion to ask question. I consent to:

Participate in the Interview
That the information about me is published so that I am recognisable in the thesis

I consent to my information being treated until the project is finished, approximately 27th of May 2019

(Signed by respondent, date)
Appendix II

Interview guide respondent 1

**Topic:** Cumulative extremism → Reciprocal intergroup radicalization 2009-2015. Using mechanisms and conditions from social movement literature explaining why there has been more RIR happening in the UK than in Norway. Looking at actions, not rhetoric.

**Cumulative extremism or spikes**

1. How would you describe the interaction between the opposing movements from 2009 and 2015?

**Intra-movement competition**

Outbidding and competition leading to radicalisation of tactics

1. After EDL’s downfall, it appears that Britain First takes over the role in terms of interacting with AM spin off groups (MAC). How do you see these two groups in relation to one another? Are they competitors, co-operators or is BF an extension of EDL?
2. Was there any form of outbidding between anti-Islamist groups in the UK? North West Infidels, Britain First, EDL, Casuals United

**Police and legislature**

AM repression, spin-off groups but needing to adapt as a result of anti-terror legislation. Still remaining resilient.

1. How will you describe the space that EDL was allowed to operate in? Any restrictions at demonstrations? Many prosecutions? Did it change over time?
2. And what did these restrictions do to EDL’s tactical adaptation?
3. Any resemblance to how they tackled AM and its spin-offs?

**Enemy image**

Diagnostic framing – who and what – enemy image

1. Who and what would you place as part of British Anti-Islamists (EDL) enemy image and diagnostic framing?
2. Mirroring as a mechanism if tight coupling. How would you describe anti-Islamists imitation and subversion of AM groups’ symbols and language?
3. Any idea how it works the other way around? AM.

**Media framing**

1. How has the British media framed the interaction between radical Islamist and anti-Islamist groups in the UK?
2. Do you think the way media frames the conflict has an impact on the development of the interaction between the two groups? Self-fulfilling prophecy by reinforcing and validating views that the conflict is inevitable?

**Organisational resources – human resources**

The resources at hand constrain or facilitate violence. Human resources are one example.

1. How would you describe the human profile of UK anti-Islamists? Age, violent or criminal background, gender, social background.
2. How would you describe the organisational strength of EDL, leadership, and organisational structure?
3. What effect do you believe Tommy Robinson has had on EDL? Both in terms of building the organisation and what happened after he left.

**Normative constraints**

Condemning or legitimating violence

1. EDL leaders have publically said that they will not engage in violence or terror, yet there were violent incidents happening frequently at demos. How do you make sense of this?
**Interview guide respondent 2**

**Samspillet generelt**  
Har du noen formening om samspillet mellom disse og anti-islamistiske grupperinger i Norge? Former for interaksjon kan omhandle motdemonstrasjoner, direkte kontakt enten fysisk eller online.

**Politiet og lovverkets rolle**  

1. Hvordan vil du betegne spillerommet radikale islamistiske grupper fikk i Norge fra politiet? Og kan du fortelle noe om utviklingen av dette fra denne tidsperioden?  
2. Ser du noen forskjeller på politiets rolle før og under demonstrasjoner med radikale islamistiske grupper i Storbritannia sammenliknet med Norge?

**Fiendebilde**  
Diagnostiserende framing – hvem og hva er problemet – fiendebilde

1. Hvem og hva ville du plassert innenfor norske radikale islamisters fiendebilde? Og hvor sentralt eller perifert ville du plassert anti-islamistiske grupper som NDL og SIAN?  
2. En mulig mekanisme som blir utløst av at motparten er en sentral del av fiendebildet er speiling. At de bruker hverandres symboler og språk. Har du sett noen indikasjon på at radikale islamister speiler og imiterer anti-islamistiske grupper?  
3. Har du noen formening om hvordan dette fungerer andre veien? Hvorvidt anti-islamistiske grupper speiler og imiterer radikale islamister?

**Media**  
Medias framing av aktørene. Påvirkningsaktør for interaksjonen mellom dem.

2. Har du noen formening om hvilken rolle medietrykk spiller inn på interaksjonen? At vi ser en korrelasjon mellom medietrykk og interaksjon?

**Organisasjonsressurser**  
**Human Resources**  
Vold taktisk avhenger av ressurser tilgjengelig. Menneskelige ressurser og medlemsprofil.


**Andre mekanismer?**  
Er det noen andre forklaringsfaktorer som du mener er relevant for å forklare samspillet, eller mangel på samspill.
Interview guide respondent 3

Politiet og lovverkets rolle
1. Hvordan vil du betegne spillerommet anti-islamistiske grupper får fra politiet i Norge og Storbritannia? Er det noen forskjeller?
2. Ser du noen forskjeller på politiets rolle før og under demonstrasjoner med anti-islamistiske grupper i Storbritannia sammenliknet med Norge?
   - For eksempel, er det en forskjell på hvorvidt gruppene får lov til å holde demonstrasjoner?

Høyreradikale partier
Norge FrP – UK. Tilstedeværelse påvirkning mobiliseringspotensiale.
1. Hvilken effekt tror du mangelen eller tilstedeværelsen av et høyreradikalt parti har på mobiliseringsstyrken til anti-islamistiske organisasjoner?
2. Ser man noen forskjell på grupperinger (endring i mobiliseringen) som NDL og SIAN etter at Fremskrittspartiet kom i regjering?

Fiendebilde
Diagnostiserende framing – hvem og hva er problemet – fiendebilde
1. Hvem ville du plassert som en del av fiendebildet til anti-islamistiske grupper?
2. Hvordan vil du beskrive de anti-islamistiske grupperingene i England og Norge når det kommer til å imitere og speile radikale islamistiske grupper?
3. Har du noen innspill på hvordan dette fungerer den andre veien? Hvor mye radikale islamistiske grupper som Islam4UK og Profetens Ummah speiler anti-islamister?

Media
Medias framing av aktørene. Påvirkningsaktør for interaksjonen mellom dem.
1. Har du noen tanker rundt framingen til media når det gjelder samspillet mellom anti-Islamistiske grupper og radikale islamistiske grupper i Norge og Storbritannia? Vil du si at det er en forskjell i de to landene for hvordan de rammer inn konflikten?

Lee Rigby – CE og Clash
1. Tror du medias inntak av konflikten har noe å si for utviklingen av samspillet mellom de to grupperingene?
2. Har du noen formening om hvilken rolle medietrykk spiller inn på interaksjonen? At vi ser en korrelasjon mellom medietrykk og interaksjon?

Organisasjonsressurser - Human Resources
Vold taktisk avhenger av ressurser tilgjengelig. Menneskelige ressurser og medlemsprofil.
2. Det var jo en god del utskiftninger i lederskap og medlemskap rundt 2011, endret det organisasjonen på noe vis?
3. Hvordan vil du sammenlikne den menneskelige profilen, og da spesielt den ”harde kjernen” i det anti-islamistiske miljøet i Norge og England? Er det flere ”mobiliserte støttespillere” der enn i Norge?
innsikt på linken mellom hooligan miljøet eller eventuelt biker-miljøet til de anti-
islamistiske organisasjonene i Norge?

Normative begrensninger
Lederne, medlemmene samt målene til en organisasjon kan ha en innvirkning på hvorvidt
man velger å bruke vold.

1. Hadde 22 juli en effekt på anti-islamistiske miljøet i Norge? Mobilisering, utskiftning,
distansering.
Interview guide respondent 4

Repression – isolation or institutionalisation
Laws: outright banning, making it criminal for individuals to belong or support the group
1. Why did the new decentralised structure make them so resilient to repression?
2. Why did they see isolation as strength? Cut off by Muslim community
3. Tactical adaptation to repression – tactical adaptation to EDL and other groups?

Enemy image - mirroring
- Subverting and using each other’s language and symbols
  1. Who is part of their enemy image?
  2. Provocative under MAC with flag burning – did they want a response from EDL or just the media?
  3. Did they use any symbols from the counter-Jihadi universe?

Media framing – Self-fulfilling Prophecy (the way they write about it)
  1. How do you see the media framing the conflict between anti-Islamists and radical Islamists? Lee Rigby and Clash of Civilizations
  2. They had an effect on media, but do you think the media had an effect on the Emigrants?

Human resources – who joins? Violence potential
Organisational resources
  1. Persistent activists – are they the ones keeping the organisation going? What would happen without them staying?
  2. Criminal activity and age – did that have an effect on their violence potential prior to being indoctrinated?

Normative constraints – response to violence (group’s response to ex members breaking the covenant)
  1. When former or current members break the covenant, what is the leadership’s response? Do they see it as harming or good for the organisation?
## Appendix III

### Reciprocal Intergroup Radicalisation Incidents Britain and Norway

#### Britain

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Action/reaction</th>
<th>Radicalisation scale</th>
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<tr>
<td>03/09</td>
<td>Bakri Network demonstrating homecoming soldiers</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>05/09</td>
<td>Counter-protest by United People of Luton (now EDL) against Bakri Network</td>
<td>Reaction to AM demonstration</td>
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<tr>
<td>06/09</td>
<td>Clashes at homecoming parade for British soldiers</td>
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<td>11/09</td>
<td>Bakri Network burning poppies on Remembrance day</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/10</td>
<td>Bakri Network burning poppies on Remembrance Day – clashes erupted</td>
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<td>11/10</td>
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<td>04/11</td>
<td>EDL showing up to “protect” Royal family against Bakri Network Protestors</td>
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<tr>
<td>09/11</td>
<td>Clashes between Bakri Network and EDL under 9/11 ceremony</td>
<td>Interaction</td>
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<td>06/12</td>
<td>Lethal attack at EDL demonstration by Islamists</td>
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<td>Heavy violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/13</td>
<td>Lee Rigby hacked to death by two Islamists</td>
<td>Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>04/13</td>
<td>Spike of anti-Muslim incidents and EDL protestors</td>
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<td>Choudary established Islamic Emergency Defence (IED), similar to EDL vigilante group</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/13</td>
<td>EDL protest outside Pompey Lads mosque</td>
<td>Reaction to Pompey Lads incident</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Clashes between Bakri Network and EDL outside radical mosque</td>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Violence</td>
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Norway

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<tr>
<td>01/12</td>
<td>NDL counter-demonstrators at Profetens Ummah demonstration</td>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>02/12</td>
<td>Arfan Bhatti sent threatening email to NDL leader Ronny Alte</td>
<td>Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/12</td>
<td>Profetens Ummah counter-demonstrators at NDL demonstration at Grønland (PU warned the Police to monitor NDL members)</td>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>01/16</td>
<td>Profetens Ummah established Allaahs Soldater</td>
<td>Reaction to Odins soldater</td>
<td>Confrontational</td>
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