Right-Wing Terrorism and Militancy in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Case Study

Jacob Aasland Ravndal
Postdoctoral Fellow
Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX)
University of Oslo
P.O. Box 1097 Blindern
0317 Oslo
Norway
j.a.ravndal@c-rex.uio.no

ABSTRACT
Combining new quantitative and qualitative data, this article first describes and compares the evolution of right-wing terrorism and militancy in the Nordic countries between 1990 and 2015. Having established that Sweden has experienced considerably more right-wing terrorism and militancy than the other Nordic countries have, the article then seeks to account for Sweden’s outlier position. In doing so, the article draws on three concepts proposed by social movement research: organizational resources, political opportunities, and frame analysis. Applying these concepts to the Nordic countries, the study finds that Sweden’s outlier position may result from different WWII experiences, leaving Sweden with a stronger and more resilient extreme right movement, but also from receiving more immigrants while lacking influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and from conducting a more restrictive public debate on immigration, leaving little room for anti-immigration concerns in the public sphere. While the first two explanations are consistent with existing research, the third challenges the dominant view on how the public debate on immigration might influence extreme right mobilization and violence.

KEYWORDS: right-wing terrorism, right-wing militancy, the Nordic countries, social movement theory, extreme right mobilization
Introduction

Why have right-wing terrorism and militancy been more widespread in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries? While all the Nordic countries experienced a wave of right-wing violence during the 1990s, most of their militant movements collapsed during the early 2000s and were replaced by more moderate and democratic organizations and parties. The exception is the Swedish militant movement, which has proven more resilient. It has also generated considerably more terrorism and violence between 1990 and 2015 than its Nordic counterparts have, as this article shows. However, existing research offers few explanations of Sweden’s outlier position. While right-wing terrorism and militancy in the Nordic countries were well documented and researched during the 1990s, the topic has received far less scholarly attention during the 2000s and 2010s. Furthermore, apart from Bjørgo’s 1997 study of right-wing violence in Scandinavia between 1982 and 1992, comparative studies are lacking.

To help fill these gaps, this article first describes and compares the evolution of right-wing terrorism and militancy in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden between 1990 and 2015, before using social movement theory to explain Sweden’s outlier position. Social movements are generally understood as informal networks of groups and individuals using unconventional means to promote or oppose social change. Social movement theory has been previously used to analyse cross-national variation in right-wing violence, and is currently becoming an increasingly popular approach to the study of extreme right mobilization. In particular, social movement scholars have proposed three concepts as being particularly helpful for analysing extreme right mobilization: (1) political opportunities, (2) organizational resources, and (3) and frame analysis.

Applying these three concepts to the Nordic countries, this study finds that Sweden’s outlier position may result from different WWII experiences, leaving Sweden with a stronger and more resilient extreme right movement, but also from receiving more immigrants while lacking
influential anti-immigration (radical right) parties, and from conducting a more restrictive public
debate on immigration, leaving little room for anti-immigration concerns in the public sphere.
While the first two explanations are consistent with existing social movement research, the third
challenges the dominant view on how the public debate on immigration might influence extreme
right mobilization and violence.

Conceptually, the article leans on Bobbio’s classic distinction between those on the left who
support policies designed to reduce social inequality, and those on the right who regard social
inequality – or hierarchical order – as inevitable, natural, or even desirable. Furthermore, unlike
their moderate counterparts, members of the far right share an authoritarian inclination, that is,
an inherent need for sameness, oneness, and group authority, resulting in intolerance towards
diversity and individual autonomy, and some form of nativism or ethnic nationalism. The article
also distinguishes between, on the one hand, radical right actors who use conventional democratic
means to gain political power, and on the other hand militants or extremists who openly reject
democracy and favour violent or other non-conventional means to generate revolutionary change.
Finally, the far right is used as a collective term comprising both radical and extreme right actors
when appropriate.

The article proceeds by first identifying some general patterns of violence in existing research,
before presenting new events data for the period 1990–2015. Part two gives a more detailed account
of how this violence has manifested itself in each Nordic country, and includes a case study of the
most influential contemporary militant group: Svenska motståndsrörelsen (the Swedish Resistance
Movement, SRM). This case is used to illustrate cross-national differences as SRM has been trying
to establish sister divisions in Norway, Finland and Denmark, but with far less success than in
Sweden. Finally, part three proposes an explanation of why right-wing terrorism and militancy
have been more widespread in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries.
Patterns of Violence

A few general patterns may be derived from existing research on right-wing terrorism and militancy in the Nordic counties. All the Nordic countries experienced a wave of racist violence during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This violence was, according to existing accounts, triggered by the arrival of an unprecedented number of immigrants, by an increasingly violent skinhead subculture, by sharpened anti-immigration rhetoric in the public sphere, and by contagious media coverage. The perpetrators were predominantly local groups and loosely organized gangs with limited ideological motivation and no overarching strategy. However, from 1992 onwards, more organized and ideologically driven militant groups began to surface throughout the Nordic countries. Most of these groups were short-lived, but some developed into terrorist-style enterprises cooperating closely with similar groups in the Nordic countries, as well as in Germany, the UK, and the U.S. This development peaked towards the end of the 1990s. However, after the turn of the millennium, most of these groups imploded and were replaced by more moderate and democratic organizations and parties – actors that continue to dominate the far-right landscape in the Nordic countries today. The exception is the more resilient Swedish militant movement, which, according to new events data, has produced more right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) between 1990 and 2015 than Denmark, Finland and Norway combined.

The RTV Dataset

The RTV dataset covers right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) in Western Europe 1990–2015. Including the most severe types of events only, the dataset offers a modest yet relatively consistent account of RTV in Western Europe. The dataset currently comprises 578 events, including 190 deadly attacks involving 303 deaths, and may be used to compare the extent of RTV in different West European countries.
Zooming in on the Nordic countries, the RTV dataset covers 141 events. The most frequently targeted victims are immigrants (70 events), leftists (38 events) and homosexuals (9 events). Other target groups include government representatives, police, Muslims, Jews, Gypsies/Roma, homeless people, and media institutions. The most frequently used weapons include firearms (39 events), knives (23 events), explosives (22 events), unarmed beating and kicking (17 events), firebombs and arson (15 events), and blunt instruments (14 events). Some activists have also used weapons such as grenades, tear gas, and pepper spray in combination with physical assaults. Truly complex terrorist attacks combining explosives and firearms have so far only happened once (the 22 July attacks in Norway in 2011).

Turning to the geographical distribution, 89 events took place in Sweden, 25 in Norway, 19 in Denmark, and 8 in Finland. However, available sources on right-wing violence in Finland appear to have been limited compared to the other Nordic countries. We may therefore suspect that some events from Finland remain unregistered, in particular events from the 1990s. If we isolate deadly attacks, which represent a more definitive and reliable measure, Sweden’s outlier position becomes even more evident: 17 unique murder events involving 20 deaths since 1990, compared to three in Norway (although as many as 77 persons were killed in one of them); one in Denmark; and none in Finland (although one person died in a recent attack from 2016). Activists affiliated with the Swedish militant movement committed 12 of these 17 deadly attacks. Nine of these 12 attacks involved multiple perpetrators. In addition, three lone actors with no direct affiliation to the Swedish militant movement committed five deadly attacks causing seven deaths.

In sum, these numbers suggest that Sweden (with a population of ten million) has experienced more right-wing terrorism and violence than Denmark, Norway and Finland combined (with an aggregate population of 16 million). Sweden is, in fact, the country in Western Europe with most deadly RTV events per capita between 1990 and 2015. By contrast, the other Nordic countries
are in a middle position compared to other West European countries. The following section gives a more detailed account of how this violence has been manifested in each country, and of some of the most important actors involved.

Right-Wing Terrorism and Militancy in the Nordic Countries, 1990–2015

Investigating the violent record of militant movements is challenging because of the limited information available. The following accounts are mainly based on online sources. Additional sources include activist magazines and handbooks, some secondary literature, and a handful of interviews with relevant experts and activists.

Denmark

Denmark was hit by the Nordic region’s first deadly attack after 1990. On 16 March 1992, a letter bomb exploded in the headquarters of the leftist group *Internationale Socialister* (International Socialists), killing activist Henrik Christensen. A formerly unknown group – *Frit Danmark K12* (Free Denmark K12) – claimed the attack. The same group issued a threat letter to a Danish-Pakistani author known for publicly defending minority groups. The group never reappeared, and the case remains unsolved.\(^{21}\)

Also in 1992, a group of young activists led by Jonni Hansen seized control of the group *Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Bevægelse* (Denmark’s Nationalist Socialist Movement, DNSM). The new DNSM leadership took on a more active and militant style, and between 1994 and 1996 they consolidated several fractions of the Danish neo-Nazi scene.\(^{22}\) In 1994, they bought a house in Greve that became a stronghold for Danish neo-Nazis. During this period, the Danish movement became something of a hub for Scandinavian, German, and UK activists, partly because Danish legislation did not ban the use of swastikas during marches and demonstrations.\(^{23}\) Consequently,
the Danish movement, spearheaded by DNSM, began to arrange annual Rudolf Hess marches attracting neo-Nazis from all across Northern Europe.

A key figure in the Danish movement was German-born Marcel Schilf. He maintained a broad international network, particularly with fellow activists in Germany and in the UK. Schilf’s close friend and ally was the Norwegian activist Erik Blücher. Together they operated various neo-Nazi video and record labels, including *Ragnarock Records*, *NS88* and *NS Records*, mainly shipping their products to German customers. For some time, they also lived together in a house in Sweden known inside the movement as Club Valhalla – a place still commemorated by older activists. Schilf was an early suspect of the letter bomb attack in 1992, but he was not charged until new information surfaced in 2013 – 12 years after his death. Schilf was one of the few people within the Nordic movement with direct relations to the UK neo-Nazi group *Combat 18* (C18). This relationship culminated in 1999, when C18 moved a part of their activities to a Danish mailbox address controlled by Schilf.

By then, C18 had already been involved in one of the most severe foiled terrorist attacks initiated from the Nordic countries. In 1997, Will Browning became the new C18 leader following an internal struggle with C18’s original leader Charlie Sargent. Browning and his associates were at that time becoming increasingly interested in the strategy of leaderless resistance. A small group of people within C18’s international network, including Schilf and Blücher, were pushing the group towards more extreme measures. Danish (and half Japanese) C18 affiliate – DNSM member Thomas Nakaba – was included in this small circle and given the dubious honour of carrying out a letter bomb attack against three UK targets – directly ordered by Browning. On 17 January 1997, Nakaba travelled to Sweden and mailed three letter bombs addressed to the UK headquarters of *Anti-Fascist Action*, to the *British Movement* (considered as coward rivals), and to Olympic swimmer Sharron Davies, who was in an interracial marriage. However, Nakaba and
Browning did not know that British, Danish and Swedish police had been watching them. Thus, the letter bombs were secured by Swedish police shortly after Nakaba left the premises. During his arrest the following morning, Nakaba shot an officer in the groin before being taken by the police.\textsuperscript{29}

After the turbulent 1990s, the Danish militant scene receded due to organizational fragmentation and, according to existing research, because they were losing the street war against leftist militants.\textsuperscript{30} Many activists left the movement in favour of less militant and more comfortable forms of activism with new nationalist organizations and parties, such as \textit{Vederfølner} [Old Norse (\textit{Veðrfölnir}): hawk from Norse mythology] and \textit{Danskernas Parti} (Party of the Danes). However, some Danish militant groups have been active also during the 2000s, most notably the Aarhus-based hooligan group \textit{White Pride}, the neo-Nazi group \textit{Dansk Front} (Danish Front, DF) between 2002 and 2007, and \textit{Danmarks Nationale Front} (Denmark’s National Front, DNF) from 2007 onwards. DNF can be seen as a continuation of DF, only with a smaller membership base and a broader international network, particularly in Russia through its former leader Lars Agerbak Wittman. While members of these groups have been involved in low-scale violence from time to time, usually involving their leftist adversaries, none of them have managed to mobilize a significant number of activists, and they rarely engage in public activities. In other words, the Danish militant movement has yet to recover from its recession.

\textit{Finland}

While the other Nordic movements gradually developed into loose networks of small autonomous groups, the Finnish 1990s movement cultivated the somewhat more flippant skinhead culture to its fullest. This movement gained momentum during the late 1980s and peaked during the late 1990s, counting somewhere between 500 and 1000 active skinheads.\textsuperscript{31} The centrepiece of the movement was the record company \textit{Ainaskin} (Forever Skinhead) managed by Marko “Jäsä” Järvinen. Järvinen
was also a leading member of Blood & Honour Scandinavia, founded in 1996 by Marcel Schilf and Eric Blücher.

In 1991, Finland received a number of Somali immigrants who became the main target of Finnish skinhead violence in the following years. One particularly severe episode happened in 1997, when a group of about 50 skinheads attacked Somali youths playing football in the Helsinki suburb Kontula. The violence did not stop before the police started shooting warning shots, and 22 skinheads were sentenced for the attack. Pekonen et al. also mention a number of other violent events from the 1990s, including ten particularly severe events from 1995 (not included in the RTV dataset because sufficient event details are lacking): a racist murder, an immigrant stabbed by a skinhead, four attacks on immigrants using explosives, and another four immigrants beaten severely.

During the 2000s, only a few skinhead groups have been active, most notably various Blood & Honour progenies, including Järvinen’s Club 28. These groups have mainly focused on organizing concerts and social gatherings, and do not engage in violent street militancy anymore. Some activists have drifted to the more populist organization Suomen Sisu (Finnish Persistence). This organization was established in 1998, and gained momentum during the early 2000s, culminating with several of its members being elected into parliament as representatives of the Finns Party.

After a few silent years, the Finnish militant scene reactivated in 2008 when Esa Henrik Holappa founded SRM’s Finnish division: Suomen vastarintaliike (the Finnish Resistance Movement, FRM). Interestingly, Holappa’s decision to establish FRM was, according to him, highly influenced by the American veteran activist Richard Scutari, one of the most influential members of the contemporary white power movement worldwide. Scutari is currently serving a
60-year prison sentence for his involvement in the American terrorist organization *The Order* headed by Robert J. Matthews in the 1980s. Since his imprisonment in 1989, Scutari has kept an active profile and corresponded with fellow activists in the U.S. and abroad. One of his pen pals was Holappa who started writing letters to Scutari when he was 17 years old. Holappa and Magnus Söderman – another pen pal from Sweden who at the time was a leading SRM member – have published this correspondence as a tribute book. This book gives unique insight into Scutari’s personal life and worldviews. It also reveals details about Holappa and Söderman’s early involvement in FRM and SRM, and how Scutari’s authority, experience, and interest in Norse mythology and Wotanism (heathenry) influenced these young activist’s own worldviews and early careers within the Nordic movement.34

Since FRM was established in 2008, its members have been involved in several violent attacks, including a tear gas attack on a gay parade in Helsinki in 2010, several assaults on leftist politicians, and the stabbing of a security guard at a book launch event in 2013 (the book was about the Finnish extreme right). In addition, one person died in 2016 a week after having been kicked to the ground by an FRM activist.35 FRM is still quite small with less than a hundred active members, but appears to be growing and is currently active in at least five different locations.36 Several FRM members have criminal records while others have a clean slate and university degrees.37 Some FRM members have also been associated with the (now defunct) online neo-Fascist collective *Musta Sydan* (Black Heart) founded in 2010. *Musta Sydan* drew inspiration from emergent neo-Fascist organizations across Europe, such as *CasaPound Italia* and the French *Génération Identitaire*. They also had links to the Russian far-right martial arts organization *White Rex* and numerous other neo-Fascist groups and initiatives.38 An interesting development happened in 2016, when FRM’s founder decided to leave the organization and reveal its inner life publicly.39
Finally, as a response to the ongoing migration crisis in Europe, several vigilante groups have surfaced in Finland and the other Nordic countries. The most prominent group is *Soldiers of Odin*, originating in Finland and later spreading to the other Nordic countries. Although several members of these vigilante groups have ties to the extreme right, they have yet to engage openly in violent or confrontational strategies.

**Norway**

The Norwegian 1990s militant scene was perhaps the smallest among the Nordic countries. The early 1990s were characterized by loosely organized skinhead gangs in the larger cities and youth gangs in some local communities. From 1993 onwards, more tightly organized groups started emerging, such as *Viking*, *Norsk arisk ungdomsfront* (Norwegian Arian Youth Front), *Einsatz* [German: “commitment/action”], *Boot Boys*, and *Vigrid* [Old Norse (*Vígríðr*): “battlefield”]. Some of these groups cultivated revolutionary ideas, ultimately aiming to overthrow the Norwegian government. However, despite such grandiose plans, their revolutionary activities were typically limited to in-group discussions and some training, as well as heathen ceremonies in the Norwegian woods. Other militant groups were equally or more interested in street activism, camaraderie, and music, and never pursued their political aims with much ambition.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, Norwegian militants were involved in several shootings, bombings, arsons, and knife and teargas attacks against immigrants and leftists. However, none of these attacks caused any fatalities. The peak, but also the end, of this wave of violence was thus the murder of Benjamin Hermansen in 2001. Hermansen was randomly targeted because of his dark skin colour. He was stabbed to death by two members of the Oslo-based group *Boot Boys*.

Besides the Norwegian militant movement, two independent activists have gained international notoriety: Varg Vikernes and Anders Behring Breivik. Vikernes, mostly known for...
burning stave churches and his one-man black metal band *Burzum* (meaning “darkness” in Tolkien’s fictional language *Black Speech*), became a devoted right-wing extremist while serving a prison sentence for murdering a member of his former band *Mayhem*. Vikernes is mostly interesting from an ideological point of view, mixing Norse mythology with Wotanism and National Socialism. Apart from his writings, Vikernes’ involvement in the Norwegian movement is limited, and he has not personally committed any politically motivated violence.

Anders Behring Breivik is beyond doubt the best-known terrorist from the Nordic countries, having killed 77 people in two separate attacks on 22 July 2011. However, Breivik’s case has little to do with the Norwegian militant movement as he operated in complete isolation from it. His case is therefore mostly interesting as an example of a lone actor who self-radicalized online.\(^{44}\)

The Norwegian militant movement was practically non-existent at the time of Breivik’s attacks. The 2001 murder of Benjamin Hermansen triggered a nation-wide campaign to eradicate right-wing militancy.\(^ {45}\) Since the early 2000s, Norwegian militant groups have not managed to recruit many new members. Consequently, the contemporary movement mostly comprises older and inactive members. Some anti-Islam groups have managed to attract new followers, particularly online. However, these groups have not engaged in violent activism. Online activism thus appears to have replaced violent street activism in Norway. Whether such online activism might lead to terrorism remains an open question. Breivik’s case certainly suggests that the combination of personality disorders, social isolation, and online radicalization can produce devastating results.

The only militant group that has upheld some activity over the past years is SRM’s Norwegian division *Den norske motstandsbevegelsen* (the Norwegian Resistance Movement, NRM). However, NRMs membership is much smaller than the Swedish and Finnish divisions. NRM also appears to be largely dependent on its Swedish mother organization. More Swedish than
Norwegian activists have been involved in the few public events NRM has organized in Norway, and NRM’s leader currently lives in Sweden. In short, had it not been for the Swedish movement, the Norwegian militant movement would not only be small but nearly non-existent.

Sweden

The Swedish militant movement exceeds its Nordic counterparts on most measures, including the number of activists, groups, violent attacks, foreign fighters, and deadly events. Sweden also experienced a wave of racist violence during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This violence was, just as in Norway, mainly committed by unorganized racist groups and members of local communities, and not by Sweden’s relatively large national socialist scene, which at the time was more careful about engaging openly in violent strategies. However, from the early 1990s onwards, older national socialist organizations such as Nordiska Rikspartiet (the Nordic National Party), Nysvenska Rörelsen (the New Swedish Movement), and Sveriges Nationella Förbund (Sweden’s Nationalist Federation) started dissolving and were ultimately replaced by smaller underground groups and networks such as Vitt Arisk Motstånd (White Aryan Resistance), Nationella Alliansen (Nationalist Alliance), Ariska Brödraskapet (Aryan Brotherhood), and (the Swedish) Combat 18.

Loose organizational structures and a declared interest in using violence and terrorism to pursue revolutionary goals characterized these new groups. Such violent strategies and related tactics were frequently distributed through newsletters and magazines such as Storm, Werewolf, and Siege. These publications were in turn inspired by American activists such as Louis Beam, who introduced the strategy of leaderless resistance in 1992, William Luther Pierce, who authored the terrorism-inciting novels The Turner Diaries and Hunter, and members of American terrorist groups, most notably Robert J. Matthews who became a “martyr” after a dramatic shootout with the FBI in 1984.
One such group was *Blood and Honour Scandinavia* (BHS), whose headquarters was in Sweden. BHS was towards the end of the 1990s becoming an influential actor within the Nordic movement and in Northern Europe. Headed by Schilf, Blücher, and Järvinen, the group controlled large parts of the underground neo-Nazi music scene and maintained a broad international network. Some of their international partners, particularly C18 in the UK, did not shy away from terrorism. Thus, BHS had the finances, the leadership, and apparently also the intention to engage in a covert terrorist campaign. However, a range of unforeseen events appears to have disrupted this dangerous development. First, two key members died in 2001. Schilf, who appears to have been BHS’ most respected member, died of cystic fibrosis in January. Then, Pierre Ljunggren, originally intended as the new leader of BHS’ Swedish division, committed suicide having been ousted from the group following Schilf’s death. Then, C18 – BHS’s most important international ally – dissolved following a major police effort to dismantle the group. Finally, BHS’s younger members ultimately challenged the two remaining leaders – Blücher and Järvinen – and as the old leadership left the group, it soon fell apart.49

By then, however, Blücher had written two influential C18 tactical manuals under the pseudonym Max Hammer. These manuals show that Blücher, who initially opposed violent revolution, chose a more extreme path towards the end of the 1990s.50 The manuals recently reappeared on BHS’s newly established website.51 Today, the group no longer exerts much influence, but its violent strategies give reason to keep an eye on it.

The 1990s culminated with three particularly severe events in 1999: In May, three affiliates of a Swedish neo-Nazi network were involved in the execution of two police officers who were chasing them following a bank robbery.52 In June, a car bomb detonated, injuring a man and his eight-year-old son. The man and his wife were undercover reporters investigating the Swedish extreme right movement.53 Finally, a neo-Nazi trio murdered the syndicalist Björn Söderberg,
allegedly because he leaked information about a fourth neo-Nazi’s membership in a trade union board, a position he subsequently lost.54

However, these were not the only severe events involving the Swedish militant movement during the 1990s. For example, in 1995 alone, as many as four killings were committed by four different activists.55 In 1997, Niclas Löfdahl, founder of Ariska Brödraskapet (Aryan Brotherhood), sent a letter bomb to then Minister of Justice Leila Freivalds.56 Numerous other events occurred during the 2000s as well, including several murders and the 2004 discovery of a small cell preparing a terrorist campaign to overthrow the Swedish government.57 In addition, two serial killers whose target selection was racially motivated have terrorized Sweden: John Ausonius and Peter Mangs. A third lone actor influenced by extreme right ideas killed three persons in a school attack in 2015.58

Since 2014, a number of Swedish activists have also participated as foreign fighters in pro-Kiev militias in Eastern Ukraine. About 30 Swedish activists are estimated to have been in Ukraine, partly facilitated by Magnus Söderman’s initiative Svenska Ukrainafrivilliga (Swedish Volunteers for Ukraine).59 Some of these volunteers, most notably Mikael Skillt, even assumed commanding positions within these militias.60

Finally, Sweden houses the currently largest and most active militant organization in the Nordic countries: the Swedish Resistance Movement.

The Swedish Resistance Movement

The Swedish Resistance Movement (SRM) recently changed its name to the Nordic Resistance Movement, following the establishment of sister divisions in Norway, Finland and Denmark. However, the organization has not been able to mobilize nearly as many dedicated activists in the other Nordic countries as it has in Sweden. The SRM case is therefore used here to illustrate that
right-wing militancy remains more widespread and popular in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries.

SRM and its youth wing Nationell Ungdom (Nationalist Youth) were established in the late 1990s by prominent activists such as Klas Lund, Erik Hägglund and Magnus Söderman. Lund, who headed SRM from 1997 to 2015 (a rare achievement in these types of groups), is a former murder convict and a member of Vitt Ariskt Motstånd (VAM – White Aryan Resistance) – a loosely organized revolutionary network with explicit terrorist ambitions.61 To finance their future revolution, Lund and other VAM members carried out several bank robberies, which ultimately landed them in prison in 1991. With a six-year prison sentence, Lund had plenty of time to contemplate the types of means that would be most effective in a future revolutionary struggle. Realizing that means such as terrorism and leaderless resistance might not be the most appropriate, Lund and his associates introduced a more subtle form of revolutionary struggle with SRM's establishment. This new form of activism emphasizes propaganda within the framework of a tightly controlled organization over terrorist activities carried out by loosely organized leaderless networks. This remarkable strategic shift has been overlooked by several observers who portray SRM as terrorists.62 One reason could be that although, for the time being, SRM has opted for the propaganda approach, the organization does not reject more extreme measures, including terrorism, in some distant future. However, according to their own statements and propaganda, SRM does not consider the time ripe for such actions. A key element of their strategy is thus to use propaganda to prepare themselves and the Nordic people for a future racial war that is in their minds inevitable.63 At the same time, they practise a sort of low-scale psychological warfare where subtle threats are used to scare or silence their enemies. They also actively prepare for and seek out violent confrontations with the police and political opponents.
SRM is principally against parliamentary democracy, although they recently established a parliamentary wing inspired by Golden Dawn’s success in Greece. The organization is hierarchically organized and divided into so-called “nests” or local chapters with their own leadership and structure. Full membership is restricted to activists willing to be publicly associated with the organization. Others can be affiliates or supporting members. Affiliates are formal members whose involvement is on a voluntary basis. Supporting members provide financial support only, and may remain anonymous.

In terms of clothing and lifestyle, SRM activists are encouraged not to wear flashy or expensive clothes (they are strongly anti-Capitalist and anti-U.S.), but rather clothes that signal their political views. They are also encouraged to wear comfortable clothes appropriate for street fighting. Drugs and alcohol are forbidden. SRM’s code of honour requires members to keep silent about the organization’s inner life, to remain loyal and humble, to show good camaraderie, to be disciplined and truthful, and to exercise and be prepared for fighting. Members practice martial arts in order to stay healthy, build confidence, and prepare physically and mentally for any type of threat.

Since SRM’s establishment in 1997, the organization has expanded slowly but surely. In Sweden, the organization currently comprises more than a hundred activists organized in seven “nests” or chapters. The number of activities reported by the organization itself, and by observers such as the anti-racist organization EXPO, suggests that their activity level has risen steadily over the past years. While many emergent neo-Fascist organizations across Europe distance themselves from National Socialism, SRM remains a fully-fledged national socialist organization. Race theory is thus an inherent part of their ideology, and the alleged international Jewish elite remains their main enemy. SRM believes that the Nordic peoples are racially and ethnically related. Their ambition is therefore to establish a Nordic nation to protect and conserve the Nordic race and culture.
A logical step towards creating a Nordic nation is establishing sister divisions in all Nordic countries. A first attempt took place in Norway in 2003 with former members of the Oslo-based group *Boot Boys*. However, the Norwegian activists appear not to have lived up to SRM’s standards, and the cooperation ended after a few years. It took several years before a new attempt was made in 2011, which testifies to the difficulties of recruiting dedicated activists in Norway. However, in 2011, Haakon Forwald, mostly known as a former member of the Swedish black metal band *Dissection*, founded NRM in close cooperation with SRM’s leadership. Since then, NRM has grown somewhat and currently counts four “nests” in eastern, southern, western and central Norway. They also claim to be preparing a fifth nest in northern Norway. Yet compared to the Swedish and even the Finnish division, NRM remains small and has carried out few public stunts.

Since 2013, SRM also claims to have a Danish division led by former DNSM member Henrik Jarsbo. However, the Danish division appears even less active than the Norwegian division. Its activities have so far been limited to leafletting and plastering stickers. Few pictures of Danish activists exist. One reason may be that other groups with similar profiles are currently active in Denmark, most notably *Denmark’s National Front*.

Finally, SRM’s Finnish division has been more active than its Norwegian and Danish counterparts have. FRM has also cooperated with and thus potentially benefited from other actors within the Finish far-right landscape. For example, in 2015, FRM participated as security guards in a joint demonstration with other actors from the Finnish far right, including *Suomen Sisu* and the online magazine *Sarastus* (Dawn). The demonstration indicates that the Finnish extraparliamentary right may be consolidating its powers. Notwithstanding these developments, compared to its Swedish counterpart, FRM remains a small actor with a more limited membership.
Why More Terrorism and Militancy in Sweden since 1990?

The following analysis seeks to isolate a set of conditions that might help explain why right-wing terrorism and militancy have been more widespread in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries. As such, it should not be read as an exhaustive account of all the factors or conditions that may foster right-wing terrorism and militancy. The analysis also does not engage with the increasingly salient issue of transnational networking and its assumed effects on militant strategies and tactics.\(^{71}\)

The reason is that transnational networking primarily serves to explain why groups and movements converge and not why they differ. However, this does not mean that transnational networking is irrelevant in the Nordic context. By contrast, as the previous sections demonstrate, Nordic groups and activists have always and still do cooperate closely across borders. In fact, the extent of transnational networking within the Nordic movement makes Sweden’s outlier position even more puzzling.

To explain this puzzle, two background conditions may serve to inform the analysis that follows. The first is that youth unemployment rates have been considerably higher in Sweden (and Finland) than in Denmark and Norway (on average 20% in Sweden and Finland 1990–2015 compared to 10% in Denmark and Norway). This is in part be due to a gradual downscaling of Sweden’s comparatively large industrial sector. The second is that Sweden has received far more immigrants than the other Nordic countries, and has experienced more problems related to segregated suburbs and crimes committed by people with immigrant backgrounds. In combination, these two conditions may have fuelled grievances among segments of the Swedish population that can be exploited by the extreme right to recruit new followers.

To connect such macro-level conditions with micro behaviours, Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann propose a framework for analysing extreme right mobilization and actions (violent and non-violent) combining three main concepts: (1) political opportunities, (2) organizational
resources, and (3) frame analysis.\textsuperscript{72} In the following, I briefly outline how these three concepts have been used in previous research, before applying them to the Nordic cases. The analysis should be read as a first attempt of applying this conceptual framework to the Nordic region, and may serve as a point of departure for more in-depth investigations in the future.

Political opportunities

Political opportunities generally refer to how access to political decision-making influences a social movement’s mobilizing opportunities and preferred forms of action.\textsuperscript{73} Limited or blocked access is generally expected to lead to more extreme actions, including militancy and violence.\textsuperscript{74} The underlying mechanism, sometimes referred to as the “pressure cooker theory”, is that when radical right parties obtain substantial support followed by political influence, they may function as a “safety valve” releasing pressure from dissatisfied radical right activists who may otherwise have turned to violence. By contrast, when access to political decision-making is limited, engaging in violent protest becomes a more attractive option.

Electoral results from the Nordic countries certainly lend support to this theory. During the 1990s, electoral support for radical right parties was limited across the entire region, while levels of militancy and violence were generally high. During the 2000s, the militant movements in Norway, Denmark and Finland receded, while less extreme and more democratically oriented radical right organizations and parties grew substantially. In Norway, the populist right Progress Party has received 15\% or more of the votes in parliamentary elections since 1997, and in 2013, they became member of a government coalition. In Denmark, the populist right Danish People’s Party has received more than 12\% of the votes in parliamentary elections since 2001, and provided parliamentary support to four of the five last elected governments. In Finland, the populist right Finns Party (formerly the True Finns) only became electorally relevant after the 2011 elections when they received 19\% of the votes. However, before that, the extraparliamentary populist right
organization Suomen Sisu had grown substantially since the early 2000s, and many of its former members are today parliamentary delegates with the Finns Party. In the 2015 election, the Finns Party received 18% of the votes, making them the parliament’s second largest party. In 2015, they also joined the government coalition.

By contrast, electoral support for Swedish radical right parties has been generally low until the Sweden Democrats’ electoral breakthrough in 2010 with 5.7% of the votes, followed by 12.9% in the 2014 election. Even after this breakthrough, all other parties refused to engage in any form of collaboration with the Sweden Democrats.\textsuperscript{75} The only radical right party that has achieved parliamentary representation prior to the Sweden Democrats was the party New Democracy, which received 7% of the votes in the 1991 parliamentary election. However, they lost all parliamentary seats in the following election with only 1% of the votes.

Although electoral results from the Nordic countries offer evidence in favour of the pressure cooker theory, one should be aware that opposite examples exist outside this region. Most notably, Golden Dawn’s recent electoral success in Greece was accompanied by a sharp increase in attacks against immigrants.\textsuperscript{76} To explain such cases, it seems reasonable to assume that the ideological and organizational profiles of such parties matter, and that the more extreme and militant they are, the more likely they are to stimulate rather than to discourage violent attacks. In the case of Golden Dawn, several reports suggest that its organizational structures resemble those of militant or even paramilitary groups more than those of conventional political parties.\textsuperscript{77} When such organizations manage to mobilize a significant number of followers, extensive violence may follow, which ties into the next concept to be discussed here: organizational resources.
Organizational resources

Organizational resources generally refer to how social movements’ organizational structures and access to different human, material, and symbolic resources influence their decisions and preferred actions.\(^7\) One underlying assumption is that social movements can be seen as rational actors seeking to maximize the effects of their limited resources. Generally, social movement research suggests that the use of violence becomes more likely when institutional and material resources are limited.\(^7\) While this assumption may be true when analysing larger social movements, we may arguably expect to find a different pattern when analysing militant movements only, and not their non-violent counterparts. Indeed, some resources have been found to push rational actors towards using violence.\(^8\)

One such resource is the number of dedicated militants and capable leaders. Based on a chronology of more than 3000 American terrorist attacks, the majority of which were right-wing, Hewitt found a strong relationship between the number of active militants, or what he labels “mobilized activists,” on the one hand, and levels of terrorism and violence on the other hand.\(^8\) At the same time, the number of unorganized sympathisers did not seem to influence terrorism and violence in the same way. Assuming that these causal relationships also apply to the Nordic region, a key condition to explaining varying levels of terrorism and violence would be the number of active militants at any given time.

My operationalization of organizational resources thus emphasizes the human capital of militant movements, more specifically the number of dedicated militants and capable leaders involved. While this certainly is a rather narrow understanding of organizational resources that could be enriched by including more components, it may still be helpful to illustrate how the Swedish movement has been and still is larger and better organized than its Nordic counterparts. To do so, we must begin by looking at the Nordic countries’ WWII experiences.
As Norway and Denmark were occupied by Germany during WWII, their citizens developed a deep mistrust and hatred of Nazi Germany and National Socialism more generally. Finland was actually a co-belligerent of Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1944, but only due to their territorial conflict with the USSR. The Finnish collective memory of WWII is therefore more ambivalent than that of the Danes and Norwegians. By contrast, Sweden remained neutral throughout the entire period, and was therefore less influenced by the war. Furthermore, Sweden never went through the same post-WWII legal purge against Nazi sympathisers as Denmark and Norway did, largely paralyzing their national socialist movements at that time. Finland also undertook a legal purge of sorts as the Finnish-Soviet armistice from 1944 required Helsinki to dismantle all fascist organizations. Sweden was thus left with a larger and better-organized national socialist movement than the other Nordic countries. This movement has remained active ever since, and reached a certain critical mass in terms of active members and capable leaders. It has therefore become far more resilient than its Nordic counterparts, who have always been critically dependent on a handful of key individuals and groups to maintain a minimum level of activity.

Besides the militant right, the organizational strength of the militant left is also worth considering here. Left- and right-wing militants often end up in a reciprocal spiral of violence, a dynamic sometimes referred to as cumulative extremism. Although comparable data are lacking, the Swedish militant left is generally seen as stronger and more violent than its Nordic counterparts. In 2013, the Swedish Security Service denominated left-wing militants as the most significant security threat to Swedish democracy. By comparison, Finnish left-wing militancy has been limited and poorly organized. In Norway, the militant left has receded following a more active period during the 1990s and early 2000s. In Denmark, left-wing militants have been more active than in Finland and Norway, but existing research suggests that they contributed to downscaling rather than fuelling the militant right.
Several observers have also noted a tendency among Swedish political elites to silently accept and sometimes even support leftist militancy and violence when targeting the far right. This tendency ties into a more general characteristic of Swedish elites as being more left-leaning, politically correct, and accepting towards immigration than elsewhere. Such characteristics, or frames, resonate with those used by the extreme right to recruit new followers and motivate violence. They portray the political elites as traitors willing to sacrifice their own nation and people, and call for violent revolution as the only way forward.

Frame analysis

Frames are generally understood as “the dominant worldviews that guide the behaviour of social movements groups.” Social movements and their leaders in particular create narratives, or collective action frames, meant to mobilize activists and motivate different types of action, including violence. The literature generally distinguishes between diagnostic frames, prognostic frames, and motivational frames, and uses these as analytical tools to identify how social movements recognize certain occurrences as social problems (diagnosis), develop possible strategies to resolve these (prognosis), and create incentives for acting on this knowledge (motivation). Frames succeed only when the target audience perceive them as credible and salient, a situation referred to as “frame alignment.” In such cases, core narratives produced by a movement resonate with the targeted individuals’ conceptions of reality, creating incentives for mobilization and action. Furthermore, successful framing is more likely to occur when a movement’s collective action frames resonate with existing master frames, or general orientations embedded in the broader society.

In research on extreme right mobilization and violence, frame analysis has conventionally been used in two ways. Some scholars study how extreme right actors interpret the world, and how such interpretations influence their identities, mobilization strategies, and preferred actions. Other
scholars study the relationship between the public discourse on immigration and racist violence. Generally, violence has been found to increase when political elites and the media propagate anti-immigration claims, creating discursive opportunities that may be exploited by extreme right actors to mobilize new activists and legitimate racist violence.

Scholars studying right-wing terrorism and militancy in the Nordic countries during the 1990s noted that a general hostility toward immigrants in the public sphere likely contributed to the sharp increase of racist attacks during that period. However, there is little evidence to suggest that such negative views of immigrants were more widespread in Sweden than elsewhere. If anything, the Swedish public debate on immigration has been found to be more liberal and immigrant-friendly than in the other Nordic countries. Sweden has also had consistently lower scores than any other West European country in surveys measuring anti-immigrant sentiments in the general population. Consequently, the prolonged existence of Sweden’s extreme right movement, and the relatively high amount of violence it has produced, can hardly be explained solely by anti-immigrant sentiments in the general population, or by a tendency among Swedish elites to speak negatively of immigrants.

However, immigrants are not the only targets frequently framed as a threat by extreme right actors. Another perceived threat comes from the political elites themselves, accused of promoting multicultural societies and marginalizing people with radical right opinions. In the Swedish case more than in the other Nordic countries, such accusations – or frames – draw strength from the fact that many Swedes as well as foreign observers, far beyond the extreme right movement, see the Swedish immigration debate as being too restrictive, with little room for anti-immigration opinions. According to a number of observers, the Swedish immigration debate has been conducted within a narrow “opinion corridor” policed by left-leaning journalists, intellectuals, and politicians who consistently brand and thus marginalize criticism and scepticism towards immigration as racist or
conductive to the spread of racism. One telling example is the economist Tino Sanandaji, an outspoken critic of Swedish immigration policies who, mostly using official government statistics, has drawn attention to the negative economic consequences of Sweden’s high immigration. Without addressing his arguments or data, one of Sweden’s major newspapers ran an op-ed denouncing Sanandaji’s criticism as “racial biology”. Similar examples abound, suggesting a climate of opinion in which critics of immigration policies, and not necessarily right-wing radicals, run a real risk of social stigmatization.

Whether the Swedish public debate on immigration has in fact been more restrictive than in the other Nordic countries remains an open question because we lack comparative studies of this phenomenon. However, more important here is the widespread belief that this is indeed the case, not only within the extreme right movement, but also among a number of journalists, academics, foreign observers, and people in general. This belief resonates with frames produced by the extreme right movement, portraying the political elite as traitors unwilling to protect the cultural heritage of its own people (diagnosis), and thus the need for violent revolution (prognosis) to create a better future (motivation). The Swedish militant movement has certainly used such narratives actively in their propaganda to justify revolutionary struggle as the only viable option for generating true political change. Perceptions of a more restrictive public debate on immigration may in other words have contributed to more militant recruitment and violence in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries, where the public debates on immigration are generally seen as more open and inclusive, and where radical right parties have gained more access to political power than in Sweden.
Conclusion

Combining new quantitative and qualitative data, this article demonstrated that right-wing terrorism and militancy have been far more widespread in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries between 1990 and 2015. Drawing on social movement theory, the article then identified three causal conditions that may help explain Sweden’s outlier position: (1) different WWII experiences, leaving Sweden with a stronger and more resilient extreme right movement; (2) the combination of high immigration with low electoral support for anti-immigration (radical right) parties; and (3) a more restrictive public debate on immigration, leaving little room for anti-immigration concerns in the public sphere. While the first and second conditions are consistent with existing social movement research, the third condition challenges the dominant view on how the public debate on immigration might influence mobilization and violence. Former studies suggest that elites’ negative framing of immigrants legitimates and thereby triggers right-wing violence. By contrast, this study suggests that an excessively negative framing of anti-immigration actors and opinions might lead to a similar outcome. While such moralizing frames and stigmatization may keep some people from joining extreme right groups, they may also push some of the most ardent activists onto even more extreme and clandestine paths—a polarization mechanism also observed in previous research on the extreme right.

If it is the case that public repression and stigmatization of radical right actors and opinions under certain conditions (high immigration and low radical right support) fuels anger and resentment on the far right, and thereby also militant mobilization and violence, then one should perhaps be more careful about how these types of actors and opinions are treated publicly. For example, by dismissing concerns about high immigration as hateful conspiracies, racism, or some form of irrational phobia, Western elites and policymakers (unintentionally) make these threats more real in the eyes of far-right activists, because they regard the elites as an active part of the
underlying conflicts. Telling someone who is afraid that his or her fears are groundless generally does not help much, especially if you personify the very thing they fear. This does not mean that one should not contest or challenge intolerant radical right actors and opinions publicly. However, in line with political psychologists who have studied authoritarian and conservative mindsets,\textsuperscript{107} this analysis suggests that one might benefit from doing so without coming across as overly aggressive, derogatory, or moralizing, however difficult that may be.

The prolonged existence of Sweden’s extreme right movement could be one reason why political support for radical right parties and the public debate on immigration have been more limited in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries. Precisely because of this movement’s long and violent record, right-wing opinions on the immigration issue are more easily associated with racism and violence, and consequently framed as a threat by leading opinionmakers. The three conditions discussed in this article thus appear to have a mutually reinforcing effect upon each other that makes an interesting point of departure for future comparative research, both within and outside the Nordic region.

The Nordic countries have had their fair share of right-wing terrorism and militancy over the past 25 years, although militant groups in Denmark, Norway and Finland have been largely replaced by less extreme and more democratic organisations and parties. It remains to be seen whether the recent electoral success of the \textit{Sweden Democrats} will lead to a similar development in Sweden. However, the ongoing migration crisis in Europe has led to an entirely new situation involving a sharp increase in the number of asylum applicants across the entire region, and particularly in Sweden. This new situation may turn out to be a game changer and potentially stimulate militant recruitment in all countries. How elected politicians, political activists, and the general public deal with this new situation will thus be critically important to avoid a new wave of right-wing terrorism and militancy in the Nordic countries.
Notes


3Bjørgo (see note 1 above).

4Iceland is not included here because a militant right-wing movement never existed there.


8Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann (see note 7 above), 6–10.


10Ibid., 72–80.


13Bjørgo (see note 1 above), 72–112; Lööw (see note 1 above); Karpantschof and Mikkelsen (see note 2 above); Kyösti Pekonen, Pertti Hynynen, and Mari Kalliala, “The New Radical Right Taking Shape in Finland,” in Pekonen (see note 1 above), 53–54.

14Bjørgo (see note 1 above), 247–310.

15Ibid, 48-53; Lööw (see note 1 above).


18 Jacob Asland Ravndal, “Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10, no. 3 (2016).

19 The RTV dataset is available at: [http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/rtv](http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/rtv).


22 Karpantschof and Mikkelsen (see note 2 above), 9.

23 Ibid., 14.


29 Ibid.

30 Karpantschof and Mikkelsen (see note 2 above).

31 Pekonen, Hynynen, and Kalliala (see note 13 above), 48; Daniel Poohl et al., “Organiserad intolerans i Finland och Sverige” (Expo, Stockholm, 2012), 52.

32 Poohl et al (see note 31 above).

33 Pekonen, Hynynen, and Kalliala (see note 13 above), 53.


36 Interviews conducted by the author with a local anti-racist activist in Helsinki, June 2014, and with the former FRM leader in Oslo, May 2016.

37 Interviews conducted by the author with journalists Marko Hietikko and Mikael Brunila in Helsinki, June 2014.

38 An archived version of this blog can be found here: [https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.mustasydan.com/](https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.mustasydan.com/).


42Tom Kimmo Eiternes and Katrine Fangen, Bak nynazismen (Cappelen, 2002).

43Fangen (see note 16 above).


46Lööw (see note 16 above).


48Ibid., 77–122.


50Also noticed by Fangen (see note 16 above), 99–100.


55The victims were Peter Karlsson, Per Skogsberg, John Hron and Gerard Gbeyo.

56Dick Sundevall, Sveriges Farligaste Man (Stockholm: Lind & Co, 2016).


Lööw (see note 16 above), 80–90.


Klas Lund et al., Handbok för aktivister i Motståndsrörelsen (Estonia: Nationellt Motstånd Förlag, 2010).

See e.g. Werner Holm, “Pankration,“ Nationellt Motstånd 3, no. 6 (2005): 16–17.


Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann (see note 7 above), 9–13.

Ibid., 11.

Ibid., 80; Koopmans (see note 6 above), 206–209.


Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann (see note 7 above), 88–89.
80 Della Porta (see note 78 above), 16–17.
81 Christopher Hewitt, _Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda_ (London: Routledge, 2003), 46.
83 Lööw (see note 16 above); Lööw (see note 2 above).
87 Interview conducted by the author with a local anti-racist activist in Helsinki, June 2014.
89 Karpantschow and Mikkelsen (see note 2 above).
90 Anna-Lena Lodenius, _Gatans Parlament : Om politiska våldsverkare i Sverige_ (Ordfront, 2006); Magnus Sandelin, _Extremister: En berättelse om politiska våldsverkare i Sverige_ (Bokförlaget Forum, 2012).
91 Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann (see note 7 above), 13.
93 Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann (see note 7 above), 13.
95 Della Porta and Diani (see note 7 above), 79–81.
96 See e.g. Gattinara and Froio (see note 7 above).
97 Koopmans (see note 6 above).
99 Bjørgo (see note 1 above), 93–100; Lööw (see note 1 above), 131–132; Mikkelsen and Karpantschow (see note 2 above), 6.
100 Martin Bak Jørgensen and Susi Meret, “Framing Scandinavian Conceptualizations of Irregular Migration,” _Nordic Journal of Migration Research_ 2, no. 4 (1 January 2012).
101 EUMC, “Majorities’ Attitudes Towards Minorities: Key Findings from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey,” (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2005).


104 See note 102 above.

105 Koopmans (see note 6 above).
