Collaboration for Peace and Security

Analyzing the partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations in peace operations

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Abstract

After the Cold War, the overall patterns of warfare and armed conflicts changed. Consequently, in order to meet the new threats to international peace and security, the United Nations (UN) had to revise its strategy. In the 1992 Agenda for Peace, the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali highlighted that the UN should reach out for help from regional organizations in order to strengthen its capacity and to make peace operations more efficient. Nevertheless, the relationship between the UN and regional organizations has never been formalized. Because there are both pros and cons with peace operations conducted by the UN and regional organizations, I argue that they should seek to complement each other. Nonetheless, it is not a prerequisite for a successful outcome.

Through an extensive analysis and comparison of the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the UN in the civil war in Somalia and the relationship between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN in the civil wars in Liberia, this thesis seeks to understand how regional organizations can succeed in peace operations in collaboration with the UN, and how they can work together more efficiently. Based on the findings in the analysis, this thesis concludes that regional hegemons can play a crucial role in peace operations, both politically, militarily and financially. However, it is not guaranteed that the regional hegemon will act in the interest of the country in which it is intervening. Moreover, I argue that the UN and regional organizations need to have a common worldview in order to succeed in a peace operation and that they need to agree on a common implementation plan in which they specify the division of tasks in order to secure an efficient collaboration. Finally, I have concluded that they need to agree on a budget based on the resources and knowledge available for them before deploying the troops.
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Any mistakes in this master’s thesis are on my own.

Line-Mari Sæther
Abbreviations

AAFC - Allied Armed Force of the Community
AAPC - All African Peoples Conference
ACS - American Colonization Society
AEC - African Economic Community
AFL - Armed Forces of Liberia
AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU - Arab Maghreb Union
APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF - African Standby Force
AU - African Union
CARICOM - Caribbean Community and Common Market
CENSAD - Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWS - Continental Early Warning System
COMESA - Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA - [Liberian] Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDRR - Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration
EAC - East African Community
EASF - Eastern Africa Standby Force
ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMIL - ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG - ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
ESF - ECOWAS Standby Force
EU - European Union
ICISS - International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
X
ICU - Islamic Courts Unions
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM - IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia
IGNU - Interim Government of National Unity
IGO - Intergovernmental governmental organizations
IMF – International Monetary Fund
INPFL - Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
LNTG - Liberian National Transitional Government
IR – International Relations [the academic study of international relations]
LAS – League of Arab States
LURD - Liberians United for Reconciliation
MDSD - The Most Different Systems Design
MODEL - Movement of Democracy in Liberia
MSSD - Most Similar Systems Design
NARC – North African Regional Capability
NATO – North American Treaty Organization
NGO – Non-governmental organizations
NPFL – National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAS – Organization of American States
OAU – Organization of African Unity
OSCE - Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAA - Pan-African Association
PIF – Pacific Islands Forum
PSC – [AU’s] Peace and Security Council
REC – Regional Economic Community
RECs – Regional Economic Communities
RM – Regional Mechanisms
RUF - Revolutionary United Front
R2P - Responsibility to Protect
SADC – South African Development Community
SIC - Sharia Implementation Council
UK – United Kingdom
ULMO - United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
SMC - Standing Mediation Committee
UN – United Nations
SNA - Somalian National Army
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
UNITAF - United Task Force
UNMIL - UN Mission in Liberia
UNOMIL – The UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM-II - United Nations Operations in Somalia-II
UNPOS - UN Political Office for Somalia
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
UNSOA - UN Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOM - United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
U.S. – United States
TCCs - Troop Contributing Countries
TNG – [Somali] Transitional National Government
TWP - The True Whig Party
WHO – World Health Organization
WW1 – First World War
WW2 – Second World War
WB – The World Bank
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1. INTRODUCTION

After the Cold War, the number of civil wars taking place in the world increased rapidly. Attacks and atrocities against noncombatants became the unfortunate but familiar feature of the warfare strategies in Africa, Southeast Asia and the Balkans in the 1990s. As a consequence, conflicts and humanitarian crisis tended to spill over to neighboring countries due to mass refugee movements (Paris, 2004, p. 2-9). The new threats to regional security in the post-Cold War period not only led to an increased demand for United Nations (UN) peace operations but also brought a new trend of regional peace operations. The new trend involved a combined effort of the UN and regional organizations to make and sustain peace (Bellamy and Williams, 2005).

Even though the UN Charter from 1945 through Chapter VIII encourage regional arrangements and regional agencies to get involved in peace operations, the Cold War impaired the proper use of the Chapter (ibid.) One year before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leaders from around 30 countries from all world continents met in Stockholm to draft the ‘Stockholm Initiative for Global Security and Governance’. The role of regionalism in collective security was discussed, and they agreed to build a new system of peace and security, both at the global scale and at the regional scale. The then UN General-Secretary Javier Pérez de Cuéllar supported the idea of involving regional organizations in peace operations as a new strategy to solve the growing security issues. In his 1990 Report on the Work of the Organizations, de Cuéllar suggested that “for dealing with new kinds of security challenges, regional arrangements or agencies can render assistance of great value” (cited in Rivelin, 1992, p. 97).

In the 1992 An Agenda for Peace, which laid the foundation for strengthening the UN in the post-Cold War period, de Cuéllar’s successor Boutros Boutros-Ghali highlighted the role of regional organizations in peace operations. However, even though Boutros-Ghali saw the need of increasingly involve regional organizations in peace operations, he argued that non-UN organizations should only have a limited role in peacekeeping operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2005). He feared that distributing power from the UN to regional organizations could threaten the international basis of the UN.

The discussion of whether the UN should have the monopoly on the use of force and the primary responsibility maintain the global peace and security is not new and is linked to the debate on universalism and regionalism. In fact, the role of regional organizations was contested already
a few years after the creation of the UN when the League of Arab States (LAS) sent forces to Palestine during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war (ibid.) LAS claimed that they were acting in accordance to the UN Charter, but the U.S. rejected the plea and there were no further discussions in the UN Security Council (UNSC). The first time the UNSC discussed the role of regional organizations in peace operations was when the Organization of American States (OAS) intervened during the 1965 civil war in the Dominican Republic. France and the Soviet Union were critical to the peace operation led by the United States (U.S.) They argued that military actions carried out by regional organizations require the authorization by the UNSC in accordance to Article 53 of the UN Charter (Williams, 2016). However, after a number of relatively successful peace operations carried out by regional organization in the 1990s, among them the ECOWAS peace operation in Liberia, the UNSC has frequently authorized peace operations carried out by regional organizations. Consequently, peace operations led by regional organizations or other non-UN actors have outnumbered the UN in the post-Cold War period (ibid.)

The developments in the field of peace operations after the Cold War reinforced the debate on universalism versus regionalism in international relations. However, as argued by Burchill (2005); even though regional organizations are seen as an important part of the international system, the debate has not changed much since the creation of the UN until today, except from the context. The debate often presents a zero-sum outcome in which the international system is either seen as something organized under a universal system or as a system fragmented into various regional groupings. In other words, the relationship between the UN and regional organizations tend to be seen as competitive. Nonetheless, the problem with the debate on universalism versus regionalism is first of all that it too often tends to overlook the fact that the capacity and the mandate of regional organizations is varying tremendously (Burchill, 2005). First of all, regional organizations in Africa and Europe are far more responsive to conflicts than regional organizations in other continents. Second of all, regional organizations are generally lacking the experience, knowledge and resources that are available for the UN. Nonetheless, regional organizations that have the necessary institutions and capacity to conduct peace operations, can more rapidly respond to a conflict in comparison to the UN that is often burdened by a heavy bureaucratic system and risks being paralyzed because of disagreements within the UNSC (ibid.) Also, because conflicts can create spill-over effects in the region, regional organizations often have greater incentives to deploy the necessary means to end the conflict or to prevent another conflict to erupt. And as regional organizations often possess
commonalities such as history, culture, traditions, ethnicity and/or languages, they have the possibility to be more conductive for action. Nevertheless, the homogeneity is not given within a region and closeness of states can also lead to continued hostilities (ibid.) In general, there are both pros and cons with peace operations led by regional organizations and peace operations carried out by universal organizations, such as the UN. Therefore, instead of looking at the relationship between regional organizations and the UN as competitive, as argued by experts like Burchill (2005) and Bjuner (2011, Ch.7), it should instead be seen as complementary.

1.1 Research question and theoretical approach

This thesis explores the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in peace operations. Based on the considerations mentioned above, the research questions are as follows:

What are the prerequisites for regional organizations to succeed in peace operations in collaboration with the UN, and how can the UN and regional organizations work together more efficiently?

In order to explore these questions, I will draw on the debate between neo-realism and neoliberal institutionalism in International Relations (IR) theory, and briefly examine the hegemonic theory to discuss the conditions that needs to be in place in order for the UN and regional organizations to succeed in peace operations. Moreover, I will use regime theory, which derives from neoliberal institutionalism, to investigate how the UN and regional organizations can work together more efficiently. As the so-called ‘neo-neo debate’ and regime theory will be further explored in Chapter 2, I will here only offer a sketch of the debate before laying out the rest of the introduction to this thesis.

1.1.1 The neo-neo debate

Neo-realism is one of the main paradigms in IR-theory and is often coined with Kenneth Waltz’s book *Theory of International Relations*. Neoliberal institutionalism, on the other hand, is a paradigm in IR-theory with roots in liberalism that was founded by the scholars Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye as a criticism to realism. Disagreements between the two paradigms dominated the debate in IR in the late 20\(^{th}\) century and is often referred to as the ‘neo-neo debate’. Even though neo-realism and neoliberal institutionalism share the belief that the international system is anarchic and the assumption that states are the main actors in the
international system, they disagree on the implications and consequences of the anarchic structure, which is the core of the debate (Powell, 1994). Waltz argued that the anarchic structure of the international system limits the possibility of cooperation between states. He claimed that states are only concerned about relative gains and are therefore afraid that they will gain less from the cooperation than the others (Waltz, 1979, p.106). Keohane claimed on the contrary that states are more concerned about absolute gains. And even though he acknowledged that international cooperation is difficult, he argued that it is possible given that they have common interests and that the cooperation is facilitated by international institutions (Keohane, 1984). Another important difference between neo-realism and neoliberal institutionalism is their understanding of hegemon powers and international regimes. Neo-realists believe that the presence of one or a few great powers that are powerful enough to govern inter-state relations, referred to as hegemons, will ensure a balance of power. However, as argued by Waltz, balance of power does not necessary lead to long-term peace because great powers will, out of their own interests, fight to “prevent others from achieving an imbalance of power in their favor” (Waltz, 1979, p. 204). Even though the neoliberal institutionalists agree that hegemony can minimize the risk of conflicts between states, they claim that it is not a necessary component. As pointed out by Keohane, another way of avoiding conflicts between states is to develop mutual policies by “establishing and maintaining international regimes that serve its own interests while managing to be sufficiently compatible with the interests of the others to be widely accepted” (Keohane, 1984, p. 243). Even though neo-realists recognize the existence of international regimes, they don’t see them as a relevant component of international relations. The reason is first of all that they believe that international regimes matter more in “low politics” domains than in “high politics” domains (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995). Another reason is that they believe that they don’t have an independent standing in international politics and are often created by great powers to serve their own interests.

1.2 Methodology

To answer the research questions, I will do a comparative case study of the peace operations conducted by the UN and the African Union (AU) during the 2007 - present phase of the Somalian Civil War and the peace operations carried out in collaboration between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the UN during the Liberian Civil War (1989-2003). The reason why I have chosen to focus on peace operations in African is first of all because it is the continent that has experienced the highest number of civil wars since the
end of the Cold War and has therefore also been the predominant location for peace operations. Also, in the last two decades, regional organizations in Africa have developed significant peace operation capacities and are even contributing with the highest number of peacekeeping forces to the UN today (de Coning, 2017). These two factors added makes Africa rich in empirical insights. Based on the research method, as will be discussed later in this section, I have chosen to compare the collaboration between the UN and the AU and the UN and ECOWAS in respectively Somalia and Liberia because the background of the civil wars have many similar traits, but the peace operations have led to different outcomes. In the following sub-sections, I will discuss what a case study is, explain the comparative method, which is the method used in this thesis, and discuss how to secure a good research quality.

1.2.1 What is a case study?

In order to understand what a case study is, it is important to clarify for the concept ‘case’. According to Gerring (2007, p. 19), a case is “a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) overserved at a single point in time or over some period of time.” A case can for example be an organization, a situation, an event, groups of people, or an individual. According to this understanding, a case study can be understood the intensive study of one or several units, or as specified by Naumes and Naumes (1999, p.10) “a factual description of events that actually happened at some point in the past”. Case study is usually considered as a qualitative research strategy, or a small-N study. However, some researchers, among them John Gerring (2007) and Todd Landman (2008), claims that it is neither qualitative nor a quantitative because it can include quantitative methods, comparative methods or mixed methods.

Case study has been used as a research strategy for more than 200 years and has led to many important and well-known theories. Among them is Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and Max Weber’s Bureaucratic Theory (Andersen, 2013, p. 15-23). The research strategy is widely used in anthropology and sociology, but also in biology, political science and organizational and management studies. In the period between the 1930s and the beginning of the 1980s, case study was often seen as an unscientific strategy and therefore considered as secondary research or a quasi-experimental study (ibid., p. 23). However, since the 1980s, the popularity of case study as a research strategy has increased. One possible explanation is that there has been an epistemological shift from the positivist model of explanation to the realist model in the last decades that emphasizes the importance of causal mechanisms (Gerring, 2007, p. 3- 5).
The number of cases (N) included in a case study directs the type of research method and format (Caramani, 2011, p. 55). The study of one case (N=1) is called a single case study and may be studied synchronically or diachronically. A case study that includes more than one case is often referred to as a multiple case study, and can either be studied in a given period, over time in several time series, at one time point or across time and space. It is furthermore common to distinguish between multiple case studies that include a few cases (N>20) and multiple case studies that include many cases (N<50). Choosing between a single case study, a small N-study, and a large N-study entails several trade-offs that are important to consider. First of all, generalization from a single case study is less secure than generalization from a multiple case study (Landman, 2008, p. 28). Therefore, single case studies are more useful for post hoc validation, to generate hypothesis and/or for testing theories. In general, the more cases involved in the study, the chances are higher that the researcher will be able to make broad empirical generalization. Also, whereby a large-N study is more extensive, involves few variables and focus on the variation between the cases, a small-N study is more intensive, often involves more variables than in a large-N study, and focus on the variation within the cases. 

The method of comparing many cases is often quantitative, whereby the method of comparing a few cases is qualitative and is referred to as “the comparative research method”. According to Landman, the main advantages of a large-N study is “its ability to use statistical controls to rule out rival explanations and control for confounding factors, its extensive coverage of countries [cases] over time and space, its ability to make strong interferences that hold for more cases than not, and its ability to identify […] ‘outliners’” (ibid., p. 27). The disadvantages, on the other hand, is that access to data is often limited, it is often very time-consuming to collect and analyze all the data, and it can be difficult to select proper measurements for the political concepts. In different to a large-N study, a small-N study allows the researcher to study each case more deeply, to describe phenomenon that depends on contextual specificities, and to analyze topics that involve complex casual mechanisms.

In addition to the trade-offs that has already been mentioned, Landman suggests that the researcher should choose the number of cases based on the research question, and his/her available time and resources. To understand how regional organizations can succeed in peace operations in collaboration with the UN, and how they can work together more efficiently require an in-depth study and is the reason why I chose a to do a small-N study. Because of word restrictions and limited time, I have chosen to compare two cases.
1.2.2 The comparative research method

According to Landman, the activity of comparison in political science centers around four main objectives: contextual description, classification, the hypothesis-testing function and prediction (ibid., p. 4). Contextual description allows the researcher to know what other countries regimes, ideology, institutions, among others, are like that can furthermore be classified in order to group the vast numbers of countries, regimes, ideologies, etc. Contextual description and classification contribute to the next objective of comparison, hypothesis-testing, which can help explain what has been described and classified (ibid, p. 6). Finally, the last objective is to make predictions about outcomes of other cases based on the generalizations from the initial comparison.

There are in general two different research designs in comparative method: The Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) and the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD). The difference between these two designs reside in the choice of cases (ibid., p. 70). MDSD is a research design in which the cases are selected based on the assumption that the cases are different in most features (a,b,c etc.) except the outcome that is to be explained (e.a. the dependent variable, Y) and a few explanatory factors (e.a. the independent variables, X). The goal of MDSD is to identify the key features that can account for the outcome and is often used in a research where the goal is to explain for example democratization, revolutions, and military coups (ibid., p.72). MSSD, on the contrary, is a design that seeks to compare cases with common features (a,b,c etc.) but with different outcome (Y) in order to identify the factors (X) than can explain the outcomes. The most similar approach is often used in area studies, for example in European studies and in African studies (ibid., p. 71). The assumption is that countries within a certain geographic area shares common features such as history, language, politics and/or culture, and that the features that are not similar can explain different outcomes.

One of the main challenges in a small-N study is linked to the choice of cases. In general, the cases should be randomly selected. If the researcher selects cases, historical accounts or sources that they know can affect the dependent variable or will support the theory, it can have serious consequences for the interferences that are drawn from the study (ibid., p.36). The problem is referred to as ‘selection bias’. Another problem that can occur when comparing a few cases is the ‘too many variables and not enough cases’ problem, which can make it difficult to properly explain the outcome. In principle, there should be less variables than cases. However, if it is not
possible to increase the number of cases or to reduce the number of variables, Landman suggests using MSSD “to achieve focused comparison of few countries [cases]” (ibid., p.32), which is the strategy I have chosen in this thesis.

1.2.3 Research quality

Undergoing a scientific study entails many considerations. For example – how do I know that the sources that I am relying on to establish the truth are reliable? What is the truth? Is there more than one truth? Can the findings we applied in other situations or to other units? Answering these questions is difficult and entails both epistemological, ontological and methodological considerations. Therefore, the debate on truth in sciences will be limited to methodological considerations. In this thesis, I will focus on the four tests presented in Yin’s Case Study Research, to judge the research quality. The four tests are; 1) construct validity; 2) internal validity; 3) external validity; and 4) reliability (Yin, 1994, p. 33), and will be further explored in this sub-section.

Construct validity judges whether the operationalized variable measure what it is supposed to be measuring. Obtaining construct validity can be problematic in a case study because it is difficult to establish a sufficient set of operationalized variables and the investigator may be subjective in his or her judgement when collecting the data. In order to overcome this problem, Yin (1994, p. 34) argues that the investigator first has to determine the specific type of changes he or she wants to study. Furthermore, the investigator needs to show that the selected operational measures of these changes reflect the changes that he or she wants to study. In other word, the process of operationalization is important. There are in addition different tactics to increase the construct validity. The most common tactic is to use multiple sources of evidence, or what is more commonly known as ‘triangulation of data’. According to Yin (1994, p. 85), interviews are “one of the most important sources of case study information”. Therefore, I considered to travel to Somalia and Liberia to conduct interviews with people that has been involved in the peace processes in the respective countries. However, because of safety reasons and limited time to conduct the interviews, I decided early on in the process that I would instead rely on sources from documents and archival records. The documents that I have been relying on are books written by social scientists and historians, articles and scientific studies, and the archival records that I have been using as sources of evidence are maps and charts and organizational records.
Internal validity tests whether the causal relationship between the variables can properly be demonstrated (ibid., p. 35). As this thesis does not investigate whether there is a causal relationship between x and y (without any interference from a third factor z), it is not necessary to assess internal validity. External validity, on the other hand, is relevant because it tests whether the findings can be generalized to other situations. As already pointed out, it is more difficult to generalize the findings from a single case study and a small N-study than from a large-N study. Nonetheless, as stressed by Yin, it is important that the investigator does not select cases based what he or she believe will be representative for other cases. Instead, he argues that “an analyst should try to generalize findings to “theory,” analogous to the way the scientist generalizes from experimental results to theory” (ibid., p. 37).

Finally, reliability judges whether the study is replicable and is also important in order to test the external validity. In other words, other researchers need to be able to replicate the study and get the same results (given that they follow the same procedures and conduct the same case study), otherwise it is not possible to conclude whether the findings are valid for other cases. Nonetheless, replicability of a case study can be challenging as the research design allows the researcher to be flexible with data. Therefore, in order to increase the reliability, I have specified all the page number that I have used in cases where the sources are taken from a book.

1.3 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is organized in six chapters. Having introduced the topic, the research question, the theoretical approach, and explained the methodology in Chapter 1, the following chapter, Chapter 2 will examine the neo-neo debate and regime theory more closely. The chapter also contains a discussion of the central concepts in the thesis. Based on the theoretical approach and the central concepts, I have created four hypotheses will be analyzed in Chapter 5. A brief historical overview of regionalism and regionalization in Africa will be presented in Chapter 3. In addition, the background of the creation AU and ECOWAS and their current peace and security mechanisms will be examined. The background of the civil wars in Somalia and Liberia will be presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the peace operations will be analyzed and the collaboration between the UN the respective regional organizations will be compared. Based on the analysis and the discussion, Chapter 6 answers the research question. In the conclusion, I will also discuss whether the findings can be generalized to other studies.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Even though IR-theory has existed as a separate research discipline for almost a hundred years, Africa is still a “blind spot” in the discipline. As argued by Harman and Brown, Africa’s place within IR-theory is a paradox (Harman and Brown, 2013). On the one hand, the research on Africa is rich in empirical details that can offer new insights about social change, uprisings and new power configurations. In general, it could represent a thriving field for IR-theory. Also, many of the political processes and political events that have been structurally important in IR-theory since the beginning, among them colonial rule, resource competition and post-conditional aid dependency, have played out from the African continent. On the other hand, the different paradigms in IR-theory are often based on political experiences from the industrialized world and rest on Western political concepts (ibid.) In other words, Africa is often on the periphery of theoretical insights, and it can therefore be challenging to apply IR-theories directly to the study of African politics. However, as argued by Dokken (2008, p. 21-25); “there are numerous examples of students and researchers who have applied these theories directly to the study of African politics […] primarily the theoretical bastions of realism and liberalism […]”, but it requires “that central concepts of the various theoretical directions […] must be handled with care”. One example is the concept ‘state’. Whereby a majority of the Western states that exists today were created after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the African states were created after the de-colonization period from the 1950s and onward. And even though many of the newly created countries in Africa have attempted to adopt elements from the Western statehood-model, there are no doubts that the African states are very different from the Western states today (Dokken, 2008, p. 31). Whereby the Western states are often classified as modern states or ‘Weberian’ states, meaning that they at a minimum fulfill the following criteria: monopoly over the legitimate use of force (within its territory); sovereign control over its own territory; and a legitimate authority (ibid., p. 28), there are no consensus of how to classify the African states. One of the most widespread concepts that have been used to describe African states are ‘neopatrimonialism’, which is a system of government with the following characteristics: “presidentialism, clientelism, and overlap between the public and private sphere” (ibid., p. 35). A neopatrimonialist state is furthermore characterized as being a weak state with a strong regime, often ruled by authoritarian leaders. African states have also been characterized as “hybrid states”, “transplanted states”, and “quasi-states”. What is similar with these characteristics is that they see the African states as dynamic (ibid., p. 39). Nonetheless,
even though the African states are different from Western states, and most likely also very
different from states in for example Latin America and in Northeast Asia, the difference is more
relevant when studying foreign affairs and domestic politics. Also, this thesis is about regional
organizations in Africa and not a study of African states per se.

In the first part of this chapter, I will look more closely at the two paradigms, neo-realism and
neoliberal institutionalism. As both of the paradigms were created as an attempt to improve
classical realism, the section will start with a brief overview of the classical paradigm.
Hegemonic theory will be discussed in the sub-section 2.1.2, and regime theory will be
examined in the section about neoliberal institutionalism. Based on the neo-neo debate and
regime theory, I have created four hypotheses that will be presented in the third sub-section.
Thereafter, I will look at the difference between universal and regional organizations, and the
debate on regionalism. In the fifth sub-section, I will look at what peace and peace operations
are, and the challenges of the peace strategies that have been applied in war torn countries since
the end of the Cold War.

2.1 Realism and neo-realism

Realism is one of the main paradigms in IR-theory and has a long intellectual tradition that can
be traced back to classical political thinkers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and
Rousseau. It is not a single coherent theory nor a single scientific approach but an ever-changing
discourse of the use power between states in international politics (Buzan, 1996, p. 47-51).
Realism is often contrasted to liberalism, constructivism and Marxism (and sometimes also
Grotianism). Twentieth-century realism, often referred to as classical realism, was established
in the post-Second World War (WW2) era as a reaction to the failure of the League of Nations
and the failures of intellectuals to find causes of war and to prevent its recurrence. The classical
realist E. H. Carr (1939) already predicted that the League would fail years before the
machinery of the organization completely broke down in 1946. He argued that the optimism of
the League, based on the post-war international idealism, was a “hasty utopian scheme” (ibid.,
p. 48). Another intellectual that has had a major influence on classical realism is the German
scholar Hans J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau was in particular concerned about the continuities of
the human conditions. Inspired by Hobbes, he believed that human beings are conflict-oriented
and has a desire to dominate. He furthermore claimed that states act in accordance to the
interests of the individuals, and they will therefore always seek power in order to achieve their
goals (Dokken, 2008, p. 21).

Even though there are many different stands within the realist school, it is possible to identify
at least three core assumptions that reflects how the political realism perceive international
politics (ibid., p.22):

1) Anarchic structure: the international political system is an anarchic system. It is anarchic
both in the sense that it lacks an international government and that it lacks a set of common
norms that can regulate the relationship between the states.

2) States as principal actors: The states are considered as the principal actors in the
international system and are assumed to be rational, self-interested. Because there will always
be a scarcity of goods and resources, states will compete in order to protect their national
interests.

3) Power-politics: Power is the central substantive focus in realism. Despite a lack of consensus
about the conception ‘power’, there is a general assumption that power is never equally
distributed among them.

In the two decades following the end of the WW2, classical realism dominated IR-theory.
However, from the late 1960s and onward, intellectuals started to question the methodology,
and the theoretical and policy agenda of classical realism (Buzan, 1996, p. 47). A well-known
The main goal of Waltz’s book was first of all to understand contemporary theories of
international politics and their defects. Secondly, he aimed at constructing a systemic theory
that he argued would better explain international politics than the theories that were available
at the time of writing his book. Waltz’s theory of international politics led to the establishment
of neo-realism, or what is often referred to as structural realism.

2.1.1 Kenneth N. Waltz’s structural realism

Kenneth N. Waltz’s systemic theory was first of all created as a criticism to theories that analyze
international politics on a unit-level. He claimed that these theories, which he referred to as
reductionism, ignore the constraints imposed on state behavior in an anarchic structure (Waltz,
1979, p. 39). Also, instead of explaining power politics as a result of “man’s will” to dominate,
like Morgenthau did, Waltz understood it as a result of the anarchic structure in which states have to struggle to survive. His argument stems from the observation that states with equal characteristics, for example similar political regimes, can produce different outcomes, and vice versa. This led him to conclude that patterns and outcome in international politics occur independently from domestic conditions and needs therefore to be analyzed from a structural level, not a unit-level (Cesa, 2009). Waltz’s theory was also constructed as a criticism to other systemic theories. He claimed that the existing theories, developed by scholars such as Hoffmann, Kaplan, and Rosecrance were not sufficient because they had failed to give a precise definition of structures, which he meant was necessary in order to understand “the comparative weights of systemic and sub-systemic causes, and to show how forces and effects change from one system to another” (Waltz, 1979, p. 40-41).

According to Waltz, structures can be defined first of all according to the ordering principle of the structures, secondly by the character of the units in the structures, and finally by the distribution of capabilities across the units (ibid., p. 81). As already mentioned, realists understand the ordering principle of the international system as anarchic. The structure of domestic political systems, on the other hand, is understood as hierarchic. The ordering principle furthermore affects the second criteria. In an anarchic system, there is no higher authority that can regulate the relation between the units (states). Waltz therefore argued that the international system is a self-help system where states have the same principal function, which is to survive (ibid., p. 100). However, it is important to point out that Waltz did not believe that states are similar in terms of regimes, capabilities, or size. Also, even though he recognized that there are other important actors in the international system, among others non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental governmental organizations (IGOs), he argued that “structures are defined not by all the actors that flourish within them but by the main actors.” (ibid., p. 93). Because states are functionally similar, the second criteria do not apply to the study of the international systems and is only relevant when studying systems with a hierarchic structure. The third and final criteria for defining structures is the distribution of capabilities. Even though Waltz claimed that structures are abstract, he did not believe that they are entirely abstract. Instead he argued that all units have different capabilities which are reflected in the distribution of relative capabilities in the anarchic structure (ibid., p. 97). Because the ordering structure is the same and the principal units (the states) are functionally similar, the only thing that can explain changes in the international system is changes in the distribution of capabilities.
In different to Morgenthau, Waltz did not believe that states are interested in power as a mean to an end but that they are first of all concerned about their own security; “at a minimum [states] seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. States, or those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view” (ibid., p. 118). In a self-help system, the units fear that they will put themselves in danger if they do not help themselves or if they do it less effectively than others and will therefore “behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balance of power” (ibid., p. 118). In domestic political systems, security problems and violence are often solved by legitimate governments through institutional mechanisms. In an anarchy, however, there are no laws or governments that can solve the security issues. The problem could have been solved if states cooperated with other states. However, as argued by Waltz, international cooperation is extremely difficult because states are concerned about relative gains. Also, he believed that states are afraid of becoming too dependent on other states because the anarchic structure makes it difficult to establish trust. Therefore, he claimed that the states will instead seek to solve security issues by strengthening their relative capabilities (e.a. power). He asserted that states can strengthen their power capabilities in two ways; internally by strengthening their military capacity or strategy, and externally by entering into a military alliance with other states or try to weaken other military alliances. Because alliances are formed at the unit-level, they can only challenge the distribution of capabilities, not the structure (ibid., p. 118). When a state has grown more powerful than any other opponent, he claimed that it will use its power to try to expand its sphere of domination. And in some cases, great powers will aspire for hegemonic power, which can lead to a balance of power. According to Waltz, the bipolar system that existed under the Cold War in which the U.S. was leading the capitalist part of the world and the Soviet Union leading in the ‘Communist East’, was an empirical evidence of the stability created by global hegemons.

2.1.2 End of the Cold War, changes in the international system and hegemony

Waltz claimed that the bipolar system would be more stable than the multipolar system that existed from the 18th century until the start of the First World War (WW1) because balancing in a bipolar system only require internal efforts, whereby in a multipolar system it require “an additional means of adjustment” (ibid., p.163). However, a decade after the first edition of Theory of International Relations was published, the bipolar system collapsed, and the international system changed again – this time to a unipolar world system with the U.S. being
the only global hegemon. According to the balance of power theory, a unipolar system cannot last for a long time because a new coalition of states will be established relatively quickly to challenge the hegemon (Odigbo, Udaw and Igwe, 2014). However, none of the other great powers, namely China, Russia, India and Brazil, have yet managed to balance the behavior of the U.S. There are different theories that seeks to explain the strength of the U.S. hegemony. For example, neo-realists like Mearsheimer claims that the other great powers have not yet managed to strengthen their relative military capability to “put up a fight” against the U.S. Neoliberal institutionalists, like Joseph Nye oppose the balance of theory explanation and argues instead that it can be explained by U.S.’ willingness to engage in international institutions (Hurrel, 2006). Nonetheless, as will be seen in the analysis, the U.S. are not able nor willing to take the leadership role to intervene in all the conflicts that are taking place in the world. Therefore, the role of regional hegemons has played an important role in international conflict management, especially in cases where the U.S.’ presence has been low or none existent. The reasons why states seek to play an active role in conflicts are many and is often a combination of different factors. According to Hurrel (2006), states that consider themselves as a natural leader often see it as an opportunity to underpin it regional power or to promote itself in order to increase its importance in both the regional and international context.

2.1.3 Criticism of neo-realism

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a debate about the future of realism. Scholars, primarily from Europe and the U.S., argued that it would diminish realism’s explanation power. A famous criticism of realism is found in Francis Fukuyama’s famous book *The End of History*. Fukuyama claimed that war between great powers would no longer happen as we move forward in history with the establishment of liberal democracies, and with the dissolution of the Soviet Union “there is no struggle or conflict over ‘large’ issues, and consequently no need for generals of statesmen” (cited in Mearsheimer, 2002, p. 24). John Mearsheimer, the founder of offensive realism, opposed this view because even though the end of the Cold War may have disapproved the realist prediction regarding the durability of military alliances and the stability of the bipolar system, the structure of the international system has not changed. Furthermore, states are still the main actors in the international system. As emphasized by Mearsheimer, realists argue that it is the structure of the international system and not changes of the system that leads to conflict between states. Therefore, he concluded that there are no reasons to believe that state behavior will change much in the next decades and that the biggest threat to realism is not real-world
events, but criticism within the academic field, in particular from neoliberal institutionalists.
(ibid., p. 26)

2.2 Neoliberal institutionalism

In similar to realism, neoliberal institutionalism is not a unitary theory but a modern paradigm in IR with roots in liberalism that seeks to explain the role of institutions in international politics. Neoliberal institutionalism is often coined with the American scholars Keohane and Nye’s criticism of realism. They claimed that even though realism is a necessary component in the analysis of world politics, it is not sufficient to undergo an analysis of world politics solely based on the realist theory (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 24). The reason is that they believed that the realist theory is in particular weak in explaining changes. In the book *Power and Interdependence*, published for the first time in 1977, Keohane and Nye proposed an additional model to complement realism. The model, which they labelled ‘complex interdependence’, is what they referred to as an ideal model of international system (ibid., p. 24).

In similar to realism, Keohane and Nye believed that the international system is anarchic and that states are the principal actors in the international system. However, they did not agree with realists that states are unitary actors. On the contrary, they claimed that there are multiple channels of access between societies, both within the state apparatus and non-state actors (Brown and Ainley, p. 35). In addition, they criticized realism for assuming that the use of force is central in international politics and that states are first and foremost concerned about their own security. One of the main assumptions behind the complex interdependence model is on the contrary that force is of low salience, and therefore, they did not believe that states prioritize security issues over other issues. Instead, the model assumes that any issue-area, both political and economic, can be on the top of the agenda, and that these issues represents different forms of interdependence (ibid., p. 36). It is important to notice that interdependence is not the same as complex interdependence, and is defined as situations “characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 8).

2.2.1 Keohane’s *After Hegemony*

Keohane spent the next decade to improve the paradigm, which he later labelled ‘neoliberal institutionalism’. In the book *After Hegemony*, published in 1984, Keohane further examined the consequences of interdependence. He argued that interdependence can affect states
negatively and lead to policy conflicts. With the relative decline of the U.S. hegemony in the world economy and growing economic interdependence, he claimed that it was more important than ever to focus on international cooperation because states with common interests can benefit from cooperating with each other in order to share the costs and the goods, and in that way avoid frictions (Keohane, 1984, p. 3-5). In different to realism that assumes that conflicts are always “lurking around the corner” in international politics and therefore understand cooperation as a result of an overall pattern of conflict, Keohane claimed that states can always choose between discord and cooperation (ibid, p. 7). Keohane understood cooperation as a process of mutual adjustment of governmental policies that “takes place only in situations in which actors perceive that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict” (ibid., p. 54). Cooperation is therefore distinguished from harmony, because if there is harmony, cooperation is not necessary. However, even though Keohane underlined the importance of international cooperation, he acknowledged that it can be extremely difficult. He used the Prisoners’ Dilemma to illustrate why cooperation is difficult and can briefly be explained as follows; the optimal solution is when all actors involved in the game (the states) choose to cooperate. In this situation, which is referred to a Pareto-optimal solution, it is impossible to reallocate the resources so as some of them will be better off without making at least one of the others worse off. However, because the states, assumed to be rational actors, know that they can gain even more if they chose to defect as long as the others chose to cooperate, they have higher incentives to defect. Therefore, Keohane argued that cooperation is only possible when states have sufficient access to information and when they manage to slowly build up the relation to one another through continuous communication (ibid., p. 69). Because cooperation requires mutual adjustments, he claimed that all efforts of cooperation needs to take place “within an institutional context of some kind” (ibid., p. 44). Therefore, in order to understand how international cooperation is possible, Keohane maintained that “it is necessary to understand how international institutions operate and the conditions under which they come into being” (ibid., p. 44). The idea that international institutions matters in international politics is central in what is today referred to as regime theory, which will be explored in the next sub-section.

2.2.2 Regime theory

The academic study of international organizations gained gradual interest from IR-scholars after the creation of the League of Nations in 1919. Since then, there has been a progressive analytical shift in how international organizations have been conceived (Kratochwil and
Ruggie, 1994, p. 4). In the beginning, scholars focused first of all on formal institutions, meaning what they do and the formal attributes. However, after the WW2, scholars started to focus more on the institutional processes. In addition, scholars gradually sought to understand what international organizations are instead of only focusing on what they do. From the 1970s, the focus has been on the phenomenon of international regimes. The shift can partly be explained by different real-life events that have affected the development in international relations (among others nuclear parity, economic recovery after the WW2, and the oil crisis in the 1970s) and because the role and scope of international organizations have changed drastically from the 1970s and onward (ibid., p. 7).

The concept ‘international regimes’ was introduced into IR-theory by the Austrian scholar John G. Ruggie in the mid-1970s. At that time, there was a lack of any systematic conception of international governance, which is the core of international organizations, and his goal was to fill the void. He defined a regime as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states (Ruggie, 1975, cited in Keohane, 1984, p. 57). Another scholar that have had an important impact on the development of regime theory in IR is the American social scientist Stephen Krasner. He criticized Ruggie’s definition for being too vague and reformulated it to include; “set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge into a given area of international regimes” (Krasner, 1982, p.186). Krasner asserted that regimes are more than temporary arrangements, and that they will only change when the principles and norms changes, which he argued are “the basic defining characteristics of regimes” (ibid., p. 187-88).

In order to analyze whether regimes matter, Krasner created a simple causal schematic in which he assumed that regimes are intervening variables standing between basic causal variables and behavior and outcome in specific issue-areas. The second arrow in figure 1 indicate that there is a causal relationship between regimes and behavior and outcome.

![Diagram](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

**Figure 1:** The causal relationship between regimes and related behavior and outcome (Krasner, 1982, p. 189).
Krasner used the simple causal schematic to check whether regimes matter according to the most important paradigms in IR. According to Waltz’s structural realism, international systems are only differing according to the distribution of power among the states. And because behavior is understood as a function of the distribution of power, he believed that it will only change when the power distribution changes. Therefore, according to structural realism, the effect of regimes is completely excluded, and is seen as something that can only indirectly cause changes in the power distribution (ibid.) Neoliberal institutionalists, on the other hand, asserts that regimes matter when states are unable to coordinate the behavior among them. And as pointed out by Keohane, regimes are playing an increasingly important role in international politics as states are becoming more interdependent. At the same time, Keohane maintained that regimes only matter under restrictive conditions and believed that regimes are irrelevant in a zero-sum situation where states act based on pure power motivations (ibid.) The reasoning is illustrated in figure 2. ‘Path a’ illustrates that there is a direct link between basic causal variables and changes in behavior, and ‘path b’ illustrates that there is a causal relationship between regimes and related behavior and outcomes. According to neoliberal institutionalism, both paths are possible but “path a” is more likely.

Figure 2: Modified structuralism’s view on how regimes can impact behavior and outcomes (Krasner, 1982, p. 192).

If considering that regimes can have an impact on international cooperation, how can we evaluate their effectiveness? Or in other words, how can we evaluate why some collective problems are more easily solved than other? According to the Norwegian professor in political science, Arild Underdal (1992), it may be tempting to evaluate regime effectiveness based on whether the operations or actions carried out by the regime have been successful or not. However, it is extremely difficult to define success and to agree on valid indicators. And even if we do so, we often tend to make conclusions based on the net benefits produced instead of the overall achievements. The problem is that it is difficult to evaluate whether the same outcome would have been produced if the international regime would not have interfered. Based on this, Underdal proposed a framework for analyzing regime effectiveness. His model includes
the following two dimensions: relative improvement and collective optimum. The reference point for calculating relative improvements is the “hypothetical state of affairs that would have come about had the regime not existed” (Underdal, 1992, p. 231). The second dimension takes into account their ability to solve the problem, in which the point of reference is the knowledge they had at the time of solving the collective problem. The two dimensions are illustrated in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative improvement</th>
<th>Distance to collective optimum</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Important, but still imperfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Insignificant and suboptimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Important and perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unimportant, yet optimal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Underdal’s two dimensions of regime effectiveness (Underdal, 1992, p. 231).*

Even though the two dimensions are complementary, he argued that both of them needs to be evaluated. The reason is first of all because they are interesting in their own way, and because the first dimension measures effectiveness in absolute terms and the second one say something about gradual changes.

### 2.3 Summary and hypothesis

In general, neo-realists have a more pessimistic world-view than neoliberal institutionalists. They argue that the anarchic structure of the international system leads to a self-help system where states first of all have to prioritize their own survival, which leads to a constant threat of war. Because states cannot trust one another, neo-realists claim that international cooperation is more or less impossible. Consequently, they do not believe that international institutions have an independent standing in international relations. Instead, realists claim that the presence of one or a few hegemon powers can create stability in the international system. Neoliberal institutionalists, on the other-hand, believe that states can chose between discord and cooperation. However, because cooperation between states is believed to be extremely difficult, neoliberal institutionalists assert that it needs to be facilitated by international institutions. The core idea is that international institutions, like international regimes can affect state behavior.
through the establishment of common principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. Neo-realists oppose this view, and even though they recognize the existence of international regimes, they do not believe that they can deter or defeat aggression.

Based on this, I assume that one of the prerequisites for regional organizations to succeed in peace operations in collaboration with the UN is that they have the same worldview, which means that they have the same understanding of what the conflict is about and what mechanisms that are needed in order to reach the wanted outcome. If not, I assume that it would be impossible to cooperate. However, regardless of the theoretical approach to international relations, there are reasons to believe that regional hegemons are interested in acquiring a leadership role in peace operations in order to demonstrate its relative power in the region. Therefore, I assume that if the UN and regional organizations do not have the same worldview, the regional hegemon and/or organization will need to follow-up with the resources that are available for them in order to carry out the peace operation. Moreover, based on regime theory, my assumption is that the UN and the regional organization need to work on a common implementation plan which is based on the knowledge available at the time of intervening in the conflict. Also, in order to reach the goal of the peace operation, that they need to use the resources available for them. The hypothesis can be summarized as follows:

H₁: Without a common worldview, it is impossible to cooperate.

H₂: Without a common worldview, the regional organizations need to follow-up with the resources that are available for them.

H₃: The UN and regional organizations needs to agree on a common implementation plan based on the knowledge available for them.

H₄: The UN and regional organizations needs to use the resources that is available for them and that they consider as necessary to reach the goal.

Based on these hypotheses, I will analyze, discuss and compare the relationship between the UN and the AU in Somalia and the UN and ECOWAS in Liberia in Chapter 5. In order to analyze the two first hypotheses, I will focus on why ECOMOG (and later ECOMIL) and AMISOM were created in the first place – who took the initiative to conduct a peace operation and how was it legitimized? Moreover, I will focus on the UN’s mandate in comparison to the
mandate of the regional organizations to discuss how they have divided the tasks in between them and whether they have used to resources available for them to reach the goal.

### 2.4 International organizations

Having defined the concept ‘international regime’, it is important to clarify for what international organizations are. According to the International Law Commission, an international organization can be defined as an “organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality” (Peace Palace Library, n.a.). An international organization consists furthermore of two or more member-states. Other IGOs and NGOs can in some instances also be members of an international organization. There are principally two different forms of international organizations; universal organizations and regional organizations. A pre-eminent example of a universal organization is the UN (de Chazournes, 2017, p. 5). Other examples of universal organizations are the World Health Organization (WTO), the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even though universal organizations may differ in a functional sense, they are similar in the way that all states can in theory join the organization as long as they meet certain conditions stipulated by the organization (ibid., p.7). In regional organizations, on the other hand, the membership is limited to states within the region. Consequently, in order to fully understand what regional organizations are, it is crucial to understand the concept ‘region’.

#### 2.4.1 Understanding the concept ‘region’

In geographical terms, a region can be defined as a territorial unit that exists at different spatial levels, which are the macro-level, sub-level, and the micro-level (Gant and Söderbaum, 2003, p. 6). Continents are often understood as macro-regional units. According to this understanding, a macro-regional entity refers to an entity that encompasses the whole continent, such as the AU. A sub-region, on the other hand, is often understood as a larger area within the macro-region (ibid., p. 6). ECOWAS is, according to this understanding, a sub-regional entity. Finally, micro-regions refer to a space between the national and local level (ibid., p. 6). From a geographical point of view, geographical features, such as water catchment basis, delimit regions. However, even though geographical features have contributed to the formation of regional organizations, for example the Caribbean Community and Common Market...
(CARICOM) and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), it is not the most common reason for regional cooperation (Wallensteen and Bjuner, 2014). Other reasons for regional cooperation include cooperation after conflicts, security concerns, trade, and social and economic development. In other words, regions are more than given territorial units. As pointed out by Bøås, “they [regions] are always in the making; they are constructed, de-constructed and re-constructed through social practice and discourse, and not only states but also non-state actors participate in the process of constructing the region and giving it a specific content” (Bøås, 2003, p. 34).

2.4.2 Regional organizations

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Articles 52-54) provides the legal framework for the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security. However, Article 52 refers to ‘regional arrangements and agencies’ without providing any definitions. In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali argued that it was intentional “thus allowing useful flexibility undertakings by a group of States to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action which would also contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN, 1992, Para. 61). Boutros-Ghali furthermore stated that these groups could include “treaty-based organizations […] regional organizations for mutual security and defense, organizations for general regional development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or function, or groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of concern” (ibid, Paragraph 61).

A more specific understanding is given in Tavares (2010, p. 9) argues that a regional agency is “a recognized organization with legal personality and an organizational structure” and a regional arrangement is “a grouping of states under a treaty for a specified common purpose without any organization to personify that arrangement”. In addition to regional organizations that can lawfully engage in a peace operation under Chapter VIII, there are some organizations who do not fall under the definition of regional agencies or arrangement, despite having some similar characteristics. Among them are alliance organizations that are typically formed as a mean of collective defense; institutions that operate out-of-area that can deploy security operations outside their geographically area; and agencies where membership is not based on regional proximity (ibid., p. 9). The AU, CARICOM, Council of Europe, ECOWAS and twenty other organizations fall under the understanding of regional agencies and seven organizations fall under the understanding of regional arrangements, among them is the Organizations for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the other hand, do not fall under the definition of regional organizations. Instead Tavares (2010, p. 12) classify them as other intergovernmental organizations. The reason is simply because they don’t consider themselves as Chapter VIII organizations. NATO was created as a collective defense alliance and is explicitly referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter that legitimize “individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” without the authorization from the UNSC (NATO, 1949, art. 5). The EU on the other hand, consider itself as something more than a Chapter VIII organization. Even though the UN has tried to formalize the relationship with the EU, it has been a strategic consideration to not become an official Chapter VIII organization (Bjuner, 2014, ch.7).

2.5 Universalism, regionalism, and regionalization

According to Christoph Schreuer, the debate on universalism versus regionalism in international relations is linked to the old debate surrounding centralism versus local governance at the local level (Schreuer, 1995). Those arguing in favor centralist solutions argue that uniform and homogenous methods are more efficient and that there exist certain universal values that are globally applicable. It is furthermore linked to the universalistic vision that “the word is governed by and operates under a single system that is applicable to states and other legal persons” (Shongwe, 2015, p. 31-32). The first international organizations that were created in the end of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century had clear universalistic features. However, after the WW2, Regionalism gained widespread support, especially from European scholars. Those that argue in favor regionalism asserts that local solutions to local problems are more efficient because it makes it easier to take into account the local peculiarities. Regionalism is in its broadest sense “the idea, ideology and goal[s] that seek to transform a geographical area into a clearly identified social space” (Bach, 2003, p.22; Grant and Söderbaum, 2003, p. 7). Regionalism should not be confused with regionalization, even though they tend to complement each other. According to Hettne, regionalization denotes the “multidimensional process of intra-regional change that occur simultaneously at several levels of social, political and economic integration” (Hettne, 1999, cited in Wunderlich, 2016, ch. 2). Even though regionalization is often seen as a result of regionalism it can occur unintentionally.
2.5.1 The creation of the UN – a strong universalistic organization

During the negotiations concerning the drafting of the UN Charter that took place at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, in Washington D.C. in the autumn of 1944, the debate on universalism versus regionalism played a prominent role (Polsi, 2015, p. 121). However, the final proposals were predominantly universalistic. The U.S., that had chosen to stay out of the League of Nations in the inter-war period, wanted to take a leading role in the end of the WW2 to create a new post-war international order. The then president of the U.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt argued in favor of a strong universalistic organization and proposed that the executive leadership would be divided between the Super Powers. Roosevelt hoped that they would be able to overcome the differences with the communist regime in Moscow if they shared the leadership position with the Soviet Union in the Security Council, (Polsi, 2015, p. 122).

In the spring of 1945, delegates from 49 countries met in San Francisco in the U.S. to discuss the draft of the Charter of the UN. Delegates from Latin American countries and Arab States raised a concern about the power invested in the UN, and the debate on regionalism and universalism continued. As a compromise between the universalistic and the regionalist approach, Chapter VIII was included in the Charter (Schreuer, 1995). However, Article 52-54 of the Charter are not the only regionalist features of the Charter. As stated in Chapter V of the Charter regarding the creation of the UNSC, the contribution of the ten rotating, non-permanent seats in the UNSC should be “equitable to geographical distribution” (UN, 1945, art. 23.1). Moreover, there are five regional groupings in the UN General Assembly that discuss and coordinate activities during the yearly meetings in the General Assembly, and takes important decisions regarding for example leadership positions.

2.5.2 The old and new wave of regionalism

The debate on regionalism between the 1950s to the 1970s, commonly referred to as the ‘first wave of regionalism’, was grounded in theories such as federalism and neofunctionalism. In the aftermath of the WW2, the faith in nation-state and nationalism was declining. Federalist thinkers in Europe such as Alberto Spinelli believed that nationalism was the root cause of most European conflicts and that the Westphalian nation-state was more of a problem for human security than a solution (Wunderlich, 2016, ch.1). Consequently, the early federalist approach to development in Europe after the WW2 was to limit the power of the nation-state by creating
a political community based on a strong supranational framework. The core idea was to create a European federalist system with a distribution of power between the regional, the national and the sub-national level. However, when the political representatives from all over Europe gathered at the Congress of Hague in 1948 to discuss the future of Europe, the proponents of the nation-state managed to mobilize enough support to create an intergovernmental system in which the national sovereignty would be protected. The outcome of the meeting was the creation of Council of Europe (ibid.)

In the 1960s, neofunctionalism became the most influential approach. The founder of neofunctionalism, Ernest B. Haas identified the process of integrating nation-states under a supranational institution as sporadic and conflictual because nation states often want to set the terms of agreements themselves and want to control the outcomes (externalities). His hypothesis was that even though integration may be challenging, it is possible under the conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation (Söderbaum, 2013). He believed that with the help of strong and visible institutions and support from interest groups, national governments wound increasingly feel entangled in regional pressures and would agree to change their original positions (Schmitter, 2005). Neofunctionalism came under massive criticism in the 1970s. Empirical developments tended to contradict the theory, which led Haas and other neofunctionalists to acknowledge that spill-overs from “low politics” to “high politics” were limited and that external geopolitical factors also should be taken into account (Wunderlich, 2016, ch. 1).

After the Cold War, there was a resurgence of interest in regionalism and is commonly referred to as the ‘new wave of regionalism’. What distinguish new regionalism from old regionalism is that it has not been dominated by the European experience of regionalization (Wunderlich, 2016, ch. 2). Also, whereby old regionalism often had a narrow focus on free trade agreements and security alliances, the number and scope has grown significantly under new regionalism (Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003, p. 3). As pointed out by Söderbaum (ibid., p. 1-2); new regionalism is characterized by its “multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and […] involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions”. In addition, the new regionalism theories can be distinguished from the old theories in that they are more concerned about the relationship between regionalism and globalization. However, there are no consensus whether they are mutually reinforcing or supporting each other (Schultz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001, p. 4).
As argued by James H. Mittelman (1996, p. 189): “if globalization is understood as to mean the compression of time and space aspects of social relations, then regionalism may be regarded as but one of the components of globalization. In this sense, regionalism is a chapter of globalization. But regionalism may also be a response or a challenge to globalization”.

2.6 Peace and peace operations

Peace and war has always been one of the key issues in IR-theory. Nonetheless, peace research was not created as a separate academic discipline before the 1950s. The Norwegian professor Johan Galtung is often considered to be the “father” of peace research, or what is more commonly referred to as peace and conflicts studies today (Grewal, 2003). Galtung developed several important theories that have led to a deeper understanding of the concept peace. Among them is the conceptualization of negative and positive peace. Galtung’s original definition of negative peace from 1964 was “absence of violence, absence of war”, and positive peace was defined as “integration of human society” (ibid., p. 1). In Galtung’s famous essay ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’ that was published in 1969, the understanding of the concept ‘violence’ was extended and added to the definitions of negative and positive peace. According to this typology, negative peace is seen as the “absence of personal violence” and positive peace as the “absence of structural violence” (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). Personal violence or direct violence is furthermore understood as the type of violence committed by an actor (individual, state institutions, organization, etc.) It is a negative formulation of peace because the absence of direct violence does not necessarily lead to a positively defined outcome (ibid.) Structural violence, on the other hand, is not conducted by a clearly defined actor but is a social structure or social institution in which people are prevented from meeting their basic needs. According to Galtung, the absence of structural violence is the same as social justice and is therefore a positive concept of peace (ibid.) The two concepts of peace are seen as two different dimensions, and one form is therefore possible without the other. However, Galtung projected positive peace as a higher ideal than negative peace because he believed that peace is more than the narrow vision of ending or reducing violence (Grewal, 2003). Instead, he argued that peace research should be studied from a structural level and that the focus should be on creating conditions for peace through non-violent means, which is based on Gandhi’s ideal of world peace.
Even though Galtung’s theory of negative and positive peace is the most widely used conceptualization of peace, he has not been able to convince all peace researchers. Among them is Kenneth Boulding that criticized Galtung for not taking into account the cost of inequality between countries (Gleditch, Nordkvelle, and Strand, 2014). The scholar Rummel accused Galtung’s theory for being a “socialist theory of peace” and portray his concept of positive peace as a “neo-Marxist theory of exploitation” (Rummel, 1981, cited in Gleditch et al., 2014). He has also been criticized for the notation ‘basic needs’ and ‘structural violence’. His research fellow Christian Bay questioned whether needs are a positive notion or a normative notion and suggested to separate between genuine and manufactured needs (Richmond, 2016). The concept ‘structural violence’ has also been criticized for not taking into account the different cultural norms and practices that constitutes violence. As a response to the criticism, Galtung published a new essay in 1990 in which he added the concept of ‘cultural violence’ to the concepts of negative and positive peace and is understood any aspect of a culture that can provide legitimate framework of violence, either directly or structurally (Gleditch et al., 2014).

2.6.1 Peace operations – before and after the Cold-War

The legal basis for UN peace operations (Chapter VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter) evolved from the conflict management mechanisms that were created by the League of Nations (Kenkel, 2013). In the seven decades of UN existence, peace operations have gone through major transformations. According to Kenkel, UN peace operations can be divided into five different generations, which are divided on the basis of the operations’ level of force, the type and depth of tasks, and what has been the case of the last generation; increased cooperation between the UN and regional organizations (ibid.) In addition, the nature of conflict matters for understanding the different generations of peace operations. The first generation of peace operations is characterized as traditional peacekeeping operations (observing ceasefires and forcing separation after an interstate conflict) that were legitimized by Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The peacekeeping operations during the Cold War often involved light armed forces that were operating under strict rules of engagement. The focus was mainly on negative peace in which the main objective was to avoid the possibility of a nuclear exchange between the two ideological blocs (ibid).

The shift from the first generation to the second generation took place in the end of the Cold War, both because of an increased demand for peace operations due to the change in the nature
of conflicts (from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts) and because of an increased supply from the UN (ibid.) The end of the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the U.S. after the Cold War lifted the blockade in the UNSC, and the UN was, in theory, finally ready to act effectively. The UN response to post-Cold War peace operations was codified in in Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace and marks a shift of focus from negative to positive peace (ibid.) In the Agenda for Peace, four overarching tasks for the UN and their allies to undertake were identified and are still relevant today. The different types of UN peace operations are preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building (UN, 1992, para. 6). Preventive diplomacy or conflict prevention is about finding the structural sources in an intrastate or interstate tension and dispute and trying to reinforce the foundations in the society that are falling apart, often through diplomatic initiatives (ibid., para. 15). It can include setting up early warning systems, information gathering, and conducting analysis. Peacemaking operations are addressing an on-going conflict and is defined as “action[s] to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means” (ibid., para. 20). Peacekeeping is a strategy deployed in a conflict that has already escalated into a more serious level and can be defined as “the use of military, police and civilian personnel to lay the foundations for sustainable peace” (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010, p. 15). In peacekeeping mission, military force should only be used as a measure of last resort, and if used, it should be a minimum of force necessary to achieve the wanted effect. Peacekeeping is often confused with peace enforcement; however, the concepts must not be used interchangeably. Peace enforcement can be defined as “the use of military and other measures to enforce the will of the UN Security Council (ibid., p. 15). In different to peace enforcement, peacekeeping missions require the consent of the host nation and/or the main parties of the conflict. Also, whereby peace enforcement is defined under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeeping is not to be found in the UN Charter. The term was for the first time used after the UN armed intervention under the tensions over the Suez Chanel in 1956. The then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld jokingly called it “chapter six and a half” because he meant that this kind of UN operations fell between chapter six and seven of the UN Charter (Clark, 1997). Finally, peacebuilding are activities undertaken in a conflict-prone or post-conflict country. The term peace-building emerged through the work of Galtung and was introduced as an official UN strategy in the Agenda for Peace. Boutros-Ghali defined peace-building as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (UN, 1992, para. 21). It includes a range of activities with an overall aim of
strengthening national capabilities at all levels through social and economic development. Contemporary peace-building is often described as liberal peace-building because the principal aim of peacebuilders is to build liberal democracies, which are seen as the most peaceful political structure. Liberal peace theory is coined with Michael Doyle’s empirical study from 1983 that concluded that no liberal democracies had ever gone to war against each other (Miklian, 2014). The idea that liberal democracies are more peaceful in their international relations can furthermore be traced back to the democratic peace theory which is rooted in Kant’s concept of ‘perpetual peace’. The liberal peace theory is based on the ideological assertions of liberalism. The fundamental assumption is that liberal values such as individual freedom, human rights, social justice, and the free market is guaranteed and promoted in a liberal democracy through a constitution that ensures the rule of law and limit the power of the government. Because a liberal democracy promotes social justice, the core idea is that it will lead to long-term peace (Fischer, 2000). Another fundamental assumption is that economic interdependence between liberal democracies creates transnational ties that encourage peaceful relations rather than war. This reasoning is also used to explain why liberal democracies are likely to go to war with autocracies but not with other liberal democracies (ibid.) Finally, a third fundamental assumption is that developed states have the duty to assist vulnerable or failed states to achieve liberal peace (Miklian, 2014).

The first series of liberal peace-building operations to help peace settlement in post-conflict countries were launched in Namibia and Nicaragua in 1989, and soon developed into some sort of a “growth industry” in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Between 1989 and 1999, fourteen major peace-building operations were deployed (Paris, 2004, p. 3). In the beginning, the new UN peace-building agenda was greeted with a worldwide optimism which was characterized by *inter alia* a growing belief in multilateralism. However, as pointed out by Bendaña (2005, p. 6); “optimism began to give way to skepticism when, in the wake of the events in the Balkans and elsewhere, the notion of peacebuilding began to encompass peacekeeping operations”. Non-violent interventions, which is and should be a core element in liberal peace-building, were hardly given a chance and was instead substituted with military interventions labelled as humanitarian interventions (ibid.) This notion was used to legitimize the use of force against a state with the intention of ending violations of human rights. The violent military interventions were often met with counterinsurgency which in turn undermined the efforts to sustain peace. In addition, the peace-building strategies that were employed often consisted of rapid liberalization strategies such as hasty efforts of holding elections and
economic reforms that did not address the direct source of the conflict. In some cases, the strategies even produced destabilizing results (Paris, 2011, p. 34).

2.6.2 Doctrinal changes

There are many examples of peace operations in the 1990s that did more harm than good, among them the first peace operations in Somalia, which led scholars and eventually the UN to question the sustainability of the rapid liberalization strategies. As highlighted in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on August 21 in 2000:

“No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor. In the past the United Nations has often found itself unable to respond effectively to such challenges. It is a fundamental premise of the present report, however, that it must be able to do so. Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully” (UN, August 21, 2000, p. xi-x).

The report is commonly known as the Brahimi report and is named after the chair of the high-level Panel that was created in May 2000 to assist the UN. It includes 69 concrete and practical recommendations for improvements of UN peace operations (Kenkel, 2013). Among the recommendations that are stipulated in the Brahimi report are the establishment of mechanisms for effective conflict prevention, definition of rapid deployment standards, increased focus on rapid and effective fact-finding, financial support for bigger and better equipped troops, and standards and implications for peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding operations.

In addition, after the failures of the international community to effectively stop and protect the victims of the genocides in Rwanda and in the Srebrenica region in Bosnia in the mid-1990s, the then General-Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan addressed the question of ‘who’ has the responsibility to protect victims of mass atrocities (Sarkin and Fowler, 2010). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), set up by the Canadian government in 2000, were given the task to respond to Kofi Annan’s question. The aim of ICISS was to develop a global political consensus about when and how the international community should respond to emerging crisis that involves the risk of large-scale humanitarian crisis. In December 2001, the Commission issued the report Responsibility to Protect that suggested that it is first of all up to the states to prevent and protect the population within its border in case of genocide.
and other mass atrocities, but that the international community has the responsibility to protect when states fail to do so. The new norm, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), was embraced by the member states in the UN and was adopted by unanimity by the 150 member states present at the UN World Summit in 2005 (ibid). The Brahimi report and the adoption of the R2P principle led to a shift of focus from peace-building to peace enforcement and is what Kenkel refers to as the third generation of peace operations (Kenkel, 2013). It also led to a change in the interpretation of the sovereignty principle; from an absolute to a relative interpretation.

The fourth generation of peace operations is characterized as robust peace-building operations. These operations have had, in different to the peace-building operations that were conducted in the 1990s, a wider focus on the use of force in order to enhance civilian tasks. Due to the complexity of these operations, the UN has increasingly requested the support from regional organizations, NGOs, and other relevant actors. The fifth, and current generation of peace operations is characterized by its hybrid character in which troops and police personnel have been put under the same command, and regional organizations and the UN has sent troops to the same mission. Also, the troops are no longer only consisting of troops from the Western world. After the terrorist attack on 9/11, and the following wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the people from the non-Western world has been the predominant source of blue helmets troops (ibid.)
3. REGIONALISM AND REGIONALIZATION IN AFRICA

Pan-Africanism is the oldest form of expression of African regionalism. It can generally be understood as a movement that address the common challenges that the African people and people of African decedents are confronted with, such as discrimination, self-determination and economic development (Bach, 2016, p. 77). The ideas and goals of Pan-Africanism have changed throughout the centuries, which if reflected in the various attempts of institutionalizing Pan-Africanism. The establishment of the Pan-African Association (PAA) at the London Conference in 1900 was the first attempt of institutionalizing Pan-Africanism. The objectives were, among other things, to secure the rights of African descendants, encourage cooperation and to improve the conditions of oppressed African communities. The initial plan was to meet every two years; however, it took almost 19 years before the second Congress was organized (ibid., p. 88). The sixth Congress, which was held in Manchester in 1945, was organized primarily around the issue of colonization. Several resolutions around the issue were proposed and led to a turning point for African nations quest for independence (Murithi, 2005, p. 24). In 1958, the first president of Independent Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah organized an All African Peoples Conference (AAPC). Nkrumah claimed that the independence of Ghana was meaningless as long as the rest of the African continent was colonized and wanted to gather both independent countries and countries that were still under colonial rule to discuss the prospect for decolonization. The AAPC conferences that were held in the subsequent years led to the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (ibid., p.24). A commitment to liberate the African continent from colonial rule was entrenched in the Charter of the OAU, adopted at the Addis Ababa Conference in May 1963. The goal to free the whole continent from colonialism was reached by the mid-1990s, with the exception of Western Sahara that is still under Moroccan rule (Bach, 2016, p. 78).

Throughout the 1990s, the goals and the ideas of the organization changed. The focus shifted gradually toward the issue of the marginalization of the African continent within the world economy and led to a pressure for restructuring the OAU. The ambition of reconfiguring the Pan-African agenda started with the adoption of the Abuja Treaty in 1991, which called for the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. The goal of AEC was to create a federal or confederal system through a six-stage plan. The step-by-step plan was combined with a vision of a gradual transfer of sovereign power to Pan-African institutions, inspired by
the European regional integration model (ibid., p. 79). The first step of the plan was to establish a Regional Economic Community (REC) consisting of regional groupings from all the sub-regions in Africa. The initially plan was that the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) would facilitate regional economic integration between the member states and through the wider AEC (AU, n.d.). However, as will be explored in the section about ECOWAS, the absence of peace has made it difficult to pursue the goal of enhancing the economic prosperity. Consequently, many regional groupings have instead been largely preoccupied with peace operations.

Map 1: The eight officially RECs recognized by the AU (Boutellis and Williams, 2013).

Today, there are a numerous of regional groupings in Africa with overlapping goals and memberships, however only eight regional-groupings are officially recognized as RECs by the African Union. The eight RECs are ECOWAS, the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (ECCAS),
the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The relationship between the African Union and the RECs is regulated in the 2008 Protocol on Relations between the RECs and the AU (AU, n.d.) The AU furthermore recognize two Regional Mechanisms (RMs); the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and the North African Regional Capacity (NARC). Because Chapter VIII of the UN Charter does not distinguish between regional and sub-regional organizations, the question of whether sub-regional organizations can lawfully take part in a peace operation with the authorization from the UNSC has been contested (Boutellis and Williams, 2013). Questions like who is subordinated to who and whether the relationship between sub-regional organizations and regional organizations is hierarchical or not have not yet been resolved. Nonetheless, the deployment of the ECOMOG troops in Liberia in 1989, which was the first of its kind, opened the door for future cooperation between the UN and sub-regional organizations without the involvement of the AU.

3.1 The creation of the African Union

Having briefly looked at the history of regionalism and regionalization in Africa, this section will examine the origin of the AU and AU’s peace and security mechanisms. The background of the creation ECOWAS and the organization’s peace and security mechanisms will be explored in the following sub-section.

At the Cairo summit of 1993, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was issued with the aim of addressing the many conflicts in Africa (Muyangwa and Vogt, 2000). However, because the OAU was an organization based on the principle of State sovereignty, conflict management was limited to ‘interventions by invitation’ and was largely ineffective. Frustration of the failures and lack of interventions led a small group of African leaders to continue to push for a further integration of African states. Among them was the leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi. At the summit of African leaders in Sirte in 1999, Gaddafi advocated for the establishment of a United States of Africa. The outcome of the meeting was the Sirte Declaration, which called for the establishing of the African Union. In May 2001, the headquarter of the AU was established in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, and on August 9, 2002, the African Union officially replaced the OAU (Bach, 2016, p. 80). Today, all the 55 states in Africa are member of the organization.
3.1.1 AU’s peace and security mechanisms

In comparison to the OAU, the mandate of the AU is broader and more proactive with regard to conflict management. Even though the AU upheld the principle of State sovereignty and non-interference, the AU has, unlike the OAU, the right to intervene in a member-state in certain circumstances (Bach, 2016, p. 80). According to Article 4h of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which is the founding document of the AU, the Union has the right to intervene in a member state “pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU, 2000, art. 4(h)). The Assembly is here referring to the Assembly of the Union, which is the supreme organ of the AU and is made up by heads of states and governments from all the member countries (ibid., art. 6). In the Protocol on Amendments to the Act, which was adopted in July 2003, AU’s right to intervene in a member state was extended to include “serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council” (AU, 2003, art. 4, expansion of subparagraph (h)). As pointed out by Weiss and Welz (2014, p. 891), Article 4h of the founding documents of the AU is “Africa’s home-grown version” of the R2P principle.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) outline AU’s strategy for the promotion of peace, security and stability. APSA is guided by the Constitutive Act and the Amendments to the Constitutive Act and was formalized in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which was adopted by the Assembly in July 2002 (Murithi, 1996, p. 86). The protocol established the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is a decision-making organ that takes decisions regarding prevention and interventions in conflicts. The objectives of the Council, which is laid down in Article 3 of the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC), is to (AU, 2002, Art.3(a-f)):

“promote peace, security and stability in Africa […], anticipate and prevent conflicts […], promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities […], co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts […], develop a common defence policy for the Union […], promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law […]

PSC has 15 members and in different to the UNSC, all of the members are elected on a temporary basis and none of them have the veto power. The members are elected by the Executive Council, ten of them are elected for a two-year period and five of them are elected
for a three-year period (ibid., art. 5.1) The four other pillars of the APSA are the African Standby Force (ASF), Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the African Union Peace Fund. The ASF was created as an instrumental tool for maintaining peace and security (Darkwa, 2017). The development of ASF started already in 2003 and the initial plan was that it would be fully operational by 2008. However, the AU was not able to deploy the ASF as originally planned due to lack of predictable funding and was not declared fully operational before January 2016 (ibid.) The regional standby force is made up by 25,000 personnel that are divided equally on five regional brigades. The regional brigades are furthermore based on three sub-regional groupings under the REC and the two RMs: namely ECOWAS, ECCAS, SADC, EASF and NARC. The regional brigades are expected to have a rapid deployment capability and should in theory be deployed within 14 days after the mandate has been issued (ibid.)


Panel of the Wise was established to advise PSC and consists of five highly respected members from the African continent that has contributed to the development of peace and security on the continent (AU, 2002, art. 11). The members of the Panel of the Wise are selected by the Chairperson the AU Commission. Article 12 provides for the creation the CEWS. The main responsibility of the organ is to “facilitate the anticipation and prevention of the conflict” (ibid.,
art. 12.1). Finally, the African Union Peace Fund, or more commonly known as the Peace Fund, was established to “provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security (ibid. art. 21.1). The member states of the AU give contributions to the Peace Fund on a voluntary basis. However, as will be explored in Chapter 5, the contributions from the AU member states have not been sufficient to cover the peace and security operations and has therefore relied heavily on funding from non-AU members and international organizations.

3.2 ECOWAS – more than an organization for economic integration

ECOWAS was created by the Treaty of ECOWAS signed in Lagos, Nigeria on May 28, 1975 (Jaye, Garuba and Amadi, 2011). The sub-regional organization comprises fifteen member states, namely Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, the Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Togo, Benin, Liberia, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Sierra Leone and Cape Verde. ECOWAS consisted of sixteen member states until Mauritania withdrew its membership in 2000 (ECOWAS, n.d.)


The original aim of the sub-regional organization was “to promote co-operations and development in all fields of economic activity […] for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer
relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent” (ECOWAS, 1975, art. 2.1). However, economic integration between the newly independent states was not as easy as foreseen by the founders. In the years following independence, a majority of the states in West Africa suffered from frequent change of political regimes through military coups (Jaye et al., 2011). The political instability made it impossible to pursue economic development because most of the leaders were more concerned about power struggle rather than paying attention to development. Also, because the leaders in the West African states often supported and aided arbitrary regime change in neighboring countries, there was a lack of trust between the governmental leaders (ibid.) I didn’t take many years before the West African leaders realized there was a strong nexus between economic integration and broader security issues. As a result, the sub-regional organization adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978, which stated that “ECOWAS cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Member States of the Community” (ECOWAS, 1978, p. 4). Article 1 (ibid.) of the protocol stipulated that (ibid., art. 1):

“Member states shall, in the relation with one another, refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity against the territorial integrity of political independence of other Member States”.

The protocol recognizes armed threats against any of the member states as a threat to the sub-regional organization and a situation that may require the attention from ECOWAS to stop the threat and/or the aggression. However, the Protocol on Non-Aggression was criticized for only identifying situations that were likely to endanger peace and security in the region and for not establishing legal instruments to respond to security situations (Agbu, 2006, p. 69). To address the limitations of the protocol, the Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) was adopted in 1981. In different to the Non-Aggression Protocol, the MAD Protocol would also apply to internal conflicts and external threats from non-member states against member states of ECOWAS. The protocol also provided for the establishment of a standby force, the Allied Armed Force of the Community (AAFC), that would comprise of military units from the member states and was meant act in case of armed aggressions. Nonetheless, the protocol was never implemented. The Francophone countries feared that Nigeria, the regional hegemon in West Africa, would have too much influence on the decisions and created instead on a defense agreement among themselves (ibid., p. 70).
With the emergence of intra-state conflicts in the end of the Cold War, ECOWAS faced new forms of challenges. The civil war that started in Liberia in 1989 had spill-over effects to Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. In 1990, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was created to intervene in the conflict in Liberia. However, ECOMOG intervened without any prior authorization by neither ECOWAS nor the UNSC, which raised a number of issues which will be analyzed in Chapter 5.

3.2.1 ECOWAS’ peace and security mechanisms

After the civil war broke out in Liberia in 1989, the ECOWAS’ leaders realized that economic development was impossible without secure environments. In line with this, a revised version of the ECOWAS Treaty was adopted in 1993 (Badmus, 2009). The Revised Treaty reaffirmed the commitment of the organization and added rules and principles from various protocols that had been adopted in the last decades. Among them is the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles that, inter alia, provided for the protection and promotion of human and people’s right, belief in the liberty of the individual, and equal and inalienable rights to free election (ibid.) An important element of the Revised Treaty is Article 58 that deals with regional peace, stability and security. Article 58.2 stipulates that the member states should establish and strengthen “appropriate mechanisms for timely prevention and resolution of intra-State and inter-State conflicts” (ECOWAS, 1993, art. 58.2). However, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia created tensions between the member states. Consequently, it took almost four years before the Authority of Heads of State and Government agreed on a security framework. At the 4th Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS that was held in Lome in December 1997, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peacekeeping and Security was created (Badmus, 2009). The protocol, which is commonly referred to as the Mechanism, was adopted in October 1998 and provided a comprehensive framework for regional interventions in West Africa. The main institutions of the Mechanisms are the Mediation and Security Council, the Authority of Heads of State and Government, and the Executive Secretariat. The Authority is composed of head of states/governments from the member states and is the main decision-making body of the Mechanisms. The Council consists of nine member states, in which seven of them are elected by the Authority and two of them by the Chairman of ECOWAS. All of the members serves for a period of two years. The Council is responsible for decisions regarding sub-regional peace and security, and to authorize ECOWAS interventions (Agbu, 2006, p. 71). It also has
the responsibility to inform the UN and the AU, to appoint commanders, and to deploy forces. Finally, the main responsibility of the Executive Secretariat is to “initiate actions for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security in the sub-region” (ECOWAS, 1999, art. 15.1). Article 18 of the revised Treaty of 1993 stipulates that (ECOWAS, 1993, art. 18.1 and art. 18.3); “the Executive Secretariat shall be appointed by the Authority for a 4-year term renewable only once for another 4-year period […] and “shall be a person of proven competence and integrity, with a global vision of political and economic problems and regional integration.” The protocol also gave the legal basis for the creation of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) and the Early Warning System. ESF was created to succeed ECOMOG and is today a multidisciplinary force, consisting of military, police and civil personnel from the member states. The Early Warning System was created with the purpose of “preventing conflicts and consists of an observation and monitoring center and observation and monitoring zones that are located in several areas in West Africa” (ECOWAS, 1993, art. 23).
4. GENESIS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN SOMALIA AND LIBERIA

What is the reason for the shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts after the Cold War, and what makes people from the same country go to war against each other? As will be explored in this chapter, Africa became a strategic spot for the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The two super powers poured money and weapons to the African governments and helped training their national armies. In exchange, they were given access to land, harbors, natural resources, and most importantly, they gained political affiliation from the African states. However, the economic support ended with the Cold War, and with high levels of foreign debt that they had obtained from international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF during the 1970s, in addition to bad governance and widespread corruption, they were not only facing a political crisis but also an economic crisis.

Another common explanation that has been used to explain the many civil wars in Africa is that the structure of the social, political, and economic life has been organized around ethnical affiliations (Braathen, Bøås and Sæther, 2000, p. 3). In other words, ethnicity has often been linked to identity. However, as pointed out by Braathen et al. (2000, 4-5), “ethnicity is part of a complex set of dynamic and interactive identities. We all carry with us a flexible set of identities […] the important issue is therefore not the notion of ethnicity, but why and how it is used politically”. In Africa, the issue of ethnical identity is partly linked to their colonial history. When the European countries divided the African continent at the Berlin conference in the late 19th century, they did not take into account the different ethnical groups that were living within and across the borders that they were drawing. When the European powers left in the 20th century, many of the newly created countries in Africa were left in a political vacuum, and the leaders that took over the power after the colonizers left were often favoring their own group, which led to inequality, hate, and an urge for revenge. However, ethnicity and colonial legacy cannot fully explain the conflicts in Somalia and in Liberia as Liberia was never colonized by the European powers and the Somalia has one of the most homogenous populations in the world and is therefore not organized along ethical lines, but clan-based lines (Zaalberg, 2005, p. 164). Nonetheless, as will be seen in this chapter, the background of the civil war in Somalia and Liberia has many similar traits.

This chapter is organized in two sections. The first section explores why Somalia, which was one of the most peaceful countries in Africa in the 1960s, ended up having one of the longest
and bloodiest civil wars in the post-Cold War period. In the second section, I will examine the background of the civil war in Liberia.

4.1 Somalia – from “Switzerland of Africa” to decades of civil war

The Republic of Somalia is a country in the horn of Africa that was established in 1960 after the unification of British Somaliland and Italia Somalia. Once labeled “Switzerland of Africa”, Somalia was a democratic country with economic prosperity in the first decade after independence, though with widespread corruption and eventually a dysfunctional multiparty system (WB, 2005, p. 9). Consequently, the peaceful and democratic period did not last for a long time. In 1969, Mohammed Siad Barre took over the power after a successful military coup and ended the democratic government (Elmi, 2010, ch. 2). Barre was an authoritarian leader and created an oppressive and exploitative state. His vision of re-establishing ‘Greater Somalia’, which is the territorial area historically inhabited ethnic Somalis, and to ban the Somalian clan-system led to three major armed conflicts between the Somalia government and different clan-groups in the period between 1977 and 1991 (WB, 2005, p. 9). In January 1991, Barre was defeated and went into exile. Barre left Somalia in a political vacuum, and as a consequence, the strongest clans that had once fought together to overthrown Barre turned against each other in search for power (Peterson, 2000, p. 20). The capital of Somalia, Mogadishu was soon transformed into a battle field where warlords, bandit groups and clan alliances were fighting against each other.

4.1.1 Peacekeeping missions in Somalia in the 1990s: a failure

During the Cold War, Somalia was one of the most aided countries in the world (ibid. p. 33). However, after Barre was overthrown, the U.S. withdrew from Somalia and they were even abandoned by the UN. In September 1991, the UN declared that Somalia was too dangerous for their staff after three UN-hired Somalis were killed in a political hit (ibid., p. 33). Combined with the civil war, Somalia was hit by a terrible drought that contributed to a deadly famine. Even though the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warned about the possibility of a famine in the end of 1991, it took another year before the UN got involved in Somalia. In 1992, ICRC took the lead and launched a mission in Somalia. They spent more than half of their yearly budget on the mission and distributed around 75% of their relief food in Somalia alone (ibid., p. 41). However, the relief workers were met with a lot of resistance from the
warlords, and by March 1992, around 300,000 people had died from either starvation or due to the conflict (Møller, 2009) Thanks to the humanitarian organizations working on the ground in Somalia, the civil war and the humanitarian crisis gained attention from the media by mid-1992. Consequently, the crisis became publicly well-known and finally received attention from the UN. The newly sworn-in UN General-Secretary, Boutros-Ghali saw it as an opportunity to prove that the UN would be able to act effectively after being liberated from the Cold War constraints (Clarke and Herbst, 2018, p. 6). In April 1992, the first UN operation, United Nations Operations in Somalia-1 (UNOSOM-1) was established to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and to secure and facilitate humanitarian relief. However, by December 1992, the operation collapsed due to internal conflicts within the operation and inability to provide safety to the relief workers (Crocker, 1995). In December 1992, a second mission was launched in Somalia under the name UNITAF (United Task Force). UNITAF was a multinational force led by the U.S. and approved by the UN. In comparison to UNISOM-I, UNITAF focused on establishing a working relationship with the Somali factions and groups and succeeded in establishing safety for relief workers (ibid.) In May 1993, UNITAF was succeeded by a second UN mission, UNOSOM-II. A few months after arriving in Somalia, the UN troops clashed with one of the biggest warlords, Mohammed Aidid and became one of the main targets of the UNOSOM-II. The manhunt ended with the Black Hawk Down incident on October 3, 1993. Two American helicopters were shot down, 18 American soldiers were killed, and more than 80 soldiers were wounded, which led the U.S. to gradually withdraw their forces from Somalia 1993 (Thakur, 1994). By March 1994, all of the U.S. soldiers had been pulled out of Somalia, and in March 1995 the UN ended the UNISOM-II operation. Consequently, the UN mission failed to build peace, and as pointed out by Møller (2009); Somalia was left in worse conditions than before arrival of the UN troops. In the following decade, the UN kept a low profile in Somalia. With the absence of the UN, the AU took over the lead in 2007.

4.1.2 Factors explaining the civil war in Somalia

In this section, I will take a closer look at the main factors than can explain the outbreak of the civil war and why the civil war has been going on for more than three decades According to Elmi, the most important factors are clan identity and clan hostility, colonial legacy, Cold War legacy, and radicalization of Islam and the establishment of terrorist groups (Elmi, 2010, ch. 2).
Clan identity and clan hostility: The Somali people are largely homogenous but are divided into six large clans: the Daord, the Isaaq, the Dir, the Hawlye, the Rahanwein and the Digil. In addition, there are around twenty sub-clans (Zaalberg, 2005, p. 164). Traditionally, each clan had its own leader and functioned as a social and political unit of organization. However, the traditional concept of land and power changed as a result of the modernization period in which the clan system and the modern form of social and political organization had to co-exist (Ssereo, 2003). The political organization after independence, sometimes referred to as clan-democracy, has acted as a cause of social cohesion but also as a cause of political conflicts, government crisis and clan-based civil wars (ibid). After Barre was overthrown in 1991, the northwest region in Somalia declared itself independent from Somalia under the name the Republic of Somaliland. A few years later, the clans in the northeast region established a joint autonomous region named the Puntland (WB, 2005, p. 15). Since the establishment of Somaliland and Puntland, the leaders have refused to cooperate with the central administration in Mogadishu, which have led to endless of battles between the Somalian enclaves controlled by armed militias.


The colonial legacy: Before the arrival of the European colonial powers in Africa in the 19th century, the Somalis did not have a central state. The judicial system was based on a mixture of Heer (traditional law) and Islam organized around the clan-based system (Elmi, 2010, ch. 2).
In 1884, the colonial powers divided the territories inhabited by the Somalis into five regions: two parts in the north controlled by Great Britain (British Somaliland), the southern part controlled by Italy (Italian Somalia), one part controlled by France (today's Djibouti), and the western part controlled by Ethiopia (the Ogaden region). As a result of Italy’s defeat during the WW2, the League of Nations decided to put Southern Somalia under British trusteeship for ten years. In 1960, Northern and Southern Somalia gained independence and were united as one state, as the Republic of Somalia (ibid, ch. 2). A decade before independence, Great Britain gave several regions of the Somali territory to Ethiopia and Kenya. The division was not popular among the Somalis and led to a series of resistance movements against the colonial forces (ibid.) The fight to regain its lost regions continued after independence. As a first step toward the creation of Greater Somalia (see map 5), the Somali Nation Army invaded the Ogaden region in Ethiopia in 1977. After a few months of fighting, Somalia lost the war due to military interventions by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The Ogaden War fatally wounded Barres regime and started the gradual decomposition and demise of the Somali state (Tareke, 2000). As will be analyzed later, due to tensions of the Ogaden region, it took long time before Ethiopia contributed with troops to AMISOM. 

The dynamics of the Cold War politics: As pointed out by Iyi, it was not a coincidence that Barre’s regime collapsed around the same time as the end of the Cold War (Iyi, 2016, p. 99). Barre’s regime was inspired by the Marxist ideology and attracted the Soviet Union as an ally in the beginning of the 1970s. The Soviet Union sent more than 6000 soldiers and civilians to Somalia that, among other things, controlled the ministry of defense and the secret police, and helped training the Somalian National Army (SNA). The Army consisted eventually of 25,000 men armed with AK-47 assault rifles (Peterson, 2000, p. 12). In total, the Soviet Union provided Somalia with weapons valued more than $270 million. However, the treaty with the Soviets ended when they decided to support the new Marxist-inspired Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Mariam during the Ogaden War (Tareke, 2000). Within short time, the Soviets moved their troops from Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia to Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. After a few months, they received assistance from Cuba that sent a troop of more than 15,000 to help Ethiopia winning the war. In March 1978, the Somalis were defeated after more than eight months of fighting. The Soviet realignment with Ethiopia caused the U.S. to switch side. In the end of the 1970s, the U.S. established instead diplomatic relations with Somalia. The U.S. supported Barres government with financial aid, arms and ammunition worth more than $800 million (Peterson, 2000, p. 13). In addition, Italy contributed with more than $1
billion from 1981 to 1990 (ibid.) The financial support from the U.S. and Italy made it possible for Barre to hold a grip on power despite the growing resistance movements. However, as foreign aid was declining in the end of the 1980s, in addition to growing corruption and inter-clan rivalry, the governmental institutions began to deteriorate, the public-school system was crumbling, and government ministries became dysfunctional (Iyi, 2016, p. 99).

*Political Islam and radical Islamism*: Islam has a long history in Somalia, however, there are no consensus on when and how Islam came to Somalia. Today, a big majority of the population are Sunni Muslims and Islam play an important role in all aspects of the Somalis life. For some, religion has even replaced the clan identity (Elmi, 2010, ch. 4). In the mid-20th century, a movement of Islamic reformation emerged in Somalia like in many other countries in the Muslim world. The movement, that is often referred to as ‘political Islam’, advocate for a stricter adherence to Koran and other written sources of Islam (Hoehne, 2015). A number of Islamic reformist groups was established after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, both militant movements close to the Muslim Brotherhood engaged in the conflicts and non-militant groups that have sought social and political transformation. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. and the following ‘war on terror’, which will be explored in the Chapter 5, new and more radical Islamist groups have developed in Somalia. The most powerful group today is al-Shabaab, which is an Islamist military group that emerged in 2003 with links to al-Qaeda (ibid.) Even though political Islam and radical Islamism only played a limited role in the first round of the civil war, the growth of terrorist groups like al-Shabaab contributed to riots and unrest and made the environment in the war-torn country even more difficult. In addition, it made it difficult for aid workers to provide health care services to the Somali people because of terrorist attacks, abduction and killing of aid workers. Consequently, many aid agencies pulled out of Somalia during the deadly drought that hit Somalia in the beginning of the 1990s (Jaffer and Hotez, 2016).

4.2 Liberia – from early independence to more than a century of conflicts

Liberia is a country located in West Africa. Except from a small period of being “semi-colonized” by the American Colonization Society (ACS) from 1820 to 1847, the Republic of Liberia has never been politically controlled by another country and has therefore a unique history in the African context (Levitt, 2005, p. 3). ACS was an American organization that was
created in 1816 with the purpose of providing a humanitarian front for freed slaves in the U.S. The founders of the organization, whereof most of them were slave owners, feared that the freed slaves would pose a threat to the American ‘slavocracy’ and believed that the only solution was to remove them from the U.S. (ibid., p. 33). Within a few decades, ASC helped more than ten thousand of freed slaves to emigrate to Liberia.

The ex-slaves, referred to as Americo-Liberians, started quickly to dominate the political, economic and social life. In 1847, they declared independence from ACS, which led to the official establishment of the Republic of Liberia and adopted a constitution with close resemblance to the American constitution (Boås, 2005). The Americo-Liberians established an oligarchy (rule of few) based on the plantation system of rule, in which the Americo-Liberians were considered as the masters, and the indigenous people were perceived as the underclass. Even though the constitution upheld that “all men are born equal”, entitled with a set of inherent rights, people from the native tribes were not considered as free men and was therefore not allowed to vote or run for political elections (ibid.) The True Whig Party (TWP), that was established in 1870 by Americo-Liberians, managed therefore to stay in power for 110 years even though the ethnic group only made up around 2% of the population (Duyvesteyn, 2005, p. 23). Consequently, Liberia had both a de facto one-party system and apartheid system between 1870 and 1980 (Boås, 2005).

Map 7: The Republic of Liberia (the UN, 2014).
In the mid-20th century, Liberia had one of the highest economic growth-rates in the world thanks to their ‘open door’ policy and long period of modernization that was aided by the U.S. (Duyvesteyn, 2005, p. 23). Nonetheless, it was mainly the elite group that benefited from the economic prosperity. As a consequence, the inequality between the indigenous people and the Americo-Liberians grew in line with the economic growth. The suppression of the indigenous people led to a widespread discontentment, however, all attempts of revolt and opposition was crushed by the Liberian army (Bøås, 2005). The Liberian army, named the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in 1956, was controlled by the Americo-Liberians and grew into being a strong force thanks to military training and economic funding from the U.S. In fact, Liberia received hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from the U.S. during the Cold War and became the largest receiver of U.S. funding in West Africa (Duyvesteyn, 2005, p.24).

4.2.1 Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor and the outbreak of the Liberian Civil War

In 1980, a group of indigenous people led by Samuel Doe killed the then president William Tolbert and many of his officials in a coup d’état (ibid., p.24). Doe became the de facto head of state after the coup and is therefore the first indigenous leader of the Republic of Liberia. However, instead of trying to unify the people as one nation, he gradually developed an authoritarian regime in which he favored people from his own ethnic group, the Krahn. The Krahn group is one of 16 ethnic groups in Liberia and made up around 5% of the population at the time Doe came into power (ibid., p. 24). In 1985, he was officially elected as the president of the Republic of Liberia. However, the election was controversial, and rumor has it that it was a fraudulent election. After the election, his own Chief of Staff, General Quiwonkpa initiated a coup. The coup failed, and Doe responded by repressing the Nimba County, which is the region Quiwonkpa’s came from. The opposition against Doe’s rule increased after the election, both among the people in Liberia and among politicians in the neighboring countries (Ellis, 1999, p. 66-67). Charles Taylor, which served under Doe’s government in the early 1980s, would later benefit from this hostility. In 1983, Doe accused Taylor for corruption. In fear of being arrested, he fled into exile, first in the U.S. and then in Ghana. Despite being arrested several times, he managed to build up an alliance that he named the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). NPFL consisted of Liberians that had fled from Doe’s authoritarian rule and other West Africans in exile. Taylor also succeeded in building up a small military force thanks to military training from Libya and Burkina Faso, and financial support from Liberians living in the U.S. On Christmas Even in 1989, around 100 fighters from NPFL went through the borders of Cote
d’Ivoire to the Nimba county in Liberia to attack government officials and soldiers (ibid., p. 75). Taylor announced that NPFL was responsible for the attack on the radio. He furthermore claimed that another attack would happen in Monrovia and recommended people to take up arms. Because the first attack happened in the Nimba county, the government suspected that the people that had been involved in the coup in 1985 was responsible for the attack. Consequently, Doe sent the AFL to the Nimba county to kill people they though were responsible (Duyvesteyn, 2005, p. 27). However, within a few weeks, the rebels from NPFL started to raid other towns and attacked civilians and politicians. The government later suspected that the people from the ethnic groups Gio and Mano were responsible and sent the Liberian army to stop the raid. Within two months, hundreds of civilians from the Gio and Mano group were either arrested or killed. The people were brutally murdered by the army. Many were found dead with either their throats slashed, or their heads cut off. This series of inhumane killing marks the beginning of the first Liberian civil war (Ellis, 1999, p.76).

The atrocities committed by the Liberian army led to an increased support for NPFL. As a result, Taylor managed to recruit not only men, but also women and children to join the fight against Doe’s government and AFL. However, the rebel group was loosely organized in the beginning and disputes within the alliance arose even before they launched the first attack in December 1989 (Duyvesteyn, p. 27). In July 1990, Prince Johnson broke out of the group and established another military faction which he named the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). Soon after, INPFL took control over Monrovia, which led to a conflict between the military groups. However, Taylor and NPFL managed quickly to take over the control in the other areas of Liberia. Several other military factions were created to fight against Taylor. In addition to AFL, NPFL, and INFL, four other military factions played a salient role during the first civil war. In 1991, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) was created by refugees from Sierra Leone that aimed at defeating Taylor (Call, 2010). In 1994, ULIMO split into two groups; ULIMO-J which was led by Roosevelt Johnson that belonged to the Krahn group, and ULIMO-K which was led by Alhaji G.V. Kromach, a Mandingo. In 1993, two other factions were created, namely the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) and the Lofa Defense Force (LDF).

The hostile environment in Liberia started when the Americo-Liberians took over the power in the newly created republic. Under Doe’s rule, the political development went from bad to worse, and as pointed out by Mgbeoji (cited in Arthur, 2010, p. 7); “it set the stage for
tyrannical rule and state failure”. After more than a century of suppression of ethnic groups and bad governance, Liberia was left in a political, economic, military, and social crisis. In August 1997, Taylor was elected as president and promised to improve the conditions in the country. However, Taylor did not keep his electoral promises, and as a consequence, the multiple crisis continued after Taylor took over the power. The opposition against Taylor grew over the years, and in 1999, a new rebel group were established. In 2000, the rebel group launch an attack against Taylor’s security forces, which led to the outbreak of the second civil war in Liberia.
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter seeks to answer the research questions: “What are the prerequisites for regional organizations to succeed in peace operations in collaboration with the UN, and how can the UN and regional organizations work together more efficiently?” The chapter is organized in three sections. The collaboration between the UN and the AU in Somalia in the 2007-present phase of the civil war will be analyzed in the first section. Section two analyses the collaboration between the UN and ECOWAS during the first and the second civil war in Liberia. Finally, the two cases will be compared in the third section based on the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2. The analysis will focus on the mandate of the peace operations, the legitimacy of the ECOMOG and AMISOM troops, the capacity of the troops, and the funding of the peace operations.

5.1 Collaboration between the UN and the AU in Somalia

5.1.1 The failure of IGAD and the creation of AMISOM

After the UN withdrew their troops in 1995, the conflict between the warlords continued. IGAD, which was one of the few transnational organizations that was left in Somalia, came up with several initiatives to regenerate the peace process and to revive the political institutions in Somalia. Their initiative led to a series of conferences held in the neighboring countries in Eastern Africa in the late 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century (Jeng, 2012, p. 258). The Somalia National Peace Conference held in Arta, Djibouti in 2002 led to the creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG). However, TNG suffered from widespread corruption, scandals and disputes between tribes. Therefore, the IGAD decided that TNG would be succeeded by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 (ibid., p. 258). In October 2004, Abdallahi Yusef Ahmen was elected as the first president of TFG. In the beginning, president Yusef’s government was operating from Ethiopia, but was re-located to Somalia in 2005. Soon after being sworn into office, president Yusef request assistance from the AU and IGAD to disarm around 55,000 militias (Williams, 2013b, p. 262). In January 2005, IGAD proposed to a IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). Their mission would be to ensure the safety of TFG officials and to restore peace and security in Somalia. In May 2005, IGASOM was endorsed by PSC and authorized the UNSC. However, became quickly cleared that IGASOM lacked the was not able to fulfill its mandate due to lack of funding and requested help from the AU. On January 19, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) created by the PSC (Williams, 2013). On February 20, 2007, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1744, which authorized the deployment of the AMISOM troops in Somalia. AMISOM were given the following tasks (UNSC, 2007, Para. 4 (a-e)):

(a) To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the process […]
(b) To provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure;
(c) To assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces;
(d) To contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance;
(e) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel.

The mandate was in other words were limited in the beginning and was mainly centered around TFG. However, as will explored later in this chapter, the mandate was expanded substantially after al-Shabaab took over the control in the capital in 2009. The first AMISOM troops comprised of around 1,650 peacekeepers from Uganda which were deployed in Mogadishu in March 2007. In late 2007, the troops were joined by peacekeepers from Burundi (IRRI, 2017). The other AU member states were hesitant to contribute with troops as the security situation on the ground increasingly deteriorated.

5.1.2 Legitimacy: recognized externally but contested internally

Even though Somalia was considered as a so-called ‘failed state’ after Barre was defeated in January 1991, the Somali people were not ungoverned (Murphy, 2011, p. 61). In the 1990s, different forms of governance were established at the local level. Private security services and military services controlled by businessmen were created to defend the interests of the people in charge at the local level and Islamic courts were established to keep law and order. The authority of the Islamic courts was often limited to a specific clan-based society, however, in some pastoral areas, clan of elders were gradually able to use traditional negotiation methods to resolve disputed between clans and families (ibid., p. 61). The distribution of power in the local communities were heavily influenced by businessmen that made money during the first years of the civil war, mainly by stealing food aid and weapons. As the clan-based ‘local
governments’ controlled by the Islamic courts created a ‘stability in the instability’ and all the previous experience with governments was that they were the biggest thieves of them all, many Somalis opposed the establishment of TFG in the beginning (ibid., p. 63) In addition, TFG was unpopular because it had been created in Ethiopia, which was Somalia’s biggest arch rival and because it consisted of former warlords that had been involved in the killings of civilians in the first years of the civil war (Verhoeven, 2009). Therefore, even though AMISOM had received international recognition, they struggled to establish internal legitimacy and had a hard time to provide sufficient security to the TFG officials during the first years of the operation.

5.1.3 Financing the troop

The Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union led to the creation of the Peace Fund. However, contributions from the member states has not been sufficient to support the AMISOM troops. Consequently, the AU has depended largely on contributions from Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), which in turn have largely depended on financial help from international institutions. From 2007 to 2011, there were only two TCCs, namely Burundi and Uganda (Williams, 2018). Between 2011 and 2014, four other member states of the AU decided to contribute with troops. Table 2 shows the year the member states sent troops to AMISOM, the size of their national army, their yearly defense budget and their contribution to the AMISOM troops. If comparing the size of their national army with their contribution to AMISOM, Djibouti has been the largest contributor to the AMISOM troops.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year joined</th>
<th>Army size</th>
<th>Defence spending (deployment year)</th>
<th>AMISOM contribution (est. maximum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>232m</td>
<td>6200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>78m</td>
<td>5400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>Unknown (2010) 12m</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>942m</td>
<td>4300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>14m</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>375m</td>
<td>4400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Contributions of the TCCs during the Somali Civil War (Source: Williams, 2018).*

In 2009, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was established to provide financial assistance of the AMISOM troops. Nonetheless, between 2009 and 2011, UNSOA did not support the civilian personnel working in Mogadishu or the establishment of AMISOM’s headquarter and the AMISOM Trust Fund had to provide the funding for these mechanisms (Boutellis and Williams, 2013). In addition to the funding from the UN, as will be further
explored later in this chapter, the EU has been an important financial partner for AMISOM. The EU has contributed with more than $2 billion to AMISOM since the beginning, primarily to cover the troop allowances ($822 per soldiers, per month) and to compensate peacekeepers that have been wounded or families of soldiers that have been killed on the battle field (Williams, 2017). EU’s main source of funding has come from the African Peace Facility, which is funded by the European Development Fund. Moreover, the TCCs has depended on bilateral contributions. The U.S. and the UK have contributed with largest contributions to the AMISOM troops, and the United Kingdom (UK), Japan and Denmark have been the largest contributors to AMISOM’s trust fund (Williams, 2017; Boutellis and Williams, 2013).

5.1.4 The Islamic courts and the Ethiopian intervention

The warlord system was gradually waning and by 2005, there were only fourteen factions left in Somalia. The biggest faction consisted of around 1,000 men and the smallest faction had no more than 50 fighters (Hansen, 2013, p. 32). In comparison, during the “golden years” of the warlord system, the biggest factions consisted of more than 6,000 militias. One reason why the warlord system gradually diminished is that the warlords had to finance the troops themselves, often through plundering or taxation. Consequently, the militias were not paid regularly, which weakened their loyalty toward the warlords. In addition, the creation of the Islamic courts represented an alternative source of power. In the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, several attempts to organize the Islamic courts there were made. The first one, the Joint Islamic Courts created in 1999 failed because it was accused to be organized around clan-based lines. A new attempt of organizing the courts were launch a year after with the creation of the Sharia Implementation Council (SIC) (ibid. p. 33). SIC consisted of different fractions ranging from businessmen to former militias. Nonetheless, the Islamic courts was extremely decentralized, which made it difficult to defeat the warlords. Therefore, al-Shabaab pushed for further unification of the Islamic courts, which in the end resulted in the creation of the Islamic Courts Unions (ICU) in the second-half of 2006. In August 2006, al-Shabaab got a formal position in the ICU, which gave them access to funding from the business community. Gradually, the hierarchy in the ICU changed and al-Shabaab got increasingly more power within the organization. In the second half of 2006, al-Shabaab launched several attacks against the warlords and on September 24, 2006, the biggest warlord administration in Kismayo was defeated. According to Hansen, the attack in Kismayo confirmed that “a combined strategy of fear, clannism and rapid movement” was a successful strategy (2013, p. 40). The ICU was
officially recognized by Al-Qaeda in July 2006 and al-Shabaab became gradually attractive for foreign jihadists. The arrival of foreign Islamic terrorists in Somalia further strengthened al-Shabaab’s power. After defeating the strongest warlords in Somalia, TFG became their next target.

In November 2006, the Ethiopian parliament passed a resolution that mandated their government to intervene in Somalia in order to protect the TFG officials from attacks by the ICU (Bamfo, 2010). On December 6, 2006, the Ethiopian troops arrived in Mogadishu and was assisted by the newly created TFG troops. After a few weeks, they managed to take control of the capital and the ICU was weakened (ibid.) However, the Ethiopian troops stayed for two more years and the last troops were not withdrawn before in December 2008. Even though the president of TFG, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed had agreed to the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia and was considered as an ally of the Ethiopian government, he started to get tired of the Ethiopian domination in Somalia and demanded the government to withdraw their troops in late 2008 (Wiklund, 2013, p. 15). After the Ethiopian troops left Somalia, Al-Shabaab gained widespread support from the Somali population, in particularly in the south and managed to take control over Mogadishu in May 2009 (Hansen, 2013, p. 73). In order to understand how al-Shabaab managed to take control over the capital despite AMISOM’s military superiority in the district, it is important to understand UNSOA’s mandate.

5.1.5 Establishment of UNSOA and its mandate

After the terrorist attack on 9/11, ‘weak and failed states’ were associated with the breeding of terrorism. One of the reasons is that many of the jihadists responsible for the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. originated from Afghanistan, which had been without an effective government since 1991 (Patman, 2015). George W. Bush, that had initiated the war on global terror after the attacks on 9/11, expressed a concerned about the strength of al-Shaabab and about their connection to al-Qaida and pushed the UNSC to take action in Somalia (Williams, 2017). The then UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon suggested to establish a multinational force to stabilize the situation in Somalia. However, none of the 50 UN member states that was requested to contribute pledged any troops, and it was only the U.S. and the Netherlands that was offered to contribute with funding (ibid.) Three of the permanent members of the UNSC, namely the UK, Russia and France opposed the proposition to create a peacekeeping troop in Somalia. And, when Barack Obama was sworn into office in January
2009, he quickly announced that the U.S. would not support the peace operation in Somalia. Therefore, the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia was never materialized. As a compromise, UNSOA was created by Resolution 1863, adopted by the UNSC on January 16, 2009 to provide logistical support packages to AMISOM (Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017). Nonetheless, as emphasized in the Resolution, UNSOA was created with the intention to “establish a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia as a follow-on force to AMISOM” (UNSC, 2009). The Resolution mandated UNSOA to (ibid., para. 6 (a-e)):

(a) To facilitate humanitarian assistance and improve humanitarian access […] and to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons, children, and other affected persons;
(b) To assist with the free movement, safe passage and protection of those involved in the political process, to provide security for key political infrastructure, and to protect and assist the institutions of a future Unity Government to help them carry out their functions;
(c) To monitor, within its capabilities, the implementation of the cessation of hostilities under the Djibouti Peace Agreement, as well as any subsequent ceasefire arrangements and joint security arrangements […];
(d) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and to protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission;
(e) To assist, in conjunction with regional and international donor partners and other interested parties, in supporting the effective re-establishment, training and retention of inclusive Somali security forces, including military, police, and judiciary.

In the following years, UNSOA’s mandate was extended several times and by November 2013, they were mandated to support around 750 civilian personnel and 33,000 troops (22,000 AMISOM troops and 10,900 personnel from the SNA army) (Williams, 2017). Moreover, in 2013 UNSOA was given the task to support the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). UNSOM was established in June 2013 to succeed the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which had been created in 1995 to advance the peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia. In different to UNPOS, UNSOM was given a permanent base in Mogadishu (ibid.) In total, UNSOA’s mandate was extended eight times between 2009 and 2015. In addition, AMISOM’s area of operation expanded from roughly 100 km² to over 400,000 km² in 2012 (ibid.) The problem was that the annual budget of UNSOA and their personnel did not
increase accordingly. Figure 3 shows that UNSOA’s annual budget between 2009 to 2015 only increased 2.8 times, from around $200 billion in 2009 to $500 billion in 2015. In the same period, USOAS personnel grew from 249 to 450 (ibid.)

Figure 3: UNSOA’s yearly budget requirement, 2009-2016 (source: Williams, 2017, p. 6).

In view of the expansion of the mandate of UNSOA, Security Council Resolution 2245 decided that it would be replaced by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). The Resolution stipulated that UNSOS would support both AMISOM, UNSOM, and the SNA (UNSC, 2015).

5.1.6 Al-Shabaab: weakened but not defeated

In 2009, Al-Shabaab’s forces consisted of only around 5,000 men, many of which had been recruited from foreign jihads. Nonetheless, despite its small forces, they managed to expand their control to most of the southern parts of the country by mid-2009. According to Hansen (2013, p. 83); the reason is first of all because the al-Shabaab forces were very mobile, which made it possible to attack a city or a district as soon as the AMISOM troops were not present. Also, the leaders managed to create a sense of unity among the fighters. However, despite the unity within terrorist group, their ideology is unclear and it is not certain whether they aimed at fighting against the clans or together with the clans. As argued by Hansen (2013, p. 80) “Al-Shabaab had two faces, one clannist but pragmatic, one anti-clanist. Showing the clannist face could have been a pragmatic approach to conquer new areas, but often there was a price to pay: Al-Shabaab became a part of clan conflicts”. Al-Shabaab was organized around a governance structure with an inner circle consisting of around eight to ten men, and various institutions, such as for example the ministry of security and the ministry of intelligence. It addition, they established a relatively strong system of law enforcement and justice. Finally, the
administration created an efficient taxation system. For example, they taxed all the ships that docked at the port in Kismayo and they demanded taxes from citizens that rented out their property to foreigners working for international organizations (Hansen, 2013, p. 91). In addition, al-Shabaab got increasingly entangled in piracy. Building up a political structure, a system of law and order, and financial mechanisms made it possible for al-Shabaab to retain the control of the capital.

Al-Shabaab launched several terrorist attacks to weaken TFG’s position, and in May and June 2009, TFG initiated two offensives against the terrorist group. However, the TFG troops were crushed by the al-Shabaab fighters. Al-Shabaab continued to expand its territories in 2009 and 2010, which is the period that Hansen (2013, p. 73) refers to the “gold age of al-Shabaab”. It was not until February 2011 that the TFG troops, backed by AMISOM troops, managed to weaken the terrorist group. Unlike AMISOM and TFG, they were not able to re-supply themselves. After months of fighting between AMISOM and al-Shabaab, they managed to liberate Mogadishu from al-Shabaab’s control (Wiklund., p. 20). Al-Shabaab was further weakened after Kenya and Ethiopia sent troops to Somalia in late 2011 to defeat the terrorist group. On October 16, 2011, Kenya launched Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ in Somalia, supposedly “in direct consolation with and liaison with the Transnational Federal Government in Mogadishu” (Williams, 2018, p. 180). In the wake of Kenya’s Operation, Ethiopia sent troops to Mogadishu in December 2011. Together, they managed to take control over the Beled Hawo district in south-west of Somalia, and the two cities, Luuq and Dhooble (Hansen, 2013, p. 112). After Djibouti contributed with troops to AMISOM in 2011 and the Kenyan forces were integrated into AMISOM in 2012, the AMISOM forces were strengthen considerably and in September 2011, they were able to take over the control of Kismayo, which was a city that had been a major source of funding for the terrorist group.

Even though AMISOM and the SNA with the support from UNSOS have managed to weaken al-Shabaab’s position in Somalia, they have not yet been defeated. In a meeting between AMISOM commanders on April 18, 2018, the AU Special Representative for Somalia and Head of AMISOM, Francisco C. Madeira concluded that “the issue at stake is essentially one; undertaking operations to disrupt, degrade and eventually destroy Al-Shabaab. This is the issue. There is no other issue” (AMISOM, 2018). In light of the ten-year anniversary of AMISOM, members of the AU met in Nairobi, Kenya in March 2017 to discuss the lessons learned from the operation and to evaluate the principal successes. In addition, an exit plan was drafted. The
exit strategy stipulates that AMISOM should gradually transfer the authority to the SNA, however, before doing so they need to undergo extensive training (AU Commission, 2017, p. 19-20). Also, the plan is to organize a political election before withdrawing in order to make sure that the political power is transferred from TFG to a democratic elected government. Nevertheless, the UN has not and will maybe never provide AMISOM with an exit plan in Somalia, which makes the future of AMISOM unpredictable.

5.2 Collaboration between the UN and ECOWAS in Liberia

5.2.1 Background of the creation of ECOMOG

At the thirteenth summit of the ECOWAS Authority in Banjul in May 1990, the Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida, raised a concern about the conflict in Liberia and proposed to establish a five-member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to mediate the conflict (Adebajo, 2002, p. 61) Ghana, the Gambia, Nigeria, Mali, and Togo were the first elected members of SMC. By the time they met for the second time in Banjul in the beginning of August 1990, the conflict in Liberia had already deteriorated. Charles Taylor controlled around 90% of the country, around 5,000 people had been killed and more than 400,000 Liberian refugees had escaped to either Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone or Nigeria (Musha, 2011, p. 154). The outcome of the meeting was the creation of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). On August 24, 1990, the ECOMOG military force landed in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia. The first ECOMOG forces consisted of around 3,500 soldiers, primarily from English-speaking states in West Africa (Mortime, 1996, p. 150). The only non-English speaking soldiers came from the French-speaking country Guinea. Guinea decided to send soldiers to assist the ECOMOG force because they were suffering from the waves of refugees coming from Liberia (Duyvesteyn, 2005, p. 29). The leading Francophone countries, namely Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, opposed the interventions. The reason is first of all that, in different to Nigeria and many of the other English-speaking countries, they supported Charles Taylor. The SMC Peace plan mandated that ECOMOG’s mission was to supervise a ceasefire, to end the civil war and to get Doe to resign as president. The plan was furthermore to establish an interim government before organizing an election within 12 months after his resignation. However, before ECOMOG was able to establish a dialogue with Doe, he was kidnapped and killed by INPFL (ibid. p. 26). The situation in Liberia deteriorated after Doe was assassinated.
Consequently, the strength of ECOMOG troops were increased to around 6,000 troops in October 1990 at peaked to over 12,000 troops in the subsequent years (Coleman, 2003, p. 205).

5.2.2 Contested legitimacy

ECOWAS did not ask for permission from the UN before they sent their troops to Monrovia in 1990. Instead, the Nigerian Minister of External Affairs sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General two days after the creation of ECOMOG, in which he asked for moral and financial support:

“In view of our shared responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, we have no doubt that you will lend your considerable moral support to the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia. We also confident that [you will] generously contribute materially towards the attainment of the states ECOWAS objective in the Republic of Liberia” (cited in Coleman, 2015, p. 77).

Without prior authorization from the UNSC to intervene in Liberia, the first ECOWAS operation in Liberia, named Operation Liberty, was considered as illegal according to international law. In addition, the operation was violating internal ECOWAS rules as it was the SMC and not the ECOWAS Authority that created ECOMOG (ibid., p. 79). Why did not ECOWAS secure a UN mandate for Operation Liberty? First of all, the conflict in Liberia deteriorated quickly and many of the ECOWAS’s leaders considered it as an urgent need to respond to the conflict in order to protect civilians from the armed conflicts (ibid., p.78). As argued by the former Secretary-General of OAU, Salim Salim (quoted in Kabia, 2009, p. 78); “to argue that there was no legal base for any intervention in Liberia is surprising. Should the countries in West Africa, should Africa just leave the Liberians to fight each other?” In addition, many of the ECOWAS’s leaders were concerned that the conflict would lead to a serious refugee crisis in West Africa. Finally, it is argued that Nigeria had personal interests in Liberia and that they saw the conflict as a possibility to demonstrate their hegemon power in the region, which will be further discussed in Section 5.3 (Kabia, 2009, p. 79).

But why did not the UN oppose the intervention? In the 1990s, the slogan ‘regional solutions to regional problems’ featured the international discourse on peace operations. Consequently, even though the legitimacy of the peace operation was contested, the UN never tried to stop the intervention. The first time the UNSC officially commended ECOWAS for its efforts in Liberia was through Resolution 788, issued on November 19, 1992 (UNSC, 1992).
5.2.3 Financing the ECOMOG troops

Because the legitimacy of the operation was contested, ECOWAS struggled to gather enough resources to support the operation during the first years of the civil war. When the ECOMOG troops were deployed in Liberia in 1990, ECOWAS had not yet created a system of burden-sharing. As the sub-regional organization was on the verge of bankruptcy, ECOWAS encouraged the member states to contribute with finances. However, the contribution was extremely uneven. In the period between 1990 and 1997, Nigeria contributed in average with around 70% of the troops to ECOMOG (ibid., p. 83). And even though Nigeria is the richest country in West Africa, they contributed with a lot more than the other countries in comparison to their share of the total gross domestic product (GDP) in ECOWAS (see figure 4 and figure 5). In total, it is estimated that Nigeria spent around $4 billion on ECOMOG during the first civil war (ibid., p.85). In comparison, Ghana who was the next largest contributor, spent around $25 million.

![Figure 4: National shares of total 1989/1990 ECOWAS GDP, excluding Liberia (Coleman, 2015, p. 83)](image-url)
In addition, a Special Emergency Fund was created to collect money to finance the troops. However, by January 1991 the fund had only received around $3 million, and most of the contributions came from member states of ECOWAS (ibid., p. 105). In 1993, a UN Trust Fund was created to support the ECOMOG mission. Nonetheless, in similar to the Special Emergency Fund it did not receive enough funding. By August 1997, the UN Trust Fund had only received around $25 million, which is just a small fraction of what Nigeria spent in total during the first civil war (Coleman, 2013). The largest contribution from outside ECOWAS came from the U.S. In the last years of the first civil war, they gave more than $10 million annually in bilateral aid, both directly to ECOWAS and to finance the ECOMOG troops (Coleman, 2015, p. 105).
5.2.4 Peace accords, the creation of UNOMIL and the end of the first civil war

In total, 16 peace- and ceasefire agreements were signed between the warring parties during the first civil war in Liberia (Bekoe, 2003). The three first peace agreements were signed in Banjul (the two first in August 1990 and third in October 1990) and resulted in the creation of ECOMOG and the establishment of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). Amos Saywer was appointed to lead the government until ECOWAS would be able to organize a political election. The fourth Banjul Agreement went into force in December 1990 proposed a platform for demobilization. The Bamako Agreement, which was signed in November 1990, led to the establishment of the first ceasefire and put an end to the armed conflict between NPFL and INPFL. However, Taylor opposed the creation of the interim government in Monrovia and broke the ceasefire by launching an attack in the capital city. ECOMOG, with the assistance from AFL and ULIMO, fought back against Taylor’s forces (Jenkins, 2007). Taylor declared himself as president of what he referred to as ‘Greater Liberia’, and set up his own government in Gbargna (ibid.) In the next one and a half years, six other peace agreements were signed, namely the Lomé agreement in February 1991, four Yamoussoukro Agreements that were signed in June-October 1991, and the Geneva Agreement that was signed in April 1992 (Bekoe, 2003). However, as pointed out by Bekoe, the peace agreements failed during the first period of the civil war, first of all because Taylor did not trust the neutrality of the ECOMOG troops and he perceived them as weak in comparison to his own troops (ibid.)

![Timeline of major events and peace agreements](image)

*Figure 6: Timeline of the major events and peace agreements that were signed during the first civil war in Liberia (Bekoe, 2003, p. 264).*
In July 1993, the Cotonou Peace Accord was signed by three Liberian parties in Benin. The peace accord stipulated that the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) would replace IGNU (Waugh, 2011, p. 164-165). And it specified that LNTG would consist of a five-member Council of State that would include members from all the five military factions that existed at that time. The UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established on September 22, 1993, through Security Council Resolution 866 to monitor the agreement. The Resolution stipulated that ECOWAS would have the principal authority to supervise the implementation of the peace agreement. The role of UNOMIL was therefore first of all to monitor and verify the peace process under the leadership of ECOMOG. As highlighted in the Resolution, “this would be the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization” (UNSC, 1993). In addition, UNOMIL were given various other tasks such as to disarm and demobilize rebellions, to deliver human assistance, and rebuild the socioeconomic infrastructure. According to Martin-Brûlé (2017, p. 76), the UNOMIL operation consisted of “303 military observers, 20 medical personnel, 45 military engineers, 58 UN volunteers, 89 international personnel and 136 local staff”.

The division of ULIMO in May 1994 led to disputes over the choice of membership in the Council of State and made it difficult to establish LNTG in Montrovia. Consequently, the peace agreement collapsed soon after it was signed (Adibe, 1997). Even though the UNSC extended the mandate of UNOMIL, they gradually reduced the number of military observers, and by spring 1995, there were only 77 military observers left (ibid). The collapse of the Cotonou Accord led quickly to a new agreement, namely the 1994 Akosombo Agreement. The new agreement was meant to supplement and amend the Cotonou Accord. However, like all the other previous peace accords that had been adopted during the civil war in Liberia, it did not bring long-lasting peace. In August 1995, the then six factions in Liberia met in Abuja in which they agreed on a revised version of the 1993 Cotonou Peace Accord. In the beginning, it seemed like the Abuja Agreement would be successful in ending the armed conflicts between the military factions. However, a few weeks after the agreement was signed, the members of the collective presidency started to fight over the procedures for appointment of positions in the government and a new conflict spurred out (ibid.) Even though the disputes between the military factions made it difficult to create peace, another reason why the peace accords in 1994 and 1995 failed is, as pointed out by Bøås (2005); that Nigeria’s real intention in the civil war was to avoid that Taylor would manage to take over the power in Liberia, and therefore wanted
to exclude him from the peace settlement. At the same time, Nigeria was keen on showing the world that they were able to lead a successful peacekeeping mission, and in September 1996, a revised version of the Abuja Agreement was adopted, which created peace in the end. The Abuja-II agreement resulted in a successful ceasefire and led to Liberia’s first genuine democratic election. UNOMIL’s was not extended after Taylor was elected and the troops were withdrawn already in September 1997. The ECOMOG troops were gradually withdrawn from Liberia in 1998 (Martin-Brûlé, 2017, p. 5).

5.2.5 Charles Taylor and the second civil war

On July 19, 1997, Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) won the election, receiving more than 70% of the votes. However, as pointed out by Levitt, it was not his popularity or network that led the victory but rather the fear of what would happen if he would have lost the election (Levitt, 2005, p. 210). Taylor’s motivation of reconstructing the country was overshadowed by his greed of making personal profit from Liberia’s natural resources. Consequently, as pointed out by Assefa “things quickly reverted to the way they were before the war. Abuse of power, corruption, manipulation of ethnic divisions, abject poverty, alienation, oppression of a large sector of the population, and hopeless ness of the youth were still rampant (Assefa, 2004, p. 1-2, cited in Kieh Jr., 2009, p. 9). Over the years, opposition against Taylor’s regime grew. In April and August 1999, an exile group of Liberians living in Sierra Leone launched incursions in the Lofa County in Liberia through the boarders of Guinea. The rebels were later organized under the name Liberians United for Reconciliation (LURD). On April 21, 2000, LURD invaded the northwest regions in Liberia from Guinea with the aim of overthrowing Taylor’s government. (Whittemore, 2008). Taylor responded by sending the national security forces to attack the rebels. In addition, they got assistance from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which was one of the main actors in the civil war in Sierra Leone. The fighting between LURD and the Liberian security forces led to the outbreak of the second Liberian civil war.

What can explain the fragile peace in Liberia? According to Call (2010) and Kieh Jr. (2009), the behavior and actions of Taylor is the principal reason for the recurrence of the civil war in 1999. In order to protect his government from criticism from civil society organizations, members of other political parties and the media, Taylor launched a campaign against opponents of the regime. In the period between 1997 and 1999, 26 persons from the media or
other political parties were arrested and 357 political opponents were killed (ibid.). Moreover, the Liberian press was banned from publishing articles that contained criticism of the regime, and two radio stations were closed down by the government. He also used ethnical scapegoating, whereof he blamed the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups for the regime’s dismal performance. Because the NPP party had the majority of the seats in the House of Parliament (49 out of the 64 seats) and in the Senate (21 out of the 30 seats), and the judges in the Supreme Court were handpicked by Taylor, there was a lack of accountability (ibid). And the independent institutions, that in theory could have contested Taylor’s regime, were paralyzed in fear of being arrested, tortured or killed. In addition, he did not fully follow up on the commitments that were outlined in the Abuja-II peace agreement. Even though he commanded the former NPFL fighters to turn in their weapons, he made sure that the elite fighters did not get demobilized, and many of them were never disarmed (Kieh Jr., 2009). As pointed out by Kieh Jr.; “the disarmament exercise was more a symbolic exercise that did not significantly diminish the war-making machinery of the major warlordist militias, especially Charles Taylor’s NPFL” (Kieh Jr., 2009, p. 12). Therefore, it was easy for Taylor to reorganize a new “war machine”. Another important factor that led to the recurrence of the civil war is the failure of the post-conflict peace-building project. As already pointed out, the disarmament and the demobilization exercises were not sufficient. Moreover, there were no re-integration programs for the returning ex-combats, no programs for the former child soldiers, no education programs and no reconciliation programs. The unemployment rate among the former combatants were high and many of them got involved in plundering and stealing after the peace settlement (ibid.) The UNOMIL troops were withdrawn only two months after Taylor was elected and ECOMOG was only left with a small troop. Consequently, there was not enough resources to keep a system of check and balance on the former combatants, and the struggle to reintegrate into the society made it easy for Taylor to recruit new combatants.

5.2.6 Ending the second civil war: a successful cooperation

A series of peace negotiations were held between late-2001 and early 2003, however, none of them led to a peace agreement. It was therefore a relief for the civilian population when the International Contact Group on Liberia, which was formed by ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, the UN and six states, finally reached a decision to establish a ceasefire on June 17, 2003 (Coleman, 2003, p. 211). The ceasefire agreement premised on Taylor’s pledge to step down as president,
and the UN called out for support from ECOWAS to assist Taylor’s exile to Nigeria and enable a transfer of power to a transitional government. There are several reasons why Taylor in the end was willing to give up the power. First of all, the rebel group LURD and the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), which was a military faction of LURD, managed gradually to take over the control in Liberia and by May 2003 they controlled more than 60% of the country (Whittemore, 2008). Moreover, the UN imposed sanctions on Taylor’s regime in May 2002 and May 2003, which made it increasingly difficult for him to finance the security forces (Waugh, 2011, p. 268). Finally, the Special Court for Sierra Leone had accused Charles Taylor for being responsible for helping RUF during the civil war by providing them with weapons in exchange for diamonds.

In similar to the first civil war, Nigeria initiated once again to take the responsibility to lead a peacekeeping mission under the authority of ECOWAS. Nonetheless, with the outcome of the ECOMOG mission in the 1990s fresh in mind, many of the ECOWAS member states opposed the proposition that ECOWAS would have the primary responsibility in the peacekeeping mission in Libera (Coleman, 2003, p. 215). One reason is that the then president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo was accused of having a personal relationship with Taylor’s sister, and the other member states were afraid that it would affect the mission’s impartiality. Secondly, they were afraid that a peacekeeping mission under Nigeria’s leadership, which had personal interests in Liberia, would again lead to a new round of regionalization of conflicts in the sub-region (ibid., p. 215). Therefore, UNSC Resolution 1497, adopted on August 1, 2003, requested the Secretary-General “on the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Liberia, to take the necessary steps, including the necessary logistical support to the ECOWAS elements of the Multinational Force, and pre-positioning critical logistical and personnel requirements to facilitate the rapid deployment of the envisaged operation” (UNSC, 2003a). Resolution 1497 led to the creation the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), which was deployed a few days after the Resolution was adopted.

On August 4, around 200 advance guards from ECOMIL arrived in Liberia. The troops increased to 700 in August 11 and was further expanded to around 3,500 troops one month later. Nigeria contributed with around 57 percent of the troops and Ghana, Senegal and Mali contributed with the rest (Coleman, 2003, p. 212). The ECOMIL troops managed quickly to stabilize the situation and to facilitate the departure of Charles Taylor, which went into exile in Nigeria on August 11, 2003. Three days later, the US Marine Expeditionary Unit landed in
Monrovia to assist ECOMIL in securing the capital and to make sure that aid workers would be able to do their jobs (ibid., p. 220). The second civil war ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in Accra, Ghana on August 18, 2003 (Nichols, 2005). The peace agreement called *inter alia* for the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) program and for the creation of the National Transnational Government of Liberia (NTGL). The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 1509, which was adopted by the UNSC on September 19, 2003. With reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolution stipulated that the mission would last for twelve months and that it would “consist of up to 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers, including formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia” (UNSC, 2003b). As outlined in Security Council Resolution 1497, the authority was officially transferred to the UNOMIL forces on October 1, 2003. Paragraph 3 of the Resolution stipulated that UNOMIL’s mandate was to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire agreement that was agreed on in the CPA; to support for humanitarian and human rights assistance; to support the security reform of the TGA in collaboration with ECOWAS; and to support the implementation of the peace process, which among other things included to start the DDRR process (ibid., para. 3).

The first round of disarmament took place from December 7 to December 27 in Camp Scheiffelin. Within twenty days, more than 13,000 fighters were disarmed, however, it is estimated that around 3,000 of them were handing in their weapons twice (Nichols, 2005). In the beginning, the peacekeepers from UNMIL lacked sufficient control and had not yet established a system to monitor the disarmed fighters. Because of misinformation about the money they would receive when they handed in their weapons, a riot spurred out in the capital after the first day of disarmament. The riot lasted for two days and resulted in the killing of nine people. As a consequence, the UNMIL decided to put the disarmament process on hold until they would able to meet the conditions for a successful DDRR process (ibid.) On April 15, the DDRR process was re-launched. The disarmament process took place in eleven different areas in Liberia and lasted until October 31, 2004. In total, UNMIL was able to disarm 102,193 fighters, and collected more than 27,000 weapons and more than 7 million small arms ammunition (ibid.) The UNMIL personnel registered the type and serial number of the weapons, before they transported it to Monrovia for destruction. The ammunition was destroyed by explosive teams at various disposal sites. The ex-combatants that were handing in their
were demobilized to cantonment sites where they had to go through a medical screening and were issued an ID card. They were also asked about their role in the conflict and had to go through different orientation sessions. After being discharged, the ex-combatants were given $150 in Transitional Safety Net Allowance, and another $150 after a period of three months (ibid.) Children under 18 years old were taken care of by different child protection agencies.

On October 2003, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was sworn into office and Gyude Bryant was appointed as the chairman of the NTGL (Martin-Brûlé, 2017, p. 188). Despite disputes over the nomination of the ministerial posts, a new government was formed. The new government consisted of members from the two rebel groups that had been fighting against Taylor’s troops and RUF in the second civil war, in addition to former members of Taylor’s government, representatives from the civil society and people from the opposition parties. Transition from NTGL to a permanent government took place on January 16, 2006, when Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was inaugurated as president of Liberia (Pham, 2006). In 2009, Charles Taylor was arrested, and in May 2012, the Special Court for Sierra Leone ruled that Charles Taylor was guilty in serious violations of human rights and was sentenced to fifty years in prison (Coleman, 2013, p. 221).

5.3 Comparison and discussion

5.3.1 Prerequisites to succeed in peace operations in collaboration with the UN

In this section, I will discuss what conditions that are necessary in order for regional organizations to succeed in peace operations in collaboration with the UN. The discussion will be based on the two first hypothesis; “without a common worldview, it is impossible to cooperate” and “without a common worldview, they need to follow-up with the resources that are available for them.”

To a certain degree, these two hypothesis seems to fit well in the Somalian case. As pointed out by Williams (2017); there was a culture clash between the UN and the AU, which made it hard to collaborate in the beginning. The UN argued that they would not contribute with a peacekeeping force because there was no peace to keep. As seen in section 2, peacekeeping missions are based on the following three principles: consent from the government in the host-country and/or the warring parties; impartiality; and limited use of force. Also, UN’s philosophy
has been that a ceasefire needs to be signed between the warring parties in the conflict. First of all, Somalia has not had a central government since 1991 and al-Shabaab, which was one of the warring parties in the conflict, did not consent to the intervention. Moreover, AMISOM fought together with TFG against one of the warring parties, instead of trying to build peace, and it did in fact use force to re-establish the control in Mogadishu and the other cities that they liberated from al-Shabaab’s control. In other words, AMISOM violated all the principles of peacekeeping. Even though the AU does not have any official peacekeeping doctrine, they saw peacekeeping as an “opportunity to establish peace before keeping it” (Williams, 2017, p. 8). In many ways, the AMISOM’s operation resembles a peace enforcement mission. However, as pointed out by Anderson (2016, 52-53):

“while [peace enforcement operations] do call for the threat or use of force to compel warring parties to end their fighting, they are characterized by defensive military postures that aim to de-escalate tensions between the combatants […] AMISOM, by contrast has engaged in a counter-insurgency operation – a ‘comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes’.

As UNSOA was deployed in Somalia to maintain the AMISOM troops in a peacekeeping mission, and not to support an extensive battle between al-Shabaab, they did not contribute with the financial, military and political capabilities that is required in order to succeed in such a mission (Anderson, 2016). Consequently, in the beginning, AMISOM had to finance the military personnel, ammunitions and equipment themselves, in addition to the establishment of other political mechanisms. However, the problem was that only two of the member states of the AU contributed with troops to AMISOM until 2011. Consequently, it took many years before AMISOM was able to take control over Mogadishu. But why did not any of the neighboring countries in East Africa, namely Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, claim a leadership role in the conflict in Somalia? Eritrea and Djibouti are one of the smallest countries in Africa and none of them would have been able to lead a peace operation alone. Moreover, Sudan has been plagued with an internal conflict since the beginning of the 1980s and has been depending on financial and military support from international organizations. But what about Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya? Ethiopia is the largest and richest country (in terms of GDP) in East Africa and has in addition the biggest impact on local politics in the region, it is therefore interesting to examine why Ethiopia preferred to launch a unilateral military operation in Somalia, first in 2006 and then in 2011, instead of launching an operation under the authority of AMISOM. One of the reasons is, as pointed out by Verhoeven (2013),
that the relationship between the two states has been unstable ever since Somalia gained independence in 1960. Somalia’s largest Diaspora lives in the Ogaden region in Ethiopia and has been marginalized by the Ethiopian government. Consequently, the ruling factions in Somalia has tried to win the region back for decades but has never succeeded. The tension increased between the two countries after Somalia lost the war against Ethiopia in 1978. Moreover, the refugee flows from Somalia to Ethiopia, and vice versa, have made the relations even more tensed. Finally, as underlined by Williams (2018, p. 184); “defeating al-Shabaab had never been Ethiopia’s primary objective. Rather, the objective was to contain the threat away from its territory”. Which is one of the reasons why Ethiopia chose to withdraw their troops after the intervention in Somalia between 2006 and 2009, and 2011 and 2012 instead of re-hatting them as AMISOM militias. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian government changed their approach in late 2013, and in January 2014, Ethiopia sent around 4,400 troops to Somalia that was integrated into AMISOM (ibid.) According to Williams (2018), they main reason why they changed their approach is because of financial issues. Instead of spending money from their national budget to pay the militias, the Ethiopian troops were given monthly allowances from UNSOA after they joined AMISOM.

In similar to Ethiopia, Kenya preferred in the beginning to launch a unilateral military operation instead of strengthening the AMISOM troops. When Kenya launched Operation ‘Linda Nchi’ in October 2011, the Kenyan government claimed that they were acting in self-defense against al-Shabaab after several foreign tourists had been kidnapped and killed by the terrorist group (ibid., p. 180). However, the intervention did not last for a long time and in 2012, the Kenyan government changed its position. In June 2012, around 3,600 Kenyan troops were integrated into AMISOM. Unlike in Ethiopia, the financial aspects were not a crucial when they chose to contribute with troops. Instead, as argued by Williams (2018, p. 181), “Kenyan authorities concluded that they would gain greater international legitimacy by being part of a multinational force rather than a unilateral mission”. Finally, refugee flows from Somalia have frustrated the Kenyan governments for decades and with the rise al-Shabaab, Kenya started to worry about their national security (ibid.). Since the beginning of the Somali Civil War, Kenya has hosted many hundreds of thousands of refugees from Somalia, and in the Dadaab camp alone, which is located in the Northeast of Kenya, there are more than 350,000 Somali refugees (Hesse, 2015). The reason why Kenya decided to accept so many refugees in the first place was that they hoped that the situation would improve. However, after the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006, they decided to close its border to Somalia because a majority of the foreign
fighters that were recruited to al-Shabaab came from Kenya. Therefore, the government feared that returning fighters would manage to build up a terrorist group in Kenya.

Finally, Uganda took part of the AMISOM mission from the beginning and was the only TCC from March to November 2007. According to Williams (2017, p. 174); Uganda’s official explanation is that they “emphasized Pan-African solidarity and fighting terrorism in the region.” Nonetheless, if that was the principal reason why they sent troops to Somalia, why did they not deploy troops to the peace operation that was established by the AU in Sudan in 2004? As pointed out by Hesse (2015); in the end of the 1980s, the government in Uganda started to push for economic reforms that were endorsed by Western governments. This in turn made them attractive for foreign investment and donors. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that one of the reasons why Uganda sent troops to Somalia is that they were concerned about their reputation in the international community and had to prove for Washington that they were a reliable security ally (ibid.)

As already discussed, the U.S. has played an important role in Liberia ever since the creation of the Liberian Republic, and as it is still the only global hegemon in the world, it is therefore important to consider the role of the U.S. in Somalia. Considering the financial and military strength of the US-led UNITAF operation, it is reasonable to assume that they could have succeeded in creating peace. However, the killing of the 18 American soldiers in October 1993 and the failure of the succeeding UN troops created instead ‘the Somalia syndrome’ in Washington. The risk adverse attitude toward intervention in civil wars continued to frame U.S.’ foreign policy toward Africa for the rest of the 1990s and had serious international consequences (Patman, 2014). With the failure in Somalia fresh in mind, the U.S. refused to take an active leadership position to halt the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the genocide in the Srebrenica region in Bosnia in 1995. Without the support from the U.S., and consequently the lack of international response to stop the genocides, more than 1 million people were brutally murdered (ibid.) This is of course not the fault of the U.S. alone but the international community as whole. However, the point is that as a global hegemon and a permanent member of the UNSC, the U.S. had played and is still playing a crucial role in decisions on international peace and security issues. After the attack on 9/11 in New York and Washington D.C., the U.S. regained interest in Somalia. However, instead of supporting the deployment of UN peacekeepers to assist the AMISOM troops in Somalia, they have instead chosen to act unilaterally. And as argued by Møller (2009, p. 25);
“the main difference between the nineties and recent years seems to be that, whereas the predominant motive then was altruistic and humanitarian, it is now selfish and focused on US national security. Both now and then, however, Washington seems to have accomplished almost exact opposite of what is what aiming for. In the nineties the result was an exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis, whereas now it is a growth of Islamist militancy and perhaps even of terror”.

Having discussed the role of the great powers in East Africa, it is important to explain Nigeria’s role in the Liberian conflict. What was really Nigeria’s intention when they initiated the creation of SMC to find a solution to the conflict in Liberia? And why did the Nigerian president, which was a military dictator, want to lead an intervention and spend resources on a peace operation in which the ultimate goal of the operation was to advance the establishment of democracy? Even though the Nigerian president was a close friend of Samuel Doe, it does not explain why he wanted to continue the operation after Doe was killed just three weeks after the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia. A more compelling argument is therefore that Nigeria, which is the largest and the richest country in the region, saw the intervention in Liberia as an opportunity to reinforce its regional hegemony, which is the contrary of what the neighboring countries of Somalia did (Coleman, 2015, p. 91). According to Adebajo, ‘Pax Nigeriana’, which “is the attempt by Nigeria to establish itself as a regional leader in Africa through political, economic, and military actions taken in Africa or on issues related to Africa”, has been one of the fundamental elements of the Nigerian foreign policy since they gained independence in 1960 (Adekeye, 2002, p. 43). According to Coleman (2015, p. 92); Nigeria’s aspirations for hegemony are twofold; they were first of all tired of the French domination in the Francophone countries in West Africa, and secondly, they saw it as an opportunity to change the focus from their own domestic problems. In other words, in similar to Uganda, they were concerned about their reputation in the international community. But can Nigeria’s aspiration for hegemony explain the relative success of the collaboration between ECOWAS and the UN in Liberia in comparison to the collaboration between the AU and the UN in Somalia?

Indeed, when comparing the Somalian case with the Liberian case, there are reasons to believe that regional hegemons can play a crucial role in peace operations conducted by regional organizations, especially when it comes to the overall funding of the mission. As seen in the analysis of the ECOMOG and ECOMIL operations, Nigeria was responsible for more than 70% of the troops in the first mission and provided for more than half of troops during the second mission. In addition, during the first civil war, Nigeria was responsible for the infrastructure of the UNOMIL personnel and provided for around 90% of the funding during the first civil war.
In general, as pointed out by Martin-Brûlé (2017, p. 69); without Nigeria, the ECOMOG mission would not have been possible and it is uncertain whether ECOMIL would have been created without the initiative of Nigeria to once again the a leadership role in creating peace in Liberia. Nonetheless, Nigeria’s leadership role also created tensions between the member states of ECOWAS and they did not succeed in coordinating the division of labor between the UN and ECOMOG. In similar to the civil war in Somalia, ECOMOG was established as a peacekeeping force, however, the fact that it cooperated with AFL and ULIMO to try to defeat Taylor’s troops illustrates their impartiality in the conflict. As argued by Adibe (1997, p. 485) “In West Africa, Nigeria’s military rulers used Liberia as a dress rehearsal for their elaborate scheme to consolidate despotic rule in their own country.” However, in different to the peace operation in Somalia, in which the AU struggled to finance even the most elementary military equipment of the AMISOM troops because of conflicting understanding between the AU and the UN, Nigeria managed to complement the funding from the UN to a certain degree. And, as pointed out in the previous section, even though Nigeria’s intention from the beginning was to defeat Taylor, they were in the end interested in solving the conflict in order to “send strong signals to the international community that Nigeria could not be ignored” (Boás, 2005, p. 83).

**5.3.2 How can the UN and regional organizations work together more efficiently?**

In order to answer this question, I will discuss the third and the fourth hypothesis: “The UN and the regional organization needs to agree on a common implementation plan based on the knowledge available for them” and “both the UN and the regional organization needs to use the resources that is available for them and that they consider as necessary to reach the goal.”

When UNSOA was established, the plan was that it would gradually take over the peacekeeping mission after AMISOM, however, this never happened. According to William (2017), the main reason is that the UNSC did not set up a timeline for the transition to a UN peace operation, consequently UNSOA was established without any clear exit-plan. In addition, the UN Department of Safety and Security considered the security situation in Somalia to be too dangerous for the UNSOA personnel. Therefore, they were only allowed to stay in the capital for short periods (ibid.) The fact that UNSOA was established as a compromise between the UN and the members of the UNSC, that refused to support the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia, seems to have affect the overall outcome. As argued by Williams (2017, p. 17), “UNSOA was designed to fail”. As seen in the analysis, the budget was
too low in the beginning to cover AMISOM’s activities. And even though UNSOA’s budget increased from 2011, it did not increase accordingly with UNSOA’s growing responsibilities. In addition, the staff-to-supported-personnel ratio was too low. For example, in 2014/2015 the ratio was 1:48, whereby in other UN missions like in Darfur and South Sudan it was respectively 1:5 and 1:4 (ibid.)

From the mid-2013 and onward, AMISOM has undergone major changes, which is a result of strategic reviews in which the overall aim has been to strengthen AMISOM’s mission (Williams, 2016). As already mentioned, in November 2013, the UN mandated that UNSOA would be responsible for supporting around 22,000 AMISOM troops in addition to around 11,000 fighters from SNA. However, as can be seen in Figure 3, UNSOA’s yearly budget did not increase from the fiscal year 2012/2013 to the fiscal year 2013/2014. Also, in addition to the lack of funding from UNSOA, internal problems in AMISOM has been another major obstacle for AMISOM and SNA to reach its goal. As argued by Williams (2016, 45);

“the AMISOM that exists on paper in the UN Security Council Resolutions and AU communiqués is not the same AMISOM that exists in reality. The real AMISOM suffers from several major international problems that have hindered its ability to effectively implement its mandated tasks”.

First of all, the lack of military equipment such as for example helicopters has made it difficult for AMISOM to weaken al-Shabaab further. Also, there has been a poor co-ordination between AMISOM’s headquarter and the TCCs and a weak command-and-control structure. This resulted in, among other things, a lack of planned logistics and security units to ensure a safe transfer of the Ethiopian forces to Somalia to join AMISOM (ibid.) As a consequence, the Ethiopian troops were integrated into AMISOM later than was initially planned. Also, it resulted in a lack of communication between the headquarter and the SNA fighters, that has played an increasingly important part in the fight against al-Shabaab. Another reason why al-Shabaab has not yet been defeated is because of its efficient “business community” that enables the terrorist organization to continue their presence in Somalia. As a consequence, even though they have lost political significant in Somalia and the control of important cities such as Mogadishu and Kismayo, “it remains a deadly foe, able to conduct operations cheaply and effectively” (ibid., p. 45). Time will show whether AMISOM and SNA will manage to defeat al-Shabaab before AMISOM will start to gradually withdrawal its troops from Somalia from 2020.
In similar to the peace operation in Somalia, the coordination between ECOMOG and UNOMIL during the first civil war in Liberia was weak. Even though UNOMIL was deployed under the authority of ECOMOG, the relationship was not further specified in the Cotonou Agreement and in UNSC Resolution 866. As summarized by Coleman (2013, p. 203); “in the first phase, the ECOWAS operation was a long-term deployment and the UN committed only a small monitoring mission.” One of the main problems during the first phase of the civil war is that ECOWAS had not yet developed any peace and security mechanisms. And as Nigeria’s leadership role in the peace operation had caused tensions between the Francophone and the Anglophone member states in ECOWAS, they did not agree on any mechanisms until after first civil war. Adding that to the fact that the UN had never before joined a peace operation conducted by another organization, they could not rely on previous records of task-sharing (Adibe, 1997). Moreover, the relationship between the UN and ECOWAS was poor. According to Coleman (2003, p. 207) the reason is first of all because the UN observers arrived more than two years after the ECOMOG troops were deployed in Liberia to secure peace, which created resentment. And as UNOMIL did not sent any military troops, they had to rely on ECOMOG for infrastructure and for its own security (ibid.) In addition, the fact that the ECOMOG troops were poorly paid in comparison to the UN observers, created envy among the ECOMOG forces. And some militias were not paid at all, and as a consequence many soldiers took part in illegal activities such as plundering, expropriation and thefts in order to “finance themselves” (Arthur, 2010).

During the second civil war, the division of labor between the UN and ECOWAS was quite different from the first civil war. ECOMIL was deployed with a clear exit plan and played only a minor role during the second civil war. Nonetheless, almost all of the ECOMIL troops were integrated into the UNMIL forces after ECOWAS’ operation ended in late 2003. What is interesting is that in both cases however, is that the division of labor was a result of ad hoc negotiations (Coleman, 2003, p. 222). Even though Nigeria took the initiative to lead the ECOWAS mission during both the civil wars, the member states of ECOWAS refused to accept a long-term deployment in 2003 and it was already agreed that the UN would take over the authority of ECOMIL before October 1, 2003. Also, by comparing the UN spending during the peace operation in Liberia from 1993 until 1997, which was in total around $81 million and the UN’s budget the second year alone of the UNMIL operation, which was around $781, there are reasons to believe that the two hypothesis also can be confirmed in the case of Liberia.
6. CONCLUSION

As seen in Chapter 5, theSomalian case is in many ways different from the Liberian case. First of all, whereby the UN never deployed any troops to Somalia to assist AMISOM, the UN took over the ECOWAS mission in Liberia in 2003 and sent more than 15,000 troops to secure the transition to peace. Nonetheless, it took almost fourteen years before ECOWAS in collaboration with the UN managed to build peace in Liberia. Second of all, whereby ECOMOG was initiated by Nigeria, who took a clear leadership role in the peace operation, AMISOM was created as a result of the failed IGAD mission. And because of conflicting regional interests in East Africa, none of the great powers in the region has taken a leadership role in Somalia. Nevertheless, some progress has been made in Somalia in the past years, and as discussed in Chapter 2, creating peace is not the only measurement of success. In the end, it is impossible to say whether the outcome would have been different without the intervention of AMISOM and without the support from UNSOA (and later UNSOS).

Based on the analysis of the Liberian and the Somalian cases, I conclude that regional hegemons can play a crucial role in peace operations, both politically, militarily and financially. But at the same time, as also seen in the case of Liberia, self-interests can overrule the hegemon goal of halting the conflict and it does not guarantee success. Furthermore, based on the comparison of these two cases, there are reasons to believe that the UN and regional organizations need to have the same understanding of the goal of peace operations and to agree on common mechanisms in order to reach it. If not, like in the case of AMISOM, it is difficult to cooperate, or as in the case of Liberia, the regional hegemon and/or the regional organization need to finance the peace operation themselves.

In order to make the collaboration between regional organizations and the UN in peace operations more efficient, I argue that the UN and the regional organizations need to agree on a common implementation plan in which they specify the division of tasks between the organization’s forces and their administrative personnel before deploying troops. And they need to agree on a budget based on the resources that are available for them and the prior knowledge they have before deploying troops. Finally, based on the comparison between the Somalian and the Liberian cases, there is no reason to reject neither the neo-realist approach nor the neoliberal institutionalist approach. Whereby the Somalian case may confirm what the neo-realists argue; that cooperation is impossible; the Liberian case suggests the opposite. And whereby the
The Liberian case suggests that hegemon powers can affect international relations in the short-run, the Somalian case suggests the opposite. Therefore, combining the two theories have been important in order to understand the collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in the case of Liberia and Somalia. And as the background of the two civil wars had many similar traits but different outcomes, there are reasons to believe that the findings in this thesis can be generalized to other cases, at least in Africa.

In addition to the factors already discussed in this thesis, it is important to consider other possible explanations that may be important in order for regional organizations to succeed in peace operations in collaboration with the UN, and how they can ensure an efficient collaboration. One thing that is interesting to analyze is why the UN chose to deploy military forces in Somalia in the 1990s but not in the 2000s. In general, why does the UN choose to deploy forces in one country whereby it is completely absent from the peace process in the neighbor country, which has been the case for example in Libya and Syria? As already pointed out, the UN peace operations in Somalia in the 1990s were the first peacekeeping operations after the Cold War. Intervening in Somalia was an opportunity to prove that liberation from the Cold War constraints would enable the UN to finally uphold its principal role, which is to maintain international peace and security. However, because of the failure of the two UNISOM peacekeeping operations in the beginning of the 1990s, many of the permanent members of the UNSC refused to back another military mission in Somalia. This reasoning suggests that timing of the conflict matters. This argument is also applicable in the case of Liberia. The outbreak of the civil war in Liberia was the first of a series of civil wars that broke out in West Africa in the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s. Therefore, Nigeria, that had the resources and the will to intervene, saw the conflict in Liberia as an opportunity to prove its relative power capabilities in the region and to strengthen its position in the international community. However, conducting a military intervention alone was not considered as a clever strategy, which is one of the reasons why they reached out to the other member states of ECOWAS. Also, the peace operations in Liberia was conducted before the U.S. initiated the Global War on Terror in Africa, which may have been the main reason why the UNSC agreed to send troops to Liberia and not to Somalia? But how does it explain the fact that the UN chose to support the AMISOM mission financially? As pointed out, the other member states of the UN did not want to contribute to troops to a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Nonetheless, the U.S. was eager to tackle the situation in Somalia in order to defeat the terrorist organization al-Shabaab and requested the UNSC to support the AMISOM mission. UNSOA was therefore created as compromise. Finally, the
choice of the UN to support AMISOM’s mission can be seen as a strategical decision. Somalia’s geographical location makes it an important country for international shipping, but it has also created a new and more dangerous form of activity, namely piracy. And as pointed out by Murphy (2011, p. 163), “Somalia piracy represents the most significant challenge to maritime security since the end of the World War II; or perhaps more precisely, the most substantial threat to the freedom of maritime trading nations to conduct their lawful pursuits peacefully”.

Finally, as already pointed out in Chapter 5, the U.S. plays an important role in decisions on peace and security, both because of its position as the sole global hegemon and as one of the permanent members of the UNSC. Therefore, even though they have to follow by the “rules of the game” in international relations, they can have a major impact on international peace and security, both negatively and positively.

To summarize, many important factors can affect the outcome of peace operations and it would be interesting to study the impact of the additional factors I have been pointing out in the conclusion. However, this would be the subject of another project.
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