OTHERWISE-THINKING

THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT
AND TRANSNATIONAL NETWORK

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Abstract

In 1965, a group of Soviet dissidents met at the Pushkin memorial in Moscow to protest ‘socialist legality’ and the return to Stalinist tendencies. A decade later, the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Accords, publicly committing themselves to implement human rights as a requirement for European security and cooperation. These two events would culminate in a transnational advocacy network spearheaded by the Moscow Helsinki Group.

This thesis asks how the Soviet human rights movement used international human rights politics to expand its domestic influence by gaining transnational attention and cooperation. The movement in the periods prior and after the Conference are compared in their use of underground publishing, foreign appeals, and legal rhetoric. Dissident organizations, like the Initiative Group and the Moscow Helsinki Group, are approached as stand-alone organizations as well as part of the movement’s continuity. Archival material from Radio Free Europe and transnational actors confirm that the movement consciously used the Helsinki framework and human rights language in order to attract broader membership and audience. These domestic and foreign allies would pressure the Soviet government in a process established at the first follow-up meeting in 1977-1978.
Acknowledgements

The past two years have been the most educational, frustrating, and rewarding years of my life. I don’t think I will ever be able to view human rights, international relations, and civil society without problematizing and somehow relating it to Soviet dissidents. I first wish to thank all my friends and fellow students on the third floor of Niels Treshcows hus. Waking up early and staying late would have been impossible without you. Thank you for much needed breaks for coffee, quiz, and laughing. A special mention to VB, it might not seem like it now, but I will miss seeing your faces every day. I hope our collective FOMO will continue to bring us together.

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I specially want to thank Bjørn and Jorun Bache for your sincere interest and enthusiasm for everything I do, especially this.
A Note on Russian Transliteration

There are a variety of ways to transliterate Russian names and terms from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Roman alphabet. Throughout this paper I have used GOST 7.79 B systems, except in cases where another English transliteration is widely used, for example, Nikita Khrushchev and Andrei Sakharov.

As authors use different methods of transliteration, there will occasionally be alternative spellings in quotations or references. Within the text I have forsaken the Russian patronymics (middle names) for the sake of readability, however, these are included for the persons included in the index in Appendix A.

In general, I have tried to stay as respectful and accurate to a language and culture which I find fascinating and hope this is seen throughout.
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INTRODUCTION

“A curious grapevine” is how Eleanor Roosevelt, First Lady and chairperson to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, described human rights’ spread to the censored people of the Eastern bloc.1 The eloquent metaphor was followed by the idea that “[a]ll the Governments, even the totalitarian regimes which completely control the means of information, are affected by what their people want […] sooner or later they have to meet these needs”.2 The idea of a curious grapevine stretching across the Cold War divide complements the familiar narrative of Soviet citizens gradually adopting the Western human rights concept until they are reintroduced to the rest of the world. The 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) visibly marked a turning point for how the world viewed the Soviet human rights activism and acted as a catalyst for transnational advocacy cooperation. While the Conference held no machinery for implementation, it inspired the creation of a new dissident organization. It was the first of many similar public monitoring groups which formed a transnational movement that in many ways dominated conversations about human rights in the 1970s. Yet what happens to this narrative if we consider individual agency and strategy?

The primary research question for this thesis asks how the Soviet human rights movement adapted and contributed to external human rights politics, like the CSCE process, to expand its domestic influence by transnational cooperation? To understand the shift in the movements’ structure and influence, there are several smaller questions that need to be addressed. First, this paper will examine the movement prior to 1975 and the history of citizens’ rights in the Soviet Union as points of comparison. What were the motives and strategies of the early movement? Secondly, the movement’s network and position in Western transnational human rights discussions will be considered. Did this shape their perception of human rights or their need for transnational networks? This thesis will also examine how the Helsinki Final Act was used to organize and justify a public monitoring group in Moscow and how this spread to other Socialist republics. How was this kind of human rights monitoring different from the earlier attempts? How was it presented and received by outsiders? Finally,

we shall look towards the West and the continuation of the CSCE process, the Belgrade conference in 1977-78. What had changed in the few years between the Conference in Helsinki and its follow-up meeting in Belgrade? Who or what influenced these differences? These questions, which jump between inquiry at the transnational, national, and citizen level, will be addressed by looking at equally varied sources. Individual experiences in the shape of memoirs and correspondence are vital to this study. The title “Otherwise-thinkers” refers to the somewhat awkward translation of the Russian word typically used for individual opposition before adopting the English word ‘dissident’. This translation symbolizes the differences between human rights activism in the Western (English) world and in Soviet Russia.

The project

What was the human rights movement?

To borrow a phrase from historian Robert Horvath, the Soviet human rights-defence movement, is typically considered to have begun in the 1960s, a period popularly referred to as the thaw. Following the death of Joseph Stalin and the easing of repression and censorship, vibrant discussions of literature, philosophy and law surfaced in Moscow. The arrest of authors Yúli Daniel and Andrei Sinyevsky in 1965 for publishing abroad under pseudonyms, reminded many of the political show trials during Stalin’s reign. In response to this, a demonstration was held in front of the Pushkin memorial on December 5th, the anniversary of the Soviet Constitution. This event, which was the first of what became an annual tradition, set the mould for a movement that would continue into the 1970s. The movement demanded adherence to Soviet laws, in particular the rights to open trials, freedom of speech and assembly, and the inviolability of the person. In addition to demonstrations, people began circulating non-conformist texts, songs, and ideas in an underground network, known as samizdat, in order to spread their ideas. Perhaps the most influential of these works was the samizdat journal The Chronicle of Current Events, first published in 1968. The journal sought to report human rights violations as well as dissident activity across the Soviet Union. Petitions also became popular among the dissidents, the signing of which posed several

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3 The Chronicle of Current Events will hereafter be addressed to as The Chronicle. Not to be confused with the American-based The Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR.
threats to their personal security. These petitions asked for release of specific political prisoners, or protested other human rights violations to the Soviet people. These small, dissident communities, repressed by the government, wrote and copied *samizdat*, signed petitions and openly protested violations of their rights, would eventually grow into citizen groups. In 1969, the Initiative Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the USSR was formed, shortly followed by the Moscow Human Rights Committee. Following the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, the movement took on these new principles in what came to be known as the Helsinki Final Act. The movement grew to become a transnational network with contingents across Eastern and Western Europe, as well as North America.

The movement was, like many other social phenomena, ambiguous in its origin and terminology. It still holds several names: the human or civil rights movement, the democratic movement, the rights-defence movement, and so on. The name and definition of this new social force even sparked debate among the dissidents themselves. Member of the movement, Pável Litvinov, argued that “human rights movement” was the best term to use as the movement was essentially non-political in character. Many dissidents stressed that their opposition was not anti-Soviet in nature, but moral or legal. However, this thesis will maintain that as this was not a prerequisite, and the movement is better classified as a political movement, “but based on politics that worked precisely by claiming to transcend politics”. Dissident Andréj Amálrik described it as a political movement that set itself apart from general opposition for several reasons. The first of which was its self-definition as a movement with specific aims and tactics. Perhaps most importantly, the movement desired legal status and visibility, which distinguished it from other underground groups. Historian Philip Boobbyer makes the point that the “human rights movement” is the most historically specific. This thesis will use that classification but refrain from taking the concept of “human rights” at face value. I agree with Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann and his idea that “human rights are still something like the doxa of our times: those ideas and sentiments that are tacitly presumed to be self-evident truths and not in need of any justification.”

Human rights in the Soviet context developed as a response to oppression from the state and

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7 Boobbyer, *Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia*, 75.
under Soviet Socialism. Historian Benjamin Nathans points out that there is a widespread tendency to “cast Soviet dissidents as surrogate soldiers of western liberalism in the ideological battles of the Cold War”. However, the movement included representatives of genuine Marxism-Leninism, Russian Christianity and Liberalism. This suggests that its own ideology was either a mixture of these or based on their shared elements. Nevertheless, André Amálrik concludes that independent of a clearly defined ideology, “all its supporters assume at least one common aim: the rule of law, founded on respect for the basic rights of man”. It is important to cast aside preconceived notions about what human rights is today and what a movement for these rights should look like. By defamiliarizing these ideas of rights, it is possible to appreciate the Soviet human rights movement’s originality and influence.

**Scope**

This thesis will primarily focus on dissent in Soviet Russia, mainly within the Moscow region. Contributions and contact with dissidents from other cities or countries will be included only in their relation to the dissent in Moscow. The chapters which describe the growth of the Helsinki movement will look into opposition movements in other Soviet republics and Eastern Europe, in the context of their interactions with the Moscow dissidents. These national groups will only be summarized here but deserve projects of their own. Similarly, the movements for Jewish emigration, Crimean Tatars, religious freedom, and so on, will be mentioned as far as they relate to the human rights movement. These movements often overlap in their activities and strategies and can therefore be difficult to separate at times. Several of the secondary sources referenced throughout this project offer excellent insight and narratives of the individuals and groups that fought for rights in other areas.

The bulk of the project and the main point of analysis will investigate the movement beginning in the early 1970s. However, the first chapter of this thesis will deal with the negotiation processes around the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which ended in 1948, as well as the emergence of the movement in the mid-1960’s. These events are necessary for comparing and understanding the movement later.

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9 This view of defamiliarizing human rights in the context of developed socialism is well described. However, as he looks almost exclusively at Volpin’s ideas about legality, it loses some of its argument when applied to the movement more broadly. Cannot deny that they were somewhat influenced by global ideas of human rights when citing the UDHR etc. Benjamin Nathans, "The Dictatorship of Reason: Aleksandr Vol'pin and the Idea of Rights under "Developed Socialism", " Slavic Review 66, no. 4 (2007): 633.

10 Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?, 12.
The thesis will end with the Belgrade Conference in 1978. There are multiple reasons for this: first of all, as the projects centres around the CSCE process, the first follow-up meeting in Belgrade corresponds well in terms of participants and structure. Secondly, the Belgrade conference acted as a test of effectiveness and implementation for both decision-makers and non-state actors. Those working for implementation, often set Belgrade as a yardstick to measure implementation, therefore it offers us a clear point of analysis. It is also useful to stay within the 1970s as there are significant external factors appearing after this, like fluctuating diplomatic relations and the death of Leonid Brezhnev. Additionally, in order to occasionally expand the thematic and geographical scope, it is necessary to limit the period in order to maintain a focused analysis.

The history of the Helsinki network does not have a clear end point. While the Moscow Helsinki Group disbanded in 1982, the American Watch Group rebranded itself as the Human Rights Watch, currently one of the most influential human rights NGOs in the world. In some European countries, like the Netherlands and Norway, Helsinki groups or committees are still active and are continuing the work of the original groups. These developments will be addressed as part of the concluding remarks.

**Terminology**

The 1960s and 1970s saw some of the most characteristic Cold War features, like détente, mutual arms limitation, and of course, the physical and psychological segregation between Eastern and Western Europe. The divide between the “West” and the “East” defined international relations and affected the lives of regular citizens. It would be impossible to write this thesis without referring to this divide, both as a physical barrier and psychological estrangement. While certain associative phrases like “Iron Curtain” and “satellite-state” is avoided, geopolitical terms like “the West” and “the East” is used throughout.

The CSCE was a European conference with the inclusion of the United States and Canada. In this context, the West refers to capitalist countries, mainly members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). “Western Europe” is still an ambiguous grouping today, but in this context, it includes countries in Central and Northern Europe which considered themselves allies of capitalism and the United States. The “East” on the other hand, refer to Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe; the Warsaw Pact countries. However, at times like the Universal Declaration negotiations, either of these terms may also include allies in South America or Asia-Pacific. The neutral or non-aligned states
within Europe, such as Finland and Yugoslavia played mostly diplomatic roles (such as being the locations for the CSCE and first follow-up meeting). This Eurocentric perspective is hopefully forgiven as a result of the narrow geographical focus of the main actors in question: Western Europe and the United States was considered the most influential ally by the dissidents themselves.

Another term that needs to be defined and situated is the English word “dissident”, originated from Latin for “sitting apart”11. In Western thought, “dissident” tends to agree, more or less, with the definition Holloway Sparks provides in her study of dissident citizenship: “the often creative oppositional practices of citizens who, either by choice or (much more commonly) by forced exclusion from the institutionalized means of opposition, contest current arrangements of power from the margins of the polity”.12 Along with many of the other writers on this subject, I use both “dissident” and “activist”. This can be somewhat confusing as the terms are not entirely synonymous. “Activist” is used as a more general term to refer to people who actively participate in the human rights discussions and campaigns. “Dissidents” then, are those activists who oppose, in this case, the current human rights policies within the Soviet Union.

The adoption of “dissident” in the Russian language was introduced by Western journalists. Lyudmila Alekseyeva, historian and former dissident, claims that “dissident” replaced the Russian word inakomyslyashchiy, literally translated to “otherwise-thinker”.13 Among these otherwise-thinkers were the pravozashchitniki: usually mistranslated as “human rights activists” despite the term implying “defender both of rights and law”.14 Benjamin Nathans, writing about Soviet dissident memoirs, claims that “dissident” was a term given by foreign journalists favourably, then adopted by the Eastern regimes in an effort to “stigmatize nonconformists by branding them with a foreign word”.15 It had anti-social and extremist connotations, which discouraged sympathy and membership.16 Through numerous references from their memoirs, it becomes clear that the pravozashchitniki did not always appreciate the term, but could not prevent it from being used.17 At the time of writing, there is no other word

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16 Boobbyer, *Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia*, 75.
that corresponds to the work of the Soviet human rights-defenders movement nor one that would be more accepted by the activists themselves. In addition, the term “dissident” favourably emphasizes the person-centred quality of the movement, as well as “the quality of estrangement from common mental structures and social norms”. However, it is an important discussion when considering East-West connections, domestic sympathy and the implications of writing from a western point of view.

Throughout this thesis there are a lot of terms and phrases which have been left in Russian instead of translating them to an English equivalent. While some of these words have acquired their own meaning outside of the Russian-speaking world, others sometimes lose their meaning when replaced. These words are usually accompanied by their meaning and translation when they occur in the text. However, some terms, like samizdat, have a longer history which is necessary to establish at this point. Any body of text can be categorised as samizdat unless it is “endorsed by an official organ of the state that reaches its audience without any change in meaning”. However, it is typically used for Eastern European underground texts and publishing. The word originated in the 1950s when the poet Nikolai Glazkov created his own book by sewing together the pages of his verse and typing “samsebyaizdat” on the bottom of the first page. This was meant as an acronym for “I published myself” as well as a parody of an official publishing house. Later it was shortened to samizdat, meaning “self-publishing”. The tradition of self-publication in Russia, however, stretches back much further in time. Historian and dissident ally, Peter Reddaway, claims that the “habit of distributing privately in manuscript those works which the censors disliked” began already around year 1820 with notables like the poet Aleksandr Pushkin. According to dissident Andréj Amálrik, samizdat appeared as

a result of the crossing of two opposing trends: the striving of society to obtain greater social and political information and the efforts of the regime to control even more completely every aspect of information given to the public.

Samizdat is generally presented as monotone, factual and often difficult to read, yet while this was certainly the case with The Chronicle, other texts were sometimes religious, emotional, and even humorous. The tone of the text depended on its intended audience, thus, for the sake

18 “The Dictatorship of Reason,” 632.
20 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 97-98.
of a rights movement, the *samizdat* was often informative and candid.\(^{23}\) The process of *samizdat* was simple, but very efficient, a writer would type multiple copies of a text and distribute among their friends, if they liked it, they would do the same. If the text became popular enough, the text could get a chance for a second publication outside the Soviet Union as *tamizdat*. This variation is simply the replacement of *sam* with the Russian word *tam*, meaning “there”. *Tamizdat*, therefore, refers to unofficial texts published outside of the Soviet Union. There are a number of other variations of other “-izdats” concerning songs or radio broadcasts, yet these are not as widely used.

**Historiography**

**Existing Literature**

The emergence of human rights as a topic for international norms and treaties has been the subject of much academic interest and debate. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann divides the recent historiography on human rights into two tendencies: the first argues that human rights has slowly developed over time to culminate in what we know as human rights today. The other disputes the previous theory by demonstrating deviations in our moral and political convictions over the past decades.\(^{24}\) One of the works that fall under the latter is Samuel Moyn’s *The Last Utopia*. Moyn’s major argument is that human rights as we know them today only appeared in the late 1970s as prior to this, human rights were not part of international concern, but of the states’ domestic jurisdiction. He blames the global success of human rights as a doctrine on the failure of other utopias, like socialism, rather than its inherent qualities.\(^{25}\) This thesis does not propose the dissident movement as a microcosm for the emergence of global human rights rhetoric but reinforces the idea of its recent development from citizens’ rights.

The Eastern bloc’s influence on international standards of human rights has gained an extensive body of literature. Their contribution to the UDHR is documented in Johannes Morsink’s comprehensive guide to the creation of the declaration.\(^{26}\) The Conference on

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\(^{24}\) Hoffmann, "Human Rights and History". 280.


Security and Cooperation in Europe has also received its fair share of attention; the Helsinki Final Act is often seen as a turning point in the Cold War, and an early sign to its end. This point of view is clearly shown the number of books that deals with human rights, Helsinki, and American foreign policy. Among these are William Korey’s *The Promises We Keep* from 1993. While the book deals with an extension of the Helsinki process, including the follow-up meetings Belgrade in 1977 and Madrid in 1980, it maintains an American point of view. President Carter’s human rights mandate, as well as the American delegations to the meetings, are the focal points throughout. Yet Korey provides a detailed description of the Helsinki movement across Eastern and Western Europe, emphasizing the role of the media in keeping the movement alive.²⁷ Peter Slezkine’s article *From Helsinki to Human Rights Watch* also approaches the post-Helsinki process and Moscow Helsinki Group from an American angle; his focus is on the group’s international legacy, the US Helsinki Committee, and the subsequent creation of the Human Rights Watch. He stresses the influence of Moscow Helsinki Group’s tactics, civil action and individual agency on the growth of monitoring groups in the Americas and Western Europe. Slezkine presents an interesting discussion on the American group’s difficulty of framing a monitoring group based on the principles of its Russian counterpart: after all, the American group did not aim to monitor *domestic* violations. The creation of a modern human rights NGO is attributed partly to “shifting historical circumstances and ideological commitments”.²⁸ These “shifts” in the international climate after Helsinki is one of the main pillars among historians for this topic. However, Slezkine sets himself apart from other contemporary authors by disregarding the Helsinki Act’s contribution to the collapse of the Soviet Union in his study.

The idea that the Helsinki Accords and its effect on human rights norms weakened communist rule to the point of collapse is presented in Daniel C. Thomas’ *The Helsinki Effect* and Sarah B. Snyder’s *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War*. Thomas’ constructivist argument is based on the idea that by committing themselves to international agreements, the Soviet Union became bound by human rights norms which ignited “unprecedented social movement and opposition activity that emerge[d] across the East bloc in the aftermath of the Helsinki Final Act”.²⁹ A weakness in Thomas’ theory is his

trivialization of the period prior to the CSCE negotiations, especially the presence of social opposition. Readers are presented with the image of a silent public boldened by the new international norms to speak up against their repressive governments and take on the idea of human rights. While Thomas acknowledges the presence of some groups of dissent, he diminishes their importance and longevity by claiming there had been a “near absence of dissent in the region during the early 1970s”. This imprecise image removes the dissidents’ agency to the point that they seem more like puppets of international norms, rather than an independent movement. Ironically, Thomas criticizes historians who overlook “autonomous societal forces” when explaining the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thomas asks, “how then can we explain the ability of mass movements, guided by surprisingly skillful opposition organizations to overthrow supposedly omnipotent communist party-states?” This project, which does not go into the collapse, asks instead how dissidents came to be such “surprisingly skillful opposition organizations” if there was no precedence for them?

Sarah B. Snyder refers explicitly to Thomas’ argument, claiming that she builds on this theory, but complicates it by emphasizing influences by collective and individual human rights advocacy in ending the Cold War. According to Snyder, unlike the UDHR, the Helsinki act was,

uniquely formulated to give rise to a transnational network because the terms of the agreement established that CSCE states could exchange views on implementation of the Helsinki final act, meaning human rights abuses would now be subject to international diplomacy.

Snyder’s investigation is more nuanced than Thomas’ as it gives stronger agency to the events happening alongside the CSCE. Yet, Snyder, like Thomas and many others, gives the movement prior to 1975 little attention. The individuals and groups are addressed but presented as short-lived attempts to gain any domestic or global importance. This predisposition among many historians to focus on UDHR in 1948 and the Helsinki Accords in 1975 as the only significant events in Soviet dissident history is addressed by Robert Horvath. The period of almost three decades between these events are often summarized as strictly censored and oppressed under Stalin’s terror, giving little attention to any organized

30 Ibid., 122.
31 Ibid., 4.
32 Ibid., 5-6.
34 Ibid., 7.
opposition happening before the CSCE. Horvath’s article *Breaking the Totalitarian Ice* contends that the Initiative Group deserves a much larger place in the narrative of Soviet rights-defence movement, as Sakharov’s Human Rights Committee and the Moscow Helsinki Group has received disproportional amounts of scholarly attention. The Initiative Group defined the movement in several ways, most importantly perhaps, by helping to “ensure that human rights, an arcane and obscure concept in 1969, prevailed over its ideological rivals and became the dominant idea of the Soviet dissident movement”.

However, this tendency to focus on post-1975 dissent, does not mean there is a total lack of scholarly work on non-clandestine civil action in the 1960-1970s. Svetlana Savranskaya’s chapter *Unintended Consequences: Soviet Interests, Expectations and Reactions to the Helsinki Final Act* emphasises the role of the early movement and its suppression prior to the CSCE. It relies mainly on sources from state agents, like the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) directives and reports of the Soviet Central Committee. This perspective is useful to situate the more person-centred approaches. Lyudmila Alekséeva’s *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights* was published in 1985 and is still widely used and referenced among scholars. Alekséeva was an active participant in the movement and one of the original members of the Moscow Helsinki Group prior to her emigration to the United States in February 1977. Her voluminous contribution to the field contains detailed descriptions of the movements for self-determination, deported nations, emigration, religious liberty, in addition to human rights. Her geographical scope moves beyond her own background in Moscow to the former Soviet republics. *Soviet Dissent* gives an idea of the actual scope of movements and groups existing before and after the Helsinki Act. Alekséeva’s first-hand experience with the Soviet system, the movement and the actors provide a unique understanding of the motivations behind the rights defence.

Benjamin Nathans also provides insight into the early movement and its individual actors. In his exploration of socialist legality and one of its main critics, Aleksándr Esenin-Vól’pin, he defamiliarizes the dissident interpretation of human rights and its effect on the human rights movement. By focusing on Vól’pin as an individual, he also seeks to continue the traditional person-centred investigation of the movement. Vól’pin’s effective debunking of socialist legality makes his contribution to the movement one of the most convincing examples of personal impact. Beyond this, Nathans uses Vól’pin’s rights-defence as a way to

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37 Ibid., 149.
guide the reader to how human rights in the Soviet setting should be understood. He claims that he approaches the subject by “[stripping] rights-talk of its self-evidence, to defamiliarize and denaturalize rights by studying them in the setting of developed socialism”. Nathans goes so far as to criticize Alekséeva’s use of the word “awakening” to personal liberties, in order to separate Western concepts of human rights from the dissident concept. The idea that the dissident conceptualization and interpretation of human rights differed from those established by Western or UN standards is supported in this study. However, Nathans does not take into account the use of the human rights language, such as the Universal Declaration, among dissidents. Even as early as 1968 the samizdat journal Chronicle of Current Events printed Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on the first number and did so for every subsequent issue. Thus, while Soviet human rights might have developed parallel to Western human rights, rather than as an offshoot, they did not occur completely independent from each other.

The use of human rights language and rhetoric among human rights activists in the Soviet Union is mentioned by several of the aforementioned authors, such as Robert Horvath and Peter Slezkine. This tactic not only helped the dissidents relate to human rights activists and observers abroad, but is a tactic not reserved to the Soviet human rights movement. Benjamin Nathans offers examples of this when looking at how samizdat discussions of the 1977 constitution referenced the newly signed international human rights agreements like the UDHR, UN rights conventions and the Helsinki Accords. While in the constitution these international human rights norms were meant to apply to the USSR’s foreign relations, dissidents applied them to domestic law. For example, the persistence on duty of work could be seen as forced labour which the International Organization of Labour had banned. Similarly, Soviet Christians cited the non-discrimination clauses in the 1966 UN rights covenants to oppose the unequal rights of expression for religious citizens.

As media, both endorsed sources like newspapers and radio broadcast as well as underground publications of samizdat, are a large part of this study, it was necessary to get appropriate background knowledge on this. A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta’s edited collection on Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provides detailed chapters that present external and internal perspectives of Western radio broadcasting to the East as well as primary documents. One of the advantages of this

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39 Horvath, “Breaking the Totalitarian Ice”: 152, Slezkine, “From Helsinki to Human Rights Watch”: 347
collection is the inclusion of Eastern European authors: such as Elena I. Bashkirova’s chapter on the internal perspective of audiences to Western broadcasts. Throughout the project a point has been made to use a variety of sources and authors as this can help to minimize an overly Western-European point of view. Friederike Kind-Kovacs’ book Written Here, Published There: How Underground Literature Crossed the Iron Curtain, views tamizdat as both a literary and social phenomenon which reinforced feelings of Pan-European familiarity. This kind of literature illuminates how the Helsinki network could develop and function in a physically and culturally divided continent.

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s research into transnational advocacy networks have become staple references in the field and for good reasons. Their research is based on a wide range of advocacy networks to establish the complex interactions among individuals and networks, and the framing of interests and identities. Their research is on transnational networks, but many of the strategies and patterns of influence coincide with that of social movements as well, making their research relevant to this thesis from the onset. For example, Keck and Sikkink outline four types of tactics used by networks (and movements): information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics. These tactics are all used, to varying degrees, by dissidents before and after the Helsinki Accords, domestically and transnationally. Accountability tactics recognize states’ tendency to outwardly adopt positions in order to divert negative attention by international observers. Advocacy networks then try to expose the state’s actual behaviour and the “distance between discourse and practice”. Governments are then pressured to implement the principles they formally endorse in order to deter international scrutiny. This particular tactic summarizes the key idea behind the Soviet human rights movement: before the Helsinki Accords, the movement used the Soviet Constitution to disprove Socialist legality and force the government to adhere to its own constitution. In 1976 the focus shifted to the Helsinki Final Act and the Soviet violations of the humanitarian provisions. Throughout this paper these tactics will be referred to in order to characterise and point out similarities between the movement in the two periods. Keck and Sikkink’s theoretical approach support the idea of a single movement with tactics employed fluidly in order to remain relevant.

42 Ibid., 97-98.
Primary Sources

Media presence was an important strategy for the dissidents and their supporters abroad. The more time they spent in the spotlight, the more familiar people would become to their cause, and the harder it was to silence them. The dissidents themselves knew this, as did the repressive agents. Newspapers and journals’ own public archives contain a lot of these articles which can be used to make inferences about their support or backlash. A lot of the articles and editorials dealing with the movement also came from other archives.

One of these archives was the Open Society Archives at the Central European University in Budapest. It holds an impressive collection of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) material that allowed for a better oversight into events, attitudes and impacts. Western radio stations, like RFE/RL, were not just broadcasting pro-West reports aimed at Eastern Europeans but functioned as a research institution for much of the Cold War. The archive holds massive amounts of newspaper clippings valuable to understand what was going on in international and domestic discussions at the time. Several dissidents mention their interactions with these stations, which make their internal broadcasting guides important as well. The way they presented news from both outside and inside the Eastern sphere played a part in shaping individual perceptions of the Cold War. Interactions between the radio stations and dissidents also counts as strategies for reaching wider audiences. RFE/RL holds a number of samizdat and tamizdat texts, many of which are translated to English. As these are the voices of the dissident movement, they are invaluable for understanding how the movement developed. However, as attempting it is to accept samizdat as the correct narrative, it is important to keep in mind that the authors had their own biases and agendas. Ann Komaromi and Olga Zaslavskaya complicates the tradition of viewing samizdat as entirely truthful and authoritative. Samizdat is “instead a much more complex social phenomenon binding a varied soviet dissident public”.43 These sources should therefore be given the same kind of critical examination as any primary sources.

The National Security Archive is an online source to a massive number of documents perceived relevant to American foreign and domestic security and policies. Among these documents are reports and messages from Soviet intelligence services are published in their original and translated forms. In addition, they have published unclassified American

43 Discussion and quote in Olga Zaslavskaya, "From Dispersed to Distributed Archives: The Past and the Present of Samizdat Material," Poetics Today 29, no. 4 (2008).
governmental documents, such as reports from the Belgrade Conference and internal memorandums from the presidential administrations.

Leif Hovelsen’s personal letters and writings are located at Riksarkivet, the National Archives of Norway. These sources are relevant as Hovelsen was involved in the dissident community and instrumental in securing Andrei Sakharov the nomination for the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize. The National Archives of Norway, Riksarkivet, holds documents from the Norwegian Helsinki Committee. The Norwegian Committee was one of the first Western Helsinki groups, as well as one of the most outspoken. Their appeals illuminate Belgrade’s importance to the transnational network’s post-Helsinki rhetoric.

Memoirs

In addition to primary sources like samizdat and personal correspondence, the main actors’ voices are heard through their own memoirs. I believe these present an original source of their opinions and aims by being written after the events, as long as they are supplemented by other sources. The opportunity to evaluate their own actions and consequences, can make their original purpose or motivation more obvious. Memoirs are often considered problematic in terms of their accountability and bias. However, for the purpose of establishing connections and relationships, they are valid historical documents. Memoirs also help understand some of the main dissidents’ personal history and political leanings before the human rights movement. This can help elucidate how the movement came about and the motivations behind.

As previously mentioned, the Soviet human rights movement was based on the actions and views of a few individuals: Personal sacrifices, like loss of careers, social status, and arrests, as well as countless hours of copying samizdat or writing appeals. Beyond their deserving of recognition, this person-based approach by studying memoirs and personal recollection is in line with the nature of the movement.

Some of the memoirs given special consideration are Yuri Orlov’s Dangerous Thoughts, Andrei Sakharov’s Memoirs, Lyudmila Alekseeva’s The Thaw Generation, and Andrei Amalrik Notes of a Revolutionary. These authors were active dissidents and their

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44 As the 1975 nomination process is classified until 2055 we cannot understand how much these efforts influenced the final decision. But we can gain an example of how Sakharov and Soviet human rights struggles were perceived abroad.
personal recollections provide valuable insight into the creation of the various groups and the movement as a whole.

**Theory**

My position is a representation of my own research process: Literature supporting the idea of a “Helsinki effect” was consistent with the familiar narrative and ‘grand scheme’ of the Cold War. This thesis was originally meant to use 1975 as the starting point for the movement. However, as I began reading more first-hand accounts and conducting research for a background chapter, disregarding the events prior to 1975 seemed not only diminishing but inaccurate. The human rights movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s shared too many similarities with the one described by Thomas, Snyder and Slezkine to be ignored. Clearly the post-Helsinki movement and transnational network was a result of more than a document, no matter its precedence and influence in Cold War diplomacy.

There are several competent researchers that worked on similar investigations, many of them already mentioned. However, most historians in the field have focused either on the movement in its early stages, ending their investigation with the dissolution of the Initiative Group or the repressions in 1972. Others examine the creation of the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Helsinki Network. Therefore, to the best of my knowledge, there are a limited number of studies into the movement before and after Helsinki evaluating its effect.

The constructivist position argued by Thomas and supported by Snyder is convincing, yet it neglects the movement prior to the Helsinki Accords. The global turn to human rights during the 1970s is used as a backdrop in this thesis, rather than a guiding force. Keck and Sikkink make the key point that that advocacy networks “embody elements of agent and structure simultaneously”. The idea that while structures affect the movement, they still have the agency to choose how to manipulate these to advance their cause, is the guiding theory of this thesis.

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45 Keck and Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks," 91.
1 Human Rights in Soviet Thought and Policy Making

The only weapon we dissidents had was glasnost. Not propaganda but glasnost, so that nobody could say afterwards “I did not know”\textsuperscript{46}

Vladimir Bukóvskij

This chapter introduces how human rights were perceived in the Soviet Union until the early 1970s. Applying theories and evidence at both the state and citizen level, this chapter will present an understanding of human rights beyond what is found in formal doctrines. As the movement was created in opposition to the existing conditions and social system, it is important to understand what this reality looked like. The early movement responses, like their legal focus and use of underground publications, shaped the rest of the movement and are therefore vital to the narrative. This chapter will delve into historical evidence of a vibrant human rights movement that had flourished independently from international processes, but their isolation made them vulnerable to government oppression.

As the Soviet Union was ruled under Socialist ideology, one might assume that policymaking, including human rights norms, were static and defined by Marxist or Leninist ideology. However, domestic and international politics fluctuated in accordance with Cold War tensions, and major events such as World War II or the death of Joseph Stalin. Twentieth-century Russia saw, like the rest of the world, massive shifts in what constituted rights for their citizens.

This chapter is arranged chronologically in order to explore how attitudes towards law and human rights changed over time. I will also switch between inquiry at the state, public, and individual levels, and how they related to each other. The first part will address state-level perceptions of citizen rights, beginning with Marxist rights of man and constitutional rights. These perceptions were put into practice during the transnational negotiations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and again after the death of Josef Stalin and the period of new social liberties. The early 1960s and 1970s also saw the focus of the concept socialist legality and early cultural and judicial opposition. These developments shaped the individuals, groups, and rhetoric that would continue to define the movement. The backlash and methods of

\textsuperscript{46} Quoted in Zaslavskaya, "From Dispersed to Distributed Archives," 678.
repression of the movement would have an impact on the movement’s visibility and causes. The consequences of this repression, like negative Western attention, influenced the tactics used by both activists and authorities in the movement’s later period.

The Rights of homo Sovieticus

Human rights in the Marxist doctrine is a topic which has been discussed by historians and philosophers alike, however, for this particular study it is not essential to move beyond a basic understanding of where it concurs and diverges. Human rights are often thought of as a “American (or Western) export product”. It is essentially about protection of the individual which was at odds with the Marxist emphasis on the collective. According to historian Lynn Hunt, Karl Marx rejected the very foundations of what is typically thought of as the rights of man. Instead of the right to religious freedom, Marx desired freedom from religion. Similarly, instead of the right to own property, Marx wanted liberation from personal property. It is important to keep in mind that human rights was not a well-developed concept at the time Marx wrote, neither in the East nor the West.

Benjamin Nathans poses the question, “What happens to human rights when ‘the human’ is understood as a work in progress?” Andréj Vyshinskij, Soviet representative to the drafting of the UDHR, argued that a declaration of human rights should not come from the UN General Assembly, as rights could not be conceived outside the state. The very concept of laws and liberties was to be protected and implemented by the state. As there were no rival classes within the Soviet Union, Vyshinskij continued, the natural contradiction between the government and the individual was ultimately solved. The government embodied the “collective individual” and their interests coincided. Historian Johannes Morsink argues that based a purely ideological point of view, the Soviet Union should have voted against the document as that kind of positivist interpretation was consistent with the rest of the Marxist doctrine. Instead, during these discussions particularly, Soviet leaders used any mention of human rights found in the Communist foundation to their own benefit. Human rights as it was

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50 Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 21-22.
51 Ibid., 22.
presented in the Universal Declaration was framed to “[complement] Marxist-Leninism, socialist legality, and peaceful coexistence”.  

Soviet Constitutions and the All-Union Discussion

Extensive studies of Soviet law have often been ignored as the laws are expected to be ignored by both citizens and authorities. While this position is overly simplistic, Benjamin Nathans suggest that “[i]t is more productive to think of laws as norms than as descriptions of reality,” and therefore, “more fruitful to focus on the tension between law in theory and law in practice”. In other words, Soviet written law should not be ignored. Laws are relevant to this study as they help us understand the agenda of the government as well as its important role in the rhetoric of the dissenters.

In 1936, the longest-lasting Soviet Constitution was adopted, known as the “Stalin Constitution”. When the drafting of a new constitution was announced in the early 1930s it was justified by describing the many changes in society and that “because capitalism had been defeated, the legal and political system had to be brought into line with the new socialist society”. Procedural legality, universal suffrage, and basic civil rights were cited as the core of the revisions. An uncharacteristically exposed, state-sponsored “all-union discussion” was introduced during its formation. Beginning in June 1936, major newspapers across the USSR published the draft and invited its readers to submit letters discussing the draft. As Nathans explains, these discussions act as “valuable sources for exploring the deployment of rights-talk in a country that understood itself as the laboratory of the future”. Most investigations of popular opinion tend to focus on the intelligentsia simply because these are the sources most easy to come by. These sources represent a very small percentage and are highly inadequate to epitomize the population. Moreover, the simple gesture of inviting the public to shape the new constitution allow us to hypothesize that the government was mindful

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54 Ibid., 166-67.
56 Ibid.
of public opinion and that citizens wished to participate in the drafting. Forty-three thousand corrections and suggestions were categorized by a state department in order to see which chapters elicited the most response. Over half of the proposals (53%) were concerned with the tenth chapter of the Constitution, named “Citizens’ Basic Rights and Duties.” Letters which dealt with specific articles mostly referred to the electoral system (4716 letters), closely followed by right to material protection (4666), rest (4060), and education (3400). From this modest overview we can see that the Soviet public (at least those who took the time to write to newspapers) were highly concerned with their own rights. This open discussion allowed for citizen voices far beyond what is typically expected during the peak of Stalin’s reign. The new Constitution was advertised as the most democratic in the world with reference to the mentions of social welfare and right to employment and leisure. This concern with rights and Soviet as the forefront of change arose again during the drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

**The Universal Declaration: Soviet participation and abstention**

The Soviet delegation abstained from the vote for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. While abstention is a far step from rejecting an international document, it was somewhat surprising considering how active Soviet delegates were in the discussions around the Declaration and human rights in general. International law was, and still is today, based on positive law – meaning that in order to be bound to the treaty’s terms, the states would have to agree to it. Despite this, the Soviet Union was repeatedly condemned for violating the Declaration. However, the Soviets occasionally ignored their own abstention when it could be used to their benefit.

The emphasis on rights was generally split between the two Cold War blocs: The West emphasized civil and political rights, like freedom of movement and expression. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe advocated the need for economic and social rights, such as rights to housing and education. Despite the divide between East and West and the focus on the two camps of rights, neither side wanted to appear less informed or willing to implement. This is perhaps the reason behind Soviet representative Platon Morozov’s offense at the Danish representative’s mention of divergent understandings of rights between the Soviet Union and

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60 Wimberg, "Socialism, Democratism and Criticism," 325.
61 Ibid.
63 Amos, "Embracing and Contesting," 149.
Western Europe. Morozov responded that the “Constitution of the Soviet Union not only proclaimed a number of rights missing from similar western European instruments, but also provided for specific means of implementing the rights mentioned in it”. He then referred to a number of specific “freedoms” outlined in the Constitution, such as Articles 127 and 128 which contain the freedom from arbitrary arrest as well as inviolability of the home and personal correspondence. At times the Soviet representatives’ views coincided more with those seen globally today, such as social welfare and gender discrimination. Aleksej Pavlov, the Soviet delegate to the Commission on Human Rights in June 1949, advocated for women’s rights to equal pay. He referred to English women who earned “thirty to fifty per cent less than men for the same work”. In contrast, he claimed, “equal pay for equal work” was guaranteed in the Soviet Union.

Due to the abstention, the Declaration in its entirety was not readily available to Soviet citizens. From Vyshinsky’s comment at the General Assembly, we can see that citizens were encouraged to look to the Soviet Constitution rather than a universal document. Nevertheless, in 1955 the entire Declaration was published in Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’ (International Affairs), a journal read both across the USSR and internationally due to its English and French translations. The feature included background history of the Declaration which stressed cooperation between the former World War II allies and the improvement of relations. The Declaration was repeatedly linked to the Soviet Constitution and acted as validation of its progressive nature when addressed in the Soviet press.

Socialist Legality and the Birth of the Movement

A turning point in international and domestic Soviet politics can be marked by Stalin’s death and Nikita Khrushchev’s so-called ‘secret speech’ in 1956. Stalin’s claim to leadership had been as a protector of the Soviet people from both external and internal threats and was upheld by terror and purges. As Khrushchev and the new leadership renounced this tactic,

65 Ibid.
67 Amos, "Embracing and Contesting," 159-60..
68 Ibid., 164.
they faced the issue of justifying their own authority. The official position became that legality would replace terror “as the preferred instrument of social control”. This renewed attention to Soviet law and re-evaluation of the Soviet system would inspire the foundation of the coming dissident movement for the following three decades.

The social liberties enjoyed after the secret speech gave way to renewed interest in arts and politics. Dissident Andréj Amálrik calls this new, independent movement the “Cultural Opposition”, emphasizing its non-conformist nature and focus on the arts. Literary journals like Novy Mir (New World) published texts that dealt with new themes like social pragmatism, cultural liberalism and moral humanism. In addition they sought to reinvent the image of the Soviet man in what they saw as an honest depiction, often portrayed as a parasitic and materialistic character, much different from how Vyshinsky painted the intrinsic redundancy for official standards for human rights at the United Nations General Assembly. Novy Mir was also the one of the first official journals to publish Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Nobel Laureate and one of the principle symbols of the thaw’s literary liberties and Soviet non-conformism. Of course, the permanency of the new social freedoms were uncertain and people were testing new limits of criticism and self-discovery. Lyudmila Alekséeva describes her own experiences with this period as, “[b]lissfully ignorant of the fact that we represented the Soviet human-rights movement in its gestation stage, we were basking in the Khrushchev’s liberalization, discovering what it meant to be human”.

A Movement in the Making

Andréj Amálrik, soviet dissident and author of Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1948, distinguishes between two generations of oppositionists: the 1956 generation, influenced by de-Stalinization, and the generation of 1966, mainly shaped by the Sinyávskij-Daniel trial and Czech political liberalization, or the Prague Spring, in 1967-68. The writers Andréj Sinyávskij and Yúli Daniel were arrested in 1965 for publishing abroad under
pseudonyms. Their arrest brought back memories of Stalinist repercussions and made many Soviet citizens question whether they were returning to that time. Political scientist David Kowalewski claims that the arrest and trial of Sinyávskij and Daniel was the “catalytic event” that transitioned the movement from the “early stage of ferment to the active stage of protest”, as is often seen in protest movements like this. The “birth of the movement”, according to Lyudmila Alekseeva, was a demonstration on December 5th, 1965. The event was planned by Valerij Nikolskij and Aleksándr Esenin-Vól’pin. The second, a poet and mathematician, is described as a “pioneer in judicial education” and handed out leaflets prior to the meeting to educate about Soviet law and invite to the meeting at Pushkin Square. The date, December 5th, was significant as it was the official anniversary celebrating the ratification of the Stalin Constitution.

The gathering was a highly public if short-lived forum in which to broadcast [Vól’pin’s] ideas about glasnost’ (openness) and zakonnost’ (rule of law) – ideas that would be taken up by a broad range of dissident figures, [...] and would later become watchwords of the last, fatal attempt to reform the Soviet system.

The word glasnost “had been in the Russian language for centuries”, yet it held “no political meaning, and until Alek Esenin-Vól’pin pulled it out of ordinary usage, it generated no heat”. The agenda of the meeting was purposely consistent with the Constitution: Article 125 guaranteed the “freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings” as long as the purpose was “in conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system”. The demands were restricted to an open trial for Sinyávskij and Daniel as per Article 111 of the Constitution: “examination of cases in all courts shall be open, in so far as exceptions are not provided for by law”.

There are varying accounts of how the demonstration unfolded and the number of people present, especially as some were only observers, foreign correspondents, or KGB officers dressed in civilian clothing. Lyudmila Alekseeva, who was present at the meeting, claims there were much fewer than fellow activist Vladimir Bukóvskij’s estimate of 200.

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81 Ibid., 275.
83 Ibid., 632.
people present, while Nathans estimates 50 demonstrators but roughly 200 people in total. Other accounts describe the sudden ending of the demonstration by civilian police; twenty people were pushed into cars and detained, while about forty people were expelled from their institutions. Expulsion from university or termination of careers was a risk many faced. Furthermore, speaking up against the government or questioning official policies was usually followed by exclusion from party membership, institutions, or work as well as being blacklisted from other universities or jobs.

The December 5th event was not reported in Soviet press, however the presence of foreign correspondents at Pushkin Square allowed for an international coverage of the event. The New York Times reported the detention of Vól’pin in great detail. In addition to a description of the event and Vól’pin’s character and questioning by the KGB, the Times extensively explained the reason behind the protest, Sinyávskij and Daniel’s arrest, and the nature of the accusations against them. According to New York Times, Vól’pin was released after being assured the trial would be open, yet there is no evidence this was due to the protests or the attention abroad. The proceedings of the February 1966 trial is well documented and lasted for three days. While the trial was technically open, it was under firm restrictions: only people given special passes by the KGB were allowed inside the building. Of the defendants’ friends and family, only their wives were allowed entry. Others interested in the case, like their friends and foreign correspondents, had to wait outside under the strict observance of KGB agents. The Muscovites present were careful not to interact with foreign correspondents in case they were observed by the KGB and suspected of “association with foreigners”. The only source of updates from inside the trial were the wives of the defendants who made sure they spoke loud enough for the foreign correspondents to hear and report back to their overseas contacts. In the end, Sinyávskij and Daniel were convicted under Article 70 of the Soviet Criminal Code, and sentenced to seven and five years in labour camps.

89 Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent, 276. New York Times reports only 10 students expelled, however due to the fact that this article was released less than two weeks after the event, I chose to trust Alekseeva’s estimation.
90 Ibid., 272, 76.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
Trial reporting and samizdat

Shortly after Sinyávskij and Daniel’s conviction, dissident Aleksándr Ginzburg reported the trial in a collection of material on the case which came to be known as The White Book. Ginzburg did not attempt to keep his collection a secret and gave a copy to the KGB immediately. When it was published abroad he made sure to notify the KGB. Despite his cooperation, Ginzburg was arrested when he refused to stop circulating the collection and hand over all copies to the KGB. Ginzburg’s arrest along with Yúri Galanskóv, Aleksej Dobrovol’skij and Lashkóva, Véra in 1968 inspired writer Pável Litvínov to replicate Ginzburgs format and publish The Trial of the Four. In this collection Litvínov outlines two main purposes of his text: “to inform Soviet and world opinion of all the circumstances surrounding ‘the case of the four’ that are known to [Litvínov]”. And to bring the case “once more to the attention of those responsible for conducting this and similar trials in our country: the supreme legislative, executive and judicial organs of the USSR”. The collection was published in the USSR and abroad, and a copy was sent to Khrushchev. Litvínov explains that he “[vouched] personally for all the information presented in the collection where the source has not been given”. Litvínov’s use of the human rights language as a tool is clear in his collection where he cites three articles of the UDHR. Trial of the Four was first published in The Chronicle of Current Events, one of the most influential samizdat periodicals in Eastern Europe, created in 1968 and a symbol of the struggle for human rights. The journal sought to publish trials, court rulings and obituaries of people known to the cause as well as official documents, often without any editorial comment. At the front page of every publication, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration was printed in its entirety. During the movement, underground journals, known as samizdat was crucial for the communication and spread of information among dissidents. Ginzburg and Litvínov’s texts stood out from other samizdat texts because they signed them with their real names and circulated openly. Their purpose and format continued to inspire other dissidents: Natál’ya Gorbenevkaya, creator of The Chronicle, wrote Red Square at Noon, a compendium on the trial following a sit-down

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
102 Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 80.
103 “Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
protest against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia at the Red Square on August 25th, 1968.\textsuperscript{104} According to Peter Reddaway, the Soviet invasion marked a new turn within the movement as prior to this, dissidents had not been very concerned with Soviet foreign policy as they were preoccupied with their own struggles with the government. The Czechoslovak reforms had been popular among Moscow dissidents, imagining a similar type of Communism for themselves. This hope, combined with the violent show of repression, was crushed and mourned by dissidents.\textsuperscript{105} The third issue of \textit{the Chronicle} came out only 10 days after the invasion and included a letter by Gorbanëvskaya describing the event of which she was part of. The letter was addressed to the Czechoslovak Communist newspaper, \textit{Rude Pravo}, as well as other European Communist newspapers \textit{L'Unità, L'Humanité, The Morning Star}. Some of the largest, independent Western newspapers like \textit{The Times, Le Monde, Washington Post, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, and The New York Times} was also among the recipients. The demonstration had been quickly dispersed with all participants, except Gorbanëvskaya detained.\textsuperscript{106} She writes that despite the abrupt end,  

My comrades and I are happy that we were able to take part in this demonstration, that we were able, if only for a moment, to interrupt the torrent of barefaced lies and the cowardly silence, to show that not all the citizens of our country are in agreement with the violence which is being used in the name of the Soviet people. We hope that the people of Czechoslovakia have learned, or will learn about this. And the belief that the Czechs and Slovaks, when thinking about the Soviet people, will think not only of the occupiers, but also of us, gives us strength and courage.\textsuperscript{107}

In Prague, the still-uncensored newspaper \textit{Literární Listy} featured an editorial which stated that “those seven people on Moscow’s Red Square are at least seven reasons why we will never be able to hate the Russians”.\textsuperscript{108}

Closely related to the circulating of \textit{samizdat} was the use of petitions known as \textit{podpisanty}. The word \textit{podpisant} was coined around Galanskóv and Ginzburg’s trial and translates to “the person who signed”.\textsuperscript{109} Dissidents would choose to sign appeals to domestic and foreign authorities, often asking for release of prisoners or lighter sentences. The \textit{podpisanty}, having signed their full names and addresses, lead to many dissidents’ first

\begin{thebibliography}{9}  
\bibitem{104} Boobbyer, \textit{Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia}, 81.  
\bibitem{105} Reddaway, \textit{Uncensored Russia : The Human Rights Movement in the Soviet Union}, 95-96.  
\bibitem{106} Gorbanevskaya states that a probable reason for her not being immediately arrested and detained like the rest was because she was carrying her three-month old baby, and had another child at home to take care of. Ibid., 99.  
\bibitem{107} Ibid., 100.  
\bibitem{108} Alexeyeva and Goldberg, \textit{The Thaw Generation}, 220.  
\bibitem{109} Ibid., 167-68.  
\end{thebibliography}
confrontation with the KGB. Each podpisant was given the choice between recanting their support or punishment in the form of dismissal from work or party expulsion.\textsuperscript{110}

**Formalization of the Movement: Groups and organizations**

These groups and organizations did not appear spontaneously, by the late 1950’s circles of acquaintances known as a kompaniya would gather to discuss news, philosophy, arts, or simply socialize as friends. These kompanii consisted sometimes of as many as forty to fifty close friends, and while they might have started as innocent networks of friends, they also worked as a way to circumvent the Soviet taboo of organized activity, which was most often met by suspicion and arrests.\textsuperscript{111} The kompanii usually met in private apartments, making this system very segmented and closed off to non-members. The kompanii were vital to the samizdat tradition, borrowing and copying samizdat was almost a ritual for members. If you liked a manuscript, you typed up, say, four copies: one was returned, two given to friends, and the last kept for yourself.\textsuperscript{112} Part of the opening up of these communities were the use of podpisanty and circulating samizdat beyond one’s own kompaniya.\textsuperscript{113} These networks of like-minded people became the foundation of the Soviet human rights movement.

The first human rights NGO in the Soviet Union was formed in 1969 and lasted until 1975. The group was founded by fifteen activist and named the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR (Initiativnaya gruppa po zashchite prav cheloveka v SSSR), or Initiative Group for short.\textsuperscript{114} Historian Robert Horvath argues that the group has received far too little scholarly attention and in many ways shaped the Soviet rights-defense movement.\textsuperscript{115} The group was borne out of government repressions of dissent: when dissident and leading supporter of a creating a human rights committee, General Pyotr Grigorévnko, was arrested under the suspicion that he would incite “anti-social elements”, his friends and fellow activists were pushed to overcome their differences and set the committee in motion.\textsuperscript{116} The groups founding appeal listed the names of fifteen members, eleven of which were Moscow intellectuals, such as Gorbanévskaya, Krásin, Yakir, and Sergéj Kovalyov. Members from

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{110} Horvath, “Breaking the Totalitarian Ice,” 151.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 57-58. Horvath, “Breaking the Totalitarian Ice,” 150.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Alekseeva’s memoir The Thaw Generation gives an excellent glimpse into the workings of such kompanii.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Horvath, “Breaking the Totalitarian Ice,” 151.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 148.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 149.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 153-56.
\end{itemize}
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outside of Moscow were Vladimir Borisov from Leningrad, Leonid Plyuschev from Ukraine, and Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Crimean Tatar, among others. In addition, thirty-nine supporters were listed beneath, as a kind of “second tier signatories”.117 According to Lyudmila Aleksieva, “[t]he Group was nothing other than fifteen people who had in the past signed a great many letters. Yet, when those same fifteen people decided to call themselves an organization, they struck a nerve”.118 Over a six-year period, their statements were read over foreign radios and members were quickly interrogated by the KGB. Among their statements was the appeal to end the systematic political abuse of psychiatric confinement. This issue would continue to occupy the movement well into the ‘Helsinki-period’ and become one of the most globally controversial violations of human rights. As for the dissidents, psychiatric abuse became a regular feature in the government’s struggle to suppress opposition.119 By May 1970, of the fifteen “first-tier” members, six were prosecuted; Gorbanévskaia, Grigorévkno, and Borisov were in mental institutions. Viktor Krasin was exiled from Moscow, and Dzhemilev and Anatoly Krasnov-Levitin were sent to labor camps.120 Robert Horvath lists four ways in which the Initiative Group marked an epoch in the history of Soviet rights-defense: first of all, they created an organization despite the regime’s long-lasting taboo against organized activity. By lasting for six years, the Initiative Group demonstrated that an organization could exist in post-Stalinist totalitarianism, if willing to fight against constant repression. Second, they introduced the use of appeals to foreign networks and governments. This would become a pillar strategy among human rights defenders. Third, their ethical and moral compass would guide the future movement. And finally, they established human rights as the foremost concept behind the Soviet dissident movement.121

Yet the Initiative Group was not the only such group: In 1970, Andrei Sakharov, Valeri Chalidze and Andrei Tverdokhlebov founded the Moscow Human Rights Committee. In a fashion reminiscent to Völ’pin’s strategy, the group used a legalist approach and kept their objectives modest.122 In accordance with their legalist focus, their structure and appeals were explicitly formal and specific in language. According to their founding document they were “prepared to establish creative contacts with public and scientific organizations, with international nongovernment organizations provided that they, in their activity, act on the

117 Ibid., 158.
118 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 252.
120 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 254.
121 Horvath, “Breaking the Totalitarian Ice,” 149.
122 Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 87.
basis of the UN Charter and do not set as their aim to damage the Soviet Union.”.

123 Their organizational structure was much more formal than the Initiative Group or their successors: Sakharov, Chalidze, and Tverdokhlebov acted as committee members, while Aleksandr Esenin-Völ’pin acted as an “expert” meant to lend his competence within the human rights field to the group. In addition, a specific role as “correspondent” for their contributions to the cause of human rights was given to famous poet Aleksandr Galich and Nobel laureate in Literature, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. 124 According to Sakharov, the publicity of the group’s formation exceeded their expectations,

...a good half of all broadcasts over the Voice of America, the BBC, and Deutsche Welle were about the Committee, stressing its significance as an independent association that would study human rights objectively and then publish its findings. 125

This publicity lead to an overwhelming response from citizens seeking assistance, either in through letters or in person. 126 In 1971, the Committee joined the International League for the Rights of Man; a non-governmental monitoring organization with headquarters in New York. The international fame of some of the Committee’s members were undoubtedly part of its success, however, their move to “attach itself to an international, non-communist, independent, Western-headquartered organization is equally dramatic and unprecedented”. 127

A few years later, in 1973, Valentin Turchin and Andréj Tverdokhlebov set up the first Amnesty International group in USSR. According to Yuri Orlov, member and soon-to-be founder of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Amnesty International had been reluctant to establish a section in the Soviet Union as a group within a totalitarian state posed a lot of difficulties. 128

After all, because an Amnesty group is responsible for specific prisoners of conscience in other countries, it is almost impossible for highly censored citizens to communicate or send material assistance to these prisoners. Sakharov expresses these difficulties in his memoir, but does not dismiss their value:

I don’t mean to imply that the group existed in vain; our human rights activists’ entry into the international arena was enough to make it worthwhile. But given soviet

123 “Three Soviet Scientists Form Group to Aid Human Rights.” 15 November 1970. HU OSA 300-4-3:14/6; World Politics: Citizen’s Rights: Constitution, 1968 – 1975; Subject Files Relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
124 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 255.
126 Ibid.
127 “Rights Group Affiliates” 06 August 1971. HU OSA 300-4-3:14/6; World Politics: Citizen’s Rights: Constitution, 1968-1975; Subject Files Relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
politic reality, the USSR Amnesty Group was, sadly, of primarily symbolic importance.\(^{129}\)

Being an official part of an international human rights organization allowed for further contact with foreign human rights activists. In addition, the dissidents involved in Amnesty were given insight into how human rights organizations functioned in other countries.\(^{130}\)

**Crackdown on dissidence**

David Kowalewski makes the point that an increase in dissent is “generally followed by an upgrading and strengthening of a regime’s coercive organs”.\(^{131}\) This explained the massive response by the regime beginning in 1971 and 1972. This new offensive included the increase in arrests and detentions, the propaganda campaigns against the most visible dissidents, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, and the case against *The Chronicle of Current Events*. Kowalewski tracked the percentage of detentions in demonstrations and referred to the sharp rise in arrests during this time. In 1970, only 5% of the demonstrators were detained, in 1971 this number increased to 12.1%, and almost doubled to 23.9% in 1972.\(^{132}\)

There were also claims from inside the dissident community that as of March 1973 a new Supreme Soviet decree yet to be published made unauthorized gatherings a criminal offense. Prior to this, it was classified as petty hooliganism with fifteen days in jail as penalty. The unnamed source expected much harsher consequences for anyone arrested under the new decree.\(^{133}\) A few weeks later, Michael Parks, a *Baltimore Sun* correspondent stationed in Moscow wrote about the “intensive, 18-month drive by the secret police [that] has virtually ended the Soviet civil rights movement’s activities as an organized group”.\(^{134}\) According to Andrei Sakharov, the regime’s improved relations with the West and the focus on détente and trade meant that the crackdown on dissidents was mostly ignored.\(^{135}\) Parks claims that the “drive” began in November 1971 when it opened a case against *The Chronicle of Current Events*, often referred to as “Case 24”.\(^{136}\) Lyudmila Alekséeva, author of *Soviet Dissent*, was

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\(^{130}\) Alekseeva, *Soviet Dissent*, 330.


\(^{132}\) Ibid., 21-22.

\(^{133}\) “Russia Toughens Laws on Assembly”, 19 March 1973. HU OSA 300-4-3:14/6; World Politics: Citizen's Rights: Constitution, 1968 – 1975; Subject Files Relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.

\(^{135}\) Ibid.

\(^{136}\) Ibid.
involved with *The Chronicle* as an editor, copier and distributor. She was interrogated repeatedly and threatened with her own and others’ arrests. While she claimed to have withstood the pressure to give up other people involved or end her association with the journal, other people did not. As a result of the campaign against *The Chronicle*, its production was halted for two years. After its editor, Anatoly Yakobson, chose to emigrate to Israel instead of prison, the remaining activists were unable to publish after its 27th issue in 1972. This was partly because of their fear for their own or others freedom, as well as the shortage of dissidents left to produce the journal.

The frequency of detainments was increased, as was the severity: one of the dissidents who tried to reach the West with information on the use of psychiatric confinement for political prisoners was Viktor Fainberg. His open letter, “Appeal to human rights organizations”, dated July 1970 outlines the inhumane conditions inside the mental institutions used to detain political prisoners. He explained how compulsory treatment was in some ways more restrictive than prisons: for example, they were allowed one meeting lasting an hour per month, but only with close relatives, while prisoners could have four hours with anyone. Also, they could only receive outside letters twice a month, only two letters at a time, with correspondence limited to close relatives. Prisoners’ correspondence was unrestricted both in volume and relation. He also wrote in great detail of the physical abuse endured by both the patients and political prisoners. Both victims and perpetrators were recorded with full names and often their year of birth. According to Fainberg no one was made to answer for these beatings, even when they resulted in serious injuries or even death. Instead they were simply forgotten by the authorities, remembered only by the witnesses. He also described the use of torture, such as by injecting the patients with sulphanilamide which caused fever. Yet these degrading conditions were only part of the problem with using psychiatric confinement for political prisoners; by claiming insanity, a person and their ideas are discredited and demoralized. It was much easier to prolong the sentence if it was presented as treatment. As Fainberg explained, “imprisonment can be ended only by the physical or

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138 Ibid., 274-75.
139 “Appeal to Human Rights Organizations” By Victor Fainberg. July 1970. HU OSA 300-4-3:14/1; World Politics: Citizen’s Rights: Constitution, 1952 – 1974; Subject Files Relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
140 Appeal to human rights organizations 300-4-3:14/1 p.8
moral death of the prisoner, i.e., by the repudiation of his own convictions”. Thus, a psychiatric diagnosis was a very efficient weapon to wield against anyone speaking against the current social order. Psychiatric confinement was not a new method for dealing with political opposition, but substantially increased after 1969. Yuri Andropov, who became head of the KGB in 1967, expanded the use of psychiatry as one of the KGBs new approaches to dealing with dissidence.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, who were becoming increasingly visible symbols of the opposition inside the Soviet Union also became targets of the renewed efforts to silence dissidence. Solzhenitsyn, author of GULag Archipelago for which he was awarded the 1970 Nobel Literature Prize, was arrested for treason in 1974. In February he was deprived of his Soviet citizenship and deported to West Germany.

On July 4th, 1973, the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, published an interview between Sakharov and journalist Olle Stenholm. Sakharov criticized the lack of freedom and civil rights in the Soviet Union and his personal scepticism around socialism. The interview reached home, and Sakharov was criticized for slandering his country to foreign journalists with incorrect facts and working against détente. In August, Pravda published a letter signed by forty fellow academicians condemning Sakharov’s “gross distortion of Soviet reality” which “discredit[ed] the good name of Soviet science”. This was not only a shock to Sakharov’s confidence and credibility, but also a warning to anyone else considering to talk to any foreign journalists. Public libel and ruining professional reputations and relationships would continue as one of the main tactics of the backlash.

The repeated blows to the movement had an effect on the morale of the dissidents. Open dissidence quieted down, and the movement could seem defeated to outside observers. However, partly as a result of the arrest of many prominent dissidents, the movement grew stronger inside the prison camps: activists from various Eastern European

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142 “Appeal to Human Rights Organizations” By Victor Fainberg. July 1970. HU OSA 300-4-3:14/1; World Politics: Citizen’s Rights: Constitution, 1952 – 1974; Subject Files Relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
146 The interview is printed in its entirety in Sakharov, Memoirs, 623-30.
147 Ibid., 386-87, 632-33.
movements joined together to protest the violations of prisoners’ human rights. These comraderies would survived outside the camps and had an important impact on the personal network in the transnational movement for human rights in the years to come. As for the activists still in Moscow, their efforts largely focused on helping their friends in prisons and camps. Andréj Tverdokhlebov initiated Group 73, meant to aid the children of political prisoners. Eléna Bonner also created a similar fund by donating a prize won by her husband, Andrei Sakharov.

An anonymous poet from Moscow described how he or she perceived the grim outlook for the movement after the crackdown:

Three or four years ago, the movement had momentum and, just as important for us Russians, romance. There is not much romance in waiting for the police to take you to prison. And certainly whatever momentum we had has gone and cannot be recovered for many years. Unbeknownst to this poet, the momentum they were waiting for was less than two years away.

Conclusion: A Legalistic Approach

This short introduction into human rights in Soviet policies and consciousness exemplifies that the history of human rights never develops in a straight line, nor does it spontaneously appear in the minds of people. It is easy to assign the origins of modern human rights to 18th century Western Europe and having spread to the rest of the world. Yet, this chapter illustrated the need for an independent discovery by Soviet citizens. The all-union discussion of the Constitution suggests that there was perhaps a stronger interest in domestic laws among citizens than often presented.

There was a wide-spread fear of re-Stalinization and, perhaps consequently, a renewed focus on legality across all levels. Disproving socialist legality became one of the pillar objectives for the movement. This included legal rights of the individual, duties of the courts, as well as a general interest in the trials of those accused of “anti-Soviet” behaviour. A certain level of legalistic understanding and interest had to be shared among members of the movement in order to remain such a prominent feature of the movement. Certainly, the

149 Soviet Dissent, 318-19.
arguments grounded in the fundamental idea of adhering to domestic laws allowed domestic and international observers to recognise and understand their cause. Perhaps most significantly, this demonstrates that the rhetoric and strategies used post-1975 were not unique nor a direct consequence of the Soviet’s signing of the Helsinki Accords. Instead, the trial compendiums by Ginzburg, Litvinov and Gorbanévskaya, for example, are evidence of a pattern which would continue in the 1970s with the objective reporting of arrests and trials. These compendiums also exemplify, along with Aleksándr Vól’pin’s legal focus, how much influence individuals had on the movement as a whole. There was no preconceived notion of what a Soviet human rights movement should look like, and it can seem almost random which issues would come to take precedence in the future. Due to this agency of the individual, a close look into the main actors and their individual and shared beliefs is important to understand the movement.

The massive crackdown on dissidence during the early 1970s acted as evidence of how serious the authorities viewed the individuals’ threat to their system. Both their individual and collective agency was halted by harassment, threats and exile. Especially the case against The Chronicle of Current Events was devastating to the movement. Sentencing mentally sound dissidents to psychiatric exile, another pillar cause in the movement, characterised the crackdown. Viktor Fainberg and Vladímir Bukóvskij were victims of this and used their experiences as evidence against the practice which would gain considerable attention among domestic and foreign observers.

The crackdown demonstrated the typical waves of dissent and repression. The rise in overt opposition had begun with Sinyávskij and Daniel’s trial until harassment and arrests made it difficult to continue in the same manner. The various sources on the crackdown testify to its severity. As the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe unfolded in 1973, the movement appeared defeated to many, yet many members continued their work, only more clandestinely or inside prison camps. Their survival was dependent on their ability to move opposition to other arenas that were harder to reach. This silent opposition could explain why it seemed like the 1975 Conference sparked an opposition independent from any prior movement.
2 Entering the International Awareness

The authorities tried to make us believe that the Soviet world was a closed sphere, that it was the whole universe. But those of us who were making holes in that sphere, however little, could breathe a different kind of air. Sometimes it was even bad air; but even so, it was not the thin air of totalitarianism.\footnote{Andréj Amálrik, \textit{Notes of a Revolutionary}, \textit{Zapiski Dissidenta} (New York: Knopf, 1982), 9.}

Andréj Amálrik

The human rights movement in the Soviet Union was not completely isolated, as seen by the Swedish interview with Sakharov or the Soviet Amnesty International faction. However, the movement was by many perceived as something particular to the situation in Eastern Europe. This chapter looks at how the movement transformed from something particular and domestic, to join the international movement for global human rights.

The work of allies abroad, such as émigrés or fellow activists, the Conference of Security and Cooperation, and international institutions, like the Nobel Peace Prize, helped familiarise the struggle of Soviet dissidents. Western governments and citizens were given names and testimonies to attach to the movement. These developments allowed for more publicity but were also dependent on the dissidents’ ability to translate their own struggle to the international human rights frame. A successful frame “must show that a given state of affairs is neither natural no accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions. This requires clear, powerful messages that appeal to shared principles.”\footnote{Keck and Sikkink, \textit{"Transnational Advocacy Networks,"} 96.}

This chapter will begin by looking into what could be the movements’ longest running ally, Western radio, specifically Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. These stations aimed their programmes on Eastern European listeners in order to broadcast Western news and, of course, propaganda. They became credible research institutions and forged strong bonds across the East-West divide. Secondly, the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe is analysed in terms of its negotiation processes, the attention it gained in the West and the East, and the signatories’ issue of mutual implementation. Finally, the narrative behind Andrei Sakharov’s nomination in the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize will be explored. In particular, the effect this had on public opinion and the movement’s protection from further repression will...
be analysed. Overall, these developments helped the movement withstand further backlash, and built sympathy and connections abroad which prepared them for the post-Helsinki transnational network.

**Voices from the West**

An important mechanism for gathering and spreading information among dissidents were Western short-wave radio broadcasts. Listening to these stations were often how citizens learned about internal and external events that official news outlets did not report. According to an internal report by Radio Liberty, there were approximately 42 million radio sets in the USSR as of January 1968. In 1974, this number was estimated to have increased to 100 million, whereas 39 million of which were privately owned.

News from the dissident circles, such as the formation of new organizations or arrests, were often only reported by foreign stations and *samizdat*. There were a number of radio stations from different countries with different aims, however one of the most popular and influential was Radio Free Europe. The Free Europe Committee was formed in 1949 to look after former Eastern European World War II allies. Their first radio broadcasts was to Hungary in 1951, and then in the spring of 1952 to Poland. From this, a network of information-gathering bureaus expanded to most of Western Europe, which was open to visiting journalists and academics. By the end of the 1950s, Radio Free Europe had “evolved into a semi-permanent feature of East European political and social landscape. It was a fact of life in Eastern Europe.”

Radio Liberation, the Soviet Union-specific station, aired its first broadcast on March 1st, 1953. This initial broadcast concluded with the message “our task is to tell you about what you will never hear in the Soviet Union, to provide you with truthful information, and to

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154 “Estimated number of individual radio sets in the USSR at the beginning of 1968”. 19 June 1968. HU OSA 300-6-1:3/1; Analysis Reports, 1968; Administrative Files; Media and Opinion Research Department; RFL/RL RI; HU OSA.
155 “1974 estimate of privately owned shortwave sets in USSR”. 11 April 1974. HU OSA 300-6-1:3/7; Analysis Reports, 1974; Administrative Files; Media and Opinion Research Department; RFL/RL RI; HU OSA.
157 Ibid., 11.
158 This was coincidentally the same day as Stalin’s stroke. Gene Sosin, "Goals of Radio Liberty," in *Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ; a Collection of Studies and Documents*, ed. A. Ross Johnson, R. Eugene Parta, and Timothy Garton Ash (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 17.
help liberate you from the web within which Soviet propaganda is enveloping your souls”.\textsuperscript{159} These early broadcasts were seen as too aggressive and the station changed its name to Radio Liberty, as “liberation” implied foreign intervention.\textsuperscript{160} While the station was careful to take nationalistic pride into consideration, the project was very much part of the American Cold War strategy. A declassified memorandum for the 303 Committee reveals CIA’s “deep involvement in radio activity”.\textsuperscript{161} The memorandum refers to National Security Council directive 5502/1 which allowed for CIA sponsorship of a “covert action program which supports media and contact activities aimed at stimulating and sustaining pressures for liberalization and evolutionary change from within the Soviet Union”.\textsuperscript{162} The memorandum continues to explain that,

> [a]nticipating the persistence of these trends in the intellectual climate of the Soviet Union in the 1970’s, there is long-range merit in continuing to encourage and support the publication and distribution of dissident literature and socio-political commentary on the broad current issues and the conditions of life in the Soviet Union, even though the regime will continue to repress dissidence.\textsuperscript{163}

Taking into account the Soviet intelligentsia’s “yearn for exposure to Western literature and cultural influence”, Radio Liberty had been broadcasting readings of samizdat already in the 1950s with famous materials like Boris Pasternak’s \textit{Doctor Zhivago} and Khrushchev’s secret speech. In 1968, they began broadcasting readings of political and social samizdat materials, which eventually turned into an almost weekly show called \textit{Materialy samizdata}.\textsuperscript{164} The samizdat unit was meant to primarily establish authenticity of the documents and provide references, but occasionally edited the text. Most of the time this was to correct obvious mistakes and grammatical errors, but they would also erase words and phrases that did not fit the guidelines of the radio. For example, to avoid further association of samizdat with the criminal act of spreading “anti-soviet libel”, Radio Liberty tried to minimize the samizdats’ endorsement of illegal opposition.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 19-20.
\textsuperscript{161} The 303 Committee was a sub-committee of the National Security Council meant to give oversight of covert actions to high ranking officials. Zaslavskaya, "From Dispersed to Distributed Archives,” 689.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} Zaslavskaya, "From Dispersed to Distributed Archives,” 685-86.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 692-94.
Listenership and Jamming

As it was impossible to use regular audience research, Radio Free Europe had to come up with new ways to measure listeners, like the rudimentary method of asking Soviet travellers. During the period 1972-1990 more than 50,000 interviews with Soviet travellers were conducted and analysed. By the early 1970s data collection had been systematized to the point that generalized estimates could begin to be made about audience size and demographic.166 This research is perhaps more useful as insight than actual science, but it shows evidence of regular listening. The constant attacks on Radio Liberty is perhaps the best indicator of their success and perceived threat to the Soviet system.167 Ironically, suppressive efforts were often counterproductive as it gave the stations more publicity.168 These efforts included regular criticism of Radio Liberty in official newspapers, but jamming foreign signals were their main defence. Jamming is defined as “intentional interference with radio, television, or other electronic communications”.169 The Soviet authorities began jamming Voice Of America and BBC in 1948, but the list grew to include China Radio International, Deutsche Welle, Kol Israel, Radio Korea, Radio Vatican, Radio Netherlands, and others.170 As the specifics of radio jamming are not relevant for this thesis, the following quote from Woodard illustrates the time, effort, and money that went into jamming foreign radio:

Approximately 200 local and distant (skywave) jamming transmitters, with a total output power of approximately three-four megawatts in 1952, had grown by 1988 to approximately 1700 transmitters with an estimated total output power of 45 megawatts. Operating these transmitters 24 hours per day at an estimated electrical cost of $0.06 per kilowatt-hour amounted to an operational cost of $48 million per year for electricity alone (assuming 50% transmitter efficiency), not including operational and maintenance labor costs, or capital costs.171

Western radios countered jamming by broadcasting from large number of transmitters on multiple frequencies (and in very high radiated power), as a result the Soviet Union were

167 Zaslavskaya, "From Dispersed to Distributed Archives," 692.
168 Henze, "Rfe's Early Years," 12.
170 Ibid., 53.
171 Ibid.
forced to utilize approximately 20 times the number of all western stations they were interfering.\textsuperscript{172}

The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Amid jamming foreign radio signals and increased repression of dissident activity, the plans for a European security conference was materializing in Eastern Europe. The idea for this conference had been in the minds of the Soviet leadership for a long time and was among the security measures mentioned by the in the 1966 Declaration of Bucharest.\textsuperscript{173} The aim of this conference was the recognition of the post-war borders, as well as improving economic relations. Eastern Europe was facing several economic issues at the time which seemed dependent on economic cooperation with the West.\textsuperscript{174} A European conference was also a way to diminish American influence in Europe by weakening other transnational institutions like NATO.\textsuperscript{175} This is expressed bluntly in the Bucharest Declaration which states that

\begin{quote}
[t]he governments of our States have more than once pointed out that in case of the discontinuance of the operation of the North Atlantic Alliance, the Warsaw Treaty would become invalid, and that their place ought to be taken by a European security system.\textsuperscript{176}
\end{quote}

This was in the context of the Soviet self-imposed responsibility to protect socialism from internal and external threats, often summarized as the Brezhnev Doctrine. This doctrine was meant to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, an event which had as mentioned, caused much foreign and domestic condemnation.\textsuperscript{177} Bearing this in mind, it is understandable that reducing non-European influence and formalizing the existing borders was of high importance to the Brezhnev administration.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 57-59.
\textsuperscript{174} Arie Bloed, ed. From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), 1,2.
\textsuperscript{175} Snyder, Human Rights Activism. Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent, 336. Kowalewski, "Human Rights Protest in the USSR."
Yet despite the international outcry over Czechoslovakia, the easing of tension between the USSR and the West, or détente, had begun in 1969 with West-Germany’s Ostpolitik and the meetings between the President of the United States and the Soviet Premier. Between 1972 and 1974, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev met multiple times in Moscow and in Washington, during these meetings they signed the first Strategic Arms Limitations Talks Agreement. These meetings and the message of open dialogue it broadcast to the rest of the world was undoubtedly an important prerequisite to the negotiations and ratification of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Yet the newfound friendships were not without controversy: in June 1973 demonstrations in defence of human rights took place in Washington and New York in connection with Brezhnev’s visit. The same visit elicited the head of the Orthodox Church in America to appeal to President Nixon in a letter concerning the persecution of religious citizens in the Soviet Union.

The preparation for a European security conference to begin in Dipoli, Finland, with diplomatic missions from 32 European states, as well as Canada and the United States. Human rights and its place on the agenda quickly became the centre of debate between the participants. The Eastern bloc faced a united front made up by the European Community, NATO and four of the neutral states: Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, all of which set the human rights agenda as a requirement for their participation in the conference. The discussions held at this stage did not go unnoticed by interested parties: the American-based journal modelled after its Soviet counterpart, *The Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR* reported in 1973 the disagreements concerned with the exchange of ideas and people and that “[t]he USSR has reportedly made concessions in the discussion of the agenda and this problem will be considered at the conference”. Apparently, the disagreements at this stage of the conference were so “fundamental that for a long time it was rather unlikely that there would ever be a CSCE”.

Nevertheless, at the end of the preparatory meetings, three metaphorical “baskets” which contained the topics of discussion were established: (1) questions relating to security in Europe, (2) cooperation in the fields of economics, of science and technology, and of the

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178 This is also highlighted by President Ford in his speech at the Final Act in Helsinki.
180 Albania was the only European states which rejected the invitation to participate. Bloed, *From Helsinki to Vienna*, 1.
183 Bloed, *From Helsinki to Vienna*, 3.
environment, and (3) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. It is also worth mentioning that under “Rules of Procedure” it was stated that all decisions of the conference were to be taken by consensus.\textsuperscript{184} This turned out to be the cause of many delays and frustrations among the delegates. It was also decided that “[a]ll States participating in the Conference shall do so as sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality” and that also, “[t]he Conference shall take place outside military alliances”.\textsuperscript{185} Yet throughout the Conference, groupings based on prior allegiances were common and highly visible. For example, the Finnish President, Urho Kekkonen, who was meant to act as a neutral host, made little effort to hide his allegiance at the welcoming session: “Security is not gained by erecting fences, but by opening gates”.\textsuperscript{186}

During the negotiations in Geneva, the second basket was settled with the least amount of conflict, while Brezhnev labelled the third basket demands “excessive and obnoxious” and even received some sympathy from the American side.\textsuperscript{187} US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, recognized the sensitivity of the conference and questioned, “what is it that suddenly possesses the West to believe that it can affect the domestic structure of the Soviet Union through a treaty signed in Geneva of peripheral significance?”\textsuperscript{188}

But Western European states were particularly adamant about using the USSR’s devotion to the conference in order to push their human rights and contacts proposals. According to The London Times in October 1973, “[m]ore than twenty west European intellectuals have signed a statement declaring that vital principles of intellectual freedom are in danger of being neglected at the [CSCE], which is now under way in Geneva”. Among the essential freedoms were “free access to books, free movement abroad, freedom to publish abroad without special permission, freedom of expression in speech and writing, and no jamming of radio and television broadcast”.\textsuperscript{189}

Yet it was not only during hypothetical discussions that human rights would threaten the delicate state of the conference: Immediately before the meetings in Geneva commenced,

\textsuperscript{184} “Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations,” 3 July 1973, Resources; OSCE. Last accessed 2 May 2019 https://www.osce.org/me/40213
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} Quoted in Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 63,64.
\textsuperscript{188} Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 28.
\textsuperscript{189} “Intellectuals fear neglect of freedoms”, 12 October 1973. Права человека / Human Rights, 1967 – 1973. 300-85-12:208/1; Subject Files; Samizdat Archives; Records of Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute; Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
Viktor Krasin and Pyotr Yakir, both prominent Moscow dissidents, were tried and sentenced under Article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code. Their pre-trial custody exceeded the legal limit of nine months, without an official explanation. Foreign correspondents’ requests to observe the trial were rejected.\textsuperscript{190} One can imagine this action as a signal from the Kremlin that they would not be hindered by the human rights provisions at the CSCE.\textsuperscript{191} Not surprisingly, it caused discussions among Western participants about their commitment to human rights outside of the conference.\textsuperscript{192} Yakir’s case, in particular, caused a lot of attention from Western press and persons; the Swedish newspaper, \textit{Svenska Dagbladet}, reported 30 cultural Swedish figures, including Ingmar Bergman, having spoken in defence of Yakir.\textsuperscript{193}

\textbf{The Helsinki Final Act}

Despite these numerous delays and lengthy compromises, the meetings ended with a document of almost 60 pages which outlined the proposed European economic, territorial and humanitarian future in what historian Arie Bloed has named a “masterpiece of diplomatic skill”.\textsuperscript{194} The signing of the Final Act occurred on August 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1975, at which all 35 states were represented by their heads of state. This notable attendance signalled the prioritization for the conference; the number of state and national leaders in one place for a single purpose was unprecedented.\textsuperscript{195} The concluding speeches by the prime ministers and presidents again showed the conferences’ potential. Like the Foreign Ministers’ addresses in 1973, these also spoke of peaceful coexistence and the end of the Cold War, but there was a common understanding about the challenges ahead. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson stated

I should like to express the hope on behalf of all of us that in years to come the citizens of Europe and North America will look back at this meeting and regard it as a turning-point in our history, a turning-point not only in what we hope to achieve here, but also in marking the developments which have made our meeting possible.\textsuperscript{196}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{191} Thomas, \textit{The Helsinki Effect}, 65,66.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{192} Ibid. note, Thomas does not include the names of the accused (“two members of a small Moscow human rights group”).}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{193} “Western Activities”, 59.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{194} Bloed, \textit{From Helsinki to Vienna}, 5.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{195} Korey, \textit{The Promises We Keep}, 1.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{196} Harold Wilson, (speech, Helsinki, 30 July 1975), Virtual Centre for Knowledge on Europe. https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/49805ee6-3bda-4149-bf17-b7be2241af79/publishable_en.pdf}
\end{footnotes}
This hope that the years of high-stake negotiations had been worth it was also shared by President Ford who argued that, “[h]istory will judge this Conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow — not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep.”. 197

The novelty of a conference between East and West had gained a lot of debate and attention and the participants were motivated to make sure it had a lasting positive impact on global tensions. In the United States the Conference had some high-ranking critics, such as Ronald Reagan who urged the President not to sign the document. 198 A Washington Star editorial from October 1973 referred to the Soviet ratification of the UN International Covenants from 1966 by explaining that “the Russians are big at subscribing to high-sounding humanitarian documents, a good deal less big when it comes to performance”. Yet the author changes their tone from accusatory to introspective when they remind the readers that “perhaps Americans should not be so critical” as they had not ratified the Covenants nor showed willingness to let foreigners interfere in domestic affairs. “Still,” the author continues, “there is a suspicion that the track record in the area of human rights is somewhat better here than it is in the Soviet Union, and is likely to remain so in the future, whatever pieces of paper may be signed”. 199

As the Final Act was signed by all participants, one can ask: Did the CSCE succeed where the Universal Declaration of Human Rights failed? The articles on human rights were largely based on the language and rhetoric of the UDHR which, unlike in 1948, the Communist bloc now accepted. A reoccurring theory is that the Soviets were so desperate to conclude the conference quickly, making them vulnerable to Western states’ human rights pressures. 200 According to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986, the Soviet acceptance of the third basket was affected by the “psychology of the negotiations”: lengthy and fastidious discussions meant the Soviet delegations had to make concessions independently. Once the document became available to other Politburo members, they were “stunned” by the third basket’s potential for international disputes and foreign intervention into domestic issues. 201

199 “Russian Rights”, 01 October 1973. World Politics: Citizen's Rights: Constitution, 1952 – 1974; Subject files relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
200 Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 24.25.
The third basket is characterised by its vague language: phrases like “intend to facilitate” and “will endeavour gradually” is common.\textsuperscript{202} In addition, the complexities of the issues as well as linguistic differences, allowed for different interpretations of the text itself. Principle VI, listed as “non-intervention in internal affairs” was interpreted differently by the two camps: In Western Europe, it was understood as a direct rebuke of the Brezhnev Doctrine, while Eastern Europe saw it as a guarantee to prevent Western powers from interfering in their internal policies, including the rights of their citizens.\textsuperscript{203} This is suggested in Brezhnev’s closing speech to the CSCE, in which he claims the major “important conclusion for the future” is that

only the people of each given State and no-one else, who have the sovereign right to resolve their internal affairs and establish their internal laws. A different approach would be perilous as a ground for international co-operation.\textsuperscript{204}

The irony of discussing human rights with the USSR was not lost on foreign observers: \textit{Le Monde} printed French writer Jean-Marie Domenach’s call for intervention in defence of Soviet dissidents like Yakir, Amálrik, Grigorenko, daring Western governments: “[i]n what ways are we helping them? Our government smiles at the Soviet Union”.\textsuperscript{205} Robert Bernstein, President of Random House and human rights activist, also challenged the thawing relationship between the blocs by referring to the publications of Vladimir Maksimov’s novel \textit{The Seven Days of Creation}. Bernstein released a statement asking, “[w]e sincerely wish to establish a détente in ideas with the Soviets. How are we in the West to do this, if a man cannot publish a book in his own country and publication outside of it threatens his freedom”. Expressing sentiments echoing Soviet intelligentsia, he continued, “[s]peaking as a publisher, it seems to me that to the Soviets détente means cut-rate grain deals and natural gas in 1980, but that the intellectual cold war is as severe as ever”.\textsuperscript{206}

\section*{The Issue of Implementation}

Organizing the Conference and coming to agreement over the final act was a long and tumultuous period, but the Conference did not end there. Implementation, which without a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[202] Bloed, \textit{From Helsinki to Vienna}, 7.8.
\item[203] Snyder, \textit{Human Rights Activism}, 33.
\item[205] “Western Activities” 64.
\item[206] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
binding force will always be uncertain, was made even more complicated by the contingency of each part:

one of the most important features of the CSCE process is the linkage of all the baskets of the CSCE process. This means that in principle progress in one field should be accompanied by progress in the other CSCE baskets. In this way, political and security issues, questions of economic cooperation and humanitarian issues are firmly interconnected.\textsuperscript{207}

Not only were linked, but dependent on each other: i.e. if national sovereignty was not respected, then national boundaries were threatened, which again endangered freedom of movement.\textsuperscript{208} Yet the signing of the Final Act did not facilitate a legally binding document, but instead politically binding. According to Bloed, a politically binding agreement is no less binding than a legal one, as the violation is “as inadmissible as violation of norms of international law”.\textsuperscript{209} Of course, this liberalistic interpretation is not necessarily shared by all spectators and participants, which makes the binding force of the document ambiguous.

Implementation and commitment were major themes during the closing speeches. President Ford referred to the past and his people:

\begin{quote}
[t]he people of all Europe and, I assure you, the people of North America are thoroughly tired of having their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unfulfilled pledges. We had better say what we mean and mean what we say, or we will have the anger of our citizens to answer.\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

Brezhnev promised that the Soviets’ would “act precisely in this manner” and expected the same from the others.\textsuperscript{211} According to Dobrynin, Gromyko defended the worrisome language in the third basket by arguing that the major political and propaganda victories achieved by the first two baskets outweighed the humanitarian commitments which were “still up to the soviet government” and did not allow foreign interference.\textsuperscript{212} Dobrynin contends that “from the very start, the Politburo’s acceptance of the Helsinki humanitarian principles implied some noncompliance”.\textsuperscript{213} With the Krasin and Yakir scandal fresh in memory, it was not surprising that Western observers had little faith in Brezhnev’s sincerity. The repetitious mentions of implementation suggests their concern that the “other side” might not honour the articles they saw as vital to peace. Not surprisingly, non-implementation of the Helsinki Accords became a common topic and a powerful weapon against other signatories.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[207] Bloed, \textit{From Helsinki to Vienna}, 9.
\item[208] Ibid.
\item[209] Ibid., 11.
\item[210] Ford, (speech, Helsinki, 30 July 1975).
\item[211] Brezhnev, (speech, Helsinki, 30 July 1975).
\item[212] Dobrynin, \textit{In Confidence}, 346.
\item[213] Ibid., 346-47.
\end{footnotes}
Brezhnev, in the spirit of diplomacy, called the conclusion of the Conference a “victory of reason”, boasting that “everyone has won: the countries of East and West, the peoples of socialist and capitalist States […] It has been a gain for all who cherish peace and security on our planet”. Yet who the actual winners of the Conference was, is still discussed as a question of interpretation. Despite concerns from other Soviet leaders, Gromyko sold it as a victory for the Soviet bloc, one which they had worked towards for the past twenty years. As for Brezhnev, whose signature would be on the document that solidified post-war boundaries, there was clear potential for personal triumph within the Soviet Union. Gromyko’s optimistic view was shared by some of the American press and public who saw the Soviet territorial acquisitions as exceeding the human rights concessions which “no one expected it to honor” anyways. More positive sentiments were made among Western European leaders who saw the process as consistent with the idea of détente as well as introducing more multipolarity to the Cold War discussions. However, as the final act became accessible to those outside the negotiation processes, it became clear that the ‘winner’ of the Conference would not be based on the text of the document, but the interpretation by common citizens.

Andrei Sakharov and the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize

The Soviet efforts to maintain the image of a government committed to implementing and respecting all aspect of the Final Act faced a serious blow in October 1975, only a few months after the signing ceremony in Helsinki. As journalist Elizabeth Pond for the Christian Science Monitor explains, “[f]ar from recognizing Moscow’s officially vaunted ‘peace policy’, the famous prize honored a man who is anathema to the Kremlin because of his human-rights activity”. The 1975 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Andrei Sakharov, founding member of the Human Rights Committee and outspoken critic of the Soviet system. This, and the Kremlin’s decision to refuse Sakharov a travel visa to receive the prize attracted new levels of attention to the human rights struggle in the Soviet Union. Sakharov, like his fellow Nobel

\[214\] Brezhnev, (speech, Helsinki, 30 July 1975).
\[215\] Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 32.
\[217\] Slezkine, “From Helsinki to Human Rights Watch,” 347.
\[218\] Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 35.
laureate, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, became public symbols of the movement and household names, not just in Eastern Europe, but across the Western hemisphere as well.

Leif Hovelsen, Norwegian World War II resistance fighter and human rights activist, was one of the most outspoken supporters of Sakharov’s nomination. His personal recollection is useful both as an indicator of what influenced Sakharov’s election, but also as an example of how he was perceived in the West. In 1973 Hovelsen met with Russian dissident friends in Paris, where they discussed Sakharov’s ongoing troubles with harassment by the KGB. The idea that “if Sakharov was awarded the Nobel peace prize, it would strengthen him in his fight for peaceful co-existence and freedom of thought and might also protect him from further harassment” was raised. Hovelsen explained to his friends that it would not be possible for the 1973 nomination but that he would do what he could for the following year. Once he returned to Oslo, he contacted Victor Sparre and Erik Egeland, founders of the Solidarity Committee for Intellectual Freedom, an organization supporting prosecuted writers, artists and intellectuals in danger of internment. Sparre and Egeland joined the cause and wrote numerous articles to give the nomination public attention, while Hovelsen would travel around Europe to find parliamentarians who would nominate Sakharov. Hovelsen received encouraging response and by January 31st, an “impressive group of European parliamentarians and professors of international law, had sent their nomination for Sakharov to the Nobel Institute”. Some nominations were sent from the United States as well, such as from Senator Hubert Humphrey.

To their disappointment, Sakharov had only been considered and new hope was placed on the following years’ prize. Hovelsen more or less copied the former strategy but realized that he had overlooked the potential of Norwegian parliamentarians’ nomination: “[t]he five Nobel Committee members who all of them were appointed by the Parliament, would naturally have felt strengthened if Sakharov also would have had a solid backing from the very Parliament that had appointed them!”, Hovelsen realized. After reaching out to his contacts in the Norwegian government, eighteen parliamentarians signed the nomination.

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220 The following narrative is based off Hovelsen’s personal letters and recollections archived at Riksarkivet in Oslo. Hovelsen considered several important figures in the Soviet human rights movement as his personal friends and regularly corresponded with Sakharov, Galich, and others.
221 Elena Bonner’s daughter and Sakharov’s stepdaughter, Tatiana Yankelevich Bonner, wrote to Hovelsen to ask for his description of the work around the Nobel Peace Prize. Leif Hovelsen to Tatiana Bonner, Oslo, 26 November 1997. [Letter] RA/PA-1840/F/L0005/0003; Andrej Sakharov – Fredsprisen; Milovan Djilas. Dissidenter i Sovjet. Russland før 1989. Rapporter; Leif Hovelsens etterlatte materiale; Hovelsen, Leif; Riksarkivet [herafter abbreviated to RA].
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
among them two former Prime Ministers and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. The mission continued across the Scandinavian countries and when Hovelsen travelled to Copenhagen to rally support there, he discovered that some Danish parliamentarians had nominated Finnish President Kekkonen, based on his role as host during the CSCE. This lead Hovelsen to speculate about Soviet intervention: ‘What a clever strategy of the Kremlin ‘bosses’ trying to prevent Sakharov from getting the prize.’ In any way the news invigorated me and my friends to work harder at it’. While some Soviet officials would undoubtedly prefer the prize to go to Kekkonen instead of Sakharov, this conspiracy is not yet confirmed.

In letter to Egil Aarvik, a good friend of Hovelsen and member of the Nobel Committee, Hovelsen proposed that,

as important it would be for Sakharov to get the Peace Prize, as important it would be for Norway to give it. Being one of the neighbours to the Soviet Union, this was an opportunity for our country to take a stand for the fundamental human rights and freedoms which are essential for human dignity, national integrity and international peace.

Hovelsen and his colleagues continued handing in material about Sakharov to the Nobel Committee until August 1975 when the nominations were final, but Sparre and Egeland continued to push news and articles about Sakharov in the press. This kept the movement alive until the last days before the announcement of the award on October 10th, 1975. Once Sakharov’s victory was made public, Hovelsen immediately phoned famous poet Alexander Galich to tell him the news:

We were no longer able to communicate by words, emotions took over and we both were weeping. Finally we were able to exchange some words again and Sasha rushed off to Radio Liberty to get the good news broadcasted to the Soviet Union and East Europe.

The Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony in Oslo, Norway

As Hovelsen described, he and several other influential persons had worked continuously to get Sakharov nominated in 1974 without success. While we cannot know the specific motivations behind the Committee’s decision at this time, we can imagine that the conclusion

\[\text{224 Ibid.}\]
\[\text{225 Ibid.}\]
\[\text{226 Ibid.}\]
\[\text{227 Ibid.}\]
\[\text{228 “The day time was at a standstill” By Leif Hovelsen. Date unknown. RA/PA-1840/F/L0005/0003; Andrej Sakharov – Fredsprisen; Milovan Dijlas. Dissidenter i Sovjet. Russland før 1989. Rapporter; Leif Hovelsens etterlatte materiale; Hovelsen, Leif; RA.}\]

48
of the CSCE and its presence in the international press and discussions influenced their verdict.\textsuperscript{229} The Nobel Committee’s press statement following the announcement, praised Sakharov and how he had “uncompromisingly and forcefully [fought] against the abuse of power and violations of human dignity in all its forms”.\textsuperscript{230} They mentioned his views on nuclear armament, détente, and democratization. His role in the implementation of the CSCE was also emphasized:

> In the various agreement signed this year by 35 states at the security conference in Helsinki, it was again emphasized that this respect for human dignity was an obligation undertaken by the states themselves. [...] in more forceful terms than others, Andrei Sakharov has warned us against not taking this seriously, and he has placed himself in the vanguard of the efforts to make the ideals expressed in this paragraph of the Helsinki agreement a living reality.\textsuperscript{231}

The Nobel Peace Prize, being a highly anticipated and discussed annual event, could be seen as a Western snub to the Soviet peace policy.\textsuperscript{232} Not only was Sakharov outspoken about Soviet human rights violations, but the failure to keep his opinions censured from Soviet and international listeners was only amplified by the award. The refusal to let Sakharov travel to Oslo to accept the prize only made matters worse for Western perception of Soviet emigration policies. His wife, Eléna Bonner, who was receiving medical treatment in Italy, made the decision while abroad to travel to Norway to accept it on his behalf and read the speech he had prepared. In his memoirs, Sakharov mention that Bonner was especially moved by a torchlight parade held in the streets of Oslo as a “spontaneous and quite extraordinary sign of the Norwegian people’s approval of the Nobel Committee’s selection”.\textsuperscript{233} What Bonner and Sakharov perhaps did not know was that this parade was planned and advertised in the Norwegian newspaper, \textit{Morgenbladet}, ahead of the ceremony.\textsuperscript{234} Along with Bonner at the ceremony were exiled fellow dissidents, Alexander Galich, Vladimir Maksimov, Viktor Nekrasov, among others. Sakharov and Bonner had sent symbolic invitations to Sergéj

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Access to all Nobel nominations are restricted for 50 years, thus any files on the 1975 nomination will be classified until 2025.
\item “Press Announcement” by the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament. 10 October 1975. RA/PA-1840/F/L0005/0003; Andrej Sakharov – Fredsprisen; Milovan Djilas. Dissidenter i Sovjet. Russland før 1989. Rapporter; Leif Hovelsen etterlatte materiale; Hovelsen, Leif; RA.
\item Ibid.
\item “Helsinki Pact Produces Conflicts for Soviets”. 21 November 1975. By Elizabeth Pond for \textit{Christian Science Monitor}. HU OSA 300-4-3:14/6; World Politics: Citizen’s Rights: Constitution, 1968 – 1975; Subject Files Relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
\item Sakharov, \textit{Memoirs}, 438.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Kovalyov, Andréj Tverdokhlebov, Valentin Turchin and Yuri Orlov, aware they would not be granted visas.235

At the time of the ceremony, Sakharov had travelled to Vilnius to observe the trial of fellow human rights activist, Sergej Kovalyov. As Sarah B. Snyder points out, “the juxtaposition of Bonner in Oslo while Sakharov observed Kovalyov’s trial demonstrated to many the Soviet Union’s poor human rights record”.236 Thus for foreign observers who had initially been hesitant to award Sakharov this prize, his treatment by the Soviet state immediately after might have convinced them otherwise. The International Herald Tribune took advantage of the untimely anniversary of the signing of the UDHR by announcing that “the Soviet Union abstained from affirming these fundamental human rights on Dec. 10, 1948. So it did again on Dec. 10, 1975”.237

**Soviet reactions to the Nobel Peace Prize**

*Radio Liberty*, which frequently produced audience research reports to stay relevant, looked into Soviet citizens’ attitudes toward Sakharov and the nomination. In this particular study, 265 Soviet citizens were asked about their knowledge of Sakharov, his nomination and their feelings toward it. While this small number of respondents is not representative of the population as a whole, especially as it is more urban and highly educated than the average, it gives a valuable insight into the attitudes at the time. First of all, listeners to western radio stations, like Radio Liberty or Voice of America, were more likely to be aware of Sakharov than non-listeners (94% to 65%, respectively). In addition, respondents with higher levels of education were both more favourable (35%) and pessimistic (39%) towards Sakharov. This suggests that while higher levels of education did not guarantee agreement with Sakharov’s personality or opinion, it suggests confidence to either support or reject his views. *Radio Liberty* also reproduced some of the comments which show that all sides, positive, ambivalent and negative, were at times highly insightful. For example, an engineer from Khmelnitsky said “[i]t was a mistake to give him the Nobel Prize. It is still too early, and the great mass of

236 Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*, 55.
237 “Misinformation?” 12 December 1975. *The International Herald Tribune*. HU OSA 300-4-3:14/6; World Politics: Citizen's Rights: Constitution, 1968 – 1975; Subject Files Relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
Soviet people are still unaware of his work”. Many of the negative comments claimed the prize was purely political and set up by anti-Soviet forces in order to weaken the Soviet Union’s role in international politics and obtain Sakharov’s nuclear secrets by bringing him to the west. Others focused more on his personality and Jewish heritage; calling Sakharov opportunistic and unprincipled or based on anti-Semitism.  

Whether negative or positive, internal or external, the attention that Sakharov’s Nobel Prize drew, made the Final Act and Soviet human rights more prevalent in the press and minds of people across the Cold War blocs. People were presented with a face, a name, and a personal story to attach to the movement. This kind of human angle, rather than a series of events and protests, became important to the Helsinki movement as a whole. While other stories and individuals became a part of the movement’s narrative, Sakharov continued to act as a symbol of human rights violations in the Soviet Union to internal and external audiences.

**Conclusion: Implementation and Publicity**

The dissidents in Moscow knew from early on that the suppression they faced would be seriously lessened if they had an international audience. However, their cause and stories would only be heard if they could convey their movement’s salience in a broader meaning. This was complicated by censorship and the East-West division. As demonstrated by Sakharov’s interview with the Swedish newspaper, speaking out often had serious consequences. Western radio stations, like Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty had nonetheless worked against censorship and sought out information about the movement. Their interest in Soviet opposition was due to their role as an American propaganda machine. Nonetheless, they became an ally of the dissidents by spreading samizdat and alternative news to the official Soviet media. They also compiled information on the movement which was available to anyone in the Western researchers.

The CSCE represent three key developments related to the movement: First, the international community began focusing on human rights as a prerequisite for cooperation and security. Economic and technological cooperation with the West was contingent on the

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238 “Andrei Sakharov and the Nobel Peace Prize: Attitudes of some Soviet citizens”. 26 March 1976. 300-6-1:3/9; Analysis Reports, 1976; Administrative Files; Media and Opinion Research Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA, 8.
239 Ibid.
240 “An Evaluation of the Influence of those parts of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that Relate to Human Rights in the USSR” 20 September 1976. HU OSA 300-85-9:67/5; Published Samizdat; Samizdat Archives; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
observance of international human rights standards. Therefore, the Yakir-Krásin scandal in the middle of the negotiations seriously threatened the finalization of the Conference. This characteristic of the Accords became one of the main concerns in the time between Helsinki and the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977.

Second, governments who claim to adhere to a position are more threatened than those that make no such claim. As seen in the final stages of the Conference, a great deal of importance was placed on implementation. Their willingness to adhere to the Final Act in its entirety became a powerful weapon in international diplomacy. If the oppositional forces could prove that the governments did not adhere to the agreement, they could use the fear of international scrutiny to their own advantage, and like the previous point, its contingency for international cooperation.

Finally, the Helsinki Accords became a way for the Moscow dissidents to frame their cause and for outsiders to understand their aims. Similarly, the Nobel Peace Prize to Sakharov gave Soviet and foreign observers a familiar face and story to attach to the movement. These two highly publicised events, the Helsinki Accords and Nobel Prize, made the movement for human rights more official and more visible to the outside world. It was no longer a few faceless individuals protesting the current order, but a cause with distinct goals and testimonies. The next chapter, which looks at how Moscow dissidents used the Final Act and their increased visibility in the West to create a group that would eventually spark a transnational advocacy network.

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3 THE CREATION OF THE MOSCOW HELSINKI GROUP

Its appearance and the wave of support it generated in the Soviet Union and in the West marked the entry of the human rights movement into a new period, the Helsinki period.242

Lyudmila Aleksieva

The lack of explicit dissidence in the Soviet Union and the increase in international attention to the issue paved the way for the new era in human rights dissidence. When the movement for human rights was purged after only a few years of existence, it was forced to move into other arenas: deeper underground, in prisons and camps, and in the West. This chapter shows how dissidence was again brought back into the public sphere where it would echo stronger than before. By framing their movement as contingent of the Helsinki Final Act, they made it easier for Western states and activists to support their cause. Now famous names like Andrei Sakharov publicised their cause in the West and gave them some protection against explicit repression.

The following chapter begins by evaluating the publication of the Helsinki Final Act to the public and the consequences of this. The document gained ambiguous reactions but acted as a kind of catalyst for the revival of the Soviet human rights movement. The Moscow Helsinki Group members faced serious suppression, like their predecessors. Despite the Helsinki Act’s humanitarian articles, surveillance, harassment and arrests became once again the norm in dealing with oppression. Finally, the Helsinki period in Soviet human rights dissidence will be situated and compared to previous structure, strategies, and aims. Certain novel aspects of the movement were results of the CSCE and new international allies, while much remained persistent with the movement described in the first chapter.

Unprecedented Blossoming: Publishing the Final Act

One of the final provisions in the Final Act states that “[t]he text of this Final Act will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely

242 Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent, 335.
as possible”. Thus, over the next few months the Final Act made it into the international conscience and discussion.

The Soviet newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestia* published nearly 20 million copies of the Helsinki Final Act, the first state to do so. Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, argues in hindsight, “[i]ts very publication in *Pravda* gave it the weight of an official document. It gradually became a manifesto of the dissident and liberal movement, a development totally beyond the imagination of the Soviet leadership”. So what made the Soviet authorities publish the Act and make it accessible to ordinary citizens? The CSCE was perceived as high-stakes diplomatic negotiations by the Soviet leadership and its successful conclusion was good for their public perception. In November 1975 *Pravda* claimed that unlike the Soviet Union, Western countries’ failure to publish the Act was a failure to mark even “the starting point of the fulfillment of the agreement”. Western governments had at that time issued a limited number of the printed Act as government publications. According to Alekséeva, the publishing of the entire text, including Basket III, must have meant that the leadership viewed the movement as stifled beyond resurrection.

Another theory, which draws parallels to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Soviet Constitution, proposes that like the publication of the UDHR in 1955, the publication of the Final Act was meant to celebrate socialist legality and the Constitution. These were justified by the Declaration according to the journal *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’* and “thus domestic ideology influenced the rights enumerated globally”. Whatever the intentions of the published text were, the reactions, like Dobrynin said, were vastly different.

Discussions on whether the Accords should be viewed as literal or norm-based ensued. American lawyer, Edward Bennet Williams, who defended Alexandr Ginzburg in 1977, claimed that by signing the Helsinki Accords, the Soviets “made it our business […] We have a right to monitor and expect the signatories to comply”. Thus referring to the specific provisions of the Final Act, such as the signatories promise to “confirm the right of the


244 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 346.


246 Ibid.


249 “More on Williams’ testimony before Helsinki Commission” 4 June 1977. HU OSA 300-4-3:14/7; World Politics: Citizen’s Rights: Constitution, 1976-1980; Subject Files Relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field”. Yet journalist Peter Osnos, in an article in the Washington Post, criticized the Soviets’ literal interpretation of the text. He argues, by narrowing its interpretation of the Helsinki provision to concrete matters such as the publication of more foreign books and reunification of certain families, the Soviets are comfortably claiming to be adhering to the letter of the accord. It is when the broader philosophical issues of personal liberty issues are raised [...] that Moscow strikes back the hardest. Like publishing the Accords first, small, often meaningless in the broader sense, concessions were raised to show their willingness to implement. Furthermore, the accusations went both ways. Particularly the United States’ poor record of racism was used to point out the flaws in Western human rights history.

Leading by example: the Moscow Helsinki Group

For years, Yuri Orlov had been searching for ways to create a dialogue between the Soviet government and society. The beginning of Orlov’s career as a nuclear physicist coincided with the death of Stalin and the “cultural opposition”. The revelations about the atrocities executed under Stalin’s leadership “shattered even those who, like me, were already anti-Stalinists”, Orlov remembers. At the order of the Central Committee, the Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics (ITEP) where Orlov worked, was to hold a closed discussion of Khrushchev’s report. Orlov, who was still a member of the Communist Party, held one of the first speeches. His main thesis was on how to avoid re-Stalinism by switching to “democracy on a foundation of socialism”. While initially met by applause, this speech would cost Orlov his job and Party membership. After years of searching for work in Moscow, Orlov accepted a position at the Armenian Academy of Sciences and decided to move there without his wife and kids. Orlov spent sixteen years in Armenia, only able to visit Moscow on short trips. After hearing about the seven-person demonstration against the Soviet

251 “Soviets Strike Back on Civil Rights Accusations” 25 November 1975. The Washington Post. HU OSA 300-4-3:14/6; World Politics: Citizen's Rights: Constitution, 1968 – 1975; Subject Files Relating to the Soviet Union; Communist Area Analysis Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
252 Ibid.
253 Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 118.
254 Ibid., 119.
suppression of Prague Spring, Orlov, embarrassed by his own passivity, decided to move back to Moscow to join his fellow dissidents in 1972.\textsuperscript{255}

An unlikely opportunity to reach out to the government with the West as an audience was found in the Final Act’s “unwielding formulations and purposely convoluted language”.\textsuperscript{256} The idea for a citizen monitoring group came from a proposal by \textit{refusenik} Anatoly Shcharansky to address the foreign public and appeal to them to form monitoring committees abroad.\textsuperscript{257} Once precedence was set abroad, they could create their own committee at home as the risk of persecution would decline.\textsuperscript{258} Shcharansky was not the first to see the potential in the Final Act; dissidents had on various occasion urged the West to use the Act to pressure the Soviet government, or they had raised it to the Soviet government when faced with violations.\textsuperscript{259} The most fruitful occasion occurred in August 1975 when Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick, as part of a US congressional delegation visited Moscow and reached out to several \textit{refuseniks} and members of the human rights movement. Fenwick consulted with Vaniamin Levich, a refusenik, and Orlov at the home of Valentin Turchin, chairman to the Soviet Amnesty faction. Orlov used this opportunity to point out that the which the Congresswoman should take advantage of the Helsinki Act as leverage against the Soviet regime.\textsuperscript{260} Fenwick took these activists’ stories and suggestions to heart and “later introduced a measure for the creation of the Helsinki Commission, making direct use of the opinions of Moscow activists”.\textsuperscript{261}

Orlov liked the idea of monitoring committees but decided to turn Shcharansky’s proposal around: to lead by example and create their own monitoring group first, and only then, invite other countries to follow suit.\textsuperscript{262} In the next two months, Orlov reached out to his existing dissident networks to discuss the idea and draft the document announcing the creation of the new Group.\textsuperscript{263} Despite Daniel C. Thomas’ argument that the “post-Helsinki period [was] distinguished by an unprecedented blossoming of dissent and independent activity across [Eastern Europe]”,\textsuperscript{264} the reactions to the humanitarian articles were mixed and its potential not clear to everyone. Some activists saw the Act as regressive compared to the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{255}Ibid., 152-56, 60-62.
\item \textsuperscript{256}Alekseeva, \textit{Soviet Dissent}, 336, 38.
\item \textsuperscript{257}The term \textit{refusenik} refers to Jewish citizens who had applied for emigration to Israel but were rejected. \textit{Refusenik} activists worked for the right to emigrate to Israel based on their Jewish heritage.
\item \textsuperscript{258}Orlov, \textit{Dangerous Thoughts}, 188.
\item \textsuperscript{259}Ibid., Alekseeva, \textit{Soviet Dissent}, 336.
\item \textsuperscript{260}Thomas, \textit{The Helsinki Effect}, 124-25.
\item \textsuperscript{261}Alekseeva, \textit{Soviet Dissent}, 339.
\item \textsuperscript{262}Orlov, \textit{Dangerous Thoughts}, 188-90.
\item \textsuperscript{263}Snyder, \textit{Human Rights Activism}, 57.
\item \textsuperscript{264}Thomas, \textit{The Helsinki Effect}, 7.
\end{itemize}
UDHR and 1966 UN Covenants. This was referenced in the Moscow Helsinki Group’s future document “An Evaluation of the Influence of those parts of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that relate to human rights in the USSR” from September 1976:

The points of the Final Act that relate to human rights were far more weakly formulated than corresponding articles of other international conventions—e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Obligations of this kind in the Final Act were mainly concerned not with guaranteeing the civil and human rights of the individual but with improving governmental regulation of those contacts between countries that are useful to the state (which automatically puts the governments of countries that have a statutory monopoly over the fundamental rights of the individual in a more advantageous position). Nonetheless, Article VII of Section I and several other articles strictly relate to the question of human rights.

Others echoed the American view that the CSCE had only favoured the Soviet regime and should not be supported. Tatyana Khodorovich, who had been one of the members of the Initiative Group, claimed she refused getting involved in politics, as the regime would only use the Final Act and a group supporting them to their own benefit. Mál’va Lánda, who would later change her mind and join the Group, echoed Khodorovich’s concerns. After years of opposing the government, creating a group to support the government seemed understandably counterproductive.

This activity did not go unnoticed by the government and Orlov, sensing his impending arrest, realized the Group had to be made public before the KGB had time to prepare their sabotage further. He rushed to finalize the founding document and get every members’ signature but, as a testament to the time sensitivity, was forced to announce it without Shcharansky’s final consent on May 12th, 1976. Recognizing the benefits of international exposure by having Sakharov as the Group’s leader, Orlov asked him, expecting a rejection. Sakharov explained in his memoirs that he “preferred the freedom of speaking out as an individual […] But I had no objection to endorsing group documents when I approved their content, and did so on many occasions”. This is supported by the fact that Eléna Bonner, who was married to Sakharov, joined as one of the original members. The following people’s signatures, all “veterans of human rights movement”, included their home

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265 Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent, 336.
266 “An Evaluation of the Influence of those parts of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that Relate to Human Rights in the USSR” 20 September 1976. HU OSA 300-85-9:67/5; Published Samizdat; Samizdat Archives; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
267 Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 189-90.
268 Ibid., 190.
269 Ibid.
270 Sakharov, Memoirs, 456; Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 59.
addresses and phone numbers: Lyudmila Alekséeva, Mikhail Bernshtam, Eléna Bonner, Alexander Ginzburg, Pyotr Grigorénko, Alexander Korchak, Mál’va Lánda, Anatólîj Márchenko, Vitaly Rubin and Anatoly Shcharansky.\textsuperscript{271} Rubin and Shcharansky were active in the Jewish movement for emigration to Israel, their membership marked the first independent citizen group to include Jewish refuseniks.\textsuperscript{272} Márchenko was at the time exiled in Siberia and heard about the Group from his wife, Larisa Bogoráž. He had spent much of his life either in prison or exiled, but his samizdat memoir, My Testimony from 1967, made him respected among dissidents.\textsuperscript{273}

Orlov signed as the Group’s chairman and read the declaration of the Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR in front of an English correspondent.\textsuperscript{274} The name was carefully chosen according Alexséeva who explained that the group included “promote” in its title “to stress its loyalty to the authorities and its desire to cooperate if they revealed a conscientious attitude towards their Helsinki human rights obligations”.\textsuperscript{275} The group came to be known as the Moscow Helsinki (Watch) Group, or by some contemporary sources referred to as the “Orlov Group”.

Immediately after the Group was announced, Orlov went into hiding in order to give the press “two or three uneventful days to report only about that”, and not his potential arrest.\textsuperscript{276} Once news of the Group’s formation was announced on foreign radio he returned to Moscow on May 15\textsuperscript{th} to begin the activities.\textsuperscript{277}

\section*{Initial reactions}

On May 13\textsuperscript{th}, a Radio Liberty announcement of the Group’s creation was made; the name, however, was left out, as was any mention of the members. Radio Liberty explained that the Group was “primarily concerned about freedom of conscience and belief and about greater human contacts and exchanges of information and culture”. They also spoke of the call for

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{271}“The Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR” \textit{Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR}, No. 20-21, April-June 1976: 5.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{272} Alekseeva, \textit{Soviet Dissent}, 339.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{273} Boer, Verhaar, and Driessen, \textit{Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents}, 347. Orlov claimed that “to have him in our group was an honor”. Orlov, \textit{Dangerous Thoughts}, 190.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{274} \textit{Dangerous Thoughts}, 190.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{276} Orlov, \textit{Dangerous Thoughts}, 192. [original emphasis]}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., 192-93.}
\end{footnotes}
similar groups to be formed in other countries and that “a proposal to set up just such a group in the US has been approved by one of the two houses of Congress.”

After a hiatus of almost two years, *The Chronicle of Current Events* reappeared in the spring of 1974. The issues covering the period from October 1972 to May 1974, began circulating in Moscow. As several of its contributors were part of the new Helsinki Group, the already established network became valuable to find and distribute new information. Their report on the formation of the Moscow Group included the entire founding declaration and an announcement from the Russian news agency TASS about the unlawfulness of Orlov’s activities. A response statement from Sakharov and Turchin was also included which warned of TASS’ tactic of discrediting Orlov in order to weaken the Group.

According to the US-based *Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR*, the Moscow Helsinki Group was “considered important by western observers not only because of its purpose but because it is another attempt to found in the USSR an independent public organization free of party or state control”. The new Group did not immediately gain as much foreign attention as the members had expected, but the attention from the KGB and Soviet state press eventually increased the interest in the Group and its members.

**Surveillance and harassment**

The members of the Moscow Group were experienced dissidents and therefore used to the risks associated with the activities of the human rights movement. It is somewhat surprising that no official arrests were made for the first nine months of their formation. This time allowed the Moscow Group to produce reports at a fast rate. “None of us said aloud that we needed to make haste while we were still at liberty, and perhaps it was only Alexander Ginzburg and I who foresaw the arrests”, Orlov contemplates in his memoir. However, while arrests were held off, surveillance and general harassment of the members was common. Orlov was picked up by the KGB as soon as he returned to Moscow and threatened...

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284 Orlov, *Dangerous Thoughts*, 195.
with arrest. According to Orlov, this was typical KGB strategy: Orlov was arrested as a witness against *The Chronicle*, as witnesses cannot legally refuse to testify. Then, typically, the witness’ role is changed to suspect in the very same case. Only afterwards, he or she gets their own case, in which they were tried as a defendant. However, Orlov was released as witness as they did not have sufficient evidence on him.\(^{285}\) Despite his release, a TASS article spoke of his “attempt to question in the eyes of the international public the sincerity of the Soviet Union’s efforts to implement undeviatingly the international obligations it has assumed”.\(^{286}\)

In addition to threats of arrests and public libelling, a Soviet decree from 1972 stated that “the use of the telephone for purposes contrary to state interests and public order is forbidden”, this meant that anyone having an “undesirable” conversation or contact, could legally have their phones tapped or simply disconnected.\(^{287}\) This was especially common for long-distance calls abroad. A Moscow Group report lists 43 subscribers in various cities whose telephones were cut off (both before and after the Final Act), including Sakharov and Orlov. This decree is particularly interesting as it breached the CSCE provision that encouraged freer contacts between people of different countries.\(^{288}\) Orlov described his and his wife’s grievances of having their phone disconnected and the constant surveillance by the KGB. Being followed on foot or seeing patrols outside their home became routine, but none the less irritating for the more prominent members of the Group.\(^{289}\) These acts correspond to those mentioned by KGB chairman Andropov in a report to the Central Committee: “The [KGB] is undertaking measures to compromise the members of the ‘group’, and to put an end to their hostile activities”.\(^{290}\)

During December 1976 and January 1977, the KGB conducted searches in the homes of several of the members, including Orlov, Ginzburg and Alekséeva. A report for the Central Committee of the Communist Party claims they found

\(^{285}\) Ibid., 205-09.

\(^{286}\) “KGB Harasses Soviet Helsinki Monitors” by Peter Reddaway. 9 August 1976. HU OSA 300-85-48:18/1; Helsinki Group, 1977 – 1989; New York Office Files Relating to Samizdat; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.

\(^{287}\) Reddaway is referring to order no. 593 of the USSR Ministry of Communications, issued 7 September 1972, “KGB Harasses Soviet Helsinki Monitors” by Peter Reddaway. 9 August 1976. HU OSA 300-85-48:18/1; Helsinki Group, 1977 – 1989; New York Office Files Relating to Samizdat; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.

\(^{288}\) Ibid.

\(^{289}\) Orlov, *Dangerous Thoughts*.

a large quantity of slanderous materials prepared by the individuals named above for
the transportation to the West was found and seized: archives of hostile documents,
drafts of future publications of anti-Soviet collections, lampoons prepared in the
West and transported to the Soviet Union through illegal channels, and also materials
exposing their criminal links with the foreign anti-Soviet organization ‘People’s
Labor Union’.\(^{291}\)

The lack of official arrests, as well as the surveillance and searches, suggests that the KGB
was gathering evidence against the members, and that Orlov and Ginzburg were right in their
sense of urgency to publish reports. This is confirmed in KGB reports from this period which
describe the intent to increase their efforts to halt the actions and spread of dissidence.\(^{292}\) In a
comment by Andréj Amálrik from January 1977, at that time exiled and living in the West, he
suspected that this kind of harassment campaign was favoured over political trials, and the
home searches marked only the beginning of a larger operation.\(^{293}\) As the trials of the 1960’s
had showed, large political hearings caused foreign attention and condemnation. Therefore,
frequent small cases of privacy violations were easier to control, and much less appealing to
foreign press. The next few months showed that Orlov, Ginzburg, and Amálrik were all right
in their assumptions.

**Arrests**

According to Yuri Orlov, the trading of Vladimir Bukóvskij for Chilean Communist leader,
Luis Corvalan on December 18\(^{th}\), 1976, marked the KGB’s general offensive against the
Helsinki movement.\(^{294}\) The years leading up to Bukóvskij’s release had seen a number of
international campaigns on his behalf. Bukóvskij was arrested in 1971 for appealing to the
World Psychiatric Congress about the use of psychiatric asylum for political prisoners. In his
own words, Bukóvskij was “faced with the prospect of becoming evidence myself – perhaps
the most vivid and dramatic exhibit of all”.\(^{295}\) Bukóvskij, as a result of his 150-page appeal,
became a focus of attention for several Western psychiatrists, individuals and organizations,

\(^{291}\) “About measures to end the hostile activity Of members of the so-called “Group For Assistance in the
Implementation of The Helsinki Agreements in the USSR” Yuri Andropov to CC CPSU. 5 January 1977. The
Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary: From the Secret Files; National Security Archive. Last Accessed 2
May 2019, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/>

\(^{292}\) Ibid., “About the Hostile Actions of the So-called Group for Assistance of Implementation of the Helsinki
Agreements in the USSR” Yuri Andropov to CC CPSU. 15 November 1976. The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th
Anniversary: From the Secret Files; National Security Archive. Last Accessed 2 May 2019,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/

\(^{293}\) Amalrik Says Soviets Begin Harassment Campaign”. 6 January 1977. HU OSA 300-85-48:11/5; Dissidents,
1975-1977: New York Office Files Relating to Samizdat; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.

\(^{294}\) Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 204.

and his arrival in Zurich was met by eager reporters and supporters.\textsuperscript{296} Ironically, the release of this one famous dissident only lead to the imprisonment of others. It is possible that the trade of Bukóvskij was meant as a distraction from increased repression as the international lobbying for Bukóvskij and Sakharov was great nuisance for the government. A KGB proposal to the Central Committee complain that “such behavior is explained by their total confidence in their own impunity and the defensive measures that could be undertaken by the West in their support.” And continues to explain that, Academic Sakharov plays a significant role in the formulation of such views, whose behavior indicates his belief that the “authorities” can do nothing to him and therefore there is nothing for others to fear. The so-called “dissidents” openly and repeatedly assert this at their gatherings.\textsuperscript{297}

With the Group’s rising confidence and foreign sympathy, so did the need to “take more decisive measures regarding the interception of the activities of Orlov, Ginsberg \textit{sic} and others on the basis of current legislation”.\textsuperscript{298}

The first official arrest was made on February 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 1977, when Aleksándr Gínzburg did not return after going outside to make a phone call (as his own phone was most likely tapped or disconnected). The arrest was anticipated for weeks by observers such as Peter Reddaway and within the dissident circles.\textsuperscript{299} In addition to his membership in the Moscow Group, Ginzburg acted as the chief manager of Russian Fund for Aid to Persecuted Persons and their Families, founded by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1974. The Fund channelled proceeds from the global sales of \textit{GULag Archipelago} into the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{300} Ginzburg had been unofficially charged with violating laws on residence, but it was charges of currency manipulations through Solzhenitsyn’s fund that dominated in the days prior to his arrest.\textsuperscript{301} In \textit{Literaturnaya gazeta} on February 2\textsuperscript{nd}, an article by Ginzburg’s former prison cellmate described the dissidents’ Western governments through the fund. Ginzburg’s supposed monetary greed, failure as a poet, and sexual deviances were especially emphasised and aimed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{296} Ibid., 436-38.
\item \textsuperscript{297} "Proposal to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" Yuri Andropov to CC CPSU. 20 January 1977. The Moscow Helsinki Group 30\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary: From the Secret Files; National Security Archive. Last Accessed 2 May 2019, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/
\item \textsuperscript{298} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{299} “Dissenters to monitor Helsinki Final Act”. 4 January 1977. HU OSA 300-85-48:18/1 Helsinki Group, 1977 – 1989; New York Office Files Relating to Samizdat; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
\item \textsuperscript{300} The Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn Center, "Solzhenitsyn Fund," https://www.solzhenitsyncenter.org/solzhenitsyn-fund.
\end{itemize}

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at discrediting the Group and its members’ moral codes.\textsuperscript{302} Even after his arrest, TASS continued to base the motivation for his activities on receiving money from the West.\textsuperscript{303} This was not Ginzburg’s first arrest: in 1967 he had written the \textit{White Book} recording Sinyávskij and Daniel’s trial. Ginzburg had served his sentence since the 1967 “trial of the four”, as coined by Pável Litvinov, who had replicated Ginzburg’s format to record the trial. For this, Ginzburg gained publicity in the Soviet Union and the West and was well-known to observers of the Eastern European human rights movement.

This escalation in intervention was felt within the Group. In a statement to Western correspondents on February 9\textsuperscript{th}, Orlov explained that he had left Moscow for a week following Ginzburg’s arrest.\textsuperscript{304} In his memoirs, Orlov explains that while he knew that hiding would be the only way to prevent his inevitable arrest, another member of the Group had told him that the “leader of the Helsinki watch group […] must not hide. This would discredit the very concept of the Group, which functioned openly as a matter of principle.”.\textsuperscript{305} On the morning of February 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1977, Orlov was arrested from the apartment of fellow group member Lyudmila Alekséeva. In February 1978, after a year of investigation, Orlov was charged under the infamous Article 70; “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”. At his trial in May 1978, “almost exactly the second anniversary of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, a careless reminder of what was really on trial”, Orlov was sentenced to seven years of labour camp and five years internal exile.\textsuperscript{306} According to \textit{The Chronicle of Current Events in the USSR}, 261 Soviet citizens signed an appeal ‘Free Alexander Ginzburg’.\textsuperscript{307} Writing an appeal for Ginzburg’s release had been one of Orlov’s last acts as leader of the Helsinki Watch Group, along with a proposal to the Belgrade Conference scheduled later that year.\textsuperscript{308} Likewise, 107 Soviet citizens issued an appeal ‘In defense of Yury Orlov’.\textsuperscript{309} These sentences, however strict, were expected by the members: Alekséeva, who at the time was planning to leave the USSR, describes her and her fellow dissidents’ trivialization of incarceration:

\begin{quote}
When you spend so much of your life under the threat of laws like article 70 and article 190, the penal system becomes a threat you take for granted. It’s a very
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[302] Ibid., 210-14.
\item[303] Internal message from Albert Hemsing. 10 February 1977. HU OSA 300-85-48:18/1 Helsinki Group, 1977 – 1989; New York Office Files Relating to Samizdat; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA
\item[304] Ibid.
\item[305] Orlov, \textit{Dangerous Thoughts}, 213.
\item[306] Ibid., 225-31.
\item[308] Orlov, \textit{Dangerous Thoughts}, 212.
\item[309] “The Helsinki Watch Groups”, 7-8.
\end{footnotes}
simple principle: if all your friends go to Paris, you see nothing extraordinary about going to Paris; if all your friends go to prison, you see nothing extraordinary about going to prison.\textsuperscript{310}

Therefore, the arrest of Ginzburg and Orlov only meant that they would not be there to sign future documents, but that the Group and its commitment to implementation would continue in their absence.

The Helsinki Period in Moscow

The newly established Moscow Helsinki Group posed certain difficulties in the perceived continuity of the Soviet movement. In a way, many of the same people and similar sentiments, the ever-evolving concept of human rights and freedom, were repeated in this Group’s mission. But this time, the Group’s title claimed they would assist the government in implementing the accords that, ironically, the government had fought so hard to attain internationally.\textsuperscript{311} There was a certain continuity to the Group, but perhaps also a novelty in the threat they posed. Andropov, in a report to the Central Committee, mentions the Initiative Group, Committee for Defence of Human Rights, and the Russian section of Amnesty International as “practically ceased to exist” by the efforts of KGB. Andropov continues to explain that “notwithstanding the failures of the efforts to create an ‘internal opposition’ in the USSR, the adversary did not give up on this idea” and goes into the creation of the Moscow Group and its membership.\textsuperscript{312} Thus the state security viewed the Group as the newest effort to establish an “internal opposition” that would jeopardize the current order and posed a serious security threat. A similar sentiment is echoed by Peter Reddaway who refer to these previous organizations as “legal precedents” which supports his claim that Orlov’s activities “did not infringe on the Soviet constitution”. Because while the other groups faced severe harassment and several arrests, “moves to declare them illegal [had] failed”.\textsuperscript{313}

\textsuperscript{310} Alexeyeva and Goldberg, \textit{The Thaw Generation}, 282.

\textsuperscript{311} The original, Russian title of the Moscow Helsinki Group (Общественная группа содействия выполнению Хельсинкских соглашений в СССР), uses the phrase содействия, which translates to both assist and promote. Thus the English title of the group varies between these two translations.


\textsuperscript{313} “KGB Harasses Soviet Helsinki Monitors” by Peter Reddaway. 9 August 1976. HU OSA 300-85-48:18/1; Helsinki Group, 1977 – 1989; New York Office Files Relating to Samizdat; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
A Universal Purpose

Orlov explains the Group’s purpose as a challenge to the Western perception of Soviet immunity to foreign pressure:

the heads of the western governments had not doubted that the Soviet Union would fail to discharge its obligations in the area of human rights, but they went along with this as an unavoidable evil. The purpose of our group was, first and foremost, to change this ‘Munich’ approach of the west.314

It is easy to draw parallels between the Helsinki Accords and the Universal Declaration, and the Moscow Helsinki Group to the Initiative Group as “like its predecessors, the group saw its objectives as monitoring the regime’s compliance with its own legal commitments”.315 The demands of the movement, which did not significantly change after 1975, were simply rephrased to fit the Helsinki framework. The Soviet Constitutions or Criminal Codes could seem complicated and foreign to Westerners, but their own governments had been part of shaping the Final Act. For example, the right to intellectual freedom which had been a staple of the movement, now referred to Principle VII which proposed “Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief”. This new packaging made the demands more accessible and familiar to outside observers. It underlined the idea that the movement asked for the same rights as enjoyed by many Western citizens. This shared objective of monitoring legal commitments was part of a larger agenda that, due to its universality, could encompass the aims of Jewish refuseniks, religious activists, and so on. Historian Philip Boobbyer discusses this universality and the movement’s politics by arguing that

the human rights movement was political in the sense that it threatened the foundations of Soviet power. Furthermore, activists like Bukovskii, Krasin and Orlov clearly had political instincts. At the same time, the emphasis on human rights rather than on political programmes meant that the human rights movement was able to unify a very diverse collection of intellectuals and activists. […] a common political programme would have been impossible. People would have fallen out over the details.316

By sticking to a widely applicable idea like human rights and holding the government accountable to their own promises, the movement was able to gain support and membership on a wide demographic.

314 Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 194.
315 Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 87-88.
316 Ibid., 89.
Branches of the Moscow Helsinki Group

As knowledge of the Moscow Helsinki Group grew and their contact with citizens broadened, their cause based on the Helsinki Final Act became associated with a number of themes within human rights; such as national and religious rights. For many this was “a result no one had anticipated: unification of the human rights movement with religious and national movements working toward the goal of the Moscow Helsinki Group”.

Their wide network allowed them to handle a number of specific issues and the Group decided to branch out in order to delegate responsibility and administer the incoming concerns. These new, intersectional networks of communication and cooperation were not lost on the KGB who described this development as:

The anti-Soviet elements, in concert with the West are striving to, in one form or another, bring into their ranks individuals who have been convicted in the past or new individuals who are easily manipulated. Here are involved nationalists, Zionists, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks and religious sects.

Two new branches of the Moscow Helsinki Group were founded to work on more specific social justice issues: The Christian Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Religious Believers, released its first document on December 27th, 1976. Since 1974, the Chronicle of Current Events had included a regular feature dealing with the persecution of religious believers. Reports about violations of religious freedom which came from the Russian Orthodox, Catholics, Baptists, and so on, went through the Moscow Helsinki Group.

In November 1975 the Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin and religious activist Lev Regelson sent a report on the poor records of religious freedom within the Soviet Union to the General Assembly of the World Council of Churches, sparking a public debate. Inspired by the Moscow Helsinki Group and the response of this report, Yakunin founded the Christian Committee and began sending regular documents to the West describing the hardships faced by religious believers in the USSR. Their founding declaration stated:

At present neither the episcopate of the Russian Orthodox Church nor the leaders of other religious organizations are defending the religious rights for various reasons.

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319 Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent, 340.
Under these circumstances, the Christian public must assume responsibility for the legal defense of religious rights.  

Shortly thereafter, the Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes was announced on January 5th, 1977. Their fundamental thesis was that whether psychiatric confinement was needed or not, laws should always be observed. Among their main objectives were observing all psychiatric prisoners and evaluating their reasons for being there, and reporting this in their bulletins. They provided material and social help to their families and wrote letters to doctors and administrators to demand release or abolishing harmful medicinal methods. The abuse of psychiatric treatment for political prisoners had been one of the main objectives of the human rights movement for years and the members of the Commission had vast knowledge of psychiatry and the legal history of the practice. The Commission’s high regard was based on their informational bulletins issued at least once every two months, and their success in obtaining the release of at least four patients in Leningrad and the greater Moscow area. In 1977 the International Congress of Psychiatrists examined reports sent by the Working Commission as evidence and condemned the USSR for their psychiatric malpractice.

Strategies and structure

Like their predecessors, the Moscow Helsinki Group used strategies like demonstrations, samizdat, letters, podpisanty, as well as public symbols, like Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. The most visible of the movement’s demonstrations took place every year on December 5th, the anniversary of the ratification of the Constitution, and the so called “birth of the movement” in 1965. Eleven years later, the tradition continued. According to Andropov’s report to the Central Committee, around 50 people gathered on Pushkin Square. He names several of the observers, like Sakharov, Alekséeva, Landa, and others, as well as the names of

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322 Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent, 347.
323 Ibid., 347-48.
324 Ibid., 348.
326 Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent, 269.
the foreign correspondents were reported.\textsuperscript{327} The Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR cites Associated Press’ report that approximately 300 persons were present. They also highlighted that while this protest usually goes by without interference, it was now broken up by uniformed and civilian policemen. An equivalent demonstration was held in Saint Petersburg and served as a public symbol of the dissidents’ resilience and comradery.\textsuperscript{328}

The Group published their own reports, or documents, independent of other samizdat publications, like The Chronicle of Current Events. As mentioned, these came out at a high rate during the first months of the Group’s formation. Four of the first five documents were very much linked to provisions in the Final Act and the harassment experienced by the Group: In May 1976 they published their second document titled, “On Violations of Contacts between People in the Field of International Postal and Telephone Communications”. Shortly followed by “On Conditions of Confinement of Prisoners of Conscience” in June. The same month they published “On Divided Families Seeking Reunification” and “Repressions against Religious Families”, illustrating a broader scope of concern.\textsuperscript{329} These documents were at the same time very specific to their own cause, but also broad enough to encompass a wide demographic and several of the humanitarian sections. Soviet citizens who had heard of the Group from shortwave radio stations, like Voice of America or Radio Liberty, found group members and reported abuses they had witnessed. The Group also sent members across the USSR in order to investigate violations and conduct research on Helsinki compliance.\textsuperscript{330} From there the initial strategy was simple, they made thirty-five copies of each report and sent these to the thirty-four signatories’ embassies, as well as a copy to Premier Brezhnev.

The strategy of appealing to foreign connections, known as the ‘boomerang pattern’ was well-established in the Soviet human rights movement, but also a common tactic of advocacy groups in general, especially those working for rights:

Governments are the primary ‘guarantors’ of rights, but also among their primary violators. When a government violates or refuses to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups often have no recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas.

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\textsuperscript{329} “An Evaluation of the Influence of those parts of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that Relate to Human Rights in the USSR” 20 September 1976. HU OSA 300-85-9:67/5; Published Samizdat; Samizdat Archives; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.  
\textsuperscript{330} On the St. Petersburg demonstration, see Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 61-62.
They may seek international connections to express their concerns and even to protect their lives.\textsuperscript{331}

Interestingly, the Group did not limit their monitoring to Eastern Europe: in October 1976, Radio Liberty reported the accusation made by Orlov and Valentin Turchin that Norway and France “had submitted to Moscow’s interpretation [of human rights] by failing to protest the recent arrests of two of their citizens by Soviet police”.\textsuperscript{332} The French and Norwegian tourists had been taken into custody for handing out leaflets made by Soviet emigres, but were released after making apologies on Soviet television. Both tourists withdrew or partly rejected their apologies once they returned to their home countries.\textsuperscript{333} This serves as an example of how the Group worked to hold all CSCE countries accountable. It also supports many of the dissidents’ claims that they were not anti-Soviet or anti-Communist, but simply pro-human rights.

The Moscow Helsinki Group had an informal structure; from the start, a non-voting, non-application system was emphasized and only those who signed a document would, in theory, be held accountable for its content.\textsuperscript{334} So while Orlov signed as the Group’s chairman, his absences and arrests did not stop the Group. The dissidents were used to work without leadership, a characteristic many Western observers failed to understand: While the individual groups may have had a leader, like Orlov or Chalidze’s Amnesty faction, the movement as a whole had no leader.\textsuperscript{335} Many wrongly attributed Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov a leadership role, yet they acted more as independent activists or symbols of support. Sakharov made his role in the movement clear when he rejected the title of leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group, in favor of acting as an individual. Yet the international attention the Nobel Peace Prize attracted, was certainly beneficial to the Groups visibility as well as the safety of the individuals.

Press and public discussion were crucial to the success of the movement as a whole, and the Helsinki Groups in particular. The more attention a subject drew made it harder to ignore.\textsuperscript{336} In a created by the Moscow Helsinki Group from September 1976 that evaluated the Final Act’s influence, the need for public exposure was emphasised. As one of three

\textsuperscript{331} Keck and Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks," 93.
\textsuperscript{332} Internal message. 25 October 1976. HU OSA 300-85-48:18/1; Helsinki Group, 1977 – 1989; New York Office Files Relating to Samizdat; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
\textsuperscript{333} Internal message. 25 October 1976. HU OSA 300-85-48:18/1; Helsinki Group, 1977 – 1989; New York Office Files Relating to Samizdat; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
\textsuperscript{334} Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 281.
\textsuperscript{335} Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent, 331-32.
\textsuperscript{336} “An Evaluation of the Influence of those parts of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that Relate to Human Rights in the USSR” 20 September 1976. HU OSA 300-85-9:67/5; Published Samizdat; Samizdat Archives; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
general causes for the Group’s success and the Soviet authorities’ increased reaction to the movement are:

Information persistently sent to world public opinion by participants of the movement for civil rights in the USSR on persecution for beliefs, on violations of human rights, and on the real nature of Soviet democracy in general has evidently begun to reach the consciousness of broad circles of Western society and has even influenced the tactics of several Western Communist parties.\(^{337}\)

As the members of the human rights movement were increasingly cut off from the outside world, either by interruptions in telephone and mail or inability to obtaining travel visas, they were dependent on foreign correspondents distributing their reports. As seen in the arrests of the members, like Orlov and Ginzburg, this public exposure did not necessarily limit their personal risks.

**Conclusion: A Framework of Fluidity**

Lyudmila Alekséeva efficiently summarizes the Moscow Helsinki Group’s impact on the movement in her memoir *The Thaw Generation*:

We weren’t the first to appeal to the foreign press; Larisa Bogoráž and Pavel Litvinov were the first to appeal to public opinion worldwide. We didn’t start the process of bringing glasnost to violations of human rights; *Khronika*, building on the philosophical groundwork of Alek Esenin-Vól’pin, started that with its coverage of the Galanskov-and-Ginzburg trial. We weren’t the first group to demand observance of Soviet and international law; Chalidze’s Committee for Human Rights in the USSR initiated that process. Nor did we invent appealing to authorities outside the USSR; that was begun by the Initiative Group. By giving our movement a new focus, Orlov made it possible for Western politicians to understand what we wanted.\(^{338}\)

Using the Helsinki framework meant that any government that had signed the Final Act and was acting on its provisions, were responsible for observing the humanitarian conditions as well. Improvement of economic trade for example, could not be excluded from the rest of the Act’s requirements. Already in their founding document, the Group referred to the prearranged follow-up meeting and their wish for inclusion at the actual conference. Both Western and Eastern governments were made vulnerable by the Group’s appeal to their multilateral commitments to human rights.

The structure and strategies of the Moscow Helsinki Group were based off earlier organizations, and the Group could not have existed and functioned without this prior

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\(^{337}\) Ibid.

knowledge and existing network. Additionally, they found a way to use the backlash for their own advancement. Arrests, sentencings, and harassments were reported to the West where it faced widespread condemnation. The authorities knew this and were forced to work around overt repression to avoid negative attention.

The domestic movement in its ‘Helsinki period’ looked a lot like the one before the crackdown in 1972-73. It’s fluidity which allowed it to go underground and reframe their cause was also dependent on familiar strategies and structures. The strategies, like boomerang patterns and samizdat, was similar in form but more efficient with the new publicity. The expulsion of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov’s Nobel Peace Prize made their membership in the movement even more important to Western publicity. Thus, while their methods had remained largely the same, the changes in international human rights politics made their cause echo louder in the West.

Their call for universal human rights, made clearer by the Helsinki framework, expanded their network within the activist space. Involving activists in the movements for national and religious freedom made their demographic wider and therefore sturdier. The next chapter, which deals with the spread of the Helsinki Groups transnationally, demonstrates how important this universality was for the network’s success.
4 The Transnational Network

What we have in common is compassion towards the oppressed man, defenceless and facing a mighty state.\(^{339}\)

Pavel Litvinov

A transnational advocacy network is defined as “voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange”.\(^{340}\) Thus domestic non-governmental organizations can be a part of an international network while simultaneously working for changes domestically.

Shortly following the forming of the Moscow Helsinki Group, other monitoring groups began forming in other Soviet Socialist states. These had personal and ideological ties to the Moscow Group and coordinated their work. Simultaneously, similar organizations were forming in Eastern Europe. Like the Helsinki Groups they focused on legality and holding their governments accountable to the Final Act and own constitutions.

Keck and Sikkink identify four tactics of transnational advocacy networks, in the period between the Helsinki Final Act and the follow-up meeting in Belgrade, these are all represented: firstly, accountability politics recognizes states’ tendency to outwardly adopt positions in order to divert negative attention by international observers. Networks then try to expose the state’s actual behaviour and the “distance between discourse and practice” to pressure the governments to implement.\(^{341}\) Secondly, leverage politics summarize the Helsinki networks efforts to use the CSCE to promote their agenda. By raising the idea that the trade and technology provisions were contingent on the implementation of the human rights, they used what is known as “issue-linkage”.\(^{342}\) Third, information politics, which is the ability to quickly and credibly move information between members and allies of the network was an important tactic to reach an audience beyond their borders. Finally, by using personal stories and activities, like the December 5th demonstration, as symbolic politics increased their visibility and outside sympathy.

If the network was to move beyond sympathy from the West, they needed to increase the salience of human rights violations in Eastern Europe.\(^{343}\) They had gained substantial

\(^{339}\) Quoted in Kowalewski, “Human Rights Protest in the USSR,” 27.
\(^{340}\) Keck and Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks,” 91.
\(^{341}\) Ibid., 97-98.
\(^{342}\) Ibid., 97.
\(^{343}\) Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 8.
recognition from Helsinki and Sakharov’s Nobel nomination. The Helsinki framework was comprehensible and in its immediate aftermath, more and more Helsinki monitors looked towards the Belgrade conference. The aim was to make Belgrade not just another diplomatic conference of empty promises, but actual reviewing of their effectiveness.

This chapter will begin by delving into the first Helsinki Groups outside of Moscow – in Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia – and their interactions with the original Moscow Helsinki Group. Next, this chapter will explore the Eastern European dissident organizations outside the USSR, with emphasis on their role in the transnational network. Lastly, this chapter will conclude by examining the network’s goal of appealing to Western Europe by raising Eastern European human rights’ salience in international relations. This went beyond attracting attention but required a common understanding and relationship based on familiarity between the two Cold War blocs.

“A kind of Coalition Under the flag of Helsinki”

Dissidents across the USSR shared important, personal similarities: in addition to common opinions about freedom and democracy, many had faced imprisonment or harassment, lost their jobs and with it their social status. These collective experiences and the mutual exchange of samizdat developed into an imagined community.344 This was important to maintain feelings of solidarity with each other and establish trust and cooperation between groups and movements. According to political scientist David Kowalewski, three factors explained the growing coalescence between the different protest movements: Firstly, the emphasis on human rights unrelated to nationality, religion, or any other distinctions. The only prerequisite was humanity; therefore, it encompassed any other rights movement. Secondly, a “common enemy” was created by the repetitious reaction to the groups by the regime. The final factor was the subculture of tolerance and unity that developed among incarcerated dissidents. In prisons, labour camps, and psychiatric asylums, political prisoners of different nationalities and affiliations forged bonds and networks that often survived their release.345 An example of this happened according to Vladimir Bukóvskij after the deportation of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in January 1974 which had “rocked everyone, and, as happens at moments of

real disaster, strengthened their resolution”. This had been felt in the camps where they begun producing and distributing their own versions of a samizdat journal: *The Chronicle of the Gulag Archipelago*. This unity and cooperation did not mean they did not diverge in their views. Dissident Pável Litvinov was aware of these sometimes opposing views but made the point that “[w]hat we have in common is compassion towards the oppressed man, defenceless and facing a mighty state”. Beyond this, the monitoring groups shared fundamental tactics: they avoided violence, worked within the constitutions and domestic laws, and pressured governments to honour obligations to international agreements.

However, unlike the Christian Committee and the Working Commission, the national Helsinki Groups were not branches of the Moscow Group, but independent and equal groups, connected by these shared goals and strategies. In January 1977, Yuri Andropov warned the Central Committee of this new transnational development:

> In the process of further work it has been established that Orlov and his closest accomplices instigated the creation of similar ‘groups’ in Ukraine and Lithuania. Recently members of the mentioned groups have significantly stepped up their collection and dissemination to the West of the slanderous material, which aim to place in doubt the sincerity of the Soviet Union’s efforts to implement the stipulations of the Final Act […]

**The Ukrainian Helsinki Group**

The first dissident organization to answer the call to create other national groups was the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Accords. Mikóla Rudénko, another veteran dissident, founded the Ukrainian Group on November 9th, 1976 after hearing about the Moscow Group on foreign radio broadcasts. Of the nine founding members, six had already served prison time for underground nationalist activities. The dissident

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347 Ibid., 427.
352 Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*.
353 Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 163. *On the Persecution of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group* was published by the World Congress of Free Ukrainian, known today as the Ukrainian World Congress. According to the book, the external representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was established with formal mandates from its home-based organization, in 1978 with headquarters in New York. The authors are listed as General Petro Grigorenko, Leonid Plyushch, and Nina Strokata. World Congress of Free Ukrainians. Human Rights Commission, *The
movement in Ukraine shared several important similarities to the movement in Moscow. Described as the “Post-1956 liberalization”, the cultural movement became politicized by the government’s suppression and saw the rise of opposition groups. Like Ginzburg and Litvinov’s records of the 1960s trials in Moscow, Vyacheslav Chornovil, a Ukrainian journalist, compiled the biographies of 20 dissidents who were tried in 1966 in order to inform the public of the “courts’ flagrant violation of the law”. The movement also saw the creation of an underground journal, *The Ukrainian Herald*, first published in 1970. *The Herald* only published eight issues before it was stopped in 1974. The editors of the *Herald* imitated the objective language of the Moscow *Chronicle*. These similarities support the idea that a similar past made it easier to continue the less formal cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian dissidents in the period after Helsinki. General Pyotr Grigorenko served as the principal link between Moscow and the Ukrainian Group until he left the USSR in December 1977. The Ukrainian dissidents were “strongly supported by human-rights activists in Moscow, who in turn informed the Western press”. The connections already established between the Moscow dissidents and the West were important for the spread of dissident material, not just for the Ukrainians. Thus, the Moscow Helsinki Group often acted as an intermediary between Eastern European dissidents and the West.

The principles and demands listed by the Ukrainian Group were echoes of earlier issues in the USSR, but rebranded for Helsinki: individuals over the state, democratization of the Soviet system, and sovereignty for Ukraine. The final point was supplemented with Articles 68 and 69 of the Ukrainian Constitution which state Ukraine’s sovereignty and right to free secession from the USSR. Alongside this, Principle VIII of the Helsinki Final Act: “respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination” was stated. By including direct quotes from the Constitution and the Final Act, they were explicitly challenging all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act. Like in Moscow, the Helsinki framework helped to unite and formalize the movement: “until the formation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, dissidents were united by shared goals and personal ties; political protests

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*Persecution of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group* (Human Rights Commission, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1980).

354Ibid., 9-10.
355Ibid., 10
358Ibid., 11-12
359Ibid., 7-8.
had been spontaneous acts of individuals or groups. The Group provided a focus and forum for the dissident movement.\textsuperscript{360}

Sakharov stated in his memoir that the persecution of Helsinki Groups was “especially fierce” in Ukraine; arrests were frequent and often led to maximum sentences.\textsuperscript{361} Unlike the nine months of freedom granted to members of the Moscow Group, Mikóla Rudénko and Oleksy Tikhy were arrested in Ukraine on February 5th, 1977, only a few months after the group’s foundation.\textsuperscript{362}

**The Lithuanian Helsinki Group**

Grigorénko described the establishment of the Ukrainian Group as a “catalyst to action in the other union republics of the USSR”.\textsuperscript{363} Only two weeks after the Ukrainian Group, on November 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1976, the Lithuanian Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Act was founded. The new group had close ties to the Moscow dissidents and on December 1\textsuperscript{st}, at a press conference in Moscow, Lithuanian religious activist, Viktoras Petkus, announced the formation of the Lithuanian Group.\textsuperscript{364} The Lithuanian Group was more like the Moscow Group in that they addressed a broader range of human and civil rights than the Ukrainian Group.\textsuperscript{365} By December, dissidents in Moscow and Lithuania had issued a report on Helsinki violations, focusing on religious persecution, happening in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{366} The Catholic Church in Lithuania was already an influential and politically active member of the Lithuanian society. This allowed for beneficial cooperation and the two wrote a joint appeal to the Belgrade conference. The Archbishop Sigitas Tamkevicius, editor of *The Chronicle of Catholic Church in Lithuania* kept in regular contact with Sergéj Kovalyov and other Moscow dissidents. The editors took advantage of the Moscow *Chronicle*’s international readership and sent issues to Moscow for them to translate and incorporate into their own issues.\textsuperscript{367} Yet, the already well-established role of the church, hindered the group from acting as the locus for dissident activity, like in Moscow and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{368}

\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., 5
\textsuperscript{361} Sakharov, *Memoirs*, 469.
\textsuperscript{362} “The Helsinki Watch Groups”, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{363} Quoted in Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*, 66.
\textsuperscript{364} “The Helsinki Watch Groups”, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{365} Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 163.
\textsuperscript{367} Komaromi, “Samizdat and Soviet Dissident Publics,” 83.
\textsuperscript{368} Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 164.
The Georgian and Armenian Helsinki Groups

Two other Soviet republics which saw the rise of Helsinki monitoring groups were Georgia and Armenia. However, neither groups were as active or successful as their Ukrainian or Lithuanian counterparts. The Georgian Helsinki Group was established in January 1977 by Georgian activists well-known to the Moscow Group. While they continued to cooperate and assist the Moscow dissidents, they only published one document as an independent group. The other, the Armenian Helsinki Group, while short-lived, managed produce a number of reports and a Belgrade-appeal. The group was forced to disband within one year of existence as several of its leaders had been arrested.

While the other Soviet republican Helsinki groups were of varying influence, perhaps their most important character was their ability to form and withhold authorities long enough to send reports to the rest of the world. While there was never a Romanian Helsinki Group, in February 1977 the intelligentsia in Romania, among them Paul Goma, sent an open letter to the Belgrade review conference. Goma had already publicly supported Charta 77. The letter complained about trampling of civil rights in Romania, especially freedom of movement and expression. Over two hundred Romanians signed the letter and some even sent their own documentation. This suggests that there existed oppositional sympathies among Romanian citizens but lacked the kind of organization or opportunity as seen in other countries.

Daniel C. Thomas contends that “[t]he creation of such groups in Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the appeal of Helsinki principles for opposition activists extended well beyond the liberal intelligentsia of Moscow”. However, the goal of Helsinki monitoring was not meant to stop at the border, and establishing the network on both sides of the Cold War divide was vital to their success.

Human Rights Monitoring in Eastern Europe

Dissidence in Eastern Europe grew and developed both independently and alongside the movement inside the Soviet Union. Like in Soviet Russia, oppositionist theories and action had been influenced by major events, such as internal reform processes and Soviet

369 Ibid.
370 Ibid.
371 Ibid., 188.
372 Ibid., 164-65.
373 Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 79.
intervention. The Prague Spring in 1968, for example, saw a wave of unity between Czechoslovak citizens and Soviet dissidents. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia which all had a significant presence of dissidents, had all gone through different methods for political change, such as normalization in Czechoslovakia and the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary. These had been followed by various degrees of repression, censorship and Soviet military presence. These experiences influenced the domestic opposition as well as their support from abroad. It is with these differences in mind that the compatibility of these organizations and movements become perhaps even more extraordinary.

**Poland**

The Polish organization *Komitet Obrony Robotników* (KOR), translated to Workers’ Defense Committee, was formed by a small group of members of the Polish intelligentsia. KOR was initially focused on protecting the demonstrators of the 1976 uprisings from state repression. In the summer of 1976, the Communist authorities in Poland declared drastic increases in the price of consumer goods which caused instant revolt from the Polish workers. The demonstrations were met with severe repressions and arrests, and the organization provided financial and legal help to workers and their families during trials. KOR fought for the workers’ amnesty and in July 1977, the remaining imprisoned workers were released. At that point, Poland had become dependent on Western credit and technology – both of which were contingent on Poland’s observance of the Helsinki Final Act. Thus, with the Belgrade conference approaching, and perhaps even President Carter’s scheduled visit to Warsaw in December 1977, the Polish authorities did not want political prisoners on their conscience.

KOR, despite not including Helsinki in their name, shared the same focus on individual rights and adherence to domestic and international law. Polish lawyer Zbigniew Romaszewski travelled to Moscow after hearing about the creation of the Moscow Helsinki Group to speak with Sakharov, Bonner and Shcharansky, among other members. When he returned to Warsaw, he confided in a friend that “[i]f they can do it there, in the heart of the empire, we can surely do it here.” Romaszewski became one of the founders of KOR and was in

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376 Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*, 67-68.
377 Zuzowski, *Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland*, 92-93.
regular contact with members of the Norwegian and Swedish Helsinki committees. The Polish Helsinki Committee was set up by KOR in 1979 and its report on Helsinki monitoring to the Madrid Conference in 1980 became the last major action undertaken on behalf of KOR: “The report was a detailed, well-documented description of the abuse of law and authority in Poland throughout the entire period of KOR’s existence”.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia saw the foundation of the group known as Charta 77. The idea for the group originated with the Soviet and Polish groups and the Czechoslovak dissidents saw an opportunity to build on the momentum of these groups. The group was announced on January 1st, 1977. This date was symbolic as Prague Spring had begun on the same day in 1968. The year 1977 also held importance as Amnesty International had named it the ‘year of the political prisoner’, and the Belgrade Conference was scheduled for June.

Jan Patocka, Czech philosopher and one of the original signatories to Charta 77, said,

Certainly Helsinki was the beginning of all of this. We were waiting to see if the Helsinki principles would be implemented here, if they would have the force of law. One had to do something as a citizen, as a human being, to ensure that these rights that were given to us would not remain a dead letter. The fundamental question now is indeed whether this action will bring about more freedom or more repression.

Their founding document detailed the violations of both the Final Act and the UN Covenants and degraded freedom of expression in Czechoslovakia to illusory. While their founding document announced the creation of a new organization, it also “designated a movement for human rights”. Similarly to the Moscow dissidents they focused on legally ratified rights and presented human rights as the core of their cause.

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379 Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 69.
380 Zuzowski, Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland, 183-84.
382 Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 70. Korey, The Promises We Keep, 51.
383 Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 69-70.
384 Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence, 88-89.
385 Ibid.
Hungary

The Hungarian organized human rights movement did not begin with a Helsinki Group, but instead a declaration of solidarity with Charta 77. Thirty-four intellectuals sent the following message to Prague in January 1977:

We declare our solidarity with the signers of Charter 77 and we condemn the repressive measures used against them. We are convinced that the defence of human and civil rights is a common concern of all Eastern Europe.

Dissent had an important presence in Hungarian society: the Szamizdat Butik in Budapest was founded during the second half of the 1970s and acted as a meeting point for anyone looking to discover or purchase samizdat. The store was only open on Tuesdays and was raided regularly, yet its continued existence and visibility suggests that the government was less threatened by Hungary’s opposition movement, which had been strongly subdued since 1956, and allowed certain freedoms. The following quote from Hungarian intellectual, Gáspár Miklós Tamás, suggests the feelings of comradery and respect for the dissidents in Moscow:

We should not ever forget that the most important dissidents were the Russians. And you know, you cannot compare our role to theirs. They were the real ones. They took the real risks. And they were also more numerous, more varied, had greater political intelligence, and daring, and imagination; they were our ideas and they started in 1961, and now these heroic people who started it are all forgotten. The Ginzburgs and everyone. That was very sad, because they were the authentic heroes.

Several Eastern European dissidents did not form nor join monitoring groups based on the Helsinki Act. Despite Stasi and KGB concerns, dissidents in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were not planning on creating their own Helsinki group. East German oppositionists kept in close contact with several of these Helsinki Groups and learnt about their strategies and missions. The Helsinki Act was most successful as a tool to seek emigration from the GDR as individual applications would cite the provisions on freedom of movement.

“Extraordinary Human Story”: Reaching the Minds and Media of the West

386 Kind-Kovács, Written Here, Published There, 108; Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence, 127-8.
387 The Dilemmas of Dissidence, 128.
388 Kind-Kovács, Written Here, Published There, 106-10.
389 Quoted in ibid., 110.
The media held an essential role in keeping the movement alive both within the USSR and to the rest of the world. Underground media, like The Chronicle of Current Events, was vital for organizing and updating dissident activity and non-conformist ideas. Mass media, like the radio and newspapers, as well as the international literature scene, “opened up ‘the Iron Curtain’” to the West.\(^{391}\) Leif Hovelsen’s description of his efforts to get Sakharov nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize is an example of how important it was to use the media to keep Sakharov’s name and mission alive in the minds of people.\(^{392}\) Similarly, it is not a coincidence that the Radio Free Europe archives collected and preserved a large number of newspaper clippings about the movement. This foreign attention is crucial to understand how the movement reached the rest of the world and thus its significance in international politics.

Original pieces of samizdat and news of arrests and harassment drew international audiences, and became one of the pillar strategies for gaining global sympathizers and pressuring the Soviet authorities from outside. In his memoir, Fear no Evil, Anatoly Shcharansky describes the renewed demand for samizdat after the creation of Moscow Helsinki Group: “Things had changed so dramatically that I no longer had to think up ways to interest the press in the statements and letters of refuseniks or dissidents; the correspondents literally tore them out of my hands”.\(^{393}\) Historian William Korey brings up the ongoing ‘information revolution’, “but it was the enormous personal courage of the known and unknown monitors that gave the media an extraordinary human story to tell”.\(^{394}\)

**Bridging East and West**

The gradual opening of the Iron Curtain did not simply allow the West to rediscover the East, rather it allowed for a reciprocal relationship between dissidents and foreign sympathizers. Foreign radio stations, like Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and BBC, were both recipients and participants in the communication with Eastern European listeners. By tuning into foreign radio stations, especially those that broadcasted in Russian, Eastern European citizens had access to alternative news and information. Listening to the radio also left less incriminating evidence than pursuing and possessing physical copies of non-conformist literature. In his memoirs, Yuri Orlov says his “thanks to foreign radio ‘voices’” for reaching Soviet citizens with personal stories of human rights violations that

\(^{391}\) Korey, *The Promises We Keep*, 51.

\(^{392}\) See chapter 3.

\(^{393}\) Quoted in Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*, 65.

\(^{394}\) Korey, *The Promises We Keep*, 51.
eventually reached the Moscow Group.\textsuperscript{395} Especially Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty focused on the internal affairs of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, respectively.\textsuperscript{396} A Radio Liberty memorandum titled “The Tone of RL Broadcasts” from April 1970, explains that,

\begin{quote}
[I]n every case possible, we should aim at a ‘dialogue’ with the listener and at contact with him. At the same time it should be borne in mind that we are interested in employing the living conversational language, which is flexible, expressive and natural.\textsuperscript{397}
\end{quote}

They attempted to create a conversation with the listener, as opposed to the typical instructive propaganda. Surely, they were hoping that this kind of conversational approach could spark discussions among themselves as well.\textsuperscript{398} They were careful not to alienate any listeners by appearing too critical or segregating; after all, European reunification was one of Radio Free Europe’s main goals.\textsuperscript{399} For example, a Radio Liberty memorandum discouraged the phrase “free world” as it had a “propagandistic connotation”, along with the alternative “Western world” and so on.\textsuperscript{400} This was one of the ways Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were working to bridge the divide between East and West in order to foster feelings of unity.

The employment of émigrés from Eastern Europe and the USSR was another way of behaving inclusive, while establishing and maintaining relationships between Western and Eastern public and intellectuals. Not only were they familiar with the listeners’ way of life, but they were also meant to “symbolically represent their countrymen’s aspirations for freedom and independence”.\textsuperscript{401} According to a Radio Liberty memorandum from October 1972, Aleksáňdr Vól’pin had accepted a reoccurring broadcasting role at the station. He was reportedly “grateful for the opportunity to reach the Soviet public via RL, for as he says he did not come to America merely to immerse himself in mathematics in a university”.\textsuperscript{402}

\textsuperscript{395} Orlov, \textit{Dangerous Thoughts}, 195. Sarah B. Snyder also offers a discussion on the role of foreign radio stations to disseminate news of the groups. Snyder, \textit{Human Rights Activism}, 61-62.


\textsuperscript{399} Kind-Kovács, "Voices, Letters, and Literature through the Iron Curtain," 203-06.


\textsuperscript{401} Kind-Kovács, "Voices, Letters, and Literature through the Iron Curtain," 199-200.

\textsuperscript{402} Internal memorandum from Gene Sosin. 12 October 1972. HU OSA 300-85-47:3/48; External Relations: Samizdat Issues: Correspondence, 1972-1973; Administrative files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
Völ’pin’s central role in establishing legality as a pillar aim in the movement made him an invaluable contribution to Radio Liberty’s credibility.

This regular contact with foreign correspondents and renewed interest in the Soviet dissidents was not welcomed by the KGB who (ironically) agreed with the idea of a reciprocal relationship. Foreign correspondents were given a highly active role in the instigating of oppositional activity according to a report to the Central Committee. The report reads that “[e]specially noticeable is the aspiration of Western intelligence services to assist organized group of individuals, who have spoken out against the governmental and social system that exists in our country”. Furthermore, it states that “[a]ccording to our data, accredited Moscow correspondents from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, England, France and Italy are persistently encouraging the leaders of the anti-Soviet movement”. According to this view, the contact between dissidents and Western correspondents not only made the Soviet Union vulnerable to foreign scrutiny, but also provided the dissidents with moral and material support.

In addition to employing émigrés, familiar voices were also heard through the broadcasting of samizdat and tamizdat. Radio Free Europe justified their broadcasting of this material back to their countries of origin by explaining that,

[t]he peoples of the USSR are the intended and primary audience for this material. By acquainting not just a few, but all, Soviet citizens with the content of their countrymen’s expression, by keeping them informed of the appearance of these documents abroad, and by relaying to them accounts of reaction outside the USSR, free radio serves as an information service transmitting the efforts of concerned Soviet citizens.

The radio stations were aware of the difficulty of obtaining samizdat for citizens in the Soviet Union, especially for people located outside the larger cities. This broadcast guidance suggests that by listening to the content of the samizdat, as well as simply being aware of their existence, more Soviet citizens might follow their wishes for an open Europe.

Books by Western authors were valued by Soviet or Eastern European citizens and strengthened feelings of mutual understanding and unity. Lyudmila Alekséeva describes in her memoir the novelty of accessing such books during Khrushchev’s thaw:

Then came Arthur Koestler’s *Darkness at Noon* and George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-four*. The latter seemed to be translated by a person who didn’t speak much.

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404 Ibid.

English. The idioms were translated literally, and most sentences retained their English structure. Still, the message came through. The book was about us. It was about our Big Brother, our Newspeak, our ministries of Love and Truth, even our Pavlik Morozov.\(^{406}\)

Even after Helsinki, foreign books published and translated in the Soviet Union were selected and edited by publishers appointed by the government and hard to come by. Ordering books by mail was forbidden due to alleged foreign exchange issues.\(^{407}\) An anonymous Soviet scientist and living in an unmentioned Western capital wrote a report on the “Soviet book scene” for Radio Liberty. In it, she described not only the long processes Soviet citizens had to go through to obtain legally published books, but also the lack of popular books.

“Occasionally one comes across gems such as Hedrick Smith’s The Russians,” she writes, “When he wrote it, the authors could not possibly have known that things would reach a pass where one man gave his wife a half-translated version of this book for a birthday present!”\(^{408}\) She further explains that not everyone who withstood the long lines to acquire popular books were interested in their contents, but used them as decorations in their apartments, to impress friends, or simply to resell them at the black market for a profit.\(^{409}\) Western books held a special, social importance among Muscovites, not just dissidents. The author brings up *samizdat*, explaining that an increasing number of self-published materials were not the typical dissident works, but legally published books too difficult to obtain through the regular channels.\(^{410}\)

**Tamizdat**

For authors within the Soviet bloc, publishing their work abroad was subject to strict censorship and licensing rules, if their material was even considered for foreign audiences. Robert L. Bernstein, at the time Chairman of the Association of American Publishers’ committee on Soviet-American Publishing Relations, described the complicated Soviet laws for publishing for the journal *Index of Censorship*. According to Bernstein, the Soviet Union

\(^{406}\) Alexeyeva and Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation*, 99. Pavlik Morozov was a Soviet martyr who supposedly turned in his father to the authorities and was killed by his family for doing so. His story was the subject of many songs, stories, and poetry, which generally praised his courage and encouraged Soviet children to follow his morality.

\(^{407}\) “A publisher looks at Helsinki” by Robert L. Bernstein. November-December 1977; HU OSA 301-0-5:1/4 Index on Censorship, 1977; Publications; Records of Index on Censorship; HU OSA.

\(^{408}\) “News from the Soviet book scene” Compiled by Max Ralis. 10 November 1978. HU OSA 300-6-1:4/2; Background Reports, 1978; Administrative Files; Media and Opinion Research Department; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.

\(^{409}\) Ibid.

\(^{410}\) Ibid.
announced in 1973 the formation of the all-union copyright agency which had kept the exclusive right not only to license Soviet works for publication abroad, but also negotiate contracts for publication of foreign works in the Soviet Union. Thus, any direct contact between Soviet writers and foreign publishers might be considered unlawful. However, these regulations were ambiguous and while no Soviet authors had been prosecuted for only publishing abroad or directly contacting publishers, they were often hindered in other ways – as seen by the disconnection of phone lines for several literary dissidents, like Andrei Sakharov. Bernstein claimed that since Helsinki, the possibility for direct contact between authors and publishers had deteriorated, as disconnecting phone lines had become more common. This violated the provisions in the Final Act that asked to facilitate the contact between peoples, and the dissemination and exchange of books and cultural property. In the same article, Bernstein expresses his wishes for stricter implementation of Helsinki’s cultural provisions:

freedom of expression is, of course, intimately connected with the fate of the publishing industry. When freedom of expression is curtailed (an this means the freedom to express unpopular, inconvenient, even outrageous thoughts – for what government or society has ever censored the expression of views echoing the official line?), then publishing becomes merely propaganda.

Authors wishing to publish abroad were therefore often forced to circumvent the official organs and publish their work as *tamizdat*, which differs from *samizdat* by being published outside its country of origin. *Tamizdat* went beyond the movement’s need for international sympathisers by acting as a “transnational undertaking that reinforced détente, dialogue, and cultural transfer, counterbalancing the persistent belief in Europe’s irreversible divisions”.

A number of Western publishers worked with *tamizdat*, some of the most prominent illustrates their geographical spread: the Dutch Alexander Herzen Foundation which was founded in 1969, first publishers of André Amálrik’s *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1948?* in 1970. In the United States, Ardis Publishers were founded in Michigan in 1971, and Khronika Press in New York, which published *The Chronicle of Human Rights in USSR*. Sixty-Eight Publishers, a Czechoslovak publishing house in Toronto, Canada was founded in 1971. *Tamizdat* was highly relevant for its ability to counter the ideology of cold war

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411 This is also mentioned in Alekseeva, *Soviet Dissent*, 321.
412 “A publisher looks at Helsinki” by Robert L. Bernstein. November-December 1977; HU OSA 301-0-5:1/4 Index on Censorship, 1977; Publications; Records of Index on Censorship; HU OSA.
413 Helsinki Final Act pg. 46-47 (Basket III, chapter 3)
414 “A publisher looks at Helsinki” by Robert L. Bernstein. November-December 1977; HU OSA 301-0-5:1/4 Index on Censorship, 1977; Publications; Records of Index on Censorship; HU OSA.
415 Kind-Kovács, *Written Here, Published There*, 6.
416 Ibid., 126-32.
isolation and the everyday reality of Europe’s division.\textsuperscript{417} Western books, \textit{tamizdat} and \textit{samizdat}, were all important to foster feelings of familiarity and being part of a larger world and movement for global human rights. According to Kind-Kovacs, “publishing in the West represented a step towards rejoining a global intellectual sphere that the Iron Curtain had divided”.\textsuperscript{418}

**Conclusion: Strength in numbers**

This chapter showed how both the media and the awareness of a follow-up meeting to the Helsinki Conference influenced the emergence of a transnational Helsinki movement. Names like Andrei Sakharov and Yuri Orlov had become symbols of human rights on either side of the Cold War divide, making the ‘Iron Curtain’ appear more penetrable than before. Whether as national Helsinki groups or independent organizations, the Helsinki network was entering as a major force to be reckoned with across Eastern Europe. In order to gain legitimacy and salience in international discussions, they employed a number of tactics recognizable as transnational advocacy network \textit{politics}. Each group and individual dissident in Eastern Europe were influenced by different events and repressions, yet they managed to create \textit{imagined communities} necessary to a common understanding and cooperation. While these communities had both convening and convergent aims, significant respect was felt for Russian dissidents among the Eastern European dissidents, as expressed by Hungarian activist Gáspár Miklós Tamás.

Their shared and foremost goal, the observance of human rights in Eastern Europe, needed priority at the upcoming Belgrade conference. To achieve this, they needed the West to go beyond expressing sympathy for their struggle, and to advocate for their demands. One method was to refamiliarize the Eastern way of life to the rest of Europe. By creating feelings of familiarity and solidarity through media and literature, the violations hit closer to home: Bridging the divide was necessary to establish a functioning transnational advocacy network.

\textsuperscript{417} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{418} Ibid., 149.
BELGRADE: THE TEST OF THE HELSINKI NETWORK

All mankind, including its best-organized and most active forces, the working class and the intelligentsia, is interested in freedom and security.419

Andrei Sakharov

While Helsinki remained the quintessential symbol of monitoring human rights violations, another European capital would surface as the follow-up meeting was drawing nearer. The very last pages of the Helsinki Final Act outlined the purpose and plan for a follow-up meeting to be held at Belgrade in 1977. According to William Korey,

[o]ne of the greatest achievements of the Helsinki Final Act was the concept of the follow-up meeting. For it was the follow-up meeting – where implementation of the accords was reviewed – that lent the Final Act a semi-juridical and politically binding character.420

Belgrade acted as both a warning and a promise – a warning to anyone violating the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and a promise to anyone working for their implementation. Human rights activists from both West and East addressed Belgrade attendees in their appeals. Governments were similarly conscious of the meeting and the expectations placed upon them by their citizens and other states. There were competing voices and concerns about the degree to which they should support the Helsinki groups and human rights dissidents among the CSCE states. Individual arrests and harassment were often publicly criticized and viewed as undemocratic. However, explicitly criticizing the Soviet government and their commitment to the Final Act jeopardized détente and made states vulnerable to counter-criticism. As independent support groups and committees sprung up in Europe and North-America, governments faced domestic pressure as well. In the period between the Helsinki Final Act and the Belgrade follow-up meeting, international human rights discussions were divided between official government positions, politicians, émigré, human rights organizations, and the media.

420 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 61. Sarah B. Snyder also emphasizes the follow-up meetings in establishing a process and providing a forum to investigate other countries’ human rights violations diplomatically. Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 7.
The first part of this chapter will deal with the American approach to Belgrade. The new presidential administration’s focus on universal human rights were put to the test at Belgrade and highly influenced their position. Their role as a Cold War superpower gave them influence over other states and the pressure felt by the Eastern regimes. Dissidents and politicians alike looked toward the United States for an indication of what the follow-up meeting would look like. Second, the spread of Helsinki monitoring to Western Europe: the concerns in Western Europe were similar to the American ones but were complicated by the formation of the first Western European Helsinki Groups. Over time, other Western European NGOs and public figures would steadily join the network. Finally, the Belgrade follow-up meeting will be addressed; it’s unprecedented use of NGO documents and reports will be given special attention.

The period 1976-1978 saw the spread of the Helsinki network to the West. This had been a principle goal of many dissenters since the beginning of the movement and therefore marked an important milestone in its development. As the Helsinki Final Act had a significant impact on the rhetoric and structure of the monitoring groups, the Belgrade conference was a sensible target for their shared concentration. The support from Americans and Western Europeans would determine the outcome of Belgrade. By focusing their efforts on Belgrade and encouraging others to do the same, the pressure applied to implement the Final Act’s humanitarian provisions would multiply.

The New American Approach

President Ford’s involvement in the CSCE had received a lot of negative attention which caused the administration to be careful to continue their association with Helsinki in case it failed American interests.421

As mentioned in chapter three, Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick met with dissidents in 1975 and brought the idea of Helsinki monitoring back to Washington. The idea of a government entity with the specific goal of monitoring compliance was rejected on many levels, yet as more news of a “Helsinki-focused wave” reached the West, minds began to change.422 Ethnic lobbies and particularly Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak émigré organizations endorsed Fenwick’s proposals.423 According to Daniel C. Thomas, the deciding

422 Ibid., 126.
423 Ibid., 126-7.
factor happened on the very anniversary of the Final Act when Congress received a translated copy of the Moscow Helsinki Group’s evaluation of Helsinki’s influence. The violations laid out in the report strongly supported the need for monitoring. In the fall of 1976, Congress established the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, despite opposition from the Ford administration. The US Helsinki Commission, as it came to be known, was authorized to monitor the signatories’ compliance or violation of the Final Act, “with particular regard to the provisions relating to human rights and Cooperation in Humanitarian Fields”. In addition to monitoring, the Commission was to “encourage the development of programs and activities of the United States Government and private organizations with a view toward taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act”. In November 1976, six months after the Group’s formation, the Commission returned from a study mission in Europe. Chairman Dante Fascell’s description of their findings summarized the negative view of the American participation in the CSCE, simultaneously supporting the need for assistance in monitoring violations in Eastern Europe:

The finding was something of a surprise to those who had criticized the Helsinki process as one of unilateral concessions to Communist political goals. Since then, however, news reports from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union – stories of ordinary citizens as well as educated political activists citing the Helsinki agreement in campaigns for repress of grievances – have at least confirmed that the accords are eliciting an unexpected response inside those countries. That response – and not the action of western government – has made Helsinki [sic] a catchword for concepts of civil liberty, religious freedom and human rights in general. The response has been met by repression – arrests of most vocal advocates of the Helsinki spirit in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, police harassment in East Germany and Rumania.

The American Helsinki Commission cannot be classified as a Helsinki Group as it was governmental instead of citizen-based. The shape of a state commission, with all its benefits and limitations, is different from the other NGOs that were forming. The US Helsinki Watch was eventually formed as an HGO, but not until 1978.

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424 Ibid., 128.
427 Ibid.
Carter’s human rights focus

While the US Helsinki Commission was created under President Ford, the dissonance between maintaining détente and protecting human rights were enhanced by the election and inauguration of President Jimmy Carter in 1977. One of the pillars in Carter’s presidential campaign had been renewed dedication to human rights, both at home and abroad. Carter’s inaugural address spoke of the American people’s moral obligations to care about others’ freedom and that “commitment to human rights must be absolute”.429 Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin discussed the sincerity of Carter’s human rights policy in his memoirs:

I came to the conclusion that while Carter really believed it was morally justified to defend human rights (and he deserves credit for that), he saw the question as a convenient propaganda weapon to keep on wielding in public at the expense of agreement on other major issues in Soviet-American relations, whether by design or not. There are good arguments for and against this policy, both moral and political. In the final analysis I believe it did more harm than good to our relations and even to the course of human rights in our country. These would have been more successfully enhanced through a combination of permanent and strong but essentially private pressure through the confidential channel, along with negotiations on issues of interest to the soviet leadership.430

Dobrynin’s evaluation is naturally biased by his position, but the question of pursuing human rights commitment explicitly or discreetly became a much-discussed topic for the early months of Carter’s presidency and the upcoming Belgrade conference. Dissident historian Lyudmila Alekséeva contemplates that while Carter’s inaugural statement might have initially scared the Soviet leaders, his “later vacillation may have encouraged them to believe that he was ‘manageable’”.431 This expectation of the US as a leader of the Helsinki principles was shared by several other dissidents who explicitly addressed the US and the President in their foreign appeals. Carter’s campaign promises and victory encouraged this hope.432 In the immediate period after Carter’s inauguration, many were surprised by the lack of outspoken, official human rights condemnation from the administration. In response, the administration tried to convince concerned parties that they were trying a quiet, diplomatic

430 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 389.
431 Sakharov, Memoirs, 469.
432 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 62-63.
approach to the issue. A number of congressmen and senators were concerned by the apparent lack of human rights commitment. The administration tried to reassure them that despite the complexity of condemning human rights violations happening within a foreign country, the American “policy will be vigorous and be reflected in all aspects of US foreign relations”. The complex issue raised by the Administration referred to the fragile relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. Multilateral disarmament and the strengthening of détente was closely connected to the upcoming Belgrade conference. Yet in line with Administrations’ reassurance, the US Senate passed Resolution 198 on July 7th, 1977, which outlined their plan to officially indicate concern for the treatment of Shcharansky and Orlov, as well as other Helsinki monitors, at the Belgrade conference. Within a week of this, The Baltimore Sun reported Carter’s strong backing and announced that according to a national opinion survey, “[t]he American public believes it is more important for President Carter to continue speaking out on human rights than for him to reach another arms agreement with the Soviet Union”.

According to a TASS article translated by Radio Liberty, “anxiety [was] growing in Western Europe over attempts by the new US administration to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries under the cover of the hypocritical campaign ‘in defence’ of human rights”. Their report mentioned an article in the West German Social Democratic Party’s newspaper, Vorwärts, which described détente and human rights as inseparable: “He who threatens the détente process, thereby limits the possibility of realising these [human] rights”. Recognizing the expectations placed on the Belgrade conference, the Soviets were quick to infer their withdrawal from the meeting if they felt they were under too much scrutiny by the other conference participants.

Yet international security was not the only concern: a causal relationship between Carter’s outspokenness and increased persecution of dissidents within the USSR was raised.

433 “Controversy over whether human rights campaign hurts dissidents” 3 June 1977. HU OSA 300-85-12:208.3/3; Права человека / Human Rights, 1977 – 1977; Subject Files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
434 “America’s human rights commitment” 26 October 1977. HU OSA 300-85-12:208/2; Права человека / Human Rights, 1974 – 1976; Subject Files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
436 “Carter backed 2 to 1, on human rights stand”. 11 July 1977. HU OSA 300-85-12:208/2; Права человека / Human Rights, 1974 – 1976; Subject Files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
437 “TASS: Western Europe anxious at US human rights campaign” 17 July 1977. HU OSA 300-85-12:208.3/3; Права человека / Human Rights, 1977 – 1977; Subject Files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
438 Ibid.
439 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 63; Savranskaya, “Unintended Consequences,” 179.
Whether this was an attempt to stop negative foreign reporting about the Kremlin or to question Carter’s foreign politics, is unclear. Journalist Joseph Kraft, reporting from Moscow for the Washington Post, claimed that Carter’s “well-meaning, but ill-conceived human-rights campaign” and the international attention it was drawing, caused the arrests of the dissidents. This point was also brought up at a White House press conference during which Press Secretary Jody Powell was asked how long the President would continue his human rights policy at the expense of Russian citizens. Powell made the point that the administration had tried the quiet approach in Anatoly Shcharansky’s case, but that it had failed – referring to the fact that he had recently been charged with treason, a charge which had shocked international observers. After the failure of a concealed, diplomatic effort, the administration had decided to go public. Powell added that if the dissidents “were interested in a life that is free of difficulty, it is unlikely they would be involved”. Even in hindsight, it is difficult to say what was the best approach towards Soviet dissidents, but historian and original Moscow Helsinki Group member, Lyudmila Alekséeva, claimed that the open support by the West was not to blame for the increased repression. Alekséeva explained that in Moscow, the recent arrests were instead seen as a consequence of the “lack of firmness on the part of President Carter”.

When it came to the follow-up meeting, the US was not going unprepared. Carter appointed Arthur Goldberg, former Supreme Court justice and United Nations ambassador, as head of the US delegation to Belgrade. Goldberg was a strong supporter of the Helsinki network and did not attempt to hide his allegiance:

Private individuals have a lot to do, outside of government. It’s a great anomaly to me that while in the Soviet Union, in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, under conditions of repression, private individuals have had the courage to organize private groups but that in our country individuals have not organized a monitoring group. I would hope they would, as an indication that individuals in our country, in addition to government, have a great interest in the implementation of the Final Act.

These kinds of allies were undoubtedly encouraging to activists looking toward the Belgrade Conference. However, not every Western country appeared as confident in their preparations for the follow-up meeting.

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440 “Controversy over whether human rights campaign hurts dissidents” 3 June 1977. HU OSA 300-85-12:208.3/3; Права человека / Human Rights, 1977 – 1977; Subject Files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.

441 Ibid.

442 Aleksseeva, Soviet Dissent, 344.

443 Slezkine, "From Helsinki to Human Rights Watch," 349.
European indecision: Keeping détente in mind

Compared to the United States’ public resolution to denounce Soviet human rights offenses, West European signatories often seemed much more hesitant and focused on prioritizing détente. One could argue that West European governments saw the CSCE as part of European reunification and the Belgrade conferences’ actualization as more important than short-term human rights concerns. Yet the inability to coordinate their positions weakened the effect of the American accusations against the Soviet Union. The following examples illustrate the disparities present in European discussions on Soviet human rights violations and the Helsinki movement.

Among the West European politicians concerned about the future of détente was member of the West German Bundestag, Peter Corterier. He explained that 60,000 East Germans had legally emigrated in the two years since Helsinki and that precautions should be taken to keep this going. However, this issue held no consensus among West German politicians, in July 1977, Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, stated that Americans and Europeans’ view on human rights were parallel. This suggested that the West would present a united front at Belgrade, a serious concern to the Soviet position in international debates. Nonetheless, other voices and acts contradicted the idea of consensus among Western states.

Paris hosted several emigres and thus saw many independent voices focusing on Helsinki monitoring, yet the French government was careful not to create enemies in the East. In June 1977, General Secretary Brezhnev visited Paris to meet with President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing about détente, trade and disarmament. In an interview with Le Monde, Brezhnev had indicated his intent to rally support for the “restraint on the rights issue” at Belgrade and keep the focus on the aforementioned issues. Brezhnev’s arrival was met by a ceremony of a gun salute and an escort of French fighter jets from the Normandie-Niemen Regiment which had fought alongside the Red Army in World War II. This extravagant show of shared history and allegiance was not well-received by a number of observers and lead to violent

444 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 144; Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent, 344.
445 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 64.
446 Internal report. 21 November 1977. HU OSA 300-85-12:208/3; Права человека / Human Rights, 1977 – 1977; Subject Files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
448 Ibid.
demonstrations. Despite the French authorities’ ban on all demonstrations during Brezhnev’s visit, about 500 demonstrators tried to march on the Champs-Elysees, but were met by riot police with tear gas. In turn the demonstrators threw rocks and “Molotov-cocktails” at the police. The march was meant to be peaceful, like the dissidents’ demonstrations in Moscow, initiated by the Committee of Coordination of Support for the Struggles of the Peoples of Eastern Europe and the USSR. The Committee members included a number of Soviet exiles, like Maksimov, Sinyávskij, Litvínov and Fainberg. At its formation in 1974, the group had received a message of support from Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as well as documents to back up the group’s claims.

In northern Europe, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee was part of the first Western Helsinki Groups and one of the NGOs appealing for increased focus on human rights violations in the upcoming conference. The Norwegian Helsinki Committee was founded on August 16th, 1977. The membership consisted of members from varied political backgrounds: in a statement from October 1978, they claim that among the 50 council members, they represented six of the largest Norwegian political parties. While they were, and still are independent, they received in their founding years substantial financial grants from the Norwegian government. This financial support suggests the Norwegian government’s willingness to be associated with the international Helsinki movement. While the Committee’s focus was supporting Eastern European human rights activists, they also accepted complaints of human rights violations from Norwegian citizens. Thus adhering to the Final Act’s encouragement for domestic and international monitoring, and the model

449 “Brezhnev” [internal report]. 18 June 1977. HU OSA 300-85-12:146/26; Международная деятельность и организации: комитеты на западе: Committee of coordination of support for the struggles of the people of Eastern Europe and the USSR 1974 – 1977 / International Activity and Organizations; Subject files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.

450 Ibid., “Soviet exile group formed to aid ‘persecuted’” 11 August 1974. HU OSA 300-85-12:146/26; Международная деятельность и организации: комитеты на западе: Committee of coordination of support for the struggles of the people of Eastern Europe and the USSR 1974 – 1977 / International Activity and Organizations; Subject files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.

451 Ibid.

452 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 142.

453 “The Norwegian Helsinki Committee”. October 1978. RA/PA-1350/A/L0001/0001; Historisk materiale m/innskal av vedtekter, rådsmøter og styremøter [hereafter abbreviated to Historisk materiale]; Vedtekter, rådsmøter, styremøter, historiske documenter; Styrende organer; Den Norske Helsingforskomité [hereafter abbreviated as DNH]; RA.

454 Ibid., “Søknad om økonomisk støtte til Den Norske Helsingforskomité’s virksomhet for 1979” to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13 July 1978. RA/PA-1350/A/L0001/0001; Historisk materiale; Vedtekter, rådsmøter, styremøter, historiske documenter; Styrende organer; DNH; RA

455 “The Norwegian Helsinki Committee”. October 1978. RA/PA-1350/A/L0001/0001; Historisk materiale; Vedtekter, rådsmøter, styremøter, historiske documenter; Styrende organer; DNH; RA.
Examples of the activities of the Committee was initiated by the Moscow Helsinki Group. Examples of the activities of the Committee was outlined in a letter to their associate members: In June 1978, the Committee described their current activity concerning Orlov’s arrest which included a telegram to the Soviet government, a formal question to the Norwegian Parliament and a meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the organization of Orlov’s lawyer’s press conference in Oslo, and a mailing campaign that had resulted in 4000 signatures.

The Committee issued a petition days before the preparatory meetings took place in Belgrade. As an ‘official’ Helsinki group, they were not bound by the same kind of careful diplomatic language as many politicians:

It is with quiet optimism we look toward the follow-up negotiations which will open in a few days in Belgrade. […] Unfortunately, we have witnessed a number of Eastern European governments arresting and persecuting individuals who have interpreted the Helsinki agreement as it was meant: a document that their own countries were bound too as well.

The Committee seemingly expected to be disappointed at the states’ unwillingness to confront the Eastern European governments in questions and challenged their commitment to the Final Act. Their appeal also refers to the on-going discussion about reviewing implementation at Belgrade.

When accords are not observed, all signatory powers have the right and duty to speak up – no matter where the violations are occurring […] The Belgrade Conference can become a test of the intentions and seriousness of the statesmen who committed their nations to the Helsinki Accords. The position adopted by the West at this occasion can become decisive for the people of Europe in the future.

Their mention of “no matter where the violations are occurring” invokes their perception that due to international politics, the USSR were let off easier than many other countries violating international laws and norms, echoing Orlov’s concern for the “‘Munich’ approach of the west”.

The Committee moved beyond the non-state platform by referring to support granted by European political organs and politicians:

When the Helsinki Final Act and its follow-up meetings were discussed at the Council of Europe, avoiding confrontation between East and West was agreed, but that this should not prevent emphasizing defense of human rights. Prime Minister

457 “Kjære Støttemedlem!” by The Norwegian Helsinki Committee.19 June 1978. RA/PA-1350/A/L0001/0001; Historisk materiale; Vedtekt, rådsmøter, styremøter, historiske documenter; Styrende organer; DNH; RA.
458 «Opprop» by Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 3 June 1977, RA/PA-1350/A/L0001/0001; Historisk materiale; Vedtekt, rådsmøter, styremøter, historiske documenter; Styrende organer; DNH; RA. [Translated from Norwegian by the author]
459 Ibid. [Translated from Norwegian by the author]
460 Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 194.
Odvar Nordli stressed that securing human rights is today at the very core of appeasement.\textsuperscript{461}

The Norwegian Committee was seemingly correct in their emphasis on support from their government. Leif Mevik, Norwegian diplomat and ambassador to the follow up meeting in 1980, claimed that Norway was one of the initiators at the follow-up meetings. At Belgrade, Norway, along with the other NATO and EU members, presented a proposition concerning the rights of institutions, organizations, and individuals assisting governments in implementing the Final Act. This was, according to Mevik, rejected in the early stages by the Eastern European participants.\textsuperscript{462}

Not even the British royal family, traditionally non-partisan and apolitical, managed to stay outside the ongoing debates. The Duke of Edinburg, Prince Philip’s radio broadcast in October 1977 consisted of an unusually political speech. The broadcast occurred only ten days after Foreign Secretary David Owen’s last visit to the USSR, and in the same week as the Palace invited Romanian General Secretary Nicolae Ceaușescu to visit the Queen. The speech warned the British people about how number of countries “whose restrictive way of life even forcibly prevented their citizens from leaving” was growing. Prince Philip kept the speech somewhat vague until he invoked Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn by claiming that horrors were often justified by an idea and presented three examples: the Spanish inquisition, revolutionary terrorism, and the gulag archipelago. By explicitly using the title of the book that had granted Solzhenitsyn the Nobel Prize in Literature, he not only made it clear that he was speaking about the Soviet Union, but also inferred the plight of the Soviet dissidents. Prince Philip warned that once governments began "the process of eroding human rights and liberties – always with the very best possible intentions – it is very difficult for individuals or for individual groups to stand against it."\textsuperscript{463} However, Prince Philip was not acting against the Government’s interests, as in July the very same year, Radio Liberty reported that Foreign Secretary David Owen had similar sentiments toward the Soviet Ambassador. He had told Nikoláj Lun'kov, Soviet ambassador to the United Kingdom, that free movement of people and ideas were essential for peace and stability.\textsuperscript{464}

\textsuperscript{461} "Opprop" by Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 3 June 1977, RA/PA-1350/A/L0001/0001; Historisk materiale; Vedtekter, rådsmøter, styremøter, historiske documenter; Styrende organer; DNH; RA. [Translated from Norwegian by the author]

\textsuperscript{462} Leif Mevik, Sikkerhet I Samarbeid: Hovedlinjer I Norsk KSSE-Politikk (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992), 49.

\textsuperscript{463} “A royal word on personal freedoms” 28 August 1977. HU OSA 300-85-12:208/3; Права человека / Human Rights, 1977 – 1977; Subject Files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.

\textsuperscript{464} Internal report. 22 July 1977. HU OSA 300-85-12:208/3; Права человека / Human Rights, 1977 – 1977; Subject Files; Samizdat Archive; RFE/RL RI; HU OSA.
The Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting

The preparatory meeting to the Belgrade Follow-up meeting began on June 15th, 1977. The main purpose was to decide the date, duration and agenda of the follow-up meeting, yet this seemingly straight-forward matter was complicated by the knowledge that these choices would act as a model for future follow-up meetings. Thus, states were determined to make the agenda favour their emphasis. The Western signatories wanted sufficient time to review implementation, while the Warsaw Pact states wanted to steer the meeting to focus on the future; new agreements and less review time. The follow-up meeting was divided into three phases: first, a review session for implementation of the Final Act. Second, discussions for further development of the Helsinki process; and finally, the drafting of a concluding document.

Civil Contributions

Lyudmila Alekséeva proposes that the Belgrade conference was the “first international meeting on a governmental level in which the Soviet Union was accused of human rights violations.” However, this was not the most remarkable point, the form in which this question was raised was also unprecedented: materials from independent social-action associations (such as the Helsinki groups), containing complaints by Soviet citizens about their government were used. It was a great victory for human rights activists and the first step by Western democratic government toward meeting halfway the forces for liberalization within the Soviet Union.

Among these “forces for liberalization” was Andrei Sakharov, who personally delivered copies of a statement to a dozen Western embassies, calling each beforehand to be met outside and escorted inside. The document urged Western governments to make the Belgrade meeting contingent on the release of Yuri Orlov and other dissidents. He explains that he encountered no difficulties, “although the KGB agents did make a great show of photographing me at three embassies.” Similarly, in a message titled “Open letter to representatives of states participating in the Belgrade Conference”, exiled members of the

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466 Ibid. Korey, *The Promises We Keep*, 77.
468 Alekseeva – page
monitoring groups appealed to international press and government officials. Among the signatories were familiar Moscow Helsinki Group members Alekséeva and Valérij Chalidze in New York City, Andréj Amálrik in Washington D.C., and Vladimir Bukóvskij in London. In addition, signatures from the representative of the Ukrainian Group, Leonid Plyuschc in Paris, and the representative of the Lithuanian Group, Tomas Venclova in Los Angeles. These geographically dispersed addresses were most likely meant to show any reader how widespread the movement was, but also remind them that members had been forced to leave their home country for a safer, democratic country. The letter purposely applied the Helsinki language to the repression:

The fact that a third of the Groups’ membership have suffered repressions speaks for itself and demonstrates the authorities’ intention to stop the gathering and dissemination of information on violations of the Final Act’s provisions in the Soviet Union. This behaviour by the authorities in itself constitutes a gross violation of the Helsinki Final Act and undermines those principles on which the Final Act is founded and, in particular, the Final Act’s affirmation of ‘the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties … in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.472

Like Sakharov, the release of Orlov and other members of monitoring groups were one of the main issues, as well as the need for further representatives abroad:

we believe that the repressions directed against Group members should be discussed at the Belgrade Conference. The release of the arrested members should be sought as a matter of urgency. We also urge the creation of a representative and competent international commission to verify the information forwarded by the Helsinki Watch Groups and to investigate the alleged violations of the Final Act.473

A Conference of Revision

The follow-up meeting lasted from October 4th, 1977, until March 9th, 1978. While the Conference was separated into phases, it did not set strict partitions between these phases which stretched the meeting into 1978.474

One of the major goals of the American policy at Belgrade was to have the conference record aired publicly. Arthur Goldberg, Ambassador to the American delegation at Belgrade, planned this to be achieved by debriefing journalists, even on closed meetings. This would, as
usual, be broadcast to dissidents in Eastern Europe by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. However, at Goldberg’s first meeting with the press a few days into the Conference, he was careful not to mention any names or specifics. Once again, the American position on human rights was questioned and it seemed détente was prioritized over human rights. In an interim report to President Carter, Goldberg states that

the most important and difficult precedent to establish has been that set forth in the President’s instructions to me to vigorously pursue a full review of implementation of all provisions of the Final Act, including particularly those provisions concerning humanitarian contacts and human rights.

He continues to explain his method of easing into the practice of ‘naming and shaming’ by starting off with “general references to broad problem areas”, then to proceed to discuss specific violations without naming the countries, until finally citing names of individuals in the specific countries where these abuses occurred. Raising these issues caused a lot of resistance from the Soviet Union and their allies, but “the procedure has the full endorsement of the NATO delegations”. Goldberg includes in the report that he specifically mentioned “Helsinki monitors Shcharansky, Ginzburg, and Orlov”. The rest of the conference saw many individual cases of violations being named by Western countries, to which Eastern states retaliated by accusing them of interference in internal affairs, as well as their own cases of human rights violations.

At the end of the Conference, it was decided that a second follow-up meeting would be held in Madrid in November 1980. The concluding document of Belgrade was almost as diffuse as the Final Act, but significantly shorter. Like in the original CSCE, the provisions had to be reached by consensus, and again this complicated the processing time as well as the language. The more specific the language was, the more likely it was that a state could reject it. Thus, the importance of the Belgrade meeting cannot be deduced from any provisions or treaties reached in the five-month period, but instead by its transformation of the CSCE into a process of reviewing violations by listening to non-state actors. It formalized the network of monitoring groups on both sides of the Cold War divide and strengthened their cooperation. While the repression of dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was far from over,

475 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 78.
476 Ibid., 80-81.
478 Ibid.
479 Ibid.
480 Bloed, From Helsinki to Vienna, 13.
their goal of being heard in an international forum had been achieved at the Belgrade Conference.481

**Conclusion: A transnational process**

The Helsinki network’s spread to Western Europe was one of the initial goals of the Moscow Helsinki Group, and considered vital to any real change. Western sympathy and allegiance had been the purpose of years of letter-writing and document smuggling in Eastern European dissident scenes. As many dissidents either emigrated or were exiled to the West, like Solzhenitsyn, Alekseeva, Bukovskij, Amalrik, and so on, the movement naturally took on a more international shape. Émigré dissidents were able to gain contacts in the West more easily and explain to any interested parties the history and nature of the movement.

The Western groups were fundamentally different from their Eastern counterparts on account of their legality and cooperation with their governments. The Norwegian Helsinki Group’s governmental funding and the establishment of the US Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe are examples of this. Lobbying by domestic groups and media coverage was important to Western states’ position at Belgrade. While détente and mutual arms limitation continued to dominate international discussions and official positions, these, along with trade and technological support, became increasingly contingent on the implementation of international standards for human rights. The use of symbolic persons like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov was also adopted by groups and individuals in the West. Historian Peter Slezkine summarizes this process accordingly,

> By the end of the 1970s, human rights had burst onto the international scene. They had been embraced by a US government and public desperate to shake off the legacy of Watergate and Vietnam and to reimagine America’s mission abroad; they had been taken up by Soviet and Eastern European dissidents eager to bring foreign attention to their cause; and in the CSCE, they had escaped the confines of the UN and emerged as a legitimate issue in East-West relations.482

The United States, a Cold War superpower and major diplomatic player, had taken somewhat of a backseat role at Helsinki and was determined to demonstrate the new administration’s human rights position by taking a leadership role at Belgrade. An influential ‘leader’ alongside the new strategy of accepting and evaluating reports by non-state groups and actors made the Belgrade Conference a powerful symbol of human rights in international diplomacy.

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482 Slezkine, "From Helsinki to Human Rights Watch,” 348.
The 1975 Conference in Helsinki produced a text which would be used in unprecedented manners. The Belgrade conference also produced a text, but of little importance. Instead Belgrade showed to the world that signing a document to show good intentions would not satisfy its citizens. Daniel C. Thomas proposes that noncompliance is sometimes explained by an issue’s lack of salience in world politics. “This salience is determined by prevailing interests or commitment of states, by the presence or absence of contradictory norms, and by the framing or agenda-setting efforts of non-state actors.” The Helsinki network managed to raise human rights’ salience to the point where it became the major theme of CSCE and the Belgrade Conference. Helsinki would continue as a process in which states would constantly have to prove their commitment to human rights to both foreign states and domestic observers.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this thesis a point has been made to prove that the movement following the Helsinki Final Act was connected and dependent on the movement prior to 1975. Historian Samuel Moyn describes the early human rights dissidence as “the first self-styled ‘human rights movement’.” This statement, however sweeping, is illustrative as it was truly ‘self-styled’ in its use of samizdat, domestic and international legality, and person-centred method. The movement’s principle strategy to increase their influence on current human rights practices was to increase their own visibility and salience in the West. By gaining audiences and allies in the West, the Soviet human rights movement made their agenda impossible for the government to ignore. The Soviet Union wished to improve their diplomatic relations with the same states that were condemning their human rights practices.

The primary research question for this thesis asked how the movement affected and adapted to the developments in international human rights politics. The first part of this chapter will address how the movement adapted through the use of a fluid framework that was fitted to the Helsinki principles. This framework allowed for a wider recognition and membership due to the universality of the human rights rhetoric. Consequently, the second part of this chapter illustrates how the Helsinki framework facilitated the expansion of these principles into a transnational advocacy network that. This network, which consisted of Helsinki monitoring groups and other activist organizations, bridged the divide between the East and West. This transnational activism culminated in the efforts focused on the follow up of the Helsinki meeting in 1977. The final point of this chapter contends that the transnational activism made Helsinki into a process that allowed for the consideration of both governmental and citizen accounts.

The Helsinki strategy

The ‘thaw’ that followed Stalin’s death led to increased freedom and new discussions of literature and arts, but also criticizing the regime and particularly the claim of socialist legality. However, these new freedoms had limits, as Andréj Sinyávskij and Yúli Daniel’s arrest testified. Their trial brought back memories of Stalin’s show trials and saw public protests and demonstrations. Among the critics were Aleksándr Esenin-Vól’pin, who took it

484 Ibid., 139.
upon himself to educate fellow “otherwise-thinkers” in Soviet constitutional inconsistencies. This led to what is often referred to as the birth of the soviet human rights movement: the December 5th demonstration in 1965. This legalistic approach to protest remained until the Belgrade Conference. What Keck and Sikkink call *accountability politics*, holding governments accountable to their public commitments was purposely changed from the Soviet Constitution to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. This new frame allowed for better foreign understanding as well as commitment from the other signature states. While not legally binding, unlike the Constitution, the Helsinki provisions were ultimately linked together and dependent on equal fulfilment. Therefore, if any state wanted to partake in East-West trade, they would have to ensure that the humanitarian articles were being followed as well.

In the introduction the discussion on the separation between the dissidents’ understanding of human rights versus the Western understanding was mentioned. The focus on human rights came from a need for protection from the systemic suppression of freedom and security. Nevertheless, dissidents frequently used Western notions of human rights in their language, such as Article 19 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This paper proposes that the movement maintained their traditions, i.e. the legalistic approach, while simultaneously applying the Western concepts that made the most sense to their cause. Therefore, the Soviet human rights dissidents did not adopt western notions of rights, nor did a ‘curious grapevine’ make its way into the Soviet society.

When Yuri Orlov proposed to his fellow dissidents that they should promote the Final Act’s humanitarian articles, he was met by both support and scepticism. Not everyone saw this method as helpful to their cause, but rather opposite. Granted, the scepticism was directed more at assisting the government to fulfil international obligations, rather than the actual articles, but it does suggest that there was some hesitancy to accepting international standards of rights. Some, like Mál’va Lánda, would later join the Moscow Group despite initial concerns. The legalistic tradition continued to define the movement into the Helsinki period and was emphasised by the other national Helsinki monitors as well. For example, the Ukrainian Group was especially focused on their secession from the USSR and their own constitution.

If there was a ‘Helsinki effect’ then its outcome was on diplomatic relations. Helsinki acted as a catalyst to including human rights standards in international cooperation. Peace in terms of the absence of active war (this was the Cold War after all) was no longer enough to ensure trade and friendship. As for civil advocacy, a Helsinki effect is misleading as they made a conscious choice to use it as an alternative frame. This new frame not only increased
international publicity but moved the movement into the “sphere of concrete international politics”.

The new human rights frame and transnational relations

Using the Helsinki frame was most visibly felt in the establishment of foreign alliances. Visible because of the characteristic name and structure of the groups in other Soviet republics, but also because of the universal rhetoric. The humanitarian articles mentioned freedom of movement and religion, rights of minorities, justice, and sovereignty which allowed for much wider membership. Individuals and movements for religious freedom, Jewish emigration, family reunification, Crimean Tatars, and national independence all found confirmation in the Final Act and the Helsinki Monitoring model. Yet the kind of moral universalism seen in the Helsinki period was present prior to this as well: the 1968 demonstration against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia saw the use of the slogan “for your freedom and ours”. This expression, originally used by Polish insurgents in the nineteenth century, invoked the idea of common freedom: their freedom would not be complete if it was not universal.

The transnational exchanges of samizdat established and maintained relationships between dissidents of different countries and ideologies. This reciprocal familiarity created allegiance and trust, thus facilitating cooperation. This was vital to any network dependent on the spread of information and testimonies. While Eastern European dissident movements like KOR and Charta 77, went beyond Helsinki as a focus, their endorsement allowed for allegiance and cooperation with the Helsinki network. Nonetheless, the various dissident organizations were often grouped together and represented opposition to the current human rights practice in the Eastern bloc.

The network’s growth in Eastern Europe did not stop at the “Iron Curtain”. Some activists made their own Helsinki monitoring groups, like in Norway, but even where this did not happen, other organizations would pressure their governments to implement Helsinki. Soviet and Eastern European émigrés were important to the internal pressure as they worked to publicize human rights violations or created new advocacy groups. National and religious groups lobbied for their government to take notice and commit to all articles of the Final Act.

485 Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 189.
486 Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, 81-83.
Détente and arms limitation were no longer separate from respect for human rights in international diplomacy.

**Helsinki as a process**

The Belgrade Conference represented the formalisation of the ‘Helsinki process’ through the effort of activists on either sides of the Cold War divide. At the follow-up meetings, small concessions were measured against general implementation. Reports and appeals by activists finally had a platform to be received and considered by national delegations. The use of NGO documents at Belgrade acted as a validation of the ‘boomerang pattern’ which had been used by the movement since its early days. Using monitors’ reports to back their condemnation of Eastern practices marked “the beginning of productive collaboration between NGOs and CSCE delegations”.

This process set the Final Act apart from other international declarations of human rights. International agreements have been used to set standards and condemn violations, like the Universal Declaration. But their importance has come from supranational organizations, rather than citizen advocacy. Citizens, as both victims and accusers, represent a serious threat to any violators, if they are allowed to speak and be heard. Helsinki went beyond diplomatic considerations, as other human rights declarations have been accused of. Détente and arms limitation continued to be important at Belgrade but had to give way to human rights concerns. Helsinki would symbolize long-term implementation and citizen agency, used by Eastern and Western NGOs for years after the original Conference in 1975.

**Concluding remarks**

In 1982, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) was founded by Helsinki committees from Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, France, Canada and the United States. Of these groups, most of them had been established fairly recent. The US Helsinki Watch was established in 1978 and would grow into the Human Rights Watch, one of the most influential human rights NGOs today.

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Also in 1982, the Moscow Helsinki Group was forced to disband. Of its members still at liberty, the daily harassment and threats outweighed the value of remaining functional. However, as a testament to the never-ending bravery of human rights activists, it was restarted and exists today in Russia. The Moscow Helsinki Group did not end violations to human rights so what did the movement achieve? Perhaps the most important accomplishment was the exhibition of individual agency inside a totalitarian state. The movement withstood government suppression for years and disproved the idea of Eastern European silent sufferers. They also discredited the idea of socialist legality, proving that citizens would not allow misuse of courts. The use and politicization of the word *glasnost* by the movement would later define Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform in the final days of the Soviet Union. And last but not least, they managed to gain international credibility. The transnational network gave the movement a place in human rights history beyond the dissident circles in Eastern Europe.
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Appendix A

Biographical Index of Dissidents

This very short collection of biographies only includes people mentioned in the thesis. It is not meant as a complete guide, but to quickly introduce and situate their names, occupations, arrests and selected works. There is information of varying importance that has undoubtedly been left out. I have purposely left out mentions of in-camp or prison hunger strikes, smaller samizdat contributions, signatories and smaller demonstrations or protests. This is done to keep the biography focused and accurate. I have also left out mentions of their religion, family, and so on, unless it is important to the narrative. Some of the entries are much longer than others, this is simply because of separate events, not as an indication of their importance to the movement.

Alekséeva, Lyudmila Mixájlovna


Amálrik, Andréj Alekséevich


Bogoráz, Larísa Iósífovna

490 Ibid., 16-17.
Born 1929. Moscow, philologist. Divorced from Yuli Daniel, later married Anatolij Márchenko. Arrested August 1968 for Red Square demonstration protesting the invasion of Czechoslovakia, sentenced to four years exile. Returned to Moscow in December 1971.\textsuperscript{491}

**Bonner, Eléna Geórgievna**

Born 1923. Moscow/Gorky, pediatrician. founding member of Moscow Helsinki Group. Married to Sakharov (accepted Nobel Peace Prize on his behalf).\textsuperscript{492} Arrested and sentenced to five years exile in Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod) in 1984. Returned to Moscow in 1986 after invitation by Mikhail Gorbachov.\textsuperscript{493}

**Bukóvskij, Vladímir Konstántínovich**


**Chalídze, Valérij Nikoláevich**


**Daniel, Yúli Márkovich** (pseudonym: NikolajArzak)

\textsuperscript{491} Ibid., 57-58.
\textsuperscript{492} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{494} Boer, Verhaar, and Driessen, *Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents*, 73-75.
\textsuperscript{495} Ibid., 80-82.

Dobrovol’skij, Aleksej Aleksandrovich


Fáinberg, Viktor Isaákovich


Galanskóv, Yúri Timoféevich


Ginzburg, Aleksandr Iľich

to be known as *Trial of the Four*, sentenced to five years strict-regime camp. Released in January 1972. Became chief manager of Russian Fund for Aid to Persecuted Persons and their Families, founded by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in 1974. Member of *Moscow Helsinki Group*. Arrested in February 1977 and sentenced to eight years labour camp. In April 1979, Ginzburg was stripped of his Soviet citizenship and exchanged to the US for two suspected Soviet spies.\(^{502}\)

**Gorbanévkaya, Natál'ya Evgén'evna**


**Grigorénko, Pyotr Grigór'evich**


**Kovalyov, Sergéj Adámovich**

Born 1930. Moscow, biologist. Member of *Initiative Group* and *Soviet Amnesty International Chapter*. Arrested in 1974, tried in Lithuania in December 1975. Sentenced to seven years strict-regime camp and three years exile.\(^{505}\)

**Krásin, Víktor Aleksándrovich**


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\(^{504}\) Ibid., 179-80.

\(^{505}\) Ibid., 282-83.

Lánda, Mál'va Nőevna

Born 1918. Moscow, geologist. Member of Moscow Helsinki Group.507

Lashkóva, Véra Iósífovna

Born 1944. Moscow, laboratory assistant. Arrested in 1967, tried with Galanskov, Ginzburg and Dobrovol’skij in Trial of the Four. Charged with typing samizdat material, sentenced to one year deprivation of freedom.508

Litvínov, Pável Mixájlovich


Maksimov, Vladimír Emel'yanovich (born Lev Alekseevich Samsonov)

Born 1932. Moscow, writer. Author of Seven Days of Creation (1971), first published in samizdat, later sent to the West. Left Soviet Union in March 1974.510

Márchenko, Anatólij Tíxonovich

Born 1938. Moscow, various jobs. Arrested in 1958 for hooliganism, escaped camp, arrested again and sentenced to three years prison. Wrote My Testimony, a samizdat memoir about camp experiences. Arrested in 1968 and sentenced to strict-regime camp, extended while in camp. Placed under police surveillance, charged with breaking rules of surveillance,

506 Ibid., 287-88.
507 Ibid., 308-09.
510 Ibid., 340-41.
sentenced to four years exile.\textsuperscript{511} Joined the Moscow Helsinki Group in absentia, having learned about the group from his wife Larisa Bogoráž.\textsuperscript{512}

**Orlov, Yuri Fyodorovich**


**Plyusche, Leoníd Ivánovich**

Born 1939. Kiev, mathematician. Member of Initiative Group and Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Arrested in January 1972, declared insane and submitted to almost three years chemical treatment. Released in 1975 and emigrated to France. Continued advocating human rights and particularly the misuse of psychiatric treatment.\textsuperscript{514}

**Rudénko, Mikóla Danílovich**


**Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievic**


**Anatólij Borisovich Shcharansky** (aka. Natan Sharansky)


\textsuperscript{511} Ibid., 347-48.
\textsuperscript{512} Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 190.
\textsuperscript{513} Ibid., 231.
\textsuperscript{515} Boer, Verhaar, and Driessen, Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents, 491-96.
Sinyávskij, Andréj Donátovich (pseudonym: Abram Terc)

Born 1925. Moscow, writer. Arrested in 1965 for publishing abroad under the pseudonym Abram Terc. Sentenced to seven years strict-regime camp. Released June 1971 after appeals by wife and Yuri Daniel.\textsuperscript{516}

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr Isaevic


Tverdokhlebov, Andréj Nikoláevich

Born 1940. Moscow, physicist. Member of Moscow Human Rights Committee, Soviet Amnesty International chapter. Arrested April 1974, sentenced to five years internal exile.\textsuperscript{518}

Vól'pin, Aleksándr Sergéevich (aka. Aleksándr Sergéevich Esénin-Vól'pin)


Yakir, Petr Ionovich


\textsuperscript{516} Ibid., 523.
\textsuperscript{517} Ibid., 542-45.
\textsuperscript{518} Ibid., 590-91.
\textsuperscript{519} Ibid., 624-26.
\textsuperscript{520} Ibid., 204-06.