

Warriors with a heart: Why risk it?

Change and continuity in the Norwegian Army's role-perception

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Abstract

After the Cold War, the Norwegian Armed Forces was without a job, and a gradual shift turned the Norwegian soldiers away from their initial role-perception of a citizen soldier towards a more professional warrior-role. This new role-perception has since been institutionalized and seen as the desired role-perception among employees in the Norwegian Army. This thesis seeks to answer the following research question: *Is the role-perception thought to have emerged within the Norwegian Army during the operation in Afghanistan (2006-2012) still valid today, especially considering the colder climate in the post-Crimea security environment?*

By conducting in-depth interviews with students at the Norwegian Military Academy and the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College this thesis found that the role-perception of a warrior still have an impact on the students which will be the future leaders of the Norwegian Army. The warrior-perception is seen as a golden standard and something to aspire to. Nevertheless, the role-perception of a citizen soldier still prevail among the soldiers in my sample. They see themselves mainly as protectors of the homeland, its people and its values, and need to find meaning within that framework to be willing to take and sacrifice life. Whether this can be seen as a consequence of a colder climate in the post-Crimea security environment is harder to answer. This thesis finds it difficult to conclude if the role-perception of a citizen soldier has emerged as a consequence of the changed security climate or simply have been resilient to the changes in role-perception thought to have been caused by the increased involvement in international operations.

Research on, and understanding of, the dominant role-perception as an aspect of civil-military relations is important because it can impact the effectiveness of soldiers as well as the relationship between the Army, civilians and politicians. If politicians frame operations and reforms in a way that does not cohere with the role-perception of the soldier this could result in a sharper distinction between the civilian sphere and the military sphere. Knowledge on role-perception is therefore important to take into account when new reforms are decided upon and implemented.

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Victoria Ramm Henriksen

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1. Introduction

Being a soldier is said to be one of the most extreme occupations in the world, because in the utmost consequence it implies a willingness to take and sacrifice life. The military is the state's most powerful tool, and according to some realists, military strength is the only way for a state to protect itself and its continued existence (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001). The Norwegian Army has for a long period of time had as its primary goal to defend Norway from the threat posed by its superpower neighbour, the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Soviet Union some thought that the best way to provide security for Norway was through increased participation in various international operations (Haaland 2008:100, Egeberg 2017:8). This is a development that coincides with the change in the term security policy; from being about security from military threats posed by other states, to the sum of tools to promote peace and prosperity worldwide (Heier et al. 2014).

Increased participation in international operations gave the Norwegian soldiers real experience from war. However, participation in operations abroad, like Afghanistan (2002-2018), Libya (2011) and Iraq (2006, 2011-2018) was controversial. The operations were controversial because there was no consensus in the Norwegian society at large, or in the political sphere, regarding whether or not to participate, and how to participate (Godal et al. 2016: 174-180).

Recent events have led the Norwegian Army to turn back to its roots. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to decide during the Wales summit that the Alliance's main priority should be defence of the allied countries, not "out of area" operations which had been the main priority for over a decade (NATO 2014). Even though the main priority of the Norwegian Army has always been to protect the homeland, these sudden shifts in priorities from political leadership might have led to changes in the role-perception of Norwegian soldiers.

Being a security policy instrument is not a new role for the Norwegian Army, but it can imply many things (Haaland 2008:263). One implication is that its primary task is to protect the homeland whenever there is a threat, or that it is more proactive by trying to remove threats,

such as global terrorism. In an open and democratic country, such as Norway, politicians often have to provide convincing arguments for why the use of force is necessary in a given situation. They do this to gain support from the society at large and to win elections (Kjølberg 2014:46-47). These shifts in overarching goals, operational focus, and varying support from the society at large can be believed to change how the military personnel view themselves and their role *vis-à-vis* the civil society. How do the soldiers perceive themselves and their role in a shifting security climate?

Given the many recent changes in structure, goals, and priorities the Norwegian Army has gone through since the end of the Cold War we can assume that the resulting downsizing and internationalization will impact how the soldiers view their role (Johansen 2013, Haaland 2010). There has been a steady growth in research in the field of civil-military relations in recent years, especially during the extensive international contribution in Afghanistan¹. This thesis will follow this line of research by investigating the currently dominating role-perception within the Norwegian Army.

1.1. Research question and delimitation

This thesis will explore the currently dominating role-perception within the Norwegian Army, and will do so by answering the following research question:

Is the role-perception thought to have emerged within the Norwegian Army during the operation in Afghanistan (2006-2012) still valid today, especially considering the colder climate in the post-Crimea security environment?

The research question implies an investigation into what role-perception characterizes the Norwegian Army today, and how prevalent the role-perception is in the face of a changing security landscape. In order to investigate the role-perception, this thesis will utilize the theoretical framework found in Haaland's (2008) PhD-dissertation, and compliment this with explanations and findings from other academic research on the subject.

¹ See for instance Haaland 2008, Haaland 2010, Johansen 2013, Brunborg 2008, Forsjord 2009, Edström et al. 2009, Edström et al. 2010, Bodding 2008.

In order to answer the research question empirically, this thesis will delimitate the research question in a few important ways. First, it will look at two periods, the first being 2006-2012, which will be contrasted with the second period, 2014-2017. In the first period the focus will be on the ISAF-mission in Afghanistan, which is believed to have impacted the role-perception of not only the participating soldiers, but also the Norwegian Army in general (Godal et al. 2016:57, Johansen 2013, Edström et al. 2009). Based on previous research, this thesis will argue that the role-perception gradually changed during the operation in Afghanistan. This thesis will label the increased professionalization and growing acceptance of being a tool for the government as an expression of a warrior-perception developed throughout participation in Afghanistan. In the second period, which will be the main focus of this thesis, I will investigate how a more assertive Russia, and the subsequent Wales Summit in September 2014, possibly changed the role-perception. This thesis will therefore investigate if the recent changes in the security landscape might have caused the role-perception to change yet again. Chapter 2 will explain these alleged shifts, and the empirical background in more detail.

Second, this thesis will only focus on one of the branches in the Norwegian Armed Forces, namely the Army. The role-perception of the Navy and the Air Force will therefore not be investigated. This is partly due to practical restraints, such as time and budgetary limitations, but also because the Army was most heavily involved in the ISAF-mission (Godal et al 2016: 47, 55), and hence more exposed to changes in the role-perception.

Third, this thesis will investigate role-perception on the tactical level, rather than operational and strategic levels (FFOD 2007:103). The strategic level is normally concerned with the overall strategy tied to how to utilize national power, while the operational level is concerned with the planning and conduct of operations; it is at this level that strategy is operationalized and executed (Von Clausewitz c1968). The tactical level is concerned with the implementation of operations, the planning and conduct of battle, and is thus the lowest level. The reason for a tactical focus is because I seek to investigate if changes in policy and overarching goals affected personnel on the ground, and not merely the top level or structural changes in the organization as such. An exogenous change, such as a changed security landscape, could affect the role-perception of soldiers on the ground, who experience it, while not yet having permeated the organization from top to bottom.

Fourth, this thesis will not seek to generalize its findings to the entire Army, rather it will investigate the role-perception of a highly selected group, namely some of the Norwegian Army's future leaders. I will therefore conduct interviews with students enrolled in the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC) and the Norwegian Military Academy (NMA). Chapter 4 will explain and debate this and other methodological decisions in more detail.

This thesis seeks to compliment previous research on this topic (Haaland 2008, Johansen 2013, Brunborg 2008, Edström et al. 2009, Edström et al. 2010, Booding 2008, Føsjord 2009, Ydstebø 2009, Lunde 2009). However, I will try to do so from a political science perspective, rather than psychology and sociology. Although, this thesis will draw from lessons provided by these research fields, it will look at role-perception as an outcome of changed civil-military relations and affected by changes in the security landscape. It will also seek to add new value to the existing academic research, which focuses mainly on the impact of the operation in Afghanistan, by also investigating what impact the Russian annexation of Crimea and NATO's subsequent Wales Summit in 2014 might have had on the soldier's role-perception. But before we can get going, it seems prudent to take a step back and define the term role-perception.

1.2. Defining “role-perception”

Terms such as military culture, profession, identity, ethos, and perception of role are often used interchangeably (Haaland 2008:35, Söderberg and Wedell-Wedellsborg 2008:184, Tomforde 2008:131, Soeters et al. 2008), and without a proper definition of key terms this thesis might just add to the confusion. This thesis aims to assess how soldiers in the Norwegian Army perceive their own area of expertise, their responsibilities to the civil society and their sense of professionalism, and thus the term role-perception will be in the forefront (Haaland 2008:20).

The term role-perception as used by Haaland (2008), is similar to other concepts. However, she argues that the term role-perception is a superior concept because it is weaker and narrower than “culture” and “identity”, and less value-laden than “ethos”. Role-perception

implies a collective perception of role and *raison d'être*, that is less deep-rooted in the individual than culture, ethos and identity, and therefore more open to change by both rational, strategic considerations, as well as common values and beliefs (Haaland 2008:38-39). This implies that role-perception is not necessarily stable, nor fixed, but subject to revision and change (Søderberg and Wedell-Wedellsborg 2008:184-186).

Several role-perceptions might therefore exist side by side for a long period of time, but only one is in the forefront at any given time. This hierarchy of perceptions is not consistent through time, but rather open to change, and as changes occur the dilemma needs to be temporarily resolved. This openness to change that the term role-perception presents is what makes it so well suited to explain how the Norwegian soldiers view themselves and their role *vis-à-vis* the civil society that they are set to serve. Brunborg (2008:20) and Johansen (2013:1) argues that there probably is a connection between societal change and military culture, and the fact that several other scholars have shown interest in this subject also suggests that they believe it to be a connection between role-perception and policy change, threat environment, and societal change (Edström et al. 2009, Edström et al. 2010). In a given situation, or with exogenous stimuli, the hierarchy of role-perceptions can be shuffled around. One example is in a particular situation, such as being deployed on a foreign mission and another one is when the security climate changes, such as after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, which is what will be the main focus of this thesis.

The concept of role-perception, as used by Haaland (2008), focuses specifically on the role of the Armed Forces in society, rather than on “national culture” in general which is the theme of many other studies (Søderberg and Wedell-Wedellsborg 2008, Soeters et al. 2008). The term “national culture” is used by many to describe differences between nationalities. The term makes an appearance in studies related to how military units from different nations work together in various international operations. This research argues that differences, cultural or operational, between military units might impede on international operations, and in some cases cultural differences and how they are handled, can be the difference between smooth and strained cooperation (Soeters et al. 2008, Finlan 2013:1-2). This thesis will, unlike Haaland (2008), try to incorporate “national culture” into its framework of role-perception, presented in Chapter 3. The existence of “national culture” within the Norwegian Army, or rather the degree of compliance between the general attitudes found in the Norwegian civil

society and in the military, will be used to divide between the two main types of role-perceptions; the warrior and the citizen soldier².

1.3. Overview of the research field

The term *civil-military relations* is normally used to describe the relationship between civil society and the military (Byler 2013). Most often, it refers to the relationships between leaders of the military and the civilian leaders of the state. However, in its broadest sense the term encompasses the relationship at all levels, including military recruitment, civilian attitudes towards the military and so on (Byler 2013). The core issue in the field of civil-military relations can be summed up in one core question; how can the civilian government ensure that it controls the military institution that it has created, and armed, to protect itself from external threats (Feaver 1996:149-150)? This is an intriguing problem, and while there is no fear in the Norwegian state that the military will organize a coup or otherwise disregard the orders from political leadership, it is still vital to know how exogenous changes in security policy affect the soldiers (Burk 2002). This is important not just to ensure their continued effectiveness in case of war or crisis, but also to ensure continued legitimacy among the Norwegian population at large.

The ultimate classic within the field of civil-military relations is Samuel P. Huntington's book "The Soldier and the State" from 1957. Huntington (1957:2) argues that a country's armed forces is influenced by their functional and societal role. The functional imperative implies that the military is supposed to be an efficient tool to handle threats to the society's security, and the social imperative arise from the dominant value pattern in the society in general. Huntington (1957:2-3) argues that the balance and the relative ordering between these influences is crucial to a nation's military security.

² Haaland (2008) labels the counterpart of the warrior the *citizen soldier/ homeland defender*. In this thesis I have chosen to only utilize the label *citizen soldier*, because it entails a stronger connection to the civil society than the warrior, and encompasses all features connected to the homeland defender. A citizen soldier protects the homeland, its people and its values. See section 3.2 for a thorough discussion of the role-perception of a citizen soldier.

Were Huntington (1957:400-427) prescribes a continued distance between the American military and the civil society in order to maintain the virtues needed to meet the threat from the Soviet Union, Morris Janowitz (1960), another pioneer, argued for a different approach. Janowitz (1960) did empirical research and found that the American military appeared to be increasingly similar to civilian bureaucracies. Contrary to the normative views of Huntington, Janowitz (1960:21) saw these developments as desirable and argued that the Armed Forces should not be isolated from developments in civil society. He argued that civilian control of the Armed Forces should be exercised through democratic education of the military, which presumably would internalize the desired democratic norms (Janowitz 1960:430). Huntington and Janowitz analysis of civil military relations paved the way a for new research field, namely *civil-military relations*, and the field has come a long way since their initial contributions (Brunborg 2008:14, Feaver 1996, Burk 2002, Schiff 1995).

The Norwegian contributions in Afghanistan spurred an academic and public debate in Norway concerning what type of military profession we would aspire to have (Godal et al. 2016:58). The potential development of a savage warrior culture scared military personnel, politicians and civilians alike (Godal et al. 2016:57). Several scholars have taken part in this debate³. However, the discussion fizzled out after the majority of the Norwegian troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2012 (Østerud 2013). It is also worth noting that the academic work on the topic were mostly done by the Army's own personnel, and while I am not intending to question their impartiality, it will only be beneficial to do a study from an outside perspective. Although, I, the author, have some experience from serving two years in the Norwegian Army, I have been a civilian since 2012 and thus represent an outside perspective.

An understanding of the relationship between the Army and the civil society on the tactical level is increasingly important because of the increased cooperation military forces has to endure in various kinds of international operations (Soeters et al. 2008, Finland 2013:1-2). In many of today's conflicts and international operations the soldiers are required to cooperate with allies from other nations, in environments that have cultures and values that are vastly different from that of their own (Rønnfeldt 2014, Soeters et al. 2008, Tomforde 2008, Söderberg and Wedell-Wedellsborg 2008). The importance of investigating the "human dimension", and how it affects the military institution as a security policy instrument is still an

³ See for instance Haaland 2008, Edström et al. 2009, Edström et al. 2010, Heier et al. 2014 and Toje 2010

important question today. Norwegian troops are most likely not done with participation in international operations (Norheim-Martinesen 2015), and the “human dimension” could play a vital role in shaping successful and unsuccessful outcomes in war (Finland 2013:1-2).

While the Afghanistan deployments spurred the debate about military professionalism in Norway, the debate has again begun to surface as the Army is currently implementing a new personnel reform⁴. The reform is extensive. With the goal of dividing the military personnel in “doers” and “thinkers”, the reform seeks to implement a specialist corps with 70% of the personnel. The remaining 30% will be officers. The reform will therefore have a great impact on how the Norwegian Armed Forces, and therefore the Norwegian Army, will look in the future. This reform also entails an education reform where officers will be drawn directly from conscripts or high school students. The new officers will therefore be younger than their predecessors and not be socialised into their own battalions, companies or platoons prior to starting their military education. Another facet of the reform is that some fear that it will create a class divide between the specialists and the officers (Talleraas 2016, Reiersølmoen 2016). Others argue against this sentiment and says that the “Norwegian model” will prevent such outcomes, without specifying how and why, and some even argue that this will depend on how the reform is implemented (Kingsrød 2017)⁵. Nevertheless, the reform and its implementation has spurred the debate on role-perception and military professionalism, both regarding what it is and what it ought to be.

The goal of this thesis is to explore how military leaders on the tactical levels view themselves and their role *vis-à-vis* the civil society after redeployment from Afghanistan, and how exogenous changes might have affect this role-perception. It seeks to compliment the findings from the growing field of research on this topic in Norway. Changing structures and policies without knowing how it and the general security landscape affect the soldier’s role-perception may lead to unintended consequences. This is not to say that new reforms and adjustments to a changing security landscape and economic priorities should not be done, but by knowing how exogenous factors influence the soldiers this could be taken into account and weighed into the decision-making, design and implementation process.

⁴ Innst.336 S (2014-2015) *Innstilling fra utenriks-og forsvarskomiteen om ordningen for militært tilsatte og endringer i forsvarspersonelloven m.m. (militærordningen)* Available at: <https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Innstillinger/Stortinget/2014-2015/inns-201415-336/> [Accessed 01.04.2018]

⁵ The «Norwegian model» will be accounted for in Chapter 3.

1.4. Thesis outline

This introductory chapter has given a brief introduction to the topic, it has presented the research question and its delimitations, defined the term role-perception, given a brief introduction to the research field and why this research is important. The next chapter will present the empirical background for the time periods outlined above and explain this delimitation in more detail. Additionally, it will present findings from previous research on role-perception and work as a springboard to the main part of the thesis. Chapter 3 will present the theoretical framework and expected empirical findings. Chapter 4 will present the methodological decisions tied to how to go about exploring the current role-perception among our sample of future leaders of the Army. Chapter 5 will present the results from the interview research and evaluate what role-perception is dominating. The sixth chapter will try to answer if this role-perception might have been influenced by the changing security landscape accounted for in Chapter 2. The seventh and final chapter will conclude this analysis by answering the research question, first drawing on the conclusions from Chapter 5, what role-perception is dominant today, and then, by summarizing the discussion in Chapter 6, evaluate whether a change has occurred, and if so, if it was caused by the changed security landscape.

2. Empirical background: The security landscape

In order to give meaningful interpretation to the results of the interview research, presented in Chapter 5, this thesis needs to be situated within the security climate at the time of the events and the broader debate regarding role-perception. This chapter will therefore provide the reader with some context and a brief overview of the empirical background for the time periods under consideration. The first period, from 2006 until 2012, which is assumed to have influenced the role-perception of the Norwegian soldiers towards that of a warrior, will be presented first. Afterwards, the second period from 2014-2017 will be presented. The empirical insights provided here will be complimented by findings from previous academic research on the topic.

2.1. International involvement in Afghanistan & the Norwegian contribution

During the Cold War the Norwegian Army had as its main priority to protect the homeland from the threat posed by its neighbouring superpower, the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Norwegian Army was left without a clear enemy and gradually increased its involvement in international operations abroad (Børresen 2005). The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon September 11th, 2001 spurred the military intervention in Afghanistan the same fall. The intervention caused the Norwegian Army to change more vigorously compared to the more modest changes of the 1990s (Haaland 2008). The contribution in this operation altered many features of the Norwegian Army and, as this thesis will scrutinize; the role-perception among its soldiers.

The international operation in Afghanistan was originally a coalition of willing allies (Østerud 2013:63). The reasoning was self-defence as the perpetrators behind the terrorist attack, the Al Qaida network, had bases in the country (Østerud 2013). The initial goal was to defeat Al Qaida and oust the Taliban regime. However, as the operations continued the state-building dimension grew more important. Norway participated in the US-led invasion, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and when NATO took the lead of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003, Norway continued participation in both operations. It was not until a change of government in 2005, that Norway finally withdrew from OEF in 2006 (Oma 2014:85, Bøifot 2007, Østerud 2013:64).

According to Øyvind Østerud, Norway had two overarching goals in Afghanistan (2013); one being to prove or show its solidarity to the United States and NATO, which can be interpreted as an insurance policy, and the other to keep up the appearance as a peace-loving nation. The Norwegian contribution can therefore be described as a balancing act. On the one hand, Norway wanted to show its valour in military operations and on the other, keep its international reputation as a *peace-nation* intact⁶. This balancing act also affected the public debate, or lack thereof, in Norway (Oma 2014, Godal et al. 2016:180).

⁶ See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the term *peace nation*.

After the change of government in 2005 the political climate shifted, and the coalition government wanted to paint a picture to the public of a division between the more offensive counter insurgency operation in southern Afghanistan, that Norway did not participate in, and the state-building approach in the more peaceful northern regions (Godal et al. 2016: 175-176). This was done in part to appease the Socialist Left Party (SV), which had been negative to Norwegian contributions in Afghanistan while they were in opposition. Now, that SV were part of the coalition government, they needed to distance the Norwegian contribution from what they labelled the failed war on terrorism (Suhrke 2011, Godal et al. 2016:175). This picture gradually began to crack as the Norwegian forces became more heavily involved in tougher military operations and had to deal with a more hostile environment in the northern region (Godal et al. 2016: 176).

In 2006 the security situation in the northern part of Afghanistan worsened on a general basis (Godal et al. 2016:122, Egeberg 2017:449-450). The military contribution became even more apparent when Norwegian forces went into the Gormach district in the province Badghis, northwest in the country, the fall of 2007 (Østerud 2013, Godal et al. 2016:119). Here the rebellion was stronger, and these military operations clearly stood out compared to the “trust building approach” in Faryab (Østerud 2013). The operations in Ghormach were an attempt at staying the unrest in Faryab, since it was assumed that the unrest and rebels were based in Ghormach (Godal et al. 2016: 123). The Norwegian forces gradually became increasingly involved in operations such as *Harakate Yolo 2* in 2007. From a military perspective these operations had some short-term success, but they were not an adequate long-term response to the increased threat level and spurred similar operations in other areas, such as the operations in *Orthepe valley* (Haaland 2016, Stensønes 2012, Godal et al. 2016:125-126)

The period 2006-2012 therefore stand out because of a growing threat level and a growing discrepancy between what was presented to the Norwegian civil society and the realities for those on the ground (Matlary 2009:103, 112,). This might have contributed to a sense of disconnect between the soldiers and the general public (Mood 2017:167-169, Matlary 2009:118-119). Additionally, there was no consensus in the Norwegian population concerning the operations in Afghanistan and the debate was distanced from the experiences of the soldiers who took part in actual combat (Godal et al. 2016:174-180). This discrepancy begun to surface when several Norwegian media outlets wrote about Norwegian soldiers who took pleasure in being in combat and taking life (Godal et al. 2016:57-58). The most known of

these cases is commonly known as the “Alfa”-case (Johansen et al. 2010, Egeberg 2017: 555-556). Fear of a vulgar and crude culture among Norwegian soldiers spurred public and academic debate (Edström et al. 2009).

In addition, the Norwegian Army underwent many structural changes in this time period. First of all, it changed from being a large mobilization force to a much smaller combat-ready structure, which should be able to deploy to any corner of the world at a relatively short notice (Haaland 2008:262, Egeberg 2017:558-559). This change led to a downsizing of the Armed Forces, with a growing focus on fewer, but more professional soldiers. A decreased focus on conscription and a growing distance between the Army and the civil society, caused Huntington’s view of civil control; increased professionalism, to become increasingly dominant on the lower levels of the Armed Forces (Heier 2013:229-230). In addition to these structural changes it was also decided to make the Norwegian soldiers more professional (Johansen 2013:1, Egeberg 2017: 560-561). The Chief of Defence at the time, Sverre Diesen (2005), referred to this as a paradigm shift, and professionalism was introduced as a necessary condition for serving in the military and seen as a way to increase military performance (FFOD 2007, St.prp. nr. 42 2003/2004). Today we can still find some evidence that the Army has embraced this new focus on professionalism to a greater extent than the Navy and the Air Force, as the Army is more positive to the new personnel reform described in section 1.3. (Vangstad 2015, Jacobsen 2016). The reform seeks to further professionalise the Army by introducing NATO-standards that could be seen as conflicting with the egalitarian culture supposedly found within the Norwegian society, see section 3.1..

The examples stated above has led several prominent researches to argue that the old role-perception, thought to dominate the Cold War era, is gone or at least diminished within the Norwegian Army (Johansen 2013:20, Edström et al. 2009). Instead, a stronger international focus, together with structural and operational changes, have made the soldiers view themselves as professional instruments for political leadership and the Norwegian state, rather than a national self-defence instrument (Haaland 2008:263, Diesen 2008, Daltveit 2014). The Army Chief of Staff, General Sverre Opedal, publicly acknowledged the emergence of a warrior culture in 2010, although he stressed that the term was still controversial (Opedal 2010). It is worth noting that this shift was also wanted and sought out by political and military leadership (Johansen 2013:19, Elevsveen 2017:57). The shift is thought to have manifested in a new and more professionalized role-perception, which I, in line with Haaland

(2008), have chosen to call a warrior-perception. The warrior-perception and its counterpart the citizen soldier will be presented in Chapter 3, but before embarking on the theoretical framework the thesis will briefly describe the current security climate and how that possibly could influence the role-perception of Norwegian soldiers.

2.2. The annexation of Crimea and the Wales Summit

The spring of 2014 marked a change in the relationship between Russia and the West, and thus also the security landscape NATO and Norway finds itself in. In 2014 Russia unlawfully annexed the Crimean Peninsula and supported insurgents in Eastern Ukraine. The war in Eastern Ukraine persists today, and as a response to Russian aggression both the European Union (EU) and several NATO members have imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia. The fact that Russia used its military capabilities to forcibly change the borders in Europe created a sense of uncertainty and fear not seen since the end of the Cold War. Since then the relationship between Russia and the West has further deteriorated and some even argue that the relationship between the United States and Russia has begun to resemble that of the Cold War (Kroenig 2015, Legvold 2016).

Although the annexation of Crimea might have been what finally sparked the public debate on how NATO best could respond to Russian aggression, this was not the first time Russia had showed its aggressive and accretive side. In 2008 in the war between Russia and Georgia, Russia demonstrated both the willingness and the capability to wage war against an independent state for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union (Allison 2008). The same year Norway launched *the Core Area Initiative*, as a first step towards making NATO turn back to its roots after over a decade primarily focused on “out-of-area” operations⁷. Nevertheless, it was not until the NATO summit in Wales, the fall of 2014, that the importance of the Alliance *raison d'être*; the collective defence described in article five of the Washington Treaty, was revitalized. Fear of continued Russian aggression, especially among

⁷ Norwegian translation: *Nærområdeinitiativet*. Mentioned by Minister of Defence Ine Eriksen Søreide in a speech at the YATA NORSEC conference 25.04.2015. *The security situation in Europe and the future of NATO – a Norwegian perspective* Available at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/The-security-situation-in-Europe-and-the-future-of-NATO--a-Norwegian-perspective/id757912/> [Accessed 04.04.2018]

NATO-members in Eastern Europe, caused this revitalization. The Summit clearly linked the “challenges posed by Russia” with the need to strengthen NATO’s collective defence (NATO 2014: para 5). The changed priorities fostered by the Wales Summit were reinforced two years later at the NATO Summit in Warsaw (NATO 2016).

Some researchers argue that the relationship between Russia and the West grew colder already in the early 2000s (Larson and Shevchenko 2010). These researchers argue that Americas choice to not include Russia as a partner in the fight against terrorism, as well as not properly addressing Russia’s ambitions on the international scene, led Russia to pursue a more assertive foreign policy. These grievances could be said to incite the critical rhetoric that Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, presented at the 2007 security conference in Munich⁸. Nevertheless, the annexation of Crimea was an eye-opener for many in the western world (Mearsheimer 2014:85). The annexation of Crimea in 2014 could therefore be characterized as the culmination of a steadily chilling relationship between Russia and the West. While Norway was among those especially eager to turn NATO’s focus back to its core areas already in 2008, the annexation of Crimea was a turning point for NATO’s relations with Russia. The annexation even led the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Ine Eriksen Søreide, to argue that Norway’s relations to Russia was “permanently changed” (Søreide 2014).

The events of 2014, and the strained relations that followed, forced NATO to reconsider its 15-years emphasis on “out of area” expeditionary operations (Larsen 2016). This change in priorities for the Alliance also have consequences for Norwegian military and security policy, and while Norway might have been ahead of its time by launching the *Core Area Initiative* already in 2008, structural changes lag behind when international involvement has been governing defence policies for more than a decade. Thus, Norway has increased its reliance on NATO and created an army not primarily designed to defend “King and fatherland”, but rather to be a security policy instrument used wherever they are needed. While the security environment can shift suddenly, and NATO now has to come to terms with a potential conflict, or at the very least an increased threat level closer to home, the structures and doctrines it has taken over a decade to change will not change as rapidly.

⁸ Vladimir Putin’s full speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy is available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html> [Accessed 03.03.2018]

The big questions for this thesis thus becomes; how has these changes in security environment affected the role-perception of the Norwegian soldiers? Could the shift in threat environment have caused the role-perception to change, or is the changes caused by the involvement in Afghanistan, and subsequent structural changes, too embedded in the soldiers? Do Norwegian soldiers perceive themselves as apolitical instruments as envisioned by Huntington, or as idealistic defenders of the homeland, its people, and values as envisioned by Janowitz? The next chapter will present the theoretical framework which will be used to evaluate the role-perception among the future leaders of the Norwegian Army.

3. Theoretical framework

This thesis will base itself on the theoretical framework found in Torunn Laugen Haaland's PhD dissertation from 2008. Here, she analyses the Norwegian Army based on four different ways to see their role as service (wo)men⁹. The reason for utilizing Haaland's framework is because it includes many of the important aspects from the two pioneers, Huntington and Janowitz, accounted for in section 1.3.. In addition, the framework also overlaps with other theories on the subject, such as Johansen's (2013) ideal types of professionalism, idealism and individualism. In this section, two of Haaland's four role-perceptions will be accounted for in detail. The reason for utilizing only two of these perceptions is twofold: First, these two are the ones that seem most relevant and contrasting; and second, the ones most likely to change due to exogenous causes, such as a changing security environment. This thesis will focus on the individual soldier, and thus try to shed light on their motivations, and their perceptions of themselves and others like them. Do soldiers in the Norwegian Army view themselves as *warriors* wanting to perform their profession, or *citizen soldiers* protecting the homeland, and its values, wherever they are (Haaland 2008:20)?

In this regard it is prudent to repeat that these two role-perceptions are assumed to exist simultaneously, both at the collective and the individual level, but that the relative importance of each role may shift (Haaland 2008:6). The role-perceptions are also contrasting and represent opposing views of the role of a soldier and his/her place in society (Edström et al.

⁹ Haaland's (2008) four role-perceptions include; the warrior, the citizen soldier/ homeland defender, the mercenary and the state employee

2009:40-41). Thus, conflicting perceptions has to be, at least temporarily, sorted in a hierarchy in any given situation. However, this hierarchy need not be the same across time and space.

Haaland (2008:168) also argues that her framework and the term role-perception do not capture national identity or culture. In this thesis however, identifying the existence of such sentiments seem vital in order to properly address some of the differences between the two role-perceptions. One of the biggest differences between the two pioneers presented in section 1.3., Huntington and Janowitz, and between the ideal-types, *the citizen soldier* and *the warrior*, presented below, is how the soldiers relate to the civil society they are set to serve. The warrior would have less, or no, ties to the society as such and thus not care if the operations they participated in were seen as legitimate by the population at large. The relative weight placed on the so-called peace nation sentiment, supposedly found within the Norwegian society, can therefore help clarify what role-perception is dominant (Edström et al 2009:26). Consequently, I need to clarify what is meant by “national culture” in this context before I can embark on the two role-perceptions.

3.1. “National culture”

First, Norway can be described as a “small” state (Kjølberg 2014). A small state has an incentive to act according to international rules and regulations and will benefit if other states, especially those with comparatively more power, do the same. Furthermore, Norway has for a long period of time tried to gain a reputation as a *peace nation* (Leira et al. 2007). The term *peace nation* implies a nation that not just tries to avoid conflict and because of its relative weakness seeks defensive rather than offensive strategies, but rather that it wants to be perceived as actively working to promote peace and prosperity in the world at large (Edström et al. 2009:26). This sentiment can be said to have been used as a rhetorical instrument, but evidence suggest that this idea also have great impact domestically (Matlary 2009:107-109). Norway is a liberal democracy, and thus seeks legitimacy for its conduct abroad from the population at large. As a consequence, the images that are presented of a peace nation are created and maintained in speech and action. In a NUPI report from 2007, Leira et al. analyses Norwegian self-perception and perceptions of Norwegian foreign policy. Some of these self-images have been repeated for so long that they have gotten a hegemonic status

(Leira et al. 2007:9). These images include Norway as a peace nation, Norway as an aid-giant and Norway as the United Nations best friend (Leira et al. 2007). These images need not be true from an empirical perspective but are created realities that have become a vital part of the Norwegian self-image (Leira et al 2007:12, Haaland 2008:253).

Furthermore, a frequently used description of Norway is *the Norwegian model*. The Norwegian model can be said to encompass many different things, but in the forefront of all descriptions there appears to be consistency in that the model represents an egalitarian, confidence-based and transparent society, where humanitarian values and compassion are in the forefront. This Norwegian model is assumed to exist within all state institutions and even the economic system. The comprehensive welfare state is seen as both a cause and an effect of the so-called Norwegian model (Barth et al. 2003).

With the above in mind the thesis will now turn to the two ideal types of role-perception. These will be presented below, together with some expected findings, and in the next chapter these expected findings will be operationalized into indicators.

3.2. The warrior

This role-perception sees the soldier as a warrior and is probably the stereotypical view of the role of armed men and women. This view of the traditional soldier is very apparent in popular culture. However, it can be said to be at odds with mainstream values in the Western world in general and especially in a social democratic, small, *peace nation* like Norway (Haaland 2008:7).

This view of the soldier, or officer, emphasises the differences and separation from civilian life and work. This role-perception describes the soldier as more than just an occupation; it is a way of life or a calling. Additionally, this image of a soldier springs from a universal image of what a soldier is supposed to be (Haaland 2008:7). With this role-perception the overall purpose for a soldier is to fight wars, their main emphasis is professionalism and their core values are honour, duty, cohesion and loyalty (Huntington 1957). Civilian control is to be achieved by surveillance and obedience (Haaland 2008:7, Huntington 1957).

The warrior-perception implies that the soldier and the Army have a culture that is disconnected from the rest of the society, which in the case of Norway is something that both the civil society and the military has perceived as problematic (Edström et al. 2009:40). However, this is in line with Huntington`s (1957) reasoning and his “model of separation”. In light of this role-perception one could assume that soldiers who participate in operations abroad do so in order to practice their trait, or to do their duty. They do not necessarily have any elaborate reasoning apart from it being their job, and that they do what is asked of them.

Haaland (2008:264) argues that among military leaders a prime motive for contributing in international operations would be to gain valuable operational experience. If this is true for the individual soldiers as well, one could argue that the main motivation for participation in Afghanistan was to get the opportunity to practice their trait, being a warrior, which they would not get in Norway. Additionally, if the perception of a warrior is truly how soldiers see themselves they would also want to practice their trait for its own sake, not necessarily because that would make them better equipped to tackle incidents in Norway.

Norwegian soldiers with a warrior-perception might think of participation in wars as a goal in itself, in order to gain real-life experience and increased military skill, and leave it to the political and military leadership to decide the overarching political goal and superior cause. Thus, soldiers with a warrior-perception would be indifferent to where they wage war and what political goal is achieved, but rather seek motivation in camaraderie, internal cohesion and loyalty to one`s fellow soldiers. This also implies that soldiers with a warrior-perception will not have any substantial evaluation of how the newfound skills will come to use. They will be indifferent regarding if their military skills were to be used in the protection of Norway or in a contested operation abroad. This definition of a warrior-perception closely resembles how Huntington (1957) characterized military professionalism (Johansen et al. 2013:863).

Soldiers identifying with the warrior-perception does not necessarily share values with the society at large. Furthermore, they do not care very much about how the politicians frame their work to the domestic audience, nor if what they are doing is in compliance with the concept of a peace nation or other civilian values. The soldiers with a warrior-perception will probably be motivated by a chance to practice their trait and gaining new skills. They will evaluate success, not from abstract political goals, but rather if their military goals were met

and if they were viewed as professional soldiers by other participants. Their main reason for joining the Army is to be a soldier, not because they have a clear idea of where they will fight and how they best can protect their homeland, but simply because they will fight. Comradery and unity is probably more important motivational factors for the warrior than abstract political goals. A warrior will presumably have a high willingness to both take and sacrifice life simply because it is his or hers calling, not because the operation in itself is worth fighting, and possibly dying, for.

Ydstebø (2009:139) also argues that for a warrior, in the traditional meaning of the word, the war becomes a goal in itself, and not how Von Clausewitz (c1968) prescribed; as a tool to achieve a political victory. However, soldiers with a warrior-perception will not necessarily yearn for war, but they do not shy away from it either. They simply recognize and accept their role as tools for the government and find motivation within this framework rather than from abstract political goals.

3.2.1. Expected empirical findings

Based on this description of a warrior, I expect soldiers subscribing to this particular role-perception to perceive themselves as belonging to a professional troop. That they see themselves as highly skilled and value the experiences from real-life combat situations. Furthermore, they will not have strong feelings regarding how, and where, politicians choose to utilize them and their special set of skills and experiences.

From this we can deduce a systematized concept of what a soldier subscribing to this role-perception will perceive as his or her role:

S₁: A soldier with a role-perception of a warrior will perceive her/himself as belonging to an army that is professional, distanced from civil society and he/she will value military unity, professionalism and skills.

3.3. The citizen soldier

This role-perception emphasises that the Armed Forces are, and should be, identical to and reflect the society that they spring from to the greatest extent possible (Haaland 2008:8). Since this perception underlines the close ties to civil society, it tends to be less universal than the warrior-perception Haaland (2008:8). This role-perception generally contributes to lower tensions between the military and the civil society (Edström 2009:40-41), since they share many of the same values, which can help to create understanding and mutual trust.

Like for the warrior, service in the Armed Forces is more than just another job for the citizen soldier, but the value connected to this role-perception differ from those of the warrior (Johansen et al. 2013: 863). A soldier with a role-perception of a citizen soldier would be motivated by a greater good that surpasses their personal interests (Johansen et al. 2013:836). This greater good will be embedded in the society that the Armed Forces spring from and reflect the values in the civil society. Thus, the values of the citizen soldier should reflect the values of the civil society (Haaland 2008:8). For the Norwegian Army today, this is assumed to include the peace nation sentiment, as well as the egalitarian, humanitarian and democratic values described in section 3.1.

The role-perception of a citizen soldier has strong historical roots in Norway, both within the Armed Forces and in society at large (Johansen et al. 2013:863). During the Cold War it was seen as the dominating role-perception among Norwegian soldiers (Johansen 2013:19, Johansen et al. 2013b:5). An idealistic military, based on strong collectivism, patriotism and altruistic values were fostered (Ulriksen 2002). Additionally, and in line with Norwegian egalitarian tradition, political leadership has for a long period of time sought to promote equality within the Armed Forces, as well as a mirroring of the population through broad conscription (Kristiansen 2002:24). This is in line with what Janowitz (1960) prescribes in his “model of convergence”, where democratic ideals and attitudes are fostered within the military and used to ensure civilian control. One could therefore expect that soldiers with this role-perception would also identify as belonging to a peace nation and give value to that affiliation while doing their part as military personnel and soldiers in an international coalition.

With the role-perception of a citizen soldier the overall purpose for a soldier is to protect their homeland and contribute to nation-building. Their main emphasis is dependent upon the

dominant values in the society that the Armed Forces are set to serve, such as democracy, liberal and humanitarian values (Haaland 2008:11). Their core value is as similar to the values in the civil society as possible, and civil control is to be achieved by recruitment from all layers of the population, and a common education. This has normally been achieved through conscription (Heier 2013: 229-230).

Furthermore, they will probably value civilian problem-solving techniques and appreciate the ability to think outside “the box”. While the warrior hopes to gain a reputation for being professional by international peers, the citizen soldier would rather appreciate a reputation of being able to solve problems and overcome challenges even though this is done in an unconventional and creative manner. Civilian skills are therefore valued. Additionally, soldiers with the role-perception of a citizen soldier will probably take pride in representing Norway when they meet soldiers and civilians in an international context, whether it is in exercises or in various operations.

Soldiers prescribing to this role-perception definitely share values with society at large, and probably also care about the legitimacy of the Army in general, and the operations they participate in, by the larger domestic audience. They would therefore probably need another motivation for potentially taking or sacrificing lives than it just being part of their duty. Contrary to the warrior, a citizen soldier will need an explicit overarching and idealistic goal embedded in the values of civil society to be willing to risk sacrificing their lives (Haaland 2009:71).

For the citizen soldier the peace nation sentiment will be more prominent, and they will care to a greater extent than the warrior about the political purpose behind the operation. One such purpose can be that the operation provides learning and skill development to be used at a later stage in the context of protection of the homeland, as they probably see at their main task. However, it may also imply that the operation itself needs to be well founded and infused with idealistic and humanitarian ideals. Their willingness to sacrifice their own life will be lower than that of the warrior and they will need an explicit reason for doing so. This reason could be that it is necessary to defend the homeland, or because the mission in itself seems vital and that the political reasoning or motivation for contributing in an international coalition have resonated down to the soldiers on a personal level. Civilian traits are more highly valued, than for the warrior presented above. The citizen soldier will probably place

high value on the ability to think outside the box in order to deescalate crisis by using unconventional methods derived from the civilian life. Like for the warrior comradery and unity is important, but equally important is their overall purpose and support from the domestic audience and politicians.

3.3.1. Expected empirical findings

Based on this description of a citizen soldier I expect the soldiers subscribing to this particular role-perception to perceive themselves as originating from an egalitarian, open, democratic and humanitarian peace nation. They will probably view themselves as problem-solvers, working on behalf of the Norwegian population. Furthermore, they will, contrary to the warrior, care about where they are deployed and how the domestic debate about the utilization of the Armed Forces is developing.

From this we can deduce a systematized concept of what a soldier subscribing to this role-perception will perceive as his or her role:

S₂: A soldier with a role-perception of a citizen soldier will perceive her/himself as belonging an army that is primarily designed to defend “King and fatherland”, and he/she will do so by mirroring the values prevailing within the Norwegian society in general.

4. Methodology

This chapter will present and discuss the methodological decisions made in order to answer the research question. It will start with a brief account of what type of study this is. Then it will present some precise and specific indicators, operationalising the systematized concepts derived from the theoretical framework presented above. The indicators will be used in the interview guide presented in appendix 1 and 2. The operationalisations will be accounted for, and the validity and reliability of the indicators and the research-process will be discussed. Thereafter the discussion will move to the method of data-gathering, namely, focus groups and individual interviews. This chapter will end with a discussion on the most important ethical considerations.

4.1. Case study research

In order to answer the research question and find out how these exogenous changes in the security environment affected the soldier's role-perception, this thesis will utilize several different sources and combine different approaches. It is the internal thoughts and feelings connected with being a soldier that is under investigation. The nature of this topic lends itself to a qualitative approach, where an open methodological orientation is employed to gain depth and density of information (Søderberg and Wedell-Wedellsborg 2008:187).

This thesis will utilize semi-structured interviews as its main data-gathering technique. This will enable me to gain depth and density of information, regarding the current role-perception among future military leaders, while also ensuring that the responses can be compared across interviews (Converse and Presser 1989:33-35, Beckmann and Hall 2013:193). Additionally, I will utilize secondary sources to evaluate how the role-perception might have changed after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This project can therefore best be described as an exploratory case study (Gerring 2017:65-68), where the two periods will be compared and possible changes in role-perception caused by exogenous changes in the security climate will be investigated. The study is exploratory because it aims to shed light on whether or not the role-perception has changed, as well as briefly evaluate the competing reasons for why the change, or no change, has occurred.

The goal is not primarily to generalize, as the methodological framework is not best suited for that purpose, but to maximize internal validity. This thesis will inquire how future leaders in the Norwegian Army, who will partake in the future development of the profession and the organization, view their own role. Even though the aim of this thesis is not primarily generalization, it can still be described as providing analytical generalization (Andersen 2010:105). Analytical generalization implies that the theoretical argument for what we are investigating, role-perception among our interviewees, and what we seek to generalize to, the Army, is similar (Andersen 2010:105, Harrits et al. 2010:148). Here, I make an assumption that the role-perception of my informants, future leaders, will reflect the role-perception of the Army based on two lines of reasoning. First, because they belong to a highly selected group, they seemingly inhabit the qualities the Army is currently searching for. Second, because they

have been, and are, leaders in the Norwegian Army and therefore the ones who will partake in shaping the role-perception in the future.

According to Hellevik (2002:17) another research criteria is replicability; that the procedures are made so explicit that the research is possible to reproduce. With qualitative research, as in this thesis, this is often hard to do (Dahler-Larsen 2008:82). The replicability of this research is limited because of two reasons. First and foremost, my informants are anonymous, this will be discussed further in section 4.7.. Second, role-perception, as previously stated, is a subjective phenomenon and might change over time. Role-perception is assumed to be influenced by the security landscape, policies, societal change and so on (Brunborg 2008:20, Johansen 2013:1). Thus, even if this thesis provide evidence for one dominating role-perception, this might change at later dates. However, even though the answers might change over time, I must be sure that these potential changes occur due to exogenous factors, and not as a result of reliability problems, connected to the way I as an interviewer ask questions or interpret answers (Mosley 2013:25). This discussion will continue below in section 4.5. and 4.6.. Additionally, the procedure, which will be accounted for in detail in this chapter, will be explicitly explained so that it can be tested again, on new populations (Andersen 2010:98, 112). This means that in principle the research is replicable, however in practice this might be difficult because of the reasons laid out above.

The strengths of qualitative research such as this, is that it provides an opportunity to gain information on the personal level, that we otherwise would not get (Mosley 2013). This strengthens internal validity. While other data gathering techniques, such as a standardized questionnaire, might strengthen the replicability and generalizability of the results, it is not as well suited to capture personal feelings and sentiments, which might be considered sensitive, which is important in this line of research (Cammet 2013). A further discussion of how I dealt with sensitive topics in the interview setting will follow below.

4.2. Indicators, validity and reliability

Based on the theoretical framework described in Chapter 3, two systematized concepts were presented of what could be considered the core of each of the contrasting role-perceptions, the warrior-perception, S_1 , and the perception of a citizen soldier, S_2 . These systematized concepts

are based on the background concept of role-perception, defined in section 1.2. (Adcock and Collier 2001).

The next step is to take the systematized concepts of the two ideal types of role-perceptions, S₁ and S₂, and operationalize these into indicators. These indicators, which will be more precise and specific compared to the systematized concepts, will be used to develop the interview guide, which is our measurement instrument (Hellevik 2002:50-51). The indicators will also be used in Chapter 5, to analyse the results from the interview research. The indicators presented below are derived from the discussion in Chapter 3 and are closely related to Haaland's framework (2008:7-8, 11, 252-253), with the modifications accounted for in Chapter 3.

For the role-perception of a **warrior** I assumed S₁:

A soldier with a role-perception of a warrior will perceive her/himself as belonging to an army that is professional, distanced from civil society and he/she will value military unity, professionalism and skills.

According to this view of the role of a soldier in the Army, we can assume that:

1. Their purpose is to be a security policy instrument, and accordingly to fight wars.
2. They have a high willingness to take and sacrifice life, as it is seen as a natural part of their profession; their duty.
3. They, to some extent, exist outside the civil society. They do not care how they, or their missions, are viewed by the general public, as long as there are enough resources and support for them to be able to do their job.
4. The development of internal cohesion and values such as loyalty, camaraderie, and professionalism is important.
5. They want to be perceived by foreign troops as being professional and highly skilled soldiers.

For the role-perception of a **citizen soldier** I assumed S₂:

A soldier with a role-perception of a citizen soldier will perceive her/himself as belonging an army that is primarily designed to defend "King and fatherland", and he/she will do so by mirroring the values prevailing within the Norwegian society in general.

According to this view of the role of a soldier in the Army, we can assume that:

1. Their purpose is to protect the homeland, its people and its values, including humanitarian values, from external threats.
2. Their willingness to take and sacrifice life depends to a great extent on how meaningful the mission seems, and how relevant it is in the context of indicator 1.
3. They care about their own and the mission's legitimacy in the civil society.
4. They value civilian skills and ideas such as tolerance, equality and individuality. Broad recruitment is seen as important to mirror the population.
5. They want to be perceived by foreign troops as being representatives of Norway.

These indicators (1-5) also need to be valid, meaning that they measure what they are supposed to measure (Adcock and Collier 2001:529). Adcock and Collier (2001:531) argue that a measurement is valid, when the scores derived from an indicator can be interpreted in terms of the systematized concept that the indicator seeks to operationalize. First and foremost, we need to evaluate if the indicators capture all the dimensions of the systematized concepts, the role-perception of a warrior and a citizen soldier, and that we have not omitted any important indicators or included something that is not supposed to be there (Adcock and Collier 2001).

The indicators cover five aspects; what is the main purpose of a soldier, what values do they see as important, how their relationship with the civil society is, if there is a high or low willingness to take and potentially sacrifice life, and how they want to be perceived. These seem in face-value, and according to the theoretical framework from Chapter 3 to be covering the most distinct features of these two role-perceptions. They reflect how the warrior sees her/his role as an effective apolitical instrument, while the citizen soldier feels a stronger ideological and nationalistic tie to the homeland.

If key elements are omitted, this can become problematic since we do not measure all relevant aspects of the two role-perceptions. However, these indicators appear to capture the most relevant aspects of the two role-perceptions. Additionally, they seem to not include irrelevant elements, even though indicator number two and five warrants an extra discussion in this regard. Indicator number five, how they want to be perceived, could be argued to be a logical consequence of the other indicators. Nevertheless, I choose to include it because it can say something about how they want to present themselves, which might be different from what they see as their main purpose or the values they cherish. Thus, Indicator five ought to be

included. Indicator two, covering the soldier's willingness to take and sacrifice life, also appear to be partly covered by indicator number one. However, indicator two can say something about how deep-felt the potential role-perceptions are. If they perceive themselves as warriors but have a high threshold for taking and sacrificing life, this could indicate that they might not be warriors at heart, but rather that they aspire to be warriors, or there might be other reasons for why they perceive themselves as an apolitical security policy instrument.

These indicators thus seem to reflect the systematized concepts, S_1 and S_2 , to a sufficient degree. However, in addition to being valid, the measurement also needs to be reliable, which means that repeated measures will provide the same result (McDonald 2005:939).

Conditioned on that what it is supposed to measure does not change, a measurement, here the interview guide, is reliable if it produces the same results over and over again (Andersen 2010:101). In interview research, for the reasons explained above regarding replicability, this will be difficult. However, the questions need to mean the same to every respondent and not be open to interpretation. There needs to be consistency in the measurement (Andersen 2010:101). Even though we now have concluded that the indicators are valid and captures all the important dimensions of the systematized concepts presented above, we need to also make sure that the indicators and thus, the interview guide, means the same to every respondent. Furthermore, I as the interviewer might introduce errors. As long as these errors are random, meaning that they do not bias the results, only increase the uncertainty associated with them, they are not very problematic. In that regard systematic errors are of greater concern, that is if the indicators and the interview guide do not reflect the systematized concept (Andersen 2010:102). Thus, it is not just the indicators that need to be valid, the way they are translated into questions can also produce errors. This discussion will continue in section 4.5. and 4.6..

4.3. The sample

Sampling involves selecting a subset of elements from the universe or population of all such relevant elements (Lynch 2013:38). In this thesis the universe is made up of soldiers employed in the Norwegian Army. These individuals also represent the unit of analysis, because it is they that I wish to say something about and they that constitutes the Norwegian Army. The sample is drawn from students currently enrolled at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC) and the Norwegian Military Academy (NMA), and

not soldiers in the Army as such. The sample consists of seven interviewees from NORDCSC and ten interviewees from the NMA, see appendix 6. These informants are not randomly selected, but rather purposely selected. Random selection is seen as the gold standard for making causal inferences and generalizations (Lynch 2013:39), and since our sample is not randomly selected it cannot be said to be the best suited for making generalizations or inferences. Random sampling in this setting was not chosen because it is hard to get a comprehensive list of all individuals currently employed in the Army, and it is not feasible due to budgetary and time constraints to interview a random sample of them. In addition, to properly control for potential random sampling bias, the number of people that needed to be interviewed exceeded what is possible in the time frame of this thesis. The sample could therefore not be labelled as “typical” for the population as a whole but is selected based on other qualities (Lynch 2013:31).

Purposive sampling involves selecting elements of a population according to some specific characteristics deemed relevant to the analysis (Lynch 2013:41). Our sample is selected because of two main arguments. First of all, they are selected because of their positions – they will be a part of shaping the role-perception in the future, given their positions as leaders in the Army. Second, they have been in the Army for a period of time, are highly selected and therefore provide an indication of the traits that the current leaders are looking for in a soldier and future officers. They have all gone through several tough selection phases, been evaluated several times and it could be argued that they represent the requirements and standards that the Army is currently searching for.

In addition to being purposely selected, the interviewees have volunteered to be a part of this research project. That participation in the project was on a voluntary basis was partly to gain access, and because I am researching human subjects which cannot be forced to participate (Lynch 2013:43-44). This could also affect the results, but is vital because of research ethics, discussed in section 4.7 (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013:86-87). Because the interviewees volunteered this could induce self-selection bias, which means that the role-perception of those wanting to participate could influence whether they participated in the study or not. If this is the case, those participating in the study might differ from those not participating.

Out of a total of 16 Army students enrolled at NORDCSC only seven volunteered to be part of the research project. Two declined the response. One participant declined due to not having

worked directly with the Army for a longer period of time, and the other for undisclosed reasons. Self-selection bias could imply that my sample actually is more open to engaging with civil society, which I represent, and that they therefore lean more towards the role-perception of a citizen soldier than those who declined my request. A chance to engage with civil society was actually mentioned as one of the main reasons for why they volunteered by three out of ten interviewees from the NMA (Appendix 6 Interview 1c, 4b and 4c NMA). One of my interviewees from the NORDCSC said that if I did not have any experience with the Army before it was the interviewees mission to leave me with a good impression (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC). This in turn, implies that my sample could be biased towards a subgroup prescribing to the role-perception of a citizen soldier who values openness and legitimacy more than their warrior counterparts. Keeping in mind that the sample could be somewhat biased, inferences drawn to the universe of students at the NORDCSC and the NMA must be made with great caution.

In order to determine how large the sample should be to adequately address the research question, I sought to find the point of saturation (Kvale 1997:108). Together with exogenous restraints such as time, I wanted to reach the number of people necessary in order to get the information needed, so that additional interviews would not provide any new knowledge or insights (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013:91, Harrits et al. 2010:165-166). When trying to strike a balance between internal validity, enhanced by repeated interviews, and external validity, enhanced by a wider sample, I choose not to conduct repeated interviewees, unless something was unclear in the first interview (Mosley 2012:26).

Patton (2002) argues that if we wish to understand a phenomenon in depth, few but information-rich interviews might be preferred. However, when the study is exploratory, such as this, a greater number of interviews should be conducted, to document diversity and properly grasp the degree of heterogeneity (Patton 2002). Since this research aims to be exploratory as well as getting “under the skin” of the respondents, I employed both focus groups and individual interviews. This is also the reason why I sought to get interviewees both from the NMA and the NORDCSC, seeing that these two groups might not reflect the same way on the question of role-perception. Students at the NORDCSC is assumed to generally have a greater level of reflection and understanding of the political sphere they work in, because they are older, more experienced and have higher education than their counterparts at the NMA.

For the reasons explained above the “ideal” number of informants had to be a discretionary decision on my part, as the author. The decision was made on the basis of two considerations; when did the interviews stop providing new and useful information, and, sadly, the practical consideration of how many people I could get in contact with. I set out with the intention of getting 20 respondents in total, 10 from each of these institutions. I ended up with 17, and even though it is a lower number than originally anticipated, I still seemed to reach the point of saturation. Given that no new information was obtained in the last interviews, but rather the same sentiments were conveyed in a slightly different manner.

4.4. Individual interviews and the focus groups

Qualitative interviews are normally utilized because researchers are interested in how the interviewees, here the soldiers, view the world, how they frame their actions, and the meaning that these individuals impose on the social relationship of the Army and the civilian sphere (Fog 2004:11, Kvale 1997:40-46, Harrits et al. 2010:145). This thesis will utilize both focus groups and individual interviews. The reason I choose to utilize both individual interviews and focus groups is because these two types of interviews have some inherent differences regarding what purpose they are best suited for; these differences will be presented below. To use the two types of interviews in combination was considered the best approach in order to answer the research question. In addition, I found that it was easier to get access to the busy students enrolled at these two institutions when I could be flexible regarding time and format of the interviews. Both the focus groups and the individual interviews were executed based on the same semi-structured interview guide, thus opening up for comparison.

The individual interview is well suited when the research requires data on the individual level as it gives the interviewees a chance to elaborate on their views and it provides the interviewer with the possibility for asking sensitive or confidential questions (Harrits et al. 2010:149). Individual interviews gave my interviewees the chance to answer more truthfully than they might otherwise have done when under the social control of peers listening in. However, social control did not seem to affect my interviewees in the focus groups and there were at times lively and intriguing debates.

The focus group are best suited to gather information on group level, such as how they interact, which norms govern the group, and how they collectively interpret and give meaning to their role as soldiers (Bloor et al. 2001:89-90). The pros of the focus group interviews are therefore that the interviewees can play-off each other`s answers. A mutual discussion might make them think of issues in a different light and reflect on their answers. A discussion will also shed light on what they want to present publicly as their role-perception (Bloor et al. 2001:22). In addition, the interview will be comparable to their everyday situation because the interviewees do interact with each other on a regular basis (Bloor et al. 2001:22).

To compliment the focus groups with individual interviews still seemed to be a good precaution. In a group setting each participant will not be able to say as much, they might suffer from self-censorship, and one person could be the informal leader of the group and might dictate the answers of the others (Harrits et al. 2010:164). The composition of the focus group is people that know each other, and this too can influence the interaction (Bloor et al. 2001:20). They are classmates and future colleagues, as well as competitors for the same jobs within a relatively small organization. This might inhibit them from expressing themselves freely because they can be held responsible for their statements by peers after the interview is finished (Bloor et al. 2001:22-24). After conducting the interviews, I felt that the focus group setting was not as inhibiting as originally anticipated. The interviewees were critical of each other`s reasoning and asked each other questions. They were often inclined to agree as well as disagree when they saw fit to do so.

4.5. The interview guide

In making this interview guide and conducting the interviews, several aspects regarding validity and reliability needed to be accounted for (Mosley 2013:21). In interview research concerns regarding reliability and validity revolve around whether or not the researcher manages to ask the right questions, or ask them in the right way, as well as if the interviewees offer truthful answers (Mosley 2013:21). Thus, both the interview guide and the conduction of the interviews could impede on the quality of the results. Below I will discuss the interview guide and the next section will discuss the interview setting.

The ambition of the semi-structured interview is to create an interview that leaves the interviewees space to articulate their perceptions and interpretations, while at the same time covering the subjects of the interview guide (Mosley 2013:9, Leech et al. 2013:210). The interview guide is therefore structured with open-ended questions, and a number of probes, ensuring that all interviews covered the same topics. The communicative style of the interview made it possible to get in-depth information about the answers which were most interesting, making sure that the interviewees had the same understanding of each question, and that no alternative thoughts and considerations were left out (Kvale 1997:129, Converse and Presser 1989:33-35, Beckmann and Hall 2013:193). Furthermore, the interview guide needed to relate back to the indicators presented above and the systematized concepts of the two role-perceptions (Mosley 2013:22, Beyers et al. 2014:175-177).

The sequence of the questions is also important. In the interview literature it is recommended to start with a so-called “icebreaker question” (Leech et al. 2013, Converse and Presser 1986:40-41). After having the interviewees briefly summarize their military careers, the first question in the interview guide is meant to be open and broad so that the respondents may reflect around what they believe to be overall purpose of the soldier, the Norwegian Army, and the Norwegian Armed Forces. An advantage of starting with broad questions is to bring the theme of the interview to the front of the interviewees mind, and thus ease the answering of the other more concrete questions (Beckmann and Hall 2013:205). Additionally, I sought to keep all questions in the present tense. This was done because I am primarily interested in their current thoughts and reflections, but also to not strain their memories (Shaffer and Presser 2003:71, Beyers et al. 2014:77-78).

I placed the more sensitive questions, such as those about taking and sacrificing life, at the end of the interview (Converse and Presser 1986:41, Cammet 2014). This is done to make sure that I have a good *rappport* with my interviewees, hopefully making them answer more truthfully about their personal views.

Some of the questions in my interview-guide could be said to have standardized answers provided by the general organization, because they to some extent also appear in recruitment-settings. One example is the question regarding values, see appendix 1 and 2. To get underneath these standardized phrases and formulations was an important task for me as an interviewer. The interview guide also helps in this regard, by asking questions that can be

viewed as similar, touching the same topic from different angles, as well as containing several probes.

I have also included a question on how the interviewees would react if they were asked to participate in a controversial mission abroad. When asking such hypothetical questions, we risk hypothetical answers (Converse and Presser 1986:23-25). However, I have chosen to include this question since I am not primarily interested in the yes/no answer per se, as I assume regardless of role-perception that they would in fact participate. Rather, I am interested in how the interviewees reflect around participation in such mission in general and hoped that this question would provoke a discussion.

The language is also important. The interview guide needs to be understood in the same way by all respondents and be neutral. It is recommended to avoid jargon, and to keep the language simple and unambiguous (Converse and Presser 1986:10-11, Blair et al. 2014:204-20, Beyers et al. 2014:179, Beckmann and Hall 2013:205). It is common practice and highly recommended to test interview guides before they are used, this has been done on fellow students at the University of Oslo, and previous colleagues in the Army (Blair et al. 2014:252). The prime consideration of the pretesting phase was the language, and I was particularly interested in how they interpreted the questions. Since the purpose of my interviews is to examine my interviewees understanding of themselves *vis-à-vis* the civil society, my interview guide contains several why and how questions (Beckmann and Hall 2013:198-199). If I, however, were interested in how the events truly unfolded or objective knowledge, this would not be advisable (Leech et al. 2013:219).

At the end of the interview the interview guide provides the interviewees a chance to make a final statement and comments, which could provide valuable insight both in regard to what the interviewees deem most important and if there are some things I could have included but did not (Leech et al. 2013:218). These types of questions are also good to include out of respect for the interviewees (Jensenius 2014, MacLean 2013). By asking this question I got extra knowledge about what interested the interviewees the most, and also what they saw as the most important questions. This was important in order for me to interpret their previous answers. For instance, one of my interviewees who said that respect from civil society was not important, actually used this opportunity to talk about respect for veterans and Veterans

Day, which might imply that the interviewee actually do care how veterans and soldiers are viewed by the general public (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC).

4.6. The interview setting

How the interviews are conducted might impede both validity and reliability of the results. By viewing the interview guide as a tool for the interviewer, I tried to make sure to cover all the relevant topics in every interview, while at the same time allowing each interview to vary a little. This can provide a greater internal validity at the expense of reliability (Mosley 2013:18, Leech et al. 2013:217). In this context the validity and reliability could be impeded if I, as the interviewer, ask questions differently, or ask them in a leading manner. Trying to stick to the interview guide and having balanced questions; not putting answers in respondent's mouth, was therefore essential.

Furthermore, the interviewer must make sure to be present in the conversation and actively listen to the respondent. I needed to make sure I paid attention to the interviewees and followed up with appropriate probes. If I were to ask questions, or probe, about an issue that had already been answered, this would probably make the interviewee feel that I was wasting his or her time (Leech et al. 2013:216-218). In order to make sure I was present in the conversation and that the information collected in the interviews was accurate, thus reliable, I choose to record every interview (Leech et al. 2013:220). This of course could only be done if the interviewees were comfortable with the conversation being recorded. While two of my interviewees had concerns regarding anonymity, everyone signed the consent form and was comfortable with me recording the conversation. During most of the interviews it seemed like the interviewees forgot that the tape recorder was there, the exception was one interviewee who on two occasions turned it off. While nothing of relevance for this thesis was said during this time, I believe it was a comfort for my interviewees knowing that they could turn it off if they saw it fit to do so. Furthermore, I needed to make sure that I also recorded the metadata; information about the overall tone and context of the interview (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013). Recording the interviews freed me from taking notes frenetically and I could focus on noting meta-data and being present in the interviews. As far as possible I tried not to schedule interviews back-to-back, to give myself some time to digest what had been said in the

interviews (Mosley 2013:25), however in some instances this was unavoidable, see appendix 6.

The interpretations of the answers might also possibly impede the reliability (Mac Lean 2013). I therefore had to be careful regarding my interpretations of the answers. “Hearing what you want to hear” is both a problem of validity and reliability (Mosley 2013: 22, 25). I therefore needed to write down my own thoughts and expected findings, so that I was aware of them prior to meeting the interviewees, see appendix 3. To think through potential answers to the interview questions is a tip from the survey literature with great value also to an interviewer (Blair et al. 2014:203-204). This is good both in regard to validity; asking the right and relevant questions and being aware of the potential bias that I could introduce in interpreting the answers. My interviews were conducted in Norwegian, and I had to think through how I translated the responses to English, to not impede on the validity and reliability. In translating the answers, I tried to keep the original meaning and sentiment, while at the same time making it sound proper English. When I have translated a direct quote, I have placed the original, Norwegian, quote in a footnote.

Another issue that might impede the replicability of a study is that different scholars might receive different answers (Mosley 2013:25). This issue is difficult to guard against, however by triangulating my findings with secondary literature I hope to ward off this problem to at least some extent. One thing I considered was that I as a civilian might not be able to make the interviewees feel that they could confide their private thoughts and reflections with me. This is one of the reasons that I decided to tell them that I had some prior experience with the Army: Serving two years in the north of Norway, from 2010 until 2012. Hopefully, the potential difference between the answers I obtain, and answers obtained by others will be due to exogenous changes in role-perception, and not due to how I asked or interpreted the questions.

4.7. Ethical considerations

Because this research involves human subjects there are also ethical considerations that might impinge on transparency and replicability (Brooks 2013:46). This project was reported to the NSD, *personvernombudet for forskning*, and several principles to ensure the protection and

minimal *risk* for my interviewees had to be followed (Brooks 2013:46, 51-53). First and foremost, I needed to ensure that my interviewees had been respected, and I needed to gather *informed consent*, see appendix 4 and 5. Thus, I had to make sure that the interviewees knew that I was approaching them in the capacity of a researcher, that the conversation and interview was part of a research project, what I intended to do with the information, and that they had a chance to decline participation. In this study the interviewees were also promised anonymity. Some of my questions were personal, and role-perception is arguably a sensitive and personal concept. Anonymity also eased access to the interviewees. If some of my interviewees had diverging views from what the Army sees as their standard it would not be reported who said what in the interview setting. Also, anonymity, albeit hindering replicability, could help to ensure truthfulness. Thus, increasing validity. These individuals are all aspiring to be future leaders of the Norwegian Army and having said something controversial in an interview might be a hinder to their future careers.

5. Findings and analysis

I am a heart-warrior – Interview 6 NORDCSC¹⁰

First and foremost, the Norwegian soldiers are people, just like you and me. They differ as much as my fellow students and I, but therein lies the premise of this thesis: My fellow students and I might not differ that much after all. We go to the same university, study the same topics in the same reading room, and deal with the same issues and problems. For instance, not falling on the ice and snow covering the roads during the winter season. The soldiers that I interviewed were indeed different, however they still had a great deal in common. Some of them even pointed it out by saying that they had been indoctrinated, in addition to “growing up” within the same organization (Appendix 6 Interview 3b and 4c NMA, Interview 4 NORDCSC). Although they have different backgrounds and different experiences in different units, they might have shared some preferences when they first went into the organization.

¹⁰ «Altså jeg er en sånn hjertekriger» - Interview 6 NORDCSC appendix 6.

The Army is a workplace that differs from many other professions. One of its many characteristics is that it recruits young people, 18 to 20-year olds, and work to keep them within the organization for as long as possible. As such, young people are susceptible to the internal organization culture, and are in a way sculpted into the organization (Edström et al. 2010:6). However, the soldiers also bring with them their own thoughts, feelings, experiences and preferences (Manekin 2017:610). Thus, the differences and similarities are exactly what makes them interesting to study. The current role-perception is assumed to spread down the organizational hierarchy from these future and present leaders to the new recruits and conscripts, which in turn will develop the role-perception further.

After conducting the interviews two main findings materialized. First of all, the soldiers could be labelled citizen soldiers at heart. This was especially visible among the younger and more inexperienced interviewees from the Norwegian Military Academy, who seemed to search more vigorously for an idealistic purpose. The importance placed on professionalism and their role as apolitical tools for the Norwegian government increased with number of deployments abroad as well as years of experience.

In this chapter I intend to present my findings and analyse if the role-perception of a warrior, thought to have emerged within the Norwegian Army during the operation in Afghanistan (2006-2012) is still valid. In order to make the analysis transparent and trustworthy I will present not just what was being conveyed in the interviews, but also the intensity of responses, so that my analysis can be evaluated by peers (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013:95). I will start by presenting and analysing the findings from the interviews conducted with students at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC). Thereafter, the findings from the Norwegian Military Academy (NMA) will be presented and analysed. The structure of this chapter is based on the five indicators presented in section 4.2. The chapter will end with a summary and a preliminary conclusion of what can be said to be the currently dominating role-perception among my interviewees from both institutions.

5.1. The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)

There were seven interviewees from the NORDCSC; six men and one woman¹¹. I conducted five individual interviews and one group interview (Appendix 6 NORDCSC). All of my interviewees joined the Army during the 1990s, giving them about 20 years of experience. They joined the military in a period where the Army slowly moved away from the Cold War scenario and became more expeditionary. Thus, the seven interviewees from the NORDCSC “grew up” in an organization with a gradually increasing focus on international deployments. The interviewees were older and more experienced than the interviewees from the NMA and all of them had participated in missions abroad. The majority had been deployed several times, both in Kosovo and Afghanistan. They were also very much involved in their education and were in many ways students just like myself; worried about exams and a pending thesis¹². In the next sections I will go through their responses to my questions and tie the responses to the indicators from section 4.2. Section 5.1.6. will present a preliminary conclusion of what role-perception was dominant among the interviewees from the NORDCSC.

5.1.1. Purpose of the Army

All seven of my interviewees from the NORDCSC stated that they believed the main purpose of the Army, the Armed Forces, and the soldier was to protect the homeland. They mentioned sovereignty and national integrity in this regard. Less focus was placed on values as such, with only one mentioning it (Appendix 6 Interview 5 NORDCSC). The protection of values was more important to the interviewees from the Norwegian Military Academy, especially among those who had served in the Army for a relatively short period. The fact that my interviewees from the NORDCSC labelled protection of the homeland as their main purpose might imply that they are citizen soldiers. Most of them pointed to international operations as a second priority meant to contribute to the safeguarding of Norway by strengthening ties to allies in NATO and the United States (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b, 2, 3 and 6 NORDCSC).

¹¹ Since it is not the purpose of this thesis to investigate gender differences, and out of concern for the anonymity of the relatively few female interviewees both at NORDCSC and the NMA, I have chosen not to reveal the gender of my interviewees.

¹² It is worth noting that not all of my interviewees were going to write a master thesis of their own.

In addition to stating protection of the homeland as the Army's *raison d'être*, three of my interviewees also stated that they, as soldiers, were instruments to be used where the politicians saw fit (Appendix 6 Interview 2, 4 and 5 NORDCSC).

A third also pointed to the fact that they do what is asked of them by the political leadership and used this to justify more controversial missions. "We never take on missions on its own, or because the Army thinks it is fun or interesting" (Appendix 6 Interview 5 NORDCSC)¹³. The interviewee continued to say that it would be wrong to state a main purpose as it was not their decision to make where the Army should deploy or what they should do. There are two comments that needs to be made in regard to this statement. First, the argument fits with what Haaland (2008:10-11, 257) identifies as a trend among soldiers to distance themselves from the role-perception of a mercenary; a soldier who fights wars for profit with no connection to political authorities in Norway. Second, it could be seen as a result of a warrior-perception; their purpose is to be an instrument but since they are not robots striped of emotions they do not take pleasure in fighting wars (Mood 2017:169). Warfighting is simply the results of them doing their duty as the managers of organized violence on behalf of the Norwegian state.

Nevertheless, only three out of seven interviewees described themselves as instruments, and one of those stated that the reason for participating abroad was to fulfil the Army's core function of protecting Norway: "We have a greater focus on national defence now, for many reasons, and we have always wanted to have that, but because of problems selling that idea to allies. That we shall sit at home and wait for something that has not yet happened [we participate]" (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC)¹⁴.

None of them had any illusions of what their mission was in Afghanistan (Godal et al. 2010, Østerud 2013). Meaning that their job was primarily to strengthen allied ties, not state-

¹³ «... og uansett det vi gjør er jo basert på hvilke oppdrag, eller hva det er politikerne beslutter at vi skal gjøre. Vi gjør jo aldri ting fordi at Forsvaret eller Hæren syns at det her er artig eller det her er interessant. Det er jo, altså vi får jo et oppdrag fra politikerne som vi løser. Så jeg vil si at det er ikke noe forskjell på de to. Begge er like viktig.» Interview 5 NORDCSC appendix 6

¹⁴ «vi har mer fokus på hjemlige trakter nå av mange årsaker, vi har vel alltid hatt lyst til å ha det. Men på grunn av at vi har hatt problemer med å selge det inn hos allierte, at vi skal sitte her hjemme og vente på noe som inntil nå ikke har skjedd.» Interview 2 NORDCSC appendix 6

building, democratization or fighting for equality. However, as one of my interviewees argued the fact that they “saved 200, no over 300 hostages in the period that I was there and that was six months, and that was a bit meaningful. Then it becomes meaningful” (Appendix 6 Interview 3 NORDCSC)¹⁵. Thus, it seems, and this was also evident in the interviews with students from the Norwegian Military Academy, that on a more personal note the Norwegian soldiers needs to find meaning in what they do both at home and abroad, a meaning that seemingly play of humanitarian values. This discussion will continue in section 5.2. as these sentiments were more present among students at the Norwegian Military Academy.

The interviewees all pointed to protection of the homeland as their main task, but they were also aware of their role as a tool for the Norwegian government. This indicates that they were in fact closer to the citizen soldier, than to a warrior-perception in the context of indicator one. Although they were aware of their role as instruments, some of them needed to feel that their contribution mattered on a personal level and this view, which is in line with what to be expected of a citizen soldier, was further strengthened by their answers on the rest of the questions.

5.1.2. Willingness to take and sacrifice life

The two questions tied to willingness to take and sacrifice life was intended to provoke a debate in the focus groups and bring forward reflections in the individual interviews. The first question was about what was worth fighting and possibly dying for, as their profession in the ultimate consequence entails a willingness to take and sacrifice life. The second question dealt with controversial missions abroad. How important is the mission`s legitimacy among the general public and how important is it that it makes sense to them on a personal level for their willingness to participate and risking the ultimate consequence of sacrificing their own life. The questions regarding controversial missions abroad could also be said to overlap with the indicator covering relationship with civil society. Do they, as a citizen soldier, care about the legitimacy of the mission in the general public or do they, as warriors, perceive themselves as existing outside the civil society, as a completely neutral, apolitical instrument?

¹⁵ «Reddet 200, nei over 300 gisler i perioden jeg var der da, og det var 6 måneder, og det gir litt mening. Da blir det meningsfullt da» Interview 3 NORDCSC appendix 6

Originally, I had envisioned that all the interviewees would say that they would participate if they were asked to do so. Nevertheless, when I probed about what they consider worth dying for two of them clearly stated that it was not worth dying for a vague political victory abroad (Appendix 6 Interview 3 and 6 NORDCSC). However, both of them underlined that they had previously participated in several operations abroad. Their statements, that it is not worth dying for political victories abroad, resonates well with the perception of a citizen soldier, who needs the mission to be meaningful in the context of indicator one, protection of the homeland and its values, which according to the discussion in Chapter 3 included egalitarian, humanitarian and democratic values.

One of my interviewees explained that while she/he did not go around thinking that “I shall die for King and fatherland” (Appendix 6 Interview 1a NORDCSC)¹⁶, the interviewee had questioned while being deployed; “is it worth dying in this vehicle to drive down to some place in Afghanistan that no one has ever heard of?” (Appendix 6 Interview 1a NORDCSC)¹⁷.

This is the same sentiment that another one of my interviewees expressed when she/he explained that it was impossible to say it was “worth it” when losing a friend and co-worker in Afghanistan. “If you go to Afghanistan you have to be willing to sacrifice your life, I think, but if it is worth it or not... It is never worth it” (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC).¹⁸ The interviewee continued to say that “when you sit here today and see Afghanistan in a freefall down again, then I cannot sit here and say that it was worth it. But if I theorize around it, and say that he had a job, and he was totally aware of what he went to. [...] He knew that the mission was to be a good allied to NATO, and he died. So, it is no problem rationalising it. But it is clear, if you ask his mother then she would probably think that it would be more worth it if he died on Norwegian borders than in Afghanistan...” (Appendix 6 Interview 4

¹⁶ «Men det er jo samme, jeg går jo ikke og tenker på at jeg skal dø for Konge og fedrelandet, men jeg kommer jo ikke til å slutte i jobben heller.» Interview 1a NORDCSC Appendix 6

¹⁷ «Er det verdt å daue i det kjøretøyet her for å kjøre ned i et eller annet sted i Afghanistan ingen har hørt om?» Interview 1a NORDCSC Appendix 6

¹⁸ «Hvis du drar til Afghanistan må du være villig til å ofre livet mener jeg. Om det er verdt det eller ikke ... Det er aldri verdt det» Interview 4 NORDCSC Appendix 6

NORDCSC)¹⁹. This statement underlines that the interviewee together with some of the others actually do think that there has to be some result of their labour, they have to fight for something meaningful for it to be “worth it” on a personal level. However, the same interviewee was clear that the ultimate consequence of sacrificing life was a natural part of their duty as a soldier; “whether I am wearing my uniform or not... I have taken on the responsibility to stand first in line to die for Norway’s peace and freedom” (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC)²⁰ Another interviewee said that “if you come to the conclusion that is not worth dying for, then you should find something else to do” (Appendix 6 Interview 5 NORDCSC)²¹.

Two of the interviewees that labelled themselves as instruments underlined that they have faith that Norway as a state would abide international law and not send them on “shady missions” (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC)²² as well as in the democratic institutions and governing bodies (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC)²³. One of the interviewees continued to say that if the mission were to go against everything the interviewee believed in then he/she would quit. However, the interviewee underlined that this was not a decision to be taken

¹⁹ «Når du sitter her i dag og ser at Afghanistan er i fritt fall nedover igjen så kan jeg ikke sitte å si at det var verdt det. Men hvis jeg teoretiserer rundt det så jo, han hadde en jobb og han var helt klar over hva han dro til. Oppdraget vårt og det var vi enig om, var ikke i min avdeling altså, men oppdraget der var å gjøre jobben der for å være en god alliert i NATO, og han døde. Så det er ikke noe problem å rasjonalisere det. Men det er klart at hvis du spør moren hans så ville nok hun ment at det var mer verdt det hvis han døde på Norges grenser enn i Afghanistan da, vil jeg tro» Interview 4 NORDCSC Appendix 6

²⁰ «Om jeg har uniform eller ikke, skulle jeg til å si. Så har jeg påtatt meg ansvaret for å stille meg fremst i køen for å dø for Norges fred og frihet» Interview 4 NORDCSC Appendix 6

²¹ «Hvis man begynner å vurdere sånn her, at det her er ikke verdt å dø for, da tenker jeg at da skal du finne noe annet å gjøre. Da er ikke Forsvaret riktige plassen å jobbe for deg» Interview 5 NORDCSC Appendix 6

²² «Der er vi flinke i Norge ikke sant. Vi drar ikke ut på shady operasjoner, ikke sant, men så lenge det der er internasjonal og norske frameworken og rammen er lovlig på plass så kan ikke jeg velge det vekk. Da må jeg slutte. Jeg kan velge det vekk selvfølgelig, men da må jeg slutte» Interview 4 NORDCSC Appendix 6

²³ «Jeg stiller der en lovlig valgt regjering eller storting sender meg. Og sånn må det være, ellers faller hele. Ellers må jeg slutte og det kan jeg jo selvsagt, og det kan jeg jo selvfølgelig. » Interview 2 NORDCSC Appendix 6

lightly and that there would have to be some fundamental flaws with the mission (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC)²⁴.

Three of my interviewees pointed out that if they were indeed to sacrifice their life they would rather see it be in Norway, than on a mission abroad (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b and 2 NORDCSC). However, they still underlined that if they died doing their job it would be worth it, even though that might sound morbid (Appendix 6 Interview 1b NORDCSC)²⁵. This sentiment resonated well with the responses among the other interviewees. One said “We are part of an alliance, and we go down to do something good, and we do something good as long as we are there, but when we go back home again it is the same hell anyways. So, the purpose of our actions can be debated, but then I think that I am still a soldier. I fight on behalf of the Norwegian government, and as long as Norway has a lawfully elected government and a parliament that send us here or there. Then it is pretty irrelevant if I think it is worth dying for, in Afghanistan or at home. Because I am an instrument” (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC)²⁶.

Thus, the majority of my interviewees stated, as expected, that deployments abroad is a part of their job and that they would participate. “No, I would go. If it is politically decided, then I will go” (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC)²⁷. This sentiment was also true regardless of how the mission was viewed by the general public, and it seemed irrelevant how controversial the mission might be. One of my interviewees said that it is more “fun when everyone is

²⁴ «Jeg kan jo ta hatten min og gå, og nå har jeg aldri vært i den situasjonen og det, altså hvis det står helt imot alle mine prinsipper og jeg ser at dette her er ikke verdt på noen som helst måte, ja – jeg skal ikke utelukke at jeg hadde sluttet, men det tror jeg skal mye til.» Interview 2 NORDCSC Appendix 6

²⁵ «Hvis jeg dør i utførelsen av min jobb, så er det verdt det. Altså hvis det er det som må til. Det kom ut litt feil, men altså jah...(pause) Det hørtes helt sånn morbid ut når det kom ut» Interview 1b NORDCSC Appendix 6.

²⁶ «Hvis jeg skal miste livet kunne jeg jo tenke meg å gjøre det for, her hjemme, for fedrelandet. Det er utgangspunktet, men så vil jeg si nei fordi når jeg da er på oppdrag så er jo ikke, selv om jeg reiser ut og tenker at ja, nå skal vi gjøre dette her som en del av en allianse. Vi skal ned å gjøre noe bra, og vi gjør noe bra så lenge vi står der, men når vi reiser hjem er det jo like helvetet allikevel. Så meningen med det vi gjør det kan jo diskuteres, men så tenker jeg at jeg er allikevel som soldat, så sloss jeg på vegne av nasjonen og Norge har, så lenge Norge har en lovlig valgt regjering og et storting som sender oss hit eller dit. Så er det altså ganske irrelevant om jeg mener det er verdt å dø for, nede i Afghanistan eller om det er her hjemme. Fordi jeg er et instrument.» Interview 2 NORDCSC Appendix 6

²⁷ «Nei jeg ville dratt, hvis det er politisk bestemt så drar jeg.» Interview 4 NORDCSC Appendix 6

cheering for you”, but that did not mean that the interviewee would not go if there were no cheering (Appendix 6 Interview 1b NORDCSC)²⁸. This indicates that the interviewee does care, at least to some extent how the missions are viewed by the general public. Another interviewee said that you would always have support from home (Appendix 6 Interview 1a NORDCSC)²⁹, and while this might not necessarily be the case, it conveys a need to be recognized and appreciated for the sacrifice you make while doing your duty on the behalf of the Norwegian state. Nevertheless, the majority cared more that the mission was meaningful to them personally, and that it was a lawful decision made by the Norwegian government, seeking legitimacy within the democratic system.

In conclusion, the majority of my interviewees at the NORDCSC pointed out that the potential sacrifice of life would be more meaningful on a personal level if they could have actually made a difference while being deployed, in light of the humanitarian values described in section 3.1.. Furthermore, a majority of my interviewees seemed to believe that sacrificing one’s life in Norway would be more meaningful than on a mission abroad. Additionally, it seems, as expected, that most of them would do their duty regardless of how the civilian population viewed the mission, as long as it was a political and lawful decision. Thus, my interviewees cannot be described as warriors that have a high willingness to take and sacrifice life. Although most of them see taking and sacrificing life as a natural part of their duty, they still searched for a way to provide meaning to their hypothetical sacrifice. Some mentioned that this could be found within comradeship and loyalty to one’s fellow soldiers (Appendix 6 Interview 2 and 4 NORDCSC), as entailed by the warrior-perception, but that only works insofar as you are already in a combat-situation. For most of my interviewees it therefore seems that the willingness to take, and especially sacrifice life, depends to a relatively great extent on how meaningful the mission is to them personally in the context of indicator one,

²⁸ «Altså det er hyggeligere å være med på noe når alle heier på deg og mener det du gjør er ... Det er det jo absolutt. Og jeg, det er jo klart man jah... Så det har jo noe å si. Men at det liksom ehm, at det ville gjort at du ikke ville dratt ut på det oppdraget, det tror jeg ikke.» Interview 1b NORDCSC Appendix 6

²⁹ «Du ville jo som soldat alltid få støtte hjemmefra, eller ikke alltid, men min oppfatning er at det norske samfunnet hvert fall har ... Når det har blåst mye rundt Afghanistan, for eksempel, så var det ganske stor støtte til soldatene der nede, selv om man var uenig med politikerne på en del ting, så hadde styrkene som var ute, som hadde støtte da. Det var ikke de man var ute etter, men det ligger litt i jobben vår.» Interview 1a NORDCSC Appendix 6

their overall purpose as protectors of the homeland, its people and values, including humanitarian values.

5.1.3. Relationship to the civil society

When asked about the relationship between the Army and the civil society, three of my interviewees stated that the civilian population “knows enough”, and that they do not need to have in-depth knowledge about the Norwegian Armed Forces (Appendix 6 Interview 2, 3 and 4 NORDCSC). When asked about the new personnel-reform, four of my interviewees argued that it would probably not affect the Army’s relation to the civil society since civilians simply were not that informed or had such a deep understanding of the internal workings of the Norwegian Armed Forces (Appendix 6 Interview 1a 2, 4, 5 and 6 NORDCSC). The two remaining interviewees said that they worried that if the reform was not properly implemented it might result in a class-divide or lower recruitment (Appendix 6 Interview 1b and 3 NORDCSC).

Even though these initial responses imply a certain distance between the civil society and the Army, most of my interviewees separated between detailed knowledge and overall interest for defence and security issues. Most of my interviewees agreed that it is important to have support and legitimacy from the civil society on a personal level (Appendix 6 Interview 3, 4, 5 and 6 NORDCSC). Some of them stressed the fact that support from civil society is important in a potential domestic crisis where the Army might need to rely on various support from civil society in order to do their job³⁰, while others stressed the need for support to get additional funding through the national budget and higher recruitment. This might imply a warrior-perception, since they argued that they do not care how they are viewed and how the civil society thinks of them as long as there are enough resources for them to be able to do their job.

However, even the ones that initially conveyed a certain distance to civil society, and that their ability to do their job was not based on popularity, or as one interviewee said; if they got a “pat on the back” (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC), proved to care on a personal level

³⁰ What in Norwegian has been labelled *Totalforsvarskonseptet*

how they were viewed by the general public. For instance, the same interviewee mentioned Veteran Day's at the end of the interview, and that veterans should be recognized for the job they did, their personal sacrifice, on behalf of the Norwegian population (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC). All of my interviewees either directly or indirectly underlined that that this mutual understanding, or recognition, between civil society and military personnel was important on a personal level. One interviewee also mentioned the United States as an example of how civilians support soldiers doing their job, regardless of whether or not they agree with the politicians and/or the assigned missions (Appendix 6 Interview 6 NORDCSC). Another one of my interviewees also said that it was a shame that the status of military personnel had declined over the years (Appendix 6 Interview 3 NORDCSC).

When asked about the 2011 campaign "For everything we have and everything we are" most of them meant that it was intended as a "wakeup call" to the general public for the importance of national defence (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b, 3, 4, 5, 6 NORDCSC), as well as to ease recruitment (Appendix 6 Interview 1b, 4, 5 NORDCSC), which was the answer expected by a warrior. Two interviewees said that it might work as "internal medicine" to help the Army pull in the same direction (Appendix 6 Interview 5 NORDCSC) and remember their core task as the "adventure in Afghanistan" came to a close (Appendix 6 Interview 1b NORDCSC).

Some of my interviewees also argued that the campaign might have been vital to increase the Army's legitimacy in the population. One interviewee argued that the public debate around Afghanistan had been misleading and that the general public deserved to know more, if not it could impede on the relationship between the Armed Forces and the general public, especially as the number of military personnel is low (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC). This dissatisfaction with political leadership and the lack of open debate was also repeated in other interviews (Appendix 6 Interview 2 and 5 NORDCSC) and mentioned by the interviewees from the Norwegian Military Academy. Although, there was some dissatisfaction with political leadership it is important to underline that the interviewees both from the NORDCSC and the NMA expressed trust in the Norwegian democratic institutions, as well as the military and political leadership at large, see the discussion in section 5.1.2..

So even though there can be controversy regarding missions and political decisions, it seems that my interviewees still want to be recognized for the job they do. To some extent they see themselves as existing outside civil society because one cannot expect the civilian population

to have in-depth knowledge of what a soldier does (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC), but they still want to be recognized for the job they do on behalf of the Norwegian society and this appeared to be important on a personal level. This sentiment might make them more similar to a citizen soldier than a warrior in light of indicator three; they do in fact care about their legitimacy within the population at large.

5.1.4. Values

While most of my interviewees, when asked directly, valued professionalism, ability to do their job and military skills, which is expected of soldiers with the role-perception of a warrior, some also highlighted what can best be described as values shared with the civil society, such as tolerating differences, letting know when something feels wrong and having good people skills (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 3 and 6 NORDCSC) (Haaland 2010:548). Courage was only mentioned in the context of daring to be different, trying new ways to solve problems and daring to say your piece if you felt unfairly treated, which some of my interviewees viewed as important (Appendix 6 Interview 5 and 6 NORDCSC). This interpretation of courage is not contradictory to the FFOD (2007), meaning that these values could still arguably be part of a role-perception of a warrior.

The question about broad recruitment, and specifically what the Army gains by broad recruitment, was meant to investigate if they, as warriors, simply were searching for the best, or if they, as citizen soldiers, believed that civilian skills and diversity were genuinely something that the Army could benefit from. When questioned about broad recruitment my interviewees were split. This division could be caused by the current and persisting debate about quotas and female soldiers (Høiback 2017).

While four of my interviewees argued that the Army benefits by recruiting the best people regardless of background, gender, ethnicity and so on (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 2, 4, 5 NORDCSC), four of them argued that the Army benefits by allowing different views and thoughts into the organization (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b, 3 and 6 NORDCSC). In order to illustrate this sentiment one of my interviewees pointed to a media-campaign a few years back

(Appendix 6 Interview 6 NORDCSC)³¹. In that media-campaign one could see soldiers driving a car when they come across a tree blocking the road. The male soldiers exit the car and try to lift the tree away from the road. Meanwhile, the sound of a chainsaw appears in the background and a female soldier steps forward and begins chopping the tree into smaller pieces. This is undoubtedly a more efficient way to clear the road the interviewee said. Thus, ability to think outside the box and be an innovative organization, drawing on the skills and ideas of its people, resonated well among some of my interviewees (Appendix 6 Interview 6 NORDCSC).

Additionally, three of my interviewees argued that it was important that the Army mirrored the population (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 3, 4 NORDCSC), which can be said to imply a role-perception of a citizen-soldier. However, not all of them had an equally easy time explaining what the Army actually gained by such a mirroring (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC). Overall, the majority of the interviewees argued that broad recruitment was a positive thing for the Army and the Armed Forces in general, however, some of them might have been unduly coloured by the current and persisting debate about what a soldier should be able to do, as several underlined the need to have strict physical demands which everyone has to meet regardless of gender etc. (Høiback 2017).

Interestingly, when asked directly about values they all mentioned professionalism, ability to do their job and military skills, which in the context of indicator four implies a warrior-perception. Yet, when I asked them at the end of the interview to describe themselves as soldiers they mentioned other values and skills. One said multi-tool (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC) one said inclusive, trustful and great implementation capacity (Appendix 6 Interview 3 NORDCSC)³², one said humble, skilled and jovial (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC)³³, one said heart-warrior, who is reflected and uses both brains and heart (Appendix 6 Interview 6 NORDCSC)³⁴ and one said reliable, compassionate and responsible

³¹ I, the author, have unfortunately not had any luck finding this movie online.

³² «Jeg har noen ord da som på en måte er viktig og det er inkluderende, tillitsfull og egentlig stor gjennomføringsevne» Interview 3 NORDCSC Appendix 6

³³ «Eh.. ydmyk, dyktig og jovial.» Interview 4 NORDCSC Appendix 6

³⁴ «Jeg ville kanskje sagt at jeg er en reflektert hjertekriger. Jeg leder på en måte med hode og hjertet.» Interview 6 NORDCSC Appendix 6

(Appendix 6 Interview 1a NORDCSC)³⁵. Only one said “soldier: I do things on behalf of the Norwegian government” (Appendix 6 Interview 5 NORDCSC)³⁶. My findings correlate with those of Mæland (2004) when he investigates the moral of officers deployed in Kosovo; only one of my interviews describe himself/herself as a soldier, and none of Mæland’s interviewees do this.

Thus, most of my interviewees aspire to meet the values currently tied to the profession and the warrior-perception, see Chapter 2 (Johansen 2013:20-21). Nevertheless, it cannot be swept under a rug that many of them also value what can best be described as civilian skills and ideas, and bring these values into the organization and their professional life.

As such, it seems that my interviewees are socialized into an organization that currently values a certain type of professionalism, where internal cohesion, loyalty and values viewed as distant from the civil society have a central place. While at the same time my interviewees cannot escape civilian values such as tolerance, equality and individuality, here represented by what my interviewees called courage to think outside the box and speak up when something feels wrong (Manekin 2017). The old-fashioned warrior ideals of courage and endurance is less in focus, so the discrepancy is between what most of my interviewees seem to hinge after, pure professionalism, and the civilian values, which finds footing among my interviewees. These civilian values can be said to be similar to what Johansen (2013) labels individualism and idealism.

In conclusion, it is hard to label my interviewees as having the role-perception of a warrior. Rather the warrior-perception is what most of them aspire to have, while at the same time being more like a citizen soldier who value civilian skills and ideas.

³⁵ «pålitelig, medmenneskelig og ansvarsbevisst» Interview 1a NORDCSC Appendix 6

³⁶ «Nei, jeg ville sagt at jeg var soldat. Hva er da en soldat? Nei, det er en som gjør det han får beskjed om, det han får ordre om, til og med egentlig gjør ting på vegne av norske myndigheter.» Interview 5 NORDCSC Appendix 6

5.1.5. How my interviewees want to be perceived

When asked how they wanted to be perceived by foreign troops four of my interviewees stated that they wanted to be viewed as professional (Appendix 6 Interview 2, 3, 4 and 6 NORDCSC). The others used words and phrases that can easily be fitted into a definition of professional, such as know our job, know what we are doing, experts, and skilled (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b, and 5 NORDCSC).

Three of my interviewees said that it was important to show that they were reflected (Appendix 6 Interview 3, 4 and 5 NORDCSC). One interviewee said this entailed to know “when to shoot and when not to shoot” (Appendix 6 Interview 5 NORDCSC)³⁷, which, although extremely important knowledge, could strictly speaking be seen as a military skill. However, it seemed that for the others it entailed something more. One interviewee explained it like this: “that they have thoughts about the mission, and the job they do, that is a bit beyond themselves” (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC)³⁸. The interviewee continued to state that he/she believed this to be caused by the high level of education among the Norwegian soldiers, and also emphasised the importance of showing of some features that we might perceive as distinctly Norwegian; like not having a rigid hierarchy when it is not necessary (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC)³⁹. This could be said to fit with how Janowitz (1960) envisioned civilian control over the military, and thus the perception of a citizen soldier. In addition to wanting to be perceived as professional and reflected, one of my interviewees also mentioned, honest and truthful, along with having integrity (Appendix 6 Interview 6 NORDCSC).

Even though my interviewees want to be perceived as professional and highly skilled soldiers, which were expected of soldiers with the role-perception of a warrior, they seem to put something more into the term professional than simply the ability to do their job and having

³⁷ «Det går litt på det her å vurdere når du skal skyte og når du ikke skal skyte» Interview 5 NORDCSC Appendix 6

³⁸ «At de soldatene vi har er høyt utdannet de er reflekter og har en tanke rundt oppdraget og jobben de gjør som er litt utover seg selv da» Interview 4 NORDCSC Appendix 6

³⁹ «Det er lite formelt, altså hvis jeg er major så kan en vernepliktig komme og diskutere ting med meg og det er liksom en litt sånn jah, dialog på det da og det er jo bra. Det gjenspeiler nok det lite hierarkiske samfunnet i Norge veldig, veldig bra da.» Interview 4 NORDCSC Appendix 6

military skills. To some extent they want to be perceived as having skills and values that can be found in the Norwegian population at large, and as such be perceived as being representatives of Norway. This becomes especially clear when one of my interviewees argued that the egalitarian culture of the Norwegian society can be transferred to a military setting and that the military can benefit from it (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC). My interviewees therefore appear to be closer to a role-perception of a citizen soldier than of a warrior in the context of indicator five.

5.1.6. Warriors or citizen soldiers?

After conducting the interviews, I had a feeling that the majority of my interviewees from the NORDCSC viewed themselves as warriors; tools for the government and distant from civil society. However, when I started rereading and analysing their responses I came to a different conclusion: At heart they were citizen soldiers.

Overall, it seems that my sample can be divided into two camps; the first camp contains three of my interviewees who were very outspoken about their role as a security policy instrument (Appendix 6 Interview 2,4 and 5 NORDCSC). While the other camp also accepted their role as tools, they were not as comfortable with it. All of my interviewees stated that their main purpose was to protect the homeland and had overall a low willingness to take and sacrifice life. The willingness depended on how meaningful the mission was to them on a personal level, either in connection to protecting the homeland or in connection with values such as humanitarianism. Most of my interviewees, and even those who saw themselves as instruments, said they would prefer if the sacrifice of life was made in connection to what they saw as their main task; protection of the homeland.

Their relationship to civil society seemed ambivalent. At first, they painted a picture of a certain distance from the civil society. Among other things they argued that the legitimacy for the mission was not important as long as it came from a lawfully elected government. Implying that legitimacy was derived from the democratic institutions, and not how the mission was viewed in the general public. However, it quickly became clear that they did care how the civil society viewed them as soldiers, and that the existence of mutual respect among soldiers and civilians was important on a personal level.

The same can be said regarding values. At first, they all valued professionalism, but it became clear that professionalism in their minds was compatible with civilian values and ideas, such as humanitarianism, tolerance and equality. Furthermore, when meeting foreign troops, several interviewees argued that it was important to show of Norwegian values and culture.

Thus, it seems that the interviewees from the NORDCSC rather could be described within the framework of a citizen soldier, than of a warrior. They perceived their main task to be defence of King and fatherland, and that they do so by mirroring the values prevailing within the Norwegian society in general.

5.2. The Norwegian Military Academy (NMA)

I interviewed a total of ten students from the Norwegian Military Academy, three women and seven men (Appendix 6 NMA). I conducted three group interviews and one individual interview (Appendix 6 NMA). My interviewees from the NMA started their military careers in 2009-2013, providing them with between five to ten years of military experience, although most had worked in the Army for just four or five years. Four interviewees came directly from civilian life and had just finished their conscription. Three of them had previously been deployed in Afghanistan.

Even though, the interviewees from the NMA varied a great deal, both regarding their military experience and age, the youngest being 21 and the oldest being 30, they all started their military careers right after the alleged shift towards a role-perception of a warrior described in Chapter 2. Thus, they started their military careers in an organization moving towards a new type of professionalism and with an increased expeditionary focus. In the next five sections I will go through their responses to my questions and tie the responses to the five indicators from section 4.2.. Section 5.2.6. will present a preliminary conclusion of what role-perception seemed to dominate among the interviewees from the NMA.

5.2.1. Purpose of the Army

When asked about the overall purpose of the Army, the Norwegian Armed Forces, and the soldier, all ten interviewees responded that the purpose is to protect Norway as well as Norwegian interests. When I probed what meaning they prescribed to the phrase “Norwegian interests” their answers varied and encompass a broad spectre of interest, including political and commercial interests. One interviewee talked about Norwegian aspirations to join the United Nations Security Council (Huffpost 2017), and that it might imply that the Norwegian military would have to prepare for more UN-operations in the future (Appendix 6 Interview 1b NMA). Another interviewee mentioned civilian and commercial interest abroad, such as Statoil and Telenor, which the interviewee argued might require protection by the Norwegian Army (Appendix 6 Interview 1c NMA). Thus, it seemed that they were aware of their role as instruments, as one of my interviewees said: “I feel that our role is to back up the political signals that Norway wish to give, but as the, as the institution with the brute force” (Appendix 6 Interview 3b NMA)⁴⁰.

Three of my interviewees outright described themselves as instrument for the politicians to use where they saw fit (Appendix 6 Interview 3c, 4a and 4b NMA). When asked to prioritize between national defence, missions on Norwegian soil, and missions abroad, several of my interviewees argued that participation in NATO-led missions served the same purpose as national defence, and hence were equal (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1c, and 3a NMA). One interviewee said that it would be good to strike a balance, but that both missions abroad and national defence was equally important (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA). Others argued that missions abroad were a secondary priority (Appendix 6 Interview 1b, 4a, 4b and 4c NMA). One of those who had argued that they, as soldiers, were instruments underlined that while; “we are political instruments, so it is the politicians who have to prioritize”, the interviewee still hoped, and believed, that national defence was priority number one (Appendix 6 Interview 4b NMA)⁴¹. The other two interviewees in the focus group agreed (Appendix 6 Interview 4a and 4c NMA).

⁴⁰ «så jeg føler at vår rolle er jo å bygge opp under de politiske signalene som Norge ønsker å gi, men som den, som den institusjonen som har den harde makten da» Interview 3b NMA Appendix 6

⁴¹ «Vi er jo et politisk instrument, så det er jo nesten politikerne som må ta av seg den prioriteringen. Men jeg vil jo se for meg at hvis vi hadde deployert store deler av hæren, altså sånn det var i Afghanistan lenge og vi hadde

Interestingly, the other interviewee who described himself/herself as an instrument also said that while being enrolled at the NMA the interviewees reflections regarding participations in operations abroad had changed: “I have actually understood that we have an essential role as instruments for the government, and that participation in international operations is something we do also to ensure our own safety” (Appendix 6 Interview 3c NMA)⁴². The interviewee continued to say that this was new to her/him because “I have always thought that it was something we had to do because there are others that does not have it as good as us [...] that we actually contributed with something in the world, not just thought about ourselves” (Appendix 6 Interview 3c NMA)⁴³.

This sentiment, that there should be a bigger purpose behind international deployments than just strengthening allied ties, was also echoed by another interviewee who had personal experience from Afghanistan. While sharing a story of an epiphany the interviewee had in the deserts of Afghanistan, the interviewee stated that “to just be able to contribute to making the world a little bit better, maybe, was something I wanted to fight for abroad” (Appendix 6 Interview 4b NMA)⁴⁴.

While three of them said they believed themselves to be security policy instruments, they still saw their main task as protecting the homeland, its people and interests. It also became increasingly clear over the course of the interview that this also entailed protecting humanitarian values, tied to the peace nation sentiment described in section 3.1. So, while it

fått en sikkerhetspolitisk krise i Norge, så er vel det såpass enkelt at vi hadde kalt tilbake strykene for å forsvare norsk territorium så det ligger jo som pri. en. Håper, jeg håper hvert fall det.» Interview 4b NMA Appendix 6

⁴² «... for de siste årene på krigsskolen har jeg faktisk forstått at vi har en veldig, veldig essensiell rolle som et instrument for staten, og det at vi deltar i internasjonale operasjoner er noe vi gjør også for egen sikkerhet.» Interview 3c NMA Appendix 6

⁴³ «Det var noe som jeg ikke på en måte hadde tenkt på i så stor grad, for som sivil så har jeg eh, alltid tenkt at det er noe vi må gjøre for det er andre som ikke har det like bra som oss. Som jeg egentlig har fått støtte for, ehm, men det har egentlig vært en sånn tosidig tanke hele tiden, som jeg ikke egentlig har vært klar over før de siste årene nå, når jeg først har begynt å studere på det. Men ja, poenget mitt er vel egentlig at jeg har fått støtte for den oppfatningen som jeg satt med før, da var det det at vi faktisk bidro med noe i verdensbildet, at vi ikke bare tenker på oss selv» Interview 3c NMA Appendix 6

⁴⁴ «Det husker jeg veldig godt at det å bare kunne bidra til en littegran bedre verden, kanskje, er noe som jeg ønsker å kjempe for da, i utlandet» Interview 4b NMA Appendix 6

could seem at first that they might view themselves as warriors, it quickly became clear that most of my interviewees needed to provide their missions with a sense of meaning. The next section will continue this discussion, for now it is enough to say that they might very well be citizen soldiers, who protect not just the homeland, but also its values, such as universal human rights and humanitarianism (Appendix 6 Interview 4b NMA).

5.2.2. Willingness to take and sacrifice life

First and foremost, I asked my interviewees to share reflections regarding taking and sacrificing life. Their answers indicated that they had been reflecting on this topic prior to meeting me (Appendix 6 Interview 1, 2, 3 and 4 NMA), and it quickly became evident, just as with the higher-ranking officers from the NORDCSC, that different levels of reflection set in at different times. Several of them underlined that when you are in combat, the big thoughts and ideals regarding “for King and fatherland” disappears. When the bullets fly, they told me, it is either you or me, or the worst-case scenario, one of your fellow soldiers. This sentiment fits very well with the warrior-perception, which according to indicator two would have a high willingness to take and sacrifice life, and find motivation within comradeship and internal cohesion, not political goals.

When asked how the interviewees would reflect around participation in a mission abroad that was controversial among the Norwegian population at large, all my interviewees said, as expected, that they would participate. However, one of my interviewees problematized it a bit further and said that if the interviewee’s immediate family, love interest and friends were not positive, then it would be harder to participate (Appendix 6 Interview 4c NMA)⁴⁵. Another interviewee from the same focus group said that you will be influenced by the debate and attitudes in the general population; “we are people, not robots” (Appendix 6 Interview 4a NMA)⁴⁶. Although most of my interviewees argued that they would be affected by the general

⁴⁵ «For min del sånn rent personlig så ville det eneste problemet vært familie og kjæreste og sånne ting da. Utland sånn rent personlig, hadde jeg vært alene på en måte så hadde det ikke vært noe problem i det hele tatt. Men det er liksom bare det jeg har rundt meg som hadde vært et problem.» Interview 4c NMA Appendix 6

⁴⁶ Vi er jo ikke roboter, vi er mennesker. Vi vil være påvirket av ja, foreldre, venner og det sivile samfunn. Det du leser i VG. Og jeg tror det er viktig å ha på en måte tatt stilling til det. Før du drar dit selv, så du ikke, så du slipper å ta stilling til det når du er der nede, for da tror jeg du kan slite, ehm. OG det handler jo til syvende og

debate, they claimed that they still would participate. One interviewee stood out when saying “it probably would not affect me if the Norwegian population was split fifty-fifty” (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA)⁴⁷

Nevertheless, all of my interviewees stated that they had faith in military and political leadership not to send them on what they labelled “psycho” missions abroad (Appendix 6 Interview 4a NMA)⁴⁸, and that they had to trust the democracy (Appendix 6 Interview 1a and 1c NMA). Two interviewees said it was too late to reflect, when “they said jump” (Appendix 6 Interview 4b and 1b NMA)⁴⁹. Other interviewees said that they as soldiers and officers had to participate in the debate prior to the decision being made, when the decision first had been made it was too late to complain (Appendix 6 Interview 1a and 1c NMA).

All of my interviewees from the NMA underlined the importance of reflecting about the mission prior to being deployed, and some talked about giving the missions meaning on a personal level (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b, 1c 3a, 3b and 3c NMA). One interviewee said that “the most important thing is to explain the rationale to yourself, because it will always be a rationale if the Norwegian state chooses to use the Army” (Appendix 6 Interview 3b NMA)⁵⁰. The interviewee continued to draw parallels to the mission in Afghanistan where the interviewee said it could be hard to find a rationale: “The overarching political goal, supporting our allies in NATO, would not have given me, as a soldier, answer enough for why I, for instance, had to see a fellow soldier be killed. I had to explain it through other things we did, that was on the side of the mission, such as giving aid to the village we had our camp next to and providing a school for girls with supplies.” (Appendix 6 Interview 3b

sist om å være profesjonell og jeg tror, jeg tror du møter deg selv litt i døren hvis du plutselig finner ut: nei, jeg skal ikke til Syria for jeg støtter ikke det som skjer der. Da er det litt sånn, har jeg egentlig noe her å gjøre.»

Interview 4a NMA Appendix 6

⁴⁷ «Hadde nok ikke påvirket meg om befolkningen var splittet femti-femti» Interview 2 NMA Appendix 6

⁴⁸ «... og jeg har absolutt tiltro til at de filtrene der er både grovmasket og finmasket nok til å ta ut det der som eventuelt måtte vær av, jeg bruker begrepet sinnssyke oppdrag, men det er klart at det er en del, du vil jo bli påvirket.» Interview 4a NMA Appendix 6

⁴⁹ «... det var for seint å begynne å tenke på om det var riktig når de sa hopp» Interview 4b NMA Appendix 6

⁵⁰ «det viktigste da er jo å begynne å forklare rasjonale for seg selv. Det vil jo alltid være et rasjonale der da, hvis staten Norge velger å bruke Forsvaret til det» Interview 3b NMA Appendix 6

NMA)⁵¹. The others in that focus group agreed and added that you have to be creative enough to find a rationale you can believe in, that makes the job you do feel meaningful on a personal level (Appendix 6 Interview 3a and 3c NMA)⁵². This resonates well with what was being conveyed by the two interviewees from the NORDCSC, who also argued that it was not worth dying for vague political goals abroad (Appendix 6 Interview 3 and 6 NORDCSC).

The fact that my interviewees underlined that they needed to find a rationale that they could believe in, and was meaningful to them on a personal level, was an interesting finding and was further elaborated when I probed about what they considered worth dying for. One interviewee said that the politically correct answer was what the Parliament has decided that it is worth dying for (Appendix 6 Interview 1a NMA)⁵³. This fits very well with how a soldier with a role-perception of a warrior were expected to answer this question. However, most of my interviewees talked about sentiments connected with the perception of a citizen soldier. Seven interviewees talked about a sense of duty to their profession and their fellow soldiers, as well as to Norway's existence and the life we lead as worth dying for (Appendix 6 Interview 2, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b and 4c NMA). Three interviewees mentioned family, friends and significant others and extended that to Norway and Norwegian interest and values domestically and abroad (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b and 1c NMA). Four interviewees also mentioned questions of international interests and defence of what the interviewees believed to be universal values, such as freedom and equality (Appendix 6 Interview 4b, 3b, 1b and 1c NMA)⁵⁴. This was echoed by the other interviewees in the focus groups. Thus, it seems that

⁵¹ «Når jeg var i Afghanistan så var det jo på en måte min følelse av å bistå et lidende folkeslag da, eller et lidende folk i et land. Men, ehm, nå i etterkant har jeg gått krigskolen og ser på en måte det overordnede politiske bidraget med det å på en måte vise NATO-støtte, og de tingene der. Men jeg tror ikke som soldat der nede, så hadde ikke det gitt meg ... Det hadde ikke gitt meg, svar nok for hvorfor jeg måtte se en kompis bli skutt eller personlig lidelse sånn sett da. Så jeg tror nok der måtte jeg forklare meg mer med andre ting vi gjorde. Og vi gjennomførte jo ting, som var på en måte utenfor oppdraget som var litt på å gi litt bistand til byen vi hadde camp i og sånne ting, vi leverte mat, skrivesaker og vann og sånt til en jenteskole» Interview 3b NMA Appendix 6

⁵² «og jeg har også troen på at jeg på en måte, hva skal jeg si, hadde vært kreativ nok til at jeg hadde funnet et rasjonale. Som jeg hadde tro på selv.» Interview 3a NMA Appendix 6

⁵³ «rent politisk korrekt så er det jo det som Stortinget har sagt at det er verdt å dø for. For det er de som, det er jo de som bestemmer hvilke norske interesser og verdier som er verdt å forsvare» Interview 1a NMA Appendix 6

⁵⁴ «... jeg mener det er et sånt grunnleggende verdisyn. Hva er det som når man blir født som menneske, hva er det for slags rettigheter man er født med. Og det er, det er verdt å kjempe for at alle skal få muligheten til å ha de

for my interviewees, like for a citizen soldier, the willingness to sacrifice life depend on whether or not the sacrifice provide meaning to them on a personal level in the context of indicator one, protection of the homeland, its people and its values.

In this regard it is also worth mentioning that one of my interviewees shared an interesting reflection about Afghanistan, which had been used as an example of a controversial mission: “Was it worth it? [pause] You can always discuss that. Maybe. It’s hard to predict if it is worth it or not, if we could predict that, then maybe we could solve the conflicts in the world“ (Appendix 6 Interview 3a NMA)⁵⁵ This was quite similar to remarks made by another interviewee, that prior to this had not mentioned any of these grand ideas about humanitarianism or protection of human rights mentioned by the other interviewees; “maybe we are the deployment that will make a difference”, the interviewee continued to say that this was a very simple way of thinking, but that the interviewee believed that many soldiers thought like that before being deployed (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA)⁵⁶.

My interviewees were all aware that they had chosen a profession that required them to be tools for the government, however it seemed that they really believed that they were fortunate to be soldiers for Norway and not a more aggressive country. Furthermore, they needed to

rettighetene i livet sitt. Og derfor er det da, spesielt for min del, utenlands operasjoner, det er litt todelt, men en av de tingene er at, det er verdt uansett hvor du er født i verden, uansett hvilken bakgrunn du har så fortjener du å få et like, hvert fall, et sett med muligheter og det er jeg villig til å jobbe for da, at alle skal få, og da i ytterste konsekvens dø for, at folk skal få de mulighetene.» Interview 1b NMA Appendix 6

«Jeg tenker det du [1b] sier der er noe av det viktige, sånn i Norge, forsvaret av Norge så er det veldig personlig plan og da er det faktisk det fysiske som interesserer meg, som er viktig og som jeg vil ofre livet mitt for. I utenlands operasjoner vil jeg heller si at viktigheten av å kjempe for at andre skal få det bedre og kjempe for det vi ser på som riktig og viktig kanskje er sterkere enn konsekvensen av å dø. At det er ikke, at det med den risikoen for å dø, det blir på en måte en konsekvens av å gjøre det som er riktig da, og derfor så er det også viktig. Eh, hvis det gav noe som helst mening.» Interview 1c NMA Appendix 6

⁵⁵«også er jo det er spørsmål som har blitt stilt sikkert etter hver eneste operasjon, som nordmenn har vært med i, var det verdt det, er det noen vits. Det var jo stor debatt både innad og i media forøvrig om var det verdt å dra til Afghanistan fordi det ble ikke helt sånn som vi hadde tenkt. Ehm og det, hva skal jeg si, jeg vil nok på et eller annet vis si at du vil finne både for og imot om det er verdt det eller ikke. Og det vil du alltid gjøre tror jeg. Så det er vanskelig å forutsi i forkant om; er det verdt å dra inn her eller ikke. Hadde vi kunnet forutse det så hadde vi kanskje kunne løst verdens konflikter.» Interview 3a NMA Appendix 6

⁵⁶ «Kanskje vi er kontingenten som gjøre en forskjell» and «litt enkel tankegang, men det var mange som tenkte sånn, mange flere enn man tror» Interview 2 NMA Appendix 6

give meaning to their mission on a personal level, and several of them argued that meaning could be found within universal values that could arguably be related to humanitarianism and the peace nation sentiment described in Chapter 3. I therefore find it hard to conclude that they have a warrior-perception. Even though they argue that they would participate, and risk life and limbs in any mission, regardless of how controversial it might be, they still say that they need it to feel meaningful on a personal level. This makes them more similar to a citizen soldier who's willingness to take and sacrifice life depends on how meaningful the mission is in light of their overall purpose; protection of the homeland, its people, and its values including humanitarian values.

The question regarding controversial missions can also to some extent be said to cover the next indicator; relationship to the civil society, and while all ten of my interviewees argued that they would participate regardless of how controversial the mission was, only one out of ten interviewees argued that a controversy in the general population would not affect the interviewee on a personal level (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA). Thus, the legitimacy of the missions, while not dictating their will to participate, is important on a personal level among my interviewees at the NMA.

5.2.3. Relationship to the civil society

When asked about the relationship between the Army and the civil society, four of my interviewees said that it varied; some knew a lot, and some were not interested at all (Appendix 6 Interview 1c, 1b, 1a and 2 NMA). In line with the responses provided by the interviewees from the NORDCSC, one interviewee separated between knowledge and interest, and argued that interests were the most important factor both on a personal level and for the Army as an organization (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA). This sentiment reflects how the other interviewees from the NMA thought, while none of these made this distinction explicit.

Some interviewees complained that the public debate was either confined to budgetary issues or too late for it to make a difference (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b and 1c NMA). One interviewee even argued that because Norway is in a state of deep peace, the general public does not care that much about security and defence policy (Appendix 6 Interview 4b NMA).

When I asked if the interviewee thought that this was negative the entire focus group responded by comparing the Army to an insurance policy, and that the civil society needed to be willing to pay their insurance fee (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NMA). Even though this could be seen as an expression of a warrior-perception, my interviewees did not wish to exist outside the civil society; recognition and legitimacy was important to them on a personal level.

One interviewee told me about his/her little sister who had joined the Army a few years back and was now going to Iraq. The interviewee said that his/her sister was good at her job, but that their mother had not realized, or wanted to realize, what her children were doing and that they might be deployed abroad. The interviewee said their parents had this impression of them as learning to be leaders and learning to tidy up their room, which was far from reality when you choose a career in the Army (Appendix 6 Interviewee 3c NMA)⁵⁷. Thus, the interviewee wanted a sense of understanding for what the job really entailed among the general public, and this was echoed by other interviewees.

One interviewee explained it like this: “To serve the society for a shorter or longer period should count positively, and then it is important that the society recognize your efforts” (Appendix 6 Interview 1c NMA)⁵⁸. Another interviewee said that: “when you, as an ultimate consequence, risk your life then it is OK to get some recognition from society and it could feel a bit unfair and hurtful if a colleague or yourself risk your life and its almost not noticed by society. So yes, it is definitely important” (Appendix 6 Interview 1a NMA)⁵⁹.

⁵⁷ «så jeg har fått støtte ehm, for å være i Forsvaret fordi at det blir på en måte, det vi snakker om da det er jo at jeg får en lederutdanning, det vi snakker om er jo at jeg lærer å strekke sengen min. Det er på en måte (latter) det er der det ligger da, og jeg husker mamma ble jo helt ødelagt nå i fjor, når lillesøsteren min skulle til Irak, hun har vært inne en del år nå og blitt kjempeflink på det hun holder på med, men jeg tror ikke det har sunket inn, og jeg tror ikke mamma heller har vært, enten ikke vært klar over det, eller ville høre det rett og slett, hva hun egentlig holder på med da. Og som 3b sier, hva ytterste konsekvens er da. Så det er nok, det nok noe man vil høre, og noe man ikke er så interessert i å høre.» Interview 3c NMA Appendix 6

⁵⁸ «samtidig sånn for meg personlig, så mener jeg at det skal, altså det å tjene samfunnet i en kortere eller lengre periode, skal jo telle positivt. Og da er det viktig at samfunnet anerkjenner den innsatsen som faktisk gjøres om det er en kortere eller lengre periode da.» Interview 1c NMA Appendix 6

⁵⁹ «Når man i ytterste konsekvens risikerer livet sitt så er det greit å få en anerkjennelse fra samfunnet og det kanskje kan oppleves litt sånn urettferdig eller sårt hvis man har en kompis eller selv ofrer livet sitt, og Forsvaret

This sentiment was also supported by other interviewees who pointed to experiences in the United States, where soldiers are thanked for the work they do on behalf of the American society (Appendix 6 Interview 4a and 4b NMA). The interviewees still underlined that they did not become soldiers to get a “pat on the back”, but that this nevertheless was important to them (Appendix 6 Interview 4a NMA). Overall, a certain level of understanding and respect was important on a personal level for the majority of my interviewees.

When asked about the campaign “For everything we have and everything we are” my interviewees were split. While some said the campaign was for recruitment and budgetary issues (Appendix 6 Interview 1b, 3a NMA), which is the response expected by soldiers with a warrior-perception, see appendix 3, most said that it was a wake-up call to the general public, making them aware of the necessity of having an Army (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b, 2, 3c NMA). Some argued that it was the result of a mismatch between the Army’s experiences in Afghanistan and what had been presented to the general public. They therefore argued that the campaign was probably intended to better the reputation of the Norwegian Armed Forces (Appendix 6 Interview 1c, 3b, 4b, 4a, 4c NMA). Two interviewees agreed while underlining that it is not necessarily the reputation but the rationale behind the military, that the campaign tried to convey in a softer manner (Appendix 6 Interview 3b and 3c NMA).

While all of my interviewees argued that a good relationship to civil society was important, both for the organization and on a personal level, some of my interviewees had an impression that the politicians understanding of what it means to be a soldier was low (Appendix 6 Interview 3c and 4b NMA). This was something they perceived as particularly problematic, and this was also mentioned by some of the interviewees from the NORDCSC. Nevertheless, like the interviewees from the NORDCSC, all interviewees from the NMA conveyed an overall trust in the democratic institutions and the political and military leadership.

When asked about the new personnel reform most of my interviewees said that they had not really thought about how it might affect relations to the general public prior to seeing me (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b, 1c, 4a, and 4b NMA). One argued that the reform probably

ikke, nei at samfunnet ikke ... det legges nesten ikke merke til da. Jeg tror absolutt det er viktig» Interview 1a NMA Appendix 6

would not affect the relationship because civilians simply did not have such a deep knowledge of the internal workings of the Army (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA). Other interviewees used the opportunity to debate back and forth. Since they were most familiar with the “school-reform”, that the new reform entails, their debate naturally circled around this topic (Appendix 6 Interview 3a, 3b, 3c and 4c NMA). Some of the interviewees argued that the new reform might be good because now the new officers would be recruited directly from the civilian sphere, representing a “breath of fresh air”, and not be so well socialized into the organization prior to starting their education (Appendix 6 Interview 3b and 4c NMA). This, they argued, could result in an even closer relationship between the Army and the civilian sphere. Nevertheless, it seemed that they had not put much thought into it before seeing me.

In conclusion, my interviewees from the NMA did not see themselves as distant from civil society, rather they seek legitimacy and recognition for their role as soldiers and for their missions. This is in line with what can be expected from a citizen soldier in the context of this indicator.

5.2.4. Values

When asked directly which values they cherished, most interviewees replied values that easily could be fitted within the Army’s framework of Respect, Responsibility and Courage⁶⁰ (Appendix 6 Interview 2, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b and 4c NMA). One interviewee added discipline as important in the military profession (Appendix 6 Interview 1b NMA). My interviewees therefore seem to have embraced the values drawn out by the Army, and these values do not contradict the values one would expect a soldier with a warrior-perception to have. In one of my focus groups the values that they cherished was comradeship and a sense of belonging with your fellow soldiers (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b and 1c NMA). This is in line with what Huntington (1957) argues should be the core motivational factor for a professional soldier and therefore also indicates a warrior-perception.

Even though my interviewees, when asked specifically about values, tied their answer to the values connected to the profession as well as to values such as comradeship and discipline,

⁶⁰ Respekt, Ansvar, Mot (RAM) (FFOD 2007, FFOD 2014)

which arguably could be tied to the warrior-perception. Their answers changed somewhat when I asked them by the end of the interview to describe themselves as soldiers. First and foremost, my interviewees became more personal. Two of the responses are particularly interesting and will therefore merit some extra discussion.

One interviewee described him/herself as someone who wanted personal growth for him/herself and others (Appendix 6 Interview 4c NMA)⁶¹. The same interviewee had previously stated that the biggest difference between the Army and the civil society was that the Army viewed the community as superior, while in the civilian sphere individuality was sought after. On the one hand, personal growth might be interpreted as an individualistic sentiment, thought to prevail in the civilian sphere (Johansen 2013). On the other hand, it could be seen as an expression of a warrior-perception were the individual soldiers seek to develop their military skills further.

Another interviewee argued that he/she was “aggressive yet caring” (Appendix 6 Interview 1a NMA)⁶². When I followed up this statement by asking what the interviewee meant by “caring” it was not the normal mantra that as an officer you are caring by being aggressive and setting demands and standards for yourself and your soldiers to follow (Mood 2017), as one of the other interviewees in the focus group suggested (Appendix 6 Interview 1b NMA). Rather, the interviewee argued that setting demands and standards, was a natural part of the job; preventing people from dying. Caring however, was seen as a quality on the more personal level; the ability to see people (Appendix 6 Interview 1a NMA)⁶³, which could be interpreted as a skill that would be valued by a soldier with a role-perception of a citizen soldier.

⁶¹ «Ønske om å utvikle meg selv og andre hele tiden.» Interview 4b NMA Appendix 6

⁶² «med tanke på aggressivitet kan jeg oppleves som å ha noe kort lunte, ehm, og jeg er offensiv når det gjelder. Også blir jeg også oppfattet som omsorgsfull fordi jeg bryr meg om folk rundt meg, at folk rundt meg skal ha det bra og jeg ser folk og det er viktig for meg også.» Interview 1a NMA Appendix 6

⁶³ «du kan selvsagt strekke den dit, men jeg mener at i omsorg så ligger det å se folk og bry seg og ta vare på de på like mye et mentalt nivå, som og ikke kun det å hindre dem i å dø, for det er jobben din - uansett. Men om du er omsorgsfull så mener jeg det strekker seg litt lenger enn kun å hindre dine menn i å dø. Du kan be dem grave hele natten slik at gropen blir dyp nok og de ikke dør, men jeg mener ikke det er omsorg jeg mener det er jobben din.» Interview 1a NMA Appendix 6

The question about broad recruitment was again intended to investigate whether or not my interviewees valued civilian skills and ideas, such as diversity and ability to think outside the box. The responses to this question was, like with the interviewees from the NORDCSC, clearly coloured by the ongoing debate (Høiback 2017) and all of my interviewees from the NMA agreed that it was important to place the right person in the right position and that the qualifications needed to be the same irrespective of gender (Appendix 6 Interview 1, 2, 3 and 4 NMA). So, while white Norwegian males have been the Army's main recruitment pool for a long period of time and still occupy most of the positions in the Army, my interviewees argued that other groups should be approached, but not given advantages in the selection process.

Nevertheless, most of my interviewees believed it was import for the Army to reflect the civil society that they are meant to protect, and that this was a value in itself (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b, 1c, 3a, 3b and 3c NMA) When asked what the Army gains by broad recruitment, the answers were more vague; while some argued that the Army could find the best soldiers simply because the pool of potential candidates were bigger (Appendix 6 Interview 2, 3a and 4c NMA), others argued that female soldiers and soldiers with an minority background had been vital in missions, such as the Afghanistan mission, and would likely be so also in the future (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1c, 3c and 4b NMA)⁶⁴. One interviewee argued that “the only thing that we know about the next war is that it will be extremely complex and complicated. In the next war it does not necessary help just having the strongest guys to fight that war. We need the smartest heads”⁶⁵. Another interviewee added that “a soccer team with just attackers does not work” (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA)⁶⁶, and continued to say that the

⁶⁴ «Du kan fort ende opp med å måtte prate med en dame i niqab og barnet hennes på en måte, og da er det ikke nødvendigvis ti staute karer som er best egnet for å gjøre det. Og kulturforståelse, empati, sympati og det å kunne holde en dialog med mennesker, har jeg inntrykk av. Det er det nye temaet da. Vinne gjennom å få oppslutning i befolkningen og om du da har et sånt tog av svære karer da så er ikke det nødvendigvis det beste.» and «Jeg ser for meg at hvis du skal vinne befolkningens gunst, hvis det er viktig i den neste krigen så må du også ha en representativ gruppe med mennesker [...] Så full krig er ikke nødvendigvis jah, en swordfight da. De to største krigerne lenger.» Interview 3c NMA Appendix 6

⁶⁵ «altså det eneste vi vet om morgendagens krig er at den kommer til å være ekstremt kompleks, komplisert og det hjelper ikke bare å ha de sterkeste gutta for å kjempe den krigen. Vi trenger de smarteste hodene» Interview 4b NMA Appendix 6

⁶⁶ «Et fotballag med bare spisser, det funker ikke» Interview 2 NMA Appendix 6

Army needs “different types of strengths and weaknesses and that diversity by all accounts would serve the Army well” (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA)⁶⁷.

In conclusion, my interviewees although having been coloured by the ongoing debate, seemed to genuinely want the Army to mirror the Norwegian population. In addition, the majority also argued that diversity and ability to think outside the box was something that would benefit the Army. As such, they valued civilian skills and ideas. However, they also have developed internal cohesion and internal values, which they did not stray from. It is not easy to conclude what role-perception the interviewees have based on what they value alone, this has to be interpreted in the light of the rest of the indicators.

5.2.5. How my interviewees want to be perceived

When asked how they want to be perceived by foreign troops all ten of my interviewees stated that they wanted to be viewed as professional (Appendix 6 Interview 1, 2, 3 and 4 NMA). When I probed about what this meant to them the answers varied a little, but the majority stated that it encompassed ability to do their job, having military skills and competence, respect for international law, being humble and subscribing to a certain set of values; a moral compass so to speak (Appendix 6 Interview 1a, 1b 2, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b and 4c NMA). One interviewee explained the moral compass by saying that “when you are in uniform you are a Norwegian soldier and are supposed to express the culture and opinions of your profession” (Appendix 6 Interview 1c NMA)⁶⁸. When asked what this entailed the interviewee continued to state that it was “democratic, fair and what Norway stands for internationally” (Appendix 6 Interview 1c NMA)⁶⁹. This response could be interpreted as an expression of the peace nation sentiment described in Chapter 3. The peace nation sentiment is, as already stated, a popular image among Norwegians of Norway’s conduct abroad, and could also be a popular image among Norwegian soldiers. Another interviewee backed up by saying that he/she wanted to

⁶⁷ «Man må ha forskjellige typer styrker og svakheter, og det tjener jo hæren bra på alle mulige måter» Interview 2 NMA Appendix 6

⁶⁸ «Så lenge man går i uniform og er i embedets medføre da. Så er det de, så er det embedets kultur og meninger som må være det som stråles ut da og ikke det personlige.» Interview 1c NMA Appendix 6

⁶⁹ «Demokratiske, rettfærdige og det Norge står for internasjonalt» Interview 1c NMA Appendix 6

be perceived as an average Joe, with meanings that conform to the meanings of the Norwegian population at large (Appendix 6 Interview 1b NMA)⁷⁰.

Other interviewees, who pointed to shared humanity as an important value, said that it was important to have respect for people regardless of their status as friend or foe (Appendix 6 Interview 3b and 3c NMA). During this discussion another interviewee in the focus group made a point of saying that this was part of being a professional and that it was important not to act as “headless Vikings” (Appendix 6 Interview 3a NMA)⁷¹. Thus, professionalism to these soldiers encompassed a sense of shared humanity.

In addition, one interviewee said that it also was good to show that they were independent and referred to expressions of egalitarianism what he/she labelled as a part of the Scandinavian culture (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA). This was also backed by another interviewee who argued that “there is hierarchy when there needs to be, but when there is no reason for it to be hierarchy then it must be possible to be equal” (Appendix 6 Interview 4b NMA)⁷². The two interviewees valued the egalitarian culture supposedly found in the civilian sphere and wanted to bring this with them when meeting foreign soldiers.

In conclusion, my interviewees want to be perceived by foreign troops as being representatives of Norway and harbouring values which they share with the civil society. This was expected of a soldier with a role-perception of a citizen soldier in the context of this indicator. They also underlined that they wanted to be perceived as professionals, but they

⁷⁰ «etter et møte med noen fra utlandet vil jeg at de skal sitte igjen å tenke at jeg er oppegående og kompetent. Det er liksom, det er de to tingene. For det er litt sånn, så lenge du mener noe innenfor den boksen her da, som er greit i norske meningsmålinger, så er det liksom fint. Så får du liksom, ja han/hun er oppegående han/hun er ikke helt på ytterkanten her eller på ytterkanten der, og at jeg er kompetent nok til å gjøre jobben min og at de får tillitt og stoler på meg da, spesielt med tanke på internasjonale operasjoner, hvis du samarbeider med andre nasjoner så er det de to tingene så lenge de tenker det. Så er det egentlig kjempebra. Det er egentlig det inntrykket jeg vil at de skal sitte igjen med.» Interview 1b NMA Appendix 6

⁷¹ «jeg tenker at i møte med andre soldater så er det viktig, for, med, at norske soldater ikke fremstår som hodeløse vikinger da. Som plyndrer og voldtar på en måte. Det, den, det å være profesjonell, det å ta ansvar for jobben sin, gjør den så godt som du kan og det å ha respekt for at det er mennesker på begge sider. Selv om noen av dem er soldater, så er det fortsatt mennesker» Interview 1a NMA Appendix 6

⁷² «det må være, det må være en hierarki, eller et hierarki når det må være et hierarki. Men når det ikke er noen grunn til at det skal være et hierarki, da må det gå an også være medmennesker» Interview 4a NMA Appendix 6

seemed to think that this entailed something more than pure military skill. It could therefore be argued that they are citizen soldiers at heart, because they also underlined that professionalism entailed other facets such as humanitarianism and egalitarianism, which could be said to be derived from the civilian sphere. This is also similar to how the soldiers from the NORDCSC said they wanted to be perceived. They wanted to be perceived as professional, but professionalism also entailed certain civilian values and skills.

5.2.6. Warriors or citizen soldiers?

My first impression after conducting the interviews with soldiers at the Norwegian Military Academy was that they were citizen soldiers. However, after rereading their answers and conducting the analysis I realised that they also expressed views which can be interpreted in light of the warrior-perception.

All ten of my interviewees stated that their main purpose was to protect Norway, Norwegian interests and values, including humanitarian values. Only three out of ten interviewees described themselves as tools for the government, and it quickly became clear that those who initially described themselves as tools also seemed to think that their willingness to take, and especially sacrifice life depended on how meaningful the mission was to them personally. A mission could be seen as meaningful if it helped secure Norway's safety or if it was convergent with Norwegian values and beliefs, such as humanitarianism. The legitimacy of the mission among the general public also appeared to be important to my interviewees from the NMA at a personal level.

My respondents also valued a good relationship, and connection, with the civil society and did not see themselves as distant from the civil society, rather they sought legitimacy and recognition for their role as soldiers, as well as for the missions they participated in.

When asked about values, my interviewees all seemed to value professionalism, internal cohesion, unity and comradeship, which are indicators of the role-perception of a warrior. However, it became clear that their version of professionalism is not too different from the values found within the Norwegian society in general. It was also striking to find how many

of them pointed to humanitarianism and egalitarianism as important values worth fighting for and present to foreign troops.

Thus, my interviewees from the NMA can best be described within the role-perception of a citizen soldier. They see their main purpose to protect King and fatherland and do so by mirroring the values prevailing within the Norwegian society in general. However, it is also worth noting that while they might be citizen soldiers at heart, they also, like my interviewees from the NORDCSC, were eager to show that the military profession is something different from civilian life, with its distinct values and internal cohesion. Thus, it seems that they have incorporated some of the facets of the warrior-perception. This was especially evident among the interviewees who had been deployed or served in the Army for an extended period of time.

5.3. Preliminary conclusion and limitations

Overall it seems my interviewees, both from the NORDCSC and the NMA best can be described as citizen soldiers. My findings resonate well with what Haaland argues in her PhD-dissertation and in her analysis of Norwegian military culture in international deployments (Haaland 2008, 2010:550-551). The perception of a citizen soldier was especially visible among the younger and more inexperienced soldiers from the NMA, who appeared to search for an idealistic purpose. However, the same sentiment was also found among the interviewees from the NORDCSC. The importance placed on professionalism and the soldier's role as instruments for the Norwegian government seemed to increase with the number of deployments abroad and years of experience. Almost 30 percent, or six out of a total of 17 interviewees, argued that they were in fact pure political instruments. Nevertheless, a majority of all interviewees, including some of those who described themselves as security policy instruments, needed a more idealistic purpose for them to be willing to risk the ultimate consequence of sacrificing life. This could be seen as supporting Haaland's argument, that vague political reasoning does not always resonate down to the individual soldiers (2008:267). This is despite that fact that most interviewees argued that when you are in combat the grand ideals and idealistic purpose quickly disappears. My interviewees separated between two distinct levels of reflection; one before you deploy or choose to join the Army, and one when you are actually performing your profession; being a soldier in combat. The

need for a more permanent, just and worthy cause exists within my sample and the defence of Norway, Norwegian interests and values, including humanitarian values, was mentioned by several of them as a cause worth fighting for.

My research implies that the role-perception of a warrior developed throughout the period of 2006-2012, is still visible today, as a sort of golden standard that the soldiers seek to reach. This was especially evident when discussing their role as tools and their values. My interviewees appear to have a growing awareness and embracing of the warrior ideals. This was especially evident among those who had served in the Army for an extended period of time and/or been deployed. However, the interviewees still stressed that military values should be firmly anchored within the civilian society that they spring from. While trying to conform to the values tied to the profession, the soldiers cannot escape civilian values such as tolerance, equality, humanitarianism and to a lesser degree individualism. Individualism is seen by many as a trait tied to the civilian sphere (Johansen 2013). However, individualism is not necessarily so dominating in a nation governed by equality, and what can be labelled the “Jante law”; where everyone is seen as equal and no one is seen as better than others (Gullestad 1992). Thus, individuality is not necessarily seen as part of the most important values among the Norwegian population and soldiers.

It is only natural that my interviewees conform to the values and standards set by an organization that actively try to sculpt young people and create internal cohesion (Edström et al. 2010:6, Manekin 2017). It is therefore interesting to find that they also value civilian skills and ideas, as well as see themselves as mainly protectors of the homelands, its people and its values, and not as an expeditionary apolitical force, solely motivated by comradeship and internal cohesion.

However, the impact of my findings should not be exaggerated. As previously mentioned in Chapter 4 there are several limitations to this study. First and foremost, there are several factors which impede generalizability from the sample to the universe. Among which, that my sample is relatively small and not randomly selected. Self-selection bias could also be said to influence the results. As discussed in section 4.2., those who choose to participate in this research might be leaning towards a role-perception of a citizen soldier and those who declined might see themselves as warriors, making my sample biased. Thus, my sample is not necessarily representative for the Army students enrolled at the NORDCSC and the NMA,

and to generalize the findings from the sample to the population of all Army students at these institutions is dubious. This also impedes on the possible analytical generalization argued for in Chapter 4. Thus, in order to conclude that the citizen soldier actually is the dominant role-perception more research is needed. Even though my findings find some support by existing research (Haaland 2008, 2010, Forsjord 2009), they might also be contradicted and should not be viewed as definite evidence for the dominance of one role-perception at the expense of the other possible role-perceptions.

6. What impact might the changed security landscape have had on the role-perception of my interviewees?

This chapter seeks to answer the second part of the research question by evaluating if the dominant role-perception of a citizen soldier, accounted for in Chapter 5, really could have been affected by the changed security climate. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the relationship between the West, NATO and Russia is further deteriorating at a rapid pace, and, as described in Chapter 2, the colder climate is thought to have influenced the role-perception of Norwegian soldiers. This evaluation will be based mainly on secondary literature. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to situate my findings in the broader debate regarding role-perception.

One of my interviewees pointed out that role-perception is not something that changes overnight, with one incident or policy change, rather it is a continuous process (Appendix 6 Interview 4 NORDCSC). As accounted for in Chapter 5, I found that the role-perception that developed since the end of the Cold War, with the increased focus on deployments abroad is still valid today as the Army has “come home”. As argued in Chapter 2, the change towards a role-perception of warrior took over a decade to properly develop and was also nurtured by high ranking officers and political leadership alike (Diesen 2008). In my interviews I found that my interviewees aspired to the ideals connected with the warrior-perception. However, they also showed clear signs of what best can be described within the framework of a citizen soldier. Thus, it is not only the warrior-perception that is resilient; the role-perception of a citizen soldier has also stood against the tides of time. The role-perception thought to dominate in the Cold War era; an idealistic patriot, is still present today, however slightly

moderated. My interviewees aspire to be warriors, but nevertheless seem to be citizen soldiers at heart.

How can we understand these findings? If we take for granted the countless of academic research proving a shift towards a warrior-perception among Norwegian Army soldiers (Nilsen 2006:55), my findings could be seen as modest evidence of a shift towards the role-perception of a citizen soldier. However, it could be argued that there has not been sufficient time for such a shift to occur. It has only been four years since the Russian annexation of Crimea and as my interviewee said at the top of this section; changes in role-perception does not happen overnight. Since there seem to be no relevant policy or societal change in the period which could influence the role-perception of Norwegian soldiers, we are left with two alternatives; either they have been influenced by the changed security landscape, turning back to their roots, or they have always been citizen soldiers at heart, even during the controversial operations in Afghanistan.

One way to view this is to see the colder security climate as an “window of opportunity” (Kingdon 1995). Some changes in culture, values and moral happens quickly. One example is when the Norwegian government in 2004 implemented the smoke-ban in public places. Almost overnight, Norwegian attitudes shifted from thinking that smoking in bars, restaurants, and public buildings was fine, to thinking that this was unbearable (Haram et al. 2014). Another example is quite recent; in 2017 a whale was found near Bergen with its stomach filled with plastic (Nilsen 2017). After the whale died, a growing number of Norwegians started to fear plastic pollution in the ocean (Fjeld 2018). This is quite remarkable changes in attitudes and values that happened rapidly. How soldiers view themselves and their role, could therefore maybe be seen in the same way. It could be argued that the new Russian threat that culminated in the annexation of Crimea was such an opportunity window for the soldiers to turn back to the role-perception of citizen soldiers, that has some similarities to the role-perception thought to have dominated in the Cold War area.

As described in Chapter 5 one of my interviewees also said that the Norwegian Army always wanted to focus on national defence, but because of a lack of a clear threat they needed to participate in missions abroad (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NORDCSC). This could be interpreted as mild evidence for the fact that the colder post-Crimea security climate actually was such an opportunity window. Another group of interviewees started debating forced

participation in international operations if your primary motivation for joining the Army was to protect the homeland (Appendix 6 Interview 4a, 4b, and 4c NMA). The interviewees agreed that it was a good thing that the focus seemingly had turned away from missions abroad and that the main focus now was on the main task of protecting the homeland (Appendix 6 Interview 4b and 4c NMA). Furthermore, they argued that there had been a shift, were those whose prime motivation was to go to Afghanistan and practice their trait had quit the Army (Appendix 6 Interview 4b NMA)⁷³. This could indicate that maybe the colder climate and changed priorities actually have influenced the soldiers. However, it is worth noting that this is quite contrary to what one of my other interviewees said, when he/she argued that it was few soldiers who went to Afghanistan to just practice their trait and did not reflect around the reason for doing so prior to deployment (Appendix 6 Interview 2 NMA).

The role-perception of a citizen soldier is similar, but not equal, to the role-perception thought to have dominated during the Cold War; an idealistic patriot. Thus, the Cold War role-perception could be seen as slightly moderated to new realities. As some of my interviewees argued; one of their best traits is the ability to find meaning in what they do. As such, it seems that they do in fact need to find meaning in their work beyond being tools for the government, which they would have accepted if they truly viewed themselves as warriors. This might imply that they have always been citizen soldiers at heart and that the warrior-perception thought to have developed in Afghanistan never actually permeated the Army. Other researchers have also argued that some of the features connected with the role-perception of a citizen soldier might be an underestimated motivation to serve in the Army, predict military effectiveness and performance (Griffith 2009, Eighmey 2006, Ben-Dor et al. 2007), and remain in the Army (Moore 2002).

The fact that the soldiers in my sample show clear signs of being citizen soldiers might be because this role-perception is resilient and that no change has occurred due to a changed security landscape. Rather they have always been citizen soldiers at heart, even during the operation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, several of my interviewees argued that they needed to provide meaning to their work for them to be willing to risk the ultimate consequence, and that meaning had to go beyond simply being a security policy instrument. This argument

⁷³ «Så da fikk man et generasjonsskifte kanskje, der man fikk ut litt av de der krigerne som bare skulle ned til Afghanistan og skyte Taliban» Interview 4b NMA Appendix 6

resonates well with the conclusion of Haaland (2010:551) when she argues that the changes thought to have happened in the wake of increased international deployments, was of a practical rather than an ideological and motivational nature.

This chapter has discussed whether this alleged change from warrior to citizen soldier, described in Chapter 5, has been caused by the changed security landscape that Norway and its allies find themselves in. The conclusion is that it is hard to evaluate whether the change was caused by the relatively recent change in security landscape, or simply because Norwegian soldiers always have been citizen soldiers at heart. In order to properly address this part of the research question more research is needed.

6.1. What about the future?

It is hard to predict the future. Changes in the security climate can happen suddenly. The wars of tomorrow will probably be very different from those of today, and we cannot exclude the possibility that Norwegian troops will be deployed to new and possibly controversial missions abroad in the future. This thesis has argued that after the Cold War the increased focus on international operations enabled the role-perception of a warrior to find footing in the Norwegian Army. Today, it seems that the warrior-perception is something soldiers aspire to achieve; however, they still need to provide meaning to their work on a personal level and therefore be citizen soldiers at heart. A growing discontent between the soldiers, civil society and political leadership concerning controversial missions might imply that more support from civil society is needed in order for them to find this meaning (Diesen 2008).

For soldiers in the Norwegian Army to be willing to risk the ultimate consequence of taking and sacrificing life it seems that they need to view the operations as legitimate and valid within the framework of Norwegian humanitarian and egalitarian values. This can sometimes be hard, and many of my interviewees argued that they sometimes need to be creative when they try to provide meaning to controversial missions. Vague political arguments and reasoning do not always resonate down to the lower levels of the organization (Haaland 2008:263-264).

One could argue that controversial missions have the potential to shift the soldier's role-perception to that of a warrior. This might be interpreted as a coping mechanism when there is a disconnect between their experienced realities and what is presented to the civil society back home. When they do not find the necessary domestic support and/or a meaning behind the mission that they truly believe in, comradeship and internal cohesion can be seen as an escape hatch for the soldiers to find meaning in the seemingly meaningless turmoil of war. It is therefore vital for these soldiers that they receive support from the civil society regardless of what the civil society feels about the political decision behind the mission (Diesen 2008). The need for this kind of support can be seen as necessary regardless of what role-perception is currently dominating. The campaign "Support our soldiers", which was launched in 2010, in the same period the first rumours of the emergence of a warrior-perception surfaced in the Norwegian public debate, can be seen as such an initiative⁷⁴.

As the years go by, fewer soldiers will have personal experience from Afghanistan. Additionally, most officers will, as a result of the new personnel reform described in section 1.3., now be recruited directly from the civilian sphere and have no prior experience with the Army. These factors, coupled by the fact that there is an increased national focus, as a consequence of a more assertive Russia, might enable the role-perception of a citizen soldier, who protects the homeland, its people and values, to thrive and prosper.

Nevertheless, the changes the Army has gone through over the past decade, especially during the operations in Afghanistan (2006-2012) still makes an imprint on soldiers and officers today. The Army is not the same as it was by the beginning of this century and it is therefore hard to expect that the soldiers to be directly identifiable with the soldiers from that era. Even though some find consistency in the role-perception over time (Brunborg 2008:77), how the soldiers view themselves and their role might just depend on a number of factors for instance, threat level and support from civil society.

⁷⁴ «Støtt våre soldater» was launched in 2010

7. Conclusion

This thesis has addressed the following research question:

Is the role-perception thought to have emerged within the Norwegian Army during the operation in Afghanistan (2006-2012) still valid today, especially considering the colder climate in the post-Crimea security environment?

In order to answer the research question, the thesis started by presenting the empirical background in Chapter 2. The first period, 2006-2012, was argued to have been characterized by the emergence of a warrior-perception among Norwegian Army soldiers. The second period, 2014-2017, was argued to have the potential to change the role-perception towards that of a citizen soldier. A greater threat level closer to home could lead the soldiers to view themselves as protectors of the homeland, its people and its values, rather than a security policy instrument designed to protect vague political goals which is one of the indicators of a warrior-perception. Chapter 3 presented the theoretical framework and the two ideal types of role-perception; the citizen soldier and the warrior. Chapter 4 described the methodological decisions tied to how to best explore the current role-perception among our sample. Chapter 4 also presented operationalized indicators of the expected empirical findings for each of the two role-perceptions presented in Chapter 3. The data was gathered through semi-structured interviews. In the fifth chapter the data gathered through the individual and group interviews were analysed within the frame of the indicators from Chapter 4. Chapter 5 also tried to make the analysis of the data as transparent as possible, presenting not just the answers but also the intensity of the answers.

Chapter 5 answered the first part of the research question: *Is the role-perception thought to have been developed within the Norwegian Army during the operation in Afghanistan (2006-2012) still valid today?* The answer appears to be yes. As described in Chapter 5, the warrior-perception still exists as a golden standard that my interviewees aspire to. However, other role-perceptions such as the citizen soldier are more important to my interviewees at a personal level. Chapter 6 debated whether this change towards a role-perception of a citizen soldier was caused by the changed security climate, or simply that the role-perception was resilient, and found that this was hard to conclude. Although my findings suggest that my interviewees really do view themselves as citizen soldiers, rather than warriors, it is hard to

conclude if this is due to a changed security landscape or simply that my interviewees always have prescribed to the role-perception of a citizen soldier – even when being deployed on foreign missions. However, it is important to remember that two or more role-perceptions can be said to exist simultaneously, but only one is in the forefront at any given time. It can therefore be argued that both role-perceptions have been present but their relative importance has shifted.

7.1. Implications and future research

This thesis can at best be seen as modest evidence of the existence of a role-perception of a citizen soldier. Chapter 4 and section 5.3. pointed to some of the problems related to this study and even if these issues were not present, this thesis could still be said to be a small contribution to the wider debate. It is based on findings from a relatively small sample, interviewed only once. However, it gives an indication of what role-perception is currently dominant and should be followed by more research on this topic.

As discussed in Chapter 6 it has been a short time since the majority of the Norwegian soldiers redeployed from Afghanistan, and it is hard to say whether my findings of a change from a warrior-perception to the perception of a citizen soldiers is a result of a “window of opportunity” or simply that the soldiers have always had this role-perception, and that the period in Afghanistan (2006-2012) thought to have brought about the emergence of the warrior-perception was the exception.

More research on this topic is important and needed. Despite the growth in research within the field of civil-military relations and role-perception in recent years, there is still much that needs to be understood. The Norwegian Armed Forces is currently in the midst of an implementation period. In order to properly implement, and design, this and future reforms we need to understand what makes soldiers tick. With more knowledge of the soldier’s role-perception we might be better equipped to tackle, or all the better avoid, unintended consequences. Furthermore, several veterans struggle from experiences abroad (Søderstrøm 2018). Knowledge about their role-perception, need for domestic support, and a meaningful purpose behind the deployment can maybe help prevent or abide some of the issues these veterans struggle with.

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Appendix 1 – Interview guide (Norwegian – original)

Hei, tusen takk for at dere tok dere tid til å møte meg i dag. Jeg vet dere har travle dager med mye skolearbeid og eksamener. Som dere sikkert husker fra mailen, handler dette om rolleforståelse hos hærsoldater. **(Si litt om deg selv og oppgaven)** Før vi begynner vil jeg bare understreke en gang til at deltagelse på dette prosjektet er frivillig, dere kan trekke dere underveis i intervjuet eller når som helst senere i prosessen, selv om jeg samler inn samtykkeskjema nå (**samle inn samtykke skjema**). Deres deltagelse vil holdes anonym, og jeg vil ikke publisere navn i oppgaven. Dersom det er ønskelig sender jeg også ut referatet til dere for gjennomlesning. Før vi begynner vil jeg først spørre om det er i orden at jeg tar opp samtalen, dette er for at jeg lettere skal kunne huske deres respons, slik at samtalen blir gjengitt på best mulig måte. Dere kan slå av opptakeren underveis dersom dere ønsker. Opptaket vil ikke publiseres, og vil destrueres når prosjektet er ferdig, sammen med alt av personalia. Er det noen spørsmål før vi går i gang?

Kort introduksjon, hvor har de tjenestegjort, hvor lenge, internasjonale operasjoner etc.

Spørsmål 1

Kan dere beskrive med egne ord hva dere oppfatter som deres (*Hærens, Forsvarets, avdelingens, soldatens*) hovedformål?

- Dersom beskytte Norge: Hvordan gjøres dette best, deltagelse ute eller mer fokus hjemme?
- Har dette endret seg over tid? Før etter 2014? Hvordan og hvorfor?

Spørsmål 2

Hvordan opplever dere at relasjonen (eller forståelsen) mellom Forsvaret, Hæren spesielt, og sivilt samfunn er?

- Har du noen personlige tanker om denne relasjonen?
- Har denne utviklet seg over tid? Kan dere beskrive hvordan dere opplever at utviklingen har vært?
- Hvor viktig er dette for Hæren, og for deg personlig?

Spørsmål 3

«For alt vi har og alt vi er» (2011) Hva tror dere var formålet med denne kampanjen?

- Hvem var målgruppen og hvorfor?
- Har den nådd målet?
- Hva var bakgrunnen for at kampanjen ble iverksatt?

Spørsmål 4

Hva er dine tanker om bred rekruttering; kvinner, minoriteter, etc.?

- Hva tjener Hæren på dette?

Spørsmål 5

Som dere sikkert vet holder man på å innføre en ny reform i Forsvaret (OR/OF), hvilke konsekvenser tror dere denne reformen vil få i forhold til relasjonen til sivilt samfunn?

- rekruttering, kultur etc.?

Spørsmål 6

I yrket deres kan dere som en ytterst konsekvens komme til å måtte ta og ofre liv, har du noen tanker om dette?

- Hva er verdt å dø for? FN-opdrag, NATO-opdrag?
- Afghanistan? Syria? Irak? Ukraina?

Spørsmål 7

Dersom det i morgen ble bedt om å stille hærsoldater på et krevende og kontroversielt oppdrag i Syria/Irak/Venezuela, hvordan ville du personlig stilt deg til dette? Hva ville du følt?

Spørsmål 8

Hvilket inntrykk ønsker du at soldater fra andre nasjoner skal sitte igjen med etter et møte med norske soldater? Hvorfor?

- Allierte, ikke-allierte, fiende? (Kreativ oppdragsløsning?)
- Fredsbevarende, fredsopprettende, NATO-opdrag, øving etc.

Spørsmål 9 (ligner på spørsmål 1, kan tas dersom ikke tilstrekkelig informasjon dukker opp i spørsmål 1)

Hvis dere tenker tilbake på deres egen rekrutt-periode, først periode i Hæren, hva føler dere har endret seg mest hos dere selv i deres syn på Hæren og på soldatyrket?

- *Hvis endring, når og hvordan skjedde dette?*

Spørsmål 10

Hva er de viktigste verdiene for deg som soldat?

- I yrkesutøvelse, i møte med andre?
- Dersom de svarer RAM: hva legger dere i dette? (Respekt, Ansvar, Mot)
 - o Hva er i så fall viktigst og hva betyr det for deg i det daglige?
- Hvorfor er disse verdiene viktige/Hva mener du disse verdiene bidrar til?
- Hvilke verdier er det viktig å fremvise til sivilt samfunn/utlandet?

Spørsmål 11 (Haaland 2008:249)

Nå nærmer vi oss slutten, og jeg lurer på om du avslutningsvis kunne beskrevet deg selv, og din rolle som soldat, i en tittel. Hvilken tittel ville det vært? (Et fengende slagord)

- Forskjell hjemme og ute?

Avslutning:

Tusen takk for at du/dere tok deg/dere tid til å møte meg.

Dersom du har noen kommentarer eller innspill du mener kan være relevant for meg å vite i forhold til det vi har snakket om i dag eller prosjektet som helhet still dem gjerne nå. Var det noen spørsmål du savnet, som du synes jeg burde stilt?

(Spør om tilgang til dokumenter eller lignende som ikke er offentlig tilgjengelig, dersom dette har vært nevnt av respondenten i løpet av intervjuet.)

- ”Du nevnte X tidligere, og jeg vil gjerne benytte anledningen til å spørre om jeg kunne få tilgang til dette, da det vil kunne være viktig for forskningsprosjektet”

Dersom du har noen flere spørsmål eller kommentarer om prosjektet, intervjuet eller meg, har du min kontaktinformasjon og må ikke nøle med å ta kontakt på et senere tidspunkt.

Appendix 2 – Interview guide (English)

Hi, and thank you so much for taking the time to meet with me today. I know that you are quite busy with school and exams. As you probably remember from the email I sent you, this interview and research project seeks to investigate the current role-perception among soldiers in the Norwegian Army. (Say a little bit about yourself and the project). Before we begin I would like to underscore ones more that participation in this project is voluntary, and that you can withdraw your consent at any time; during the interview, or later in the process, even though I am gathering these letters of consent. (Gather them with signatures). Your participation will be anonymous, and I will not publish your name in the thesis. If you want I can send the transcript from our meeting today? Before we begin, I would like to ask if it is ok with you that I record our conversation? This is to help me remember your answers, but please feel free to turn of the recording device if you want to. The recording will not be published, but will be deleted when the project is finished, together with personal information etc. Are there any questions before we start?

First, I would like to ask for a short introduction, how long have you served in the Army, where have you worked, have you participated in any international operations etc.? Think of it like a brief resume.

Question 1

Can you describe with your own words what you think of as your (the Army, the Armed Forces and the soldiers) main purpose?

- If they answer protect Norway: How do we do that best, in your opinion? Participation abroad or main focus at home?
- How has this changed, when you started vs. today? Has this changed over time? Before and after 2014?

Question 2

How do you feel the relationship (or understanding) between the Armed Force, the Army in particular, and the civil society is today?

- Do you have any personal thoughts or reflections concerning this relation?
- How has this relationship developed over time in your experience? Can you describe how you feel the development has been?

- How important is this relationship for the Army and for you personally?

Question 3

“For everything we have and everything we are” (2011) was a media campaign launched in 2011. What do you think was the purpose of this campaign?

- Who is the target audience and why?
- Has this goal been achieved?
- Why do you think this campaign was launched, what was the reason behind it?

Question 4

What are your thoughts about broad recruitment; women, minorities, ethnic, religious, sexual etc.?

- What does the Army gain?

Question 5

As you probably know, the Army is about to implement a new personnel reform. What consequences do you think this reform will have regarding the relation to the civil society?

- Recruitment, culture and so on?

Question 6

In your line of work, you in the utmost consequence might have to take and sacrifice life? Do you have any thoughts about this?

- What is worth dying for?
- UN-mission, NATO-mission?

Question 7

If tomorrow, you were asked to deploy to a demanding and controversial mission abroad. Say in Syria, Iraq or Venezuela? How would you feel about this and what would your initial thoughts and reflections be?

Question 8

What impression do you wish that soldiers from other nations shall have after a meeting with a Norwegian soldier? After a meeting with you? Why?

- Allies (In NATO), Non-allies

- Peacebuilding, peacemaking, NATO-missions, practice etc.?

Question 9 (Similar to question 1. Will be used if question 1 did not provide enough information)

If you think back to your first period in the Army, your recruit-period, what do you feel has changed most for you personally, in your view of the Army and the soldier?

- *If change, how and when did this happen?*

Question 10

What are the most important values for you as a soldier/officer?

- Doing your job, when meeting others?
- If they answer, RAM: What does these mean to you? (Respect, Responsibility and Courage)
 - o What is most important and what does this mean to you in your day to day life?
- What do you think these values contribute to? / Why are they important?
- What values are most important to show to the civil society?

Question 11 (Haaland 2008:249)

Now we are approaching the end of the interview, and I was wondering if you could describe yourself and your role as a soldier in a tittle? What tittle would that be? (A catchy slogan, a sales pitch). Imagine yourself at a job interview and your job is to sell yourself as a soldier to me in one last sentence?

Ending:

Thank you again for taking the time to meet with me today. If you have any comments or question that you think would be relevant for me to know, regarding what we have discussed today, or the research as a whole, please feel free to ask. Were there any questions you thought was missing, and that you thought I should have asked but did not?

(If it comes up and is relevant, ask for access to documents that are not publicly available)

If you have any more questions or comments about the project, the interview or me, you have my contact information and please do not hesitate to contact me at a later date.

Appendix 3 – Interview guide with expected answers

Hi, and thank you so much for taking the time to meet with me today. I know that you are quite busy with school and exams. As you probably remember from the email I sent you, this interview and research project seeks to investigate the current role-perception among soldiers in the Norwegian Army. (Say a little bit about yourself and the project). Before we begin I would like to underscore ones more that participation in this project is voluntary, and that you can withdraw your consent at any time, during the interview, or later in the process, even though I am gathering these letters of consent. (Gather them with signatures). Your participation will be anonymous, and I will not publish your name in the thesis. If you want I can send you the transcript from our meeting today? Before we begin, I would like to ask if it is OK with you that I record our conversation? This is to help me remember your answers, but please feel free to turn of the recording device at any time. The recording will not be published, but will be deleted when the project is finished, together with all personal information. Are there any questions before we start?

First, I would like to ask for a short introduction, how long have you served in the Army, where have you worked, have you participated in any international operations etc.? Think of it like a brief resume.

Question 1

Can you describe with your own words what you think of as your (the Army, the Armed Forces, the soldiers) main purpose?

- If they answer protect Norway: How do we do that best, in your opinion? Participation abroad or main focus at home?
- How has this changed, when you started vs. today? Has this changed over time? Before and after 2014?

Expected answer Warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier
Purpose is to practice their trait, waging war. Prepare, and develop military knowledge and skills.	Purpose is to defend Norway, its people and its values. Including humanitarian values.

Question 2

How do you feel the relationship (or understanding) between the Armed Forces, the Army in particular, and the civil society is today?

- Do you have any personal thoughts or reflections concerning this relation?
- How has this relationship developed over time in your experience? Can you describe how you feel the development has been?
- How important is this relationship for the Army, and for you personally?

Expected answer Warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier
Separated, which is good. The civil society needs to understand the need for the Armed Forces but should not interfere in the conduction of military operations and the Armed Forces should not interfere with the workings of civil society. Do not need support from the civil society. Civil society is important insofar that it provides the Army with funding and personnel.	Very important, understanding creates legitimacy – which is important also on a personal level. Needs and seeks support from the general population.

Question 3

“For everything we have and everything we are” (2011) was a media campaign launched in 2011. What do you think was the purpose of this campaign?

- Who is the target audience and why?
- Has this goal been achieved?
- Why do you think this campaign was launched, what was the reason behind it?

Expected answer Warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier
Recruitment was the purpose; young people was the target audience.	Increase the understanding of the Armed Forces and the Army’s purpose, defense of Norway, within the general population. The target audience was therefore the Norwegian population at large, and maybe also personnel in the Armed Forces.

Question 4

What are your thoughts about broad recruitment; women, minorities, ethnic, religious, sexual etc.?

- What does the Army gain?

Expected answer Warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier
As long as the Army can choose among the best it is ok.	Good, mirroring the population, more diversity, new ideas thoughts and reflections are welcome.

Question 5

As you probably know, the Armed Forces are about to implement a new personnel reform.

What consequences do you think this reform will have regarding the relation to civil society?

- Recruitment, culture etc.?

Expected answer Warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier.
Does not matter, as it is an internal reform.	Class divide? Might impinge on the mirroring of the civil society?

Question 6

In your line of work, you in the utmost consequence might have to take and sacrifice life? Do you have any thoughts about this?

- What is worth dying for?
- UN-mission, NATO-mission?

Expected answers Warrior	Expected answers Citizen soldier
Does not have any profound thoughts around this apart from it being their duty and career.	Need it to mean something; either defending Norway, Norwegian values, interest or humanitarian ideals.

Question 7

If tomorrow, you were asked to deploy to a demanding and controversial mission abroad. Say in Syria, Iraq or Venezuela? How would you feel about this? What would your initial thoughts and reflections be?

Expected answer Warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier
Ok.	It would depend on legitimacy and purpose but would go if they were asked.

Question 8

What impression do you wish that soldiers from other nations shall have after a meeting with Norwegian soldiers? After a meeting with you? Why?

- Allies (In NATO), Non-allies
- Peacebuilding, peacemaking, NATO-missions, rehearsals?

Expected answers warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier
Show that we are professional and reliable.	Represent Norway and Norwegian values. Reliable, capable of doing their job, also in unconventional ways.

Question 9 (Similar to question 1. Will be used if question 1 did not provide enough information)

If you think back to your first period in the Army, your recruit-period, what do you feel has changed most for you personally, in your view of the Army and the soldier?

- If change, how and when did this happen?

Expected answer Warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier
Become more professional, internal cohesion etc. Especially during Afghanistan? Experiences?	Kept much of their civilian connection, but more drilled and experienced. Better at doing their job. Better able to convert civilian skills and characteristics to be used within the military framework.

Question 10

What are the most important values for you as a soldier/officer?

- Doing your job, when meeting others?
- If they answer, RAM: What does these mean to you? (Respect, Responsibility and Courage)
 - o What is most important and what does this mean to you in your day to day life?
- What do you think these values contribute to? / Why are they important?
- What values are most important to show to the civil society?

Expected answer Warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier
Professionalism, loyalty, honor, duty, endurance. Courage to do what is needed in battle – even though civil society might disagree?	Tolerance, equality, individuality. Courage to speak up if something feels wrong, courage to be creative? Equal rights, equal possibilities?

Question 11 (Haaland 2008:249)

Now we are approaching the end of this interview, and I was wondering if you could describe yourself and your role as a soldier in a tittle? What tittle would that be? (A catchy slogan, a sales pitch). Imagine yourself at a job interview and your job is to sell yourself as a soldier to me in one last sentence?

Expected answer Warrior	Expected answer Citizen soldier
Courageous, drilled, aggressive, achiever of various objectives, instrument	Problem solver, defender, protector, representative of Norway, security guarantor?

Ending:

Thank you again for taking the time to meet with me today. If you have any comments or question that you think would be relevant for me to know, regarding what we have discussed today, or the research as a whole, feel free to ask. Were there any questions you thought was missing, and that you thought I should have asked but didn't?

(If it comes up and is relevant, ask for access to documents that are not publicly available)

If you have any more questions or comments about the project, the interview or me, you have my contact information and please do not hesitate to contact me at a later date.

Appendix 4 – Information letter (Norwegian – original)

Forespørsel om deltakelse i forskningsprosjektet

Working title: “Why risk it? Change and Continuity in the Norwegian Army’s role-perception.”

Bakgrunn og formål

Oppgaven er en del av mastergradsstudiet ved Universitet i Oslo, og søker å besvare problemstillingen: *Has the role-perception among soldiers in the Norwegian Army changed since redeployment from Afghanistan, especially considering the events of 2014?* Formålet med studien er derfor å finne ut hvilken rolleforståelse som dominerer blant norske hærsoldater. Du forespørres herved å delta da du tilhører en høyt selektert gruppe av fremtidige ledere i Den norske hæren.

Hva innebærer deltakelse i studien

Deltakelse i studien innebærer aktiv deltagelse i individuelle eller gruppe-intervjuer med maksimal varighet av en time, 1-2 ganger. Spørsmålene vil omhandle hva som er Hærens og soldatens formål, forholdet til sivilsamfunnet og verdisyn. Informasjonen vil registreres med lydopptak og notater.

Hva skjer med informasjonen om deg?

Alle personopplysninger vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. Det er kun jeg, Victoria Ramm Henriksen og min veileder, Tormod Heier, ved Forsvarets Høyskole, som vil ha tilgang til eventuelle personopplysninger. Personopplysningene og opptakene vil lagres forsvarlig. Navneliste/ koblingsnøkkel vil lagres adskilt fra de øvrige dataene.

Det vil arbeides for at du som deltaker ikke vil kunne gjenkjennes i den endelige publikasjonen.

Prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes 23.05.2018. Datamaterialet vil i etterkant av prosjektslutt anonymiseres, dette vil skje senest innen 31.12.2018, da forsinkelser kan forekomme.

Frivillig deltakelse

Det er frivillig å delta i studien, og du kan når som helst trekke ditt samtykke uten å oppgi noen grunn. Dersom du trekker deg, vil alle opplysninger om deg bli anonymisert.

Dersom du ønsker å delta eller har spørsmål til studien, ta kontakt med Victoria Ramm Henriksen på telefon 9084 6173, eller veileder Tormod Heier på telefon 4764 2420

Studien er meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning, NSD - Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS.

Samtykke til deltakelse i studien

Jeg har mottatt informasjon om studien, og er villig til å delta

(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)

Appendix 5 – Information letter (English)

Request for participation in research project

Working title “Why risk it? Change and Continuity in the Norwegian Army’s role-perception”

Background and purpose

The thesis is a part of a master’s degree at the University of Oslo, and seeks to answer the following research question: *Has the role-perception among soldiers in the Norwegian Army changed since redeployment from Afghanistan, especially considering the events of 2014?* The purpose of the research is to find out what type of role-perception is dominant among soldiers in the Norwegian Army. You are hereby requested to participate, because you belong to a highly selected group of future leaders of the Norwegian Army.

What does participation in the research entail?

Participation in the research entail active participation in individual or group interview with a maximal duration of one hour, 1-2 times. The questions will revolve around the purpose of the Army and the soldier, relations to civil society and values. The information will be registered with tape recorder and notes.

What will happen to your personal information?

All personal information will be treated confidentially. It is only I, Victoria Ramm Henriksen, and my supervisor, Tormod Heier at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, that will have access to your personal information. Your personal information and the recordings will be stored separately and responsibly.

It will be worked towards that you as a participant will not be recognisable in the final publication.

The research project will be finished 23.05.2018. The data will after the projects ending be properly anonymised, this will happen at the latest 31.12.2018 as delays might occur.

Voluntary participation

It is voluntary to participation in the study and you may at any time withdraw your consent without providing any reason for doing so. If you withdraw your consent all information about you will be anonymized.

If you want to participate or have any questions regarding the research project, please contact Victoria Ramm Henriksen by telephone 9084 6173 or supervisor Tormod Heier by telephone 4764 2420.

The research project has been reported to Personvernombudet for forskning, NSD - Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS.

Consent for participation to the study.

I have received information about the research project, and is willing to participate

(Signed by project participant, date)

Appendix 6 – Interview methods table

Interview/date	Length in minutes	Number of interviewees	Institution English name	Institution Norwegian name	Recording
Nr.1 26/02-18	50:52	2 (a and b)	The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)	Stabsskolen	Audio recording
Nr.2 28/02-18	44:24	1	The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)	Stabsskolen	Audio recording
Nr.3 28/02-18	30:32	1	The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)	Stabsskolen	Audio recording
Nr.4 28/02-18	48:27	1	The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)	Stabsskolen	Audio recording
Nr.5 01/03-18	35:48	1	The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)	Stabsskolen	Audio recording
Nr.6 14/03-18	45:57	1	The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)	Stabsskolen	Audio recording

Declined for not actually having worked in the Army		1	The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)	Stabsskolen	
Declined for undisclosed reasons		1	The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)	Stabsskolen	
Total		7/9			
Saturation	Yes, even though I originally anticipated 10 interviewees out of a total of 16.	1 female	The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College (NORDCSC)	Stabsskolen	
Nr.1 06/03-18	60:00	3 (a, b and c)	The Norwegian Military Academy	Krigsskolen	Audio recording
Nr.2 06/03-18	58:18	1	The Norwegian Military Academy	Krigsskolen	Audio recording
Nr.3 07/03-18	60:12	3 (a, b and c)	The Norwegian Military Academy	Krigsskolen	Audio recording
Nr.4 07/03-18	60:09	3 (a, b and c)	The Norwegian Military Academy	Krigsskolen	Audio recording
Total		10			
Saturation	Yes	3 females	The Norwegian Military Academy	Krigsskolen	

Appendix 7 – Project authorization by the NSD (Norwegian – Original)



Tormod Heier
Postboks 800, Postmottak
2617 LILLEHAMMER

Vår dato: 04.12.2017

Vår ref: 56782 / 3 / AMS

Deres dato:

Deres ref:

Tilråkning fra NSD Personvernombudet for forskning § 7-27

Personvernombudet for forskning viser til meldeskjema mottatt 24.10.2017 for prosjektet:

56782	<i>Norges engasjement i Afghanistan: profesjonskultur/rolleforståelse hos militært personell på taktisk nivå</i>
Behandlingsansvarlig	<i>Universitetet i Oslo, ved institusjonens øverste leder</i>
Daglig ansvarlig	<i>Tormod Heier</i>
Student	<i>Victoria Ramm Henriksen</i>

Vurdering

Etter gjennomgang av opplysningene i meldeskjemaet og øvrig dokumentasjon finner vi at prosjektet er unntatt konsesjonsplikt og at personopplysningene som blir samlet inn i dette prosjektet er regulert av § 7-27 i personopplysningsforskriften. På den neste siden er vår vurdering av prosjektopplegget slik det er meldt til oss. Du kan nå gå i gang med å behandle personopplysninger.

Vilkår for vår anbefaling

Vår anbefaling forutsetter at du gjennomfører prosjektet i tråd med:

- opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemaet og øvrig dokumentasjon
- vår prosjektvurdering, se side 2
- eventuell korrespondanse med oss

Meld fra hvis du gjør vesentlige endringer i prosjektet

Dersom prosjektet endrer seg, kan det være nødvendig å sende inn endringsmelding. På våre nettsider finner du svar på hvilke [endringer](#) du må melde, samt endringskjema.

Opplysninger om prosjektet blir lagt ut på våre nettsider og i Meldingsarkivet

Vi har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet på nettsidene våre. Alle våre institusjoner har også tilgang til egne prosjekter i [Meldingsarkivet](#).

Vi tar kontakt om status for behandling av personopplysninger ved prosjektslutt

Ved prosjektslutt 31.12.2018 vil vi ta kontakt for å avklare status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Dokumentet er elektronisk produsert og godkjent ved NSDs rutiner for elektronisk godkjenning.