ABSTRACT: India has over the recent decade witnessed a spate of land transfers as special economic zones, extractive industries, or real estate disposess farmers, land owners, and indigenous groups of their land. As a result, struggles over land have emerged with force in many locations, almost across India. Yet while the political economy and legal aspects of India’s new ‘land wars’ are well documented, the discourses and identities mobilised against large-scale forcible land transfers receive less scholarly attention. We suggest ‘the regional identity politics’ of India’s current land wars to explain the important role of place-based identities in garnering broad, public support for popular anti-dispossession movements. We explore how land, and its produce, are mobilised by anti-dispossession movements in the Indian states of Goa and West Bengal. The movements mobilised land and food not as emblematic of structural changes in the political economy, but first and foremost within a symbolic field in which they came to stand metaphorically for regional forms of belonging and identity under threat. While reinforcing regional solidarity, these identities also contributed to the fragmented and often highly localised nature of India’s current land wars, while also potentially disrupting efforts to sustain organising in the long term.
To attract industrial investments, boost economic growth, and create a world class infrastructure, India passed a new Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in 2005. This act established a legal framework for the creation of geographic areas governed by distinct regulatory regimes in which taxes and other bureaucratic burdens on business activity were substantially reduced (Jenkins et al., 2014; Jenkins 2011). The initial response from investors was enthusiastic, and by 2016 there was a total of 416 formally approved SEZ projects across India, of which 205 were operational (Government of India, 2016). This period also saw an escalation of extractive mining activities, coupled with a general thrust towards industrialisation and a booming real estate sector. All these activities entailed a swift transfer of land to Indian or multinational corporations or other investors, usually facilitated by the state through the exercise of eminent domain, and at times carried out by force.¹ Yet these land transfers have been highly controversial as groups faced with dispossession and displacement organised to put a stop to the state-led expropriation of their land. As a result, India has over the past decade been home to thousands of big or small ‘land wars’ (Levien, 2013) in many states, including Goa, Maharashtra, Odisha, West Bengal, Haryana, and Andhra Pradesh.

There now exists a considerable literature on India’s new land wars in which legal, political, and economic perspectives have tended to dominate the debate (see e.g. Bedi and Tillin, 2015; Levien, 2013, 2015; Nielsen and Nilsen, 2015; Sud, 2014; D’Costa and Chakraborty, 2017). This literature has been crucial in not just enhancing our understanding of the politico-economic drivers of land dispossession and its local ramifications, but also in mounting a broader critique of India’s current regime of dispossession (Levien, 2013) that sees the control

¹ More than 45,000 hectares of land have been ‘notified’ for SEZs alone (Government of India, Department of Revenue, 2014: v).
of land gradually move into the hands of the corporate sector and real estate developers. Alongside this literature, another strand that we return to below has focused on the mobilising identities that anti-dispossession activists have sought to tap into as they work to build a larger, public support base. In line with Amita Baviskar’s (2008: 7) argument that the materiality of natural resources is always embedded in wider structures of meaning that cannot be distilled down to ‘the economic last instance’, this literature has reminded us how land, as a factor of production and a site of belonging and identification, bridges material and symbolic concerns (Bedi, 2015b; Fay and James, 2010). In this article, we seek to contribute to this literature by exploring how land, and its produce, are mobilised in anti-dispossession campaigns in the Indian states of Goa and West Bengal. That land and food concerns should figure prominently in such campaigns may seem obvious. SEZ entrepreneurs prefer areas which are well developed and these usually include cultivated and productive agricultural land that is thus targeted for expropriation (Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce, 2007: 60). Similarly, the dispossession-driven implementation of the SEZ policy in India coincided with record levels of global hunger and increasing food insecurity that pushed the urban rate of malnourishment in India to 70 per cent in 2009-10 (Basu and Das, 2014). India’s SEZ policy thus opened up a political space for oppositional movements to mobilise widely shared land and food concerns that were national or even global in scope. Indeed, case studies from around the world have analysed the agricultural implications of land grabbing (Bedi, 2015b; De Shutter, 2011; Franco, 2012; Goldstein, 2016; Kugelman, 2012) and foregrounded issues of food security or food sovereignty (Edelman et al., 2014). The movements’ evocation of land and food that we later analyse thus relate to broader structural transformations and critiques thereof – also emanating from within different Indian ministries and parliamentary standing committees – questioning the agricultural and food security
implications of the SEZ policy and what has been called ‘the great Indian land grab’ (Sud, 2009) more generally.

And yet, as we show below, the two movements analysed here mobilised land and food not as emblematic of structural changes in the political economy, but rather first and foremost within a symbolic field in which they came to stand metaphorically for regional forms of belonging and identity under threat. While felt connections to the land is an often invoked identity marker in popular mobilisation, the anthropology of food similarly tells us how food is a key carrier of cultural meaning and signification (Jenkins, 1999). Indeed, the sharing of a food culture is a basis for collective identity and commensality, and also a means of expressing inclusion and otherness (Fischler, 1988). Ichijo and Ranta (2016) highlight the anthropological perspective on food and national identity when they argue that the ways in which particular people perceive their ‘food culture’ helps them imagine themselves as part of the nation. Importantly, as Ayora-Diaz (2004: 50) shows from Mexico, food performs this imaginative work not just at the level of the nation, but also at the subnational or regional level as ‘a political marker of regional identity’, which is what concerns us in the cases we analyse here. Such symbolic and political implications of food and land remain, however, under-theorised in the literature on India’s land wars, and it is by analysing the interlinkages that the movements examined here established in their public campaigns between the politics of land, food, and belonging that we bring out how appeals to a threatened regional identity – symbolically mediated by land and food – helped the movements to garner broad popular support in their home states. We subsume such appeals under the label ‘the regional identity politics’ of India’s new land wars. At the same time, however, we suggest that this parochial identity politics has also, in spite of its regional efficacy, contributed to consolidating rather than overcoming the often fractured nature of India’s current land wars. We return to this at greater length in our concluding discussion.
We proceed to briefly contextualise the debate on India’s new land wars. We then provide two ethnographic accounts of how movements employ symbols and tropes of land and food to mobilise regional identities through discourse and practice in the contexts of West Bengal and Goa. These states have been home to some of India’s most intense recent struggles over land (on Goa, see e.g. Bedi, 2013b, 2015; Da Silva, 2014; Jones, 2009; Sampat, 2015; on West Bengal, see e.g. Banerjee, 2006, 2014; Banerjee and Roy, 2007; Majumder, 2012; Nielsen, forthcoming; Roy, 2014; Ray, 2008), and we have selected them for comparative analysis because in crucial ways they illustrate the localised identity dynamics in India’s land wars. At the same time, the different demographics, size, and histories of the two states also allow us to identify key differences in the workings of regional identity politics, something which we seek to do in our concluding discussion.

Before we proceed, two caveats are in order. First, we do not claim that the regional identity politics of the land wars in Goa and West Bengal is the sole reason for their relative success. As Sampat (2015: 781) writes with reference to Goa, the anti-SEZ movement’s success was the outcome of an ‘alliance of forces’; and, more generally, effective grassroots organisation, the ability to link up with (or stay clear of) political parties, direct public action, and prolonged strategies of judicialisation have, as we have argued elsewhere (Bedi, 2015a; Nielsen, 2015a), been no less important. However, because the role of mobilising regional identities has so far not been sufficiently analysed we choose to foreground this aspect here. Second, we would like to stress that we will not concern ourselves with examining the multifaceted identity-defining relationships between different categories of ‘project affected populations’ and the land on which they live or the food they produce, nor will we interrogate the discrepancies that may often exist between what we with Guha (2000) could call the public and the private faces of anti-dispossession movements (see also Nielsen, 2009). Our analysis is thus explicitly centred on what Scott (1990) would label ‘the official story’, or the
‘public transcripts’ of the anti-dispossession movements under analysis. These public transcripts, Scott reminds us, never tell the full story and may – in the context of social movement mobilisation – additionally obscure the fact that ‘the true range of participants’ interests and identities bears only a partial resemblance to the version espoused by [the] most empowered voices’, as Youngblood (2016: 6) puts it. Analyses that seek to peel the onion of such public transcripts undoubtedly contribute with valuable insights into the localised micro-politics of movement organisation and representation, and we have pursued this line of inquiry in the context of India’s land wars elsewhere (e.g. Nielsen, forthcoming). Here, however, our aim is primarily to understand the appearance of collective unity that is forged around public identity claims rather than the reality of differentiation that may exist on the ground, and to that end we focus in the main on the public symbolism and politics of land, food, and identity as they are invoked in activist discourse, representation, or practice at the regional scale.

India’s New Land Wars

The ways in which land in India has been made available for large industrial or mining ventures, SEZs, real estate, or new townships has often necessitated dispossessing and/or displacing people already living on the land. This has been done differently in different Indian states, thus creating an uneven pattern of compliance with and resistance to land dispossession across India’s federal geography (Bedi and Tillin, 2015). As indicated, scholars and activists

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2 While we have above identified some of the states where resistance to land acquisitions has been most fierce, land transfers have generally met with limited resistance in, for example, Tamil Nadu (Vijayabaskar, 2014) and Gujarat (Sud, 2014). The picture is more mixed in Andhra Pradesh (see for example Cross, 2014; Oskarsson,
working on India’s new land wars criticise the policy of transferring land to corporate control on many accounts. Many justifiably see this as a ‘new enclosure movement’ (Corbridge et al., 2013: 210) and as evidence that advanced global capitalism has decisively moved from a phase of expanded reproduction to one of accumulation by dispossession, a process in which the Indian state is crucially involved (see for instance Banerjee-Guha, 2013; Kapoor, 2011; Levien, 2011, 2012, 2013). The basic claim is, as Sud (2014: 45) puts it, that land is being taken from the poor, for the rich, with the collusion of the state. In a similar way, the legal regime that until January 2014 underpinned the state’s exercise of eminent domain – the land acquisition act of 1894 – has been the target of intense criticism from scholars and activists, who see it as a draconian colonial leftover designed for subjecthood rather than citizenship (e.g. Sundar, 2011).

A range of detailed case studies of particular land struggles, and of the anti-SEZ movement in particular (Jenkins et al., 2014), have recently enhanced our understanding of some of their complex, localised identity dynamics. Anti-mining protests in Adivasi (tribal) areas have, for example, often strategically foregrounded essentialised Adivasi identities to mobilise support from near and far (Padel and Das, 2010), thus glossing over the considerable demographic complexity that exists in mining areas (Bedi 2013a; Oskarsson, 2017). In other anti-dispossession movements, caste identities have similarly been a mobilisational focal point. From Haryana, Kennedy (2014a) shows us how the anti-SEZ movement there came to be dominated by landowners from the Jat caste who tend to monopolise social and political power at all levels. One strand of the anti-SEZ movement was built on a Jat *khap panchayat*, or clan council, that is notorious for dispensing their own form of ‘social justice’ of which

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2010; Oskarsson and Nielsen, 2014; Srinivasulu, 2014), India’s leading state in terms of setting up SEZs, where the nexus between political and business interests has been particularly close.
Dalits – the formerly untouchable castes – often are the targets. Conversely, in Tamil Nadu’s Thervoy, local activists mobilised a threatened ‘Dalit identity’ to stop a land acquisition for a Michelin car tyre factory that would have displaced several Dalit-dominated villages (Steur, 2015). While appeals to a shared caste identity in both cases facilitated intra-caste mobilisation and cohesion, they also tended to alienate potential local supporters from other castes, thus narrowing the movements’ social base and geographical spread.

Social movement scholars approach such identity appeals through the prism of ‘framing’ to bring out how the strategic deployment of particular symbols and identities contributes to mobilising potential adherents and constituents; reinforce particular identities; garner bystander support; and affect ‘changes in hearts and minds’ (Snow, 2004; Gamson, 2004; Williams, 2004; della Porta and Diani, 2006). Unlike the cases discussed above, we detail how the Goa and West Bengal anti-dispossession movements sought to frame their campaigns by appealing to broader, more inclusive regional identities that promised to transcend questions of tribe, caste, or clan. They have done so, we argue, largely through the symbolic evocation of land and food as key identity markers. We thus offer our analysis as a first attempt at understanding how Indian social movements evoke the symbolism of land and food as a means through which to critique new forms of land dispossession. In both cases, the food staple rice is invoked to mediate an emotional attachment to land, and as emblematic of a shared regional-cultural food heritage and identity that is threatened by dispossession. The use of land and food staples to subsume a diversity of identities under a more widely shared regional identity thus potentially facilitates the kind of upwards scale shift that promises to take contention beyond its local origins and touch on the interests and values of new actors (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 95). Importantly, we seek to show how the regionalised nature of

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3 We say ‘potentially’ to stress that successful social movement mobilisation does not necessarily correspond with maximised or solidified shared identity among movement participants (Youngblood, 2016).
the movements’ identity politics is reflected in the regionalised nature of the scale shift they worked to achieve.

Our analysis is based on Nielsen’s long-term periodic ethnographic fieldwork among local anti-dispossession activists in two villages in Singur, West Bengal between 2007 and 2009 followed by subsequent short field visits in 2014, 2016 and 2017; and on Bedi’s year-long ethnographic fieldwork on land, social movements and SEZs in Goa in 2008-2009 and several subsequent field visits in 2010, 2012, 2015 and 2016. We both relied extensively on participant observation, interviews, and local surveys among SEZ fenceline communities (Goa) and dispossessed villagers (West Bengal). In Goa, Bedi completed 140 interviews with SEZ fenceline community stakeholders, activists, journalists, government officials, academics, and corporate representatives. Additionally, Bedi completed four community-level surveys in communities with industrial sites or SEZs within or close to their communities. In Singur, Nielsen carried out long-term close-up participant observation with local ‘unwilling farmers’, as well as interviews and village-level surveys. He also spent time with activists in Kolkata.

Sonar Bangla

From late May 2006, West Bengal became home to two of the most talked-about land wars of the past decade. The first erupted in the state’s Singur block, located some 45 kilometres from the state capital of Kolkata. Here, news about an impending land acquisition spread, leading to almost instantaneous protests from villagers, who feared that their land would be taken

4 The Goan SEZs involved little fresh land acquisition as most of the land allotted to SEZs was already in possession of the government. Fenceline communities therefore refer to communities living adjacent to the planned SEZs whose agitation was principally directed against what Sampat (2015) calls ‘anticipated dispossession’ in the backdrop of accumulation processes already underway.
from them. It was soon revealed that the state’s Left Front government had entered into an agreement with Tata Motors – a leading Indian car manufacturer – to acquire and subsequently lease out 997 acres of agricultural in Singur, on which Tata Motors would then establish a new car plant. In the midst of fierce resistance, land acquisition notifications were circulated during the summer months of 2006. The payment of the cash compensation to which land owners were legally entitled commenced in September the same year, even as anti-dispossession activists sought to sabotage the payment process by laying siege to the local Block Development Office. The police responded by *lathi* charging the demonstrating villagers. Many were arrested, and one activist subsequently died from his injuries.

The land in Singur was finally *de facto* acquired and fenced in December amidst much violence. Yet the movement to reclaim the farmland continued, now led by the flamboyant regional politician (and current Chief Minister of the state) Mamata Banerjee of the Trinamul Congress (TMC). In late 2008 she spearheaded a siege of the factory site in Singur, in the wake of which Tata Motors announced that it would relocate its factory to Gujarat.

The second land war occurred in Nandigram, 125 kilometres southwest of Kolkata. In January 2007, news had spread that as much as 14,500 acres of land would be acquired from 27 *moujas* (revenue village) in Nandigram for a chemical hub and SEZ, to be operated by Indonesia’s Salim Group. On hearing this news, villagers immediately gathered in front of the local *panchayat* office for more news, but the *pradhan* ostensibly refused to share any information. Later, a police force appeared and allegedly started firing on the demonstrating villagers without any provocation (Roy, 2008: 74). But as more villagers joined the protests, the police retreated and one police vehicle was burnt. From then on Nandigram was in effect a ‘liberated zone’ controlled by the Bhumi Ucched Pratirodh Committee (BUPC – Committee to Resist Land Eviction) which spearheaded the resistance. This situation persisted until March when the police – with the active and violent assistance of party cadre from the ruling
Communist Party of India (Marxist) eager to see the BUPC defeated and the industrial project carried through – re-entered Nandigram with full force. The result was 14 deaths according to the official story, but as many as 50 according to unofficial ones. The state’s Chief Minister publicly defended the police action as ‘necessary to bring back rule of law’ (Samaddar, 2013: 132-133). Yet the public outcry over the police atrocities in Nandigram acquired such force that the state government was eventually forced to cancel the SEZ-project and chemical hub.

In activist discourse, the industrial projects planned for both Singur and Nandigram were ‘framed as the displacement of “peasants”’ (Roy, 2007: xlii), that is, as causing the displacement of rural people earning a living as small farmers, sharecroppers, agricultural labourers, and others who ‘still identify with farming as their primary form of identity and occupation’ (ibid.: xlii). Activist discourse often stressed the intimate and close relationship between ‘peasants’ and their land. One activist fact-finding mission report, for example, wrote that ‘for the people of Singur, their land is their life and part of their culture. It is a place for learning and worship’ (Lahiri and Ghosh, 2006: 12). It added that ‘for generations the local people cultivated the land and most of them cannot think of any other occupation beyond agriculture’ (ibid.: 13):

The survival and livelihoods of the peasants are closely related to the land and the agriculture that they practice. They come from generations of farmers and their skills and knowledge have been acquired through the decades of understanding, working and sustaining the land and the surrounding natural resources. These are what they know and do well. Their skills are not suitable for other occupations (ibid.: 14).
Nandigram was often represented in similar ways, with the added layer that its historical connection with the anti-colonial struggle and the *tebhaga* movement in the 1940s were stressed as evidence of ‘the indomitable spirit of the … chasi-samaj’ (Manthan Samayiki, 2007; see also Gangopadhyay, 2008), that is, of ‘agriculturalist society’.

As Katy Gardner (2012: 98-101) has shown, ‘land’ in Bengal is filled with emotional significance and has deeply resonant meanings within Bengali culture as the source of belonging and nurture. In this context, the images of ‘the peasant’, ‘the village’, and ‘the land’ that are visible in the representations outlined above invoke, in the popular imagination, powerful images of *Sonar Bangla*, a ‘Golden Bengal’ of fields of plenty (Roy, 2011: 271). The idea of *Sonar Bangla* has its roots in the anti-colonial struggle and ‘conveys to the mind the image of a rich fertile and prosperous land inhabited by a peaceful agrarian community, living in harmony with its pastoral surroundings’ (Guhathakurta, 1997: 197). It thus encapsulates the idyllic, idealised, pastoral image of rural Bengal that had developed among a host of predominantly Calcutta-based Bengali nationalist writers since the 1880s. In this powerful pastoral image – created largely for and on behalf of the *bhadrakok*, the educated urban middle classes – ‘the village’ is the true spiritual home of the Bengali nation where the Bengali rural ‘folk’ evince all the qualities of the Bengali ‘heart’, another category essential to the romantic nationalism of the time (Chakrabarty, 2002: 127-128). Here, the ‘eternal nature of the Bengal village’ stands as a vigilant and compassionate mother, a bulwark against the contingencies of history. In other words, ‘dispossession from this land is tantamount to exile and motherlessness’ (Panjabi et al., 2009: 45).

While the frame of *Sonar Bangla* enabled the otherwise localised land wars in Singur and Nandigram to tap into and resonate with widely shared regional cultural meanings and identities also in urban areas, the latent gendered qualities of this frame points us towards the symbolic importance of food. In popular representations of both land wars, the trope of ‘the
land’ as mother, and of motherhood more broadly, figured prominently. This is not particularly surprising insofar as ‘the village’ was, in the romantic nationalist imagination, part of a gendered chain of signification that linked the pastoralised landscape of rural Bengal to the sacred motherland of the Bengali nation, iconised by the figure of the idealised mother (Sen, 1993). A particularly interesting illustration of the symbolic and political significance of motherhood in the context of the land wars in Bengal can be found in activist documentary films produced by urban activists supportive of the Singur and Nandigram movements. One of the earliest of these was the anthropologist Dayabati Roy’s documentary Abad Bhumi (Right to Land) that portrays the early weeks and months of the Singur movement. Abad Bhumi opens with a series of brief, almost snapshot-like images from Singur. Within 25 seconds we see footage of three women in a paddy field transplanting saplings; an elderly widow boiling rice in the husk outdoors; and a younger woman squatting on a white concrete floor stuffing rice into a large bag. This connection between women and rice is a recurring image that we return to below.

In Abad Bhumi, footage of women from Singur marching in rallies, shouting slogans, waiving brooms or transplanting saplings reappear with regular intervals. When women appear as interviewees, they are as a rule (albeit with a few exceptions) surrounded by children of various ages, thus underscoring their status as mothers. When women speak about land, they do so using a non-economic discourse that construes land in a manner that closely follows the symbolic registers of Sonar Bangla, that is, as a source of sustenance and identity, and not as property. The women explain that they are willing to occupy their fields along with their children and drive out the intruders with sticks or brooms; one women says that Tata will have to poison them to stand any chance of dispossessing them; and another says that she is ready to lay down her life so that her son may live to cultivate the land in the future, thus emphasising her status as mother of a male child.
In her follow-up documentary, *Unnayaner Name* (In the Name of Development), Roy reports from both Singur and Nandigram. Women are again depicted transplanting paddy saplings and boiling and storing rice; and marching in rallies, waving brooms, shouting popular movement slogans, singing, and proclaiming that they will rather ‘give blood’ than relinquish their land. In addition, the film also depicts women extensively as victims of police atrocities. In its depiction of the horrendous violence that engulfed Nandigram during much of 2007, women appear on several occasions as weeping mothers grieving their dead sons. Still, they insist that they are ready to give blood and even sacrifice their husbands and sons, thus again underscoring their status as wives and mothers of male offspring.

Such representations of village women as the embodiment of an undying spirit of self-sacrifice do more than simply convey an empirical fact about women’s fearlessness when faced with land dispossession. They conjure up powerful symbolic images of village women-as-wives-and-mothers as the last line of resistance in a situation where the rural peasant household that is the foundation of *Sonar Bangla* is threatened with annihilation. This chain of signification is, in turn, in important ways enabled by the obvious symbolic and material association that is repeatedly established between village women and paddy/rice. Transplanting paddy and boiling and storing rice are tasks that are as a rule carried out by women, and so at one level the visual juxtaposition of rice and women merely reflects ordinary and routine practices of everyday rural life. But the lush, green paddy fields that we repeatedly see in the films are also concrete manifestations of *Sonar Bangla* in all its abundance, fertility and prosperity. This close link between paddy and prosperity is reflected in language since, as Greenough (1983: 840) notes, ‘wealth’ (*dhan*) and ‘paddy’ (*dhan*) are in Bengali closely related in sound and sense: Paddy wealth is what enables one to feed oneself and others, and thus stands for both abundance and the continuity of key social relationships. And the ceremonial exchange of cooked rice links kin to kin, mankind to the gods, and the
living with the dead. The lush paddy fields in Singur that are threatened with extinction by being converted into a car factory thus appear as both the foundation of the well-being and prosperity of the individual family and of a regional Bengali identity and sense of belonging. In this rendering, land dispossession represents a grave cultural and social rupture that threatens to destroy key identity-defining social relationships at the regional scale.

Generic constructs such as Sonar Bangla that implicitly foreground the prosperous peasant owner-cultivator of course gloss over the multiplex forms of rural stratification along the lines of caste and class that, as shown in other studies, characterised the project affected population in Singur (Nielsen, 2015b). Yet by mobilising the symbolism of land and food to tap into the potent imagery of Sonar Bangla, the Singur and Nandigram land wars could connect with a sympathetic and very influential urban intellectual elite who want ‘the Sonar Bangla of Tagore be preserved and protected’ (Dutta, 2007). The efficacy of Sonar Bangla becomes all the more clear when contrasted with how, in Bengal, the protests of people displaced in urban areas – for instance slum dwellers, squatters and informal vendors evicted as part of urban ‘beautification’ drives – have never garnered broad, popular support to anywhere near the same extent, even when they have invoked ideas of belonging and identification with the land.

In the popular imagination, Kolkata is a ‘gentleman’s city’ in which the presence of the poor and the homeless is at best ambiguous (Roy, 2007: xlii). While Kolkata’s identity is thus not upset by the dispossession of the urban poor, ‘the peasant’ and ‘the village’ are foundational to Sonar Bangla and to a broader regional Bengali identity, however romanticised.

Amka Naka SEZ, Amka Zai PEZ

Nationally, the events in Singur and Nandigram became synonymous with the violence associated with land acquisition and dispossession. Community stakeholders and (some)
politicians frequently evoked ‘Nandigram’ to express that the nature and scale of state violence witnessed in West Bengal would not be tolerated elsewhere in India, including in Goa.

Goa has a vibrant history of environmental activism that goes back many decades and in which identities and relationships around land have formed important refrains for mobilisation (Sampat, 2015: 775-776). Land-related protests in Goa, however, gained national notoriety after the state became the first in the nation to officially reject the SEZ model. Agitations against SEZs in Goa began in 2007, following the passage of national and state-level SEZ legislation. More specifically, it was the government’s registration of three SEZs in Goa that triggered state-level protests. The Goan government transferred land to SEZ corporate developers in 2007, a period already marked by land contestations arising from highly dubious regional planning practices on the part of the government. Goan law requires that draft Regional Plans outlining land use planning – including agriculture plans – be submitted to the public for review. When the government at the time sought to pass the ‘Regional Plan 2011’ without transparency and public review, they were met with resistance from a wide range of actors. Simultaneously, rising food prices highlighted the state’s agricultural vulnerability to a concerned public. With citizens thus already mobilised around land matters, the politicians and officials implicated in transferring Goan lands to SEZs in 2007 soon came under public scrutiny, and a concerted campaign by political and civil society caused the government to partially backtrack on SEZs. On 31 December 2007 the Goa government announced a plan to stop all current and future SEZ projects.

The anti-SEZ resistance in Goa may be characterised as a struggle of self-defined ‘average citizens’ to defend land, assert identity, and challenge perceived government corruption and irregularities in land matters. Visible in the opposition to SEZs, both past and present, are key organising tropes prominently represented by references to Goan pez, a rice gruel staple food,
and to ‘Goan identity’. In the context of Goa, *pez* and Goan identity allude to familiar ideas and resources that are claimed to be shared by all Goans, seemingly across class and religious divisions. Although the general Goan public was already critical of the state’s ambiguous role in land deals even prior to the SEZ policy implementation, the use of these organising tropes helped to bring diverse constituents together around familiar and relatable ideas even if, as Sampat (2015: 772) reminds us, calls for a Goan identity may not resonate with equal and uniform valence across social location. These ideas will be reviewed in turn, and then we will reflect on how they functioned as organising tools to both represent and protect identities, lands, and foods presumed to unify ‘true’ Goans. The two major anti-SEZ movements were the SEZ Virodhi Manch (SVM) and the Goa Movement Against SEZs (GMAS). Each group will be presented in more detail in relation to the discourses most closely associated with their activism.

Environmental struggles in Goa have historically rested on a mixed social base (Sampat, 2015: 775) and the SVM similarly remains a loose movement composed of SEZ fenceline community stakeholders, Catholic priests, and urban activists which garners support from Hindus and Christians from distinct socio-economic, caste, and class backgrounds. Emerging from efforts to contest the earlier deeply flawed regional land planning process, the movement effectively transformed their concerns into a broader critique of rapid land, agriculture, and demographic changes in the state. Movement discourses, protests, presentations, and press statements contest how the average Goan lacks the agency to make decisions about land use, development, and industrialisation.

The movement invoked and promoted the idea of ‘the common person’ in a range of ways, including in the frequent use of terminology that evoked something customary for many in the state. A common reconceptualisation, or play on words, of SEZs in the context of popular protests was in the form of PEZ, which has two meanings. As explained above, *pez* is a
traditional rice gruel meal and a staple diet of people in Goa. It is also called *canji* or *nivol*, and is prepared with rice and water. Traditionally, farmers would have their *pez* in the early morning before setting off to the fields; other adults would have it as a mid-morning snack that would keep them going until breakfast, while children would rush home to consume it during school breaks. *Pez* is also eaten when people fall sick or to treat a fever, when the rice gruel is used to soothe the digestive system (Malkarnekar, 2016). *Pez* became a rallying term for organizing against SEZs. One of Bedi’s respondents described *pez* as “something common to all of us”, and SVM movement members emphasised how this quality cut across religious and caste and class differences within Goan society. As one SVM activist explained, while *pez* may be seen as the poor man’s simple and nourishing diet, it is also used by the more wealthy segments of society in times of illness (Wass, 2011: 88). For that reason, *pez* became a rallying term to reinforce an imagery of the ‘common concerned citizen’, seemingly unmarked by class or caste.

A vivid example of the use of ‘*pez*’ in the anti-SEZ campaign can be found in a protest verse written by Dr Manoharrai Sardessai in Konkani for an anti-SEZ meeting in the city of Margao:

*Amka naka SEZ amka zai PEZ* (We don’t want SEZ we want PEZ)

*Goenkara tuka kitem zai?* (Goans, what do you want?)

*SEZ zai kai PEZ zai?* (Do you want SEZ or PEZ?)

*Goenkar mhuntta “aik Sorkara Maka SEZ naka PEZ zai”* (Goans are saying, ‘listen government I don’t want SEZ, I want PEZ)

*Amka naka SEZ, amka zai PEZ* (We do not want SEZ, we want PEZ)
This poem illustrates the second usage of the term PEZ, namely ‘Peoples Economic Zone’. This concept stands in contrast to the private corporate developer SEZ model, even as it asserts an active interest among ‘the people’ in economic development. Through this play on words, SVM showed how they wanted development to be determined by and for the people of the state, in reflection of Goan culture, identity, and land-use preferences. SVM similarly titled their protest blog ‘No to SEZ…Yes to PEZ’ and also used ‘pez’ discourses to sway politicians in other contexts. One such instance occurred during a protest on 28 August 2008, a time when the SEZ policy had been scrapped but the land at SEZ sites remained in legal limbo (Bedi, 2015a). Around 50 SVM members stood in silent protest at the Panjim entrance of the Mandovi Bridge which leads to the state Legislative Assembly Hall. The organisers chose this location to encourage the Members of the Goan Legislative Assembly (MLA) to ‘walk the talk’ regarding SEZ de-notification. The MLAs were en route to the Assembly Hall for the afternoon talks of the Monsoon session. The protestors witnessed two MLAs divert their cars away from the protest (there is an alternative, but longer way to the Assembly), while another MLA directly passed but turned his eyes away. After the MLAs had thus bypassed the demonstration, around 20 policemen with lathis came to the area. Posters and banners held by the protestors included phrases such as “Amka Naka SEZ, Amka Zai PEZ”, and ‘Save Goan Identity, Do Away with SEZs’, seeking to reference the cultural connection of Goans to land.

While the ‘pez’ discourse and imagery was thus clearly visible in the SVM’s campaign, the other major movement opposing SEZs, GMAS, more frequently invoked ideas and images of
Goan identity. The party political mobilisation against SEZs in fact began with GMAS, which was officially initiated in October 2007. GMAS included an unusual alliance of opposition political parties and activists. The unknown implications of SEZs combined with concerns about in-migration, job insecurity, and unaffordable land provided the basis for organising resistance to SEZs around the relatable, yet nebulous idea of Goan identity. Following in the footsteps of the organising efforts in 2006 to halt the unpopular regional plan – a campaign which, incidentally, also drew on ideas of Goan identity – some anti-SEZ organisers similarly framed the SEZ issue as a threat to Goan identity. GMAS argued that SEZs would change the state’s ‘unique’ demography and place. The movement arose and generated publicity on the premise that Goa is a special place that requires protection from people, interests, industries, and governments that threaten this idealised vision of Goa (Bedi, 2015). GMAS claimed that SEZs would inevitably result in a huge influx of workers from outside the state and would inundate the Goan population. The then leader of the opposition, and current Chief Minister, Manohar Parrikar, spoke of a ‘demographic invasion’; and concerns about in-migration of ‘non-Goans’ and the takeover of land by outsiders were frequently framed as a threat to ‘Goan identity’ (Da Silva, 2014: 118-119).

As with the discourse of Sonar Bangla in Bengal, the invocation of ‘Goan identity’ is far from a novel organising trope in Goa. Indeed, the historically constituted idea of a ‘Goan identity’ (and related perceptions of land, food, people, and nature) that is somehow distinct from the rest of India has and continues to be routinely deployed to mobilise political action. Used in conjunction with demands for ‘special status’ for Goa – a status granted by the federal government to select states which, among others, guarantees that only long-term residents will be able to purchase land or property – ‘Goan identity’ is symbolically used as short-hand to reference popular concerns over the growing scarcity of affordable land for native Goans; illicit agricultural land conversions; and the influx of labour migrants from other parts of India.
Some individuals involved in the anti-SEZ movement to an extent played upon a ‘Goa for Goans’ discourse that captured local anxieties about influxes of both outside capital and migrant labour (Levien, 2013: 377; Sampat, 2015: 782), although this discourse was far from uniformly subscribed to by all movement supporters.

When used in such contexts, ‘Goan identity’ indexes something unique in the state’s culture, language, and soil. As one activist told Bedi, Goan identity revolves ‘around a particular lifestyle which talks about agriculture, fishing, about music’ (interview, May 2009), and often people draw on the historical legacy of Portuguese colonialism to frame how their identity is distinct from ‘Indian culture’ more generally. During Portuguese colonialism, and after, ‘Goan identity’ was used to provide a unifying collective value. Some activist respondents attribute this perceived Goan ‘uniqueness’ to the prolonged impact of Portuguese colonisation which ‘influenced our culture here, we became a totally different kind of people, closer to western societies, like a mixture’ (interview, November 2008). The colonial construct of Goa as ‘Goa dourada’, or Golden Goa, an enclave of apparent prosperity and leisure created by Portuguese mercantilism and Catholicism, in many ways embodies this view of Goa as fundamentally different from the rest of India (Trichur, 2013: 17-23). According to Rubinoff (1998: 31), ‘all Goans, whether they be Hindus, Christians or Muslims, recognize a common oneness that distinguishes them from others on the Indian subcontinent’.

While Rubinoff (1998: 20) maintains that the eventual political and economic integration of Goa encouraged the area’s assimilation into India and thereby diluted the area’s unique cultural identity, the trope of a Goan identity under threat remains alive and well in political discourse. For some Goans, the geographical landscape of Goa has come to embody the identity of the place. Formerly filled with paddy fields, hills, forests, and sweeping views of the rivers and the Indian Ocean, many now literally see traditional Goa and Goan identity seeping away as landscapes are transformed by mining, SEZs, urbanisation, real estate
development, industrialisation and infrastructure development (Nielsen and Da Silva, 2017). Some of the descriptions of land and identity in the context of the anti-SEZ mobilisation indeed echo romanticised ideas about an ideal Goa that is now rapidly fading away. A social movement activist explained that ‘I think that Goan identity for me comes from the land, the culture, each land has its socio-economic, cultural fabric … you are attached to a land, and that land expresses itself to you physiologically, and socially’ (interview, December 2008). When land is thus seen as intrinsically linked to the ‘cultural fabric’ and identity of a place, certain social and internal reactions and relationships are created and may become particularly salient in the context of land dispossession or agricultural loss.

These discursively projected concerns resonated well with more general anxieties about land loss, particularly for SEZ fenceline communities. In a household survey conducted by Bedi with 200 villagers, the respondents were questioned if land availability – i.e. the perceived ability to access, purchase, farm, or otherwise use land – was a problem in their village. Within three SEZ affected villages and one not affected by SEZs, 72.5 per cent of the respondents identified land availability as a problem. Many respondents also identified threats to Goan identity as an issue. These more widely shared concerns about land provided a broader platform for the anti-SEZ resistance among the general public. Overall, both anti-SEZ movements sought to encourage regional identities that would resonate with key constituents, while also amplifying their message to a broader audience. The construction of these identities synthesising land, food, and ‘Goanness’ helped create a strong mobilising force in opposition to SEZs.

**Discussion and Conclusions**
In concert with other social movements in India, the two cases of anti-dispossession mobilisation presented above illustrate how movements construct and reinforce identities to encourage solidarity and cohesion, and generate a collective vocabulary of contestation (Guha, 2000; Ray, 1999; Routledge, 1993). Both in West Bengal and Goa, movement activists and supporters worked to emphasise particular discourses, symbols and identities to encourage solidarity internally, and to mobilise the sympathy of a larger public. As social movement scholars have long argued, such attempts to construct identities reflect efforts to assign meanings to ‘the struggle’, and to connect it to broader social processes (della Porta and Diani, 2006). What is of interest here is how movement organisers, who articulate the discursive space of opposition, have more specifically presented and projected the movement’s distinct regional identities by invoking land and food as salient regional identity markers. In West Bengal, implicit emotional appeals to protect an idealised Sonar Bangla iconised in the peasant, the rice fields, and the Bengali mother, were visible. In Goa, the trope of motherhood was much less salient – unlike in Bengal, where the idea of land as ‘mother’ was cemented during the anti-colonial movement, it was the Konkani language rather than the land that, in the nationalist movement in Goa, became synonymous with the iconised figure of the mother (Perez, 2011: 119) – but appeals to protect a unique ‘Goan identity’ rooted in the landscape, the soil, and the pez were made in a comparable manner. In this way, popular mobilisations that emerged out of similar structural transformations found expression in distinctly regionalised ways. In a country as diverse as India, this may not come as a big surprise. Even the agrarian populism of the Indian new farmers’ movements of the 1980s whose scale of reference appeared to be unambiguously national insofar as they posited a generalised, fundamental opposition between an exploitative ‘urban India’ and an exploited ‘rural Bharat’ as the main contradiction (Brass, 1995), have been shown to be deeply inflected by regional histories, symbolism and identities in their campaigns (Youngblood, 2016).
Organising opposition in both geographies thus involved creating connections and forging solidarity across disparate actors at the regional scale. Idealised and distinctly regional visions of land, food, identities, and belonging generated the visual and sensory means for people to feel connected to their place, thus underscoring the place-specific orientation of identity formation in social movement campaigns and symbolic vocabularies. Place specific processes and organizing potentials mediate these identities and shape movement agency (Routledge, 1993: 27), and in both cases we see how historical and geographical contexts create possibilities, boundaries, and fissures for the creation of movement identities (see also Featherstone, 2008: 7).

By invoking land and food to successfully elide or evade potentially contentious issues of caste, class, religion, and gender – if not in practice then at least at the level of public discourse and symbolism – both movements were able to mobilise a larger public around widely shared ideas about regional belonging and identity. Yet there were important differences as well which underscore what Mody (2014) calls ‘the primacy of the local’ in India’s new land wars, that is, their inflection by specific and distinctive regional identities and concerns. Hence, while the invocation of a Bengali peasant identity as a focal point for mobilisation – and as a symbol that could bridge the rural-urban divide – in West Bengal reflects the key role of the owner-cultivator in the potent image of Sonar Bangla, the figure of the peasant has never occupied quite the same pride of place in constructions of Goan identity. And, unlike in Bengal, rural-urban differences are not particularly pronounced in Goa and are hence easier to bridge. In contrast, given the smallness of Goa an equally encompassing ‘Goan identity’ could be mobilised partly in opposition to non-Goans staking claims to Goa’s land. In Bengal, the trope of the outsider was less salient, even if there is a long history of representing the Bengali peasantry as oppressed by the machinations of non-Bengali imperialists and monopoly capitalists (Roy, 2007: 183). Lastly, in both states the regional
identity politics that the movements espoused could be successfully channelled into the
domain of electoral politics, albeit in very different ways. In West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee’s
regional Bengali nationalism easily incorporated the land wars there into her political
campaign to protect *ma, mati, manush*, or ‘mother, motherland and mankind’ (Chakrabarty,
2011: 155). This slogan draws together many of the potent symbolic aspects of the land
struggles in the state as discussed above: ‘*Ma*’ as ‘synonymous with Bengal’, that is, as
synonymous with Bengali identity, culture and history; ‘*mati*’ standing for land not just in an
economic sense, but as something people are wedded to, around which their lives revolve; and
‘*manush*’ referring to humanity and humanism, threatened by ‘brutal state repression and
killing’ (Gupta, 2012: 95). In Goa, it was the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
that emerged as the most important political champion of the anti-SEZ movement. They
achieved this, however, not by foregrounding the overarching Hindu identity that is otherwise
at the core of the BJP’s politics, but rather by endorsing the popular anxieties related to an
evaporating Goan identity, which on the surface is unmarked by religion.

While the land wars in Goa and West Bengal were relatively successful in fending off land
dispossession, they largely remained regionalised in scale and scope in spite of concerted
efforts by usually educated middle-class activists in those and other states to link localised
conflicts into a nationwide anti-SEZ campaign (Cross, 2014). Indeed, as Levien (2013) writes,
while some umbrella organisations, such as the National Alliance of People’s Movements,
have attempted to bring India’s many disparate land struggles onto a common national
platform, they have found the task extremely difficult ‘given the heterogeneity of these
movements, their internal contradictions, and the overwhelming imperative felt by each
movement to stop their particular project’ (ibid.: 367). While there are several contextually
specific reasons for why this should be the case, the state scale at which land acquisitions are
carried out in India provides an important explanation. Processes of state rescaling in India
over the past 25 years have rendered the subnational or regional scales increasingly important (Kennedy, 2014b). In the context of land dispossession, it is noteworthy that India has no singular national policy for land use and no specific national state department that coordinates its administration. Rather, land related policies fall under many different departments and are split between the national and the subnational governments. The latter may in fact actively resist national dictates, adapt them, or formulate their own regional land policies and practices based on the local political and economic context (Sud, 2009, 2014). In addition, it is the regional state governments and their affiliated agencies that are the key actors in executing land acquisitions. For this reason, most anti-dispossession movements have determined that the most effective way to proceed is to fight their battles precisely at the regional state level (Bedi, 2013b; Levien, 2013; Ren, 2016). As we have indicated above, the ways in which such battles shape up will depend on the historically produced regional political systems in which they are embedded, and on the very different ways that activists ‘see the state’ (Bedi, 2013b).

What the identity politics of the movements in Goa and West Bengal share, however, is precisely their regional scale of reference. Regional identities as articulated through land and food are, we have argued, potent mobilising tropes that can garner broad popular support among a regional audience to fight a regional war. But, they are likely to be less efficacious in other contexts, and may not travel well. Rather, such scaled orientations produce a situation in which the regionalised articulation and forms of resistance to land dispossession may in effect preclude national mobilisation (Bedi, 2013b). As Levien (2013: 369) writes, anti-dispossession politics has been, and will likely continue to be, led by local, single-purpose organisations that make strategic use of supra-local alliances as expediency demands. While this may frustrate activists working to transform the many localised land wars into a unified national force by framing them with reference to national or global structural transformations, food security, or land
grabbing, the regional scale may be exactly where the future of India’s land wars lies: when the current pro-business national government recently failed in amending the current national legislation underpinning the exercise of eminent domain in ways that would make the acquisition of land for private investors easier and swifter, it instead encouraged the subnational states to formulate their own investor-friendly land laws. With key legal mechanisms of land dispossession thus encaged in regionally differentiated ways, the mobilisation of land and food within the framework of a regional identity politics is likely to remain a key feature of India’s present and future land wars.

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