

Sticks and Stones: Examining the Effects of Coalitional Meta-Perceptions on Newcomer Altruism towards the Host Culture

An experimental study of Latino Immigrants Exposed to Positive or Negative Majority Views of Latinos

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04.06.18

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2018

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Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo

Acknowledgments

First of all, I would like to thank my extremely patient and helpful supervisor Lotte Thomsen for all the help and supervision she provided during this project. In more ways than one, this project would not have been possible without you, and I am grateful for all the help you have given me during the last year. Second, I would like to thank Elisabeth Bergersen for long coffee-breaks and for listening to my hopeless ramblings about analysis and methodology. Our discussions on everything from statistics to implementation intentions helped immensely during the final stretch of this work.

I would also like to thank the involved parties of “Psykologisk Selskab” and the theater group “Morrari”. I want to thank Morrari for giving me an opportunity to be spontaneous and playful in an incredibly stressful period of my life, and for letting me be part of something bigger than myself. I thank Psykologisk Selskab for giving me the opportunity to be part of a legacy at the department and to plant seeds in a garden I may very well never get to see.

A special thanks to my parents for being there for me throughout my 5 years of studies. Everything I am today I owe to them Especially to my mother for always listening to my problems, even if she has no idea what I am talking about.

Finally, I would like to give a special thanks to my best friend and girlfriend, Ella Marie Sandbakken. Thank you for always being there for me, for pushing me when I needed it, and for helping me through the rough patches on the way. You were always there when I needed you, and you never gave up on me. Even when I had given up on myself. This paper would never have been finished if it was not for you.

Thank you all, this is for you.

Abstract

Evolutionary cultural and coalitional perspectives (e.g. Henrich, 2016; Richerson & Boyd, 2004) suggest that members of an existing group should be wary of newcomers (Cimino & Delton, 2010; Delton & Cimino, 2010) trying to enter their coalition and be acutely attuned to cues whether the newcomers are collaborators or *free riders*, because they will be getting access to the existing common *public goods* of the group to which they have not yet contributed. This thesis turns this idea on its head, positing instead that newcomers should be acutely attuned to cues that the host group sees them as good coalitional members (or not), and should be wary of contributing altruistically to a group that excludes them as full members and thus from the communal sharing of common public goods that membership implies: Why contribute altruistically to a communal pool to which you cannot count on access? In other words, I posit that newcomers should be acutely attuned to meta-perceptions of whether the hosts see them as good coalitional members, which in turn should predict their altruism towards members of the host group in need.

Specifically, based on the premise that cultural norms and markers to large degrees signal coordination benefits and indeed commitment to cultural cooperation (cf. Henrich, 2016), I predict that when newcomers (meta-) perceive that the host culture sees them as a symbolic threat (i.e. a threat to culture or core values by members; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), a critical underlying psychological mechanism that will make newcomers disengage from altruistic cooperation with the host culture is their inference that members of the host culture do not see them as good coalition members, over and above previously established psychological processes of social identity and identity fusion.

Here, experimentally manipulate the framing of representative survey findings, using no deception, to suggest that the majority of Americans feel immigration from Latin America has *not negative* or *not positive* consequences for American culture. I will test whether this framing causes changes in altruistic donations among Hispanic participants living in the US towards charities benefiting “Ordinary American Citizens”; and whether this effect on altruistic donations is uniquely mediated by perceptions that Latino immigrants are not being seen as good coalition members, over and above processes of social identity and identity fusion.

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1 Introduction and Theoretical Framework

It is not a controversial claim that modern society is heavily influenced by groups and the relationship between them. Our relationship and interactions with other groups can be the difference between alliances and coalitions, or conflict and prejudice. Humans are not unique in the animal world for forming social relationships reflecting for instance kin, dominance, reciprocity or coalitions and territorial groups (e.g. Goodall, 1986; Horner, Carter, Suchak, & de Waal, 2011; Wilson, Britton, & Franks, 2002). Where humans are unique are in the mere scale of our social relationships and coalitions and the extent to which we will go to help others not related to us and punish violators of social norms (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Through norms, language, and ritualistic behavior, entire nation-states band together in *imagined communities* and identify as one group, even though they have never – nor will they ever – meet all the other individuals in their group. Understanding the nature of this cooperation is key to understanding the human nature of not only cooperation but also of conflict and prejudice.

When two groups meet, the results are not always peaceful and unproblematic – indeed the archeological record indicates the deep roots of warfare between human cultural groups (Henrich, 2016). Imagine for example when someone migrates from one country to another. Often there are cultural differences and barriers that can lead to conflicts between the new arrivals and the people already living in the country. One can often see skepticism from the majority group, claiming things like “they are different from us” or that the immigrants are there to exploit a country and that they are “fortune seekers”.

This raises the question: If majority members react to migration and newcomers with skepticism and by seeing them as *symbolic threats* (threats to a group’s beliefs, values, norms, etc) (as demonstrated across cultures in Obaidi, Kunst, Kteily, Thomsen, & Sidanius, 2018), what does this reaction do to the newcomers? When newcomers see that the group they are attempting to join sees them as a threat, this, of course, suggests that they might not be accepted by, and able to join, the group that simply does not trust them. In principle, this could lead to one of two responses: The newcomers might give up and disengage from the new group, considering joining it a lost cause because of the low level of acceptance from the group; or they engage even more, trying to prove themselves as good, altruistic co-operators to the group so that it may grant them access. This choice in turn should hinge upon whether

or not the newcomers think they have any chance of ever being accepted as full members of the group sees the new group as a potential new coalition. Hence, I hypothesize that as long as the participant sees the American national group as a possible coalition to them, they will attempt to increase their efforts to prove themselves to the majority (H1). I also suspect that being perceived as a threat should lower both acceptance felt from the majority, and how the participant believes the majority sees them. This, in turn, should lead to reduced cooperation from the participants (H2), as I will argue below. Finally, I will be testing an alternative hypothesis, where I hypothesize that any changes in coalitional behavior stem from changes in social identity (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This study will build on a theoretical foundation laid by both evolutionary psychology, and cultural and social psychology. This theoretical foundation will be expanded on below, starting with the concept of cultural evolution.

1.1 Cultural Evolution

Cultural evolution is the study of how cultures evolve and adapt to changing environments and conditions in similar ways genes evolve and adapt. Within this field, one could say that the ultimate reason for culture is biology since our brains and our anatomy has evolved to lay the foundation for forming cultures (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). The rapid changes in cultures mean that genes alone would not be sufficient to explain how human nature evolves. Cultures, on the other hand, can be seen as an adaptation to allow humans to make rapid changes in ways of living in rapidly changing environments (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). As mentioned above, cultures evolve in many ways in the same way as genes do. By transferring values, knowledge and norms to the next generation, cultural traits that are viable are carried on, while those who are not viable extinguish over time. An important factor to consider here is population thinking.

Population thinking is a term referring to seeing a species not as an essential, unchanging unit, but rather as a population of variance in genetic information (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Some cultural traits will be better adapted or more favorable than others. These traits will be passed on through social learning to the next generation, which will then adapt and pass on cultural traits and knowledge. As Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd put it:

Culture is taught by motivated human teachers, acquired by motivated learners, and stored and manipulated in human brains. Culture is an evolving product of populations of human brains, brains that have been shaped by natural selection to learn and manage culture.

(Richerson & Boyd, 2005, p.7)

In this way, normative behavior and cultural traits are passed on. This is the key to human cooperation and altruism. Through normative behavior and by showing cultural and ethnic markers, groups of people state their group belonging and loyalties. A cultural marker could be for example a language or an accent, or ritualistic behavior like keeping kosher or not working on the Sabbath. These markers make it easier for groups to identify the belonging and loyalties of other individuals. If you speak with a certain accent and act in a certain way that is characteristic to a group, then the group members should quickly see that you are one of them and help you according to the *norms of cooperation* in the relevant culture. If you, on the other hand, have a reputation as a norm violator or as someone who does not help your fellow group members, then the group may be more reluctant to help. More on that later.

To fully understand the concept of cultural evolution, we need to understand that culture is the immense body of knowledge, practices, and ideas that we inherit from other people not through genes, but through social learning (Henrich, 2016). Through the ages, humans have come up with small adaptations to their way of living, making humans capable of spreading to every climate on earth. Bear in mind that even though humans occupy more than 90% of the Earth's biomass (Henrich, 2016), we are still only one species with very little genetic variance. Ants on the other hand, who occupy a similar amount of land, have split into 14000 distinct species. In addition to this, our genetic cousin *Pan troglodytes* (or the chimpanzee) lives in a fairly isolated area of Africa and have split into four distinct subspecies (Boyd & Silk, 2005). This suggests that our adaptations do not come from genetics, but from the cumulative knowledge of those who came before us. One example of this is how the Inuit have adapted to living in the freezing conditions of the Arctic, in conditions where most people would lack the means and knowledge required to survive. The ability to learn adaptations from those who came before us is what drives humanity according to the school of cultural evolution. Our ability to acquire techniques and knowledge through social learning from those who came before us is to an extent why we can survive in a vast number of biomes without the genetic adaptations we see in many animals. We have cultures,

and through cultural learning and norms we are able to adapt to rapidly changing environments and maintain vast cultural coalitions.

1.2 Coalitions, Altruism, and Strong Reciprocity

The ability to form packs or groups is not uncommon in nature. What is uncommon, is human's ability to form large, non-kin-based cultural coalitions with people we will likely never meet. Richerson and Boyd (2004) claim that the reason for this is a form of multi-level selection, where those groups that were more cooperative and altruistic on average fared better than the more selfish groups. This will be discussed further later in the thesis, but put simply, if the gains of altruism for the group as a whole were bigger than the individual member's loss from acting altruistically, this would give rise to cooperative, altruistic culture. Evolutionarily speaking, coalitional bonding is clearly advantageous in the sense that many individuals working together towards a goal increase the likelihood of the group reaching said goal. In combat for example, if other aspects of formidability are held constant, one would assume that two individuals would beat one individual, three would beat two, and so forth (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). This thought that there is strength in numbers is also seen in chimpanzees (Wilson et al., 2002). A Troop of chimpanzees will not attack another troop unless they outnumber the other troop by at least a factor 1.5 (Wilson et al., 2002). In fact, other primates form coalitions similar to those formed by humans. An example of this is how chimpanzees have been shown to participate in a number of collective activities such as cooperative hunting (Mitani & Watts, 2001) and territorial patrols (Mitani & Watts, 2005). In addition to this, Chimpanzees and some species of monkeys have shown basic altruistic tendencies (Silk et al., 2005).

Where humans deviate in their cooperation from other primates, is in the human capacity for social learning, where human toddlers vastly outperform chimpanzees and orangutans (Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007). The *cultural intelligence hypothesis* proposed in the 2007 paper by Herrmann and colleagues states that humans have highly specialized skills for social cognition and learning. These skills would make efficient cultural learning and cultural transmission possible over generations, in turn making the learning of essential skills and cultural traits and norms more efficient than individual exploration (van Schaik & Burkart, 2011). One consequence of this view of social and cultural learning, is that cultural norms exist to aid the efficiency of group interactions

(Mark Schaller & Neuberg, 2012) Since cultural transmission would be of great advantage to individuals due to its efficiency compared to individual exploration, one can assume that preserving cultural norms that aid efficiency should be a priority for humans.

As mentioned previously, humans do have a tendency to punish norm violators (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). This could be one explanation for why threats to symbolic threats (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) from out-group members solicit such aggressive responses from people (Obaidi et al., 2018). By violating key cultural aspects such as values and belief systems, the newcomers make the cultural coalition less efficient and thereby pose a severe threat to the group's survival theoretically speaking. From this one can assume that groups should be wary of newcomers, as they pose the threat of being less efficient group members or free riders that do not contribute to common public goods.

Let us assume that group n has two types of people. The *cooperators*, and the *free riders*. Cooperators produce a resource benefit (b), which is split equally between group members. In the process of doing so, they take a cost to their own total resources (c). The equation for the total resources of a cooperator would then be $bx-c$, where x is the total number of cooperators. Free riders, on the other hand, get the benefit from the cooperators work, but they contribute nothing and thusly take little to no cost to their own resources from sharing their own resources with the group. The formula for free riders would then be bx . This means that over time, the free riders would acquire more resources than the cooperators, and free-riding or selfishness would be the most advantageous trait. In turn, this means there should not be an incentive to take a cost so that others can acquire more resources than you, and the coalition collapses. A model built on simple reciprocity alone is not evolutionarily stable. It is however stable if you introduce a third type of individual: The punishers. Punishers punish selfishness at a cost to their own resources. They still contribute as cooperators, but an extra cost is incurred on them per punishment for example in the form of a lower reputation in the group. One problem that occurs with the inclusion of punishers, is the so-called *second-order free rider problem*. The second-order free rider problem asks why an individual would incur a cost to themselves by punishing others when letting others punish would be more beneficial to them. One explanation for this comes from Karthik Panchanathan & Robert Boyd (2004). In their 2004 paper, Panchanathan and Boyd show that a model including the possibility of exclusion from indirect reciprocity (i.e. helping others in order to uphold a good standing with the group and therefore be included in future forms of cooperation) should make individuals willing to contribute to collective action (i.e. costly

actions that benefit the group as a whole). In a model where someone can withhold help (or indirect reciprocity) without risking punishment, there would be a clear incentive to punish as free riders or norm breakers would incur a loss on the entire group.

In this model, reputation in the group is key. One way to punish free riders without incurring large costs to oneself could come through gossip. If a rumor that an individual is a free rider or a norm breaker circulates, then the free rider would be punished collectively by withholding indirect reciprocity. It is not uncommon in a society that gossip is spread about someone deviating from the norm or being different. In fact, one of the clear tendencies when looking at economic games in small-scale societies is that most deviation in trends from what we see in most large-scale societies can be traced back to cultural norms and the fear of violating these norms (Henrich et al., 2005). In short, norm-breakers are being labeled as symbolic threats, and thereby they are punished for deviating from the norm through exclusion from help from the group.

The concept combining altruistic cooperation and so-called altruistic punishment is called *strong reciprocity*. Strong reciprocity requires both that an individual will act altruistically towards those who act kindly towards them, and that the individual is willing to punish those who act unfairly or unkindly towards them. The key element here is that the individual is willing to punish those who act unkindly or unfairly even though this could incur a cost to the individual and that it does not provide a material reward for the individual directly (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002). Strong reciprocity thus deviates from the concept of reciprocal altruism, where an actor would be willing to incur a cost to themselves towards those they deem deserving (i.e. conditional altruism), but only if this yields future benefits to the actor directly (Fehr et al., 2002). Fehr and colleagues (2002) exemplify this through a game known as the sequential (i.e. one actor makes a decision, then the other actor makes their decision knowing what the first actor did) prisoner's dilemma. In the prisoner's dilemma, two actors decide whether they choose to cooperate with or betray the other actor. If both cooperate, they both get a reward of for example 5 tokens, if both betray, they get a reward of for example 2 tokens, and if one betrays the other while the other cooperates, the one who betrays gets 7 tokens. A purely altruistic person would cooperate no matter what the first actor did, as they are unconditionally altruistic. A strong reciprocator would condition their response after what the first actor does. A reciprocal altruist, on the other hand, would always choose to betray the other actor, given that the game is a one-shot game where there is no future reward for cooperation. In other words, strong reciprocity is the propensity to

cooperate within a group in a shared task while being willing to punish those in the group who do not cooperate (i.e. free riders). Gintis (2000) identified an evolutionary model where when faced with extinction level events (i.e. famine, war, natural disasters), neither reciprocal altruism nor kin-selection (where reciprocal or altruistic behavior is limited to relatives) would be sufficient for group survival, whereas a model built on strong reciprocity would be an evolutionary stable model.

Strong reciprocity builds on different cultural norms of cooperation. In many cultures, one would not expect children or the elderly to carry their own, as they have limited capacity to contribute. They are not in violation of the norms of cooperation. Those opposed to social welfare programs would on the other hand possibly see the unemployed as in violation of the norms, as they could contribute, but they do not. This norm of cooperation is important to the context of this study, as one could argue that a majority group claiming that a minority group is a threat to them is in violation of the norms of cooperation and that the newcomers would see the claim that they are a symbolic threat to the majority as an unfair or unkind action. This, in turn, should lead to punishment or the newcomers withholding indirect reciprocity from the majority group.

Assuming the strong reciprocity framework is correct, cooperation and altruism as ethical behaviors are evolved traits that do not need to be a means towards personal gain (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003). Instead, ethical behavior in humans leads to a feeling of pleasure, while unethical behavior leads to pain. In other words, we have evolved to take pleasure in doing good for our group, since more altruistic groups were more successful in comparison to more selfish groups. (Gintis et al., 2008) This is in opposition to the view of altruism as *enlightened self-interest*, where altruism is seen as a means to further one's own survival by helping others. In this view, morality is a maladaptation to modern societies. The reason we help strangers is because we encountered very few strangers in evolutionary times, and we, therefore, mistake them for close relatives or kin. Gintis and colleagues, on the other hand, argue that ethical behavior is adaptive and that ethical behavior was fitness-enhancing in early humans because groups with more altruists fared better than groups of selfish individuals. Since the altruistic groups outperformed the selfish ones, the benefits of superior performance outweighed the cost of altruism.

This debate corners on the concept of group selection vs. individual selection, where Gintis and colleagues represent a part of the scientific community that believes human sociality has evolved not as a product of individual fitness enhancing, but rather as a product

of enhancing the group fitness of groups as a whole. As Gintis et al. (2008) put it, “Group selection is probably not common in the world of biota, but it does occur, and when it does, it can produce highly fit organisms. Our species is but one example of the power of group selection”. (p. 247). Regardless of what the evolutionary explanation for altruism is, most coalitional theories require some form of cheater detection, or a system for detecting free riders. One such system is the *welfare trade-off ratio* system (Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006).

Tooby, et al. (2006) argue that individuals make decisions about the importance put on other individuals welfare in accordance with a welfare trade-off ratio or WTR (Tooby et al., 2006). According to the WTR, the importance an individual *i* places on the welfare of another individual *j* is compared to how much importance they place on their own welfare. If the individual *i* detects that individual *j* places less importance on their welfare in return, a system evolved to react with anger should be triggered. When a minority member experiences that the majority see them as a threat, it is not unreasonable to expect that this skepticism towards the majority will give the impression that the majority does not prioritize the minority member’s welfare and lead to anger and unwillingness to cooperate and prioritize the welfare of majority members. This raises the question, if a newcomer experiences that the majority group is not willing to prioritize the newcomer’s wellbeing, why should the newcomer cooperate with the majority by acting in coalition with the majority? Put differently; if the newcomer experiences that the majority is threatened by them and does not prioritize the newcomer and their group, should the newcomer not deprioritize the welfare of the majority in favor of prioritizing their own group? This should mean that when the participants feel less accepted by the majority and that they meta-perceive that the majority see them as bad members of the coalition, they should be less willing to act altruistically on the majority’s behalf (H2).

1.3 Integrated Threat Theory

The *Integrated Threat Theory* (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) is based on the idea that threats lead to prejudice. The theory suggests that there are at least four types of threats that lead to prejudice: Realistic threats, symbolic threats, negative stereotypes and intergroup anxiety (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001). Intergroup anxiety can be described as discomfort or stress that is experienced when one interacts with members of an out-group. (Stephan &

Stephan, 2000) Realistic threats are perceived threats to an in-groups economic and political status as well as threats to the in-group's welfare (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001). An example could be how immigrants are often portrayed as fortune seekers coming to take the jobs of in-group members. Symbolic threats, on the other hand, are threats regarding perceived violations of the in-group's beliefs and norms. This can refer to beliefs and norms as well as attitudes, morals, and values (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001). Research has shown that symbolic threats not only predict negative attitudes towards minority groups better than affective factors (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993), but also that the perception of symbolic threats predict violent attitudes towards out-group members better than realistic threats in both minority and majority groups (Obaidi, Kunst, Kteily, Sidanius, & Thomsen., in press). By presenting participants with stimuli that indicates that the majority group sees the participants group as a threat to their culture, we could direct focus to the cultural and normative differences between the newcomers and the majority group to the participants. This, in turn, would indicate to the participants that the majority group sees the newcomers as less good members of their cultural coalition, and therefore that they are less likely to include newcomers in future indirect reciprocity as the newcomers are being seen as norm violators by the majority.

1.4 A Societal Context of Between-Group Hierarchies

The context of intergroup processes, such as when a newcomer originating from another group seeks membership in another group, is a between-group hierarchy. Virtually every modern society is characterized by a societal model where some group hold higher status and have more resources than others. Social dominance theory (SDT; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al, 2016) tries to explain how such hierarchical social structures are produced and maintained. SDT argues that societies are characterized by social hierarchies where some groups pose a disproportionate of power or influence over other groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Levin, 2006). Specifically, these groups can be divided into three systems. Age, gender, and arbitrary-sets (Pratto, Sidanius, Levin, 2006). The age system states that older members of the group have more power than e.g. children. The gender set states that men have more power than women. Finally, the arbitrary-set system states that arbitrarily created groups will form a hierarchy where one power majority has

disproportionally more power than other groups. Examples of these groups could be religious groups, ethnic groups, or groups based on sexuality. Since this study will focus on ethno-national groups (i.e. an arbitrary group), it is the latter of the three systems that will be the focus in this subchapter. The importance of this hierarchical structure becomes clear when one looks at the decision-making process behind coalitional mobility. If there is no hierarchy, then there would be little reason to attempt to join another group. This is the topic for the following segment.

The social hierarchies outlined by SDT are maintained different mechanisms. One example of this is the use of *legitimizing myths*. These legitimizing myths are beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and social truths that are held with a wide consensus within the hierarchy. There are two types of legitimizing myths; Hierarchy-enhancing- and Hierarchy attenuating myths. The hierarchy legitimizing myths are widely held beliefs pertaining to why one group is better than others. Examples of this could be the use of eugenics to excuse racial hygiene, the use of “God-given rights” to excuse that some people should rule a nation, or simply the stereotype that immigrants are lazy and the belief in a just world where you get what you deserve. These myths give excuses to why some groups or some humans are better than others, and why there should be a hierarchy in society. Hierarchy attenuating myths, on the other hand, are beliefs and doctrines that challenge the dominance of one group. Examples of this could be socialist political doctrines or humanist doctrines such as universal human rights. The term legitimizing myths does not speak to the absolute truth-value of any of the perceptions and ideologies that it describes, and that its hierarchy-enhancing or attenuating function is served no matter the absolute truth-value of the legitimizing myth, as long as great enough numbers subscribe to it. For instance, whether it is or is not true that the members of all groups possess the same aptitude for some domain does not affect the hierarchy-attenuating or enhancing functions of believing this to be the case or not.

In the case of a newcomer, or immigrant, arriving in a new country hoping to be accepted as a full member of the host culture, there will be a clear hierarchy between the dominant host majority and the subordinate newcomer minority group. Furthermore, societal discourse and majority opinion about the minority group – is it positive or negative for the country, can its members be trusted or not – will serve hierarchy-attenuating versus enhancing functions and will be important cues for newcomers as to their future prospects in the host country. Hence, newcomers should be acutely attuned to such meta-perceptions of what that majority thinks of them when calibrating their own costly behavior towards members of the

majority group. Of course, this analysis also suggests that social dominance orientation (SDO, Pratto et al, 1994; Ho et al, 2015) may moderate the calibration of newcomer altruism in response to meta-coalitional perceptions. However, for sake of brevity and parsimony, in this initial study and proof of concept, I focus on demonstrating effects on and of meta-coalitional perceptions for altruistic behavior, leaving further explorations of their potential moderation by SDO for future research.

1.5 The Decision-Making Process of Applying for Coalitional Membership

If there is strength in numbers, then it follows that there would be a weakness in lack of numbers (M. Schaller & Neuberg, 2008). All else being equal, the largest group or coalition would most likely come out on top in the occurrence of an intergroup conflict. However, “all else” rarely is equal. Within a society, there will be some groups with a disproportionate amount of resources and power. When someone enters a new society, this poses an interesting dilemma for the newly arrived individual. You could either stay with your own group which is less resourceful and lower in the societal hierarchy, or you could attempt to join with the majority group which is on top of the societal hierarchy of power.

Error management theory (EMT; Haselton and Buss, 2000), states that when faced with a decision, one can commit two types of errors: False positives, and false negatives. In this case, identifying a group as a viable cultural coalition if you will in fact never be accepted by the group, is an example of a false positive. Believing that a cultural coalition is not viable when it in fact is, would be an example of a false negative. EMT further states that humans have evolved biases towards making the decision leading to the potentially least costly error (Haselton and Buss, 2000). This bias does not necessarily make us biased towards making the correct decision, only the least costly mistake. For instance, in studies where participants were asked to make a split second decision on whether to shoot a possibly armed assailant (e.g. Baumann & DeSteno, 2010; Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008), it was shown that participants more readily identified out-group males as potential threats. In this case, falsely identifying the out-group males as armed would lead to a less severe cost than falsely identifying them as unarmed where the consequence would be death to the individual that made the error. One could make the assumption that early humans would have been faced with situations where resources were scarce, and they had to make a choice between leaving

their own struggling group to try and find another group. When faced with the decision to either attempt to join the majority coalition of an area or to stay with and prioritize the minority group one identifies with, people should have an evolved bias towards making the least costly error assuming that coalitions were something early humans had to deal with. Whether you choose to join or to abandon the possible coalition, one must estimate the risks and potential costs of your decisions. If you stay with your group, you gain nothing, but you do not lose anything either. On the other hand, if you try and join the majority you will have to invest time and resources to show that you are trustworthy and a beneficial addition to the group. If you are accepted, you gain access to resources that would otherwise be unavailable to you. Though if you are *not* accepted, the time and resources invested are lost forever and you take a penalty. By that logic, if you do not expect to ever be part of the majority group, you would not be inclined to invest in resources that benefit the majority more than it benefits you. In other words, an immigrant should be less willing to cooperate with a majority group if they are given the impression that they will never be accepted by the majority group but rather that any attempt to join the majority group would be futile. This would be true for those who do not feel like they are a part of the in-group already, but what then if the individual feels included in the group but see that they are risking exclusion?

As mentioned previously, the selection of who gets to join a coalition and who does not is crucial to the survival of a coalition. There would be adaptive incentives for avoiding free riders and conduct a form of selection for trustworthy co-operators before one can see a newcomer as a fully-fledged member of a group. In the following section, I address the evolved concept of newcomers and the testing and hazing processes that go into selecting a newcomer for membership in a coalition

1.6 The Concept of a Newcomer

Newcomers, as opposed to veterans, are individuals that intend and attempt to join a coalition they are not yet part of. While the newcomers often hope to contribute to and benefit from their new potential coalition, the veteran members are not always certain about the newcomer's intent (Cimino & Delton, 2010). The reasoning behind the skepticism of the veteran members has been touched upon above, but it corners on the potential costs of cooperation versus the potential benefits. While newcomers can be a great resource for any group, there is a risk of them not contributing their fair share or not adhering to the local

cultural norms and guidelines. A new member of a hunting party could be a poor hunter and free-ride on the rest of the group or a new employee in the workplace could be a bad match with the preexisting organizational culture and therefore perform poorly together with other employees. In their 2010 paper, Cimino and Delton provide preliminary evidence for what they call the evolved concept of a newcomer. This concept consists of a series of cognitive subroutines designed to test and evaluate the coalitional impact a newcomer may have. An example of these subroutines is how newcomers are seen as less trustworthy, less likable, more deserving of punishment, and less entitled to coalitional benefits compared to veteran members (Cimino & Delton, 2010). They are also judged as less likable and less competent than veterans (Cimino & Delton, 2010). This subroutine is the basis for the newcomer-inventories used in this study, that will be explained in further detail later.

If such a newcomer-threat-detection system does exist, then a question follows. Are there evolved concepts of potential new coalitions where one might apply for membership as well? If a free rider joins a coalition, this is costly to the coalition. In the same vein, it can be very costly to a newcomer to try and join a coalition without ever being accepted by it. This suggests the hypothesis that when the newcomer experiences the new coalition as less trusting, and that they perceive that it is unlikely for the newcomer to be accepted by the new coalition, they should be less inclined to act altruistically on the majority groups behalf. It further suggests that newcomers should be acutely attuned to meta-perception of exactly the characteristics that an evolutionary analysis of newcomers suggest will be crucial in their evaluation: That one is trustworthy, competent, likable, entitled to benefits, loyal, grateful, and hardworking. On the other hand, if a newcomer perceives that the group is somewhat permeable and sees the newcomers as a good potential coalitional member so that they might eventually be accepted, this might motivate newcomers to contribute altruistically to the group, proving their worth to it. Indeed, this may be the case, even upon rejection so long as the newcomer perceives there is *some* chance of eventually joining the group.

Convergent evidence in support of this latter point is provided by work done on social exclusion, which shows that social exclusion can lead to increased affiliative behavior such as mimicry (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008), conformity (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000), and even increased altruistic behavior towards potential cooperative partners (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007). These findings predict that a newcomer would be willing to incur greater costs when being rejected from the group as a measure to prevent further rejection, as long as there is a chance of acceptance in the end. If this is the case then there

should be an effect only on donations given to the majority focused charity, insofar as there is no chance of exclusion from the minority group if donations are not increased to it. This, in turn, presumes that the participants do not feel that they have a bad reputation within the minority group as a norm violator or a free rider.

1.7 Social identities and Identity Fusion

If the predictions that coalitional meta-perceptions will be a key underlying psychological process underpinning altruistic commitment among newcomers or immigrants to a host culture were to be confirmed, one potential counter-argument to such findings might be that they “simply” reflect nothing but already well-documented processes of social identity and identity fusion. Hence, this project will also empirically assess the effects of these variables on immigrant altruism towards the host culture.

Social identity theory builds on the premise that an individual’s feeling of belonging to a certain social group influences how they act in relation to members of their own in-group and members of out-groups. (Hogg, 2016) An individual can categorize themselves as members of different groups, and situational factors make different social identities and inter-group relations salient (Hogg, 2016). These categories are, according to social identity theory, not merely passive schemas that are either activated or deactivated in different situations. They are actively created on the spot to reflect the contemporary state of the self and others. In other words, these categories are highly fluid, according to social identity theory. Hogg (2016) states that many members of low-status groups will seek to identify with higher status groups through social mobility. This should be the case here, and so a straightforward prediction from a social identity perspective is that when faced with information that the American national group is permeable to the newcomers, their identification as American, rather than as a member of their ethnic minority group, should increase. On the other hand, when newcomers see that the American national group is less permeable, they should dis-identify with the American national group, and their ethnic identity should be made salient, such that their identification with their ethnic group rather than the American national group should increase (Huddy, 2001).

From social identity and social categorization perspectives, when a person categorizes both themselves and others into a group, they are not categorized as individuals, but rather in relation to their similarity to an in-group prototype (Swann, Gómez, Seyle, Morales, & Huici,

2009). This, in turn, would predict that some people would see themselves as more prototypical than others (Swann et al., 2009).

From this foundation, Swann and colleagues developed the concept of identity fusion (Swann et al., 2009). Identity fusion is a visceral sense of oneness such that a person's social and personal identities fuse together (Whitehouse, in press; but see also Thomsen & Fiske, in press). The key difference between an individual that is strongly self-categorized as a group member and a *fused* individual, is that where the self-categorized group member undergoes a process of deindividualization, the fused member retains a strong sense of personal identity. A group member willing to commit extreme acts on behalf of their group (e.g. acts of terrorism), would per definition be non-stereotypical, as the act would not be considered extreme if the act was stereotypical for a group. This is not the case for fused members of a group, as their personal identities are preserved and fused with their social identities. Another important factor in the fusing of identities is that highly fused individuals should attempt to shore up their group identities when their personal identities are threatened, and vice versa (Swann et al., 2009). This means that if the group they identify with is threatened, this should lead to the individual being motivated to protect their identities.

The prediction suggested by an identity fusion framework, then, is that strong identification as an ethnic minority made salient by the experimental manipulation should make individuals less inclined to act altruistically on the majority group's behalf, and more inclined to share with their ethnic minority in-group, at the expense of the majority group. If the individuals are highly fused with their new national identity, on the other hand, this should lead to them feeling that their identity as American is threatened and should lead to higher donations to the national group, at the expense of the ethnic minority group. Based on this, I also test this alternative hypothesis that any changes in donations do not stem from coalitional thinking and evolved concepts, but rather come because of changes in social identities and identity fusion.

1.8 The Present Study

As mentioned earlier, this paper will test the hypothesis that newcomer/immigrant members of an ethnic minority (Specifically Latin Americans) will be less inclined to show altruistic behavior towards the majority group (i.e. White Americans, or as we euphemistically describe it "Ordinary American Citizens") when presented with a short article

giving the impression that Americans see immigration as a threat to American core values.

The reasoning behind this hypothesis, is that when faced with an uncertain future coalitional status (i.e. you are uncertain whether or not you – as a newcomer – will be accepted by the cultural coalition you are attempting to join), one will have to evaluate what the least costly error would be in accordance to error management theory. Considering that any possible gains from the coalition are uncertain, while the cost of a failed attempt to join is significant, one could assume that the most costly error, in this case, would be to try to join with the majority and fail in doing so. This, in turn, would then predict that the effects of the experimental manipulation would be mediated by how the participants think that the majority group sees them as coalitional members. If they think the majority sees them as poor or costly members of a cultural coalition, they will be less likely to invest in the majority's wellbeing.

I will assess costly altruism by giving Latino participants a surprise (real) monetary bonus that they may keep or donate one or both of to two charities that either benefit their ethnic minority group (*Hispanic Federation*) or the White majority group (*Facing Hunger*, that works in predominantly White, rural Appalachia). The reason for adding one obviously minority centric and one charity that works in a traditionally white, rural area, was to control that any differences in donations did not simply stem from an overall increase in donations. The full amount of all participant donations was of course in fact donated to these two charities upon completion of the study.

In the experimental economics literature that addresses processes that underpin monetary donations in experimental games, it is a key methodological principle that no deception should be used to not undermine the validity of the current and future studies. Additionally, in an era of increasingly tense intergroup relations with several cases of intergroup violence, for ethical reasons it is problematic to deceive participants that the outgroup sees them in ways that are not documented, even if carefully debriefed afterwards. Hence, I will test both the hypothesis of both the main effect of being perceived as a threat and the hypothesis of the mediated effect of the perception of how good of a coalition member the majority sees the participants as, by first presenting participants with a short newspaper article reporting actual representative survey findings (Lopez, Passel, Demographer, & Rohal, 2015) that approximately 1/3 of Americans think immigration from South- and Central America has mainly negative consequences for the US, 1/3 think it has positive consequences, and 1/3 think that it has mixed effects that are not mainly positive, nor mainly negative. Hence, using no deception, I can truthfully frame these findings in either a

positive or negative direction, by truthfully describing to participants that 2/3 of “Ordinary American Citizens” either think that immigration from South and Central America do *not* have mainly negative effects or does *not* have mainly positive effects for the United States.

Finally, if I am correct that this positive or negative framing will affect costly altruism towards the majority group *because* of the meta-coalitional perceptions that the newcomer infers from this information, then any causal effects of the experimental manipulation on donations to the majority group (i.e. *Facing Hunger*) should be mediated by these meta-coalitional perceptions. In contrast, I predict no such effects on donations to the *Hispanic Federation*.

In addition to the two hypotheses mentioned above, I will test the alternative hypotheses that any differences in altruistic behavior among the participants exposed to the negative and positive framing of how White Americans see Latino immigrants are due to processes of social identity and identity fusion: In theory, being perceived as a threat by the majority in a country should make a participant’s ethnic identity salient (Hogg, 2016). The experimental manipulation should by that logic increase identification with the participants’ ethnic group and decrease their identification with the American national group in the anti-immigrant condition, and vice versa in the pro-immigrant group. The same logic can be applied to identity fusion, as when the participant’s ethnic social identity is threatened, their personal identity should become more fused with this identity to try and shore up around the social identity.

However, I predict that coalitional concerns will outweigh the identity concerns presented by the social identity hypothesis (or that any effects of social identity will indeed be *due* to such coalitional concerns). Hence, I predict that whereas coalitional meta-perceptions will have effects on costly altruism over and above social identity and identity fusion, identity fusion and social identity will not have unique effects over and above meta-coalitional meta-perceptions. Furthermore, American national identity has been shown to be highly stable over time among American minority members, even when they are being prompted with information and encounters that should make their ethnic minority identity salient (Huddy, 2001). This suggests that it does not play a fluid, on-the-fly calibrating role, as suggested by Hogg (2016) and hence may not underpin moment-to-moment reactions to immediate coalitional information.

2 Methodology

2.1 Approval

This study was approved by the internal review board at the Department of Psychology at the University of Oslo (Number: 1155214).

2.2 Participants

305 participants (200 men, 105 women, mean age 32) of Latin American descent were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowd-sourcing platform and randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. The participants were paid 1.25 USD for their participation, as well as a 0.50 USD bonus, which the participants could choose to donate either partially or completely to one of two charitable organizations. Of the 305 participants, 90 participants had to be excluded from further analysis due to failing exclusion criteria such as correctly answering a concentration check. This left a total of 215 participants. (136 men, 79 women, mean age 33)

2.3 Design and Procedure

All data for the experiment were collected through Qualtrics Online Survey Software & Insight Platform. IP addresses and metadata of the participants were not collected, and no personal information on the participants was saved. The participants were presented with information about the experiment and were asked to give informed consent before proceeding to the survey. Here the participants were first asked to provide demographic information such as age, gender, their state of residency, their identified ethnicity, and level of education.

Following the demographic questions, the participants were asked to evaluate in their own opinion the ethnicity of most ordinary American citizens and immigrants to the United States.

Following these questions, the participants completed a battery of different personality and attitude scales and inventories for a separate project that were not analyzed here¹.

Next, participants were randomly assigned one of two articles to read. The statistics for these texts were gathered from a report done by PEW research center that showed in a nationally representative survey that 37% of White Americans think immigration from Latin America has been mostly negative, 26% believe Latin American immigration has been mostly positive, and 35% believe it has been neither positive nor negative (Lopez et al., 2015):

Anti-immigrant condition:

***Cultural Threats and Benefits: Study Finds Approximately Two-Thirds of Americans Do NOT See Immigration as Mostly Positive:** A representative study of the American population from Pew Research Center found that about two in every three Americans do NOT think that the immigration from Latin America has been mostly positive for America. For instance, Rep. Steve King tweeted that immigrants are "importing a different culture, a different civilization, and that culture and civilization, the imported one, rejects the host's culture." and that "Cultural suicide by demographic transformation must end" and that immigrants are refusing to assimilate into the American culture and civilization."*

Pro immigrant condition:

***Cultural Threats and Benefits: Study Finds Approximately Two-Thirds of Americans Do NOT See Immigration as Mostly Negative:** A representative study of the American population from Pew Research Center found that about two in every three Americans do NOT think that the immigration from Latin America has been mostly negative for America. For instance former president Ronald Reagan once said "I have always believed there was some divine providence that placed this great land here between the two great oceans to be found by a special kind of people from every corner of the world who had a special love for freedom and a special courage that enabled them to leave their own land, leave their friends and their countrymen, and come to this new and strange land to build a new world of peace and freedom and hope."*

After reading one of the articles, participants were presented with a manipulation check, to confirm that they have read the article. After the manipulation check, the participants were asked to answer how trustworthy, competent, likable, loyal, grateful, hardworking, and entitled to benefits they thought Americans think immigrants are on a meta-coalitional perceptions measure developed specifically for this study ($\alpha=.94$). This *coalitional meta-perception* measure was inspired by the work done by Cimino and Delton on the evolved concept of newcomers (Cimino & Delton, 2010; Delton & Cimino, 2010)

After this, the participants were asked to answer questions on Americans expectations of them, as well as a measure of Identity Fusion (Gómez et al., 2011), measured on a 6 point Likert scale ($\alpha=.96$), and finally whether they believe American citizens see them as a foreigner or as part of their country, and whether the participant believe that at some point they will be accepted as a fully-fledged member of the American in-group. The latter was measured on a 6 point Likert scale ($\alpha=.85$). All measures after the manipulation were presented in randomized order.

After the final survey, participants were informed about their 0.50 USD bonus, and that they could donate any amount of their bonus to one, none or both of two charitable organizations; The Hispanic Federation, or the Facing Hunger Food Bank.

Specifically, participants were instructed: *After you complete this survey, you will be eligible to receive a \$0.50 bonus. If you wish to do so, you can choose to donate your bonus to a charitable organization. Below you can see two suggested organizations with descriptions of their work and an option to donate.*

The two charities were described in the following way, presented in random order:

Hispanic Federation

Established in 1990, the Hispanic Federation is a service-oriented membership organization that works with over 100 Latino health and human services agencies to promote the social, political and economic well-being of the Latino community. The Federation's member agencies work in the areas of education, health, immigration, civic engagement, economic empowerment, the environment, and disaster relief. With offices in New York, Washington D.C., Connecticut and Florida, and a non-profit footprint throughout the East Coast, HF uplifts Hispanic children, youth, and families locally and nationally. The Hispanic Federation's mission is to empower and advance the Hispanic community.

Facing Hunger

Based out of Huntington, West Virginia, Facing Hunger Foodbank is a private, non-profit, charitable organization founded in 1983 and is incorporated in West Virginia. Formerly known as the Huntington Area Food Bank, the foodbank initially served Cabell and Wayne Counties. The need was so great across the region that the foodbank expanded its service area after just its first year of operation. The foodbank's service area currently includes

nearly 240 agencies across 17 counties in West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and South-eastern Ohio. Facing Hunger is a part of Feeding America and helps feed more than one hundred thousand families annually.

Before continuing to analysis, I calculated the mean score for the coalitional meta-perception scale to use as a mediator variable. A factor analysis showed a one-factor solution with an eigenvalue of 5.149, no solution with more than one factor had an Eigenvalue greater than 1. I also calculated a composite mean score for the questions “Americans see me as a foreigner” (reverse coded), “Americans will always see me as an immigrant rather than as an American” (reverse coded), “Americans accept me as part of their country” and “At some point, I will be accepted as American by Americans”. These questions constitute a mean score of acceptance felt by the participants from the American population. A factor analysis showed an eigenvalue of 2.770 for the single factor model. No other solution provided an eigenvalue greater than 1. Finally, I added social identity, and identity fusion as mediator variables to test the alternative hypothesis that changes in altruistic behavior can be explained by changes in social identity and the participants level of identity fusion. A factor analysis of the identity fusion items provided a one-factor solution with an eigenvalue of 5.931. No multi-factor solution provided an eigenvalue greater than one.

3 Results

3.1 Framing Affects Altruistic Behavior

After excluding the 90 participants as described above, I ran a *Chi-square test of goodness of fit* to test whether the participants did, in fact, see most Americans as white. The distribution between the 6 ethnic categories the participants could choose from (White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian American, Latin American, and Other) was not equal, $X^2(5, N = 215) = 829.70, p < .001$.

Next, I ran a series of *analyses of variance* using donations to the two separate charities as the dependent variable and the experimental condition as the independent variable. As predicted, I found an effect of the manipulation of positive versus negative framing of majority attitudes towards Latin American immigration to the US on donations to the majority focused charity, $M_{\text{pro immigrant}} = 5.3366; M_{\text{anti immigrant}} = 9.3947; F(1, 213) = 5.754, p = .017, d = .330$.

Table 3.1
ANOVA Table for Direct Effects of Experimental Manipulation

		Sum of		Mean		
		Squares	df	Square	F	Sig.
Donations (Hispanic Federation)	Between Groups	416.112	1	416.112	2.873	.092
	Within Groups	30850.214	213	144.837		
	Total	31266.326	214			
Donations (Facing Hunger)	Between Groups	881.930	1	881.930	5.754	.017
	Within Groups	32649.791	213	153.285		
	Total	33531.721	214			

The distribution of the donation variables violated the assumption of normal distribution, so a Mann-Whitney U test was also conducted to assure that the significant effect of the conditioning would be robust to this non-normality. Again, the effect on donations to the majority focused charity (Facing Hunger) were significant in a one-tailed exact test ($p = .013$). Note that the effect on the majority focused charity was such that participants who were presented with an article suggesting that the most of the majority group did *not* see immigration from their minority coalition as positive for the US, in fact, donated *more* to a

charity helping majority members in need. This main effect thus suggests a compensatory affiliation response where participants react to exclusion threats by increased cooperation/affiliation attempts along the lines of the findings from the social exclusion literature. The effect on donations to the minority-focused charity did not reach significance.

As a further check, a *donation bias score* was also calculated by subtracting donations to the Hispanic Federation from donations made to Facing Hunger. An ANOVA showed no significant difference between the two experimental groups when using this difference score as a dependent variable, suggesting that the effect of the experimental manipulation is unique

Figure 3.1
Results of mediation analysis using donations to majority focused charity as dependent variable




Figure. 3.1: Structural model for mediation analysis. All coefficients are unstandardized. *p < .05, **p < .01

to donations on behalf of the majority, and not, in fact, an increase in the difference in donations to the two charities. Hence, only the donations made to the majority focused charity will be used as a dependent variable in the following mediator analysis

A mediator analysis was conducted using the Process 3 macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013) to examine possible mediator effects. The results of this analysis are shown in figure 3.1. Due to the non-normality of the dependent variable, a bootstrap with 5000 samples was conducted through the same macro. In the mediation analysis, I used donations to Facing Hunger as the dependent variable

The results of the mediator analysis show that there is, in fact, a significant effect of the experimental framing manipulation (positive versus negative majority views of immigrants) on both the perceived acceptance of the majority by the participant ($B = 0.443$, $SE = 0.143$, $p < .01$) and the coalitional meta-perception measure of whether the majority sees members of the minority coalition as possessing the key collaborative traits a coalition will be seeking in newcomers ($B = 8.832$, $SE = 2.936$, $p < .01$). Only the meta-perception measure had a significant effect on donations to the majority-focused charity ($B = 0.118$, $SE = 0.043$, $p < .01$). The confidence intervals for the main effect and the indirect effect of the meta-perception measure did not span zero. The indirect effect of coalitional meta-perceptions shows that when participants are presented with a negatively framed article, donations decrease, $B = 1.0384$, $SE = 0.5484$, 95% CI [0.1988, 2.3253]. In contrast, the direct effect of how the articles were framed showed an increase in donations, $B = -4.7528$, $SE = 1.7348$, 95% CI [-8.1730, -1.3327]. The total effect of the experimental manipulation was also negative, meaning that donations increased in the anti-immigrant condition, $B = -3.7339$, $SE = 1.6822$, 95% CI [-7.0499, -0.4178] This means that even though the total effect leads to increased donations, there are two opposing effects working on the participant.

A parallel analysis was run with donations made to the minority-focused charity as the dependent variable to control that there were no suppressor effects present. None of the effects on donations to the minority-focused charity reached significance.

3.2 Does Social Identity or Identity Fusion Account for the Effects on Donations?

Finally, it is worth mentioning again that there was that there were no significant effects on or of social identity, nor on or of identity fusion, over and above the coalitional measures constructed for this study: Social identity and identity fusion seem to have no unique, predictive value regarding how much the participants donated, and our experimental manipulation also had no significant effect on neither of the two measures. One way

ANOVAs further confirmed that there was no direct effect of the experimental manipulation on neither ethnic identity ($F(1, 212)=1.196$, n.s.), national identity ($F(1, 212)=1.655$, n.s.), nor identity fusion ($F(1, 212)=.20$, n.s.). This is in stark contrast to the predictions made by social identity theory that seeing the national majority group as permeable should increase identification with the American national group in an attempt to become part of a higher status group. The effect of identity fusion also failed to reach significance on all accounts. Hence these two established intergroup phenomena do not account for the results presented here.

4 General discussion

To summarize the results of this study; I found a significant main effect on altruistic behavior of how information about intergroup attitudes is framed. This effect was in concurrence with what is predicted by the social exclusion literature, in that when presented with information that the participant risks exclusion they will be more willing to incur costs to themselves to prove their worth. Second, I found a significant indirect effect of how information is framed on donations, through how participants think the American majority sees them in relation to their key qualities as potential coalitional members, namely their trustworthiness, competency, likableness, loyalty, gratefulness, and how hardworking, and how entitled to benefits they are. I also found an effect of framing on the perceived acceptance of the participants by the American majority. These effects were both positive, and both in line with what I hypothesized, such that when participants were presented with the anti-immigrant article, they felt less accepted by the majority, and they meta-perceived that the majority saw them as less good coalition members. However, the effect of perceived acceptance on donations to the majority group did not reach significance as predicted. Finally, there is no evidence in this study to support the hypothesis that the effects of negative versus positive views about a minority on its costly altruism towards the majority out-group can be explained by either social identities or identity fusion, and also no evidence that such information affects costly altruism to the minority in-group.

4.1 Negative framing leads to more donations on behalf of the majority

When rejected by the majority group, the participants can react in one of two ways in regard to donations. They can increase their donations, or they can decrease them. As mentioned previously, the research done on social exclusion shows that social exclusion can lead to increased coalitional behavior such as mimicry (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008), conformity (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000), and increased altruistic behavior towards potential cooperative partners (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007). These effects of exclusion suggest that greater efforts of affiliation and costly altruism are taken when being rejected by the group, as a measure to prevent further rejection, as long as there is a chance of acceptance in the end. This is what we see in the direct effect described above.

The other possible reaction to rejection is that the participants decrease their altruistic behavior when seeing that the majority is less likely to accept them and that they are less likely to contribute to the participant's well-being. This would then predict that meta-perceptions of how trustworthy, competent, likable, loyal, grateful, hardworking, and entitled to benefits the majority see the minority as (i.e. how good a coalition member does the participants think the majority sees them as) should lead to decreased donations when presented with the anti-immigrant text. The results of this study show that this indirect effect is *also* present, as predicted, Indeed one might argue that is remarkable that participants make such rich and specific meta-coalitional inferences about whether and how the majority values them as potential coalition-members, and that these inferences significantly affect the costly altruism / real monetary donations of the minority participants, while there are no effects on standard, main-stream social psychological measures of social identity and identity fusion.

In sum, on the one hand, the participants want to focus on their own wellbeing, retaining all of their monetary surprise bonus above the wellbeing of the majority group, insofar as they see that the majority does not see them as good coalitional members and then presumably would not prioritize helping the minority above other members of the national group. On the other hand, they also react directly to the threat of exclusion by increasing their altruistic behavior and make more costly donations to the majority group, as also seen in other social exclusion paradigms such as *cyber ball* (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000) where the participant is being excluded in an online ball-tossing game.

The fact that the participants that read the anti-immigrant text are prompted to directly increase their donations as evidenced by the main effect, while simultaneously being prompted to decrease their donations insofar as they perceive that the majority does not see them as possessing the attributes that would get newcomers access to a coalition, through the indirect effect through coalitional meta-perceptions, speaks to the complications minorities face in society. On the one hand, minority members want to be accepted by the majority and are willing to show their worth through donations. On the other hand, insofar as they see that the majority see them as less trustworthy and less loyal, this will make them less willing to contribute to a group of which they may well never be accepted as part. This dissonance, being torn between trying to become a part of a group while being well aware that this may never happen, may, in turn, lead to decreased well-being for the minority members while promoting inaction in their own integration efforts. Future work should empirically address

the effects of meta-coalitional perceptions on immigrant health and acculturation styles.

The effect of causal manipulation of positive or negative framing of majority Americans attitudes towards Latino immigrant on how accepted the Latino participants felt by Americans is also worth discussing. Even though the level of acceptance felt by participants had no significant effect on donations, the fact that how the article was framed made participants feel less accepted by American society is on its own an important finding. It may seem obvious, but acceptance is an important part of integration efforts. For example, perceived discrimination has been shown to have negative effects on several physical- and mental health aspects (see Pascoe & Richman, 2009, for a meta-analytical review).

Although perceived acceptance and perceived discrimination are not the exact same concept, lack of acceptance from the majority group could be seen as a form of discrimination. From a policy-making perspective, this could be problematic, as not feeling accepted by the majority society could, in turn, lead to minority members not partaking in majority society (in the same vein as the effects perceived Islamophobia on national engagement shown in Kunst, Tajamal, Sam, & Ulleberg, 2012). This will make integration efforts more difficult while the stereotypical image of immigrants as not willing to integrate and living in parallel societies is reinforced for the part of the majority society that is already skeptical of immigrants. This, in turn, could further worsen the problem of perceived acceptance for the minority members.

4.2 No effects on or of social identity and identity fusion

Another highly interesting finding from this study is the effect that I did *not* find. Social identity and to an extent identity fusion are both well-established paradigms within social psychology. The fact that none of the aforementioned constructs seem to have any predictive value in this study is an important finding. Of course, greater statistical power through increased number of participants might have rendered a significant effect, but if so, such an effect would still be markedly weaker and less robust than the effects of the coalitional meta-perceptions and perceived acceptance that was developed for the current study, which, with N=215 and a simple two-cell experimental manipulation, was well-powered to find moderate-sized effects.

The failure of social identity-based constructs to cause changes in actual altruistic behavior towards the majority outgroup as well as the immigrant ingroup, and also their failure to respond to negative versus positive information about majority views of the immigrant ingroup, is especially interesting when we consider that the factors that *do* have an effect in the paradigm developed here, are constructs based on coalitional psychology and cultural evolution. In other words, it is coalitional thinking and motivation that seems to prompt the differences in intergroup behavior, not self-categorization/identity fusion and salient social identities.

From the predictions made by social identity theory, one should expect that when faced with an article that highlights the discrepancy between the participants' national- and ethnic identities, the ethnic identity of minority members should become salient and override the national identity (i.e. the American identity) (Huddy, 2001). As shown by the results of this study, this evidently is not always the case. One explanation for this could be that the American national identity has been shown to be not only particularly strong, but also highly stable over time and situations (Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001; Huddy, 2001). This stands in contrast to the predictions from social identity theory that when an identity is threatened, the identity in question should become salient as the difference between two groups (e.g. Hispanics and Anglo-Americans). Since this explanation for the lack of effect from social identity regards the American identity specifically, a replication in a non-American context is needed. This will be further discussed in the chapter on future directions and studies.

When it comes to identity fusion, one would assume that individuals with highly fused identities should feel threatened by the claim that Americans see immigrants as a threat insofar as they themselves are included in the immigrant population in question. Indeed, the Identity Fusion perspective predicts greater costly altruism on behalf of the ingroup under conditions of intergroup threat (Whitehouse, in press) but we did not find any such evidence that identity fusion predicted costly donations to the minority ingroup when facing threats from the negative views of the majority group. The fact that this effect seems to be non-existent in this study could have multiple explanations. One could be that the fused individuals simply do not see themselves as affected by the claim that immigrants are a threat, as they do not feel that this concerns them. Another explanation could be that threat meta-perceptions simply have no effect on social identities. The latter explanation is plausible, as the experimental manipulation indeed also had no effect on social identities. Note again, that this is in stark contrast to the predictions made by social identity theory that when faced with

a possibility to permeate a national group of higher standing than your ethnic group, national identification should increase and minority identification should decrease. It is nonetheless interesting that both social identity and identity fusion – two well-established concepts in acculturation research – failed to show any predictive value.

These findings regarding social identity and coalitional factors lend support to the claim made by among others Cimino and Dalton (2010) that humans have an evolved concept of newcomers. Specifically, the findings that participants adjusted their meta-perceptions of how the majority views newcomers as they read the different articles suggests that there is a form of automatic sub-routine allowing us to rapidly evaluate our standing with potential coalitions support my claim that these mechanisms are not only evolved to detect harmful newcomers, but also to evaluate coalitions and an individual's standing with the coalition. It appears that there are sub-routines dedicated to detecting the likelihood – or rather the unlikelihood – of the newcomer being accepted as a member of the coalition. Humans must navigate an intergroup landscape of cultural coalitions, but this includes applying as a newcomer for membership in new coalitions as well as deciding on the newcomer applications of others. A baby born into the world does not know beforehand which of these situations it will be in during the course of its life, and so any evolved concept must handle both.

Finally, the present results also point towards the importance of understanding coalitional building as a more complex and many-faceted phenomenon. This becomes especially clear seen in light of the contradicting direct and indirect effects shown in the mediation models shown above (figures 3.1). If coalitional thinking is, in fact, the driving force behind inter-group relations, then the need for social psychology to embrace cultural evolution and evolutionary psychology becomes clear.

5 Strengths, Limitations, Implications, and Future Directions

5.1 Strengths

In this thesis, I have shown a causal effect between framing, coalitional meta-perceptions, and donations. The fact that all donations made in the experiment were made with real money by the participants and that the altruistic behavior shown in this thesis did have an actual cost to the participants, strengthens the ecological validity of the experiment. This would mean that we should be able to find these effects in the real world and in a non-experimental context as well.

Another strength of the study conducted in this thesis is the fact that all the information in the articles presented to the participants were real data. The participants were never deceived. The only manipulation we did of the statistics presented by PEW (Lopez et al., 2015), was to ascribe a large undecided group to either the positive or negative group. From an ethical standpoint, this is a very important point. The topic of racial and ethnic relations in the US can be a controversial and rather touchy subject. If I were to fabricate statistics or quotes made by politicians, this could have a negative impact on how certain individuals perceive their position in the American society and give a false impression of what the situation really is. By using real statistics and real quotes from real politicians to construct the articles presented to the participants, I ensure that the participants are not lead to believe something that is not true. There is the issue of how the statistics were presented in a certain way in the articles, but the full description of how the undecided group was ascribed to either the positive group or the negative group as well as a link to the PEW report was given to the participants during the debrief.

In addition to the ethical aspects of deceiving participants when it comes to a topic that can be as serious as racial and ethnic relations, Deceit is generally seen as a taboo within the field of experimental economics (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Madsen & Stenheim, 2015). Usually, economical experiments and games are abstracted to such a degree that deceit would not be necessary. This level of abstraction is not necessarily present in this experiment, but on the other hand, it would be of little interest to see if participants change their altruistic

behavior based on their coalitional position if the position presented to the participants was not anchored in reality.

5.2 Limitations

The first limitation that needs to be addressed, is the limitations of using worker crowd-sourcing platforms such as MTurk in scientific studies. It should be addressed that MTurk workers are, by definition, a sample of convenience. One should, therefore, be careful about the representability of the sample in relation to the American population. One should also take note of the fact that the MTurk workers are paid to perform the *human intelligence tasks* (HITs), and that workers possibly could perform many HITs in a day. In regards to the question of representability in the MTurk sample, Huff and Tingley (2015) found very little difference between MTurk workers and the respondents of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The CCES is a US national stratified sample survey with more than 50000 respondents conducted every year (CCES, n.d.). In other words, the MTurk worker sample is a good match with the American population, albeit not a perfect match. As for the question of the reliability of the worker responses, Rand (2012) showed little variation in demographic answers by workers across different trials, and Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) showed very little variation in three different judgement tasks (The Linda Problem, the Asian Disease Problem, and the Physician Problem) between MTurk samples, University samples, and a sample drawn from an unnamed internet discussion board. From this, we can possibly draw that the MTurk worker sample is a relatively reliable sample. One should despite this still be careful with such as sample, as established measures could be familiar to workers.

Another limitation of this study could be said to be the limited cultural scope of the study. This study was run on a very particular minority in a very particular cultural context. It would be interesting to see these results replicated in a different context on a different group, as racial and ethnic relations in the US may not be representative of other countries or areas. Even though one can be tempted to generalize the findings presented in this thesis to other cultural contexts, the effects presented explain far from all variance in the sample, and it is probable that the many cultural and societal factors that differ between contexts could lead to differing results in future studies and replications. The potential for further studies and replications is in other words not only interesting but also highly necessary, as the American

national identity has been shown to be somewhat unique regarding the level of stability and strength it shows (Citrin et al., 2001; Huddy, 2001).

5.3 Implications

This study could have important implications for both future studies and for policymakers. First of all, the two opposing effects on altruism towards the host culture of how information about their views of immigrant is presented provides an important insight into the complicated nature of the position immigrants and minority members have in society. In addition to replications and further quantitative exploration of the effects found in this study, a *qualitative* study examining phenomenologically how minority members experience articles like the ones presented in this study would be highly interesting, both in its own right and as guidance for further studies. Furthermore, from a policy-making perspective, the two contradicting direct and indirect effects point to the importance of understanding the complexity of a minority position in society. Sometimes, the effects on integration and acculturation efforts may not be either positive or negative, but both simultaneously. Even though the framing and effects of fear of exclusion overpowered the effects of coalitional meta-perceptions, as the total effect was negative meaning that those in the anti-immigrant condition donated more compared to the pro-immigrant condition, the effect of coalitional meta-perceptions were still there. This duality in how participants reacted sheds light on the difficult situation minority members often find themselves in.

Another implication of a more indirect nature comes through the framing of the articles used in the experiment. The difference in information stems from an attempt to make statistics support a specific narrative and to create a certain version of reality. Mark that none of the statistics used in the articles were changed from the original PEW article (Lopez et al., 2015), but rather than reporting the large undecided segment of the survey-participants they were indirectly ascribed to either the pro-immigrant group or the anti-immigrant group because we (truthfully) said either that the majority of White Americans did not see Latino immigration as mostly positive, or did not see it as mostly negative. Presumably, simply by reporting that a large part of the population is neither exclusively positive, nor negative to immigration (i.e. reporting the full truth of the survey), the effects the results from this survey have on immigrants, and potentially public opinion would be completely different. If a news outlet were to frame statistics in a certain way to fit a

narrative, it would certainly not be the first time this happened. One can wonder how the political environment in both the US and in other countries would look if news sources consistently reported independently from a certain narrative.

Finally, the results of this study raise important questions in regarding the predictions made by social identity theory. Chief among the predictions in question is the prediction that a threatened identity should become salient and that the minority identity should become salient when the difference between minority and majority is pointed out (Huddy, 2001). These questions, as well as the question of how the decision-making process behind identification works and what social inferences the decision is in fact based upon according to social identity theory has already been raised by Huddy in 2001 and is to the best of my knowledge yet to be addressed empirically by the social identity researchers. In any case, this study implies that it may, in fact, be coalitional thinking and motivations that drive the decision-making process behind costly altruism in intergroup relations.

5.4 Future Directions

As briefly mentioned in the limitations chapter, a replication of this study in different cultural contexts this is, in fact, a basic evolved mechanism of human nature as it is expressed in cultural coalitional group living, then it should also be expressed in other cultures and minorities. This should then also be true for non-WEIRD (White, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic) cultural contexts (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). In the future, I plan to conceptually replicate this study in two different cultural contexts. One replication will focus on the Muslim minority of Norway. Here participants will be recruited through Facebook and other contact networks. The second conceptual replication I will attempt will be done on Bangladeshi immigrants living in Pakistan. This replication will be a lot more difficult, but it should be feasible through services like MTurk.

In future replications, I will also investigate SDO as a possible moderator of effects. One might predict that the higher participants score on SDO, the higher their endorsement of the hierarchical status quo and acceptance of the dominance status of the minority. This could then predict greater willingness to throw oneself at the mercy of the majority and seek their acceptance by going out of one's way to act cooperatively towards them. Conversely, one might also predict that lower SDO could predict greater empathy with poor, rural groups of

whites and greater willingness to help them altruistically. Future research should address these empirical questions.

6 Conclusion

In this thesis, I have been examining what effects being perceived as a symbolic threat has on a minority group member. What I found was that when participants read descriptions that the majority group in their country see them as a symbolic threat, the participants become more willing to act altruistically on behalf of the majority. This is likely a direct, immediate, compensatory affiliation response, due to fear of exclusion from the group. At the same time, however, insofar as the participant meta-perceive that the majority does in fact not see them as good coalitional members, because they are not seen as loyal and trustworthy, suggesting that they may never be allowed to fully join the majority coalition, this makes minority newcomers act *less* altruistically on behalf of the majority. The duality of these effects speaks to the complexity and difficulties in the situations minority members face. In contrast, social identity had no predictive value on altruistic behavior in this study. This is somewhat surprising, as I was expecting at least some form of effect from one of the more established concepts in social psychology.

The findings from this study are interesting in their own rights and can have important implications both in regard to future studies, but also policy making. That being said, as the American national identity seems to be special in regards to its stability and dominance over ethnic identities (Huddy, 2001), it is important to see these results replicated in a different, non-WEIRD cultural context: If coalitional inferences regarding newcomers applying to new coalitions, and their effects on costly altruism, are in fact evolved aspects of human nature, it should manifest itself across culture.

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ⁱ These scales and inventories included; the SDO_{7(s)} Scale (Ho et al., 2015), the Ten Item Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), the Vancouver Index of Acculturation (Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000), a measure of community attitudes where the participants are asked to indicate their perceived importance of contribution and solidarity in a community, a slider measure of ethnic- common-, and dual in-group identities, and finally a measure of the participant perceptions of Americans and immigrants based on the concept of *Newcomers* (Cimino & Delton, 2010). All measures were presented in random order.