«Any small thing Ugandans do, they will kill you»

A study of xenophobia towards Ugandan traders in South Sudan

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Abstract

Anti-immigrant hostility is on the rise in many parts of the world. The escalation of hate crimes and hate speech against international migrants witnessed in receiving societies points towards a climate of increasing intolerance and enmity. The phenomenon has received considerable attention in the social sciences over the past decades. However, more often than not, anti-immigrant hostility is treated as a problem that affects countries in Europe and North America, while the drivers of anti-immigrant hostility in the global south remains largely overlooked. This study aims to address this blind spot in the literature.

Informed by empirical evidence gathered through fieldwork in Gulu, Northern Uganda this thesis investigates the drivers of xenophobia towards Ugandan migrant workers in South Sudan. In accordance with the existing theoretical literature about drivers of anti-immigrant hostility, the findings of this study reveals that the perceived negative impact of Ugandans on the economic interests and cultural values of the South Sudanese motivate hostile reactions towards them. However, the most popular theories of anti-immigrant hostility fall short in explaining why this reaction is sometimes a violent one. This study argues that greater attention must be devoted to the wider context of violence, within which xenophobia takes place. In South Sudan, it is because the negative attitudes takes place in a context where violent problem-solving is the norm, that the reaction is sometimes a violent one.
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All remaining errors are my own.
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1 Introduction

International migration is a contentious topic in the contemporary world. Although people have always moved in search of better opportunities, the increasingly global scope and local impact of international migration have raised controversy and sharp debate in many receiving countries, where discontent with the (perceived) negative effects of immigration is becoming increasingly salient (Castles et al. 2014, pp. 1-7). This trend was clearly demonstrated in the 2016 United States Presidential Election, when Donald Trump rose to power on crude anti-immigrant rhetoric, but anti-immigrant hostility has also come to the fore in many other parts of the world. The arson attacks against refugee centers in Sweden, the lethal persecution of the Rohingya population in Myanmar, and the violent attacks on black migrant workers in South Africa are some examples of the phenomenon, to mention but a few. These incidents all have one thing in common: they are rooted in a fear, dislike and hatred of foreigners, namely xenophobia.

Like any form of prejudice and discrimination, xenophobia is a divisive force in society. If left unfettered it can lead to violence, mass murders, and in the worst case, genocide. (Barroso 2015, pp. 38-39; Human Rights First 2011). As long as push factors such as violent conflict, poverty, inequality and climate change persist, it is unlikely that international migration will diminish, and probably neither will xenophobia (Castles et al. 2014, pp. 6-8; United Nations General Assembly 2016, pp. 1-3). Therefore, it is urgent to find ways to defeat xenophobia and promote peaceful coexistence. To understand the problem is a critical step towards this end, and for that reason, this study aims to develop a better understanding about the drivers of xenophobia.

Previous research

An extensive body of research within the realm of ethnic and migration studies has been devoted to explaining various forms of anti-immigrant hostility (c.f. Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; or Wimmer 1997, for a review of the most popular theoretical arguments). Focusing on intergroup relations and intergroup conflict, the majority of this research links anti-immigrant hostility to people's beliefs about the (perceived) negative effects of immigrants and
immigration on society. The dominating argument maintains that anti-immigrant hostility is a reaction against the real or perceived threat posed by the immigrant group, be it to the receiving society's interests or their identity.

A major weakness of the current literature, however, is that it concentrates almost exclusively on conditions in developed countries, particularly in North America and Europe. This is despite the fact that neither international migration nor anti-immigrant hostility is confined to these countries. Consequently, with the notable exception of South Africa, there is very little knowledge about the drivers of anti-immigrant hostility outside of the European and North American context. My study will address this blind spot in the literature by looking into the migrant experience of Ugandan migrant workers in South Sudan. Because this case, to the best of my knowledge, has not been investigated thoroughly before, it presents a unique opportunity to gain new insights into xenophobia and the dynamics of immigrant-host relations in the global south.

**Research approach**

As will be described in greater detail in the background chapter, my interest in this case comes from a number of newspaper articles and reports about a “creeping xenophobia” targeting Ugandan migrant workers in South Sudan (Green 2012). The veracity of these reports, however, is subject to debate. Therefore, this study starts out by investigating some of the disputed empirical facts. With a broader fact-finding purpose, I ask:

*How does Ugandan traders experience doing business in South Sudan?*

The final research question takes a more analytical approach and asks:

*What factors can explain the problems that Ugandan traders encounter in South Sudan?*

In the course of answering the research questions, the thesis will draw on insights from the broader theoretical literature about anti-immigrant hostility, focusing particularly on the effect of economic threats and cultural difference on immigrant-host relations. The analysis will be based on empirical evidence gathered during fieldwork in Gulu, Northern Uganda in December 2015, where a total of twenty-three informants contributed. The views that inform
the analysis derive primarily from Northern Ugandan migrant workers, hereafter referred to as Ugandan traders, engaged in small-scale trade and service provision within the informal business sector, as well as from their South Sudanese counterparts. Furthermore, the analysis includes the views of representatives from Ugandan media, civil society organizations and the respective governments.

The study will focus primarily on developments in South Sudan since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with Sudan in 2005, up until the civil war broke out in December 2013, mainly because it is within this time period that migration escalated and foreign migrant workers became a prominent feature of society in South Sudan.

Structure of the thesis

The first chapter of the thesis will present background information relevant for the case under study, with a particular focus on historical events and political developments that have influenced the past and present relationship between Northern Ugandans and South Sudanese. The second chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis. Three possible explanations will be presented to help make sense of the problems that Ugandan traders encounter in South Sudan. The first two of these concentrates on xenophobia and different sources of anti-immigrant hostility, while the last one concentrates on the legacy of war and its impact on the use of violence in South Sudan. The third chapter describes the methods used to compile empirical information about the topic under study, namely the case study research design and qualitative interviewing. Strengths and weaknesses of the research strategy will be discussed, along with measures to overcome them. The fourth chapter presents the empirical findings and the analysis of these. It will be argued that there exists certain xenophobic attitudes about Ugandans in South Sudan, which motivate hostile reactions towards them. However, as we shall see, the argument about these attitudes and the theories that guide them falls short when it comes to addressing the different expressions of hostility. Simply put, they cannot adequately explain why the hostile reaction is sometimes a violent one. To this end, it is necessary to take a closer look at the wider use of violence in society in South Sudan. Arguably, it is because these attitudes takes place in a context where violent problem-solving is the norm, that the reaction is sometimes a violent one. The fifth and final chapter concludes the thesis and makes recommendations for future research.
2 Background

The aim of this chapter is to provide relevant background information about the case under study. The focus is twofold. The first part gives a description of historical events and political developments that have influenced the relationship between Northern Ugandans and South Sudanese. This description is important because it highlights past experiences that affects how Ugandans and South Sudanese relate to each other today. The second part gives a review of more recent events and developments in cross-border trade that have led to allegations about xenophobia targeting Ugandan traders in South Sudan. This review is important, because it presents the motivation for the study of the topic.

A history of war and subjugation

In many aspects, the historical events and political developments that have shaped the lives of the people in South Sudan and Northern Uganda are quite similar. Both areas have been conflict-ridden over long periods of time, and both people have a history of social, political and economic marginalization (Titeca 2009). These experiences have sometimes fostered interaction between the two peoples, but also turned them against each other. To understand how this happened, it is necessary to recount some of the major historical developments in the two areas.

The border between Northern Uganda and South Sudan (and also Congo) is not accurately demarcated, and some critics say that the current separation is an artificial colonial construct. Leopold (2009), for instance, suggested that maybe parts of Northern Uganda would more naturally be part of Southern Sudan (ibid, p. 470). In fact, during the last half of the nineteenth century, when the first contact with the outside world occurred, interactions and trade across what later became international borders was already taking place (Meagher 1990, pp. 65-66). With the entry of the Europeans, the area came to be known as the Lado Enclave. It was unruly, with slave traders and ivory hunters reigning relatively freely over the area and causing unrest amongst the population (Leopold 2005, pp. 10-11 and 112-115). But the local people in the area adapted, and learned how to manipulate the tripartite borders to their advantage, for example by keeping their cattle in one country while living in the other - all to
avoid paying taxes (ibid, p. 109). The current division of the territory was settled in British/Belgian negotiations during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (ibid, pp. 108-130).

2.1.1 Historical events and political developments in Uganda

Uganda gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1962, but the colonial system had established regional and ethnic divides that would trouble the country for many years to come. By dividing the country into productive zones in the South and nonproductive zones in the North, the colonial administration created a socio-economic division between the North and South that led to the development of the former, and economic marginalization of the latter (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, p.8). To date, Uganda remains regionally divided between the Bantu-speaking people of the Central, Eastern and Western areas and the Nilotic and Sudanic-speaking people from the North (Laruni 2015, p. 212). With the establishment of indirect rule and local administration based on ethnic divisions, the colonial system institutionalized and exacerbated ethnic differences (Byarugaba 1998). The emphasis on regional and ethnic identity hindered the development of national unity, and laid the foundation for ethnicized politics in post-independence Uganda (Byarugaba 1998; Laruni 2015).

The question of who could better rule independent Uganda became pressing in the early 1950s (Laruni 2015, p. 216). Politicians promised democratization, national unity and economic development; independence was going to end ethnic factionalism (ibid, pp. 213-214). Milton Obote, a Langi from Northern Uganda, established the Uganda People’s Congress and formed a coalition government with the dominant South-Central Buganda tribe (Eichstaedt 2009). The coalition, however, was short-lived, and in 1966 Obote abolished the traditional kingdoms and assumed all executive powers of government (Byarugaba 1998, p. 185). In his rise to power, Obote portrayed himself as a spokesperson for the Northern region and thereby mobilized support from the Acholi and Langi tribes (Laruni 2015, p. 218). When military officer Idi Amin, a Kakwa from North-Western Uganda, ousted Obote in 1971, the Acholi and Langi were to suffer for their apparent closeness to the former state leader.
Idi Amin was a brutal dictator, internationally known under the nickname “Butcher of Uganda”. An estimated three hundred thousand Ugandans were brutally murdered during his eight years as president, many of these were Acholi and Langi soldiers (Eichstaedt 2009, Keatley 2009). Amin and his ruthlessness drove the country to the brink of collapse. The attempted invasion of Tanzania eventually led to his downfall in April 1979 (Roberts 2014, p. 692). In 1980, in a highly disputed election, Milton Obote won and was reinstated as president (Eichstaedt 2009). Dissatisfied with Obote’s return to power, Yoweri Museveni, a Banyankole from South-Western Uganda, formed the National Resistance Army (NRA), a group of well-trained soldiers intent on overthrowing Obote (ibid.). In 1985, after years of conflict, it was Brigadier Bazilio Olara Okello and General Tito Okello Lutwa from Obote’s own army who overthrew him. It was the first time that both the political and military leaders in Uganda were Acholi (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, p. 9). The new government, however, was unstable and did not last long (Finnström, 2003 pp. 100-101). In January 1986, the NRA captured power and Yoweri Museveni became president of Uganda.

Museveni introduced a one-party system based on his National Resistance Movement (NRM) (Eichstaedt 2009). With the NRM, Museveni aimed to bring democracy, political stability and economic development to the country. Many claimed he succeeded, but in reality ethnic and regional tensions still lurked beneath the surface, and peace in Uganda was illusive (Finnström 2003, pp. 101-103; Van Acker 2004). As Finnström (2003) writes, “[T]he 1986 capture of Kampala also marks the starting point of several other armed conflicts in Uganda. The battle zone shifted location, from central Uganda towards the north and the country’s other peripheries” (ibid, p. 103).

In Acholiland, Museveni’s capture of power marked the beginning of decades of violence and insecurity. As many of the soldiers from Obote and Okello’s army fled northwards to regroup and rebel, the battlefield was moved to Acholiland (ibid.). In 1986, in the midst of the many rebel groups and disenfranchised soldiers in Acholiland, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) came to life. Led by the notorious Joseph Kony, the LRA waged a brutal war in Northern Uganda for twenty years (Eichstaedt 2009, pp. 15-18). The war brought tremendous suffering upon the Northerners, and ensured that the North was again deprived of development.

What made the LRA such a long-lived rebellion was its close ties to the Government of Sudan (GoS) (Eichstaedt 2009). After taking power in 1986, Museveni had openly supported the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in their fight against the GoS (Van Acker 2004, pp. 337-38). In retaliation, the GoS offered safe haven and military support to the LRA (Schomerus 2007, p. 18):

[T]he Sudanese government started to aid the makeover of what had been a motley group of rebels into a coherent, well supplied military enterprise [...]. The LRA and its use of terror became the ultimate fifth column of the Sudanese army: a clandestine, cost-effective force used to destabilize the SPLM/A and Uganda (Van Acker 2004, p. 338).

The “war of proxies” (Finnström 2006, p. 120) formally ended in 2002, when the GoS granted the Ugandan military permission to chase the LRA within Southern Sudanese territory (Eichstaedt 2009). But the invasion, named Operation Iron Fist, was unsuccessful (Schomerus 2007, p. 26; Dolan 2010, p. 9). The period was one of the bloodiest in the war, and it brought tremendous suffering upon the civilian population in South Sudan (Schomerus 2007, pp. 22 and 28-29). This suffering would generate animosity and suspicion towards Ugandans in general, and Acholis in particular (Carrington 2009, p.7). Fighting in Northern Uganda also escalated and the humanitarian situation deteriorated drastically (ibid.). Today, the LRA’s strength is diminished. The number of fighters is dwindling and the rebel group is no longer a direct threat to Northern Uganda (Zapata 2011). However, the conflict added to the many historical events and processes that have affected the relationship between people from Northern Uganda and South Sudan - in this case, by sometimes turning people against each other.

### 2.1.2 Historical events and political developments in South Sudan

Like Northern Uganda, South Sudan has always been affected by being situated in the periphery of the state. That is not only in terms of geographical distance from the center of state authority, but also in terms of social, political and economic marginalization (Titeca 2009, p. 3). These developments date back to the nineteenth century, when Sudan was under Turco-Egyptian rule (1821-1885). This period marks the beginning of a North-South divide in Sudan, where the North emerged as the administrative and economic center of the state, whereas the South became the arena for commercial exploitation, mostly for ivory and slaves (Johnson 2003, pp. 2-6). This divide was continued and even intensified under the Anglo-
In the period leading up to independence, the disparities in development became increasingly salient and it was evident that the Southerners in their disadvantaged position would have difficulty in influencing the direction of the country (ibid, p. 17). With no real ability to affect the outcome, the decision was made to opt for a united Sudan, and the Southerners’ hope for greater autonomy were subsequently shattered (ibid, pp. 25-27). What followed next was a process of “Sudanization”, within which Northerners assumed powerful positions in the South, and the Arabic language and Muslim faith was progressively introduced to the Southerners (ibid, p.30). The fear of further Northern domination caused widespread discontent and led to violent protests in the South prior to the 1956 independence (ibid, pp. 27-29).

In February 1962, the first opposition movement was formed in exile under the name Sudan African Closed Districts National Union, which later became the Sudan African National Union (SANU) (Rolandsen 2011, p. 215). In the late summer of 1963, the decision was made to proceed with violent resistance. The military wing of SANU, the Anya-Nya, was formed, which marked the beginning of the Southerners’ armed uprising against the North and the start of the first civil war in Sudan (ibid, p. 222). The first civil war lasted until the Addis Ababa Agreement was reached in 1972. The peace agreement, however, left many dissatisfied in both Northern and Southern Sudan, and in 1983 the country was again at war (Johnson 2003, pp. 39-58). The second civil war ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, which paved the way for independence for South Sudan in July 2011. However, the years of colonization and warfare had disrupted development and it was obvious from the outset that the new state would face daunting challenges (Knopf 2013).

In December 2013, a political crisis erupted in the country. Tensions within the leadership of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement had gradually escalated throughout 2013 (De Waal 2014). In mid-December that year, President Salva Kiir accused former Vice-President Riek Machar of staging a coup and ordered his arrest, along with several other prominent political figures. It was the last drop, and the tensions spilled over into violent conflict (ibid.).
Cross-border trade and intergroup animosity

Informal trade between people from Northern Uganda and South Sudan has existed since pre-colonial times, despite consistent attempts made by the British in Uganda to gain control over it (Meagher 1990, p. 66). In the early 1980s, informal trade in the borderlands thrived with the Ariwara market in Congo, where Ugandans, South Sudanese and Congolese traders came together to sell and buy goods. This trade was mainly facilitated by the refugee movements from Northern Uganda in the late seventies (Titeca 2009, p. 4). However, when the second civil war broke out in Sudan, the “triangular trade” collapsed; “it simply was too dangerous for them to come to Congo” (ibid, p. 5).

After the signing of the CPA, opportunities for cross-border trade reemerged. This time the scene of the trade shifted to South Sudan (ibid.). There was an acute demand for goods and services in the country, which made South Sudan an attractive destination for foreign traders (Carrington 2009, pp. 9-10). A number of traders arrived from neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Congo and Kenya. The majority, however, came from Uganda. Some of the trade followed traditional patterns and was facilitated by the fact that the same ethnic groups are found on both sides of the border (Titeca 2009, pp. 2-3). These include the Acholi, Madi, Kakwa and Lugbara groups. But a large number of traders also came from Central and Eastern Uganda, and included groups of people that had limited previous contact with the South Sudanese (Carrington 2009, p. 20). The traders engaged in small-scale trading, mostly informal, and helped develop the hotel, restaurant and transportation industries in the country (ibid, pp. 10-11).

Between 2005 and 2010, trade between the two countries flourished. South Sudan became Uganda’s biggest and most important export market, while Uganda became South Sudan’s most important source of goods and services (ibid, p. 22). The revival and expansion of the cross-border trade was of great importance to both Northern Uganda and South Sudan. The years of violent conflict and marginalization had impacted significantly on development in the two areas. Although the humanitarian situation improved in Northern Uganda after the LRA left the area, development was still lagging far behind the rest of the country (ibid, p. 6). In this situation, informal cross-border trade became an important source of self-sufficiency (Titeca and de Herdt 2010, p. 581). According to Titeca and de Herdt, “Cross-border trade is perceived as a ‘home-grown’ or ‘indigenous’ form of development which allows people in the
border areas to ‘fend for themselves’ in the light of a neglectful national government” (ibid, p. 582). In South Sudan, cross-border trade provided a lifeline for the general population who generally lacked access to food, basic infrastructure and social services (Carrington 2009, p. 6 and 18).

Soon after its emergence, however, it became clear that trading in South Sudan was not trouble-free. The media reported about incidents where Ugandan traders had been arrested without cause, intimidated, harassed, raped and even killed, often by state security officers (International Alert 2014, p. 5). In the period between 2007 and 2012, more than 100 Ugandans forwarded complaints to the Government of Uganda and asked for compensation from the Government of South Sudan (ibid, p. 18). Some complaints were directed towards local partners for contract breaches and under- and non-payment, while others concerned accusations of violence and harassment (ibid.). In some instances, the alleged mistreatment of Ugandans in South Sudan inspired acts of retaliation towards South Sudanese in Uganda. This happened in April 2009, when two Ugandan truck drivers were killed and eight others injured in South Sudan. The incident sparked clashes between Ugandans and South Sudanese in the Koboko district in Northern Uganda, where an unspecified number of South Sudanese were killed (Schomerus and Titeca 2012, p. 19).

The Government of Uganda have taken notice of the complaints and some initiatives have been implemented to address the traders’ problems. Most noticeably these initiatives include: (1) the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding to improve trade relations between the two countries, and (2) the establishment of the Ugandan Trade Dispute Arbitration Committee – a committee meant to consider the authenticity of the traders’ complaints (International Alert 2014, p. 11). However, according to Chief Executive Officer of Kampala City Traders Association, Moses Kalule, the process has stalled (Interview 21, 17.12.2015). Some demands for compensation to the companies in the formal sector were met, but the small-scale traders engaged in the informal business sector have not yet had their complaints processed (ibid.). The lack of progress with their complaints have caused frustrations amongst many Ugandan traders in South Sudan. In June 2012, a group of drivers initiated a sit-down strike along the Kampala-Juba road, first and foremost to protest the mistreatment they claim to have faced at the hands of the South Sudanese, but also to criticize both authorities’ passivity about the matter (Daily Monitor 2012).
Amidst the complaints, the question was raised as to whether or not Ugandans are victims of a creeping xenophobia in South Sudan (Green 2012). The Government of South Sudan has categorically denied this and describe the reported incidents of mistreatment as “isolated incidences which can happen anywhere” (Sudan Tribune 2007). Elizabeth Majok, then Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce in South Sudan, said that “Ugandans who came to South Sudan were met with generally favorable business conditions and were not systemically discriminated against” (Irin News 2012). Yet state policies have sometimes indicated otherwise.

In August 2013, the Ministry of Interior in South Sudan made the sudden decision to ban foreigners from operating motorcycle taxis, known as boda-bodas in South Sudan (Jok and Mayai 2013). Without prior warning, foreign boda-boda drivers, of which Ugandans constituted a majority, were forced to leave the country, often facing harassment along the way by local police and immigration and customs officers. The ban, and the manner in which it was conducted, was met with sharp criticism by lawmakers and government officials in Uganda, some of which called for the expulsion of South Sudanese from Uganda in retaliation (ibid.). Although the Government of South Sudan maintained that the ban was initiated to fight crime, some observers speculated that the ban was actually implemented to create jobs for the native population (The Guardian 2013).

After independence in 2011, South Sudan has faced economic hardship, and trade between the two countries has declined (International Alert 2014, pp. 17-18). The shutdown of oil production in January 2012 and the outbreak of civil war in December 2013 were important causes of this (Rolandsen 2015). However, the mistreatment of Ugandan traders in South Sudan definitely added fuel to the fire (Sagmo, Rolandsen and Nicolaisen 2015).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has presented various historical events and political developments that have impacted on the relationship between Northern Ugandans and South Sudanese. It has been demonstrated that past experiences have sometimes fostered interaction and cooperation between the two groups, while at other times, turned them against each other. Furthermore,
the cross-border trade between the two countries was discussed, with particular emphasis on the problems that have been reported by Ugandan traders in terms of mistreatment over the past decade. We will return to many of these historical events in the analytical chapter of the thesis, when the attempt is made to make sense of the problems that Ugandans encounter in South Sudan.
3 Theoretical framework

This chapter will present the theoretical framework of the thesis. The issue of xenophobia towards Ugandans in South Sudan can be related to the broader theoretical literature about anti-immigrant hostility; a literature which has its roots in various disciplines within the social sciences, but mainly within sociology, social psychology and political science. Within this literature, there exists a number of possible explanations to why immigrants sometimes become targets for violence, harassment and discrimination. The majority of these concentrates on two distinct sources of anti-immigrant hostility, namely interests and identities. These two schools of thought will constitute the theoretical backbone of the thesis. However, as was touched upon in the introduction chapter, a major weakness of the current literature is that it focuses almost exclusively on conditions in countries in North America and Europe. It poses a challenge because most explanations will inevitably reflect circumstances that are quite different from those in developing countries like Uganda and South Sudan. On the other hand, this weakness presents a unique opportunity to contribute to a theoretical literature in dire need of development.

In the following, I will outline the main points of the two theoretical approaches and discuss how they may relate to the experience of Ugandan traders in South Sudan. Thereafter I will present an alternative approach to the topic under study, which links xenophobia to the wider context of violence in post-conflict societies. First, however, it is necessary to define the key concept of this thesis, namely xenophobia.

Conceptual clarifications

When immigrants are met with hostile reactions in a host country, they are often described as victims of xenophobia. Taken from the Greek term xenos (stranger) and phobos (fear), xenophobia is most commonly defined as a dislike, hatred, or fear of foreigners (Crush 2008, p. 15). As a theoretical concept it is used to describe the “attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity” (United Nations, 2001).
The concept of xenophobia is still fairly undeveloped. In everyday discourse, it is often confused with related concepts such as racism and ethnocentrism (Duckitt 2010; Hervik 2015), perhaps unsurprisingly, as they all refer to a sense of ingroup favoritism and outgroup antipathy (ibid.). What distinguishes them theoretically is what signifies the “otherness” of the outgroup. While xenophobia refers to negative reactions towards immigrants, racism and ethnocentrism are associated with exclusion and discrimination on the basis of physical characteristics or cultural differences. Of course, in reality the different phenomena often overlap, and xenophobia may involve elements of both racism and ethnocentrism (ibid.).

As was duly noted by Harris (2002), a major weakness of xenophobia as a theoretical concept is the lack of specification about its practice. According to Harris:

Xenophobia’ as a term must be reframed to incorporate practice. It is not just an attitude: it is an activity. It is not just a dislike or fear of foreigners: it is a violent practice that results in bodily harm and damage (p. 170, his emphasis).

What distinguishes this violent practice from other forms of violence is its motivation. According to Harris (2001), the concept of xenophobia entails that foreigners are subjected to violence by virtue of their foreignness or nationality (ibid.). The relationship between xenophobia and violence, however, has been given remarkably little attention in the academic literature. Most studies simply take for granted that the one is connected to the other. In the case of South Africa, for instance, most research has concentrated on explaining the root causes of hostile attitudes, leaving questions about its physical manifestations mostly unanswered. This is despite the fact that these studies often take the “waves of xenophobic violence” as their point of departure.

In this study, the concepts of xenophobia and anti-immigrant hostility will be used interchangeably to describe hostile reactions towards foreigners, be it attitudes or acts of violence and harassment. However, the often preconceived connection between xenophobic attitudes and violence will be contested towards the end of the analysis.
The interest-based approach

The interest-based approach has its theoretical core in group threat theory, developed by scholars like sociologist Herbert Blumer (1958) to explain race prejudice. The basic assumption of group threat theory is that prejudice emerges from a conflict of interests between groups. Hence, rather than attributing prejudice to feelings embedded in the individual, group threat theory links prejudice to the conflictual relationship between groups.

A little reflective thought should make this very clear. Race prejudice presupposes, necessarily, that racially prejudiced individuals think of themselves as belonging to a given racial group. It means, also, that they assign to other racial groups those against whom they are prejudiced [...]. Such identification involves the formation of an image or a conception of one's own racial group and of other racial groups, inevitably in terms of the relationships of such groups (ibid, p. 3).

According to Blumer, a collective process of categorization takes place, which defines where the different groups belong in relation to each other, placing one group above the other. Influenced by public discourse and the media, the dominant group comes to see itself as superior and entitled to certain privileges vis-à-vis the subordinate group. This perception of one's own group’s position is fundamental because it “reflects, justifies, and promotes the social exclusion of the subordinate racial group” (ibid, p.4), but it does not necessarily lead to prejudice. However, when this perception is coupled with the feeling that the subordinate group threatens the position of the dominant group, it fosters prejudice. This is because the dominant group aims to preserve “what ought to be”, namely their superior social position and the benefits that follow, be it power, wealth, or prestige. According to Blumer:

[A]cts or suspected acts that are interpreted as an attack on the natural superiority of the dominant group, or an intrusion into their sphere of group exclusiveness, or an encroachment on their area of proprietary claim are crucial in arousing and fashioning race prejudice. These acts mean “getting out of place” (ibid.).

Essentially then, prejudice is a “defensive reaction” towards the threat posed by the subordinate group, and the relationship between the two can be described as a perceived conflict or competition over incompatible interests (ibid, p. 5).
Group threat theory and the proposed relationship between conflictual interests and prejudice have its theoretical foundation in rational choice theory (Wimmer 2000, p. 48). This means that prejudice as a defensive reaction is understood as a rational action (ibid.). That is because the intergroup competition is seen as a zero-sum scenario where the gains of the subordinate group are believed to come at the expense of the dominant group. Within this context, it is in the interest of the dominant group to pursue strategies that prevents the subordinate group from advancement (Esses et al. 2001).

There are different versions of group threat theory, and although the line of reasoning explaining prejudice is essentially the same, debate exists about whether the threat is real or imaginary (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, p. 318). In Blumer's version of group threat theory, the threat need not reflect objective realities. What is of importance is that it fosters feelings of fear and apprehension, or what Blumer describes as “a felt challenge to th[e] sense of group position” (Blumer 1958, p. 5). In contrast, realistic conflict theory asserts that hostility is a response to actual threats to the interests of the dominant group (Bobo 1983). Both approaches have inspired a number of hypotheses about the causes of anti-immigrant hostility, most of which concentrate on the relationship between economic factors and opinion formation. Within this body of research, which is sometimes referred to as the interest-based approach, hostility is seen to derive from the perception that immigrants compete with the native population for access to material resources (Wimmer 2000, pp. 48-51). Some of the hypotheses proposed by this literature are relevant for the study of Ugandan traders in South Sudan, and I will therefore account for them in the following.

### 3.1.1 Economic determinants of anti-immigrant hostility

The most renowned hypotheses within the interest-based approach concentrate on either contextual- or individual-level determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes. What the different hypotheses have in common is that they all identify factors which are thought to heighten the sense of conflict or competition between immigrants and their hosts.

Focusing on contextual determinants of anti-immigrant hostility, one school of research investigates whether or not the state of the national economy influences opinion formation (c.f. Citrin et al. 1997; Quillian 1995). Assuming that hostility is driven by competition
between groups over access to material resources, hostility is expected to increase when resources are scarce and the sense of competition is heightened, such as in times of economic recession (Quillian 1995, pp. 589-590). Thus one can anticipate that opposition towards immigrants and immigration is greater in countries where the economy is weak. Statistical studies of this hypothesis, however, have yielded contradictory results. In research on European countries, Quillian found that prejudice was more prevalent in countries with poor economic circumstances, but more recent studies have later refuted these findings (c.f. Sides and Citrin 2007). Other research has found that it is people's (pessimistic) beliefs about the state of the national economy, and not the actual circumstances, that boost opposition towards immigration (Citrin et al. 1997).

A second hypothesis, which is sometimes referred to as the job threat hypothesis, investigates the effects of individuals' economic circumstances on opinion formation (c.f. Citrin et al. 1997; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007). Assuming that hostility is related to the threat that immigrants pose to the interests of the host population, anti-immigrant attitudes are expected to be more prevalent amongst those who are directly threatened by the presence of immigrants, which typically involve the low-skilled, low-paid or unemployed segments of the population (ibid.). Prior research on preferences for immigration policy have documented that opposition towards immigration is in fact higher amongst the low-skilled and low-paid workers (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006), whilst the higher-educated tend to be more positive (Gang et al. 2013). Furthermore, there is some evidence suggesting that unemployment is associated with anti-immigrant hostility (ibid.), although this finding is not uniform.

Although the different hypotheses within the interest-based approach have produced mixed results, there are reasons not to neglect such factors from the study of hostility towards Ugandans in South Sudan. It is quite possible that the impact of economic circumstances is more significant in very poor countries like South Sudan, where the vast majority of the native population are unemployed and uneducated, and where a great proportion of the immigrant population consists of migrant workers who explicitly strive to take advantage of the already limited economic opportunities.
The identity-based approach

An alternative explanation to that of the interest-based approach maintains that hostility has more to do with values and identities than material interests (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, p. 317). The approach has its foundation in social identity theory, developed by social psychologist Henri Tajfel and his student John Turner (1979), to explain the psychology of intergroup conflict.

The basic assumption of social identity theory is that prejudice emerges through the formation and preservation of individuals’ social identity. Hence, rather than attributing prejudice to the competitive relationship between groups, social identity theory links prejudice to individual psychological processes. According to Tajfel and Turner, people have a tendency to categorize themselves and others into different social groups. This process of categorization helps the individual to make sense of his or her place in society, i.e., to develop a sense of belonging in the social world. In the words of Tajfel and Turner:

Social groups [...] provide their members with an identification of themselves in social terms. These identifications are to a very large extent relational and comparative: they define the individual as similar to or different from, as “better” or “worse” than, members of other groups (ibid, p. 40).

Group membership, as such, becomes an important element of people's self-image, and because people strive to achieve a positive self-image, they will also strive to belong to a group that is positively distinct from others. According to Tajfel and Turner, these pressures to evaluate one's own group positively will make groups inclined to differentiate themselves from each other (ibid, p. 41). Derogation of other groups may serve to this purpose because it helps differentiate between the self and the other in a manner that enhances the positive image of the group to which oneself belongs, while at the same time, diminishing that of the other (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, p. 217). Within this framework, incompatible group interests are neither necessary nor sufficient for intergroup conflict or competition. Here, the fundamental aim is to achieve group superiority in symbolic terms. Therefore, “the mere awareness of the presence of an out-group is sufficient to provoke intergroup competition or discriminatory responses on the part of the in-group” (Tajfel and Turner 1979, p. 38).
Like group threat theory, social identity theory has inspired different hypotheses about the causes of anti-immigrant hostility, most of which concentrate on the relationship between symbolic values and opinion formation (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, p. 317). Within this body of research, which is sometimes referred to as the identity-based approach, hostility is seen to derive from the threat that immigrants pose to the distinctive identity of the native population (Sides and Citrin 2007, p. 479). Some of the hypotheses within this literature are also relevant for the study of Ugandan traders in South Sudan, and I will therefore account for them in the following.

3.1.2 Cultural determinants of anti-immigrant hostility

The most renowned hypothesis within the identity-based approach is the one concerning the effects of cultural differences on opinion formation (c.f. Davidov et al. 2008; Sides and Citrin 2007). Assuming that hostility derives from the threat that immigrants pose to the distinctive identity of the host community, it is expected to increase if the immigrant group is visibly different in terms of customs, values and appearances. This is because the immigrants’ differentness is seen to be incompatible with, and therefore threatening to, the cultural unity of the host community (ibid.). The argument goes that the greater the difference, the less likely are the immigrants to assimilate into the existing culture, and the greater is the threat to the identity of the host population (Sides and Citrin 2007, p. 477; Wimmer 2000, pp. 51-54). Thus one can anticipate that hostility towards immigrants is greater in countries where the immigrant population is racially and culturally distinct from the host population, and particularly amongst individuals who value cultural unity (ibid.). Research from European countries has provided empirical evidence in support of this argument (c.f. Ford 2011; Ivarsflaten 2005; Sides and Citrin 2007). However, there are reasons to question whether these findings are applicable to the African context.

While European countries attract immigrants from all over the world, the majority of the immigrant population in African countries consists of migrants from other African countries, often within the same region, that have similar appearances, values and customs, to the host population (Shimeles 2010). As such, one can expect that the immigrants appear more compatible with and less threatening to the distinctive identity of the host community. Furthermore, it is debatable whether or not there exists the same kind of cultural unity in
African countries, as it does in European ones (Whitaker and Giersch 2015). In European countries, allegiance to the nation-state is an important source of common identity which ties people together across ethnic boundaries. But African countries are ethnically diverse, and national identity tends to be less important than ethnic identity (ibid.). Therefore, it is difficult to imagine a sense of cultural unity amongst the native population for the immigrants to threaten. But that is not to say that cultural factors are entirely irrelevant for the understanding of anti-immigrant attitudes in Africa.

Rather than focusing on cultural differences, scholars have suggested that it is cultural similarity that fosters hostility towards immigrants in African countries (Adida 2011). The argument goes that the greater the cultural and ethnic overlap, the greater is the threat to the privileges of the host population, and the more motivated are the members of the host society to reject the immigrants. This is because immigrants who share ethnic and cultural traits with the host society are more likely to successfully assimilate and make claims on the resources of the state, whereas immigrants who are visibly different are more easily distinguished as unentitled foreigners. Thus, in contrast to what has been claimed for European countries, one can hypothesize that it is cultural similarities rather than cultural differences that give rise to anti-immigrant hostility in African countries (ibid.). However, because the research conducted by Adida is recent and fairly uninvestigated outside of the West-African context, the effect of both cultural similarities and cultural differences will be examined in the case studied here.

Another related hypothesis that belongs within the identity-based approach is the so-called contact thesis. Proponents of this hypothesis maintain that, under the right circumstances, contact between immigrants and their hosts fosters greater tolerance between groups (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, p. 317). There is, however, considerable debate about what exactly the “right circumstances” are. Allport identified four such “facilitators of contact”: equal status; intergroup cooperation; common goals; and support by social and institutional authorities, a list to which others later have added (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, p. 317). Statistical studies of the hypothesis have confirmed that intimate contact, i.e. friendships with immigrants, can in fact increase acceptance for immigration (c.f. Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; McLaren 2003).
Culture of violence

An alternative approach to the study of xenophobia towards Ugandan traders in South Sudan is to investigate the phenomenon against the wider context of violence in the country. To this end, I can rely on the theoretical literature about violence in post-conflict societies.

In the aftermath of war, there are often expectations of improved physical security. However, scholars have found that high levels of violence tend to persist in post-conflict societies (Berdal 2012; Steenkamp 2011). It has been observed in countries such as Cambodia, East Timor, Guatemala, and Rwanda, where violence continued even after the peace agreement was signed and the conflict was officially ended (Berdal 2012). The nature of the violence may differ from context to context. It can be perpetrated by organized groups motivated by political grievances, but it need not be. It can also be committed by individuals and it can be apolitical in its purpose (Steenkamp 2011, p. 358 and 369). The general observation, however, is the same: violence appears to beget further violence (Berdal 2012, p. 310).

Steenkamp (2005) links the continued use of violence in post-conflict societies to the legacy of war and its impact on society's norms and values. More specifically, she argues that the long exposure to violence lead to the development of certain “violence-supporting” norms and values that make society more tolerant to the continued use of violence (ibid, p. 255). The outcome is a culture of violence where violence is the accepted and legitimate means for people to solve problems and deal with their frustrations (ibid, p. 254).

According to Steenkamp, there are a number of factors related to conflict that contribute to the culture of violence. These factors create a context within which “the use of violence is allowed and even encouraged” (ibid, p. 255). Steenkamp locates these factors at four different levels; the international level, the state level, the communal level and the individual level. The argument goes that “all these factors on various levels eventually create conditions that allow for the use of violence on a micro level” (ibid, p. 256). For the topic under study, it is particularly those factors located at the state level, regarding the state security and justice apparatus, which appears to be of greatest significance. Therefore it is to these factors that I will turn my attention.
According to Steenkamp, the state and its actors contribute to a culture of violence in different ways. One way is by setting the example of violence (ibid, pp. 257-261). During war, the use of violence by state agents is necessary to intimidate opponents. Therefore, the prohibitions against acts of violence are lifted and violence becomes accepted, legitimized, and sometimes even honored. The officially approved use of violence during war can influence the attitudes of civilians and make them more accepting towards the use of violence also in peacetime (ibid.). According to Steenkamp, “This acceptance and legitimization of violence during the conflict persists (especially in the eyes of civilians) into the post-war period and is the backdrop to rises in violent crime incidents after war” (ibid, p. 258). Furthermore, the official use of violence sometimes continues after peace has been made, where members of the state security forces are involved in excessive use of force, often under the pretense of maintaining law and order. The consequence of the continued use of violence by state security officers is that it can “provide a legitimization for the individual use of violence – whether out of self-protection or by following the state's example” (ibid.).

Another way in which the state can contribute to a culture of violence is by not providing effective deterrence for the individual use of violence (ibid, p. 261). With the power to prosecute and punish perpetrators, the judiciary and law enforcement systems have the ability to discourage violent behavior. However, when the institutions are unable to carry out their task and the use of violence goes unpunished, there are “limited costs to using violence and little incentives for norms and values to change” (ibid, p. 259).

It makes little sense to describe South Sudan as a post-conflict country today, but during the interwar period 2005-2012 we may consider South Sudan a post-conflict society. In the analytical chapter of this thesis, the culture of violence approach will be used to examine if the hostility towards Ugandans may have less to do with xenophobia, and more to with the legacy of war and its impact on the use of violence in South Sudan.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the theoretical framework that will guide the study of xenophobia towards Ugandan traders in South Sudan. The choice was made to focus primarily on two
popular approaches to the study of anti-immigrant hostility, namely the interest-based and identity-based approach. These theoretical contributions offer different explanations to why immigrants sometimes become targets for hostility. Both theories assert that a sense of threat is a necessary condition for hostility to develop, but what constitutes the nature of the threat is a topic for debate. While the interest-based approach emphasizes the importance of economic factors in shaping people’s opinions, the identity-based approach emphasizes the importance of people’s values and identities. These theories are not, however, mutually exclusive and it is likely that both economic factors and cultural factors influence opinion formation in South Sudan. For the purpose of this study, these theories can be useful in making sense of the motivations for hostility towards Ugandans. More specifically, the interest-based approach can help shed light on the significance of the economic competition with Ugandans, while the identity-based approach can help explain the impact of past interactions, ethnic ties, and different lifestyles between Ugandans and South Sudanese. However, neither of the theories address the physical expression of hostility. The culture of violence perspective was therefore introduced to offer an alternative approach or possible counter-argument to the arguments about xenophobia. The perspective differs from the other theories presented in that it focuses less on the perpetrators motivations for hostile reactions, and more on the context within which such reactions takes place. In the investigation of the research topic, the perspective will be used to raise questions about the often presumed relationship between xenophobic attitudes and violence.
4 Research design and methodology

In this chapter, I will present the research strategy and discuss the methodological choices I have made. First, I will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the case study design in relevance to the topic at hand. Second, I will demonstrate that qualitative research and in-depth interviewing is the best approach when the aim is to understand the experiences of Ugandan traders in South Sudan. Finally, I will discuss the challenges associated with qualitative research in relevance to ethics, validity and reliability, as well as how I have worked to overcome these challenges.

Case study research design

The purpose of a research design is to ensure that the information obtained makes it possible to develop well-informed answers to the research question (de Vaus 2001, p. 16). My research will be designed as a case study of xenophobia towards Ugandan traders in South Sudan.

The aim of my research is to explain why Ugandan traders are subjected to violence and harassment in South Sudan. To answer this question I must identify which factors motivate these actions and develop an explanation of how they do so. The case study research design is generally better suited than cross-case research for identifying and understanding such causal mechanisms (Gerring 2007, pp. 43-45). This is because the case study, with emphasis on the single or a small selection of cases, offers the opportunity to gain deeper understanding about the complexities of a specific phenomenon. The access to depth and detail that case study research makes possible allows me to ‘peer into the box of causality’ (ibid, p. 45) and investigate the different factors that may explain the problems that Ugandan traders encounter in South Sudan, including factors that I did not identify as relevant beforehand (George and Bennett 2005, pp. 20-22).

The overall aim of scientific research is to uncover and understand causal relationships in the real world (King et al. 1994, pp. 6-8). To achieve this aim it is important to minimize uncertainty associated with the conclusions (ibid.). The emphasis on in-depth understanding of a phenomenon within its real-life context is one of the virtues of case-study research
By actually travelling to Northern Uganda and seek out those people who have experienced doing business in South Sudan, it is possible for me to identify factors that relate to their problems and eliminate irrelevant ones. Therefore, case study research has the potential of achieving a high degree of internal validity, meaning that the proposed causal argument is correct for the case under study (Gerring 2007, p. 43).

However, the small sample size weakens the external validity of my results and the ability to generalize my findings. This is because it is difficult to say something with confidence about the broad population of cases when you study just the one or a few (ibid.). Because the findings rely on empirical evidence from a small pool of purposely selected informants, mainly from Northern Uganda, I cannot claim with certainty that my findings are valid for the general population of Ugandan traders, nor for other migrant workers in the African context. But that is not to say that the findings of the research is irrelevant. My study of xenophobia towards Ugandan traders in South Sudan may suggest interesting approaches for the study of the problem in a cross-case format. Furthermore, the study may identify causal mechanisms that can be of value for further development of theories about anti-immigrant hostility.

**Qualitative interviewing**

While the choice of case study research design denotes what I will study, the choice of qualitative interviewing determines how it will be studied (Sake 2000). A case study may be based on either qualitative or quantitative information, or a combination of the two (Yin 2003). But when the aim is to develop comprehensive explanations about causal relationships, qualitative research is generally the best choice (Denzel and Lincoln 2000). This is because qualitative research is flexible; it allows you to adapt and make alterations to the research strategy if you discover unexpected information, and it gives greater attention to context and detail than does quantitative research (Rubin and Rubin 2005). As available literature on the experiences of Ugandan traders in South Sudan is limited, I found it necessary to collect first-hand data. Qualitative research may take many different forms, but I have relied on qualitative in-depth interviewing.
The aim of qualitative interviewing is to develop coherent explanations based on informants’ first-hand experiences with the topic at hand (ibid, pp. 12-15). By piecing together information from different viewpoints, I have created a narrative of my own where I combine information about actual events with the meanings that people ascribe to them. The interviews I conducted resembled ordinary conversations where the informants were encouraged to participate actively in shaping the content and direction. With a relatively unexplored research topic like mine, the ability of informants to influence the interview and provide the information that they perceived as important was of great value. I frequently encountered new information that challenged my preconceived ideas about their experiences in South Sudan. Without this openness and flexibility towards taking in this new information, I would run the risk of drawing ill-informed conclusions (ibid.)

Methodological challenges

There are certain methodological challenges associated with the qualitative approach, particularly in terms of ethics, validity and reliability. In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss these challenges in relevance to the selection of informants and the process of data gathering.

4.1.1 Selection of informants

How the informants are selected is important for the credibility of the research. Qualitative research methods can enhance credibility by selecting informants with experience and knowledge about the research topic and with opinions that reflect a variety of perspectives (ibid, pp. 64-67). Ideally, the combined views of all the informants produce a balanced perspective that adequately represents the research topic. I have therefore relied on purposive sampling for the selection of informants. With purposive sampling, the informants are selected to fulfill a specific purpose, most often on the basis of their unique ability to inform the research topic (Chambliss and Schutt 2010, p. 123). The sample cannot be generalized because it is unlikely to be representative of the whole population of Ugandan traders, but it leaves me better equipped to develop holistic explanations that are more likely to hold true within the case under study, thereby strengthening the internal validity of my research findings.
Before setting out to conduct the actual interviews, I identified certain groups of informants, which in combination were likely to represent a nuanced perspective about the experience of doing business for Ugandan traders in South Sudan. The most important group was that of Ugandans with actual experience of working in the country. I expected them to help me form an understanding of what it is like for Ugandans to do business in South Sudan, as well as to identify which challenges they face in the country. Ideally, I would have liked to also interview South Sudanese workers in South Sudan to learn about their perceptions concerning these issues. It would have been interesting to see whether their opinions were in contrast or coherence with those of Ugandan traders. However, because of the fragile security situation in South Sudan, I would have to settle for interviewing South Sudanese people in Uganda. Their opinions were useful in giving me some idea of how Ugandans are perceived by South Sudanese. However, because most of the South Sudanese people I interviewed have lived, studied and worked alongside Ugandans, their viewpoints are likely to be more sympathetic towards them.

I also wanted to interview representatives of the Government of South Sudan and the Government of Uganda to learn about how they deal with the security problems concerning Ugandan traders in South Sudan, but also to get their take on specific policies and incidents that I believed to be of relevance to the discussion about xenophobia. Finally, I planned to include representatives from different non-governmental organizations and the media. From having worked directly with topics concerning Ugandan traders in South Sudan, I expected them to have knowledge about the problems that Ugandans face in the country.

Although I had established which groups of people I wanted to interview, I had difficulties making contact with some of them. Ugandan traders and South Sudanese people living in Uganda proved especially difficult to identify. For that purpose, I engaged two research assistants. They were not only useful in terms of identifying and accessing relevant informants; they also functioned as excellent interpreters. Even though English is the official language in Uganda and South Sudan, I found that most people at the grassroots were more comfortable speaking in their local language. To have one assistant familiar with the Acholi language and the other with Arabic proved invaluable to me.
Of course, there are certain challenges associated with the involvement of research assistants and interpreters. In anthropology, their involvement has been frowned upon because they are thought to hamper the ability of the researcher to truly understand social phenomena (Borchgrevink 2003). Inevitably, the researcher loses a degree of control over the research. Information may be changed or omitted under translation, and certain informants may be suggested before others (Scheyvens et al. pp. 131-133). However, there are also clear benefits of engaging assistants and interpreters, especially when the time available for fieldwork is short, like mine. Just as assistants and interpreters can prevent access to some informants and information, they can also function as “gate-openers” for the researcher (Borchgrevink 2003, p. 109). During the course of my research, the assistants occasionally hindered, but mostly facilitated, such access. One example of the former occurred after an interview at the border crossing point in Elegu. I had just concluded the interview and was on my way to the restroom when I was stopped by a Ugandan man who had overheard parts of the conversation with my assistant and the informant. He wanted to share his experiences as a Ugandan driver in South Sudan, but was reluctant to approach our table being uncertain about whether my assistant, who spoke Arabic, would be sympathetic with the South Sudanese. In the end, he told me his story in the hallway, but he would not come to join our table.

More often than not, however, I found the benefits of engaging the research assistants to outweigh the drawbacks. With their help, I could access informants and information that would probably otherwise be unobtainable to me. Mostly because I simply did not know where to look or precisely what to look for. By being part of the locality, the assistants knew how to distinguish and approach informants with the relevant background. To mitigate the possible loss of information in translation, I made sure to emphasise for the assistants that their job was to translate and not to interpret the information. If I suspected that information was being omitted or altered, I would ask for more detailed descriptions. After the interview, I would always go through the content of the conversation with the assistant.

To access representatives from the respective governments, as well as from non-governmental organizations and the media, was difficult. I tried everything from calling and emailing to making physical appearances at their offices to get in touch with the right people. It was a tiresome but eventually rewarding process. In total, I conducted twenty-three interviews with
individuals and groups representing Ugandan traders, South Sudanese people, government institutions, non-governmental organizations and the media.

4.1.2 Data gathering

Qualitative interviews are not “neutral tools of data gathering” (Fontana and Frey 2000, p. 646). The interviewer and interviewee bring their own biases to the interview that may influence the answers that are given and the meaning that the researcher ascribes to them (Rubin and Rubin 2005). If these biases are ignored, there is a risk of drawing false conclusions.

4.1.3 Real and perceived power imbalances

According to Fuji (2010, p. 233), “how informants identify researchers can determine the amount or level of access the researcher can gain”. To encourage the informant to be open and honest, it is important to establish a relationship of trust between the interviewer and interviewee (Gaskell 2000, p. 46). However, this relationship may be affected by real or perceived power imbalances (Scheyvens et al. 2003, p. 149). On the one hand, there are real differences related to access to money, education and other resources. On the other hand, there are perceived differences that can exist in the minds of informants, such as feelings of inferiority and superiority (ibid.). Being a white, female university student from Western Europe certainly influenced how the informants perceived me. At the grassroots level, most of the informants appeared nervous, but simultaneously excited, about meeting with me. When I explained the purpose of my study and asked for their participation, I often found that they underestimated the value of the information they could provide. In the actual interviews, particularly in the very beginning, some would behave as if they were inferior to me. The most vivid example is perhaps when one informant placed me on a chair while she insisted on remaining seated on the ground. Despite their nervousness, most of the informants appeared excited to “show me off”, as they time and again introduced me to friends and family. In my interviews with representatives from the respective governments and non-governmental organisations, the situation was often reversed. They would take more control of the actual interview and try to educate me about the history of Uganda and South Sudan. Still, I had the feeling that they took my research seriously and made an effort to fit me into their busy schedules. Without my background, I am not sure they would have.
According to Rubin and Rubin (2005, p. 84), to overcome these power imbalances, it is important to present oneself in a nonthreatening way. I always started my interviews with a presentation of myself and the purpose of my study. I explained to the informants how the information would be used and how I would anonymize their identity if so requested. Throughout the interviews I strived to appear as a keen listener, emphasizing that I was there to learn from their unique experience with the research topic. I often found that the less knowledgeable and more curious I appeared about the topic at hand, the more confident and comfortable they were about sharing their experiences with me.

I was perhaps less prepared for how I would be affected by these power imbalances that existed between my informants and myself. In doing research in a developing country, you are almost certain to come across people who are less privileged than you. It was difficult not to be moved by the stories of hardship that some of my informants shared with me. I could not help being left with the feeling that my research must appear trivial to those people who struggle to cover even their most basic needs. Although I certainly hope that my research can be of help to my informants, it would be naïve of me to deny that I am likely to gain more from my fieldwork than my informants will. It is an ethical concern that it is important to take into consideration (Scheyvens et al. 2003, p. 155). Scholars like Scheyvens and Storey (2003, pp. 2-8) raise the question of whether it is appropriate for Western researchers to travel to the Third World to conduct research that mainly is for their own benefit. In their opinion, however, the concern for propriety should not prevent research in developing countries altogether. Instead, one ought to think more about reciprocity (ibid.). I always made an effort to make the interview worth the interviewee’s time by taking the time to meet their friends and family, as well as to participate in certain social activities with them. For example, I visited the university of one informant and I visited the village of another.

4.1.4 Assessing the veracity of the information

For various reasons the informant may lie, conceal, exaggerate, or in any other way misrepresent information. It may not be intentional; sometimes people forget or memory becomes blurred. But if the informant is reluctant to share, or gives misleading information to the researcher, it will influence the validity of the research findings because the empirical evidence will deviate from the truth (Gaskell 2000, p. 44). It is therefore important to assess
the veracity of the information that the informant provides. The question is, how can you trust that the informant is telling the truth? To assess the veracity of the information I interviewed people likely to represent different, sometimes even contending, viewpoints. I also found it useful to discuss my preliminary findings with representatives from the different non-governmental organisations who had experience from researching similar topics. To strengthen the validity of my findings, I have also compared my data with evidence from different types of data sources, such as newspaper articles and reports.

4.1.5 Assessing the reliability of the information

“Researchers are not invisible, neutral entities; rather, they are part of the interactions they seek to study and influence those interactions” (Fontana and Frey 2000, p. 663). The interviewer, like the informant, is a person with interests and expectations that might shape the questions that are asked and how the answers are interpreted (Rubin and Rubin 2005). Before I travelled to Uganda to conduct my research, I had already developed certain ideas about how Ugandan traders are treated in South Sudan. These ideas most certainly influenced the topics of the questionnaire I brought with me. However, by allowing myself to deviate from the questionnaire and ask more broadly about experiences and opinions, I believe that the informants were given the opportunity to steer me towards what they felt was most important.

“Judgments in the social sciences are never value free” (Scheyvens and Nowak 2003, p. 106). My preconceived ideas about my research topic affect the “lens” through which I interpret the information and experiences that were shared with me. Consequently, a different researcher with a different lens may reach conclusions different from mine (Rubin and Rubin 2005, p. 27). The qualitative interview, as such, is a “subjective experience” very much contingent upon the context in which it takes place (Brockington and Sullivan 2007, p. 57). This subjectivity can threaten the reliability of the research findings - the likelihood that the same procedure will yield the same results when conducted by a different researcher (King et al. 1994, p. 26). Reliable results are often more difficult to achieve in qualitative research because the process of data gathering is hard to replicate (ibid.). However, by being thorough and transparent in reporting how the information was collected, I aim to strengthen the reliability of my research findings.
Conclusion

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the qualitative case study offers the best method to study the insecurity of Ugandan traders in South Sudan. This is because the method allows for in-depth and within-context exploration of the research topic, which is of great advantage when the aim is to develop a comprehensive and nuanced analysis. However, the qualitative method also contains certain weaknesses, particularly in terms of representation, validity and reliability that can influence the results. These weaknesses have been accounted and corrected for to the best of my ability.
5 Findings and analysis

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the two research questions:

1. How does Ugandans traders experience doing business in South Sudan?
2. What factors can explain the problems that Ugandan traders encounter in South Sudan?

The first part of the chapter takes a descriptive approach to account for the key findings of my fieldwork. In this section, I will demonstrate that Ugandan traders find migrating to South Sudan profitable, but dangerous, as they feel vulnerable to violence and harassment in the country. The second part of the chapter takes a more analytical approach. In this part, I will attempt to explain their security problems. First, I will investigate whether and how their problems can be linked to xenophobia in South Sudan. I will argue that the violence and harassment can be interpreted as a reaction to certain attitudes about them, which can be characterized as xenophobic. These attitudes reflect discontent about the economic success and cultural difference of Ugandan traders in South Sudan. However, I will also argue that the violence and harassment cannot be understood in isolation from the wider context of violence in South Sudan, because it is within this context that discontent about Ugandans transforms into violent action against them.

Doing business in South Sudan

When I traveled to Northern Uganda in December 2015, it was with the intention to investigate how Ugandan traders experience migrating to South Sudan. Amidst local news reports about an increasingly hostile environment for foreigners in the country, I was curious to find out what was going on. My conversations with Ugandan traders formerly based in South Sudan resulted in some interesting findings. I will account for them in the following.

As part of my investigation into their experiences of doing business in the country, I wanted to find out what motivated their move and what they were expecting to gain from this experience. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I found that the Ugandan traders migrated primarily for economic purposes. It was the belief that they could sell their goods and services at a higher price, with less competition, than in their home country that motivated their move to South
Sudan. In Uganda, they found it difficult to create equally rewarding business opportunities. One woman whom I interviewed was just about to migrate to South Sudan to start her business in arts and crafts when we met. She captured both the sense of pessimism about the business prospects in Uganda as well as the expectations of the economic opportunities awaiting in South Sudan. She said:

I am going because here in Gulu there is not much money and there are many arts and crafts. There is more money to make in South Sudan than here. I sell my goods cheaper here, then maybe when I go there, I will add a little bit […] I am really excited going there because I know I am going to make money (Interview 10b, 08.12.2015).

Of course, there is some truth to the tale that there is money to be made in South Sudan – or there was, anyway. In the years following the signing of the CPA, South Sudan was the “Promised Land”. With an acute demand for basic goods and services, there were plenty of opportunities for foreign traders, formal and informal alike (see background chapter). Since then, however, South Sudan has faced economic hardship, and trade between the two countries has declined (ibid.). The Ugandan informants appeared rather unaffected by this. In their opinion, their greatest problem was the difficult labor market at home, to which the market in South Sudan provided a promising solution. In the words of one informant:

The business here is not so good, there is little money. But there, even if you have something very small you can sell it for a lot of money (Interview 8, 03.12.2015).

Of course, the situation might be different for others, depending on what kind of work they are doing in South Sudan. My informants were mostly involved in small-scale trade and service provision within the informal business sector, which is a sector that has proven to be less affected by the economic downturn than the formal sector (International Alert 2014, pp. 17-18).

The Ugandan traders generally view their business operations positively, not only in regards to what they gain from South Sudan, but also in regards to what they bring to the country in terms of development. In their opinion, their business operations are a positive contribution to the development of South Sudan because they bring goods and services that would otherwise be unavailable to the South Sudanese. “They find that our things are very good, better than
others and they lack them,” said the woman soon to start her business in South Sudan (ibid.). “Without Ugandans, the country would go under,” said another informant (Interview 19a, 13.12.2015). However, they do not feel that they are treated or viewed accordingly by the South Sudanese. This appeared to evoke discontent amongst the Ugandan traders, who felt that they deserve better. One informant said that:

“If you compare the Ugandans in South Sudan with the South Sudanese in Uganda, the South Sudanese are well treated, while the Ugandans in South Sudan are mistreated (Interview 3, 20.11.2015).

With my research into their migrant experience, I was also interested to learn about how they found working and living as foreigners in South Sudan. From reading about the topic beforehand, I was well aware of the various allegations of mistreatment raised by other Ugandans (see background chapter). However, I was not expecting to find such overwhelming support for these claims myself. From my conversations with the traders, it was evident that their enthusiasm about economic gains was overshadowed by concerns about their safety. A common view was that it was risky to conduct business in the country, primarily because they felt vulnerable to mistreatment. They claimed to be subjected to violent attacks and various forms of harassment in the country, oftentimes at the hands of the very people responsible for their safety, namely the state security officers. Out of the six Ugandan traders that I have interviewed, all but one claimed to have experienced for themselves or witnessed coworkers being intimidated, arrested, chased or beaten by state security officers. Some of the informants gave vivid descriptions of their violent encounters with police and army personnel. I will recount two of their stories here.

The first story was told to me by Charles¹ a man who works with recruiting people to the construction industry in South Sudan. Like many others, he traveled to South Sudan in search of more profitable work than what was available back home. When I met Charles, he had worked in the country for about seven years; first in Warrap state, then more recently in Juba. In his current job, he is involved in recruiting workers to a larger construction project. Although his work is profitable, he is reluctant to remain in the position. He feels that his work puts him in danger, and fears that he will be killed if he stays in South Sudan. In his own

¹ Some of the names of the Ugandans and South Sudanese informants have been altered to protect their anonymity, see appendix for details.
words, Charles said, “When my contract ends next year, I will not renew it. The money is not worth it. It is not worth it if I am killed, and I have been very close to being killed in South Sudan”. When I asked him directly if he himself had faced violence or harassment in South Sudan, he said “of course”, as if it was inevitable. In fact, he claimed that he has been “attacked several times” by army personnel. In one incident he was in his car when they fired at him. He spoke casually about the shooting, as if it was nothing out of the ordinary, and said that he simply drove away to remove himself from the situation. In another incident he was arrested, allegedly without probable cause, and detained for four days before his company bargained his way out. During his incarceration he claims that he “faced a lot of punishment”. When I asked him to elaborate about this, he said that he was beaten by the officers (Interview 19b, 13.12.2015).

Another informant, Beatrice, a woman who works as a hairdresser in South Sudan, described how she was attacked by civilians and shot at by security officers in the country. She started her business in South Sudan in 2013. It was successful at first, but in February the following year, a group of South Sudanese attacked her and her colleagues. “They came from nowhere and started beating us, so we took off”, she said. Later, when they returned, they found that everything they had was burned down. They filed a complaint about their losses to the local authorities and were promised compensation. However, when they went to collect, they were met by an army commander and his soldiers who, according to Beatrice, “became very wild”. They were shooting at them, and Beatrice and her colleagues had to run for their lives. When I asked her if such problems occur often, she said that “there are so many things like that happening with other business people affected”. According to Beatrice, “any small thing Ugandans do, they will kill you” (Interview 8, 03.12.2015).

The stories of Charles and Beatrice paint the picture of a hostile environment, where there is a fine line between safety and danger for Ugandans in South Sudan. The fear that they may be subjected to violence and harassment anywhere, at any time, and for no legitimate reason, was repeated by many of the traders, who felt that they were vulnerable to such treatment in the country. Hence, in contrast to what has been claimed by South Sudanese authorities (see background chapter), the Ugandan traders did not perceive the episodes of violence and harassment as isolated criminal events. Instead they saw them as part of a wider problem of insecurity for Ugandan traders in South Sudan. These views are similar to the ones brought
forth by Ugandan media, where South Sudan has been portrayed as increasingly dangerous for Ugandan traders. Newspaper articles such as “Another Ugandan Businessman killed in South Sudan” (Daily Monitor 2015) and “South Sudan; A Death Trap for Ugandan Traders” (Red Pepper 2013) have reported about killings, torture and unlawful arrests of Ugandans who have come to take advantage of the economic opportunities in the country. Amidst such reports of mistreatment, then-Human Rights Commissioner Joy Kwaje stated, “The question that needs to be answered is […] is it systematic, organized, criminal?” (Schomerus and Titeca 2012, p. 16).

Although it is difficult to consider the exact extent of the problem in the absence of reliable statistics, a recent survey study of the experiences of Ugandan workers in South Sudan clearly demonstrate that violence and harassment is a problem that goes beyond the individual experiences of the Ugandan traders that I have interviewed. The study found that more than sixty percent of the respondents had experienced for themselves, or knew of a fellow Ugandan who had experienced, being physically attacked in South Sudan (Twesigye 2014, p. 75). Furthermore, the study found that ninety-two percent of the respondents had been verbally abused, examples including being referred to as “poor, good for nothing, thieves, criminals, cheats, and that Ugandans are in [South Sudan] to steal money” (ibid.). When migrants become frequent victims of violence and harassment in a host country in this way, it is often interpreted as a symptom of xenophobia. This is seen for example in South Africa, where violent attacks and verbal abuse against foreigners have been linked to certain hostile attitudes about them (c.f. Crush 2001, 2008; Landau et al. 2005; Morris 1998). The argument goes that a strong sense of discontent with foreigners have caused the native population to act out against them, sometimes violently (ibid.). My evidence indicates that this is a plausible explanation for the problems that Ugandans encounter in South Sudan. There are several indications of this.

First, my evidence indicates that there exists attitudes in South Sudan which can be characterized as xenophobic, especially if xenophobia is understood in its broadest sense; as a dislike, hatred or fear of foreigners. It was the impression amongst the majority of the Ugandan traders that the South Sudanese don't like them, generally because they were seen to

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2 The study investigates the migration experience of Ugandans moving to South Sudan, as well as the Arab Gulf States. The results regarding Ugandans in South Sudan are based on interview data from a sample of 192 Ugandans with experience from working in South Sudan.
take money out of the country and bring in problems like crimes and diseases. To associate foreigners with “society's ills” in this way is by no means an uncommon reaction towards foreigners. Similar views have been observed amongst the public in receiving countries all around the world, including South Africa. Already in its early years, Human Rights Watch reported that “South Africa's public culture has become increasingly xenophobic”, with the reason given that especially black immigrants were being blamed for the rise in crime, unemployment and spread of diseases (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Since then a number of scholars have made the argument about a violent xenophobia in South Africa, believed to be fueled by these very attitudes about foreigners (c.f. Crush 2001, 2008; Landau et al. 2005; Morris 1998).

Second, when asked about what precautions they take to stay safe in the country, several of the informants talked about measures that involved concealing their nationality and foreignness. Measures varied from the more modest, such as trying not to stand out in a crowd and attract attention, to the more drastic, such as learning and speaking the local language or even altering their names from something Ugandan to something Arabic. For example, consider this statement by Beatrice:

My best technique is to stay among the South Sudanese. If possible, even speak their language with them. The closer you stay with them, the more friendly you become with them, the more sympathy they will have with you. If you see them fighting among themselves, never ever involve yourself into stopping them. Because if you get involved and they realize you are Ugandan, they will kill you (Interview 8, 03.12.2015).

Of course, and as we know from the theoretical chapter, the concept of xenophobia entails that foreigners are attacked, assaulted and abused by virtue of their foreignness or nationality (Harris 2001). Therefore any attempts made at disguising one's foreignness or nationality can be interpreted as reactions to, and thereby also signs of, xenophobia. Furthermore, because these measures are taken to stay safe in the country, they illustrate the potential danger that the traders associate with being recognized as Ugandan. In other words, these measures imply that their security problems are linked to xenophobia. This assumption will be investigated further in the next part of the analysis.
Making sense of the problems of Ugandans

In this part of the chapter I will attempt to make sense of the security problems that Ugandans encounter in South Sudan. Because my evidence suggests that their problems are linked to xenophobia, I will start out by investigating how different theories about xenophobia can shed light on their experiences. The first section will focus on the role of economic factors, while the second section will focus on the role of cultural factors. From my research, I find that both factors motivate hostile reactions towards Ugandans in South Sudan. However, as we shall see, these arguments and the theories that guide them fall short when it comes to addressing the different expressions of hostility. Simply put, they cannot adequately explain why the hostile reaction is sometimes a violent reaction. Therefore, in the final section of this chapter, I will investigate an alternative explanation, which links the Ugandans’ experiences with violence and harassment to the wider context of violence in South Sudan.

5.1.1 Economic drivers of hostility

My evidence indicates that the hostility towards Ugandans in South Sudan can be interpreted as a reaction to the threat that they pose to the native population's access to jobs and money. This was evident from my conversations with the Ugandan traders.

A common belief amongst the Ugandan informants was that they were blamed for taking money and jobs away from the South Sudanese. The informants felt that their business operations in the country were viewed with resentment, generally because they were seen to limit the economic opportunities available to the South Sudanese. Some of the informants were even convinced that the abuse they had experienced was motivated by these very attitudes about them. George, a man who worked as a driver in South Sudan, claimed that he was directly confronted with these attitudes when he was arrested in the country. When talking about the incident he said:

I was arrested in South Sudan for no reason. In arrest, they tortured me really bad, also for no reason. They kept blaming me for taking money, saying that us Ugandans take money from South Sudan” (Interview 19a, 13.12.2015).

Another example is found in Charles, who was certain that he was mistreated because of his job in the country. In his own words he said:
They wanted to kill me to take my job, they don't like that I have this job and they don't like that I bring Ugandans in who I hire (Interview 19b, 13.12.2015).

For most of the Ugandan informants, these were allegations that they felt were unjustified. In their opinion, they occupied jobs that the South Sudanese were unqualified for or otherwise unwilling to take. In the words of one informant:

Ugandans have experience, they are educated. That is how they are taking the jobs (Interview 8b, 02.12.2015).

However, for the South Sudanese informants, it was precisely the impression that they are outcompeted by Ugandans, who come with skills and experience that exceed their own, which appeared to cause most frustration. One informant, a man who worked as a money changer at the border explained the situation accordingly:

Those people who are outside, they are educated. So when they go there they have the upper hand of getting work, leaving alone those people who are residing there (Interview 13, 9.12.2015).

Prior research has explained similar sentiments with reference to people's economic circumstances. The argument goes that hostility is more likely to evolve in a context of economic hardship, because when resources are scarce, the sense of threat to one's own access to resources is heightened (see background chapter). It is certainly likely that economic circumstances have a role to play in the hostility towards Ugandans in South Sudan. The country ranks amongst the poorest in the world. Most people are without paid work and struggle to cover even their most basic needs. Within this context it is not all that baffling that they lash out against Ugandans who are comparatively successful in making money. Green (2012) captured this point when he commented on the treatment of foreigners in South Sudan, saying, “The sense that non-natives are succeeding while South Sudanese are scraping to survive fuels a sense of antipathy”. If we follow the logic of group threat theory, this reaction is actually a rational one. As was described in the theoretical chapter, this is because the competition from foreigners is interpreted in zero-sum terms, where the gains of foreigners are seen to come at the expense of the native population. That the competition with Ugandans is interpreted in this way is apparent in the view that Ugandans take jobs away from the South Sudanese; a view which, as we will see, is not entirely unreasonable.
Studies about the labor market situation in South Sudan have demonstrated that there are in fact limited economic opportunities available to the South Sudanese, and that foreigners, including Ugandans, to some degree affect this (c.f. African Development Bank Group 2013; United Nations Development Programme 2015). Most people in South Sudan are illiterate and lack any kind of formal qualification, therefore they have few options but to seek out opportunities within the private business sector, which is a sector dominated by foreigners, including Ugandans. However, also here they face challenges. Although opportunities exist, it is comparatively difficult for the native population to access them. A study of the business climate in South Sudan found that particularly foreign businesses in the private sector have a tendency to favor foreign workers before nationals, the reason given that the South Sudanese “lack the impetus and requisite skills” to qualify for these jobs (African Development Bank Group 2013, p. 37). Thus, there is some validity to the claim that the South Sudanese are outcompeted by foreigners, whose skills and experience exceed their own. Furthermore, it is difficult for the South Sudanese to take matters into their own hands and initiate entrepreneurship. While Ugandans can buy and bring their goods cheaply from their home country to fill shortages in the local market, most South Sudanese simply lack the necessary capital to “get businesses going” (International Alert 2014, p. 16). The consequence of all this is that most South Sudanese remain unemployed and unable to secure a steady livelihood.

Of course, it is an oversimplified explanation to blame Ugandans for their own un(der)employment. If Ugandans were to be withdrawn from the labor market altogether, economic opportunities would likely be even fewer, and the South Sudanese would still not have the qualifications or capital necessary to take advantage of most of them. In the bigger scheme of things, the lack of economic opportunities is related to the overall state of development in South Sudan. Therefore, any frustrations about limited economic opportunities should logically target those that are responsible for this, namely the Government of South Sudan. Job creation, infrastructural development and provision of education are all areas identified as crucial to lift people out of poverty and un(der)employment in South Sudan, but the government has to date failed to allocate sufficient funds to bring about significant change in any of these areas (United Nations Development Programme 2015). So why, then, do the South Sudanese act out against Ugandans and not the authorities?
A possible answer is found in the relationship between the two groups. Arguably, it is the perception that the Ugandans are encroaching on their land, taking their jobs and their wealth that truly fuels antipathy. These views reflect the belief that the jobs and money should belong to the South Sudanese, a belief which is consistent with the argument in group threat theory that the native population see themselves as superior and entitled to certain privileges compared to the immigrant group. In this situation, the relative success of Ugandans, to borrow a phrase from Blumer, means “getting out of place” (1958, p.4). They are the “unworthy other”, encroaching on what rightfully belongs to the South Sudanese. Wimmer (2000) ties this perception of “what ought to be” to beliefs about the native population as the rightful owners of the resources of the state. According to Wimmer, these beliefs evolve with the formation of the nation-state; a process through which those who have participated have earned the right to enjoy the resources of the state (pp. 56-61). It is likely that the South Sudanese feel that they should be the ones benefiting from their hard-won independence; that through their many years of struggle, they believe that they have earned this right. In his analysis of xenophobia in South Sudan, Green (2012) made this point when he said:

[The] South Sudanese citizens are angry, claiming that foreigners are making money in the newly-independent country they didn't fight to free, while those who did fight for independence are struggling to get by.

When the competition from foreigners is perceived in this way, it makes sense to follow the logic of group threat theory and interpret the hostility towards Ugandans as a defensive reaction with which the South Sudanese strive to protect their interests from the “unworthy other”.

However, my evidence does not fully support that the competition with Ugandans is perceived in this way. On the contrary to the perceptions held by the Ugandan informants, many of the South Sudanese informants expressed gratitude about the positive contributions brought by Ugandan traders to their country. This was particularly in terms of access to goods and services, for which the business operations by Ugandans were viewed as indispensable. In the words of one informant, “they are helping the community around” (Interview 14, 09.12.2015). Of course, it is possible that the South Sudanese that I have interviewed are more positive about Ugandans because they work, study, and live alongside them at the border crossing point. Meanwhile, negative attitudes may be more prevalent amongst South Sudanese who have less contact with, are less dependent upon, and who are more directly
threatened by the business operations of Ugandans. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that the attitudes towards Ugandans are likely more diverse, and hostility is perhaps less widespread, than what is portrayed by the Ugandan informants and certain elements of the media.

Altogether, the evidence and discussion presented in this section imply that discontent about the threat Ugandans pose to the interests of the South Sudanese motivate hostile reactions, albeit probably to lesser and greater extents depending on people’s economic circumstances and degree of interaction with Ugandans. However, there appears to also be other factors that motivate hostile reactions. I will turn to them next.

5.1.2 Cultural drivers of hostility

My evidence indicates that the hostility towards Ugandans can be linked to discontent about certain behaviors associated with them that are thought to impact negatively on society in South Sudan. These behaviors, and the discontent that they generate, can be linked to cultural differences between Ugandans and South Sudanese. This was evident from the responses in my conversations with people from both countries.

A common belief amongst the Ugandan informants was that they were blamed for having brought unwanted behaviors such as theft, robberies and prostitution to South Sudan. In the words of one informant:

They say that Ugandans are thieves and that Ugandan women, especially prostitutes, they go there and give them sickness, especially HIV/AIDS (Interview 3, 30.11.2015).

These views were prevalent also amongst the South Sudanese informants who felt that immigration has exacerbated certain problems in South Sudan. A common view was that there has been an increase in crime and a spread of diseases in the country, which can be attributed to the influx of criminals and prostitutes from Uganda. One informant, a man working as a clearance agent at the border, said that:

Very many Ugandans are making crimes in South Sudan. A person comes here as a trader, he goes and gets guns and will rob people at night […]. When you look at crime now in Juba, these are all Ugandans (Interview 12, 09.12.2015).
About prostitution, the same informant said that:

If you look at the number now of people infected by HIV who have been brought from Uganda. The ladies are making their business now in South Sudan, they can bring diseases. It has spoiled the community in South Sudan (ibid., my emphasis).

These views have been observed in society in South Sudan since the influx of foreigners in 2005. In his research on the cross-border trade, Carrington (2009) wrote that:

While commercial or transactional sex was undoubtedly a feature of life in Southern Sudan before, it has grown and become more visible since the opening up of Southern Sudan following the signing of the CPA. It is a source of growing discussion, disquiet and even tension within some communities. In some cases it has also created perceptions and stereotyping that certain groups of foreigners are all prone to behaving in particular ways that their hosts find unacceptable (p. 10).

Many of the South Sudanese informants were convinced that the violence and harassment against Ugandans was a reaction to their bad behaviors in the country. According to one informant:

Harassment has happened because some of the Ugandans have bad behaviors. Those Ugandans, some are thieves. From there, if we catch a thief we just kill. The community, if they get a person who is a thief or who is misbehaving, we take care of it with murder. That's how we get justice. Ugandans experience harassment, but not all. If you go there and you have good behaviors - if you behave well, you can stay as normal (Interview 13, 09.12.2015).

One cannot deny that some, and perhaps many, Ugandans have come to the country with dubious intentions. To some extent this is confirmed by official records. Regarding crime levels, the United States Bureau of Diplomatic Security maintain that there has been “a continuous rise in crime” in South Sudan since independence (Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2016). The boda boda drivers, of which Ugandans constituted a majority, are assumed to have a contributing role in this (ibid.). The South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) estimate that eighty percent of all criminal cases committed in Juba involve the motorcycle taxis (Jok and Mayai 2013, p. 1). Regarding the spread of HIV/AIDS in the country, official records are less persuasive. The South Sudan Aids Commission estimates that sex workers and their clients contribute to more than sixty percent of the new HIV infections in South
Sudan, but whether and to what extent Ugandans contribute to this development is unknown (Republic of South Sudan 2015).

However, to attribute their experiences of mistreatment to their own misbehavior is erroneous. My evidence does not support a hypothesis like this. Neither of the incidents of mistreatment reported by Charles and Beatrice seems to indicate a context in which they could have been interpreted as thieves, sex workers or any other illicit character. More realistically, the portrayal of Ugandans as criminals and bearers of disease reflect stereotypes, with lesser or greater root in reality. The question then is how to make sense of the stereotypes and the reactions that they generate.

**Cultural differences**

A possible explanation is found in the cultural differences between the two groups. Arguably, the stereotypes about Ugandans generate discontent because they break with established values and practices in South Sudan. This was evident in the ways the South Sudanese talked about the effects of increased crime and prostitution. In contrast to what one perhaps would expect, only one of the informants raised the possible impact of these behaviors on people’s health and security. The informant said that:

> Ugandans went there in 2005, most of the ladies they have been infected. In South Sudan there is no HIV medicine, so once you get HIV you will die, you cannot get treatment for it (Interview 13, 09.12.2015).

The majority of the informants, however, emphasized that these behaviors have introduced something new and unwanted to society in South Sudan, namely immorality. In their opinion, lying, theft and promiscuous ladies were unheard of before Ugandans came to the country, and contrast sharply with values and practices associated with the prevailing Arab culture. Consider this statement from one of the South Sudanese informants:

> After the CPA, prostitutes came to South Sudan from Uganda and they are dressing in short skirts, show a lot of skin. In South Sudan women must wear long dresses, they must cover up. They don’t want immorality in their country, women have to dress decent (Interview 1, 24.11.2015).
That cultural differences impact on the treatment of Ugandans in South Sudan was also the impression of David Okidi, project manager at International Alert, Kampala, who has conducted research and written about the cross-border trade with the Business for Peace Project. During our conversation about the experiences of Ugandan traders in South Sudan, Okidi stated:

The Arab culture which is prominent in South Sudan is very different from Ugandan culture. For example, they don’t believe in contracts, which Ugandans have taken advantage of. In turn, the criminal Ugandans have created an impression of Ugandans as untrustworthy. The idea of Ugandans as untrustworthy set the grounds for harassment (Interview 20, 15.12.2015).

Cultural difference has been a popular explanation for anti-immigrant hostility in countries in Europe. As was described in the theory chapter, the argument goes that hostility is a reaction to the threat that foreigners pose to the cultural unity of the host society. The greater the difference, the less likely are the immigrants to assimilate into the existing culture, and the greater is the threat to the distinctive identity of the host population (see theory chapter). Critics, however, have questioned whether the hypothesis is applicable to the African context, where differences are often less apparent and cultural unity are often less important. My evidence indicates that cultural differences do matter, although the differences that influence cultural compatibility, and the understanding of cultural compatibility itself, may not equate to the one(s) that apply in the European context.

In European countries, cultural compatibility has to do with whether or not the immigrants are compatible with the cultural unity of the host society, which is often equated to national unity and a strong sense of allegiance to the nation state. The factors that are thought to influence cultural compatibility in this context are those that threaten cultural homogeneity, such as differences in physical appearances (ibid.). In South Sudan, however, there does not exist the same kind of cultural unity as there does in many European countries. South Sudan is ethnically diverse, and ethnic identity is for most people of greater importance than national identity (Frahm 2015). As concisely expressed by Jok (2011):

At the moment, South Sudan is only slightly more than a geographical expression. It contains more than sixty cultural and linguistic groups, each of which have a stronger sense of citizenship in their tribes than in the nation. The main glue that binds the country’s multiple ethnicities together is the history of their struggle for freedom and collective opposition to the north (ibid, p.2).
Hence, it does not make sense to view the discontent about cultural differences as a reaction to the threat they pose to the cultural unity of the South Sudanese. Instead, I propose, it is the differentness itself and the (in)ability of South Sudanese to accommodate and tolerate it, that is the root of discontent. This was evident with the informants’ emphasis on how the behaviors of Ugandans represent something new and unwanted to South Sudan. In this line of reasoning, the effect of cultural differences on responses to immigrants need not necessarily be a function of preferences for cultural unity, as is hypothesized in the European context. It could also be a function of dissatisfaction with change. A similar argument has been raised about xenophobia in South Africa, where the stereotyping of immigrants as engaged in “illicit or immoral activity” is linked to anxiety about the “unknown” (Morris 1998, pp. 1125-1126). According to Harris, this anxiety is a result of previous isolation from foreigners; an experience which has hampered their ability to tolerate difference. In his own words:

The isolation of South Africans during the apartheid years from the rest of Africa [...] has meant [...] that South Africans are unused to nationalities beyond southern Africa and find incorporating them difficult (ibid, p. 1125).

This description of South Africa could very well be a description of South Sudan, which, until the peace agreement was signed in 2005, had been relatively isolated from their African neighbors. Whether and how a history of isolation has impacted on their ability to tolerate cultural difference, and henceforth impacted on their responses to immigrants and immigration, is an interesting question for future research.

**Cultural similarities**

As was described in the theoretical chapter, there is an alternative argument to that of cultural differences that deals explicitly with the impact of cultural traits on anti-immigrant hostility in the African context, which deserves being mentioned here. The main point of the argument is that it is cultural similarity rather than difference that fosters hostility between groups in African countries (see theory chapter). My evidence, however, does not seem to support this assumption. On the contrary, ethnic and cultural overlap was viewed as something positive in South Sudan. A common view amongst the Ugandan informants was that violence and harassment occurred between people with no ethnic and cultural ties, whereas ethnic and
cultural overlap functioned as a deterrent to mistreatment. Consider this statement by Patrick Okumu, District Commercial Officer in Northern Uganda:

The people of South Sudan who are bordering Uganda like the Equatoria region, they have common characteristics. It is the people who are South Sudanese coming from the far end of South Sudan who do not have close relations with the tribes, who participate in the harassment. Because there is no way a Madi of South Sudan will harass a Madi from Uganda (Interview 11, 09.12.2015).

This statement is interesting because it indicates that it is the more “distant” ethnic groups, which the Northern Ugandans have interacted less with in the past, that are associated with mistreatment, while the “closer” ethnic groups are acquitted based on their ethnic ties to the Northern Ugandans. Not only does this finding coincide with the argument above, where the lack of experience with the “unknown” fosters anxiety about it, it also indicates, in accordance with the contact thesis, that contact and familiarity impact positively on immigrant responses. This is a very positive finding because it implies that, over time, as the South Sudanese become more accustomed to the presence of foreigners, hostility may in fact decrease.

### 5.1.3 Context of violence

Up to this point, I have argued that the hostile reactions towards Ugandans in South Sudan are motivated by certain xenophobic attitudes about them. However, neither of the explanations presented above deal with why the hostile reaction is sometimes a violent reaction. It is a general problem concerning most research about xenophobia that the expressions of hostile attitudes and acts of violence and harassment are taken to be one and the same. For the case under study, my evidence indicates that it is not necessarily the case that violence and harassment are caused solely by xenophobia. Studies of the native population’s perceptions of safety in South Sudan reveal that experiences of violence and harassment are not confined to Ugandans. On the contrary, very similar security problems to the ones reported by Ugandans have also been reported by South Sudanese civilians (Jok 2013b). This similarity suggests that the violence against and harassment of Ugandans may have less to do with xenophobia, and more to do with the wider context of violence and insecurity in South Sudan.
As was described in the theoretical chapter, it is not uncommon for the use of violence to persist in societies that have experienced protracted violent conflict. According to Steenkamp (2005) this is because the long periods of conflict and sustained exposure to violence give rise to a culture of violence where violence has become embedded in the norms and values of society, to such an extent that it constitutes the accepted means for people to solve problems and deal with their frustrations (ibid.). My evidence suggests that there are certain violence-supporting behaviors and structures in South Sudan, related to the legacy of war, that cause insecurity for Ugandans.

A common view amongst the Ugandan informants, was that the South Sudanese, as a people who have grown up in the midst of war, have developed a tendency to resort to violence. Moses Kalule, Chief Director of the Kampala City Traders Association raised this point when he talked about the existence of a “fighting mentality” amongst the South Sudanese. He said:

Somebody is born during the war and the only thing they have been exposed to is the fight. So they have genes now, people from there, they have fighting genes (Interview 21, 17.12.2015).

This tendency was described to me in different ways during the course of my interviews, but most often as something intrinsic to their nature. Mark Moro, Regional Director of the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, captured the general impression when he said about South Sudan that “it's a country with a strong instinct of violence in them” (Interview 18, 13.12.2015).

The perceived tendency to resort to violence was a cause of serious concern for the Ugandan traders who believed that, in the interaction with people of this character, even the smallest of disagreements could have the most dreadful of outcomes. Christine, a woman who worked as a hairdresser in South Sudan, described the situation accordingly:

South Sudanese are short-tempered and they kill so easily, not like Ugandans. Even if you are just making fun, fun that people should laugh about, once it hurts them, they will just kill you (Interview 3, 30.11.2015).

Another informant, a man named Kelama who has done missionary work in South Sudan, gave me a real-life example to demonstrate the supposedly violent character of the South Sudanese. For the interview he took me to his village in the outskirts of Gulu Town, a village
that also hosts a number of South Sudanese people. He pointed some of them out to me, including two children who were playing in the background. As we went on with the interview, Kelama touched upon the subject of the violent behavior of the South Sudanese. He tried to explain, saying:

When you go there, deep into the village, people are very harsh. They fall very angry, very fast. Something very small, they want to fight.

The conversation, however, was interrupted when the two children started fighting with one beating the other. Kelama started laughing and pointed towards the children, saying, “I think you have seen the example here” (Interview 7, 03.12.2015).

Steenkamp (2005) identifies a number of structural factors related to the legacy of war that are thought to “create and sustain” a culture of violence. According to Steenkamp, these factors “create a context for violence where the use of violence is allowed and even encouraged” (ibid, p.255, her emphasis). Based on my research, violence-supporting structures in South Sudan include the circulation of small arms, particularly in the hands of civilians, and general weaknesses in the state security and justice apparatus.

The impression that guns are everywhere was a serious cause of concern for the Ugandan informants, who feared that the combination of short-tempered citizens with easy access to weapons could have fatal outcomes. All facts considered, their concerns are not unreasonable. The long period of violent conflict and guerrilla fighting have left plenty of small arms in circulation in South Sudan, much of which have remained in the hands of civilians (International Alert 2012; O’Brien 2009). And although civilian arms control was early on identified as critical for security and stability in South Sudan, progress in disarmament has been negligible. The attempts at civilian disarmament initiated by the government have been unsuccessful and have sometimes caused more damage than good (ibid.). In consequence, South Sudan has remained as what International Alert described as “a very heavily armed society” (2012, p. 40).

Civilian gun ownership is problematic because it exacerbates security problems in South Sudan. It has been linked to widespread local violence, as well as violent crime across the country (Saferworld 2012). One example of the former is found in Jonglei State, which has been the scene of sporadic violent clashes between neighboring communities (Rolandsen and
Breidlid 2012 and 2013). One example of the latter is the increase in armed robberies and physical assaults in urban areas (Jok 2013a). Although civilian gun ownership does not directly cause these security problems, it is most certainly a facilitating factor (Saferworld 2012).

Central to the trader's security concerns were also weaknesses in the state security and justice apparatus. There was the impression amongst the Ugandans that lawlessness prevails in the country, and that nothing is done to curtail it. Beatrice explained the situation accordingly:

> In Uganda we have law and everyone fears law because if you do anything you are arrested and taken to jail and then you suffer for the things you have done. In Sudan it's very different, it's like there is no law there [...]. If you quarrel with someone, he picks the gun and shoots you. That’s not Uganda (Interview 8, 03.12.2015).

The weaknesses in the state security and justice apparatus was also an important point raised in my meeting with Richard Okello Okot, Senior Commercial Officer in the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Co-operatives. In the attempt to make sense of the situation of Ugandan traders in South Sudan, Okot said:

> If you don't have a legal system in place to handle disagreement, then people are bound to resort to a crude way of resolving it; physical. That is what is taking place in South Sudan. Any trade dispute, they handle it in the local way; fighting, killing. Remember Southern Sudan is just a new state building states and institutions, so those things are bound to happen and is indeed happening (Interview 23, 18.12.2015).

Along similar lines, Moses Kalule linked the problems of Ugandans to weaknesses in the state security and justice apparatus in South Sudan. According to Kalule:

> It’s a young legal system. Usually they do not have clear procedures to pursue or resolve a case through law. When an incident comes they use mob justice. They take the law into their own hands. That’s why there are so many incidents of harassment. If a Sudanese is not happy with you and your business - instead of sitting with you around a table to resolve it, they take a judgement without listening to you (Interview 21, 17.12.2015).

For the Ugandan traders, the absence of law and order was problematic because it generated distrust to the state security and justice apparatus and left them with the impression that they cannot rely on the formal institutions for protection in the country. Several studies of the state
security and justice apparatus confirm that their distrust is not groundless (c.f. International Alert 2012; Snowden 2012). The judiciary and law enforcement agencies are in fact fraught with challenges and struggle to fulfill even their most basic functions (ibid.). A lack of experience with civilian policing and statutory legal procedures are some of the reasons for this (Baker and Scheye, 2009, p. 175).

The involvement of security officers in the violence and harassment against Ugandan traders paint a picture of a security force that acts with disregard of its mandate and the law. It is problematic, not only because it is a direct violation of their responsibility to protect, but also because the misconduct of individual officers undermines trust in the security forces as a whole. Instead of being seen as guarantors of security, many of the informants view the security forces with suspicion, or even as a source of insecurity. The South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) in particular is seen as an institution that fails to meet the traders needs for protection. The majority of the informants does not seek help from the police when they come into trouble, mostly because they believe it will come to naught, or at worst prove counterproductive. They see the police as incapable or unwilling to help solve their problems. Consider this statement by Christine:

As a Ugandan, if you go and report any issue to the police, they ignore it. They will say that you Ugandans are just stubborn people. The best normally if you have a friend who originally comes from there, a man who is a Dinka or Sudanese. You say this is what happened to me and he will go and talk. They will not say the other person is guilty. You might end up paying money, even for you who did not do anything (Interview 3, 30.11.2015).

Ugandan traders are not the only ones to raise complaints about the police service in South Sudan. Members of the police service, along with members of the armed forces and national security service, have time and again been accused of committing crimes against South Sudanese civilians in the country. These crimes are similar to the ones reported by Ugandan traders and include accusations of beatings, shootings, rapes and robberies (Jok 2013b, pp. 12-14). Furthermore, like the Ugandan traders, South Sudanese civilians experience that their problems are ignored by the police service. According to Executive Director of the Sudd Institute, Jok Madut Jok, crimes against civilians are not properly investigated (2013a, p. 73). The investigation is either insufficient, or victims are threatened to keep quiet. According to Jok “not a single case of murder, armed robbery or assault on a citizen has been investigated or settled” (ibid.).
In the absence of functioning state security and justice institutions, the native population has relied, and continues to rely, on local security and justice arrangements (Baker and Scheye 2009, Willems and Deng 2016). Some of the Ugandan traders recognized the potential value of such informal arrangements (see statement by Christine above). However, by virtue of being non-native and unfamiliar with the procedures, these are arrangements that most Ugandans probably have limited access to. In consequence, the majority of the Ugandan traders are left with the impression that they have to fend for themselves in an insecure environment. Of course, the existence of such an environment does not rule out the possibility that xenophobic attitudes may motivate mistreatment; my evidence most certainly indicates that they sometimes do. But, arguably, it is within this environment that it makes sense for discontent concerning economic interests and cultural differences to transform into acts of violence.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has presented the empirical findings of my fieldwork, as well as the analysis of these. The first part of the chapter aimed to investigate how Ugandan traders experience doing business in South Sudan. In line with prior research, the empirical evidence revealed that the Ugandan traders find their business operations profitable, but dangerous, as they feel vulnerable to violence and harassment in South Sudan.

The second part of the chapter took a more analytical approach and attempted to make sense of their problems. It was argued that there exists certain xenophobic attitudes about Ugandans in South Sudan, which motivate hostile reactions towards them. Following the logic of the interest-based and identity-based approach it was argued that these attitudes reflect discontent concerning the impact of Ugandans on the economic interests and cultural values of the South Sudanese. However, a critical point was raised about the failure of these theories to address why this discontent is sometimes expressed violently.

To address this shortcoming, Steenkamp’s (2005) argument about the continued use of violence in post-war societies was of value. As it appears from my research, the violence and harassment towards Ugandan can be linked to the legacy of war and its impact on certain
norms and structures in South Sudan. Arguably, it is within this context that it makes sense for discontent concerning threats to economic interests and cultural values to transform into violent action. The implications of this finding and those above will be discussed further in the final chapter of this thesis.
6 Conclusion

The starting point of this thesis was the rise in xenophobia witnessed in many parts of the world, and the need to develop a better understanding about the drivers of this phenomenon, especially outside of the European and North American context. The case of xenophobia towards Ugandan traders in South Sudan was chosen to this end. However, because the case is fairly unexplored, with arguments about xenophobia being based mostly on unverified media reports, it was necessary to approach the topic from a more explorative angle. The research questions that guided the study was:

1. How does Ugandan traders experience doing business in South Sudan?
2. What factors can explain the problems that Ugandan traders encounter in South Sudan?

To help interpret the empirical evidence and answer the research questions, three possible explanations were presented. The first two focused on different sources of anti-immigrant hostility, while the third one focused on the legacy of war and its impact on the continued use of violence in post-conflict societies. Throughout this thesis, these theories have been referred to as the interest-based approach, the identity-based approach and the culture of violence perspective.

Based on empirical evidence gathered during fieldwork in Gulu, Northern Uganda, the analysis resulted in several interesting findings. In answer to the first research question, my evidence revealed that Ugandan traders find migrating to South Sudan profitable, as the economic opportunities available exceeds those at home. However, they also find migrating dangerous, because they feel vulnerable to mistreatment. The majority of the informants had witnessed someone or experienced for themselves being subjected to violence and harassment, often at the hands of state security officers. With certain xenophobic attitudes reported by the informants, as well as potential dangers associated with these, my evidence indicated that it was plausible to investigate the acts of violence and harassment as a symptom of xenophobia. This finding is consistent with most media reports about the topic, but contradicts with the official line of the respective governments.

The xenophobic attitudes reported by the informants appeared to reflect beliefs about the negative impact of Ugandans on the economic interests and cultural values of the South
Sudanese. The view that Ugandans take jobs and money away from the South Sudanese, and bring unwanted behaviors such as theft, robberies and prostitution to South Sudan was identified by many of the informants as a source of discontent, and was by some linked directly to acts of violence and harassment. In the broader literature about xenophobia, neither of these views are uncommon associations about foreigners. On the contrary, they represent stereotypes that underpins some of the most popular arguments about anti-immigrant hostility, including the interest-based and the identity-based approach.

Through the lens of these theoretical approaches, it was argued that the hostility towards Ugandans can be linked to certain factors that heighten the sense of threat to the economic interests and cultural values of the South Sudanese. Turning first to threats to economic interests, it was argued that the blaming of Ugandans for taking jobs and money make sense when it is interpreted in light of the difficult economic circumstances that affect most South Sudanese. In this situation, the success of Ugandans appears illegitimate and unfair, mainly because the South Sudanese had expected to be the ones benefitting after the peace agreement and independence. Turning next to the threats to cultural values, it was argued that dissatisfaction with the behaviors of Ugandans makes sense when it is interpreted in light of a history of isolation and previously limited contact with foreigners. In this situation, their lack of experience with difference in the past impact on their ability to tolerate difference in the present. Altogether, these findings suggest that xenophobia in South Sudan is likely more complex than what is first apparent. Seemingly, it has to do with the state of (under)development in South Sudan, especially the lack of job creation, provision of education and infrastructure development. But probably also the mindset of the people, who have not yet become accustomed to the differentness of foreigners.

A critical point that was raised in the analysis, as well as in the theoretical chapter, was that the theoretical approaches about anti-immigrant hostility does not deal with the practice of xenophobia. They present xenophobia as hostile attitudes, but they do not adequately explain why the hostile attitudes sometimes transform into violent action. More often than not, the relationship between the two is simply presumed. By a closer look at the evidence in this study, however, it is clear that this is not necessarily the case. Xenophobic attitudes may motivate hostile reactions, but it is in the wider context of violence in South Sudan that it makes sense for these attitudes to transform into violent action.
Further research

Some of the findings in this study suggest some interesting approaches for future research, both case specific and non-case specific. The argument about xenophobia in this study is based on perceptions raised recurrently by the various informants. However, the evidence have demonstrated that the attitudes are likely more diverse and is perhaps less widespread than what is often assumed. A statistical study of attitudes based on a representative sample of the population in South Sudan would be useful to uncover if, and to what extent, such variations exist. A statistical study could also be used to test the effects of the causal factors identified in this study, namely economic threats and cultural differences, as well as the significance of interrelated variables such as poverty, level of education and intergroup contact. Alternatively, a qualitative study of the perceptions of South Sudanese in areas with less historical contact with Ugandans could be of value.

The findings of this thesis also highlight the need to reconsider some of the established theoretical arguments. The evidence presented indicates that one should not be too quick to dismiss the impact of cultural differences on opinion formation simply because the significance of national identity is less than elsewhere. Considering this, it would be valuable for future research to devote greater attention to the drivers of xenophobia in a context of ethnic diversity. An interesting point of departure identified in this study could be to investigate how a history of isolation influence people’s ability to tolerate the differentness of foreigners. The possible moderating effect of ethnic overlap found in this study should also be of great interests to scholars seeking to find ways to combat xenophobia.
References


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Schomerus, M. and Titeca, K. (2012). Deals and Dealings: Inconclusive Peace and


### Appendix: List of informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Place of interview</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Taban Mike</td>
<td>Head Technician, Gulu Service Center</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>24.11.2015</td>
<td>Gulu Town</td>
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<td>2. Eric Onen</td>
<td>Boda Boda driver</td>
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<td>4. Moses Odokenyero</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>01.12.2015</td>
<td>Gulu Town</td>
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<td>5. Santa Joyce Laker</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>02.12.2015</td>
<td>Gulu Town</td>
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<td>6. Alex Doru</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) Crafts Producer</td>
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<td>11. Patrick Okumu</td>
<td>District Commercial Officer</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>09.12.2015</td>
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<td>12. Male*</td>
<td>Money Exchanger</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>17. Magok Gong Magok</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) Construction Worker/Recruiter</td>
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<td>David Okidi</td>
<td>Project Manager Business for Peace,</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>15.12.2015</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Richard Okello Okot</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>18.12.2015</td>
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* The interviewee requested anonymity