Personal Values and Party Choice

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Abstract

While we have extensive knowledge upon the effects from political values onto voting; the role of personal values is largely unappreciated. Using Schwartz basic personal value theory, this thesis aims to expand on our knowledge upon the relation between personal values and party choice. Specifically, to what degree Schwartz's personal values can explain party choice; how personal values are prioritized among party family voters and whether these voters share the same prioritizations across cultural borders. We subject a sample of six countries, with data collected from the European Social Surveys from 2002 to 2014, to ANOVA analyses and Multinomial Logistical Regression. The findings show that personal values explains party choice best in more fragmented party systems, smaller more ideological strong party voters have clearer value prioritizations and collectively oriented personal values are better predictors for party choice than individually oriented.

Preface

This thesis marks the end of five years of higher education at the University of Oslo. I am grateful to all who have helped me in writing this thesis and made these past years unforgettable. Unfortunately I cannot name but a few.

I had the honour of having Oddbjørn Knutsen as my supervisor for this thesis. I have over the years sought his advice on both methodology and empirics on course assignments and my bachelor thesis. When it came to choose a supervisor for my master thesis I had no qualms on who to ask. Knutsen's extensive knowledge on value structures, party families and statistical methodology has proved immensely valuable and I could not have accomplished this thesis without him. Thank you.

I need to show appreciation for those who have made my time at the university eventful and unforgettable. I need to thank my friends, Lars Döpker, Aqib Chaudry, Matthew Roman and Jonas Nilsen. Our (not so often substantive) discussions upon politics and society and regular lunches has made the, otherwise long and tiresome, days at the study hall enjoyable. I thank my friends at the student martial arts club, OSI Kendo. The companionship we have shared these past years have made me realise my passion for Kendo. Not to mention the underrated therapeutic properties of hitting someone with a stick, while wearing a pseudo-samurai armour and screaming incomprehensibly, after a long day of exam cramming.

I thank my parents, Anne Sofie Bjelland and Geir Nyvoll, for bringing me into this world. Without their love and guidance I would never have become the man I am today. The support they've showed me through all my endeavours is truly awe inspiring. I also thank my siblings, Inga Nyvoll and Arne Nyvoll. I have almost exclusively fond memories from our shared childhood. I admired you both throughout my childhood, and I still do to this day.

Last, put not least, I must thank my companion in life, Stine Pauline Enersen. We found each other in High School and we've stuck together since. Spending time and living together these past years have brought me immense happiness. Seeing you smile, hearing your voice and sharing our thoughts constantly reminds me of why I feel in love with you in the first place. May we always be together.

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1.0 Introduction

Uncovering what compels people to vote for specific parties is an everlasting endeavour in political science. The literature on party choice is vast and equally so are the theories and methods attempting to provide explanation. Traditionally, social stratification explained party choice. Your social class, status or economic situation determined which party or parties you would support. However, in the recent decades, scholars have witnessed the dwindling predictability of party choice. Voting volatility and decline of partisanship gave the need for new explanations. This led many scholars to put an emphasis on the role of values. Pertaining that core beliefs and value dimensions could explain party choice.

In the wave of research on values, two specific conceptualizations stand out: personal- and political values. The former are, "cognitive representations of desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or group." (Piurko et al. 2011:538). The latter are, "overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship, and society" (Schwartz et al. 2010:423). These two values differ in both contents and goals. They both desire a particular end-state of existence that in turn spawns goals and actions they consider legitimate and necessary in order to reach this. With personal values, an end-state centres on the individual or a collective in which the person is a member. This is different from political values. Political values are oriented towards the political arena. Such values manifest desires for particular ways society should be organized or appear and produce ideas or actions aimed at changing or maintaining the political reality.

Of the two values, political values have by far been the most represented in the political science literature. Perhaps familiar to most people is the use of values to understand the meaning behind influential conflict dimensions such as the left-right or liberal-conservative dimensions. The left-right dimension is a popular tool used by scholars and electorate alike to navigate in the otherwise complex political landscape. The dimension, representing two incompatible political ideologies on each extremity, has proved surprisingly resilient in predicting which party the individual voter will endorse. To such an extent that it is rare for a voter to vote for a completely different party than what corresponds to their specific position on the scale (Klingemann & Fuchs 1993:222). However, which political conflict

does it represent? Certainly, it is an ideological divide; however, there is evidence that most of the electorate do not perceive these divides as clearly. Political values have helped clarify what underlies this conflict. For instance, many frequently interpret the left-right dimension as a reflection of the political value of equality (Feldman 2003:49).

While there is no doubt about the extensive influence and achievements of studies applying political values, personal values have gone largely unappreciated. Personal values serve as, "standards for judging *all* kinds of behaviour, events, and people." (Schwartz et al. 2010: 422, italic in original). They define who we want to be and what we want our surroundings to be. Given this, personal values should be crucial in shaping political values and subsequently party choice. It therefore comes as a surprise that research on the effects from personal values on both political behaviour and party choice is limited and overshadowed by political value research.

Feldman & Johnston argues that political attitudes cannot be reduced to a single political value dimension (Feldman & Johnston 2014). In their article, they show how people are not consistent in their value adherence. For example, people who have authoritarian characteristics do not necessarily oppose equality (Feldman & Johnston 2014:354). They are likely to be social conservative, but are equally likely to be liberal or conservative on economic policy (ibid.). Equality is in fact a very ambiguous concept. In for instance the United States, equality is defined as political equality. All citizens must have the same access to the political arena. However, in most of Western Europe, equality refers to equality of results and is primarily a materialistic concern (Feldman 1988:419). On the intrastate level, the meanings of core political values such as freedom can shift from person to person or one setting to another. "For a capitalist, freedom is the absence of coercion, particularly from the government. For a socialist, freedom is being able to remove barriers like poverty and racism." (Feldman 2003:49). Thus, people adhering to two conflicting ideals can both be adherents of a given political value.

Political values are at times unable to consider the complex structure of attitudes and values organizing political evaluations (Feldman 1988: 416-418). Researchers of personal values argue that a focus on a few overarching (political) values miss the conflicts and tensions that are central to the dynamics of values (Feldman 2003:481). Such overarching values cannot guarantee to be universal for all societies. In short, the conceptualization of political

values ignores the heterogeneity in how citizens understand political conflict (Feldman & Johnston 2014:338).

If we are to acquire profound knowledge on political behaviour and subsequently avoid such uncertainties as mentioned, then we need to apply values that are universal, causally relevant, measurable and applicable. Personal values are a prime candidate for this. While political values originate from the political reality of its citizens, personal values spring from the biological needs, requirements of social interaction and survival and welfare of the individual and its group (Feldman 2003:484). Personal values emerge from basics necessities of human life and thus should be universal. In a chain of causation, personal values appear before political values, they give shape, coherence and structure them. Given this, personal values should be first choice for any scholar attempting to study political behaviour.

1.1 The purpose of this thesis

This thesis endeavours to expand on our knowledge on the relationship between personal values and one key part of political behaviour, party choice (voting). In order to achieve this we will be applying a theory of basic personal values as developed by Shalom Schwartz.

1.1.1 Shalom Schwartz and basic personal values

Shalom H. Schwartz is a social psychologist with a Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of Michigan and currently has the position of Professor at the Department of Psychology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Researchgate 2018). His interest for cross-cultural differences in values inspired him to specify and test a universal structure of values (Feldman 2003:49). Eventually leading to the development of a theory upon basic personal values. His theory outlined ten basic personal value types, values that structure and shape our life and motivations. These ten value types were self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence and universalism. Self-direction and stimulation compels a person to seek self-actualisation, exploring oneself and having an exciting life. Achievement and power motivates a person to seek accumulation of resources, prestige and wealth. Security, conformity and tradition encourages a person to feel safe and avoid changes that can endanger your current lifestyle. Universalism and

benevolence motivates a person to feel compassion and tolerance for other people and nature.

Schwartz theory differs from other personal value theories because it suggests how value systems are organized (Feldman 2003:50). His theory can specify relationships among values; which values are compatible or opposed (ibid.). This makes his values dynamic in a way never seen before in previous theories (Feldman 2003:49, Schwartz 2007:176). The existence of this value structure has been proven for 40 samples in 20 culturally different countries (Schwartz 1992:37). 92.5 % of the samples had the existence of 8 or more value types, while 67,5 % had all ten (Schwartz 1992:25-27). Other researchers finds similar results (Piurko et al. 2011:540). The interrelation of his values makes the theory capable of studying how a whole system of values, rather than a single value, affect other variables (Schwartz 2007:176). One such variable is party choice.

Marina Barnea & Shalom Schwartz hypothesized that people would choose political parties that advocated political goals similar to their own personal motivations and values (Barnea & Schwartz 1998). For instance, people who put high importance on self-direction, universalism and stimulation would adhere to liberal parties on the liberalism dimension (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:19-21). Barnea & Schwartz applied a discriminant analysis on a survey from 1990 containing both Schwartz's values and reported which party whom the respondents voted for in the previous election in Israel. The analysis revealed that the liberalism dimension corresponded well to the predicted personal values (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:31-33). Barnea & Schwartz also tested whether demographic or value-based variables provided better predictions for party choice. Values proved a better fit for parties with clear ideological profiles, for the less distinct, demographics had higher prediction (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:35).

Shalom Schwartz, Gian Caprara and Michele Vecchione conducts a similar analysis upon the effects of personal values on party choice (2010). They presented three hypotheses. First, basic personal values organize and give coherence to core political values (Schwartz et al. 2010:423). They theorized the pursuit of personal values lead people to favour the ideologies or policies that promote them (ibid.). Second, Personal- and political values have an effect on voting (Schwartz et al. 2010:432). Third, core political values mediate the effect from basic personal values onto voting (Schwartz et al. 2010:423). They expected that both

personal and political values effect party choice, but that the latter fully mediated all effects from the former (Schwartz et al. 2010:421). Using data from surveys conducted one month prior to the Italian national election of April 2006 and one month after (Schwartz et al. 2010:432), Schwartz et al. was able to find support for all their hypotheses. A correlation- and multidimensional scaling analysis revealed a strong relationship between personal values and political values (Schwartz et al. 2010:439-440). A binary logistic regression showed how both personal and political had a significant effect on party choice (Schwartz et al. 2010:442). The analysis also indicated that personal values were fully mediated by political values since including both political and personal values in the analysis gave no significant rise in explanatory power from political values alone (ibid.).

1.1.2 Research question

As mentioned, the purpose of this thesis is to expand on our knowledge on the relationship between personal values and party choice. We further specify this to; *to what degree can Schwartz's basic personal values explain party choice*? Evaluating the current literature, three perspectives remain underdeveloped. The relationship between personal values and party families, the application of Schwartz's theory on party choice in cross-national samples and the predictability of party choice from personal values. Previous studies have scrutinized one or two of these perspectives, but thus far, none has incorporated all three.

1.1.3 On party families and cross-national sample

This thesis differs from other studies in its attempt to discover differences in personal value priorities across party families, in addition to studying this in a cross-national sample.

To this author's knowledge, there exists no published material on the relationship between Schwartz's personal values and party families. Certainly, there is research on the relationship with voting. A recurring theme is a focus on a dichotomous voting variable. Where all votes combines into a centre-left or centre-right grouping. The reduction is understandable since the majority of the articles study Italian elections, a democracy famous for election coalitions (see Schwartz et al. 2010, Vecchione et al. 2013 and Caprara et al. 2006). It must not be understated the importance of these studies since they have proven valuable in mapping

the motivations of the left and right electorate. However, by applying a dichotomous variable, we lose valuable information. For instance, Caprara et al. finds that, “Tradition and conformity values that, like security values, endorse the status quo, correlated with voting for the centre-right.” (Caprara et al. 2006:21). Although these are interesting results, we are at a loss of how the parties differentiate on the right. Will for instance voters for the Radical Right have a more or less emphasis on security than Conservatives? Do Right Liberals share this emphasis on “rightist” values or do they advocate more strongly for private market associated values such as achievement? With a dichotomous variable, we lose both the distinction to what degree their electoral basis adhere to these values and how high of an importance these values have when casting their vote.

The article by Barnea & Schwartz (1998) views the motivations for individual parties. However, their case is limited to only Israel, with no attempt at finding a universal value set for specific party families. In fact, there seems to be few attempts to test Schwartz’s values on a cross-national sample. The article, “Basic personal values and the meaning of left-right political orientations…” by Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov (2011) is one of the few published articles who does this. Although this study do not attempt to connect Schwartz’s values neither to voting nor to party families. Instead, they study political orientation and again only apply a dichotomous dependent variable.

In conclusion, a focus on party families is beneficial due to expanding our knowledge of personal motivations on who votes for what and uncovering whether the partisans for the same party families in different nations share the same value priorities.

1.1.4 On the predictive effects

The affect from personal values onto party choice is underappreciated in the current political science literature. Schwartz and his associates claim political values fully mediate the effects from personal values (Schwartz et al. 2010:442-443). There is no denying that political values are better at predicting party choice. Because these values are often derived from people’s political attitudes and policy preferences. Thus, they are created from direct associations to political statements and subsequently parties. However, as stated earlier, the application of political values can be problematic due to varying conceptualizations. Perhaps even more

cumbersome is the fact that applying political values to any case requires considerate knowledge of the political landscape. For instance, Barnea & Schwartz adjust their political values to the Israeli context (1998:21-22, 24, 25-26). Schwartz et al. apply eight political value dimensions, where two of them are specifically tailored to the Italian context (Schwartz et al. 2010:429-430).

Schwartz's theory of basic personal values can forego this need of intricate knowledge of the political landscape. Schwartz proved that his values exist across a multitude of cultures as different as China and the Netherlands. The theory might be considered universal, and a valuable tool in studying political parties across cultural borders. Essentially, "applying this theory reduces the risk of overlooking values that might be politically relevant in some contexts but not others." (Piurko et al. 2011:540).

In conclusion, by applying Schwartz values we are able to study multiple party families across different democracies. If Schwartz's values explain party choice, then we can use the theory to make comparative analyses of democracies within varying cultures. Essentially foregoing the problems of comparing political values across borders. To clarify, this thesis will not include political values into its analyses, since this is already well documented.

1.2 Disposition

Chapter two introduces the theories and concepts relevant to this thesis. Deliberating on the concept of values, Schwartz's personal values, and party family. It also presents theories regarding the dynamic structure of Schwartz's personal values and the relationship between these values and party choice. The chapter ends with a presentation of all expected hypotheses, defined through party families' placement on relevant political conflict dimensions. The third chapter introduces the data used for the analyses in this thesis. The construction of variables and methods used in analysing the data. Chapter four presents the results from the analysis and assessing whether it supports or rejects our hypotheses. The final chapter summarizes the findings provided by the analysis and provide concluding remarks.

2.0 Concepts, theory and hypotheses

Before attempting to answer the research question of this thesis, we need to familiarize ourselves with relevant theories and key concepts. Section 2.1 delves into the concept of values, what is the content of a value. Section 2.2 provides detailed explanation of Schwartz's values. What these are, how they are to be interpreted and how these values are a part of a larger structure. We also delve into how the concept of values differ from other similar concepts. Section 2.3 attempts to theoretically explain how values and party choice are related. Section 2.4 presents three politically relevant conflict dimensions and how these are relatable to Schwartz's personal values. We use these conflict dimensions to form our hypotheses. Section 2.5 to 2.6 defines party families and introduces each of the party families applied in this thesis. We also place the party families on the conflict dimensions presented in section 2.4. The final section (2.7) presents all the hypotheses we have for this thesis. These include both general hypotheses and specific hypotheses for party families. A summary of all the party family hypotheses are provided at the end of section 2.7.

2.1 The value concept

The concept of "value" is extensively used both in daily interactions and scholarly literature. Subsequently there exists a multitude of varying definitions, which in part might have branch definitions. This thesis focuses on one such branch definition, personal values, which is a conceptualisation of values directed to a specific subset of values. However, we have yet to introduce the general concept of a value, especially how we separate values from other concepts such as attitudes. Shalom Schwartz defines a value as, "[Values (1) are] concepts or beliefs, (2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and (5) are ordered by relative importance." (Schwartz 1992:4). In Schwartz's opinion, this definition incorporates five features of a value recurrently mentioned in the literature (Schwartz 1992:3). Values and attitudes differ through feature three and five presented in the definition of values (Feldman 2003:480-481). Attitudes refers to evaluations of specific objects or situations, values however are in the abstract, are more general and is the basis for evaluations across numerous different situations (Feldman 2003:481). Since values are directed towards a desirable end state, they

rarely trigger negative connotations. Desirable end states will likely spawn positive associations and thus any individual might have multiple desired values (Feldman 2003:481). However, we still exhibit preferences when confronted, meaning some values must be more important than others. We therefore commonly speak of value priorities, "the relative endorsement of values with respect to each other." (ibid.). We adhere to several values, but prioritize some more than others. For instance, security and freedom are both important values. In a given situation were the two values oppose, he/she will prioritize freedom over security. Such priorities must not be mistaken as categorical hierarchies. In reality, many values complement each other and will be prioritized or opposed simultaneously. Therefore it will make more sense to speak of a value system, rather than hierarchy.

In addition to the five features, there exists a consensus on two general characteristics of values. First, they are relatively few in number (Feldman 2003:479). There is a finite number of values. Much fewer than attitudes, but not necessarily fewer than ideologies. Second, values are assumed to be stable (enduring). This is a natural implication from values being standards of evaluation (Feldman 2003:479). An individual's value priorities remain mostly the same over the course of their lives. Although they may be susceptible to change, albeit slowly, due to adaptations to their surrounding environment. It is assumed that these processes are slow enough to give stable evaluations and behaviour (ibid.).

2.2 Schwartz's universal structure of values

Schwartz was interested in cross-cultural differences. He sought to build and test a universal structure of values. Schwartz was aware of the varying difference in attitudes and values across cultures, however he was convinced underlying these were a smaller number of goals and motivations which were universal (Feldman 2003:484). To find these universal motivators, Schwartz drew on the basic biological and social needs necessary for human existence. He theorized that values emerges from three universal requirements. These were, "… needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups." (Schwartz 1992:4). With this basis and with knowledge from earlier research, Schwartz derived ten motivational types (Schwartz 1992:4-12). Through a survey conducted in 20 countries with a total of 40 samples with 36 value items, Schwartz were able to confirm the existence of the ten motivational values in 67.5 % of the samples

(Schwartz 1992:4, 25-26). A total of 92.5 % of the samples had confirmed existence of eight of the motivational values (Schwartz 1992:26).

Schwartz ten motivational values (which he would later dub basic personal values) were the following:

1. Self-direction

Derived from organismic needs for control and mastery (Schwartz 1992:5). Self-direction is characterized by independent thought and action. Emphasis on exploration, autonomy, choosing and pursuing own goals and encourage creativity.

2. Stimulation

Derived from the organismic need for variety and stimulation in order to maintain an optimal level of activation (Schwartz 1992:7). Emphasis on challenges in life, seeking excitement and a varied life.

3. Hedonism

Derived from organismic needs and the pleasure associated with satisfying them (Schwartz 1992:8). Emphasis on pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. It is similar to stimulation, however it differs on which motivational goals it manifests. Hedonism simply advocates bodily pleasure which can be achieved through consumption or sexual encounters. Stimulation advocates an active and varied life. Keeping life interesting and meaningful.

4. Achievement

Derived from the requirement for individuals to obtain resources for survival (Schwartz 1992:8). Competent performance is crucial in survival, naturally society and individuals focus on fostering skills and abilities which are beneficial and necessary to ensure social interaction and the function of institutions. Emphasizes demonstration of competence and obtaining social approval (ibid.).

5. Power

Power derives from multiple requirements. Social institutions require a power structure to function, and a power relation exists in most social interactions across all cultures (Schwartz 1992:8-9). In order to justify the existence of power in social life and legitimize it, “groups

must treat power as a value." (Schwartz 1992:9). Power emphasizes control and dominance over people and resources and the pursuit of social status and prestige (ibid.).

6. Security

Derived from the need for protection and ensuring the group's survivability. This can be both external (i.e. foreign invaders) and internal (i.e. crime). Emphasizes safety, harmony and stability of society, relationships and self (Schwartz 1992:9).

Schwartz notes security might have two sub values, an individual and collective. However, his findings imply that these supposed sub values are closely related and difficult to distinguish between (Schwartz 1992:41). In fact, they are so closely related that the findings suggest people view the collective as an extension of the self (ibid.).

7. Conformity

For a group function to run smoothly, socially disruptive interactions must avoided in order to maintain cohesion and stability (Schwartz 1992:9). Individuals therefore abide rules and reservations in order to prevent social upheaval. Defining goals of this value is, "restraint of action, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms." (ibid.).

8. Tradition

Over the course of a group's history they develop symbols and practises which are conducted regularly. These are eventually sanctioned as traditions and become a value in itself for the group's members (Schwartz 1992:10). Tradition is derived from the survival and welfare needs of a group, "Traditional modes of behavior becomes symbols of the group's solidarity, expressions of its unique worth, and presumed guarantors of its survival." (ibid.).

Tradition and conformity are closely related through common motivational goals, however they appear to be empirically distinguishable (Schwartz 1992:39-40).

9. Benevolence

Benevolence has a narrower goal than the other values, it emphasizes the concern for the welfare of close others in everyday interaction (Schwartz 1992:11). Thus adhering to this value would mean being primarily concerned over family, friends and ones close collective (close

collective can in this context mean perceived collective, such as people of the same nationality). This is derived from, “the need for positive interaction in order to promote the flourishing of groups and the organismic need for affiliation.” (Schwartz 1992:11).

10. Universalism

Derived from survival needs of groups and individuals only made apparent by contact with people outside ones extended primary group and thus made aware of the scarcity of natural resources (Schwartz 1992:12). This leads to two realizations, first, failure to protect the environment will lead to the destruction of the resources crucial for survival, and second, failure to accept and treat justly others who are different can lead to life threatening conflict (ibid.). Universalism emphasizes protection of welfare of all people and nature, understanding, appreciating and tolerating people who are different.

Although benevolence and universalism seem similar, Schwartz proclaims their separation is necessary. Research into collectivist and individualistic societies show that the collective share great concern for their close ones but relative indifference for those outside, individualistic however distinguish less sharply between in and outgroups when addressing their concerns (Schwartz 1992:12). This suggests a high emphasis on benevolence in collective groups and an equal emphasis on universalism and benevolence in individualistic groups.

In Schwartz original article he theorizes an eleventh value type, spirituality. However, he could not find any consistent existence of it. Schwartz noted spirituality takes many different forms. Some focus on the collective while others focus on self-transcendence (Schwartz 1992:10). Understanding spirituality could even require some level of religious sophistication (ibid). He concluded that spirituality was too closely related to others values such as benevolence, and therefore not a standalone universalistic motivator (Schwartz 1992:38).

Table 2.2 *Summary of the ten personal values (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:19)*

Value	Description
Self-direction	*Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, freedom, independence, ability, wisdom, world of beauty).*
Stimulation	*Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life).*
Hedonism	*Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life).*
Achievement	*Personal Success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (success, wealth, ambition).*
Power	*Social Status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority).*
Security	*Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self (family security, national security, social order).*
Conformity	*Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm other and violate social expectations or norms (self-discipline, politeness, honouring parents and elders, obedience).*
Tradition	*Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide (devoutness, respect for tradition, humility, spiritual life).*
Benevolence	*Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (helpfulness, forgivingness, social justice).*
Universalism	*Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (honesty, broadmindedness, protecting the environment, meaning in life).*

In regard to these ten basic values, we can make some clarifications. Personal values are not traits. Traits are, “dimensions of individual differences in tendencies to show consistent patterns of thought, feelings and actions” (Caprara et al. 2009:82). They are enduring dispositions, behavioural patterns which describes what people are like (Caprara et al. 2006:3). Traits have no goals, they vary in frequency and intensity and when explaining their behaviour, people might refer to traits. For instance, one might say they are hardworking

when trying to explain why they work unnecessary overtime at work. Traits are not however modes of evaluation. When people need to justify or legitimize their behaviour they refer to values (Caprara et al. 2006:3). Traits can be considered both positive and negative, values on the other hand defines what we consider desirable and therefore will be seen as positive regardless (ibid.).

We can also draw a distinction from norms. A norm is a known and communally approved prescription which tells us what is acceptable or unacceptable behaviour (Schiefloe 2003:145). Conducting oneself in line or in opposition to norms can receive positive or negative reactions from the people around us (Schiefloe 2003:144). In contrast to personal values, which are defined and shaped by the individual, norms are created and maintained thorough social interactions (Schiefloe 2003:145). In fact, norms are a result of values (ibid.). For example, a community values benevolence very strongly, and therefore expect everyone to spend much of their time and resources on helping those in need. They have created a norm of compassion, rewarding those who show it and shunning does who do not. Perhaps the largest difference between personal values and norms is how norms merely constrain our actions, while personal values defines, guides and give them meaning. Norms are imposed upon us by our social surroundings (external collective pressure), values are developed and maintained by the individual.

In a chain of causation, traits affect personal values. The set of traits a person possess will in part determine which values they prefer. Following this, personal values shape the political values which again decide which political party one prefer (see figure 2.2). This relationship is highly simplified, since all these aspects are interdependent (i.e. people tend to change their traits in order to match their values). In reality, all parts of the chain have a direct causal effect on party choice, regardless of how much is mediated by the others. This thesis will, as mentioned, only focus on personal values.

Figure 2.2 Simplified Causal Model



2.2.1 The Dynamic relationship of Schwartz's values

Schwartz's values are unique in the way they suggest a value system. The values are interdependent, the pursuit of one value does not immediately disqualify the pursuit of others. Rather, the pursuit of a specific value will complement or oppose another. A visual two-dimensional representation of the structural relation between the values can be seen in figure 2.2.1. In this figure, values which are adjacent to each other have strong compatibility. The closer any two values are, the more likely they are to share underlying motivations (Schwartz 2007:175). The further apart they are, the more antagonistic are their underlying motivations (ibid.). For instance, the pursuit of power may conflict with the pursuit of benevolence. Seeking control and dominance over people will likely obstruct actions aimed at increasing the general welfare of the less fortunate (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:18). Likewise, seeking power will likely enhance achievements goals, since increasing ones control and dominance in many cases facilitates demonstration of personal success and recognition (ibid.).

The compatible value pairs are as follows: power & achievement, achievement & hedonism, hedonism & stimulation, stimulation & self-direction, self-direction & universalism, universalism & benevolence, tradition & conformity, tradition/conformity & security, security & power (Schwartz 1992:14-15, 30-35).

This value system is not solely a product of a priori assessments. The dynamic structure has been developed and expanded through empirical evidence. In his dataset with 40 samples from 20 different countries, Schwartz subjected the data to a smallest space analysis (SSA) (Schwartz 1992:3, 21-22). The SSA were able to confirm the existence of all the latent values within all the 40 samples (Schwartz 1992:23-24). Although not all 40 samples had the presence of all ten values at once, the analysis showed that in cases where less than ten values were identified, the missing values formed along the expected structure or formed an intermixed relationship with a neighbouring value (i.e. when tradition were not identified, it emerged as a mixed value with benevolence) (Schwartz 1992:26-27). Thus the SSA still proved how the values formed a dynamic structural relationship befitting the circular structure, even when not all values could be separately identified. In general, the theorized value structure and the observed value structured from the analysis proved remarkably similar, and only a few adjustments had to be made in order for both structures to represent the same properties (Schwartz 1992:14, 24, 30-31).



Figure 1.2.1 Structural representation of the ten personal values (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:20)

2.2.2 The dual and quartal structure

Schwartz suggests that his values can be organized in a dual and quartal structure. The conflict between individualistic and collectivist interests gives rise to a dual structure. “The five value types that serve primarily individual interests (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction) form a contiguous region opposed to another contiguous region formed by the three value types that serve primarily collective interests (benevolence, tradition, conformity).” (Schwartz 1992:13). Individualistic interests are in conflict with collective interests, since empowerment of the individual is likely to damage the cohesion of the

collective. The pursuit of one cannot facilitate both. Universalism and Security have properties that make them borderline cases between individual and collective values, and can therefore be argued to be a part of both (Schwartz 1992:13). The quartal structure suggests they are more closely akin to the collectivist interests.

The quartal structure (visualized in figure 2.2.1) facilitates groups according to compatible goals. These groups are: Self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence), values that emphasizes cosmopolitism and concern for others welfare (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:18). Self-enhancement (power and achievement), values that emphasizes personal success and dominance over others (ibid.). Openness to change (stimulation and self-direction), emphasizes independent thought and action and favouring change (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:19). Conservation (security, conformity and tradition), emphasizes values and action which preserve the status quo and encourages submission and self-restriction (ibid.).

Self-enhancement and conservation has goals aimed at overcoming sources of anxiety by, “gaining dominance or admiration” or by, “avoiding conflict, unpredictability, and change by submitting to others’ expectations and passively accepting the status quo.” (Piurko et al. 2011:540). Openness to change and self-transcendence has goals which are relatively anxiety free. They express growth and self-expansion through, “promoting the welfare of others” or by “autonomous self-expression” (ibid.).

The four value groupings form distinct conflict dimensions. Openness to change forms a conflict dimension with conservation. Openness to change motivate people to follow their own emotional and intellectual interests (Schwartz 1992:43). This encouragement can lead people to unpredictable and uncertain paths which can threaten the fabric of cohesion within a social group. Conservation on the other hand values stability and the status quo. Conservation values provides a feeling of certainty, which is comforting and soothing when interacting with other through relationships, traditions and within societal institutions (ibid.). Naturally these two value groupings collide, since their goals and desires are incompatible. Conservation want stability, but openness to change threatens this through their personal exploration and the potential threat it pose to societal norms and customs. Schwartz’s analyses was able to confirm the existence of this dimension in all his 40 samples (Schwartz 1992:42).

Self-enhancement versus Self-transcendence constitutes a second dimension. Self-enhancement values motivates one to enhance their own personal interests, even if this is at the expense of others (Schwartz 1992:43-44). Self-transcendence motivates people to, "… transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others, close and distant, and of nature." (Schwartz 1992:44). Naturally, selfish accumulation of resources and prestige at the cost of others is in conflict with caring for others and nature. Since the former encourages to take advantage of the opportunities surrounding you, regardless of implications for others (as long as it is beneficial to yourself). Schwartz was able to confirm this conflict dimension in all his 40 samples (ibid.).

Table 2.2.2 *Conflict dimensions within the value structures.*

Individualistic values	**Conflict Dimensions**	**Collectivist values**
Self-direction Stimulation	Openness to change vs. Conservation	Security Conformity Tradition
Achievement Power	Self-enhancement vs. Self-Transcendence	Benevolence Universalism

Abnormalities within the value structure

In the quartal structure, conformity and tradition take up the same spatial position. These appear as two separate values in Schwartz's analyses. However, neither one are closer than the other to either security or benevolence (Schwartz 1992:30-31). They both share a strong relationship to security, but since neither fit into the grouping of self-transcendence, it makes little sense to arbitrarily place one of them "closer" to self-transcendence. Thus, they are placed together instead (ibid.).

Hedonism differs from the other values in the quartal structure. Hedonism has elements from both self-enhancement and openness to change. Hedonistic goals will want change in society, since the ruling norms are often conservative and restrictive. At the same time they desire to enhance their personal success and power, since these elements will

further their hedonistic causes (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:19). Hedonism is therefore a value which can be defined within both groups (Schwartz 1992:43-44 and Schwartz 2007:181).

To summarize, the dynamic relationship creates an expectation for which values people will adhere to. If a person shows clear signs of adhering to universalism, it is unlikely they will advocate power. Since Universalism is compatible with benevolence and self-direction, the person will most likely show signs of adhering to these two values as well.

2.3 Relation between values and party choice

Usually when we converse about decision-making we refer to our rationality. When confronted with a situation in which we are expected take action, the ideal human being will undertake a rational deliberation on his/her options. This involves carefully weighing his/her options and determining which of these options present the most effective means to reach the desired result (goal) (Balsvik & Solli 2011:234). Such a model of human behaviour fails to explain why people will reach different conclusions (even irrational ones) on equal problems despite have the same amount of information available.

Max Weber presents a human model in which values play a crucial part in shaping the decision making process. For Weber, values motivate action. A value can severely limit the options the person see as legitimate in a given situation or encourage the person to pursue a goal complementing his/her values (Dillon 2014:129). The person acts in accordance to his/her value because he/she genuinely believe this to be good and valuable. The value is a part of their life and they guide their life in accordance with it. Such dedicated pursuit of a value can lead to decision that, on face value, appear irrational; such as actively enlisting during wartimes and putting themselves in great danger (ibid.). These actions are rational, because they are the results of careful deliberations and acting on what that person finds most important, they act in the service of their values (ibid.). Actions done in the value-rational mind-set always involves, "…'commands' or 'demands' which, in the actor's opinion, are binding…" (Dillon 2014:130).

Applying Weber's value-rational human model to party choice, we see two outcomes. First, values shapes which options are legitimately available. A person will not see parties whom appear to be direct opposites of their values as legitimate options (Caprara et al.

2006:24). For example, parties which promote xenophobic policies and rhetoric will likely disgust people who prioritize universalism. Such parties will not even be considered. Second, voters will actively look for and seek out parties which are in tune with their personal values. Among the parties which are legitimate for the voters, they will choose the party which best represents their most highly prioritized values (Caprara et al. 2009:84). People want others to attain or preserve their cherished personal values (ibid.) Voting for a political party which appears to promote these cherished ideals is a way to spread one's own conception of the desirable.

2.4 Politically relevant conflicts

In the upcoming section (2.7) I will present the hypotheses for this thesis. Because we are examining party families, we require theoretical tools which can justify why we expect a party's voters to prioritize or deprioritize specific personal values. To achieve this we develop our hypotheses from core political conflict dimensions. By determining which role the party families play within such dimensions, we can theorize which personal values their voters' will have in accordance to which values most suits their position on the conflict dimensions. The political conflict dimensions in question are: the economic left-right, classical liberalism and the "New Politics" vs. "Old Politics".

Schwartz and other authors have relied on this same method. That is, deriving personal values form conflict dimensions (Schwartz et al. 2010:423-434, Barnea & Schwartz 1998:19-20 and Vecchione et al. 2013:469).

2.4.1 Economic left-right conflict

The economic left-right dimension encompasses several different values, for instance equality (Feldman 2003:49). However, the commonality of the different values is that they all tap into ideas of how the economy should be shaped (Knutsen 2006:239). More specifically value conflicts related to, "economic inequalities, differences in ownership to the means of production, and conflict over the desirability of a market economy." (Knutsen 1995:65).

The economic right is associated with market liberalism (Knutsen 2018:75). Believing in a free market where competition, independent enterprise, personal freedom, a "weak"

state and private property play a key part. The emphasis on the market is central. The market is a motivator which, “stimulates personal achievement, which in the long run will contribute to important collective interests” (Knutsen 2018:76).

In opposition to this is the economic left. Core to their beliefs are principles which are a contradiction to what the right stand for; a strong active government promising, “economic security, solidarity, equality in income and living conditions between social classes and strata.” (Knutsen 2018:76). The left emphasizes the importance of resource redistribution, rejection of the hierarchical organization of society (which the right believe to be a natural part of individual achievements), the welfare of all and cooperation and mutual understanding (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:22, Piurko et al. 2011:545 and Caprara et al. 2006:10-11).

The value conflicts underlying the left-right were largely a result of the polarized social structure, segmenting society into groups. These groups were spawns of the industrial society, propelling the privileged bourgeois into increased affluence and stagnating the underprivileged working classes (Knutsen 2018:13). This polarized structure created a strong in-group mentality. The working class were considered the natural base for the left, and the notion of “them vs. us” were amplified through political marginalization in the late 19th and early 20th century (Knutsen 1995:64-65 and Katz & Mair 1995:9-11). They developed a community of solidarity for each other, advocating their collective rights. This in-group bias were (or are) most associated with old Socialists parties such as Social Democrats or Communists.

2.4.2 Classical Liberalism

Classical Liberalism embodies Liberalism vs. Conservatism and Christian morality. Liberalism emphasizes progression of individuality and freedom, while conservatism emphasizes conservation of the status quo (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:21). Liberalists believes in the, “essential goodness of the person, it calls for maximizing individual freedom in order to permit people to actualize their goodness” (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:21). They are essentially egalitarian, however, their idea of equal differ from the one we know from the economic left-right. Liberalists believe in equality within the framework of the law (von Beyme 1985:32). They advocate values of self-expression, freedom of speech and the right to individuality.

Conservatives advocates the preservation of the status quo, or in cases it has been lost, the rejuvenation of traditional values and norms (von Beyme 1985:48). They emphasize preservation of the regime and social structure in order to "… avoid change and control threats it may pose." (Piurko et al. 2011:545). In some cases, conservatives stress the importance of Christian heritage and subsequently the conservation of Christian values and norms within key social institutions (von Beyme 1985:49). The fallacy of man, and the potential threats of an uncontrolled society is a recurring theme within conservativism (ibid.). Due to the connection to Christianity, the Classical Liberalism dimension has in some countries become congruent with a secular-religious dimension (von Beyme 19985:35-36).

2.4.3 New- vs Old Politics

The theory of New Politics claims that new political cleavages and value dimensions has emerged as a result of the post-industrialisation of society (Knutsen 1997:229). Due to the increased level of affluence, well developed welfare states and general high levels of fulfilled materialistic needs, New Politics suggests people are shifting their issue priorities in post-industrial countries (Knutsen 2006:121). From fulfilling "old" materialistic needs and values to fulfilment of modern issues, such as environmental protection, alternative life and social and political participation (Knutsen 2018:13-14).

One approach into defining the contents of New- and Old Politics is through Ronald Inglehart's Material/Post-Material dimension. Inglehart characterizes Old Politics as material values concerning physical well-being and security (Inglehart 1977:3-18). New Politics, or Post-Materialism, emphasizes greater quality of life, beauty or aesthetics, greater individual freedom and a more open and free society. Inglehart conceptualize the material and post-material values through a hierarchical pyramid of needs (Inglehart 1977:42 and Dalton 2014:87-104). The pyramid has four steps outlining the basic needs of humans. The two first steps are physiological needs and represent materialist values. First, humans require basic sustenance, such as food or housing. Second, People need security, protection from things or people who can or seek to harm them. When one has reached a sufficiently high enough standard of life, people will begin to pursue goals which do not give an immediate material gain, but provide personal satisfaction and happiness. These are represented in the last two steps in the pyramid, the post-material values (Inglehart 1977:42 and Dalton 2014:87-104).

The last two steps are higher order needs and can be a desire for a less impersonal society, political participation, free speech, ideas instead of money, intellectual accomplishment or beautiful cities or nature (environmentalism).

A second interpretation of New Politics is provided by Scott Flanagan. Flanagan has suggested that the change to New Politics is a conflict dimension spanning libertarian vs. authoritarian values (Flanagan 1982). Libertarian values are segmented in the need for independence, self-indulgence and self-assertiveness (Flanagan 1982:408). In general, these values reflect self-actualization, a desire for a person to express their individuality and experience life on their own terms. Authoritarian values are defined through conformity, frugality, pietism and defence and loyalty to the community (Flanagan 1982:407). Such values reflect our dependency on others and the need to preserve our fragile life from outside dangers (ibid.). Flanagan believes all people desire more individuality and freedom, but is limited by their materialist reality and therefore succumbs to prescribed norms and values intended to preserve their lives (Flanagan 1982:407-408). Such authoritarian values were developed and segmented by their previous generations. Flanagan's theory has a similar outset to Inglehart's, in which both argue that values in our society is changing, due to the increased affluence and lack of unfulfilled materialistic needs (Flanagan 1982:407-408). In contrast to Inglehart however, Flanagan views the previous "old" values not as defined through materialistic needs, but rather just as values of control (Flanagan 1982:408). People do not develop the old values from their materialistic reality, they are prescribed from their ancestors. When peoples materialistic reality changes, they revaluate the usefulness of these authoritarian values.

In the context of this thesis, we will interpret New Politics and Old Politics within the frameworks of Inglehart's theory. Therefore, in all forthcoming sections, New Politics will be understood as post-materialism and Old Politics as materialism. We opt for Inglehart's interpretation because Flanagan's theory is objectively difficult to separate from Classical Liberalism. We also find Flanagan's theory unsatisfactory in explaining altruistic elements found in new Politics such as environmentalism.

2.4.4 Relevance to Schwartz's ten values

It is possible to establish a connection between these conflicts and Schwartz's values. One is the economic left-right conflict, where we can envision self-transcendence values as proponents of the left and self-enhancement values as proponents of the right. The left advocates solidarity and equality, people who believe in these principles should be inclined to endorse concern for others and promotion of welfare. This is in line with the self-transcendence values, which both encourages concern for others albeit in-group or out-group (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:22). In addition, most studies have found these to be the strongest predictors for leftist vote (Caprara et al. 2006:16 and Piurko et al. 2011:555). Due to the in-group bias of the left in the traditional economic left-right dimension, it is likely that benevolence stands stronger than universalism. The right legitimizes unequal distribution through believing the difference in affluence and achievements is due to individual prowess. Their emphasis on self-accretion indicates an adherence to values promoting self-enhancement, values which are crucial for surviving the competitive market environment. Thus the right should endorse power and achievement, values which are intrinsically self-empowering (Caprara et al. 2006:16, Piurko et al. 2011:555 and Schwartz et al. 2010: 431).

With Classical Liberalism we can imagine the openness to change values influencing liberalists, whilst the conservative faction favour the conservation values. Liberals support of self-expression and right to individuality bears reminiscence of openness to change. Self-direction promotes independent thought and action-choosing, while stimulation represents adventure and an exciting life (Schwartz 1992: 5, 7). These are also values which encourages doing something different from the norm (Schwartz & Huismans 1995:92-93). Contrary to the liberalists, conservatives are likely to endorse conservation values. This is due to the conservatives' emphasis on maintaining the current social order, and rejection of individuality due to their potential threat to the status quo. Security demands safety and harmony in society, conformity encourages restraint from action which can harm the current social order and tradition means respect and commitment to cultural or religious customs (Schwartz 1992:9-10). In addition, the three values have a strong connection to religiousness, due to Christian morality emphasising, humility, preserving social order and protecting individuals against uncertainty (Schwartz & Huismans 1995:92-93).

With regards to Old and New Politics, we can outline a divide between the Openness to change values and universalism in one end vs. the conservation and self-enhancement values in the other. Environmentalism stands strong in New Politics, and many define it as the clearest manifestation of New Politics (Knutsen 1997 and Knutsen 2018:77-78). Universalism taps directly into environmental concerns in addition to representing broadmindedness and concern for the welfare of all (Barnea & Schwartz 1992:19 and Schwartz 1992:11-12). Thus people on the New Politics dimension should be strong adherents of the value. Since New Politics spawns a desire for a less impersonal society, ideas instead of money or individual action and participation (Knutsen 2018:14). It is likely that New Politics consists of people adhering to Openness to change values. Since these values encourages a person to seek greater gratification and happiness in life. For Old Politics we find the values which intend to protect and/or enhance people's materialistic reality. This is in large part benevolence, as they would like to see the welfare preserved within the group (danger of diminished welfare if shared with too many strangers). Power and achievement, as amassing of selfish affluence, ensuring that you have the skills needed to secure your materialistic needs. And conservation values as preservers of the status quo and hindering individual self-expression and potential dangers to your daily life.

New Politics and liberals in Classical Liberalism can seem similar due to both embracing the goodness of individuals. However, we consider New Politics to contain more altruistic elements such as environmentalism. Liberals in Classical Liberalism is therefore used for parties which are strictly individualistic and lacking the altruistic elements of New Politics.

2.5 Defining party family

Although no two parties are truly the same, they bare enough of a resemblance to categorize them in a conventional matter. We group them into what we call party families. Four characteristics are used to conceptualize a party family. First, the parties share a common or similar origin (Gallagher et al. 2011:238). Parties that emerged and mobilized in similar historical circumstances or had the intention of representing similar interests can be treated as belonging to the same family (Mair & Mudde 1998:215-216). This approach largely focuses on parties emerging from polarizing political cleavages, in which the conflicts evolve into

ideological divides that segment the party in specific subgroups within society (ibid.). The rise of socialist and social democratic parties are a typical example of this.

Second, the parties share similar behaviour (Gallagher et al. 2011:238-239). Many parties form international links and establish transnational federations (Mair & Mudde 1998:216). They do so because they believe they share common interests or destiny (Gallagher et al. 2011:238-239). Perhaps most relevant for Europeans are the various party groups found in the European Parliament. Here political parties from the entirety of the European Union gather into groups with parties they believe share common interests and characteristics.

Third, parties whom share similar policies or ideologies can belong to the same party family (Gallagher et al. 2011:239). Policies advocated by a party in a given country, which to an extent are similar to a party in another country can be identified as a part of the same family. Uncovering parties' political and ideological similarity requires a variety of different sources. These range from, expert judgements, legislative behaviour, mass survey data, formal policy statements and similarities in political manifestos (Mair & Mudde 1998:217-218). Using policy and ideology to classify parties can be problematic. Since the "same" policy may practically mean quite different things across different political systems (Gallagher et al. 2011:239). However, it becomes impossible to talk of parties belonging together without taking into consideration what they say.

Fourth, parties whom share the same name or label can belong to the same family (Mair & Mudde 1998:220). This approach seem relatively straightforward, however it is not uniformly conventional. It might seem useful when defining parties on the left (i.e. parties naming themselves "socialist" must surely belong to a socialist party family). However, similar parties have a tendency to have varying names (i.e. labour, social democratic or socialist) and in some cases the name can be wholeheartedly misleading (Mair & Mudde 1998:221).

While there exists no single party which will perfectly fit all four criteria simultaneously, all parties in a family will share some of these four characteristics.

2.6 The party families

2.6.1 Social Democratic

Socialist parties had its infancy in the 19th century, initially launched as a platform to represent the political interests of the workers (Gallagher et al. 2011:240). While they may have been anti-establishment to start off, the socialist parties gradually moderated their position and embraced democracy (von Beyme 1985:59-63, 77-79). The socialist parties embracing democracy, eventually calling themselves social democrats as a rejection of revolutionary Leninism, grew steadily in support and rallied electoral success through their extensive amount of members and collaboration with unions (von Beyme 1985:62-63, 74 and Katz & Mair 1995:10-11). The majority of Social Democratic parties' first experienced governmental power in the years following World War I (Gallagher et al. 2011:240). Social Democratic parties' main agenda was to expand (or create) a welfare state and ensure equality through resource redistribution (von Beyme 1985:70-71).

Today, social democratic parties are the most prevalent and in most cases the largest left party in Europe (Gallagher et al. 2011:240-242). While they started out as parties for the workers, the present electoral base of social democratic parties are much more diverse. Still pooling the most support from the lower strata (especially the lower educated), Social Democratic parties now have a significant amount of middle class voters, and in general appeal to a broader part of the population (Gallagher et al. 2011:243 and Knutsen 2004:179). This is largely due to the moderate image these parties have taken in the last decades. Becoming more accepting towards a free market and private enterprises and adopting liberal policies (Gallagher et al. 2011:243). However, the general focus on welfare and resource distribution still remains (Gallagher et al. 2011:243, Piurko et al. 2011:545 and Caprara et al. 2006:10-11). Social Democratic parties are most often regarded as a part of the left on the left-right economic dimension and Old Politics.

2.6.2 Left Socialists

Many emerged as splint offs from Social Democratic or communist parties. The Left Socialist parties stand as a "radical" alternative to Social Democratic parties. Advocating a more orthodox resource redistribution policy and spurred on by environmentalism and individual liberty (Gallagher et al. 2011:249). Most Left Socialist parties appeared during the student

uprisings of the 60s and landslide elections of the 70s (Gallagher et al 2011:249). Their support then (and remains to this day) came from the middle class and higher educated strata of society (Gallagher et al. 2011:249 and Knutsen 2004:179). Left Socialists exist on both the New Politics and economic left-right dimension. They are insistent on being part of the left on the economic dimension due to their strong opposition to private enterprise and their endorsement of state controlled market (Knutsen 2004:15). In addition, they advocate environmentalism. This, cobbled with their endorsement of individuality, makes them New Politics oriented (ibid.).

2.6.3 Communist

Communist parties broke from the socialists parties in Europe following the First World War. The communist parties were anti-reformist and centrist, subsequently rejecting to cooperate with other parties and purging members which did not stay true to the party line (von Beyme 1985:99-103). The communist, due to their unwillingness to cooperate, were shunned by other parties and marginalized in national assemblies. Though they experience brief surge of governmental power in the few years post- World War II, due to their struggle against the occupying fascists and Nazis (Gallagher et al. 2011:248). For most of their history, Communists were united through an international communist network, a network largely dominated by the Soviets. It was not until the 70s that Communist parties in Europe began to reject and break-free from Soviet doctrine (von Beyme 1985:104-105). They adopted the term Eurocommunism, stressing the opposition to any kind of central leadership in the world, abandonment of Marxism-Leninism and an increased focus on basic rights and political liberty (von Beyme 1985:105, Gallagher et al. 2011:249 and Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:45-46). These moderations made the communist parties marginally different from other left parties (Gallagher et al. 2011:249). However, they remained highly critical of the free market and strongly emphasize a controlled economy through state ownership (Gallagher et al. 2011:249 and Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:45-46). Some authors pertain that a single communist party family no longer exists, and that we are rather speaking of a family of different types of Far Left parties (Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:46-47).

Communist parties are situated on the left in the economic left-right dimension. They primarily focus on welfare and resource redistribution. In the recent decades, they have

adopted more liberal policies and in some cases environmentalism, which might indicate an adoption of New Politics. However, their explicit advocacy for state involvement and support for the lower strata and the impoverished, remains as their most central policies (Gallagher et al. 2011:249).

2.6.4 Green

Although environmentalism were beginning to be recognized as an international issue, dominant parties in the 60s and 70s largely ignored the issue, maintaining their focus on re-industrialization and economic growth (Mewes 1998:31 and Knutsen 1997:232-238). Due to gradual increase in collective awareness on the effects of environmental destruction and the advocacy of green interest groups, the Green parties eventually emerged in the late 70s and 80s (Mewes 1998:31, Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:67 and Gallagher et al. 2011:251). They primarily advocated environmental protection, but they quickly endorsed policies covering social justice and participatory democracy (Mewes 1998:29-30, Hlousek & Kepecek 2010:70, 80 and Gallagher et al. 2011:252). The green movement did not uniformly become Green parties across Europe. In Germany, growing dissent towards nuclear energy spurred the formation of the Green party, however, in other countries, such as Norway, environmentalism was merely adopted by the existing parties (Mewes 1998:31-37, Hlousek & Kepecek 2010:68 and Knutsen 1997:231-248). In countries where explicit Green parties exist, they receive most electoral support from the higher educated strata, those living in urban environments and among younger cohorts of the electorate (Knutsen 1997:252, Knutsen 2018:126-130, 146-148 and Mez 1998:83 and 87).

Green parties are by many seen as the epitome of New Politics. Their focus on environmentalism, political participation and social equality echoes the earlier outlined characteristics of New Politics (Knutsen 1997:229-230). They distance themselves from the older political conflict dimensions and claim no explicit affiliation with either the left or right. However, they do have a history of predominantly cooperating with the left (Hlousek & Kepecek 2010:71-72). Largely due to left parties' gradual adoption of the issues which green parties have advocated since its birth (Gallagher et al. 2011:252).

2.6.5 Liberals

In this thesis we operate with two different liberal party families; Left- and Right Liberals. These share a common origin, but have in the later decades separated into two observably different types of parties. We will first present their common origin, before specifying what separates them today.

Regarded as the very first party family, Liberal parties emerged during the late 18th and early 19th century. The earliest expression of a liberal was someone who had an, "optimistic faith in the better nature of man and belief in reason." (von Beyme 1985:32). They saw a need for equality in order to battle the segmented aristocracy. Although, their concept of equality only meant equality before the law (ibid.). The early- to mid-1800s saw the emergence of two distinct type of Liberal families, Liberals and Radicals. Liberals were a moderate alternative, encouraging reform of the state institutions, but within the framework of the existing monarchic state. They saw constitutionalism and later parliamentarism as a solution for a more democratic society (von Beyme 1985:32 and Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:105-106). The Radicals supported direct rule by the people (republicanism), a government by assembly and the mandate given to the elected to be made in line with Liberal principles of representation (von Beyme 1985:32). These two types were not mutually exclusive, as liberal parties might have elements from both to a varying degree.

While the Liberal parties of the 19th century primarily fought for a more egalitarian law and democratic representation. The end of the dominance of monarchies after World War I and the resurgence of democracies post-World War II saw the development of two strands of Liberal parties.

Left Liberals

The Left Liberals bare the most resemblance to the Liberal parties of old. They uphold the concern for civil rights and progressive politics with an emphasis on social justice, egalitarianism and human rights (Gallagher et al. 2011:263, von Beyme 1985:38, Barnea & Schwartz 1998:21 and Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:107-108). They opposed authoritarian policies and in general want to ensure as much freedom as possible for the individual (Gallagher et al. 2011:263). Left Liberal parties had a tendency to emerge in countries where there were little

anti-clerical tension and where a Conservative right party adopted the market liberal agenda (Gallagher et al. 2011:263). Left Liberals are situated as liberals in the Classical Liberalism dimension.

Right Liberals

Much like left liberals, right liberals are agents of individual freedom. However, while they both share concerns on individual rights, Right Liberal parties are adamant defenders of the free market and (increasingly less relevant) anti-clerical (secularism) (Gallagher et al. 2011:263 and von Beyme 1985:36-37). Right Liberals appeared in democracies with the presence of a strong Christian democratic party and/or the lack of a party representing the market liberal agenda (Gallagher et al. 2011:263). Right liberal parties therefore advocate policies of minimalist state intervention, market liberalisation and secularisation of state institutions; in addition to the liberalist elements shared with Left Liberals (Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:108).

Right Liberals are situated as liberals in Classical Liberalism due to their advocacy of individualism and anti-clericalism. In addition to being part of the economic right due to their endorsement of market liberalism and private property.

2.6.6 Christian Democratic

Christian parties emerged as a counter-reaction to secularisation (von Beyme 1985:81). We can observe the emergence of three different Christian parties (von Beyme 1985:85-89 and Gallagher et al. 2011:256). First, homogenous Catholic societies gave rise to strong conservative Christian party emphasising Catholic morality, social cohesion and preventing the secularization of the state from the Liberals. Second, Christian Democratic parties emerged in mixed religion society such as Germany. The mixed society prevented from creating a hard-line conservative party and made the Christian party more moderate (von Beyme 1985:86). Third, in primarily protestant countries, Christian Democratic parties emerged as a reaction, not to a secularising state (church and state were integrated), but to what they perceive as a rapidly secularising and permissive society (von Beyme 1985:89).

The majority of modern Christian Democratic parties have seized to publicly stress their religiousness (von Beyme 1985:93). Apart from their party names, their Christian

character most prominently comes to light upon moral issues such as abortion or divorce (Gallagher et al. 2011:256). Although there is no doubt that they put high salience on Christian morality and values, even if the Christian origin is downplayed (von Beyme 1985:92-93 and Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:136).

They want to preserve social cohesion, and are therefore reluctant to pass reforms which can endanger this (Gallagher et al. 2011:256 and Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:136). This has made them inclined to pass pro-welfare policies, which are both in line with Christian doctrine of charity and fear of social change (Gallagher et al. 2011:256 and von Beyme 1985:93-95).

Christian Democratic parties are a part of the conservatives in Classical Liberalism. They want to preserve the status quo and are reluctant to endorse any policy which can endanger this (i.e. permissive individualism). Christian Democratic voters are very likely to show clear prioritizations on Schwartz's personal values. Since Christian Democratic voters are well known for being strongly religiously value oriented in comparison to others (Knutsen 2018:196-202).

2.6.7 Agrarian

As evident by its name, Agrarian parties were a special interest party for the rural communities in Europe. They emerged during the late 19th and early 20th century to represent farmers and the agricultural sector (Gallagher et al. 2011:264). Agrarian parties operated along the rural-urban cleavage, and in representing the agricultural, advocated protectionist policies in order to ensure the livelihood of farmers (Christensen 2001:38). The early Agrarian Parties tended to be conservative and segmented in religious rural communities (von Beyme 1985:113-114).

In modern times, the majority of Agrarian parties have disappeared or merged with Liberal, Conservative or Christian parties (von Beyme 1985:114). Those who have survived has undergone, albeit not radical, changes. Agrarian parties rebranded themselves from representing mainly farmers, into adopting a broader definition of "rural". Proclaiming the defence of rural communities against centralization (Christensen 2001:46-47 and Hlousek & Kepecek 2010:102). They emphasize the necessity to preserve traditional rural life (Hlousek & Kepecek 2010:100). This has most specifically manifested as preventing shutdown of rural

schools and administrative offices (Christensen 2001:46-47). In addition to being sceptical of a free market (Christensen 2001:48 and Hlousek & Kepecek 2010:100). The surviving Agrarian parties are conservative and protectionist, some still clearly clinging to their religious roots (Hlouske & Kepecek 2010:100- 102). The vast majority of present day Agrarian voters live in rural areas (Christensen 2001:49-51). With voters more or less being evenly spread in educational and vocational groups.

Agrarian parties are primarily conservative on the Classical Liberalism. They are sceptical of centralization, and would like the traditional and religious life to remain in its present state. They are against a permissive liberal market, but this does not make them economic left by default. Agrarian parties have shown to be pragmatic when it comes to market solutions, the common denominator is that they should not threaten the rural communities (Hlousek & Kepecek 2010:102).

2.6.8 Conservative

Historically, Conservatives have been the second party to emerge in most countries. Conservativism were a movement to defend positions which are threatened, or in some cases already lost (von Beyme 1985:46). Thus, Conservative parties were reactions to the establishment of Liberal parties threatening the stability and sanctity of society and its institutions and norms (von Beyme 1985:46-48). They upheld the necessity of monarchy and rejected social reforms and extension of democracy. Since then, Conservatives have undergone far-reaching changes. While they were originally pragmatic opponents to the liberals, they have adopted several key doctrines. First, they now endorse democracy and principles of human rights, values which the Liberals originally had ownership of (von Beyme 1985:51). They still however, uphold the necessity to maintain the status quo. Referring frequently to traditions and the necessity for restraint to, “avoid change and control threats it may pose.” (Piurko et al. 2011:545). This is in a way a relic of their formerly religious attachment, despite most Conservative parties being secular today (Gallagher et al. 2011:260). They still adhere to the same conservative values defined in Christianity, but rarely refer to Christian doctrine when attempting to legitimize them (von Beyme 1985:50-51). Second, Conservatives have adopted market liberalism, and promotes the minimal state intervention principle (Gallagher et al. 2011:260-261 and von Beyme 1985:52). This is not a uniform trend

across all conservative parties. However, in democracies where the Conservatives are a significant force, they have adopted it. Third, Conservative parties have become nationalistic. They emphasize national interests and the need for national unity (Gallagher et al. 2011:260, Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:160 and von Beyme 1985:56-57).

The early Conservative parties were mainly built up by aristocracy or endorsed by the clergy (von Beyme 1985:46-50, 52). However, throughout the 20th century, Conservatives gradually attracted middle and upper class voters (von Beyme 1985:52). By the end of the century, with the decline of mass parties, lower classes also started to support Conservative parties (ibid.).

Conservatives are a part of the conservatives Classical Liberalism as well as the right in the economic left-right dimension (see Christian Democrats and Right Liberals).

2.6.9 Radical Right

Scholars are generally in disagreement about what exactly should encompass a Radical Right party, but some common features are highlighted. First, Radical Right parties are generally xenophobic, they want to limit the influx of immigrants and in some occasions their rights (Kitschelt 2007:1178 and Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:185). Second, they voice a nationalist rhetoric often in conjunction with xenophobic sentiment (Kitschelt 2007:1178, Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:185 and Gallagher et al. 2011:268). Third, they are anti-establishment, in which they either reject the current democratic system or have resentment for the current laws and procedures operating the state (typically towards taxation, "multiculturalist laws", unnecessary bureaucracy, the discourse of contemporary politicians and the current democratic procedure) (Kitschelt 2007:1178 and Gallagher et al. 2011:268).

Some have classified Radical Right parties as market liberalists (Kitschelt 2007:1182-1184 and Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:184). However, this is contested. Others have found this to differ significantly between countries and over time (Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:185 and Ivarsflaten 2005:471-472). Neither do the Radical Parties' voters form a uniform preference on neo-liberal economic policies (Ivarsflaten 2005 and Oesch 2013). Others have suggested that Radical Rights are predominantly concerned with law and order and display attitudes akin to welfare chauvinism (welfare only offered to "true citizens") (Hlousek & Kopecek 2010:185).

Which suggests considerable state intervention, although this does not prevent market liberal policies on other policy areas.

Radical Right parties have been a part of European democracies throughout the 20th century (von Beyme 1985:125-130). However, the modern form of the Radical Right party we recognize today first gained traction in the late 70s and 80s (Gallagher et al. 2011:266). These parties emerged as sudden mobilization among the electorate or as radicalization of pre-existing parties (ibid.). These "new" Radical Right parties mobilized against immigration and multi-culturalism and/or against established political systems, institutions and parties (often seen as corrupt or overly cumbersome and unnecessary) (Gallagher et al. 2011:267-268).

Due to the inconsistency among the Radical Right voters upon whether they support market liberalism or not, we do not expect their voters to be situated on any specific side of the economic left-right. The advocacy of traditional values and protection from threats (mainly immigration) suggests they are conservative in the Classical Liberalism dimension. However, we deem it more likely that they are in fact materialist as found in Old Politics. They feel left behind by the new globalising society and wants to preserve the old system in which they were winners (Gallagher et al. 2011:268).

2.7 Hypotheses

This thesis operates with an extensive set of hypothesis. The forth coming sections will present the hypotheses, following a clarification or explanation for the hypothesis in question. In order to ease navigation, the hypotheses follow a specific structure. Every hypothesis is denominated by the letter H, followed by two numbers separated by a period. The first number denotes the hypotheses and party families (i.e. H1.0 and H1.1 are the general hypotheses, H2 is for Social Democratic, H3 is for Left Socialists, etc.). The second number denominates whether the hypothesis expects the forthcoming personal values to predict (H x.1) or deter (H x.2) voters from voting for that specific party. For example, H2.1 represents values which are expected to be highly prioritized by Social Democratic voters. H2.2 are values which are expected to be deprioritized by Social Democratic voters. Finally, each personal value given within the hypothesis has a conjoining letter denomination. These are: (a) Self-direction, (b) stimulation, (c) hedonism, (d) achievement, (e) power, (f) security, (g)

conformity, (h) tradition, (i) benevolence, (j) universalism. Thus, hypothesis H2.2e would mean Social democratic voters prioritize power the least. As this might appear overwhelming, we have provided a table summarizing all the hypothesis at the end of the chapter.

2.7.1 General Hypotheses

H1.0 – The electorate of specific party families will share the same value priorities.

Due to the similarity in policies, behaviour and, in part, common origin, I expect party families to share the same value basis in their respective electorate across varying democracies. This assumes that party families are so alike that they attract and deter the same value priorities despite operating in different countries.

To clarify, I do not by this hypothesis assume that all parties in all countries will have identical results. The direction and strength will vary across countries, however I expect these tendencies to be consistent. Or put simply, party families will share the same value priorities relative to other parties. For example, we expect all Green party voters to prioritize universalism more than the national average of their given country.

In the upcoming hypotheses, one might observe parties which share similar or identical predictions. In such cases, it is expected that the electoral basis of these parties share the same value priorities, but differ in the relative strength of their prioritizations.

H1.1 – The explanatory power of personal values increases the more fragmented the party system is.

Earlier research has found that political values explained party choice to a higher degree the more fragmented the party system was (Knutsen 2018:230-232). In the context of this thesis, we expect the explanatory power of Schwartz's personal values to increase in accordance with the number of effective parties.

A party system is considered fragmented if it contains more than two parties within the representative assembly and none of the parties are able to achieve absolute majority on their own (Karvonen 2011:1823). An assembly with many parties, but where one has absolute majority on its own, is not considered fragmented (ibid.). When measuring how fragmented a

party system is, we often resort to the Laakso-Taagepera Index. This index estimates the Effective Number of Parties within the party system based on the size of the party (fraction of seats within the assembly). In theory, a perfect two party system will have the score of 2.0, while a multiparty system with five equally sized parties vying for power would have a score closer to 5.0 (Karvonen 2011:1823). In short, the higher the estimate, the more fragmented the party system is.

2.7.2 Social Democratic parties

H2.1 Social Democratic voters most highly prioritize (f) security, (i) benevolence and (j) universalism.

H2.2 Social Democratic voters deprioritize (d) achievement and (e) power.

Social Democratic voters are expected to highly value benevolence and universalism due to their position on the left of the economic left-right dimension. It is likely that benevolence will be stronger, due to the in-group bias of people belonging to this dimension. Achievement and power represents the right and should therefore be incompatible for Social Democratic voters. Security is included due to Social Democratic party's placement on Old Politics. We assume their voters are predominately materialistic and desire to secure their jobs and general welfare from internal and external threats. Other Old Politics affiliated personal values are not included, since we expect these to be outweighed by the left mentality from the left-right economic dimension.

2.7.3 Left Socialists parties

H3.1 Left Socialist voters most highly prioritize (a) self-direction, (b) stimulation, (i) benevolence and (j) universalism.

H3.2 Left Socialist voters deprioritize (d) achievement, (e) power, (f) security, (g) conformity and (h) tradition.

Due to Left Socialists placement on the left we expect them to have the same value priorities as Social Democrats. However, since they adhere to New Politics, universalism should be amplified due to their environmentalism, likewise, power and security should be even less

prioritized due to their contradiction to broadmindedness and environmental protection. Their adherence to New Politics should also encourage individualistic exploration through self-direction and stimulation. While conservation values should be deprioritized due to such values hindering change.

2.7.4 Communist parties

H4.1 Communist voters most highly prioritize (i) benevolence and (j) universalism.

H4.2 Communist voters deprioritize (d) achievement, e) power, (f) security, (g) conformity and (h) tradition.

Situated on the left, Communists should prioritize benevolence and universalism and deprioritize achievement and power. It is difficult to determine whether universalism or benevolence will be stronger for Communists. On one hand, their clear endorsement of international solidarity with the impoverished and lower strata would mean a surge of universalism. On the other hand, the in-group bias affiliated with the left might enhance benevolence.

The conservation values are included not due to Communists placement on any political dimension. Rather, it is due to their pronounced rejection of imperialism and the capitalistic society as a whole. Conservation values ensures the existence of the status quo, essentially legitimizing and reproducing the current capitalistic superstructure.

2.7.5 Green parties

H5.1 Green voters most highly prioritize (a) self-direction, (b) stimulation and (j) universalism.

H5.2 Green voters deprioritize (c) hedonism, (e) power, (f) security, (g) conformity and (h) tradition.

Green's placement on New Politics should make them prioritize the openness to change values and universalism. Conservation values are deprioritized because they hinder self-exploration. Universalism is expected to be the strongest predictor, since environmentalism is the Green's raison d'être. Power and hedonism are values which promote selfish acquisition

of resources without concern for others. The intrinsic selfishness associated with these values would likely appal and deter green voters who highly prioritize universalism.

2.7.6 Left Liberal parties

H6.1 Left Liberal voters most highly prioritize (a) self-direction, (b) stimulation, (c) hedonism and (d) achievement.

H6.2 Left Liberal voters deprioritize (e) power, (f) security, (g) conformity and (h) tradition.

Left Liberals are situated on the liberal faction of Classical Liberalism and New Politics. Since they are individualistic oriented it is expected they prioritize all individualistic values, with the exception of power. Power is assumed to be an exception due to selfish accretion of power is likely to hinder the majority from exploring their own individuality. Conservation values emphasizes social order and hinders individualistic expression.

2.7.7 Right Liberal parties

H7.1 Right Liberal voters most highly prioritize (a) self-direction, (b) stimulation, (c) hedonism, (d) achievement and (e) power.

H7.2 Right Liberal voters deprioritize (f) security, (g) conformity, (h) tradition, (i) benevolence and (j) universalism.

Right liberals are liberals in the Classical Liberalism dimension, as well as being right in the economic left-right dimension. This makes it likely that they prioritize all individualistic values, since they either promote self-exploration or accretion of personal wealth. This makes them deprioritize all collective values. Since the conservation values hinders individualistic exploration and the self-transcendence values hinders self-empowerment.

2.7.8 Christian Democratic parties

H8.1 Christian Democratic voters most highly prioritize (f) security, (g) conformity, (h) tradition and (i) benevolence.

H8.2 Christian Democratic voters deprioritize (a) self-direction, (b) stimulation, (c) hedonism, (d) achievement and (e) power.

An earlier study on the values of religious people found them to be highly collectivist (Schwartz & Huismans 1995:97-99). Subsequently rejecting individualistic values. This is somewhat expected considering Christian morality and norms which emphasizes unity, preserving the social order, devoutness, consideration for others, family and denial of sinful bodily pleasures, among others (Schwartz & Huismans 1995:91-94). Thus the collectivist values should be prioritized among the Christian democratic voters. Security, conformity and tradition all encourages one to adhere to the established norms and customs and secure cohesion within the group. Benevolence encourages charity within the group which again complements social cohesion. The open collectivist ethos of Christian Democratic unlikely to attract individualistic voters prioritizing power, achievement, stimulation and self-direction. Such values are never the less threats to the preservation of social order which Christian Democratic parties try to protect.

Tradition and hedonism are expected to be among the strongest predictors. Due to tradition being a key part of religious life and hedonism being whole heartedly sinful.

2.7.9 Agrarian parties

H9.1 Agrarian voters most highly prioritize (f) security, (g) conformity, (h) tradition and (i) benevolence.

H9.2 Agrarian voters deprioritize (a) self-direction, (b) stimulation, (c) hedonism (d) achievement and (e) power.

Agrarian voters are expected to support values which maintain the status quo and secure rural life. Thus they should prioritize the conservation values. In addition, Agrarian voters should be highly conscious of their rural identity and as such should have a strong in-group mentality. Hence they prioritize benevolence.

Because Agrarian voters desire to preserve their traditional rural life, they are expected to be discouraged by values which propagate individualism and progress. Hence they should deprioritize self-direction, stimulation and hedonism. Since Agrarian parties are sceptical of a liberal market, I expect their voters to share this opinion and deprioritize achievement and power.

2.7.10 Conservative parties

H10.1 Conservative voters most highly prioritize (d) achievement, (e) power, (f) security, (g) conformity and (h) tradition.

H10.2 Conservative voters deprioritize (a) Self-direction, (b) stimulation, (i) benevolence and (j) universalism.

Conservatives are expected to prioritize self-enhancement and conservation values due to the party's placement on the right and on the conservative faction on the Classical Liberalism dimension. Since the openness to change and self-transcendence values are incompatible with these, they are expected to be deprioritized by conservative voters.

2.7.11 Radical Right parties

H11.1 Radical Right voters most highly prioritize (c) hedonism, (e) power, (f) security, (g) conformity and (h) tradition.

H11.2 Radical Right voters deprioritize (a) self-direction, (b) stimulation, (i) benevolence and (j) universalism.

We expect, by their placement in Old Politics, that their voters adhere to the conservation values. This is largely due to Radical Right parties' emphasis on preserving the national culture and general xenophobia. Immigrants can be perceived as a serious threat to the preservation of norms and customs (Datler et al. 2013:913). Power is also included here since it facilitates the desire for a secure and strong nation as advocated through their pronounced nationalism.

Since the openness to change and self-transcendence values encourages change and a more open society, I expect Radical Right voters to deprioritize these values.

Finally, I expect their voters to prioritize hedonism. This is an assumption drawn from Radical Right parties' anti-establishment mentality. They voice disdain towards unnecessary and rigid rules such as alcohol sale restrictions or fossil fuel tax. They promise removal of such laws which hinder people from enjoying the finer things in life. It is possible such promises attract those who simply desire to enjoy themselves.

2.8. Summary of all party family hypotheses

Table 2.8 *Summary of party family hypotheses*

Party family	Prioritized (Hx.1)	Deprioritized (Hx.2)
Social Democratic (H2)	(f) Security (i) Benevolence (j) Universalism	(d) Achievement (e) Power
Left Socialists (H3)	(a) Self-direction (b) Stimulation (i) Benevolence (j) Universalism	(d) Achievement (e) Power (f) Security (g) Conformity (h) Tradition
Communist (H4)	(i) Benevolence (j) Universalism	(d) Achievement (e) Power (f) Security (g) Conformity (h) Tradition
Green (H5)	(a) Self-direction (b) Stimulation (j) Universalism	(c) Hedonism (d) Achievement (e) Power (f) Security (g) Conformity (h) Tradition
Left Liberal (H6)	(a) Self-direction (b) Stimulation (c) Hedonism (d) Achievement	(e) Power (f) Security (g) Conformity (h) Tradition
Right Liberal (H7)	(a) Self-direction (b) Stimulation (c) Hedonism (d) Achievement (e) Power	(f) Security (g) Conformity (h) Tradition (i) Benevolence (j) Universalism
Christian Democratic (H8)	(f) Security (g) Conformity (h) Tradition (i) Benevolence	(a) Self-direction (b) Stimulation (c) Hedonism (d) Achievement (e) Power
Agrarian (H9)	(f) Security (g) Conformity (h) Tradition (i) Benevolence	(a) Self-direction (b) Stimulation (c) Hedonism (d) Achievement (e) Power
Conservative (H10)	(d) Achievement (e) Power (f) Security (g) Conformity (h) Tradition	(a) Self-direction (b) Stimulation (i) Benevolence (j) Universalism
Radical Right (H11)	(c) Hedonism (e) Power (f) Security (g) Conformity (h) Tradition	(a) Self-direction (b) Stimulation (i) Benevolence (j) Universalism

3.0 Research Design

Section 3.1 to 3.2 presents the data used in the analyses of this thesis. It begins with specifying which data set is applied, how the data was collected and deliberate on the selection of countries to our sample. From this we delve into the specific variables applied in our models and how these were coded. Section 3.3 discusses the reliability and validity of our data and methods. Section 3.4 introduces the statistical methods applied in our empirical analyses in chapter 4. We explain how these models are the most suited for answering our research question and hypotheses as well as how they are to be interpreted.

3.1 The Data

This thesis relies on the cumulative data files provided through the European Social Survey (hence forth referred to as ESS). The ESS is a cross-sectional and longitudinal dataset currently containing data from seven surveys conducted at regular intervals from 2002 to 2014 in 36 countries (ESS 2018a). The eight ESS (2016 survey) had yet to be included in the cumulative data file at the time of writing, and is thus not included in this thesis.

The ESS consists of face-to-face interviews conducted over a 1 to 4 month period at the end of the specified survey year (ESS 2018b). The data samples must be representative for all persons aged 15 and over, currently living in the host country, regardless of citizenship or other categorizations (ESS 2018c). Each country is required to provide a minimum of 1500 respondents, or in cases of countries with population of less than 2 million, 800 respondents (ibid.). All respondents are selected through random probability to ensure a representative sample (ibid.).

The ESS presents itself as the most adequate choice in order to answer this thesis research question. The ESS contains 21 items each measuring one of the 10 personal values. These 21 items are consistently asked in each of the seven surveys without modifications. In addition, each survey asks the respondent which party they voted for during their last national election. The ESS stands out from other available data due to its high number of participating countries. As mentioned earlier, prior research often limits itself to one country (see Barnea & Schwartz 1998, Vecchione et al. 2013 and Schwartz et al. 2010). The ESS however, due to its sheer size, provides the opportunity to apply Schwartz's values on several countries at the

same time. Furthermore, having data collected over several elections provides us with a fairly high sum of cases, N. This enables us to draw conclusions on parties with even minimal political support.

This thesis include data from seven surveys on six specific countries. The countries in question are: the Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, Norway, Poland and Portugal. This amounts to a dataset with 87 513 cases (see table 3.1.1).

3.1.1 On the selection of countries

This thesis first hypothesis expects that the electorate of all party families, regardless of country, share the same value priorities (H1). In order to properly test whether this is true, we need to test countries which differ culturally. If the analysis shows that value priorities differ widely on the specific party families across different countries, then H1 holds no merit.

Table 3.1.1 *Summary of countries included in sample*

Country	**Number of cases (N)**	**Region of Europe**	**Party system**	**Welfare regime**
Netherlands	13 505	Central-	Multiparty	Conservative
Germany	20 490	Central-	Multiparty	Conservative
Great Britain	15 667	The Isles	Two-party	Liberal
Norway	11 703	Northern-	Multiparty	Social Democratic
Poland	12 430	Eastern-	Multiparty	Post-Communist
Portugal	13 718	Southern-	Multiparty	Southern

Note*: Total N=87 513*

For the sake of simplicity we selected one country from five regional corners of Europe. These were the Isles, Southern-, Central-, Northern- and Eastern-Europe. Each region represented by, Great Britain, Netherlands, Portugal, Germany, Norway and Poland (see table

3.1.1). The six selected countries are among the few in the ESS which have consistently participated in all seven surveys. This his ensures data continuity and comparability between them. Each country should, by the virtue of their history and geographical climate, have developed different cultures and societal goals.

Apart from difference in geographical position, I relied on three criteria to justify their difference. First, the countries have different party systems. A country's party system suggests which political conflicts exist within the political arena. Differing party systems suggests disputes and interests alignment of varying degree (Broughton & Donovan 1998:1-2, Oxford Reference 2018a and Oxford Reference 2018b). In addition, the party system suggests attitude towards governance (Lijphart 1999:1-3). A two-party system is argued to bring stability, predictability and decisive and effective action (Grant 2018, Lijphart 1999:9-20). In contrast, multiparty can be a sign of a consensus driven, cooperative democracy (Lijphart 1999:42-47). Of the countries in this thesis only Great Britain has a two-party system. Although this in the recent decades have proved to weaken, due to the advances of the Liberal Democrats and the regional parties, such as the Scottish National Party (Webb & Fisher 1998:20-21, 27 and see Lynch 2007 and Green & Prosser 2016). Britain's party system is a product of a majoritarian electoral system. However, it also bears signs of little inclination for bipartisan consensus building and a local favouritism (urban-periphery, regionalism) and class segmented partisanship (Webb & Fisher 1998:11-15, 18).

The remaining countries in this thesis practise multiparty systems. Yet, all are observably unique. For instance, the Netherlands has one of Europe's most populated parliaments. Nevertheless, the Dutch parliament is characterized by a high level of cooperation, consensus and compromise (Napel 1999:182). While the well-populated parliament can in part be credited to the country having one single proportional electoral district, it must be noted that prior to the implementation of this electoral system; the Dutch parliament had already eight political groups (Napel 1999: 169). Although, historically, politics were largely structured by the four "pillars" of sub-groups in Dutch society; Catholics, Protestants, secular working class (socialist) and the secular middle class (liberals) (Napel 1999: 164-165). These cleavages are largely disappearing, but Dutch society still retain a high level of pluralism. With several sub-interests being represented in parliament (Napel 1999: 169-171, 179-182).

In contrast to the Netherlands, Poland had initially, in its first elections in the late 90s and early 2000s, a highly fragmented multiparty system characterized by a high level of electoral volatility and high number of politically relevant parties (Bértoa & Walecki 2014:339-341). However, this has changed in the last elections, where a few parties have proved resilient and become large, stable and predictable (Bértoa & Walecki 2014:340, Tworzecki 2012 and Markowski 2016). Although every election new political parties continue to surface and shock the party system, the effective number of parties remains stable (Bértoa & Walecki 2014:340, Bértoa 2016, Tworzecki 2012 and Markowski 2016). The seemingly chaotic Polish party system bears signs of a system in which the political conflict dimensions have yet to fully segment and converge on key parties. While the established European democracies have had decades to cement their conflict dimensions, Poland has only had two decades, due to their Communist past.

A second option for justifying the countries difference is through their welfare regimes. The shape of a state's welfare regime is a product of its community's social structure. How the host country's society is structured, what they perceive as valuable and what goals and actions they see legitimate or justified, determines their type of welfare state (Scruggs & Allan 2008: 644). For instance, conservative countries, defined by a high level of (previously or presently) religiousness and desire to reinforce the "natural" social order, have historically been associated with the continental European countries (Scruggs & Allan 2008: 644-645, 648-651). These welfare states have been characterized with a high level of social expenditure and a degree of paternalism, while still emphasizing the importance of preserving traditional social and family roles (Scruggs & Allan 2008:645). Southern European countries have regimes which are very similar to the conservative model, but differ slightly on some key aspects. The conservative model has an element of "familialism", which is to be understood as the employment protection programs are mainly for the male work force (Knutsen 2018:36). This aspect is even stronger in Southern-European countries (ibid.). There is relatively little state intervention in welfare programs (Knutsen 2018:37). There is extensive "clientelism", where cash subsidies are given to political client groups (ibid.).

Liberal welfare regimes saw the market as a liberator of individual freedom and allowed individuals to act with the constraint associated with social hierarchies organizing the church and state (Scruggs & Allan 2008:645). Liberal welfare states therefore opted for a

predominately market oriented welfare solution. With private enterprises as the prime supplier. State policies manifested themselves as encouragements to engage more with the market solutions (Scruggs & Allan 2008:645). This type of welfare regime is most commonly associated with Anglo-Saxon nations, such as Great Britain. The last welfare regime is social democratic. This regime were created through a desire for social solidarity and a need for social democratic parties to attract electoral support (Scruggs & Allan 2008:645). The result were a universalistic welfare state with broad applications and citizenship was sufficient enough to partake in it (ibid.). Since the prime motivation was to reduce inequality, social democratic parties sought for solutions largely non-market oriented, though confined by a capitalist economy (ibid.). This regime was commonly associated with the Nordic countries.

These types of welfare structures are not mutually exclusive, and recent decades have shown most welfare states opting more for a liberal, free market oriented, welfare system (Scruggs & Allan 2008:660-663). Nevertheless, countries still bear visibly different approaches to organizing the welfare state. Poland, as a post-communist country, fails to adequately resemble any of the presented welfare regimes. Studies have found them to bear resemblance of conservative regimes, however, the results are not uniformly conclusive (Fenger 2007:25-27). Rather, there does not seem to be a uniformly post-communist model as of yet (ibid.). Table 3.0 presents all countries and their placement within the welfare regime typology.

Finally some purely practical arguments. Since this thesis desires to test the value priorities of ten party families, naturally, the data should have these ten parties readily available. Thus the inclusion of Portugal over other Southern European nations, due to continued relevancy and survival of Communists parties. Norway and Poland above other alternatives, due to the presence of Agrarian parties. Germany because of the presence of a clearly defined Green party. And so forth.

3.2 Measurements and variable construction

3.2.1 Dependent variable

The dependent variable in the analyses in the forthcoming chapter is party choice. The ESS contains two variables which can define party choice: “party voted for in last election” or “Which party [do you] feel closer to”. This thesis opted for the former. Casting a vote requires

a conscious choice were the individual has done deliberations over which political party they want to see empowered. A vote is likely to be effected by several deliberations including personal values. In addition, the "previous vote" variable has more respondents than the "feel closer to" variable.

The numerical values of the party alternatives in the questionnaire varied immensely. In order to ensure comparability, each item were recoded and merged into new variables. These new variables contained party families rather than individual national parties. The new numerical values were: 1 Social Democratic, 2 Left Socialist, 3 Communist, 4 Green, 5 Left Liberal, 6 Right Liberal, 7 Christian, 8 Agrarian, 10 Conservative, 11 Radical Right and 19 other parties. The "Other parties" category contained parties whom were politically irrelevant, short lived, had an unsatisfactory amount of units or unable to categorize into any of the ten party families. Parties in this category fulfilled two or more of these requirements. Responses with no relevance to the analysis, such as "refusal" to answer or "don't know" were coded as missing. The coding into party families were based on codings provided by Oddbjørn Knutsen, which has been used in his earlier works. In the case of parties or countries not included in his earlier research, the coding were done through consultations with Oddbjørn Knutsen and Elisabeth Bakke, both from the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. The recoding and merging of party families amounted to a total of seven variables. One variable for each country containing all respondents across all the surveys, and one variable containing the entirety of respondents regardless of country and year. The dependent variable is at the nominal measurement level.

For a complete overlook over the placement of parties into party families, see the appendix.

3.2.2 Independent variables

Personal values

The ESS provides 21 items each meant to measure a respective basic personal value. Schwartz tries to avoid indirect indicators - such as attitudes - to measure values, and instead develops instruments of, "broad and basic motivations relevant to various attitudes and behaviours in different domains in life" (Datler et al. 2013: 910). These items are verbal portraits where each matches a person's gender and describes his/her goals, aspirations or wishes (Schwartz et al.

2010:433). Each portrait is meant to measure one personal value (ibid.). For example, “Being very successful is important to her/him. She/he hopes people will recognise her/his achievements.” describes a person who values achievement and, “it is important to her/him to live in secure surroundings. She/he avoids anything that might endanger her/his safety.” describes a person who values security. For each portrait, the respondent is prompted to answer “how much like you is this person?”, in which they can give an answer on a scale ranging from, 1 “very much like me” to 6 “not at all like me” (Schwartz 2007:178). Two items operationalise each personal value, with the exception of universalism which has three due to its broad content (Schwartz 2007:178). Ultimately, the verbal portraits assume people will give the most positive answers to the people that are embodiments of their own values. All 21 items are listed in the appendix.

Why opt for verbal portraits rather than directly asking respondents about their value priorities (i.e. how important is it for you to be secure?)? Schwartz presents five arguments (Schwartz 2007:179). First, few people spend time thinking about what is important or not in their daily life. They do, however, assess others and compare themselves to them. Second, many find it difficult to decide what is important to them, and may be inclined to present themselves in a better light as a result of the dislike of their own values (Schwartz 2007:179). Third, direct items require a response scale, which will be biased towards the higher end due to most values being important to people (ibid.). Fourth, elderly and the less educated find it difficult to translate their values into importance scales (ibid.). Fifth, direct items mentions only a single abstract goal, and fail to encompass the broad set of goals inherent in values (ibid.).

In order to apply the 21 items to an analyses, one has to merge them into their respective personal values. This requires the creation of indices. Before creating the indices, some preparatory work is required. First, we change the scale on all the 21 items. Each item now has a score scaling from 0 to 10. In which 0 is “not like me at all” and 10 “very much like me”. This is a change simply for convenience, as a 0 to 10 interval is more applicable and intuitive in the forthcoming analyses. Second, steps are taken to account for missing values. Since we want to preserve as much data as possible. Respondents where not all numerical values are missing (i.e. just one of two items have a missing value) on the theorized index; the missing value is replaced by the mean value of all responses on that item. For instance, index-

A is determined by variable-X1 and variable-X2. Respondent-1 has the value 7 on variable-X1 7, but Variable-X2 has a missing. Since only one of the two variables has a missing, the missing value is replaced by the mean of all responses on variable-X2. If the mean of variable-X2 is 5, then respondent-1 will have variable-X2=5.

When constructing the indices, we need to account for individual response tendencies. People rate the portraits differently. While most people rate them similar to themselves, others rate them dissimilar to themselves or simply opt for the same response on all items regardless of its contents (Schwartz 2007:180). The basic personal values however, exists within a dynamic structure, and prioritizing a specific value should therefore be a trade-off between other relevant values (ibid.). If for example one respondent values tradition as 5 and all other values are given lower score answers, and another person values tradition as 5, but gives all other values a higher score, then they both have the same absolute score, but the former clearly prioritize tradition higher than the latter person (Schwartz 2007:180). In order to properly present individuals true priorities, we need to correct individual responses. We follow the suggestion by Schwartz to centre each person's responses on their mean (Schwartz 1992:53, Schwartz & Huismans 1998:97 and Schwartz 2007:180). This, "converts absolute value scores into scores that indicate the relative importance of each value to the person" (Schwartz 2007:180). First, we compute the mean for all indices from the items that define them. Second, we compute the total mean of all 21 items. Third, we subtract the total mean from each mean index.

As revealed in the method section (section 3.3.1 and section 3.3.2) we centre the indices according to the mean of the sample being analysed. All analyses have the mean centred on national samples, meaning the mean of 21 items for a specific country. The only exception to this is in the analysis presented in section 4.1.

Other variables

The analyses will included some standard control variables. These will be gender, education and age. Gender is a dichotomous variable in which 1 is "male" and 2 is "female". The dataset contains 30 953 males and 46 548 females. The variable is recoded into 0 "male" and 1 "female" to better suit the analysis. Education has the respondent report their education level,

the ESS has structured the answers so that they fit within the ES-ISCED education standard. The variable range from 0 to 7 where, 0 “incompatible with ES-ISCED standard”, 1 “Less than lower secondary”, 2 “Lower secondary”, 3 “Lower tier upper secondary”, 4 “Upper tier upper secondary”, 5 “Advanced vocational, sub-degree”, 6 “lower tertiary education, BA level”, 7 “Higher tertiary education, >= MA level”. Education has a mean of 3,2 and median of 3. It is at the ordinal level. Age range from 14 to 123, with a mean of 34,4 and median of 34. It is at the interval level (continuous). Respondents younger than 18 will be excluded from the analyses by default, due to not having been able to cast a vote in the previous national election.

Schwartz have suggested that these three control variables have an effect on basic personal values. However, since these effects are not entirely relevant to this thesis I will but briefly summarize them. One tends to become more conservation value oriented with age, due to more commitment to habits and stronger ties to their social networks (Datler et al. 2013:912). Thus they experience fewer changes and challenges and become more inclined to preserve what they already have (ibid.). Education exposes people to new experiences, different people and alternative life styles. Higher educated people should, “score higher on self-enhancement, openness to change, and self-transcendence values, and lower on conservation values” (Datler et al. 2013:912). Schwartz assumes men attribute individualistic values higher than collective values, and females vice versa (ibid.).

3.3 Reliability and validity of the data

3.3.1 Reliability

Reliability is a term referring to the “consistency” and “accuracy” of the measurements (Trochim 2006a and Hellevik 2011:183). We can deem the measurements reliable if we consistently produce the same expected results over several different observations. This is in many cases connected to how we operationalize what we intend to study, in this case Schwartz’s personal values (Hellevik 2011:50-51). A way of concluding whether our data has a high level of reliability is through internal consistency. Schwartz’s value portraits are meant to be indicators for the same latent construct (personal value). If these items truly reflect the same construct, then they should yield similar results (items correlate) (Trochim 2006b). Cronbach’s alpha can estimate the reliability of our indices. Cronbach’s alpha is mathematically equivalent to computing the average of all correlations between all possible

split-half samples (Ibid.). The correlations between the half-samples are a result of correlating the half-samples which are total score from all items in the half-sample in question (Trochim 2006b). Bear in mind, Cronbach's alpha is not actually equated like this, however, it would yield the identical result. If α=1 there is perfect correlation (all items scale identically), if α=0 then there is no common variance what so ever. Table 3.3.1 presents the Cronbach alpha estimates for all basic personal values.

Table 3.3.1 *Cronbach Alphas, means and standard deviations for all ten values*

Value	Number of items in index	Cronbach Alpha	Centred Mean	Centred Mean Standard Deviation
Self-Direction	2	.468	.83	1.51
Stimulation	2	.631	(-) 1.37	1.94
Hedonism	2	.683	(-) .61	1.93
Achievement	2	.677	(-) .78	1.76
Power	2	.408	(-) 1.79	1.68
Security	2	.597	.74	1.64
Conformity	2	.606	(-) .16	1.88
Tradition	2	.373	0	1.82
Benevolence	2	.605	1.43	1.25
Universalism	3	.585	1.14	1.23

Note*: N varies between 85 670 (Achievement) to 85 798 (Universalism) due to missing.*

Cronbach's alpha range from .373 (tradition) to .683 (hedonism) (see table 3.3.1). As a general rule of thumb, α>.70 is considered acceptable, with the possibility of α>.60 being acceptable as well in very large samples. As evident from table 3.0, Schwartz's personal values have relatively low levels of reliability. This is expected, since the few items are intended to "… cover the conceptual breadth of the value rather than a core idea" (Schwartz et al. 2010:433). For example, universalism as a value includes goals such as tolerance, concern for nature and the weak. This encompasses many different assessments and a person can therefore differ on the items meant to measure the specific value (i.e. one might consider environmental protection much more important than protection of the weak). A solution to the low level of reliability would be to structure the indices after the higher-order values instead (see table 3.3.2) (Schwartz 2007:181). However this prevents us from making the finer distinctions this thesis hypotheses require (see section 3.4.1). As for other measurements in

the data, since the data were collected through randomized selection within the host country; all demographic variables should be statistically representable and therefore have a high level of reliability (see section 3.1).

Table 3.3.2 *Higher-order values Cronbach Alpha reliability*

Higher-Order Value	Number of items in index	Cronbach Alpha
Openness to change	4	.651
Self-Enhancement	4	.701
Conservation	6	.728
Self-Transcendence	5	.717

3.3.2 Validity

Schwartz suggests the low levels of reliability is not a problem for further analysis. Instead, the key issue lies on validity. Validity regards "what" has been measured (Hellevik 2011:183 and Adcock & Collier 2001:529-530). We can deem the data valid when, "… scores meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept." (Adcock & Collier 2001:530). In the case of this thesis, the indices must truly represent basic personal values and are not just results of measurement errors. Normally, a high level of reliability is required to ensure a high level of validity. Put bluntly, It helps little that the measure produce observable characteristic which legitimately fits into our theoretical frame and definition of a personal value, if the collection and processing of the measurements themselves are inaccurate and full of systematic measurement errors (Hellevik 2011:53). In the case of Schwartz's values however, the low levels are not an inherent problem, due to the repeatedly proven salience of the values. Schwartz's values continue to provide consistent and predictable results across many different cultural-, national- and longitudinal-samples. The analyses in his article *Universals in the content and structure of values*, were able to prove the existence of the ten values across 40 different samples from 20 different countries (1992). Confirming the hypothesised structure between the ten values, identifying key dimensional conflicts within the structure and confirming that contents of each individual value (Schwartz 1992: 23-35). These same results have been confirmed in earlier ESS data. Analyses on the first ESS produces the same

value structure when subjected to small space analysis (SSA) (Schwartz 2007:182-183). This constitutes a confirmation of his values across 20 countries, where also the key conflict dimensions mentioned in section 2.2.2 are confirmed (ibid.). In a few countries only 8 of the ten values were confirmed, however, the missing values were absent due to intermixing with neighbouring values (Schwartz 2007:183). This does not disconfirm the value structure, since it is an expected part due to the closeness of neighbouring values (Schwartz 1992: 26-27 and Schwartz 2007:183). Some empirical analyses have encountered results which deviates from what is expected from Schwartz's value structure. These deviations are however a minority among the other confirmed hypotheses (Datler et al. 2013:918-922).

The existence of Schwartz's values and its dynamic structure has largely been confirmed. The verbal portraits measuring his values are a result of meticulous planning and considerations, and have been developed over many years (Schwartz 1992:179). There is little doubt that Schwartz's values and the items meant to measure them share a high level of validity. They most certainly measure the values within his theorized structure and the values and its structure has empirically been confirmed (Schwartz 2007:182). However, how can we then explain the low levels of reliability? The low levels of reliability, is not due to measurement errors, but rather due to the amount of indicators per value index. Most scholars now applying Schwartz's values agree that 21 items are too few to accurately measure the ten values. Up to 40 items is required to properly capture the entire structure (Datler et al. 2013:916). The fault created by the low amount of indicators becomes evident when we make indices according to the quartal structure. Internal consistency increases significantly (see table 3.3.2). The high level of shared variance between each item in the quartal structure indicates they compose the same latent structure. Internal reliability is low due to the broadness of the individual values (Schwartz et al. 2010:433). Two items are unable to capture the entirety of the latent value. Studies using the 40 item surveys are able to identify all ten values, surveys with 21 (like the ESS) are unable to do so (Datler et al. 2013:916). Studies with 21 items report high levels of correlation between items meant to measure two separate (but neighbouring) values (ibid.).

3.4 Method

3.4.1 One-Way ANOVA analysis

Due to few items measuring the ten personal values and the general broadness of the values, the items share high correlations with values they are not intended to measure. As seen in table 3.4.1, the highest correlation exists within the quartal structure (i.e. universalism is strongest with benevolence which are both part of self-transcendence). The amount of correlation between items within these grouping are almost identical to the correlation for items within the same value (see table 3.4.1). There is also a lesser, but significant correlation with neighbouring values outside the quartal grouping.

Table 3.4.1 *Examples of high correlation between neighbouring items*

Universalism	U1	U2	U3	B1	B2	SD1	SD2
U1	1	.344	.306	.320	.294	.185	.212
U2	.344	1	.310	.368	.342	.234	.248
U3	.306	.310	1	.316	.359	.183	.228
Tradition	T1	T2	C1	C2	B1	B2	
T1	1	.229	.224	.304	.229	.179	
T2	.229	1	.325	.357	.227	.216	

Note*: Pearson correlations, N varies within 100 from 85 700, All presented results p<0.01*

This might be indications of multi-collinearity. Multi-collinearity occurs when two or more independent variables share an exact (or approximately) linear relation (Paul 2006:2). We conduct a VIF-test in order to identify the existence of multi-collinearity. VIF tests for multi-collinearity between independent variables in a linear model. That there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables is irrelevant, as VIF only tests for linearity among the independent variables (IBM 2014). VIF must be 10>VIF>1 in order for there to be no danger of multi-collinearity. The VIF-test confirms the existence of multi-collinearity, putting all indices at VIF>600. Multi-collinearity poses a problem for further analysis. Multi-collinearity can artificially increase the P value, showing insignificant variable effects, despite this being entirely untrue (Paul 2006:3). In addition, the confidence intervals for the regression coefficients can become very high. Because the confidence intervals are so high, the inclusion or exclusion of variables can dramatically change the numerical value and direction of regression coefficients (Paul 2006:3) Any coefficients which estimates how

individual X variables impact Y are not to be trusted. In fact, the only results we can trust from an analysis with multi-collinearity are the estimates which predict Y from a set of X variables (Paul 2006:3 and Schwartz 2007:180). This includes measures such as R^2 estimates, which simply estimates the variance in Y explained by the total included X variables.

While the broadness of Schwartz's items can in part be blamed for the created multi-collinearity. The majority of the blame lies with the centring of the value indices. Centring is a, "… procedure which causes linear dependency among the value scores" (Schwartz 2007:180). A solution to avoid multi-collinearity would be to create indices according to the higher-order values in the quartal structure (Schwartz 2007:181). However, this is not an option for two reasons. First, the merger into higher-order values prevents us from differing between values within these groupings. For instance, we will become unable to separate universalism and benevolence from each other. We are then at loss to which value is more defining for the electorate for parties such as the Greens and Social Democratic. Second, earlier studies on party choice do not merge their items into the higher-order values (apart from occasionally merging conformity and tradition). We therefore become unable to make any meaningful comparisons with earlier research.

In order to avoid the problems inherent with multi-collinearity, we conduct a one-way ANOVA mean comparison analysis. An ANOVA analysis requires a continuous dependent variable and any number of categorical independent variables (Wetcher-Hendricks 2011:192). ANOVA will then present the mean scores on the dependent value for those who fall into a particular category defined by the independent variables (Wetcher-Hendricks 2011:200). An observant reader might remember that party choice is the dependent variable in this thesis. However, for the purpose of the ANOVA analysis, it will be the independent while the personal value indices are the dependents. Our indices scores scale from 0 to 10. This scale is sufficiently large enough to simulate a variable at the interval level. Thus, the indices can be used in the ANOVA analysis as dependent variables.

Since party choice is a nominal variable, it makes little sense to speak of mean scores within this variable. Instead, we are interested in how the mean scores of the value indices changes when controlled for party choice. By ranking these mean scores we can compare parties and dissect which values are most highly prioritized in a given party family's voters in comparison to other parties. With this we also avoid cultural differences in prioritizations. For

instance, country A might be more individualistic than country B, thus country A will have a higher mean score on individualistic values than country B. However, we still expect people who vote for Right Liberal parties to prioritize individualistic values. Thus, the Right Liberal party will be ranked the highest on such values in their respective countries, despite the mean score being a completely different numerical value. Because the national mean scores varies, the indices are centred on the mean of their respective country sample's mean.

The ETA coefficient

Mean comparisons on their own can indicate main effects, however, they are incapable of telling us how relevant these effects are. For this we apply the ETA-coefficient. ETA is a coefficient for estimating correlation between variables which share a non-linear relationship (Knutsen 2014:13). Its interpretation is almost equal to Pearson's R, in which 1 is perfect correlation and 0 is no correlation what so ever (Knutsen 2014:14). The interpretive difference between ETA and Pearson's R is the fact that ETA can only have positive scores, while Pearson's R can have both negative and positive scores. For ETA to be applicable, the dependent variables must be at the interval level and the independent at the categorical level.

Because of the large size of the samples, the majority of the ANOVA analyses will be significant at the $p<0.01$ level. This means that few ETA coefficients will be insignificant and irrelevant. However, we can make a distinction of how relevant. In such a large sample, correlations of 0.20 or larger can be considered highly relevant (strong), scores ranging from 0.10 to 0.19 will be moderate and scores less than 0.10 will be low. ETA scores will be considered acceptable as long as $p<0.05$.

ETA^2 is a measure equal to R^2 (Knutsen 2014:13). R^2 is the amount of variance explained by on variable on the other in a linear relationship. ETA^2 estimates can be interpreted the same way and is applicable to nonlinear relationships.

ANOVA and the ETA-coefficient does not prove causality. Mean comparisons can uncover main effects between party choice and personal values. For instance, that voters for party-A on average give a high score to universalism than other voters. But these results are entirely descriptive. They do not prove causality. ETA is a measurement of correlation, and thus can be interpreted as a measurement of probability; but again, this is not causality.

3.4.2 Multinomial Logistics Regression

While the bivariate analysis can reveal associations and correlations through the ETA-coefficient. It is at loss at to what degree the personal values explain party choice. ETA^2 can provide this, but since it measures the variance explained by only one variable at the time, the presented results will be miniscule. Since party choice is a nominal value, the dependent and independent variables will share a non-linear relationship. This excludes popular linear models such as ordinary least squares. In order to acquire an estimate for the total explained variance on party choice by personal values, we subject the data to a multinomial logistic regression.

Assumptions

In order for us to legitimately use this model on our dataset, several assumptions needs to be fulfilled. First, the dependent variable needs to be at the nominal level and subsequently, there are no linear relationships with the independent values (Long 1997:148-150). The independent values can be at any level, however, they must be specified as either a continuous or categorical variable in the model, nominal values are not computable (ibid.). Second, there must be independence of observations (Lund Research ltd. 2013). Even though this thesis utilizes cross-sectional and longitudinal data, there is no presence of interdependent observations. No respondent is present in more than one survey. Third, there must be no presence of multi-collinearity (ibid.). This dataset has considerable amounts of multi-collinearity. But as mentioned, this does not affect the estimates for the proportion of variance that the model can explain, and thus is not a problem for further analysis. Fourth, the data must be free of extreme values (outliers) (Long 1997:65-66). Extremely high or low numerical valued respondents on any independent variable can exaggerate the variable's affect. Upon exploring the contents of each variable, the demographic variables showed no significant outliers. Their mean and medians were almost identical, skewness were very small (gender -.13, education .31 and age .10) and stem-and-leaf plot and boxplot did not single out any influential respondents. The personal value indices had indications of a few outliers. These outlier are however not influential. Because the indices has fixed interval, none of the outliers are "extreme" enough to significantly alter the model. They are also in an extreme minority. Removing these outliers is inadvisable, because it makes it more difficult to compare the different multinomial logistic models due to huge difference in N. In addition, removing minor

outliers like these can produce biased estimates (Jennings 1986:988). The outliers do not pose a threat to the logistic models.

Logistic regression and Nagelkerke R^2

Logistic regression models specify a non-linear model relating X to the probability of an event Y (Long 1997:50). The probability of Y occurring when X changes is controlled by all other X variables held constant. In a binary logit model, this process is relatively straight forward. For example, the dependent variable Y has the scores of 0 and 1. The binary logit model will then present the probability of Y=1 occurring for every change in X (the probability of Y=0 will be the constant in this case) (Long 1997:50-53, 149-150). A multinomial logistic regression can be thought of as, "simultaneously estimating binary logits for all possible comparisons among the outcome categories" (Long 1997:149). With three outcomes for the dependent variable Y (i.e. 0,1 and 2), multinomial is equivalent to running a binary analysis with 0 to 1, 1 to 2 and 0 to 2 (ibid.). Four outcomes adds three new comparisons (0 to 3, 1 to 3 and 2 to 3). Our model specify eleven different outcomes, one for each party family and the "other" category.

The key interest for our thesis however is not the probabilities produced by the multinomial logistic regression model, but the estimates for explained variance. A normal linear regressions apply R^2, which, "…summarizes the proportion of variance in the dependent variable associated with the predictor (independent) variables…" (IBM 2018). However, a normal R^2 estimate is not applicable in a non-linear model. Instead, we must apply pseudo-R^2 estimates which provides the same type of interpretation as ordinary R^2, but is fitted for non-linear models (an approximation of R^2). While statistical programs like SPSS provides several pseudo-R^2 estimates, we opt for the pseudo-R^2 estimate Nagelkerke R^2. Nagelkerke produces estimates ranging from 0.00 to 1.00. Nagelkerke R^2=0.00 means none of the variance in the dependent variables is explained by the model, Nagelkerke R^2=1.00 means all of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the model. Nagelkerke R^2 can be interpreted in terms of percentages, where a score of 0.13 means 13 % of the variance in dependent variable is explained by the independent variables (Knutsen 2014:8). We prefer Nagelkerke over other estimates for two reasons. First, the predictabilities will be small in this analysis due to large samples and the nature of latent variables like personal values and demographic variables. Other pseudo-R^2 estimates such as Macfadden R^2 will therefore produce very low and less

intuitive estimates (IBM 2018 and Long 1997:104). Second, Nagelkerke is an adjusted estimate of Cox and Snell's pseudo-R^2 and produce similar if not identical results. However, Cox and Snell's estimate cannot produce estimates equal to 1.00 in a "perfect" model (Nagelkerke 1991). Although it is entirely impossible for our models to even approach this level of explanation, we find it more intuitive that the estimate range from 0.00 (0 %) to 1.00 (100 %). In general, Nagelkerke R^2 produce estimates which are almost identical to normal R^2 and we therefore choose Nagelkerke's R^2 over other options (Knutsen 2014: 8-9).

As a clarification, all references to explained variance will hence forth in this thesis refer to the pseudo-R^2 estimate Nagelkerke-R^2.

Models and Interpretation

We subject each country to three different multinomial logistic regression models. Model 1 (M1) determines party choice by the ten personal values. Model 2 (M2), determines party choice by the demographic variables. Model 3 (M3) includes both demographic and personal values as predictors for party choice. We then compare the results from these models to determine how much explanatory power personal values provide. Since demographic variables comes before personal values in a chain of causation, we will not view the true effect of personal values before we control it for demographic variables. Therefore, we also present a revised analysis were we have subtracted the results from M2 from M3. This reveals the true effect given from personal values (Model 1c2). This is necessary because a portion of the explanation from values seen in M1, is in fact spurious. Because demographic variables come before personal values in a chain of causation, personal values and demographic variables will share some explained variance onto party choice.

4.0 Empirical Analysis

Chapter four presents the results from all the empirical analyses. Section 4.1 presents how the six countries differ on their prioritizations of specific values and explains how these national deviations will be controlled for in the upcoming sections. Section 4.2 to 4.11 provide the results from the ANOVA analyses on individual personal values. Each section presents a summary of the relevant hypotheses for the personal value, followed by a discussion on whether the results supports or rejects our party family hypotheses as well as how relevant the personal value is for determining party choice. Section 4.12 compares all the ETA coefficients from the previous sections and briefly deliberates on which values seem to be better for determining party choice. Section 4.13 explores the results from the multinomial logistic regressions. Discussing how personal values are better (or worse) at explaining party choice than demographic variables. It also deliberates on whether the results support or rejects hypothesis H1.1.

4.1 Mean scores in all countries

Table 4.1.0 is the mean scores on each of the ten personal values on each of the six countries. The mean scores in this table are based on indices centred on the mean of the 21 items of the entire sample. The original indices were given an interval of 0 to 10, after centring they scale from -6.355 to 3.645. A score of 0 would mean the national average is identical to the mean of all 21 items. By Schwartz interpretation, positive scores means these are highly prioritized values, while negative scores are less important to the respondent (or in this case, the country on average) (Schwartz 2007:180). All presented results in table 4.1.0 are significant at the <0.001 level.

The table 4.1.0 results show how the different countries collectively prioritize their values differently. Self-direction seems to be much more highly prioritized in Central- and Northern-Europe. As the Netherlands and Germany both have an average score of 1.11 and Norway has a score of 0.93. In contrast, Portugal and Poland has scores below 0.5. Stimulation is deprioritized across all countries. The Netherlands seem to prioritize stimulation the most amongst the other countries and Germany, Poland and Portugal the least. Hedonism is deprioritized in all countries except the Netherlands, were it has a slight positive score. Apart

from Germany, Norway, Portugal and Britain prioritize hedonism mostly the same. Poland appears extreme in comparison with the other countries, with a score of -1.88, Poland is vastly more negative to hedonism. Achievement seems to be the least prioritized among most of the countries. With Central- and Northern-European countries having scores around -2.00. Poland and Portugal prioritize achievement the highest among the six countries. Power is deprioritized in all countries. Among the sic countries, Portugal prioritize power the highest, while Norway and the Netherlands has the lowest scores. Security is most highly prioritized in Poland, Portugal and Britain, and the least in the Netherlands and Norway. Conformity has positive scores in Norway and Poland around 0.50. The other countries deprioritize it, with Germany having the lowest score. Tradition is positively scored in Poland and Portugal, and negatively in the Netherlands, Germany and Norway. Benevolence is prioritized across all countries. With Germany, Norway and Britain ranking the highest, and the Netherlands, Portugal and Poland the lowest. Universalism is also prioritized across all countries. Germany ranks it the highest, followed by the Netherlands, Norway and Britain. Poland and Portugal ranks universalism the lowest.

Table 4.1.0 makes it apparent how the importance of some values varies across countries. Poland for instance, is drastically more negative to hedonism than any of the other countries. Poland and Portugal also seems to be deprioritize individualistic values such as self-direction much more than the other countries (achievement is an exception to this). Similarly, they rank the conservation values higher as well (the exception being Portugal on conformity). As a contrast, the Netherlands rank the individualistic values quite high, but the collectivist values in conservation low in comparison to the other countries.

The ETA coefficients further show how the averages deviate between the countries. The ETA scores in table 4.1.0 show the relationship between personal values and country. The scores show how much the prioritization of the personal value prioritize with living in one of the six countries. Put simply, I high correlation signify that there is considerable deviations between the countries on how they prioritize the value. According to the ETA scores, hedonism is the value which deviates the most between the countries, followed by conformity, security and benevolence. Universalism, stimulation and achievement has the lowest scores, indicating that the deviations are less pronounced.

Table 4.1.0 **Personal values by country**

	Self-direction	Stimulation	Hedonism	Achievement	Power	Security	Conformity	Tradition	Benevolence	Universalism
Netherl.	1,11	-1,01	0,07	-2,03	-0,96	0,23	-0,07	-0,39	1,29	1,17
Germany	1,11	-1,69	-0,15	-2,02	-0,87	0,76	-0,73	-0,06	1,70	1,31
Britain	0,87	-1,18	-0,75	-2,00	-0,90	0,94	-0,31	0,00	1,61	1,15
Norway	0,93	-1,12	-0,67	-1,82	-1,01	0,20	0,51	-0,43	1,65	1,17
Poland	0,38	-1,50	-1,88	-1,32	-0,64	1,26	0,57	0,45	1,08	1,07
Portugal	0,44	-1,55	-0,58	-1,41	-0,26	0,94	-0,42	0,42	1,14	0,86
Total	0,83	-1,37	-0,61	-1,79	-0,78	0,74	-0,16	0,00	1,43	1,14
ETA	0,194	0,133	0,310	0,140	0,173	0,219	0,254	0,178	0,200	0,116
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
N	85 733	85 728	85 704	85 777	85 670	85 743	85 694	85 762	85 736	85 798

Notes: centred on the mean defined by the 21 items of the entire sample. The mean of the 21 items is 6.355. Thus table 4.1.0 has mean scores defined by an interval of -6.355 to 3.645.

The national deviations across all of the ten personal values pose a problem for further analyses and comparisons. Our hypotheses expect the electorate of parties to prioritize a value more or than other contemporary parties. Put bluntly, they should have a higher and positive score than the national average. If we are to conduct further analyses without controlling for national deviations, comparisons will be difficult. For instance, Conservatives are expected to prioritize tradition more than the other parties that do not (hypothesis H10.1h). Let us say that Conservatives vary from their national average by 0.2, according to table 4.1.0, the Conservatives in Poland will then have a score of 0.65, while those in Norway will have a score of -0.23. Without controlling for national deviations, the analysis can misleadingly show Norwegian Conservatives deprioritizing tradition over other values, although in reality, they give it more credit than their national contemporaries.

The centring of the personal values on the 21 items (see section 3.2.2) was implemented to control for individual response tendencies, however it did not control for national deviations. The ANOVA analyses in section 4.2 to 4.12 will be based on means centred on the national subsamples and not the entire samples as done for table 4.1.0. For example, all analyses regarding Germany will have centred means on the 21 items of only German respondents. In addition, the tables only present scores which have been controlled for national deviations. The national mean score on each index is subtracted from the mean scores of the parties. The score 0.00 will then signify the party's electorate have identical prioritization of the personal value as their country mean. A positive value will signify higher prioritization and a negative a lower prioritization. For example, country A has a national mean score of 1.5 on self-direction, Party B has a mean score of 1, party C has a mean score of 2. We then subtract the national mean from both parties. Party B then has a score of -0.5 while party C has a score of 0.5. Party B is therefore more positive and therefore prioritize self-direction more than their national contemporaries. Party C is negative and therefore prioritize self-direction less than their national contemporaries.

In order to determine whether the analyses support our hypotheses regarding the party families, we consider only parties which have scores of 0.1 or higher to support the hypotheses of positive prioritization. Likewise, only parties with -0.1 or lower supports the deprioritize hypotheses. Parties whom do not meet this 0.1 criteria but behave as expected (i.e. Social Democrats fail to meet the 0.1 criteria for benevolence, but consistently present a

positive mean score) will not be supported but be regarded as plausible. If the party family fail to meet any of these requirements, their hypothesis will be rejected. We use 0.1 as a criteria solely due to this appearing to be a natural threshold score in the analyses. Most parties either barely deviate from their national averages (less than 0.05) or deviate quite drastically (more than 0.15).

4.2 Self-Direction

Self-direction is expected to be prioritized for the voters of parties who encourage exploring and expressing ones individuality and the right to be oneself without constraints. In contrast it is expected to be deprioritized for the electorate of parties which desire to keep the status quo and prevent uncontrollable social change.

Table 4.2.0 *Summary of self-direction hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Left Socialists (H3.1a) - Green (H5.1a) - Left Liberal (H6.1a) - Right Liberal (H7.1a)	- Christian Democratic (H8.2a) - Agrarian (H9.2a) - Conservative (H10.2a) - Radical Right (H11.2a)

Table 4.2.1 shows the mean scores of the electorate of all party families on self-direction in their individual countries, table 4.2.2 shows the parties ranked by the mean score regardless of country, and table 4.2.3 show the ETA coefficients ranked by country. All tables have been controlled for national deviations. If we look at table 4.2.2, we can see that the Greens, Left Liberals, Left Socialists and Right Liberals are all among the top ranked and well beyond our criteria of 0.10. This seem to support our hypotheses on which parties prioritize self-direction. Among the lowest ranked, only the Christian Democrats satisfies our criteria of -0.10, supporting the deprioritize hypothesis.

Table 4.2.1 **Self-Direction values per country**

	Netherl.	**Germany**	**Britain**	**Norway**	**Poland**	**Portugal**	**Mean**
Soc. Dem.	0,01	-0,03	-0,04	-0,18	0,05	-0,07	-0,05
L. Socialists	0,25	-0,09		0,21		0,43	0,20
Communist				0,75		0,10	0,43
Green	0,41	0,40	0,46	0,98			0,56
L. Liberals	0,27				0,53		0,40
R. Liberals	0,09	0,09	0,11	0,21	0,20	-0,03	0,11
Chr. Dem.	-0,34	-0,15		-0,40	-0,18		-0,27
Agrarian				-0,01	-0,18		-0,09
Conservative			-0,03	0,11	0,16	0,12	0,09
Radical Right	0,00	0,10	0,25	0,12	-0,33		0,03
Other parties	0,10	0,29	-0,06	0,35	0,16	0,27	0,22
ETA	0,165	0,124	0,054	0,135	0,120	0,095	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	
N	10 138	12 978	9 634	8 236	6 508	6 482	

Table 4.2.2 **Self-Direction ranked by party**

Green	0,56
Communist	0,43
L. Liberals	0,40
L. Socialists	0,20
R. Liberals	0,11
Conservative	0,09
Radical Right	0,03
Soc. Dem.	-0,05
Agrarian	-0,09
Chr. Dem.	-0,27

Table 4.2.3 **ETA ranked by country**

Netherl.	0,165
Norway	0,135
Germany	0,124
Poland	0,120
Portugal	0,095
Britain	0,054

The Agrarians, Conservatives and Radical Rights fail to meet our 0.1 criteria. The Agrarians are ranked second lowest, and viewing table 4.2.1 we can see that the two Agrarian parties in Norway and Poland have different scores. Even though they are both in the negative (showing that they both prioritize self-direction less than their national contemporaries), only Poland satisfies our -0.1 requirement. The results are to inconclusive and thus does not fully support our hypothesis, but it remains plausible since Agrarians have negative scores in both of their respective countries. For the Conservatives, we can see that their prioritization is exactly the opposite of our expectations. In the rankings (table 4.2.2) Conservatives have a score of 0.09, and viewing the results in 4.2.1, only the British Conservatives have a negative score. In fact, the Conservatives are passing our requirement for 0.1 in all other countries. The results seem to tell us that Conservatives prioritize self-direction, rather than oppose it as we originally hypothesized. The Radical Rights give similar results as Conservatives, they largely prioritize self-direction rather than reject it. However, they vary much greater in scores than the Conservatives. As seen in table 4.2.1, Radical Right voters vary between -0.33 to 0.26. Unexpectedly, the Communists become the second highest ranked party in the ANOVA analysis. They easily fulfil our 0.1 criteria, in both of their host countries.

The ETA coefficients in the analysis are mixed. With the highest score in the Netherlands and the lowest in Britain (see table 4.2.3). The coefficients of Britain and Portugal are low (ETA<0.1), which makes it highly unlikely that self-direction is a value which determines British and Portuguese party preference. The ETA coefficients for the other four countries are moderate. Self-direction likely plays a part in party choice, but it is doubtful that self-direction is a key value determining party choice. We would need to see higher ETA scores in order to draw this conclusion. All results are significant at the 1 % level (P<0.01).

The ANOVA analysis provides support for our hypotheses regarding the parties whom prioritize self-direction (H3.1a, H5.1a, H6.1a and H7.1a). It also support our hypothesis for the Christian Democrats deprioritizing self-direction (H8.2a). The analysis finds no convincing results for the hypotheses regarding Conservatives and Radical Rights. Hypothesis H10.2a and H11.2a must therefore be rejected. The Agrarians fail to meet our 0.1 criteria, but their electorate behave as expected (they deprioritize self-direction in comparison to the national average). Hypothesis H9.2a is therefore not fully supported but remains plausible.

4.3 Stimulation

Due to stimulation and self-direction being part of the same higher-order value, openness to change, we expect the same parties expected to prioritize or deprioritize self-direction to also do the same for stimulation (see table 4.2.0 and 4.3.0). This is for the same reasons briefly summarised for self-direction.

Table 4.3.0 *Summary of stimulation hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Left Socialists (H3.1b) - Greens (H5.1b) - Left Liberal (H6.1b) - Right Liberal (H7.1b)	- Christian Democrats (H8.2b) - Agrarian (H9.2b) - Conservative (H10.2b) - Radical Right (H11.2b)

As we can see in table 4.3.2, all parties expected to prioritize stimulation are among the top ranked and are over our 0.1 criteria. This supports our hypotheses regarding the Left Socialists, Greens, Left Liberals and Right Liberals. The rankings also supports our hypotheses regarding both the Agrarians and the Christian Democrats. With being the two lowest ranked and passing our criteria of -0.1.

Again however, the Conservatives and the Radical Rights reveals scores which are in opposition to our expectations. They both achieve positive scores, with the Radical Rights even passing our 0.1 criteria (see table 4.3.2). Looking at table 4.3.1, we see as with self-direction, that the Radical Rights vary greatly on stimulation between the countries. With -0.25 in Britain to 0.66 in Germany. The Conservatives have a similar pattern, with -0.10 in Britain and 0.22 in Norway. In fact, only the Radical Rights and Conservatives in Britain match the expectation from our hypotheses. Again the Communists surprise by ranking very high. They appear as the third highest ranked in table 4.3.2, and in both their host countries (Norway and Portugal, see table 4.3.1) they have scores well over our criteria of 0.1.

Table 4.3.1 **Stimulation values per country**

	Netherl.	**Germany**	**Britain**	**Norway**	**Poland**	**Portugal**	**Mean**
Soc. Dem.	-0,03	-0,08	-0,04	-0,25	0,01	-0,05	-0,07
L. Socialists	0,20	-0,14		0,29		0,68	0,26
Communist				0,73		0,21	0,47
Green	0,49	0,52	0,74	0,86			0,65
L. Liberals	0,42				1,00		0,71
R. Liberals	0,23	0,14	0,26	0,23	0,30	-0,09	0,18
Chr. Dem.	-0,48	-0,19		-0,47	-0,27		-0,35
Agrarian				-0,39	-0,22		-0,31
Conservative			-0,10	0,22	0,20	0,02	0,09
Radical Right	0,09	0,66	-0,25	0,21	-0,08		0,13
Other parties	-0,01	0,51	-0,16	0,51	0,19	0,17	0,24
ETA	0,175	0,134	0,085	0,154	0,124	0,093	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	
N	10 143	12 980	9 624	8 239	6 503	6 484	

Table 4.3.2 **Stimulation ranked by party**

L. Liberals	0,71
Green	0,65
Communist	0,47
L. Socialists	0,26
R. Liberals	0,18
Radical Right	0,13
Conservative	0,09
Soc. Dem.	-0,07
Agrarian	-0,31
Chr. Dem.	-0,35

Table 4.3.3 **ETA Ranked by country**

Netherl.	0,175
Norway	0,154
Germany	0,134
Poland	0,124
Portugal	0,093
Britain	0,085

The ETA score are mixed (see table 4.3.3). With Portugal and Britain revealing low scores (ETA<0.1) and thus making it very unlikely that stimulation is important when determining party choice. The other countries have moderate ETA scores, with the Netherlands approaching ETA scores of 2.0. However, as with self-direction, we doubt stimulation is decisive in determining party choice. All results are significant at 1 % level (P<0.01).

We find support for our hypotheses regarding the parties whom prioritize stimulation (H3.1b, H5.1b, H6.1b and H7.1b). We also find support for our hypotheses for the Christian Democrats and the Agrarians deprioritizing stimulation (H8.2b and H9.2b). The analysis finds no convincing results for the hypotheses regarding the Conservatives and Radical Rights. Hypothesis H10.2b and H11.2b must therefore be rejected.

4.4 Hedonism

As seen in table 4.4.0, hedonism is expected to be prioritized by voters for the two parties who emphasize extensive individual freedoms and for the voters of Radical Right due to their anti-establishment attitudes. Hedonism is expected to be inherently deprioritized by the Greens, Agrarians and Christian Democrats. Since hedonism is a sin in Christian morality and mindless indulgence is by many Greens seen as a path to climate destruction.

Table 4.4.0 *Summary of hedonism hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Left Liberal (H6.1c) - Right Liberal (H7.1c) - Radical Right (H11.1c)	- Green (H5.2c) - Christian Democratic (H8.2c) - Agrarian (H9.2c)

Table 4.4.1 **Hedonism values per country**

	Netherl.	**Germany**	**Britain**	**Norway**	**Poland**	**Portugal**	**Mean**
Soc. Dem.	-0,04	0,00	0,04	-0,03	0,13	-0,10	0,00
L. Socialists	0,06	-0,01		0,03		0,83	0,23
Communist				0,22		0,13	0,17
Green	0,03	0,04	-0,21	-0,15			-0,07
L. Liberals	0,14				1,17		0,66
R. Liberals	0,16	0,05	-0,01	-0,07	0,00	-0,03	0,02
Chr. Dem.	-0,23	-0,09		-0,68	-0,34		-0,33
Agrarian				-0,23	-0,23		-0,23
Conservative			-0,05	0,17	0,24	0,11	0,12
Radical Right	0,24	0,58	-0,03	0,21	-0,30		0,14
Other parties	0,13	0,54	0,08	0,29	0,01	0,14	0,24
ETA	0,105	0,065	0,027	0,131	0,131	0,113	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,217	0,000	0,000	0,000	
N	10 144	12 980	9 623	8 230	6 504	6 477	

Table 4.4.2 **Hedonism ranked by party**

L. Liberals	0,66
L. Socialists	0,23
Communist	0,17
Radical Right	0,14
Conservative	0,12
R. Liberals	0,02
Soc. Dem.	0,00
Green	-0,07
Agrarian	-0,23
Chr. Dem.	-0,33

Table 4.4.3 **ETA Ranked by country**

Poland	0,131
Norway	0,131
Portugal	0,113
Netherl.	0,105
Germany	0,065
Britain	0,027

Table 4.4.2 confirms 4 of our 6 hypotheses. Left Liberals and Radical rights are among the top ranked with scores over 0.1. Christian Democrats and Agrarians are the two lowest ranked, passing our criteria of -0.1. The Greens and Right Liberals do not pass the 0.1 criteria. If we look at table 4.4.1 we can see that Green voters do not create a uniform pattern across the countries. Being positive in the Netherlands and Germany, and negative in Britain and Norway. This also goes for the Right Liberals, being positive in the Netherlands and Germany and negative in Britain, Norway and Portugal. Both fail at prioritizing consistently.

The ANOVA analysis of hedonism provides three unexpected results. Left Socialists, Communists and Conservatives all have a positive view of hedonism and all pass the 0.1 criteria (see table 4.4.2). If we further examine this in table 4.4.1 we see that the Conservatives are more or less consistent, passing the 0.1 criteria in all but Britain. The Communists seem to be genuine as well, passing 0.1 in both Norway and Portugal. The Left Socialists however seem to bloat because of the unusually high level of hedonism among Portuguese Left Socialist voters. None of the other Left Socialists have results passing the 0.1 criteria.

The Eta scores for Hedonism are miniscule (see table 4.4.3). Britain and Germany have very low ETA score. Britain fails to even be significant ($p>0.05$). This suggest that hedonism is irrelevant for party choice in Britain. For the other countries the scores are moderate, but are all at the low end of the spectrum ($ETA<0.150$). This makes it very unlikely that hedonism is key in determining party choice. Although, interestingly, the ETA scores are higher for Poland and Portugal than they were on the openness to change values. All countries are significant at the 1 % level ($p<0.01$), with the exception of Britain.

In conclusion, we find support for the hypotheses regarding Left Liberals, Radical Rights, Christian Democrats and Agrarians in the analyses (H6.1c, H11.1c, H8.2c and H9.2c). The hypotheses regarding Right Liberals and Greens (H7.1c and H5.2c) must be rejected due to inconsistent results.

4.5 Achievement

As seen in table 4.5.0, achievement is a value expected to predict all party families. Parties promoting permissive individuality and the idea that success is due to individual prowess are expected to attract voters prioritizing achievement. Parties which emphasize collective unity or are negative to market liberalism is expected to attract voters which deprioritize achievement.

Table 4.5.0 *Summary of achievement hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Left Liberal (H6.1d) - Right Liberal (H7.1d) - Conservative (H10.1d)	- Social Democratic (H2.2d) - Left Socialists (H3.2d) - Communist (H4.2d) - Green (H5.2d) - Christian Democratic (H8.2d) - Agrarian (H9.2d)

Viewing table 4.5.2, we see that the rankings are not entirely after expectations. Left Liberals and Right Liberals are among the top ranked both passing the 0.1 criteria. Agrarians and Christian Democrats are the two lowest ranked and also pass the -0.1 criteria. The other six parties does not pass the 0.1 criteria or behave as expected. Conservatives are fifth ranked from the top, but fall short with a score of 0.08 (see table 4.5.2). The Social Democrats and Communists fail to distinguish themselves significantly and lie close to the national means (see table 4.5.2 and 4.5.1). Greens and Left Socialists produce results widely different from expectations, by being among the three top ranked and passing the 0.1 criteria (see table 4.5.2). If we review these anomalies closer in table 4.5.1, we see that the Left Socialists are mostly divided, and that the high ranking is mainly due to Left Socialists in Norway and Portugal. The Greens however are consistent in their endorsement of achievement with most countries passing the 0.1 criteria. Norway is an exception to this, but they still give achievement a positive score (see table 4.5.1).

Table 4.5.1 **Achievement values per country**

	Netherl.	**Germany**	**Britain**	**Norway**	**Poland**	**Portugal**	**Mean**
Soc. Dem.	0,02	-0,06	0,04	-0,12	-0,05	-0,02	-0,03
L. Socialists	-0,11	-0,03		0,21		0,42	0,12
Communist				-0,02		0,03	0,01
Green	0,34	0,15	0,12	0,02			0,16
L. Liberals	0,39				0,45		0,42
R. Liberals	0,27	0,18	0,09	0,25	-0,09	-0,04	0,11
Chr. Dem.	-0,36	-0,06		-0,21	-0,14		-0,19
Agrarian				-0,24	-0,13		-0,18
Conservative			-0,07	0,25	0,16	-0,04	0,08
Radical Right	0,05	0,21	-0,49	-0,14	-0,10		-0,09
Other parties	-0,12	0,13	-0,15	0,11	0,05	0,11	0,03
ETA	0,151	0,052	0,046	0,108	0,083	0,066	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,001	0,000	0,000	0,000	
N	10 141	12 982	9 631	8 240	6 506	6 486	

Table 4.5.2 **Achievement ranked by party**

L. Liberals	0,42
Green	0,16
L. Socialists	0,12
R. Liberals	0,11
Conservative	0,08
Communist	0,01
Soc. Dem.	-0,03
Radical Right	-0,09
Agrarian	-0,18
Chr. Dem.	-0,19

Table 4.5.3 **ETA Ranked by country**

Netherl.	0,151
Norway	0,108
Poland	0,083
Portugal	0,066
Germany	0,052
Britain	0,046

The ETA coefficients are marginal for the achievement analysis. Germany, Britain, Poland and Portugal have low scores (ETA<0.1). Norway is moderate, barely passing 0.100. The Netherlands have an acceptable moderate ETA score (ETA=0.151). In summary, these correlations are comparatively low and make it very unlikely that achievement is a value which is key in determining party choice. The low correlations and the unexpected rankings might indicate that achievement is not as strongly associated with a market liberalism as originally theorized. This is further indicated through the endorsement given by voters for clearly market sceptic parties such as the Left Socialists. All results are significant at the 1 % level (P<0.01).

In conclusion, we find support for our hypotheses regarding Left Liberals, Right Liberals, Agrarians and Christian Democrats (H6.1d, H7.1d, H8.2d and H9.2d). We did not find satisfactory support for our hypotheses on Conservatives, Social Democrats, Left Socialists, Communists and Greens (H10.1d, H2.2d, H3.2d, H4.2d and H5.2d). These must therefore be rejected.

4.6 Power

We expect that power is value which predicts all parties mainly due to its connection to market liberalism (left-right economic dimension). Parties that promote self-accretion of resources and prestige are expected to attract power votes. Radical Right voters are expected to prioritize power due to power promoting strong state (attracts nationalist voters). Parties that are sceptic to the market, believe selfish accretion of resources are in part to blame for climate destruction or are highly collectivist, are expected to attract voters that deprioritize power.

Table 4.6.0 *Summary of power hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Right Liberal (H7.1e) - Conservative (H10.1e) - Radical Right (H11.1e)	- Social Democratic (H2.2e) - Left Socialists (H3.2e) - Communist (H4.2e) - Green (H5.2e) - Left Liberal (H6.2e) - Christian Democratic (H8.2e) - Agrarian (H9.2e)

Table 4.6.1 **Power values per country**

	Netherl.	Germany	Britain	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Mean
Soc. Dem.	-0,15	-0,07	0,01	-0,14	-0,07	0,05	-0,06
L. Socialists	-0,29	-0,14		-0,17		-0,13	-0,18
Communist				-0,44		-0,12	-0,28
Green	-0,14	0,06	-0,41	-0,31			-0,20
L. Liberals	0,15				0,20		0,18
R. Liberals	0,44	0,22	-0,09	0,06	-0,40	-0,01	0,04
Chr. Dem.	-0,13	0,03		-0,20	0,08		-0,06
Agrarian				-0,12	0,07		-0,02
Conservative			0,08	0,38	-0,05	0,03	0,11
Radical Right	0,17	0,15	-0,07	0,03	0,22		0,10
Other parties	-0,29	-0,22	-0,16	-0,24	-0,15	-0,12	-0,24
ETA	0,158	0,057	0,054	0,152	0,060	0,039	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,002	0,072	
N	10 139	12 975	9 629	8 235	6 500	6 474	

4.6.2 **Power ranked by party**

L. Liberals	0,18
Conservative	0,11
Radical Right	0,10
R. Liberals	0,04
Agrarian	-0,02
Chr. Dem.	-0,06
Soc. Dem.	-0,06
L. Socialists	-0,18
Green	-0,20
Communist	-0,28

4.6.3 **ETA Ranked by country**

Netherl.	0,158
Norway	0,152
Poland	0,060
Germany	0,057
Britain	0,054
Portugal	0,039

The analysis provides support for five of our hypotheses. Conservatives and Radical Rights are both among the top ranked with scores passing the 0.1 criteria (see table 4.6.2). Likewise, Left Socialists, Greens and Communists pass the -0.1 mark and are the three lowest ranked. Right Liberals fail to the pass the 0.1 criteria, as goes for the Agrarians, Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. Albeit some of these has the correct positive or negative prioritization as outlined in their hypotheses. Left Liberals appear as the highest ranked in table 4.6.2, which is in contradiction to what our hypothesis expected.

Viewing table 4.6.1 we can see that the Left Liberals are uniformly positive to power. As for those parties that failed to pass the 0.1 criteria in table 4.6.2, we can see that these parties have mixed relations with power. Half of the Right Liberals are positive to power, while the other half is negative. This half and half relation is present in the Christian Democrats and Agrarians as well. The Social Democrats are mostly negative to power, with the Dutch and the Norwegians even passing the -0.1 criteria. The British and Portuguese Social Democrats have positive scores but deviate little from their national average. The hypothesis regarding the social democrats is plausible, due to the majority of voters deprioritize it.

The ETA coefficients are again marginal (see table 4.6.3). Germany, Britain, Poland and Portugal has low ETA scores (ETA<0.100). The Dutch and Norwegians have moderate scores of roughly 0.150, these are acceptable scores, but they are comparably low. Portugal fail to provide results valid at the 5 % level ($p<0.05$, see table 4.6.3), making power irrelevant for party choice in Portugal. The low ETA scores signify that power is on its own a poor predictor for determining party choice.

The ANOVA analysis provides support for our hypotheses regarding Conservatives, Radical Rights, Left Socialist, Communists and Greens (H10.1e, H11.1e, H3.2e, H4.2e and H5.2e). We did not find satisfactory results for Right Liberals, Left Liberals, Christian Democrats and Agrarians (H7.1e, H6.2e, H8.2e and H9.2e). These hypotheses must therefore be rejected. The hypothesis regarding the Social Democrats (H2.2e) is regarded as plausible, since it fails to meet the -0.1 criteria, but their voters seems to mostly deprioritize power as expected.

4.7 Security

Security is perhaps one of the most central personal values. It is possible to connect it to all of the party families. It is expected to be prioritized by voters for parties desiring to keep the status quo and protect their current lifestyles from outside threats, whether these be economical, militarily or criminally. Parties who discourage military action or desire a more open and inclusive society are expected to attract voters who deprioritize security.

Table 4.7.0 *Summary of security hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Social Democratic (H2.1f) - Christian Democratic (H8.1f) - Agrarian (H9.1f) - Conservative (H10.1f) - Radical Right (H11.1f)	- Left Socialists (H3.2f) - Communist (H4.2f) - Green (H5.2f) - Left Liberal (H6.2f) - Right Liberal (H7.2f)

The ANOVA analysis confirms the majority of our hypotheses. In table 4.7.2, Radical Rights, Christian Democrats and Agrarians are among the top three ranked, all passing the 0.1 criteria. All deprioritize parties pass the -0.1 criteria. Social democrats fail to pass the 0.1 mark, while the Conservatives has a negative score, opposite of what we expected.

Looking at table 4.7.1 we see that in most cases, people who vote for the same party family are congruent in how to prioritize security. For example, all Radical Rights prioritize security more than their national averages. Similarly, the majority of Right Liberals deprioritize security. It seems the majority of party voters are in agreement of how to prioritize security. It also seems to be a polarizing value, as seen in table 4.7.2, voters distinctively prioritize or deprioritize security.

Social Democrats are largely positive to security, with Germans and Norwegians achieving score over 0.1. Social Democrats in other countries fail to deviate too much from their national average (see table 4.7.1). Again we see the Conservatives being indecisive on how to prioritize a personal value. Britain and Portugal has a positive relations to security, while Norway and Poland has a clear negative association, even passing the -0.1 criteria.

Table 4.7.1 **Security values per country**

	Netherl.	Germany	Britain	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Mean
Soc. Dem.	-0,01	0,12	0,06	0,30	0,08	0,01	0,09
L. Socialists	-0,24	0,11		-0,42		-0,40	-0,24
Communist				-0,73		-0,12	-0,43
Green	-0,68	-0,79	-0,76	-1,08			-0,83
L. Liberals	-0,50				-0,87		-0,69
R. Liberals	-0,07	-0,18	-0,37	-0,49	-0,03	0,07	-0,18
Chr. Dem.	0,31	0,23		0,14	0,16		0,21
Agrarian				0,15	0,08		0,11
Conservative			0,12	-0,29	-0,17	0,01	-0,08
Radical Right	0,41	0,07	0,67	0,21	0,17		0,31
Other parties	0,04	-0,19	0,18	-0,24	-0,11	-0,08	-0,08
ETA	0,187	0,193	0,134	0,178	0,120	0,071	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	
N	10 144	12 982	9 620	8 237	6 507	6 484	

Table 4.7.2 **Security ranked by party**

Radical Right	0,31
Chr. Dem.	0,21
Agrarian	0,11
Soc. Dem.	0,09
Conservative	-0,08
R. Liberals	-0,18
L. Socialists	-0,24
Communist	-0,43
L. Liberals	-0,69
Green	-0,83

Table 4.7.3 **ETA Ranked by country**

Germany	0,193
Netherl.	0,187
Norway	0,178
Britain	0,134
Poland	0,120
Portugal	0,071

The ETA coefficients are approaching satisfactory levels. The Dutch, Germans, British and Norwegians have moderate ETA scores at the top end of the spectrum (0.150<ETA<0.200). Only Portugal has a low ETA score (ETA<0.100). The correlations for security surpass the ETA scores seen so far in this chapter. Since security has provided higher ETA scores than other values thus far, it seems more likely that security is a key value in determining party choice. This is further supported by all countries having p scores below the 1 % level (P<0.01) and eight out of ten parties provide satisfactory results according to our hypotheses.

In conclusion, the analysis supports eight of our hypothesis (H8.1f, H9.1f, H11.1f, H3.2f, H4.2f, H5.2f, H6.2f and H7.2f). The hypotheses regarding Conservatives failed to provide satisfactory results and must therefore be rejected (H10.1f). The Social Democrats fail to reach the 0.1 criteria, but their voters are predominantly positive to security across the different countries, we therefore regard H2.1f as plausible. The consistency of how the voters prioritized security and the relative high ETA scores signify that security is a value which might be decisive in determining party choice.

4.8 Conformity

Conformity has the same expectations as security (with the exception of Social Democrats) since it is a part of the same conflict dimensions. It is expected to be prioritized by voters for parties desiring to keep the status quo and protect their current lifestyles. Parties who desire a more open and inclusive society and more permissive individuality are expected to attract voters who deprioritize conformity.

Table 4.8.0 *Summary of conformity hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Christian Democratic (H8.1g) - Agrarian (H9.1g) - Conservative (H10.1g) - Radical Right (H11.1g)	- Left Socialists (H3.2g) - Communist (H4.2g) - Green (H5.2g) - Left Liberal (H6.2g) - Right Liberal (H7.2g)

Table 4.8.1 **Conformity values per country**

	Netherl.	**Germany**	**Britain**	**Norway**	**Poland**	**Portugal**	**Mean**
Soc. Dem.	-0,09	0,06	-0,04	0,16	0,10	0,11	0,05
L. Socialists	-0,36	0,02		-0,48		-0,86	-0,42
Communist				-1,21		-0,19	-0,70
Green	-0,68	-0,76	-0,75	-1,36			-0,89
L. Liberals	-0,48				-1,01		-0,75
R. Liberals	0,00	0,01	-0,26	-0,37	0,07	0,05	-0,08
Chr. Dem.	0,54	0,29		0,66	0,18		0,42
Agrarian				0,19	0,23		0,21
Conservative			0,20	-0,08	-0,22	-0,08	-0,04
Radical Right	-0,09	-0,27	0,23	-0,04	0,23		0,01
Other parties	-0,21	-0,62	0,22	-0,60	-0,19	-0,22	-0,32
ETA	0,220	0,172	0,102	0,182	0,142	0,123	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	
N	10 144	12 975	9 626	8 238	6 502	6 478	

Table 4.8.2 **Conformity ranked by party**

Chr. Dem.	0,42
Agrarian	0,21
Soc. Dem.	0,05
Radical Right	0,01
Conservative	-0,04
R. Liberals	-0,08
L. Socialists	-0,42
Communist	-0,70
L. Liberals	-0,75
Green	-0,89

Table 4.8.3 **ETA Ranked by country**

Netherl.	0,220
Norway	0,182
Germany	0,172
Poland	0,142
Portugal	0,123
Britain	0,102

Looking at table 4.8.2 we see that the Christian Democrats and the Agrarians are the two top ranked party families, both passing the 0.1 criteria. Left Socialist, Communists, Left Liberals and Greens are the four lowest ranked with scores below -0.1. Radical Rights, Conservatives and Right Liberals fail to meet the required 0.1 score, and Conservatives have yet again scores which are contradictory to what we expected in our hypotheses.

If we view this closer in table 4.8.1, Conservatives are mostly in agreement about conformity, however, they (with the exception of British Conservatives) largely deprioritize conformity. The Radical Rights fail to show any uniform relationship to conformity, British and Polish Conservatives prioritize conformity, while Dutch, Germans and Norwegians deprioritize it. Right Liberals also fail to show a uniform relation to conformity. While British and Norwegian Right Liberals are predominantly against it compared to their national average, the other Right Liberals in our sample has a positive score.

The ETA coefficients are, as in security, much higher than in the previous value analyses (see table 4.8.3). The lowest being in Britain and Portugal (0.102 and 0.123) and the highest in the Netherlands and Norway (0.220 and 0.182). The Netherlands has a high ETA score (ETA>0.200) and the rest have a moderate score (ETA>0.100), with many being at the high end of the spectrum. Portugal and Poland has high ETA score in comparison to the ETA scores they had for the individualistic personal values. The fact that conformity has comparatively high correlations, makes it plausible that conformity is one of the most important values in determining party choice. All results are significant at the 1 % level (P<0.01).

The ANOVA analysis gives support to our six hypotheses regarding Christian Democrats, Agrarians, Left Socialists, Communist, Greens and Left Liberals (H8.1g, H9.1g, H3.2g, H4.2g, H5.2g and H6.2g). The analysis does not give satisfactory results regarding the Conservatives, Radical Rights and Right Liberals. Their hypotheses must therefore be rejected (H10.1g, H11.1g and H7.2g).

4.9 Tradition

We have the same expectations for traditions as we had for conformity. It is expected to be prioritized by voters for parties desiring to keep the status quo and protect valued customs and traditions. Parties who desire a more open and inclusive society, more permissive individuality and general personal freedom are expected to attract voters who deprioritize conformity.

Table 4.9.0 *Summary of tradition hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Christian Democratic (H8.1h) - Agrarian (H9.1h) - Conservative (H10.1h) - Radical Right (H11.1h)	- Left Socialists (H3.2h) - Communist (H4.2h) - Green (H5.2h) - Left Liberal (H6.2h) - Right Liberal (H7.2h)

Table 4.9.2 provides support for 8 of our nine hypotheses. Agrarians and Christian Democrats are ranked highest with scores far surpassing our 0.1 criteria. Likewise, Right Liberals, Left Socialists, Greens, Communists and Left Liberals are ranked lowest, also far surpassing the -0.1 criteria. The analysis finds no support regarding the Conservatives, and their score is again negative, contrary to what is expected by our hypothesis.

Further insight is provided by table 4.9.1. Conservatives are divided, with the British and Portuguese prioritizing tradition, while Norwegian and Polish Conservatives deprioritize it in comparison to their national mean. The remaining parties are largely in agreement on how to prioritize tradition. We see a similar pattern to what we saw for security. That voters for party families across all the six countries are consistent in how they prioritize tradition. For example all Left Socialists, Communists, Greens and Left Liberals score tradition negatively (see table 4.9.1). All Right Liberals are also negative (with the exception of Portugal). Similarly all Christian Democrats and Agrarians score it positively.

Table 4.9.1 **Tradition values per country**

	Netherl.	Germany	Britain	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Mean
Soc. Dem.	-0,09	-0,02	-0,06	0,09	-0,20	0,07	-0,04
L. Socialists	-0,35	-0,12		-0,62		-1,08	-0,54
Communist				-1,27		-0,18	-0,73
Green	-0,71	-0,62	-0,38	-0,74			-0,61
L. Liberals	-0,58				-1,19		-0,88
R. Liberals	-0,33	-0,06	-0,25	-0,39	-0,34	0,13	-0,21
Chr. Dem.	0,79	0,35		0,72	0,43		0,57
Agrarian				0,70	0,47		0,59
Conservative			0,19	-0,20	-0,36	0,02	-0,09
Radical Right	-0,05	-0,17	0,11	0,13	0,55		0,11
Other parties	-0,13	-0,47	0,25	-0,39	0,12	-0,27	-0,18
ETA	0,281	0,173	0,096	0,214	0,235	0,162	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	
N	10 142	12 981	9 628	8 231	6 512	6 491	

Table 4.9.2 **Tradition ranked by party**

Agrarian	0,59
Chr. Dem.	0,57
Radical Right	0,11
Soc. Dem.	-0,04
Conservative	-0,09
R. Liberals	-0,21
L. Socialists	-0,54
Green	-0,61
Communist	-0,73
L. Liberals	-0,88

Table 4.9.3 **ETA Ranked by country**

Netherl.	0,281
Poland	0,235
Norway	0,214
Germany	0,173
Portugal	0,162
Britain	0,096

The analysis of tradition provides the thus far highest ETA coefficients (see table 4.9.3). The Netherlands, Norway and Poland all have high ETA scores (ETA>0.200). Germany and Portugal has moderate ETA score (ETA<0.200), but both have scores are at the high end of the spectrum (0.150<ETA<0.200). Britain has a low score (ETA<0.100). The exceptionally high ETA scores signify that tradition is most likely one of the strongest determinants in deciding party choice among Schwartz's values (the exception being Britain). All results are significant at the 1 % level ($p<0.01$). The ETA scores have been comparably high across all the three conservation values. This might be an indication that these values are the strongest determinants for party choice.

The ANOVA analysis for tradition provides support for our hypotheses regarding the Christian Democrats, Agrarians, Radical Rights, Left Socialists, Communists, Greens, Left Liberals and Right Liberals (H8.1h, H9.1h, H11.1h, H3.2h, H4.2h, H5.2h, H6.2h and H7.2h). The analysis finds contrary results to what was expected of Conservative voters, therefore this hypothesis must be rejected (H10.1h).

4.10 Benevolence

Benevolence is expected to be prioritized by voters who are a part of a community with high in-group mentality or adhere to the left on the economic scale due to its emphasis on egalitarianism. Those who deprioritize are expected to be individualistic and reject helping others due to their faults are their own to bear and fix.

Table 4.10.0 *Summary of benevolence hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Social Democratic (H2.1i) - Left Socialists (H3.1i) - Communist (H4.1i) - Christian Democratic (H8.1i) - Agrarian (H9.1i)	- Right Liberal (H7.2i) - Conservative (H10.2i) - Radical Right (H11.2i)

Table 4.10.1 **Benevolence values per country**

	Netherl.	**Germany**	**Britain**	**Norway**	**Poland**	**Portugal**	**Mean**
Soc. Dem.	0,07	0,02	0,00	0,06	-0,03	0,02	0,02
L. Socialists	0,20	0,14		0,00		-0,10	0,06
Communist				0,10		-0,02	0,04
Green	0,02	0,11	0,01	-0,17			-0,01
L. Liberals	-0,05				-0,18		-0,12
R. Liberals	-0,21	-0,14	0,08	-0,09	0,10	0,00	-0,04
Chr. Dem.	0,04	-0,06		0,14	0,03		0,04
Agrarian				-0,14	-0,03		-0,08
Conservative			-0,04	-0,09	0,01	-0,03	-0,04
Radical Right	-0,02	-0,32	0,01	0,02	-0,06		-0,07
Other parties	0,05	0,10	-0,07	-0,08	0,00	-0,07	-0,01
ETA	0,101	0,078	0,034	0,065	0,031	0,025	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,047	0,000	0,511	0,541	
N	10 146	12 975	9 627	8 233	6 508	6 489	

Table 4.10.2 **Benevolence ranked by party**

L. Socialists	0,06
Communist	0,04
Chr. Dem.	0,04
Soc. Dem.	0,02
Green	-0,01
Conservative	-0,04
R. Liberals	-0,04
Radical Right	-0,07
Agrarian	-0,08
L. Liberals	-0,12

Table 4.10.3 **ETA Ranked by country**

Netherl.	0,101
Germany	0,078
Norway	0,065
Britain	0,034
Poland	0,031
Portugal	0,025

The ANOVA analysis provides no support for any of the theorized hypotheses. In fact, only Left Liberals fulfil the -0.1 criteria, but we provided no hypothesis on benevolence regarding this party. The rankings in table 4.10.2 are somewhat what was expected by the hypotheses. Left Socialist, Communist, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats are the top ranked. Right Liberals, Conservatives and Radical Rights are ranked among the lower end. The Agrarians are ranked opposite of what we expected.

Table 4.10.1 provides further information. While there are a few exceptions (such as the Radical Rights in Germany or the Christian Democrats in Norway), most parties deviate very little from the national average. Left Socialists and Right Liberals are the only parties which has more than one score which passes the 0.1 criteria. However, these are negated by the voters in the other countries which has an opposite direction on their score or deviate little from the national average.

The ETA coefficients for benevolence are extremely low. With no country achieving a correlation above 0.102 (see table 4.10.3). Only the Netherlands, Germany and Norway has p-scores valid at the 1 % level ($p<0.01$) (table 4.10.1). While Britain is valid at 5 % ($p<0.05$), Poland and Portugal has such high p-scores that they must be considered insignificant. The unsatisfactory ranking results, together with the low ETA coefficients and insignificant results, suggests benevolence, on its own, has very little sway in determining party choice. Rather, benevolence seems to be a value which the large majority of voters can agree upon, and therefore seems to be insignificant in determining party choice. The ANOVA analysis provides no satisfactory support for any of the hypotheses, they must all be rejected (H2.1i, H3.1i, H4.1i, H8.1i, H9.1i, H7.2i, H10.2i and H11.2i).

4.11 Universalism

Universalism is expected to be prioritized among voters who value economic egalitarianism and welfare for all and those who value the environment (Left in the economic dimension and New Politics towards environmentalism). Universalism is expected to be deprioritize by voters for parties which promote a highly individualistic lifestyle and general self-empowerment over collective-empowerment.

Table 4.11.0 *Summary of universalism hypotheses*

Prioritize	Deprioritize
- Social Democratic (H2.1j) - Left Socialists (H3.1j) - Communist (H4.1j) - Green (H5.1j)	- Right Liberals (H7.2j) - Conservative (H10.2j) - Radical Right (H11.2j)

The ANOVA analysis ranking presented in table 4.11.2 ranks Greens, Communists and Left Socialists the highest, with all passing the 0.1 criteria. Conservatives and Radical Rights are the three lowest ranked, also these passing the -0.1 criteria. Social Democrats and the Right Liberals fail to pass their 0.1 criteria.

As evident in table 4.11.1. Right Liberals are divided on how to prioritize universalism. The British, Norwegian and Polish score is positive, but the Dutch, German and Portuguese score it negatively. The majority of Social Democratic voters seem to score universalism positively, but they deviate marginally from their national average.

The ETA coefficients provide a mix of high and low correlations (see table 4.11.3). The Netherlands, Germany and Norway all have high ETA scores (ETA>0.200). The Netherlands and Norway are almost approaching 0.300. Britain has a moderate ETA score (ETA<0.200), but in comparison to the British ETA scores for other persona values, it can be considered high ETA. In fact, an ETA score of 0.156 is the highest ETA score Britain has produced in the entire analyses. Poland and Portugal has ETA scores (ETA<0.100). All results are significant at the 1 % level ($p<0.01$), with the exception of Portugal which is only accepted at the 5 % level ($p>0.05$, see table 4.11.1). It seems universalism is a key value in determining party choice in the Netherlands, Germany, Britain and Norway, but is minor in Poland and Portugal.

Table 4.11.1 **Universalism values per country**

	Netherl.	**Germany**	**Britain**	**Norway**	**Poland**	**Portugal**	**Mean**
Soc. Dem.	0,22	0,04	0,03	0,07	-0,02	-0,01	0,06
L. Socialists	0,42	0,16		0,63		0,15	0,34
Communist				1,25		0,10	0,68
Green	0,61	0,59	0,79	1,30			0,82
L. Liberals	0,16				-0,06		0,05
R. Liberals	-0,39	-0,22	0,29	0,44	0,13	-0,03	0,04
Chr. Dem.	-0,10	-0,23		0,21	0,04		-0,02
Agrarian				0,05	-0,05		0,00
Conservative			-0,21	-0,32	0,03	-0,11	-0,15
Radical Right	-0,53	-0,68	-0,28	-0,51	-0,21		-0,44
Other parties	0,29	-0,03	-0,10	0,18	-0,04	0,05	0,07
ETA	0,281	0,227	0,156	0,287	0,059	0,048	
Sig. (p)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,002	0,011	
N	10 144	12 986	9 631	8 245	6 510	6 486	

Table 4.11.2 **Universalism ranked by party**

Green	0,82
Communist	0,68
L. Socialists	0,34
Soc. Dem.	0,06
L. Liberals	0,05
R. Liberals	0,04
Agrarian	0,00
Chr. Dem.	-0,02
Conservative	-0,15
Radical Right	-0,44

Table 4.11.3 **ETA Ranked by country**

Norway	0,287
Netherl.	0,281
Germany	0,227
Britain	0,156
Poland	0,059
Portugal	0,048

The ANOVA analysis provides support for hypotheses regarding Left Socialists, Communists, Greens, Conservatives and Radical Rights (H3.1j, H4.1j, H5.1j, H10.2j, H11.2j). Right Liberals do not provide satisfactory results and must therefore be rejected (H2.1j and H7.2j). Social Democrats do not pass the 0.1 criteria, but they give universalism a positive mean score in the majority of the countries. Hypothesis H2.1j is therefore plausible.

4.12 Cross comparison of ETA coefficients

Table 4.12.0 summarizes the ETA coefficients provided by all the former ANOVA analyses in section 4.2 to section 4.11. Table 4.12.1 ranks the means of the scores presented in 4.12.0 on personal values. It confirms the pattern we witnessed in the previous sections. That benevolence, hedonism and the self-enhancement values correlated to a small degree with party choice. These correlations are on average less than 0.100. Even though we could see clear differences in prioritizations among the individual party families, the low ETA scores tells us that these values are not key in determining their party choice. Table 4.12.1 presents the conservation values and universalism as the strongest correlations on average, followed by the openness to change values. All of these have on average correlations over 0.100, and in the case of conformity, universalism and tradition, the correlations are over 0.150 on average.

ETA coefficients seem to suggest that collectivist values provides the highest amount of explanation for party choice. Tradition, universalism and conformity are the only values which achieved correlations of over 0.200 in their respective countries (see table 4.12.0). Tradition and universalism were among the two values which voters for party families across the six countries prioritized most similarly (together with security). There were few instances where voters for a party family did not all agree to rate these values positively or negatively.

Table 4.12.2 presents the ranked means of all the ETA scores on the six countries. With the Netherlands and Norway ranked the highest and Britain and Portugal the lowest. Interestingly, the correlations seem to follow the expectations of hypothesis H1.1, which stated that personal values explains party choice more strongly the more parties are available for the electorate. The Netherlands is well known for having a fragmented party system, furthermore, Britain is known for is majoritarian party system with few viable party options. However, correlations are not the same as explained variance, the multinomial logistic regression model is needed for this.

Table 4.12.0 **ETA coefficients comparison by country**

	Self-direction	**Stimulation**	**Hedonism**	**Achievement**	**Power**	**Security**	**Conformity**	**Tradition**	**Benevolence**	**Universalism**	**Mean**
Netherl.	0,165	0,175	0,105	0,151	0,158	0,187	0,220	0,281	0,101	0,281	*0,183*
Germany	0,124	0,134	0,065	0,052	0,057	0,193	0,172	0,173	0,078	0,227	*0,127*
Britain	0,054	0,085	0,027	0,046	0,054	0,134	0,102	0,096	0,034	0,156	*0,079*
Norway	0,135	0,154	0,131	0,108	0,152	0,178	0,182	0,214	0,065	0,287	*0,161*
Poland	0,120	0,124	0,131	0,083	0,060	0,120	0,142	0,235	0,031	0,059	*0,111*
Portugal	0,095	0,093	0,113	0,066	0,039	0,071	0,123	0,162	0,025	0,048	*0,084*
Mean	*0,116*	*0,127*	*0,095*	*0,084*	*0,087*	*0,147*	*0,157*	*0,193*	*0,056*	*0,176*	

Table 4.12.1 **ETA mean ranked by value**

Tradition	0,193
Universalism	0,176
Conformity	0,157
Security	0,147
Stimulation	0,127
Self-Direction	0,116
Hedonism	0,095
Power	0,087
Achievement	0,084
Benevolence	0,056

Table 4.12.2 **ETA mean ranked by country**

Netherl.	0,183
Norway	0,161
Germany	0,127
Poland	0,111
Portugal	0,084
Britain	0,079

4.13 Explanatory power of the personal values

Table 4.13.0 presents the results from the multinomial logistic regression models. To summarize, Model 1 (M1) determines party choice by the ten personal values. Model 2 (M2), determines party choice by the demographic variables. Model 3 (M3) includes both demographic and personal values as predictors for party choice.

Viewing table 4.13.0, the highest explained variance in M1 are in the Netherlands, Norway and Germany. Roughly 20 % (0.199) of the variance in party choice is explained by personal values alone in the Netherlands, 18 % (0.184) in Norway and 12 % (0.119) in Germany. Personal values explain less than 10 % variance in party choice in Britain, Poland and Portugal. Demographic variables (see M2) provide the highest amount of explanation in Norway, the Netherlands and Poland (13 %, 10 % and 9 % respectively). While it provides the least in Germany, Portugal and Britain (8 %, 7 % and 5 % respectively). On average, personal values alone (M1) explain 12 % of the variance in party choice, while demographic variables (M2) explain 9 %.

Table 4.13.0 **Explanatory power of personal values and demographic variables on party choice**

	Netherl.	Germany	Britain	Norway	Poland	Portugal
Model 1	0,199	0,119	0,061	0,184	0,096	0,047
Model 2	0,102	0,075	0,049	0,134	0,091	0,067
Model 3	0,246	0,158	0,103	0,260	0,145	0,090
Effective number of parties	7,7	4,3	3,9	5,3	4,5	3,9
N (1)	10124	12944	9603	8214	6472	6432
N (2)	10294	12996	9655	8685	6516	6502
N (3)	10106	12876	9431	8197	6458	6429

Notes: Presents Nagelkerke R^2 as estimates for explained variance. Model 1 - only the ten personal values as independent variables; model 2 - only the demographic variables, gender, age and education; model 3 - all variables, personal values and demographic variables. Effective number of parties based on Knutsen 2018:244 and Bertóa 2016.

M3 includes both personal values and demographic values in the same model. The combined model explains the most in Norway (26 %) and the Netherlands (25 %). It provides the least explanation in Portugal (9 %) and Britain (10 %). The Combination of both personal values and demographic variables (M3) increases the total explanatory power from M1 by an average of 5 % (Δ Nagelkerke R^2 NL=0.047 GER=0.039 GB=0.042 NOR=0.076 POL=0.049

POR=0.043). This is on average equal to a 32 % increase from personal values alone (100 % = Model 1).

However, M1 and M3 presented in table 4.13.0 can be misleading. Since demographic variables come before personal values in a chain of causation, personal values is in part affected by the demographic variables. Personal values and demographic variables will therefore have some shared explanation on party choice apart from their unique influence. This shared explanation is the amount of explanatory power that personal values mediates from the demographic variables. Therefore, a portion of the effect from personal values can be spurious. If we want to find the unique affect from personal values, we must control for the demographic variables.

Table 4.13.1 **Explanatory power of personal values when controlled for demographic variables**

	Netherl.	Germany	Britain	Norway	Poland	Portugal
Model 2	0,102	0,075	0,049	0,134	0,091	0,067
Model 1c2	0,144	0,083	0,054	0,126	0,054	0,023
% of M2	141	111	110	94	59	34

Notes: Presents Nagelkerke R^2 as estimates for explained variance. Model 2 - only the demographic variables, gender, age and education; Model 1v2 - personal values after it has been controlled for demographic variables (M3-M2=M1c2); % of M1 - amount of variance explained by M1v2 in comparison to M2 (100 % = M2).

Table 4.13.1 presents the explained variance from personal values, controlled for demographic variables (Model 1c2, hence forth M1c2). We see in table 4.13.1 that a portion of the affect from personal values was in fact spurious. Personal values remain the most influential in the two most fragmented democracies, the Netherlands and Norway. However, the estimate is now reduced. Where uncontrolled personal values in the Netherlands had close to 20 % explained variance (see M1 in table 4.13.0), they now have 14 % (see M1c2 in table 4.13.1). Likewise, Norway had the explained variance from personal values reduced from 18 % to 13 % after the control (see M1 table 4.13.0 and M1c2 table 4.13.1). Portugal remains the country in which personal values provide the least explanation for party choice. The explained variance from personal values is reduced to 2 % from 5 %. Interestingly, the control reveals that personal values provide the same amount of unique explanation in Britain and

Poland (5 %, see M1c2 table 4.13.1). This is different from what we saw in table 4.13.0, in which personal values clearly provided more explanation in Poland than in Britain.

% of M2 in table 4.13.1 compares the explained variance from controlled personal values (M1c2) to the demographic model (M2). In this comparison, 100 % equals M2. We see that personal values provide more explanation than demographic variables in the Netherlands, Germany and Britain. In Norway, Poland and Portugal, demographic variables provides better explanation.

The analyses show the same pattern as suggested from table 4.12.2, that personal values give more explanation the more parties there are to choose from. We find support for our hypothesis that the explanatory power of personal values increases with more fragmented party systems (H1.1). In table 4.13.0, the two countries with the most fragmented party systems, the Netherlands and Norway, has the highest absolute explanatory power. Portugal and Britain has the least fragmented party systems and personal values also provide the least explanation in these countries. When we control for demographic variables in table 4.13.1, these rankings do not change. The Netherlands and Norway still has the highest absolute explanatory power and Britain and Portugal has the lowest.

It is worth mentioning, that the comparison in table 4.13.1 revealed that demographic variables was in fact a better predictor than personal values in the case of Norway. Similarly, personal values was a better predictor than demographic variables in Britain. This does not however reject our hypothesis. H1.1 expects the explanatory power from personal values increase with more fragmentation. We made no predictions on whether personal values provided more explanation than demographic variables.

Germany and Poland are ambiguous cases. Both has roughly the same effective number of parties but differ significantly on the explanatory power provided by personal values (see table 4.13.0 and table 4.13.1). Personal values seem to be more relevant in Germany than in Poland. This is visible by the fact that Poland provides the same amount of explanation for personal values as Britain, while Germany is closer to Norway and the Netherlands. In addition, the Netherlands, Germany and Norway are the only three countries which have been significant at the 1 % ($p<0.01$) across all the personal values analyses in section 4.2 through 4.11.

5.0 Discussion

This thesis sought out to see, “to what degree can Schwartz’s basic personal values explain party choice?”. We sought to expand on three concepts previously unexplored in the literature. First, the relationship between personal values and party family choice. Second, whether this relationship was universal across party families across different countries. Third, the predictability of personal values onto party family choice. Our final chapter summarizes all results found in our analyses. On how well the personal values were able to identify voters according to party families, how our results compare to earlier research and whether personal values are good predictors for party choice.

5.1 On the prediction of party family from personal values

The general hypothesis of this thesis expected the voters of the same party family to share the same value priorities (H1.0). Following this line of reasoning, we outlined 20 hypotheses (two for each party family) upon which value priorities the party’s electorate would have. The intent were to use the electorate’s value priority relative to their national average in addition to the ETA coefficients as measurements for how likely it is that these values are key in determining their party choice. A summary of the results regarding the party family hypotheses is provided in table 5.1.

Table 5.1 *Summary of the results regarding the party family hypotheses*

Notes: **Bold**=Supported, *Italic*=Plausible and ~~crossed~~=rejected

Party family	Prioritized (Hx.1)	Deprioritized (Hx.2)
Social Democratic (H2)	*(f) Security* ~~(i) Benevolence~~ *(j) Universalism*	~~(d) Achievement~~ *(e) Power*
Left Socialists (H3)	**(a) Self-direction** **(b) Stimulation** ~~(i) Benevolence~~ **(j) Universalism**	~~(d) Achievement~~ **(e) Power** **(f) Security** **(g) Conformity** **(h) Tradition**
Communist (H4)	~~(i) Benevolence~~ **(j) Universalism**	~~(d) Achievement~~ **(e) Power** **(f) Security** **(g) Conformity** **(h) Tradition**
Green (H5)	**(a) Self-direction** **(b) Stimulation** **(j) Universalism**	~~(c) Hedonism~~ ~~(d) Achievement~~ **(e) Power** **(f) Security** **(g) Conformity** **(h) Tradition**
Left Liberal (H6)	**(a) Self-direction** **(b) Stimulation** **(c) Hedonism** **(d) Achievement**	~~(e) Power~~ **(f) Security** **(g) Conformity** **(h) Tradition**
Right Liberal (H7)	**(a) Self-direction** **(b) Stimulation** ~~(c) Hedonism~~ **(d) Achievement** ~~(e) Power~~	**(f) Security** ~~(g) Conformity~~ **(h) Tradition** ~~(i) Benevolence~~ ~~(j) Universalism~~
Christian Democratic (H8)	**(f) Security** **(g) Conformity** **(h) Tradition** ~~(i) Benevolence~~	**(a) Self-direction** **(b) Stimulation** **(c) Hedonism** **(d) Achievement** ~~(e) Power~~
Agrarian (H9)	**(f) Security** **(g) Conformity** **(h) Tradition** ~~(i) Benevolence~~	*(a) Self-direction* **(b) Stimulation** **(c) Hedonism** **(d) Achievement** ~~(e) Power~~
Conservative (H10)	~~(d) Achievement~~ **(e) Power** ~~(f) Security~~ ~~(g) Conformity~~ ~~(h) Tradition~~	~~(a) Self-direction~~ ~~(b) Stimulation~~ ~~(i) Benevolence~~ **(j) Universalism**
Radical Right (H11)	**(c) Hedonism** **(e) Power** **(f) Security** ~~(g) Conformity~~ **(h) Tradition**	~~(a) Self-direction~~ ~~(b) Stimulation~~ ~~(i) Benevolence~~ **(j) Universalism**

5.1.1 Social Democrats

It proved difficult to find specific prioritizations which distinguished the Social Democrats from the rest of the electorate. Out of the five hypotheses theorized, two were rejected and the remaining three were only deemed plausible. In general, Social Democratic voters differed very little from the national average in their respective countries. Social Democrats were also rarely consistent on how to prioritize specific values, giving values such as achievement both positive and negative scores depending on which country we observed. In the cases where there were more visible patterns (which were in the cases of power, security and universalism), they never differed radically from the national average. It might be worth mentioning that Social Democrats consisted the largest single party family group in the dataset (ca. 20 % of valid cases) and that the national averages can be skewed towards their voters.

5.1.2 The Minor Left Parties

Left Socialists prioritizations proved easy to predict. Of the nine theorized hypotheses, seven were supported and two were rejected (achievement and benevolence). Left Socialists were always among the highest or lowest ranked and voters were largely consistent across the six countries in how they prioritized the specific values. The Left Socialists most clearly differed from their national averages on the conservation values and universalism. While they had scores on the rankings ranging from the 0.10s to the 0.20s on the individualistic values (self-direction, stimulation, achievement and power). Their scores on universalism and the conservation values ranged from the 0.30s to 0.50s (security -0.24, conformity -0.42, tradition -0.54 and universalism 0.34; see the ranking tables in section 4.7 to 4.9 and 4.11). This is much in line with the findings which found universalism and the conservation values to be the strongest predictors (highest correlations) for party choice.

Communists differed drastically from the national averages and were even more distinct in their prioritizations than left Socialists. Of our seven hypotheses, two were rejected and the rest were supported. The two rejected were the same as for Left Socialists. As with the Left Socialists, Communists were most easily identified for universalism and the conservation values (security -0.43, conformity -0.70, Tradition -0.73 and universalism 0.68; see the ranking tables in section 4.7 to 4.9 and 4.11).

We originally hypothesized that Communist voters would prioritize values which were in line with the values of the left in the left-right economic dimension. In addition we expected them to be anti-conservationist, solely because values such as conformity and tradition aided in maintaining the capitalistic superstructure. We did not hypothesize Communists would prioritize self-direction and stimulation, yet they did. In fact, Communists proved to have identical (but more "extreme") value prioritizations to the Left Socialists. The only value where the Communists differed in prioritization differed from the Left Socialist was regarding achievement. In retrospect, placing the Communists in the New Politics dimension, rather than left-right economic dimension alone, would have better suited the analyses.

5.1.3 Greens

The Greens were perhaps the easiest voting group to discern from other contemporary party family voting groups. Seven out of nine hypotheses were supported, two were rejected. The Greens were the ones most clearly prioritizing the openness to change values (top ranked for self-direction, second for stimulation) and most clearly deprioritizing the conservation values (bottom ranked security and conformity, third bottom on tradition) (see ranking tables in section 4.2 to 4.3 and 4.6 to 4.9). Surprisingly hedonism was not deprioritized among voters. Although this clearly was the case of Britain and Norway, the Greens in the Netherlands and Germany seemed to slightly favour it. Green voters do not seem to uniformly recognize hedonism as a contradiction to environmental protection. They were however clearly negative to power as such is a value that encourages accumulation of resources without necessarily having concern for nature or other people. Albeit they were not as negative towards power as they were towards the conservation values. The Green voters seem to highly favour individualistic freedom and reject values which supress individualism. The Greens were the strongest adherents of universalism, the value connected to environmental protection.

5.1.4 Liberals

Left Liberals proved to be much more individualistic than we originally anticipated. For all individualistic values, Left Liberals showed clear positive prioritization. To such an extent that they even prioritized power, which we originally expected them to deprioritize. They ranked third on self-direction and first on stimulation, hedonism, achievement and power (see

ranking tables section 4.2 to 4.6). This enthusiasm for individualism was accompanied by a clear rejection of all collective values. Being among the lowest ranked across the conservation values and benevolence. In fact, Left Liberals were the only voting group which passed our -0.1 criteria for benevolence, something we had not anticipated in our hypotheses. On universalism they showed no uniform pattern for prioritizing or deprioritizing it. In all we had a total of eight hypotheses regarding the Left Liberals. Seven were supported and one was rejected.

Right Liberals were not as easily identifiable as Left Liberals. We had theorized ten hypotheses, in which five were supported and five were rejected. Right Liberal voters were far less uniformed in the value prioritizations than the Left Liberals. Achievement, security, tradition and the openness to change values were more or less prioritized uniformly across the six countries. However, on the rankings, Right Liberals never strayed as far from the national averages as the Left Liberals or the Left Socialists (see rankings section 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.7 and 4.9).

Our hypotheses seemed to fit some countries better than others. While they were almost perfect fits for the Netherlands, Germany and Norway; the British, Polish and Portuguese Right Liberals varied to a much greater extent on all values. This difference between the six countries is most clearly seen in our analysis on power. Where Dutch, German and Norwegian Right Liberals fit our expectations perfectly, while the three other countries contradicts it. In general, Right Liberals voters were easier to identify for individualistic values than for the collectivist.

5.1.5 Christian Democrats and Agrarians

Christian Democrats and Agrarians were expected to have identical value priorities due to both being highly in-group biased and highly focused on preserving their current way of life. Nine hypotheses were theorized for both of them, and both had the same two hypotheses rejected and the remaining supported (albeit the self-direction hypothesis for the Agrarians were only deemed plausible). These two parties most clearly deprioritized achievement, hedonism and the openness to change values (see rankings section 4.2 to 4.5). They were also the parties which most clearly prioritized the conservation values (see section 4.7 to 4.9).

There is little doubt that these two parties highly value the integrity of their communities. This is visible through their clear endorsement of collective values and rejection of individualistic values. Power was the only individualistic value hypothesis that was rejected. Neither the Christian Democrats nor the Agrarians clearly prioritized or deprioritized this value uniformly across the countries.

5.1.6 Conservatives

Conservative voters has been the most ambiguous voting group across all the analyses. We presented nine hypotheses, in which two were supported and seven were rejected. It proved immensely difficult to discover a specific set of value prioritizations for the Conservative party family voters. Conservatives voters showed no uniform pattern for neither the conservation values nor the openness to change values. On the rankings Conservatives rarely stray far away from the national averages. Only the hypotheses on power and universalism were supported.

The results regarding the Conservatives show us how there exists a wide array of different parties under the Conservative party family label. As mentioned in section 2.6.8, Conservative parties have undergone deep and radical changes since their birth in the early 1800s. They have adopted different policy areas according to which domain remained unclaimed in their respective nations. For instance, some Conservative parties adopted market liberalism, due to a lack of powerful market liberal parties. In countries where there were a strong market liberal party, they have put higher emphasis on conservative values.

With Right Liberals we could see how some national parties suited our hypotheses better than others. Regarding Conservatives, only the British voters have prioritizations fitting our hypotheses. The Conservatives in Norway, Poland and Portugal has widely differing prioritizations. Interestingly, the Conservative voters in Norway and Poland fit better into the hypotheses we had for Right Liberals.

Personal values seem to be poor predictors for Conservative party family voters.

5.1.7 Radical Rights

We presented nine hypotheses regarding the Radical Right voters. Five were supported and four were rejected. Radical Right voters prioritized hedonism, power, security and tradition. Radical Right voters were not as negative to individualistic values as we originally expected. As the majority of Radical Right voters prioritized both self-direction and stimulation positively, which we expected to be deprioritized. Although these prioritizations were not nearly as strong as for security and tradition. Security was particularly strong, as Radical Rights prioritized this value much higher than other party family voters. We were only able to find support for one deprioritization hypothesis, universalism. Radical Rights differed clearly from other party families by deprioritizing universalism much lower than any other contemporary party family voting group (see section 4.11).

Radical Right voters fit quite well within Old Politics in the New- vs. Old Politics conflict dimension. The highest emphasis was on values such as power and security which aids in maintaining their current materialistic lifestyle and values such as universalism, which introduces elements that threaten this lifestyle, such as environmental protection or immigration (both argued to potentially result in loss of welfare and/or jobs).

5.1.8 Rejected hypotheses

We presented in total 84 hypotheses regarding the ten party families. In our analyses, 51 hypotheses (ca. 61 %) were supported, 29 were rejected (ca. 35 %) and 4 were deemed only plausible (ca. 5 %). The majority of party family hypotheses were true. Voters shared the same relative priorities across the six countries. Most of the rejected hypotheses were due to the personal values, achievement, power and benevolence, and the voters for Conservative, Radical Right or Right Liberal parties.

Achievement and power were not prioritized as expected for a majority of parties. Achievement was positively prioritized by voters for parties both on the left and right of the economic dimension. The only parties which clearly deprioritized achievement were Agrarians and Christian Democrats, which were in general negative to all types of individualistic values. Power were deprioritized by voters for parties on the left, but not uniformly deprioritized by voters voting for parties on the right of the economic left-right dimension. In fact, the only "rightist" party voters who prioritized power were Conservatives and Radical Rights. Parties

which are expected to have increased emphasis on power due to elements of nationalism. In addition, achievement and power had low correlations for most countries. In the case of Portugal, power was insignificant ($p>0.05$). This indicates that these two values has very little relevance when determining party choice. Both the unexpected prioritizations and the low correlations begs the question whether these two values are truly as connected to market liberalism as theorized. Given that the economy and the market are key issues in any political debate, it seems odd that self-enhancement values, which are intended to measure market liberal attitudes, has such low correlations. The results in this thesis suggest that achievement and power are not as closely related to market liberalism, or that the voters simply do not see the connection.

Benevolence proved to be an uncontroversial value the majority of voters agreed upon. It had the lowest correlations and in some countries insignificant results. Since the differences between the parties varies so little, benevolence seems to matter little in determining party choice.

5.1.9 Comparison with earlier research

Piurko et al. (2011:555) found that universalism followed by benevolence (though to a lesser extent) were the strongest predictors of the left. In our analysis, universalism certainly seems to be favoured among "left" party voters. As all left parties consistently prioritize universalism, and the correlation of universalism is among the highest. It is however interesting that the largest party on the left, Social Democrats, have a weak relationship to universalism, which suggests that universalism is a much better predictor for the more pronounced "leftist" parties.

Benevolence in this thesis appears largely irrelevant. It is true that the left parties appear to prioritize benevolence more than the "right" parties. However, the differences are small and the low correlations indicate that benevolence is a poor measurement on its own to determine party choice.

The same article by Piurko et al. (2011:555), found that conservation values and power defined the right. This has in our analyses found mixed results. None of the conservation values were uniformly prioritized by Conservatives. Conservative parties are often the largest

party on the right, but exactly which values define this party family seem highly ambiguous. Only the prioritization of power and the deprioritization of universalism was consistent among the Conservative voters across the six countries. Radical Rights, who clearly prioritized security, seemed to have a lacklustre prioritization of the other conservation values. Furthermore, Right Liberals, whose party is also recognized as a part of the right, deprioritized all the conservation values. In addition, security was mostly prioritized among Social Democratic voters. The relationship was not as strong as seen with other right parties, but the relationship was never the less positive. Over all, despite some varying results, voters of right parties favour the conservation values more than voters for the left parties. But this relation is far from as clear cut as the left voter's relation to universalism and benevolence. In fact, left voters are much more consistent in how they deprioritize the conservation values than right voters are in prioritizing them.

Schwartz, Caprara and Vecchione found that self-direction also predicted left vote in addition to universalism and benevolence (Schwartz et al. 2010: 438, 445). The ANOVA analysis in this thesis for the most part supports that view; since left parties rank the highest on self-direction. Social Democrats are an exception to this however, as the analysis revealed they mostly deprioritize self-direction. In addition, the ETA coefficients indicate that openness to change value are subpar in predicting party choice in comparison to conservation values. This begs the question of how useful self-direction (or in extension, stimulation) is for predicting left party choice, since it is not consistently endorsed by the largest left party voting bloc. Schwartz et al. also find that power and achievement are predictors for the right (Schwartz et al. 2010:438, 445). However, as mentioned earlier, achievement seems to be a value endorsed by many voting groups, even for voters outside the "right".

Barnea & Schwartz found that personal values were better predictors for small and ideologically distinct parties than for larger and less ideological parties (Barnea & Schwartz 1998:35). Our analysis indicate the same. People voting for smaller niche parties like Left Socialists, Communists, Greens, Left liberals, Agrarians and Christian Democrats had clear prioritizations on almost all hypothesized values. People voting for parties which are often larger like Social Democrats, Conservatives and Radical Rights (although the size of Radical Right parties vary greatly across democracies) had prioritizations which differed little from the national averages and many of their hypotheses found no support. This is largely expected, as

larger parties have more voters and more voter's increases the number of motivations and deliberations for people voting for that party. In short, more people equals more diverse opinions.

5.1.10 The general hypothesis

Returning to our original hypothesis (H1.0), "The electorate of specific party families will share the same value priorities"; the analyses in this thesis largely support this hypothesis. As discussed in the sections above, the majority of party family voters were mostly consistent in how they prioritized the values. However, the analyses also show that personal values are best at predicting value prioritizations among voters of smaller niche and ideologically strong party families. Larger and more diverse parties have less clear values prioritizations. In addition, collectivist values are more likely to explain party choice than individualist values.

5.2 The explanatory power of personal values on party choice

The multinomial logistic regression analyses found that the explanatory power of personal values were larger in more fragmented party systems. This was in line with the expectations of hypothesis H1.1. The countries with the least amount of effective parties provided the lowest explanation. Countries like the Netherlands and Norway with much more effective number of parties had substantially higher estimates.

With regards to the estimates provided in the regression analyses, it becomes necessary for us to discuss the relevance of personal values on party choice. At first glance, Nagelkerke R^2 estimates below 0.30 can seem low and statistically insignificant. Out of all available variables in the dataset, personal values alone (model 1, see table 4.13.0) explains less than 20 % of the variance in party choice. Less than 15 % when controlled for demographic variables (model 1c2, see table 4.13.1). Studies using political values or social construct variables have achieved estimates over 0.30, some even surpassing 0.50 (see Schwartz et al. 2010:442 and Knutsen 2018:256).

However, it is important to remember what personal values are and how they relate to other variables in a causational chain. Personal values are the most basic values we possess. They construct our motivations and personalities and guide our behaviour patterns and

assessments. Most people are unaware of the links between their personal values and their political views (Schwartz et al. 2010:448). In a chain of causation, personal values and party choice are separated by a range of mediating variables. It is therefore unsurprising that personal values provides less explanatory power than i.e. political values. Because political values are very much directly linked with our political preferences and evidently party choice.

In light of this, estimates provided in our analysis for variables not directly intended to measure party choice are very high for a dataset of several hundred variables. Especially considering that earlier research has provided similar estimates (Schwartz et al. 2010:442 and Piurko et al. 2011:553).

5.3 concluding remarks

This thesis set out to uncover, "to what degree can Schwartz's basic personal values explain party choice?". Our analysis found that voters for specific party families had clear prioritizations on specific values. The electorate's prioritizations were more consistent and stronger for smaller and more ideological distinct parties. Larger parties had shifting prioritizations among the voters across the six countries and in general deviated less from their national averages.

Collectivist values seems to provide higher probabilities for determining party choice, than individualist values. Even voters that we expected to be individualistic showed this in their prioritizations, the prioritizations were much stronger for the collectivist values. This was confirmed by the ETA coefficients which had the highest scores for universalism and the conservation values and lowest for the openness to change and self-enhancement values.

When testing for the explanatory power, personal values explained the most variance in the more fragmented party systems. Personal values mediated much of the effects from demographic variables. When controlled for this, personal values were still explained more in the most fragmented party systems. However, demographic variables were a better predictor in Poland and Portugal and partly Norway.

In conclusion, Schwartz's personal values are more suited for testing party choice in fragmented multiparty-systems, where values play a much larger role. When testing for individual parties, the effects from personal values are likely to be stronger for smaller niche parties than for larger less ideologically distinct parties.

6.0 Literature

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6.1 List of figures and tables

Appendix

***Table 6.0**: Party family coding*

	Party
Social Democratic	Labour Party (NOR), Social Democratic Party (SPD) (GER), Labour (UK), Scottish National Party (UK), Plaid Cymru (UK), Partido Socialista (PS) (POR), Labour Party (NL), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD+coalition partners) (POL).
Left Socialist	Socialist Left Party (NOR), , Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) (GER), Linkspartei.PD (GER), Die Linke/PDS (GER), Bloco de Esquerda (BE) (POR), Socialist Party (NL) .
Communist	Red Electoral Alliance (NOR), Red (NOR), Partido Comunista Português/Partido Ecologista (PCP/PEV) (POR), Coligação Democrática Unitára (CDU) (POR).
Green	Green party (MdG) (NOR), Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (GER), Green Party (UK), Green Left (NL).
Left Liberal	Democrats `66 (NL), Palikot Movement (POL).
Right Liberal	Liberal Party (V) (NOR), Liberal Democratic Party(FDP) (GER), Liberal Democrat (UK), Partido Social Democrata (PSD) (POR), Party of Freedom and Democracy (NL), Unia Wolnosci (POL),.
Christian Democratic	Christian Democratic Party (KrF) (NOR), Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) (GER), Christian Democratic Party (NL), Christian Union (NL), Social Reformed Party (NL), Law and Justice (PiS) (POL).
Agrarian	Centre party (NOR), Polish People's Party (PSL) (POL)
Conservative	Conservative (H) (NOR), Conservative (UK), Centro Democrático Social/Partido Popular (CDS/PP) (POR), Civic Platform (PO) (POL).
Radical Right	Progress Party (NOR), Republikaner (GER), National Democratic Party/German People's Union (GER), Alternative für Deutschland (GER), UK Independence Party (UK), British National Party (UK), List Pim Fortuyn (NL), PVV (List Wilders) (NL), Self-Defence (SRP) (POL), League of Polish Families (POL)

***Note**: Any party not mentioned in this table were either coded into the "other party" category, or was not listed as an option in the surveys.*

Table 6.1: *All 21 personal value items.*

Notes: *Includes variables no. 1021 through 1041. SD=Self-direction, ST=Stimulation, H=Hedonism, A=Achievement, P=Power, SE=Security, C=Conformity, T=Tradition, B=Benevolence and U=Universalism. Parentheses with denomination not included in original cumulative data file.*

Variable Name	Description
Ipcrtiv (SD1)	*Important to think new ideas and being creative*
Imprich (P1)	*Important to be rich, have money and expensive things*
Ipeqopt (U1)	*Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities*
Ipshabt (A1)	*Important to show abilities and be admired*
Impsafe (SE1)	*Important to live in secure and safe surroundings*
Impdiff (ST1)	*Important to try new and different things in life*
Ipfrule (C1)	*Important to do what is told and follow rules*
Ipudrst (U2)	*Important to understand different people*
Ipmodst (T1)	*Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention*
Ipgdtim (H1)	*Important to have a good time*
Impfree (SD2)	*Important to make own decisions and be free*
Iphlppl (B1)	*Important to help people and care for others well-being*
Ipsuces (A2)	*Important to be successful and that people recognize achievements*
Ipstrgv (SE2)	*Important that government is strong and ensures safety*
Ipadvnt (ST2)	*Important to seek adventures and have an exciting life*
Ipbhprp (C2)	*Important to behave properly*
Iprspot (P2)	*Important to get respect from others*
Iplylfr (B2)	*Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close*
Impenv (U3)	*Important to care for nature and environment*
Imptrad (T2	*Important to follow traditions and customs*
Impfun (H2)	*Important to seek fun and things that give pleasure*