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November 21, 2016
Acknowledgements

I have grown since I started writing this thesis. I feel as if I have given birth to three children in the last five years. Two of them are co-authored with my husband, Alexandre. Their names are Clothilde (4) and August (1). My mother-in-law once asked me if I was proud of my baby-daughter. I had to answer ”no”. My children never cease to impress me, but their accomplishments are their own. I can only accompany them.

The third child is currently in your hands. I always dreamt of doing a doctorate’s degree. When I got the news that I was accepted as a fellow at the University of Oslo, I was thrilled. I celebrated. I told everyone (including my boss at the job I resigned from). However, when asked, I was unable to answer what use a PhD would be to me. At 30 years old, I had gotten the job of my dreams.

Now that my thesis is written, am I proud? Yes, somewhat. Would I do it again? Yes, but I would go about it differently. However, that would not be possible without the work I have currently documented. I am proud to contribute to our knowledge of political organization in the European Parliament. I feel privileged that I have been given the means and the time to do so.

During these years, I have profited from frequent advice and the company of numerous colleagues and friends. In particular, I would like to thank my advisor, Bjørn Høyland. Bjørn is dedicated and takes pride in the success of his students. I love trying out new ideas on him, and his advice has often pushed me in the right direction.

My papers have profited from valuable comments from participants at conferences and seminars: Elin Haugsgjerd Allern, Stefanie Bailer, Nathalie Brack, Giacomo Benedetto, Edoardo Bressanelli, Olivier Costa, James Cross, Elena Frech, Leif Helland, Simon Hug, Francis Jacobs, Seth Kincaid Jolly, Michael Kaeding, Carl-Henrik Knutsen, Amie Kreppel, Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Sven-Oliver Proksch, Guri Rosén, Håvard
Strand and Merethe Vestlund. I am especially indebted to Jessica Fortrin-Rittberger who took the time to read the last paper in this dissertation, find all the weak spots and highlight the strong ones.

My introduction also improved after useful comments from Jørgen Bolstad, Knut Heidar, Olav Skram Stokke and Inga Margrete Ydersbønd. I would also like to express my gratitude towards my co-author, Fang-Yi Chiou. Our discussions, his patience, explanations and comments have been valuable to my academic work. Also, I will never forget our not-so-planned trip past the White House after a late-night dinner at APSA.

I have had the chance to work in a group of excellent colleagues. Knut-Andreas Christophersen has been a tremendous support during my teaching experience. Also, the Department of Political Science has a very well-run and dedicated administration. Herding a set of airheaded academics and students (I've been in both categories) is a gigantic task! I would like to express my admiration for the Head of Office, Ida Weseth Bjøru, as well as Guro Schmidt Øvregard, responsible for the PhD program.

I have spent a lot of time with a group of fantastic PhD students: Tatjana Stankovic started the same day as me. Since then, I have considered her my academic twin. I rely on her for everything. We work in different fields, but her feedback is always candid and to the point. Vibeke Wøien Hansen was a year ahead of me, and has been a good guide for a great number of things. The same goes for Håvard Mokleiv Nygård. Our ”dark-side dinners” together with Bjørn are memorable!

My math and game theory skills took a major leap thanks to the joint effort of Tatjana, Vibeke and Andreas Holmedahl Hvidsten. I have enjoyed many moments with Mathias Wasaznik Johannessen over the years. He knows how to put things in perspective. Moreover, I would like to thank Cristina Bucur. In the last year, I have spent the first part of my day looking forward to our regular coffee breaks. They are the perfect combination of academically instructive and leisurely amusing.
I have also faithfully enforced the monthly payday-pint. Words cannot describe the importance of these occasions. Thanks to Tommy Knutsen, Inga Margrete Ydersbond, Tore Wig, Sirianne Dahlum, Atle Haugsgjerd, Andreas Kokkvoll Tveit, Kjersti Skarstad and Vilde Hernes (among others) for showing up to these and other events; and for being such great colleagues!

Last, I would like to thank my family: My husband, Alexandre Ducroq, has in long periods run our day-to-day life and taken care of the children. I am also grateful to my two children who have put up with an absent and absent-minded mother all their lives. They continue to teach me about the smallest and most important things in life. Many thanks also to my parents and in-laws for their support as well as my grand-father: His untiring curiosity for how things work is an example to follow.

Oslo 21st of November 2016
Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen
Contents

1 Introduction 1
  1.1 The EP in legislative bargaining .......................... 5
    1.1.1 Passing legislation: The evolving role of Parliament . 7
    1.1.2 Internal organization in the European Parliament .... 11
  1.2 The theoretical framework ............................... 19
    1.2.1 Theories of legislative organization .................. 19
    1.2.2 Theories of democratic accountability ................ 27
  1.3 Summary of papers .................................... 33
    1.3.1 (Self-)selection and Expertise among Decision Makers 33
    1.3.2 Delegation in Committees: Loyalty and Experience ..... 35
    1.3.3 Striving for Influence: The Effect of Performance ... 37
    1.3.4 How Legislated Gender Quotas Impact Representation 40
  1.4 Summary of my contributions ........................... 42
    1.4.1 Data collection .................................. 42
    1.4.2 Contribution to a future theorization ................ 50

I Transnational Group Delegations 55

2 (Self-)selection and Expertise 57
  2.1 Literature review and theory ............................. 60
    2.1.1 Individual legislators and legislative proposals ...... 60
CONTENTS

2.1 Experience and expertise .......................... 61
  2.1.2 Experience and expertise ...................... 61
  2.1.3 MEPs’ own requests .......................... 62
  2.1.4 A contract between a group and its rapporteur ... 64
  2.1.5 Expectations .................................. 66

2.2 Data and the model ................................. 68
  2.2.1 Original data on MEP background and in-house beha-
       viour ........................................... 68
  2.2.2 Bayesian modelling of missing and unobserved data ... 70

2.3 Variables .......................................... 74
  2.3.1 Satisfying the group’s need for information (H1) .... 74
  2.3.2 Balancing group needs with individual requests (H2) . 75
  2.3.3 Satisfying a broader span of members (H3) .......... 78
  2.3.4 Control Variables ............................... 78

2.4 Results ............................................ 79
  2.4.1 A clear advantage for policy experts (H1) .......... 79
  2.4.2 Individual requests satisfied only when policy drift is
       limited (H2) .................................... 81
  2.4.3 Competitive claims appeased (H3) .................. 83
  2.4.4 Model performance ............................... 85

2.5 Conclusion ......................................... 86

3 Delegation in Committees ............................ 89
  3.1 Modeling Report Allocation within Political Groups ..... 93
    3.1.1 Sequence of Play ............................. 93
    3.1.2 Payoffs ..................................... 95
    3.1.3 Equilibrium and Hypotheses .................... 97
  3.2 Data and Statistical Model ........................ 104
    3.2.1 Statistical Model ............................. 106
  3.3 Empirical Results .................................. 112
    3.3.1 Controlling for context ......................... 115
  3.4 Conclusion ....................................... 118
CONTENTS

4.7.3 Effect of information in a broader context 162

5 Biased Selection and Quotas 165
  5.1 The literature on candidate selection and the effect of quotas 167
    5.1.1 Causes for biased candidate selection 168
    5.1.2 Political agency and the effect of quotas 170
  5.2 Theory 172
    5.2.1 Consequences of biased recruitment 173
    5.2.2 Consequences of uncertain candidacies 175
  5.3 Data and variables 177
    5.3.1 The European Parliament - before and after the legislation of quotas 177
    5.3.2 Variables 180
  5.4 Results 191
    5.4.1 The effect of biased selection 191
    5.4.2 The change in behavior when quotas are imposed 196
  5.5 Conclusion 207

III Appendices and Bibliography 211

A Appendix to chapter 2 213
  A.1 First model 213
  A.2 Main model 214
  A.3 Results from imputations of attendance level 216
  A.4 Model code in OpenBUGs: 216
  A.5 In-sample predictions 220

B Appendix to chapter 3 223
  B.1 Proof 223
  B.2 Model specifications and convergence tests 230
CONTENTS

C Appendix to chapter 4  233
C.1 Theorizing party choice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
C.2 Proofs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
C.3 Details on the data sample  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
C.4 Details on the main model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
C.5 Alternative models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

D Appendix to chapter 5  269
D.1 Variable description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
D.2 Model descriptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
List of Figures

1.1 Committee activity over the last 15 years. While the number of committee meetings parallels the number of reports drafted, the number of attendees is also affected by things like EU enlargements and time. ........................................... 43

1.2 Groups choose among the most dedicated members when they allocate reports. The most experienced members also capture the highest-impact reports. ........................................... 46

1.3 Parties are more likely to upgrade their ranking of inexperienced incumbent candidates than EP long-termers. ........... 48

2.1 Results from a first model of codecision report allocations. Results show a positive effect of policy expertise, although the estimate is less precise for former ministers. ................. 80

2.2 Results from the three alternative models of codecision report allocations. Group coordinators value expertise and dedication, but they also pay attention to group cohesion: Own-initiative reports do not improve access to codecision allocations, and the effect of dedication is conditioned by loyalty. ... 82
While having drafted a codecision report in the preceding year increases chances of another allocation, the effect of having written an own-initiative report during the current or previous legislative term has negative repercussions. (Estimated effect among the most loyal rank-and-file MEPs with mean attendance (as estimated among full committee members) and no prior experience/expertise.)

The sequence of moves
Relationship between expertise and probability of being allocated reports
Substantive Effect of Experience
The probability of garnering a “safe seat” increases with legislative impact.
Eleven countries used closed list systems.
Operationalization of safe seats.
Empirical strategy to isolate national party decision to renominate.
MEPs who are selected by parliamentary groups, are more likely to be reselected by national parties.

The process of incumbent candidate selection.
Women not elected from quotas aspire to longer careers.
In the absence of quotas, women perform better than men.
Legislated quotas lead parties to hold women more accountable.
Legislated quotas lead women to increase their efforts.

In-sample predictions for MEPs who wrote more than 3 reports. Number of predicted reports are surrounded by 95 per cent credible intervals.
A.2 In-sample predictions for MEPs who wrote 3, 2 or 1 report. Number of predicted reports are surrounded by 95 per cent credible intervals. ........................................ 222

C.1 The posterior belief is a function of prior uncertainty and the precision of new information. .......................... 237
C.2 Random intercepts (median values surrounded by 95% HDI) from model 1. ............................................. 246
C.3 Equation 1: traceplots and density plots for main parameters. 248
C.4 Equation 1: Gelman-Rubin diagnostics. ....................... 249
C.5 Equation 1: Autocorrelation (chain 1). ......................... 249
C.6 Equation 2: traceplots and density plots for main parameters. 251
C.7 Equation 2: Gelman-Rubin diagnostics. ....................... 252
C.8 Equation 2: Autocorrelation (chain 1). ......................... 252
C.9 Equation 3: traceplots and density plots for main parameters. 254
C.10 Equation 3: Gelman-Rubin diagnostics. ..................... 255
C.11 Equation 3: Autocorrelation (chain 1). ....................... 255
## List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Number of Reports Drawn on Behalf of the Committee</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Univariate statistics</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Bivariate results – Mean number of codecision reports within values of the explanatory variables.</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Proportion of correct in-sample predictions</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Descriptive statistics</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Report Allocation – Structure</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Report Allocation – Trend and Controls</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Descriptive statistics (N=1134)</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Results from the two submodels estimating the level of ambition and controlling for eventual selection bias</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems. Median effects from binary logit model. 95 percent HDI reported in parantheses.</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Bivariate statistics: Mean values among MEPs in their first legislative period (1999-2014).</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Women elected without help from quotas are more likely to seek a EU-level career. Results from a binomial model.</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3 Women who were not elected through a quota system perform better than other MEPs. Quotas lowers female performance compared to previous levels. Results from a poisson model with varying intercepts. ................................. 202

5.4 Women elected from legally binding quotas have a greater effect of performance during reselection to office. Results from a binomial model with varying intercepts. ......................... 204

5.5 Women elected from legally binding quotas provide more effort in office than other MEPs – male or female. Results from a linear and a poisson model with varying intercepts. .............. 206

A.1 What determines the allocation of codecision reports? The effect of national level political experience. Results from poisson model with varying intercepts (standard deviation in parenthesis). ................................................................. 214

A.2 What determines the allocation of codecision reports? Results from poisson models. Model without imputations excludes all reports from the first year following election. Model of all sessions imputes unobserved lagged variables from the first year (loyalty and attendance). ................................................. 215

A.3 What determines the attendance rate in committee? Results from OLS model used to impute unobserved values on attendance rates (predictor in the full model of codecision allocations). 216

B.1 Summary of convergence statistics tests ........................................ 231

C.1 Member states using closed list PR for the subsequent election (N=1134). Number of observations included in the analysis are also reported. The Conservative party in the United Kingdom joined the ECR group in the 7th legislature, and is thus excluded from the analysis. ................................. 244

C.2 Equation 1: Gelman and Rubin’s scale reduction factors ... 247
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.3</td>
<td>Equation 1: Geweke’s z-scores for both chains.</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.4</td>
<td>Equation 2: Gelman and Rubin’s scale reduction factors</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.5</td>
<td>Equation 2: Geweke’s z-scores for both chains.</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.6</td>
<td>Equation 3: Gelman and Rubin’s scale reduction factors</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.7</td>
<td>Equation 3: Geweke’s z-scores for both chains.</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.8</td>
<td>Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems. Median effects from binary logit model. 95 percent HDI reported in parentheses.</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.9</td>
<td>Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems: Controlling for MEP ambition.</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.10</td>
<td>Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems: Different ways of controlling for MEP ambition.</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.11</td>
<td>Alternative operationalizations of candidate selection in closed-list systems.</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.1</td>
<td>List of party quotas.</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.2</td>
<td>Descriptive statistic</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.3</td>
<td>Results from a binomial model run in parallel to the main model predicting safe seat allocations.</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

Introduction

Party organizations obtain influence through their choice of representatives. Extra-parliamentary party organizations gain sway through the candidates for whom they secure election, while parliamentary party groups shape policies through the allocation of tasks to competent members. This dissertation delves into the mutual influence of parliamentary group allocations and the choices made by extra-parliamentary party organizations. In the center are members of Parliament whose political careers are shaped by both actors.

This dissertation deals with party organization in the European Parliament (EP) and its impact on their members (MEPs). The European Parliament is a case in which parliamentary party groups and extra-parliamentary party organizations and have no unified, overarching organizational structure. National parties organize elections. They run national campaigns on national programs, they control candidate selection, and they decide which transnational parliamentary group to join in office. Moreover, resources allocated to parliamentary groups cannot be spent on election purposes. Parliamentary work, on the other hand, is organized around transnational political groups. They coordinate through the Conference of Presidents – consisting of the EP president as well as group leaders. Groups receive their resources directly from Parliament which finances staff and office space. They appoint the EP
leadership positions and distribute committee seats. They allocate speaking time as well as various committee tasks such as the drafting of proposals. Groups owe their procedural rights to Parliament’s internal rules, which are controlled by the chamber itself. Their central position is legitimized by their stabilizing effect on parliamentary negotiations and the rationalization of legislative work through division of labor.

The European Parliament can be qualified as a committee-oriented, “working” parliament. The bulk of the legislative work is done in committee prior to plenary reading, and group positions are mainly defined by members on the relevant committees. Committee work follows a particular organization in which the preparation of proposals are captured by one of the groups and then delegated to an individual member. The member then produces a “report” on behalf of the committee containing all negotiated amendments. The “rapporteur” defends the committee compromise during the plenary reading, and continues to follow the dossier during inter-institutional bargaining. In matters pertaining to particular proposals, the rapporteur is the single most influential MEP. The institution of rapporteurs makes it possible to identify and assess the impact of backbenchers in Parliament.

I make use of report allocation to successively consider the relationship between MEPs and their parliamentary groups, then the relationship between MEPs and their national parties. The dissertation is consequently divided into two parts which concentrate on two broad questions:

1. What are the trade-offs faced by transnational political groups in their allocations of reports?

2. To what extent do report allocations impact national parties’ choice to retain MEPs in office?

The relationship between groups or parties and their MEPs is considered through the principal-agent framework. Principal-agent problems involve a principal (the group or the party) who relies on an agent (the MEP) to
further his interests. The agent is typically better able than the principal to execute specific tasks. There are two sources of tensions in their interaction:

The first problem occurs when the agent’s interests differ from those of the principal, so that the latter runs the risk of agency drift; the agent serves his own interests at the expense of the principal. This is the main challenge faced by European parliamentary groups. They do not control group membership, since candidate selection is the prerogative of the extra-parliamentary party organizations. Groups cannot prevent members from shirking using incentives; nor can they select their members according to preferences. Nevertheless, groups rely on their committee members’ expertise to amend proposals and assess their consequences. Allocations are continuous, enabling groups to learn about the abilities of their MEPs. They draw their legitimacy from the coordination of their members in order to further a common interest. Groups thus face a continuous trade-off between their need for expertise and the risk of agency drift. The two first chapters of the dissertation investigate how group coordinators allocate reports so as to maximize the value added by the rapporteur while limiting agency drift.

The second problem arises from the asymmetry of information held by the two players. The principal cannot observe and sanction details in the agent’s execution of assigned tasks. This is the main challenge faced by national parties. They can incentivize members to produce effort by increasing electoral accountability. Parties also have some knowledge of their agent’s preferences, and – at least in closed-list proportional representation electoral systems – they are able to select candidates whose preferences are relatively aligned. However, they do not know the ability of their members to maneuver in Parliament. Without institutionalized presence in the EP they cannot efficiently monitor and advise on political strategies. They thus enter into an outcome-based contract similar to that of voters. MEPs are either rewarded by reselection or kicked out of office at the end of the term. The two chapters in the second part of the dissertation investigate how national parties
use report allocations to dissipate uncertainty about MEPs’ ability to gain influence.

The main contributions of the dissertation pertain to the interconnected choices made by MEPs and their two principals. I show that parliamentary groups make selective delegations so as to facilitate the transmission of information between members of the group. Group coordinators prefer experienced MEPs to newcomers, and policy experts to generalist politicians. Furthermore, groups make trade-offs between their members’ demand for exposure and the need to limit agency drift.

I likewise show that national parties use group delegations as signals of quality during the reselection of incumbent candidates. I argue that report allocations impact MEP careers to the extent that national parties need new information about agent quality, and to the extent that parliamentary groups can provide it.

Finally, the dissertation contributes to the empirical literature by explicitly taking into account that principal-agent contracts are two-way relationships. Each selection is not only made by the principal; it is also sought after and accepted by the MEP. In all of my studies I consistently control for the likelihood that MEPs are within the choice set of the principal. For example, all studies include measures of the effort MEPs’ put into their office. This is especially important in the context of the European Parliament where individual investment in legislative work varies greatly and the average tenure is short. My main contribution in this respect is empirical: I have collected a unique set of data on MEPs’ attendance in committee, including all meetings from the 1999 election until 2014. Three of my studies draw on these data. In the last chapter, I make further use of this measure to show how increased accountability incentivizes members to put effort into their mandate.

Information occupies two different, albeit central, roles in the dissertation. In the study of parliamentary groups information is a service provided by the rapporteur. I build on theories of legislative organization initially
developed on the U.S. Congress. A key argument is that policymakers need information about future consequences of proposals. My conception of information is somewhat broader, including political skills and assessments of the political feasibility of proposals. In the study of national parties’ choice of candidates the informational environment determinates the final selection. The environment includes the perceived need for and the availability of information about MEPs’ ability to gain influential positions.

The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows: I first go through the specificities of party organization and legislative activity in the European Parliament. I then present an overview of the theoretical frameworks that I rely on. I highlight my main contributions, theoretical and empirical, to the field. Next, I present the main questions, strategies and findings of the individual chapters, before I end with a few concluding remarks on the implications of my study.

1.1 The European Parliament in legislative bargaining

Although the European Parliament is a supranational assembly, I argue that committee delegation and candidate selection can fruitfully be studied within frameworks traditionally used to study national representation.

On the one hand, studies of committee delegation in the EP have, for the last 20 years, drawn on theories of legislative organization developed for the U.S. Congress. The choice is natural. The EU legislative arrangement can be conceived as a separation-of-powers system in which no government relies on continuous support in Parliament. Legislative activity in Parliament is, moreover, committee-oriented, and parliamentary group cohesion is relatively low. The EP differs from the U.S. case, however, insofar as parliamentary groups play no role in the reelection of their members. Nor can they command loyalty through the perks of a majority position as is the case for the U.S.
parties. Their existence can therefore not be justified within the framework suggested by Cox and McCubbins (1993).

On the other hand, given the low salience of EP elections, individual accountability of MEPs has generally been seen as slight, in particular in comparison to the U.S. case. I argue that in closed-list PR systems, the primary accountability of MEPs is to their parties, rather than directly to voters. Parties are better able to gather and coordinate on information about candidates’ track records. Individual accountability thereby has more similarities with continental European systems than with the U.S. electoral system. In assessing individual accountability, we should therefore look to the party link as a transmission belt between voters and their parliamentary representation.

In the following subsections I first describe the legislative process at the European level with a specific accent on the EP’s role compared to other institutions and the centrality of rapporteurs.

The EU can be conceived as a separation-of-powers system in which the Commission – the main holder of executive power – has a monopoly on legislative proposal, while the European Parliament and the Council function as a lower and an upper house. Today, the promulgation of legislation usually requires all three players to agree on its wording. The relative influence of each institution has evolved over time, as has the scope of EU legislation itself (Subsection 1). I draw on this variation to show how the differential impact of Parliament directly or indirectly influences the principals’ choice of agents. Furthermore, in the EP most of the legislative work is done in committees. The organization gives individual legislators a particular impact (Subsection 2). It makes the EP a particularly suitable case for studying the premises of individual delegations within partisan organizations.
1.1. THE EP IN LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING

1.1.1 Passing legislation: The evolving role of Parliament

The extension of parliamentary power has gone in two directions: First, Parliament’s involvement in the designation of EU’s main executive body, the Commission, has seen several important advances. Second, Parliament has, over time, obtained the status of a co-equal legislator with the Council. Pertaining to the first point, the relative impact of Parliament compared to the member states depends much on whether its position is backed by the Commission (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001; König, Lindberg, Lechner, and Pohlmeier, 2007). Thus, Parliament has had a vested interest – and has played an active role – in the observed evolution towards parliamentary approval of the composition of the College of Commissioners. The groups’ recent initiative to forward candidates for the Commission presidency has also taken them closer to changing the power relationship between institutions (Hobolt, 2014, p. 1536-38). The EU legislative system still retains an important separation of powers, however. In the following, I concentrate on Parliament’s position during legislation.

While both the Council and Parliament can call for initiatives to be taken (Articles 241 and 225 TFEU), all legislative proposals originate from the Commission. Proposals are communicated simultaneously to Parliament and the Council. The European Parliament always issues its opinion first. The Commission then decides whether to incorporate the amended proposal and transmits the dossier to the Council. The Council can then accept the amended text or communicate a new draft of its own (a so-called common position among member states). The Commission and Council function as veto players, while the role of Parliament varies quite substantially.

The number of potential readings – as well as the relative power of the EP – has evolved considerably since Parliament’s first direct election in 1979. The EP’s role in legislation is defined by the procedure applied to each proposal. Its choice depends in turn on the policy domain and is specified in
the European treaties. In the following I describe the historical evolution of the main legislative procedures in order to justify why several studies in the dissertation concentrate on allocations under parliamentary “codecision” rather than treating all allocations indiscriminately (for an overview, see Hix and Høyland, 2011, p. 49-74 or Corbett, 1998, p. 49-74).

The first opportunity was seized already in 1980 in the “isoglucose case”. Under the consultation procedure Commission proposals were communicated simultaneously to the Council and the EP. Member states infrequently made their decision before even receiving Parliament’s opinion, effectively ignoring the consultation. One of these cases was taken to the European Court of Justice which ruled that the Council had to wait until Parliament had issued its opinion (Roquette Frères v Council, Case 138/79). While some uncertainty remained about the obligation for a “sincere cooperation”, the case gave Parliament, in effect, a delaying veto.

The Single European Act (1986) introduced a second reading in cases where the common position did not sufficiently incorporate new amendments. The cooperation procedure applied to approximately one third of all EU legislation (Hix and Høyland, 2011, p. 53) and aimed to incentivize inter-institutional agreement: The Council could either approve EP amendments by qualified majority vote in the first reading, or overrule Parliament by unanimity after the second reading. Cooperation was sequentially replaced by the codecision procedure already in the 1990s, and was finally repealed by the Lisbon Treaty (2009).

The main innovation of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) affecting legislative bargaining was the codecision procedure. It supplemented most applications of cooperation. Codecision includes a potential third reading: In cases of sustained disagreement a conciliation committee is convened. In its early version member states could overrule Parliament by qualified majority vote after conciliation. An academic debate occurred about whether the treaty reform actually improved Parliament’s position. The in fine possibility for
Council to supersede EP proposals by qualified majority rather than unanimity spurred Tsebelis and Garrett to argue that cooperation presents a better deal for Parliament (Tsebelis, 1994; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1997, 2000). Other scholars found codecision to be an improvement (Steunenberg, 1994, 1997; Crombez, 1996, 1997; Moser, 1996, 1997). Parliament effectively resolved the matter by changing its rules of procedure (rule 78). In cases of a sustained disagreement after conciliation the EP leadership would automatically ask the Commission to retract its proposal. In the event of a refusal, the leadership would table a motion to reject the proposal. The change was finally implemented in the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). Non-agreement after conciliation implies that the legislation fails, and the status quo prevails. While some scholars today consider Parliament to be a coequal legislator to the Council (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000), others emphasize that the requirement of an absolute majority to amend or reject proposals still makes the EP a junior partner (Hagemann and Hoyland, 2010). The Lisbon Treaty (2009) further increased the scope of the procedure and relabeled it the “ordinary legislative procedure”. Because much of the legislation treated in this dissertation was introduced prior to 2009, I consistently refer to the procedure as “codecision”.

Overall, legislative procedures define windows of opportunity for Parliament. In this dissertation, procedures are considered as preconditions for parliamentary impact and treated as exogenously given. As such, they produce important effects on the decisions made by the principal (the group or the party). In the first paper I show how codecision and own-initiative reports are delegated to different subsets of legislators. I argue that groups pay particular attention to their collective needs when allocating high-impact legislation, while own-initiative reports are policy statements that cater more to the demand for individual exposure. In the second paper I take this argument further, together with my coauthors, and show that the groups’ requirements for expertise and loyalty have increased over time as the EP has become more
influential. The most stringent criteria apply under codecision. In the third paper I demonstrate that the more selective report allocations also convey the most information about MEP quality. They therefore have a greater bearing on national parties' choice to retain incumbent candidates.

The efficiency of parliamentary activism to increase the EP’s role – as it has been discussed here – has required extensive internal coordination on the part of MEPs. Parliamentary groups, with their ability to reach broad political consensus, have played an important role in this evolution. One can argue that the combination of strong political groups in Parliament with weak partisan coordination across institutions has made the high level of parliamentary activism possible. The political groups’ interest in increasing their role has been aligned with Parliament’s institutional interests. National parties – which may often also have delegates in the Council and Commission – have not prevented this evolution. Highly integrated partisan organization beyond the EP might have yielded other results, although counterfactual speculations are beyond the scope of this introduction.

Overall, the autonomy of the College of Commissioners ensured by the relative separation of powers has nudged the EP in the direction of a “working parliament”. A comprehensive study of the origin and effects of committee organization in Parliament is also beyond the scope of this dissertation. I will, however, in the following subsection describe and place the EP committee system in a comparative perspective in order to highlight its role in legislation. In particular, I point to the centrality of individual legislators. Their role goes beyond supporting (or scrutinizing) the policies of a governmental majority, as is often the case in parliamentary systems. Individual legislators are instrumental to Parliament’s ability to shape legislation. This is why report allocation and candidate selection are such important topics. The next section then describes the partisan organization at the EU level and how it relates to individual behavior.
1.1.2 Internal organization in the European Parliament: The impact of individuals

The internal organization of the European Parliament is dominated by strong committees (1) in which individual legislators play a central role (2).

**Strong committees**

I consider seven of the features that Strøm (1998) identifies as influential for committees’ policy impact and oversight. Pertaining to the latter, he mentions the committees’ authority to compel ministerial (1) or civil servant (2) attendance and documentation. The EP committees have gained some sway in this respect. Since this dissertation concentrates on the making of policies, I will not dwell further on the monitoring of Commission activities.

Committee influence increases when their jurisdiction remains stable over time, and in particular if it corresponds to ministerial portfolios (3). This allows for the accumulation of policy expertise in committees and more efficient monitoring of ministerial activities. With the exception of a minor reorganization in the 5th legislature (1999–2004), the EP’s committee system has remained stable over time. Their jurisdiction also overlaps quite extensively with the Commission’s Directorates-General. This has typically allowed committees to establish hearings of individual commissioners prior to their nomination. Also, representatives of the concerned directorates general routinely attend committee meetings. The two first papers explicitly draw on this feature to show that groups prefer allocating reports to members who have repeatedly served on the same committee. The argument is that those members have obtained expertise which is valuable to the group. Simply serving in Parliament over several periods does not entail the same value.

Strom further points out that when the committee stage precedes the plenary meeting (4) – as is the case in the European Parliament – this also enhances the role of committees. The EP Bureau authorizes the drafting of
reports, but the core of information gathering and political bargaining is done in committee. The plenary debate and voting in Parliament is structured around the committee’s report. Although proposals are open to amendments in the plenary, their probability of adoption is low at this stage because consensus has already been reached. This is due to the extensive delegation of authority to parliamentary groups and their efficient division of labor at the subcommittee level. The dynamic can be understood with the help of Strom’s last points on committee organization.

The influence of committees is greater when they have the right to initiate legislation (5) or substantially rewrite proposals (6). The European Parliament does not have the right to initiate proposals, but it has an unlimited power of amendment. Amendments tend to be issue-specific, however, and do not extend to the U.S. practice of linking otherwise unconnected proposals. Parliament can give its opinion on Commission activities and call for initiatives to be taken through so-called own-initiative reports. These reports have no legal value, though, and can at best be translated into “soft law”. In the second part of the dissertation I argue that the combination of a substantial impact of committee amendments and a lack of control over the political agenda leads parties to enter an outcome-based contract with their MEPs. Parties cannot precisely foresee who will have the qualities to gain sway prior to their election. Nor can they commit to implementing a detailed working program in the EP. Yet the result of the legislative process is important to them. The result is that parties delegate the organization of legislative work to parliamentary groups. The groups’ allocations are then used as signals of quality when parties make their decisions to retain incumbent candidates.

Strom argues that the existence of subcommittees also better coordination on particular policies (7). Some EP committees tend to have a large membership, so coordination at the subcommittee level is of particular importance. Although a few formal subcommittees exist, the most significant organization is structured around individual proposals. The EP is different
from the U.S. case in this respect. Rapporteurs – in contrast to the American bill sponsors – are official negotiators on behalf of their committee but also the selected delegates of their parliamentary group. They are flanked by “shadow” rapporteurs with similar mandates from the other groups. The system had already existed for some time when it was formalized in the rules of procedure in 2009. At this point, the extensive practice of “early agreements” meant that proposals received no substantial treatment in plenary. Indeed, an important contribution of the Amsterdam Treaty was the institution of early agreements. Legislation can be adopted at the first reading if the Council and Parliament adopt the same set of amendments. The use of early agreements increased rapidly. In 2009, more than 90% of codecision proposals were concluded in this way (Hix and Høyland, 2011, p. 73). The practice has substantially increased the importance of rapporteurs, as most inter-institutional negotiations now take place behind closed doors already at the committee stage (Farrell and Héritier, 2004; Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli, and Koop, 2013; Reh, 2014). The final policy outcome is defined by the participants in the negotiations (including the rapporteur), rather than by the pivotal players in the different institutions (Achen, 2006). Shadow rapporteurs thus ensure some degree of representation of the political diversity of Parliament behind the closed doors of early agreements.

While my studies concentrate on the designation of full rapporteurs, my interest lies in within-group delegations. As such, I expect that my theoretical framework also applies to the study of shadow rapporteurs.

The impact of individuals

Upon the reception of a Commission proposal, the parliamentary group presidents meet through the EP Bureau to consider whether the text needs further deliberation. Proposals are then delegated to committees which will draft a legislative “report”. The distribution of reports varies somewhat across committees. In most cases, allocations follow an auction-like system
between parliamentary groups. Points are distributed to each group according to their size at the beginning of the legislative period, as well as mid-term. Each report is then subject to a “bidding round” among the parliamentary groups (Wurzel, 1999, p. 11-13). The major players at this stage are the group coordinators in each committee. Higher-impact reports (as defined by the legislative procedure) tend to require more points from the winning group, while technical reports sometimes are distributed for a low price to renowned experts. Suggesting a particular rapporteur can also contribute to lower the price groups pay for some reports. The committee chair functions both as a default rapporteur when no group signals interest and a consensual figure when dealing with sensitive issues (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, 2007, p. 140-141). The system implies that groups sustain an opportunity cost in acquiring reports. It also means that they can be expected to prioritize reports that they consider of particular salience – and omit bidding altogether if the coordinator does not think he has a suitable rapporteur.

Rather strict proportionality rules apply between national delegations within groups (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003, p. 347). The official distribution of reports is thus paralleled by a second round of distribution between national party contingents. According to one line of argument, leaders of national party delegations thus have the upper hand compared to the transnational parliamentary groups (Kreppel, 2002, p. 177-221). While the argument has some bearing on centralized decisions, such as the distribution of committee seats, only the largest national parties would be able to ensure a full-fledged hierarchical structure within all of Parliament’s 20 committees.

Studies of committee seat placements in the EP (beginning with Bowler and Farrell, 1995) have drawn on theories of legislative organization developed for the U.S. Congress in order to determine whether seat allocations follow the distributive (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994), informational (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987, 1990; Krehbiel, 1991) or party rationale (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). A review of all three theories will be provided later in
this introduction. No conclusive evidence has been provided. Assignments are controlled by parliamentary groups, and studies show that committees tend to reflect the political composition of the plenary (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; McElroy, 2006). However, groups take into consideration the wishes of individual MEPs so that committee assignments reflect their policy interests (Whitaker, 2001; Whitaker 2011). Finally, Yordanova suggests classifying committees in two categories according to either their potential for distribution of regulatory benefits to constituents or their requirement of policy expertise. She finds that the first category tends to consist of preferential outliers compared to the chamber. The latter category, on the other hand, does not attract preference outliers but contain members with a high level of expertise.

I argue that committee assignments in practice are largely open to self-selection in the EP. In cases where MEPs do not receive their most preferred committee seat as a full member, they generally obtain a position as a substitute. Not only are substitutes allowed to draft reports, they also enjoy full speaking and voting rights provided the meeting is not fully set (Corbett et al., 2007, p. 128-129). It rarely is. Attendance rates in committees are even lower than in plenary meetings. In my study of three of the largest committees in the 6th and 7th legislatures (2004-2014), I observe for example that the average attendee is present in 51% of all meetings. The real selection is done at the subcommittee level by parliamentary groups, which thus act as gatekeepers. In contrast to the U.S. Congress in which rank-and-file members remain relatively free to sponsor bills, the right to amend legislation in the EP is closely controlled by group coordinators through the institution of rapporteurs. The most important party of the legislative activity takes place within the restricted circle of the rapporteur and his shadows, as well as the committee leadership. In the first study of report allocation I therefore do not control for committee membership, but rely on committee attendance as a measure of self-selection into the committee.
Studies of allocations within committees have multiplied since the turn of the century. They tend to rely on the same set of theoretical expectations as the initial studies of committee seat placements. Most studies concentrate on report allocations, although a similar rationale seems to apply to the designation of shadow rapporteurs (Hurka, Kaeding and Obholzer, 2014) and committee coordinators (Obholzer and Kaeding, 2015). Three elements are most often discussed: (1) the information MEPs can provide to the group, (2) his or her loyalty to the group, and (3) his or her general commitment to the mandate.

First, authors converge in pointing to *information* as an important quality among rapporteurs. The type of information under consideration varies. Knowledge of the policy implications of proposals is scarce, although vital for the detailed elaboration of legislation. Some studies therefore point to expertise as an important determinant for allocations (Yoshinaka, McElroy and Bowler, 2010 on the 4th and 5th Parliament; although results hold only under consultation in the 6th Parliament: Yordanova, 2011a: 111-115). The findings parallel what has previously been shown for committee assignments (McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009: 272), and are further corroborated by what I find in the first part of this dissertation.

Common affiliation with national parties in government is said to provide important inside information on the Council’s position (Hoyland, 2006; Costello and Thomson, 2011, although questioned by Yordanova, 2011a). Kaeding (2004: 365-66), for his part, argues that EU-level experience provides valuable connections and knowledge of legislative procedures. The finding is supported by Yordanova (2011a: 113-116) who demonstrates that holding the same committee seat across at least two periods indeed increases the likelihood of codecision allocations. My first paper reproduces this result.

Overall, recent contributions imply that delegations in the EP do not follow a system of seniority to the same extent as in U.S. committee assignments. The count number of years in Parliament has, for example, little
impact on allocations (Hausemer, 2006, p. 522-524; Yoshinaka, McElroy and Bowler, 2010, Hurka and Kaeding, 2012). This would shift the power relationship away from individual members in favor of parliamentary groups, which keep control over delegations, in pursuit of their own broader interests. The second paper makes the argument that the relationship between report allocations and length of tenure in committees is inversely U-shaped. It reflects the expertise which MEPs build up, and it is valuable to parties. Tenure therefore initially has a positive effect during report allocations. However, the experience also makes rapporteurs better able to induce policy drift. As time goes by, the positive effect of tenure flattens out so that loyalty is the most distinguishing feature among the more senior members.

Second, studies have showed that coordinators prioritize loyal members during delegations (Hausemer, 2006, p. 526 Yoshinaka, McElroy, and Bowler, 2010, Yordanova, 2011a). A debate remains on whether groups are capable of inducing group cohesion by rewarding loyal members with influential positions or whether the findings are conditional on the cooperation of national parties (Kreppel, 2002). The latter argument is compatible with a logic in which groups are *de facto* run by a few major national parties which both make up the group median voter and allocate positions in committees. The argument in this dissertation goes in the direction that groups exist to facilitate and enforce an exchange of information between members (see for example Hix and Hoyland, 2014). Groups thus have a pronounced self-interest in promoting collective goals by limiting policy drift and prioritizing loyalty.

I make no attempt to empirically distinguish preference divergence at the individual level from loyalty induced by party discipline, as both rationales lead to the same result: Parliamentary groups prefer delegating to loyal members. Previous research has relied on NOMINATE scores – which are developed to capture legislators’ ideal points – to measure loyalty along the main policy dimensions of Parliament. This is a reasonable interpretation of the results. Roll call votes may present a selection bias (Hug, 2010) and can
be seen as a strategic interaction in which group coordinators or the national party leadership monitors their members (for an overview, see: Thiernse, 2016, Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug, 2008, Finke, 2015). Roll call votes provide a measure of revealed policy divergence but are likely to underestimate the distance between the true preferences. It is particularly relevant for MEPs who seek selection by their principal and might therefore alter their voting behavior. In the first part of the dissertation I use a simple count of member defections during roll-call votes. The operationalization is a direct measure of loyalty and means that all votes are weighted equally. I consider the possible trade-offs groups face in their criteria of selection. In the first paper, I show that groups are more likely to comply with individual legislators’ wishes for influence when their loyalty is high. In the second paper, we demonstrate that when the rapporteur’s capacity to induce agency drift is high, groups put relatively greater emphasis on loyalty. We further show that loyalty has the greatest effect when the potential impact of a proposal is high.

Third, recent studies of report allocation tend to include a control for MEP commitment to his or her mandate. Scarrow (1997) identified three paths to European mandates: Some MEPs are early in their political careers and consider Parliament as a stepping stone to national mandates. Other MEPs enter Parliament at the end of a national career, while a third group of members can be considered EP careerists. The latter category is likely to have vested interests in EU politics and a long-term commitment to their mandate. Scarrow suggests that members of this group make up the backbone of EP legislative activity. Authors have more recently included controls for MEP investment when modeling report allocations. Attendance rates during plenary sessions are positively correlated with the acquisition of rapporteurships (Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Hurka and Kaeding, 2012; Hurka, Kaeding, and Obholzer, 2015). Two justifications for this choice coexist. On the one hand, Benedetto proposes it as a means of defining the actual choice set of MEPs who are willing to draft reports. On the other hand, it has been
suggested that the group leadership rewards assiduous members with reports
(Hix, Noury, and Roland, 2006).

In modeling the parliamentary groups’ choice of rapporteurs and the national parties’ choice of candidates, I draw on measures of MEP commitment to
distinguish selection from self-selection. In the first part, I draw on attendance rates to capture the extent to which MEPs value report allocations. In the second part, I find that attendance is also an important predictor of
the extent to which MEPs intend to seek reelection to Parliament.

1.2 The theoretical framework

1.2.1 Theories of legislative organization

Students of the internal organization of the European Parliament have drawn
on theories of legislative organization first developed by the Americanist liter-
ature. The EP presents several features that call for comparisons with
the U.S. Congress (see for example Kreppel, 2009; Hix and Høyland, 2014).
Parliament combines a structure of strong committees with relatively weak
parliamentary groups. The survival of the executive does not depend on a
stable majority in Parliament. The separation of powers requires less cohe-
sive groups than what is the case in classical European-style parliamentary
systems. This means that consensus can be negotiated on an issue-to-issue
basis.

Political group leaders have generally limited possibilities to impose party
discipline (Maltzman, 1997, p. 23). In particular, the ideological dimension
is cross-cut by other sources of competing interests. Reelection concerns
bring other issues to the surface. Groups play a limited role in candidate
selection, which means that members need to cater to diverging interests.
In particular, internal conflict occurs pertaining to constituency interests (in
the US) or national party interests (in the EU).

There are some substantial differences between the European and the
U.S. systems as well. Most notably, members of the European Parliament are elected from a more or less party-centered ballot, while their American counterparts obtain their mandate in a highly candidate-centered system. Moreover, committee assignments in Congress follow a seniority norm which favors individual autonomy. The European Parliament, on the other hand, has organized delegations explicitly around parliamentary groups. Lastly, in the United States, legislation is introduced by individuals or groups of individuals, while the process of amendments in Parliament is – as previously discussed – centered on a restricted group of selected (shadow) rapporteurs. The outcome is that the European system lends a greater role to partisan organizations acting as principals, both outside of Parliament (national parties acting as a selectorate) and inside the chamber (transnational groups acting as gate-keepers).

American theorists have concentrated on the long-standing puzzle of why we do not see majority cycling in Congress. The literature on social choice predicts that the coexistence of numerous salient policy issues would lead to inherently unstable policies, as an alternative winning coalition always exists (Arrow, 1951). Three strands of congressional theories have successively proposed three different explanations. In the following, I briefly survey the theories most commonly applied to the EP.

**Distributional theory**

A first generation of scholars suggested that the system of strong committees in Congress allows members to exchange influence, thereby creating stable policy outcomes (e.g.: Shepsle and Weingast, 1994; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). Committees have strong procedural advantages compared to the plenary whereby they institutionalize a distribution of disproportional influence for committee members over specific policy areas. The institutional choice means that members agree up front to support propositions from other committees in exchange for a seat on the committee
of their choice. The system is upheld by three elements: (1) Committees control the agenda and the policy outcome in their jurisdiction. (2) Members put different values on policy areas. (3) Members are able to self-select to their most preferred committee. Committees thus end up being staffed by policy outliers.

Policy outcomes in this system do not reflect the preferences of the median voter in one unified policy dimension. Specific policies are defined by high demanders, and budgets tend to be unbalanced. Nevertheless, in its most common version, the distributive perspective assumes that voters – acting as a principal – define legislator preferences: Katz and Sala (1996) demonstrate that the development of a candidate-centered electoral system has increasingly induced incumbent candidates to claim credit for legislation. They therefore need influence in office over issues that are relevant to their constituencies. The American version implies that the preferences of reelection-seeking legislators are generated by the geographically defined interests of their constituents. Congressmen from rural districts will, for example, have a specific interest in providing benefits to the agricultural sector. Distributional theory in its purest form, however, only assumes that policy salience diverges among legislators.

Organization in the European Parliament has been analyzed within an adapted view of the distributive rationale. While EU policies are often regulatory – and rarely directly redistributive – they often have a redistributive effect. Authors have also observed that links to pressure groups – at least in some committees such as the environmental committee – have an effect on both committee assignments (Yordanova, 2009; McElroy, 2006) and report allocations (Kaeding, 2004). The European ballot structure furthermore implies that legislators’ preferences would mainly be defined by national party affiliation. Hausemer (2006) demonstrates, for example, that rapporteurs are allowed to access dossiers of particular salience to their party.

Notwithstanding these contributions, the application of distributional
theories to the European case remains awkward for several reasons. First, while I have previously argued that committee assignments in the EP are in practice open, most decisions are made within the restricted group of rapporteurs and their shadows. These positions are controlled by the groups, which tend to select loyal members, not policy outliers. Second, Parliament deliberates on committee proposals under an open rule. However, it is true that the extended use of early agreements moves policy decisions away from the chamber and into a restricted circle of lawmakers.

The most important contribution of the distributive approach to the European literature is probably its emphasis on the demand side of legislation. What are the motivations for MEPs to pursue report allocations? Who are their extra-parliamentary principals? How do reelection-seeking MEPs best reach their goals?

While I do not provide exhaustive answers to these questions, I do identify national parties as important extra-parliamentary principals to the MEPs, in particular in closed-list PR systems. I show that parties expect MEPs to obtain influential positions such as rapporteurs. I further demonstrate that when accountability increases, reelection-seeking MEPs redouble their efforts to obtain influence.

The informational theory

A second generation in the congressional literature also emphasizes the stabilizing role of committees (e.g.: Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987; Krehbiel, 1991). However, authors provide different justifications for their existence.

Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) suggest policy-making is a case of imperfect information. Legislators have defined preferences, but they do not know the exact effect of different proposals. Collecting information is time-consuming. Committees are subunits with delegated authority which permit the assembly to increase its workload dramatically. They allow members to specialize in policy domains and share information (Krehbiel, 1991). In contrast to
1.2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

the individual benefits provided in the distributive perspective, this arrangement benefits the chamber as a whole. The system requires three elements: (1) Legislators are incentivized to specialize in order to gain disproportional impact. This is done by allowing committees to maintain important prerogatives compared to the plenary and through a seniority practice in the allocation of committee positions. (2) The floor must nevertheless keep some control over the agenda, and the political composition of committees must reflect the chamber as a whole so that (3) all members on the floor can find a reliable informant within each committee.

Students of the internal organization of the EP have picked up the argument that policy-makers work with imperfect information. Most authors seem to agree that rapporteurs are selected for the information they can provide (e.g.: Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Yordanova, 2011b). My understanding of information is somewhat wider than the initial concept of policy expertise. It includes everything from inside information on other institutions (Høyland, 2006) and experience with EU-level systems (Kaeding, 2004) to a meta-level understanding of systems/length of education (Daniel, 2013).

However, there are at least two reasons why Krehbiel’s theoretical framework does not travel as readily to the European case as the insistence on imperfect information would indicate. The initial framework was set up for a system which maximizes both the development of expertise and the exchange of information. While we see elements of both, the way it is done is different from what Krehbiel predicts.

First, Krehbiel considers the floor to be the main principal of committee members, while I suggest transnational groups occupy this position. Notwithstanding his assumption of a procedural precommitment which does not hold in the EP, Krehbiel also imagines a system in which individuals are incentivized to specialize because of the autonomy they increasingly gain. Parties very explicitly play no role in this setup (Krehbiel, 1993) and the floor’s control over individuals is only sporadic. In contrast, all positions of influence in
the EP are allocated on an issue-to-issue basis by the transnational groups. One example of this is Krehbiel’s idea of seniority “practice” by which long serving-members are rewarded for their specialization. He emphasizes that there are possible deviations from the practice to exclude policy outliers, but there is no systematic selection. This implies a linear probabilistic relationship between length of tenure on a committee and the influence of members. It might also imply a decreasing loyalty on the part of members as they gain in seniority. His system would thus ensure individual autonomy and enforce gains from trade by preserving individual turfs.

There has been some debate as to whether the high stability in committee membership in the EP and the repeated allocation of reports to a small subset of MEPs can be conceived as a seniority practice (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009; Yoshinaka et al., 2010). However, there is no evidence that length of tenure has a linear effect on report allocations. In the second paper we demonstrate that the relationship is inversely U-shaped because transnational groups keep tabs on allocations throughout an MEP’s career. Moreover, we see that loyalty has a constant positive effect and plays a relatively more important role when an MEP gains in seniority. I contend that groups can credibly commit to rewarding specialization because they need it. However, they also keep control over delegations. In fact, together with my coauthors, I make the claim that informational considerations take place within groups and contribute to the justification why groups exist.

Second, Krehbiel considers appointments to collective bodies such as standing committees. A problem occurs when we apply congressional theories to individual delegation decisions such as report allocation. Krehbiel’s “heterogeneity principle”, in particular, posits that delegation is made to subunits that reflect the composition of the chamber so that floor members may triangulate information to infer their best position on issues. Although over time rapporteur allocations are roughly proportional to the political composition of the chamber, this does not ensure efficient transmission of
information on individual dossiers. The informational framework certainly sheds light on the practice of shadow rapporteurs. However, groups only have one informant per issue. It raises the question of the role of political parties and how they maximize transmission of information and prevent policy drift at the rapporteur selection stage. Parliamentary groups are indeed omnipresent in the European Parliament.

Krehbiel (1993) argues that the existence of political groups does not necessarily cause political outcomes that deviate from what is otherwise acceptable to the median of the chamber. Theories of legislative organization can thus effectively ignore the presence of groups. At the micro-level, however, we argue that parliamentary groups face a delegation problem in the system of (shadow) rapporteurs. Groups may or may not have the upper hand in this exchange. Individual members are vested with the authority not only to negotiate a consensus between the groups in Parliament, but also to build a winning coalition across institutions. This ultimately limits the possible outcomes on the Parliament floor. Groups are important barriers to agency drift. The transmission of information from individuals to the group should therefore be modeled separately, and differently, from what is conceived in the traditional literature on committee assignments. This is done in the second article.

The partisan theory

The partisan theory suggests that committees exist to help parties gain influence over individual behavior (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). Legislators have, from a social-choice point of view, chosen to delegate authority to the party leadership. This provides members with at least three advantages:

First, parties vest rank-and-file members with disproportional influence over some policy areas. However, they keep close control over their delegates. The division of labor liberates time for individuals to specialize. Specialization and exchange of information consequently takes place among like-minded
legislators. From the party members’ point of view, they are thus able to make more and better policies. Second, cohesive, common legislation provides members with a shared “party label” from which all legislators profit during elections. Third, members of the majority party in a bipartisan system are able to reap more influential positions than the party size would indicate.

The contract is enforced by the party leadership which possesses a certain number of disciplinary tools. The most prominent of these emanate from parties’ capacity to assign or reassign members to committee positions, thus preventing disobedient members from accessing salient positions. Parties can also expulse members, effectively hurting their chances of reelection as well as barring them from future spoils of the party’s majority status. Using these tools is costly to the party leadership, however. Cox and McCubbins (2005) therefore suggest that party cohesiveness also arises from the leadership’s control over the agenda: The leadership can initiate legislation on which members agree, while blocking contested issues.

The partisan approach to legislative organization in Congress thus presupposes a bipartisan chamber, with extensive legislative initiative and parliamentary parties competing in the electoral arena. None of this is relevant to the multiparty setting of the European Parliament, where groups play a negligible role during elections. Groups also have limited agenda-setting power, as legislative proposals are initiated by the Commission. Groups’ position in Parliament can be said to be precarious in the sense that their role is defined by the rules of procedure, which are continuously revised by the members of the chamber, while their membership is defined by national parties. In this respect, transnational groups in the EP represent a critical case of partisan organization in Parliament. They are central players.

In this dissertation I argue that delegations made by groups serve at least two important purposes. First, groups select rapporteurs on the basis of expertise and loyalty to maximize the quality of information. This benefits
the membership as a whole. Second, these allocations serve as signals which national parties can use to assess the quality of their incumbent candidates as legislators. In modelling the effect of report allocations on MEPs’ prospects of reelection, I rely on the theorization of democratic accountability developed for studies of voters and their political representatives.

1.2.2 Theories of democratic accountability

Democratic accountability takes place when the electorate holds decision-makers responsible for their actions in office. The European Parliament has justified its increasing powers on the grounds that it is the only directly elected institution in the EU policy-making machinery. Nevertheless, the accountability of MEPs is said to be exceptionally low. Elections to the European Parliament are defined as second-order: Voters cast their ballot knowing very little about what has been accomplished in the EP (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Marsh, 1998; Hix and Marsh, 2007, 2011). In particular, scholars have argued that the relative obscurity of EU lawmaking is caused by the lack of a visible and accountable government and alternative ruling majorities. The electoral systems in EP elections are overall party-centered. Nonetheless, parties’ electoral results are often influenced by governmental status at the national level. Their support also increases in the number of national heavyweights figuring on their lists rather than the track record of MEPs (Hobolt and Høylund, 2011). Parties are furthermore said to pay little attention to EP politics, including in their choice of candidates. As a result, a common assumption is that individual reelection possibilities are only marginally affected by performance in office (Hix and Høylund, 2011, p. 55).

Much of the theoretical framework I rely on in the dissertation’s second part was developed to understand individual accountability vis-à-vis voters in candidate-centered systems. In Europe’s party-centered context, parties are commonly regarded as “transmission belts” between individual representa-
tives and voters. My dissertation contributes by considering the relationship between MEPs and their national parties within a framework of democratic accountability. It is a necessary, though insufficient, condition for the democratic responsibility of EP representation.

The literature offers valuable insights pertaining to the role of information: On the one hand, the quality and availability of information on performance in office increases accountability. On the other hand, the impact of information increases with the perceived need for it. In the next subsection I survey the theoretical foundation for both claims.

**Developments in the theorization of democratic accountability**

Theorists of democratic accountability have, over the last 15 years, gone from mainly focusing on risks of moral hazard to considering the effect of adverse selection (for an overview, see Ashworth, 2012).

**From sanction to selection of candidates.**

A longstanding tradition in the literature has maintained that voters assess politicians' performance *post hoc*. They sanction inappropriate behavior by refusing reelection to incumbent candidates (e.g. Key, Cummings, and Maass, 1966; Barro, 1973; Fiorina, 1981; Ferejohn, 1986; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999). These are models of pure *moral hazard* in which voters alter the behavior of their representatives by the threat of a sanction. As such, all candidates have identical qualities but perform differently as a function of the incentives they receive.

This requires two elements to be present: First, voters need to attribute outcomes to specific policies and their authors. Recognizable lines of responsibility facilitate accountability (e.g. Powell and Whitten, 1993). Information therefore plays an important role in voters’ choice. I argue that the institution of rapporteurs in the EP provides a link between individual actions and
policy outcomes. While the information might be lost on the electorate as a whole, I argue that it is perceived and acted upon by national parties.

Second, these models assume that all representatives are single-minded reelection seekers. However, all careers come to an end. The electorate therefore needs to choose the best representation up front rather than relying on mechanisms of sanction to which representatives may not be sensitive. Fearon (1999) suggests that voters are more concerned with future policies when they go to the polls. They consequently cannot commit to credible sanctions of unwanted behavior. The change in theorization may not immediately have observable consequences. Voters look to the past to learn about the future. In systems with a high proportion of reelection seekers, the majority of representatives indeed alter their behavior out of fear of deselection. However, this insight carries particular weight in the EP where the median tenure hardly exceeds one term. While the minority that constitutes what Scarrow identifies as “European careerists” would be sensitive to electoral sanctions, the representation ensured by a majority of MEPs is defined by mechanisms of selection.

Two sources of uncertainty affect accountability.

Information plays a vital role in processes of accountability. It is conceived as a signal that is a more or less accurate description of reality. The empirical literature is particularly rich in studies demonstrating how the presence and precision of signals affect levels of effort and voters’ choices. Following Fearon’s (1999) criticism, studies often rely on a combination of moral hazard and adverse selection to better understand the mechanisms of democratic accountability. Performance is defined by representatives’ actions (pertaining to moral hazard) and talents (pertaining to adverse selection). There are two elements of uncertainty which determine the extent of accountability:

First, the initial candidate selection entails uncertainties. The intrinsic qualities of candidates are different but unknown. Legislators can no longer
be considered to be identical and internally interchangeable. They enter into office with different qualities. These could be political preferences (e.g. Fearon, 1999) or talent (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2013, pp. 81-89) or a combination (see Ashworth and Mesquita, 2006). In this dissertation, I assume parties already have intimate knowledge of their members’ preferences. I therefore concentrate on their acquisition of information about candidates’ talents as legislators. As the initial ambiguity decreases, voters pay less attention to performance. For example, uncertainty drops with repeated reelection, as representatives have been selected and reselected on multiple occasions. This is why reelected members of the house are free to spend less time on signaling and more time on legislation (Ashworth, 2005).

Second, once in office, performance can either be attributable to the candidate’s actions and talents or to chance. The greater the element of chance, the lower is the accountability. In line with a view of elections as sanctions, authors have showed that legislator behavior is affected by the information provided to voters. Recent studies emphasize the role of mediating sources of information such as newspaper coverage (Berry and Howell, 2007; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010) and competitors (Gordon, Huber, and Landa, 2007). The higher the visibility, the higher the effort provided.

A theorization combining candidate sanction and selection

The empirical expectations explored in the second part of the dissertation are based on a two-period version of Holmström’s (1999) model of career considerations and manager hiring (also related to a political context by Gehlbach, 2013). My main contribution in this respect is the application of the model to the relationship between candidates and parties in a closed-list PR system. Empirically, I demonstrate that parties select candidates on the basis of the information they need and the quality of information they acquire. Assuming agents with limited career spans implies that parties discount effort while paying close attention to performance.
In the second part of the dissertation, I assume that parties seek influence in Parliament. Everything else being equal, they prefer the highest performing candidates. Parties in party-centered systems obtain political influence from their allocation of safe seats to candidates who perform well. Performance is a function of a candidate’s talents, effort and luck. A candidate’s talent is unknown to both the candidate and his or her party (Persson and Tabellini, 2013, p. 83-84). Performance in office gives an indication of talent, however, and helps parties decide whether to retain MEPs for another period. In both of my studies I rely on report allocations as measures of performance. While rapporteurships in themselves do not imply that the author has moved policy substantially, I contend that they are preconditions for policy impact.

Parties set a cut rule for performance. Their expectations are defined by the mean in the chamber, since they have no other information. Parties further assume that MEPs perform differently at equal levels of effort because their abilities vary. Ideally, the party would consistently retain MEPs who perform above average, while replacing incumbent members with below average performance. There are two random components, however, which affect the extent to which parties learn from performance.

On the one hand, parties have variable need for information. The more heterogeneity there is among members, the less specific are parties’ expectations. Candidate lists generally include a mix of several types of candidates: Some may represent different factions within the party. Others may attract more media attention. Some candidates are experienced, while others represent a new beginning, and so on. These groups are more or less heterogeneous. As a consequence, parties put more emphasis on the performance of some candidacies, due to the uncertainty they entail. Few studies explicitly explore the empirical implications of this aspect of candidate selection. My two last articles contribute to the literature by demonstrating how uncertainty in the initial candidate selection affects behavior in office and the subsequent ac-
countability of incumbent candidates. In line with Ashworth’s study (2005), I show that repeatedly elected MEPs have lower utility of report allocations, while members who were elected to Parliament on an unsafe seat or with political experience at the national level (rather than in the EP) have a high utility from allocations. A similar logic applies to women elected through legislated quotas: Given the uncertainty implied by imposed quotas, parties make an ex post evaluation of women’s abilities. Knowing this, I show that legislated quota women exert more effort during their term than comparable MEPs.

Note that my results are driven by the parties’ uncertainty about candidacies, and not by the expected level. A candidacy may, for example, entail high prior expectations while at the same time being risky. A candidate may have performed very well in another elective office at the national level, yet the transfer makes it uncertain if he or she will repeat the performance.

On the other hand, certain types of performance convey more information. Influence depends on a series of random events. For example, where expertise is highly valued – but the agenda is exogenously set – some skills pay off more than others. Also, the feasibility of different coalitions may be unpredictable and conditional on the agenda. Moreover, because of informal rules such as proportionality across national party delegations, the distribution of influence within Parliament may only partially reflect merit. The precision of the signal therefore depends on institutional and political environments. In the second article I show that high-impact allocations (i.e., budget, cooperation and codecision procedures) are more selective than when Parliament’s opinion has less bearing. These allocations accordingly convey more information than other responsibilities. Thus, in the third paper, I observe that while the first high-impact allocation on average increases an MEP’s odds of reselection by 32%, other reports are barely worth mentioning.
1.3 Summary of papers

In the following I will briefly review the four articles that make up this dissertation.

1.3.1 (Self-)selection and Expertise among Decision Makers

Research question: How do transnational groups accommodate both their individual members’ demands for delegation and the group’s collective needs during the allocation of codecision reports?

Motivation: Transnational groups constitute a case of parliamentary party groups whose existence cannot be explained by the partisan approach (Cox and McCubbins, 1993): Groups do not have an extra-parliamentary organization to speak of. Moreover, the second-order nature of EP elections means that a common “party label” does not help members secure reelection. Nor is there a majority party in Parliament which is consistently able to provide members with a disproportionate share of positions. Groups nonetheless control key positions and use their gatekeeping powers to organize a division of labor among like-minded legislators.

The article is motivated by the observation that a group’s presence in the European Parliament is precarious. They continuously need to legitimize their existence, both in the short term and in the long run. The role of parliamentary groups is defined in the rules of procedure of Parliament and can be altered by a vote in the chamber. Groups therefore need to justify their position in the long run by pursuing the common interests of their members. They delegate legislation to policy experts on behalf of all the members of the group, and they seek to limit the risk of agency drift inherent to the delegation. In the short run, however, they need to accommodate individual requests for influence so as to prevent members from leaving the group.
**Research design and data:** I seek to explain codecision allocations in a representative subset of committees. Yordanova (2009) classifies EP committees into those with potential for distributive politics, those mainly driven by the informational rationale and mixed committees. I rely on a sample of all three and show how group coordinators balance between individual wishes and the common interests of the group.

I perform a cross-sectional time-series analysis of report allocations in each parliamentary session over a ten-year period (2004–2014; 10 sessions). The choice of model implies that I measure the purported causes before consequences. A lagged version of the dependent variable controls for autocorrelation.

**Main contributions:** The article serves to contextualize the second contribution in this dissertation and shed light on the trade-offs group coordinators face.

First, I reproduce what we already know about report allocation: It is driven by the search for policy expertise. I test this in three ways. Expertise acquired in political work outside Parliament carries some advantage. However, the greatest effect is among MEPs who stay on the same committee across periods. They are 2.5 times more likely to secure codecision reports than other members. Finally, group members who handle codecision legislation in one session will, the following year, be 1.2 times more likely to receive yet another report. Nevertheless, past allocations do not fully explain future delegations.

Second, I extend our knowledge by showing how coordinators balance between individual wishes and the interests of the group. I do this in two ways. On the one hand, coordinators are more willing to cater to individual demands when the preference divergence is low. I show that the positive effect of dedication in committee work is consequently moderated by loyalty. An increase in attendance by ten per cent among the least loyal MEPs would
improve chances of a report allocation in the next year by 16%, while the most loyal members would see their chances grow by 29%.

On the other hand, I demonstrate that low-impact reports are delegated to another subset of MEPs than those generally preferred for codecision. MEPs who are allowed to initiate reports are 52% less likely to receive drafts for codecision in the same year. While this could be because legislative initiative is time-consuming, we see that the effect of own-initiative reports on future allocations is also negative. MEPs who have already initiated legislation once are 14% less likely to receive a codecision report for the rest of the legislature. The results are in contrast with the immediate effect of codecision allocations.

1.3.2 Delegation in Committees – coauthored with Fang-Yi Chiou and Bjørn Høyland

Research question: Do informational concerns limit groups’ reliance on specialized committee members?

Motivation: While there is a rich literature on committee organization, less is known about delegation to individuals within committees. Students of report allocation in the EP have drawn on theories of legislative organization developed for the U.S. Congress. Overall, they provide mixed support for existing theoretical approaches, emphasizing both the importance of party affiliation and informational concerns (Daniel, 2013; Kaeding, 2004; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; Whitaker, 2001; Yordanova, 2009). Finally, Yoshinaka et al. (2010) propose a unified framework composed of partisan and informational perspectives, arguing that report allocation simultaneously advances partisan policy goals and rewards technical experts. However, combining competing perspectives based on collective committee assignments to predict individual allocations risks producing contradicting predictions. In particular, the approach cannot enlighten us on situations in which groups
are called to make trade-offs between expertise, on the one hand, and the risk of agency drift, on the other. We seek to mend that gap by proposing a new theory and through thorough empirical testing.

**Design and data:** We propose a formalized informational model of how political groups select among candidates for individual committee tasks such as report allocations. We argue that delegations are made so as to maximize the transmission of information among members of the group. Two of our predictions are common in the literature although their justification is different, while one is new to the field.

We then test the empirical implications on data from the European Parliament covering the whole period from the first direct elected Parliament in 1979 until the end of the 7th Parliament in 2014. Using a hierarchical conditional logit model, we are able to model each individual allocation separately. In contrast to most previous studies we thereby draw on variations in behavior also within individuals and legislative periods.

**Main contributions:** First, we reproduce previous observations. However, we extend the empirical analysis to a longer time period while providing a different and more stringent theoretical account of the causal mechanism: Specialization and loyalty have a baseline positive effect on allocations because groups need information from reliable informants.

Second, we bolster our theoretical argument by testing a new and original claim derived from the model. Groups sometimes trade expertise with loyalty. The trade-off is motivated by groups’ need for information. Our main contribution is to predict that the effect of experience is inverted U-shaped. Group coordinators value expertise. However, very specialized MEPs are better able to undermine coordinators’ interests. MEPs in these cases need to express a higher level of loyalty to their parties to obtain the same likelihood of selection. This is supported in the empirical part of the paper. MEPs with intermediate levels tend to be preferred to MEPs with very low
or very high levels of experience.

1.3.3 Striving for Influence: The Effect of Performance

Research question: How does access to information affect the renomination of incumbent candidates?

Motivation: A general perception in the literature on the European Parliament is that reelection does not usually hinge on parliamentary performance (Hix and Høyland, 2011, p. 54-55). Nevertheless, very few studies actually look into how behavior in office affect MEPs careers (Hix and Høyland, 2014, p. 595), and in particular the likelihood that they will return to Parliament. My study inscribes itself in a burgeoning literature on the topic. A few studies indicate that at least some types of parliamentary activity have a positive impact on reselection (van Thomme, Ringe, and Victor, 2015; Frech, 2016; Wilson, Ringe, and van Thomme, 2016a). This seems to be particularly true in party-centered systems (Wilson et al., 2016a). None of these studies provide a theoretical description of the causal process at play or the reason why some activities have an effect while others do not. I believe my contribution is valuable in this respect.

Within the broader literature, there have been few attempts to theorize the candidate selection process within parties (Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 109). Candidate selection has been studied along two axes: the degree of inclusiveness and the level of centralization. I argue that both describe relations of asymmetric information between candidates and the selectorate. Such situations have been thoroughly theorized in the American context, and the conditions for accountability of legislators to their voters have been explored. I take the theoretical claims from that literature and apply them to the relationship between parties and their members.

In European-style democracies with party centered ballots, parties are generally seen as "transmission belts" delivering democratic accountability.
I therefore draw on recent developments in the literature on democratic accountability to theorize and test the conditions under which MEPs’ performance in office impacts their reselection by parties. Specifically, I suggest that the perceived need for and access to information about performance determine how performance impacts reselection.

**Research design and data:** I seek to explain the national parties’ allocation of safe seats to incumbent candidates as a function of performance in office. The data covers three parliamentary periods and three subsequent elections (1999–2014) in 11 member states.

I assume that all parties seek influence in Parliament through their choice of candidates. The assumption is not unproblematic. European elections are – as previously shown – second-order, and candidate lists sometimes testify to a primarily national orientation (Scarrow, 1997; Hobolt and Høyland, 2011). Recent studies suggest, however, that parties pursue several goals simultaneously when they select candidates, one of which is policy impact (Frech, 2016; Pemstein, Meserve, and Bernhard, 2015).

A null finding in my article could be explained either by parties’ lack of ambition in the EP or by lack of information about EP politics. I follow a most-likely scenario of individual accountability by concentrating on member states that apply a closed-list PR system. Parties are better able to access information and coordinate on a single set of criteria than voters. By concentrating on allocations of safe seats rather than actual reelection, I further isolate the effect of parties’ choices from that of voters.

**Main contributions:** My main contribution to the European literature is to demonstrate that parties seek policy influence through their choice of candidates. In so doing, they rely on information provided by transnational political groups.

Much of the extant literature emphasizes the potential for conflict between groups and parties (e.g., Hix and Høyland, 2011, p. 55, Hix and
Høyland, 2014, p. 594-95 and 600-601). In contrast, I stress the interest they generally share in gaining influence. I argue that keeping up to date on the EP agenda and various political opportunities in office requires resources and is time-consuming. National parties thus delegate day-to-day work in Parliament to transnational groups while tracking the outcome of MEP service (for somewhat similar suggestions, see Hix, 2008, Yordanova, 2011a, p.108-109). I point out one of the functions performed by transnational groups on behalf of the national party. Future studies may pick up on these ideas to predict behavior in case of a conflict.

My findings are also of interest in relation to the broader literature on the relationship between parliamentary party groups and the party selectorate. My study gives indications about accountability in situations of asymmetric information. Examples of asymmetry are parliamentary party groups that are poorly integrated into the extra-parliamentary party organization or parties in which candidate selection is highly decentralized.

I theorize and test two implications of information asymmetry: First, the selectorate relies more on high-quality information about performance than on less informative signals. When the signal increases in precision, the effect of performance grows. Low-impact reports (which are less selective) increase the odds of a safe seat by 6%, while the similar effect of selective, high-impact legislation is 32%. Second, I show that parties update their beliefs about incumbent candidates to the extent that they are uncertain about their quality. For example, I find that one report allocation to an untried member in his or her first term would increase his or her odds of a safe seat by 20%, while members who are better known to their selectorate (because they are in their second term or more) have a substantially lower effect of allocations (7%).
1.3.4 How Legislated Gender Quotas Impact Representation

Research question: How does biased political recruitment – and the subsequent legislation of quotas – affect the quality of representation ensured by women in Parliament?

Motivation: Gender quotas remain a disputed policy instrument aimed at bringing more women into elected office. Among parties, concerns are expressed that they may no longer be able to select the best candidates. They argue that the selection process is not biased and that the dearth of women is due to supply-side factors. Some feminists have expressed concerns that quota women are suspected of being less qualified and thereby lose authority rather than gaining it. I consider the change in the quality of representation when quotas are exogenously adopted and enforced (i.e., legislated quotas).

The paper concludes this dissertation by illustrating how the delegation choices made by parties and groups are interconnected. First, groups are dependent on parties’ choice of candidates to obtain a pool of dedicated and talented legislators from which to choose. Second, parties are dependent on group allocations to dissipate doubts about the quality of the candidates they have chosen. Third, this feeds back to the groups’ allocation decisions: When parties select reelection-seeking candidates and hold them accountable, the effort MEPs put into their mandate increases.

Research design and data: I draw on the unique institutional setup of the European Parliament: Criteria for report allocations are constant across all MEPs. All members are subject to the same set of requirements when influence is distributed. I also hold behavioral incentives from the electoral system constant by restricting my study to countries that have closed-list PR ballots.

However, the way members enter into office varies. To address this, I
take advantage of the adoption of legislated quotas in three member states – France (2000) Portugal (2006) and Spain (2007) – during my period of study. I thereby follow a “before-after” design in which the remainder of the member states serves as control group. Variation in the application of gender quotas also enables comparisons between women, as well as between men and women. My findings can therefore not be explained by gender, but rather the institutional context.

I analyze the same subset of MEPs as previously: I concentrate on 11 member states in up to three periods (1999–2014). I then successively analyze the value of office, performance, reselection and effort of MEPs.

**Main contributions:** I contribute to the literature by applying a theory of democratic accountability to the case where biased candidate selection and gender quotas work in combination. My point of departure is that parties seek to select candidates able to obtain positions of influence in office; however, they cannot know beforehand how much impact a candidate will gain. I then define gender bias as a candidate selection with a higher hurdle for women than for men. I derive and test four empirical implications from this framework.

To obtain selection, a candidate has to display his talents as a legislator. If the process is biased, women either need to be more talented or work harder to exhibit their qualities. This amounts to a screening process by which women who are elected are more likely to (1) put a high value on office and (2) be more productive. Empirically, I find that upon entering Parliament, non-quota women are more than twice as likely to plan on a lengthy career as men. In the absence of quotas, I then show that – at equal level of effort – the average number of high-impact allocations is 54% higher among women.

Gender quotas explicitly aim to lower the threshold for women and induce parties to slate candidates which they would not otherwise have selected.
On the one hand, I find that quotas tend to level out gender differences in talent. On the other hand, I find that *legislated* quotas lead to increased differences in effort. When quotas are effective – in the sense that parties comply by naming more women, yet resist to changing their selection criteria – party selectors end up with a set of elected women whose quality they consider uncertain. Parties react by relying increasingly on information about performance during the reselection stage. Empirically, I observe that (3) while the baseline MEP increases his or her odds of reselection by 14% after their first report, the similar effect for women after the quota reform is 85%. (4) Knowing this, legislated quota women are incentivized to invest more in their mandate because they have more to gain from performance. I thereby observe that women’s attendance in committee increases by 42% following the reform, while the number of parliamentary questions increases by 19%.

1.4 Summary of my contributions

The previous section gave an account of the individual contributions of each paper. This section treats their joint contribution to the literature on party organization in the European Parliament. First, I give a short overview of the most important part of the data collection (Subsection 1) before briefly discussing how the studies inform our understanding of the relationship between transnational groups and national parties (Subsection 2).

1.4.1 Data collection

The main data-gathering effort has pertained to committee activity and the organization of party lists. Attendance, report allocations and list placement successively serve as explanatory and explained variables in order to explore the mutual influence of individual investment, group allocations and the party selectorate’s choice.
Figure 1.1: Committee activity over the last 15 years. While the number of committee meetings parallels the number of reports drafted, the number of attendees is also affected by things like EU enlargements and time.
Committee activity

This dissertation is concerned with the principal’s choice of agents. Only a minority of the MEPs can be qualified as “European careerists”. Key to the validity of the studies is therefore an efficient control for the subset of MEPs’ who seek allocations and aspire to reelection. The objective is to rule out the alternative explanation that allocations are driven by self-selection.

To meet the requirement, I have collected data on MEPs’ attendance in committee meetings from the beginning of the 5th legislature when committee minutes were made electronically available (1999-2014). The data includes some 331,950 observations of individuals in meetings. They contain an identification of each MEP, the committee in question, the position on the committee (leadership/member/substitute) and the date of the meeting. Throughout the dissertation, I use attendance as a measure of the investment MEPs make. It also functions as a proxy for the value members put on their European office.¹

I also rely on a list of the 14,424 reports presented to the plenary over the last 35 years. The list has been automatically scraped from the EP website in part by me and in part by Bjørn Høyland. The list includes an individual identifier for each report, its title, the committee and the rapporteur responsible as well as the date it was communicated to the plenary. I have also added information about the procedure under which the report was allocated. For the period prior to 1999, I collected information by hand from paper versions of the Official Journal of the European Union. For later periods, the information is available electronically.

Figure 1.1 illustrates the variation in committee activity over the 15 years preceding the 2014 election. It shows that legislative work is cyclical, with a major dip corresponding to the EP elections. The number of committee

¹In the second study, however, we are obliged to use plenary attendance (during roll-call voting), since the time period encompasses all seven parliamentary terms following the first direct elections in 1979.
meetings also closely matches the number of reports drafted. This corroborates my argument that reports constitute the core legislative activity in committees. The figure further indicates an increase in activity over time uncorrelated with the sheer number of reports. It is particularly clear in the number of attendees. Some of the variation may be due to the recent EU enlargements (2004, 2007 and 2013), although for the most part it remains unexplained. My studies focus on the participation of MEPs relative to other members at any given point in time. The time trend is therefore treated as noise and modeled as such.

Attendance rates are positively influenced by the capacity of parties to recruit and hold accountable careerist MEPs. Groups and parties are dependent on a set of dedicated members to obtain influence. Figure 1.2 illustrates, for example, how the proportion of meetings attended by full committee members correlates with report allocations at the member-state level. The dotted line stems from an OLS with one predictor (average attendance) estimated on the 27 member states (weighted by the number of observations from each country). My argument is not that attendance directly leads to report allocations. Rather, transnational groups choose among the most dedicated members when they allocate tasks. They are also willing to accommodate members' demands for exposure as long as the cost is low.

We see that the number of reports secured by countries like France and Germany can be explained by the investment made by their representatives. Typically, we would expect that the share of French rapporteurs would increase if parties were to incentivize members to invest in one level of government rather than switching mandates. The graphic also shows that many of the newer member states tend to underperform despite their investment. It may to some extent be explained by the lower share of EP long-termers. The grayscale reflects the proportion of MEPs who were also present in the previous term. The general impression is that national delegations with a stable membership (darker shades) tend to obtain more reports.
INVESTMENT and INFLUENCE

Figure 1.2: Groups choose among the most dedicated members when they allocate reports. The most experienced members also capture the highest-impact reports.
Lastly, the figure suggests a positive relationship between experience in Parliament and influential allocations. The size of the labels reflects the average number of high-impact reports. The most productive member states tend to be of darker color and/or clustered at the upper-right part of the plot. In the multivariate analyses, I make the argument that groups draw on their members' expertise. Some countries profit more from this than others.

Reselection of incumbent candidates

The second part of the dissertation concentrates on the accountability of members to their national parties. Parties' influence over representation resides essentially in their capacity to select or deselect members from their list.

In order to assess the impact of service on career prospects, I have collected all electoral lists for the EP elections held between 1999 and 2014. I thereby know the list placement of all MEPs. Generally speaking, incumbent members either do not reappear on the list or they receive a similar or better spot. 69% of the observations were renominated at the end of their term. About two thirds of them obtained a placement above the number of seats the party currently had, and only 18% got a lower placement than before. Nevertheless, merely distinguishing between renomination and no renomination omits valuable information.

In the multivariate analysis, I therefore dichotomize renomination into safe-seat allocations and other categories (unsafe seat/no renomination). I have collected data on the electoral district an MEP is elected from and the number of seats held by the party in this particular region. Seats are considered "safe" when the slot is higher than the number of MEPs a party currently boasts in the district.

I dichotomize the variable because list placement in itself does not reflect an equal likelihood of reelection. The realism implied in a slot depends on the
Figure 1.3: Parties are more likely to upgrade their ranking of inexperienced incumbent candidates than EP long-termers.
1.4. SUMMARY OF MY CONTRIBUTIONS

size of the party and the electoral district. For example, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) presented a single list of candidates in the 2014 election in a nationwide circumscription with 96 seats. The SPD had 23 seats prior to the election and won another four after the ballot. When incumbent candidate Petra Kammerevert appeared at the 14th place, this entailed a high probability of reelection. On the other hand, when Michael Gahler in the same election obtained the second place on the Christian Democratic Union list (CDU) for Hessen – where the party only held two seats – the allocation appeared highly uncertain.

Figure 1.3 illustrates the relationship between the former list placement of incumbent members from closed-list systems and the slot they obtained in the upcoming election. The graphic already hints at a few potentially confounding factors which may lead to the conclusion that service in office does not affect candidate reselection.

The dashed diagonal line illustrates the hypothetical perfect correlation between past and future seat placement. Observations along the line indicate cases where parties have not updated their assessment. One explanation could be that performance does not affect MEPs' future career. Another explanation is that parties often have precise and realistic expectations about candidate quality. Hence, they do not change their mind in between elections. In the later parts of this dissertation I make the argument that the effect of performance measures (such as report allocations) depends on the quality of the information they contain and whether the receiver perceives the need for more information. The effect of report allocations therefore varies across groups of MEPs and legislative procedures.

There is, for example, a substantial difference between MEPs who are in their first term (the bottom pane in figure 1.3) and members who have served several terms (the top pane).

In the case of new members, parties are uncertain about what to expect. They therefore use the information available to reassess candidatures at the
end of the term. The bubble plot indicates that those who obtain renomination tend to acquire a similar or better slot in the subsequent election (i.e., they are beneath the dashed line). The size of the bubbles also suggests that authors of high-impact legislation tend to do better. This being said, the figure also contains a number of low performers who still obtained good slots.

The top pane illustrates the case of incumbent candidates who have already been reselected at least once. The frequency of high performers is more substantial among experienced MEPs. However, there is no indication that a good track record leads to a better ranking. There are two explanations to this. First, parties already have extensive experience of the candidates’ ability. Second, MEPs who have served longer in the EP obtain more reports, but they are also more likely to retire. Most of them do not reappear on the list. However, some also figure in unwinnable slots, for example to signal continuity. In my studies of parties’ reselection of candidates, I consistently estimate the probability that MEPs wish to seek reelection.

The data collection of committee activity and electoral lists means the conclusions in this dissertation rest on original and high-quality data. The time periods I cover are also more extensive than in most existing studies.

1.4.2 Future theorization of the relationship between national parties and transnational groups

I have articulated two research questions: What are the trade-offs faced by transnational groups in their allocation of reports? And to what extent do these allocations impact national parties’ choice to retain MEPs in office?

The first part of the dissertation identifies tradeoffs for the groups. They continuously balance competing needs. On the one hand, groups accommodate individuals’ requests for exposure all while ensuring added value for the majority of their members. On the other hand, groups also regularly trade off their need for expertise with their fear of agency drift. In both cases, their
main pursuit is the common interest of the group.

In the second part, I argue against the claim that reelection is independent from performance. I demonstrate that a candidate’s track record is useful. However, parties are more receptive to new information when in doubt, and when signals are of good quality.

My overall contribution is to highlight two key functions performed by transnational groups. First, groups organize legislative work on behalf of national parties. Second, groups’ choice of agents also provides parties with information about who to keep and who to let go. As such, they play an indirect role in the reelection of MEPs. This argument is new to the literature.

In the future, students of party organization may want to better theorize and test empirical implications of the relationship between groups and parties. I believe such a theorization should base its claims on those two functions performed by groups.

Groups contribute to solving a collective action problem, yet their cohesiveness cannot be explained within the framework provided in the congressional literature. Groups never obtain majority status, they do not play a major role in electoral campaigns, and they do not control the legislative agenda. I believe their cohesiveness can be derived from the national parties’ control over the electoral ballot and their lack of information about parliamentary work. Group authority is, in other words, contingent on parties’ control over careers and their intention to obtain influence. It is a problem of delegation between a principal and an agent. National parties function as principals. They chose groups, endow them with MEPs and delegate authority. Transnational groups function as agents. They are better placed to observe politics in Parliament, elaborate strategies, delegate tasks and supervise members.

Testable implications may be derived from variations in the asymmetry of information. Reliance on transnational groups rises when the cost of performing the task within the party is high.
We would expect the scope of delegation to increase as the legislative process grows in complexity. This is consistent with the growing detail of proposals and the involvement of an increasing number of actors within and outside of Parliament. As an example, the 7th legislature included MEPs from close to 180 national parties. Codecision reports include technical details pertaining to the prohibition of certain types of fishing gear for deep-sea stocks in the North-East Atlantic (report A7-0359/2014) and the quality of statistics for the macroeconomic imbalances procedures (report A7-0143/2014). Although highly technical, the first report involves important environmental considerations, while the second aims at strengthening the economic governance of the Union. The 180 national parties would have been hard pressed to find as many experts on deep-sea fishing gear to help them elaborate a proposal. Parties stand much to gain from efficient transnational coordination in cases such as these.

This is in line with the common argument that groups ensure division of labor. However, I do not believe that the efficiency of this type of contract can be entirely understood without the reliance on electoral incentives. In the fourth paper, I show that careerist MEPs from party-centered systems are responsive to incentives in the incumbent candidate selection. Moreover, parties often defer to the group on the matter. The relative cohesiveness of groups compared to their American homologues may be explained by the combination of strong party control over reelection and the relative lack of information about candidate quality and day-to-day EP politics.

Furthermore, as fewer members have the information required to form an opinion, the potential for intra-group conflict decreases once the delegation has been made. In these cases, we would expect that media coverage and lobbying are significant mediating sources of information and predictive of voting defections.

Generally, we would also expect to see extensive delegation when the costs of maintaining a party hierarchy and of information transmission are
prohibitive. The cost would be defined by elements such as party size and internal organization. Parties with highly decentralized and/or inclusive candidate selection are, for example, less able to monitor and sanction their members in office. They would be less likely to issue voting instructions, and more sensitive to group signaling.

Other empirical implications may be derived from variations in the risk tolerance. On a day-to-day basis, national parties stand to lose more from local electoral swings than do transnational groups. They may, for example, be more inclined to defect from group voting instructions when national media attention and issue salience (as defined by the party and its voters) are high. Groups are less sensitive to such issues and may therefore allow for defections in order to accommodate a few members’ reelection concerns. Likewise, groups may be more prone to humor party requirements when the defection does not jeopardize the outcome. In a similar vein, I argue in the first paper that groups are more inclined to allocate reports to high-demanding MEPs when the potential impact is low.

Broadly speaking, as the impact of the European Parliament grows, the potential gains from having cohesive groups increases. This would point in the direction of more risk tolerance among parties. Parliament has continuously revised its Rules of Procedure to marginalize non-affiliated members and empower the transnational groups. Opting out of a group membership is less and less a viable option. Parties’ greater acceptance of agency costs could also explain why increased preference heterogeneity following the EU enlargements did not lead to lower voting cohesion, since the development was paralleled by a growth in parliamentary impact.

In the remainder of this dissertation, I lay the groundwork for future questions by studying the conditions for – and the consequences of – report allocations.
Part I

Transnational Group Delegations: Information and Trade-Offs
Chapter 2

(Self-)selection and Expertise among Decision Makers

Abstract:

Rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP) are the most influential members in terms of the legislation they handle. They are appointed by their political groups. In making these appointments, these groups need to accommodate both their collective needs and individual requests. This article explores situations in which the collective need for information is prioritized: the codecision procedure. The data includes allocations over a 10-year period (2004–2014) in three of the most powerful EP committees, as well as key career choices among members. EP groups emphasize policy-specific knowledge. They also pay attention to individual members’ requests for exposure, but only when the expected policy drift is minimal. Harsh selection during the allocation of codecision reports creates pressure to accommodate a greater selection of legislators during other attractive report allocations. Own-initiative reports therefore impact allocation of codecision reports negatively.

Publication status:

Part of an accepted special issue in Journal of Legislative Studies
CHAPTER 2. (SELF-)SELECTION AND EXPERTISE

Over the last 30 years the European Parliament (EP) has skillfully used its internal organization to maximize its position in the EU system. The delegation of dossiers to individual legislators – through the institution of rapporteurs – has helped overcome challenges posed by limited resources and an increasing number of MEPs.

Report delegation decisions are made by transnational political groups. These groups exist in order to organize legislative activities to the benefit of their members. Group coordinators need to balance two needs when choosing rapporteurs:

First, coordinators need to ensure that members will perceive the legislative output as improved by the group’s decisions. Proposals improve when the author has information about potential consequences (Krehbiel, 1991). I argue, in line with Maltzman (1997), that the emphasis on the group’s need for information increases with the salience of a policy, and that political groups are more willing to enforce discipline when the opportunity cost is high. Allocations of codecision reports are therefore most-likely scenarios of an informational rationale. This study isolates the effect of policy-specific expertise from general political capability. Results indicate that expertise always improves chances of delegation. The EP is no institution for “all-around politicians”.

Second, coordinators also need to satisfy individual MEPs’ requests for exposure and influence. Transnational groups are coalitions of national party delegations which can decide to leave at any time (McElroy and Benoit, 2010). These groups must therefore take care to distribute tasks fairly. Groups’ discretion in their choice of rapporteur is thus limited by norms of proportionality, and coordinators accordingly face pressure to accommodate a wider array of members.

In the face of competing demands, how do political groups accommodate both their individual members’ demands for delegation and the group’s collective needs during the allocation of codecision reports? I argue that groups’
informational needs dominate allocations of high-impact dossiers, while another set of MEPs are favored for political tasks with less tangible consequences.

When theorizing individual delegations – such as rapporteurships – I argue that an informational rationale has different implications from studies of committee membership. Krehbiel (1991) modelled an exchange between a floor and heterogeneous, specialized committees. The diversity of opinions in committees allows floor members to triangulate information and deduce political bias. This is hardly possible when only one rapporteur (or a shadow) is named by each group. As a consequence, coordinators emphasize converging political preferences. Several studies have already disclosed this tendency (Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Yordanova, 2011b). The pool of potential rapporteurs is restricted to those who wish to partake in such work. In a system of self-selection, this implies a positive interaction between dedication and political outliers on policy proposals (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). I argue that when political groups organize work in order to extract information for their own benefit, the same interaction is negative. This is to say that coordinators take into account individual needs for exposure, but only to the extent that the group gains by it.

I rely on cross-sectional time-series data of 10 years of report allocations. I am therefore able to explore how choices at one point in time affect future delegations. Observations are made at the level of the committee and include key career choices among members of three of the most influential committees in the European Parliament (Yordanova, 2009)\textsuperscript{1}. I have collected attendance rates from all committee meetings in the period 2004–2014. These are used to separate the effect of individual claims for influence from criteria dictated by collective needs.

\textsuperscript{1}Committees on Employment and Social Affairs, Environment and Consumer Protection, and Transport and Tourism
2.1 Literature review and theory

This section first reviews existing literature on report allocations before presenting different theoretical approaches to how coordinators make delegations.

2.1.1 Individual legislators and legislative proposals

In the last 15 years we have seen numerous empirical studies of delegation and committee work in the European Parliament (for an overview, see Hix and Høyland, 2013; Yordanova, 2011a). Most of this literature has relied on theories of legislative organization borrowed from the U.S. Congress. The same theoretical references have been used to explain both committee seat allocation and report allocation, indicating that these are generally perceived as two stages in the same process of selection.

In contrast to the bill sponsor in the U.S. system, the European rapporteur has an official role in amending and presenting draft legislation ("reports"). Single pieces of legislation are trusted to committee members who are in charge of negotiating bills between party groups and between institutions. As the EP’s position improves, so does the potential power of the rapporteur. The actual contents and success of legislative proposals are believed to depend in part on the qualities of the rapporteur.

The European Commission has the formal monopoly of legislative initiative, while the EP (along with the Council) has, in principle, an unlimited power of amendment. Upon the reception of a proposal, a bargaining round ensues in a committee during which political groups bid for the coordinating responsibility (Wurzel, 1999, pp. 11–13). Each group has a limited number of “points” which they can use to “buy” reports. The total number of points is allocated as a function of group size. The prize is set as a function of the number of bidders. EP groups therefore sustain an opportunity cost for each report, which increases with its salience. Once a group has secured a draft,
its coordinator selects a member to draw up the actual report.

The role of the EP in the legislative process depends on the Europeanization of the policy domain. While the EP is an equal legislator to the Council during the “ordinary legislative procedure” (formerly codecision), there are other domains in which Parliament has merely a consultative role. Parliament can also draw reports on its own initiative. These reports are subject to prior authorization by the EP Bureau and often serve the purpose of monitoring the Commission’s work. Although put forth as the next step of EP empowerment and used for calling on legislative initiative, such reports can at best be translated into “soft law” (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, 2011, pp. 266–67).

Recent studies have explicitly looked at the effect of procedure on report allocations. Findings suggest that the same set of criteria is used to allocate codecision reports and legislation of lesser impact (Hurka et al., 2015; Hurka and Kaeding, 2012; Yordanova, 2011b). Notably, Yordanova (2011b) has found that allocations under the consultation procedure are positively correlated with allocations of codecision reports. Does this imply that the same set of MEPs is eligible for all types of reports?

### 2.1.2 Experience and expertise

Groups need information about both the consequences of policy proposals and their political feasibility. Committee members’ past experience helps reduce uncertainty.

One strand of the literature emphasizes the importance of personal networks and political experience – especially under codecision. Kaeding (2004, pp. 365–66) stresses that experience at the European level provides connections and knowledge of the procedures. Some researchers have stressed the role of inside information on the Council’s position obtained through the (national) party channel (Høyland, 2006; Costello and Thomson, 2011, although questioned by Yordanova, 2011b). These findings are not unambiguous, how-
ever. Incumbency in the EP has little impact on report allocation (Hause-mer, 2006, pp. 522–524; Yoshinaka et al., 2010, Hurka and Kaeding, 2012), whereas incumbent committee members (who are thus specialized in a specific policy area) are highly favored; at least under the co-decision procedure (Yordanova, 2011b, pp. 113–116).

Information about policies is scarce. Committee staff is generalist, so much hinges on the resources provided by the rapporteur (personal staff, connections and past experience with similar policies). Indeed, another strand of the literature shows that policy-specific knowledge improves a member’s chances of obtaining a seat on at least some committees (McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009, p. 272). Expertise seems to have attracted report allocation in the 4th and 5th Parliaments (Yoshinaka et al., 2010), although in the 6th parliament this is only the case in areas in which the EP opinion is consultative (Yordanova, 2011a, pp. 111–115). These studies look at educational and professional expertise (Bowler and Farrell, 1995, p. 231; Yordanova, 2009, p. 266; Yordanova, 2011a, p. 111; Daniel, 2013) – or a mix of the two with policy-specific political mandates (McElroy, 2006, p. 17; Yoshinaka et al., 2010, p. 467).

In the following I look at MEPs’ past political mandates and distinguish between political experience and policy-specific expertise.

### 2.1.3 MEPs’ own requests

Recent studies of report allocation control for plenary attendance and find a positive effect (Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Hurka and Kaeding, 2012; Hurka et al., 2015). There are divergent interpretations of the meaning of attendance records. While Benedetto (2005) suggests that attendance records offer a way to identify MEPs who opt out of legislative work, there have also been claims that it is because the group leadership rewards assiduous members with reports (Hix, Noury, and Roland, 2011).

Including an efficient control on MEP dedication is central to exploring
the group coordinators’ choices. It foregoes the conclusion of reverse causality by which MEPs who self-select into positions naturally become experts/experienced. Findings show that at equal levels of participation, experienced MEPs are preferred during report allocations (Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Hurka and Kaeding, 2012; Hurka et al., 2015).

Endogeneity issues have also made it difficult to explore the effect of expertise gained from prior political work. According to several accounts, legislative or executive experience at the national level impacts neither committee assignments (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Yordanova, 2009) nor rapporteur selection (Kaeding, 2004, pp. 365–66). A common explanation is that a European Parliament seat often serves as a relaxing end to a political career or a secondary mandate (e.g.: Corbett et al., 2007, p. 67; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; Hix and Høyland, 2011, p. 55). The problem of endogeneity is best resolved with an efficient control on MEP dedication to their current mandate.

Attendance as a criterion for selection, on the other hand, is best understood within the partisan approach as one of several selection criteria together with group loyalty. Hausemer (2006, p.526) found that partisan considerations were central during report allocation in the 5th parliament insofar as group coordinators tended to allow loyal rank-and-file members to earn the most salient bills. This is further corroborated by Yoshinaka et al. (2010) who found that the NOMINATE distance from the party group median substantially decreased MEPs’ chances of garnering a report in the 4th and 5th parliaments. Yordanova (2011a, p.117) even concludes from an analysis of the first half of the 6th parliament that “promoting party group cohesion and coalition-building appear to be the major mechanisms driving report allocation”. Coordinators fear policy drift when they delegate reports. It is likely that the party leadership appreciates the dedication of MEPs whose loyalties lie with the party line.

There are several reasons for drawing on theories of legislative organi-
zation to explain the EP’s internal organization (for an overview, see Yordanova, 2013).

The EU can be conceived of as a formal separation of powers system insofar as the executive is not dependent on a stable majority in the EP. Without the imperative of a governmental majority, party discipline is less important, and coalitions are formed on a case-by-case basis (Kreppel, 2009). Cleavages other than ideological ones (such as constituency interests, which in the EU often overlap with national interests) become important. Internal divisions limit leaders’ ability to wield the whip (Maltzman, 1997, p. 23), and few sanctions are generally available. Group divisions and lack of party discipline are contrasted by strong committees (Yoshinaka et al., 2010, p. 58).

This is a fortiori the case in the EP: Parliamentary groups are formed by parties from the state level which are disposed to leave if dissatisfied (McElroy and Benoit, 2010). Preference divergence is sometimes large, and members pay heed to the national delegation’s dictates: Reelection is controlled by national parties which decide who heads their lists, and electoral campaigns are directed nationally. (Hix et al., 2011, p. 496).

Nevertheless, the EP’s legislative work is organized to fit transnational political groups. This is the reason why groups exist. They play a decisive role in choosing the EP president vice presidents, and committee chairs. They also choose rapporteurs and organize the agenda and individual speaking time. In fact, EP groups are reported to be more cohesive during roll-call voting than their American homologues (Hix et al., 2011, p. 501). To justify their existence, EP groups need to continuously balance between allocations which benefit the group as a whole and internal coalition-building.

2.1.4 A contract between a group and its rapporteur
Theories of legislative organization tend to revolve around an agency problem in which parliamentarians are hired to further the interests of a principal.
though different theories consider different principals (Maltzman, 1997, pp. 9-13), they all share the assumption that the quality of an agent is dependent on his or her expertise. This is the centerpiece of the informational approach which emphasizes how individual expertise on the consequences of laws improves their quality, and thus the collective gain. Much attention is accordingly paid to the incentive structure for members of Congress to specialize (Krehbiel, 1991). The focus is on the supply side of legislation, however, with an overall assumption that all MPs seek influence in the chamber.

One of the main contributions of the distributive perspective is to stress the driving forces of legislators themselves (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994, pp. 149-53). Why accept the extra workload of drafting reports if not in the hopes of setting the agenda? The distributive equilibrium relies on an exchange of influence between legislators. Each member of Congress is given a disproportionate influence over his or her most coveted policy domain. A natural implication is that policy expertise is strongly related to policy outliers. In fact, the effect of MEP dedication would increase with the degree of party group disloyalty.

The partisan approach supplements previous theories and contends that parties serve an informational purpose between MEPs with similar preferences. Party members take cues from specialized colleagues whose interest-driven bias is smaller. In order to enforce the contract, party members delegate control over nomination to electoral offices and in-house privileges to the party. The existence of parties is justified by the advantages a common party label procures during an election, as well as the disproportionate influence that the majority party can offer their members (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 1994). Neither justification applies to the European context, since European groups are only responsible for in-house coordination and can procure no electoral benefits. Furthermore, there is no majority party in the EP. To ambitious MEPs, however, groups are key gatekeepers, controlling influence.
The EP is consequently a good case for testing the minimal requirements for the existence of parliamentary parties. In the following, I argue that groups mainly exist to fulfill their members’ need for information.

Theories of legislative organization are designed to explain committee seat allocations, not individual delegations. One of the predictions in the informational approach is that committees are staffed with members with heterogeneous preferences. Players can deduce any interest-driven bias in policy information by triangulation. This is hardly possible when only one rapporteur is named per group. Calculating the bias is therefore costly, so that when groups delegate for informational purposes, they will strive to reduce any incentives for drift. On the other hand, given the overall weak incentives for party group formation, coordinators need to pay more attention to the demand side of legislation (i.e., MEPs’ own wishes). This is particularly reflected in the strict proportionality rules that are applied between national delegations even within groups (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003, p. 347). Group coordinators’ objectives therefore should be expected to oscillate between informational delegations and strategic distribution of influence.

2.1.5 Expectations

Maltzman (1997) implies that the explanatory power of each approach depends on the legislative context. Members have greater incentives to act as agents of their group when groups are central to the legislative process (Maltzman, 1997, pp. 38-40). As we have seen, institutional rules put EP groups in charge of report allocations.

In particular, Maltzman (1997) suggests that the informational approach dominates when political salience is high, as the party leadership in such cases is more willing to incur the costs of ensuring party discipline (Maltzman, 1997, pp. 32-36). In the European context, “salience” often translates to the potential policy impact the EP can have on legislation, as well as the
opportunity cost sustained by the group. Both the opportunity cost sustained by the group and the salience perceived by members are defined by the legislative procedure under which a bill is passed. As such, the allocation of codecision reports is a most-likely scenario for an informational game taking place within EP groups. This leads to several hypotheses about how codecision rapporteurs are chosen/selected.

Rapporteurs inform the larger legislative body about the practical implications of proposals and suggest improvements. The political sway of Parliament depends on its ability to enter into detailed debates about policies. Committee staff, however, is generalist. The rapporteur’s experience from political work in a relevant policy domain is therefore essential. This background will ensure that the rapporteur has a grasp of a policy’s contentious elements. Also, he or she will know who to see to obtain more information. When holding political experience constant, I therefore expect expertise to improve chances of allocation.

**Hypothesis 1.** Policy-specific experience (expertise) improves chances of report allocation.

Having limited capacity to discover and sanction policy drift, coordinators prefer loyal group members. However, groups need to trade off the collective gains from information with individual claims for exposure. As a consequence – among qualified and loyal candidates – they are expected to consistently allocate reports to those who have shown the most interest in committee work. This is to say that the effect of MEPs’ self-selection increases with their loyalty to the group.

**Hypothesis 2.** Dedication has the most positive effect among loyal members.

Given the high level of selection during codecision, group coordinators are under pressure to satisfy a different set of members during other allocations. Own-initiative reports are politically charged statements and offer

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2 “Salience” often refers to the interest a principal takes in particular issues.
their authors a unique possibility to push for an agenda. These reports are attractive and limited in number – especially in committees with a crammed agenda (as is the case for the three committees under study). Committees need prior authorization to draft own-initiative reports from the Conference of Presidents before they name a rapporteur. Hurka and Kaeding (2012, p. 516) thus conclude that these reports also entail an opportunity cost. However, these reports imply no detailed legislation and no inter-institutional bargaining. The group’s needs are therefore not the same as for co-decision reports. I therefore expect a negative correlation between allocations during co-decision and the drafting of own-initiative reports.

**Hypothesis 3.** Allocations of own-initiative reports decrease chances of allocation of high-impact legislation.

### 2.2 Data and the model

#### 2.2.1 Original data on MEP background and in-house behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>251</td>
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<tr>
<td>Codecision - 2009-2014</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own-Initiative - 2004-2009</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own-Initiative - 2009-2014</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Number of Reports Drawn on Behalf of the Committee

Since the dependent variable is a count of allocations within a session (one year), the statistical model is a Poisson model with log-link. The data structure is naturally multi-level and observations are ordered as a cross-sectional time series.
The use of the codecision procedure depends on the policy domain, so that the model allows for differing levels of allocation across committees. We furthermore see from Table 2.1 that more reports were drawn in the 6th legislature (2004-2009) than in the 7th (2009-2014) and that allocations were cyclical, with more reports allocated in the last half of each legislature. Because of these variations, the model will include varying intercepts for the legislature (EP 6 and EP 7), the committee, and the parliamentary session (ranging from 1 to 5), as well as individual intercepts for each MEP, thus accounting for individual variation which is not explained by the model.\footnote{The complete code used to estimate the model in OpenBUGs can be found in the online appendix.}

All studies to date have relied on pooled data which makes it impossible to distinguish causes from consequences. Explanatory variables are lagged in order to increase the probability that the correlations in the data have a causal origin. The lag in the data structure implies that some information is unknown at the beginning of each cycle, yet allocation decisions are also made in the first year following elections. This information is unknown both to me as a researcher and to the decision-makers themselves. It is therefore modelled as such. I furthermore allow the dependent variable to be autocorrelated: The past number of codecision reports might influence present allocation decisions. This is dealt with by adding a lagged value of $y$ as a control in the model.
CHAPTER 2. (SELF-)SELECTION AND EXPERTISE

\[ \text{Report}_i \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_i) \]
\[ \log(\mu_i) = \alpha_i \]
\[ + \alpha_{(EP,i)} \]
\[ + \alpha_{(Committee,i)} \]
\[ + \alpha_{(Session,i)} \]
\[ + \alpha_{(MEP,i)} \]
\[ + \beta_1 \times \text{NationalPolitics}_i \]
\[ + \beta_2 \times \text{PolicyNationalPolitics}_i \]
\[ + \beta_3 \times \text{Incumbency}_i \]
\[ + \beta_4 \times \text{CommitteeIncumbency}_i \]
\[ + \beta_5 \times \text{Loyalty}_i \]
\[ + \beta_6 \times \text{Loyalty}_i \times \text{Attendance}_i \]
\[ + \beta_7 \times \text{Attendance}_i \]
\[ + \beta_8 \times \text{PastOwn} - \text{InitiativeReports}_i \]
\[ + \beta_9 \times \text{PresentOwn} - \text{InitiativeReports}_i \]
\[ + \beta_{10} \times \text{LaggedCodecisionReports}_i \]
\[ + \beta_{11} \times \text{Chair}_i \]

\[ (2.1) \]

2.2.2 Bayesian modelling of missing and unobserved data

I have fitted two Bayesian versions of the model with vague, though slightly conservative priors for the regression coefficients. They follow a multivariate normal distribution with a mean of zero, a precision of 1 and an expected covariance of 0. The variance parameter \( \tau \) for the random intercepts is inverse gamma distributed with given shape and scale parameters of 1 and 10. The
2.2. DATA AND THE MODEL

priors can be conceived as alternative null-hypotheses which are outweighed (or not) by the data.

\[ \beta_i \sim N(\mu, \Sigma) \]
\[ \alpha_j \sim N(0, 1) \]
\[ \tau_j \sim IG(1, 10) \]

All models are run with 50 000 iterations, a 20 000 iteration burn-in, and only every 10th iteration is stored in order to address autocorrelation in the simulation. None of the models showed any signs of non-convergence.\(^4\)

The Bayesian approach explicitly models both known and unknown quantities (Gill, 2009, p. 43). There are two types of unknown data in this model: One is due to missing observations in the data, and the other is due to things the coordinators themselves do not know. The values of these unknowns are either simulated through Bayesian priors using MCMC methods or they have been excluded listwise. The advantage of MCMC simulations compared to the most common frequentist solutions (listwise exclusion or replacement by mean) is that they allow me to keep information from all observations; I can use whatever other information I have to impute the missing observations, and credible intervals take into account uncertainty arising from unavailable information.

Missing observations are few. Roll-call votes contain 9 per cent missing observations. These are assumed to be missing completely at random (MCAR), and are simply given an uninformative prior with a likely value within the range of the variable.\(^5\) The variable based on previous committee seats in a national parliament contains 4 per cent missing observations. These are assumed to be missing at random, contingent on the value of the

\(^4\)Convergence statistics are provided in the online appendix.
\(^5\)Loyalty \(\sim U(0,3)\)
MP variable (MAR)\(^6\). Missing values on previous political experience at the national level are assumed to follow a binomial distribution with an empirically informed probability of positive counts\(^7\) (for an overview on sources of missing data and possible solutions, see Little and Rubin, 2002).

The data also include observations for which the coordinators lack information at the time of the allocation. Attendance rates and voting behavior are observed in the year preceding the report. I assume that coordinators rely on this information to assess the dedication and loyalty of their group members. Following elections, this information is not available on newcomers, yet coordinators allocate reports in the first year of the term. In a first fit of the model I deal with this using listwise exclusion. The model is thus estimated on 1,992 observations of 485 individual MEPs in the periods 2005-2009 and 2010-2014.

In a second fit of the model I impute values for the unobserved data. I assume that coordinators believe new members are on average similar to old members, and that their loyalty therefore is roughly the same. Unknown values of loyalty are thus simulated through the same distribution as missing observations. Unknown values of attendance, however, are imputed using a normal regression which is estimated in parallel to the main model. Predictors are drawn from the MEP’s position on the committee. Although the main model assumes that MEPs can choose their level of dedication independently of their position on the committee, I also assume that coordinators use the group members’ positions to form expectations about their future level of attendance. Attendance among committee chairs is used as a reference level, while the relative effects of vice-chairs, full members and substitutes are estimated. Results are reported in the appendix.

\(^6\)I have been unable to collect information on 23 former MPs or 13 per cent of the positive counts of MPs.

\(^7\)MP ~ B(0.33, 1) and PolicyMP ~ B(0.42, 1)
2.2. DATA AND THE MODEL

\[ Attendance_j \sim N(\mu_j, \tau) \]

\[ \mu_j = \alpha + \beta_1 \times ViceChair_i \]
\[ + \beta_2 \times Member_i \]
\[ + \beta_3 \times Substitute_i \]

Imputations are done for all newcomers. I use data from the last year of the 6th term to model incumbent members of the 7th term. The second fit includes 2,488 observations of 503 MEPs in the period 2004-2014. All other variables are observed when reports are allocated.

In simulating data, I obtain less reliable estimates of dedication and loyalty, while obtaining a more precise estimate of the effect of all other variables. Moreover, the second fit gains in realism insofar as it does not ignore the uncertainty faced by players.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0.33</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy MP</td>
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</tr>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Univariate statistics
2.3 Variables

2.3.1 Satisfying the group’s need for information ($H_1$)

Codecision allocations are a most-likely case in which coordinators seek policy information. Expertise may be acquired prior to an MEP’s first election to Parliament or through in-house specialization. The hypothesis on expertise is operationalized and tested in two different manners. At all times, the relative effect of policy expertise is measured at equal levels of political experience.

The variable *Incumbent* captures whether a member has previous experience from the European Parliament. It expresses whether committee members have already sought and gained reelection at least once. Turnover is high among committee staff as well as MEPs and their assistants. Incumbent members are therefore particularly valuable for preserving institutional memory. Some 45 per cent of the MEPs in this study had been reelected to office at least once. This is in contrast to the 80 to 90 per cent of incumbents in the U.S. Congress (Manning and Petersen, 2013). Bivariate statistics indicate a learning period among newcomers: While 33 per cent of all committee members wrote at least one codecision report during their stay in the EP, we see that the proportion is slightly smaller among MEPs who were in their first term (24 per cent). This figure is nonetheless high in a comparative perspective. Freshmen in Congress, in contrast, continue to occupy a secondary role despite efforts to improve their position (e.g., Matthews 1960; Ainsworth and Hanson 1996).

The variable *Committee Incumbent* captures the relative policy expertise an MEP has acquired through specialization. It indicates whether incumbent members returned to the same committee after reelection. Committee memberships are stable overall with 72 per cent of those who were reelected being reassigned to the same committee as before. Policy specialization in this manner is expected to impact allocations positively.\[^8\]

\[^8\]Note the difference in operationalization with what would have been expected from
I capture the effect of expertise acquired through political work on the national level. A large proportion of the MEPs are experienced statespeople: Some 32 per cent had previously served in a national legislature, whereas 11 per cent had experience from the executive branch of a national government. Given the discontinuity of the party structure between the EP and national politics, service at one level may not automatically be rewarded with positions at another level (Stolz, 2003, p. 243). The binary variables MP and Minister capture previous national offices. When controlling for dedication, these variables are assumed to capture an MEP’s political skills, and not his willingness to serve as a rapporteur.

Expertise from the national level is captured through two binary indicators: Policy MP and Policy Minister designate former MPs and ministers who sat on national parliamentary committees or were in charge of portfolios in policy domains overlapping with their present EP committee. In the final model, these two indicators are combined into a simple, binary index. In fact, some 36 per cent of the former MPs and 53 per cent of the former members of government had previously been active in a policy domain with direct relevance to their present committee. Moreover, we see from the bivariate statistics that former national politicians with policy expertise perform better than their non-expert homologues.

2.3.2 Balancing group needs with individual requests

\((H_2)\)

It may be that MEPs who have a particular interest in EU legislation are more likely to be assigned to committees that overlap with their policy interests. Therefore, I control for MEPs’ propensity to self-select into (or opt

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an American-style seniority system as tested by Yoshinaka et al. (2010). In a seniority system, we would expect a linear relationship between the number of terms/years in office and assignments.
CHAPTER 2. (SELF-)SELECTION AND EXPERTISE

<table>
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<td>0.24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CommitteeIncumbent</td>
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<td>0.28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<th>50-75%</th>
<th>75-100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Bivariate results – Mean number of codecision reports within values of the explanatory variables.

out of) positions in Parliament. Previous studies have used attendance rates in plenary for this purpose. A part of the MEPs’ pay is conditional on attendance at plenary sessions. This is not the case with committee meetings. MEPs who attend committee meetings therefore signal a strong interest in EP legislation – particularly within the policy domain in question. Each committee meets between 20 and 30 times a year, and turnout varies substantially. While the average attendee is present at 51 per cent of all meetings, only 71 members attended more than 90 per cent of meetings. Attendance ranges from 0 to 1 and expresses the proportion of meetings in which the MEP participated during the year prior to the report. Where I model all 5 years in a term, the variable is simulated for the first year. Bivariate statistics in Table 2.3 already suggest a positive correlation between attendance levels and codecision proposals.

In the final model, I also run an alternative fit in which attendance is measured as participation in plenary meetings rather than in committees. Missing observations from the plenary are excluded. Moreover, there are no means of deducing an MEP’s investment in a particular committee from his or her plenary attendance. Substitute committee members are therefore also
excluded. Because the overall attendance level in plenary has become high in recent years due to the financial incentive structure,\textsuperscript{9} I do not expect results to be as clear, nor do I expect this model to perform as well, as the main model.

A rapporteur who generally to es the party line is less likely to deviate from the group's position. Keeping track of loyalty to the group position during roll-call votes is an efficient way for coordinators to monitor their members' inclination to follow decided policy. Voting offers the occasion for rank-and-file members to participate in making EU law and express their preferences. Voting records also constitute important information for voters, parties and researchers alike. \textit{Loyalty} is a count variable derived from roll-call votes cast on proposals treated by the committee on which the MEP sits. The measure captures the proportion of times MEPs align to the position endorsed by his or her group. Both attendance and loyalty are lagged by one year.

Bivariate statistics are ambiguous: The least loyal MEPs garner more reports than the highest quartile.\textsuperscript{10} Voting loyalty is nonetheless remarkably high; MEPs voted on average in line with their transnational group in 93 per cent of the votes pertaining to their policy domain. Only 15 per cent of the observations voted against their group in more than 20 per cent of the votes. The variable is highly skewed. In the final analysis, the measure is recoded into batches corresponding to its quartiles, ranging from 0 to 3: The first quartile (91.44) receives the value 0, and the last quartile (96.74) is assigned the value 3.

In a setting where coordinators endeavour to both pick a good rapporteur and to satisfy the personal ambition of members, the effect of dedication will increase with MEP loyalty. In order to test \textit{H}_2 the model therefore includes an interaction between attendance and loyalty.

\textsuperscript{9}Mean attendance level in these data is 89 per cent.

\textsuperscript{10}Non-affiliated MEPs and members of de facto technical groups (the EFD, the UEN and the IND/DEM) are excluded from the analysis.
2.3.3 Satisfying a broader span of members ($H_3$)

To appease internal claims for exposure, coordinators may also choose to give own-initiative drafts to other group members than those responsible for codecision legislation. I measure this effect in two different ways:

*Number of Present Own-Initiative Reports* captures the number of own-initiative reports an MEP has presented to the plenary in the same year as the measure of codecision reports. I expect that MEPs who write codecision reports do not acquire own-initiative reports the same year and vice-versa.

*Number of Past Own-Initiative Reports* measures the number of own-initiative reports MEPs have drafted up to now in the current and in the previous parliament. None have drafted more than 4 such reports during the last 10 years.

While I expect both of these variables to have a negative effect in the final analysis, we can see rather mixed evidence from the bivariate statistics. This may change, however, in the multivariate analysis where the effect of group selection is isolated from MEP self-selection.

2.3.4 Control Variables

The model also includes a control for the committee *Chair*. Whereas the American Congress is dominated by two parties, with the committee chair being a majority leader, this is not the case in the multi-party European Parliament. The chair is more of a figure of consensus. Less salient reports are referred to the chairperson as a default option or if the initially appointed rapporteur loses the confidence of the committee (Hausemer, 2006, p. 523; Corbett et al., 2007, p. 143). Committees can either keep their chair throughout the entire legislature or redistribute positions at midterm. For this reason, the data contains a total of 8 individual chairmen.

Position on the committee (except for the chairperson) is not controlled for. The data include both full committee members and their substitutes.
Substitutes are allowed to draft reports and enjoy full speech rights, as well as voting rights (provided that the committee meeting is not fully set – which it rarely is). In fact, some 31 codecision reports were allocated to 23 different substitutes during the period of study. Studies of committee allotments and report allocation essentially rely on the same theories and assume the same criteria of selection. Controlling for committee position would mask the true pattern of selection; the correlation is spurious. Position is used nonetheless to impute the level of dedication a coordinator expects from his or her group members when they first join a committee.

Finally, the model also includes a lagged version of the dependent variable to control for autocorrelation. *Number of Codecision Reports (lagged)* is a count variable which captures the number of reports an MEP garnered in the committee in the previous year. For newcomers to the EP the first observation is 0, while incumbent members are assigned the number of reports from the last year of the previous session.

### 2.4 Results

#### 2.4.1 A clear advantage for policy experts \((H_1)\)

Results from a first, tentative model are reported in Figure 2.1. They lend support to Hypothesis 1 on expertise. Policy-specific work among former MPs almost doubles their chances of garnering a report. Similarly, a relevant ministerial portfolio increases chances of allocation among former members of government by 65 per cent. The overall impression is nonetheless that political careers in the EP are separate from careers in national politics, and that the transition from one level to another is far from automatic. While the total effect for former members of parliament with policy-expertise is positive, this is not the case for either former MPs without expertise or for former ministers (with or without expertise).
What determines the allocation of codecision reports?

Log-transformed coefficients from poisson model surrounded by 95% HDI

- Total Effect Policy Minister
- Total Effect Policy MP
- Number of Codecision Reports (y lagged)
- Attendance
- Policy Minister (Expertise)
- Policy MP (Experience, no expertise)
- Minister (Expertise)
- MP (Experience, no expertise)

Log–transformed coefficients from poisson model surrounded by 95% HDI

Figure 2.1: Results from a first model of codecision report allocations. Results show a positive effect of policy expertise, although the estimate is less precise for former ministers.
2.4. RESULTS

This pattern is also clear in the general model displayed in Figure 2.2: MEPs with a prior political career at the national level (either in the executive or the legislative branch) who have not been able to secure a seat (at least as a substitute) on a relevant committee are 48 per cent less likely to obtain codecision reports than their colleagues with no national experience. Switching to a committee in a relevant policy domain would, on the other hand, multiply their chances by 2.1.

The effect of specialization is similar within the European Parliament. MEPs who have been reelected and reassigned to the same committee are 2.5 times more likely to earn a report, while the effect of reelection when switching committees between elections is – for all practical purposes – none. Incumbent MEPs are just as likely as freshmen to earn reports unless their European experience was directly related to the committee’s jurisdiction.

We clearly see that coordinators consistently appreciate policy-specific knowledge. It is an additional advantage when this expertise was obtained at the European level: MEPs with policy expertise from national politics are 14 per cent more likely to garner reports than EP freshmen without such experience. The corresponding figure for committee incumbent members is 106 per cent.

2.4.2 Individual requests satisfied only when policy drift is limited \((H_2)\)

The decision of MEPs to attend committee meetings is a prerequisite for all report allocations. The measure of attendance taps directly into the degree to which MEPs are able to self select in the EP. The model displays how the total effect of self-selection is moderated by the negative baseline effect of group loyalty. (The negative effect of loyalty disappears when attendance reaches 71 per cent.) per cent.)

Full committee members attended on average 64 per cent of all meetings.
CHAPTER 2. (SELF-)SELECTION AND EXPERTISE

What determines the allocation of codecision reports?

- Chair
- Number of Codecision Reports (y lagged)
- Number of Present Own−Initiative Reports
- Number of Past Own−Initiative Reports
- Attendance
- Loyalty: Attendance
- Loyalty
- Committee Incumbent (Expertise)
- Incumbent (Experience, no expertise)
- Policy National Politics (Expertise)
- National Politics (Experience, no expertise)

Log–transformed coefficients from poisson model surrounded by 95% HDI

Figure 2.2: Results from the three alternative models of codecision report allocations. Group coordinators value expertise and dedication, but they also pay attention to group cohesion: Own-initiative reports do not improve access to codecision allocations, and the effect of dedication is conditioned by loyalty.
2.4. RESULTS

A further increase in attendance by ten percent would improve chances of a report allocation in the next year by 16 per cent among the least loyal members. This effect increases drastically when considering loyalty. The most loyal members would—with the same increase in attendance—be 29 per cent more likely to receive a codecision report the following year.

Coordinators are selective about their choice of rapporteur: Although they take into account the wishes of their group members when they delegate the most important legislation, the effect increases substantially when coordinators believe the risk of policy drift is minimal.

2.4.3 Competitive claims appeased ($H_3$)

The effect of past allocations depends on the procedure under which they were done.

MEPs who are allowed to initiate reports are 52 per cent less likely to receive any drafts for codecision in the same year. While this could be because legislative initiative is time-consuming, we see that the effect of own-initiative reports on future allocations is also negative. MEPs who have initiated legislation once are 14 per cent less likely to receive a codecision report for the rest of the legislature.

These results are in stark contrast to the immediate effect of codecision allocations. Group members who handle codecision legislation on behalf of the group will be 1.2 times more likely to receive another report the following year. This effect is quite substantial considering that we already control for the committee chair, who is oftentimes the default option. EP coordinators rely on the same group members to supervise legislation. Yet—as the attendance variable indicates—there are other candidates who are willing to draft reports.

The overall results support the idea that coordinators are under pressure to provide their groups with high-quality policy proposals, while at the
CHAPTER 2. (SELF-)SELECTION AND EXPERTISE

Figure 2.3: While having drafted a codecision report in the preceding year increases chances of another allocation, the effect of having written an own-initiative report during the current or previous legislative term has negative repercussions. (Estimated effect among the most loyal rank-and-file MEPs with mean attendance (as estimated among full committee members) and no prior experience/expertise.)
same time giving exposure to a broad range of members. On the one hand, it means that MEPs who handle codecision reports acquire expertise that will be valuable for groups during the next allocation. This leads to an increasingly narrow set of codecision rapporteurs. On the other hand, groups need to satisfy the other members’ need to build a political profile. This is attended to in part through allocation of own-initiative reports.

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<th>Correctly predicted [positive counts]</th>
<th>All sessions</th>
<th>No imputation</th>
<th>Plenary attendance</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Correctly predicted [zero counts]</td>
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<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.094</td>
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<tr>
<td>95% HDI overlaps true value [positive counts]</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>0.962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95% HDI overlaps true value [zero counts]</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4: Proportion of correct in-sample predictions

2.4.4 Model performance

At first glance, the model performs extremely well: In-sample simulation of predicted values shows that rounding off to the predicted count of reports matches the actual number of allocations in 86 per cent of all cases when missing values are imputed. 92 per cent of all observations overlap with the predicted 95 per cent highest density interval (HDI). This is, however, to some extent, an artifact of the high number of non-rapporteurs in the sample.

Table 2.4 shows that predictions are particularly precise for zero counts (98 per cent), while only 11 per cent of the rapporteurs were predicted with a correct number of reports. The HDI nonetheless overlaps with the true number of reports in 43 per cent of all cases.\(^\text{11}\) We also see that the model in which attendance and loyalty have been imputed for the first year in office performs somewhat better than the model in which the first year of each term is excluded.

\(^{11}\)Predictions for all rapporteurs are reported in the online appendix.
The first model—with no imputed lag—is also run with an alternative operationalization of attendance in plenary rather than committee meetings. We see that the predictive performance of this model is weaker. More interestingly, we also see from Figure 2.2 that Hypotheses 2 and 3 are not supported in this alternative fit of the model. Assuming that MEPs are under less pressure to attend committee meetings than in plenary sessions, this alternative run illustrates the importance of controlling for individual wishes when modelling coordinator choice in order to avoid endogeneity problems.

2.5 Conclusion

Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that parties in Congress maintain the support of their members mainly because of the opportunities they procure for politicians during elections and because of their majority status. EP groups cannot provide any of these benefits. They have, however, been given procedural advantages (Hix et al., 2011). When allocating positions, EP groups can be expected to seek common gains for their members. They do so by providing information through careful rapporteur selection. Because of their weak position, however, groups are expected to pay close attention to MEPs’ wishes.

This paper has explored Maltzman’s (1997) claims that committee assignments follow an informational rationale when salience is high. Salience is operationalized as policies in which the EP has the greatest say, and for which groups have sustained an increased opportunity cost. The higher investment of the political group incites coordinators to be more selective in their choice of rapporteurs. I found that codecision reports were trusted to MEPs who tended to be more loyal, and who had previous experience with political work in a relevant policy domain—either from national politics or at the European level. This was also the case for incumbent members of the EP. Thus, switching committees between periods comes with penalties. The
allocation of one codecision report furthermore influences the next allocation, such that some MEPs become repeat rapporteurs. Generally speaking, this analysis conveys the idea that political and procedural skills need to be coupled with policy expertise. The European Parliament is not place for the “all-around” politician.

An MEP’s dedication to committee work is an important predictor for allocations, yet the effect is the greatest when coordinators feel certain that the named rapporteur will not drift far from the group’s official policy. This is all the more important for individual assignments – such as rapporteurships – for which the group has limited means of triangulating information.

In the model, we see that not all reports increase their author’s chances of being a codecision rapporter. There is a path-dependency in which being a codecision rapporteur increases one’s chances of acquiring codecision reports in the future, while writing own-initiative reports decreases one’s chances. This may be the result of a distributive pressure by which coordinators need to satisfy a wide range of MEPs’ wishes for political exposure. Does this jeopardize Parliament’s ambition for legislative-executive supervision? Own-initiative reports are often put forth as one of Parliament’s main tools for political signalling to the Commission. These initiatives are part of the political debate and indications to the Commission of the general mood in Parliament. Own-initiative reports also require a majority in the plenary to be adopted. Nevertheless, they imply no formal inter-institutional compromises and have no legal effect. They may serve as a first step in policy change, but they are often more vague and more extreme than what a final consensus looks like once the Commission has put forth a formal proposal.
Part II

National Parties’ Candidate Selection: Information and Accountability
Chapter 4

Striving for Influence: The Effect of Performance

Abstract:
I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse-selection model I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case for information asymmetry. Studying three elections in 11 member states, I find that the allocation of influential positions in office improves chances of reselection. The effect increases when the allocation is more selective, and when the prior uncertainty around candidacies is high. The study thus proposes a new approach to the relationship between national parties and transnational groups in the EP. It also suggests venues for research on parliamentary politics and candidate selection in general.

Publication status:
Accepted for publication in Party Politics (2016).
How does access to information affect the renomination of incumbent candidates? Procedures of candidate selection are commonly categorized according to their inclusiveness and decentralization (Rahat and Hazan, 2001). Both axes refer to the distance between the party selectorate – acting as principal – and members of Parliament (MPs) – acting as agents. This article explores how asymmetric information affects the selectorate’s choice in a similar way to what has previously been suggested for voters in studies of electoral accountability (e.g., Fearon, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2013). In closed-list electoral systems the selectorate can affect political outcomes by picking candidates who obtain influence. However, since the candidates’ ability is initially unknown, renomination hinges on the information available.

The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case to test implications of asymmetric information. First, parliamentary groups are transnational and organizationally separated from national parties, which are responsible for candidate selection. Thus, parties have no means of direct monitoring, but still wish to know how their members perform. Second, influential members of Parliament (MEPs) are easily identifiable, so that parties have access to relevant information.

Performance – in terms of influential positions – provides information about ability, but it is also the result of effort and luck. The extent to which performance reveals candidates’ ability consequently depends on the institutional setting and the candidate’s motivation to exert effort. This article shows how variations in the allocation of parliamentary positions affect the selectorate’s choice, while holding self-selection constant.

Moreover, the greater the variation in the candidates’ ability, the greater the prior uncertainty around candidacies. This again, increases the effect of performance, as the selectorate needs more information. I test this implication by identifying categories of MEPs whose ability to influence is particularly uncertain.
4.1. CANDIDATE SELECTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The following study is based on the allocation of safe seats to incumbent members in 11 member-states of the European Union across three elections. The analysis is based on original data on the list placement of 1134 incumbent MEPs, their political background, as well as their effort and performance in office. Results show that national parties reward MEPs who have obtained influential positions. The effect increases when the random component of allocations in Parliament decreases, as well as when uncertainty around candidatures is greater.

The next section reviews the literature on candidate selection and argues which insights from models of electoral accountability may be fruitful. The second section presents the case of the European Parliament, and then derives expectations about how the informational context influences candidate reselection. Then, I present the data and the empirical strategy to test the hypotheses; i.e., the statistical model and operationalizations. The last section displays the results and discusses their validity. The conclusion then summarizes my argument and suggests venues for future research.

4.1 Candidate selection and accountability

In party-centered electoral systems, the party selectorate determines reélection. Its choice of candidates can be analyzed in the adverse selection model usually applied to voters.

4.1.1 Candidate selection: inclusiveness and decentralization

Attempts to theorize the candidate selection process have remained few (Hazan and Rahat, 2006, p. 109). Commonly the selection has been characterized along two axes: The degree of inclusiveness (i.e., the size of the selectorate) and the degree of centralization (Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Hazan
and Rahat, 2006, p. 112).

Most studies are centered on the effect of inclusiveness; and notably its effects on party membership (e.g., Webb, Farrell, and Holliday, 2002) and the representativeness of parties (e.g., Pennings and Hazan, 2001). A few studies also explore the effect of decentralization. They have drawn on the literature on electoral systems (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Results suggest a positive effect on activities aiming to build a personal reputation (Hazan and Rahat, 2000; although contested by Shomer, 2009), and on MP responsiveness to local demands (Norris, 2006, p. 105), as well as a negative effect on responsiveness to party requirements (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Bowler and Katz, 1999; Sieberer, 2006).

Both axes of the selection process refer to situations of asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament. While not a central element in the literature on party nominations, information asymmetry has been thoroughly explored in the literature on electoral accountability. In this article, I use a principal-agent framework to model implications of information asymmetry between MPs and their parties. Specifically, I use an adverse selection model to explore parties’ choice of candidates. This approach contrasts with models assuming that the party selectorate is able and willing to sanction their members in Parliament.

4.1.2 Accountability and information

Theories of political agency have evolved the last 15 years from mainly focusing on risks of moral hazard to include an element of adverse selection (for an overview, see Ashworth, 2012). Democratic accountability implies that voters hold elected representatives responsible for their performance. Availability and need for information on performance have thus emerged as essential to whether accountability takes place.

Studies have long shown how identifiable lines of responsibility favor accountability (Powell and Whitten, 1993). Earlier works modelled elections
mainly as a sanction mechanism provided to voters (e.g.: Key et al., 1966; Barro, 1973; Fiorina, 1981; Ferejohn, 1986; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999, for an application on candidate selection in mixed-member electoral systems, see also Hennl, 2014). The focus was on how voters’ choice influences behavior. The quality of information provided to voters was crucial, as voters need to know which outcomes are attributable to political actions.

More recent works tend to consider elections as an opportunity to select or de-select candidates for the future (Fearon, 1999). Politicians do not value reelection equally, so that post hoc sanctions may not prove efficient. Similarly, voters cannot recover their past losses – but they can influence future gains – so that threats of sanctions are not credible. As a consequence, voters look to the past for information about future performance.

Performance is a function of a candidate’s actions, talents and luck. Hence there are two elements of uncertainty in the model: Voters need to know whether performance is attributable to qualities of the candidate, or to chance. Also, representatives are no longer considered as a priori identical. Rather, they enter into politics with different qualities, such as preferences (e.g.: Fearon, 1999) or talent (e.g.: Persson and Tabellini, 2013, pp. 81-89; for a combination of the two, see Ashworth and Mesquita, 2006). Voters – knowing that they cannot sanction behavior – will seek to select the most talented politicians. Ability is a latent trait which voters will have to deduce from a candidate’s performance.

Candidates seeking reelection thus have an incentive to exert effort to perform well as a signal of their ability. This has several implications: First, the level of effort depends on how incumbents value reelection (Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet, 2012), implying that term limits decrease the efforts of incumbent members (Besley and Case, 1995; Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, and Rose, 2011), while they encourage rent-seeking (Ferraz and Finan, 2011).

Second, studies have explored candidate responsiveness as a function of the information provided to voters. They point to the enhancing role of
mediating sources of information such as media coverage (Berry and Howell, 2007; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010) and competitors (Gordon et al., 2007). The higher the visibility, the higher is the overall level of effort.

The MP’s behavior is also influenced by the quality of the signal he can send. The signal is a more or less accurate description of reality. Legislators may gain more from other activities intended to signal ability (such as constituency service or electoral campaigning) (e.g., Daley and Snowberg, 2009; Ashworth and Mesquita, 2006). Recent empirical works have, for example, gone as far as showing how the number of credit-claiming messages is more effective for voter-approval than the actual size of the pork (Grimmer, Messing, and Westwood, 2012).

These studies show how the presence and precision of signals affect voters’ choice, and representatives’ actions. The differences in candidacies further means that voters’ responsiveness varies as a function of their prior uncertainty about the candidates’ ability. As the initial uncertainty decreases, voters pay less attention to past performance. For example, repeated re-elections reduce the uncertainty around candidacies, as representatives have been selected and reselected several times based on information about their performance (Banks and Sundaram, 1998). As a consequence, re-elected representatives are free to spend less time on signaling (Ashworth, 2005).

The following analysis describes the interactions between a party selectorate and their members of Parliament. It is based on expectations derived from a two-period version of Holmström canonical model (also related to a political context by Gehlbach, 2013) on career considerations and manager hiring. The limited number of periods implies that voters disregard effort, while paying close attention to ability. A formalized description of the model is presented in the online appendix.
4.1.3 Theoretical model

I assume that all parties seek political influence in Parliament. Everything else being equal, they always prefer the best-performing candidate. In party-centered systems the selectorate obtains policy impact from its allocation of safe seats to candidates who obtain influence. Ability is a latent trait, and thus unknown both to the candidate himself and his party (Persson and Tabellini, 2013, p. 83-84). Over time, however, performance gives an indication of ability, and helps parties decide whether to retain members of Parliament in office.

Parties decide on a cut rule for performance. They assume that MPs perform differently at equal levels of effort as a result of differing levels of ability. Absent any information, parties further expect that an MP’s ability is equal to the mean in the chamber. Ideally, the party would consistently prefer a freshman to incumbent members who perform below average, while retaining MPs who perform above. There are two sources of uncertainty, however, which determine the extent to which parties learn from performance.

On the one hand, not all performance conveys the same amount of information. Influence in Parliament depends on a series of random components which neither the MP nor the party can influence or foresee. In committee-oriented legislatures where expertise is highly valued, some skills pay off more than others. Which skills are needed, depends on the issues on the agenda. When the agenda is not controlled by the party, the actual impact of specific MPs is unforeseeable. Coalition patterns may also change throughout the term, especially in separation-of-powers systems. More generally, the distribution of influence within Parliament may be only partially conditional on merit. The precision of the signal therefore depends on the institutional and political context.

On the other hand, parties have varying needs for information. Ability is a continuous variable which is not uniformly distributed. The more heterogeneity there is among members of Parliament, the more often the party
is wrong in their expectations about newcomers. Parties rely, in these situations, more heavily on the signals before setting the cut rule.\footnote{While Ashworth (2005) assumes a censored prior distribution for candidates who have been repeatedly reelected, I here assume that legislators are drawn from different distributions entirely.} Candidate lists in multi-member districts generally consist in a mix of several types of candidates: Some may represent different factions within the party. Others may attract more media attention. Some candidates are experienced, while others are freshmen, etc. These groups are more or less heterogeneous. As a consequence, parties put more emphasis on the performance of some categories of members, due to the uncertainty they entail.

It is important to note here that the effect of a signal does not depend on whether the selectorate initially believes a candidate is of low value. It is the \textit{uncertainty} surrounding the candidacy which leads the selectorate to rely on performance. Thus, a candidacy may entail high prior expectations, but can also be considered risky. For example, a candidate may have performed very well in another elective office. However, the transfer makes it uncertain if he or she will repeat the feat. In the empirical part of this study I hold the \textit{value} of a selectorate’s prior expectation constant, while exploring how the \textit{uncertainty} induce parties to rely on signals.

### 4.2 Member competences and the allocation of key-positions

The European Parliament (EP) is an ideal case for exploring the implications of information asymmetry between the party selectorate and representatives. This is because the organization of the EP follows a division of labor between transnational groups which organize legislative work in Parliament, and national parties which select candidates and organize elections. This has spurred a debate over whether and how national parties use their control
4.2. ALLOCATION OF KEY-POSITIONS

over the nomination process to influence behavior in office.

4.2.1 Information asymmetry: Control of performance and reselection

Internal rules put transnational parliamentary groups in a key position for the organization of activities. Being selected by the parliamentary group is a prerequisite for legislative influence. Leadership positions, committee seats and drafts of legislation are distributed to political groups according to strict proportionality rules before they are allotted to individual members. The control over such positions puts groups in a powerful position over members who seek influence (Cox and McCubbins, 1993).

Group allocations are efficient identifiers of MEPs who are in a position to gain impact. This is true for the parliamentary leadership, but also for rank-and-file members: Parliament is a committee-oriented legislature in which information gathering and political bargaining is done in committees prior to plenary reading (Ström, 1998). The EP uses a system of “reports” by which selected committee members (“rapporteurs”) are in charge of preparing proposals on behalf of the committee. If the proposal is adopted, they also represent Parliament in inter-institutional bargaining. The rapporteur is the most influential MEP pertaining to particular pieces of legislation.

The ensuing question is whether transnational groups are autonomous actors. Groups consist of national party delegations, and parties have control over their MEPs’ future career; both on the national and the European level.

Kreppel (2002) argues in line with Krehbiel’s (1993) argument that transnational groups’ cohesiveness is the artifact of members sharing preferences. While the official rules give parliamentary groups authority to distribute positions in Parliament, unofficial rules impose a second round of proportional allocation to national party contingents. Positions, she argues, are allotted to members by their parties, and not by the group (Kreppel, 2002, pp. 177-221). The real decision makers would, according to this line of argument, be
the party contingents – and especially the larger ones – because they are able to impose discipline through candidate selection. This leads Kreppel (2002, p. 206) to conclude that “[…] the impotence of the group elite to control member reelection leads to a palpable inequality between the leaders of the national delegations and the leaders of the party groups.”

As Parliament’s powers have grown; parties are expected to increasingly pay heed to allocations. There is some evidence that national parties ensure representation on committees with particularly salient policy domains (Whitaker, 2011). Raunio (2000) further finds that contacts between MEPs and their national parties increased during the 1990s in parallel with the enhanced role of the EP.

Nonetheless, active monitoring of MEPs requires a clear agenda for what to obtain and what strategy to adopt. Yet, the legislative agenda is mainly set by the Commission. MEPs take positions on a multitude of issues which were not covered by the electoral program. This furthermore happens in a separation-of-powers system where coalitions are transnational and inter-institutional, and not designed to uphold any governmental majority. Parliamentary groups are better fit to address this situation than national parties. Empirically, one study shows that the control remains sporadic – with parties mostly paying attention to specific issues to avoid embarrassments. National delegations give few voting instructions, and most communications between MEPs and their national party are based on personal ties (Raunio, 2000, p. 215-218).

National parties thus have limited information about in-house politics, and the responsibility for day-to-day work is delegated to transnational groups. Yet, parties seek political influence, and can use their control over the nomination process to select appropriate candidates. Past performance provides, in this context, indications of future influence. Bivariate statistics displayed in figure 4.1 already suggest how parties tend to allocate safer seats to members who draft legislation.
Figure 4.1: The probability of garnering a “safe seat” increases with legislative impact. The calculation is done only among MEPs who claim they would like to make a career in the EP.

Research on the impact of legislative service on party renomination to the EP has been limited. Frech (2016) finds that assignments to powerful committees positively impact German MEPs’ probability of reelection. Report allocations and plenary attendance only have a positive impact under some specifications, while committee leadership positions have no effect. van Thomme et al. (2015), on their part, make an analysis of all incumbent candidates to the 2014 election. They show how performance – such as group leadership and reports drafted – improves candidates’ chances of reelection, although – here too – EP leadership positions seem to have no effect. The authors also find mixed evidence that efforts to obtain influence
such as policy specialization and attendance – have an impact. Overall, I make a distinction between activities to which MEPs need to be selected by the group (“performance”) and activities which are dependent only on the MEP’s choice (“effort”).

4.2.2 Effort leads to performance

Parliamentary groups not only decide who gains influence, but also under what conditions it is given. The selective element of report allocation has increased over time as the EP has gained in power and in policy domains where the EP has a stronger institutional standing. The more selective groups are, the more they reduce the random element in the allocation of influential positions. Such positions are thus more informative than, for example, allotments following the national party size or MEP self-selection.

An extensive literature shows that allocations serve the group as a whole: Groups need information about the implications and political feasibility of policies (Krehbiel, 1991). Allocations of committee seats, chairs and vice-chairs, as well as reports thus follow a system in which competence – and in particular policy expertise – is valued (e.g., Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Yordanova, 2009; Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Yordanova, 2011b,a; Whitaker, 2011; Daniel, 2013). Group leaders limit policy drift by naming more loyal members to draft legislation (Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Yordanova, 2011a). Although voting cohesiveness in the European groups is less impressive than that of the national party delegations, their overall coherence is greater than in the U.S. Congress (Hix, Noury, and Roland, 2009, p. 823).

Recent studies further point out that work-intensive and high-impact activities such as drafting reports require an initial investment on the part of the MEP. Attendance in plenary sessions has, for example, proven a strong predictor (Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Hurka and Kaeding, 2012; Hurka et al., 2015).

Following the literature on allocations in Parliament, we see that groups
reward defined skills/abilities, but also the efforts MEPs exert to obtain influence. On the other hand, according to the theoretical framework, national parties are concerned with the performance of their MEPs; namely the influence they obtain.

4.2.3 Ambition leads to effort

There is a growing literature on how reelection concerns affect legislative behavior (and thus performance) in the EP. An MEP’s loyalty to the national party is higher when parties are gatekeepers to reelection (Hix, 2004), as well as among those who are expected to run for office on the national level (Meserve et al., 2009). A recent study further shows that participation levels increase with an MEP’s intention to seek reelection (Hoyland, Hobolt, and Hix, ming). These findings are in line with the claim that ambition leads to efforts.

Ambition levels vary substantially in the EP, and should therefore not be assumed to be fixed. EP elections are second-order: This implies that MEPs do not necessarily value reelection, and that voters and parties do not necessarily consider EP politics when making their choice.

First, between 1999 and 2014, the median MEP had stayed in Parliament only one term. A number of MEPs reside in Brussels either as a forced retirement or as a “training camp” (Scarrow, 1997). The EP is sometimes used as a final retreat from national elected office, a place to parachute in case of electoral defeat, or by national politicians who want to get rid of competitors. The EP may also be used as an arena in which young politicians can gain political experience before they “graduate” to the national level (Meserve et al., 2009). It therefore makes sense to model renomination to the European Parliament within a framework robust to limited career spans, and to emphasize implications of the risks of adverse selection.

Second, voters have little information on the political life in the EP. National campaigns are run by national parties on mainly national issues. As
a consequence, the electorate tends to sanction their governing parties (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Marsh, 1998; Hix and Marsh, 2007), and candidatures are evaluated based on political experience from the national – rather than the European – level (Hobolt and Høyland, 2011). This gives incentives for parties to put forward a mix of candidates who have a broader appeal. I assume, however, that parties prefer – everything else being equal – incumbent candidates who obtain influence.

4.2.4 The model in a European context

Little literature exists on the national parties’ choice. Gherghina and Chiru (2010) find that the political experience and economic resources of candidates improved their list position in Romania in the 2009 election. Their contribution has – together with Frech (2016) – remained unique. In contrast, there are several empirical studies of MEPs’ effort which can be understood in the same theoretical framework.

While the EP has been plagued with high levels of absenteeism, this has not prevented it from developing a core of active and influential long-timers (Scarrow, 1997). The varying impact of members suggests a great spread in the types of MEPs: In the 1999-2014 period one member in four did not draft any report during their term, whereas one MEP drafted no less than 53. Parties’ prior uncertainty about their candidates’ type would therefore be high. In terms of equation 10 in the appendix this would imply a higher level of $\sigma_\theta$, which impacts effort. This heterogeneity would be the reason why some researchers have felt the need to control for effort level when they model report allocation (e.g.: Yoshinaka et al., 2010).

A similar effect would ensue from a situation in which groups convey little information about the MEP’s type (when $\sigma_\epsilon$ is high). This would be the case, for example, when groups organize EP work, and report allocations are done mechanically according to party size within the group. Following Daniel’s (2013) observation that reports have been increasingly allocated as a function
of competence, this would imply that some of the increase in participation observed in the same period is due to changes in the information conveyed to parties.

Empirical findings are in line with the intuition that the effort exerted in office increases with the value MEPs put on reelection \((B)\). Considering participation in roll-call votes, Hoyland et al. (ming) find that MEPs’ expressed and/or realized ambition to stay in Parliament has a positive effect on attendance levels, while ambitions for a national career have a negative effect. The finding is robust across national electoral systems. The European Parliament is partially populated by MEPs who aspire to higher national offices – either they are in the beginning of their career or they use Parliament as a second base in case their party’s electoral fortune dries up at home. Notably, Mamadouh and Raunio (2003) suggest that France’s under-representation among rapporteurs is the consequence of their practice of dual mandates. Similarly Scarrow (1997) identifies a group of former national politicians who are put to grass awaiting their retirement. None of these MEPs have vested interests in a future in the EP.

In the empirical part of this study I will strive to keep the value that MEPs place on reelection constant, while I explore the effect of uncertainty on parties’ selection of candidates.

### 4.3 Hypotheses

Although there are no term limits in the European Parliament, only 33 percent of all the MEPs in the study sought reelection for a third time.\(^2\) Thus, it is logical to select candidates according to their assumed ability rather than their behavior (which cannot be sanctioned \textit{post hoc}).

MEPs’ performance in office – in terms of influential positions – informs

\(^2\)22 percent of all MEPs received a safe seat, and 27 percent were reelected for a third time.
parties about abilities. I test two implications of this expectation. Being a part of the EP leadership signals quality. So does the institution of rapporteurs. The latter offers a particularly good chance for observers to identify back-benchers’ political work.

**Hypothesis 6.** Candidates who have obtained influential positions (EP leadership or reports) in Parliament are more likely to receive a safe seat.

When the selective element for obtaining a position in Parliament increases, less is left to chance. Such allocations carry more information back to national parties. Parliament’s position relative to the Council depends on the legislative procedure under which legislation is passed. The selection criteria are more stringent when the potential impact of reports is high. The EP is a co-equal legislator to the Council under the 'codecision' and 'budgetary' procedures. This leads to the expectation that such reports have a higher impact on the party’s choice than ordinary reports.

**Hypothesis 7.** The most competitive report allocations – such as codecision and budget procedures – have a stronger positive effect on the likelihood of receiving a safe seat.

Similarly, the MEP’s potential for influence is unknown when he enters Parliament. This entails a high prior uncertainty about abilities, leading parties to put more weight on the information provided by the parliamentary groups. I test four implications of this expectation:

First, it is likely that an MEP’s initial allocation(s) in Parliament carry more weight than succeeding positions, since the party is increasingly better informed. Hence, I expect the effect of report allocations on candidate selection to have a parabolic shape.³

³The only way to test this is through cross-sectional data. The proportion of renominations is compared between MEPs who have written different numbers of reports. However, the theoretical argument implies a temporal dimension in which the first report in an MEP’s career carries more information than the second.
There are furthermore three categories of MEPs whose potential for influence is particularly uncertain upon their arrival: First, MEPs in their first term have no proven record from the European Parliament. I therefore expect freshmen to have a greater effect of allocations than MEPs who have already served in the EP.

Second, it is more likely that parties fill the more uncertain part of their list with candidates of whom they are more uncertain.

The third category includes members who have previously held higher office on the national level (former ministers and members of Parliament). They have extensive political experience, but it is uncertain how they adapt to the European environment. On the one hand, performance is higher among the most assiduous committee members\footnotemark[4] if they also have experience from the national level (4.91 against 3.01 reports). On the other hand, former national politicians write on average fewer reports (2.97 against 3.45 reports). Their candidacy thus entails a potential gain, but also a risk.

**Hypothesis 8.** Reports drafted by MEPs whose ability to obtain influence is more uncertain, have greater positive effect on the likelihood of receiving a safe seat.

While the first hypothesis is a common corollary to the entire literature on accountability, the second and third hypotheses pertain to the uncertainty derived from signaling models.

### 4.4 Data and variables

At the basis of the following analysis is a list of all 1134 MEPs from closed-list electoral systems who were registered as members at the end of the 5th (1999-2004), 6th (2004-09) or 7th Parliament (2009-14).\footnotemark[5] Data on MEPs,\footnotemark[4] Only 22 per cent of the MEPs attended more than half of the committee meetings\footnotemark[5] Replication files are available online.
their curricula and activities in Parliament are drawn from the EP website. Membership data are provided by Høyland, Sircar, and Hix (2009), while committee attendance is coded from minutes of committee meetings (own data). The dependent variable is drawn from lists of candidates collected from the European Parliament website, its informational offices and national informational websites.\footnote{Independent members, technical and euroskeptic groups (EDD, IND/DEM, UEN, TDI and NI) are excluded from the analysis. These members either have no EP group which selectively allocates positions, or hail from national parties which explicitly do not seek European level influence. That is, there is either no provider or no receiver of the signal.}

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Missing obs.</th>
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<td>0.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>All reports</td>
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<td>2.00</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-impact reports</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics (N=1134)

4.4.1 Dependent variable

*Renominated to a safe seat:* Not all candidacies imply a realistic probability of being reelected. The dependent variable indicates whether the incumbent decided to run for reelection and received a rather safe placement on an ordered list. A ”safe seat” is calculated as the number of seats obtained by
4.4. DATA AND VARIABLES

the party in each legislative district during the last election, subtracted one seat. In regions where the party only has one seat, this seat has been coded as safe.\footnote{Models with less restrictive and more restrictive operationalizations are included in the appendix: One in which all renominations are counted – irrespective of list placement – and one in which only reelection is counted.}

By focusing on renominations rather than reelection, I am able to isolate the party’s choice from that of the voters. The analysis thus concentrates on the 11 member states which used closed-list systems.\footnote{Following Daubler and Hix (2013), Austria and Bulgaria are classified as closed lists.} Figure 4.2 details the electoral system of each member state.

4.4.2 Independent variables

According to $H_6$, MEPs who gain important positions within the EP are rewarded with a safe seat in the hopes that they will obtain influence also in the future. The hypothesis is tested through two operationalizations.

*EP Leadership* is a binary variable and captures whether an MEP was a part of the EP leadership. It includes committee chairs, group leaders, EP questors and EP (vice-)presidents. Committee chairs draft more legislation than common members, but this effect is controlled for by the count variable on reports.

*Reports* is a count variable and indicates the extent to which rank-and-file members are able to garner influential positions. The variable is skewed. 20 percent of the MEPs in the sample garnered no reports during their mandate, while the mean number of reports is slightly above 3. The first model also includes a quadric term to account for the decreasing utility of allocations as parties gain information about their MEPs’ abilities. In models 3a, b and c, the count number is truncated to 10 reports.

$H_7$ explicitly explores the effect of the informational environment defined
CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE

Closed list PR in European Parliament elections

Figure 4.2: Eleven countries used closed list systems in at least one of the three elections under study.
Figure 4.3: Safe seats are operationalized as a function of list placement and the number of seats held by the party. Observations are jittered.
by the institutional setting. A second model therefore divides allocations into precise and less precise signals.

**High-Impact Reports:** Parliamentary groups react to the enhanced role of the EP relative to the Council during the co-decision and budget procedures by a more selective allocation of reports. This provides more information back to national parties about which MEPs are considered competent. These allocations are expected to have a stronger effect on renominations than issues on which the EP position has a lower impact. Descriptive statistics already indicate the increased selection effect: 58 percent of all MEPs never drafted any high impact report, while 15 percent drafted 3 or more.

**Low-Impact Reports** provides a count of all other report allocations. They include everything from housekeeping activities such as waiver of immunities, to own-initiative reports which put issues on the agenda, but cannot translate to legislation. These allocations are more evenly distributed. 20 percent never drafted any report, while 44 percent drafted 3 or more during the term.

$H_8$ suggests that parties are more active in seeking information on MEPs whose abilities are initially more uncertain. The first model already tests the expectation that the first report allocations carry more weight than the succeeding ones through the quadric term. Models 3a, b and c furthermore test the effect of allocations among *incumbent*, *barely elected* MEPs and members with *national experience*. The first variable marks all MEPs who were members during the previous term. The second variable indicates MEPs who figured at a placement equal to or below the number of seats the party had in Parliament prior to last election. The third is an indicator of former members of a national parliaments or former (prime) ministers from the national government. All categories of MEPs entail a heightened prior uncertainty which is expected to make report allocations particularly effectual.
4.4.3 Control variables

The model controls for two different sources of endogeneity: The party’s prior belief about a candidate, and the candidate’s choice to stand for reelection.

*Safe Seat Last Election:* I seek to capture how the party selectorate updates its beliefs about incumbent candidates in light of their legislative service. The model thus includes a lagged version of the dependent variable in order to control for the initial level of expectations. This also controls for the alternative expectation by which EP groups are run by national parties, which would choose the same MEPs to positions in Parliament and on electoral lists.

*Ambition in the EP:* A second source of endogeneity comes from the candidate’s own choice to rerun for office. While we can safely assume that an incumbent MEP appears on the ballot on a common accord with his party, it is less certain why he does *not* stand for reelection. Furthermore, since the party cannot sanction representatives *post hoc,* it seeks to make its decision based on ability rather than results obtained through efforts. This is a corollary of the limited time span of MEPs careers. I therefore control for the MEP’s intention to seek reelection. Intentions are, by nature, an unobserved, latent variable. I, as a researcher, and the party selectorate can only infer from the actions of MEPs (including their expressed wishes) and the opportunity structure. I model the control variable accordingly:

First, I rely on the expressed ambition by respondents in a survey conducted by the European Parliament Research Group (Farrell, Hix, and Scully, 2011). Their ambition level is considered as fixed and coded as 0 (does not want to stay) or 1 (wants to stay). For the remainder of the MEPs, I model intentions as a function of the *causes* for seeking reelection (career opportunities in the EP, where MEPs are in their individual careers, etc.), as well as some of the known *effects* of ambition (efforts provided to gain influence). Figure 4.4 displays my empirical strategy to measure the party choice in
4.5 The empirical strategy

In order to isolate the party’s choice of incumbent candidates, I estimate three interconnected equations. All three are optimized simultaneously. First, I model the allocation of safe seats and include a control for the propensity to seek renomination (level of ambition). The latter variable is estimated in a separate submodel. Last, I run a second submodel to check whether the information I use to measure ambition, is representative for the entire population of MEPs. I do this by including the dependent variable from the main model as a predictor. Details of these calculations will be treated in the next sub-sections.

The analysis is done in a Bayesian framework using MCMC methods. Convergence statistics for the main parameters are displayed in the online appendix.
late unobserved data: They treat observed quantities as fixed and conditioned upon, while unobserved quantities — such as latent and missing values\textsuperscript{10} — are inferred (Gill, 2009, p. 43). This presents the advantage that all equations are optimized simultaneously, and that the uncertainty surrounding estimated variables is considered in all equations where these are included.

\textsuperscript{10}There are few missing observations in the data. Information about how they are imputed is given in the appendix.
CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE

\[ Pr(\text{Safe Seat}_i = 1) = \alpha_i \]
\[ + \alpha_{Election,i} \]
\[ + \alpha_{EP\ Group,i} \]
\[ + \alpha_{Nationality,i} \]
\[ + \beta_1 \times \text{Reports}_i \]
\[ + \beta_2 \times \text{Reports}_i^2 \]
\[ + \beta_3 \times \text{EP Leadership} \]
\[ + \beta_4 \times \text{National Politician} \]
\[ + \beta_5 \times \text{Incumbent} \]
\[ + \beta_6 \times \text{Ambition}_i \]
\[ + \beta_7 \times \text{Safe Seat Last Election}_i \]

\[ Pr(\text{Ambition}_i = 1) = \gamma_1 \]
\[ + \gamma_2 \times \text{Age}_i \]
\[ + \gamma_3 \times \text{Party Size} \]
\[ + \gamma_4 \times \text{MEPs to National Politics} \]
\[ + \gamma_5 \times \text{Committee Attendance}_i \]

\[ Pr(\text{Ambition}_i = NA) = \delta_1 \]
\[ + \delta_2 \times \text{Safe Seat}_i \]
\[ + \delta_3 \times \text{Years of Term Served} \]

4.5.1 The main model – the allocation of safe seats

I seek to explain national parties’ allocation of safe seats: With a binary dependent variable, the main model is binary logistic. The unit of observation is members of the EP prior to each election. To account for potential
national specificities in career patterns and diverging political opportunities across parliamentary groups, the model further includes varying intercepts for the election in question, the nationality and the transnational group.\footnote{Coefplots of all intercepts are reported in figure 7 in the online appendix.} Alternative models include interaction terms in order to test hypotheses 7 and 8. For ease of interpretation, only total effects are reported.

The model also includes a predictor of MEPS' level of ambition. The estimation of this variable is done in a separate submodel.

\subsection*{4.5.2 The first submodel – controlling for endogeneity}

The dependent variable in the first submodel is the level of ambition. It draws on information from a survey among MEPS. The EPRG (Farrell et al., 2011) has regularly surveyed newly elected MEPS, asking whether they see themselves as members of the EP in 10 years. The response rate is moderate (27 percent). The remaining 73 percent of the observations are estimated through a logistic regression, using information from respondents to estimate nonrespondents' motivation to stay in Parliament.

Several predictors capture career opportunities in the EP and at the national level. A first variable expresses the probability of returning to the national level. It is measured as the proportion of MEPS who returned to domestic politics following the last EP election. Meservé et al. (2009) further claim that younger MEPS and members of smaller party contingents are more likely to kindle ambitions outside of the EP. There have also been claims that large national party delegations are particularly attractive, as these offer better opportunities in Parliament (Raunio, 2000). Thus, the model includes the size of the party delegation – operationalized as the percentage of seats – and age as a proxy for where the MEP is in his career.

Second, the model includes attendance level in committees as a measure of the MEP's effort. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, and expresses the proportion of meetings an MEP has attended compared to the most assiduous
member. Legislative work is done in committees, so MEPs who seek influence need to attend meetings. Previous studies have shown that attendance in plenary is the effect of ambition (Hoyland et al., ming), and that it is a prerequisite for obtaining positions (e.g., Yoshinaka et al., 2010). Attendance in committee is a more accurate measure of hard-working and influence-seeking members: In contrast to plenary sessions, MEPs receive no per diem for attending committee meetings, the media coverage is low, and participation levels are not publicly available. The measure is based on close to 300,000 observations of MEPs in committees and has not previously been used.

The results from the first submodel are reported in the first part of table 4.2. The estimation performs rather well: Rounding off the predicted probability of a respondent answering 'Yes' at the relevant cutting point,\textsuperscript{12} the model predicts 66 percent correctly in-sample.

### 4.5.3 The second submodel – controlling for selection bias

The respondents in the survey may not be randomly sampled. This would skew the results in the main model. The simulation therefore includes a second submodel to check if missing information in the predictor ("Ambition") is correlated with the dependent variable ("Safe Seat") of the main model. Including the dependent variable from the main model into the submodel for unobserved values induces the estimator to account for eventual skewness when evaluating the parameters of the main model.

The second submodel is a binary logistic estimation of the probability of a non-response to the EPRG survey. Covariates capture whether the MEP obtained a safe seat and the number of years the MEP was a member of Parliament during the term.

\textsuperscript{12}Some 27 percent of the respondents claimed they would like to stay on for another decade. All estimations above this probability are coded as 1.
Results reported in the second part of table 4.2 show that safe-seat allocations are not related to the probability of answering the survey. The estimation of MEP ambition is done on a representative subsample. On the other hand, MEPs who have not stayed in Parliament during the entire term, are more likely to be missing: This is natural as the survey was distributed at the beginning of the legislature, while the data include MEPs who were present at the end.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pr(Ambition = 1)</th>
<th>Median effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.388, 4.309]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.114, -0.05]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Size</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.014, 0.311]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPs to National Politics</td>
<td>1.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-2.134, 4.049]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Attendance</td>
<td>1.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.184, 2.861]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pr(Ambition = NA)</th>
<th>Median effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>8.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[5.767, 11.38]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Seat</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.378, 0.17]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Term Served</td>
<td>-1.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-2.116, -0.986]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number of respondents | 305 |
| Number of observations | 1134 |

Table 4.2: Results from the two submodels estimating the level of ambition and controlling for eventual selection bias.
### Table 4.3: Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems. Median effects from binary logit model. 95 percent HDI reported in parantheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable &quot;Safe seat&quot;</th>
<th>H1</th>
<th>H2</th>
<th>H3 [Nat. Pol.]</th>
<th>H3 [Incumbent]</th>
<th>H3 [Barely elected]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1: Reports</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>[0.06, 0.184]</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.005, 0.001]</td>
<td>[-0.001, 0.136]</td>
<td>[0.004, 0.002]</td>
<td>[0.015, 0.404]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Leadership</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.036, 0.944]</td>
<td>[0.061, 0.986]</td>
<td>[0.047, 0.944]</td>
<td>[0.046, 0.971]</td>
<td>[0.062, 0.968]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: Low-Impact Reports</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.017, 0.136]</td>
<td>[-0.004, 0.002]</td>
<td>[0.158, 0.404]</td>
<td>[-0.028, 0.007]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Impact Reports</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.075, 0.229]</td>
<td>[0.092, 0.27]</td>
<td>[0.092, 0.359]</td>
<td>[0.092, 0.359]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls: National Politician</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.226</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.448, 0.205]</td>
<td>[-0.437, 0.211]</td>
<td>[-0.556, 0.102]</td>
<td>[-0.43, 0.222]</td>
<td>[-0.444, 0.205]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.737</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.757</td>
<td>-0.432</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.046, -0.43]</td>
<td>[-1.096, -0.164]</td>
<td>[-1.066, -0.446]</td>
<td>[-0.851, -0.022]</td>
<td>[-1.048, -0.435]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barely elected</td>
<td>1.207</td>
<td>1.302</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>1.279</td>
<td>0.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.491, 1.951]</td>
<td>[0.574, 2.066]</td>
<td>[0.542, 2.024]</td>
<td>[0.561, 2.075]</td>
<td>[0.135, 1.805]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambition</td>
<td>1.171</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.174</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.637, 1.729]</td>
<td>[0.688, 1.774]</td>
<td>[0.582, 1.733]</td>
<td>[0.624, 1.721]</td>
<td>[0.61, 1.694]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Seat Last Election</td>
<td>1.856</td>
<td>1.973</td>
<td>1.889</td>
<td>1.898</td>
<td>1.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.195, 2.602]</td>
<td>[1.266, 2.728]</td>
<td>[1.218, 2.657]</td>
<td>[1.229, 2.677]</td>
<td>[1.194, 2.659]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>1134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.6 Results

4.6.1 Effect of signal ($H_6$)

The results displayed in table 4.3 offer ample support for the first hypothesis. Parties tend to update their evaluation of MEPs in light of their performance in office.

Leadership positions – either as a group leader, committee chair or as a (vice-) president in the chamber – have a positive effect on an MEP’s career. The odds of obtaining a safe seat in the upcoming election is 63 percent higher among these members. Leadership only provides information about a few MEPs, however.\(^\text{13}\)

The institution of rapporteurships, on the other hand, offers a unique opportunity to observe accomplishments among rank-and-file members. Report allocations are selective delegations which reflect the MEP’s ability to gain influence. Writing one’s first report increases the odds of receiving a safe seat by 13 percent. Among those who have captured three reports the odds of reselection is 43 percent higher than among non-rapporteurs.

The relative effect decreases for every additional delegation. This is in line with the expectations from $H_8$ that parties update their belief to the extent that they need new information. The first appointment carries more information about an MEP than – say – the tenth.

It is worth noting that the curvilinear effect does not lend support to the alternative expectation that the best MEPs are systematically recruited out of Parliament. This would imply a peak effect at around 3 reports (the mean). Candidates performing better than the average MEP would be increasingly likely to gain positions outside of the EP. The empirical tipping point in this model, however, is beyond the realistic scope of the predictions (20 reports).\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{13}\)10 percent of the incumbent members were registered as leaders, while 44 percent had drafted at least one report.

\(^{14}\)Only 1 percent of the candidates drafted more than 20 reports. Similarly, only 3 percent of the MEPs wrote more than four high-impact reports.
4.6. RESULTS

Figure 4.5: Members of the EP who are selected by parliamentary groups, are also more likely to be reselected by their national parties. The effect is the highest when the signal is informative. (95% HDI)

The effect of report allocations will in practice never become negative.

4.6.2 Effect when signal is precise \((H_7)\)

The second model lends support to \(H_7\). When the signal increases in precision, the effect of holding rapporteurships grows. Low-impact reports increase the odds of a safe seat by 6 percent, while the similar effect of high-impact legislation is 32 percent. Three such reports would more than double an MEP’s chances of reselection to office.

This is because parliamentary groups pay more attention to the group’s
collective needs when the potential impact of a proposal is high. Personal attributes such as experience and expertise are treasured, but also the ability to enter into inter-institutional bargaining. The latter quality is less required when reports merely contain policy statements or concern housekeeping.

More stringent selection criteria convey, in turn, more information about how groups assess the MEP. National parties do not only consider the precision of the signal, however, but also their need for further information.

4.6.3 Effect when there is uncertainty about ability ($H_8$)

The model provides ample evidence of $H_8$. When parties are uncertain about an MEP’s ability to obtain influence, they rely more heavily on information supplied by the parliamentary groups. This is already discernable in the greater effect of an MEP’s first rapporteurships, compared to later allocations. Moreover, some MEPs also stand more to gain from performing well: EP freshmen, MEPs who were only barely elected last election and former national politicians.

EP freshmen have yet to prove that they are accomplished legislators, while incumbent members have been tried several times in the past. One allocation to a member in his first term would increase his odds of a safe seat by 20 percent, while those who are in their second term (or more) have a substantially lower effect of reports (7 percent).

Model 3c illustrates this same point again: MEPs who were only barely elected to the EP last election may increase their odds of a safe seat by garnering reports. One report increases his odds by 25 percent, compared to 9 percent among those who entered Parliament on a safe seat. This figure increases to 57 percent after three reports.

The results are somewhat less clear for former national politicians. They make a heterogeneous group, and parties are likely to know that. While highly experienced, these members need to adapt to the European setting
by defining new standards for political success, forming new networks and adjusting their behavior to new requirements. The third model in table 4.3 indicates that those who make this transformation and obtain influential positions, are more likely to return to Parliament. Each report allocation increases the odds of a safe seat by 16 percent among former national politicians, compared to 9 among other members. The difference between the two falls just short of conventional statistical significance, however. Three reports would increase chances of reselection by 35 percent.

4.6.4 Validity and alternative explanations

The model predicts 73 percent of the observations in the sample correctly (cut value: 0.46)\textsuperscript{15}. Hence, the model seems to capture some of the essential traits of parties’ candidate selection. This is not to say that parties do not have other reasons for nominating candidates: Party lists with high-profile public figures tend to garner more votes, different political factions of the party may have to be represented, key-figures in the party may need a parachute or are shuffled off to an early retirement. These considerations may also vary across parties. However, the model indicates that national parties on average take into account accomplishments in the EP.

There are two alternative explanations to why influential positions in Parliament would correlate with the allocation of safe seats: On the one hand, MEPs who wish to stand for reelection could be self-selecting into influential positions. On the other, positions in Parliament and on electoral lists could both be allotted by national parties alone.

First, the analysis includes a control for the MEP’s ambition, and it behaves as expected. Those who are the most likely to wish reelection, are also over 3 times more likely to obtain a safe seat. In alternative opera-\textsuperscript{15} 46 percent of the MEPs obtained a safe seat. This would be the prediction of a null model. A correct prediction rate above this level shows the improvement represented by the present model.
tionalizations of the dependent variable we furthermore see that the effect of ambition is stronger for renominations in general than for safe seats (table 14 in the appendix). This indicates a greater element of party selection for the most salient list positions. Admittedly, the estimation of ambition may be insufficient. However, in models which do not include this control, we see that the effects overall remain the same (see table 12 in the appendix).

Second, the effect of performance could be a consequence of national parties allocating both EP positions and safe seats to their most preferred candidates. If this was the case, we would see a positive effect of incumbency, as MEPs who have been selected and reselected by their party, would be a natural choice for positions in Parliament. The effect of performance would furthermore be the same among incumbent candidates as among freshmen. The results give no support for this. The model furthermore includes a lagged version of the dependent variable which effectively controls for the party’s initial appreciation of their MEP. MEPs who have already been awarded a safe seat in the previous election are more than twice as likely to obtain a safe position once again. The findings are in line with predictions from a model in which groups and parties are separate.

4.7 Conclusion

4.7.1 Effect of information in the European Parliament

This study shows how the informational context influences how the party selectorate considers the performance of incumbent candidates. Studies of candidate selection commonly characterize the process along two lines: the degree of inclusiveness and centralization. I have argued that both axes involve asymmetric information between the members of a parliamentary group and the party selectorate. The situation has been thoroughly explored in the literature on electoral accountability. I have, consequently, applied a baseline adverse selection model drawn from this literature on a most-likely
4.7. CONCLUSION

In the European Parliament, the national party (the selectorate) is organizationally separated from the parliamentary group. Parties seek political sway by selecting candidates they believe are able to obtain influence. For incumbent candidates this belief can be informed by their past performance. The internal organization in Parliament, furthermore, provides ample information on performance: Strong committees involve numerous committee chairmanships and rapporteurships which imply that performance— in terms of influential positions—is readily observable even on backbenchers.

Parties perceive this information as signals. Their responsiveness thus depends both on how informative the signal is, and to what extent parties feel they need new information. After analyzing 3 elections in 11 different member states, I find that performance in Parliament has a consistently positive effect on re-selection by the national party. This is true both for leadership positions and legislative drafts obtained in office.

Results further show that when positions in Parliament are reserved for a more select group, the effect of the signal increases, because of the information it carries. In the European Parliament this is observable through the differences in legislative procedures under which proposals can be made.

Last, signals have more effect when parties are initially more uncertain. In the European Parliament this is apparent through the increased weight of the first allocations in office as well as the increased impact of allocations among freshmen, MEPs who barely were elected initially and former high-ranking national politicians.

4.7.2 Implications for future studies of the European Parliament

This article differs from previous research on the European Parliament by suggesting an alternative conception of the power-relationship between transnational groups and national parties. Parties delegate authority to better in-
formed groups in order to gain influence. The relative autonomy of groups can therefore be analyzed from the perspective of agency loss. This reasoning has three rather counterintuitive implications.

First, the empowerment of the European Parliament would imply more delegation to transnational groups – not less – because the potential gains lead parties to seek greater influence and accept greater agency loss.

Parties keep control over the process as long as they are in charge of candidate selection. This leads to the second implication. Parties from closed-list systems are more likely to receive and act upon information on performance than voters in other PR systems. The very strength of nomination, which usually empowers parties from closed-list systems, would also make them more dependent on transnational groups.

Third, the loyalty which parties from closed-list systems can impose on their MEPs would also be transferred to transnational groups. This is because parties use the groups’ assessment as a criterion in their own selection process.

4.7.3 Effect of information in a broader context

The theoretical framework suggests interesting venues for future research on party politics in at least two directions: The effect of performance varies as a function of the institutional context in Parliament, as well as the procedures of candidate selection in the party.

First, the internal organization of Parliament affects the information contained in the signal. In contrast to the bill sponsor in the U.S. Congress, the European counterpart is selected. This increases its informational value and empowers those who control such positions. In the current study, the selective element in group allocations is considered as exogenously given by the legislative procedure (which is set in the European treaties). Future studies could explore how parliamentary groups can manipulate allocation criteria
4.7. **CONCLUSION**

and influence candidate selection.\textsuperscript{16}

A second venue would be to explore the effect of the selection process itself. One possibility is to explore how prior uncertainty impacts legislative behavior and the quality of democratic representation. Incumbent candidates whose initial ability was particularly uncertain are held to higher standards. This again gives stronger incentives to exert effort during the term.

Coordination problems in the selectorate may also impact how signals are received. A decentralized selectorate implies a greater information asymmetry, which again would involve a greater reliance on signals. Decentralization would consequently empower those who effectively control individual performance: This could be the MP himself, but it could also be the parliamentary group, committees or the parliamentary leadership. On the other hand, as the size of the selectorate increases, the cost of obtaining information from Parliament increases. The use and empowerment of rapporteurs could help lower the cost. In the US Congress, it is for example, common to claim credit for bill sponsorships as part of a strategy to inform voters.

\textsuperscript{16}In a formal model this would imply a game with three players in which Nature’s second move is replaced by a parliamentary group.
Chapter 5

How Do Legislated Gender Quotas Impact Representation?

Abstract:

How does biased political recruitment – and the subsequent legislation of quotas – affect the quality of representation ensured by women in Parliament?

I draw on insights from the literature on political agency to distinguish between the effects of selection and sanction. First, if recruitment in the absence of quotas implies higher requirements for women, then selected women are of higher quality. Second, when quotas lower the bar, new women enter office. However, parties are less certain about their quality and react by increasing accountability.

I investigate representation in the European Parliament (1999-2014) before and after the legislation of quotas in several member states. Absent quotas, I find that biased selection leads to female representatives who aim at longer careers and perform better at equal levels of effort. When quotas are legislated, parties emphasize women’s record of service during reselection. Women are thus incentivized to provide more effort.

Publication status:

Submitted.
Gender quotas, which are designed to bring more women into elected positions, remain a disputed policy instrument. When effective, they replace men deemed qualified by women suspected of thwarting fair competition. Quotas vary in their efficiency to boost the number of female representatives (Krook and Schwindt-Bayer, 2013, p. 557-559). They vary in their origin and enforcement. Yet, within-case comparisons of quota adoption rarely distinguish between predictions from different quota types (Krook, 2014, p. 1283).

In this article, I consider the top-down adoption of mandatory quotas: the so-called legislated ("statutory") quotas. While applicable to all parties within a system, their perceived legitimacy among recipients may be all the lower. I contend that introducing quotas to an otherwise biased selection process has a direct effect on the substantive representation women provide. In particular, I ask how biased political recruitment — and the subsequent legislation of quotas — affect the quality of representation provided by women.

Representation is "high-quality" when legislators pass legislation and are held accountable for it. Theories of democratic accountability distinguish between the effects of electoral sanction and selection (Fearon, 1999). I draw on these insights and suggest that both are at work.

On the one hand, biased recruitment is a selection process with a higher hurdle for women than for men. I show that, absent quotas, biased selection brings higher-type women into office (Anzia and Berry, 2011). They are higher-performing at equal levels of effort and aspire to longer careers (Black, 1972). On the other hand, quotas aim to lower that bar. The predicted effects occur in the tension between "old" and "new" practices, creating a "label effect" on women (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). I demonstrate that when quotas are legislated, democratic accountability increases for the women involved. Parties are uncertain about the quality of these women and react by relying more heavily on sanctions post hoc. Women, in turn, respond by working harder. The results are driven by the fact that legislated
5.1. THE LITERATURE ON CANDIDATE SELECTION AND THE EFFECT OF QUOTAS

quotas – in contrast to party-level quotas – are exogenous and compulsory: Parties comply but do not fully adhere to them.

I rely on extensive data on 15 years of performance, behavior and candidate selection in the European Parliament (EP). The EP offers an ideal case to test my claims. Three member states – France, Portugal and Spain – introduced legislated quotas during the period of study. By using a “before-after” design with a control group, I observe the change in behavior among women and their parties and trace it back to the change in policy. In all other respects, I hold institutional constraints and behavioral incentives constant by considering only members of the same transnational assembly who are elected from a closed-list PR ballot. The EP also provides natural variation in the selection hurdle among women. Comparisons are thus made across female legislators. Consequently, the findings cannot be explained by innate characteristics of gender, but rather by elements of the political recruitment process.

The article proceeds as follows: I start by reviewing extant literature on electoral accountability, quotas and candidate selection. Second, I outline my expectations for the impact of selection bias on candidate quality in the absence of quotas and sketch out how behavior changes in anticipation of prospective sanctions when quotas apply. Third, I present and justify my choice of the European Parliament as a case, my data and main operationalizations. Fourth, I show how pre-reform recruitment bias leads to higher-performing women who value office more. Last, I investigate the post-reform behavior of parties and women.

5.1 The literature on candidate selection and the effect of quotas

There is frequently a divide between the intended purpose of legislated quotas and parties’ willingness to comply with such quotas (Dahlerup and Freiden-
vall, 2005). Norms and practices do not immediately change when quotas are introduced. Rather, the new requirements need to be “accommodated” to the parties’ existing procedures (Verge and Espírito-Santo, 2016). Legislated quotas therefore follow an inherently different logic from that of party-level quotas. The effects of quota adoption investigated here flow from that tension between “old” and “new” practices.

I start by observing the old practices (i.e., candidate selection absent gender quotas) with the aim of detecting the effect of biased recruitment on candidate quality. The next subsection reviews the purported causes of a bias so as to better conceptualize observable implications (Subsection 1). I then move to debate how the literature on political agency may enlighten our understanding of gender quotas and their effect on representation (Subsection 2).

5.1.1 Causes for biased candidate selection

Political recruitment is a sequential process. It begins with a pool of eligible candidates (1). Some of them aspire to run for office (2), but only a minority are nominated (3) and finally elected (4) (Norris, 1997). The proportion of women has been observed to decrease at all stages of the recruitment process. The phenomenon is often conceptualized within the framework of the supply-and-demand model of candidate selection (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995).

Supply-side explanations highlight the lack of women who aspire to a political career. Norris and Lovenduski (1995) emphasize factors such as resources (time, money, relevant experience) and motivation (ambition, interest in politics). More recent research has observed that – although the group of eligible women has grown – they generally deem themselves unqualified (Fox and Lawless, 2004, 2011). Women consequently “fall off” in the passage from the eligible pool to aspirant candidates. The conclusions are corroborated by experimental studies that indicate that women avoid winner-take-all environments – even when their performance is high – so that fewer high-ability
women and more low-ability men enter the competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Drawing on those results, Kanthak and Woon (2015) find that women overall are more sensitive to institutional context. When messages concerning skills are truthful, they enter into competitions at rates equal to men, while avoiding electoral-campaign-like situations in which information is noisy. The main takeaway is that women who decide to run are, on average, more qualified because of the higher standards to which they hold themselves.

Demand-side explanations, in contrast, point to the lack of interest among party selectors. Fox and Lawless (2010) find, for example, that women with similar qualities to men are less likely to be recruited by party officials. Except for incidences of outright discrimination, the causal mechanism for party disinterest can be conceptualized as “statistical” discrimination (for an overview, see Altonji and Blank, 1999). It is impossible to know how new candidates will perform in office. Party selectors therefore rely on information about visible skills to infer future performance. They start with a prior belief which they update based on signals of quality. Discrimination flows either from differences in the prior belief (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993) or from the precision of the signal (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Lundberg, 1991). Gender stereotypes are prior beliefs that lead selectors to assume that individual women conform to preconceptions about all women. The same information about two aspirant candidates thus results in different decisions, depending on the selectors’ prior beliefs. Niven (1998) observes, for example, that the strong notion of women as an “outgroup” consistently leads male party chairs to prefer male candidates. Noisy signaling, on the other hand, occurs when selectors interpret the value of some pieces of information differently than other pieces. Selectors are unable to correctly observe and interpret women’s signaling. An example is when recruitment is done within social networks. This has spurred a rich literature on the gendered nature of candidate recruitment.
The implication of demand-side explanations for later stages is similar to that of supply-side factors: Successful female candidates need to possess higher skills and/or work harder to display their aptitudes. The selection bias would also explain why female candidates tend to perform at least as well as their male counterparts during election (Fox and Lawless, 2004). Moreover, the final set of elected women would be overqualified for office. Assuming equal opportunities in Parliament, these women should be expected to overperform (Anzia and Berry, 2011).

The current subsection has looked at potential mechanisms leading to biased recruitment. The next subsection delves into the effect on representation when attempts are made to mend biased selection by implementing a quota law.

5.1.2 Political agency and the effect of quotas

Theories of political agency generally distinguish between the effect of selection and the effect of sanction. In sanctioning models of political accountability (Ferejohn, 1986) voters reject representatives whose efforts do not meet a set standard, while higher-performing incumbents return to Parliament. The threat of rejection influences in-house representation, as re-election-seeking candidates increase their efforts to pass the electoral hurdle. Other models draw their insight from the observation that candidatures are not all equivalent, and voters cannot always induce legislators to change behavior. During their last term, candidates do not seek reelection, and are therefore not sensitive to incentives. To counter the effect of this phenomenon, voters in selection models choose candidates with better intrinsic qualities (Fearon, 1999). The representation they obtain is the result of ability and effort. The choice is made by discounting effort from performance so as to consider only a candidate’s abilities. Following these insights, we might infer that high-quality representation is ensured by legislators who possess a certain talent and/or are responsive to electoral incentives.
The debate about gender quotas has mainly revolved around their effect on selection. Two questions recur: First, are more women elected into office? The question pertains mostly to quotas' impact on descriptive representation, and contributions are centered on the efficiency of different policies (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Second, are the women selected to meet quotas less qualified? Some studies concentrate on activities in office and find little evidence of marginalization or lower activity (Murray, 2010; Zetterberg, 2008; Devlin and Elgie, 2008). Others look at what candidates bring into office: their socioeconomic background or political experience (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Murray, 2010; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2012; O'Brien, 2012; Murray, 2012a). While differences between male and female representatives exist, they seem of little consequence. From her study of French MPs before and after the parity reform, Murray (2010, p. 116) even concludes that “…quota women are more like men than their nonquota counterparts, rather than the other way round.” Her observation points to an equally pertinent question: namely, are non-quota women different from men?

This article argues in line with Anzia and Berry (2011) that gender bias has a selection effect on the quality of non-quota female representatives, while legislated quotas mainly have a sanction effect. The literature on electoral systems has long relied on the prospect of sanction to predict the behavior of members of Parliament (e.g., Carey and Shugart, 1995; Carey, 2007; Hix, 2004). These studies do not consider legislated quotas as a part of the electoral setup. Yet, quotas determine in part how the competition is framed and what defines successful strategies (for an exception, see: Finke 2016).

The question of quotas has most often been treated within the literature on women and politics. Quotas aim explicitly to “make space” within existing parties (Htun, 2004). Their efficiency often depends on the political will to implement them (Davidson-Schmich, 2006). While some studies indicate that exogenous quota adoption has propelled more women to the po-
sition of lead candidates (O’Brien and Rickne, 2016), other scholars point to the “stickiness” of intra-party practices of recruitment (Verge and Espírito-Santo, 2016). Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) argue that the “top-down” introduction of quotas creates a “label effect” on women. This latter term designates the perception that quota women did not win their seat in a free and fair competition, but rather through favorable treatment. Women are thus subject to a “super surveillance” under which they need to prove their competence to hold office (Puwar, 2004; Verge and de la Fuente, 2014).

In the next section, I lay out my theoretical argument and its empirical implications. I start by discussing whether the “old” practices would lead to the selection of a dissimilar type of non-quota women. I then contend that while parties do not immediately alter their most preferred selection criteria following the adoption of quotas, they do choose to add women to their electoral lists. This creates an uncertainty about quota women to which parties react by holding them more accountable.

5.2 Theory

This article explores the effect of quota adoption when recruitment is biased. Since my interest lies with the effect of quotas on representation effect on representation, I take a wide view of the candidate selection process with a focus on incumbent members. The stages are illustrated in Figure 5.1.

The analysis starts with the initial selection of representatives. This stage subsumes aspirant candidates’ decision to run, parties’ choice of candidates and the casting of votes by the electorate.¹ Once in office, a candidate exerts effort to provide representation. This effort – in combination with talent –

¹By restricting my study to closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems, I assume that voters can only pick a party and do not impact the final choice of candidates. Their decision is not further discussed and is treated as noise in the remainder of this article.
leads to a level of performance. At the end of the legislative period, the candidate and the party may consider a reselection.

I argue that variations in the effort, performance and reselection of candidates can be traced back to features of the initial selection stage. I consider two such features: First, absent quotas, a preexisting bias affects elected women’s performance and value of office (Subsection 1); and second, when quotas are imposed, uncertainty from the initial selection alters parties’ emphasis on reselection criteria and candidates’ efforts (Subsection 2).

5.2.1 Consequences of biased recruitment

Biased recruitment is a selection with a higher hurdle for women than for men. A candidate has to invest talent and energy to successfully contest elections. The additional requirements implied in a biased selection mean that only women with lower opportunity costs enter office: They are more talented and/or place higher value on the mandate so that they are willing to work harder.

First, if women anticipate discrimination or underestimate their talent, they have to work harder to succeed. The pool of elected women would value
office more, due to their bigger investment. The logic is parallel to the one pursued by Black (1972) in his seminal study of political ambition among local councilmen. He argues that representatives place a higher value on their office when it was hard to obtain. It is the effect of a screening process: Only the most committed candidates enter the most demanding races. He furthermore points out that those who initially had a considerable desire to be selected are also the most likely to seek reelection. This leads to the first hypothesis that female representatives are more likely to aspire to a long career in Parliament when the threshold is hard to pass.

**Hypothesis 9a.** *The probability that women aspire to a long career in Parliament increases when the initial selection hurdle is harder to pass.*

Second, parties seek to select the most talented legislators for their list. If the party discounts talent – either by relying on stereotypes or due to an inability to observe signals – only the most qualified women will pass. The same logic applies if women themselves discount their aptitudes. Although we cannot directly measure talent, we can observe the performance of elected officials. At equal levels of effort, the most talented members perform better. This leads to the hypothesis that women perform better when the initial selection is tough.

**Hypothesis 9b.** *The performance of female members of Parliament increases when the initial selection hurdle is harder to pass.*

The purpose of this part of the study is to observe the selection effect of biased recruitment. In the transition from “old” to “new” practices following the adoption of a quota, I anticipate several observable changes in talent and behavior within the group of elected members.

As far as candidate quality is concerned, all quotas are designed to lower the entry costs for female candidates. We would therefore expect a decrease in

\[ \text{"Talent" in this respect pertains to any quality which the candidate cannot himself alter over the period of study.} \]
5.2. THEORY

the talent of female members when quotas apply. The point of comparison is important, however. In the absence of quotas, we expect that women overperform compared to men. Because of that initial difference, the effect of a policy change can only be assessed within each gender. Women should be compared to women. Moreover, the flipside of a quota being introduced is that the number of seats available to men is reduced. This would imply a harder competition among men for the remaining slots. A corollary would be an increase in male talent when quotas apply.

In addition to the immediate effect on candidate quality, I also expect a change in party and candidate behavior depending on the type of quota implemented. Legislated quotas are exogenous and compulsory. Parties may comply without fully adhering to them. If effective, quotas induce parties to deviate from their preferred selection criteria and name candidates they would not otherwise have chosen. In such cases, parties are uncertain about the outcome of the initial selection. The result is a “super surveillance” under which women need to prove their aptitude to hold elected office.

5.2.2 Consequences of uncertain candidacies

The argument is similar to the more formalized notion in the literature on political agency that voters and parties are sensitive to the informational context in which candidates are selected. Banks and Sundaram (1998) present, for example, a two-period model which combines the effect of selection with the behavioral incentives of a sanction. Parties make repeated decisions over the course of a member of Parliament’s career, each time using the information at hand. The first selection is made based on parties’ prior beliefs about the future performance of candidates. At the end of each term, parties may update their beliefs in light of the candidate’s record and decide whether to retain him or her for another term.

Banks and Sundaram (1998) assume short political careers, which means that parties seek to (re)select the best candidate by discounting efforts made
in office. Reelection-seeking incumbents, however, react in anticipation of a potential deselection (as if it were a sanction) by exerting more effort in order to display their competence. The rationale behind selection will thereby dominate when careers can be expected to be short, while accountability increases when career lengths are foreseeably long.

The model predicts that uncertain prior beliefs lead parties to rely more heavily on incumbent records, since they, at the reselection stage, have the occasion to reassess their choice. I expect the same logic to apply following the adoption of legislated quotas. A party which has not yet internalized the new requirements from a quota is more likely to nourish doubts about the aptitude of the women selected. This leads to a greater reliance on in-house performance when deciding whether to retain incumbent female members. My third expectation is therefore that a good record of service has a bigger impact on women’s careers when legislated quotas apply.

**Hypothesis 10a.** *In-house performance has an increased effect on the re-election of women who entered through legislated quotas.*

It is important to note that the prediction is driven by the *uncertainty* which surrounds the initial entry into office of quota women, and not the belief that they are unqualified. Such a belief would imply a lower probability of female reselection, while the effect of service would be constant across all candidates. In contrast, I expect that parties have little confidence in their original evaluation and are willing to make a reassessment.3

My last hypothesis is not a direct effect of the quota per se, but a consequence of parties’ reactions to the quota. Women stand to gain more from a good record of service when quotas are legislated. They are well aware of the parties’ increased emphasis on a track-record. Reelection-seeking female

3The two expectations are compatible: Parties may well expect quota women to be of lower quality, yet recognize being uncertain about how these women will perform. The baseline prediction for quota women would be negative, increasing rapidly with performance.
candidates are therefore incentivized to work harder during their mandate. This leads to my fourth expectation that women from legislated quotas work harder than their peers.

**Hypothesis 10b.** Women from legislated quotas know the selectorate emphasizes performance, and therefore increase their effort to perform well.

Note that I distinguish between *effort* and *performance*. Effort pertains to all actions that representatives may undertake freely to promote the interests of their constituents. Performance, on the other hand, is a measure of the influence they obtain through these actions, which they cannot control.

In the next section I detail how I measure and test my hypotheses on the case of the European Parliament.

### 5.3 Data and variables

In this section, I start by explaining why the period in the European Parliament (EP) between 1999 and 2014 is ideal to test the effect of exogenous quotas (Subsection 1). I then explain my data sources and structure, my empirical strategy and how I measure key variables (Subsection 2).

#### 5.3.1 The European Parliament – before and after the legislation of quotas

As a supranational assembly, the EP hosts over 700 representatives directly elected from the current 28 member states. In office, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) share the same institutional context. They sit within transnational political groups and face the same legislative agenda. Key positions in Parliament are controlled by the transnational leadership, which applies a single set of criteria to decide how effort translates into influence. In order to make cases more comparable, I restrict my study to the 11
CHAPTER 5. BIASED SELECTION AND QUOTAS

member states which applied closed lists during election. While all MEPs are elected from a PR ballot, approximately half hail from candidate-centered systems. The increased intra-party competition induces members to spend less time in Parliament (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Holm, Hobolt and Hix, 2013), and policy leadership tends to have a negligible effect on re-election prospects (Wilson, Ringe, and van Thomme, 2016b). Their incentives to attend committee meetings and pass legislation are therefore less pronounced. For reasons of comparability, these cases are excluded.

Despite the similarities in the retained cases, the sample contains considerable variation in how MEPs enter into Parliament. I observe a total of 68 national parties that are responsible for recruiting candidates. Their perception of women in politics and application of party-level quotas varies. I draw on that variation in order to observe how changes in the selection hurdle lead to changes in the quality of elected women. More importantly, three countries – France (2000), Portugal (2006) and Spain (2007) – adopted legislated quotas under the period of study. In the first term (1999-2004) these countries are observed prior to the change in policy. France is observed after the policy implementation over the following 10 years, while Portugal and Spain only in the last term (2009-2014). I thus follow a “before-after” design in which the remainder of the member states serves as control group to account for time-dependent idiosyncrasies.

The legislated quotas can be seen as exogenous, although not randomized. They were passed by a majority of the members of the national Parliaments, but are addressed to the selectorate in all parties across the political spectrum and at all levels of government. Furthermore, the public debate was mainly concerned with the underrepresentation of women at the national – and not the European – level. Last, the quotas were first applied in the European elections at two different time points, which further controls for

4 Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia (2009), France, Germany, Greece (2004 and 2009), Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Great Britain
Three conditions have to be present for the legislated quotas to produce the hypothesized effects: First, recruitment has to be biased to begin with. Second, quotas must be mandatory, with few loopholes, so that parties in fact alter their selection. Third, parties do not immediately change their preferred selection criteria but proceed to an ad hoc addition of women in order to comply with the law.

The countries in this study can be qualified as neither critical nor most-likely cases of such an implementation of quotas. On the one hand, the quotas did not seem to produce a substantial effect. A number of left-wing parties had already applied party-level quotas for some time prior to the legal change. Moreover, the proportion of women from France, Portugal and Spain was higher than in the control group\(^5\) to begin with (40% against 33% in the 5\(^{th}\) Parliament). Last, the relative increase in female representatives in the national delegations has not been very different from that of other member states which did not adopt new quotas (up to 46% against 39% in the the 7\(^{th}\) Parliament).

On the other hand, country-level studies indicate that the reforms also encountered substantial resistance. Parties did not immediately change their preferred selection criteria. In all three countries, laws were adopted as high-profile policies following the entry into power of leftist governments.

In addition to the opposition from the major right-wing parties, the reforms also met opposition from the left side of the spectrum. For example, Luc Ferry, a member of the French Socialist Party, worried that the reform “...runs the risk of creating ‘quota women’, elected women who could, rightly or wrongly, be suspected of owing their entry into politics more to legal obligations than to their personal merit” (my italics; Micheline Amar, *Le piège de la parité*, 1999, p. 124, cited in Murray, 2010, p. 95). The Portuguese

\(^5\)The proportion for the control group is calculated among the countries which are present in the sample during all three periods: Austria, Germany and Great Britain. Including the other countries does not modify the results much.
Communist Party similarly rejected the law, arguing that differences in political participation had socioeconomic origins that could not be fixed by quotas (Baum and Espírito-Santo, 2012, p. 327).

The adoption seemed to be the least controversial in Spain where, by the time of the reform, even the fiercest opponent of quotas (the Popular Party) had adopted targets to boost female representation (Verge, 2012, p. 399).

Resistance continued after the reforms, with parties often choosing to field women in unwinnable seats in all three countries (Murray, 2004, 2012b, 2013; Verge, 2013). Election concerns had a particularly negative effect in the French case where the national electoral system (two-round single-member plurality) led parties to prefer the financial penalties incurred by naming male incumbents over losing seats. Thus, even the main instigator of the law, the French Socialist Party, sustained a yearly loss of 1.5 million euros in the 2002-2007 period. (Murray, 2007, p.575).

While the problem has been less pervasive in the second-order PR context of the European Parliament, Southwell (2013) still notes that the passage from a nation-wide French constituency to eight regional entities in 2004 has dampened the effect of the reform. Overall, these considerations have led Murray (2013) to conclude in the French case that the on-the-surface “fast-track” solution of quotas has led to an incremental change in women’s representation. Her observation meshes with the argument that top-down introduction is frequently accompanied by inertia in the actual recruitment criteria. The tension between targeted goals and party practice leads to the hypothesized post hoc accountability of quota women.

5.3.2 Variables

I have described a theoretical understanding of the recruitment process of incumbent candidates. Now, I observe empirical implications at the different stages of the process. Several measures successively serve as explanatory and explained variables. Unless otherwise stated, all information is drawn from
Explained variables in the exploration of biased recruitment

I start with a pre-reform observation of biased recruitment. If women have to work harder or be more talented to obtain office, then these differences are observable in the pool of elected candidates. I start by tracing variations in value of office and talent back to variations in how elected candidates were recruited. I draw on performance as a proxy for talent. The effort MEPs produce is, in this respect, an intermediate variable.

Value of Office is measured as the intention to stay in Parliament at least another ten years. That is, the MEP aspires to reelection. The variable is binary and only observed among the respondents to the EPRG Survey (Farrell et al., 2011). The survey is administered following the election of each new legislature and, in the current sample, had a response rate of 27%. Some 27% of the respondents also expressed a clear intention to extend their term beyond a decade. Career spans are indeed short in the European Parliament. The median length of tenure among individuals in the sample was 6 years, only slightly longer than one term. In contrast, the sample also includes 39 members who had stayed more than a quarter of a century. If women have to work harder to be selected, I expect they aspire to longer careers.

Performance is measured as the count number of high-impact pieces of legislation an MEP handles during a term. Drafting legislation on behalf of their committee is a position which members can strive for, but not self-select into. The European Parliament is a committee-oriented legislature: proposals are drafted and consensus is reached in committee prior to the plenary reading. In committee, draft legislation is delegated to one of the political groups which appoint an individual member to handle the dossier. The member writes a “report” on behalf of the entire committee and defends the amended proposal during the committee meetings, plenary deliberations and inter-institutional bargaining (Corbett et al., 2007). The institution of
“rapporteurs” clearly identifies key players in Parliament other than the leadership itself. If national parties seek influence, they need their members to be chosen to write reports. Previous studies have shown that having an influential position increases the probability that a candidate will be selected by their party for reelection (van Thomme et al., 2015; Frech, 2016). This is particularly true in the case of high-impact reports, which are allocated on a selective basis and are thus a clear signal of candidate quality (Hermansen, 2016). Legislation is defined as “high impact” if it is passed under a procedure in which the European Parliament is a co-equal legislator to the Council (i.e., codecision and budget procedures). Allocations are not evenly distributed among members, and thus help discriminate between rank-and-file legislators. In the sample, 58% of the observations did not serve as high-impact rapporteurs during their term. Among those who did serve at least once, in contrast, the average is tree. The performance measure first enters the analysis as a dependent variable, reflecting the consequence of gender bias at the pre-election stage. It then reenters as an independent variable, explaining reselection.

Explained variables in the exploration of uncertain candidates

In the second part of the analysis, I compare the post-reform behavior of parties and quota women with their pre-reform behavior, as well as with the control group. I suggest that quota parties dissipate uncertainty by relying more heavily on incumbent candidates’ records of service. Reselection is, in this case, the explained variable, while performance acts as an explanatory factor. I also expect that quota women anticipate parties’ reactions and are incentivized to work harder once elected. In the last analysis, effort is the explained variable, whereas it was previously included as a control.

Reselection is a binary measure of the allocation of safe seats to incumbent members. It is coded from electoral lists presented in the European elections (the 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections). These lists were gathered from the
5.3. DATA AND VARIABLES

European Parliament information offices as well as national websites. A list placement is classified as “safe” if a member is put higher than the number of seats held in a given circumscription prior to the election. 46% of the MEPs in the sample were renominated to a safe seat, while 54% returned to office.\footnote{The measure closely approximates the probability of reelection. While more sophisticated operationalizations may be possible, I have opted for a measure which is uniform to all member states in all elections regardless of circumscription size, political context etc.}

Effort is measured in two different ways. Attendance in Committee – in contrast to report allocations, which are selective – only depends on the individual and requires no cooptation from the group leadership. It is operationalized as the proportion of times an MEP has attended committee meetings as compared to the most assiduous members (capped at 400 meetings). The information is drawn from attendance lists reported in the minutes of committee meetings. Committees convene between one and three times per month during each session. Recent studies emphasize that a minimum of parliamentary activity is required in order to qualify for reports. Attendance in plenary sessions is thus a strong predictor of allocations (Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Hurka and Kaeding, 2012; Hurka et al., 2015) Attendance in committee meetings is a fortiori a prerequisite for entrusting members with other committee tasks. In order to further ensure the robustness of the measure of effort, Questions captures the number of parliamentary questions (capped at 100) asked over the term. While I do not expect that written or oral questions lead to report allocations, I consider them to be a core parliamentary task and an open-to-all activity which can boost an MEP’s profile with his or her national party. Therefore, asking questions seems a reasonable strategy for candidates who seek exposure.

Explanatory variables – gender and the institutional setting

Female indicates whether an MEP is a woman. While I consistently use men as a baseline to which all comparisons are made, I expect that gender differences appear as a function of the candidate selection. All models therefore

6
explore the combined effect of gender and the institutional setting through interaction terms. The context can either be characterized by formalized requirements (such as quotas) or informal biases (in the absence of quotas).

I start with a pre-reform analysis of how biased recruitment impacts the quality of elected candidates. I expect that biased recruitment leads to significant differences between male and female MEPs. I further nuance the proposition by assuming that gender quotas intervene to lower the threshold for women.

*All Quotas* indicates whether an MEP entered office within a formalized quota system. It serves to distinguish non-quota women from other women. In the sample, 77% of the women in their first term were elected through quotas, while 23% were not. There were two types of quotas in the sample, distinct in their origin and enforcement.

*Party Quota* and *Legislated Quota* designate MEPs who entered through quotas imposed by the party or by electoral law, respectively. Information is drawn from the quotasProject – Global Database of Quotas for Women (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the University of Stockholm, 2016) and completed where necessary by country-level studies (Baum and Espírito-Santo, 2012; Verge, 2012). I do not expect these two types of quotas have the same effect on candidate selection, and I only theorize the effect of legislated quotas.

The party-level quotas considered here are aimed mainly at national elections and are endogenous to the party. On the one hand, they may be the result of a genuine will to change practices or promote more women. They are more frequently used among left-wing parties. The cost they imply means they are more easily implemented in parties with a certain female power base (Dahlerup, 1988) and are often preceded or accompanied by other actions to promote female candidacies, such as women's training sessions (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993, p. 8). This would indicate that parties already have leveled the playing field, and that their quota women are quite similar to men.
5.3. DATA AND VARIABLES

However, as noted in the Spanish case, parties may even strategically seek to promote female candidacies in order to gain credibility with their voters (Verge, 2012). In these cases, quotas are not merely applied to mend a perceived injustice or select the best candidates. The visibility of female representatives is valued as such, and their quality is of less importance. On the other hand, the de facto application of party-level quotas is not sanctioned by an external actor. As noted in the case of the Portuguese socialists, parties may well adopt formalized quotas, while omitting to apply them over long periods of time (Verge and Espírito-Santo, 2016). In such cases, the qualities of quota women would be similar to those possessed by non-quota women. In other words, the empirical implications of party quotas are ambiguous and unique to each party. Where relevant, they are included as a control but not explored further.

Legislated quotas, in contrast, are adopted and enforced exogenously. While the French law, in particular, has been criticized for containing a number of loopholes, all three countries have adopted laws with strong sanctions and fewer gaps for the large-district PR ballot applied in European elections.

Control variables for the multivariate analysis

The analyses include a number of controls. Incumbent indicates whether an MEP also served in Parliament during the last term. It is an important control when considering performance, as experienced members are preferred when high-impact reports are allocated (e.g.: Yordanova, 2011b). This also means that MEPs need to provide less effort as their career advances, although their performance may continue to improve (Banks and Sundaram, 1998). Given the short median tenure in Parliament, it is to be expected that incumbent members are less likely to aspire to long service. Generally, we also know that male incumbency tends to work against female newcomers. In the sample, 34% of the observed incumbents were female, while the same figure among freshmen is 40%.
Performance is measured as the count number of high-impact pieces of legislation that a member is involved in drafting. However, the complexity of the dossier may vary from case to case. Where relevant, analyses thus include a control for the difficulty implied in drafting reports. *Complexity of Reports* accounts for the mean number of recitals that rapporteurs have included in their drafts. Recitals formalize the reasons for the contents of the text. A similar measure has previously been used by Kaeding (2006) to explain delays in member state transposition of EU directives. It controls for the possibility that women may be assigned to a high number of low-salience dossiers, rather than obtaining real policy sway. Non-rapporteurs naturally have a zero count. The median high-impact rapporteur also did not use the opportunity to use recitals, while the mean rapporteur used two recitals. The distribution is thus heavily skewed and has – in line with previous research – been log-transformed.

*Elected on a Safe Seat* is the lagged version of the Reselection variable. It indicates whether an MEP entered Parliament on a safe seat. It is included as a control in two instances. First, while representatives who value office are likely to seek reelection, they also make a calculation of the probability of winning next election (Black, 1972). If the party has previously allocated a safe seat, it is an indicator of the likelihood of a future resélection. Second, a lag is included when modeling the party’s choice of candidates at the resélection stage so as to isolate the effect of candidates’ performance in office from parties’ prior beliefs during the initial selection.

**Bivariate statistics – differences between women**

Bivariate statistics for new entrants displayed in Table 5.1 give some indication of the consequences implied by differences in quota origin: About half of the women entered the EP through party-level quotas. They tend to have about the same experience from national politics as male newcomers but are
the most likely to have entered on a safe seat. They are also slightly more likely to obtain a safe seat in the upcoming election. Yet – at the beginning of the term – they were the least likely to aspire to a long European career. They spend the most time in committee and ask at least as many questions as other MEPs, although their track records of high-impact legislation are somewhat worse. The figures suggest that parties that adopt quotas are better at recruiting women and put more value on female presence regardless of level of ambition. I have not theorized either the quality or the behavior of these women and will not dwell on it any further.

In contrast, women from legislated quotas tend to be older and more highly educated than their peers, while they have less experience from national politics. They were less likely to enter on a safe seat and less likely to obtain one in the next election. These observations are in line with the idea that quotas are legislated to address the dearth of women in (national) politics while parties hold on to old practices. When they access office, these women are more likely to aspire to a long career – surpassed only by the non-quota women. The effort they produce is also higher than that of non-quota women, while their record of service is in fact higher, and equal to that of the men.

Finally, bivariate statistics lend some support to the hypothesis that non-quota women are of higher quality than other elected members: They are twice as likely as men to aspire to a lengthy career and – despite their lower investment in committee work – they handle almost the same amount of high-impact legislation. Overall, the table shows that – while there are few differences between men and women in general – global statistics hide substantial variation within the group of female representatives. The remainder of the article is devoted to tracing these differences back to the initial candidate selection using a multivariate approach.
CHAPTER 5. BIASED SELECTION AND QUOTAS

The data structure and model choices

My unit of analysis is MEPs who were registered as members at the end of each legislative term. The list of names, age, gender, background and party affiliation is provided by the EP website. Since I assume a defined party selectorate seeking influence in the European arena, the data does not include independent members and members of technical and eurosceptic groups (i.e., the EDD, IND/DEM, UEN, TDI, EDF, ECR and ITS groups are excluded). The data set thus includes 1,131 observations of a total of 765 individual MEPs over three legislative periods (1999-2014).

In order to test my hypotheses, I run a series of generalized linear models with a varying link function ($g()$), depending on the explained variable in question ($Y_i$). My interest lies in the interaction between gender and the institutional setting, whether it concerns the effect of a gender bias among women (in the absence of quotas) ($b_1$) or the effect of quota law among women ($b_2$).

$$Y_i \sim g(\mu_i)$$

$$\mu_i = a_{Nationality_i} + a_{Party_i} + a_{Legislative term_i} + a_{Transnational group_i} + b_1 \times Female_i + b_2 \times Female_i \times Quota_i + b_3 \times Quota_i + b_4 \times Controls_{1,\ldots,(j-3)}$$

All models further control for unexplained variation from different sources: They include varying intercepts for each legislative term, transnational party group, nationality and national party. The effect of legislated quotas can thus be attributed to the change in legislation, and not to national, party level or other time-dependent differences. For clarity, more detailed descriptions of each model are provided in the empirical subsections and in the online
5.3. **DATA AND VARIABLES**

appendix.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>104</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>333</th>
<th>334</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reselection (Renominated to Safe Seat) (0 or 1)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Office (Aims or Lengthy Career) (0 or 1)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance (High-Impact Reports) (0 - 24)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect (Questions) (0 - 100)</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect (Attendance in Committee) (0 - 1)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislated Quota (0 or 1)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quota (0 or 1)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected on a Safe Seat (0 or 1)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected as Minister (0 or 1)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection (1 - 4)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Years)</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (1 - 4)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National MP or Minister (0 or 1)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected on a Safe Seat (0 or 1)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected as Minister (0 or 1)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection (1 - 4)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Bivariate statistics: Mean values among MEPs in their first legislative period (1999-2014).
5.4 Results

5.4.1 The effect of biased selection on the quality of elected candidates

In this section, I explore the selection effect on the pool of representatives when recruitment is biased. If women are held to higher standards than men (by themselves or by their selectorate), only women who are willing to work harder to gain office (Subsection 1) or are more talented (Subsection 2) are able to secure (s)election.

Women who pass the selection hurdle aspire to longer careers ($H_{9a}$)

When recruitment is biased, I expect women elected without quotas to be significantly more likely to aspire to long careers than men. My argument is that women who aspire to hold office need to value the office more highly than men do in order to make the additional investment.

I fit a binomial logit model to explain Value of Office. It is modeled on the subset of 305 MEPs who answered the EPRG Survey in the sample. The respondents were asked whether they could see themselves in Parliament a decade from now. The different categories of women (no quota/all quotas) are included as dummies depending on whether a quota system applied. The baseline is therefore all men. My expectation is that non-quota women are significantly more likely to answer “yes”. Although the elected officials who value office the most are the most likely to seek reelection, they also calculate the probability of winning before they rerun (Black, 1972). The party’s previous decision to put candidates in a safe seat is indicative of the future probability that the candidate will earn the same privilege. The model therefore controls for whether MEPs entered office in a safe seat, as well as incumbency, the legislative term, transnational group and nationality.

The results are reported in Table 5.2 and illustrated in figure 5.2. They
CHAPTER 5. BIASED SELECTION AND QUOTAS

The effect of gender bias on VALUE of OFFICE

Coefficient $p(\beta > 0) = 0.98$

The effect of gender bias on VALUE of OFFICE

Coefficient $p(\beta > 0) = 0.3$

Figure 5.2: Women not elected from quotas aspire to longer careers in Parliament than other members of Parliament.
5.4. RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: 'Aims at Lengthy Career'</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.06, 0.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (Elected without Quota)</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.06, 1.77]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (Elected from All Quotas)</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.92, 0.5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.36, -0.23]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected on a Safe Seat</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.08, 0.11]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Median effect with 95% symmetric posterior density interval.

Table 5.2: Women elected without help from quotas are more likely to seek a EU-level career. Results from a binomial model.

are in line with the predictions of $H_{a1}$. Upon entering Parliament, women elected without quotas are more than twice as likely to plan on a lengthy career as men. The difference is not observable among quota women. The effect can therefore not be attributed to qualities inherent in women. The results speak to the higher investment that women have to make to obtain office due to biased selection.

In the next subsection, I examine whether gender bias also leads to the selection of better-skilled female legislators. I then contrast the results with situations in which quotas lower the requirements for women.
Women who pass the selection hurdle are higher-performing ($H_{0b}$)

In terms of $H_{0b}$, the performance of female members of Parliament increases when the initial selection hurdle is tougher. I consider different variations of the threshold: I compare female with male performance in the absence of quotas (1). It is an explicit test of biased recruitment. Furthermore, since all gender quotas are designed to lower the bar for women, I also compare the performance of non-quota women with those from party-level quotas (2) and the effect before and after the adoption of legislated quotas (3). The comparisons across women make the design robust to alternative explanations related to characteristics inherent to women.

The dependent variable is Performance, measured as the number of high-impact reports handled on behalf of a committee. I fit a Poisson regression. The independent variables of interest are Female and the interaction terms between Female and Legislated Quotas as well as Female and Party Quotas. I expect that women perform significantly better than the male baseline in the absence of quotas, while the application of quotas (the interaction terms) has a negative effect. Specifically, I am interested in the selection effect on women’s talent as legislators. The model consequently controls for covariates other than talent that impact performance: the level of effort in office, incumbency and the average complexity of reports. Varying intercepts account for unexplained variation between legislative terms, transnational groups, nationality and party affiliation.

The results are reported in Table 5.3. When no formal mechanism ensures female representation, women who pass the selection hurdle perform better. The difference is sizeable. Even when controlling for effort in office, the predicted number of reports among non-quota women is 54% higher than that of non-quota men. The data lends support to the idea that candidate selection in the absence of quotas is biased in favor of men. The cost of forwarding a candidacy is higher for female aspirants. As a consequence, women who finally pass the hurdle are able to garner more reports. Although
there can be multiple mechanisms causing the bias, the differences cannot be explained by gender, as they are only observable among sub-categories of women.

When quotas are legislated, the effect of being a woman disappears. The difference is substantial and different from zero. The finding is corroborated by a similar effect when party quotas apply. Furthermore, we also observe an increase in the general performance of MEPs following the electoral reform. A partial explanation may be that quotas restrict the number of seats available to men. This was particularly true immediately after the change in policy, as there was a surplus of qualified (incumbent) male competitors. When competition increases, so does the quality of (retained) male candidates (Murray, 2014).

The same is true for women, insofar as the quality of elected women depends on the parties’ capacity to attract female talent. The quotas enlarge the number of seats available to women. Following the adoption, new women were able to access office who previously did not meet the old standards for female candidates, if only barely. While their ability to garner reports is expectedly lower than their female non-quota homologues, they may still be of equal talent as the non-quota males. When the reform has a minor effect on the number of elected women – as is the case in this sample – it means that the effective threshold for quota women is no lower than the old threshold for men. The sum of these effects is illustrated in Figure 5.3. While gender differences in talent prior to the quota law were substantial due to biased selection, the differences have been negligible since its implementation.

The analysis conforms to Anzia and Berry (2011)’s observation for the US Congress: Biased selection leads to higher-performing women. Quotas intervene in this relationship to lower the selection hurdle for women while increasing it for men. The outcome is a group of representatives whose performance is not differentiable according to gender.
5.4.2 The change in behavior when quotas are imposed

The discussion thus far has concerned the effect of a biased selection on the quality of female MEPs. In this section, I explore the change in behavior when quotas induce parties to deviate from their preferred selection. I start by observing how parties alter their reselection strategy (Subsection 1) before inquiring how women react (Subsection 2) when quotas apply.

Higher accountability of quota women ($H_{2b}$).

Quotas can be a “fast track” to increase female representation. However, when they originate from Parliament rather than within the party, the commitment to address the bias may be lower. Legislated quotas consequently tend to be less effective than party quotas (Tripp and Kang, 2008, p. 351-52). When quotas bring women into office whom parties otherwise would not have selected, their ability to perform as legislators appears uncertain. During reselection, parties update their beliefs about all candidates. However, their prior uncertainty about female candidacies leads them to put more emphasis on new information. Candidates’ records of service are valuable signals in this respect.

I run a binomial logit model to explain Reselection, measured as the allocation of safe seats to incumbent members. Predictors of interest are the Performance interacted with Female and Legislated Quota. I expect the term to be positive and different from zero, implying that women from legislated quotas benefit from a greater effect of a good track record than other MEPs. The model controls for the average complexity of reports, incumbency, whether an MEP entered Parliament on a safe seat (i.e., a lagged version of the dependent variable) and an estimation of his or her intention to seek reelection. The latter is considered a latent/unobserved trait which is estimated simultaneously to the main equation. Details are provided in
5.4. RESULTS

the online appendix. The model also includes varying intercepts for the legislative term, transnational group, party affiliation and nationality.

The results are reported in Table 5.4 and give support to the hypotheses. The change in the effect of performance among women following the reform is illustrated in Figure 5.4, and it is substantial. Performance has a positive effect on the odds of reselection for all MEPs: For each piece of high-impact legislation handled by the baseline MEP – male or female – the odds of obtaining a safe seat increases by 14%. In contrast, the similar figure for women elected within a legislated quota is 85%. The model controls for both party-specific and time-varying elements as well as gender. The alteration in reselection criteria can therefore be traced back to the change in quota policy.

The effect is driven by the uncertainty following the selection of additional women. In contrast, the interaction between Female and Legislated Quota (necessarily included) captures the prior belief that quota women are inferior. I have not theorized such a belief, and the model is not calibrated to test it convincingly.\footnote{First, in order to isolate the effect of an MEP’s record of service, I have included a lagged version of the dependent variable which subsumes many of the beliefs parties held before the last selection. Second, I have included an estimate of the candidate’s intention to seek reelection in order to isolate the party’s decision from that of the candidate. Women who anticipate a lower probability of reselection are also less likely to forward their candidature. Thus, the intention to seek office is, at least partially, an intermediate variable. However, while vastly imprecise, the baseline effect of legislated quota women is negative and of the same magnitude as the allocation of one report. It would imply that these women have substantially lower odds of being reselected unless they obtain reports. This would be in line with the idea that parties hold negative prior beliefs about the women they select. The results neither support nor invalidate such a statement, however.}

Two elements of the quota legislation drive the results: First, it has an exogenous origin. Parties do not necessarily adhere to the policy and/or have not (yet) altered their selection practice in a more gender-neutral direction. Second, candidate quotas are mandatory. To comply with the law, parties add women to the list without being entirely convinced about their quality.
A candidate’s record of service therefore provides valuable information that the party did not have prior to the first selection. The result is a “super surveillance” of quota women: increased accountability to compensate for perceived glitches in the initial recruitment. The system creates strong incentives for reelection-seeking women who can expect a greater payoff for their investment in office.

**Greater efforts of quota women (H$_{28}$).**

Women elected from legislated quotas struggle with a “label effect.” In-house performance can dissipate doubts about their quality as legislators. Quota women are thereby incentivized to provide more effort. Bivariate statistics in Table 5.1 indicate that these women handle on average slightly more legislation than other MEPs in their first term. According to my argument, this is not the effect of biased selection. Rather, it is the effect of increased effort.

I test the hypothesis through two operationalizations: committee attendance and parliamentary questions. Most legislative work in the EP is done in committees. Attending meetings is a prerequisite for obtaining more influential committee tasks such as rapporteurships. As such, attendance has a direct effect on report allocations. Parliamentary questions furthermore allow members to build a policy profile perceivable by their party. While oversight of the executive is a key parliamentary task, it does not capture my definition of candidate performance in terms of influence insofar as it is accessible to all and dependent only on the MEPs’ choice.

*Effort* is modeled as as a function of the interaction between *Female* and *Legislated Quota*. I expect the term to be positive. For comparison, the model also includes a similar interaction for party quotas. Given that the incentive to exert effort decreases as retirement approaches, I further include a control for whether the MEP has already been reelected at least once, as well as for the number of years the MEP has been a member during the
5.4. RESULTS

The model also contains varying intercepts for the legislative period, transnational group, nationality and party affiliation. First, I run a linear model in which committee attendance is the dependent variable operationalizing effort. Since the measure is bounded between 0 and 1, it is transformed to obtain an approximately normal distribution ($\log(\frac{x}{1-x})$). Second, I test the same hypothesis in a Poisson regression by considering the number of parliamentary questions asked by a given member (capped at 100).

The results displayed in Table 5.5 are in line with the expectations. The effects are substantial and bounded away from the constituent terms of the interaction. The predicted effect of the reform on women’s investment in committee meetings is further illustrated in Figure 5.5. While quotas contribute to leveling out gender differences in terms of performance, the reverse is true for investment in office. Following the adoption of legally binding quotas, the attendance rate for female MEPs increased by 42%; the growth in parliamentary questions was 19%. Once again, the inclusion of relevant controls means that the cause can be traced back to the change in the electoral law.

The findings indicate that quota women are receptive to electoral incentives in a similar way as other elected officials. The effect is driven by two factors: On the one hand, parties’ visible resistance to the law means women know that parties are uncertain about their quality. The importance of the origin of legislated quotas (exogenous) for the change in behavior is further corroborated by the lack of effect of party quotas (endogenous). It is not the gender quotas themselves that cause women to exert more effort, but rather the parties’ reaction to the policy. On the other hand, quotas are exogenously enforced and thus perceived as credible. It means that quota women know they are participating in a competition in which gender-related prior beliefs and noisy signals cannot affect the outcome. Performance, in contrast, provides precise signals which distinguish them from other female
candidates. They thereby produce more effort. The incentive structure implied in legislated quotas contrasts with the example of party quotas which may be visibly enforced in one election, while remaining uncertain in the next.
Figure 5.3: In the absence of quotas, women perform better than men at equal levels of effort. Differences are smaller after the quota reform. Predicted results from a Poisson model of high-impact report allocations with varying intercepts.
Table 5.3: Women who were not elected through a quota system perform better than other MEPs. Quotas lowers female performance compared to previous levels. Results from a poisson model with varying intercepts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: 'Performance'</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.9 , -0.45]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.22 , 0.64]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Legislated Quota</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.69 , -0.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislated Quota</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.5 , 1.08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Party Quota</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.57 , -0.08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quota</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.36 , 0.31]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.38 , 0.64]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effort (Attendance)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.18 , 0.29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effort (Questions)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0 , 0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of Report</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.41 , 0.55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>1122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2$ (Legislative Term)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2$ (Transnational Group)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2$ (Nationality)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2$ (Party)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Median effect with 95% symmetric posterior density interval.
Figure 5.4: Legislated quotas lead parties to hold women more accountable: They have a greater effect on performance.
### Table 5.4: Women elected from legally binding quotas have a greater effect of performance during reselection to office. Results from a binomial model with varying intercepts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: 'Safe Seat'</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.78, -0.92]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04, 0.24]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Legislative Quota * Performance</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.08, 0.92]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Performance</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.25, 0.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Legislative Quota</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.36, 0.36]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Quota * Performance</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.33, 0.08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.42, 0.31]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Quota</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.67, 0.54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of Report</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.32, 0.42]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.99, -0.37]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims at Lengthy Career (estimated)</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.89, 1.96]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag (Elected on a Safe Seat)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.65, 1.34]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>1122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Median effect with 95% symmetric posterior density interval.
Figure 5.5: Legislated quotas lead women to increase their efforts. Predicted results from a linear model with varying intercepts.
CHAPTER 5. BIASED SELECTION AND QUOTAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Attendance (linear mod.)</th>
<th>Questions (poisson mod.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.49</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ -3.79 , -3.19 ]</td>
<td>[ 1.64 , 1.86 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ -0.23 , 0.16 ]</td>
<td>[ 0.04 , 0.11 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Legislated Quota</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ 0.02 , 0.62 ]</td>
<td>[ 0.12 , 0.23 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislated Quota</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ -0.11 , 0.3 ]</td>
<td>[ -0.24 , -0.14 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female * Party Quota</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ -0.26 , 0.23 ]</td>
<td>[ -0.12 , -0.02 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quota</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ -0.42 , 0.14 ]</td>
<td>[ 0.06 , 0.21 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ -0.45 , -0.2 ]</td>
<td>[ -0.09 , -0.04 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Term</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ 0.6 , 0.72 ]</td>
<td>[ 0.34 , 0.37 ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>1120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \sigma^2 \text{ (Legislative Term)} \] 0.47 0.41
\[ \sigma^2 \text{ (Transnational Group)} \] 0.09 0.35
\[ \sigma^2 \text{ (Nationality)} \] 0.22 0.67
\[ \sigma^2 \text{ (Party)} \] 0.09 0.68

Note: Median effect with 95 % symmetric posterior density interval.

Table 5.5: Women elected from legally binding quotas provide more effort in office than other MEPs – male or female. Results from a linear and a poisson model with varying intercepts.
5.5 Conclusion

This article has explored the direct effect of legislated quotas and gender bias on the quality of representation ensured by female members of Parliament. Quality is defined as a candidate's talent for legislative work and value of office. The latter is important because reelection-seeking candidates can be held accountable.

I have shown that non-quota women tend to obtain more influence and put greater value on office than other representatives because they have had to pass a higher hurdle. I have further demonstrated that all quotas – whether put in place by parties or legislated by Parliament – contribute to leveling out the differences in talent between men and women. Last, I have established that quotas with an exogenous origin – namely, legislated quotas – also have behavioral effects on democratic representation. Women are held more accountable because of the uncertainty which parties experience in their initial candidate selection. Women are thereby incentivized to invest more effort in the exercise of their mandate.

I have found the European Parliament to be an especially well-suited case on which to test my expectations. On the one hand, I hold institutional constraints and incentives to invest in parliamentary activities constant. On the other hand, the variation in types of quotas and their application to a subset of parties means that comparisons are made across women. The design precludes essentialist explanations of gender differences. Most notably, I have drawn on the adoption of quota laws in some member states to do a “before-after” analysis with a control group.

The study starts with a pre-reform analysis of political recruitment. It concludes that candidate selection in the absence of gender quotas is biased in favor of men. Hence, only higher-quality women are selected. The findings show that, at equal levels of effort, non-quota women capture on average 54% more high-impact legislation than other members. These women are furthermore more than twice as likely to aspire to a long career in the European
I have not identified the causal mechanisms for the bias. However, the results shed light on some alternative explanations. First, throughout the study, the differential effect of candidate selection has been compared not only between men and women, but also across female MEPs. The findings cannot be explained by supply-side factors alone, but must come from an interaction with the party selectorate. Second, statistical discrimination based on a biased prior belief (gender stereotypes), seems unlikely to hold over time, as women elected without quotas outperform men. Third, Kanthak and Woon’s (2015) argument that women tend to shy away from competitions with noisy informational environments is partially resolved for the selection of incumbent candidates. The institution of rapporteurs clearly identifies rank-and-file members who perform well. In closed-list systems where parties are the main principals, this information is likely to influence the decision of who will return to office.

In the second part, I explore the behavioral effect of one specific kind of quota: legislated quotas. The observed change in behavior among women and parties occurs from the tension between “old” and “new” practices which creates a “label effect” on quota women. When quotas have an exogenous origin, parties may not immediately change their selection procedures. The recruitment of women thus entails a greater uncertainty which the selectorate reacts to. These findings hold on two conditions: 1) parties hang on to biased recruitment criteria and 2) mandatory quotas induce them to add women to their lists.

There are two measurable consequences of legally imposed quotas: First, parties react by holding women more accountable post hoc when candidacies are pushed through in the initial selection. Thus, drafting one piece of high-impact legislation increases the odds of a safe seat by 14% among ordinary members of Parliament, while the similar figure for legislated quota women is 85%. Second, women elected under legislated quotas work harder than other
members because they stand to gain more by it. Thus, their investment in committee work is 42% higher than among other members – male or female.

The findings entail several interesting policy implications. They take away some of the concerns voiced against legislated quotas: While the selection process might entail uncertain candidate talent, quota women are also held more accountable. Parties’ ability to attract ambitious women who aim to have long careers – and who are therefore responsive to electoral incentives – is of the utmost importance for the quality of representation.

Policy makers may furthermore observe that the average performance of women is lower when quotas apply. This is not to say that representation would have been better in the absence of quotas. There are two reasons for this. First, non-quota women tend to overperform because they are more talented. If quotas are effective, new women access office. The average female performance therefore decreases, even if the party retains the higher-type incumbent women. Second, the average male performance goes up. After the reform only the highest performing men are retained, while the least talented are supplanted by women who previously did not meet the biased standards. In short, gender quotas lower the threshold for women, while they effectively increase the threshold for men. The empirical question is whether the worst quota women perform worse than lower-tier of non-quota men.

This study suggests several ways forward for future research. First, my main theoretical claim pertains to the effects of exogenous and mandatory quotas. I have argued that legislated quotas in closed-list systems can be qualified as such. However, the differentiation between party and legislated quotas may be less relevant in other electoral systems. Future research could investigate effects in candidate-centered systems where voters are the main principals. In these systems, all quota are exogenous to the voters, whereas only reserved seats are mandatory. I would therefore expect that the most relevant distinction is between candidate quotas (regardless of their origin) and reserved seats. On the one hand, the knowledge that candidate quotas
apply might induce voters to discount female performance, thereby disincentivizing female candidacies. Hence, successful female candidates would look more like non-quota women from closed-list systems. On the other hand, reserved seats would entail a separate competition for men and women, thereby producing a similar effect to what legislated quotas yield in closed-list systems. In addition to this, I would expect that the effect of performance on reelection differs in candidate-centered systems. While parties are well aware of the influence candidates obtain in office and can act upon it, voters are more likely to respond to highly visible signals such as media appearances.

Second, little research has been done on how quotas affect the representation provided by men. I have observed that men tend to perform better after the quota reform, and have suggested that this is the effect of increased competition. This may come from a selection effect (only the "better"-type men are retained) or a sanction effect (men increase their effort to perform better). The selection effect would be observable after a reform. The sanction effect would be of particular importance before the reform when male incumbents consider reelection and anticipate a reduction in the number of seats available. Also, it would entail that men’s performance increases as the level of the quota is high compared to previous levels.
Part III

Appendices and Bibliography
Appendix A

Appendix to chapter 2

A.1 First model
### Table A.1: What determines the allocation of codecision reports? The effect of national level political experience. Results from poisson model with varying intercepts (standard deviation in parenthesis).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef. (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Mean (Intercept)</td>
<td>-3.27 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP (Experience)</td>
<td>-0.73 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister (Experience)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy MP (Expertise)</td>
<td>0.7 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Minister (Expertise)</td>
<td>0.5 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>1.92 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Codecision Reports (y lagged)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Effect Minister with Expertise</td>
<td>0.42 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Effect MP with Expertise</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Observations</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. MEPs</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. sessions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A.2 Main model
### Table A.2: What determines the allocation of codecision reports? Results from poisson models. Model without imputations excludes all reports from the first year following election. Model of all sessions imputes unobserved lagged variables from the first year (loyalty and attendance).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All sessions</th>
<th>No imputation</th>
<th>Plenary attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Mean (Intercept)</td>
<td>-3.16</td>
<td>-3.08</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Politics</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy National Politics</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Incumbent</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty : Attendance</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Past Own-Initiative Reports</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Present Own-Initiative Reports</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Codecision Reports (y lagged)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Observations</td>
<td>2488</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. MEPs</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Sessions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.3 Results from imputations of attendance level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef. (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.86 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chair</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>-0.23 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitute</td>
<td>-0.56 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Observations</td>
<td>2175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. MEPs</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Sessions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.3: What determines the attendance rate in committee? Results from OLS model used to impute unobserved values on attendance rates (predictor in the full model of codecision allocations).

A.4 Model code in OpenBUGs:

```r
model
{
  for( i in 1:N){
    COD[i] ~ dpois(mu[i])
  }
```

```
###########
##Likelihood##
###########
```
#Level 1#

\[
\log(\mu[i]) <- \\
\quad a.\text{id}[\text{ID}\{i\}] + \\
\quad a.\text{year}[\text{Year}\{i\}] + \\
\quad a.\text{com}[\text{Com}\{i\}] + \\
\quad a.\text{ep}[\text{EP}\{i\}] + \\
\quad b[1] \times \text{NatPol}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[2] \times \text{PNatPol}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[3] \times \text{Inc}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[4] \times \text{ComInc}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[5] \times \text{Loyalty}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[6] \times \text{Loyalty}\{i\} \times \text{Attend}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[7] \times \text{Attend}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[8] \times \text{INI.\text{cum}}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[9] \times \text{INI}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[10] \times \text{COD.lag}\{i\} + \\
\quad b[11] \times \text{Chair}\{i\} + \\
\epsilon[i]
\]

\[
a <- \mu.\text{id} + \mu.\text{year} + \mu.\text{com} + \mu.\text{ep}
\]

\[
b.\text{nat} <- b[1] + b[2]
\]

#Level 2#

\[
\text{for}(j \text{ in } 1:\text{N.id}) \{ \\
\quad a.\text{id}[j] \sim \text{dnorm}(\mu.\text{id}, \tau.\text{id})
\}
\]
for(j in 1:N.year) {
    a.year[j] ~ dnorm(mu.year, tau.year)
}

for(j in 1:N.com) {
    a.com[j] ~ dnorm(mu.com, tau.com)
}

for(j in 1:N.ep) {
    a.ep[j] ~ dnorm(mu.ep, tau.ep)
}

for (i in 1:N){
    epsilon[i] ~ dnorm(0,tau.epsilon)
}

#########
##Priors##
#########

#Level 1#

b[1:K] ~ dnorm(mu.prior[], Si.prior[,] )

mu.id ~ dnorm(0,1)
tau.id ~ dgamma(1,.1)

mu.year ~ dnorm(0,1)
tau.year ~ dgamma(1,.1)
A.4. MODEL CODE IN OPENBUGS:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{mu.com} & \sim \text{dnorm}(0,1) \\
\text{tau.com} & \sim \text{dgamma}(1,.1) \\
\text{mu.ep} & \sim \text{dnorm}(0,1) \\
\text{tau.ep} & \sim \text{dgamma}(1,.1) \\
\text{tau.epsilon} & \sim \text{dunif}(0,100) \\
\end{align*}
\]

##############
##Prior for NAs##
##############

for(j in 1:N){
NatPol[j]~dbin(m.natpol,1) \\
PNatPol[j]~dbin(m.pnpol,1) \\
Loyalty[j]~dunif(0,3) \\
}

Attend[j]~dnorm(mu.att[j], tau.att)

mu.att[j]<- p.a.att+ \\
p.b.att[1]*ViceC[j]+ \\
p.b.att[2]*Member[j]+ \\
p.b.att[3]*Subst[j] \\
}

p.a.att~dnorm(0,1) \\

A.5 In-sample predictions

In-sample predictions for positive counts (rapporteurs) are presented in figures A.1 to A.2. Estimates of the median number of reports per individual MEP are surrounded by their 95 per cent highest density interval.
Figure A.1: In-sample predictions for MEPs who wrote more than 3 reports. Number of predicted reports are surrounded by 95 per cent credible intervals.
Figure A.2: In-sample predictions for MEPs who wrote 3, 2 or 1 report. Number of predicted reports are surrounded by 95 per cent credible intervals.
Appendix B

Appendix to chapter 3

The appendix presents the proofs of the theoretical results and estimation details and convergence tests.

B.1 Proof

Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, \( \{r^*(\omega), p^*(r), \mu\} \), \( C_j \)'s information is characterized by a set \( S = \{s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_i, \ldots, s_n\} \subseteq I_n \), where \( s_n = 1, n \leq 2^N \), and \( s_i \) is strictly increasing, such that \( M \) who observes \( \omega \in (s_{i-1}, s_i] \) will submit a report that induces \( C_j \) to adopt a policy \( s_{i-1} + s_i \).

Proof: First of all, we show that in any equilibrium \( C_j \)'s policy is weakly increasing in the signal that \( M \) observes. Suppose \( \omega' \) and \( \omega'' \), \( \omega' > \omega'' \), are two alternative signals that \( M \) receives. We want to show that \( p' \geq p'' \), where \( p' \) and \( p'' \) are \( C_j \)'s equilibrium policy under \( \omega' \) and \( \omega'' \), respectively.

When \( M \) observe \( \omega' \), in equilibrium,

\[
\begin{align*}
E \left[ -(\omega - p' - x_M)^2 | \omega' \right] & \geq E \left[ -(\omega - p'' - x_M)^2 | \omega' \right] \\
E \left[ 2\omega(p' - p'') | \omega' \right] & \geq E \left[ (p')^2 - (p'')^2 + 2x_M(p' - p'')^2 | \omega' \right]
\end{align*}
\]

(B.1)
Likewise, when $M$ observes $\omega''$, in equilibrium,

\[
E \left[ -(\omega - p'' - x_M)^2 | \omega'' \right] \geq E \left[ -(\omega - p' - x_M)^2 | \omega'' \right]
\]
\[
E \left[ (p')^2 - (p'')^2 + 2x_M(p' - p'')^2 | \omega'' \right] \geq E \left[ 2\omega(p' - p'') | \omega'' \right]
\]

(B.2)

From inequalities (1) and (2) and the fact that $\omega' > \omega''$, we obtain

\[
\left( E \left[ \omega | \omega' \right] - E \left[ \omega | \omega'' \right] \right) (p' - p'') \geq 0
\]

Since $E \left[ \omega | \omega' \right] - E \left[ \omega | \omega'' \right]$, it follows that $p' \geq p''$.

Given this result, it follows that for any report ($r$) observed with positive probability in equilibrium, there exists an interval $(a, b]$ induce $r$. This implies that $C_j$’s information system can be characterized by a set $\{s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_i, \ldots, s_n\} \subset I_n$, where $s_n = 1, n \leq 2^N$, and $s_i$ is strictly increasing. With $M$’s reporting strategy, $C_j$ will adopt a policy $p^*(r) = \frac{a - i + i}{2^s}$ when $M$ observes $\omega \in (s_i-1, s_i]$.

**Lemma 2.** Suppose that $M$’s information system is $I_N = \{\frac{1}{2^N}, \frac{2}{2^N}, \ldots, 1\}$.

Denote $z = 2^N$. Suppose that for $k \in \{1, \ldots, (z-1)\}$, $C_j$ will adopt $-t$ as the equilibrium policy for all $\omega \in (\frac{k}{2^N}, \frac{k+1}{2^N}]$, where $h = 1, \ldots, (z-k)$, and $-s$ ($s \neq t$) for all $\omega \in (\frac{k-h-i}{2^N}, \frac{k}{2^N}]$, where $i = 0, 1, \ldots, (k-h)$. The incentive compatibility requires that $x_M \leq \frac{2+i}{4z}$.

Proof: Given $M$’s and $C_j$’s ideal points are $x_M$ and 0, where $x_M > 0$, $M$ has incentives to deviate by submitting a report making $C_j$ believe that $\omega$ is below $\frac{k}{2^N}$, when $\omega = \frac{k+1}{2^N}$, where $k \in \{1, 2, \ldots, (z-1)\}$.\(^1\) As such, the

\(^1\)As described in the text, $M$’s posterior beliefs conditional upon receiving signal $\omega_N = \frac{k}{2^N}, k = 1, \ldots, 2^N$ are that $\omega$ is uniformly distributed between $\frac{k-1}{2^N}$ and $\frac{k}{2^N}$. 

incentive compatibility requires

\[- \int_{\frac{\omega}{z}}^{\frac{\omega+1}{z}} (\omega - t - x_M)^2 d\omega \geq - \int_{\frac{\omega}{z}}^{\frac{\omega+1}{z}} (\omega - s - x_M)^2 d\omega\]

With some algebra, it follows that

\[(t - s) \left\{ \frac{2k + 2}{z^2} - \frac{s + t}{z} - \frac{2x_M}{z} \right\} \geq 0\]

From Lemma 1, we know that \( t \geq s \). This implies that \( x_M \leq \frac{2k+1}{2z} - \frac{s+t}{2} \). By Lemma 1, \( t = \frac{2k+h}{2z} \) and \( s = \frac{2k-h-i}{2z} \). It follows that

\[x_M \leq \frac{2 + i}{4z}\]  \hspace{1cm} (B.3)

**Lemma 3.** C’s updated information, which is characterized by a set \( S = \{s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_k, \ldots, s_n\} \subseteq I_n \), where \( s_n = 1, n \leq 2^N \), and \( s_k \) is strictly increasing, can be obtained by an equilibrium, if the incentive compatibility requirements stipulated in Lemma 2 are met for \( k = 1, \ldots, (n - 1) \).

**Proof:** We want to show that the following specification for \( \{r^*(\omega), p^*(r), \mu\} \) exists and is an equilibrium if the incentive compatibility requirements stipulated in Lemma 2 for \( k = 1, \ldots, (n - 1) \) are met.

\[r^*(\omega) = \begin{cases} \frac{-s_k + x_{k+1}}{2} & \text{if } \omega \in (s_k, s_{k+1}], k = 0, \ldots, (n - 1) \end{cases}\]
\[ p^*(r) = \begin{cases} 
  r & \text{if } r \in \left\{ -\frac{s_0+s_1}{2}, \ldots, -\frac{s_k+s_{k+1}}{2}, \ldots, -\frac{s_{n-1}+s_n}{2} \right\} 
  
  -1 & \text{otherwise} 
\] 

\[ \mu(\omega|r) = \begin{cases} 
  \frac{1}{(s_{k+1} - s_k)^2} & \text{if } r = -\frac{s_k+s_{k+1}}{2} \text{ and } \omega \in (s_k, s_{k+1}], k = 0, \ldots, (n-1) 
  
  1 & \text{if } r \notin \left\{ -\frac{s_0+s_1}{2}, \ldots, -\frac{s_k+s_{k+1}}{2}, \ldots, -\frac{s_{n-1}+s_n}{2} \right\} \text{ and } \omega = 1 
  
  0 & \text{otherwise} 
\] 

First, when the incentive compatibility requirement is met for each \( k \), this implies that each \( k \), \( M \) observing \( \omega \in (s_k, s_{k+1}] \) has no incentives to deviate to a report making \( C_j \) believe \( \omega \leq (s_{k-1}, s_k] \). Given this, this \( M \) will have no incentives to deviate to make \( C_j \) believe \( \omega \leq s_{k-1} \). Moreover, because \( x_M > 0 \), \( M \) has no incentives to deviate to a report making \( C_j \) believe \( \omega > s_{k+1} \). Therefore, for each \( k \), it is optimal for \( M \) to propose \( r = -\frac{s_k+s_{k+1}}{2} \).

Second, since only \( M \) observing \( \omega \in (s_k, s_{k+1}] \) will submit a report \( r = -\frac{s_k+s_{k+1}}{2} \) in equilibrium, by the prior belief and Bayes rule, \( C_j \) believes each \( \omega \in (s_k, s_{k+1}] \) with an equal probability, so \( \mu(\omega|r) = \frac{1}{(s_{k+1} - s_k)^2} \). This is true for \( k = 0, \ldots, (n-1) \). For non-equilibrium-path belief, i.e., observing \( r \notin \left\{ -\frac{s_0+s_1}{2}, \ldots, -\frac{s_k+s_{k+1}}{2}, \ldots, -\frac{s_{n-1}+s_n}{2} \right\} \), we assign the probability of 1 to \( \omega = 1 \).

Finally, given \( \mu(\omega|r) \), for each \( k \), when observing \( r = -\frac{s_k+s_{k+1}}{2} \), \( C_j \) believes each \( \omega \in (s_k, s_{k+1}] \) with an equal probability and therefore adopts \( -\frac{s_k+s_{k+1}}{2} \) as the final policy to maximize \( EU_j \). When observing \( r \notin \left\{ -\frac{s_0+s_1}{2}, \ldots, -\frac{s_k+s_{k+1}}{2}, \ldots, -\frac{s_{n-1}+s_n}{2} \right\} \), \( C_j \) believes that \( \omega = 1 \) and therefore adopts \(-1\) as the final policy.

By Definition 1, \( \{r^*(\omega), p^*(r), \mu\} \) specified above is an equilibrium. This implies that the updated information system can be sustained in equilibrium and that we only need to check the incentive compatibility requirements for \( C_j \)'s updated information system.

The proof of Proposition 1: With Lemma 3, we will only need to check the incentive compatibility requirements specified in Lemma 2 for the existence of an equilibrium.
B.1. PROOF

By Lemma 2, for \( N = 1, 2, \ldots \), separating equilibrium requires \( i = 0 \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, (z - 1) \). From Equation B.3, this means that \( x_M \leq \frac{1}{2^z} \), i.e., \( x_M \leq \frac{1}{2^{v+1}} \).

For partial pooling equilibria, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 imply that, for a given \( x_M \), partial pooling equilibrium where \( M \) sends the same report for \( \omega \in [0, \frac{2^N - 1}{2^N}] \) and a different report for \( \omega \in \left( \frac{2^N - 1}{2^N}, 1 \right] \) exists if other partially pooling equilibria exist. By Equation B.3, it follows that this partially pooling equilibrium exists if and only if \( i = z - 2 \), i.e., \( x_M \leq 1/4 \). In other words, only pooling equilibria exist if and only if \( x_M \geq 1/4 \).

Lemma 4. Denote \( S_p(N, x_M) \) as \( C_j \)'s updated information system under most efficient partial pooling equilibrium. (1) When \( N = 2 \), \( S_p(N, x_M) \) is \( \left\{ \frac{3}{4}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (1/8, 1/4] \).

(2) When \( N = 3 \), \( S_p(N, x_M) \) is \( \left\{ \frac{4}{8}, \frac{7}{8}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (2/32, 3/32] \), \( \left\{ \frac{5}{8}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (3/32, 4/32], \left\{ \frac{6}{8}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (4/32, 6/32] \), and \( \left\{ \frac{7}{8}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (6/32, 8/32] \).

(3) When \( N = 4 \), \( S_p(N, x_M) \) is \( \left\{ \frac{6}{16}, \frac{10}{16}, \frac{13}{16}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (2/64, 3/64], \left\{ \frac{7}{16}, \frac{12}{16}, \frac{15}{16}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (3/64, 4/64], \left\{ \frac{8}{16}, \frac{14}{16}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (4/64, 5/64], \left\{ \frac{10}{16}, \frac{15}{16}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (5/64, 6/64], \left\{ \frac{11}{16}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (6/64, 8/64], \left\{ \frac{12}{16}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (8/64, 10/64], \left\{ \frac{13}{16}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (10/64, 12/64], \left\{ \frac{14}{16}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (12/64, 14/64], \) and \( \left\{ \frac{15}{16}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (14/64, 16/64] \).

(4) When \( N = 5 \), \( S_p(N, x_M) \) is \( \left\{ \frac{8}{32}, \frac{15}{32}, \frac{21}{32}, \frac{26}{32}, \frac{29}{32}, \frac{31}{32}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (2/128, 3/128], \left\{ \frac{11}{32}, \frac{20}{32}, \frac{30}{32}, \frac{31}{32}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (3/128, 4/128], \left\{ \frac{13}{32}, \frac{23}{32}, \frac{29}{32}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (4/128, 5/128], \left\{ \frac{14}{32}, \frac{24}{32}, \frac{30}{32}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (5/128, 6/128], \left\{ \frac{16}{32}, \frac{27}{32}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (6/128, 7/128], \) and \( \left\{ \frac{17}{32}, \frac{28}{32}, 1 \right\} \) if \( x_M \in (7/128, 8/128] \).
\{\frac{17}{32}, \frac{28}{32}, 1\} \text{ if } x_M \in (7/128, 8/128], \{\frac{18}{32}, \frac{29}{32}, 1\} \text{ if } x_M \in (8/128, 9/128], \{\frac{19}{32}, \frac{30}{32}, 1\} \text{ if } x_M \in (9/128, 10/128], \{\frac{20}{32}, \frac{31}{32}, 1\} \text{ if } x_M \in (10/128, 11/128], \{\frac{21}{32}, 1\} \text{ if } x_M \in (11/128, 12/128], \text{ and } \{\frac{a+15}{32}, 1\} \text{ if } x_M \in (2a - 2)/128, 2a/128], a = 7, 8, \ldots, 16.

Proof: By Lemma 3, we only need to check the incentive compatibility requirements for the existence of an equilibrium. The proof for each \(N\) is very similar, so we will provide detailed proof only for the case of \(N = 3\). Under this case, \(z = 8\) and \(M\)'s information system is \(\{\frac{1}{8}, \frac{2}{8}, \ldots, 1\}\). As stated in Proposition 1, separating equilibrium exists when \(i = 0\). Based on Equation B.3, separating equilibrium exists \(x_M \in (0, 2/32]\). While the receiver's updated information system under separating equilibrium has \(z\) segments, each of which has \(1/z\) in length, it has less than \(z\) segments (each segment has at least \(1/z\) in length) under any partial pooling equilibria. With this in mind, we will solve for the most informative partial pooling equilibria for \(x_M \in [\frac{2}{32}, 1]\).

When \(x_M \in (2/32, 3/32]\), \(i = 1\) from Equation B.3. Lemma 2 implies that the length of a segment has to be longer at least by \(1/8\) than that of this segment's right-hand neighbor segment. This implies that \(S_p(N, x_M)\) is \(\{\frac{4}{8}, \frac{7}{8}, 1\}\).

Similarly, when \(x_M \in (3/32, 4/32]\), \(i = 2\). Lemma 2 implies that the length of a segment has to be longer at least by \(2/8\) than that of this segment’s right-hand neighbor segment. This implies that \(S_p(N, x_M)\) is \(\{\frac{5}{8}, 1\}\). When \(x_M \in (4/32, 5/32]\), \(i = 3\) and \(S_p(N, x_M)\) is \(\{\frac{6}{8}, 1\}\). This process is repeated until \(x_M \in (7/32, 8/32]\) \(i = 6\). When \(x_M \in (8/32, 9/32]\) \(i = 7\), even two-segment partial pooling equilibrium cannot exist, as shown in Proposition 1.

Lemma 5. Suppose that \(C\)'s updated information system under an equilibrium is \(\{s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n\}\), where \(s_n = 1\). \(C_j\)'s equilibrium expected utility,
denoted as $E_{U_j}$, is $-\frac{1}{12} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (s_i - s_{i-1})^3 + \epsilon$, where $s_0 = 0$.

Proof:

$$E_{U_j} = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} \int_{s_{i-1}}^{s_i} (\omega - \frac{s_{i-1} + s_i}{2})^2 d\omega + \epsilon$$

$$= -\sum_{i=1}^{n} \int_{s_{i-1}}^{s_i} \frac{(s_i - s_{i-1})}{2} t^2 dt + \epsilon$$

$$= -\frac{1}{3} \sum_{i=1}^{n} 2 \left( \frac{s_{i-1} - s_i}{2} \right)^3 + \epsilon$$

$$= -\frac{1}{12} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (s_{i-1} - s_i)^3 + \epsilon$$

The proof of Proposition 2: Based on Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we can calculate $E_{U_j}$ for each $N$. For instance, when $N = 3$, $E_{U_j}$ is $-\frac{8}{6144} + \epsilon$ for $X_M \in (0, 2/32]$, $-\frac{1+3^3+4^3}{6144} + \epsilon$ for $X_M \in (2/32, 3/32]$, $-\frac{3^3+5^3}{6144} + \epsilon$ for $X_M \in (3/32, 4/32]$, $-\frac{2^3+6^3}{6144} + \epsilon$ for $X_M \in (4/32, 6/32]$, $-\frac{13+7^3}{6144} + \epsilon$ for $X_M \in (6/32, 8/32]$, and $-\frac{8^3}{6144} + \epsilon$ for $X_M > 8/32$. Similarly, we can calculate $E_{U_j}$ for other $N$s. It is clear that for each $N$, $N = 1, \ldots, 5$, $E_{U_j}$ is decreasing with larger $x_M$.

The proof of Proposition 3: The proof is similar to that for the last proposition. Based on Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, for each $N$, $N = 1, \ldots, 5$, we first calculate $E_{U_j}$, which is a function of $x_M$, as seen in the proof of the last proposition. For $X_M \in (0/64, 1/64]$, $E_{U_j}$ is increasing in $N$.\footnote{If we allow for $N > 5$, $E_{U_j}$ will increase and then decrease with increasing $N$, because larger $N$ requires smaller $X_M$ for separating equilibrium.} For $X_M \in (1/64, 2/64]$, larger $N$ results in larger $E_{U_j}$ for $N \leq N^*(x_M) = 4$ and decreases afterward, where $N^*(x_M)$ denotes the peak of $E_{U_j}$ for this range of $x_M$. For $X_M \in (2/64, 4/64]$, larger $N$ results in larger $E_{U_j}$ for $N \leq N^*(x_M) = 3$ and decreases afterward. For $X_M \in (4/64, 8/64]$, larger
$N$ results in larger $EU_j$ for $N \leq N^*(x_M) = 2$ and decreases afterward. For $X_M \in (8/64, 16/64]$, larger $N$ results in larger $EU_j$ for $N \leq N^*(x_M) = 1$ and decreases afterward. $EU_j$ remains constant for $X_M > 1/4$.

B.2 Model specifications and convergence tests

Most models are run with three separate chains initiated with distinct staring values. After a short adaptive phase, each chain is run for 20,000 iterations. We discard the first half of each chain, basing our inferences on the last 10,000 iterations. This leaves us with 30,000 simulated data points for each model. There are some exceptions, Model 3, the mixture model is run for 55,000 iterations, discarding the first 5,000. This is in order to ensure that the mixture proportions $\pi_i$ and $\mu_i$ converges. Model 6, the individual level controls model is run for 15,000 iterations on three chains in order for some of the control variables, notable age$^2$ to converge. A summary of the convergence tests is provided in Table B.1. These tests indicate no non-convergence problems (Jackman, 2009; Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin, 2004).
Table B.1: Summary of convergence statistics tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Gelman - Rubin</th>
<th>Heidelberger - Welch</th>
<th>Geweke</th>
<th>MCMC sample</th>
<th>No. Chains</th>
</tr>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>30000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 6</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>45000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Gelman - Rubin test of between vs. within chain variance. The test is reported to pass if the ratio is less than 1.1 for all the substantive parameters in the model. Heidelberger - Welch test whether the samples are drawn from a stationary distribution by comparing the estimate of the mean by successively comparing the mean from each chain with the mean after discarding the first 10 percent, then the first 20, and so on until the first half of the chain is discarded. It is reported as a pass if all substantive parameters pass all tests for difference in means at the .05 level. The Geweke test also test convergence. It does so by testing whether the mean of the first 10 percent of each chain is equal to the last 50 percent. If the absolute value of all z-scores for all chains are less than 1.96, it is considered It is reported as a pass if all substantive parameters pass.
Appendix C

Appendix to chapter 4

C.1 Theorizing party choice

The following analysis describes the interactions between a party selectorate and their members of Parliament. It is based on expectations derived from a two-period version of Holmström’s (1999) canonical model (also related to a political context by Gehlbach (2013)) on career considerations and manager hiring. The limited number of periods implies that voters disregard effort, while paying close attention to ability.

When parties nominated their candidates for the first time, they had already acquired beliefs about how they would perform in office. Prior to the next election, parties update their belief in light of how a candidate has performed in office. More specifically, it uses the positions garnered by the MEP to determine his ability to obtain influence.
Game sequence, types and efforts

Consider two players, the party \((P)\) and an incumbent MEP \((M)\). They play a game in two periods where Nature \((N)\) moves twice.

1. The game starts with Nature selecting the quality of the MEP: \(\theta_1, \theta_2, \ldots, \theta_j\).

   Each type is drawn from a continuous variable which is normally distributed: \(\theta_j \sim N(m, \sigma_{\theta_j}^2)\). While the players know the shape of the distribution, neither observes the particular quality of the MEP in office. We can think of the type as a bundle of qualities which define the MEP’s ability to gain influence. While the MEP might know his own skills, he doesn’t know exactly how they translate in the EP.

22. The incumbent MEP picks his effort level, \(e_1\), unobserved by the party.

   Effort is here understood as any action an MEP can freely undertake which increases his chances of garnering positions.

22. Nature decides the outcome, \(\pi_1\), of the MEP’s term in office.

   The parliamentary group allocates positions in Parliament as a function of the MEP type and his efforts: \(\pi_1 = \theta_1 + e_1 + \epsilon_1\). In addition there is a random element which introduces uncertainty in the mapping from type and effort to the actual outcome: \(\epsilon_1 \sim N(0, \sigma_{\epsilon_1}^2)\). In this game, the uncertainty is exogenously given by the legislative procedure. The uncertainty is reduced when allocations are more selective, as they convey more information about MEP type than – say – a proportional allocation according to party size.

22. The Party observes the outcome, and decides whether to renominate the incumbent or pick a freshman who is also randomly drawn from a similar distribution. Payoffs are distributed.
At the end of the first period, the party receives $\pi_1$. If the MEP is renominated, he gets the payoff $B - c(e_1)$, and 0 otherwise. $B$ denotes the value the MEP puts on being renominated, while $c(e_1)$ denotes the cost of the effort.

The game then starts a second period similar to the first, except that this time, the MEP moves last.

22. Nature chooses the type ($\theta_2$): Incumbent members keep their type. For new members, the type is drawn at random from the same distribution as before.

23. The elected MEP picks his effort level, $e_2$.

24. Nature decides the outcome, $\pi_2$. Payoffs are distributed.

At the end of the game, the MEP who was reelected receives $B - c(e_1) - c(e_2)$, while the party receives $\pi_1 + \pi_2$.

**Equilibrium**

The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Players proceed by backward induction and sequentially choose weakly dominant strategies, given their knowledge of the other players’ options.

In his last period, the MEP cannot increase his payoff by exerting effort. He thus provides none. Hence, the political outcome $\pi_2$ from the second period only depends on the MEP’s type. Knowing this, a forward-looking party will discount the effort provided during the first period in order to deduce his type.

This means that the incumbent MEP has to make believe that his quality is higher than that of the average candidate:

$$\tilde{\theta} \leq \theta_1 \quad \text{(C.1)}$$
The party doesn’t know the MEP’s level of effort, nor his type, so it bases its choice on the outcome and the effort level which it can reasonably expect from any rational incumbent seeking reelection. In order to find the equilibrium we must look for a pair of $e_1$ and $\pi$ which maximizes the MEP’s chances of reelection:

$$\max_{e_1} (Pr(\pi_1 \geq \pi|e_1)B - c(e_1))$$ (C.2)

**The party’s beliefs**

To infer a signal, the party uses the outcome, knowing that it is a function of the MEP’s quality and effort as well as a stochastic element.

$$\pi_1 = \theta j_1 + e_1 + \epsilon_1 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\pi_1 - e_1 = \theta j_1 + \epsilon_1$$ (C.3)

This implies that the signal has an expected value of $\theta j$, but is surrounded by some uncertainty: $N(\pi_1 - e^*, \sigma^2)$. The party’s posterior belief depends on both the precision of the signal and its prior belief about the MEP: $N(m, \sigma^2)$. In this case, the party’s belief is informed by the distribution from which the MEP was first drawn. Upon receiving the signal, the party does a Bayesian updating to form new expectations. (This is detailed in the next subsection.) In this case, both the prior and the signal are normally distributed, and thus conjugate. This yields a posterior expectation about the MEP’s type which is a weighted sum of the prior belief and the signal.

$$\bar{m} = \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \sigma^2} m + \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \sigma^2} (\pi_1 - e_1)$$ (C.4)

This implies that the party’s posterior belief depends on the relative uncertainty about the MEP’s type and the group’s choice. Figure C.1 illustrates how either signal or the prior belief influences posterior beliefs when
uncertainty increases. The other is held constant with a standard normal distribution. The figure shows how the effect of the signal increases when the prior uncertainty increases, or when the uncertainty of the signal itself decreases. This article aims at testing implications derived from this insight.

![Graph showing the relationship between posterior belief, uncertainty, weight of signal, and weight of prior.](image)

Figure C.1: The party’s posterior belief is a function of his prior uncertainty and the precision of new information.

The party then picks her best voting rule in equilibrium: It prefers the incumbent to a freshman as long as his expected quality, \( \bar{m} \), is higher than the average candidate running against him, \( m \).

\[
\bar{m} \geq m
\]  

(C.5)

Plotting the party’s posterior belief from equation C.4 into the voting rule, we see that the MEP’s outcome must be at least as good as what an average MEP would obtain by optimizing his effort (detailed in the next subsection). This defines the party’s indifference point.

\[
\pi_1 \geq m + \epsilon_1^* \equiv \bar{\pi}
\]  

(C.6)
The MEP’s beliefs

The MEP doesn’t know the outcome when he picks his effort level. Nor does he know his type, so he cannot adjust his level of effort to the average outcome (Persson and Tabellini, 2013, p. 83-84). This also means that—absent any information about his own quality—he assumes that his type is equivalent to the expected value of the prior distribution, \( m \) (i.e., any other MEP). The uncertainty surrounding his belief comes both from the uncertainty he has about the future outcome as well as the initial uncertainty about his type: \( \sigma^2 = \sigma_0^2 + \sigma_e^2 \). The incumbent thus knows his probability of being renominated to a safe seat with some uncertainty:

\[
Pr(\text{Renominated}|e_1) = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\bar{\pi} - e_1 - m}{\sigma}\right) \quad (C.7)
\]

He will therefore seek to optimize his final payoff by by solving:

\[
\max_{e_1} \left(1 - \Phi\left(\frac{\bar{\pi} - e_1 - m}{\sigma}\right)\right) B - c(e_1) \quad (C.8)
\]

Differentiating with respect to \( e_1 \) yields the first order condition. Rearranging, this expresses the effect of the MEP’s cost of effort as a function of his value of renomination as well as the informational environment:

\[
\phi\left(\frac{\bar{\pi} - e_1^* - m}{\sigma}\right) \frac{B}{\sigma} = c'(e_1^*) \quad (C.9)
\]

Since the prior expectation about MEP type ought to be equal to the average MEP output excepted his maximized effort, the parameter value of the PDF is set to zero.

\[
\phi(0) \frac{B}{\sigma} = c'(e_1^*) \quad (C.10)
\]

\[1\text{It is possible to think of this as if the MEP picks his level of effort before Nature makes the first choice.}\]
C.2 PROOFS

The MEP’s equilibrium effort is increasing in the value of reelection \( B \) and decreasing in the uncertainty \( \sigma \) surrounding both his type and the realization of the outcome.

C.2 Proofs

Conjugate priors and likelihood

Bayes law requires a prior belief and a likelihood derived from data to obtain a posterior probability: \( \text{Posterior} \propto \text{Prior} \times \text{Likelihood} \)

- Prior: \( \theta \sim N(m, \sigma^2_\theta) \)
- Likelihood/signal: \( s \sim N(\pi - e, \sigma^2_e) \)
- Posterior: \( N(\bar{m}, \sigma^2) \)

The party’s expected belief about the MEP after receiving the signal is the same as the posterior mean prediction:

\[
\bar{m} = \frac{m}{\sigma^2_\theta} + \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i}{\sigma^2_e} \frac{1}{\sigma^2_\theta + \frac{n}{\sigma^2_e}}
\]  
\( (C.11) \)
Multiplying two distributions, the formula reduces to: \( n = 1 \) and \( \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i = \pi - \epsilon \).

\[
\tilde{m} = \frac{m}{\sigma_\theta} + \frac{\pi - \epsilon}{\sigma_\epsilon}^2 \\
\tilde{m} = \left( \frac{m}{\sigma_\theta} + \frac{\pi - \epsilon}{\sigma_\epsilon}^2 \right) \frac{\sigma_\theta^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} \\
\tilde{m} = \frac{m}{\sigma_\theta} + \frac{\pi - \epsilon}{\sigma_\epsilon} \\
\tilde{m} = \frac{m}{\sigma_\theta} + \frac{\pi - \epsilon}{\sigma_\epsilon} \frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} \\
\tilde{m} = m \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} + (\pi - \epsilon) \frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2}
\]

The party’s uncertainty about the MEP’s type is the same as the posterior variance parameter:

\[
\sigma^2 = \left( \frac{1}{\sigma_\theta^2} + \frac{n}{\sigma_\epsilon^2} \right)^{-1} \\
\sigma^2 = \left( \frac{1}{\sigma_\theta^2} + \frac{1}{\sigma_\epsilon^2} \right)^{-1} \\
\sigma^2 = \left( \frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} + \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} \right)^{-1} \\
\sigma^2 = \frac{\sigma_\theta^2 \sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2}
\]

The voting rule

The weighted average of the party’s updating is symmetric, so that the two weights may be expressed in terms of each other: \( \lambda = \frac{\sigma_\theta^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} \) and \( 1 - \lambda = \frac{\sigma_\epsilon^2}{\sigma_\theta^2 + \sigma_\epsilon^2} \).
\[ \bar{m} \geq m \iff \lambda(\pi_1 - e_1^*) + (1 - \lambda)m \geq m \iff \lambda\pi_1 - \lambda e^* - 1 + m - \lambda m \geq m \iff \]

\[ \begin{align*}
\lambda\pi_1 &\geq \lambda e^* - 1 + \lambda m \\
\pi_1 &\geq e_1^* + m \equiv \bar{\pi}.
\end{align*} \]
C.3 Details on the data sample

On the selection of countries  Daubler and Hix (2013) have studied how list systems used in European Parliament elections (2004 and 2009) function in practice. Austria and Bulgaria have formally flexible list systems, meaning that voters may give preference votes. However, the lists are only reordered if one or several candidates reach a certain (relative) number of preference votes. When the threshold is set high, the system will tend towards a closed-list ballot. The number of candidates on a list further influences negatively the probability of a reordering. Few candidates passed the hurdle, causing the authors to reclassify Austria and Bulgaria as *de facto* closed list systems.

Missing observations  There are few missing values in the data. Missing values on committee attendance (3 percent) are imputed using information from plenary attendance and EP leadership status (a simple linear regression). All other missing observations are treated as missing at random. They are given prior distributions with mean and deviation informed by the observed data.

The most substantial imputation is done in the lagged dependent variable (7 percent). Most of these unobserved values concern the 2009 election (reelection of the 6th Parliament). The lagged dependent variable requires information on party seat share following the 1999 election as well as list placement in the 2004 election. This information does not exist for new member states which joined the EU in the 2004/2007 EU enlargement. Where this information was available and meaningful (i.e. the parties were represented prior to the first EP elections), I used the number of appointed observers to the EP. These members were appointed from the national parliament on the basis of their representation at home.

A similar problem exists for France which switched from a national circumscription in the late 1990-ies to several subnational units. A listwise
exclusion would remove many of the newer member states from the analysis, which would lessen the generalizability of the present results. In these cases, I therefore treat the information as missing at random by giving the variable a prior binomial distribution with a probability informed by the data.
## Table C.1: Member states using closed list PR for the subsequent election (N=1134).

Number of observations included in the analysis are also reported. The Conservative party in the United Kingdom joined the ECR group in the 7th legislature, and is thus excluded from the analysis.

<table>
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<th>Reelected</th>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>99</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C.4 Details on the main model

Random intercepts and convergence statistics are only reported for model 1.

Random intercepts

It is evident from figure C.2 that there is no baseline time trend in the allocation of safe seats. There is also little cross-national variation in the propensity to reselect MEPs, with the exception of Greece and Hungary (which tend to reselect to a lesser extent) and Spain (which tends to reselect more often than the general mean). We also see that MEPs seating in the two largest EP groups (the socialists and the conservatives) tend to be reselected more often. This may be because these groups include large national parties with more safe seats to allocate.
Figure C.2: Random intercepts (median values surrounded by 95% HDI) from model 1. The number of observations within each group are reported in parantheses.
C.4. DETAILS ON THE MAIN MODEL

Convergence statistics

The analysis is done in a Bayesian framework using MCMC methods. Regression coefficients, $\beta_i$, $\gamma_i$ and $\delta_i$, are given a multivariate normal prior with a of mean zero and precision parameter 10. All effects are therefore vaguely assumed to be independent, although allowing variables to control for each other. Detailed BUGs code is available with the online reproduction material. The model is run with 50,000 iterations. I use a 2000-iterations burn-in, keeping every $10^{th}$ iteration. The two chains show no signs of non-convergence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Point est.</th>
<th>Upper C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reports</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports2</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLeadership</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NationalPolitician</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarelyElected</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambition</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>1.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SafeSeatLastElection</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>1.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>1.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C.2: Equation 1: Gelman and Rubin’s scale reduction factors
Figure C.3: Equation 1: traceplots and density plots for main parameters.
Figure C.4: Equation 1: Gelman-Rubin diagnostics.

Figure C.5: Equation 1: Autocorrelation (chain 1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Chain 1</th>
<th>Chain 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reports</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports2</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLeadership</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NationalPolitician</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>-0.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-1.035</td>
<td>1.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BarelyElected</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
<td>-0.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambition</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
<td>-1.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SafeSeatLastElection</td>
<td>-0.267</td>
<td>-0.573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C.3: Equation 1: Geweke’s z-scores for both chains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Point est.</th>
<th>Upper C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>1.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Size</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPs To National Politics</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Attendance</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C.4: Equation 2: Gelman and Rubin’s scale reduction factors
Figure C.6: Equation 2: traceplots and density plots for main parameters.
Figure C.7: Equation 2: Gelman-Rubin diagnostics.

Figure C.8: Equation 2: Autocorrelation (chain 1).
### C.4. DETAILS ON THE MAIN MODEL

#### Table C.5: Equation 2: Geweke’s z-scores for both chains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chain 1</th>
<th>Chain 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.586</td>
<td>0.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.943</td>
<td>-0.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Size</td>
<td>-0.416</td>
<td>-1.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEPs To National Politics</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td>-1.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Attendance</td>
<td>-0.981</td>
<td>-1.182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table C.6: Equation 3: Gelman and Rubin’s scale reduction factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Point est.</th>
<th>Upper C.I.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>1.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Seat</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>1.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Term Served</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>1.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table C.7: Equation 3: Geweke’s z-scores for both chains.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chain 1</th>
<th>Chain 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.711</td>
<td>-1.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Seat</td>
<td>1.472</td>
<td>-1.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Term Served</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>1.169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C.5: Equation 2: Geweke’s z-scores for both chains.

Table C.6: Equation 3: Gelman and Rubin’s scale reduction factors

Table C.7: Equation 3: Geweke’s z-scores for both chains.
Figure C.9: Equation 3: traceplots and density plots for main parameters.
C.4. DETAILS ON THE MAIN MODEL

Figure C.10: Equation 3: Gelman-Rubin diagnostics.

Figure C.11: Equation 3: Autocorrelation (chain 1).
The BUGs code for the model

model{

for(i in 1:N){

SafeSeat[i]~dbern(p[i])

logit(p[i])<-mu.SafeSeat[i]

mu.SafeSeat[i]<-a
+a.group[EPGroup[i]]
+a.nat[National[i]]
+a.ep[EP[i]]
+a.list[1]*Reports[i]
+a.list[2]*Reports[i]*Reports[i]
+a.list[3]*EPLeader[i]
+a.list[4]*NatPol[i]
+a.list[5]*Inc[i]
+a.list[6]*Uncert[i]
+a.list[7]*Future[i]
C.4. DETAILS ON THE MAIN MODEL

+a.list[8]*SS_lag[i]

############################

##Impute missing variables##

############################

##Predictors of missing values on Future##

FutureNA[i] ~ dbern(p.fut.na[i])

logit(p.fut.na[i])<-mu.fut.na[i]

mu.fut.na[i]<-betaNA[1]
+betaNA[2]*SafeSeat[i]
+betaNA[3]*Time[i]

##Impute missing values on Future##

Future[i] ~ dbern(p.fut[i])

logit(p.fut[i])<-mu.fut[i]
mu.fut[i]<-
beta[1]
+beta[2]*Age[i]
+beta[3]*Seats[i]
+beta[4]*Career[i]
+beta[5]*AttCom[i]

##Impute missing values on committee attendance##

AttCom[i]~dnorm(mu.att[i], tau.att)

mu.att[i]<-beta.att[1]
+beta.att[2]*Attend[i]
+beta.att[3]*NoCom[i]

##Priors on missing values; other variables##

#Binary variables#

NatPol[i]~dbin(NatPol.m, 1)
C.4. DETAILS ON THE MAIN MODEL

EPLead\[i\]~dbin(EPLead.m, 1)
Inc\[i\]~dbin(Inc.m, 1)
Uncert\[i\]~dbin(Uncert.m, 1)
Career\[i\]~dbin(Career.m, 1)

#Count variables#
Time\[i\]~dnorm(Time.m, Time.sd)
Seats\[i\]~dnorm(Seats.m, Seats.sd)
Attend\[i\]~dnorm(Attend.m, Attendsd)
Age\[i\]~dnorm(Age.m, Age.sd)
SS\_lag\[i\]~dbin(Lag.m, 1)

}

##Set general mean##

a.star<-a+mean(a.group[])+
mean(a.ep[])+
mean(a.nat[])


### Priors on regression coefficients:

#### Prior for general mean

\( a \sim \text{dnorm}(a.\mu, a.\tau) \)
\( a.\mu \sim \text{dnorm}(0, 1) \)
\( a.\tau \sim \text{dgamma}(0.001, 0.001) \)

#### Priors for national intercepts

\( \text{for}(j \text{ in } 1: N.\text{nat}) \{ \)
\( a.\text{nat}[j] \sim \text{dnorm}(\mu.\text{nat}, \tau.\text{nat}) \)
\( \} \)
\( \mu.\text{nat} \sim \text{dnorm}(0, 1) \)
\( \tau.\text{nat} \sim \text{dgamma}(0.001, 0.001) \)
for(j in 1:N.nat){
a.nat.star[j] <- a.nat[j] - mean(a.nat[])
}

### Priors for EP intercepts ###
for(j in 1:N.ep){
a.ep[j] ~ dnorm(mu.ep, tau.ep)
}
mu.ep ~ dnorm(0, 1)
tau.ep ~ dgamma(0.001, 0.001)

for(j in 1:N.ep){
a.ep.star[j] <- a.ep[j] - mean(a.ep[])
}

### Priors for group intercepts ###
for(j in 1:N.group){

a.group[j] ~ dnorm(mu.group, tau.gr)
}

mu.group ~ dnorm(0, 1)

tau.gr ~ dgamma(0.001, 0.001)

for(j in 1:N.group){
a.group.star[j] <- a.group[j] - mean(a.group[])
}

a.list[1:N.fixef] ~ dmnorm(a0[], A[,])

## Priors on fixed effects ##

beta[1:N.beta] ~ dmnorm(b0[], B[,])

betaNA[1:N.betaNA] ~ dmnorm(c0[], C[,])

beta.att[1:N.b.att] ~ dmnorm(d0[], D[,])

tau.att ~ dgamma(0.001, 0.001)
}
C.5 Alternative models

I have fitted a number of alternative models to explore the validity of the dependent variable, as well as the measure of MEPs’ ambition.

Table C.8 displays the results from the interaction included in the main models so that the reader may evaluate the size and the precision of the difference in effect of reports between groups.

Table C.11 displays the effect of performance and ambition on the probability of being renominated, renominated to a safe seat and reelected, respectively.

Table C.9 displays the effect of excluding the control for ambition: The first column displays the model fit reported in the article. The second column displays the effect of excluding the control. From the results, we see that the inclusion of ambition mainly alters the effect of incumbency. This is logical, given that MEPs who have stayed in Parliament several terms are more likely to retire. Columns 3 and 4 displays the same model fit run only on respondents to the EPRG survey. While the direction of effects remains consistent with the main model, we see that the low number of observations makes it difficult to effectively test the effect of performance on renomination.

Table C.10 displays the results using other ways of modelling ambition. The first column displays the model fit reported in the article. The second column displays effects on safe seat allocation only among MEPs who figured on the electoral list ("renominated"). This is another way of including only MEPs who are likely to wish reelection. The third column displays a kitchen-sink model in which all covariates used to measure ambition are directly included into the main model. The fourth column displays the results from a model in which unobserved values on ambition are drawn from a binomial distribution with an empirically informed probability ($p = 0.27$). This is the Bayesian version of "replacement by mean". Results in all models are
similar.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: “Safe seat”</th>
<th>H1</th>
<th>H2</th>
<th>H3 (Nat. Pol.)</th>
<th>H3 (Incumbent)</th>
<th>H3 (Barely elected)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1: Reports</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>[0.06 , 0.184]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports2</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>[-0.005 , -0.001]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Leadership</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>[0.036 , 0.944]</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>[0.047 , 0.944]</td>
<td>0.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>[0.062 , 0.968]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: Low-Impact Reports</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Impact Reports2</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>[-0.004 , 0.002]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Impact Reports</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Impact Reports2</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>[-0.028 , -0.007]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3: Reports (trunc. 10)</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports*Group with Prior Uncertainty</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Nat. Pol/Incumbent/Barely elected)</td>
<td>[-0.014 , 0.15]</td>
<td>[-0.22 , -0.008]</td>
<td>[-0.003 , 0.285]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Politician</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.226</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.448 , 0.205]</td>
<td>[-0.437 , 0.211]</td>
<td>[-0.556 , 0.102]</td>
<td>[-0.43 , 0.222]</td>
<td>[-0.444 , 0.205]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.737</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.757</td>
<td>-0.432</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.046 , -0.43]</td>
<td>[-1.086 , -0.464]</td>
<td>[-1.066 , -0.446]</td>
<td>[-0.851 , -0.022]</td>
<td>[-1.048 , -0.435]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barely elected</td>
<td>1.207</td>
<td>1.302</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>1.279</td>
<td>0.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.494 , 1.951]</td>
<td>[0.574 , 2.086]</td>
<td>[0.542 , 2.024]</td>
<td>[0.561 , 2.075]</td>
<td>[0.135 , 1.805]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambition</td>
<td>1.171</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.174</td>
<td>1.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.637 , 1.729]</td>
<td>[0.688 , 1.774]</td>
<td>[0.582 , 1.733]</td>
<td>[0.624 , 1.721]</td>
<td>[0.61 , 1.694]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Seat Last Election</td>
<td>1.856</td>
<td>1.889</td>
<td>1.898</td>
<td>1.877</td>
<td>1.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.195 , 2.602]</td>
<td>[1.266 , 2.728]</td>
<td>[1.238 , 2.657]</td>
<td>[1.229 , 2.677]</td>
<td>[1.194 , 2.659]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>1134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C.8: Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems. Median effects from binary logit model. 95 percent HDI reported in parantheses.
### Table C.9: Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems: Controlling for MEP ambition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEP Ambition</th>
<th>MEP Ambition not incl.</th>
<th>MEP Ambition list wise excl.</th>
<th>MEP Ambition</th>
<th>MEP Ambition not incl.</th>
<th>MEP Ambition list wise excl.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.437</td>
<td>-1.998</td>
<td>-2.168</td>
<td>-1.824</td>
<td>-2.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.060, 0.184]</td>
<td>[0.060, 0.181]</td>
<td>[-0.088, 0.133]</td>
<td>[-0.095, 0.125]</td>
<td>[-0.102, 0.125]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barely Elected</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
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<th>MEP Ambition list wise excl.</th>
<th>MEP Ambition</th>
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<td>266</td>
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<td>MEP Ambition list wise excl.</td>
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### C.5. ALTERNATIVE MODELS

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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>MEPs to National Politics</td>
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<td>Years of Term Served</td>
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<td>Safe Seat Last Election</td>
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<td>1134</td>
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Table C.10: Allocation of safe seats in closed-list systems: Different ways of controlling for MEP ambition.
Table C.11: Alternative operationalizations of candidate selection in closed-list systems.

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<th>N1134</th>
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<td>0.318</td>
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<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.009</td>
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<td>Incumbent</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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<td>0.093</td>
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<td>0.032</td>
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<td>Reports</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reports</td>
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<td>Interpell</td>
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<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.044</td>
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APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4

APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4

APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Appendix D

Appendix to chapter 5
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Party</th>
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<th>Quota Prop.</th>
<th>Female MEPs</th>
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<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs 1985</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative 1993</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>Österreichische Volkspartei 1995</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Parti Socialiste 1990</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1986</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Die Linke 2004</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland 1988</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands 2002</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Panellinio Sosialistikó Kinima 1988</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Magyar Szocialista Párt 20%</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Partido Socialista 1988</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Partidul Democrat 2004</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya 1982</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Obrero Español 1988</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Izquierda Unida 1989</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Bloque Nacionalista Galego 2002</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 2004</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Partido Socialista 1988</td>
<td>33%</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
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<td>Liberal Party</td>
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<td>0.44</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Liberal Democrats Party</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table D.1: List of party quotas.
D.1 Variable description

The data set includes 1,131 observations of MEPs from 11 member states.

**Performance:** Count. Indicates the number of high-impact reports for which an MEP has acted as rapporteur. The impact is defined as all legislation falling under the codecision and budget procedures. The list is collected from the EP website. (ImportantReports)

**Value of Office:** Binary. Indicates if an MEP would like to stay in Parliament the next 10 years. The variable is drawn from the EPRG Survey (Farrell et al., 2011). The question asked in the 2000 and 2006 waves read as follows: “Where would you most like to be 10 years from now?”. The 2010 wave refrased the question: “What would you like to be doing 10 years from now?” (FutureInEP)

**Reselection:** Binary. A seat is defined as “safe” when the list placement of the candidate is above the number of seats the party won in the same circumscription following the previous election. (SafeSeat)

**Effort (Attendance in Committee):** Proportion. The untransformed variable indicates the number of committee meetings an MEP has attended during the term, expressed as a proportion of the most assiduous member of that committee (capped at 400). (AttendanceCommittee.prop)

Continuous. The variable used in the analysis is transformed \( \log\left(\frac{x}{1-x}\right) \) to look more like normal distribution: The normalization implies that the measure is not sensitive to the fact that the number of committee meetings varies across committees and over time. (Attendance)

**Effort (Questions):** Count. Indicates the number of parliamentary questions (written or oral) asked by the MEP during the term (capped at 50).
The list is collected from the EP website. (Questions)

**Female:** Binary. Indicates whether an MEP is female. (Female)

**All Quotas:** Binary. Indicates all MEPs who have been elected under either a party-level or a statutory quota system. Information is collected from the IDEA database (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the University of Stockholm, 2016) (AllQuota)

**Party Quota:** Binary. It indicates MEPs who were elected from parties which applied party-level gender quotas. Information is collected from the IDEA database (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the University of Stockholm, 2016). The database only lists party quotas which exceed the legislated quotas. For France, Portugal and Spain I have additionally relied on information from case studies (Baum and Espírito-Santo, 2012; Verge, 2012). A list of the parties, their nationality, the number of observations in the sample and the proportion of women among the observed MEPs is displayed in table D.1. (PartyQuota)

**Legislated Quota:** Binary. Includes the member states in which legally binding gender quotas applied for the election of the legislature. In the sample this includes France (enacted in 2000, applied for the 2004 and 2009 elections), Spain and Portugal (enacted in 2007 and 2006 respectively, applied for the 2009 election). Information about the quota system was drawn from the database of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the University of Stockholm (2016). (StatutoryQuota)

**Age:** Continuous. The age (expressed in years) of a member of Parliament as of June the year of his/her election. (Age)
D.1. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION

**Education:** Ordinal. Ranges from 1 to 4. Drawn from Daniel (2013) and completed with information from MEPs’ curriculum on the EP website. (Education)

**National MP or Minister:** Binary. Has the MEP previously served as a minister of government or member of Parliament at the national level? Information from MEPs curriculum on the EP website. (NationalPolitics)

**Incumbent:** Binary. Indicates whether an MEP has previously been re-elected at least once. (Incumbent)

**Years of Term:** Continuous. Expresses the number of years of the current term the MEP has been registered as a member of Parliament. Most members stay for a full term (5 years). (TimeInEP Term)

**Complexity of Report:** Continuous. Expresses the average number of recitals in the report delivered by the MEP during the term. Information is collected from the EP website. In the analyses the variable is logtransformed ($\log(x + 1)$). (Complexity.N.recitals and Complexity.N.recitals.log)

**Elected on a Safe Seat:** Binary. Indicates whether an MEP entered office in the current term on a safe seat. In the case of new member states, the variable is calculated from the number of observers to the EP from the party. (SafeSeatLastElection)

**Party Size:** Proportion. Proportion of the seats held by the national party. (PartySeats.prop)

**In Favor of EU Integration:** Ordinal. Ranges from 1 to 7 where higher values indicate more favorable. The variable is drawn from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker, Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly, Koedam, Kostelka, Marks,
Polk, Rovny, Schumacher, Steenbergen, Vachudova, and Zilovic, 2015). It expresses the “overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration”. (position)

**MEP:** Categorical. An anonymous personal identifier for each MEP. (ID)

**Nationality:** Categorical. Indicates an MEPs’ nationality. (Nationality)

**Transnational Group:** Categorical. Indicates an MEPs’ transnational group affiliation. (EPGroup)


**Party:** Categorical. The Chapel Hill ID number indicating an MEP’s national party affiliation. (ChapelHillID)
Table D.2: Descriptive statistic

<table>
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<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td>0.193</td>
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<td>0.441</td>
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<td>1093</td>
<td>0.808</td>
<td>19.176</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>632.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(Complexity of Report+1)</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>6.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected on a Safe Seat</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>0.682</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D.2 Model descriptions

All models are Bayesian, estimated via the MCMC algorithm. Each model is run with 60,000 iterations with 5,000 iterations burn-in, keeping every 10th iteration, and shows no signs of non-convergence. Priors on the $\beta$-coefficients are non-informative multivariate normal ($\beta \sim N(0, 10)$). Varying intercepts are centered around a grand mean, and are fitted with slightly stricter priors ($\alpha \sim N(0, 1)$).

The model testing $H_0$: Fitted as a binomial model in which the dependent variable is binary, indicating whether a newly elected MEP intends on staying in Parliament at least 10 more years. The model is run among the respondents to the EPRG survey (Farrell et al., 2011), and therefore includes 305 observations. The model includes varying intercepts for the legislative term, the EP group, and nationality.

Given the low number of respondents, the different categories of women are estimated as dummies depending on whether a quota applied rather than through interaction terms. The model furthermore controls for incumbency, as MEPs who have already been reelected once are more likely to retire, and whether (s)he entered on a safe seat.
\[ \text{Aims at Lengthy Career}_i \sim \text{Binomial}(p_i) \]

\[
\log(p_i) = \alpha + \alpha_{EP\text{Group},i} + \alpha_{EP,i} + \alpha_{\text{Nationality},i} + \beta_1 \times \text{Female Outside of Quota System}_i + \beta_2 \times \text{Female from Statutory Quota}_i + \beta_3 \times \text{Female from Party Quota}_i + \beta_4 \times \text{Incumbent}_i + \beta_5 \times \text{Elected on a Safe Seat}_i
\]

The model testing $H_{9b}$: Fitted as multilevel Poisson model in which the dependent variable is the count number of high-impact reports drafted by an MEP during term.

The number of reports varies over time and across political groups. The model therefore includes varying intercepts for the legislative term ($EP$) and the transnational political group to which MEPs belong ($EP\text{Group}$) as well as national characteristics ($\text{Nationality}$) and national party affiliation ($\text{Party}$).

The model furthermore controls for the effort MEPs provide ($\text{Attendance}$). The variable is transformed ($\log(\frac{x}{1-x})$) and missing observations (6\%) are imputed through a second, linear equation estimated simultaneously to the main regression. Predictors include plenary attendance, age, committee chairmanship, whether an MEP was elected in a safe seat and whether he or she intends on having a long career (where available). All other missing observations are assumed to be random and imputed by drawing from an empirically informed distribution. Count variables are drawn from a normal distribution with empirically informed mean and standard deviation. Binary
predictors are drawn from a binomial distribution with an empirically informed proportion of “successes” and a size of 1. MEPs who do not have a national party affiliation as registered in the Chapel Hill survey are listwise excluded ($N = 1,120$).

The model includes an interaction between Female and Legislated Quota. $\beta_1$ thus captures the difference in performance among non-quota women (the baseline woman) compared to non-quota men. $\beta_2$ captures the difference in performance between women elected from a legislated quota system and women elected without quotas.

$$\begin{align*}
    Reports_i & \sim \text{Poisson} (\lambda_i) \\
    \log(\lambda_i) &= \alpha \\
    &+ \alpha_{ID,i} \\
    &+ \alpha_{EPGroup,i} \\
    &+ \alpha_{EP_i} \\
    &+ \alpha_{Nationality,i} \\
    &+ \beta_1 \times Female_i \\
    &+ \beta_2 \times Female_i \times Legislated Quota_i \\
    &+ \beta_3 \times Legislated Quota_i \\
    &+ \beta_4 \times Female_i \times Party Quota_i \\
    &+ \beta_5 \times Party Quota_i \\
    &+ \beta_6 \times Incumbent_i \\
    &+ \beta_7 \times Attendance_i \\
    &+ \beta_8 \times Questions_i \\
    &+ \beta_9 \times Complexity of Report_i
\end{align*}$$

The model testing $H_{10, i}$: Fitted as a binomial model in which the dependent variable is binary, indicating whether an incumbent member obtained a safe seat in the upcoming elections. The model includes varying inter-
cepts for the legislative term, the EP group, nationality and party affiliation. The model controls for the prior belief of parties (lagged dependent variable) \((Elected\ on\ a\ Safe\ Seat)\), the average complexity of the reports drafted, incumbency and an estimation of the likelihood that the member intends on seeking reelection \((Aims\ at\ Lengthy\ Career)\). Missing observations mainly exist on the lagged dependent variable (6%). These are assumed to be random and imputed by drawing from a binomial distribution with an empirically informed proportion of “successes” and a size of 1. Most of these missing observations stem from Romania and Bulgaria which joined the EU in 2007. MEPs who do not have a national party affiliation as registered in the Chapel Hill survey are listwise excluded \((N = 1,120)\).

The hypothesis is tested in a three-way interaction term between the candidate’s gender \((Female)\), the quota system \((Legislated\ Quota)\) and high-impact legislation \((Performance)\).
Main model:

\[
\text{Safe Seat}_i \sim \text{Binomial } (p_i)
\]

\[
\log(p_i) = \alpha + \alpha_{ID,i} + \alpha_{EP\text{Group},i} + \alpha_{EP,i} + \alpha_{Nationality,i} + \beta_1 \times \text{Performance}_i + \beta_2 \times \text{Female}_i \times \text{Legislated Quota}_i \times \text{Performance}_i + \beta_3 \times \text{Female}_i \times \text{Performance}_i + \beta_4 \times \text{Female}_i \times \text{Legislated Quota}_i + \beta_5 \times \text{Legislated Quota}_i \times \text{Performance}_i + \beta_6 \times \text{Female}_i + \beta_7 \times \text{Legislated Quota}_i + \beta_8 \times \text{Complexity of Report}_i + \beta_9 \times \text{Incumbent}_i + \beta_{10} \times \text{Aims at Lengthy Career}_i + \beta_{11} \times \text{Lag (Elected on a Safe Seat)}_i
\]

The main equation is estimated simultaneously to two supplementary equations. The first supplementary model estimates the likelihood that an MEP will wish to seek reelection. It is based on the question from the EPRG Survey about the intention to stay in Parliament. Given the low response rate, for most of the MEPs the estimation is informed by a number of contextual factors. Intention is therefore modeled as a function of where the MEP is in his or her career (Age, National MP or Minister), the salience of
a European mandate (Party Size, i.e., larger parties are able to offer better opportunities to their members) and the effort he or she has put into office (Committee Attendance).

A second supplementary model accounts for whether the response rate to the survey is correlated with the dependent variable of the main model (Safe Seat). The absence of correlation gives an indication that the survey sample is representative for the population under study. Results are reported in table D.3.

**Measurement model:**

\[
\text{Aims at Lengthy Career}_i \sim \text{Binomial}(p_i) \\
\log(p_i) = \gamma_1 \\
+ \gamma_2 \times \text{Age}_i \\
+ \gamma_3 \times \text{Proportion of Party Seats}_i \\
+ \gamma_4 \times \text{National MP or Minister}_i \\
+ \gamma_5 \times \text{Committee Attendance}_i
\]

\[
\text{Pr}(\text{Aims at Lengthy Career} = \text{NA}) \sim \text{Binomial}(p_i) \\
\log(p_i) = \delta_1 \\
+ \delta_2 \times \text{Safe Seat}_i \\
+ \delta_3 \times \text{Years of Term}_i \\
+ \delta_4 \times \text{In Favor of EU Integration}_i
\]

**The models testing** \(H_{30b} \): Two models test the hypothesis using different dependent variables.
### Table D.3: Results from a binomial model run in parallel to the main model predicting safe seat allocations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: 'Aims at Lengthy Career'</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[2.22, 5.22]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.12, -0.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Seats</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.02, 0.28]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Mandate on National Level</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.25, 0.97]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Attendance</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.15, 0.6]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: 'Aims at Lengthy Career=NA'</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[4.81, 10.73]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Seat</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.37, 0.18]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Term</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-2.18, -0.99]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Favor of EU Integration</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.06, 0.27]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations: 1129  
Number of respondents: 305

**Note:** Median effect with 95% symmetric posterior density interval.
D.2. MODEL DESCRIPTIONS

The first model is fitted as a linear regression in which the dependent variable is a transformed version of committee attendance ($Effort$). Attendance is measured as a proportion, and is thus transformed ($\log\left(\frac{x}{1-x}\right)$) so as to approximate a normal distribution.

The second model is fitted as a Poisson regression in which the dependent variable is the number of parliamentary questions. The variable is very long tailed, and is therefore capped at 100.

Both models include varying intercepts for the legislative term, the EP group, nationality and party affiliation. They control for lower incentives to provide effort among members who have already been reelected at least once ($Incumbent$) and the number of years the MEP has been a member during the term. ($Years of Term$). Missing observations on the dependent variables are listwise excluded, as are MEPs without party affiliation (as listed in the Chapel Hill survey), so that the first model is estimated on 1,048 observations while the second is estimated on 1,118 observations.

$H_{306}$ is tested through an interaction between gender ($Female$) and legislated quota system ($Legislated Quota$). I expect $\beta_2$ to be positive and distinguishable from zero. On the other hand, I do not expect that women in general ($\beta_1$) spend more time in committees. For comparison of the differential effects of different quotas, an equivalent interaction is fitted between gender ($Female$) and party-level quotas ($Party Quota$).

$$Attendance_i \sim \text{Normal} (\mu_i, \tau)$$

or

$$Questions_i \sim \text{Poisson} (\mu_i)$$
\[
\log(\mu_i) = \alpha \\
+ \alpha_{ID,i} \\
+ \alpha_{EP_{Group},i} \\
+ \alpha_{EP,i} \\
+ \alpha_{Nationality,i} \\
+ \beta_1 \times Female_i \\
+ \beta_2 \times Female_i \times Legislated Quota_i \\
+ \beta_3 \times Legislated Quota_i \\
+ \beta_2 \times Female_i \times Party Quota_i \\
+ \beta_3 \times Party Quota_i \\
+ \beta_4 \times Incumbent_i \\
+ \beta_5 \times Years of Term_i
\]
Bibliography


International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the University of Stockholm (2016). quotaproject – global database of quotas for women @ONLINE.


