Music Analysis in Popular and Western Art Musicologies

Interpretation and Power from Trichotomies of Down Under and Pathétique (IV–Adagio lamentoso)

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Music Analysis in Popular and Western Art Musicologies: Interpretation and Power from Trichotomies of *Down Under* and *Pathétique (IV–Adagio lamentoso)*

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I. Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my excellent thesis supervisor and primary mentor, Tami Gadir. Her razor-sharp, respectful, fun, and always deeply professional approach to student supervision is not to be taken for granted. She has given me crucial advice, inspiration, and expectations to follow. I could not have asked for a better matched friend and mentor, and I simply could not have completed this thesis without her generous support.

Moreover, as my own epistemological position(s) seemingly increased in diffèrence (or, in more French terms, I guess: diffèrance) to Tami’s over the course of this master’s project taking multiple unexpected turns, she served as an important moderating force whenever my thinking approached fanatic postmodernism. This has been crucial to me and my thesis in the development of a method of communicative reach towards the Reader (this thesis did, for a long time, run the risk of deliberately taking on the form of hostile neo-Derridean “gibbly-gobbly,” as it were). Thank you, Tami, for your scepticism in tandem with 100% support.

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I thank my parents—mamma and pappa—for taking such great care of me throughout my childhood, my teenage years, and my student years. Moreover, their outstanding interest for my musical and academic interests is one of the principal reasons that this thesis now exists. I would also like to thank Sanne for taking such great care of me in the beginning of my adulthood and over the course of writing this thesis. Her experience as a student of so-

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1 The radical but nonnovel placement of my acknowledgements (cf. the very title of the first chapter of *Of Grammatology*: “The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing” [Derrida, 2016: p. 6])—they appear after my table of contents—is authorially intended and performed in the hopes of directing attention towards one of the things which readers of theses arguably-usually skims. In other words, I attempt to stress here that even my acknowledgements can become part of my thesis as text. From my point of view as author, then, this entire thesis is—in some very literal sense (that is, from its cover page to its overview of appendices)—offered towards the reader as text, awaiting interpretation. For an interesting discussion on "the order of discourse," which is one possible genealogical origin point among many of this critique of our institutionalised necessary-problematic methods of reading-writing, see Foucault (1981).
called classical piano performance has furthermore—through symbiotic and interesting discussions—given me insight into some performative aspects of "classical" musicking which have proven crucial to several of the analyses present in this thesis. Thank you, Sanne.

My department, Institutt for musikkvitenskap, has generously let me in on with what must be one of the most diverse research milieux in Norway. Its free access to various kinds of practical knowledge (such as performance, ear training, composition [satslære], and music production)—in tandem with a proper pluralism of different strains of theoretical approaches to understanding music, stretching from hardcore hermeneutics towards more scientific-ish approaches—has been very tough to navigate, but nevertheless rewarding to construe overviews of. I would thus like to especially thank Stan Hawkins, Ashbjørn Eriksen, Hallgjerd Aksnes, Erling E. Guldbrandsen, Catherine A. Bradley, Tejaswinee Kelkar, Eirik Askeroi, and Even Ruud for providing invaluable insight into the diverse field that musicology has become as of today.

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It is largely because of Nicholas Carthy and his generously long involvement as conductor and teacher at the annual youth orchestra seminar Toppenkurset internasjonale sommermusikkskole that I have developed my passion for Tchaikovsky’s sixth symphony. I recall the time I, as a 16-year old electric bassist dabbling exclusively with rock music, was asked by Toppenkurset to participate as “percussionist” in their symphony orchestra as they were rehearsing Pathétique (I was asked because there was a shortage on actual percussion students, and because I for some reason was able to read music at the time—striking the bass drum with a mallet in horribly uninformed ways does not require further specialisation).

It was mostly Nick’s extraordinary pedagogical skills and warm character (as well as god-like musical abilities) that compelled me to come back to Toppenkurset for years on a row (until I suddenly realised I was too old), usually entering different performative roles in the
symphony orchestra each year (such as “percussionist,” double bass backbencher, composer—and finally conductor of my own little symphonic piece, supervised by Nick). I was as such afforded basic insight into the very culture of "classical" music performance, indispensable for the very existence of this thesis. I cannot omit giving special thanks to Nick for this. In a similar vein, the organisers of Toppenkurset, Vefsn Unge Strykere, as well as the Wika family, have my infinite gratitude.

Julia Esther Eller and Mons Thyness have both proven crucial in their advisory roles to the practical-technical aspects of actually getting this thesis printed and delivered (of which there does not always even exist straightforward solutions, as I have learned the easy way). They have also been valuable colleagues to me in terms of my part-time student position at Institutt for musikkvitenskap as department engineer. I wish Mons and Julia and all my other fantastic colleagues at the IMV administration good luck in taking care of the department henceforth— and thanks for our very important lunch breaks!

My many friends and hundreds of past/present dorm mates at Blindern studenterhjem have served as my extended family over the last few years. In addition to thanking them for providing a rock-solid foundation on which to socialise (a luxury foreign to many Oslo students), I would like to thank our animal mascot Hans Majestet den Blinde Bukk (presently Jan IV) for serving as my spiritual leader over the course of the writing of this thesis.
II. Introduction

This master’s thesis explores the scope arising between some of the different analytical methods found across popular musicology and western art musicology. As a vehicle in this exercise, the contrasting cases of Men At Work’s Down Under and the final movement of Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony (Pathétique), Adagio lamentoso, are subject to bi- and tripartite analyses articulated on at least two levels, and from a range of different musicological perspectives (ranging from cultural analysis to "old-school" formal analysis).

The current problem of music analysis—how it should be conducted, and what it should tell us—has since the "violent" discursive shifts of 1980’s and -90’s musicology been a matter of often heavy dispute. It is arguably possible to construe these disputes as a struggle of (Foucauldian) discourses raging between formalist/contextualist extremes, resulting in e.g. the formation of the so-called new musicology movement. As a chaotic plurality of approaches to music analysis subsequently emerged, then, a further disordering of discourse became apparent, seemingly serving as a fracturing and rethinking force of e.g. "old-school" formal analytical aims and ideological underpinnings. Meanwhile, more traditionally inclined mind-sets often stood their ground.

As for today, it is possible to observe not only one, but multiple dominating musicologies and approaches to analysing (or understanding) music, and it might just seem that these operate in near isolation. Besides the more or less recent work of e.g. Nicholas Cook,2 these musicological mind-sets interact in any substantial manner only rarely, or put another way: generally, they do not really cite each other. This is not necessarily "bad," of course, but the question as to whether they have anything to learn from each other in an interdisciplinary sense is nonetheless easily raised—accordingly, this is one of the main questions that I attempt to raise in this thesis.

2 See for instance the bypassing of any ruling notion of a pop-classical split across the anthologies Taking It to the Bridge (Cook & Pettengill, 2013) or The Cambridge Companion to Recorded Music (Cook et al., 2009).
One of the overarching methods employed across this thesis is the construction of di- or trichotomies as a means of producing “new” perspectives from existing texts. To expose the mechanisms of interpretation at work here, you (the Reader) and I (the Author) will look into some of the oppositions which constitute such differing texts and oscillate within these oppositions. Any constructed -chotomies are as such readily subject to so-called "metamodern" deconstructive strategies, shaped according to each unique deconstructive affordance. This oscillatory method hopefully affords the reader multiple useful ways of—in their own personal way—approaching the questions raised in this thesis, if any.

Readers should probably beware, if they have not noticed already, that this thesis sometimes becomes “quite continental” in terms of its philosophical convictions—at the same time, it strives not to be.

**Articulation of a governing research question [problemstilling]**

There is a prevalent expectancy within the current Foucauldian episteme of Norwegian academia that larger student works, such as theses, clearly define a governing research question [problemstilling]. From an international perspective, which is from where I attempt to situate this thesis (I am, after all, writing mostly in the language of English—and most of the works cited are written in English), this practice is strikingly unique.

In short, I argue that the above Norwegian dogma presupposes at least a certain notion of modernism (or essentialism). Any exercise of this dogma would attempt to very clearly define very particular aims and goals. But as it kind of is argued in this thesis, things which might seem very clear are often prone to the concept of the Derridean free play of meaning—they are constantly invaded by unclarity; they are, actually, ambiguity in disguise. It is furthermore hard to think "outside the box" when one is "forced" to adopt an essentialist way of thinking (which defining a problemstilling, then, arguably encourages) by those in power (that is, in this case, the institution of Norwegian academia). A very real social consequence of this may
perhaps be that the dogma of the problemstilling directs students who write theses towards an understanding of their own aims which limits the potential of their scholarly work.

Nevertheless, in my own case here, I must realise that I am writing at a specific time (the age of the problemstilling, as it were) and place (Norway); and that my work will be evaluated by scholars-in-power,\(^3\) of whom at least one is based at my own department. I will, out of the interest of not disturbing my examiners too greatly, then, conform to our current academic expectations. Here we go:

How can popular musicology and western art musicology—as if constructed as opposing discourses—symbiotically inform each other?

One possible overarching aim of this thesis, which in some anti-essential way extends beyond the above problemstilling, is to critique different ways of understanding music so as to inform the humanities more broadly. An example of such broader informing of the humanities—which I centralise willingly—is the development in this thesis of some considerations of the mechanisms of interpretation. Another centralised example might be the critique of the role of power in discursive shifts of the 1990's methodological disputes pertaining to music analysis—which could say something about the mechanisms of power in society in general. We could perhaps go on, but I will spare the Reader (and my Self) for this.

I would like to suggest, then, that my work in this thesis is relevant for more than musicology as a field, and more than music analysis in general. In short, I hope my work can contribute to society in some unpredictable way.

\(^3\) In this case, the idea of evaluation/examination is understood to be a necessary evil of academia. In the certain Foucauldian sense which I construct onwards, the necessary exercise of power pertaining to evaluation/examination is not necessarily "bad," then. Let us just say that things can be both necessary and problematic at the same time.
IIIa. Three epistemological starting points

A marvellous thing about the genre of thesis is that it allows (and perhaps even expects) its authors to thoroughly situate themselves theoretically, as opposed to what often is the case in e.g. scholarly journal articles, scholarly student exams, or scholarly book chapters. In the following section of my master’s thesis, which in a sense is such a theoretical situating of myself as the present author, I reach towards an account of what I am tempted to call the epistemological starting points of my thesis.

From an authorial perspective, the theoretical focal point of this thesis as it relates to epistemology is the oscillation between certain notions of postmodernism and certain notions of modernism (resulting, in this case, in so-called metamodernism). This oscillatory mechanism might further be explained as a deliberate and repeated alternation between [1] what the Reader is encouraged to construe as e.g. “way too inspired by 1960’s and -70's France” and [2] what hopefully could be understood by the Reader as a fanatic belief in the veracity of—let me for now just put it like this (and the Reader may well gasp): enlightenment ideology and its associated beliefs. The epistemological scope which arises between these two extreme positions, and which is articulated by an oscillation between the two, becomes a “third perspective” of sorts, which in its own way bypasses both postmodern aporia and cocksure modernism at the same time. Its sum is greater than its parts [sic]. I will return to this idea in my sub-section Some notions of "metamodernism" later.

As a means of exposing notions of the above oscillatory mechanism, I choose in the present section through two separate instances of writing to construct the postmodern and the modern. Here, as some method, I attempt to articulate the two in each other’s voices, so that they in a symbiotic manner explain each other.

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4 Other possible elements of this extreme modernist pole include notions of essentialism, structuralism, and the firm belief in singular truths. Somewhat of the reverse, then, goes for the postmodernist pole, which includes notions of anti-essentialism, the belief in a plurality of possible truths, and perhaps also holism.
As far as my account of postmodernism is concerned, I choose a modern voice over a postmodern one as it arguably would be rather pointless to ask the Reader to produce construals of what would become a self-reflexive postmodern account of postmodernism. Such exercises in scepticism have previously been conducted *en masse* by postmodern thinkers, and I think that simply repeating these exercises in this day and age usually bears little fruit. However, because such a construction runs the risk of presenting my take on postmodernism as *the* take on postmodernism, I choose—as a counterweight to the possibility of fanatic modernism—to emulate a postmodern voice in my subsequent construction of modernism. The binary opposite hence performed hopefully affords the Reader multiple useful ways of understanding the ideas of modernism/postmodernism, as they in this thesis become so-called “metamodernism.”

Note, then, that the following discussion might at times become extreme in its attempts to convince the reader, polarised in its articulation—as well as self-contradictory on multiple levels. And this is partly the point of this whole deconstructive exercise in the first place.

**A modern construction of postmodernism**

Postmodernism (or postmodernity; or post-structuralism; or “bullshit”⁵ etc.), as the term is understood and used in this thesis, is characterised by intellectually crippling self-reflexive approaches to ontological paradoxes, where uses of humour and irony become important methodological tools. Moreover, postmodernism is commonly known for its anti-*foundational* (or anti-essentialist) tendencies, its suspicious views of virtually any form of authority (including the potential authority of the Self), and its rebellious nature.

Wherever power—commonly understood as the ability of certain people (or institutions) to control the will and actions of other people—is made an issue, the common postmodernist will have a leniency towards critiquing the ones who most obviously hold power at the given

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⁵ Frankfurt (2005) cited in Barker & Jane (2016: p. 6). Frankfurt here calls cultural studies in general "bullshit." I furthermore argue that “cultural studies” borrow their epistemological convictions in large parts from postmodernism, which also is a thorough-faring point across Barker & Jane (2016).
moment, so as to negotiate power mismatches and keep them in constant flux (lest the postmodernist ends up staring at authoritarianism, which the postmodernist will want to avoid at all costs). At the same time, there is often a recognition within the postmodernist that power (and power hierarchies) is a necessary evil of humanity; power becomes as such not necessarily bad, but rather simply a necessity within our various games of human social co-existence. For the postmodernist, power simply becomes a fact of interaction between people.

With clear historical origins in 1960’s and -70’s France, postmodernism is constituted by the various discourses which society generated from commenting on the writings of thinkers such as Foucault, Derrida, or Barthes. These particular thinkers respectively explored—with writing as their primary tool—problems such as [1] the connection between discourse and power (which eventually invites to a curious case of an inconceivable relativism), [2] the ambiguity of language (and therefore the impossibility of the concept of the stability of meaning and therefore any stability of clarity), and [3] the proclamation of the death of the Author and the rise of the Reader (as mediated through a text, written by an author).

In the following construction of postmodernism, I will provide readings of these three points, which will provide clear and stable definitions of the key postmodern ideas which hopefully serve as useful methods across this thesis. I will furthermore take the following two considerations—from Christopher Butler in his Postmodernism: A Very Short Introduction—to be axiomatic onwards:

The danger, but also the point, for many postmodernists, of embedding theoretical and philosophical arguments within a literary rhetoric is that the text is thereby left open to all sorts of interpretations. There is as we shall see a deep irrationalism at the heart of postmodernism – a kind of despair about the Enlightenment-derived public functions of reason – which is not to be found elsewhere in the other developing intellectual disciplines of the late 20th century (for example, in the influence of cognitive science on linguistics, or the use of Darwinian models to explain mental development). Books of a postmodernist persuasion are often advertised by their publishers, not for their challenging hypotheses or arguments, but for their ‘use of theory’, their ‘insights’, their ‘interventions’, their ‘addressing’ (rather than answering) questions.

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[Postmodernism is also often seen as extending backwards to Nietzsche, Kierkegaard; even Plato etc.—perhaps even further in some way. But with my very specific and very modern Authorial narrative here in mind, I will for now settle with the perhaps more common (mis-)conception of postmodernism as “originally” “French.”]

Secondly:

It is the thousands of echoes and adaptations, and unsurprising misunderstandings, of [postmodernist's] obscure writings that have made up the often confused and pretentious collective psyche of the postmodernist constituency.  

What Butler in the above second citation argues is that commentaries on postmodern thinkers can differ wildly. Any reading of these thinkers, he claims, is founded on the activity of individual interpretation. As such, there is no thing as "the postmodern," at least not in a stable sense (which is why I choose to "construct" it here, in this section). Furthermore, and in this vein, I will argue that there can only be useful or less useful interpretations of these postmodern thinkers, where the degree of usefulness must be judged according to each given situation and by each given individual. Following this, it is hard to substantiate the arguably common critique of postmodernism that “anything goes.” In a sense, it is very true here that “anything goes,” but it is still usually necessary to justify why "that which goes" would be useful (if it is desired to be received as useful, that is—we could go in breaking down things in some Derridean way, but by the power vested in the Author, I will stop this game of free play right here).

Onwards, and firstly: my accounts of Foucault and Derrida will rely primarily on a selection of secondary sources—or commentaries on the two thinkers—which for the most part engage with them in hopes of explaining what they are all about (as opposed to in a Butlerian sense addressing questions about them). Secondly, my (limited) account of Barthes will be a close reading of a central text of his, namely The Death of the Author. This close reading will lay this thesis’ foundational perspectives on the symbiotic relationship between the Author and the Reader, culminating very teleologically in my methodological idea of the Reader-Author (which probably is not that novel). My accounts of Foucault, Derrida, and

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Barthes are moreover perhaps rather excessive and unnecessarily detailed in the context of this thesis, especially given the large scholarship which already exist on them. This excessiveness, however, seems necessary, as this "large scholarship" is rather disparate—according to Butler (and also my Self).

**FOUCAULDIANISM**

Who was Michel Foucault, the scholar? It would be a strange activity to securely position Foucault within any academic category or discipline. Some scholars would regard him as a philosopher, while other scholars would regard him mainly as an (innovative) historian. Yet another set of readers, perhaps not too fond of either category, would rather prefer to think of “Foucault’s unsystematic, non-traditional philosophical approach to be a weakness[;] they contend that the critical aspects of his work undermine or even prohibit Foucault from being able to promote positive social change through his philosophy.”

His wildly polarised reception set aside, it is a fact that Foucault mainly produced works which sought to historicise so-called systems of thought—and Foucault’s very own choice for the title of his professoriate at the Collège de France was “Professor of the History of Systems of Thought.” This choice is arguably well reflected in his main works (or books), which served as a rethinking of issues such as Europe’s treatment of the mad from the middle ages until Foucault's day (*Madness and Civilisation*, first published in 1961); the very concept of knowledge and how certain discourses (or epistemes) become accepted over other discourses (*The Order of Things*, 1966, and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 1969); the rise of the modern prison system, and how this cannot *necessarily* be “gentler” than pre-modern methods of punishment (i.e. brutal execution—*Discipline and Punish*, 1975); and finally that which at

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9 The following perspective on Foucauldianism has—in addition to the specific works cited henceforth—been synthesised in some Foucauldian manner and ordered in the wake of loose and sporadic readings of parts of the following works: Sim (2013), Gutting (2005), Taylor (2014), Prado (2000), May (2014), and Danaher et al. (2000).
Foucault’s time usually was considered radically deviant sexuality (History of Sexuality, across three volumes—1976 and 1984, a fourth volume posthumously published recently).

A common interest throughout these Foucauldian works is the historicising of changing conceptions of “truth” over time, and how normalised behaviour in societies accordingly changes over time. In his first book, Madness and Civilisation, for example, Foucault constructs a seemingly relativistic perspective of madness where he points out that society’s very perception of the mad in the middle ages and society’s perception of them in modern times are wholly different: the mad of the middle ages were not considered “ill,” as they usually are (even) today. While Foucault recognises that the mad “frequently […] were handed over to boatmen,”¹² and perhaps were regarded as a nuisance as such, their social reception did not entail (in effect criminal) confinement before the 17th and 18th centuries, and not medical treatment (via the problematic asylum) before the 19th century.

Foucault proposes here that the shift in society's treatment of the mad towards that of "medical treatment" was due to the social exercise of power. This exercise of power was projected onto the (essentially powerless) mad as a form of conformation to society's more or less blind valuation of Reason following the Age of Enlightenment. Or as Gutting & Oksala put it: “Foucault argued that what was presented as an objective, incontrovertible scientific discovery (that madness is mental illness) was in fact the product of eminently questionable social and ethical commitments.”¹³ The tragic and very real effect of this for the mad, then, was a "scientific" othering by those in power within society—in effect an othering by anyone who was not seen as mad—which we for that matter still frequently see today.

Foucault’s method here, which he in later works would term “[the] archaeology [of knowledge]” (later expanded into "[the] genealogy [of knowledge]") is concerned with uncovering discontinuities in history, and by doing so showing how discourses change over time. That is: how differing discourses throughout history point towards radically differing “conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given domain and

¹² Foucault (1965: p. 6).
¹³ Gutting & Oksala (2019).
Moreover, a key characteristic to this method is the disregard for the subject, which has Foucault not use great men as markers of history (as arguably was common in 1960’s historiography), for instance, but rather cultural discontinuities observed empirically through studies of historical primary sources.

Foucault becomes, towards the end of the 1960's, concerned with delineating discursive shifts as they relate to knowledge itself, and it is here that things start to get really tricky for most people. Here, reason itself becomes a discursive marker of modernity (or simply modernism), fully estranged from the previous Classical and Renaissance modes of conceptualising what knowledge means, which in pre-modern times would be guided by more religious ideas.

We could choose to read into Foucault, then, that discontinuity becomes knowledge. We cannot know, it might seem for Foucault, anything but the differences between opposing discourses; difference itself becomes a marker of knowledge. The difference between the past’s treatment of the mad and what later would go on in asylums, for instance, marks such a discursive shift. In other words, there is no stable truth, and no stable way of conceptualising anything.

It might just seem that Foucault's message, as constructed above, is inspired by (or is in intertextual diffrance to) Bob Dylan's The Times They Are A Changin,' and in terms of Norwegian sayings, we could reduce this particular view on Foucault's message as such: "tidene forandrer seg." A possible difference between Foucauldians and this popular Norwegian saying, however, is that Foucault can be read as intellectually crippling in his own self-reflexivity (and as such, in this thesis, a postmodernist). He fundamentally embraces his own paradox—namely, that the truth he presents about power's role in discursive shifts inevitably will become untruth as soon as the discourse he works within shifts. This embracement of paradox can become rather perplexing for most of his readership, especially those inclined to holding onto a strictly modernist mindset.

14 Ibid.
As the very concept of knowledge becomes inextricably tied to the social exercise of power, Foucault lends himself to epistemological hopelessness and rebellious attitudes. His apparent relativism is easily (and often) read as rather useless, which in part might be an explanation as to why analytic philosophers generally do not find his texts too interesting. This is not to say that the current discursive situation in the humanities in general, as well as the social (and medical) sciences, are not heavily influenced by Foucault's writings. They ostensibly are.

DERRIDEANISM

Where Michel Foucault mainly was concerned with histories of thought, Jacques Derrida was concerned mainly with critiquing the mechanisms of language itself and, followingly, the very ambiguity of meaning. This critique famously took the form of a “method” (or more commonly a strategy) of writing known as “deconstruction”—a term which since its first use by Derrida has become notorious for its resistance to any stable definition. Accordingly, many commentators on Derrida (this includes Derrida himself) are cautious in their attempts of affording their readership any such stable definitions or simple answers as to what deconstruction (or Derrideanism generally) is all about. This gives rise to a general hesitance about anything related to Derrideanism. I could perhaps argue that this observable phenomenon is borne out of the individual reader's conviction arising from Derrida’s prose style, which is notorious for its “difficulty” of straightforward meaning extraction.

In the following modern account of Derrida (as opposed to Derrideanism, the title of this section notwithstanding), I will attempt to disregard any of my personal convictions regarding Derrida’s prose style, and I will attempt to provide stable definitions of the terms which are

\[15\] See Lawlor (2018) for an account of how Derrida himself used the term “deconstruction,” and how his terms changed meaning according to each new piece of writing.

\[16\] See for instance the introduction in Glendinning (2011).

\[17\] See, for instance, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences (1970), one of Derrida's early texts, which arguably is “difficult” to read.
central to understanding deconstruction as it is employed as a strategy of writing-reading across this thesis.

According to Jack Reynolds, deconstruction is fundamentally founded on the activity of discovering the "internal problems that actually point towards alternative meanings"\textsuperscript{18} in any given text. The way deconstruction works—according to Reynolds—is by uncovering the binary oppositions which produce hierarchies of valorisation according to the Author's interpretation of themselves. Thus, deconstruction reveals the inevitable "points of equivocation and 'undecidability' that betray any stable meaning that an author might seek to impose upon his or her text."\textsuperscript{19}

What Reynolds means with "undecidability" above is that which "cannot conform to either polarity of a dichotomy,"\textsuperscript{20} or in other words concepts that seem stuck between their dichotomous poles. As an example of this, Reynolds points towards the concept of the ghost, whose presence is kind of "there" and "not there," all at the same time. The ghost is "neither present or absent, or alternatively, it is both present and absent [sic] at the same time."\textsuperscript{21}

Central to the idea of deconstruction becomes often the paradox of différence (translated and verbalised in this thesis into the English equivalent diffèr), which in onwards is understood as the undecidability of the difference between difference and defer. A hopefully clear explanation of how this becomes an undecidable: as we open any dictionary, we see that any definition of any word inevitably will point towards other words. In this sense, defining things becomes the continual and perpetual activity of uncovering the difference between words. At the same time, defining things becomes the perpetual activity of deferral, postponing stable definition by simply pointing to other words. Hence, there can be no stability of definition. We see that sameness and difference mesh. This can become a crippling and disturbing paradox, which perpetually mocks my present attempt at defining

\textsuperscript{18} Reynolds (n.d.).
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
deconstruction (or anything at all in this thesis)—which as the reader can see is done through writing.

According to Norris (and apparently Derrida), then:

Writing is the endless displacement of meaning which both governs language and places it for ever beyond the reach of a stable, self-authenticating knowledge.22

But if writing is hopeless, can we not simply resort to speech? Would not speech be better than writing, as this surely would guarantee the presence of meaning—the metaphysics of presence? "Of course not," says the early Derrida. Speech is dependent upon writing (and the other way around), he claims. While "thinkers as different as Plato, Rousseau, Saussure, and Levi-Strauss, all [have] denigrated the written word and valorised speech, by contrast, as some type of pure conduit of meaning,"23 Derrida simply reverses the hierarchy of this speech/writing dichotomy. Following Reynolds, he does this by specifically engaging with de Saussure's claim that writing is "derivative [of speech] and merely refers to other signs"24 by stating that derivation and deferral must be "equally true of speech."25 The sign as sound—in difference to its signified—is as arbitrary as the sign as written, in différence to its signified. There will thus always be a "slippage of meaning occurring"26 in any human communication.

We see above deconstruction in practice. It is often a reversal of the oppositions identified within the given text—a reversal of the text's established hierarchies—so that new meaning arises from that given text. And as one succeeds in doing that, one simultaneously reverses also the very possibility of the given hierarchy (often with the potential result that nothing makes sense anymore anyway). Deconstruction must be adapted to each given text, however, and therefore always changes its nature according to that which it seeks to deconstruct.

23 Reynolds, Jack (n.d.)
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Sim (2013: p. 83).
We can see this occurring in Derrida's breakdown of fiction/non-fiction writing: "Once one has distinguished, as does the entire philosophical tradition, between truth and reality, it goes without saying that truth 'declares itself in a structure of fiction.'"27 As we write, Derrida claims here, we will at least indirectly rely on literary techniques common to non-fiction. Even the distinction between fiction [skjønnlitteratur] and non-fiction [sakprosa], then, becomes broken down at Derrida's hand. Following deconstruction, any opposition we can conceive of—that is, any dichotomy ever—will potentially be subject to mutual invasion by its constituent poles. Following Derrida, there can be no stability to constructed hierarchies of value.

It follows from the concept of deconstruction that meaning does not stick across time, much in the same way that systems of thought (or ways of conceptualising knowledge) does not stick across time for Foucault. According to Derrida, if meaning from an utterance were a cake, and if it for some reason were to be thrown at a wall, it would [1] become deformed as it hit the wall and [2] eventually lose its form further as it eventually simply slid down the wall.

We see in my cake here an example of Derrida's impossibility of a metaphysics of presence, both synchronically and diachronically (that is, for instance: as the given message is received by the Reader, and as the given message is read by others across time).

For Derrida, then, (any) language becomes all "gibbly-gobbly," and this extends towards his epistemological convictions, as for Derrida, there is nothing but language ("there is nothing outside the text"). As such, what is truth and not becomes gabbly-gashnably; everything and anything becomes shnabbra-goblagibaloi in endless deferral.28 Like my above account of diffèrance, this idea can also become deeply disturbing if one is sufficiently convinced of it, as perhaps evidenced by (academic) society's extremely polarised views of Derrida's ideas (and prose style). Understandably, if this prose style is to be understood, Derrida claims that the Reader must invent upon it (or that is: interpret it):

27 Butler (2016: loc. 1939–1940)
28 At least one possible convincing everyday-example of this is the easily observable fact that wildly differing languages simply exist (in the sense of i.e. Chinese versus i.e. Icelandic), are used by people, and that these languages carry different meanings according to each (Chinese/Icelandic) Reader.
The "danger," or pragmatic pitfall of Derrida—and the intense criticism/praise he has received—can perhaps be explained in terms of his perpetual sceptical self-reflexiveness. His writing style took care to not contain any obvious oppositions, or dichotomies, lest they be deconstructed. The immediate effect of this is that it becomes impossible to extract from Derrida's writings any obvious meaning content; each instance of reading Derrida has the potential of producing vastly differing interpretations (according to each reader). As if this sceptical self-reflexiveness is a central feature of the methods of his writing (and as such his thinking), he becomes simply a hopeless case for the modern Reader, who usually will expect (or demand) that a single, correct meaning exists. Derrida becomes in this sense a severe threat to the Foucauldian modernist episteme (or modern discourse in general), which can be seen as (still) dominant in certain prominent corners of today's western society and culture.

**DID BARTHES REALLY KILL THE AUTHOR?**

One might construe in Barthes’ *The Death of the Author* a grave sense of irony. At the same time as Barthes proclaims that the Author is dead, he takes on the role of Author. As he claims that "we know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the Author-God)" he destroys his own proclamation that the Author is dead, and it would perhaps be unimaginable to assume that Barthes' did not realise this himself. That would be ridiculous... right? What, then, is Barthes' point with this text? Is there a point to *Barthes'* text at all?

We might surmise that Barthes' concern starts with raising the question as to how texts should be interpreted. Being dissatisfied with how textual interpretation as an activity

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29 Derrida cited in Reynolds (n.d.).
commonly was performed at his time, he constructs a heavy critique of the contemporary cultural convention he lives in, which is
tyrannically centred on the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for the most part in saying that Baudelaire's work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh's his madness, Tchaikovsky's his vice.  

Firstly, Barthes negotiates here against the idea that the Author (or as we have seen: the Author-God, in his terms) holds the key to the single, correct interpretation of their own texts, and that the Reader's destiny is to uncover this correct interpretation. Secondly, Barthes negotiates against the idea that the Author's biography—that their fame and misfortunes, for instance—is the most important facet of understanding what they produce. The Author's biography should be detached from reading the text, or at least not be the focal point of extracting meaning from it.

Barthes points out—almost in a Foucauldian manner—that, in fact, the romantic idea of the Author essentially is a modern invention, or "a modern figure." We can in this regard look to the middle ages, Barthes says, where authorship was unheard of; the birth of man, as it were (in more Foucauldian terms), had not yet happened. Any notion of the importance of the individual did not exist. And in our own case as musicologists, we can remember from our music history classes that most composers of the middle ages did not seem to really care to put their names on "their" works. The ruling conceptions of aesthetics were different; music was part of quadrivium, not trivium. Copyright was not an issue at all; God was.

Is this where Barthes, through writing his text, wants us to go? Back to God, that is, and back to the middle ages? Not at all. He seeks through his text the complete and utter destruction of any notion of an Author-God, and as such shift the concern so that the generation of meaning and responsibility of interpretation lies with the Reader. Barthes seeks to establish the text as "a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash."  

31 Ibid., p. 143.
32 Ibid., p. 142.
33 Ibid., p. 146.
What Barthes means here, then, is that it is the Reader who brings their perspectives—
their variety of previously read and interpreted texts—to any reading of any Author-God's
text. In a very Derridean way, Barthes suggests here that any text becomes the cake-upon-the-
wall I mentioned previously. Meaning does not stick; it slides down the wall and deforms.
Meaning is invented upon by the Reader in a very Derridean way; the Reader is the one who
holds the key to interpretation, not the Author, says Barthes, the Author of The Death of the
Author.

[...] we know that to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the
reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author. \[34\]

The only sensible way to handle Barthes here, I think, is to construct Barthes as an Author
who—through the use of self-deprecating irony—merely raises the question as to whether the
responsibility of meaning production rests within the Author or the Reader. The answer to this
question might become that both parties are responsible for this; the author guides the
Reader’s navigation through the Author’s authorial writings, while the Reader must walk the
textual path provided by the author. But is this the correct way of handling Barthes' text here?
Am I not an Author here myself?

There is of course a reason I have put Barthes in this current section of mine, where I
attempt to give definite answers as to what postmodernism is, and as such categorise him as a
postmodernist (not every scholar would necessarily do that). It is the paradoxical use of irony
above, and in Barthes' text, which makes him belong to this category. Just like Foucault and
Derrida, Barthes becomes the paradox he describes, and just like them, he epitomises
hopelessness.

\[34\] Ibid., p. 148.
**Postmodern Aporia**

As the stability of discourses, the stability of meaning, and the stability of the reader-author relationship (which extends, then, outwards beyond merely written texts) is questioned, an aporia emerges. Reality becomes unstable, and nothing really makes sense anymore. Anything can mean anything. As modern dogmas are broken down completely, and there is nothing there to guide the Reader—there is no stable discourse, but rather a plurality of possible discourses—the world descends into a chaotic plurality of différence where nothing really matters anymore, and where epistemological hesitation cannot be escaped.

Following my above modern construction of postmodernism, it becomes a strange to attempt to continue writing. As if meaning is in continuous deferral, and as if truth will change over time, there is no guarantee that any of that the intentions of the Author—my intentions—will stick. The solution, it seems, is to simply embrace paradox, as we have seen is the above cases of e.g. Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault. Only through intellectually crippling self-reflexivity can one continue writing. And this writing must consist of describing paradox through becoming paradox. Following this sub-section, we can (not) conclude that postmodern embraces paradox in its hopeless self-reflexiveness. It becomes the paradoxes it describes.

Postmodernism, as constructed above, becomes—quite simply—kind of hopeless:
A postmodern construction of modernism
Cette page a été intentionnellement laissée vierge.
Oh Merde, nous sommes toujours des hommes.
Enlightenment is dead.

*It's only probably a ruck-dabbit, [...]*

—Wittgenstein.
Cette page a été intentionnellement laissée vierge.
[this is probably "Mozart’s little joke"]
**Some notions of "metamodernism"**

As if postmodernism as an idea is hopeless and in political terms anarchistic, and as if modernism as an idea is fanatic and in political terms authoritarian, so-called "metamodernism" becomes an idea of hope and political freedom. As if this idea, then, seeks to avoid the previous pitfalls of both modernism and postmodernism, metamodernism is both clear and unclear in its self-reflexivity. As if metamodernism continually "deconstructs deconstruction"—its main activity is perhaps to self-deconstruct perpetually—metamodernism becomes a method of both bypassing and working within the dichotomy of modernism/postmodernism (which, as we might have just seen, can become either hopeless or fanatic in their reach for the Truth).

**A MATTER OF OSCILLATION**

Postmodernism is dead … but something altogether weirder has taken its place.36


As the 1990's concluded, and as the 2000's went by relatively peacefully, postmodernism was pronounced dead by a large number of scholars. This is evidenced and clearly articulated in anthologies such as Rudrum & Stavris' *Supplanting the postmodern* (2015), and it is e.g. in here that we find a central "origin point" of this metamodernism I speak of above. It is, in part, articulated by Vermeulen & Akker in their 2010 essay *Notes on metamodernism* as such:

Like a donkey[, metamodernism] chases a carrot that it never manages to eat because the carrot is always just beyond its reach. But precisely because it never manages to eat the carrot, it never ends its chase, setting foot in moral realms the modern donkey (having eaten its carrot elsewhere) will never encounter, entering political domains the postmodern donkey (having abandoned the chase) will never come across.37

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Central to Vermeulen & Akker's initial idea of the metamodern is the perpetual oscillation between the modern and the postmodern, which in expanded terms become oscillations (in the plural sense, then) between "a modern enthusiasm and a postmodern irony, between hope and melancholy, between naïveté and knowingness, between unity and apathy" and so forth. Metamodernism is still very similar to the postmodern: "both metamodernism and the postmodern turn to pluralism, irony, and deconstruction in order to counter a modernist fanaticism." However, at the very same time, central becomes also the idea of modern "commitment"—the idea that we actually can do something good with our lives, and (believe that we) learn.

Metamodernism, then, becomes—in a sense—postmodernism filled with hope. There is no self-reflexive dwelling on paradox, an endeavour which we have seen can become a central characteristic of the postmodern, and which point towards a general condition of epistemological aporia. Such ideas are disposed of without hesitation, and a curious case of hopeful scepticism of sorts emerges. This form of scepticism is distinct from modern scepticism in that it acknowledges postmodernism.

Vermeulen & Akker draw their arguments and conclusions—if there are any conclusions—from contemporary (visual) arts and culture rather than strict logical analysis. It is as such understandable that they view metamodernism as "[...] *neither* a manifesto, *nor* a social movement, stylistic movement, or a philosophy [...]" and it is not unreasonable to think that their ideas easily might be received in the same vein as postmodernism (as we have seen was the case with at least Foucault, but really postmodernism in general) across this world's analytic philosophy departments. This does not preclude, however, that their cultural observations may inform us, in Vermeulen & Akker's terms, epistemologically and ontologically.

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38 Ibid., p. 316.
40 Ibid., p. 310.
41 Akker & Vermeulen (2017: p. 5).
Metamodernism becomes in Vermeulen & Akker's terms an epistemological game of pretend, where, "[it] moves for the sake of moving, attempts in spite of its inevitable failure; it seeks forever for a truth that it never expects to find."\(^{42}\) The way it moves, in their terms ontologically, then, is firstly by "[oscillation] between the modern and the postmodern."\(^{43}\) Secondly, because this inevitably will fail at some point, it "is a pendulum swinging between 2, 3, 5, 10, innumerable poles. Each time the metamodern enthusiasm swings toward fanaticism, gravity pulls it back toward irony; the moment its irony sways toward apathy, gravity pulls it back toward enthusiasm."\(^{44}\)

One should note from this that there is a danger of uselessness to constructing the metamodern as a foundational extreme perspective which guides all reasoning and thereby all construction of perspectives. It has ostensibly no foundational answer to itself; it oscillates also away from itself when it needs to (but always comes back again at some point). And it does this because there always is the possibility of a fanatic metamodernism.

I will therefore stop my very modern account of metamodernism right here.

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But one more thing: besides oscillation—and perhaps more in the this thesis' terms—metamodernism's central theme is also that of hope in face of paradox, and tragically (but nevertheless importantly), whenever this hope becomes fanatic, it usually turns to hopelessness (which, again, will turn to hope at some point).

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\(^{43}\) Ibid., p. 315.
\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 316.
IV. Two overarching methods

The ideas proposed in this methodological section overarch and invade any analysis within this thesis (not just the musical ones, then). The following ideas are, in a sense, an application of my previous theoretical discussions, and it is also here the Reader well might find a connection between this thesis' theoretical argument and its musical analyses of *Down Under* and *Adagio lamentoso*.

The metamodern "Reader-Author"

Barthes makes a sharp distinction between what he calls a ‘readerly’ and a ‘writerly’ text. The former forces a particular reading on the reader, who, as Barthes puts it, ‘is left with no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text: reading is nothing more than a referendum’ (Barthes 1975: 4). We might think of most nineteenth-century novels as falling into the readerly category, with their authors adopting a position of control with regard to their readers, pushing them towards the particular reading of their narrative they consider to be paramount. Writerly texts, however, demand active participation on the part of the reader, their goal being ‘to make the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text’ (Barthes 1975: 4).

Perhaps the activity of writing is a hazardous game (in some Lyotardian sense). If so, this is at least because the inevitable disconnect between the Reader and the Author gives rise to a strange paradox. This paradox is Barthian in the sense that it might become reminiscent of Stuart's above review of Barthes' *S/Z: An Essay* [1970], 1975.

There are at least two components to this paradox which I construct here: [1] as the Author cannot directly reply to any criticism from the Reader, there definitely is no chance for so-called *samtidig imøtegåelse*. Furthermore, [2] the Reader therefore holds considerable power, as it might eventually just seem that they write what they read as they interpret texts.

At the same time, though, the Author obviously directs the Reader in their reading through

45 Sim (2013: p. 27).
46 This notion might become especially hazardous in terms of the inevitable examination of not only this thesis, but any other current IMV thesis. Consider the fact that we, the Student—for some strange reason—will not be able to defend our theses orally in front of our examiners, or that is: the Professor. And all the while this strange ignorance of this specific power issue goes on at IMV, oral defence is common practice at certain other UiO departments.
authorial writing; the Author holds considerable power too, then. The ambiguity of this power relationship, where no one really knows who holds power, might easily lead to a paradox. The question of who actually conducts the writing—and who conducts the reading—becomes as such unclear, and we see perhaps the rise of an Author-Reader\textsuperscript{47} [sic] of sorts.

In this methodological exposé, which for that matter probably cannot be that novel, I will hope to break down and "reinvent" the Reader/Author dichotomy (or relationship) so as to at least moderate my paradox as it seeps into this (or perhaps any) thesis. The "oscillatory-deconstructive" aim of this "reinvention" is furthermore informed mainly by a close reading of the postmodern, modern, and metamodern ideas articulated previously, and I will as such examine how the mechanisms of language—how writing possibly produces meaning in the Reader (and the other way around)—work within my proposed "metamodern" theoretical framework, which is based partly on my very correct reading of Vermeulen & Akker\textsuperscript{48}.

Rhetorically, metamodern writing aims in this thesis to \textit{convince} the Reader by means of realising that the Reader will interpret the Author's text in endless directions; there is, then, no "correct" way for me to put things—only the way which hopefully can become convincing, and which may or may not become "correct" according to whether it actually convinces.

The above use of the word "convince" might come across as rather dubious and gobbly-gobbly, especially for essentialist readers who are accustomed to their specific Truth(s). I will in this regard remind the Reader, then, that epistemologically, the metamodern prose style acknowledges both postmodern (anti-essential) and modern (essential) convictions. It oscillates between these, thus creating an alternative order of discourse which is something else than simply a combination of modernism and postmodernism. However, because of its tendency to induce and (then) deduce—it frequently seems to assert the Truth—the metamodern prose style might actually come across as essentially quite essentialist.

\textsuperscript{47} Readers should probably note that this is the last time I use this "term" henceforth.
\textsuperscript{48} Vermeulen & Akker (2015).
Metamodernism risks asserting things mainly because no time is afforded to dwell on the paradoxes it acknowledges as ever-present in human subjectivity—it refuses to be self-reflexive in its reliance on paradox (like the postmodernists were), all the while it acknowledges the "validity" of paradox. It will be authorially presupposed in this volume's text, then, that intense postmodern scepticism potentially underlies all my straightforward assertions onwards (and backwards).

I state—in the above regard—that I as Author cannot really claim to give conclusive statements to anything. What I can claim to do, however, is to produce interpretations of things which in relation to certain intersubjective fields may constitute “truth.” This is done through the process of affording the reader a certain text (which I articulate). Thus, truth may of course be said to exist and not—many of the controversial discourses surrounding the current President of the United States, for instance, would normally not qualify as Truth for e.g. most Norwegians (including my Self). This is obviously different, however, for a large number of people with certain political affiliations, who for a set of reasons I will not critique here are drawn into believing such discourses. Another striking example of this mechanism of interpretation is the apparent current surge of people who genuinely believe that the earth is flat. They seemingly come to believe such things through the influence of reading conspiracy theory videos published on YouTube.49

My point here is that—the valuation of specific truths, such as Trump or the form of the earth notwithstanding—multiple truths can obviously be said to exist, and as humans, it seems that we cannot escape positioning ourselves within certain intersubjective fields of truths. It becomes here the continual negotiation of differing perspectives, directed perhaps by Foucauldian mechanisms of power exertion (in the case of this thesis: partly by my, the Author's, influence on the Reader), which constitute truth. Following this, Truth conveyed by my (musical) analyses in this thesis, then, must be produced by the Reader's individual interpretive affordance.

49 For a useful presentation of the current flat earth movement, see Amundsen (2019).
While Derrida's previously mentioned impossibility of a metaphysics of presence well might be convincing and challenging to my above argument, I will negotiate against this impossibility by claiming that there actually can exist degrees of such presence. As if slippage of meaning is an inevitability, there can be degrees of slippage of meaning. I hope through, among other things, my prose style—which seeks to share my take on Truth with the reader—to mitigate such slippage of meaning.

And that is this thesis’ approach to the communication of truth, as it were (we could also call that my epistemological position, but I will not make such conclusive statements). All this is probably wrong in some sense, and it has also probably been thought of before—but "that is okay," because "I cannot know everything and every philosopher really that well," and that is probably because "I'm simply a human master's student working within the limited field of musicology." No, but sincerely: my point is that truth probably is socially constructed, and in this thesis, the Author and the Reader—we—construct it together (I neither do nor want to know everything, by the way).

Based on these assertions, I lend myself in this thesis to a method of writing where I attempt to produce a writerly-readerly text which hopefully convinces the reader. That is: not a writerly or a readerly text, but probably the sum of it all, which in holistic terms we might choose to remember is greater than its parts.

[If the modernist natural scientist, as it were, just had a seizure from reading my text, they might want to remind themselves that also their very objective experiments are in need of interpretation and valuation according to some intersubjective field of science—which for that matter, and by virtue of its apparent rigour, can become quite useful in solving apparent problems. It can also become kind of limited and authoritarian in its perspective—you just had a seizure, remember.]

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50 See my sub-section on Foucauldianism in *A modern construction of postmodernism* for more on this.
THE PLACE OF SATIRE IN THE HUMANITIES

As the Reader may have already noticed, I take sometimes on a partly colloquial style of writing in this thesis. As if this style oscillates between the ironic and the sincere—as if it oscillates between perhaps mild humility and very outrageous arrogance—it hopes to be effective in "establishing" a certain truth, or in other words becoming interesting and convincing for the Reader. That is not to say that interesting things automatically constitute "truth," but they might by their interpretive affordance to the Reader help the Reader construct their truth (or in other words: interpret my text here in some useful way).

The general idea is that this style of articulation attempts to mitigate paradox by means of oscillating between the established extreme poles of that given paradox, so that at least a third perspective arises. This third perspective is ostensibly not in its nature hopeless postmodern scepticism or fanatic modern "knowledge"—it becomes just something else, perhaps simply a "[new] perspective," depending on what the reader does with it. And sometimes-often in this thesis, these extreme poles take the form of an irony/sincerity dichotomy.

I do not wish to not claim that such a style of writing as a method is novel. Previous notions of the academic use of satire—the oscillation between irony and sincerity is probably satire—can be construed convincingly in at least Vermeulen and Akker's writing style(s) [remember at all times their donkey, cited on p. 27 in this volume], and for that matter also the curious figure of "Hanzi Freinacht," who recently has given claim to a so-called *Metamodern Guide to Politics*,51 apparently published by himself and his own publishing company.

This work is outrageous in its form of communication, and "Hanzi" seems here to attempt to kind of solve a world problem. Whether this succeeds or not is (for my part) of...
course left entirely up to the individual Reader, but the interesting thing here for this thesis, I think, is "Hanzi's" method of communication. In his strange and rather humorous combination of being half-traditionally-academic and half-not-so-traditionally-academic (or writerly-readerly, I guess, in more Barthian terms), all through a strange and free-from blend of sincerity and irony, "Hanzi" can come across as eerily convincing (and not, at the same time) upon the Reader. Nevertheless, "Hanzi" is, in my humble opinion, a most fanatic form of metamodernism, who refuses to oscillate away from his ironic/sincere dichotomy, and who refuses to oscillate away from the idea of oscillation.

Metamodernist writing lays the grounds for interpretation of its texts and attempts nothing more, and thereby leaves the responsibility for interpretation entirely with the Reader, who may or may not construe useful meaning in it through different instances of reading across time. In this regard, the above use of pseudonym by the sometimes outrageous "Hanzi" suddenly makes very much sense, and is something the world has seen previously in e.g. Kierkegaard's encounters with discursive power. Writing stuff is risky business.

This metamodern method of communication is furthermore a case of the common literary technique of "show, don't tell,“ where the Author lays the grounds for the production of "knowledge" by inspiring potential interpretations in the Reader. Borrowing from fiction writing, then, this style of communication attempts to not tell the reader everything, but rather guide the Reader by authorial awareness of the distinction between informal and formal styles of writing, and then by the awareness of the complete and utter Derridean breakdown of any such distinction.

It would not, for instance, articulate itself in the same way before a fragile 6-year old as before a powerful professor. It tries to continually deconstruct and as such re-evaluate its probable degree of convincement to whoever might hold the role of Reader—it tries, with hopeful naivety—to anticipate the reader (which becomes an impossibility if published, as there are many kinds of readers out there). And it is very prone to failure at almost any time—

52 Readers should remember in this regard Derrida’s apparent breaking down of the distinction between fictous writing [skjønnlitteratur] and non-fictous writing [sakprosa].
53 See Lysvåg & Stenbrenden's (2014) distinction between formal and informal English prose styles.
simply the mood or the ideological convictions of the given reader might for instance hamper any chance of convincement. Nevertheless, a hopeful attempt is at least made, and that is arguably one of the main justifications behind metamodernist thinking.

Metamodernist writing, as constructed in this thesis, encourages the Reader to laugh out loud at the same time as taking the arguments it produces seriously. It tries to be quick (in its tempi), concise (in its form), interesting (in my case partly by way of oscillation between a humorous/serious [or ironic/sincere] dichotomy of sorts), and somehow precise and factually correct—all the while realising that some readers (especially some scholars) are not going to like this rebellion against the apparent prevalence of formal writing.54 It is, in other words (and again), satirical in nature, which for that matter partly can become a characteristic of cultural studies in general.55

Following its partly postmodernist influences, the metamodernist will to use humour and irony in oscillation to dry seriousness and sincerity (modernism) becomes a hopefully effective method in convincing the reader. I argue that there as such should be room for satirical methods in humanities research in general—the power of its inevitable gatekeepers in deciding discourse notwithstanding.56 As some method of staying sane, then, metamodernism simply laughs at paradox, as opposed to postmodernism, which tries to engage in paradox by becoming paradox; and also as opposed to modernism, which tries to solve paradox and which then by definition loses. Put in very frank terms: who is to decide that metamodernism as an idea cannot laugh?

Am I—the present Author—sincere, ironic, or somewhere in-between? The answer to this question can become a so-called Derridean undecidable,57 which in this specific case might mean that once again everything is arguably entirely up to the individual reader. Let me

54 It is a truism that even scholars disagree in general, and such disagreement might go as far as taking on the form of very sincere and harsh polemic. See my following section Discourses of music analysis for more on this.
55 My “conclusion” here as to the nature of cultural studies follows my own reading of Barker & Jane (2016)
56 Again, readers should in this regard remember Derrida’s apparent breaking down of the distinction between ficteous writing [skjønnliteratur] and non-ficteous writing [sakprosa]. Also, gatekeeping is here—like most things that has to do with power—understood as a necessary evil of humanity.
57 In a similar manner as the previously discussed ghost.
just put it like this: The Reader is free to interpret me in any way they 1) want, and/or 2) are forced to by their own convictions. I even need to do this for my Self, self-reflexively.

Besides the concept of the Derridean undecidable, which just cropped up again, I have previously discussed a set of postmodern paradoxes. If there conversely is a set of metamodern paradoxes, a constituent here must probably be the difficulty for the Reader in tracing the Author's oscillatory trajectory between sincerity and irony. And this paradox can become scary, both for the Reader and the Author—but it is at least not as scary as postmodernist paradoxes, which potentially cripple you. If this metamodern paradox exists, its problematic character is mitigated by assuming a position of self-reflexive hope (as opposed to postmodern self-reflexive hopelessness). This assumption of hope to oscillation might in some cases suggest that anything too sincere be read in an ironic voice, and that anything too ironic be read in a sincere voice.

I argue that this is a fruitful method for the Author of projecting their perspectives unto the Reader, as it might afford the Reader means to negotiate between their own interpretive power and the interpretive power of the Author, producing a field of intersubjectivity between the two which downplays so-called "misunderstanding."

In the case of this thesis, we see perhaps from its outset, to this point, and onwards an incoherence in prose style—I hope to appear to be (mostly) sincere (or "serious") from its start and towards the end—and that is from an Authorial perspective done to appease the probable Reader. And this easing in of the Reader is part of my anticipation of my readership, i.e. mostly my examiners, who probably expect simply a very sincere text. We will, then, in the satirical curve of this thesis soon go from the relatively dry to the very lively (or perhaps the wet)—and then back to the dry again. We will "go forth and oscillate[.]."58 So "buckle up." I state "boldly" that I do not really care about my grade, but rather the points I attempt to make.

As three conclusive remarks to this sub-section on some metamodern writing style, and to firmly argue my point in this section, I see no other way than to (again) be very frank:

1. Postmodernism fuck over the Reader in its blind belief in nihilism and irony.
3. Metamodernism, then, takes care of (and at the same time potentially fuck over) the Reader in its hopeful ambition to oscillate between the extreme poles of—well—[1] and [2]. Through this process of providing hopefully diverse grounds for interpretation, it aims to produce in the Reader at least one "new," hopefully useful perspective—an endeavour which the present metamodernist Author realises inevitably will fail/succeed in endless directions, according to each reader. (By the way, if they have not done so yet, readers should perhaps notice my above 1990's phallus-like symbolism, which kind of makes my unfortunate above use of profanity deeper and more complex. It is in part produced by my numbers enclosed by brackets—I worked hard to get that right.)

I suppose the Reader just was afforded this thesis' "structural high point" (as Agawu well might put it) in terms of satire. As the present Author, I assure the Reader that I will moderate myself immediately onwards, and that I through the rest of my thesis will become outrageous only when I think I need to (or that is: when the Reader thinks so), which means that I will not really swear or anything like that. This thesis is, after all, ostensibly not NRK's Nytt på nytt or Trygdekontoret. However, I will, as the Reader might choose to see, at least retain my partly colloquial form of expression in an obvious manner, and I guess I as such have just opened up for saying anything I feel I need to in my musical analyses. Academic freedom (to be weird) at last, I guess (or hope).

Crucially, I suppose, I have argued in this section that there should be room for critical satire as a means of communication in humanities research. Satire is here simply a freedom of

59 Sorry-not-sorry about the following—the Reader is sincerely advised to momentarily turn on their will to laugh.
60 Agawu (1984).
expression which draws on the metamodern idea of freedom (and obviously, each reader will (dis-)agree with each instance of such free expression). In our everyday oral lives—and also in our everyday oral lives as scholars—we typically laugh, and we have fun as a method of getting our perspectives across while at the same time staying healthy. As we have seen previously, Derrida has already broken down the distinction between speech/writing (and also possibly any dichotomous distinction), so why should this strange but central human activity of laughter not extend to our more writerly-readerly activities?

Anyway, consider that satire does not have to be perceived by the Reader as "funny" or laughable to become relevant, interesting, or useful. It is primarily, I think, satire's ambiguous oscillatory trajectory between constructed poles (in my case irony/sincerity) which is useful here. Nevertheless, the health benefits stemming from laughter sure might help in the interpretation of my kind of drawn out thesis here.

Metamodernism as an idea might, as Vermeulen and Akker rightly notes, quite simply become a "neoromantic sensibility"61 (but perhaps without an apparent blind belief in e.g. the simple version of the idea of the romantic genius, as that might sound like a too stable and authoritarian concept for free oscillation). As if laughter is a human emotion, and as if (neo-)romanticism's key characteristic is to kind of outrageously express such emotions from time to time, metamodernist writing recognises human emotions as it hides on (or in?) the insides of sincerious academia.62

62 Note, however, that especially the humanities—or at least musicology, and herein especially popular music studies—arguably has seen a surge in more readerly texts for the past few decades. We can perhaps surmise that this is mainly due to the wide-spread influence e.g. Barthes' ideas.
**Dichotomies and trichotomies**

[metamodernism] is a pendulum swinging between 2, 3, 5, 10, innumerable poles. Each time the metamodern enthusiasm swings toward fanaticism, gravity pulls it back toward irony; the moment its irony sways toward apathy, gravity pulls it back toward enthusiasm.\(^{64}\)

While metamodernism as *an idea* well might swing between Vermeulen & Akker's above "innumerable poles"—in other words a possibly infinite number of conceivable dichotomic oppositions—metamodernism might as such, *in practice*, become unbearable for the human mind. There are simply too many poles to take into consideration. I would in this regard like to propose that we, as humans (not as ideas, then), must either choose our poles by will (that is: construct them), or be provided our poles from some authority. That is, not necessarily from God: any other human or natural entity with the potential to hold social power will do; the Author or the wild animal at large are good examples. Here, in these examples, the Author constructs in his text oppositions which form a basis for the Reader to construct their interpretations upon, and in the case of the wild animal at large, the physically weaker human being will probably need to choose between fight/flight.

Any (musical and non-musical) analysis within this thesis depends on the construction of such oppositions, and they take on firstly the following form: that of the Derridean dichotomy, which possibly is what Vermeulen & Akker build their idea of oscillatory metamodernism on (understandably, they do not state this explicitly—simple Derrideanism is arguably considered rather old-fashioned, or perhaps even presupposed across the general discourse of the humanities as of today—or perhaps avoiding Derrida is their way of avoiding the fanatic canonising of an already famous postmodern thinker).

This thesis' articulation of methodological opposition between popular musicology and western art musicology, for instance, constitutes such a dichotomic construction provided by me, the Author. The Authorially deliberate disconnectedness between this thesis' first half

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\(^{63}\) The sub-section *Di-, tri-, and polychotomies* is based on parts of a previous exam submission of mine in the UiO/IMV course **MUS4605 — Research Seminar in Popular Music**.

and its second half is another such dichotomic construction (as if the "theory" part is one pole, and the "analysis" part is another). Here, the boundaries between theory/analysis will demand interpretation from the Reader, so that their difference is negotiated freely (as implied elsewhere, it would go against this thesis' general theorising of the concepts of interpretation and power to attempt to lay bare for the Reader *everything* through "very clear" articulation).

Furthermore, the metamodernist idea of oscillation between poles furthermore suggest that such dichotomic constructions inform one another, and we see as such that they can be thought of as kind of dependent on each other (as we have seen, Derrida kind of said the same thing—at first seemingly different poles will always potentially "invade each other"). I employ, then, in this thesis a strategy where I either [1] explicitly construct extreme poles or [2] subtly imply extreme poles, such as in my hopefully humorous use of satire, or in my occasional tendency to contradict the various narratives I present right after presenting them. I moreover accept—I welcome, actually—the inevitability that the reader might construct their own oppositions in interpreting my text, such as agreement/disagreement, or other useful perspectives.

Furthermore, I expand in my lower level analyses—that is, in my analyses of *Down Under* and *Adagio lamentoso*—the idea of the dichotomy to that of the trichotomy, where we do not get simply two poles, but three poles which depend upon and inform each other.

The world has previously seen similar ideas in e.g. Charles Sanders Pierce's view on semiotics, where signs are composed of "a sign-vehicle, an object, and an interpretant;"\(^65\) or e.g. Kant's numerous categories, "divided into four classes of three;"\(^66\) or e.g. Kierkegaard's anonymous and parodic satire of Hegelian so-called dialectics, comprised of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (in my humble terms a form of trialetics, or a trichotomy; holism might not have been that clearly articulated at Hegel's time, where the sum of oppositions constitute

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\(^65\) Atkin (2013).
\(^66\) Thomasson (2013).
more than its parts). Here, Kierkegaard proposes a hilarious "progression of existential stages"—in threes.67

While this is all interesting, an in-depth study of the history of trichotomies would blow the scope of this thesis (and is not something I presently am capable to do anyway). I am, after all, simply a musicologist, so it might be enough to suggest here that when dichotomies will not suffice, and when we would like to expand our thinking, it seems most practical for the human mind to think in terms of a maximum of threes at the time. "Alle gode ting er tre." (Oh, and the age-old idea of the Christian holy trinity suddenly springs to mind.)

Anyway, returning to metamodernism, oscillation, and this thesis: I will in a visual manner present the trichotomy as such:

![Trichotomy Diagram]

In my analysis of Adagio lamentoso, for instance, I have chosen to fill a trichotomic structure such as the one above with the extreme poles of [a] formal structure, [b] metaphor and drama, and [c] three performances. My main argument here, then, is that these three, seemingly very different (or différent), perspectives on Adagio lamentoso depend upon and inform each other by oscillation to and fro their respective extremes.

This specific choice of poles—this specific choice of this trichotomy—serves principally as a limitation of scope. I could, for instance, in my analysis of Adagio lamentoso, convincingly substitute any of the above extreme poles with e.g. a music-historical

67 McDonald (2017).
perspective (which I, for that matter, argue still would suggest music analysis, insofar it becomes a perspective on music and meaning). I could look at *Adagio lamentoso*'s effect on human emotions—and attempt to measure this empirically (if I had the necessary training, that is, which I at the moment do not). I could look at *Adagio lamentoso*'s effect on human bodily movement with motion capture cameras—and construct some sort of perspective from that. The list arguably goes on, and my point is that my specific choice of extreme poles in the specific trichotomies of this thesis cannot be exhaustive or final. The world is more complicated than that.

The previously mentioned Kantian categories which embody trichotomies, and which for that matter seem to draw on "Aristotelean ways of classifying" things, support the idea that trichotomies can be thought of as a construction of perspectives which become limited in scope [avgrenset]. In this vein, I propose that much in the same way as Kant's trichotomies are divided into classes, and which as such form an organising principle, trichotomies will potentially be informed by other trichotomies. This is arguably quite similar to the rather turbulent idea of intertextuality (the term is frequently assigned different meanings by different scholars for different purposes), which here simply is understood as texts depending on each other in a network of texts:

This organising principle of Vermeulen & Akker's previously mentioned conception of "an infinite number of poles" is the ideal methodological foundation of this thesis. It can

68 Thomasson (2013).
perhaps be described as a "metatrichotomy" which potentially extends fractally in an infinite web of trichotomies, which constitutes a "polychotomy" of sorts (the Reader must forgive my frequent "invention" of terms here; I assure the Reader that the latter above term will be used at least once onwards). Sadly, however, I have not been able to really construct such a metatrichotomy; I have in this thesis, on the highest articulated level, been forced by practical necessity to limit my perspective to that of a dichotomy between two trichotomies constituted by some of the differing methods found within popular musicology and western art musicology. This particular dichotomy, then, is a fractal hierarchy of di- and/or trichotomies, which extend from the utterance level and upwards to my higher levels of analysis.

To sum up this section: we can see that my scope is limited to the opposition between the texts which I analyse, as well as the potential oscillation between them. Expanding upon my hopelessly reductive problemstilling, then, my analyses do not to investigate what music analysis is. One might rather think of my question as such: how is music analysis? Or put in more Barthian terms, which would assert that things cannot possibly be, but recurrently becomes through the act of reading: how becomes music analysis [sic]? One possible immediate answer to this question—and I shall cite some of the oral habits of one of my professors at IMV here—is as follows: "den som lyver best, vinner."
IIIb. Discourses of music analysis

In his 2012 journal article *Theory and Method in Popular Music Analysis: Text and Meaning*, Thomas Solomon constructs, in a discursive analysis of popular music studies, a dichotomy between formalism and contextualism. Solomon's aim here is to gather an overview of a methodologically disparate field—"an interdisciplinary field of study in which musicology, sociology, media and cultural studies, and other academic disciplines have met and engaged in (sometimes tempestuous) conversations."\(^70\)

Solomon categorises popular music studies—and how they investigate musical meaning—by means a continuum between formalism and contextualism. Thus, Solomon draws up a dichotomy where the latter finds meaning in music "not in purely formal structures, but in relationships between form and context."\(^71\) The opposite goes for formalism, then, which Solomon understands so as to "in its most radical form [assume] that music does not refer to anything outside itself."\(^72\)

Solomon's above dichotomy can be seen as parallel to a similar dichotomy of formalism/contextualism in western art musicology. I argue that this dichotomy was set in motion in 1980 by Joseph Kerman through the journal article *How We Got into Analysis and How to Get Out*, which set the stage for the well-known discursive disparities in 1990's and 00's musicological discourses.

I will in this section attempt to construct a perspective where Foucauldian mechanisms of power is seen as a force in the formation of these discourses. Through this perspective, I will examine how the Truth about *what music just is* [musikkbegrepet] has become a contemptuous matter for musicologists of the 1990's and early 2000's. I construct here a perspective, then, where I attempt to trace some of the the breaks and discontinuities (and not much more than that) of musicological thinking of mostly the past few decades, focusing on

\(^69\) IIIb. Discourses of music analysis is partly based on a previous exam submission of mine in the UiO/IMV course MUS4216—Methodological Topic: History and Analysis.
\(^71\) Ibid., p. 95.
\(^72\) Ibid., p. 94.
western art musicology and popular musicology. This thesis' analyses of both *Down Under* and *Adagio lamentoso* will in turn be situated according to these discontinuities.

**Western art musicology**

According to Duckles & Pasler of *Grove Music Online*, some of (western art) musicology's origins can be traced to Guido Adler's 1885 *Umfang, Methode und Ziel der Musikwissenschaft*, which through a tabulation of categories "codified the division between the historical and systematic realms of music study." Following Duckles & Pasler, the difference between Adler's historical and systematic realms of musicology was, chiefly, that the latter was a complete "reorientation of the discipline to fundamental questions which are non-historical in nature." We can sense here—in systematic musicology—the birth of what I choose to term "old-school" formal analysis [strukturanalyse], where the autonomy of the musical structure supposedly becomes paramount to investigating musical meaning.

A key example of an analytical method within the realm of this "old-school" formal analysis—often regarded as rather extreme in its positivistic tendencies—and which eventually came to being over the course of the 1920's, is Schenker analysis. According to Duckles & Pasler, it presents itself as both a universal theory of tonality and a sophisticated tool of analysis by which an individual piece of tonal music may be opened up for inspection and its individuating features of harmony, form and thematic content delineated with unprecedented precision.

The idea of the Schenkerian method is founded on the idea of the *Ursatz*, which is discovered by the Schenkerian analyst through reducing the given composer's score to a "result of successive harmonic-contrapuntal layers." In this way, the Schenkerian analyst shows how virtually any given piece of music of the common practice period can be reduced

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73 Duckles & Pasler et al. (2001).
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Drabkin (2001).
to, in essence, a I-V-I harmonic progression. One should perhaps note that there was (or is?) a general sense of valuation to the Schenkerian method, where pieces which did not conform to this *Ursatz* were prone to be rejected as "bad," or at least not as "great" as those of the common practice "master composers" (such as Mozart, Beethoven, or Bach).

The eventual prevalence of Schenkerian in English-speaking musicology (or really: the prevalence of positivistic formalism in music analysis generally) sparked Joseph Kerman's aforementioned journal article. Here, Kerman's dissatisfaction with the ideological underpinnings of "old-school" formal analysis, especially "articles on music published after 1950" which "appear sometimes to mimic scientific papers in the way that South American bugs and flies will mimic the dreaded carpenter wasp,"77 were put on prominent (and I guess rather harsh) display.

Kerman's main concern in his journal article was to critique the tendency to quasi-scientific formalism that ruled in the music-analytic climate of his day, and which by its apparent positivism obscured what it really propelled in terms of valorisation. For Kerman, strict formal analysis did not take into regard its own ideological convictions, which he saw as founded upon the greatness of the instrumental German tradition (or western art music, then); for Kerman, strict formal analysis becomes as such simply a "tool" to propel this greatness.

In Williams' terms, Kerman's critique of his day's music-analytical climate was a call towards "following the model of literary criticism"78 (a discipline which, for that matter, Williams notes as ironically in severe postmodern aporia at the time). "Music analysis should not hide its ideological underpinnings through a false sense of positivism," Kerman seems to proclaim, then. For the positivistic-formal analyst, however, this might sound as a strange proclamation. As Erling E. Guldbrandsen notes, it is obvious that formal analysis necessitates valuation:

77 Kerman (1980: p. 313).
78 Williams (2001: p. 121).
For the formal analyst, the ideological convictions of the music they analysed were presupposed; the contextual matters of the music they studied was either pre-given or described elsewhere (such as in music-historical works). The formal music analyst saw no need to address such issues through their investigations into the music they loved. They were ostensibly not "hiding" their ideological convictions, as Kerman seems to propose, then. While they generally show(-ed) a strive for what—from the epistemological context of this thesis, at the very least—becomes obviously mistaken "scientific" "objectiveness" in their aims to prove the greatness of western art music, one should perhaps be careful to conflate ideological convictions and applied methods. That is: there is no necessary link between an analyst's passion for music and the multitude of possible ways of analysing or commenting upon it, simply on the grounds that such a link has existed previously.

Nevertheless, the view of formal analysis as taking into regard only "the music itself" gained traction among certain corners of the musicological discourse following Kerman, which through his polemic was opened up and now ready to transform. In a harsh attack on such views on formal analysis, Susan McClary presented in her book chapter *Narrative Agendas in "Absolute" Music [...]* an analysis which served as a feminist reading of the sonata form present in Brahms' Third Symphony. McClary's answer to Kerman's call for a critical musicology was thus answered, and widespread musicological interest for the critical study of music was as such sparked. This interest for the critical study of music would evolve into a movement commonly known as "new musicology."

It is quite understandable that Kofi Agawu, as a response to this newfound surge in prominence of critique at the apparent expense of formalism, only in 2004 responded to Kerman's *How We Got Into Analysis and How to Get Out* with a journal article entitled *How...*

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**We Got out of Analysis, and how to Get Back In Again.** Here, Agawu claims that Kerman has misunderstood the very nature of music analysis, and frames formal analysis as a performance of the work in question in its own of right.81 Extending here upon his view of "new musicology" as a "musicological regime"82 in which it becomes hard to live on as a music theorist, Agawu, then, comes in sharp defence of formalism.

In the wake of Kerman, we can sense a certain feeling of postmodernism—and its tendency to propel full free play of meaning and deconstruction—as it eventually reaches musicology and (new) musicologists. There seems here to not have been any agreement as to what *music analysis*—the very term that e.g. Kerman, McClary, and Agawu were arguing over—actually meant, and we see in this sense an instance of scholars talking past each other. Derridean free play of meaning became in this case very real.

The harsh polemic between—in Agawu's terms—formalists and "anti-formalists" can furthermore be seen in terms of a Foucauldian power play, where the convincing argument serves as the main tool for establishing power and dominance (and as such musicological discourse). It is apparent from this that scholarly discourse in its essence can become quite political; we see here how power struggles, masquerading as methodological discussion (or straightforward polemics), become key in any attempt to convince the opposition that they are wrong. It is, then, possible to read into the above an obvious political opposition between "music-theorists" and "(new) musicologists." The dynamics of power play here manifests as a set of polemics which attempts to argue for and against *the* correct way of how to *correctly* extract meaning from music.

Who, however, won out? I would like to argue that there are not (nor can be) any "winners" to the 1990's turmoil that plagued (and helped) western art musicology in its historical trajectory towards this day. As Treitler noted in his 1999 book chapter *The Historiography of Music [...]*, criticism's "quarrel with positivism and formalism, which threatens to throw the baby out with the bathwater, is largely irrelevant,"83 and this has

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81 Agawu (2004).
arguably proven to be quite true. Rather than an actual establishing of a "new musicology" and associated correct ways of analysing music, we see the rise of a chaotic pluralism of music-analytical methodologies, complete with a decentralised and diverse set of approaches to understanding music.

Formalism, despite Agawu's concerns, has continued to exist, and so has the critical study of music. If there is one good thing, I suppose, which came out of this quarrel, it seems to be that it opened up for new ways of understanding music (beyond the aims of "'new' musicology," that is). Now, questions as to what music analysis meant, and what it was supposed to tell us, seriously started to appear.

As the disparate idea of performativity eventually reached musicology, musicologists such as Nicholas Cook began to draw attention to the fact that music is performed by living musicians, and that if musicologists were to study this phenomenon, they should at all study this beyond any conception of a text, so that they think of "music as (not of) performance."84 We see here a new dimension to the formalist/contextualist debate, protruding in a way so as to cast even the "new musicologists" as formalists. In a response to Cook, Gulbrandsen argues that one should be careful not to view the newfound study of performance as a "liberation from the 'work'," proposing that performativity can be understood as detached from such a limited view of performance. As "an alternative" to Cook's view, Gulbrandsen offers a reading of Boulez' changing approaches to the interpretation of Mahler over time, where the "highly complex play (jeu) [...] between compositional writing, musical work, performance, analytic interpretation, and aesthetic experience [...]" is afforded salience.85 For Gulbrandsen, then, text always invades context (and vice versa) in a very Derridean way, drawing a distinct boundary between the Cookian study of performance and the performative study of music.

Today's state of (western art) musicology, where ideas as different as music as formalism, music as (literary) criticism, music as performance, and music as performativity

84 Cook (2003).
(the list is not and arguably cannot ever become complete) exist side by side can seem quite perplexing. Now, if there is a tragedy to the 1990's disputes as to what music just is [musikkbegrepet], it must be the way in which the grounds were laid for arguing for a correct way of analysing (or studying) music. As we can see, attempting to establish dominating discourses through quarrelling becomes a central characteristic to such activities. I believe a possible danger here is that the so-called paradigmatic shifts in (western art) musicology of the 1990's have set the stage for a future of musicology where a key aim becomes to establish newfound ideas as the ruling discourse. My point here, then, is that as musicologists, we might not need to be so harsh on each other for being interested in different (or really: different) ways of understanding music. As I otherwise show in this thesis, I suppose, we might actually end up informing each other's perspectives.

**Popular musicology**

According to Middleton & Manuel, the 1960's and 70's early interest in the study of popular music—at least as it manifested as an early form of "popular music studies" beyond Adorno and sociologists publishing in the 1950's—was largely conducted by young scholars working in the field of "social studies" (or sociology), "radical [...] musicology," and "cultural studies (in particular the movement originating in the Birmingham University Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies [...])." These disparate and very different approaches to the study of popular music would not coalesce before 1981, a year which saw the founding of a "well-regarded academic journal (Popular Music [...])" as well as a "scholarly society (the International Association for the Study of Popular Music)," or IASPM.87

While IASPM and Popular music well may have served as a common ground on which for popular music scholars to converge, popular music studies was—as we might remember from my above presentation of Solomon—not at all unified in its methodology. A

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87 Ibid
dichotomy between formalism and contextualism, quite reminiscent of the one found in western art musicology at the time, strongly manifests as "a substantial literature accrued and new generations of scholars emerged" over the course of the 1980s and 90s.88

The extreme formalist pole, then, of the 1980's and 90's scholarly treatment of popular music embodies scholars applying Schenkerian analysis to explaining popular music. A prominent (and arguably quite late) example here, among many, is Walter Everett's 1992 ambition

to expose the musical means of expression of geniality and exuberance in the Beatles' simple early song, "She Loves You," using the "serious" tools of academic analysis that pertain to issues of voice leading.89

Everett seems here to build on a musicological-ideological practice which stems from a time when, as Allan F. Moore noted in 2001, "musicologists became particularly concerned with the canonical 'masterpieces' of the Western tradition," and where the primary motivation for studying such "masterpieces" were to uncover (or sometimes even prove, I might add) through Schenkerian analysis why they were "great."90 It is obvious to see here that Moore in a way mirrors Kerman's above concerns in his 1980 incursion into old-school WAMc formalism and its associated ideologies.

The extreme contextual pole within popular music studies may well be inhabited by scholars such as Simon Frith, who generally prefers (or preferred?) to view music purely as a social construct. In a 1983 book chapter, Frith frames "the aesthetic question"—how the text achieves its effects—to be "secondary."91 The music, and how it sounds, then, becomes a secondary concern to Frith, who is more interested in how it can be described socioculturally. And he might well seem to argue this pretty harshly.

An equally harsh response to both formalist/contextualist extreme poles discussed above can be read in Moore's 2001 Rock: the primary text, which introductorily contains a

88 Ibid.
90 Moore (2001: p. 9)
firm argument against Frith's above assertions. In a response to Frith's view of the
subservience of the aesthetic question, Moore proposes the idea of a "primary" and
"secondary text" of rock. The former, Moore argues, is a cognizing of music's sounds, without
which "we have no musical entity to care about."92 The secondary text, then, becomes
commentaries upon the primary text. Rather ironically (and perhaps also rather intentionally),
this is the exact inverse of Frith's view that the sociocultural is of primacy, while the "music
itself" is secondary. This inverted stance notwithstanding, one should be careful to think about
Moore as not caring about the secondary text at all. The secondary text is of course important,
but nevertheless, to 2001 Allan F. Moore, "aesthetic question has primacy."93

Methodologically, Moore argues onwards in his book that the analysis of the primary text
(of rock) must be suited to the music which it analyses. The methods of the analysis of
popular music must expand upon the up to then available repertoire of WAMcy methods,
then, Moore seems to suggest, as the formalist methods of western art music simply cannot be
suitable to the analysis of popular music. Keeping Moore's above take on Schenkerianism in
mind—which might seem to in large parts have constituted the current method of formal
analysis at Moore's time and place—this makes sense.

We see in Moore a prominent example of a budding popular musicology in the early
2000's. And Moore is certainly not alone in sharing this response, or tension, towards
sociologists and formalists of the study of music: while less confrontational than Moore in his
approach, a young Stan Hawkins, who seeks to [Settle] the pop score ...,94 argues against a
"scientific objectivity afforded to the internal structures and architectonic levels of music"
which "[easily can] rule out the possibility of creative criticism."95 Drawing on the concepts
of an at the time recently established "new musicology," then, Hawkins argues for a critical
approach to understanding popular music.

92 Ibid., original emphasis.
93 Ibid.
94 Hawkins' title for this book is, of course, meant to be taken as ironic-sincere. Judging from Hawkins'
inclination towards postmodern thinkers in the introduction to this book, it is orthographically implied that the
pop score cannot really be "settled ..." in any stable manner.
95 Hawkins (2002: p. 1)
Moreover, much like Moore and rock, Hawkins suggests an expanded methodology for the musicological study of pop. A concrete example of this: building in part on tools originating in western art musicology, Hawkins suggests as a guiding principle to the investigation of musical coding five "basic types of compositional features" which serve as analytical categories for the study of this kind of music: "1. Formal properties: [...] 2. Harmonic idioms: [...] 3. Recording and production techniques: [...] 4. Textures and timbres [...] 5. Rhythmic syntax." At the same time, Hawkins is adamant that "the status of the musical code cannot bypass the elements of secondary interrogation," or in more Moorian terms: the secondary text always informs the primary text.

The overall discursive effect in relation to other approaches of music studies—both in the case of Hawkins and Moore (but also other scholars such as e.g. Derek B. Scott)—is a methodological distancing from both western art musicology and popular music studies. Emerging from this distancing, then, is a drawing of new methodological and ideological boundaries to the musicological pursuit of popular music. This as opposed to especially [1] a distinctly sociological pursuit of popular music, or popular music studies, but also [2] a Schenkerian (or generally formalist-positivist) "old-school" western art musicology, as well as [3] "new musicology."

Over the course of the late 1990's and early 2000's, we see in this sense the Foucauldian birth, as it were, of a popular musicology. The methodological distancing from the above existing approaches to (popular) music largely takes the form of simultaneous transformations and combinations of their repertoires of methods. For popular musicology, a regularly articulated interest for the sociocultural (sociology) works in tandem with criticism (new musicology), all the while tools from "old-school" formal analysis are expanded upon and repurposed for the study of popular music. Furthermore, popular musicology's ideological moorings are largely postmodern. Among other things, this involves intense suspicion aimed at modern ideas of e.g. "masterworks" and academic canonisation of (musical) art works, all

96 Ibid., p. 11.
97 Ibid.
the while aesthetic considerations not necessarily are negated. If anything, such considerations rather transform the common ideological underpinnings of western art musicology.

**A PMcy-WAMcy condition?**

The year is 2017, and the place is the University of Oslo's Department of Musicology. As far as local doctoral theses, their evaluations, and their public defences go, this year features two very different works, namely Thomas Erma Møller's *Sources, Structure, and Surface: Philological and Analytical Studies in Fartein Valen's Orchestral Works,*\(^{98}\) and Kai Arne Hansen's *Fashioning Pop Personae: Gender, Personal Narrativity, and Converging Media in 21st Century Pop Music.*\(^{99}\) But how are these dissertations different, exactly? A key difference between the two dissertations is, of course, that Møller's dissertation springs out of a tradition of western art musicology (henceforth, in this thesis, abbreviated to WAMcy), while Hansen's springs out of the now rather established tradition of popular musicology (henceforth, in this thesis, abbreviated to PMcy). Insofar as both dissertations obviously claim—from their titles alone—to deal with musical analysis, one might construe between them at least a certain sense of methodological opposition. And if so, is that really that problematic? Are they not simply different?

We could simply assert that the two represent different scholarly interests, and this is obviously very true. Where the one is concerned with popular music, the other is concerned with western art music. After all, they are studying two very different musics, both of which spring out of quite differing traditions (while notions of différance looms freely across this thesis, I will not willingly set forth an argument here as to how the apparent atonal style of Valen invades e.g. Beyonce's music or vice versa. I cannot see how that would be useful right

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\(^{98}\) Møller (2017).

now—that is not to say that the interplay between such an apparent dichotomy not could be articulated in an interesting manner somehow!).

This notwithstanding, why is it even possible to draw a methodological line between PMcy and WAMcy in general? They ostensibly both deal with music analysis, so would it not be more useful for both to symbiotically share their methodologies, rather than let them operate in near isolation? Could not a study into e.g. Beethoven's social representation of contemporary society, borrowing on current PMcy methods, become interesting and perhaps even important? It is, I think, a truism that e.g. Beethoven still holds a great deal of relevance for most people today—for popular culture in general—and I believe a large part of this relevance well might turn out to be something more than simple ideological notions of the composer as a "master composer," or his works as "masterpieces," as 1990's and early 00's popular music scholars seemed to be gravely concerned about.

Such an approach might sound rather McClary-ish and as such something that kind of already exists—as previously discussed, PMcy has always shared at least one methodological pole with WAMcy, and that is the critical approach to music analysis. Nevertheless, WAMcy and PMcy have evolved a great deal methodologically since the 1990's. As for the former, we see an increased interest in e.g. music as performance, while the latter has seen a range of exciting ways of approaching music (such as the audiovisual method). All the while, PMcy and its aims and methods seem to largely have gone unnoticed in WAMcy's methodological repertoire. Conversely, PMcy's "distancing" from WAMcy has arguably not been subject to any substantial rethinking since the turbulent musicological climate of the 1990's and the early 2000's. The net result here, I think, is two methodological poles—two musicologies—extending in their own directions, and which might seem to in an unnecessary manner be rather estranged as of today. There is no oscillation between them; to repeat my rather banal introductory statement: they rarely cite each other.

Following my previous construction of musicological (or music-analytical) discourse, PMcy seems mainly to be concerned with social representation in its analysis of music.

100 Or rather: the development of analytical methods suitable to the study of popular music.
WAMcy, on the other hand, seems to mainly be concerned with how music represents itself (however contextualist its methods may appear as compared to old-school WAMcy formalism). Where PMcy's general overarching aim seems to involve the treatment of music as a vehicle for societal critique, WAMcy's general aim seems to be to investigate music simply because music (or musicking) is interesting on its own terms, i.e. in terms of the questions it raises in terms of e.g. aesthetics. There is an historical reason for this: as we have seen, the one was heavily influenced by sociology, while the other remained kind of very humanities-ish in its concerns. Both approaches are of course "valid" in the sense that they provide their own unique sets of perspectives, all of them potentially interesting. Extending on this, however, I argue that it is possible to construct a dichotomy of the two where we see invasion between them, and where they methodologically inform each other by "metamodern" oscillation. Deliberately running the risk of setting forth a naïve and unclear argument: I firmly believe PMcy can become "more aesthetically" concerned, while WAMcy can become "more socioculturally" concerned. I firmly believe this because for popular music to become "social," [sic] it must also become "aesthetic," [sic] and for western art music to become "aesthetic" [sic], it must also become "social" [sic].

A commonality between WAMcy and PAMcy is the study of recordings. Cookian studies of performance history, for instance, study music primarily through recordings. And it would arguably be weird for a 2019 Agawuian or McClaryian analyst to not use the obviously useful tool of the recording in constructing their analyses/critiques from scores. Moreover, as Cook notes notes that Greig notes:

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\text{classical performers tend to see recordings as in essence reproducing concert performances, whereas for pop performers the recording is, so to speak, the primary text.}^{101}
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So... As if the primary text for pop performers and therefore—to a perhaps equivalent extent, popular musicologists—is the recording, then what is the primary text for classical performers and western art musicologists? Both Agawuians and McClaryians would ostensibly look to

\[101\text{Cook et al. (2009: p. 2–3).}\]
the score (or notation), while Cookians obviously would look to the recording, then (like the popular musicologist)—but never either exclusively. That would simply be crazy. (And in the case of the classical performer, the answer is obviously obvious.) We can see here, in some limited way, that the primary texts of WAMcy becomes notational representation and/or the recording. It is neither/both, not neither/or or both/and.

Returning to Greig (no pun intended); the primary text of PMcy becomes simply the recording, then. It is, however, not that simple. PMcy uses notation too (to some extent). As for the use of notation in PMcy analysis, Middleton rightly asserts that "the issue of notation is itself difficult" in the context of PMcy methodology. An important part of the previously discussed methodological distancing of PMcy from WAMcy was arguably a severe suspicion on the former part towards the use of notation in analysis, where it arguably was "discovered" that notation cannot explain the whole of the sound emanating from the (popular) music being studied.102 This view is not alien to WAMcy, however. Cook notes that

> conventional score notation is extremely selective as a representation of musical sound: it provides a basic pitch and time framework with some annotations, but gives only broad indications regarding dynamics, articulation and timbre, and says virtually nothing about temporal or dynamic nuance.103

To be very sure, the use of notation as an abstraction of sounds is at least as problematic in today's western art musicology as in popular musicology. As we already have seen argued by e.g. Guldbrandsen or e.g. Cook and the study of performance/performativity in general, notation is simply something that is performed, be it by the performer, the analyst, or even the listener. In this sense, the score, as of today, can be thought of as more a guideline for performance than anything else, and this is arguably well reflected in many of today's (and

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102 There is, of course, more to this than this simplified take on this: popular musics simply do not always need notation to be analysed (nor do "classical" musics, for that matter). As if the recording is PMcy's primary text, it follows that any use of notation in its description would become a limited transcription. This is perhaps primarily what popular musicologists was (and still is) concerned about regarding notation's role in PMcy.

surely also past) performance practices of so-called classical music (as we also shall see in my own performative analyses henceforth).

Notation is, for many classical performers of today's performance cultures—especially those frequently regarded as of high esteem, I might add—more descriptive than prescriptive. This is not much more than a matter of freedom of performance, where the free interpretation of the tyrannical score—and crucially, where this interpretation somehow convinces the listener—is what by definition (of conviction) might become interesting for the listener. It is rather well-known within literary techniques of composition that oscillation between opposing poles tends to sometimes fascinate humans (and many performers recognise this, while many do not).

Anyway, my point is that WAMcy and PAMcy are not necessarily that dissimilar. We see that at least two of their "primary texts" obviously invade each other. And to be perfectly honest, the two categories might not be as closed from the start as I might have seemed to have constructed them as here (to my defence, I paradoxically have to do this simply to argue my point).

Have we not read and written enough now to raise the question as to the methodological divide between WAMcy-PMcy, or between /ˈwɑː.m.si/ and /ˈpɑː.m.si/, or even between wamsi-pamsi? Can they not at the very least be allowed to oscillate freely, if the given Author so wishes? I guess we will see whether my following analyses of Down Under and Adagio lamentoso are able to raise these questions further.
X. Analysis of Down Under

*Down Under*, the pop song, is an important and prominent cultural object of Australian popular culture. It carries enough weight among Australians that it frequently is regarded as the "unofficial [national] anthem for Australia," and it is also a commonality among Australian pub owners to turn on the song when it is time to close down their pubs. From a Norwegian perspective, it can perhaps in a certain sense be compared to the contemporary popular Norwegian reception of the popular songs of the Trønder-rock band D.D.E., at least in terms of its position in national popular consciousness (but perhaps not in terms of usefulness at alcohol-induced parties and rock festivals; *Down Under* is perhaps more like an informal national symbol for most Australians).

The social importance—and prominence—of *Down Under* in Australian popular culture can clearly be read in a televising of the closing ceremony of the 2000 Summer Olympic Games, held in Sydney (see appendix 3). Here, as if *Men at Work* were playing a cover version of their own tune (it differs considerably to their studio recording), people of all nationalities can be seen parading to the song. It is tempting to surmise that the Australian organisers of these Olympics might have thought of *Down Under* as a useful representation of Australian national identity; they wanted to show *Down Under* to the world, as it were. As if this is true, the American-accented TV commentator seems to agree that the Olympics organisers have succeeded, stating that "Down Under practically is the anthem of any swimming venue after an Aussie victory."

I form in the following analysis of *Down Under* a trichotomy of texts, and I take here on the role of a Barthian Reader of sorts, constructing a narrative which hopefully is useful and interesting to the readers of this thesis. I look at the constituent parts of this constructed trichotomy, and as a conclusion to my analysis, I construct a perspective on how they interact.

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104 *X. Analysis of Down Under* is based on a previous exam submission of mine to the UiO/IMV course MUS4605 — *Research Seminar in Popular Music*.
in a performative manner, and how they are situated according to my construction of a constructed popular musicological discourse.

The three texts I have chosen are [a] that of the audial aspects of Down Under, where I focus on the studio recording; [b] that of the audiovisual aspects of Down under, where I focus on the music video; and [c] that of the infamous legal case relating to the song, where Men At Work were found guilty of copyright infringement on the grounds of sameness between Down Under's flute riff and parts of the Australian children's tune Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree.

**Audiality (a)**

There is at least one strange thing about Down Under, the studio recording (see appendix 1). Following my above account of the song as a significant cultural object of Australia, there is a certain contradiction within it in terms of representation of identity. One might think that as a significant marker of Australian national identity, the song would carry prominent Australian sonic markers. Perhaps apart from a controversial two-bar flute motif, however, there is relatively little audial Australian-ness readily apparent in the song.

Lyrically, as a recurring feature of its choruses, the song does state that its narrator (and other characters in the song) "come from a land down under" ("down under" is a common colloquial expression for simply "Australia"). Stylistically, however, Down Under seems to carry what I argue to be an appropriated reggae beat—and reggae, as we might know, can be understood as strikingly Jamaican. Quite frankly, then: how does a white, British-Australian pop group end up appropriating black Jamaican-ness, and how does this in any way reflect an Australian national identity?

We need not look further than E. Patrick Johnson's ethnomusicological study of an "all-white, mostly atheist, Australian gospel choir" to gain a useful, nuanced, and perhaps

106 I borrow my use of the term "sonic marker" mainly from Askeroi (2013).
107 Johnson (2005: p. 59)
not that hostile perspective in terms of answers to this question. As a starting point, Johnson here questions how the Australian established tradition of gospel choir appropriates the American equivalent tradition of gospel choir. In this American tradition, most gospel choirs would most probably be all-black, mostly theist, and certainly not in any apparent way Australian. What Johnson ostensibly performs in his study, then, is in his own terms an analysis which "demonstrates the problematics of gospel performance in terms of cross-cultural appropriation, as well as the mutual benefits garnered when self and Other performatively engage one another via gospel music."\(^{108}\)

Through an analysis of numerous direct interviews with the singers of the Australian gospel choir which becomes Johnson's case, Johnson develops a perspective where the Australian gospel choir tradition becomes "no more contradictory than black, gay Republicans."\(^{109}\) This perspective is profound, as in America, political affiliation with the Republican party is frequently read (by those opposing the Republican party) as an inclination towards racism and homophobia. Still, and perhaps curiously, there exists indeed (or has existed) prominent, openly gay and black Republicans. Examples include Marc Morgan and Tim Day, who both ran for congress in 2008.

It seems crucial, in regard of the above (and below) use of the word "black," to state for the Reader that Johnson does not view blackness as a "biological essence," but rather a "racial trope"—a cultural essence which does not "belong to any one individual or group," but which nevertheless can be "appropriated to the exclusion of others," thus making "identity become political."\(^{110}\)

A common black-and-white perspective—the strangeness (and potentially racist) nature of this apparent Australian appropriation of American black culture—is simply deconstructed by Johnson's study. Johnson surmises that the popularity of Australian gospel choir

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\(^{108}\) Johnson (2005: p. 60, my emphasis).
\(^{109}\) Ibid., p. 59.
\(^{110}\) Ibid., p. 62.
may be due to the sense of community it encourages. Singing together in choirs provides an opportunity for an otherwise internationally diverse group to come together as Australians.\textsuperscript{111}

All the while the Australian gospel choir tradition does not necessarily become simply racist in its sense of appropriation, Johnson still raises questions as to the historical issues of white appropriation of blackness, where "whites have appropriated musical forms [...] without paying homage or royalties to their progenitors, [which] demonstrates the material reality by cultural usurpation in a racist and capitalist society."\textsuperscript{112}

Apart from this, there is present here also an unquestionable question about issues of authenticity. Whatever the Australian gospel choir accomplishes in terms of mimicking the American gospel choir musically (which, for that matter, according to Johnson's field work kind of works out), they will never become all-black, mostly theist American choirs. The Australian gospel choir is more than a combination of Australian-ness and American-ness, and in terms of this, at least, it might make no sense to even call it a gospel choir. The sum is greater than its parts [sic]. In more pragmatic terms, however, this might make sense; Australian gospel choirs are, after all, singing religious "black" cultural currency without really making a big point out of it—there is no need to do that, and perhaps in their eyes, this is unproblematic and not really that strange.

My interest in investigating the appropriation issues pertaining to Down Under is similar to the interests which sparked Johnson's study. I will here investigate how an Australian Self works against a Jamaican Other. The following limited transcription of a salient point in Down Under points towards the song's Jamaican-ness, and serves as a limited presentation of the reggae influences present in the song:

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., p. 80.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p. 60.
A striking sonic marker of a Jamaican musical style and identity can be heard in the above notated motif present in Electric guitar 1 (look for the semiquavers), which is repeated across *Down Under*, and which as such becomes a vital part of the song's Self. This motif becomes a sonic marker of Jamaican-ness insofar this motif is strikingly reminiscent of the Jamaican reggae drum and bass riddim (the Other), which is constituted in large parts by the drum and bass patterns of Jamaican reggae music, and which is a prominent sonic marker of its stylistic identity.

Such Jamaican *riddims* can fruitfully—that is, in the service of this analysis—be reduced to the following characterisation: the bass part can be thought of as a repetitive pattern consisting of a succession of short notes, which are followed by rests on stressed beats. In the case of Bob Marley and The Wailer's *Three Little Birds*, for instance, we see a clear instance of this:
In *Three Little Birds*, the drum set works in tandem with the above bass pattern, which also rests on beats which for the listener usually become stressed (in this case the third beat of a 4/4 metre). The bass and the drums work, then, in conjunction with each other, creating the riddim together. What, however, stresses the beat if there is nothing there but rests? Davis, in his description of the 1968-1975 reggae groove, argues that a

...guitar pattern [provides] persistent counterpoint to the bass and drum riddims. The chords of the guitar and keyboard [mesh] so that their accents [take] on reggae's characteristic pulse-like metre.¹¹³

Electric guitar 2 of *Down Under*, in the absence of a *Down Under* keyboard, provides Davis' counterpoint to the song's riddim. It marks the third beat of its 4/4 metre consistently throughout *Down Under* much like e.g. the keyboard (or organ) present in *Three Little Birds*, creating a strictly rhythmic counterpoint (that is: not a fugal counterpoint or anything like that, which among other things would involve tonality as well), and which as such points towards a reggae style. Straying beyond my above transcription of *Down Under*, additional guitars (a third and even a fourth) can be heard entering at certain points in the song—especially in its choruses and interludes—working against the riddim-like Electric guitars 1 & 2, producing a reggae-like beat.

The reggae-like beat, which becomes a part of the song's Self (as it is present throughout most of the song), and which at the same time becomes a central appropriation of Jamaican (black) signs, continually works against other parts of *Down Under's* Self. And these other parts can be understood as strikingly Australian (or white). Such white sonic markers include the drum set and electric bass parts, which as we might sense from my above transcription, become quite rock-like. The drum set and electric bass parts, then, form an opposing pole to *Down Under's* established reggae-like characteristics.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Davis (2001).
¹¹⁴ If the rock-like interplay of the drum set and the electric bass becomes white here, however, we might note that, historically, the origins of rock—stretching back towards the blues—rather easily can be argued to be black.
A more detailed description of *Down Under's* rock-like *Self* can—transcending my transcription—be heard within the very sonic mix of the drum set and electric bass. Here, in the kick drum, we hear a powerful thud-like sound on beats 1 and 3 which stands in stark contrast to that which can frequently is found within the reggae style (the kick drum here is frequently subtler, round, and damped in its sonic character; it is more unpredictable in its rhythmic patterns). Moreover, the repetitive rhythmic pattern of a powerful-sounding snare drum, falling consistently on beats 2 and 4, is more or less unheard of within reggae, as is the predictability and repetitiveness of *Down Under's* hi-hat and shaker patterns. As for the bass guitar: its habit of strictly performing quarter notes and chordal roots on beats 1–4 hinders any idea of a *riddim*, and becomes a prominent marker of Australian whiteness.

On yet another level than that which can fruitfully be represented by notation, we see yet another dichotomy between *Down Under* and e.g. *Three Little Birds*. The high tempo of the former, which is almost dance-like in character—as well as its energised *feet* from micro-rhythmic 115 considerations—are different to the slow and laid-back (and perhaps cannabis-induced) micro-rhythmic character and *feet* of the latter.

It is furthermore possible to read in *Down Under* a striking case of appropriation of language. In its lead vocalist's very pronunciation of lyrics, we hear a mimicking of Jamaican patois: most salient is perhaps the lead vocalist's pronunciation of that which would be the RP consonant /d/, which consistently is performed as an /l/. Moreover, the RP vowel /ɑ/ becomes in the lead vocalist's performance of Jamaican patois almost an /e/. Besides the opposition between a rock-like and a reggae-like style, the pronunciation of *Down Under's* lyrics create further opposition between an Australian *Self* and a Jamaican *Other*. For today's listener, lyrics and lead vocal melodic lines are arguably that which becomes the most important and therefore salient parts of the song. Perhaps, then—and besides my previous discussion of style—it is this recurring phonetic performance which is the most salient or "important," case of appropriation across *Down Under*.

We see, then, a general and recurring oscillatory effect in *Down Under* from whiteness to blackness. *Down Under* oscillates between a sense of its Australian Self and the Jamaican Other. In some intertextual sense, *Men At Work* are not alone in appropriating the reggae style. The English pop group UB40, for instance, base their instrumental performative style, their pronunciation of lyrics, and even their lead vocal tone (nasality) heavily on what one might read in e.g. Bob Marley's music. UB40 perform and appropriate this reggae style so effectively that it would hard to imagine that this band even is English (unless told so). Clear instances of such appropriation can be heard in UB40's hit *Red Red Wine*, as well as e.g. *Kingston Town* (it seems appropriate to remind the reader here that Kingston is the capital city of Jamaica).

We find instances of reggae appropriation which also are local to Norway. The Norwegian group *Manna*, for instance, base much of their instrumental style heavily on the idea of *riddim*, and their style of vocal performance—much like UB40—arguably appropriates the vocal style of Bob Marley (in particular his tendency to sing with a nasal tone, then). Prominent examples can be read in e.g. *Kikerter og Ris*, as well as *Vi vil ikke ha mer krig*, where the former even includes direct citations of a Bob-Marlian motivic style, as well as an instance of an utterance in a—to me, at least—unknown language which differs from the Northern Norwegian dialect which form the basis of most of *Manna*'s performances.

Is any of this problematic in terms of the politics of appropriation? Here, we might borrow from Johnson's conclusion regarding the (initially) strange tradition of Australian gospel choirs. While UB40 and Manna hardly become national symbols of their respective countries—and as such, we might see here simply a borrowing of style or (arguably extremely high degrees of) stylistic intertextuality—*Down Under* becomes quite interesting in terms of its use of black (or perhaps rather Jamaican) cultural currency.

We see in the case of *Down Under* that Jamaican cultural currency has become vital in the construction of an informal national anthem for Australian popular culture. This has happened without any noticeable homage to Jamaica; this case of appropriation has ostensibly simply not been problematised to any large degree before, and there is little available evidence as to what the people of Jamaica—arguably a David versus an Australian Goliath on
the world stage—actually feel about this. One might surmise, however, that the lessons learned from the widely historicised white appropriation of jazz and blues musics point—in Down Under's case, at least—towards a precarious issue in terms of identity politics.

**Audiovisuality (b)**

The analysis of music videos—the articulation of meaning extraction from them—has recently become a central concern of popular musicology. While Hawkins & Richardson in 2007 noted that "surprisingly little scholarly work on pop videos have been forthcoming,"\textsuperscript{116} we see in current popular music discourse a recent surge in interest for this approach to music analysis.\textsuperscript{117} The methodology behind audiovisual analysis is in large part founded on connecting audiovisual phenomena to social representation, and such analyses are performed through interpreting the musical and visual coding present in the given music video. Such coding serves as nothing more than a vehicle to ultimately discussing issues in society; the concern, then, is not primarily found within an autonomous perspective on music (videos) where weight is put on formal description. We see with the music video analyst primarily an interest in generating relevant societal critique from the reading of texts (or in this case, then: music videos).

A prime example of this in can be found in Marita B. Djupvik's journal article *Naturalizing Male Authority and the Power of the Producer*.\textsuperscript{118} Here, Djupvik problematises the male producer's authority (or power) over female artists. This power relationship becomes evidenced through a trichotomy of the lyrical cues, the musical cues, and the visual action present in Nelly Furtado's music video *Promiscuous*, as produced by Justin Timberlake. We see in Djupvik's journal article a perspective on how the interplay between Furtado and Timberlake serves as a representation (or naturalisation) of male authority over women, especially in music production, which as of today is heavily gendered (towards maleness).

\textsuperscript{116} Hawkins & Richardson (2007: p. 605).
\textsuperscript{117} See in this regard for instance the forthcoming status of the *The Bloomsbury Handbook of Popular Music Video Analysis*, edited by Stan Hawkins and Lori Burns.
\textsuperscript{118} Djupvik (2015).
While there hardly are any women at all in the music video of Down Under (see appendix 2), it can—at least by virtue of its informal status as a national symbol of Australia—arguably serve as a representation of certain facets of Australian identity. In particular, we can read from Down Under prominent markers of the nature of white Australian masculinity.

Formally, the music video includes an introductory scene, 7 scenes proper, and an outro scene. Shifts between these scenes are abrupt in the sense that they include locations and/or visual action that differ vastly from each other. Furthermore, a curious case of desynchronization between audio and video (in particular in the form of faulty lip-syncing) can be read throughout Down Under. This desynchronization works in tandem with visual synchronisation, and helps supports Down Under's non-sensical visual-lyrical narrative, creating an effect perhaps similar to Richardson's description of "uncanniness" in his take on surrealism:

Surrealism, in my view, is a cluster of ideas (rather than a unitary ‘code’) whose genealogy extends back to the French interwar movement and whose principal modus operandi involves the defamiliarisation of something familiar, causing us to perceive it differently. Surreal effects are often achieved through strategies of de-and recontextualisation; the placing of familiar objects (often originating in popular culture) in unfamiliar contexts, resulting in strange or ‘uncanny’ effects (cf. the Situationists’ tactics of détournement). The logic of surrealism resembles dream logic, insofar as ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ relations are knowingly subverted.  

The introductory scene of Down Under takes place in the desert, with Men At Work's drummer playing on a set of bottles, mimicking the Jamaican reggae upbeat (which usually is played on tightly tuned timbales). The immediate effect from reading this scene is that of a subversion of cause and effect, similar to that which Richardson describes above: we hear in the audio ostensibly not bottles (rather, we hear timbale-like drums), and at the same time as Men At Work's drummer fails to hit his bottles, the reggae-like upbeat continues unhindered.

*Down Under's* first scene proper, much like its introductory scene, takes place in the Australian outback or desert, and becomes as such a clear signifier of (male pop star) Australian-ness. In Young's terms, this would point towards the predominance of rural and coastal associations in the imagery of Australian male pop performers contained in music videos, in which men as solo performers or as part of a band have generally preferred to sing to the desert [...].

The visual action in this scene includes a "fried out" car known in Australia as a "combi" (an abbreviated expression for "combination van"). It travels through the Australian desert in a carefree manner (on "a hippie trail"). The carefree character of this journey throughout the outback is emphasised when the combi breaks down, and when it is revealed that it carries a group of weary men, "head full of zombie," in its back.

The lyrical phrase "head full of zombie" suggests that the men present in this scene are under the influence of drugs, in particular that of cannabis (to have one's "head full of zombie" is an Australian colloquial expression for being under the heavy influence of the drug). This notion is reinforced as the driver of the combi, in seeming drug-induced panic, runs through the desert, where he encounters "a strange lady" who gives him "breakfast." As the song's first chorus is introduced, this "strange lady" asks whether the combi driver "come[s] from a land down under," inferring that all of the above behaviour is typical of white Australian males. Towards the end of the scene featuring this strange lady, we see in the case of *Down Under* a rare interplay between the feminine and the masculine (the strange lady is the music video's sole woman): she rolls her eyes at the combi driver, who apparently did not pay attention as she was asking her question.

This non-sensical, or perhaps in Richardson's terms, surreal opening of *Down Under*, sets the stage for much of the rest of the music video. Moving onto its third scene, which overlaps with *Down Under's* first chorus, we see an Australian land-grabber who carries a sign which reads "sold," and who as such seems intent upon stealing land from the indigenous

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people of Australia. In short order, as this male land-grabber forcefully erects his sign, we experience a break with expectations: the indigenous people he dispossesses are revealed to be a group of all-white male Australians.

The power held by (colonial) whites in Australia, as it is projected onto Australian Aborigines, is following emphasised by an interplay of visual action and lyrical cues. The land-grabber warns this group of all-white male Australians that they "better run, [and] better take cover." They should all be able to "hear the thunder" approaching, as he points his finger at the horizon.

The fourth scene of *Down Under* features Men At Work's flautist, sitting in an old gum tree like a kookaburra bird, playing the flute motif which by the end of the 2000's would lead to severe legal consequences for Men At Work. A hung koala furthermore dangles from the gum tree, hiding the flautist's ostensibly de-synchronised flute fingering. At the very same time, the flautist's bodily movements, which become dance-like, is synchronised to the beat of *Down Under*.

In the following scene, the narrator "[buys] bread from a man in Brussels" who is "six-foot-four and full of muscles" in a Brussels shop. As the narrator, expecting this Belgian man to be French-speaking, asks whether he speaks English ("do you speak-a my language?"), he is simply handed a vegemite sandwich (a common Australian food). The "man in Brussels" is subsequently revealed to in fact be an Australian migrant ("I come from a land down under"), and as the chorus is re-introduced, a feeling of Australian comradeship emerges, complete with the spilling of beer and the consumption of alcohol (and flower pots).

As the interlude of *Down Under* plays, the sixth scene of the music video is shown. We are now back in the desert, with three of *Men At Work's* band members digging into it with toy shovels, and with the hung koala now attached to the flautist's body. As one of the remaining band members attempts to dance, the other juggles three Australian citrus fruits. This non-sensical and humorous nature of Australian masculinity is emphasised as *Men At Work* collectively jumps away from the screen and into the desert like kangaroos. A sense of Australian-ness in *Down Under* is as such underscored.
The seventh scene of *Down Under* takes place "in a den in Bombay," which is filled with white, male Australians. The theme returns to Australian male drug (ab-)use as the narrator asks whether the present Indian drug dealer is "trying to tempt me," before stating that "I come from the land of plenty." As this supposedly Indian drug dealer immediately recognises the narrator's nationality, he is revealed to in fact be a fellow, white Australian man. Following this, we see a powerful synchronisation between audio and video. As the third and final chorus of *Down Under* plays, the lights within the Indian drug den are turned on, and the "Indian" drug dealer—now quite excited to have discovered a group of fellow Australians—directs his newfound mates to leave the dangerous situation of the Bombay drug den. Opium-induced stupor notwithstanding, they are rushed towards the exit, and they crash like a train-wreck into a door which seems to be locked.

The desert is centralised again in the outro of *Down Under*. Here, *Men At Work* (dressed in white) walks through it in a carefree manner all the while a team of roadies (dressed in black) carry their heavy flight case. The video's only black person follows the roadies—and whips them like a slave driver. Nature/culture is furthermore broken down as a power line—in the middle of the precious Australian desert—is made visible towards the edges of the screen. The outro reads as kind of Monty Python-esque, leaning on non-sensical British humour.

There are a number of opposing poles readily apparent in *Down Under* (i.e. [de-]synchronisation, violent narrative turns between scenes, and surreal visual action which does not really become impossible). These opposing poles can either be read as uncanny or satirical, and as with its audial oscillation between a reggae and a rock, the music video oscillates between that which becomes kind of creepy and that which becomes simply funny.

While the music video might operate within a creepy/funny dichotomy rhetorically, its subject matter is more sincere: it becomes through this audiovisual analysis a representation of Australian masculinity. *Down Under* brings into light for the individual Reader societal issues as diverse as male drug (ab-)use, markers of nationality (i.e. kangaroos), the dominance of male whiteness in Australia, and heteronormative sexuality (i.e. the "strange lady").
As a conclusion to this audiovisual analysis, I will present Mr Lancaster's view on *Down Under*. Mr Lancaster served as the legal counsel for Larrikin Music Publishing over the course of the infamous legal case which impugned *Down Under* (which will be introduced shortly). He interestingly provided the Court with the following analysis:

Mr Lancaster described *Down Under* as an affectionate celebration of, and a witty commentary on, some of the icons of Australian popular culture, with a sharp edge that takes aim at Australian gender stereotypes. He said that this is apparent in the lyrics of *Down Under* and that it is just as pronounced in the video released with the 1981 recording. He submitted that the same references occur musically (Par. 210).

**Copyright issues ©**

EMI songs Australia, Colin James Hay, and Ronald Graham Strykert—henceforth *Men At Work*—were in 2011 found guilty of copyright infringement following their appeal to the Federal Court of Australia ["Høyesterett"][121]. This appeal was motioned following a 2010 judicial conclusion that two 1979 and 1982 impugned recordings of *Down Under* infringed on the copyright Larrikin Music Publishing held and holds to the 1932 Australian children's song *Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree*. This judicial conclusion was reached on the grounds of similarity between parts of the two songs: more specifically, the musical material found to infringe on Larrikin Music Publishing's rights were two bars of *Down Under's* flute part. Following the Federal Court's verdict, *Men At Work* were denied any chance at further appeal by the Full Federal Court.

The court case stirred great controversy in Australia and generated widespread media coverage both domestically and internationally. A high point in this controversy can be read in a news article where Colin James Hay raises the question as to whether the outcome of the case contributed to *Down Under's* flautist's yield to alcoholism and eventual death.[122] In the following analysis of the court case as text, I will mainly refer the 2010 ruling where *Men At

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Work first were found guilty of infringing on the rights of Larrikin. As my references to this case are numerous onwards, I will rely (and have already relied) in my own text on in-text references which follow the paragraph numbering system present in the 2010 court documents.

The aim of the following analysis is to conduct a short reading of the musicological-discursive background on which this ruling was made. Crucially, in this regard, Dr Andrew Ford, the "expert musicologist called by Larrikin" (par. 13), transcribed the following passages from both Kookaburra and Down Under:

In assessing the motivic similarity between bars 1 & 4 of Down Under and bars respectively bars 1 and 2, the present judge concluded that there was a "sufficient degree of objective similarity which are seen and heard in Down Under to amount to a reproduction of a part of [Kookaburra]" (par. 157) And this very conclusion was key to the judge's subsequent and final opinion that Men At Work did indeed infringe on Larrikin's rights. Speaking in 2010

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123 FCA 29 (2010).
popular musicological terms, the above reading of *Down Under* is—of course—rather outrageous.

What is immediately apparent from the above treatment of *Down Under* and *Kookaburra* is that it seems to have been conducted from an analytical perspective where an absurd version of some Moorian notation-centred primary textual view dominated. Here, only abstractions of pitch and rhythm really mattered—and somehow, this was established as the local current Foucauldian episteme present in this Court. If there is a difference between the common Moorian and the judge, however, it must be in the form of the complete disregard for any notion of even the existence of a secondary text. This not only on the musicologically ignorant judge's part, but also both "expert musicologists" that were called as witnesses to the Court. Put another way: there can quite obviously be more to the comparison between *Down Under* and *Kookaburra* than motivic similarity. Exactly how did the judge construct such a strange final opinion as above, then?

The judge did, of course, consider other musical parameters than what he chose to term "melody;" among these are aural (on the grounds of the recordings) and visual (on the grounds of transcriptions) interpretations of the similarities between *Down Under* and *Kookaburra* in terms of "key, tempo, harmony, and structure" (par. 160). Or in other words: that which can be represented through notation alone. The construction of a polychotomy where this (limited) analytical perspective dominates can in large parts be traced back to Dr Ford's statements, who, after explaining to the Court the very basics of music theory, steered all discussion—consciously or not—towards a limited primary-textual analytical perspective. Dr Ford's following statement seems to be a turning point in the dramatic narrative progression present in the court documents:

> The melody is identical, but the chord that underpins it is different, and gives a slightly different feeling ... it's a bit like shining a different light on it (par. 130).

As a notation-centred dichotomy between melody and harmony is introduced, the "expert musicological witness called by Larrikin" (par. 13) manages to set the stage for the
nature of any ensuing analytical discussion. The opposing poles of opinion are hence convincingly constructed as disagreement/agreement within a discourse of notational representation. The "expert witness" called by *Men At Work*—a Mr Armringer—cannot compete against Dr Ford's analytical arguments, and the judge is, then, as such convinced that *Men At Work*'s

1979 recording and [...] 1981 recording of Down Under infringe Larrikin's copyright in Kookaburra because both of those recordings reproduce a substantial part of Kookaburra (par. 337).

That the judge—the actor which most obviously wields power here—comes across as strikingly incompetent even within a limited primary textual analytical discourse is perhaps to be expected. Nevertheless, this did not in this case help *Men At Work* (the actor which most obviously do not wield any power here) and the subsequent dire—perhaps even unreasonable—consequences they faced following this court case.

We see here a clear instance of the *very real* social consequence the common fethisising of music as formal structure can lead to. In this case, then, the sociocultural aspects of *Down Under* (but also *Kookaburra*) were simply eschewed by the Court. In terms of this, and as an opposing pole to the Court's final conclusion, we can perhaps conclude that *Kookaburra*—which original function was to serve as a Victorian Girl Guides' song (par. 122)—in no way can be similar to the national anthem-like, reggae-ish, culturally appropriating, and visually full-of-drugs'n'alcohol concept of *Down Under*.

In concluding this analysis of the 2010 court case as text, I will present Elisabeth Adeney's view on some of the societal effects this ruling had on Australia. Writing for the Deakin Law Review, she notes that

[the outcome caused significant disquiet in the musical and broader communities, since it was widely felt that what the band had done was both trivial and artistically acceptable. Although the work was still in copyright, the author was long dead. One of the judges of the Full Federal Court expressed his unease at the outcome, suggesting that changes to the law might be appropriate.]

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124 Adeney (2012: p. 341, my emphasis)
Analysis of Down Under analyses \((a + b + c) + d\)

The above three analyses take on three quite different perspectives. While they of course cannot to tell the whole story—nor give a coherent explanation—as to what *Down Under* is, they ostensibly show how *Down Under* might become. [sic]. Minding my epistemological starting points (especially the "metamodern" one), we might choose to perhaps think of them as a deliberate failed attempt at a holistic account of *Down Under*, then. Despite their apparent difference, there is a case of interplay between all three perspectives. In a sense, we might think of this as the three perspectives depending on each other. If these "perspectives" are texts, they lie near each other in some intertextual network (or simply a trichotomy).

Analysis [a] takes on a seemingly Moorian primary textual perspective, apparently focusing on the old-fashioned musicological fascination with music as simply sound. What we ostensibly see in this analysis, however, is that the secondary and primary texts intertwine. The presence of textual level (primary/secondary) oscillates between their such respective extremes, producing a text which gathers a perspective on the appropriation issues pertaining to *Down Under*.

Analysis [b] is largely concerned with identity, and how this is represented by *Down Under* as music video. Here, *what music just is [musikkbegrepet]* is transformed towards that of context, and would perhaps in Solomon's term approach the extreme "contextualist" pole in popular musicology (not popular music studies): we see no apparent focus on music as simply sound, but rather music. Nevertheless, it depends on analyses [a] and [c] occasionally, making references to its reggae-like character (this includes drug [ab-]use) and the 2010 legal case. As such, we see some oscillation towards [a] and [c] in the case of [b]. Analysis [c] is heavily dependent on [a] and [b]. Its very conclusion rests on the veracity of the *Down Under's* contextual features so as to negate an apparent problematic view on the song as simply formal structure. Analysis [c] would obviously lose its purpose without [a] and [b].

Throughout all analyses, we see a trajectory of loss of power on Men at Work's part, where they start out in [a] as a possible antagonist, appropriating foreign cultural currency from an ostensibly less powerful . In analysis [b], *Men At Work* assumes a relatively "neutral"
role, where they function as societal critiquing Authors before a potential readership. Towards analysis [c], they obviously hold the role of a(n) (apparently losing) protagonist, where the power of the Australian (Federal) Court dominates.
Y. Analysis of Pathétique: IV. Adagio lamentoso

Tchaikovsky's sixth symphony has been shrouded in musicological-interpretive mystery from its first public performance in 1893 and up to recent times. The easily construed correlation between the symphony’s apparent tragic subject matter and the composer’s death—which occurred a mere nine days after the symphony’s premiere—has produced a volume of sometimes contrasting accounts of just what this symphony means. And the enigmatic character of this symphony is certainly not helped by Tchaikovsky himself alluding to a “programme that will remain a riddle for everybody” in a well-known letter to his nephew Vladimir ‘Bob’ Davydov, wherein the composer moreover states that “the symphony will be entitled Programnnaya simfonia (No. 6); Symphonie à Programme (No. 6); Eine Programm-Symphonie (No. 6).”125

Towards the end of the 20th century, the above mystery gave rise to a musicological quest for the Truth behind Pathétique and its hidden programme, which often entailed linking the symphony to the circumstances surrounding the composer’s death. In relation to this, two divergent and oppositional Foucauldian discourses can be identified: that which understood the symphony as a representation of Tchaikovsky’s homosexuality and ensuing suicide, and that which, as a reactive force, firmly asserted the Tchaikovskean suicide as dubious (and at least kind of uninteresting in any attempt at understanding the sixth symphony). The former discourse can be traced to Alexandra Orlova, a Soviet musicologist who once emigrated to the West, and who in 1981 introduced the idea that Tchaikovsky was sentenced to suicide by a “court of honour” composed of “[some of] Tchaikovsky’s former school-friends” at the prestigious St. Petersburg School of Jurisprudence.126

The background for this death sentence was, according to Orlova, a threat from Duke Stenbok-Fermor, who was “disturbed by the [homosexual?] attention which the composer was paying to his young nephew.”127 As such, the Duke wrote a “letter of accusation” intended for

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125 Tchaikovsky cited in Ritzarev (2014: 1)
127 Ibid., p. 133.
the Tsar wherein the composer, “through exposure”, would risk the “loss of all his rights,” “exile to Siberia”, and “inevitable disgrace.” Fortunately (or not) for Tchaikovsky, one of his former classmates at the School of Jurisprudence, now a high-ranking civil servant, was in this case to be the Duke’s messenger. As such, he was able to provide the composer with the option of suicide, so that he could... "preserve" his "honour"—according to Orlova.129

The Orlova affair, as it were, was by the end of the 1980’s subject to intense scrutiny and criticism mainly fronted by Tchaikovsky biographer Alexander Poznansky. As of today, Orlova’s story might seem to have been rejected by most Tchaikovsky scholars as pure fiction (whether Orlova acted in good faith or not is another story).130 This does not, however, preclude the fact that the Orlova affair gained traction among some musicologists, paving way for the suicide myth into volumes such as the 1986 edition of The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, as well as giving rise to heated correspondences in scholarly journals.131

While the music-historical aspects surrounding Tchaikovsky's very last piece of music is interesting (and important, I think, to at least mention here), the following analysis will as stated elsewhere not take on a music-historical focus. It will not even consider the symphony as a whole; I will here analyse only its last movement (Adagio lamentoso, that is).

Much like in my analysis of Down Under I will attempt here to construct a trichotomy of different analytical perspectives of Adagio lamentoso—and analyse them as text. In detail, I will look at the symphonic movement as a [a] formal structure [b] as drama from metaphorical projection, and [c] as three performances. The conclusion of this analysis will attempt to see how these three perspectives interact and inform one another.

128 Ibid.
130 See e.g. Bullock (2015) or Poznansky (2015).
Formal structure (a)

The following formal analysis will deal with Adagio lamentoso (see appendix 4 and 7) on two levels: that of the lower-level segment, and that of the overarching form. Lower-level segments are here constructed in terms of interpreted sameness and difference between certain parameters found within the score,\textsuperscript{132} while the overarching form will be built on interpreted sameness and difference between my constructed lower-level segments.

In his analysis of the formal structures of Rachmaninov's symphonies, Asbjørn Eriksen notes that

\begin{quote}
I musikkverk av så høy kompleksitet som Rachmaninovs symfonier vil det være svært tidkrevende og neppe særlig interessant å kartlegge så mange som mulig av strukturelementene.\textsuperscript{133}
\end{quote}

While Adagio lamentoso arguably cannot be understood as that "complex" in structural terms, I will adopt Eriksen's above approach in my method of segmentation of it. Trying to lay bare every possible structural interconnection for the Reader might be rather pointless, even for structures of seemingly little "complexity;" my main concern here is somehow informing analyses [b] and [c], at the same time as I provide a hopefully potentially interesting text from formal analysis in itself.

How will I proceed in segmenting Adagio lamentoso? What parameters will I focus on in constructing sameness and difference? In identifying segments, I will mainly look for differences in texture, as well as differences in orchestration. Texture is here understood as the way in which a reduction of the full score to SATB voices interact as counterpoint and/or four-part homophony—and homophony is in the following analyses usually understood in terms of more or less traditional 4-part harmony.\textsuperscript{134} Orchestration will furthermore be

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\textsuperscript{132} See Eriksen (2009: p. 149) for an account of how sameness and difference often contribute to segmenting in the formal analysis of music. Here, sameness and difference is understood in terms of "[grad] av tidsmessig nærhet," "store endfringer i ett eller flere av de musikalske 'parametrene'," "symmetri," and "parallelitet."

\textsuperscript{133} Eriksen (2009: p. 143).

\textsuperscript{134} see e.g. Hyer's (2001) account of this, where he claims that "it has been generally assumed that all tonal music, including melodic imitation, can be represented in terms of a four-part texture and heard as chorale-like successions of harmonies."
understood as the realisation of such textures. As such, I will not simply take into account the pitch and rhythm read from the score, but also the probable musicking and audible result in performance.

The contrapuntal aspects of Tchaikovsky's symphonies have (only) recently attracted scholarly attention: in his dr. philos thesis, Svein Hundsnes views these works mainly through the lens of this form of texture.\textsuperscript{135} While Hundsnes constructs a typology of counterpoint suited for his own analyses, the very term "counterpoint" is moreover quite ambiguous in current musicological discourse. It can be taken to mean as different things as the polyphonic styles of Palestrina or Bach (or Valen), and—as with the concept of 4-part writing—it is dominantly defined by a more or less disparate field of pedagogical textbooks on the subject matter. In the following analysis, I will simply adhere to Kennan's definition of common-practice counterpoint, where it is understood as constituting at least two independent melodic lines.\textsuperscript{136} “Independence” is here chiefly understood in terms of differences between such melodic lines in terms melodic curve and rhythm. At the same time, there will be an element of sameness between such parameters, as well as sameness between the general melodic style and harmonic background which these melodic lines are built upon (or alternatively produce in tandem).

It follows from the above that I will largely neglect describing the harmonic aspects of \textit{Adagio lamentoso} in any detail. I choose this approach as there is little modulation in the movement, and as I take its harmonic progressions to as such provide little of interest in terms of sameness and difference to my above method of segmentation. This does not apply to passages where harmony is identified as a prominent marker of sameness/difference, however.

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{135} Hundsnes (2014).
\textsuperscript{136} Kennan (1999).
ADAGIO LAMENTOSO AS SEGMENTS AND OVERARCHING FORM

The first four bars of *Adagio lamento* feature segment A1, which in textural terms can be reduced to a set of descending four-part SATB parallel block chords. The four voices which comprise the descending block chords of this segment are furthermore scored across the string orchestra (with the exception of basses) so that violins I/II and violas/celli respectively cross each other by each successive note. As these parallel block chords reach their phrasal conclusions, they receive a response in the form of entrances of a secondary alto voice, scored for all three flutes and both bassoons. Figure 1 below shows an SAATB reduction of the above, while figure 2 represents the composer's orchestration of the SATB parallel block chords as scored in strings.

![Figure 1](image)

While Tchaikovsky’s crossing maneuver here may look rather dazzling on paper, today’s usual audible result in terms of performance is that the crossing string parts coalesce in a way that makes it hard to notice that they actually cross. Most string sections of today’s orchestras are arguably seated in the following order, from left to right: V1, V2, Vla., Vc. (with Db. somewhere behind Vc.)—or alternatively V1, V2, Vc.; Vla. Why all this crisscrossing, then? A plausible explanation to this is that Tchaikovsky anticipated that V1/V2 would be seated on opposing sides of the conductor, so that a clear ping-pong stereo effect as their voices cross each other. Historically, this seating arrangement was more common in the 19th century than today.
A shift in texture and the introduction of a new motif (fig. 3) gives rise to segment B1 (bb. 5–8). Here, strings (now joined by basses) are asked by Tchaikovsky to musick in a traditional four-part SATB chorale texture (now governed by more traditional voice-leading conventions). Moreover, the secondary alto voice of A1 is continued, and now takes on a clear melodic role as it works contrapuntally against the string SATB texture in the form of a rhythmically independent, mostly descending melodic line (discontinued by ascending leaps), providing upbeats against the string SATB texture. As an enrichment of the harmonic situation of B1, this secondary alto voice alternates between consonance and dissonance against the triadic harmonic fundament provided by the string section.

Across bb. 9–11, the latter half of the B1 motif (fig. 3) is transformed by diminution, and we see as such here a short development of segment B. Over the course of this developmental passage, the ascending motion of the soprano voice of the string SATB, continually transposed by thirds, works increasingly contrapuntally against the increasingly dominant secondary alto voice (which moves by step and leaps)—eventually, it competes with the soprano line for perceptual saliency in the listener (fig. 4).
Across this development of B1, a gradual thickening of the secondary alto part occurs in terms of orchestration; both clarinets and both oboes provide here a doubling of the secondary alto part, entering successively as upbeats to bb. 10 and 11. As tension gradually increases in terms of motivic direction and dynamics, a structural high point in b. 12 is anticipated.¹³⁸

The structural high point in b. 12 gives rise to segment C1 (bb. 12–18). This segment features a forte-fortissimo woodwind tutti in octaves which in effect takes over the soprano part previously held by the first violins. As this woodwind tutti onwards introduces a fortspunnet step-wise descending melodic line (which motivically is a development of the soprano voice in A1) [fig. 5], the string SATB takes an accompanying role while the woodwind tutti—octave doublings notwithstanding—plays above the string orchestra. The overall texture, then, is transformed from SAATB and into SSATB. First violins—now taking on the secondary soprano part—again move in thirds, working together with the rest of the strings so as to form a counterpoint against the now primary soprano woodwind line.

¹³⁸ For an interesting discussion on structural high points, see Agawu (1984).
Following a short “general pause” in the form of a crotchet rest across the entire orchestra, A1 is reintroduced by means of a transitionary “upbeat” (b. 19). A crossing of string orchestra parts texturally reminiscent of A1 return here in the form of this “upbeat” and arrive at an exact repetition of segment A1 in bb. 20–23.

Immediately following this repetition of A1, a variant of B1 is introduced—segment B2 (bb. 24–29). While much remains the same in B2 as compared to B1—both textural and the secondary alto ideas return—the soprano line is now transposed by descending thirds (as opposed to ascending thirds in B1), and the flutes are no longer involved in realising the secondary alto voice. Moreover, over the course of this segment, the orchestration in strings is lightened; violins II and violas are gradually removed.

Segment C2 (bb. 30–36) features a fortspunnet descending melodic line and similar textural attributes to C1. A main difference between C1 and C2, however, is that the fortspunnet descending line is scored as a "solo" for both bassoons (alternatively, perhaps a "bassoon soli"). The previous lightening of orchestration in the string orchestra is furthermore emphasised dynamically by means of a general gradual diminuendo.

As the bassoon soli reaches a conclusion in b. 35, a modulation to the relative major of B minor (until now the key) is subtly prepared by means of a chromatic movement in horn II, which in tandem with static strings transforms the overall harmonic situation—the key—towards that of D major (fig. 6).
Following a short general pause across the orchestra, the listener is introduced to a transition in the form of repetitive syncopated triplets in horns I and II (bb. 33–34), an idea that will return many times throughout *Adagio lamentoso*. As these triplets imply a prolonging of the A major chord in b. 36, they gravitate towards the new tonal centre (D major). The harmonic transition from these horn triplets to the first beat in b. 39 is ambiguous, however, and provides little resolution of the preceding A major chord; as strings and woodwinds enter, we see in effect a II7 (or E minor seventh) chord, introduced via the new tonic (or a D major chord) on the third and weak beat of b. 38. Meanwhile, the triplets function as pedal point to the harmony produced by the strings.

**Segment D1** (bb. 37–46) introduces of a new motif in the soprano voice. This new motif is more or less reminiscent of the soprano voice motif present in A1 (in that its descending motion comprises a fourth). The texture here is contrapuntal, which consists of either three or four voices (fig. 8), depending on what is understood as "melodic."
The soprano line in the above reduction is scored for violins I and violas, the alto voice for woodwinds (bassoons and clarinets), and the bass voice for celli and basses. The contrapuntal interplay between these voices is characterised by restated motifs which coincide in their repetitiveness. Thus, we may perhaps speak of a "cellular" counterpoint across D1. Moreover, and interestingly, we see in the first four bars of D1 a free canon at the fourth between the soprano and bass voices. Here, the first half of *comes* is written as free counterpoint, while the second half is a more direct imitation of *dux*.

For the better part of this segment, the horns continue realising their pedal point triplets, and produce as such a static tenor voice. Towards the end of segment D1, however, this tenor voice becomes an active melodic line, changing its role towards that of a clearly active participant in the contrapuntal texture.

In **segment D2** (bb. 47–55), the contrapuntal texture is continued with the same amount of voices as in D1. A difference here, however, is that the melodic material previously heard in the tenor voice is continued in the alto voice, while the tenor voice continues the free canon previously heard in the bass voice, now as a (stricter than) free canon at the unison. Here, the first half of *comes* omits a few notes, producing a leap instead of a stepwise descending line, while the latter half simply is in strict imitation.

With the exception of the soprano line, then, we see a downwards shift in the continuation of melodic material, where the alto voice invades the tenor voice, and where the tenor voice invades the bass voice. This shift of melodic continuation naturally stops at the bass voice,
where we instead see a new bass line. Thus, a clear 4-part contrapuntal texture across this segment emerges.

As compared to D1, the orchestration of voices in D2 is in general terms thicker. The soprano voice is now doubled at both the unison and the octave (below) by violins II, which serve as a reinforcement of both violins I and violas. The tenor voice is realised by means of overlap, with horns III/IV playing the first half, and alto and tenor trombones playing the latter half. We see, however, no reinforcement of the alto voice, which continues to be realised by both clarinets and both bassoons alone. In (recorded) performance, the usual effect of this is that these syncopated triplets are masked by the reinforced orchestration of the other voices.

Towards the end of D2, a chromatic ascending motion in the soprano voice marks a building intensity. This is "released" by a prominent trumpet entry, which serves as a doubling of the tenor line at the octave. And as this reinforced tenor line reaches its conclusion, it is given back to horn section. At this point, we see the rise of segment D3 (bb. 55–62), which in textural terms is an exact copy of D1. The orchestration, however, is different: we see here added octave doublings in all voices (except the bass voice) and generally thicker orchestration. In detail, the soprano voice is played across three octaves in violins I/II and violas. The alto voice features all woodwinds except the bassoons and is played across two octaves. The tenor voice now sees all horns participating, again in octaves; and the bass voice is realised in the exact same way is in D1 (by cellos and basses, then).

As is the case with segments D3 and D1, segment D4 (bb. 63–70) is in textural terms an exact copy of D2, but with immensely reinforced orchestration (in effect, we see here eventually a full orchestra tutti, percussion and timpani notwithstanding). A prominent new element here is a reinforcement of the bass voice by the bass trombone, as cellos are assigned to the tenor voice. Eventually, the bass voice is reinforced further by the tuba as the chromatic ascending motion in the soprano voice of D2 is repeated, building anticipation for yet another climax.
As D4 strives towards a structural high point, we see a development of segments A (bb. 71–81). The tonal centre is violently shifted towards that of B minor by means of an ambiguous and unexpected modulation to I\(^6\) in the now new key (or a B minor chord with D as bass). The soprano voice motif from A1 is onwards reshaped and repeated as transpositions at the second, culminating in a rapid descending motion towards a development of segments D (bb. 82–89). Here, the harmonic, textural, and thematic contents of segments D are—respectively—transformed by way of [1] a striking transposition to the tonic minor key, [2] a textural shift towards the homophonic, and [3] a distribution of the soprano voice motif of D across time by means of repetitions, followed by general pauses and motivic division.

At the conclusion of the development of segments D, a rapid transitionary ascending motion leads to segment A2 (bb. 90–93). Compared to segment A1, the texture and orchestration of A2 is slightly different. Here, the descending 4-part SATB parallel block chords are not realised as crossing voices (all strings move in parallel motion), and horns I/III now realise the secondary alto voice. Segment B3 (bb. 94–102), which directly follows A2, is mostly similar to B2 in that it motivically is comprised by descending thirds in the soprano voice. A difference here, however, is that the orchestration is different—the horns continue to realise the secondary alto voice from A2, while the idea of descending thirds is stated three times as opposed to two times in A1.

Following a restatement of the now familiar rapid ascending transitionary upbeat, as well as a restatement of segment A2 (bb. 103–107), a relatively lengthy development of segments A (bb. 108–125) ensues. From b. 108, thematic material from A is developed both texturally and thematically. Together with an increase in dynamic intensity, this developmental section works towards a structural high point in b. 115. Here, timpani, basses, and the tuba add a secondary bass voice to the previously four-part texture. A prominent ascending step-wise primary bass voice emerges from this secondary bass voice, scored for all trombones, moving in contrary motion to the soprano line, culminating in repeated restatements of A2. Thus, we see the rise of segment A3 (bb. 126–136). Throughout A3, the general intensity gradually wears off. A key marker of this reduction of intensity is seen in b. 131, where the soprano
voice of A2 is transposed down a fourth. Moreover, the orchestration is gradually thinned out towards b. 136.

The above is followed by a development of segments D (bb. 137–146), where a thematic variation of the soprano theme is spread out across a 4-part chorale-like homophonic texture scored for the brass section alone. Onwards, a return of the syncopated triplets, now functioning as a bass voice (and now scored for double basses, supported by horns) introduces segment D5 (147-fine), now in B minor. The canon at the unison from D2 returns, and now becomes the centre of attention, as it is surrounded by accompanying voices scored for woodwinds and trombones which no longer can be said to work as independent melodic lines. At b. 155 (or rehearsal mark N), both texture and orchestration is lightened so that the canon is played by a cello divisi. Towards the very end of the movement, cellos and basses play alone as Tchaikovsky's very last composition "dies out."
The above segmentation is summarised in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Bar number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1₁</td>
<td>1–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>5–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B—development</td>
<td>9–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>12–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₁₂</td>
<td>20–23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>24–29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>30–36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>37–46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>47–54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>55–62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4</td>
<td>63–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A—development 1</td>
<td>71–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D—development 1</td>
<td>82–89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₂₁</td>
<td>90–93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3</td>
<td>94–102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A₂₂</td>
<td>103–107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A—development 2</td>
<td>108–125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A—development 3</td>
<td>126–136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D—development 2</td>
<td>137–146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D—development 3</td>
<td>147–fine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In discussing the overarching form of this symphonic movement, Eriksen suggests an ABAB form, as his analysis of the movement chiefly identifies "[veksling] mellom temaer." Eriksen furthermore notes that this may be viewed as a Sonata form without development, a form which he notes as often called "Sonatina form."\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Grove music online}, partly concurring with Eriksen, describes this form of form as such:

A short, easy or otherwise 'light' Sonata, especially a piece whose first movement, in Sonata form, has a very short development section (the term 'sonatina form' has occasionally been used for a movement with no development section).\textsuperscript{140}

As with most accounts that has to do with the description of form in music, the \textit{Grove music online}'s account of the Sonatina [form] is rather ambiguous. It explains the term "Sonatina" both as a (diminuted) variant of the multimovement Sonata and as a constituent part of such a multimovement piece of music. Nevertheless, it is clear from \textit{Grove music online} and Eriksen's accounts that the Sonatina form in some way well may be viewed as Sonata form "lite." And while Eriksen's analysis in no is way untrue or unconvincing—there is of course nothing wrong with suggesting an ABAB form here—it might seem just as possible, on the grounds of my above segmentation, to argue for a Sonatina form with (relatively simple) development.

The three major sectional components to the Sonata form are traditionally thought of as [1] the exposition section, [2] the development section, and [3] the recapitulation section. The exposition section usually contains a primary theme area and secondary theme area (which often contrast by differing keys; where the primary theme is in a minor key, the secondary theme will usually be in the relative major key). Following the exposition, the development section transforms the thematic material present in the exposition, often by frequent modulations and variation of primary and secondary theme areas. Finally, the recapitulation section usually contains a restatement of both primary and secondary themes.

\textsuperscript{139} Eriksen (1994–2014: p. 8).
\textsuperscript{140} Anon. (2001).
areas, and here, the secondary theme area commonly "surrenders" harmonically to the primary theme area (so that it assumes the tonal centre of the primary theme).

Following the above, it is clear that thematic areas may be defined in terms of whether they are developed or not. In the case of *Adagio lamentoso*, the above table suggests that the only developed segments in the movement are those of A and D (the short development of B in bb. 9–11 notwithstanding). Thus, segments A mark the primary theme area, while segments D mark the secondary theme area. It is now possible to speak of an exposition, where the primary theme area ranges from bb. 1–36, and where the secondary theme area ranges from bb. 37–70. The differing tonal centres of these theme areas support this view, as the primary theme area is in B minor, while the secondary theme area is in D major.

Developments of both segments A and D directly follows this exposition. While there is no modulation here—the tonal centre is reverted to B minor—there is transformation of the thematic contents of both segments. A sudden restatement of the primary theme area suggests an early recapitulation, but as a lengthy development of segment A directly follows this restatement, however, any idea of actual recapitulation is negated, and we may thus speak of a false recapitulation. Following this false recapitulation are two sets of final developments of segments A and D, occurring in pairs. They provide a sense of recapitulation *at the same* time as they obviously develop *Adagio lamentoso*'s primary and secondary theme areas, where the latter "surrenders" its tonal centre to the former.

It follows from the above discussion that the overarching form of *Adagio lamentoso* may be described as [1] exposition, [2] development, and [3] developmental recapitulation. The development section can be characterised as lacking in complexity as compared to the conception of a sonata form. There is no modulation. Thus, any development here can be termed as uncomplicated. Nevertheless, this supports my initial statement that *Adagio lamentoso* may be described as embodying the Sonatina form, where we at the very least see a development section (however "simple" or of "little complexity" the development section is in structural terms). Through such a(n) (unconventional) view, I believe it is possible to extract a greater amount of meaning from the movement than otherwise.
The overarching form of *Adagio lamentoso* is summarised in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bar number range</th>
<th>Segment range</th>
<th>Tonal centre</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Overarching form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–36</td>
<td>A1–C2</td>
<td>B minor</td>
<td>Primary theme area</td>
<td>Exposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37–70</td>
<td>D1–D4</td>
<td>D major</td>
<td>Secondary theme area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71–89</td>
<td>A(dev1)–B(dev1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thematic development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90–107</td>
<td>A2₁–A₂₂</td>
<td></td>
<td>False recapitulation</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108–125</td>
<td>A(dev2)</td>
<td>B minor</td>
<td>Thematic development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126–136</td>
<td>A(dev3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Primary theme area (with development)</td>
<td>Developmental recapitulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137–146</td>
<td>D(dev2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147–fine</td>
<td>D(dev3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary theme area (with development)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Metaphor and drama (b)

In seeking to expand upon "allegedly autonomous musical structures"¹⁴¹ in her approach to analysing selected pieces from Geirr Tveitt's *A Hundred Hardanger Tunes*, Hallgjerd Aksnes employs what she terms "metaphorical projection" to explain the motional and emotional characteristics of said pieces. Aksnes' method is mainly built on the idea that metaphors can be grounded in "shared cultural and biological dispositions among [...] listeners,"¹⁴² and that they as such communicate the meaning of a given piece of music intersubjectively between different readers of that given piece of music.

Aksnes' notion of metaphorical projection as it relates to motion is in large parts built on cognitive metaphor theory, as articulated by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Here, notions of certain image schemas serve as an explanation to e.g. the "gravitational pull" that [often] is felt by the listener when the dominant resolves to the tonic. Moreover, an instance of "floating" in one of the Tveitt pieces is explained through much the same interpretive mechanisms, relying on a different schema.

Aksnes' general idea here, as I read it, is a merging of culture and cognition, where the individual (the Self) works in tandem with the experiences of other individuals (the Other), [potentially] creating an intersubjective field of Truth (an idea not dissimilar, then, to some of my own reflections in the sub-section *The metamodern "Reader-Author"*). This view on metaphor theory expands upon on the Aristotelean idea of metaphor, which Aksnes understands as "a linguistic phenomenon where an entity from one semantic field is transferred to another field [...]". Thus, a clear distinction between (Aristotelean) "traditional" metaphor theory and (Lakoffian-Johnsonian) "cognitive" metaphor theory is constructed.

Aksnes does not restrict metaphor theory to simply motion. Astutely recognising that also emotion plays a large role in *complementing* (not supplanting, then) a recently formal analytical discourse within western art musicology, she extends her analysis to investigating how Tveitt's *O be ye most heartily welcome* projects notions of the emotion "happy." Here,

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 267.
Aksnes looks towards "our bodily expressions of happiness (metonymic metaphors) and our bodily experiences of happiness ("pure" metaphor)." In essence biology and culture then, which furthermore, by Aksnes, is mapped onto the interpreted formal properties of the Tveitt piece.

What I would like to think that Aksnes' substantial application of cognitive metaphor theory to music analysis tells us in general is that the use of metaphor in the analysis of music is something we do whether we like it or not; it is something that we might never escape as music analysts as long as we communicate through written or oral language. Thus, in analysing Adagio lamentoso as metaphor, I will make no excuse for constructing "strong emotional connotations" which, as Aksnes notes further, "[often has] been rejected as hopelessly subjective and unscientific by music analysts." 143

Nevertheless, I must emphasise that the "gibbly-gobbliness" of reading metaphors in music might be a bigger issue than Aksnes seems to recognise. To me, there seems to be an ever-present "danger" of different Readers of the same given piece of music potentially disagreeing—to varying degrees—as to the metaphorical properties of that given piece of music. The metaphysics of presence are unstable at best. Shared biological and cultural dispositions, then, might not be as "shared" as Aksnes frequently might seem to suggest in her 2002 study of Tveit's A Hundred Hardanger Tunes. This does not preclude, however, the potential value of pursing such interpretive activities, especially not if one in some "metamodern" manner recognises that one will fail at such activities to some extent at the same time as one somehow retains hope at succeeding.

In analysing Adagio lamentoso as drama, I will draw upon Eriksen's method of constructing opposing characters read into presence in his analyses of Rachmaninov's three symphonies. 144 Drawing mainly on Gregory Karl's 1993 idea of music as plot, Eriksen employs through his narrative analyses of these symphonies a typology of Karl's character types (such as Initial state, Antagonist, Protagonist, etc.) as well as Karl's typology of

144 Eriksen (2009).
interactions between such character types in lower-level segments (such as through Control, Causation, or Conflict.) Like Eriksen, I will not employ Karl's entire typology on Adagio lamentoso (Adagio lamentoso is not that "complex," remember). I will instead select those characters and interactions I think would be especially relevant for the following analysis. These are Karl's Antagonist, Protagonist, as well as the notion of Control between them.

Key to Karl's notion music as plot is an idea of ("structuralist") views on sameness and difference, where, according to Eriksen, "(1) man anerkjenner at mening har et systematisk grunnlag (2) fokus ligger på relasjonen mellom enhetene mer enn på deres individuelle særtrekk," and "(3) forholdet mellom enhetene forstår som binære motsetninger."\(^{145}\) While similar to the "post-structuralist" ideas in this thesis, then, there is a clear lack of articulated notions of e.g. diffèrance to Karl's method. Nevertheless: oppositions are of course a shared articulated belief here. In the following analyses, such oppositions are identified by means of Aksnes' take on metaphorical projection.

I assure the Reader that I only speak for my own experiences and expressions of Adagio lamentoso, and that I as such cannot lay claim to how these translate to other readers through any shared cultural or biological dispositions. Keeping my previously articulated epistemological starting points in mind, I remind the reader that what I ostensibly do by giving a description of my own experiences and expressions of Adagio lamentoso—in terms of drama and metaphor—is that I present how the symphonic movement may produce metaphorical meanings in readers of the movement—not necessarily what those meaning are. It is, then, a matter of "to become," not "to be."

There is a clear case of opposition between the primary and secondary theme areas of Adagio lamentoso. In emotional terms, the primary theme may convincingly be described as a case of

\(^{145}\) Ibid., p. 327–328.
"hopelessness" or "sadness;" among other structural parameters, the unconventional voice-leading present in bb. 1–4, the dominance of descending motions, and the tonal centre (in minor) supports such an assessment. Conversely, the secondary theme area may convincingly be understood as "hopeful," yet "bittersweet." While the secondary theme area is in a major key, its perpetually descending motional characteristics—even in canon—work against any idea of a projection of joy.

There is, then—harmonic considerations notwithstanding (the primary theme area is in B minor, and the secondary is in D major)—a sense of substantial motivic similarity between the two. They both evoke a general motional sense of downwardness, and as Eriksen has noted as a characteristic of this movement, any number of ascending motions is followed by a descending motions of at least equal extent.\(^{146}\) Expanding upon this, it might be possible to assert that the motional repertoire of Adagio lamentoso is rather unbalanced in favour of descent, especially when taking its rather "hopeless" ending, with the double basses and cellos clearly signifying "death," into special consideration.

While the primary and secondary theme areas can be seen as similar, then, they are rather different at the same time. Where the former is dominated by mostly homophonic texture (with an independent melodic line "struggling" against it), the latter is dominated by counterpoint exclusively. Where the motional characteristics of the primary theme area becomes centralised towards "downwardness" and "doom," the secondary theme area—while also kind of "downward" in its general sense of motion—at least counteracts such ideas by constant contrary motion (because the texture is exclusively contrapuntal).

It is now possible to speak of an antagonist and protagonist of Adagio lamentoso. Normally, perhaps, within the repertoire of classical and romantic music, one would speak of the primary theme as "the hero" and the secondary theme as "that which disturbs the hero;" and, to take on a familiar feminist voice: the primary theme as "the masculine" and the secondary theme as "the feminine;" and so on.

Adagio lamentoso, however, features somewhat of the reverse. It would here seem that its primary theme area embodies some antagonist, while its secondary theme area embodies some protagonist. This is not simply because the former is "sad," and because the latter is "happy;" it has more to do with how they interact.

Given my (necessarily limited [avgrenset]) formal analysis of Adagio lamentoso, there is to me no convincing evidence that the secondary theme in any way attempts to control the primary theme, loses that fight, and then surrenders to the primary theme. As Eriksen notes: compared to e.g. Beethoven's fifth symphony, Adagio lamentoso (or really the sixth symphony as a whole) is a reversal of antagonist and protagonist: "Her er 'fra kamp til seier'-ideen i Beethovens femte symfoni blitt reversert til 'fra kamp til nederlag og død."\textsuperscript{147}

Following Eriksen's take on Karl, this would essentially mean that the primary theme area controls the secondary theme area somehow. Clear instances of this are apparent throughout Adagio lamentoso. Examples include the primary theme area's motivic similarity to the secondary theme area, resulting in a general sense of "hopelessness" being projected unto the secondary theme area. The secondary theme area, then, accepts this controlling behaviour, and surrenders in Adagio lamentoso's developmental recapitulation. Other prominent markers of control include a direct invasion of the primary theme area soprano motif in the middle of the secondary theme area (on the transition from segment D2 to segment D3, that is). Here, the aforementioned prominent trumpet entry, doubling the tenor voice(s) at the octave, is almost a direct citation of the primary theme motif:

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 10.
As Eriksen rightly notes, *Adagio lamentoso*—and, on a mirrored, higher hierarchical level of form: the symphony as a whole—is an expression of simply "*nederlag*" and "death."

**Three performances (c)**

Three different performative aspects of *Adagio lamentoso* are in the following analyses investigated as three very different texts. The first analysis is based on a recorded performance by the New York Philharmonic (as led by Leonard Bernstein), and I explore here some of the audial aspects of said recording, as well as the discursive power relation to the score as evidenced by this audiality. The second analysis is based on a performance by the Japanese piano duo *Duo Plaisir*. It investigates a recorded performance of *Adagio lamentoso* as a piano reduction for four hands (or for a piano duo), where the musicking aspects between pianists Yoshihiro Ota, Moeko Wada, and the listener (of recordings)—as well as sameness and difference to orchestral performance—are afforded salience. The third analysis is an audiovisual analysis of the Vienna Philharmonic (as led by Karajan), and principally examines the musicking aspects between orchestra and conductor.

Much previous musicological research on performance in music has examined the difference between performances of the same piece across time as evidenced through the medium of the recording. Here, one has primarily attempted to historicise or critique changing
and differing conceptions of performance styles diachronically. I make no attempt here, however, in this thesis, to work within the above established domain of performance analysis.

My methodology in this section, as implied above, then, is in large parts influenced by Christopher Small's idea of musicking. I view here the following performances in part as a social construct, where I investigate the interplay between human musicians (and also between humans and objects, I might add), and how this relates to power issues.

While Small understandably did need to be quite bombastic lest he simply be scoffed at and rejected by his peers those of the authoritarian kind) in propelling his idea of the music as a social construct—resulting in an apparent position that e.g. "the score" and music does not exist because it simply is an abstraction of sounds ("only musicking exists")—I see no need to assume such a position onwards in my analyses and in this day and age. The musicological-discursive climate of 2019 is nowhere near as brutal as the one in of 90's, and—quite frankly—Small's ideas seem generally to not be too controversial today.

A common (but not necessarily essential) aim to the three following performative analyses is the description of power distribution between Author and Reader. In the case of the first text, the 1983 performance by the New York Philharmonic and Bernstein, we will partly look at the relationship between the score as Author and the performers as Reader. In the second text—the Duo Plaisir's 2017 piano reduction performance—we will take on a perspective where Duo Plaisir's interaction with Tchaikovsky as Author is explored. In the final analysis, Karajan will be viewed as Author, while the Vienna Philharmonic will be seen as Readers of Karajan.

**THE NEW YORK PHILHARMONIC BY BERNSTEIN (1987): GHOST SINGERS**

The New York Philharmonic & Bernstein's 1987 recording of *Adagio lamentoso* (see appendix 6) has a total duration of 17 minutes and 18 seconds. As such, it is most probably

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148 See e.g. Cook (2007).
149 See e.g. Small (1998).
the recording of this particular symphonic movement with the lowest average tempo of them all, and one might be tempted to surmise that "adagio" here seems to perhaps mean "grave" to Bernstein. It might also be tempting to view this as a defiance by the Reader-Conductor of the power of the Author-Composer, or in other words a matter of a conductor performing this piece in their own (very) personal way (or in their own [very] personal tempo). If we have a look at Bernstein's own marked score of the movement (appendix 5), however, we see that he might as well have defied his own metronome mark in this specific performance, not necessarily only Tchaikovsky's metronome mark. In this marked score, the first page states a conductor's metronome mark of plus-minus 44 BPM, while my own measurements of the two first bars (which I only found possible to make through the aid of Sonic Visualiser) indicates an average tempo of 18 BPM.

The issue of tempo in music performance is rather ancient. As David Fallow notes, "tempo and expression marks may be the most consistently ignored components of a musical score." There is, of course, no "correct" tempo to any performance of any given piece of music. Rather, perhaps there only can be convincing tempi. Is Bernstein convincing in his decision to conduct *Adagio lamentoso* in this manner, then? He certainly convinces me on a personal level, but such facts might be rather uninteresting in the context of this thesis, so I will afford the Reader a chance to construct their own judgement here.

The valutative outcome of Bernstein's tempo choice notwithstanding, a striking aural phenomenon within this recorded performance—which well might be augmented by its slow tempo—is that the soprano voice of the secondary theme area (as realised by violins and violas) take on a distinct *vocal* quality. It sounds almost as if a soprano section (comprised of soprano singers, then) and a barytone soloist join in on the performance! Is this a phenomenon specific to live performance, or is it something that occurs only as a part of the recording process? Following the below commentaries on this phenomenon, there does not

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150 The New York Philharmonic Leon Levy Digital Archives—from which Bernstein's marked score was downloaded—dates the marked score to 1986. This is probably the score which Bernstein conducted from in making the 1987 recording, then (if he performed from a score, that is).

151 Fallows (2001).
seem to be any consensus here among expert performers on this. This lack of consensus might at the very least suggest that this aural phenomenon is rather rare, both in the contexts of live and recorded performance:

Ja, dette er et interessant fenomen. Jeg har opplevd det tidligere, som du påpeker, at strykere i et visst register, og i visse sammenhenger, kan klinge som sangstemmen. Og det er nok riktig som du er inne på: at det skyldes overtone-spekteret som oppstår når strykerne spiller sammen.

— From personal correspondences between myself and a professor of performance at a Norwegian educational institution of performing arts.¹⁵²

Jeg hører definitivt det samme som deg. Veldig fascinerende! Når det gjelder grunnen: Jeg har opplevd dirigenter som synger underveis (f.eks Inbal), men de synger definitivt ikke så rent at det blender med orkesteret og overtoner…. Jeg tror det handler om en bevisst teknikk i forhold til synkronisering/desynkronisering av vibrato. Det tror jeg bare ville gjort at det hørtes klanglig sprukende ut. Derimot tror jeg de spiller så utrolig rent (og da med mer bratsj/andrediisi 2.fiolin enn toppoktaven i fiolin) at det på oppat gir dette utslaget. Jeg har aldri opplevd dette i noen sammenheng på podiet. Man skal selvfølgelig ikke være for bombastisk, men jeg tror dette fenomenet kun lar seg fange i opptakssammenheng.

— From personal correspondences between myself and a concertmaster at a major Norwegian symphony orchestra (this person is also a professor of performance, by the way).¹⁵³

Depending on the frequency response and other characteristics of the sound reproduction system in use, the ghost singers of Adagio lamento, so to speak, can be heard throughout the entire secondary theme area [04:22–06:01], sometimes quite obviously, and sometimes only by means of attentive listening. A particular moment which prominently features the ghost soprano singers can be heard towards the very end of segment D₃—or more particularly on the upbeat to b. 61, and they might seem here to "double" vlns. II. In terms of

¹⁵² [Opplysningene som fremgår av dette sitatet er ikke mottatt under taushetsløfte. Den siterte personen har ikke vedtatt tilbud om anonymisering. Tilgjengeliggjøring av denne masteroppgaven via DUO er slik utført i henhold til §13 i forvaltningsloven. Videre har jeg—av forskningsetiske personvernhensyn—selv valgt å anonymisere personen så langt det lar seg gjøre.]
¹⁵³ [Det samme gjelder her som i foregående fotnote.]
spectrographic visual representation, this moment may be described as such (annotations in the form of vertical lines represent the pulse at the quarter note):

In terms of notational visual representation, the aural experience of the string orchestra as heard in the above passage may be described as such:

What could possibly cause this aural phenomenon? From the above spectrographic representation, we see that there is a clear difference in the upper harmonics area (4462 Hz
and above) between the upbeat to b. 61 and the beat immediately preceding it. The harmonics of especially violins I, violins II, and violas are simply louder than before, then, and might help us understand why the sonic character of the soprano voice takes on a distinctly *vocal* character (and—curiously—that of a ghostly soprano section). Moreover, increased loudness of upper harmonics is, of course, not restricted to the particular moment represented above. Throughout the secondary theme area of *Adagio lamentoso*, there is a clear correlation between the prominence of upper harmonics and the prominence of singers. Whenever the loudness of upper harmonics increases, the listener will tend to hear "soprano singers."

We have now briefly taken into consideration some of the possible "physical" reasons that we hear soprano singers. Tandemly informed by such a perspective onwards, then, what could be some of the performative reasons that we hear them? The previously cited concertmaster points out that the collective ability of the New York Philharmonic's string section (especially violins II and violas) to "play in tune" might be a contributing factor here. Surely, they do play "in tune"—but what does this mean?

A perfect synchronisation of pitch can surely not be any valuative goal here, as there always will be some variety and nuance to the micrometric dimensions of the individual string player's fingering of their fingerboards. As I might suggest from measurements above spectrographic representation, such nuance is clearly evident by the rather broad black lines signifying pitch variation in orchestral parts: the extreme poles in the pitch variation of violins I, for instance, vary as much 100 Hz (this might be explained by desynchronisation through vibrato, as well as lower orchestral parts' harmonic structures extending onto the first violin parts' fundamental frequency).

Such pitch variation is arguably one of the things which distinguishes a human string section from a strictly synthesized one (thus the tendency in the mimetic MIDI orchestration of e.g. today's film- and television composers to rely on samples, rather than e.g. synthesised samples or tone generations). We might here, as a parallel to Danielsen's use of the concept of micro-rhythm, speak of micro-intonation.  

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As a conclusion to this analysis, I will (again) raise a rather banal question: is the presence of ghost singers or micro-intonation at all indicated in the score as Author (not the composer as Author, then)? Maybe—maybe not. As if the tonal qualities of performance are presupposed through its representation of orchestration (and at the same time not), there is ostensibly no fundamentally clear answer to this question. Perhaps this is an undecidable, like Derrida's ghost (pun intended). We see here a clear example of the ambiguous relationship that invades any Author-Reader relationship (of the score).

**ADAGIO LAMENTOSO AS PIANO DUET BY DUO PLAISIR (2017): IS THE COMPOSER DEAD?**

Pianism can be a lonely endeavour. As if the orchestral string player is a herd animal preferring to play in string sections—and as if the orchestral wind player is a quasi-solo instrumentalist with the occasional solo—and as if the percussionist (or timpanist) truly becomes the forgotten solo player of the orchestra—the pianist is, by virtue of their potential ability to play any voice simultaneously, condemned to play and rehearse alone and in isolation from any idea of social interaction with other musicians (lest they become conductors). Their octopus-like command of the keyboard limits the need to interact with other humans in the performance of music, and musicking with their musical colleagues might as such become a foreign luxury for pianists.

In the above sense, at least, it is understandable that the piano duet continues to be a popular format for pianists in which to perform in tandem. If pianists usually take on the role of Author and perform alone (save for their readership of audiences), they are through the genre of piano duet afforded an exception to the above description of the pianist as a loner (it is, of course, not uncommon for keyboard instrumentalists to perform with orchestras, or in chamber music constellations, or with singers etcetera—but bear with me). Pianists are, after all, ostensibly humans, and most humans need to partake in social interaction with other humans to stay healthy.
The genre of piano duo is a sub-genre of chamber music, which historically—before the arrival of the recording—mainly was a case of domestic\textsuperscript{155} musicking (that is: as both the performance of and the listening to music). The piano became by virtue of its flexibility in performing larger number of voices simultaneously a source for musicking in a time where the symphony orchestra was a rare commodity, and the recording a material impossibility. One might perhaps even surmise that the pianist was less lonely in previous times as they might be today; they were, in this sense, in very high demand, both as amateurs and professionals.

Moreover, as symphony orchestras of pre-recording times rarely played the same symphonic work two times, the piano became an important instrument in the process of musical reproduction and also, following Dawes, as a means of becoming familiar with orchestral music:

\textit{About 1798–1800 the London publisher Birchall brought out all Haydn's London symphonies in this form, and duet arrangements of these and of symphonies by Mozart, Beethoven and later composers remained the chief means whereby amateur musicians became familiar with the standard orchestral repertory until the arrival of the gramophone record in the 20th century.\textsuperscript{156}}

\textit{It is possible to play on the piano \textit{Adagio lamentoso} solo—there are such transcriptions of Tchaikovsky's sixth symphony out there—but if such a performance is to become convincing for the listener (and probably also for the performer themselves), it usually demands considerable technical skills. The performance of the multitude of simultaneous melodic lines which are present in this symphony (and symphonic works generally) often demands from the pianist a considerable technical awareness of their fingers and bodies, and of the different voices constituting the textures of such pieces (which, after all, is written for many more musicians than a single pianist). Besides the obvious necessity for "proper technique," a solo performance of \textit{Adagio lamentoso} limits any conception of}

\textsuperscript{155} Dawes (2001).
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
musicking essentially to the Self (any listener would arguably be part of the performance also, though).

While I am no pianist myself, I will risk suggesting that the pianistic performance of symphonic pieces might become more challenging than playing e.g. fugues, at least in terms of timbral expectations in the performer-listener. It is not unreasonable to surmise that today's symphonic pianist continually will be compared to the numerous forces present in a symphony orchestra, which ostensibly is the constellation of orchestral forces most of today's people listen to when listening to (recorded) symphonic works. The colours of the orchestra, by the orchestration of its texture, is apparently lost in the pianistic performance, then.

In the Japanese piano duo Duo Plaisir's 2017 performance of Tchaikovsky's own piano reduction of *Adagio lamentoso* (see appendix 8), however, the textural characteristics of the piece are conversely afforded greater clarity than is likely in an orchestral performance. As the piano is uniform in its timbral characteristics, there is little danger of voices being masked by other voices. All melodic lines are astoundingly clear, and as if Tchaikovsky messed up *Adagio lamentoso's* texture by "poor orchestration," we can gather from Duo Plaisir that piano performances of orchestral music affords the listener an alternative to the common orchestral recording. In piano performances of symphonic works, clarity of texture becomes emphasised.

A striking example of this can be heard in the second main theme section of Duo Plaisir's recording. The triplets at approximately [3:33]—at risk of being "lost" in woodwinds in symphonic performances—are in this piano performance clear and easily recognisable. The metaphorical properties of *Adagio lamentoso*, then, become changed considerably if performed by means of the piano. If today's listeners are accustomed to symphonic recordings of the movement, we can gather from the above that today's symphonic piano performances oscillate between sameness and difference to the orchestra; the distinction between the two, as well as what *Adagio lamentoso* actually is—a concept, a performance by piano or orchestra, or a score—becomes through comparison to the orchestra negotiated by the probable listener.

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157 This has been confirmed by personal e-mail correspondences with Duo Plaisir.
In more formal terms, *Adagio lamentoso* is in Tchaikovsky's reduction scored for two parts, namely that of the Primo (taking care of upper textural constituents) and that of the Secondo (taking care of lower textural constituents). As there are only two pianists cooperating by musicking—there is no authorial conductor—the social situation of performance is markedly changed from orchestral performance. We see (or hear) here simply two musicians who play together, cooperating in performing Tchaikovsky's text.

With only two musicians musicking, we might surmise that the modern respect for the Author of the score—the composer, then—is more easily negated than when a larger power hierarchy is needed by practical and conventional necessity (such as in an orchestra). "Errors" of score reproduction—such as the one heard at approximately [04:02] or [04:10] (the performance of chords are "wrong") simply do not matter as much. For the professional performer, the show must go on, and it is easier for the show to go on when performing in pairs rather in herds. The composer's power, as well as the authenticity that the score represents, is as such negotiated in this case by a trichotomy of performer I, performer II, and the probable listener.

**THE VIENNA PHILOHARMONIC BY KARAJAN (1984): IS THE CONDUCTOR DEAD?**

There might be nothing more authoritarian in the world of "classical" music than the romantic idea of the modern conductor; that one musical genius—that Author—who directs the music emanating from a modern orchestra of Readers, and who as such takes responsibility for their musicking between each other. The conductor often becomes the person "behind it all," but who by virtue of his highly skilled musicianship has abandoned any form of sound producing musicking and therefore really does not need to actually play anything to be the one "behind it all." He simply shows his musicians what to do (there are, even as of 2019, arguably few prominent women conductors internationally), and these musicians—if inclined to modern ideas of authority—usually follow him blindly, because they dare not do anything to rebel against the power hierarchy they are part of (the modern
The symphony orchestra is a fine example of a highly structured hierarchy of power, almost military-like in its form, with the concertmaster serving as staff sergeant. Perhaps this might be because rebellion cannot really be the practical thing to do when all you want to do is to musick with your instrument.

The above construction of the (authoritarian) conductor is arguably quite common within today's conceptions of a modern classical music culture—at least as a discursive opposite pole to a postmodern classical music culture, where the conductor by definition is treated in less high esteem than above. A prominent and very real example of this opposite, "postmodern," discursive pole is to be found within an orchestra famous for resisting the authority of the conductor, namely the Vienna philharmonic.

Historically, the Vienna Philharmonic has had a complicated relationship with its musical leadership (among many other things, such as women, as well as accusations of Nazi affiliations and a 20th century tendency to only hire white musicians). One can read from the orchestra's history a general sense of suspicion towards the idea of conductors, especially those who would wish to conduct the orchestra permanently—the Philharmonic's idea of enrolling permanent conductors was disbanded 1933, and they continue to this day a "policy of working with every conductor of repute." Notions of this tension between the Philharmonic and their conductors can be seen in a popular journal article written by [sir] Adrian Bolt (the founder of the BBC Symphony Orchestra). Bolt seems here to, through a conversation with a certain professor Egon Wellesz, have garnered deep respect for this Austrian orchestra, especially following Wellesz' statement that "[a]ny conductor, you know, who doesn't disturb the Vienna Philharmonic gets on quite well with them.

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158 See Kennicot (1996) for a music critic's account on the Vienna Philharmonic of the late 1990's as an all-male bastion. For a journalistic account of gender issues more local to Austria, see Anon. (1999). See also Osborne (1999).

159 Osborne (1998); and Oestreich (2013).

160 Hellsberg (n.d.).

161 Boult (1951).

162 Ibid., p. 1.
In their 1984 video recorded performance of Tchaikovsky’s sixth symphony (see appendix 9) however, we might read a rather peaceful symbiosis between Karajan and the musicians of the Vienna Philharmonic. Immediately apparent from this interaction is a tendency in Karajan to not cue the entries of the orchestra or the individual musician ([in-]famously, the Vienna Philharmonic do hold a reputation for not taking cueing from its conductors very well). This does not extend to simply helping the orchestral musicians navigate their parts and enter at the right moment (which—of course—is rather unheard of in elite level orchestral musicking); he only rarely forms any direct contact with any individual orchestral musician to inform them on how to perform or express their parts. There is no authorial conducting here, then. It is seldom specific, and usually general. Karajan does not *tell* the Vienna philharmonic what to do. He *shows* them collectively, through his restrained bodily gestures, what to do.

This is evidenced right from the start of the performance of *Adagio lamentoso* [36:55]. Of the visible orchestra musicians, only the first desk of the violins I seem to pay Karajan any significant attention (who for that matter here assumes a habit of conducting with closed eyes). They largely do this to gather vital temporal information whenever the collective pulse of the performance becomes ambiguous. The collective string orchestra generally look at their parts (or at Karajan in the corner of their eyes), relying largely on the conductor's temporal information to disseminate throughout the orchestra's chain of command, as it were.

This "ignoring" of Karajan is evident throughout most of *Adagio lamentoso*—and does not change to any significant degree until the bassoon "soli" in segment B2 [38:49]. Here, first chair of bassoons occasionally glances at Karajan, most likely to coordinate and synchronise temporally with the string orchestra's entries. The side effect, of this, however, is of course that the bassoons are influenced heavily by Karajan's emotional expressions.

As the secondary theme area commences [39:19], Karajan oscillates between closed eyes and open eyes all the while forming intriguing and influential (facial) expressions. A striking example of this is seen towards the latter half of segment D1 [39:19], where he seems to imitate the caressing of a baby (before "crushing" it). In segment D2, as the trombones enter,
we see sustained attention from the alto trombone player—generally, he tends to follow Karajan closely.

As the secondary theme area builds in intensity, Karajan generally attempts to hold back the orchestra through incrementally smaller gestures, especially as orchestra and conductor approach the high point of segment D3 [40:05]. Towards the transition to D4 [40:34], we see on the other hand an instance of extreme expressiveness in Karajan. His left arm vibrates, his facial expressions aggressively embodies the bittersweetness of the secondary theme, and he produces large bodily movements, bending down towards the concertmaster. Towards the end of the secondary theme area, Karajan makes his first direct contact (as evidenced by the video, anyway) with the concertmaster [40:45]: Karajan solemnly stares at him so as to anticipate the coming "doom" of the development section, as well as *Adagio lamentoso's* trajectory towards a feeling of "death."

We read a general sense of emotional expressiveness in Karajan as the development ensues. His bodily movements are enlarged, a facet of performance that (visually) is not mirrored in the orchestra to any large extent. This is especially true for the brass section, who tend to remain motionally apathic (see e.g. [41:06]). In *Adagio lamentoso's* false recapitulation, where pulse easily becomes ambiguous (there are a lot of "general pauses"), Karajan becomes responsible for temporally coordinating the string orchestra.

As the developmental recapitulation is reached through a daring attempt by Karajan to directly cue the Vienna Philharmonic tam-tam (gong) player [40:08], he maintains close general contact with the brass section throughout their chorale-like passage [44:26]. Following this, we see close attention paid to Karajan by the basses, as they look for temporal guidelines in the performance of the temporally vital syncopated triplets [44:53]. Karajan reassumes at this point a habit of conducting with closed eyes, emphasising this habit as the cellos and basses eventually take over the texture. Towards the end, his eyes remain closed, and as the final pizzicati of the basses are performed, Karajan eventually signals the end of the piece by letting his hands drop. Nevertheless, he "stares" solemnly towards the ground, embodying *Adagio lamentoso's* feeling of "nederlag."
We have seen through this audiovisual analysis a perspective on the conductor as an influence upon the orchestra, *almost* like I, the present Author, become an influence upon the you, the Reader. The power distribution between orchestra and conductor is ambiguous, but not in exactly the same way as between you and me. For the orchestra, the conductor becomes a secondary text, and not a primary text.
Analysis of Adagio lamentoso analyses \((a + b + c) + d\)

One might read notions of a certain teleological progression from structure to performance in my above analyses of *Adagio lamentoso*. Nevertheless, I believe to have shown as such that none can exist without the other. There cannot be any formal structure without notions of performance, nor any performance without notions of structure—and, after all— notions of metaphor has arguably been shown to be necessary in the construction of both structure and performativity. Moreover, there can be no metaphorical projection or narrative dramatic construction without any structure or notion of performance. One might draw here a line of similarity towards e.g. Guldbrandsen's aforementioned performative study of Boulez' changing conceptions of Mahler, where as many relevant aspects as possible are drawn into consideration.\(^{163}\)

Thus, in the case of my own analyses of *Adagio lamentoso* herein, we see a discursive adherence to e.g. Kerman/Agawu/McClary/Cook, all at the same time; they oscillate between formal analysis and contextual analysis of music's social position within society, and never expect any approach to be "correct." In the case of its articulation of *Adagio lamentoso*’s contextual position within "society," however, we see largely a limitation to musicking between musicians (and to some extent the listener), with the analyses' interests effectively ending the in performance. There is little broader critique of society other than perhaps notions of the general power relationship between Author/Reader.

\(^{163}\) Guldbrandsen (2006).
Z + (X + Y). Analysis of *Adagio lamentoso* and *Down Under* analyses

As if the (meta-)analysis of *Down Under* somehow reflects PMcy, it largely suggests that PMcy's aims ultimately are concerned with broader society. And as if the (meta-)analysis of *Adagio lamentoso* somehow reflects WAMcy, it largely confirms WAMcy's concern of music as an aesthetic object. It is, however, possible to construct invasion between the two.

The audial analysis of *Down Under*—as well as the analysis of its copyright issues—is heavily dependent on WAMcy, at least in terms of discursive history. While its methods have been reshaped for the study of popular music and as such does not resemble WAMcy too much in its present form, its ability to generate descriptions of sounds depends heavily on the (previous) existence of formal-analytical WAMcy. Moreover, it is informed by Aksnes' use of cognitive metaphor theory, where any descriptive utterance potentially becomes metaphor. The apparent contextualism present in *Down Under*'s audial analysis, however, originates ostensibly in sociology—and there is a lack of articulated performative perspectives.

The audiovisual analysis of *Down Under* becomes in this thesis "responsible" for the very existence of the audiovisual analysis of the Vienna Philharmonic and Karajan's performance of *Adagio lamentoso*. As already argued, however, this audiovisual analysis is very local and particular in its societal critique; it ostensibly investigates primarily the mechanisms of power within the symphony orchestra—it is as such a modification of the aims of the audiovisual method as it is used in PMcy.

The performative analyses of *Adagio lamentoso* can largely be seen as influenced by the contextualism broadly present in PMcy. It is concerned mainly with critiquing performance in terms of power relationships to humans and objects. As we have seen is the case with the audiovisual analysis of the Vienna Philharmonic et. al., however, these power relationships are on their most apparent level constricted to musician cultures.

We can in this section see examples are links between all analyses on all levels. These links are something more than similarities; they are ostensibly dependencies articulated as a complex web of opposing poles. Between these poles, we see oscillation to varying degrees; we see dependencies to varying degrees.
V. A conclusion

It is tempting, and perhaps rather common, to simply believe that no cultural object is more ambiguous than what we could come to understand as the formal structure of music. It is strangely elusive in its meaning content (if there is any), as there simply are no words. Meanwhile, it is common to think of the formal structure of music as a language, because it can indeed carry meaning for people (which arguably is much of musicology's *eksistensgrunnlag* anyway). Meanings emanating from such formal views on music does, as we have seen in this thesis, especially take on the form of ambiguous constructions of metaphor and also narrative interpretations (such as drama). If the formal structure of music is a language, then, it becomes "gibbly-gobbly." The analysis of formal music can hence become a fruitful investigation into the mechanics of interpretation.

Meanwhile, it is arguably important to keep in mind that music is more than a formal abstraction of its sounds; to convincingly understand music in current musicological discourse, it has become a social necessity for music scholars to obey the discursive power of the convincing contextualist and look at that which surrounds its formal structure, and in that sense its context. I argue that this context, however, also becomes elusive much in the same manner as with the case of sonic abstraction, as if we cannot escape the idea that "there is nothing outside the [con-]text." *Il n'y a pas de hors-texte.* In this thesis, texts and contexts have been identified in the constructed opposition between different and as such opposing ways of looking at music.

We (you, the Reader—and I, the Author) have raised in this thesis questions pertaining to a variation of approaches to analysing music, and one can perhaps also say very different *musics* at that. These different approaches have been negotiated through performative discussion, and we have through the oscillation between such approaches connected music to society in a multitude of ways, through a set of analyses of varying ambition and scope.

It is my hope that western art musicology and popular musicology—as if they are musicologies—onwards can contribute to critiquing society together, in tandem, and perhaps
not in the apparent isolation which might in effect be the case today.\textsuperscript{164} The power struggles between the musicological discourses of the 1990's are long gone. In this regard, I believe that I at the very least have proposed in this thesis ways in which e.g. western art musicology and popular musicology can learn from each other, i.e. in a more direct manner than previously.

As one possible "conclusion" to this thesis, I will offer some comments on its take on the interplay between the concepts of power and interpretation as I believe they might have been informed by this thesis' (musical) analyses. In this regard, we will return to our three postmodern thinkers:

- Meaning can be found in the metamodern pendulum's oscillation between opposing Derridean poles.
- The very construction of Derridean poles can be subject to Foucauldian discursive power.
- The metamodern pendulum's position between poles, as well as the construction of poles, may be informed by a Barthian Author-Reader relationship, which may be informed by Foucauldian power mechanics.

Or:

- Meaning can be found in the metamodern pendulum's oscillation between differing Foucauldian epistemes, such as modernism/postmodernism.
- The construction of Foucauldian epistemes may be understood by Derridean views of sameness and difference, which perpetually invade each other.
- The degree of invasion between Author or Reader, and the validity of Foucauldian epistemes, can be understood according to each Barthian Reader's and Author's value judgements.

Or:

- The Barthian relationship between Author and Reader can be a Derridean dichotomy where the Author perpetually invades the Reader and vice versa.
- The Author may direct the Reader through assuming a Foucauldian exercise of discursive power.
- The degree of the Author's Foucauldian power over the reader is a Derridean undecidable.

And so forth...

\textsuperscript{164} Somewhat in this vein, however, exciting current developments can be seen in e.g. The Routledge Companion To Popular Music Analysis (Scotto, Smith; Brackett, 2018), which is "stimulated initially by a desire to incorporate methods, tools, and technologies developed for contemporary art music in the service of widening the scope of popular music studies, [...]" (p. xvi). Note however that the wider scope of popular music studies includes popular musicology as a sub-discipline, and that there is a difference in the scopes of contemporary art music(-ology) and western art music(-ology).
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Bibliography

Cautionary note: a substantial amount of works in this bibliography is in the form of their Amazon Kindle edition (a company and concept which has become a necessary evil over the course this master's project). In some direct citations of these, where there were no pagination system, I have been forced to cite ranges of so-called "locations," which refers to individual words within the given Kindle edition. The reader will be able to find between such "location ranges" the exact position of the quotation within the text of the work. Alternatively, the reader may want to simply search for the direct quotation in question in the Kindle app.

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### Overview of digital appendices

The following digital appendices are available in two forms: [1] as physical files on USB flash drives, and [2] as references primarily by way of unstable URL hyperlinks (which may become useless forever at any time). Mainly due to the (im-)possibility of copyright issues local to Norway, the physical files stored by means of the first-mentioned USB flash drive medium are available only to the examiners of this thesis (as well as any interested personal acquaintances, if they were to exist).

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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ap2.mp4</td>
<td>Audio recording of Adagio lamentoso (Tchaikovsky piano reduction performed by Duo Plaisir).</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Ap5.pdf</td>
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Music Analysis in Popular and Western Art Musicologies

Interpretation and Power from Trichotomies of Down Under and Pathétique (IV–Adagio lamentoso

Øyvind Thomkhieo Berg
Master's thesis in musicology
Spring 2019