Higher Education Students’ Perception of Solidarity

A Case Study of Bachelor and Master Students at the University of Oslo

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UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

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Abstract

Universities are subject to many, often conflicting demands. When it comes to the type of education students should receive at universities, both economic, labour-marked oriented, and idealistic, formation-oriented demands are placed upon the institutions. One of these idealistic goals is to educate students for solidarity, as part of an effort to educate responsible, engaged citizens. This qualitative study explores how bachelor and master students at the University of Oslo understand the term solidarity, and how they describe the connection between attending a higher education institution and their development of solidarity. To answer the research questions focus group interviews were held and analysed using abductive reasoning and concepts based on a normative, critical theory of solidarity. The analysis reveals that students have a complex perception of solidarity, which is largely based on interaction in communities. While they think that solidarity is an essential value in democracies, they find many structures at the University of Oslo disparaging to its development. Students see a strong connection between solidarity and their disciplinary identity, but a much weaker one to their identities as students.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>EHEA</td>
<td>European Higher Education Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>The Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences at the University of Oslo (Norwegian: Det matematisk-naturvitenskapelige fakultet ved Universitetet i Oslo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>UiO</td>
<td>The University of Oslo (Norwegian: Universitetet i Oslo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UV</td>
<td>The Faculty of Educational Sciences at the University of Oslo (Norwegian: Det utdanningsvitenskapelige fakultet ved Universitetet i Oslo)</td>
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1 Introduction

Students at higher education institutions not only have to gain disciplinary knowledge, skills, and develop a scientific way of thinking, they also expected to grow as conscious and responsible citizens, who use their knowledge to contribute in meaningful ways to the well-being of everyone (cf. Solbrekke and Helstad 2016: 962). These expectations have their roots in the Humboldtian university model and have central importance in the current discourses on the internationalisation and globalisation of higher education.

From its Humboldtian origin, the European university got its Bildung-ideal, making it a place that forms well-rounded citizens versed in scientific exploration, contributing to society as an educated middle-class (Anderson 2004). Universities have thus always been both a place for the distribution of knowledge, and the formation of character. As their underlying ideology has become outdated, Humboldt’s ideas might have lost some of their importance over the years. However they remain one of the cornerstones in debates over the role of universities in modern society, even though institution has been exposed to many other influences as well (Holford 2014: 10-11). In present day Europe for instance, influence of Humboldt’s ideas on the Bologna Process and the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) is undeniable.

In 1988, the Magna Charta Universitatum, one of the main precursors of the Bologna process and the EHEA (Neave and Maassen 2007: 135), charged universities with educating their students in a way to make them “serve society as a whole” ('Magna Charta Universitatum' 1988: 1), contributing to its social, cultural and economic well-being. In the same year, the European Council of the Ministers of Education defined the so-called European dimension of higher education to include humanistic values of democracy, justice, and mutual understanding (Council of the Ministers of Education 1988: 1). This European dimension became an important part of the Bologna Declaration ten years later (cf. European Ministers of Education 1999: 4) and remains to this day an important aspect in the EHEA (Zgaga 2009: 176).

These values are however have not remained confined to Europe, but have spread across the world (Holford 2014: 7). In 1998, the UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education charged tertiary education with the task of tackling, amongst other things economic and political threats to peace, increasing inequality on a global scale, and environmental disasters (UNESCO 1998: 3). This was to be achieved through educating for mutual cultural understanding,
research-based education and the university’s mission to “protect and enhance societal values […] and the reinforcement of humanistic perspectives” (UNESCO 1998: 21).

Given the importance of the Bologna process and the EHEA for Norwegian higher education (Maassen, Vabø, and Stensaker 2008: 132), a system very much influenced by Humboldtian ideals (Serrano-Velarde and Stensaker 2010: 214), it is no surprise that these thoughts have made it into the universities’ strategic plans here. The University of Oslo (UiO) is no exception: Its Strategy 2020 lays out how the university seeks to tackle global issues and challenges through internationalisation, linking teaching and research, and being engaged in society (cf. Universitetet i Oslo 2010a: 4), like it was proposed in the UNESCO documents. It also has as one of its goals to educate and form its students in line with those values:

The University of Oslo is ready to take responsibility for helping to resolve global challenges, particularly those related to climate and the environment. UiO will take responsibility for facing environmental and climate-related challenges both through research and education related to the environment […]. Students are an important part of the university’s academic fellowship, and UiO shall provide solid education as well as impetus for self-formation. Self-formation implies that students develop insight into traditions of knowledge and an awareness of norms and cultural premises in academic fields and in society. The University of Oslo shall provide education with a special emphasis on knowledge, skills and attitudes characteristic of internationally oriented research-intensive universities. (Universitetet i Oslo 2010b: 5)

One of the central elements persistently named in all those documents, is the ideal of solidarity. Within the EHEA, which seeks to make Europe to be the most competitive knowledge economy worldwide, the promotion of the *European dimension* is one of the key goals (Teichler 2014: 10). With that comes an idea of international citizenship and solidarity (Gavari Starkie 2009: 130). However, there is a conflict with another reading of the EHEA’s purpose; making Europe economically competitive can also be seen as a project exclusively dominated by capitalist ideals and economic interests, where thoughts of social cohesion have little or no place (Gavari Starkie 2009: 135-36; Zgaga 2009: 176). The focus on learning outcomes and employability leave little room for students pursuing knowledge for its own sake, or ideals of character formation, like in the old *Bildung* model (Karseth and Solbrekke 2010: 572-73).

Furthermore, educating for citizenship and democratic ideals are only two of the ever-increasing number of expectations universities have to meet, and often, they are seen to be losing out to employability, excellence and innovativeness (Teichler 2014: 9). Even though the social dimension, and especially the inclusion of underprivileged students, has regained importance within the EHEA, the emphasis here is still heavily placed upon employability as a means to solve problems like youth unemployment (Karseth and Solbrekke 2016: 228).
In 1998 UNESCO stated that one of the ethical responsibilities of universities is to “defend and actively disseminate” (UNESCO 1998: 22) solidarity. Ten years later it was still a target, one that was given special emphasis and was “to be encouraged despite the economic downturn” (UNESCO 2009: 4). As recently as 2015 UNESCO identified other obstacles but also possibilities for the development of solidarity through higher education: “[…W]hile technological development contributes to greater interconnectedness and offers new avenues for exchange, cooperation and solidarity, we also see an increase in cultural and religious intolerance, identity-based political mobilization and conflict.” (UNESCO 2015: 9-10).

Both the documents from UNESCO and the debates about the purpose of universities in the EHEA show that there seems to be a misalignment or conflict between solidarity and other ideals within the current social order. Yet still, the university as an institution is continuously framed as an agent of social change, establishing understanding and dialogue, equity and tolerance, which lead to solidarity (cf. eg. Gacel-Ávila 2005: 122).

Writing about the goal of social dimension of the Bologna Process, Neave and Maassen put it like this:

[…]f Europe is to generate any citizen cohesion – apart from that expressed in the administrative, legislative and formalistic domains – it is important to ensure that interests external to Europe do not confine the European identity to […] a “Common Market”, populated not by citizens but by consumers. Yet, the translation of consumers to citizens depends precisely on creating a sense of solidarity. Whether that sense of solidarity without which social cohesion remains a technocratic code word, is to permeate from above or grow up from below is very certainly a task that deserves our engagement […]. (Neave and Maassen 2007: 152-53)

Their article also draws attention to the fact that there are multiple ways of understanding terms like citizen cohesion or social cohesion (Neave and Maassen 2007: 144). Indeed, the terminology taken from the documents that have been discussed in this introduction so far has been varied. For example, Neave and Maassen’s (2007) use of citizen cohesion is very close to the meaning Gavari Starkie (2009) gives to social cohesion and citizenship. Together with the tensions between different tasks of the university summarised above, this makes for a quite blurred picture of the university’s function in society when it comes to promoting solidarity. Therefore, the question needs to be studied empirically, to get a better understanding of how the value of solidarity is transported through higher education.

This thesis is a contribution to filling this gap, illuminating if and how solidarity grows “from below” (Neave and Maassen 2007: 153), that is from the level of students at a higher education
institutions. The perspective of the students was chosen, as they are the main target of many of the measures in the documents discussed above. That makes their point of view uniquely useful to answer questions like: Are students involved in or affected by the goals to foster solidarity through knowledge, research and education, like the University of Oslo has set for itself (cf. Universitetet i Oslo 2010a: 5)? What are the thoughts and beliefs held by them in the first place? Do they feel that their opinions are influenced by attending higher education?

1.1 Aim of the Study and Research Questions

The aim of this study is to probe the understandings and ways of thinking about solidarity amongst students at the University of Oslo and to see how they describe the connection between higher education and solidarity.

The following research questions guide the inquiry:

- How do students at the University of Oslo understand the term *solidarity* and what do they see as solidary behaviour?

- How do students describe the connection between their area of studies and solidarity and what obligations to society do they feel they have when it comes to solidarity?

- How do students describe the influence of attending university education on their perception of solidarity?

Focus group interviews with bachelor and master students from The Faculty of Educational Sciences and The Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences at the University of Oslo are used to answer these questions. As an exploratory case study, this thesis puts into dialogue the voiced opinions of the students with the theory of solidarity developed by Søren Juul (2013) to get an insight into the students’ perceptions and the importance they attribute to solidarity. Works by Rainer Forst, Axel Honneth, Paul Ricœur, on which Juul’s (2013) theory is partly based, will be referred to for clarification and reference. Reflective reasoning (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009) is used to mediate between theory and data to reach an interpretation of the data in light of the theory and vice versa.
1.2 Context of the Study

After laying out the scope of the study, it now seems appropriate to discuss the underlying ideas and thoughts. This step is an important part of reflective methodology whereby implicit pre-understandings and ideological assumptions of the research context are discussed (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 12). The discussion clarifies from which theoretical perspective the research problem is approached as well as the stance of the researcher. The following chapters take up two assumptions that run through the whole thesis: The first one pertains to the concept of modernity that is referred to in both the theory and the subsequent analysis. The second part will then address normativity and its relationship to social science, as well as its implications for the study.

1.2.1 Modernity

Above, solidarity has been described as at odds with other tendencies in current rationales in the political discourse on higher education. Economic goals, the specialised needs of the labour market and the pursuit of excellence at universities put individual achievements in front of inclusivity, cooperation, or solidarity. But how then can the current condition of society, in which these discourses happen, be described more succinctly from the chosen perspective of this thesis?

A fundamental assumption of Juul’s (2013) theory and this thesis is that society has been individualised. This is founded on the works of Bauman (2000), Beck and other sociologists (cf. eg. Beck and Grande 2010) who argue that traditional societal structures have collapsed, forcing individuals to redefine themselves constantly, carrying the full risks in the process. Communities founded under these conditions are fragile and often held together by a threat or fear, making them hostile towards outsiders (Juul 2013: 151). This fundamental distrust towards the unknown other running through present day society leads to a division into “us’and ‘them’” (Juul 2013: 191 quotation marks in original) and to unfair allocation of goods and opportunities. One of the many possible examples here would be the current debates in Norwegian society on immigration, where refugees are seen as a threat to, amongst other things, the national identity, and the welfare system.

In his work on liquid modernity, Bauman describes how deregulation and transfer of responsibility from the public to the private, a higher dependency on one’s own capabilities and
competencies in building a meaningful and fulfilling life has arisen (Bauman 2000: 29). With this comes a constant uncertainty that has to be carried individually, and “fears, anxieties and grievances [that] are made to be suffered alone” (Bauman 2000: 148), dividing people and making concepts like common interest meaningless.

Oxenham (2013) has examined what these circumstances may mean for higher education. He argues that they lead to a feeble education that discourages scholarship and character development by depersonalising the learning experiences. Through the commercialisation of university education students are consuming it rather than being formed by it, fostering social injustice, egotism and a disengagement with societal issues. Within the institution, the pressure to create one’s own life leads to unhealthy competitiveness, isolation, and unfulfilled lives. It is important to note that this characterisation does not fully apply to the Norwegian system of higher education, which forms the context of this study. While there are findings that indicate a sense of solidarity amongst students at the University of Oslo (cf. eg. Jensen and Nygård 2000; Solbrekke 2008), according to the perspective laid out here, there is a risk that even students in this tuition-free higher education system might develop attitudes similar to the ones described by Oxenham (2013). A general trend of individualisation in society, together with increasing competition at university and in the labour market could arguably contribute to such a development.

From these perspectives on modernity, the notion of solidarity seems threatened; individualisation and communities held together by fear do not encourage solidary action to help others. In this light, the conflicting implications of the EHEA and the UNESCO goals for higher education, where the economic and administrative demands are given much more space than solidarity, can be understood as part of a larger societal transformation that is part of liquid modernity.

Consequently, any theory of solidarity has to take a critical perspective towards the current social order and propose a different one, where the perceived insufficiencies and problems have been replaced by a well-reasoned alternative (cf. Juul 2013: 41). Additionally, solidarity itself is not a value-free concept, but loaded with prescriptive elements and normative rules. Using a critical, normative theory is therefore one of the possible approaches that can be used to analyse peoples’ ways of thinking about solidarity. In this thesis, Juul’s (2013) theory of solidarity in individualised societies was chosen for this purpose because of its thoroughly argued structure and concepts.
1.2.2 A Critical, Normative Theory of Solidarity

This chapter gives an overview of the theory of solidarity that is used in this thesis and discusses how it will be used in the analysis of the empirical data.

As stated above, having a normative basis for an analysis of empirical data means having a historically and socially shaped preconception of an alternative situation where the perceived oppressions and inequalities of the current social have been eradicated (Juul 2013: 29-30). Criticism therefore comes out of experience and yet transcends it, creating a hermeneutic circle that mediates between the real world and the proposed alternative.

If criticism is contingent on the historical and social conditions in which it is situated, the theory of solidarity used here has these characteristics as well. It is to be understood as a “‘draft’ towards moral progress reflecting the real existing problems of society” (Juul 2013: 41, quotation marks in original), yet not to be seen as universal or a-historical. Juul (2013: 131) specifically designs his theory of solidarity as a counterpoint to the predominant logics of justification in our present day society, which are characterised by capitalist and administrative logics. Through concrete analysis of current forms of judgement, he aims at identifying and criticism the patterns that hinder the development of solidarity.

Juul’s (2013) theory is based on a composite of Honneth’s (2005) theory of recognition, Forst’s (2002) ideas on contexts of justice and Ricoeur’s (1992) formula for the ethical life as the good life, with and for others in just institutions. Juul integrates these different standpoints and adds to them critical hermeneutic judgement.

A critical, normative theory of solidarity has to bridge the divide between us and them, which Juul (2013: 64, 68) argues, can be achieved through mutual recognition. A state of mutual recognition is key to the realisation of the good life for everyone as it does away with the inherent fear and distrust in the individualised society. It is obvious that mutual recognition cannot be achieved without the other; only through the good life of the other can the good life for everyone be achieved (Ricoeur 1992: 181-82). Recognising the other as another self, so that oneself can feel recognised by them, is the precondition for one’s own good life with and for others. Because the recognising relationship cannot be limited to direct interaction, it is a matter of building a just social order as well. In short, solidarity from this perspective, is therefore about the good life, with and for others, in just institutions (cf. Ricoeur 1992).
From a critical hermeneutic perspective, it is impossible to define the good life or goods in a universal or absolute way, as they are subject to change over time (Juul 2013: 50). They can be seen as historically shaped “standards of excellence” (Ricœur 1992: 177) that are held by a community, that serve as reference points for the self-reflection of one's own practice. Through self-interpretation and weighing of practical choices against what we believe are essential principles for our good life as a whole, actions are directed towards these principles, while the principles themselves can be changed through the deliberations of practical choices. This process can be described as a hermeneutic circle between the concept of the good life and practical decisions (Ricœur 1992: 179).

This ethical concept of the good is the fundament on which moral ideas of the just rest (Juul 2013: 68-69). While ethics define the purpose of the good life, morality deals with universal norms argued in reference to it. The good and the just are therefore the two poles between which Juul develops his theory of solidarity, referring to Honneth’s (2005) theory of recognition and Ricœur’s (1992) hermeneutics for the good, and Forst’s (2002) theory of contexts justice and his own concept of hermeneutic judgement for the just.

How then is the theory used in this thesis? Firstly, the students’ articulations of their opinions on solidarity will be read and interpreted in light of the theory, which will help to develop an analytical understanding of their perspective on solidarity. During abductive reasoning in the analysis, the theory itself will be interpreted through the empirical data as well, which might contribute to its development (cf. Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 5). Finally, this process also indicates how a critical, normative theory may provide tools for a further analysis of structures and practices at the University of Oslo that may encourage or hinder the development of solidarity among university students.


1.3 Thesis Outline

Chapter one has given an introduction into the topic, presented the research problem and questions, and provided the rationale for the study. It then moved on to discussing what view of society underlines this thesis, which provided reasons for the choice of a critical, normative theory, which was presented alongside with an explanation of how the theory will be used in the rest of the study.

Chapter two further embeds the thesis in the current research context, presenting both theoretical and empirical studies. Special emphasis is placed on articles dealing with matters of moral development of students at universities and the connections that are being drawn between solidarity and higher education.


Chapter four lays out and argues for the research design, methodology, and case of this study. The chapter also provides a description of the focus groups and their participants, before delving into matters of trustworthiness and research ethics.

Chapter five contains the analysis, which uses the concepts derived from the theory as a guide through the respondents’ understandings.

Chapter six discusses the findings and formulates answers to the research questions. It also includes a subsection on the implications the outcomes have for the university.

Chapter seven concludes the thesis with a look back to its starting point and a look forward to possible further avenues of investigation.
2 Literature Review

As a concept, solidarity has a place in many different areas of research on higher education. In order to put the thesis into context, this review provides an overview of both theoretical and empirical contributions that have been made.

2.1 Theoretical Contributions

This first section will examine theoretical positions that describe the role and importance of solidarity in higher education. It starts by taking up the discussion on Bildung begun in the introduction, and placing it in the Norwegian context. Then the review proceeds to presenting theories and thoughts that are more general.

The German term Bildung can be translated into both utdannelse and dannelse in Norwegian. While utdannelse is equivalent to the English word education, the exact definition of dannelse in the context of higher education is more difficult. Kalleberg (2011), in his conceptual and historical article about citizenship education at Norwegian higher education institutions, argues that while the Norwegian word dannelse is semantically closely related to the Humboldtian Bildung, it has a more political meaning as well with “stronger connotations of democratic equality and liberal democracy” (Kalleberg 2011: 90). Additionally, he identifies universities as central cultural institutions of modern society, as places that educate citizens to be autonomous, knowledgeable and responsible (Kalleberg 2011: 107).

Beck et al. (2015) further explore the notion of Bildung in the context of professional education. In reference to Klafki’s interpretation of the term, the authors argue that professional education needs to encourage students’ engagement in practice, where they construct and develop their sense of citizenship, professional identity, and critical capacities. Three values are central to this process: self-determination, co-determination, and solidarity. While self-determination is the capacity of being able to decide independently and responsibly both as a citizen and as a professional, co-determination includes contributing to the “cultural, economic, social and political development” (Beck et al. 2015: 449) of others. Solidarity, finally, is about recognizing the rights of others and actively supporting those who are denied their rights. Of great importance in the learning process along the lines outlined in the paper, are free interaction...
between students and teacher, and participation in practice combined with reflection (Beck et al. 2015: 454)

Taking formation, one the English words commonly used to translate Bildung, as their starting point, Sutphen and de Lange (2015) discuss how the moral development of students is addressed in study programmes and courses, and develop a conceptual framework for understanding formation. Formation is "the process of change that students undergo in higher education, as well as the change faculty members undergo as they teach and pursue their scholarship" (Sutphen and de Lange 2015: 412). Referring to previous empirical studies on formation in higher education, the authors discuss how the concept of formation can inform change within curricula, teaching, and research. Formation is about letting concepts shape the understanding of real-life situations and the other way around. This forms a hermeneutic circle, which leads to knowledge of self and a heightened awareness of one’s own societal responsibility for others. Students in non-professional programmes often have to undertake these processes of reflection and socialisation without support from their study programmes while there are plenty of teaching practices and curriculum measures that could support the process. Communities of practice, reflection and sense-making exercises are discussed as valuable tools in formation (Sutphen and de Lange 2015: 417).

Mendes (2014) takes up the issue of higher education for democracy and focuses on social cohesion. He argues that social cohesion is a term that is historically grown and shapes our view of the world. His article sets out to delineate its use throughout the time, while developing an alternative paradigm for higher education in the 21st century. Solidarity is proposed as a possible substitution for social cohesion and social capital. In reference to Émile Durkheim, solidarity is defined as that which “holds society together” (Mendes 2014: 33). Mendes operationalises solidarity as solidarity amongst strangers: in an unequal and heterogeneous society, solidarity action happens between strangers through “collective effervescence” (Mendes 2014: 34), that is through establishing a group feeling based on a shared space, personal qualities, objects, or mood.

Based on this concept of solidarity, Mendes develops his Education as Freedom paradigm, which describes four processes that should be implemented in institutions. Universities should be accessible places for marginalised and minority groups, they should actively seek to educate for solidarity, democracy and defend of cultural diversity, they should promote action research,
and finally foster an “ecology of knowledges” (Mendes 2014: 37), wherein universities actively engage with popular knowledge that are to be found in societies.

The role of education for the promotion of social responsibility and building a strong democratic society is also discussed by Marginson (2011), yet he concentrates his attention on a very different aspect of higher education. His paper focuses on the question whether or not higher education is a public good. He concludes that due to the global value of knowledge and cooperative, international research activities, higher education cannot possibly be seen only as a private good. As universities are charged with collaboratively tackling global problems, they are places where solidarity is being put into practice (Marginson 2011: 429). As these global challenges cannot be solved in a short period of time, the public good function of universities, that is its contributions to broad societal interests as well as being an institution that is “open, egalitarian, and accountable to the larger community beyond higher education” (Marginson 2011: 418) will remain strong. To make this possible, it is important to educate students in self-reflection, critical thinking, and to foster their interpersonal connections that cross traditional social, cultural and ideological boundaries (Marginson 2011: 429).

Gacel-Ávila (2005) discusses the global conditions that make solidarity an important goal for higher education. Her point of departure of UNESCO’s World Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty-First Century of 1998. In this document, higher education is identified as a key to changing the current paradigms for international relations by educating students to develop global understanding and consciousness. Garcel-Ávila argues that sustainable human development needs the globalisation of solidarity, a term introduced by the United Nations Development Programme. The role of higher education institutions in the globalisation of solidarity is identified as promoting global consciousness among students, giving them insight into the interconnectedness and interdependence of societies in the globalised world, promote both knowledge about the students’ own cultural background and a respect for pluralism. These four elements together serve as the basis for solidarity and global citizenship (Gacel-Ávila 2005: 123). To achieve these goals, there is a need for institutions to implement a comprehensive internationalisation strategy that includes teaching and learning processes, the curriculum and the policies of the institution (Gacel-Ávila 2005: 130-31).

Education for solidarity is also at the heart of Nicholson’s paradigm for a pedagogy at higher education institutions (Nicholson 1989). It is on the one hand based on feminist, counterhegemonic ideas, on the other hand influenced by the post-modern concepts of higher
education as put forward by Lyotard and Rorty. Fundamental to this new paradigm is Rorty's concept of solidarity, which has, together with tradition and community, replaced reason and objectivity as the central dogmas of higher education. The aim is a plurality of thought where teachers introduce students into an intellectual community with which they will develop solidarity that is transferable to the outside world (Nicholson 1989: 200-01). These communities should be in critical and productive dialogue with the ideas that have shaped them, and be especially inclusive for the thoughts of marginalized intellectual “heroes or heroines” (Nicholson 1989: 204). When educators see that the conversation does not leave out important contributors, students can reinterpret the common traditions from new and contemporary perspectives.

Separating university education into professional and liberal programmes, Sullivan and Rosin (2008) argue, has removed the link to real life situations from the respective programmes. They claim that liberal education without a practical element is devoid of applicability, whereas purely professional courses lack discussion of the moral, social and personal implication of praxis that are at the heart of the liberal education curriculum. Through a “pedagogy of engagement” (Sullivan and Rosin 2008: 2) that bridges the traditional divide, they propose an education for practical reasoning. Practical reason in this case means that students practice mediating between theoretical knowledge particular to their fields and concrete, practical problems (Sullivan and Rosin 2008: 19). Abstract concepts and values like solidarity, can most effectively be learned, the authors argue, when the they are first explored within contexts familiar to the students and then discussed theoretically (Sullivan and Rosin 2008: 69). Judgement in real life situations therefore informs theoretical understanding, which in turn is contextualised in praxis. Practical reason therefore describes the hermeneutic activity that joins together analytical thought and holistic construction of meaning (Sullivan and Rosin 2008: 103-04). The inclusion of practical reason in education allows students to become self-conscious practitioners that are involved in solving the societal problems around them (Sullivan and Rosin 2008: 104).

Most of the arguments and points raised here can also be found in the strategic plan Strategi 2020 of the University of Oslo (Universitetet i Oslo 2010a: 5). For example, the document closely follows the arguments laid out by Marginson (2011) and Gacel-Ávila (2005) as the goal of solidarity is framed within the context of taking responsibility for society both within Norway and beyond. In other words, it is relating the scientific mission of the university to a public-
good argument. Furthermore, *Strategi 2020* links the goal of solidarity to teaching and learning, specifically in relation to fostering a consciousness amongst the students for the global environmental challenges. At a later point the document also makes reference to “research-based teaching that forms and educates” (Universitetet i Oslo 2010a: 8, translation by researcher)\(^1\), closely tying into Kalleberg’s (2011) discussion on *Bildung* in Norwegian higher education.

### 2.2 Empirical Studies

In 2000, Jensen and Nygård published a study they had done at the University of Oslo, which is thematically close to the present one. The study examines the social morality of the students at the university, how they deal with the tension between individual and collective interests, and how much the university supports their understanding of the importance of community. Jensen and Nygård start from the assumption that students are “trapped in an individual performance ethics” (2000: 9) and investigate how this description fits with the students’ motivation for, and their choice of study programme. Furthermore, the authors look into the students’ attitudes towards others, their readiness for empathy, and their use of time. These insights were used to describe student life in general as well as the moral education at the University of Oslo. Contrary to the initial hypothesis, idealistic motivations outweighed instrumental reasons for the choice of studies and the wish to contribute positively to society was stronger than getting a high-paying job. Students from all faculties were heavily oriented towards building a just, inclusive, and ecological society that prioritises ideas over money (Jensen and Nygård 2000: 82-90). Yet students did not feel a special responsibility and were not keen to act in situations they found morally problematic or wrong.

Based on these findings, Jensen and Nygård (2000: 97-98) conclude that the university has to increase its engagement with these issues and actively shape the moral and identity formation processes at the institution. As possible solutions, they propose uniting the different, fragmented

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\(^1\) While there is an English translation of this document, the sentence quoted here takes on a very different meaning in the official translation. “Studentene skal tilbys forskningsbasert undervisning som danner og utdanner, også på tvers av etablerte faggrenser.” (Universitetet i Oslo 2010a: 8) becomes “Students will be offered impetus for self-formation and research-based education, including instruction of an interdisciplinary nature.” (Universitetet i Oslo 2010b: 8), and loses the connection between research, teaching and formation. Consequently, a new translation was made, where the original meaning is preserved.
disciplinary cultures around a common, university-wide identity, and incorporating moral reasoning exercises and discussions into the different disciplines. These activities strengthen the sense of self and self-worth of students, who then can confidently contribute to society in a positive, well-reasoned, and effective way.

One of such possible activities was studied by Arratia Figueroa (2008), who explores the potential of service learning activities for teaching solidarity to nursing students. Her empirical study focuses on a course at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. She argues that immersion activities, which are fundamental to service learning, are uniquely useful to translate ethical concepts to students. During the course, which includes work experience at a health care centre within the local community, students are required to reflect upon solidarity and their function as practitioners within society at large. The reflection happens both in discussion groups and in private journals. Arratia Figueroa names four dimensions of solidarity that are of importance: public, private, political and cultural ones (2008: 65). She argues that students as future professionals need to be aware of all of these dimensions and that both the immersion into the workplace setting and the reflection activities that are happening parallel to that experience, help students to foster and develop their perception of solidarity and more generally their ethics and understanding of social responsibility.

Morales Rodríguez (2013) emphasises that learning at higher education institutions of the 21st century has to include not only knowledge acquisition and the development of intellectual skills. Acquiring and modifying values and ethics through both positive and negative experiences and through the interaction with teachers and peers has to be seen as equally important. The quantitative study, which is part of the impact assessment of the social responsibility agenda of the University of Malaga, analyses student’s attitudes towards solidarity before and after taking a course for the training of ethical and solidarity values. It describes a correlation between taking the course and having a better understanding of solidarity concepts, which was particularly strong when students used active learning techniques. Based on the assumption that attitudes and values positively influence individual behaviour in conflict situations, Morales Rodríguez concludes that student active learning activities focusing on citizenship education should be more central in university education. Solidarity is named alongside honesty, civility and non-violence as a key component that should be taught in tertiary education (Morales Rodríguez 2013: 49-50).
For her study on education for professional responsibility, Solbrekke (2008) interviewed students during their professional education at the University of Oslo and as novice practitioners in their respective fields. In line with the current dynamics in individualised society, where control through collective rules is replaced by individual self-monitoring (Solbrekke 2008: 486), she finds that the priorities of young professionals had shifted from being oriented towards the good for wider society to a more local perspective, where the individual client takes precedent (Solbrekke 2008: 496). Based on these findings, Solbrekke (2008: 497) argues that students in professional programmes need to develop an understanding of the wider consequences and moral implications of their work as professionals while still at university. For this, universities and employers need to create opportunity and spaces to discuss dilemmas of balancing the clients’ and society’s interest in an atmosphere that is conducive to a plurality of attitudes and a wide range of problems.

In an earlier publication Solbrekke (2007: 99-100) also points out that while students of professional degrees feel well equipped for the disciplinary challenges of their professional lives, they wish for a better education in ethical and moral questions, and for theory and practice to be more closely linked in their respective programmes. She argues that one way to achieve this is to let students explore their personal morality, norms, and convictions, and joining them with “professional judgement” (Solbrekke 2007: 102). Thus, students are encouraged not to see their personal interests and professional responsibility as separated but as closely interconnected.

In their longitudinal study at an Irish university, O'Flaherty and Gleeson (2014) find that attending higher education in general increased the moral competency amongst the students. The researchers used quantitative measures to evaluate the moral judgement of students at several points during their time at university and conclude that higher education significantly contributed to the moral development of all students, regardless of their discipline (O'Flaherty and Gleeson 2014: 66). Interdisciplinary involvement presented itself as particularly effective in furthering social justice, equality, and respect, as well as in preparing students to work for the common interest in their professional careers.

Johnson’s (2015) study is aimed at finding out which factors support the development of students’ civic identity. The large scale quantitative study undertaken at more than 100 institutions explores the development of US students' civic identity which Johnson identifies as an important yet understudied topic in context of diverse and multicultural society (2015: 688).
One of the most significant factors for the development of an inclusive civic identity is found to be the representation of the whole breadth of society at the institution. However, this in itself is not enough; there is also the need for dialogue and interaction between different groups around societal problems. Exercises in perspective taking, wherein students can explore social reality from a different standpoint than their own, leading to better understanding, are described as particularly useful, especially if these exercises are closely guided by teachers (Johnson 2015: 689). Apart from increasing the opportunities for engagement with others of a different social background, connecting the knowledge content of a course to wider societal issues positively affects the development of students’ civic identity (Johnson 2015: 701).

This last point is subject to a more in-depth exploration by McLean, Abbas, and Ashwin (2015). Their qualitative, longitudinal study uses interviews with undergraduate sociology students at four British universities to examine if disciplinary sociological knowledge positively influences the students’ engagement with the surrounding society and their willingness to contribute to improving it. They find that forming a disciplinary identity helps all, and especially disadvantaged students to develop self-confidence, sense of community and inclusion, and political engagement in and awareness of the problems of the wider society.

There are also studies that focus on the connection between solidarity and student life in general, not just related to learning at universities or curriculum content. Two of them are presented next.

In their study on student associations at US campuses, Strachan and Owens (2011) argue from a social psychological perspective that an on-campus civil society can be highly effective for students to develop their civic identities. By reviewing a number of different studies they conclude that representing the whole breadth of society at the institution is a prerequisite for the development of inclusivity; it needs to be supplemented by events and structures that gather and connect people. Groups based on narrow identities, based on categories like gender, race, political affiliation, sexual orientation, religion, and others can positively contribute to students' social capital as well, which also leads to better academic performance and retention. Yet on their own, if they are not integrated, given incentives to cooperate and connect, these groups might have unintended, divisive effects (Strachan and Owens 2011: 475).

Theocharis (2011) describes how a change in higher education policy, in the case of his study an increase in tuition fees, can lead to solidarity amongst students and social and political action.
The empirical study uses the student protests in the United Kingdom in 2010 as its case. While his paper focuses mainly on the students’ use of ICT for organising protests and occupations, he emphasises the importance of solidarity messages and actions from other institutions within the country and across the world. Internet-based networking made it easy for other political actors such as NGOs and trade unions to show their solidarity with the students' struggles and was used to coordinate actions together (Theocharis 2011: 186). The study is an example of how the experience of being a student can lead to the engagement in solidarity action.

In summary, the literature reviewed here presents solidarity as a fruitful concept within many areas of research in higher education. It can inform both theoretical discussions, connecting with notions of formation, Bildung, the purpose and use of university education, and global challenges, as well as empirical inquiries into teaching and learning practices, students’ experiences, curriculum content, and non-formal learning.

On the theoretical side, solidarity is often included as a central value into new paradigms for higher education (Nicholson 1989; Gacel-Ávila 2005; Sullivan and Rosin 2008; cf. Mendes 2014). It is also important within the context of the scholarly debate on Humboldt’s ideals and their consequences for and influences on modern higher education institutions (cf. Kalleberg 2011; Beck et al. 2015; Sutphen and de Lange 2015).

From the empirical studies can be concluded that there is quite some evidence that solidarity can be fostered at universities. Reflection activities (cf. Arratia Figueroa 2008), discussion of experience and the open interaction between teachers and students that includes a variety of different perspectives (cf. Solbrekke 2007, 2008; Morales Rodríguez 2013; Johnson 2015), as well as interdisciplinarity (cf. O'Flaherty and Gleeson 2014), are named as useful tools in learning for solidarity. In the process students’ disciplinary and professional identity become connected, making them more society oriented in their practice (cf. Solbrekke 2007, 2008; McLean, Abbas, and Ashwin 2015). These pedagogical efforts can be supported by a well-organised, inclusive, and diverse student life that unites the different groups around societal issues relevant to all of them (cf. Strachan and Owens 2011; Theocharis 2011).

The main contributions of the present study include contributing to our understanding of the processes discussed above from the perspectives of the students at university, and getting an
insight into how students themselves reflect upon their moral development at university. As the studies by Jensen and Nygård (2000) and Solbrekke (2007, 2008) have been undertaken in the same context as the present thesis, comparing the findings could also give an indication of developments or persisting tendencies at the University of Oslo.
3 Theoretical Framework

As stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis uses as its theoretical and analytical foundations Juul’s (2013) theory of solidarity. It draws largely on Honneth’s concept of recognition, Forst’s theory of judgement and Ricœur’s concept of the good life. Juul’s normative theory stipulates “that solidarity most fundamentally is a matter of recognition, justice and good judgement” (2013: 9). The ethical aim of the theory is in accordance with Ricœur (1992): the good life, with and for others, in just institutions.

This chapter will describe these elements and how they will be used in the analysis and the discussion of the empirical findings.

3.1 Combining Liberal and Communitarian Arguments on Solidarity

Juul (2013: 191) develops his theory of solidarity to counter the predominant types of judgement in our individualised and pluralised society. The recent debate in moral philosophy on the good life and the just distribution of goods centres around liberal theories of the just and communitarian theories of the good (Juul 2013: 45). As representatives of the traditions, Juul (2013) discusses John Rawls and Michael Walzer’s libertarian theory of justice and Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Alistair MacIntyre’s communitarian philosophies. Both philosophical schools are criticised by Juul (2013) and incorporated into his theory of solidarity in revised forms.

Based on the works of the thinkers mentioned above, Juul describes the fundamental idea of liberalism as a just social order, that is a state where rational individuals enter into mutually agreed upon contracts, establishing equality of basic liberties and duties and formal rights (Juul 2013: 48-49). This is done without reference to traditional concepts of the good life or utility, but from a hypothetical natural or original position of ignorance. The contracts would in such a situation ensure equality for all, as everyone would regard everyone else as their equal; differences in social or economic status would similarly only be possible if they resulted in compensating benefits for everyone (Juul 2013: 49).

Communitarianism, as presented by Juul, sees any moral concept like solidarity as rooted in the beliefs of a specific community at a specific point in time, its values and the sense of
responsibility for each other (Juul 2013: 54-55). Humans do not act only rationally, but out of solicitude, common objectives, and a common understanding of the good life as well. To behave morally is to act in line with one’s moral character, which is shaped through interaction with the virtues, and the social ethics held by the community. This practical, moral wisdom, is not defined by formal rules but learned over time (Juul 2013: 57). The notion of the good is therefore dependent on the beliefs and values of the community.

Juul (2013) discusses criticism of both positions. Liberalism, he argues, can neither account for changing ideas of goods nor reason its claim of a-historicity and superiority over other value systems (Juul 2013: 53-54). He criticises communitarianism for often assuming that humans only are members of only one value community, and its inclination to idealise traditional communities, which frequently are intolerant and repressive (Juul 2013: 58). In conclusion, he argues that both formal rights, like in liberalism, and social ethics, as a communitarian idea, are necessary for peoples’ communal good life, as long as the notion of the good life is inclusive and anchored in democracy and pluralism (Juul 2013: 60).

In the analysis of the focus group interviews, the two philosophical schools of liberalism and communitarianism will be used to examine what underlying logic the students use when they describe solidarity and its function in society. They are interpreted as different ways of thinking about solidarity – whether they base their perception of solidarity more on mutual contractual obligations or on a sense of belonging in a community. As Juul’s (2013) critique points towards inconsistencies and unwanted consequences of both theories, it will also be explored in the analysis, whether and how the students come up with similar or completely new criticisms.

### 3.2 Recognition

Before distinguishing different types of recognition, the role recognition plays in Juul’s (2013) theory of solidarity has to be examined.

**Solidarity: Struggling for everyone’s chance to be recognised**

Within Juul’s theory of solidarity, recognition “is the general prerequisite for human self-realization and hence for the possibilities of leading a good life together with others” (Juul 2013: 72). Recognition as a concept in philosophy goes back to the works of Hegel, and has been developed further by, amongst others, Honneth, whose writings on the subject are central...
to the work of other philosophers (Patton 2012: vii), like Juul (2013). To a large degree, Juul adopts Honneth’s (2005) theory of recognition, which is mainly based on Hegel’s earlier work. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel links recognition to self-consciousness: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.” (Hegel 1977, §178)². This quote highlights the importance of recognition: without it one cannot develop a “positive self” (Juul 2013: 108), which is necessary for self-realisation as well as the good life, or as Ricœur put it: “[...] it is indeed our most authentic identity, the one that makes us who we are, that demands to be recognized.” (Ricœur 2005: 21)

Solidarity, as it is described by Juul (2013: 119), accordingly is about giving everyone the chance of being recognised as who they are, and thus enabling them to strive for their version of the good life. This process is not without competition and problems, when different claims to recognition are at odds with each other.

Honneth describes the processes of persons trying to get the recognition they want, based on Hegel’s *life and death-struggles for recognition* (Honneth 2005: 21-23). Hegel had argued that seeking recognition, as it is of the highest importance for one’s self-consciousness, is fundamentally an existential act, which requires the willingness to face one’s own death. While Honneth himself does not use the expression *life and death* for his concept of struggles for recognition, he maintains that they are struggles out of a personal feeling of being disrespected, that is a feeling of not being recognised (Honneth 2005: 131). As these struggles particularly highlight the existential importance of recognition for humans, Juul calls them *existential struggles for recognition* in his theory (Juul 2013: 96-97).

The Honneth-inspired existential struggles for recognition are however not the only ones considered by Juul (2013: 97). He also describes struggles that are started out of solicitude or indignation on behalf of others, which he bases on Ricœur’s metaphor of giving and receiving recognition as a gift (cf. Ricœur 2005). He keeps the term *struggles* for those types of interactions as the word also implies “that the struggle for recognition turns itself critically towards cultural habits and political and institutional developments that obstruct certain people’s opportunities to gain the recognition necessary to lead a good life.” (Juul 2013: 101)

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² The word *acknowledged* in this quote is a translation of the German *anerkannt*, which can also be translated as *recognised*. 
These different struggles and how they will inform the analysis in this thesis will be discussed in chapter 3.3. Before that, recognition itself will be addressed.

### 3.2.1 Three Types of Recognition: Love, Legal Rights and Social Esteem

Honneth (2005: 95-130) distinguishes three types of recognition: love, legal rights, and social esteem. They differ in the closeness of the recognising relationship, love being the most intimate, and social esteem the most distant. While all three types contribute to a person’s overall self-consciousness, each of them is associated with a different form of self-relation. Similarly, there are three different forms of disrespect corresponding to them, depending on which type of recognition is denied.

In the analysis, the different types of recognition will be used to explore how the students talk about solidarity in relation to people in their nearer and extended social environment.

**Love**

Honneth sees love as the core of all morality, and it relates to the intimate relations between individuals that are emotionally close to each other, like close family members and friends or romantic partners (Juul 2013: 89). It is the basis of self-confidence, which enables action, communication, and participation in public life. According to Honneth, the fundamental realisation of love that leads to self-confidence is the insight that the other is individually independent, followed by the assurance “that the loved one will continue to care even after he or she has become independent” (2005: 107). Love is therefore the most fundamental element for identity formation and the necessary prerequisite for social order, but in itself not sufficient for either purpose (Juul 2013: 86). Physical abuse is the form of disrespect that is associated with the love recognition (Honneth 2005: 132).

**Legal Rights**

Legal recognition means equal and universal rights for all members of a legal community, (Juul 2013: 89). It leads to the development of self-respect as a person with rights and duties. The recognition of the other members of the community happens through taking the position of a “generalized other” (Honneth 2005: 108), which enables us to identify ourselves and the others
as having the same rights as legal persons. The perspective of the generalised other also makes us aware of the relationship and connection between rights and obligations in the community (Juul 2013: 90). The type of disrespect that is associated with legal recognition is denigration and the exclusion from rights held by others in the community (Honneth 2005: 132).

Here, Juul elaborates on Honneth's account of what constitutes a community, thus clarifying which position of the generalised other one has to take. Juul (2013: 93) argues that Honneth's concept of community is a minimal one; in modern, rootless societies, traditional communities, like class or social status no longer exist and communities are united only through their common horizon of values, within which one sees the personal particularities of the other as valuable for a “shared praxis” (Honneth 2005: 129). While Honneth leaves the exact meaning of shared praxis open (Juul 2013: 93), Juul defines it as the realisation of mutual dependency that directs our actions (Juul 2013: 94). In other words, in liquid modernity, recognition requires seeing and recognising the other and treating them justly, from the standpoint of their own values, and consider their specific needs, even if one disapproves of them. This is what ultimately constitutes a community that can collaborate to achieve common goals (Juul 2013: 94).

This critical clarification is even more relevant to the last form of recognition, social esteem.

**Social Esteem**

The recognition of the self-ascribed traits and values of others, not limited to people within the same legal community, is called social esteem (Juul 2013: 90). This type of recognition, requires openness to others’ values, especially those of minorities, and a form of societal organisation that gives everyone equal chances of being recognised for their particularity (Honneth 2005: 122). The ultimate goal is “an interactive relationship in which subjects mutually sympathize with their various different ways of life, because, among themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically” (Honneth 2005: 128). This means seeing plurality of value systems and ways of life in a positive light, and an active engagement with the development of the other; under these conditions, shared goals of the community can be reached (Honneth 2005: 128; Juul 2013: 90). If ways of life are discriminated against, people are denied social value, making this the form of disrespect opposed to social esteem (Honneth 2005: 134).

For this type of recognition, Honneth (2005: 121-22) uses the terms social esteem and solidarity interchangeably, suggesting that solidarity is only about respecting and engaging with different
ways of life. He also describes a historical development from the establishment of legal rights to social esteem. Moreover, he sees legal rights as the level plane where people are treated the same regardless their personal characteristics and consequently as a precondition for social esteem or solidarity. Juul (2013: 95) argues that legal rights cannot be a prerequisite for social esteem; working to integrate someone into a legal system and awarding them equal rights for example, is a solidary act that be instigated by feelings of social esteem for the other. While the two types of recognition are closely linked, there is no logic of conditionality between them.

Solidarity consequently has something to do with legal recognition as well. Therefore, the third type of recognition will only be referred to as social esteem in this thesis, while solidarity is reserved as a term for the larger, encompassing idea (cf. Juul 2013: 95).

These three types of recognition give an insight into whom one can be in solidarity with and how this relationship can affect both persons involved. Next, the concept of struggles for recognition, introduced above, will be examined.

### 3.2.2 Struggles for Recognition with and for Others

The deciding factor in categorising actions for Juul (2013: 72) is why one does them. Three different types of struggles are distinguished based on the reason behind them: existential struggles, struggles out of solicitude and egoistic struggles (Juul 2013: 97). These three categories will be put into dialogue with the students’ perspective on what solidary action is, what they consider valid motives for solidarity, and what they exclude.

As described above, the first type of struggle goes back to Hegel's concept of the life and death-struggle for recognition, which is adapted by Honneth (2007a). In Honneth’s reinterpretation, it is feelings of disrespect that instigate an existential struggle, which has as its goal the establishment of a stable, mutually recognising relationship. This felt disrespect can be pertaining to any of the three types of recognition addressed above. This type of struggle will be referred to, in accordance with Juul (2013: 97), as existential struggles for recognition.

Juul (2013: 96-101) argues that other motivations for struggles for recognition are possible, too: among them are solicitude, outrage on behalf of others, or perceived structural injustice. As
these struggles follow the same logic, they are summarised under the term *struggles of recognition based on solicitude for the weaker* (Juul 2013: 97).

The concept of struggles out of solicitude is closely based on Ricœur’s (2005) idea that recognition can be given under peaceful circumstances as well. Free and different persons can cooperate without hidden goals or agendas for mutual recognition, leading to the good life together with and for others (Juul 2013: 98). Ricœur (2005: 242) further clarifies the nature of this relationship by using the metaphor of a gift: a gift is given primarily out of kindness or affection for others without ulterior motives and the implied expectation of receiving a gift in return. Yet social codes very much suggest that a gift should be reciprocated by a gift in return (Ricœur 2005: 232). Translated to recognition this means that recognition can be offered by the stronger to the weaker out of solicitude. The weaker, thus recognised as an individual of value, in turn can recognise the stronger, establishing a relationship that enables both of them to strive for the good life together (Juul 2013: 99-100).

Both existential struggles and struggles out of solicitude have in common that they are always undertaken with and for others. This is not the case for the last type of struggle, Juul (2013: 97) defines: These are *egoistic struggles for recognition* are struggles that one engages in purely for utilitarian self-interest and egoistic intentions and they do not lead to the ideal of the good life with and for others that is underlying this theory. Consequently they are not part of Juul’s (2013) solidarity theory.

In summary, struggles for recognition are efforts to establish a recognising relationship for the good life with and for others. These efforts are started either because one feels disrespected and wants to engage in a recognising relationship with an other to alleviate this disrespect; or because one feels for an other and wants to recognise them, getting recognition in return.

### 3.3 Contexts of Justice and Justification

While the previous chapters focused on recognition, the next ones examine what happens when different claims for recognition overlap or are mutually exclusive. Here, the question becomes how to weigh the different claims, what arguments are valid in the deliberation, and what rights the conflicting parties have.
Concepts presented here will provide analytical tools to examine how students deal with ethical conflicts, dilemmas, which priorities they set when there are multiple possible courses of action.

Justice is concerned with exploring how people rationalise their actions and what arguments are valid to justify them before others (Juul 2013: 109). Juul (2013) partially bases his concept of justice on the writings of Forst (2002), who integrates communitarian and liberal theories in his concept of contexts of justice. As the name implies, Forst’s theory is context sensitive and takes into account that human beings have varying needs within the multitude of communities they are engaged in, meaning that these needs have to be justified in different ways (Juul 2013: 109).

Forst develops four different logics of justification that relate to different types of intersubjective relations. Ethics are arguments about what is good for oneself, laws pertain to all legal persons equally, citizenship and democracy is about politically justifying rules for everyone in the community, and morality comprises rules of what is right for everyone (Forst 2002: 244-45).

Within these four contexts, actions can and have to be justified through discourse with others (Forst 2002: 245). In such a justification discourse, explanations for actions are debated with arguments that are valid within the concrete situation and that are accepted by both sides as relevant (Forst 2012: 15). These justification dialogues can be offered and demanded by anyone. Their basis is the rational grounding, the deliberations and thoughts that have led to the conscious action in question.

3.3.1 Ethics

Ethical rules pertain to a person’s own good life and those closely connected to them. Each of the many ethical communities has its own set of rules and norms, that the members are free to obey, change or break, thus shaping their own path through life (Forst 2002: 258). Ethical rules are not in any way binding for people outside of the ethical community and arguments based on them that extend to people outside of the community are always invalid (Juul 2013: 116). Justification within the realm of ethics means two things: justifying one’s own actions to oneself and answering questions on the common good for all people within the community based on the established, commonly held convictions (Forst 2002: 259-60).
3.3.2 Law

Humans are not only members of ethical communities; they are legal persons as well. A legal person is “responsible before the law” (Forst 2002: 264) and has to justify their actions for which they are wholly responsible with legal arguments within the framework of rights and obligations. This means that reference to ethical or moral believes are not valid arguments for justification of actions within the legal context. While a system of laws does have coercive elements like punishment for wrongdoing, it is still fundamentally grounded in the mutual respect of legal persons (Juul 2013: 117).

3.3.3 Citizenship and Democracy

Citizens do not only have responsibility before the law, they are also responsible for it (Forst 2002: 267). That is to say, that they both have the obligation to find a common way of life with other citizens of different backgrounds, and engage in a justifying dialogue with them, as well as responsibility for their communal actions when faced with outsiders. Citizenship is therefore a common project that is undertaken by equally privileged participants through open discourse to establish legitimatised rules (Juul 2013: 117).

3.3.4 Morality

All humans make up the justification community when it comes to moral questions. Moral reasons must be valid for everyone else as well, such that they have “unconditional, categorical and universal” validity (Forst 2002: 268). Fundamentally, morality frames how one should treat one's fellow human beings with rules that are reciprocal and not refutable with rational arguments (Juul 2013: 117). Moral rules apply especially when all other justification contexts fail to establish common ground for argumentation.

In this study, the different contexts of justice inform the analysis of how the students talk about moral and ethical conflicts within the context of solidarity, if they distinguish between different logics of justification, and how they navigate in their reasoning between them. This is also how Juul (2013: 117) proposes using the different contexts as sensitizing concepts in a hermeneutic analysis of real life situations. While Forst’s contexts of justice are useful to clarify the formal
criteria for justification dialogues, they do not give an indication of what good judgement, a necessary element of a normative theory of justice, really is (Juul 2013: 118-19).

3.4 Good Judgement

Ideally, the four contexts of justification are in alignment, yet conflicts can arise both within one context and between them (Forst 2002: 241). These normative conflicts can occur when goods or personal characteristics are unequally distributed or when goods are given different culturally or historically determined attributes, connotations and importance (Juul 2013: 127-28). Additionally, individuals might have different preferences when it comes to goods.

Forst (2003: 708-09) argues that each of these cases has to be judged differently depending on the context in which the conflict is situated. This highlights the importance of justification: As actions are driven by normative believes that can be interpreted in different ways, people have a right to be presented with arguments and reasons for other people’s choices and actions (Forst 2003: 49). Without this, justice would be arbitrary and there would be no accountability for actions. Since implementation of abstract laws within concrete situations is not a linear process, one cannot assume that justification is self-evident either; or as Juul puts it: “the law has to be distinguished from the implementation of the law” (Juul 2013: 113).

Juul (2013: 118-19) agrees that judgement has to be context sensitive. However, a critical theory of solidarity, like the one he develops, needs to have something to say about the current, predominating judgement in society, as the status quo which is to be criticised. He shows that current modes of judgement, marked by neoliberal and dehumanising market-oriented ideologies (cf. eg. Juul 2013: 183-85), follow economic and administrative logics that have nothing to do with recognition, justice, or solidarity.

A hermeneutic idea of what constitutes good judgement cannot only rely on abstract normative ideals and principles that are theoretically understood, but has to be developed through judgement in real situations, in “the school of life” (Juul 2013: 127); through this concrete, critical analysis, the best arguments can be identified. These arguments are those that bring society closer to the ideal of solidarity and thus to the good life, with and for others in just institutions.
To analyse forms of judgement hence means to examine how the students use their judgement in real-life situations and how it is formed by being engaged in the world – more precisely what they learn about solidarity at university and how they reflect upon that experience.
4 Research Design and Methodology

This section presents the research design and methodology of this study and gives reasons as to why these choices have been made. It then moves on to discussing the method used for gathering the empirical data and for the subsequent analysis. Finally, trustworthiness and ethical considerations will be addressed.

4.1 Case-Study Design

Yin defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2009: 18). The present study meets these criteria, as its aim is to get a deep understanding of the students’ perceptions as they themselves describe them. More precisely, it is a critical, single case study. These two features require further discussion.

A critical case study is characterised by having a theory with a clear proposition that is tested in a case that has characteristics where these propositions can be reasonably assumed true. (Yin 2009: 47). The testing of a theory in a critical case leads to a better understanding of the explanatory power of the theory and of the specific case (Bryman 2016: 62). Juul’s (2013) theory of solidarity includes propositions about ways of judgement in present day society, furthermore, it is itself designed to be applied in real life situations. Using reflexive methodology, the requirements placed on a critical case study can be met, as it allows for both theory development and interpretation of the empirical setting. In other words, the dialogue between data and theory both tests the theory through practical application and interprets the data through the lens of the theory, contributing to the understanding of both.

Even though the participants for this study were recruited from two different faculties, the study is not concerned with comparison. Instead, common patterns across all the groups are identified, as well as variations in expression. Two faculties were chosen because they are very different in their epistemic beliefs, thus ensuring that the results are not heavily influenced by one specific disciplinary perspective on the topic. Ultimately, the goal is to reach a deep understanding of the general perceptions of the students. The research interest is in the underlying structure and not in comparison between two groups. All students together form one
unit of analysis, which makes this a *holistic*, single case study (Yin 2009: 46; Thomas 2011: 138). Holistic case studies, like the present one, are concerned with the “global nature” (Yin 2009: 50) of an organisation, in this case of the University of Oslo, but often ignore important differences within it. As the research questions of this study are also aimed at the connection the students draw between solidarity and the knowledge content of their curricula, this blind spot of holistic case studies becomes very relevant.

When it comes to these aspects of the inquiry, the two different faculties therefore have to be discussed separately. For this part of the analysis, the two groups present two different units of analysis, and the case study becomes *embedded* (Yin 2009: 50). These embedded units of analysis have to be discussed within their larger context, so as not to become case studies of their own (Yin 2009: 51), which is done in the discussion chapter of this thesis.

**The Case: The University of Oslo**

A closer description of the University of Oslo will reveal why it can be seen as a critical case where Juul’s (2013) theory can be applied.

The University of Oslo was chosen firstly because it has, as mentioned above, the development of solidarity in its strategic plan. It is also considered a *flagship university* (Gornitzka and Maassen 2017) for the Norwegian higher education sector, an old and prestigious institution in the national context.

While Norway is not a member state of the European Union, it is a co-signatory of the Bologna Declaration and part of the EHEA. It was found to be largely compliant with the demands of the EHEA-regulations (cf. European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice 2015), so it can be assumed that the tensions between the economic and citizenship-building logics that have been described in the introduction, can also be found here. Indeed, Sataøen (2016: 5-6) argues, that market forces as well as Humboldtian ideals of formation of responsible citizens influence the Norwegian higher education sector as a whole. Additionally, since Norway is a comparatively small country at the periphery of the EHEA, the effects of transnational developments are more noticeable here than elsewhere (Gornitzka 2008: 2-3). Juul’s (2013) theory of solidarity describes these contradictions at great length. Therefore, Norway presents itself as a well-suited site to work with the theory in an empirical setting.
Within Norway, University of Oslo, with its ambition to belong to the best universities worldwide and as an institution that is very engaged in transnational cooperation, is arguably especially involved in those change processes. This makes the University of Oslo an especially valuable, critical case.

The Faculty of Educational Sciences (UV) was chosen for its combination of academic and professional programmes offered and its large student body (cf. Universitetet i Oslo 2016), to make recruitment easier. The Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences (MN), while having a similar combination of pure and applied study programmes, was included in the study to get a perspective that is epistemologically different to the one of students from UV. This ensures that the results can be generalised beyond the context of a single faculty.

For transparency, there were also reasons of convenience and ease of access as this thesis was written at the same institution and largely conducted at the faculty that offers the programme this thesis is written for. Recruiting participants from all across the university would have significantly complicated and prolonged the recruitment process and delayed completion.

### 4.2 Reflexive Methodology

Reflexive methodology, as described by Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009), is used in this study. Reflexive research has two characteristics: Firstly, it sees conclusions drawn from data as careful interpretations. This interpretivist epistemology means that it is concerned with understanding human behaviour through a hermeneutic process, not explaining it (Bryman 2016: 691).

As the relationship between empirical data and theory is problematic and ambiguous, it is important to explore assumptions and pre-understandings that influence the reading. Consequently, reflections on the overall context of the research, such as the narrative, the traditions, and the language in which the research is situated, are the second characteristic of this methodology (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 9). This leads to a critical self-interpretation as well as a critical evaluation of the interpretations of the empirical data.

The mode of understanding associated with the reflexive stance is abduction (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 4). By going back and forth between data and theory during the process of interpretation, both elements are constantly re-evaluated in light of one another. Through that
process, abduction opens up the possibility of developing and refining the theory used while exploring a specific field of inquiry (Blaikie 2004).

The reflexivity of the abductive approach can take place on four different levels: the empirical foundation, the hermeneutic between theory and empirical data, the critique of ideological assumptions and the postmodern critique of power relations and language – yet no level ideally takes precedent over the others (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 271-72). Reflection takes place both within the individual levels as well as between the levels of interpretation. Framing reflection as interpretation also implies that nothing in research is obvious, simple or without ambiguity but dependent on judgement and intuition.

Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009: 283) concede that it is practically impossible to give equal weight to all four reflective levels and devise four research profiles that are closer to practice. Of these four profiles, the one that is adopted in this study is the one of insight-driven research. It is characterised focusing on the interpretation of the empirical material, in order to reveal meanings and create insights (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 284). Reflections on underlying ideologies, language, and the empirical foundation itself are framing the study, without taking a central place in it.

4.3 Linking Theory and Methodology

The process of abductive reasoning described above, whereby theory and empirical data inform the interpretation each other, can be seen as a hermeneutic circle. Interestingly, Alvesson and Sköldberg understand their approach to research partly as a reaction to the “phobia of empirical matters” (2009: 2) they diagnose in critical theory and hermeneutics. Given that Juul (2013) bases his theory of solidarity largely on those two philosophical schools, there is the need to discuss if there is not a misalignment between the theory and the methodology used in this study.

Juul emphasises that humans cannot detach themselves from the world and that interpretation is always laden with preconceptions and historically and socially influenced values, which makes claiming absolute and unalterable truths impossible (Juul 2013: 26-27). An open hermeneutic consciousness sets these preconceptions vis-a-vis empirical analysis in order to test them. Understanding them becomes the process of fusing together the horizons so that one informs the other. It can therefore be said that Juul’s (2013) theory of solidarity does not fall
under, but even shares Alvesson and Sköldberg’s criticism of a lack of empiricism in hermeneutics.

There seems to be a close relationship between the underlying thoughts of the reflexive methodology and the theory as well: Reflexive methodology draws largely on critical theory and hermeneutics in its criticism of the more traditional approaches to research in the social sciences. The awareness of the process of interpretation, based on hermeneutics, and the need to reflect upon the political-ideological context, a core requirement in critical theory, are both integrated into the paradigm (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 263). As described above, these two elements can also be found in the theory of solidarity used here.

Theories themselves always carry, implicitly or explicitly, “a point of view” (Anyon 2009: 4) that convey the researcher’s opinion. Juul (2013) takes over Ricœur’s (1981) philosophical hermeneutic arguments that the negation of these fundamental ideologies and the neglect to engage with cultural and historical biases leads to inconclusive or deceptive results in social sciences. Moreover, the more the existence of these prejudices is neglected and goes unexamined, the less valid the results become. Ricœur further reasons that researchers are unable to detach themselves from their own prejudices and values; while they might be able to partially reflect upon their beliefs and preunderstanding, they can never step behind them and see them fully (Ricœur 1981: 243). Reflexive methodology gives similar reasons for why reflection on the theoretical, political, and cultural influences are essential for research: awareness of context makes it possible to take critical distance from it and make new and innovative interpretations (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 269-70)

As Juul (2013) also argues, theories are not value-neutral but laced with preconceptions of the world. This implies also that the critical evaluation of ideology that is undertaken in critical social science has to remain non-complete, as the researcher can never entirely grasp their own pre-understanding (cf. Ricœur 1981: 245). Additionally, such a critique can be started, but never completed, as the critique of ideology always is of its time and does not eliminate it, and the historical circumstances the researcher is embedded in continuously change, giving rise to the need of further critical evaluation. Similarly, Alvesson and Sköldberg emphasise the continuous nature of social science when they describe the role of empirical data as arguments for “understanding social reality in the context of a never-ending debate.” (2009: 304).
In summary, by choosing a normative theory, this thesis takes a cognitivist approach, claiming that ethical and moral statements can be argued for rationally and therefore can have objective validity (Juul 2013: 22). Concisely argued interpretation is therefore also possible based on normative ideas, making way for the exploration of the perceptions of solidarity held by the participants of this study.

4.4 Focus Groups

Focus groups were used to generate the empirical data for this study. Focus groups are informal discussions between participants, who are selected based on criteria relevant to the research topic, on a particular theme that is relevant to them. During the course of the discussion, the participants discuss and describe meanings and interpretations of the topic at hand from their own perspective and in their own words (cf. Frey and Fontana 1991: 175-77; Morgan 1997: 2; Liamputtong 2011: 3).

Blaikie (2004) criticises that methods used in abductive interpretivist studies rarely are argued for, even though there are no methods that are universally established as compatible. The next chapter will reason why focus groups are an appropriate method in the context of this study and its methodology.

4.4.1 Choice of Method

By initiating a group discussion that is to some extent removed from the control of the moderator, focus groups limit the researcher’s influence over the data created. If the discussion is running smoothly, the groups generate their own structure and meaning through their inherent dynamics (Frey and Fontana 1991: 179). Two processes are identified that can enhance the quality of the data: complimentary interaction, revealing shared experiences that are elaborated upon in dialogue between the participants, and argumentative interaction, that highlight diverging opinions held within the group (Liamputtong 2011: 32).

While semi-structured interviews could provide similarly interesting insights, focus groups have another advantage. Liamputtong names as one of the key benefits of the focus group method over classical one-on-one interviews that it forces the researcher to listen to the participants speaking about the topic in their own terms. This prevents premature generation of meanings (Liamputtong 2011: 33). Both within the context of the theoretical framework and
the methodology, the creation of meaning is meant to happen in the hermeneutic between the
theory and the empirical reality, that is the data that is produced in the focus groups. By leaving
the sense-making process to the participants, the subsequent interpretation is based on
interactions in which the researcher was much less important than in the one-on-one setting of
an interview. This makes way for interpretation in light of theory as opposed to ad-hoc
interpretation that is often necessary in the interview situation in order to ask follow-up
questions.

4.4.2 Number of Groups, Composition and Group Size

When it comes to the number of groups, the ultimate criterion named in the literature is
saturation, that is the point at which further groups would not yield any new insights and the
research questions can be answered with sufficient trustworthiness (Liamputtong 2011: 45; Morgan 1997: 43). There are two factors that put limits on the number of groups: the number
of available participants will place a natural upper limit, while the lowest possible number of
groups that can produce meaningful results is argued to be two (Morgan 1997: 44). Conducting
only one focus group discussion runs the risk that the results might be random, not
representative, and severely influenced by the group dynamics without having a possibility to
check that. Consequently, the aim for this study was to have two focus group interviews for
each of the two faculties.

Whereas Morgan claims that it is difficult to maintain a discussion in groups with fewer than
six participants (1997: 43), groups with four or five participants have become increasingly
popular, as they give more room to the individual participants to speak and to explore ideas
(Liamputtong 2011: 43). As the participants signed up for the groups voluntarily, it was
reasonable to assume that they would have an interest in the topic and the willingness to engage
with it. Therefore, all groups were planned with four participants.

Homogeneity of background ensures and enhances fluid discussion within the group (Morgan
1997: 36-38; Liamputtong 2011: 35). The groups in this project consisted of students that study
at the same faculty, consequently their background was similar enough to be able to refer to
common experiences, making it easier to relate to one another. While they were not completely
homogeneous, meaning that they did study different subjects within the faculty, they had
sufficient common ground they could explore. This led to freely flowing discussions that required little moderator involvement.

Two focus groups were held with students from UV. The participants were between 22 and 32 years old, and had all studied at UV for at least four semesters. Both groups, UVa and UVb, consisted of two male and two female students, and had an equal number of pedagogy students and teacher studies students. Two participants studied at master level, while the others were close to finishing their bachelor programmes.

Of the two groups that were planned with MN-students, only one could successfully be completed. The other one could not be conducted, as none of the participants turned up. Attempts to reschedule were unsuccessful since the students who volunteered to participate either declined due to upcoming exams or because they were leaving for holidays. The implications of this will be discussed in the chapter on research quality criteria (4.6). The remaining group of MN-students had only male participants in the age range of 24-30, who were close to finishing their bachelor and master programmes with a strong applied orientation.

### 4.4.3 Recruitment

“ [...] [I]nadequate recruitment efforts are the single most common source of problems in focus group research projects” (Morgan 1997: 38). Indeed, recruitment turned out to be a long process.

The invitation to participate in the study was sent out via e-mail to all relevant students with the generous help of the administrators at UV and at MN. However direct responses to these e-mails were rare. Additionally, students were approached during or after lectures and seminars with the permission of the respective professors.

Having made initial contact, groups should be held shortly afterwards to maintain the initial interest and to highlight the value of the effort on the part of the participants within the study (Howatson-Jones 2007: 12). This recommendation could not be met, as the recruitment process stretched itself over two months. This however did not affect the interest of those who had signed up.

It is generally recommended to over-recruit, as having one or two additional participants is better than having to cancel a group (Liamputtong 2011: 53). While this had been the original
plan, over-recruitment was ultimately not used, since it would have delayed the project even further.

The information letter and the consent form can be found in Appendix A of this thesis.

4.4.4 Structure of Group Conversations and Level of Moderator Involvement

As this study is largely exploratory, the questions asked in the sessions were mainly open-ended, which meant that the discussions were less structured, compared to groups with more focused questions (Frey and Fontana 1991: 180).

Morgan warns that the non-directive approach, with little involvement of the moderator, has to trade off exploratory potential with comparability between the groups (Morgan 1997: 40). To balance insight with comparability, he therefore suggests a funnel approach, which opens with a less structured discussion that is followed by more concrete and narrow questions towards the end. This was the approach chosen for this study as well, starting the sessions with a broad and open discussion about ideas and understandings, and then narrowing it down to more concrete personal experiences.

Additionally, a stimulus activity (Liamputtong 2011: 64) was used in the beginning, both to lead into the discussion by getting a shared idea about the topic as well as to establish that the main discussion is to be amongst the participants of the focus group. By writing down their initial thoughts and associations with the word *solidarity*, the participants were also given the possibility to “get into” the topic. Afterwards two and two students talked to each other to establish a dialogue and to get the discussion going in a more protective environment. The first round of questions was designed to establish common ground and gave the participants the possibility to get familiar with the various associations. The participants could also establish a shared idea of the concept that included the various standpoints. The different opinions were thus reconciled so that they did not impede the discussion.

An interview guide was used, however the order of the questions as well as probing or clarification questions were different in each group. The interview guide can be found in Appendix B.
4.5 Data Analysis

The interviews were transcribed by the researcher himself and subsequently coded using NVivo. As the interviews were quite unstructured and free flowing, with participants making associations with and references to previous statements, using a software proved very useful for connecting various parts of the interviews with each other.

A different set of codes, developed out of the interpretation of the different groups, was developed in a first step. Then, codes from the different interviews that were similar were aggregated and developed into themes that came out of the conversations. As recommended (Bryman 2016: 577), memos were created by the researcher for each of these aggregated nodes and themes. This process formed a structure that was then interpreted using Juul’s (2013) theory of solidarity. Aggregating the different nodes first following the logic that came out of the data ensured that thoughts not covered by the theory were not lost. It also provided a solid basis for the interpretation of the theory itself.

A Personal Note on Language

The focus groups were held in Norwegian, as it was the mother tongue of the participants. The analysis was also done in Norwegian, and only the quotes used in the text were translated into English. While it is not my mother tongue, I am fluent in it and felt confident enough to carry out the study in that language. To ensure that my understanding was correct, the quotes in this thesis were left untranslated and as I had transcribed them, during the supervision process. Both supervisors of this thesis have Norwegian as their mother tongue. As I translated the quotes into English, I decided to attach them in their original version in Appendix C, in order to increase transparency. Each quote will therefore, in addition to being attributed to the speaker, be followed by a number in squared brackets, which refers to the original Norwegian quote.


4.6 Quality of Research

Before going through the various quality criteria for research, the matter of the collapsed focus group will be taken up again.

The Second MN-Focus Group

As argued above, the results form a single focus group cannot form a reliable basis for interpretation all on their own. They are not generalizable beyond the context of the one group as there is simply no way of discerning whether or not the opinions voiced in the group are representative. During the analysis of the data, it became clear that the participants of the MN focus group shared very similar thoughts and beliefs to those in UVa and UVb. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the group discussion indicates the more or less representative opinions among the students. In that sense, it is indicative of a general student experience that bridged the divides between the two faculties. For the analysis of this general student experience shared across all the groups, which makes for the largest part of the analysis, the voiced opinions of the participants can therefore reasonably be compared to the UV groups, thus solving the problem of not having a second group of MN students.

Such a comparison however is not possible when the discussion turns to the connection of disciplinary knowledge and solidarity. As argued above, the responses from the UV and MN students are presented separately. The chapter on the experiences of the MN students and how they see the connection between their fields of study and solidarity (5.7.3) has a lower credibility than the rest of the study, as there was no possibility to check the interpretation of the one group against another.

4.6.1 Trustworthiness

As Bryman (2016: 384) suggests, Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) criteria for research are used here to discuss the trustworthiness and the limitations of the study. While their criteria mirror the quantitative categories of validity and reliability, they are adapted for the qualitative research paradigm and therefore the logical choice for this study.
**Credibility**

Establishing credibility is about showing that the researcher’s account of social reality corresponds to point of view of the research subjects. As described in 4.4.1, using focus groups ensures that the account of the participants is largely undisturbed by the preunderstandings and prejudices of the researcher.

Respondent validation is recommended as a means to further increase credibility (Bryman 2016: 384). Checking the outcomes of focus groups against the opinions of a single participant is however problematic, as focus groups work through collective sense-making and a variety of ideas that cannot be verified by asking just one participant (Morgan 1997: 65). Reconvening the whole focus group presents issues of feasibility and puts high demands on the participants. Alternatively, it is suggested to use “group-to-group validation” (Morgan 1997: 63), whereby topics and issues are compared across different groups, looking for common patterns and structures. Group-to-group validation was extensively used in this thesis.

**Transferability**

As most qualitative inquiries, this study is interested in getting a deep insight into the particularities of the context discussed here (cf. Bryman 2016: 384). A description of the empirical setting is given in 4.1, so that the transferability to other contexts can be judged. The descriptions of the theoretical assumptions in 1.2.2 and how the participants themselves understand their social reality in 5.2 will provide further information on the particularities and positioning of the study. Ultimately, whether or not the findings presented here are transferable to another context, is “an empirical issue, the resolution of which depends upon the degree of similarity between sending and receiving (or earlier and later) contexts.” (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 316)

**Dependability**

Research should be comprehensible, well documented, and open to scrutiny. Throughout the thesis, the aim was to give well-founded reasons for the steps taken and to present the results in a clearly understandable way. While Lincoln and Guba’s (1985: 317) ideas of stepwise replication is beyond the scope of a master thesis, there was close dialogue with the supervisors throughout the process on all aspects of the study, which comes close to what Lincoln and Guba (1985) call an inquiry audit.
Confirmability

Several measures, like group-to-group validation, and clarity of expression mentioned above, ensure that the results of this study are comprehensibly supported by the data. Like for dependability, the supervision by two experienced researchers also increases the confirmability of the study. All quotes are included in the text with enough context to make it possible for the reader to check the interpretations directly against the source. In addition, the original Norwegian transcription can be found in Appendix C, so that the accuracy of the translations can be checked as well.

4.6.2 Ethical Considerations

This thesis was written for the master programme Higher Education at the Department of Education at the Faculty of Educational Sciences, University of Oslo. As sensitive personal data was collected, it was submitted to NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS, which approved the research project.

All participants of the study received detailed information on the context and modalities of the study before they participated in the focus groups. They signed consent forms before the discussions began. Participants were promised not to be named in the text of the thesis and their names have been replaced by initials in the transcripts and by codes (UVa 1 for participant number one of focus group a with UV students, etc.) in this document. The numbers have been assigned randomly. They is used as a gender-neutral pronoun, instead of he and she. In the description of the participants of the groups in 4.4.2, no information was given that could lead to the identification of the participants.

As the participants of the groups heard each other’s statements as well, anonymising the speakers alone does not ensure that the content of the discussions remained confidential. Therefore, all participants signed confidentiality agreements as part of their consent forms and they were reminded not to talk to others about the content of the focus group discussions before and after the group discussions.

The participants were informed when the audio recording started and when it was stopped. They could request the recording to be paused at any time. The recordings, transcripts, the NVivo-files, and the signed consent forms were only accessible to the author and the supervisors of this thesis. Any digital information was exclusively stored on password-protected devices.
5 Analysis

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the focus group interviews. Abductive reasoning ensures a close tie between the empirical account and the theory throughout this section of the thesis. The first part of the analysis, chapter 5.2, will explore how the students describe the society they are living in. Next, the attention turns to their perceptions of solidarity in chapters 5.3 to 5.6, before moving on to how they describe their experiences at the University of Oslo in 5.7.

As a prelude to the analysis, the first subchapter discusses the participants’ most basic associations with the word solidarity. It also takes up the question in which situations they encounter or use it themselves.

5.1 Associations, Meanings and Use of the Word Solidarity

Within all the groups, the word solidarity was associated with a certain vagueness and consequently participants found it difficult to come up with a succinct and satisfactory definition: “I think that it may be the same with solidarity as well, if you just, you just use it all the time and then you don’t actually fully understand what it means. It just becomes a… vague word.” (UVa 1) [1] “I would say that the reason I had to ask for the definition of the word is that it obviously is not used a lot in my social circle.” (MN 1) [2]

At the same time, the word had a very positive connotation for the participants: “So, when I think about solidarity, I would say it’s a strong word.” (UVb 4) [3] “But just in general, I would think that normally, solidarity is something positive.” (MN3) [4] However, some of the participants were critical of the use of the word especially in political contexts, as its positive attributes and vagueness lends itself to making meaningless statements:

UVa 1: It is, well, a powerful word that makes something sound very positive, if you manage to put it into any context, then it will sort of elevate what you are trying to get across.
UVa 4: It can get empty quickly. Like when all politicians want to have ROBUST3 things [laughter], robust systems, and things like that… what, what does that even mean? [5]

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3 “robust” is an often-used catchword in Norwegian politics.
Many participants also addressed this vagueness before the interviews and during the recruitment process and others said that they were unsure whether they had anything to say on the topic because of that.

The most common associations with the terms that emphasised a sense of unity like *samhold*, *felleskap*, *å inkludere* (that is union/loyalty, sodality, to include respectively), as well as feelings *sympati*, *empati* (sympathy and empathy in English), and actions that help another person or group.

In conclusion, the students described the word *solidarity* as quite evocative but without being able to define it satisfactorily. For the most part, the students saw it as a positively connoted word.

### 5.2 Norway – An Individualised Society?

One of the basic assumptions of Juul’s (2013) theory of solidarity is that modern society has to some extent been transformed from a capitalist market economy to a liquid modernity where radical individualisation has undermined social cohesion and solidarity (Juul 2013: 9, 15). Radicalised individualism can be described by the dissolution of traditional social communities like nations, or class, separating individual from common well-being (Juul 2013: 150-51). This makes solidarity a normative “counter-model” of society. The discussion therefore now turns to the question whether the students themselves see solidarity as compatible with the current organisation and structure of Norwegian society.

In the perceptions of the participants, this individualisation can also be seen to a certain extent in the Norwegian society. For some, solidarity was a word that belonged more into the 1970s when socialism and unions were much stronger than they are now: “Well, also the 70s come to mind rather quickly, when it comes to solidarity. [...] If you think about the whole thing with the unions, there are fewer and fewer in trade unions now than were then.” (MN 1) [6] There was large consensus that solidarity was a value associated with left-wing politics and social democracy, and opposed by right-wing parties and nationalism.

Another group discussed whether the solidarity that once had been part of the 17th of May-celebrations[^4] still was present or whether it had been replaced by pretence and individual

[^4]: The 17th of May it the Norwegian Constitution Day, the country’s national day.
enjoyment: “[…N]ow I sort of come back to the 17th of May, which has just been mentioned, is that real solidarity or is that a lot of false solidarity? Since it is so unbelievably extreme for that one day.” (UVb 2) [7] “When I talk to my friends, we are just talking about the champagne breakfast, about what we are going to eat, […] it’s more about feasting and not about singing the national anthem. We’ve never talked about what it is we are celebrating, actually.” (UVb 4) [8]

This perceived individualisation makes solidarity an important value for some of the participants especially for its role in maintaining the democratic tradition: “But what I like about Norway is that the democracy is very prevalent, it’s something we trust a lot, and that requires an inner solidarity in the country […]. Because without solidarity, democracy falls.” (UVb 1) [9]

The impact of individualisation was seen to be somewhat limited due to solidary principles and routines that are ingrained into the Norwegian institutions at every level: “Well, solidarity is embedded in the structure, so no matter where you are, if you are at your job or at university, you always have some organisation that can [help you].” (MN 3) Taxes and the welfare state were also named as important sources and provisions of solidarity.

At the same time, some of the participants reflected upon the question if general wealth in society, combined with cuts in the welfare system had eroded solidary feelings in society at large. Similarly they found that responsibility had shifted from the public to the individual:

MN 2: So, in Norway, you are generally doing quite well. And then […] you don’t really have to fight for your neighbour because most likely, he will also be doing quite well.

MN 1: But do you think that’s because we are all doing better than before or because we have given everyone more responsibility for their own wellbeing?

MN 2: Maybe a bit of both. [11]

This shift from the public to the private is what individualisation, as it is used in Juul’s (2013) theory, who references to Bauman and Beck, is all about. Traditional structures, that gave sense and meaning to the lives of citizens have been liquefied (cf. Bauman 2000), and the risks of building a life have been transferred to individuals who are now solely responsible for their choices (cf. Beck and Grande 2010).

Another concern that was frequently voiced was that solidary statements might just be made in order to gain acknowledgement and out of an egoistic motivation to be seen as a better person – especially on social media. This will be discussed in chapter 5.5.
In conclusion, the participants painted an ambivalent picture of the Norwegian society. While they thought that solidarity still was an essential value, they questioned whether it still had the importance it used to have. The next chapter will explore how they argued for their conviction that solidarity has an important role in society.

5.3 Communitarian and Liberalist Arguments

As elaborated in chapter 3, Juul (2013) presents liberal theories of social contracts and communitarian theories as the main strands in moral philosophy, and therefore in matters of solidarity, today. Juul’s (2013) theory bridges the divide and builds on arguments from both sides, but also presents criticism of both positions. Here, these categories will be used to explore if the students argued for solidarity using community-based, and therefore communitarian or contract-based arguments, which are associated with liberalism.

The opinion of the participants veered strongly on the side of communitarianism which states that commonly held beliefs and values, together with a sense of responsibility towards the group are fundamental to solidarity (Juul 2013: 54-55). As mentioned above, words referring to community were often used when they talked about the basis for solidarity. One participant put it like this: “[… I] have written passion or a common interest or goal, there needs to be something that binds everything together, in one way or another.” (UVa 2) [12] Another emphasised one’s responsibility towards the community: “I believe that you have to do something in order to be part of a community. There are certain norms, rules, values that characterise a community and based on those you are becoming an engaged member of the community. You do your part.” (UVb 1) [13] These remarks draw attention to the fact that moral behaviour can only be judged within the context of the values and practical wisdom of a community (Juul 2013: 57).

One of the main criticism of communitarianism is that humans participate not only in one but in multiple communities at the same time (Juul 2013: 58). Furthermore, without a pluralistic concept of community, communitarianism tends towards cultural localism and ultimately exclusive nationalism.

The critique of the nationalistic tendencies of communitarianism was also raised by one of the participants, who described the nationalistic solidarity shown during the 17th of May celebrations as at odds with their feeling of solidarity as a citizen of the world:
Is it possible to be a solidary person but then not allow others to be a part of it? […] Just like me, I like to think of myself as a citizen of the world, at least I try my best, and so I want to show solidarity with everyone I meet. But then [on the 17th of May, note by the researcher] it’s suddenly just an attitude, but it’s not like I only feel solidarity with just that one group. (UVb 1) [14]

In this quote, the participant reflects upon a conflict between their expressed and their enacted values, as well as one between their global attitudes and localised practices. According to the student, excluding people based on their nationality on a day like the 17th of May reduces their solidarity to an attitude. Since others, non-Norwegians, usually tend to lack the national feeling of pride and belonging together, the inclusive attitude, which solidarity requires, is hard to live out in practice. As the participant argues, there is therefore a risk that including those left outside, remains “just an attitude”.

Solidarity can therefore not be based on the values of any community, as it would exclude many from benefiting from it. Juul (2013: 60) consequently argues that it has to be rooted in pluralism, democratic principles and formal rights as well.

Similar attempts at reformulating the communitarian ideas could also be found in some of the statements by the participants – if only with different conclusions drawn from it. One argued that one would always have enough in common to elicit a feeling of similitude, even with people living on opposite side of the world: “If you don’t have anything in common, then I would say that it is a bit difficult, but usually you do have something in common, just because you are a human being. So you have some sort of connection, maybe it’s faith, or maybe it’s [something else].” (MN 2) [15] Others argued for groups that would be inclusive and welcoming to outsiders:

But I went more for community, and to consider similarities/differences, some sort of common goal, that you have a group that has a common goal or wish, if one can say that? It can also be a common understanding between people. And everyone should be included, so with solidarity it’s like ‘no one left behind’.” (UVb 1) [16]

In another exchange, two participants discussed the possibilities of solidarity between members of different groups:

MN 1: So for me I thought a lot like, you do something, which maybe doesn’t benefit you, something that benefits a group, and maybe even not your own group but groups that… if there are two different groups within another group, then you can stand in solidarity together, or do something that actually costs you something compared to the others. [concurring reactions] To get a feeling of belonging together.

MN 3: That that’s the same thoughts that I’ve had, actually. It’s definitely inclusive and… you had a good point, actually, with not just keeping it to your own group or trying to expanding it a bit, maybe?

MN 1: Yes, if it’s someone who has a similar background but is from a different group, for example,
then you still can do things together, because if it helps them, it could be that they help you or others in the end – or something like that. [17]

Here, the notion of unity within a group as a prerequisite for solidarity is being replaced with a logic of exchange of solidarity between different entities. Another participant described this as something that had evolved over time:

Yes, it can be that solidarity has, from a historic perspective, that it has gone from meaning that you show solidarity for your own kind, but that this has developed to mean that you maybe show solidarity for those who are different from you. (UVb 3) [18]

Ultimately, Juul (2013: 56) transcends communitarianism by making recognition as a prerequisite for the good life: morality, he argues, is rooted in communal values and a responsibility to others. However, traditional communities with strong concepts of the good life tend to be hostile and oppressive towards minorities and outsiders, yet they are often idealised in communitarianism (Juul 2013: 58). Consequently, he develops a concept of the good life “which must not be so strong that it becomes arrogant and intolerant” (Juul 2013: 60) and which is based on pluralism and democratic values, supported by good judgement.

The participants made similar criticisms in their arguments. While they saw solidarity as very much rooted in community and a feeling of belonging together, they problematized both exclusion and limited feelings of solidarity, and advocated for approaches that are more open to outsiders.

The arguments they presented were almost exclusively communitarian in nature. Rarely, they referenced liberalist contractual arguments. One of the few instances is this description of how solidarity can be seen as a strategic investment or mutually beneficial trade between two different groups:

This would be a very personal type of solidarity, but sometimes there can be other motivations for doing it, others apart from compassion, empathy and… that it’s more concrete things you are thinking of. And you can also do things that benefit yourself, that are not necessarily… a matter of personal compassion but more like… an “I stand to benefit if I help this group” kind of thought. Maybe more like horse-trading? (MN 1) [19]

The participant here emphasises a rational way of thinking about solidarity: weighing different potential future scenarios against each other and choosing the one that will yield the best outcome for oneself resonates with the type of reasoning that is central to liberalist contract theories (Juul 2013: 49).
The underlying self-interest in the logic brought forward in the quote above points to tensions and ambiguities between different rationales for engaging in solidarity that will be further analysed in chapter 5.5.

### 5.4 Recognition: Different Arenas for Solidarity

Juul’s (2013) theory has the idea of recognition as the basis of the good life, which itself is the aim of any ethical theory. A just social order is therefore one that gives everyone the chance to attain the recognition necessary for a good life, with and for others, in just institutions (Juul 2013: 193). Recognition, as defined by Honneth, works on three levels: love, between close relatives and friends, legal rights, between members of the same legal community, and social esteem, between members of different groups, marked by different ways of life. Together they are the necessary prerequisites of a positive relation to the self (Juul 2013: 15).

The participants themselves did not use the term *recognition* in its Norwegian equivalents anerkjennelse, gjenkjennelse, and bekreftelse, nor any verbs or adjectives derived from those words. However, similar thoughts were formulated during the focus groups.

One group discussed different levels of solidarity, ranging from the individual, over societies to solidarity between countries.

UVb 1: […]ell you can think solitarily on an individual level, and on a societal level, and a national level, European level, and… yes, how can you say that…
UVb 3: …universal?
UVb 1: Universal, yes, thanks. Yes, no, that’s interesting. Something one should discuss. [20]

Similar thoughts were shared in the other groups as well, yet they were never fully explored or developed. As no coherent systematization was suggested by the participants, let alone one that was shared by all of them, Honneth’s terminology of love, legal rights, and social esteem is used in the following chapters to structure and contextualize the discussions in the groups. This allows for the thoughts and opinions shared across the focus groups to appear more clearly and succinctly, and therefore for a richer mutual interpretation of theory and the perceptions of the students.
5.4.1 Love

Love, the first form of recognition, refers to a “strong emotional attachments among a small number of people” (Honneth 2005: 95). It is seen as the most basic form of recognition whereby people mutually recognise their need for and dependence on the other.

The love relationship was probably the one that was least discussed in the groups. However, solidary action for families and friends were named in the discussions. “[I] have written down that being loyal to something, for example your family, that you are loyal and solidary there, with the family.” (UVb 3) [21] Arguably, being faithful to the family refers to a reciprocal dependence between family members, which would make it an example of love. Another participant argued that it is easier to act in solidarity for someone one has a close relationship with: “I think that if it’s friends, or best friends, or a group you are closely associated with, or have stronger ties to, then it’s easy to be there for them or to help with something and to be solidary, actually.” (MN 3) [22] While Juul (2013: 89) and Honneth (2005: 96) see love as the most fundamental form of recognition, one that enables human beings to act with self-confidence, they do not say whether the existence of such a relationship makes it more or less likely for anyone to take action for the person with whom one has this relationship. The student’s argument however highlights the strong connection and therefore the importance that love recognition has for individuals. It also shows that they differentiate between the different levels of solidarity based on closeness to the other.

5.4.2 Legal Rights

As the second type of recognition, the legal relation between members of a community is based on the realisation that if oneself has legal rights, the other has the same rights, resulting in mutual, normative obligations to one another (Honneth 2005: 108). These rights are awarded independent of individual characteristics and qualities, establishing autonomy and enabling everyone to develop self-respect as a trusted, morally responsible citizen (Juul 2013: 89-90).

The importance of equal rights was emphasised by one participant when the discussion turned to the question whether or not solidarity can be between any two people on the basis that they share an understanding of each other just because they both are human beings while being completely different in every other way. The participants agreed that that was possible and one of them remarked that this fundamental equality even has a basis in law: “Is that not what human
rights are based on in part?” (UVa 2) [23] The other participants of the group agreed with this argument. This was one of remarkably few instances where participants referred to a legal rule as the basis of solidarity.

Returning to the discussion about different levels of solidarity outlined above, rights and laws of a society were identified as one of areas where solidarity is rooted: “I think it can be at the level of society or on an individual level, so it’s not just about how you behave yourself but also about how society behaves and how rules are created and written and things like that.” (UVb 3) [24] This statement emphasises the fact that solidarity is not only a matter of individual, personal interaction, but of societal organisation as well. Ricœur’s (1992) formula of the good life, with and for others, in just institutions, reflects this as well. It has a central place in Juul’s (2013: 68-69) theory, which argues that the good life cannot be achieved in isolation from others but only with them. As the ethical question of the good defines the context for the moral discussions of the just, it follows that justice has to include just institutions, too. Otherwise solidarity would be limited to direct interaction between people. Just institutions based on equal rights and fair processes allow everyone to struggle for recognition and ultimately the good life.

Taking taxes as an example, another participant illustrated the mutual relationship of rights and obligations between oneself and the generalised other:

Generally, paying taxes, that’s very solidary, right? [concurring reactions] Because it’s like saying, “Here, take my money, if someone can’t get by financially, they can get help.” But at the same time you know that there’s a system that, if you fall on hard times, protects you, too. (MN 2) [25]

This emphasises not only the importance of a fair system of laws but also the life with and for others, ensuring well-being for oneself in times of need. This secure system of welfare, upheld by taxes, also shows a strong belief of the participants in the Norwegian welfare society. This is illustrated by the exchange in the two quotes below. Two participants argued that a basic understanding of solidarity and responsibility is necessary to understand the importance of paying taxes:

UVb 4: That’s an important part of a democratic country, I think, solidarity within the population, in many different forms.
UVb 1: Especially in the welfare state, which you’ve named earlier. There, everyone understands why we are paying taxes and therefore-
UVb 4: Yes, why we are doing that. [26]
Talking about health insurance, one of the participants gave another example of the importance for solidarity in maintaining social welfare institutions:

> If you for example just take a look at the USA, there are so many there who don’t think that a common health insurance is important, and THAT is something that only works on a solidary principle, but there are millions who think, “I am young, I am healthy, why should I pay for the elderly?” (UVb 4) [27]

In his theory of recognition, Honneth places recognition in the first and second sphere in front of social esteem, which he calls solidarity. As discussed in the theory chapter, one of the changes Juul (2013: 94-95) makes to Honneth’s theory, is to remove legal recognition as a precondition to social esteem and placing them both alongside of each other. Solidarity thereby becomes a matter of all three levels of recognition. He argues that legal norms without social esteem are meaningless.

The participants have made similar arguments in their statement quoted above. On the one hand, as MN 2 put it, a fair system of taxes can induce recognition of the other as a person with the same value as oneself, regardless of their ways of life, which is close to the definition of social esteem. On the other hand, the understanding of the inclusivity of the welfare state and its inherent value can lead to understanding and realisation of the importance of taxes, which falls into the domain of legal recognition.

### 5.4.3 Social Esteem

As the third and last area of recognition, social esteem relates to individual abilities, traits, and ways of life. In order to recognise each other’s particularities, individuals need to have a shared value-horizon, meaning that they are sharing “an orientation to those values and goals that indicate to each other the significance or contribution of their qualities for the life of the other” (Honneth 2005: 121).

The participants talked extensively about the importance of relating to other people’s values, experiences, and qualities. When they are shared, they are fundamental to establishing a feeling of belonging together and ultimately solidary action, they argued. One participant formulated it like this: “I would say that that is what solidarity comes down to, maybe, that you have understanding for those around you, and that you feel like one of many.” (MN 2) [28]
As it becomes clear in this exchange, shared purpose or goals can unite very different people:

UVa 1: But maybe it’s that, this interest, or this value, or this goal that you have in common, even if you aren’t necessarily in the same situation?
UVa 4: Yes, that’s what I meant with that, like, well-
UVa 1: But then that has to go both ways, like, that YOU have compassion for someone who is worse off than you and feel sorry for them. Because it has to be the same feeling with which you meet each other.
UVa 4: Yes! That’s what I meant. Yes, that’s what I feel in any case.
UVa 1: That could be about something else, something that maybe doesn't affect you directly and that’s why both of you can have the same approach to it? [29]

Another group drew attention to the fact that if being in some way similar to each other is a prerequisite for solidarity, this puts limits on the potential for solidary action:

MN 1: I think that you can be solidary with people in other parts of the world as well, but I think that that has a lot to do with similarity and culture, or likeness.
MN 2: Yes, because I believe that the more you have…
MN 3: … in common…
MN 2: … in common with the other group, the easier it is to be solidary, I think. [30]

These limits to social esteem due to cultural similitude is problematized by Honneth (2007c) as well. According to him, this type of thinking can be traced back to traditional, class-based societies, and is no longer relevant in individualised societies. Instead, he argues for recognising everyone “for their own achievements and abilities in such a way that they learn to esteem and value themselves” (Honneth 2007c: 261). This means that social esteem is not limited to “our kind of people” (Juul 2013: 90) but can be awarded to others as well, if one radically opens up one’s own culture horizon.

Two participants brought that argument down to a rather extreme example:

UVb 2: But it may well be that Nazis are solidary with each other, even though they have a very negative opinion about the other members of society.
UVb 3: And that can be a solidarity within a group. So they can be inclusive for each other, even though, from an outside perspective, it doesn’t look like that there is much solidarity there for other people. [31]

In this case, social esteem is limited to people with a certain belief that unites them as a group. Their belief however runs against the ethical goal of the good life with and for others as it is based on excluding other parts of society from their chances of gaining recognition. As solidarity is about giving everyone a chance of being recognised (Juul 2013: 119), the students justifiably question whether one can speak of solidarity in this example.
Another necessary element for social esteem that is missing here is an emotional connection in the others’ particularities. In his description of social esteem, Honneth specifically excludes what he calls “passive tolerance of the other” (Honneth 2007c: 261). True social esteem, he argues, requires an active, emotional investment in the other’s individual traits and values.

Addressing the difference between tolerance and solidarity, one participant made a similar point:

Well, tolerance is… [long pause] well, it’s about that you tolerate something you do not necessarily like, I think. [concurring reactions] That you… I see you, I see what you stand for, what you mean, that’s ok, but I don’t agree with it, and maybe I even don’t think much of it, but you shall be allowed to continue believing that. But solidarity, I think, has … has something to do with a feeling that that person has some of the same values like you, or some of the same opinions like you, and therefore you appreciate that person. (UVa 1) [32]

To be a truly solidary society, there is the need or integrating diverse ways of life and values into one shared social structure (Juul 2013: 91). One participant framed this as an educational project, saying: “It’s just… yes, knowledge and… opening your mind. That makes you able to see… the other’s perspective and understand things you hadn’t understood before.” (UVa 2) [33]

5.5 Motivation for Solidarity: Disrespect and Solicitude

In chapter 3.2.2, Juul’s (2013) three struggles for recognition were interpreted as three different motivations for solidary actions. They are: the existential struggle for recognition, correlating with a personal experience of injustice as a reason for action; struggles out of solicitude for the weaker, that is recognition given out of charity as a gift to someone who is being oppressed; and egoistic struggles for recognition, where one’s own good life alone motivates an action. However, egotism was excluded from solidarity as it has nothing to do with the good life with and for others (Juul 2013: 97). The students gave and discussed examples for all three of these motivations.

Telling about their experience at work, one participant started talking about how the threat of unemployment made the employees join a union:

MN 3: […When] everything is going well, you just forget about it, when things become a bit tougher and you realise that it’s probably you who is going to lose their job, it becomes, “Oh, no I have to become a member.” [laughs]
MN 2: Because it’s a bit like you’ve just said, you don’t have to be empathic because you feel sorry for others.
MN 3: No.
MN 2: It can also be that “Oh, shit, now it’s going badly for me as well, we have to stand united, we are one group.” Because you yourself need it. [34]

Interestingly, Honneth (2007d: 75) discusses unemployment as a central example for an instance of disrespect, which hinders the development of social esteem. Since being employed is being awarded a higher social status in the current societal order, employment is directly linked to the chance of getting the social esteem that is necessary to form an individual identity (Honneth 2007d: 76). Employees that fear for their jobs therefore engage in solidary action due to a personal feeling of disrespect. Ultimately, if they choose to work together with others, they share the collective goal to avert redundancies, which guarantees the good life for them with and for others. What the participants describe here also comes very close to how Honneth (2005: 165-66) describes the beginning of collective struggles for recognition: a personal feeling of disrespect, in this case the threat of unemployment, is interpreted as something affecting a group of others as well. This can then lead to collective action against the common threat. Consequently, this example is an instance for an existential struggle for recognition with and for others.

There was large agreement between the participants to exclude egoistic motives as a valid source for solidarity. In a conversation about commemorative profile pictures on Facebook in the aftermath of tragic events, one group concluded:

UVb 3: Mhm. But do you think more in the line of that one shows… to promote oneself, in a way, as a good person who-?
UVb 2: Yes.
UVb 1: That can also happen.
UVb 3: More in an egoistic way?
UVb 2: It can easily become that. Because it doesn’t last long. I feel that it doesn’t last that long.
UVb 1: And now we are also talking about action. Because in that case, that is not an action. I completely agree, it becomes a fake action, in a way, but no… to show solidarity-
UVb 4: I think most people do it for themselves.
UVb 3: Yes, right? [laughs]
UVb 4: They feel better, “Yes, now I am solidary”, but it actually is not solidarity.
UVb 3: No, it isn’t, is it? [35]

In contrast to the example of the trade unions, where there is a personal realisation that everyone can profit from a struggle together, the participants argued that in this case, there is no such general benefit. To put it differently, a benefit of everyone replaces the egoistic intention of joining the trade union, while the focus here remains on gaining personal social esteem from the suffering of others.
However, it has to be said that egoistic intentions can also be seen in the case of employees that join a trade union in order not to lose their work. Just looking at the intentions behind the actions in this case and the example right above does not provide strong enough arguments for distinguishing between the two. Only basing the distinction between existential and egotistic struggles for recognition on what initiated them, which is the criterion Juul (2013: 72) uses in his theory, does not seem to provide a classification powerful enough in this instance.

The participants also problematized that it would be difficult to judge from the outside, whether an action was driven by egoistic motives.

UVb 1: But it’s very difficult, because you can’t know people’s intentions?
UVb 3: No…
UVb 2: So how can you then feel solidarity in another person, if it is like, “Hm. Are we really standing together in that matter?”
UVb 3: … yes, if you don’t know?
UVb 2: But then it will flatten out again, because if that person only does it until the hype or the attention is over and afterwards there is no trace to be found any more? But if you […] support the victims when there is the need, or if for example do something, […] that you show] that you are a person who is involved not only when the media reports something or the matter is getting attention. [36]

While the participants here seem to suggest that motivation should be judged based on the action and how long one’s engagement lasts, Juul (2013: 97) does not formulate a similar criterion in his brief description of egoistic struggles for recognition. The tensions and ambiguities that have surfaced in the section above will be taken up again in chapter 6 of this thesis.

Juul (2013: 96-101) argues for alternative struggles for recognition other than those initiated by a personal feeling of disrespect. These struggles out of solicitude for the weaker result from the wish to alleviate the disrespect felt by others. The participants mentioned the fact that empathy and sympathy can be motivating factors for solidary action as well; in another discussion, participants made a direct connection between injustice suffered by others and solidary action:

MN 1: Because injustice has a clear connection with solidarity, that’s clear.
MN 3: Yes!
MN 1: To help someone because what they experience is unjust, but doesn’t necessarily have something to do with you personally, in that case I can use the word solidarity. [37]

One participant was convinced that solidarity is more than just reactions to injustice: “If, for example, someone is treated unfairly, then you can maybe show solidarity. […] But actually, solidarity means other things, too, like how you treat someone, so when I meet you on campus and I see that you are lost … or something like that, that can also be solidarity.” (UVb 4) [38]
Offering assistance to someone who is lost or helping someone who is in a difficult situation, those instances of solidarity are close to Ricœur’s (2005) gift metaphor that underlies recognition out of solicitude for the weaker. To recall, recognition can be given as a gift without hidden intentions or expectations, which according to social convention, should be reciprocated.

Referring to the Bible, one participant explained this logic of receiving and giving recognition like this:

Hm, no, I just believe, that if you… I really believe in what you say about the Bible. Now I’m not Christian but that it’s like: treat others like you want others to treat you. I think that this can be… that this is very close to solidarity. If you show solidarity for others, then I think that many will also show solidarity for you. (UVa 4) [39]

Throughout the different group discussions, the participants gave examples for recognition given out of solicitude, a central element of Juul’s (2013) theory.

5.6 Contexts of Justice and Justification

Different claims for recognition can be competing and mutually exclusive. As described in chapter 3.3, Juul (2013) supplements his reformulated recognition theory with the notion of a just order of recognition and a logic of justification, which is largely based on Forst’s theory of contexts of justice. Forst (2002) argues that human interaction can be judged in four different contexts: ethics, law, citizenship and democracy, and morality. While these contexts can and should be in agreement, there is the possibility for conflicting arguments and conclusions within and between these contexts. Each context is associated with its own mode of logic of justification. Additionally, everyone has a right to justification, that is to get reasons for other peoples’ actions as well as to argue for one’s own opinions and actions.

At the very end of one of the focus groups, one participants made a very similar point in a casually interjected comment, after a longer discussion on the implications of automation for society. “You have to justify your thoughts, ‘I support a dystopia where only engineers have jobs building robots while everyone else starves’ [laughter] That’s like… you can’t say that out loud if that’s what you believe, anyway.” (MN 1) [40] While this was probably meant as a joke, it does draw attention to the fact that there is a need for justifying one’s own opinions and ultimately, if this thought is developed further, the actions that are based on them.
The integration of justice and justification into a theory of solidarity pushes it into the domain of ethics of intention, where the aim of an action is evaluated, and not its outcome (cf. Honneth 2007b: 107). Yet without action, the intention itself remains hidden and no justification dialogue can begin (Forst 2002: 190).

The participants also expressed this thought:

UVa 2: […] there has to be a certain… well, you can go around thinking, “Yes, I am solidary”, because you are feeling that, but you actually don’t do anything with that feeling; then you don’t show your solidarity, you just feel it. I think that there has to be a certain action connected to that feeling for it to be solidarity.

UVa 4: Yes, I do agree with that as well because… well you would never say, “oh, that guy over there, he is so solidary”, if he just goes around and-

UVa 2: Yes, exactly! “Look at me, I am solidary!” … No, I couldn’t agree more. “Look at me!”

[jokingly; laughter] No, I totally agree. [41]

Indeed, action is essential for solidarity. Three arguments can be made here, based on Juul’s (2013) theory itself and his own sources:

Firstly, Forst’s (2002) theory of contexts of justice explicitly is about justifying actions. While deliberation and intention plays an important part as the rational grounding for an action, in the end the action itself is to be justified in reference to these reasons in a public discourse.

Secondly, taking up the difference between tolerance and solidarity again, tolerance was defined as passive and recognition as “emotional participation” (Honneth 2007c: 261), which would require at least some sort of mental action if not an active effort to understand the other. Moreover, Honneth himself conceived his recognition theory as not just a cognitive state but rather as an existential stance that “we take towards others and which affects our being-in-the-world” (Honneth 2012: 24). If recognition itself changes our way of being, then it contains in itself at least the notion of a minimal action to affect that change.

Finally, Juul (2013: 32) emphasises that his theory leaves the decision on what to do in any given situation to practical judgement, as no moral rule can ever be applied in all situations without careful reflection. This also suggests that his theory ultimately refers to judgement of actions and not just attitudes. It would therefore seem reasonable to argue that within the context of Juul’s (2013) theory intention without action does not qualify as solidarity, which resonates with the arguments of the participants quoted above.
Another participant approached the problem from a different angle by inverting the justification relationship of action and intention:

It strikes me that it probably can be very different from person to person, what you see as solidarity and whom you consider solidary. I agree with what has been said about action, that one needs to perform an action, but no matter how small it is, it can justify a person’s attitude and show if they are solidary. But let’s say I hold the door open when everyone wants to enter a room, and for me that’s very solidary, but for everyone else it’s just natural since I was the first to go through the door. (UVb 2) [42]

Since ideas of solidarity can vary from person to person, an action is necessary to justify the intention as it makes the intention accessible and open to judgement by others. The two arguments are therefore circular: an action can legitimise an intention and intentions can justify actions.

Overall, explicit theoretical thoughts on justification like the ones presented here were rare in the focus group discussions. However, on a more implicit level, the participants often talked about reasons to act in solidarity. These reasons can be interpreted as justifications for actions, or at least beginnings for potential justification discourses. (Forst 2012: 14-15) describes reasons for an action as its rational grounding, which can, once publicly scrutinised, be deemed a reasonable justification of an action.

Juul (2013) uses Forst’s contexts of justice as sensitising concepts for judgement in concrete situations where abstract rules are implemented through interpretation. He emphasises that different contexts can intersect and therefore introduces a hermeneutic concept or judgement, whereby all principles of justice “must pass through a judgement which is not a purely theoretical capacity but something learned in the school of life” (Juul 2013: 127).

As the theory emphasizes the importance of context, the analysis turns to instances where the participants argued for and against recognition based on the specific context they were situated in.

One participant gave an example from their working experience on how a common practice can seem both justifiable and illegitimate, depending on the perspective taken. They had worked for a company that had both regular customers but also a contract with the local government. In case they had to work overtime, the government and not the customer was charged in order to be more competitive:
Because for the individual client that’s very positive, if they don’t have to pay for the extra hour you work for them, and the workers get their money, but that negatively affects society and… it negatively affects all of us in the municipality if money is distributed like that. (UVb 2) [43]

In this quote, the student clearly separates the different benefits and cost, and concludes that the practice is not justifiable. The situation as it was described demonstrates a conflict between the good life of the company customers, its employees, and owners who have adopted this practice as their ethical norm, but it is blatantly at odds with existing legal norms. The student seemed to think that the practice was not justifiable, as they emphasised the cost for everyone in municipality and therefore limiting the chances for the good life for all.

The importance of different points of view in matters of solidarity also came up in this exchange:

MN 2: That’s maybe that… if you help someone, it’s often by giving them resources and for the most part it’s like that, that if you give someone resources, you have to take these resources from somewhere else. So it becomes a bit like: You take from someone to give to someone else, in a way. There is someone who gains from that but quite often there is someone who loses as well.

MN 1: A zero-sum game, yes.

MN 2: And … solidarity is actually a lot about where you see it from, also because some might look at it as something negative and not solidary because someone is losing something, while others would see it [differently]. [44]

The conflict described here is between different claims on the levels of ethics or citizenship. If one feels treated unfairly because others benefit from something that one feels has been taken away from oneself, different ethical beliefs of “what is good for us” are in conflict. It is also a matter of organising society in a just way, through well-reasoned rules for the distribution of goods. Here, different claims for recognition overlap, giving rise to the need for justification. Forst (2012) argues that justification can be demanded, otherwise, justice would become arbitrary. The people who feel disadvantaged in the present example could therefore demand a justification discourse about what they see as the unfair distribution of goods, which would ultimately lead to the resolution of the conflict. Arguments in this debate would have to be primarily made in the citizenship and democracy context of justice and, if the two groups are part of the same ethical community, could involve ethical arguments.

Participants discussing the relationship between teachers and students gave another example that showed the importance of the judgement in situations. They agreed that there could not be a rule obligating the two groups to work together in any case, yet:
Even though they all agreed with UVa 2 that a common, uniting basis for solidarity is needed, they also seemed aware of the fact that the final decision on actions is bound to the specific situation they are situated in. In this case, the decision has to be justified within the contexts of law, since any action on the part of the teachers has to be argued for on a legal basis, and citizenship, since issues like fraværsgrense are about redefining the legal framework in a just way.

While the participants of the study did not explicitly refer to different modes of justification depending on context, the exchanges quoted here and many others suggest that they are well aware that solidarity is not free of conflict and that some argumentation is necessary in order to determine the appropriate action.

Returning once more to Juul’s (2013) hermeneutic concept of judgement, indicating that judgement is learned through real life experience, the following section examines how the participants of the study reflected upon their experiences at university with regard to their perceptions of solidarity.

### 5.7 Learning Judgement at University

Asked about whether they felt attending university has influenced for their perception of solidarity, the participants of the study reflected both on their experience at the University of Oslo as a social environment as well as on their field of study. While the general experience of being a student at the university of UV and MN students can be discussed together, their

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5 Fraværsgrensa is a rule applying to students in the last tier of Norwegian secondary education, videregående skole, that stipulates that students who are absent for more than 10% of lessons in any subject will not receive a grade. Absence due to sickness, political engagement, or similar activities, do not count towards the 10%. (Source: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/fravarsgrense/id2423161/, accessed 8.10.2017)
thoughts and perceptions connected to the content of the study programmes are analysed separately since they are very different in their focus, structure, and content.

5.7.1 Studying at the University of Oslo

Overall, the participants of the study thought that studying had positively contributed to their own sense of solidarity towards others. Especially, the contact with other students was very important for them.

UVa 1: I believe that the contact to other students has an influence… on the level that one is in the same situation and that one maybe realises that one thinks the same things are funny or entertaining, and difficult or tiresome. […]
UVa 2: We meet different people and get to know different persons, and… that makes you also maybe change your mind and maybe your perspective on certain things.
UVa 3: You become a bit more humble, quite simply. That is actually quite important, I think, for … showing solidarity. [46]

Others reported that their sense of connection and community between students of the same discipline:

MN 2: But for me it was like… after I started attending university, […] I became a bit more focussed on those who are close to me, those I often work with and those that are… those who I feel closer to? That I maybe was more ready to fight for them […].
MN 3: If it think about our group, then we are studying at the institute of physics, we are all in small groups of maybe seven,…
MN 2: Yes, something like that.
MN 3: Yes, something like that. And then you quickly realise that we are […] always spending time together, you know? You hold yourself a lot more to the group you identify yourself with the most. [47]

The students also emphasized the importance of solidarity action in various walks of university life. As an example, they named standing together as a class:

You are often standing together as a class like a workplace stands together. […]e have classes together and so on, so there you get some feeling of belonging together and maybe you want that the others succeed as well. (MN 2) [48]

Another important area was between students through inclusive actions: “Or talking to people who sit on their own, because you want to include them in your solidarity and your community and do something about it.” (UVb 1) [49]

This is an instance of recognition given as a gift out of solicitude for the weaker, just like Ricœur (2005) has developed it. Recognising and integrating a student who previously was socially isolated into a social environment can be the first step in a continuous exchange of recognition under peaceful conditions, when the initial gift is reciprocated.
Another student reported that their exchange semester had helped them establish a connection with other students from all around the world:

I was on exchange in Belgium last autumn and met students from almost the whole of Europe, the USA, Japan, other countries, that was a lot of fun. But then you also realise how much you have in common, how much you have… a similar perception, or similar experiences just by… being a student. (UVa 1) [50]

Similarly, living together with other students was a valued experience for one participant:

I have been living in a flat-share with other students for nearly two years now and that has changed me a lot. […] I used to be very… how can I say that, individual?, individualistic?, and I still am, but not to the same extent as before. I had been living alone and now, it’s the first time that I live with other – and that, I would say, has made me more solidary. (UVb 4) [51]

The participants also identified student politics and student societies as important arenas where solidarity is practised.

One group discussed whether the fact that they are allowed to study without having to pay tuition was solidarity on the part of society at large, and whether it meant that they had a responsibility towards society because of that.

MN 1: Now I’m thinking from a higher perspective: We are costing society a lot when we are studying, a whole lot, so that’s a solidary action on the part of society to pay that we are getting an education for free.
MN 2 + MN 3: Yes.
MN 1: That is solidary, […] but most of us are actually going to earn that money back […]. Then it’s solidarity if we… try to finish within the given time, that would be a solidary towards society.
MN 3: Yes? [laughter]
MN 2: I’m not sure that THAT is solidary, just because you live up to something.
MN 1: But that would the opposite, they are paying everything until you graduate, that is a solidary action. [52]

From a theoretical point of view, studying for free could be seen as solidarity, especially if it allows people from a financially underprivileged background to increase their chances of striving for the good life. Again, this would qualify as a gift out of solicitude for the weaker. While gifts are conventionally expected to be returned, there is no obligation to do that (cf. Ricoeur 2005: 242). Consequently, if one can finish one’s study on time, this could be such a gift given in return, yet there is no obligation and, as always, it depends on the individual context the student finds themselves in.

The participants did not debate their relationship with society and their place within it further, yet they actively reflected upon what their societal responsibility would look like once they
would have graduated and started to work in the professions they were educated to do. These thoughts will be discussed separately in the next two chapters.

When it came to the experience of studying at the University of Oslo, the participants were quite critical. They perceived the university as individualized and disparaging to solidary behaviour.

Participants from both MN and UV felt that the university lacked a feeling of belonging together and that it encouraged competition over connection.

MN 2: […]I live in Ås and there, there is also NNMU6, and I have been to Samfunnet i Ås7 often, and there… I get the impression that there is a lot more cohesion there. They have bigger student societies and people try to cooperate, they are a bit more… trying to hold a bit more together and they are friendlier towards each other. You get the impression even more that UiO is very impersonal and if it’s impersonal, you don’t become solidary because you don’t see – you don’t have quite the same…-

MN 3: - Well, I don’t know how it is in [your programmes] but for us, what makes it impersonal and a bit more individual, is that you can choose the courses you want to take yourself.

MN 1 + MN 2: Yes.

MN 3: So quite often, you end up in a course on your own.

MN 2: You don’t get the whole class together.

MN 3: So if you are only seven in your programme, then you are very likely to take courses alone. [53]

Later, one of these students mentioned that many students that had dropped out had given the lack of community as one of the reasons for their decisions:

What you are saying are the same complaints about UiO most people have, that there is only little camaraderie and that’s always… I remember that everyone who had dropped out has complained about that… that there is little camaraderie between students. (MN 3) [54]

A culture of individualisation is not conducive to a feeling of community or even solidarity (Juul 2013: 158). The pressures put on individuals to build a future for themselves leads them to focus on their own lives, rather than engage with others. Judging from the descriptions by the participants, these structures are also present at the university.

Starting from their disciplinary perspective, one group of UV-students reached a similar conclusion:

UVb 1: So, some of us are here to learn and that brings with it solidarity and an understanding for what you learn about formation, pedagogy, understanding of other people, and then there are those who are ego-driven: How can I get the most out of this, how can I get the best grades, how can I get the best job. So, it’s very different how people understand their own studies. Therefore, not everyone graduates from here with the attitudes they should have. [everyone agrees]

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6 Norges Miljø- og Biovitenskapelige Universitet; The Norwegian University of Life Sciences
7 The Student Society in Ås
UVb 2: It is very individual, and you can also see that at The Faculty of Educational Sciences.
UVb 1: Sadly. [55]

In reference to Beck, Bauman and others, Juul (2013: 198) describes modernity as a system where everyone has to be able to build their own life independently from others, and where any qualification and skill might become outdated by tomorrow. These characteristics of modernity, he argues, are an obstacle to solidarity. The students’ portrayal of the structures at the University of Oslo resonates with Juul’s (2013) description.

In these two exchanges, the students name an individualized curriculum and an overemphasis on personal achievement as obstacles for the development of solidarity. At other points in their conversations they also discussed overfilled classes, competition for jobs after graduation, indifference to fellow students, weak levels of student society organisation and a focus on individual, superficial learning outcomes.

In summary, the students gave a nuanced reflection on their university experience. While they saw it as an enriching, character developing time that had made them more open and aware of others, they also described a climate of competition and students looking out only for themselves. There seems to be a good fit with Juul’s (2013: 119) criticism of individualism in society, where capitalist and administrative logics determine judgement. In a way, the students presented the university as a microcosm that reflects wider societal structures, which they also criticised as problematic and disparaging to feelings of community and belongingness.

5.7.2 The Faculty of Educational Sciences

The UV student saw a strong link between their discipline and solidarity. One participant described the connection rather jokingly like this: “Poteto, Potato, almost, right? [laughter]” (UVa 3) [56] Delving deeper into the connection, the participant argued that people working with education and teachers in particular have solidarity almost written into their job description:

[...I]t's a solidary profession. [...I]t is characterised by the fact that you go out and help people, to say it as mundanely as possible, that is fundamentally what they are doing. [concurring reactions] [...M]aybe a bit more concrete, it might be better to say that you, in a way… show respect for and help people who belong to a lower social class, that is almost a prime example for solidarity. [...] But that’s what we do as teachers, to put it like that. We help children from lower social strata because they don’t have that much knowledge. (UVa 3) [57]
Another participant described solidarity as something that fundamentally is ingrained in education: “It is in a way underlying in, well, it almost has to be a part of… what we are studying.” (UVa 2) [58]

Participants also said that they had developed an understanding of the global importance of education and the challenges it faces across the world. This included solidarity for women who are disadvantaged and for schools in conflict areas:

I think that as soon as you study something to do with pedagogy or anything like that […] you develop solidarity for… anything to do with education. So: yes, education is important, we have to get schools into countries where there are conflicts, things like that, so that is also about solidarity. (UVa 1) [59]

Several times, participants referred to the ideal of dannelse and its close ties to solidarity⁸. “The notion of dannelse in pedagogy, I would say, should create a form of community or solidarity.” (UVb 1) [60] “Implied in the whole democratic ideal of dannelse [unintelligible], there is the idea that you should act solitarily.” (UVa 1) [61]

However, the students characterised the treatment of the topic in lectures and seminars mostly as parenthetical and limited to specific pieces of literature:

Interviewer: But are you talking about that, at university?
UVa 1: Not concretely?
UVa 3: Nothing concrete, only when it is related to the reading list. [concurring reactions] [62]

Only one participant who studied to be a schoolteacher in samfunnsfag⁹ said that discussions on solidarity were an important part of their courses:

So I am studying samfunnsfag as my main subject and there, there is a lot of emphasis on everything like citizenship and the democratic way of thinking, and I would say that solidarity is a part of that. That is being conveyed very clearly. Both in the readings and in lectures. (UVa 4) [63]

The students found that the disciplinary content of the curriculum helped them develop through self-reflection and new insights, which ultimately also positively affected their attitudes towards solidary action.

[Y]ou get a deeper understanding of how other people work, how you – you understand your own priorities, motivations; mastering, why am I conflict averse. So you get a deeper understanding of yourself, and therefore a deeper understanding for the others. And a deeper understanding of the others gives you a deeper understanding of yourself. I feel that strongly, pedagogy has given me a lot of insight into that. (UVb 1) [64]

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⁸ See chapter 2.1 for a discussion of the term dannelse.
⁹ Social studies, a subject taught at Norwegian schools, which combines history, political sciences, geography, and sociology.
I think that you just get more conscious of a lot of things [concurring reaction] by… by developing more ways of approaching things then you maybe had before… which also can make it easier to be solidary with someone. (UVa 1) [65]

All students agreed that they had been changed through their experience at university:

UVa 4: I feel that my whole self has been influenced by attending university, so… [concurring reactions]
UVa 2: Well, it IS about formation of human beings, so it would be difficult not to change [laughs].
UVa 4: - I think…[laughter] the more knowledge you have, something you get from being at university, the more… the easier it is to have solidarity. You need knowledge to be solidary [concurring reactions] and that, I believe, is something that… university education, or higher education in general… facilitates. More knowledge, more solidarity. [66]

Finally, one participant argued that other pedagogical skills that they had developed at university helped him understand and act in solidarity with others:

I…half of the courses that I have taken have given me… definitely two of them, have given me tools while two have given me a lot… they have made me a lot more conscious of my attitudes; but those tools were amongst others in rhetoric, to be more able to articulate yourself and doing it better; and to be able to get across what you actually mean in a statement because you think about how the recipient understands what you are saying. (UVb2) [67]

Overall, the students at The Faculty of Educational Sciences felt that they had developed a deeper understanding of solidarity and better “tools” to engage in solidary action. They reported that knowledge and disciplinary skills as well as self-reflection had made them more open towards others and more aware and ready to act in solidarity. It can therefore be said that these skills may help them in what Juul identifies as the essence of solidarity: “to give all people the chance to strive for their vision of the good life and solve the problems that arise when different visions collide.” (Juul 2013: 119).

5.7.3 The Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences

As mentioned above in chapter 4.6, this section is only based on one focus group, which means that it was not possible to compare the statements and the generalise the findings. Furthermore, the answers of the participants were often contradictory. They are presented here however, as they firstly complete the picture of this study and secondly, as they offer some insight into topics and questions that are relevant to studying matters of solidarity in relation to higher education.

When directly asked about the connection between studies and solidarity, the initial reaction of the participants was very clear:
MN 1: It’s very separate from what we are studying, solidarity.
MN 2: I think that we are probably the group… who works on their own the most, in a way.
MN 1: We are also voting a lot bluer10 than for example [unintelligible]
MN 2: I believe so too, yes. [67]

They also said that their attitudes had not changed due to the knowledge gained in their studies. In addition, they reported that discussions on ethics had been scarce in their curricula. On the question whether they had talked about how their actions would affect society during some of their classes, they replied:

MN 3: Absolutely not, no.
MN 2: Maybe a tiny little bit. I think that the only… no. No. [laughs]
MN 1: I had a lecture about ethics and you probably had ExPhil11, maybe?
MN 2: No, I didn’t take ExPhil. I took an engineering degree and we learned a bit about the history of the mobile phone and similar… nonsense subjects.
MN 1: No, ok, we have ExPhil, so we should understand research ethics, not that the course is very popular among people [laughter], and then we had one ethical question, which was just about robots in general, not about whether they take away people’s jobs, that was mentioned, but I didn’t think at all about that.
MN 2: I think what you do get is a tiny amount of ethics in one of the courses I took. [68]

In addition, expressions like “nonsense subject” and the characterisation of ExPhil as a course that does not appeal to students, suggest that those discussions are seen as unnecessary, irrelevant or trivial.

During other parts of the discussion however, the conversation turned to real ethical and moral dilemmas the students had and will be faced with throughout their careers. One participant who worked on automation reflected upon how their actions affect vulnerable groups in society:

MN 1: I also believe that it’s my job to take away the jobs of the rest of Norway. […]
MN 3: Automation?
MN 2: Oh, that’s what you mean!
MN 1: Yes, to take away the jobs of those who have the least, in a way, that’s what I’m doing…
MN 3: We are in the same boat, actually! [laughter]
Interviewer: So it actually has something to do with the subjects you are studying?
MN 2: Yes, but…
MN 1: Actually, it benefits society, but it doesn’t necessarily benefit the workers. […] I am not solidary with truck drivers…
MN 2: Aren’t you?
MN 1: Since I am taking away their jobs. [But I] am solidary with the Norwegian GDP, gross domestic product, and that benefits everyone, so I am more solidary than not solidary… [laughter] like a pair of scales… Otherwise, I wouldn’t be allowed to do what I’m doing, if it didn’t produce positive results, so

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10 In Norwegian politics, parties on the right side of the political spectrum are associated with the colour blue. Voting blue means voting for a conservative or right-wing party.
11 ExPhil is a mandatory course in many bachelor programmes at the University of Oslo. It is an introduction into Western philosophy and science. It also includes a block on ethics.
that the majority profits. But that being solidary with a bigger group is better than being solidary with a smaller one, that’s not right either. [70]

This extract exemplifies how the participants do consider and weigh the results of their work and the conundrums that come with it. It is also a situation in which moral judgement has to be justified because there is no overarching, abstract, normative rule that can be applied (cf. Juul 2013). Arguably then, this puts into question the initial reaction of the participants that solidarity and their fields of study have little to do with each other.

In another instant, the students in this focus group discussed whether they could justify working for a weapons manufacturer. In their reasoning, they gave arguments of a personal nature: “I don’t want to have a bad consciousness” (MN 3) [71], socio-economic reasons: “One of the reasons that I didn’t want to work with weapons is that I would like that we use our money elsewhere.” (MN 2) [72], and political ones: “So, we as citizens have sent our soldiers into war and therefore it’s about protecting them and making their job as easy as possible, since usually we are at war for a good cause.” (MN 1) [73] This again shows the importance of justification, even in areas that seem remote from solidarity.

Interestingly, one of the participants argued that in the end it would be a private decision whether or not to work for a company that develops weapons:

But it absolutely is a private choice. Because I think that is has nothing at all to do with whether you are solidary or not … I think it boils down to a private choice. And what you can and can’t live with. (MN 3) [74]

While the final decision is indeed a private one, it has, if one argues with Juul’s (2013) theory, everything to do with solidarity, as it not only pertains to living with others but also to justification of this personal judgement.

Overall, it could be argued that the focus group discussion amongst the students from The Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences shows the need for a critical concept of solidarity: not only did they report a low level of solidarity amongst the students themselves, they also initially argued that there is no connection between their studies and solidarity. If solidarity is a matter of the good life with and for others (Juul 2013: 69), however, then there is a need for awareness that it penetrates all aspects of life, not just some of them. A fair distribution of chances to achieve recognition is fundamentally a question about societal organisation too; therefore, no sector of society can be excluded.
The participants were aware of their responsibility towards others and the impact their work will have on marginalised groups. However, the university does not seem to support reflection on those questions and leaves it to the individual student to figure out the ethical dilemmas with which they are faced. This seems a wasted chance for the development of judgement through engagement with real-life problems (cf. Juul 2013: 127).
6 Discussion

The thesis started with a discussion on the conflicting expectations placed upon higher education: the formation of responsible and engaged citizens on the one hand, and economic and administrative demands on the other. In this context, this thesis explores if and how these tensions can also be found at the level of students at a higher education institution and how they see themselves being influenced by attending university.

Taking a step back from the analysis presented in the previous chapters, the main findings can be summarised and the research questions answered.

- How do students at the University of Oslo understand the term solidarity and what do they see as solidary behaviour?

The participants of the study described solidary behaviour as actions, which aim at alleviating, or rectifying an injustice, disadvantage, or problem perceived or felt by oneself or someone else for the sake of the other and not primarily for personal gain. They saw solidarity as both an attitude and a willingness to act, which is informed by knowledge, empathy, and compassion. Communities, that is groups of people united by either a common goal, belief or personal characteristic or way of life, play an important part for the participants in determining with whom they want to engage in solidarity. For them, solidarity also meant a just and compassionate organisation of society, inclusivity, and the appreciation of other people’s unique characteristics.

- How do students describe the connection between their area of studies and solidarity and what obligations to society do they feel they have when it comes to solidarity?

Both the students from The Faculty of Educational Sciences and The Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences participating in the study saw solidarity as a relevant value for their area of studies, especially in their future practice as professionals. Students from UV described solidarity and pedagogy as closely linked and emphasised that the value of solidarity was something that educators should teach their students. While the students from MN at first were hesitant about drawing a connection, they discussed many issues connected to their fields where solidarity needs to be considered, especially concerning the effects of technology on society.
When it comes to their identities as students, the participants described themselves as quite removed from larger societal issues. This is not to say that they were disengaged with them. However, their identity as students did not play a role in their engagement. This point warrants further discussion and will be taken up in chapter 6.2.

- How do students describe the influence of attending university education on their perception of solidarity?

Two aspects came to light during the analysis: On the one hand, the students found many processes, experiences, and structures at UiO to be individualising and disparaging of solidary behaviour or development. On the other hand, they also felt that their experience of studying, the knowledge they had gained, and the personal connections they had formed, had had a very positive influence on how they thought about solidarity and related topics. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.3.

Before the discussion of these empirical outcomes, a concluding reflection on the dialogue between theory and data will focus on the theoretical insights and implications that can be drawn from this study.

### 6.1 Interpreting Theory through Empirical Data

As elaborated upon in chapter 4.1, this thesis is a critical case study that applies a theory in a certain empirical environment in order to explore its explanatory powers. In the course of the abductive reasoning process employed in the analysis, some issues have surfaced that are taken up here.

**The Relationship between the Spheres of Recognition**

As it came forward in the analysis of the different types of recognition, students distinguished clearly between forms of communities and recognition, which they separated according to the closeness of the relationship to the other members. Students also described themselves as more likely to engage in solidary action with members of closer communities than with more distant ones. To put it differently, the students described themselves to act more readily in solidarity if someone close to them was affected than if they had little in common with the other.
Similar thoughts cannot be found in Juul’s (2013) theory and while he elaborates on the relationship between legal rights and social esteem, the relationship with the love recognition is somewhat left open. As elaborated in chapter 3.2.1, Honneth (2005) describes legal rights as a precondition for social esteem. Juul (2013) redefines the relationship between legal rights and social esteem as two forms of recognition that can mutually condition each other without any hierarchy between them. However, he does not include similar clarification of the relationship of the love recognition social esteem and legal rights. He writes that it is the “most elementary form of recognition that […] is at the heart of all morality” (Juul 2013: 89), and that it is “decisive for the individual’s ability to enter positively into social relations and participate in society” (Juul 2013: 91), which both seems to suggest that it is a prerequisite for the other two types of recognition. However, this is not made explicit in Juul’s (2013) theory.

If this interpretation were correct, it would resonate with the students’ opinion that helping people close to oneself is more easily triggered and more fundamental, since it is about establishing or defending a person’s essential sense of self and their possibility to be a part of society.

### Struggle(s) for Recognition

Juul’s (2013) theory clearly distinguishes between struggles for recognition out of personal feelings of disrespect, those instigated by feelings of solicitude and excludes egoistic motivation as not being a part of solidarity. In the analysis of the motivation behind solidary actions in chapter 5.5, this distinction left some ambiguities when it was applied to the examples suggested by the participants. Especially when it came to egoistic struggles for recognition and struggles out of disrespect, the participants’ perspective called into question whether the distinction was as clear-cut as the theory suggests. The students also suggested that the intentions behind actions might never be fully knowable and that there might be multiple motivations that are both egoistic and altruistic.

Interestingly, Juul himself gives an example for these divergent motivations, as well: talking about what motivated him to write his book he names both indignation for the social injustices he sees in society and his own private interest in merit, and he adds: “The different motives do not necessarily exclude each other.” (Juul 2013: 97) Yet his final distinction between struggles of recognition does not consider this and is based on motivation alone. This leaves the question open how one is to judge struggles for recognition that have multiple motivations.
The problem here might be that the focus on motivation takes the attention away from the ethical aim of struggles for recognition – the good life with and for others. A struggle out of a personal feeling of disrespect does not necessarily have to be benefiting others, for example. On the other hand, is a struggle for others that is started out of private interest in fame and personal recognition really to be considered solidarity? Both this aim and the initial motivation seem therefore relevant in judging whether a struggle of recognition is to be considered an act of solidarity or not. This additional criterion would go a long way to increase the applicability of Juul’s (2013) concept of struggles for recognition.

6.2 Student Identity and Solidarity

While discussions between the participants on how they as students could engage in solidarity were not rare, most of them revolved around solidarity with other students and not with groups outside of the university context. As students, they felt responsible towards their peers, be it at the same class, the same programme, the same discipline, or the university in general. Solidary actions for others outside of the student milieu were not discussed in reference to their identity as students, but rather as citizens like all others. This might be due to the strong orientation towards thinking in different communities, and the sharp borders that come with it, described in chapter 5.3. While this study is not designed to show causal relationships, it suggests that the identity as students it somewhat removed from the society around them. One notable exception is the conversation quoted in 5.7.1, on the question whether finishing your education in the shortest time possible, was an act of solidarity towards society on the part of students. Interestingly, the students dismissed the thought after short consideration.

This finding mirrors to an extent the results of the study by Jensen and Nygård, who found 17 years ago that students at the University of Oslo did not feel a special responsibility to engage with societal issues, (2000: 84-85). Students were however interested in serving society in their professional capacities.

It should not be inferred, neither from Jensen and Nygård’s (2000) study, nor from the present one, that students perceived studying as being completely removed from matters of solidarity. The participants of the focus groups described it as a learning experience through disciplinary knowledge and contact with other students. The latter part was particularly important to them.
6.3 Solidarity at the University of Oslo

Juul’s concept of solidarity provides tools to criticise structures and forms of judgement “that constitute obstacles to solidarity” (Juul 2013: 131). In this section, these tools will be used to analyse structures at UiO that encourage or hinder the students’ development of solidarity. This criticism has the account of the participants as its basis.

The present study found that students heavily associated matters of solidarity with their future identities as practitioners in their respective fields. While their identities as students was very localized, they envisioned themselves as fully integrated and engaged working members of society after their studies. Students from both MN and UV brought up many topics that connected their field of studies with solidarity. They were very aware of problems they will be faced with during their working life and reflected upon them. However, they reported that they made these reflections on their own, outside of the courses they attended.

A noteworthy exception was one student, enrolled in a teacher education programme for samfunnsfag, who said that due to the content of their courses, they sometimes had discussions on matters of solidarity in their classes. Quite similar results for the University of Oslo have been reported by Solbrekke (2007) who found that students wished for better education in the moral and ethical aspects of their future professions.

In the eyes of students, the university seems to fall somewhat short of its ambition to support their self-formation, a goal it set itself in its strategic plan: “Self-formation implies that students develop insight into traditions of knowledge and an awareness of norms and cultural premises in academic fields and in society.” (Universitetet i Oslo 2010b: 5) While it is true that students reported being positively influenced in their ethical development by attending university, as the analysis above has shown, they described that most of those contributions came from private reflections and not from measures taken by the institution.

The students also described in clear terms an atmosphere of competition at the university. Both, participants from UV and MN, felt that individual achievement was prioritised above everything else. This pressure to excel leads to little cooperation between students and to a focus on getting the best grades rather than deep understanding, the students reported. After finding similar low levels of student interactions in courses, Jensen and Nygård recommended cooperation activities, not only to aid students’ learning but also because of their positive effects
on tolerance through taking the other’s perspective (2000: 85). These were also skills, the participants named as important for developing solidarity. As in Jensen and Nygård’s (2000) study, the students participating in the focus groups seem to have a willingness to cooperate more than they get the chance to in the current structures.

Together with individualised curricula, the students described the current structures at the University as leading to a fragmentation of the student body, to feelings of isolation, students dropping out, and to an orientation towards being competitive in the labour market.

Like the student taking part in a student exchange quoted in chapter 5.7.1, participants in this study felt they could gain from meeting other students, whether it was at home or abroad. Student exchanges are an important part of the Bologna process, and sometimes described as a key contribution to reaching the moral development goals of the *European dimension* of higher education (Teichler 2014: 143). From the perspective of the participants, they do indeed present them with the possibility to meet and learn from students from other countries, which contributes to their understanding of each other and ultimately, solidarity.

Talking about the student culture, while they saw student politics and student societies as arenas for solidarity, the participants neither found it to be very developed at the University of Oslo, nor did they describe themselves as very active in it. Also here, the results of this study are similar to those of Jensen and Nygård, who also reported a low engagement with student politics and student associations (2000: 88). Yet, as Strachan and Owens (2011) have argued, student societies can play an important role in the development of students’ civil identities, especially, if there is an exchange between different interest groups. Also from the standpoint of Juul’s (2013: 60) theory, student organisations that are run as pluralist, inclusive, and democratic communities, could contribute to the development of solidarity.

On the point of pluralism, Johnson (2015) has argued for representing the whole spectrum of society at university and emphasised the potential for the development of students’ civic identity through dialogue and perspective taking exercises. Likewise, the participants of this study have described meeting other students as a positive, enriching experience.

In the eyes of the students participating in this study, to put it in terms of Juul’s (2013) solidarity theory, the overall environment created at the University of Oslo does little to encourage the development of good judgement – at least not the structures that are directly influenced by the
Some of the structures in place even had individualizing effects, that is to say, actively worked against the development of solidarity.

Still, the participants found studying to be an enriching experience and as having strong formative impact on their personal development. They described the process as comprehensive, with one student saying, “I feel everything about me has been influence by attending university, actually.” (UVa 4) [75] This mirrors McLean, Abbas, and Ashwin (2015) and O’Flaherty and Gleeson (2014) conclusions that university education positively contributes to students’ ethical and moral development and makes them more engaged citizens.

6.4 Limitations and Implications

This case study offered a chance to look in depth into a very specific aspect of formation at the university from the perspective of the students. As discussed above, many of its findings resonate with previous work done at the University of Oslo, like Jensen and Nygård (2000) and Solbrekke (2007, 2008). However, the study also comes with a number of limitations. While the participants of the study were from two very different faculties, their accounts showed striking similarities, which makes it possible to draw conclusions for other faculties as well. Yet those conclusions have to be made carefully and only pertain to the general student experience, not to the specifics related to curriculum content of the study programmes and epistemic beliefs of the other faculties. While it would have been interesting and rewarding to extend the enquiry to a larger number of faculties, this was beyond the scope of a master thesis. Together with the issues laid out in the chapter on trustworthiness (4.6.1), and the methodological weakness of the collapsed focus group, these are the main limitations of the study.

Even with these limitations, it is possible to derive some implications from the study. If one agrees that solidarity is an important value in modern day society, and adopts the standpoint of Juul’s (2013) theory, there are some “measures” that could increase the learning opportunities for solidarity at the University of Oslo. As it became clear in the literature review section of this thesis, there are many concepts and empirically tested learning activities that could increase engagement with solidarity, and which could be implemented in the curricula at the university. Students’ efforts to reflect upon the ethical implications and problems of their future
professional lives should be supported and guided, regardless of their study programme (cf. Solbrekke 2007).

Juul (2013) argues that good judgement is learned in real-life situations. One obvious consequence of that is that in order to facilitate solidarity development at the institution, the university should bring these situations into the classroom or the classroom into these situations. Situated learning or project learning are but two of many possible pedagogical approaches that could break down the borders between university and the outside world. Both the studies by Arratia Figueroa (2008) and Morales Rodríguez (2013) present examples of how this can be accomplished. Additionally, this would help tackling the problem that students see their identity as distant and separated from the society around them. By opening up the study process and engaging with societal problems, they could also gain insight into how they can actively contribute to society not just as practitioners after their studies, but as students, too.

Another element of Juul’s (2013) theory that suggests a way forward is the concept of open, inclusive, and democratic communities, that foster solidary feelings and behaviour. The overall experience of students of the atmosphere at the University of Oslo was characterised by distance, individualism, and competition. Developing the overall sense of community in the direction of Juul’s (2013) ideal would help to create a more solidary atmosphere at the university as well. Furthermore, actions that increase the sense of belonging to the university, as well as those that facilitate interactions between students of different programmes and at different faculties could increase the feeling of unity, and give students valuable opportunities to engage with each other, creating understanding and furthering solidarity amongst them (cf. Jensen and Nygård 2000).
7 Conclusions

Within the overarching context of the debate on the purpose of universities in present-day society, this thesis suggests that while the structures at the university encourage individualism and competition, students value ethical and moral formation. As it is now, this process is happening for the most part outside of the curricular activities. This study also found that students see solidarity as an important value for a functioning and just democracy. This seems to suggest that in the conflict between marked-driven and idealistic ideals, they strongly veered to the idealistic side.

This thesis focused on students’ perceptions. The insights gained from that perspective point to other possible avenues of research that could further our understanding of solidarity formation at universities. It would for instance be interesting to cover the same topic from a different perspective. An analysis of teaching practices for solidarity or mapping of teachers’ and professors’ attitudes towards the topic would supplement this study, painting a more comprehensive picture about how solidarity is being addressed at the university and what status it has as a value there.

In addition, a study with a longitudinal design, following a group of students through their experience at university, could yield interesting insights into how they develop their perceptions of solidarity. With the end of the decade fast approaching and with it the conclusion of UiO’s Strategy 2020, research into how the university can contribute to ethical and moral development, which one of the main goals of the strategic plan, seems quite warranted.
Bibliography


American and European Experience of the Transformation of Higher Education and Research (Cambridge Scholars: Newcastle upon Tyne).


Appendix A: Informed Consent Form

Samtykkeerklæring

«Solidaritet i høyre utdanning fra studentenes perspektiv»

Bakgrunn og formål

Hva innebærer deltakelse i studien?
Studien består av gruppeintervju på omtrent en time. Fire til fem deltakere blir bedt om å diskutere sine erfaringer og oppfatninger knyttet til solidaritet og universitetsstudiet sitt. Hele gruppeintervjuet registreres ved bruk av lydopptak og notater.

Hva skjer med informasjonen om deg?

Frivillig deltakelse
Det er frivillig å delta i studien, og du kan når som helst trekke ditt samtykke uten å oppgi noen grunn. Dersom du trekker deg, vil alle opplysninger om deg bli fjernet.

Jeg har mottatt informasjon om studien, og er villig til å delta:

Navn:

Dato og signatur:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix B: Interview Guide

Intervjuguide
Studentenes solidaritetsbegrep i kontekst av høyre utdanning

Før intervjuet
- Informasjon om formål av studien
- Informasjon om
  - deltakelse og forløp av gruppeintervjuet
  - frivillighet av deltakelse
  - bruk av data og datasikkerhet
- Signering av samtykke- og taushetserklæringer

Spørsmål
2. Kan dere nå snakke sammen to og to om hva dere har kommet på? (2 minutter) [Alle sammen:] Var dere enige? Var det mye forskjell?
3. Hva betyr solidaritet for dere?
4. Hvordan tenker dere at man kan «gjøre solidaritet» …
   a. i hverdagslivet?
   b. i yrkeslivet?
5. Ser dere sammenheng mellom det faget dere studerer og solidaritet? Hvorfor er det viktig?
6. På hvilke måter er solidaritet blitt tatt opp i undervisningen i det faget dere studerer?
7. Hva vil dere si er de viktigste arenaer for diskusjoner om solidaritet?
8. Hvis du tenker på din egen oppfatning av solidaritet
   a. har den endret seg gjennom den tiden du har studert og hvorfor?
   b. på hvilken måte har den endret seg?
9. Opplever du at du har fått utviklet noen «verktøy», måter å leve ut solidaritet i praksis?
10. Når du nå tenker på det du sa i begynnelsen av vår samtale, da jeg spurte dere om hva solidaritet betyr for deg, vil du forandre eller legge til noe?

Etter intervjuet
- Takk for deltakelsen
- Kontaktmuligheter ved spørsmål
# Appendix C: Quotations in Norwegian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original</th>
<th>Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong> “Jeg tenker det kan kanskje bli litt sånn med solidaritet øg, hvis man bare, man bruker det hele tiden og så skjønner man egentlig ikke helt hva det betyr. Så blir det bare en sånn... snevende ord.” (UVa 1)</td>
<td>“I think that it may be the same with solidarity as well, if you just, you just use it all the time and then you don’t actually fully understand what it means. It just becomes a... vague word.” (UVa 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong> “Så jeg ville si at grunnen til at jeg måtte spørre om definisjonen på ordet er jo at det tydeligvis i min omgangskrets ikke er mye brukt.” (MN 1)</td>
<td>“I would say that the reason I had to ask for the definition of the word is that it obviously is not used a lot in my social circle.” (MN 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong> “Så hvis jeg tenker på solidaritet, så er det et sterkt ord.” (UVb 4)</td>
<td>“So, when I think about solidarity, I would say it’s a strong word.” (UVb 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong> “Men sånn generelt så tenker jeg jo at solidaritet som noe positivt.” (MN 2)</td>
<td>“But just in general, I would think that normally, solidarity is something positive.” (MN 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5</strong> UVa 1: Det er jo liksom et kraftfullt ord som får noe til å høre så veldig positivt ut da, hvis du klarer å sette det inn i et sammenheng, så ville det liksom løfte opp det du prøver å formidle. UVa 4: Det kan fort bli litt tomt. Hvis liksom alle politikerne skal ha ROBUSTE ting, [latter] robuste systemer og sånn… hva, hva menes med det liksom?</td>
<td>UVa 1: It is, well, a powerful word that makes something sound very positive, if you manage to put it into any context, then it will sort of elevate what you are trying to get across. UVa 4: It can get empty quickly. Like when all politicians want to have ROBUST things [laughter], robust systems, and things like that... what, what does that even mean?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6</strong> “Så jeg tenker også 70-tallet veldig fort, når det gjelder solidaritet. […]Hvis du tar den fagforenings-greia, det er mye færre i fagforeninger nå enn det var.” (MN 1)</td>
<td>“Well, also the 70s come to mind rather quickly, when it comes to solidarity. […]If you think about the whole thing with the unions, there are many fewer in trade unions now than were then.” (MN 1)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>7</strong> “[…D]a kommer jeg litt til 17. Mai som ble nevnt i stad, er det ekde solidaritet eller er det veldig mye falsk solidaritet? Siden det er så utrolig ekstremt den ene dagen da.” (UVb 2)</td>
<td>“[…N]ow I sort of come back to the 17th of May, which has just been mentioned, is that real solidarity or is that a lot of phoney solidarity? Since it is so unbelievably extreme for that one day.” (UVb 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8</strong> “Når jeg snakker med mine venner så snakker vi bare om sjampagnefrokost, om hva skal vi spise, […] det handler mer om feiring og ikke om å syngse nasjonalången. Vi har ikke snakket om hva man feirer, egentlig.” (UVb 4)</td>
<td>“When I talk to my friends, we are just talking about the champagne breakfast, about what we are going to eat; […] it’s more about feasting and not about singing the national anthem. We’ve never talked about what it is we are celebrating, actually.” (UVb 4)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Men det jeg liker med Norge er at demokrati star veldig sterkt, det er noe vi satser hoyt på og det krever solidaritet innad i landet [...]. For uten solidaritet faller demokratiet.” (UVb 1)

“But what I like about Norway is that the democracy is very prevalent, it’s something we trust a lot, and that requires an inner solidarity in the country [...]. Because without solidarity, democracy falls.” (UVb 1)

Altså solidaritet ligger i strukturen så uansett hvor du er, om du er på jobb eller på skolen, du har alltid noen organer som kan [hjelpe deg]” (MN 3)

“Well, solidarity is embedded in the structure, so no matter where you are, if you are at your job or at university, you always have some organisation that can [help you].” (MN 3)

MN 2: Altså i Norge da har du det generelt ganske bra. Og da […] trenger du liksom ikke å kjempe for sidemannen fordi du vet at mest sannsynligvis har han også det bra.

MN 1: Tror du det er fordi vi alle har det bedre eller fordi vi har gitt alle mer ansvar for å ha de bra selv? MN 2: Kanskje litt begge deler.

“[…] Jeg skrev lidenskap eller felles interesse eller mål, det må være noe som holder det sammen på en eller annen måte da.” (UVa 2)

“[…] I have written passion or a common interest or goal, there needs to be something that binds everything together, in one way or another.” (UVa 2)

“Jeg tenker at du må gjøre noe for å være en del av et fellesskap. Det er jo visse normer, regler, verdier som preger et fellesskap og derav vil det være at du tar en delaktig posisjon i det fellesskapet. Du gjør din part.” (UVb 1)

“I believe that you have to do something in order to be part of a community. There are certain norms, rules, values that characterise a community and based on those you are becoming an engaged member of the community. You do your part.” (UVb 1)

Er det da mulig at bare du er en solidarisk person og så får de andre ikke lov til å bli med? […] Sann som meg, jeg liker å se meg som en verdensborger, prøver mitt beste, og da vil jeg vise solidaritet til alle jeg møter. Så da er det plutselig bare en holdning men da er det ikke at jeg kun føler solidaritet til den ene gruppa. (UVb 1)

Is it possible to be a solitary person but then not allow others to be a part of it? [...] Just like me, I like to think of myself as a citizen of the world, at least I try my best, and so I want to show solidarity with everyone I meet. But then [on the 17th of May, note by the researcher] it’s suddenly just an attitude, but it’s not like I only feel solidarity with just that one group. (UVb 1)

“Hvis du ikke har noe til felles, så tror jeg det er litt vanskelig, men som regel så har man noe til felles bare fordi man er et menneske da. Så du har noen form for tilknytning da, kanske det er tro, eller kanske det er [noe annet]” (MN 2)

“If you don’t have anything in common, then I would say that it is a bit difficult, but usually you do have something in common, just because you are a human being. So you have some sort of connection, maybe it’s faith, or maybe it’s [something else].” (MN 2)
| 16 | Men jeg gikk mer på felleskap og se på likheter/ulikheter, et type felles mål, at man har en gruppe som har et felles mål eller ønske, kan man da si? Det kan også være en felles forståelse mellom menneskene. Og alle skal med, altå med solidaritet da er det «no one left behind» da.” (UVb 1) | But I went more for community, and to consider similarities/differences, some sort of common goal, that you have a group that has a common goal or wish, if one can say that? It can also be a common understanding between people. And everyone should be included, so with solidarity it’s like ‘no one left behind’. (UVb 1) |
| 17 | MN 1: Så for meg så ble det veldig at du gjør noe som kanskje ikke gagner deg for at det skal gagne en gruppe og til og med kanskje ikke din egne gruppe men grupper som... hvis det er to forskjellige grupper innad i en annen gruppe så kan dere solidarisk stå, eller gjøre noe som egentlig koster dere noe i forhold til noen andre. [anerkjennende reaksjoner] For å få samhold. MN 3: Jeg ser at det er de samme tankene jeg hadde i hvert fall. Det er i hvert fall inkluderende og... du hadde det godt og egentlig faktisk med det å ikke bare holde det i din egen gruppe eller med å prøve å ekspandere det litt, kanskje? MN 1: Ja, hvis det er noen som har like forutsetninger men kanskje er fra forskjellige grupper så kan de fortsatt gjøre ting, fordi hvis det hjelper dem så kan det hende at det de hjelper dere eller andre til slutt – eller sånne ting. | MN 1: So for me I thought a lot like, you do something, which maybe doesn’t benefit you, something that benefits a group, and maybe even not your own group but groups that... if there are two different groups within another group, then you can stand in solidarity together, or do something that actually costs you something compared to the others. [concurring reactions] To get a feeling of belonging together. MN 3: That that’s the same thoughts that I’ve had, actually. It’s definitely inclusive and... you had a good point, actually, with not just keeping it to your own group or trying to expanding it a bit, maybe? MN 1: Yes, if it’s someone who has a similar background but is from a different group, for example, then you still can do things together, because if it helps them, it could be that they help you or others in the end – or something like that. |
| 18 | Ja, det kan godt hende at det har gått fra solidaritet, sånn historisk da, at det har gått fra å være at man viser solidaritet for sine egne men det har kanskje utviklet seg til at man kanskje viser solidaritet for de som er annerledes enn deg. (UVb 3) | Yes, it can be that solidarity has, from a historic perspective, that it has gone from meaning that you show solidarity for your own kind, but that this has developed to mean that you maybe show solidarity for those who are different from you. (UVb 3) |
| 19 | Det der blir veldig sånn personlig solidaritet, så noen ganger kan det være andre forutsetninger for hvorfor man gjør det enn kanskje medfølelse, empati og ... at det er mer konkrete ting man tenker på. Og du kan også gjøre ting som gagner deg selv da som ikke nødvendigvis er en... personlig medfølelses-ting, men mer at «det vil hjelpe meg hvis jeg hjelper denne... | This would be a very personal type of solidarity, but sometimes there can be other motivations for doing it, others apart from compassion, empathy and... that it’s more concrete things you are thinking of. And you can also do things that benefit yourself, that are not necessarily... a matter of personal compassion but more like...an “I stand to benefit if I help this
<p>| 20 | UVb 1: [...] så man kan tenke solidarisk på individnivå og samfunnsnivå og nasjonal nivå, europeisk nivå og... ja hva skal man si... UVb 3: ... universelt? UVb 1: Universelt, ja takk. Og nei, det er spennende. Noe man skulle diskutere. | UVb 1: [...] well you can think solitarily on an individual level, and on a societal level, and a national level, European level, and... yes, how can you say that... UVb 3: ... universal? UVb 1: Universal, yes, thanks. Yes, no, that’s interesting. Something one should discuss. |
| 21 | “[J]eg skrev ned at man er trofast mot noe, for eksempel med familien at man er trofast og solidarisk der, mot familien.” (UVb 3) | “[I] have written down that being loyal to something, for example your family, that you are loyal and solidary there, with the family.” (UVb 3) |
| 22 | “Jeg tenker også venner eller nære venner eller en gruppe som du er mer assosiert med eller har sterkere bånd til, så der det lett å stille opp og hjelpe til og å være solidarisk, faktisk.” (MN 3) | “I think that if it’s friends, or best friends, or a group you are closely associated with, or have stronger ties to, then it’s easy to be there for them or to help with something and to be solidary, actually.” (MN 3) |
| 23 | “Er det ikke det liksom menneskerettigheter delvis er basert på?” (UVa 2) | “Is that not what human rights are based on in part?” (UVa 2) |
| 24 | “Jeg tror det kan være på samfunnsnivå og individnivå altså at det ikke bare er hvordan man selv oppfører seg selv men også hvordan samfunnet oppfører seg også hvordan reglene blir laget og skrevet og lignende.” (UVb 3) | “I think it can be at the level of society or on an individual level, so it’s not just about how you behave yourself but also about how society behaves and how rules are created and written and things like that.” (UVb 3) |
| 25 | “Det å betale skatt generelt, det er veldig solidarisk, ikke sant [anerkjennende reaksjoner] for det er jo lott som «her, ta pengene mine hvis noen ikke klarer seg så kan de få hjelp». Men samtidig så vet du at det er et system som hvis det går dårlig for deg så har du en sikring også.” (MN 2) | “Generally, paying taxes, that’s very solidary, right? [concurring reactions] Because it’s like saying, “Here, take my money, if someone can’t get by financially, they can get help.” But at the same time you know that there’s a system that, if you fall on hard times, protects you, too.” (MN 2) |
| 26 | UVb 4: Det er en ganske viktig del av et demokratisk land synes jeg, solidaritet mellom befolkning på mange forskjellige måter. UVb 1: Spesielt i velferdsstaten, som du nevnte nå. Da forstår alle hvorfor vi betaler skatt og så- UVb 4: Ja, hvorfor vi gjør det. | UVb 4: That’s an important part of a democratic country, I think, solidarity within the population, in many different forms. UVb 1: Especially in the welfare state, which you’ve named earlier. There, everyone understands why we are paying taxes and therefore- UVb 4: Yes, why we are doing that. |
| 27 | Hvis vi bare tenker på for eksempel USA, at det finnes så mange som ikke synes at en felles helseforsikring er viktig, og DET | If you for example just take a look at the USA, there are so many there who don’t think that a common health insurance is... |</p>
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<td>28</td>
<td>“Mener det er det solidaritet går på kanskje, at du har forståelse med de rundt deg og at du føler deg som en av mange da kanskje.” (MN 2)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>UVa 1: Men kan det være det, den interessen, eller den verdien eller det målet da, som man har til felles, selv om man ikke nødvendigvis har det likt? UVa 4: Ja, det var det jeg mente med liksom det, altså- UVa 1: Men da må du liksom være frem og tilbake, være sann at DU har medlidelsen med noen som har det verre enn deg og synes synd på dem. For det må liksom være samme følelsen derer møter hverandre med. UVa 4: Ja! Det var det jeg mente. Ja, det er det jeg føler i hvert fall. UVa 1: At det er liksom rundt et eller annet, noe kanskje utenfor deg selv, så derfor kan dere ha liksom samme tilnærming til det?</td>
</tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>UVa 4: I would say that that is what solidarity comes down to, maybe, that you have understanding for those around you, and that you feel like one of many.” (MN 2)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>MN 1: Jeg tror du også kan være solidarisk med folk i andre steder i verden, men jeg tror det har veldig mye med likhet og kultur eller likheter å gjøre. MN 2: Ja, fordi jeg tror altså jo mer du har … MN 3: … til felles … MN 2: … til felles med den gruppe da, jo lettere er det å være solidarisk, tenker jeg.</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>MN 1: I think that you can be solidary with people in other parts of the world as well, but I think that that has a lot to do with similarity and culture, or likeness. MN 2: Yes, because I believe that the more you have… MN 3: … in common… MN 2: … in common with the other group, the easier it is to be solidary, I think.</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>UVb 2: Men det kan godt være at nazister er solidariske innad selv om de har veldig negativt syn for andre i samfunnet. UVb 3: Og det kan være solidar[isk i]nnad en gruppe da. Så de kan være inkluderende overfor hverandre da selv om sett utenfra ser ikke det for andre mennesker ut som at det er mye solidaritet der.</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>UVb 2: But it may well be that Nazis are solidary with each other, even though they have a very negative opinion about the other members of society. UVb 3: And that can be a solidarity within a group. So they can be inclusive for each other, even though, from an outside perspective, it doesn’t look like that there is much solidarity there for other people.</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Altså tolerantse er… [lang pause] altså det handler om at du tolererer noe du ikke</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Well, tolerance is… [long pause] well, it’s about that you tolerate something you</td>
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<td>[nødvendigvis liker, tenker jeg. [anerkjennende reaksjoner] At du… jeg ser deg, jeg ser hva du står for, hva du mener, det er greit men jeg er ikke enig og synes ikke nødvendigvis så mye OM det, men du skal fortsette å få lov til å synes det her. Men solidaritet, så tror jeg, det har … det har med en følelse av at den personen har noen av de samme verdiene som deg selv, eller noen av de samme meningene som deg selv, og derfor setter du pris på denne personen. (UVa 1)</td>
<td>do not necessarily like, I think. [concurring reactions] That you… I see you, I see what you stand for, what you mean, that’s ok, but I don’t agree with it, and maybe I even don’t think much of it, but you shall be allowed to continue believing that. But solidarity, I think, has … has something to do with a feeling that that person has some of the same values like you, or some of the same opinions like you, and therefore you appreciate that person. (UVa 1)</td>
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<td>33 “Det er bare… ja, kunnskap og bare liksom… utvide sinnen. Det gjør at du… greier å se ... andres perspektiver og forstå ting du ikke nødvendigvis forstod da.” (UVa 2)</td>
<td>“It’s just… yes, knowledge and… opening your mind. That makes you able to see… the other’s perspective and understand things you hadn’t understood before.” (UVa 2)</td>
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<td>34 MN 3: […] gode tider som man glomm om det, når ting blir litt tøffere og du ser at det er deg som kommer til å miste jobben så blir det «Å, nå må jeg melde meg inn.» [ler] MN 2: Fordi det var det var litt det du sa, du trenger ikke å være empatisk fordi du synes synd på andre - MN 3: Nei. MN 2: - det er jo det at «oi, shit, nå går det dårlig med meg også, vi må stå sammen, vi er en gruppe». Fordi du vet at du selv trenger det da.</td>
<td>MN 3: […]When] everything is going well, you just forget about it, when things become a bit tougher and you realise that it’s probably you who is going to lose their job, it becomes, “Oh, no I have to become a member.” [laughs] MN 2: Because it’s a bit like you’ve just said, you don’t have to be empathic because you feel sorry for others-MN 3: No. MN 2: -it can also be that “Oh, shit, now it’s going badly for me as well, we have to stand united, we are one group.” Because you yourself need it.</td>
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<td>35 UVb 3: Mhm, Men du tenker mer på at man viser… for å fremme seg selv, på en måte, som et godt menneske som-? UVb 2: Ja. UVb 1: Det kan også skje. UVb 3: Mer på en egoistisk måte? UVb 2: Det blir fort det da. For det varer ikke. Jeg føler ikke at det varer så lenge. UVb 1: Og da snakker vi også om handlelger. For da er man liksom: Det her er ikke noen handling. For jeg er helt enig, det blir jo på en måte en falsk handling men, nei… for å vise solidaritet-Uvb 4: Jeg tror de fleste gjør det for seg selv. UVb 3: Ja, ikke sant? [ler]</td>
<td>UVb 3: Mhm. But do you think more in the line of that one shows… to promote oneself, in a way, as a good person who-? UVb 2: Yes. UVb 1: That can also happen. UVb 3: More in an egoistic way? UVb 2: It can easily become that. Because it doesn’t last long. I feel that it doesn’t last that long. UVb 1: And now we are also talking about action. Because in that case, that is not an action. I completely agree, it becomes a fake action, in a way, but no… to show solidarity-UVb 4: I think most people do it for themselves. UVb 3: Yes, right? [laughs]</td>
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<td>UVb 4: De føler seg bedre, «ja, nå er jeg solidarisk» men det er egentlig ikke solidaritet. UVb 3: Nei, ikke sant?</td>
<td>UVb 4: They feel better, “Yes, now I am solidary”, but it actually is not solidarity. UVb 3: No, it isn’t, is it?</td>
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<td>UVb 1: Men det er så vanskelig, for du kan ikke vite tankene til folk? UVb 3: Nei… UVb 2: Så hvordan kan du da føle solidaritet i den andre hvis det er sånn «hmhm. Er vi sammen om dette?» UVb 3: … ja hvis du ikke vet? UVb 2: Da blir det på likt nivå igjen, fordi hvis personen gjør det helt til hypen eller oppmerksomheten er over og så er det ikke noe spor av det da lenger men hvis du […] er der for de ofrene hvis det skal være noe eller for eksempel gjør noe […] at man er en person som fortsatt rører ikke bare når media eller når saken er aktuelt da.</td>
<td>UVb 1: But it’s very difficult, because you can’t know people’s intentions? UVb 3: No… UVb 2: So how can you then feel solidarity in another person, if it is like, “Hm. Are we really standing together in that matter?” UVb 3: … yes, if you don’t know? UVb 2: But then it will flatten out again, because if that person only does it until the hype or the attention is over and afterwards there is no trace to be found any more? But if you […] support the victims when there is the need, or if for example do something, […]that you show] that you are a person who is involved not only when the media reports something or the matter is getting attention.</td>
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<td>MN 1: Fordi urettferdighet har jo en klar sammenheng med solidaritet, den ser jeg. MN 3: Ja! MN 1: Å hjelpe noen fordi det de opplever er urettferdig, men ikke nødvendigvis har med deg å gjøre, da kan jeg bruke ordet solidaritet.</td>
<td>MN 1: Because injustice has a clear connection with solidarity, that’s clear. MN 3: Yes! MN 1: To help someone because what they experience is unjust, but doesn’t necessarily have something to do with you personally, in that case I can use the word solidarity.</td>
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<td>“Hvis, for eksempel, noen blir urettferdig behandlet, da viser vi kanske solidaritet. […] Men egentlig betyr solidaritet også andre ting, sånn hvordan man tar noen imot, så hvis jeg møter deg på campusen og jeg ser at du ikke vet veien … eller sånn, det kan også være solidaritet.” (UVb 4)</td>
<td>“If, for example, someone is treated unfairly, then you can maybe show solidarity. […] But actually, solidarity means other things, too, like how you treat someone, so when I meet you on campus and I see that you are lost … or something like that, that can also be solidarity.” (UVb 4)</td>
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<td>Hm, nei, jeg tror bare hvis du… jeg tror mye på det at du… det er som du sier ibibelen, jeg er ikke kristen men, at det er: være som du vil at andre skal være mot deg. Jeg tror det kan være… gir mye på solidaritet. Hvis du viser solidaritet mot de andre, så tror jeg det er mange som ville vise den mot deg også. (UVa 4)</td>
<td>Hm, no, I just believe, that if you… I really believe in what you say about the Bible. Now I’m not Christian but, that it’s like: treat others like you want others to treat you. I think that this can be… that this is very close to solidarity. If you show solidarity for others, then I think that many will also show solidarity for you. (UVa 4)</td>
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<td>&quot;Du må jo forsvare tankene dine, «jeg er for en dystopi da bare ingeniørene sitter og lager roboter og andre sulter» [latter] det blir litt sann... du kan i hvert fall ikke si det hoyt hvis det er det du mener.&quot; (MN 1)</td>
<td>“You have to justify you thoughts, “I support a dystopia where only engineers have jobs building robots while everyone else starves” [laughter] that’s like… you can’t say that out lout if that’s what you believe, anyway.” (MN 1)</td>
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<td>UVa 2: […]Det må jo være en viss... altså du kan jo gå rundt og føler det og «ja, jeg er solidarisk» fordi du føler det, men du gjør ikke noe med det, men da viser du ikke solidaritet, du bare føler det kanskje. Jeg føler at det må være en viss handling knyttet til det for at det liksom er solidaritet. UVa 4: Ja, jeg er også enig i det fordi... altså man ville jo ikke sagt at «å han der, han er så solidarisk» hvis han bare går rundt og - UVa 2: Ja, ikke sant! «Se, jeg er solidarisk!» ... nei jeg er absolutt enig. «Se på meg!» [latter] Nei, jeg er helt enig.</td>
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<td>Det slår meg veldig at det trolig kan være forskjellig fra individer hva som er solidaritet og hvem som er solidarisk. Jeg er enig i det med handling at det må gjøres en handling, men uansett hvor liten den er, så kan den rettferdiggiøre en persons holdning og om at den er solidarisk. Men la oss si jeg lukker opp døra når alle kommer og så for meg er det veldig solidarisk, men for alle andre er det bare naturlig fordi jeg gikk først av alle sammen. (UVb 2)</td>
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<td>Fordi det blir jo positivt på individnivå å kunden slipper å betale den ekstra timen hvor du jobber hos dem, og så får arbeideren pengene sine, men det går jo ut over samfunnet og … det går jo indirekte ut over alle i kommunen hvis pengene blir distribuert denne veien. (UVb 2)</td>
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<td>MN 2: Det er jo kanskje det som er litt... hvis du hjelper noen da så er det ofte ved å gi dem ressurer og veldig ofte er det sånn at hvis du gir noen ressurser så må disse ressursene komme fra et annet sted, så det er jo ofte litt sånn: du tar fra en og</td>
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Because for the individual client that’s very positive, if they don’t have to pay for the extra hour you work for them, and the workers get their money, but that negatively affects society and… it negatively affects all of us in the municipality if money is distributed like that. (UVb 2)
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<td>så gir du det til en annen på en måte. Det er noen som tjener på det men ofte noen som tapper på det også. MN 1: Zero-sum game, ja. MN 2: Og … solidaritet handler jo mye om hvor du ser det fra også fordi noen ville jo se på det som noe negativt og usolidarisk fordi noen andre tapper på det mens andre ser på det [annerledes]. You take from someone to give to someone else, in a way. There is someone who gains from that but quite often there is someone who loses as well. MN 1: A zero-sum game, yes. MN 2: And … solidarity is actually a lot about where you see it from, also because some might look at it as something negative and not solidary because someone is losing something, while others would see it [differently].</td>
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<td>UVa 4: […]Men hvis det kommer opp en sak, som fraværsgrensa, DA hvis lærerne er enige, har de solidaritet. UVa 1: Du har liksom solidaritet på forskjellige plan. UVa 2: Det var jo det jeg hele tiden har ment, lidenskap, interesse, mål, altså det må jo være noe som knytter de sammen, selv om de kanskje kan være veldig ulike eller like, så er det noe som knytter dem sammen. UVa 3: Det er veldig sånn situasjonsbetinga, det her, solidaritet. [bifallende reaksjoner] UVa 2: Det kan jo være veldig sånn åpent og ikke nødvendigvis veldig spesifikt, men jeg føler også at det kan være veldig spesifikt også. UVa 4: […]Bu if there is an issue like fraværsgrensa, THEN, if the teachers agree, they have solidarity. UVa 1: You have solidarity on different levels. UVa 2: That’s what I’ve been saying all along, passion, interest, goal, so there has to be something that binds them together, even if they maybe are very different or even very similar, there is something that binds them together. UVa 3: It’s very situational, solidarity. [concurring reactions] UVa 2: It can be very open and not really something specific, but I feel that it can be something very concrete as well.</td>
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<td>UVa 1: Jeg tror kontakt med andre studenter har en innvirkning… på det nivået at man liksom befinner seg i samme situasjon og at man liksom kan se at man kanskje synes at de samme tingene er morsomme og gøy og samme er vanskelige eller slitsomme. […] UVa 2: Vi møter forskjellige mennesker og blir kjent med forskjellige folk, og… det gjør jo også at du kanskje foraner tanker og kanskje foraner syn på ting da. UVa 3: Man blir litt mer ydmyk rett og slett. Det tror jeg er egentlig ganske viktig for å … liksom vise solidaritet. UVa 1: I believe that the contact to other students has an influence… on the level that one is in the same situation and that one maybe realises that one thinks the same things are funny or entertaining, and difficult or tiresome. […] UVa 2: We meet different people and get to know different persons, and… that makes you also maybe change your mind and maybe your perspective on certain things. UVa 3: You become a bit more humble, quite simply. That is actually quite important, I think, for … showing solidarity.</td>
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<td>MN 2: Men for meg så går det vel er på at … etter at jeg starta på universitetet, […] så var det kanskje blitt mer fokus på de som står nærmere meg, de som jeg ofte samarbeider med og de som er liksom… MN 2: But for me it was like… after I started attending university, […] I became a bit more focussed on those who are close to me, those I often work with, and those that are… those who I feel closer</td>
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De som står meg litt nærmere da? At jeg kanskje kunne kjempe for dem litt mer for dem [...] 
MN 3: Jeg tenker på oss, så er vi fra fysikk, så er vi i veldig små grupper, og vi er totalt kanskje sju stykker,…
MN 2: Ja, noe sånt. 
MN 3: Ja, noe sånt. Og du ser det ganske fort at vi er [...] alltid sammen, ikke sant? Det er mye mer at du holder deg til den gruppa du identifiserer deg med mest.

MN 2 + MN 3: Ja, noe sånt. Og du ser det ganske fort at vi er [...] alltid sammen, ikke sant? 
MN 3: If it think about our group, then we are studying at the institute of physics, we are all in small groups of maybe seven…
MN 2: Yes, something like that. 
MN 3: Yes, something like that. And then you quickly realise that we are [...] always spending time together, you know? You hold yourself a lot more to the group you identify yourself with the most.

“Du står jo ofte sammen som en klasse som en arbeidsplass står sammen. […] Vi har jo kurs sammen og sånn, da får du litt samhold og du vil kanskje at de andre også skal gjøre det bra.” (MN 2)

“You are often standing together as a class like a workplace stands together. […]We have classes together and so on, so there you get some feeling of belonging together and maybe you also want that the others succeed as well.” (MN 2)

“Eller snakke med folk som sitter alene, fordi man vil inkludere dem i solidariteten sin og felleskap og gjøre noe med det da.” (UVb 1)

“Or talking to people who sit on their own, because you want to include them in your solidarity and your community and do something about it.” (UVb 1)

Jeg var på utveksling til Belgia nå i fjor høst og møtte liksom studenter fra hele Europe, USA, Japan, sånn forskjellige land, det var veldig morsomt. Men man merker også hvor mye som er likt da, hvor mye man liksom ... ha like oppfatninger, eller like opplevelser man har av ... det å være student i hvert fall. (UVa 1)

I was on exchange in Belgium last autumn and met students from almost the whole of Europe, the USA, Japan, other countries, that was a lot of fun. But then you also realise how much you have in common, how much you have… a similar perception, or similar experiences just by… being a student. (UVa 1)

Jeg har nå bodd i et studentkollektiv i nesten to år og det har forandret meg mye. […] Jeg var veldig… hvordan kan man si det, individuell? individualistisk? før, det er jeg jo fortsatt men ikke så mye som før. Jeg har alltid bodd alene og nå er det første gangen jeg bor sammen med mange andre – og det ville jeg si har gjort meg mer solidarisk. (UVb 4)

I have been living in a flat-share with other students for nearly two years now and that has changed me a lot. […]I used to be very… how can I say that, individual?, individualistic?, and I still am, but not to the same extent as before. I had been living alone and now, it’s the first time that I live with other – and that, I would say, has made me more solidary. (UVb 4)

MN 1: Jeg tenker nå litt større perspektiv da: Vi koster jo samfunnet veldig mye når vi studerer, veldig mye, det er jo en solidarisk handling fra samfunnets side å betale for at vi skal bli utdannet gratis. 
MN 2 + MN 3: Ja. 
MN 1: Det er jo solidarisk, […] men store parten kommer jo å tjene penger tilbake

MN 1: Now I’m thinking from a higher perspective: We are costing society a lot when we are studying, a whole lot, so that’s a solidary action on the part of society to pay that we are getting an education for free. 
MN 2 + MN 3: Yes.
[…]. Det er jo da solidaritet at vi… prøver å fullføre på normal tid er jo en solidarisk handling i forhold til samfunnet. MN 3: Ja? [latter]
MN 2: Jeg vet ikke om DET er solidarisk da, bare fordi du lever opp til noe. MN 1: Men det er det motsatte, de betaler for alt frem til du blir utdannet, det er en solidarisk handling.

MN 1: That is solidarity, […] but most of us are actually going to earn that money back […]. Then it’s solidarity if we… try to finish within the given time, that would be a solidarity towards society. MN 3: Yes? [laughter]
MN 2: I’m not sure that THAT is solidarity, just because you live up to something.
MN 1: But that would the opposite, they are paying everything until you graduate, that is a solidarity action.

MN 2: […]eg bor i Ås og da er det NMBU, og jeg har vært mye på Samfunnet i Ås og det er mye mer sånn… jeg får inntrykket at det er mye mer samhold der. De har større studentforeninger og folk prøver å samarbeide og folk er litt mer sånn… prøver å holde litt mer sammen og er litt mer vennlig mot hverandre. Du får litt mer inntrykket at UiO er veldig upersonlig og hvis det er upersonlig så blir du ikke så solidarisk for da ser du ikke, da har du ikke helt samme…-

MN 3: - Altså jeg vet ikke åssen det er for [programmene deres] men for oss så er det det som gjør det upersonlig og litt mer individuelt det er det at du kan velge de fagene du ønsker selv.

MN 1 + MN 2: Ja.
MN 3: Og ofte havner du i fag alene.
MN 2: Du får ikke noe klasse med dem.
MN 3: Så hvis det kun er sju stykker så er det fort gjort at du tar fag alene.

MN 2: […]I live in Ås and there, is also NMBU, and I have been to Samfunnet i Ås often, and there… I get the impression that there is a lot more cohesion there. They have bigger student societies and people try to cooperate, they are a bit more… trying to hold a bit more together and they are friendlier towards each other. You get the impression even more that UiO is very impersonal and if it’s impersonal, you don’t become solidary because you don’t see – you don’t have quite the same…-

MN 3: - Well, I don’t know how it is in [your programmes] but for us, what makes it impersonal and a bit more individual, is that you can choose the courses you want to take yourself.

MN 1 + MN 2: Yes.
MN 3: So quite often, you end up in a course on your own.
MN 2: You don’t get the whole class together.
MN 3: So if you are only seven in your programme, then you are very likely to take courses alone.

“Det du sier er de klagene de fleste liksom har om UiO, at det er veldig lite sammenhold og det er alltid… jeg husker alle de som har sluttet har klaget på det… at det er lite sammenhold blant studenter.” (MN 3)

“What you are saying are the same complaints about UiO most people have, that there is only little camaraderie and that’s always… I remember that everyone who had dropped out has complained about that… that there is little camaraderie between students.” (MN 3)

UVb 1: Altså noen av oss er jo her for å lære og det innebærer jo solidaritet og en forståelse for det du lærer om dannelse, det pedagogiske, forståelse av andre

UVb 1: So, some of us are here to learn and that brings with it solidarity and an understanding for what you learn about formation, pedagogy, understanding of
mennesker, og så er det de som er ego-orienterte: hvordan kan JEG komme best ut av det, hvordan kan JEG få de beste karakterene, hvordan kan JEG få den beste jobben. Så det er jo veldig ulikt hvordan mennesker ser på sitt eget studium. Så derfor går ikke alle ut fra her med de holdningene de egentlig skulle ha hatt.
[alle er enige]

UVb 2: Det er veldig individuelt og det sees også på UV fakultetet.
UVb 1: Dessverre.

[56] “Poteto, Potato, nesten, ass. [latter]” (UVa 3)

[57] “[…D]et er solidaritetsyrke. […] Den er preget av at du går ut på å hjelpe folk da, for så si det så banalt som mulig, det er jo det de i bunn og grunn gjør. [anerkjennende reaksjoner] […]Kanskje litt mer spesifikt da, det er bedre å si, men at man på en måte … viser respekt for og hjelper folk som er fra et litt lavere sosialt lag, det er jo sann prime solidaritet, nesten. […] Men det er jo det vi gjør som lærer for å si det sånn. Vi hjelper barn fra lavere sosialstatus, fordi de har ikke like mye kunnskap.” (UVa 3)

[58] “Det er jo noe underliggende på en måte, altså det må nesten være det… innenfor … i hvert fall det vi studerer.” (UVa 2)

“Poteto, Potato, almost, right. [laughter]” (UVa 3)

“I think that as soon as you study something to do with pedagogy or anything like that […] you develop solidarity for… anything to do with education. So: yes, education is important, we have to get schools into countries where there are conflicts, things like that, so that is also about solidarity.” (UVa 1)

“I agree”

“I think that as soon as you study something to do with pedagogy or anything like that […] you develop solidarity for… anything to do with education. So: yes, education is important, we have to get schools into countries where there are conflicts, things like that, so that is also about solidarity.” (UVa 1)

The notion of formation in pedagogy, I would say, should create a form of community or solidarity.” (UVb 1)

“Implisitt i det hele demokratiske dannelsesidealet [uforståelig] da er det jo at man skal liksom opptre solidarisk da.” (UVa 1)

“Implied in the whole democratic ideal of formation [unintelligible], there is the idea that you should act solidarity.” (UVa 1)

Interviewer: But are you talking about that, at university?

Interviewer: Men snakker dere om det, på universitetet?
| 63 | UVa 1: Ikke sånn konkret?  
UVa 3: Ikke noe konkret og utenom det er relatert til noe i pensum. [anerkjennende reaksjoner] | UVa 1: Not concretely?  
UVa 3: Nothing concrete or when it is related to the reading list. [concurring reactions] |
| 64 | “Altså jeg har jo samfunnsfag som hovedfag da er det veldig mye fokus på det med medborgerskap og demokratisk tankegang og da mener jeg at solidaritet er en del av det. Det blir jo kommunisert veldig tydelig. Både i pensum og i forelesninger.” (UVa 4) | “[Y]ou get a deeper understanding of how other people work, how you – you understand your own priorities, motivations; mastering, why am I conflict averse. So you get a deeper understanding of yourself, and therefore a deeper understanding for the others. And a deeper understanding of the others gives you a deeper understanding of yourself. I feel that strongly, pedagogy has given me a lot of insight into that.” (UVb 1) |
| 65 | Jeg tror man bare blir mer bevisst på veldig mye [bifallende reaksjoner] av å … at du får litt flere innfallsvinkler på ting enn du kanske hadde fra før…. som også kan gjøre det lettere å bli solidarisk med noen. (UVa 1) | I think that you just get more conscious of a lot of things [concurring reaction] by… by developing more ways of approaching things then you maybe had before… which also can make it easier to be solidarity with someone. (UVa 1) |
| 66 | UVa 4: Jeg føler at hele meg har blitt preget av å være på universitetet, altså... [stor enighet]  
UVa 2: Det er jo dannelse av mennesker liksom, altså, det er litt vanskelig å ikke endre seg [ler].  
UVa 4: Jeg tenker jo... [latter] jo mer kunnskap man har som man får av å være på universitetet jo mer... jo lettere det er å ha solidaritet da. Du må ha kunnskap for å være solidarisk [bifallende reaksjoner] og det tenker jeg jo at... universitetsutdanning, eller høyre utdanning generelt, ... eh, er med på å legge til rette for da. Mer kunnskap, mer solidaritet. | UVa 4: I feel that my whole self has been influenced by attending university, so… [concurring reactions]  
UVa 2: Well, it IS about formation of human beings, so it would be difficult not to change [laughs].-  
UVa 4: - I think...[laughter] the more knowledge you have, something you get from being at university, the more… the easier it is to have solidarity. You need knowledge to be solidarity [concurring reactions] and that, I believe, is something that… university education, or higher education in general,... facilitates. More knowledge, more solidarity. |
| 67 | Jeg… halvparten av fagene jeg har hatt har gitt meg… i hvert fall to av dem har gitt meg verktyrer mens to ting har gitt meg veldig sånn… har gjort meg mye mer | I…half of the courses that I have taken have given me… definitely two of them, have given me tools while two have given me a lot… they have made me a lot more |
bevisst på holdning men disse verktøyene er blant annet i retorikken, det å kunne ytre seg bedre og mere og da kunne få vist hva du egentlig mener via ytringen fordi du tenker på hvordan mottakeren tar imot det du sier. (UVb 2)

conscious of my attitudes; but those tools were amongst others in rhetoric, to be more able to articulate yourself and doing it better; and to be able to get across what you actually mean in a statement because you think about how the recipient understands what you are saying. (UVb2)

68 MN 1: Det er veldig adskilt fra det vi studerer, solidaritet.
MN 2: Jeg tror vi er vel den gruppa som … jobber for seg selv, på en måte.
MN 1: Vi stemmer også veldig mye blære enn for eksempel [uforståelig]
MN 2: Det tror jeg, det tror jeg.

MN 1: It’s very separate from what we are studying, solidarity.
MN 2: I think that we are probably the group… who works on their own the most, in a way.
MN 1: We are also voting a lot bluer than for example [unintelligible]
MN 2: I believe so too, yes.

69 MN 3: Absolutt ikke, nei.
MN 2: Kanskje veldig, veldig lite. Jeg tror kanskje det eneste… nei. Nei. [ler]
MN 1: Jeg hadde forelesning om etikk, eller dere har vel hatt ExPhil, kanskje?
MN 2: Nei, jeg har ikke hatt ExPhil. Jeg hadde ingeniørfag og vi hadde litt sånn mobilhistorie og sånn… tullefag.
MN 1: Nei, ok, vi har ExPhil, så vi skal jo forstå forskningsetikk, det er ikke nødvendig at det satser godt for folk [latter] og så, vi hadde et etikkspørsmål, det var bare om roboter generelt, ikke om at de tok jobbene fra folk, det ble nevnt, men det var ingenting jeg tenkte på det.
MN 2: Jeg tror at det man har er bitte litt etikk i det faget jeg hadde.

MN 3: Absolutely not, no.
MN:2: Maybe a tiny little bit. I think that the only… no. No. [laughs]
MN 1: I had a lecture about ethics and you probably had ExPhil, maybe?
MN 2: No, I didn’t take ExPhil. I took an engineering degree and we learned a bit about the history of the mobile phone and similar… nonsense subjects.
MN 1: No, ok, we have ExPhil, so we should understand research ethics, not that the course is very popular among people [laughter], and then we had one ethical question, which was just about robots in general, not about whether they take away people’s jobs, that was mentioned, but I didn’t think at all about that.
MN 2: I think what you do get is a tiny amount of ethics in one of the courses I took.

70 MN 1: Jeg tenker også at jobben min er jo å fjerne jobbene til resten av Norge da. […]
MN 3: Automatisering?
MN 2: Å ja, sånn ja!
MN 1: Ja, å ta jobben fra de som har minst på en måte, det er det…
MN 3: Vi ligger i samme båt egentlig!
[latter]
Interviewer: Så det har faktisk noe med selve faget dere studerer å gjøre?
MN 2: Ja, men…
MN 1: Det gagner jo samfunnet men det gagner jo ikke nødvendigvis arbeiderne.

MN 1: I also believe that it’s my job to take away the jobs of the rest of Norway. […]
MN 3: Automation?
MN 2: Oh, that’s what you mean!
MN 1: Yes, to take away the jobs of those who have the least, in a way, that’s what I’m doing…
MN 3: We are in the same boat, actually! [laughter]
Interviewer: So it actually has something to do with the subjects you are studying?
MN 2: Yes, but…
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<td>“Jeg vil ikke ha dårlig samvittighet” (MN 3)</td>
<td>“I don’t want to have a bad consciousness” (MN 3)</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>“Og litt av grunnen til at jeg ikke vil jobbe med våpen er at jeg heller ville prøvd å putte pengene et annet sted.” (MN 2)</td>
<td>“One of the reasons that I didn’t want to work with weapons is that I would like that we use our money elsewhere.” (MN 2)</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>“Så vi som borgere har sendt soldatene i krig og da er jo det å beskytte dem og å gjøre jobben deres som mulig som mulig siden det vi er i krig for er jo vanligvis en god sak.” (MN 1)</td>
<td>“So, we as citizens have sent our soldiers into war and therefore it’s about protecting them and making their job as easy as possible, since usually we are at war for a good cause.” (MN 1)</td>
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<td>“Men absolutt, det er et privat valg, liksom. For jeg tenker det har absolutt ingenting med om du er solidarisk eller ikke … jeg tenker det koker ned til et personlig valg. Og hva du kan leve med eller ikke.” (MN 3)</td>
<td>“But it absolutely is a private choice. Because I think that is has nothing at all to do with whether you are solidary or not … I think it boils down to a private choice. And what you can and can’t live with.” (MN 3)</td>
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<td>“Jeg føler at hele meg har blitt preget av å være på universitetet, altså.” (UVa 4)</td>
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