The Storting's Attitude Towards Military Interventions

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Abstract

Norway, as a small state, is a loyal ally of the US and NATO, and a supporter of international law and norms. The proliferation of interventions in the 1990s happened with and without UN backing, and Norwegian allies executed several of these. The Norwegian dilemma is especially interesting here: the dilemma between Norway as the junior partner (of NATO and the US) and Norway as a peace nation (whose main goal is a UN-led world and the protection of civilians).

What can the Storting's debates on, and attitude towards, five recent military interventions tell us about the relative explanatory weight of realist and idealist interests in Norwegian foreign policy?

In order to answer this question, the thesis has used a qualitative research design where three different explanatory variables (alliance, international law, and the protection of civilians) have been used in the analysis of Storting debates on five military interventions (Kosovo 1999, Iraq 2003, Georgia 2008, Libya 2011, and East Ukraine 2014).
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Tora Susann Dahl Manger

Oslo, 26. oktober 2017
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# Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ap</td>
<td>The Labour Party</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Frp</td>
<td>The Progress Party</td>
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<td>H</td>
<td>The Conservative Party</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>KrF</td>
<td>The Christian Democratic Party</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>Sp</td>
<td>The Centre Party</td>
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<td>SV</td>
<td>The Socialist Left Party</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>The Liberal Party</td>
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<td>WMDs</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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1 Introduction

The post-Cold War world was marked by the proliferation of military interventions. As the Iron Curtain fell, the 1990s saw numerous interventions by the West, such as the interventions in Somalia, Kuwait, Iraq, Bosnia, and Haiti. An intervention is a forced interference into a state’s internal or external affairs (Østerud et al. 1997: 250), and can be carried out by a state, a group within a state, a group of states, or an international organisation (Krieg 2012: 7). When a single state intervenes, it is invariably accused of pursuing its national interests. If, on the other hand, the intervention is authorised by the United Nations (UN) and involves a multinational force, it invariably has more legitimacy (Lange et al. 2009: 101).

The UN Security Council has authorised several interventions since 1991 based on humanitarian grounds. Humanitarian intervention is an intervention executed to ‘prevent gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law’ (Krieg 2012: 7). Unlike conventional military interventions, the goal of humanitarian interventions is to decrease suffering for civilians, and will therefore follow ‘guidelines of limited force’ so as not to worsen the situation on the ground (Krieg 2012: 8).

The debate around military interventions on humanitarian grounds became more prominent when NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999 without an explicit mandate from the Security Council. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN at the time, agreed to establish consensus on international use of force in extreme cases, as well as a rewording of the sovereignty principle. This resulted in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that clarified all states' responsibility for protecting their own population. R2P focused on the state's responsibility to protect its own populations from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Use of military means was not desirable, but should be considered if other means were insufficient to improve the situation.

Support for international law has been a mainstay in Norwegian foreign policy for centuries. When Denmark was attacked in 1864 by Prussia and Austria, there was a debate in the Norwegian Parliament¹ (Storting) over whether Norway should provide military aid to Denmark. One of the justifications for helping Denmark was the fact that Norway as a small

¹ From now on referred to as the Storting.
state needed to support peace and stability. This topic reappeared when Norway, four decades later, was seeking full independence from Sweden. It was seen as important that Norway played an active role in the world as a supporter of international law (Leira 2015: 22). The perception was that by developing and supporting international law, Norway increased the likelihood of living in peace (Leira 2015: 35). With the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919, the ideas of peace and international law reappeared. Pursuing peace was seen as the morally right thing to do in the interwar period (Leira 2015: 36). Following the two World Wars, The UN was founded in 1945. The idea was that military force should be controlled. The principles of non-intervention and states’ rights to sovereignty were established (UN 2016). Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, peace promotion became a greater part of Norwegian foreign policy (Skånland 2010: 34-36).

In the aftermath of WWII, Norway required external security and NATO was seen as the way to ensure this (Leira 2015: 37). Norway’s policy of engagement since the mid-1990s has increasingly revolved around participation in international operations led by NATO rather than the UN. Norway’s military contribution to UN operations has thus gradually assumed a more military character (Haaland 2007: 497-498). Norway’s relationship with the United States (US) and Norway's membership in the defence alliance has been a backbone of Norwegian security policy (Hansen 2009: 88). Heinz Gärtner defines alliances as ‘formal associations of states bound by the mutual commitment to use military force against non-member states to defend member states’ integrity’ (Gärtner 2001:2). Whereas coalitions are oriented towards specific goals and lack formal institutions, alliances are much more binding. Alliances entail a more or less explicit guarantee of assistance in a conflict situation and are therefore an important form of insurance for small states (Krause and Singer 2001: 16).

As reflected in Norwegian foreign policy, Norway, as a small state, is a loyal ally of the US and NATO, and a supporter of international law and norms. The proliferation of interventions in the 1990s happened with and without UN backing, and Norwegian allies executed several of these. The Norwegian dilemma is especially interesting here: the dilemma between Norway as the junior partner (of NATO and the US) and Norway as a peace nation (whose main goal is a UN-led world and the protection of civilians).

During the Cold War, Norway’s foreign policy was characterised by the dominance of realist security politics over idealist value diplomacy (Stokke 2012: 214). However, as the Cold War
ended, international institutions and laws became more important, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to decreasing security threats, and there was an increased public openness and debate on foreign policy, effectively shifting the balance between idealism and realism, making ideals and soft power diplomacy more prominent (Nye 2004; Stokke 2012).

In the 1990s value-based interests thus increasingly mattered in Western foreign policy. There was a debate in the 1990s over whether Norwegian foreign policy was dominated by realist interests, such as security, or value-based interests such as humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, and support for the UN (Matlary 2002: 3). Public diplomacy, the development of diplomacy in the public space, has led to the political discourse increasingly revolving around more value-based interests (Matlary 2002: 9).

However, a recent study by Stokke (2012) on the Norwegian peace engagement claimed there had been a reorientation towards realist interests in the 21st century, in contrast to the centrality of values in the 1990s. Additionally the study showed the meaning of interest had been broadened to include the concept of value in idealism (Stokke 2012: 223).

**1.1 Research Question**

I would find it likely that by studying one part of public debate, parliamentary debates, I should be able to detect the balance of realist and idealist arguments in the Storting. I want to study the Storting debates on five recent military interventions, to see if there is a return to realist interests. As the debate in Norway on military interventions has mainly revolved around alliance arguments, international law, and the protection of civilians, I have chosen to focus on these three categories to study the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions.

Based on the information above, my research question is as follows:

*What can the Storting’s debates on, and attitude towards, five recent military interventions tell us about the relative explanatory weight of realist and idealist interests in Norwegian foreign policy?*

**1.2 Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework as a whole is based on small state theory, as Norway is considered a small state in military terms. The theoretical framework is based on the belief that small states are dependent on an alliance and that they also tend to be supporters of international
law. Therefore, as Norway is a small state, it will be logical to assume that Norway, in its foreign policy, would base its decisions on alliance values and international law. As I am interested in examining the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions, these two elements can be expected to be key elements of the parliamentary debates, accompanied by the concern for the civilian population. As alliance theory suggests that states tend to be more loyal to their allies in times of conflict, the East-West tension at the time of the interventions will be of importance. The Storting is largely consensus-oriented on matters concerning foreign affairs (Sjaastad 2006: 19), and therefore one can assume that divisions and party politics will not play an active role in these discussions. The theoretical framework will be discussed further in chapter 2.

1.3 Case Selection and Research Method

To make this study feasible within the time and space constraints of a master thesis, I will compare five military interventions; three of them US- and /or NATO-led and two conducted by Russia. The intervention of Kosovo in 1999, the intervention of Iraq in 2003, the intervention of Libya in 2011, the intervention of Georgia in 2008, and the intervention of East Ukraine in 2014 will be compared to better shed light over the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions.

This thesis provides a qualitative analysis of the Norwegian parliamentary debates, which took place in the period 1998-2015 with emphasis on the years around the interventions in Kosovo in 1999, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011, Georgia in 2008, and East Ukraine in 2014. The empirical material was retrieved from the Storting’s home page online, and the main data will be Statements\(^2\) (redegjørelser) with subsequent debates supplemented with Question Times\(^3\) (spørretimer), and one white paper with a subsequent debate. The similarity of the empirical material simplified the comparison of the five interventions and hopefully led to fewer errors. The empirical data was obtained from all relevant debates in the Storting, and this material was then categorised, analysed, and compared. The findings from the parliamentary statements were not first and foremost classified according to quantitative count of occurrence, but rather by a qualitative assessment of centrality and importance.

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\(^2\) According to the Storting’s dictionary, the official English word for the Norwegian word redegjørelse is Statement, and will from here on be used in the English version with a capital letter.

\(^3\) According to the Storting’s dictionary, the official English word for the Norwegian word sporretime is Question Time, and will from here on be used in the English version with a capital letter.
However, where I found it necessary I have supplemented the qualitative analysis with quantitative findings.

1.4 Outline of the Thesis

Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework in the form of small state theory, as well as a brief summary of the Storting’s role in Norwegian foreign policy. Chapter 3 provides the methodological framework, and addresses case selection, data material, and the categorisation of the empirical material. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 present and analyse the parliamentary debates on the interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, Georgia, and East Ukraine, whereas chapter 8 compares the findings of the five cases. Finally, chapter 9 summarises the major findings of the individual and comparative analyses, and contains concluding remarks.
2 Small State Theory

This thesis examines the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions. The theoretical framework is built on small state theories. For a small state like Norway, both NATO and the UN are important institutions. Whereas NATO contributes with military security, the UN helps develop and maintain norms and laws that promote stability and limit the use of military force in conflicts. Resourceful small states like Norway can affect institutions’ and states’ behaviour, thereby promoting their interests through these organisations (Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 9).

Small Powers are different from Great Powers not merely in magnitude of capability but also in how they think and act (Rothstein 1968: 1). The term small power is relative, but the ones belonging to this category share some commonalities (Toje 2010: 137). There is no widely accepted definition of what a small state is, but the distinction often depends on the context one wishes to research (Kjølberg 2007: 8). Therefore, definitions based on relative size rather than absolute size are more important in this context. For this thesis, it is Norway as a small state in the context of military capacity that is of interest. As for the rest of the thesis, the term small state will be used, and it will be understood in the context of capacity and not size.

The identity of being a small and vulnerable state has played a key role in framing Norwegian foreign policy. Two of the general positions in the history of Norway’s foreign policy have been idealism and realism. Idealism and realism seek to overcome the perceived lack of power by pursuing influence through value diplomacy or participation in alliance politics (Stokke 2012: 213), hence my focus on the balance between idealist and realist arguments in this thesis.

Next, I will briefly explain the Storting’s role in Norwegian foreign policy, before clarifying the dependent variable, ‘attitude towards military interventions’. The chapter’s main part will explore theory linked to the presumed influence that alliance, international tension, international law, and certain humanitarian norms have on small states, and how these factors affect small state-parliamentarians’ attitude to military interventions. The next subsection will address the Storting’s role in decisions regarding foreign affairs, as well as what has been known as the consensus culture.
2.1 Norwegian Foreign Policy Making

The purpose of my thesis is to look at attitudes in the Storting towards military interventions. It is therefore important to explain the Storting’s role in foreign affairs. Parliamentary democracies have to take opposition and opinion into account to a greater degree than non-parliamentary democracies when it comes to foreign and security policies (Kjølberg 2007: 14). The Constitution gives the government responsibility for foreign policy, but the Storting still plays an important constitutional role through legislation, budgets, and various forms of debate (§ 75).

That the Storting should play an active role in Norway’s foreign affairs is a relatively new idea. Foreign policy is of different nature than other policy areas. With the exception of a few areas, such as Norway’s relation to the EU, the Storting is largely consensus-oriented on matters of foreign policy (Sjaastad 2006: 19). Consensus is more common than criticism and party disagreement.

The Storting’s foreign policy task consists more of support of the government’s foreign policy than constitutional control of the government (Sjaastad 2006: 19). Open disagreement is seen by almost all in the Storting as not just a strategic problem, of a non-united foreign policy, but also a potential threat to Norway's role in the world. Still, consensus is not obtained automatically, even in a small state such as Norway (Sjaastad 2006: 20). The government and the Storting meet up in confidential meetings through the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. Therefore, we rarely notice the Storting assuming a prominent and independent role in matters of foreign affairs, as foreign policy disagreements are not played out in public and dissenting opinions are rarely made public (Sjaastad 2006: 33).

The Storting will in plenary, and thus in public, concentrate on clarifying the main lines in Norwegian foreign policy and thereby maintain national interests, and a consensus-building body will therefore be very visible in the public sphere (Sjaastad 2006: 19). This collides with the ideal objective that disagreement has an intrinsic value to help regulate and limit discussion and debate – also in the Storting – as the critical voices are being marginalised (Sjaastad 2006: 21). However, if at least six of the committee members demand it, it is possible to have a case on the agenda of the extended foreign committee in the plenary.

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4 In 2009 the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Defense were merged.
session (The Storting’s Rules of Procedure, § 13), which happened in the case of Libya, and can explain why there exist very open discussions surrounding this intervention and several Statements from an early stage on.

The fact that Norwegian foreign policy is largely consensus-oriented does not mean that there is a general consensus on all individual cases or that party political landscape can be seen as monotonous. One can expect fewer conflicting arguments when analysing the parliamentary debates than if the public had access to the discussions that takes place in the closed meetings between the government and the Storting. However, areas where the parties strongly disagree will still be prevalent in the parliamentary debates.

Due to the general support from the Storting to the Norwegian government’s decisions on foreign matters, party politics should not be of great concern, but remain rather stable from case to case, so that other explanations will be more prominent.

Before moving on to the factors that might explain such variation, I will present a brief summary of the political parties in the Storting at the time of the interventions. The Storting representatives included in the empirical material of the five interventions came from seven different parties: the Centre Party (Senterpartiet, Sp), the Conservative Party (Høyre, H), the Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF), the Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet, Ap), the Liberal Party (Venstre, V), the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, Frp), and the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV).

Most parties have stable positions on Norway’s relationship to both NATO and the UN. However, the Socialist Left Party differs in attitude from the general opinion of the Storting especially when it comes to NATO’s role, as the party has a history of being highly critical of NATO. The Socialist Left Party's predecessor, the Socialist People's Party, was founded in 1961 based on foreign policy opposition (Furre 1992: 321). The underlying ideology was anti-capitalism and hence anti-Americanism because the US was considered to be the

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5 Two more parties were represented in the Storting at the time of some of the interventions. The Coastal Party (Norwegian: Kystpartiet) was in the Storting at the time of the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, and the Green Party (Norwegian: Miljøpartiet De Grønne, MDG) was in the Storting during the intervention in East Ukraine. However, none of the representatives are included in the empirical material, as they did not contribute to the matters in question.

6 For the translation of Norwegian Party names, I apply the terms used in the Norwegian Storting’s online dictionary. I’ve chosen to keep the Norwegian abbreviations of the party names, as I have not found any official translation of these. These abbreviations will thus be used throughout the analysis, but the full English names will be applied when referring to the parties.
foremost missionary of capitalism. A consequence of this was resistance to a US-dominated NATO because the organisation was considered a piece of American imperialism. The Socialist People's Party, and later the Socialist Left Party, were in opposition to the official Norwegian security policy (Furre 1992: 348). Other parties, such as the Labour Party and the Conservative Party are clear supporters of NATO. The fact that the Socialist Left Party differs with regards to NATO and the US is not problematic for the thesis, but it is nonetheless important to keep in mind when analysing the parliamentary debates. It will also be interesting to see how this plays out with the consensus culture. With that said, critique from representatives of the Socialist Left Party towards NATO or the US will thus be less of a surprise than critique from representatives of other party groups.

The governments at the time of the interventions varied; the government in position during the Kosovo intervention was a coalition of the Christian Democratic Party, the Centre Party, and the Liberal Party. The government in position during the Iraq intervention was a coalition of the Christian Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, and the Liberal Party. The government in position during the interventions in Georgia and Libya was a coalition of the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party, and the Centre Party. Lastly, the government in position during the East Ukraine intervention was a coalition of the Conservative Party and the Progress Party. Although this is not a focal point in this paper, one should keep in mind whether the representatives speaking are a part of a party group that is in the government, as one will expect a government party to be less vocal in its disagreements.

Based on this subsection, it can be said that the Storting is involved in the shaping of Norwegian foreign policy through legislation, budgets, and various forms of debate, despite the fact that Norwegian foreign policy is largely the domain of the executive power. In addition, the government may consult the Storting’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, and the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in special security policy matters. The content of these meetings is secret, which applies to both the matter to be discussed and the members’ opinions. The existence of these committees helps to maintain the consensus that has traditionally existed in Norwegian security policy as it is then taken away from the public debates. However, if at least six of the members of the committee so require, the matter shall be dealt with in the plenary session of the Storting.

Due to the nature of the empirical material in this thesis (the transcripts from the parliamentary debates) not much disagreement is expected. Additionally, as the focus of this
thesis is to look at the balance of realist and idealist arguments used in the Storting, the existence of secret and confidential meetings is not considered as a problem.

2.2 Dependent variable: Attitude towards intervention

The dependent variable is the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions. Attitude towards intervention is here understood as a placement on an attitude scale, which goes from strong condemnation (-2) to strong support (2) towards use of military force. The scale is numeric and the attitude is measured based on the qualitative evidence from the parliamentary representatives’ statements. If none of the party groups or none of the representatives are against the operation, and the Storting actively supports an intervention that is considered a strong support (2) for the intervention. If all party groups and all representatives are against the interventions that will be considered a strong condemnation (-2) of the intervention. For the attitude to be considered moderate condemning (-1) there would have to be a clear doubt as to condemn an intervention from an important party group or from several representatives from several party groups. For the interventions to be considered moderate support (1) there would have to be a clear doubt as to supporting an intervention from an important party group or from several representatives from several party groups. In addition to the consensus around certain decisions, language use will also help to distinguish between e.g. moderate condemnation and strong condemnation. For the Storting’s attitude to be given the score of 0, the Storting would have to be indifferent to a military intervention. In sum, attitude towards military intervention will be measured on a scale from strong condemnation to strong support.

Some disagreements are more expected than others, such as disagreement from the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party. Therefore, support from fellow government parties is seen as expected, support from non-government parties is seen as supporting a broad consensus, and lack of support from parties such as the Progress Party and the Socialist Left Party are seen as less significant and quite predictable on certain foreign policy matters. These disagreements will be looked upon as somewhat expected party differences, but are nonetheless important to highlight in the analysis.

Although the dependent variable is attitude towards military interventions, it is also a purpose of the thesis to look at the presence of realist and idealist arguments. The balance of arguments will be ranked from strong predominance of realist arguments (-2), moderate predominance of realist arguments, balance of arguments (0), moderate predominance of
idealist arguments (1), to strong predominance of idealist arguments.

Later in this chapter the scores on the three variables to each of the five military interventions will be presented. The presentation of how the five military interventions score on alliance pressure, international law and the protection of civilians will prepare for the analysis of the parliamentary debates and what to expect from these debates.

The factors that might explain the variation in the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions will be addressed in the remaining part of this chapter.

2.3 Alliances and Interventions

Due to the study of military interventions, and the selection of cases, the main focus of this thesis will concern security through NATO and the US, and Norway’s advantages and disadvantages of being part of these alliances.

**Alliance Dependency**

Since small states typically cannot provide for their security (e.g. in military operations) they tend to participate within an institutional framework, and they tend to seek alliance partners (Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 7). Small states have a need to use multiple means to compensate for the fact that they are small, and one of these means is to enter into alliances (Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 12). Alliances result in small states gaining access to deliberations and decision-making they would not have without an alliance (Holst 1985: 261). As their resource base is smaller, membership in alliances is thus a means small states can use to promote their security interests.

An alliance is a formal commitment by which two or more states agree to take military action (or to avoid taking certain military actions) under certain defined circumstances (Lai and Reiter 2000: 203). Normally, all parties of the alliance enter voluntarily, and the choice to join an alliance will therefore be in a state’s own interest (Lai and Reiter 2000: 205). States thus join alliances because it is in their interest to do so, even though it restricts their freedom of action. When states feel threatened, they will rely on one or several other states’ capabilities to counter this threat. The threat or fear of war is therefore the main reason for alliance formation. That’s why alliance agreements typically contain obligations between the parties involved that an attack on one is an attack on all (Carlsnaes 2008: 11), such as NATO’s article 5. Alliance is one of several responses to threats.
Alliances are central forms of international cooperation and are often looked at as the primary expression of a state’s foreign policy preferences. When entering into an alliance, states signal what their foreign and security policies are. Political costs are related to the signals one gives to other non-members when one enters into a specific alliance. A state’s policies can be restricted by loyalty to allies. This is applicable to how Norway’s membership in NATO restrains Norway’s relationship to Russia.

The political costs are not just related to non-members of the alliance one chooses to enter, but also to the members of one’s alliance (Kjølberg 2007: 26). It is important for states that need alliances for protection, e.g. small states, to show they are willing and able to help others in the alliance (Kjølberg 2007: 22). The consequences of being allied are closely related to the motivation for having a good relationship with the guarantor and the benefits it provides.

Once alliances have begun to form, the alliance security dilemma changes. As the original phase entailed whether or not to enter an alliance, the second phase involves how much one should commit to the alliance (Snyder 1984: 466). As a member of an alliance one is expected to render assistance if other members are threatened and this also applies to small states. As part of an alliance one will have to participate in operations that might be outside the interest of one’s state. As a small state in alliance with the US, like Norway, one will be drawn into conflicts that one would not have without the participation in the alliance, and be threatened by states that first of all are in conflict with the US, but will extend their threats to its allies. However, the benefits of being a member and supporter of the alliance outweigh the disadvantages (Kjølberg 2007: 25).

Participation in international operations that are important to the US and NATO is therefore a way for states such as Norway to show loyalty and at the same time emphasise it is willing to share the burden (Kjølberg 2007: 28). Small states may not share the dominating state’s agenda but they will stay in the alliance for the economic, political, and security benefits in particular (Kjølberg 2007: 26). There is an expectation that if one is a loyal ally helping others, this help will be returned. For Norway this means that by supporting NATO and the US, Norway is actually helping itself, as Norway is dependent on NATO and the US for military support.

As elaborated, alliance dependency often implies a special reliance on a large or dominant partner in the alliance, such as the US in NATO. Norway, as a small state in military terms, is
completely dependent on NATO, and thus the US, for security. It is therefore an important security concern for Norway that NATO remains a vital and functional security organisation. This makes it important that Norway contributes to the performance of the tasks NATO undertakes, both to ensure the organisation's further work and to ensure that Norway retains or increases its influence and position within the organisation.

**International Tension**

As widely discussed in academia, the end of the Cold War saw a new world order. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the international system shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar system and has since evolved into a more multipolar system (Harrison 2004: 5). International tension can be linked to countries’ fear of war. When the fear for war is greater, and the tension is higher, small states tend to depend more on their allies. Variance in external threat is relevant because it tells the smaller ally whether the greater ally’s capabilities are likely to be necessary to deter aggression or defend against an attack (Davidson 2011: 16).

For Norway, this means that variance in external threat will affect Norway’s relationship to the US. Norway will be more inclined to support intervening allies in times of great international tension. Furthermore, Norway will, as an ally of the US, side with the US when there is great international tension. This is also applicable to Norway sharing the view that the US has on Russian interventions in times of high international tension. When external threat is greater, I expect the Storting to be more supportive of US interventions; when external threat is lower, the Storting can more easily criticise a US-initiated intervention. Likewise, when international tension is great, the Storting is expected to side with the US’ stand on the Russian interventions. Both Russian cases are in times of relative high international tension, with the East-West tension during the intervention in East Ukraine being greater than that during the intervention in Georgia.

As East-West tensions vary over time, I will present points from both sides, to highlight significant events on the way to full tension in the post-Cold War world. As I will keep this overview brief, I have primarily focused on NATO expansions as well as interventions by the US/NATO and Russia.

NATO’s expansions in 1999 and 2004 antagonised Russia. At the 1990 London Summit, a decision was made to enhance NATO’s political dimension, making it clear that NATO was ready for expansions (Moore 2007: 27). The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was
established in 1997 ‘to soften the blow of enlargement for Russia and make clear that NATO also sought to integrate Russia into the evolving security architecture’ (Moore 2007: 27-28). The first phase of the enlargement started at NATO’s Madrid Summit in 1997, when membership invitations were issued to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The process was finalised in 1999 (Moore 2007: 25). In Prague in 2002 new invitations were issued, leading to the accession of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in 2004 (Moore 2007: 25). At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008 there was a request by Georgia and Ukraine to be placed in NATO’s Membership Action Plan, which is a significant step on the road to formal candidacy (Gallis 2008: 3-4). Although no time frame for eventual memberships was provided, NATO stated, ‘… these countries [Georgia and Ukraine] will become members of NATO’ (Gallis 2008: 6), letting Moscow know that it could not determine which governments enter NATO.

The NATO-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999 increased East-West tension. With the absence of a Security Council resolution, recognising that Russia and China would veto any resolution authorising an intervention, NATO intervened in Kosovo (Moore 2007: 25) and the intervention in Kosovo led to a short lived East-West tension. Despite Russia’s vehement opposition to the war, Russia ended up contributing forces to the operation (Moore 2007: 40). The events of September 11, was seen as instrumental to an unexpected turn in NATO-Russia relations and for a short while, NATO-Russia relations improved significantly (Moore 2007: 79, 110). In 2002, Russia’s own desire for a more cooperative relationship with NATO ultimately led to the establishment of the new NATO-Russia Council (Moore 2007: 79). The new Council allowed ‘Russia a seat at the table’ during NATO discussions of certain, specified issues (Moore 2007: 93). As well as serving to improve NATO-Russia cooperation, the Council was also ‘a means by which NATO could sweeten the enlargement pill for Putin’ (Moore 2007: 79).

The East-West tension increased with the intervention in Iraq in 2003. Moscow perceived the intervention in Iraq as ‘further evidence of U.S. unilateralism and lack of restraint’ (Rumer et al. 2017: 21). In 2008, Kosovo declared its independence with the support of the US, and 22 of the 27 EU members. However there was strong dissatisfaction from Serbia and Russia (Bolgari 2011: 3).

The intervention in Georgia in 2008 added to an increased East-West tension. Russia did not appreciate NATO’s interest in Georgia, and admitted in 2011 that the primary motivation in
sending its troops into Georgia had been to avert the Georgian track towards NATO accession (Allison 2014: 1269). Needless to say, the intervention was not well received by Washington. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in East Ukraine between February and September 2014 escalated East-West tensions dramatically (Allison 2014: 1255).

After this review, it would be useful to place the five military interventions on an alliance scale, between -2 and 2, to evaluate whether the circumstances promotes US loyalty. If there were according to the international climate, in the time prior to the interventions, pressure to support an intervention by an ally or condemn an intervention by a non-ally. A score of 2 would indicate an allied intervening in times of high international tension, whereas -2 would indicate an intervention by your allies’ declared opponent in times of high international tension. In times of moderate international tension the scores of -1 and 1 will be given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Alliance argument</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Ukraine</td>
<td>-2</td>
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The alliance variable promotes loyalty; the value on the alliance variable thus indicates the strength of this loyalty in conjunction with the international climate at the time of the interventions. There is an increased East-West tension throughout the period that is studied in this thesis. With the low international tension at the time of the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, US loyalty is moderate, international tension is low enough to make criticism a relatively low-cost in security terms. There would be greater reason to believe that US loyalty would play a part in the intervention in Libya due to the increased East-West tension. In the case of Georgia, the alliance variable promotes a moderate condemnation, as promoting loyalty in this case relates to the US’s stand on this intervention. With the increased international tension, following the annexation of Crimea, the alliance variable in the case of East Ukraine promotes a strong condemnation.

It is important to emphasise that the cases that are given the same value on the alliance argument are not a homogenous group. Looking at the circumstances around the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, there was an increased tension in the case of Iraq, but more
so after the intervention in Iraq, therefore Kosovo and Iraq are distinguished from other cases, such as the case of Libya.

With all this in mind, the expectations are that the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions will be influenced by the consequences of being an ally, especially in conjunction with the international tension at the time of the intervention. As an ally of the US and a member of NATO, Norway is expected to support its allies’ operations and stance. Furthermore, one can expect greater support for allies in times of high international tension.

Still, as I will explore next, the position of small states is not only affected by alliance dependency.

2.4 International Law on Humanitarian Intervention

The position that small states have in the international system is also affected by how international institutions, norms and laws, protect small states. The acceptance by the international system gives small states protection, and raises the threshold for other states to threaten them. Therefore, the desire for small states to help preserve and develop norms and institutions that can help eliminate the power gap to other states is also a motive for participation in international operations. This is especially a motive for participation in UN operations. Most UN norms are supported by relatively weak sanctions, and it is in the interest of small states to help the UN enforce international law (Kjølberg and Nyhamar 2011: 9). It has been a Norwegian priority that international operations are rooted in international law, and preferably backed by UN mandate (Lange et al. 2009: 101).

Three issues loom large in the debate on military intervention: humanitarian intervention, the UN Charter, and the establishment of the R2P. This subchapter will address the relationship of these three factors with military interventions.

**Humanitarian Intervention**

The issue of humanitarian intervention is about the dilemma of how to protect civilians who are victims of violence from their own authorities or other actors. International law and the UN Charter set clear requirements for how states should treat their own population, as expressed by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. A key issue of the human rights regime is that there is no universal authority that can ensure these rights are maintained on a global scale. In practice, the primary responsibility lies with each state. The main motive behind humanitarian
intervention is to protect civilians in extreme situations where the individual state does not want to or cannot protect its own population. In many cases, the forces of government are themselves responsible for the violence.

For a long time, there was scepticism towards the concept of humanitarian interventions, including in Norway. For instance, Norway was against the Vietnamese intervention of Cambodia in 1979 despite the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime, partly due to Cold War politics and loyalty to the US, but also due to the principle of non-interference that stood strong in the second half on the 20th century and in Norwegian foreign policy (Gjerdåker 1995: 210).

Towards the end of the 20th century, the occurrence of traditional intergovernmental wars declined, while the number of civil wars rose (Bellamy 2010: 360). An important reason for this was that the Cold War ended and the superpower policy no longer inserted itself into internal conflicts. Today, internal disputes constitute the most common form of conflict, and around 90 per cent of the victims of these conflicts are civilians. The number of civilians who have been killed as a result of violence by their own government is higher than civilian victims in traditional intergovernmental conflicts (Bellamy 2010: 360).

The consequence of the increase in internal disputes was that the use of military force to protect civilians increased (Weiss 2012: 1). The focus on international human rights and global norms of democracy became increasingly prominent, which had far-reaching implications for the Westphalian principle of non-interference (Moore 2007: 47). There was a divide between supporters of absolute respect for sovereignty and non-interference, and those who felt these principles had to be set aside in cases of extreme human rights violations (Glanville 2012: 3). There was a growing international consensus that suppression of ethnic minorities and violations of human rights within state borders could no longer be tolerated, and ‘the absolute right of states to act as they see fit within their own territories was no longer accepted’ (Moore 2007: 47).

**International law and the UN Charter**

A desire for a world based on international law, a UN with integrity and viability, and respect for the Security Council’s unique responsibility for international peace and security have been central to Norwegian foreign policy. It is important for a small state such as Norway to support the formalisation of rules for conduct in the international arena, as well as support for organisations such as the UN. In order to create predictability, it has therefore been important to establish institutions that maintain certain frameworks for international cooperation.
From 1945 and onwards, alongside the idea of human rights, which was behind the drafting of the UN charter, there arose the principle of non-intervention. The idea that sovereign states represented a political process of self-determination and states should be free to pursue their own political and economic projects within their own borders rose. This was an idea that was championed by both developed countries and all states created in the aftermath of the decolonisation. The number of states tripled in the two decades following 1945; a number of new states created in this period were wedded to the notion of non-intervention, partly because of their colonial experience (Welsh and Slim 2011).

Because an intervention, humanitarian or non-humanitarian, is an interference of one state into the domestic affairs of another state, the sovereignty of the receiving state is violated (Krieg 2012: 7). One of the main concerns regarding interventions is thus the violation of states’ rights to sovereignty (Østerud et.al. 1997: 108). Among the most controversial ways the Security Council has implemented its special responsibility for managing international peace and security is its authorisation of the use of force for humanitarian purposes (Welsh 2008: 535).

Article 2(1) of the UN Charter establishes the sovereignty principle, which ensures the independence and equality of all states in international law. In the UN charter two powerful clauses were connected to the notion of non-intervention, prohibiting external actors from intervening in matters within a member state's national jurisdiction. Article 2(4) banned the use of force except in self-defence and Article 2(7) enshrined the notion that a state was free to pursue its own political and economic programme without the interference of others in its domestic affairs, and prohibits interventions by the UN itself.

The idea is that member states shall settle disputes among themselves in a peaceful way when possible. Military interventions should be the last option, and should only occur if no other solution is possible. There are two exceptions to this, the UN Charter article 51 of individual and collective self-defence, and Chapter VII articles 39 through 50 with regard to the UN Charter’s system of collective security. Only the Security Council can authorise a military intervention, and this can only occur if none of the permanent members (China, France, Russia, the US, the United Kingdom (UK)) veto the intervention.

**The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)**

Francis Deng, a Sudanese diplomat who at that point was the UN’ first Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, coined the notion ‘Sovereignty as
Responsibility’ (Welsh and Slim 2011). The idea behind Sovereignty as Responsibility was that sovereignty entails rights to non-interference, but it is contingent upon good and responsible behaviour, and most importantly requires basic human rights for citizens. In this sense, sovereignty entailed responsibility as well as rights. This idea became fundamental to the development of the R2P (Welsh and Slim 2011).

Two key things happened in the 1990s that galvanised the international community’s evolving practice. First there was the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, which the international community had knowledge about, but where there was a deliberate effort to depict what was happening as the ordinary business of civil conflict. This was portrayed as a civil conflict which outsiders had no right to intervene in, and there was a deliberate attempt in the Security Council to avoid use of the word genocide, meaning an intervention would be illegitimate. Second, there was the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which did not have the authorisation of the Security Council. Many countries, including Russia and China, were very opposed to how it would set precedence for external involvement in the domestic affairs of other states (Welsh and Slim 2011).

Kofi Annan, then Secretary General of the UN, wanted a consensus around when international intervention might be legitimate and successful. At the UN millennium summit in 1999, Annan challenged the international community to build a new consensus around interventions. A Canadian government-sponsored commission was created called The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Welsh and Slim 2011). Sovereignty could no longer be absolute in certain circumstances where extreme violations of human rights were occurring and the state in question was unable or unwilling to protect its people. If so, the international community had to step in. The first responsibility continued to rest with the sovereign state, but if the state could no longer or was no longer willing to protect its people, then the international community had a remedial responsibility. This became the set of notions that underpinned the R2P.

There were three major obstacles to turning R2P into action. First, the five permanent members of the Security Council were, for various reasons, reluctant to sponsor a notion that would mean added responsibility for them. Particularly the US was worried that R2P would become a legal notion that would impose obligations on other states. Russia and China were suspicious that R2P would become an opening for excess intervention. Second, there was a concern in the developing world that the responsibility to protect would be a cloak for a new
round of imperialism. Third, the Iraq War in 2003 increased this concern, as it was looked upon as an attempt to use humanitarian rationale for a war that was essentially a war about weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and Saddam Hussein’s possession of them. The Iraq War almost killed the principle because this was exactly what a lot of countries had feared (Welsh and Slim 2011).

Nonetheless, in 2005, at the World Summit, the R2P doctrine was incorporated into the Outcome Document (UNRIC 2016). With the title ‘Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,’ the 2005 World Summit Outcome document included paragraphs 138, 139, and 140 that referred to the doctrine. The three paragraphs include the responsibility each individual state has to protect its population, as well as stating that the international community should help and encourage states to ‘exercise this responsibility.’ Additionally, paragraph 139 points out that responsibility can be reached through diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter. However, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities fail to protect their populations, the UN will be ready to take collective action through the Security Council, which is the agent through which the responsibility to protect will be exercised (General Assembly resolution 60/1).

It is very much a UN responsibility to protect, not an abstract international community’s responsibility. So what in fact happens when the Security Council is divided, as it was over Kosovo? The endorsement in 2005 required council authorisation and management of the R2P, and for better or for worse the principle is subject to the politics that go on within the Security Council (Welsh and Slim 2011).

The following year, in 2006, in resolution 1674 (2006) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the Security Council officially recognised the concept. There are interesting dimensions to the way the principle was articulated. It created no new legal obligations (Welsh and Slim 2011). Prior to 2005 there were dozens if not hundreds of laws saying states cannot do certain things internally. The problem was not the absence of laws or rhetorical commitments; the problem was enforcing these internally (Raschdorf and Hehir 2013).

Another important piece of the 2005 Summit Outcome Document is that the responsibility to protect application was narrowed to four very specific crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing, and the first three were actually also part of the statute of the international criminal court. The idea was that it applies to very specific
situations not just any human rights violations, and that was required to gain consensus (Welsh and Slim 2011).

**Idealist Arguments**

Military interventions will naturally be connected with the legality of the operation, the consequences of human suffering, and the wish to protect civilians. Therefore, on the basis of the theory above, two separate idealist categories of arguments are chosen: international law and the protection of civilians.

After this review, it would be useful to review the five military interventions that are of interest in this study, and their basis in international law.

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<th>Cases</th>
<th>Basis in International Law</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>East Ukraine</td>
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Scores on this variable depend on the existence of accordance in international law. Scoring -2 means there existed no discussion in the Security Council, no resolutions. Scoring -1 refers to discussions in the Security Council in the form of resolutions, but that these resolutions did not allow for the use of force, only non-violent sanctions. Scoring 0 means international law is unclear on the situation; this is not relevant here as international law is clear with regards to military intervention. Scoring 1 refers to conditional authorisation for the use of force, that means there have been one or several Security Council resolutions allowing for the use of force, but the use of force is linked to procedural measures and need to be taken back to the Security Council for discussion before an authorisation is given. The value 2 refers to authorisation from the Security Council.

There would be according to these values, modest basis in international law to support the intervention in Kosovo, while the Security Council had passed resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203 that urged Serbia to change its behaviour, it did not authorise the use of force. Similarly to Kosovo, ‘resolution 1441 warned Iraq of serious consequences if it did not comply with the details therein but it did not explicitly authorise UN member states to take military action against Iraq to force it to comply’ (Davidson 2011: 143-144), there existed numerous
resolutions but none that allowed for the use of force, and no authorisation from the Security Council. In Georgia, there existed no UN resolutions on the matter. There was great reason to support the intervention in Libya due to resolution 1970 and 1973 as well as the Security Council authorising the intervention. With regards to the Russian intervention in East Ukraine there would be no need to support the intervention based on international law, as there existed no Security Council resolution.

I will now present the five military interventions and the existence of an acute humanitarian crisis.

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<th>Cases</th>
<th>Acute Humanitarian Crisis</th>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Ukraine</td>
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Scores on this variable, humanitarian motivation, is linked to the concept of R2P and thus the government’s role in the humanitarian crisis. If the government violates one of the four criteria on a large scale that case will be scored 2, if the government violates one of the four criteria in a more moderate scale that case will be scored 1. For a case to score 0, the government's role in the civilian suffering is unclear. In cases that score -1, the government is trying to protect the civilians, but is not able to. In cases that score -2, the government succeeds in protecting its citizens.

When the intervention in Kosovo took place, approximately 230,000 people were displaced and more than 10,000 were killed in massacres (Krieg 2012: 89). In Libya in 2011, there were thousands of civilian casualties and an acute humanitarian crisis (Chivvis 2014: 26-27). In both cases the government’s attack on civilians were large scaled and sudden.

What the three cases, Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine, have in common is that there had for some time been attacks on civilians. In Iraq, from the time when the Ba’th Party came to power in 1968, there had been massive human rights abuses against ethnic minorities and political opponents, and hundreds of thousands had been killed (Krieg 2012: 103). In Georgia in January 1991, 2,000-4,000 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced in a conflict
between Georgia and South Ossetia (Nichol 2009: 2). In July and August 2008 tension rose again, Georgians and South Ossetians launched artillery and bombing attacks on each other, Georgia sent ground forces into South Ossetia, and Russian peacekeepers were killed (Nichol 2009: 4-5; Tagliavini Commission vol. 1 2009: 23). In the armed conflict between the separatist forces and the Ukrainian government, at least 478 civilians were killed and 1,329 were injured between mid-April and mid-July 2014 (OHCHR 2014). By early August about 730,000 Ukrainians had left the country for Russia due to the fighting in eastern Ukraine, and 117,000 people were displaced inside Ukraine (Reuters 2014). In all three cases the government’s attacked civilians in various degrees, however in none of the three cases had there erupted a sudden or increased humanitarian crisis ahead of the interventions.

In all five cases, the government was involved in the attacks on civilians in various degrees. The groups are here, like in the case of alliance arguments, heterogeneous, meaning that the circumstances of the government’s attack on civilians in the cases were not identical in methods or extent, but it is nonetheless helpful for further comparison to group them.

At times when motivations to protect civilians cannot be justified in international law, the two idealist categories will collide; this is especially relevant in interventions before the establishment of the R2P, more specifically in the debates on Kosovo. Furthermore, by separating the two categories, it will be easier to detect whether it was the legality of the operations or rather the feeling of moral obligations due to non-interventions in the past that formed the Storting’s attitude. It is expected that the establishment of the R2P in 2005 institutionalised the protection of civilians, and that following 2005 the categories will collide less, as interventions on humanitarian ground would be more accepted provided they are authorised by the Security Council. In the case of Libya, but also in the case of Georgia and East Ukraine, R2P will in general help distinguish better between non-humanitarian and humanitarian military interventions.

2.5 Summary

Norway, as a small state, is both a supporter of international law and dependent on its allies for external security. The expectation is that the Storting’s attitude will be affected by each of the factors presented in this chapter. Small states have reasons to support international law and would therefore be sceptical of interventions that violate international law. However, in times when the international system is unstable and the fear of war is greater, Norway will be particularly inclined to support its allies. This means that as East-West tensions grew
throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the theories I have presented in this chapter would imply that the Storting will be more inclined to support US interventions and the US stance on other interventions.

The dreadful consequences of non-interventions in the 1990s, Rwanda and Srebrenica, are expected to be central among the arguments for the protection of civilians. One expectation would be that the debates on the interventions closest in time to the non-interventions in those two countries would be strongly marked by those consequences.

Furthermore, the introduction of R2P clarified the criteria for legitimate military interventions on humanitarian grounds. Therefore, the parliamentary debates should show an increase in support for interventions that can be based on the principle of R2P. It should also be easier to differentiate between humanitarian and non-humanitarian military interventions in the interventions that took place after 2005, which for this thesis means Georgia, Libya, and East Ukraine. I expect a stricter attitude and an attitude of condemnation towards interventions that do not fulfil the principles of R2P.

From this chapter I derive the expectation that when the Storting supports its allies in an action with dubious basis in international law, like Kosovo, the need for fair justification, preventing human suffering, will weigh heavily. Such reasoning will not be equally necessary when the Storting opposes a non-humanitarian intervention, as it did in Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine, or when the intervention is in accordance with international law and authorised by the Security Council, as was the case in Libya.

The next chapter will provide the methodological framework and will more specifically address selection of cases and data material, as well as show a further development of the three categories of arguments.
3 Methodology

I will use a qualitative research design to explain the Storting’s variation in attitude towards military interventions. A qualitative research design emphasises ‘words rather than numbers in the collection and analysis of data’ (Bryman 2012: 380). This type of research design focuses on in-depth research of one or a small number of cases.

This chapter offers a methodological framework that includes case selection, the process of compiling the empirical material, and the categorisation used to organise and analyse this material. Validity and reliability are two factors that are of crucial importance for the soundness of the research and will, together with challenges, be commented on throughout the text where I find it relevant. The first methodological area that will be addressed is the selection of cases.

3.1 Case Selection

Stokke (2012) found that the increasing use of idealist arguments in the public foreign policy debates in the 1990s had returned to a predominance of realist interests around the turn of the century. The idea was to study the Storting’s debates on recent military interventions to see if I could detect such a trend. When studying the balance of realist and idealist interests, cases where these interests point in opposite direction would be particular beneficial to uncover whether consideration of Norwegian security interests dominate or whether consideration of international law and the suffering of civilians are given priority even if it may adversely affect Norwegian security interests. In my selection of cases, Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine are the cases that can best highlight this.

Although the study focuses on military interventions after the turn of the century (with Kosovo being a minor exception) due to the assumed return to realist interests, I have not focused on the military interventions of the 1990s. Furthermore, looking at the interventions that took place in the 1990s (Northern Iraq 1991 (US), Somalia 1992 (US), Haiti 1994 (US), Rwanda 1994 (France), and Bosnia 1995 (NATO)) all were executed by close allies and none of them would be better suited to show a proper dilemma with divided interests.

There are three military interventions that took place between 1999 and 2014 that I excluded, East Timor 1999 (Australia), Sierra Leone 2000 (UK), and Afghanistan 2001 (US/NATO). In the case of East Timor, Australia yields some, but hardly strong alliance arguments. The
intervention was additionally in accordance with international law as ‘Responding to the occurring humanitarian crisis the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1264 (1999) authorizing an international intervention force under the leadership of Australia to take all necessary measures to restore peace and security in East Timor’ (Krieg 2012: 92). In the case of Sierra Leone, ‘UN Secretary General Annan called on the international community and particularly Britain as the former colonial power [to intervene]’ (Krieg 2012: 95) and resolution 1289 (2000) and 1299 (2000) stated that ‘the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region’ (Krieg 2012: 96). As the intervention in Afghanistan was an article-5 operation, meaning ‘an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all…’ (NATO 2017), the case was not chosen.

The cases of Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine were the ones that come closest to showing a proper dilemma with divided interests in the 21st century.

To make this study feasible within the time and space constraints of a master thesis, a selection of five cases was thus made consisting of the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003, the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011, and the Russian interventions in Georgia in 2008 and in East Ukraine in 2014.

Kosovo was an interesting case for several reasons. The NATO-led intervention in 1999 was executed before the concept of R2P and was executed without approval from the Security Council. This was the first time NATO had used military force without the approval of the Security Council, and the intervention contributed to a short period of East-West tension. Many looked upon the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo as an intervention based on humanitarian grounds, although it did not originate from a Security Council authorisation. The intervention started an international debate that sovereignty entails responsibility as well as rights.

The US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 occurred during a time where 9/11 and the War on Terror, not East-West tension, was the current threat situation. But it was not UN-backed and the US failed to legitimise the intervention on humanitarian grounds. The case of Iraq was chosen to illustrate the Storting’s attitude towards non-humanitarian military interventions executed by allies to better shed light on the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions
and to be comparable with the two Russian cases. The intervention in Iraq occurred in times of low international tensions, although it sparked international tension.

The UN-backed, NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011 was authorised by the Security Council and is by many used as a prime example of the R2P. Although it was UN-backed, with the resolution 1970 and 1973, the operations that took place clearly went beyond the parameters of these resolutions. The intervention can be divided into two parts, the first part that was backed on humanitarian grounds that the resolutions relate to, and the second part that went beyond this and aimed for regime change. Therefore the parliamentary debates on the intervention in Libya will focus on the earlier phases of the intervention and treat the case as a humanitarian military intervention.

Both Russian interventions occurred in times of high international tension, and both interventions lacked a UN mandate. In both cases Moscow attempted to justify the interventions on the basis of humanitarian grounds (Matlary 2016: 37). Although, in the case of Georgia Russia was allowed to intervene to protect the civilians and the Russian peacekeepers, the operations that followed went beyond the protection of civilians. Putin tried using the same logic in East Ukraine, nonetheless the two interventions are characterised as non-humanitarian military interventions.

Three of the interventions, Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya, were executed by allies of Norway, one without a UN mandate but with stated humanitarian goals, one without a UN mandate and without clear humanitarian goals, and one with a UN mandate and clear humanitarian goals. The two remaining cases, Georgia and East Ukraine, were executed by a non-ally and characterised as non-humanitarian military interventions as they were without a UN mandate and with no clear humanitarian goals. The cases can be tied to the elements that vary in the theoretical framework and will therefore help explain the difference. The variation will help determine what affects the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions as a whole, if there is a variation in attitude between military interventions, and what explains this variation. The cases differ from each other in ways that help differentiate between alternative explanations. The variation in types of military interventions and the choice to implement interventions executed by allies and non-allies made the selection of the military interventions diverse. This diversity will help the study on the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions, and the balance of idealist and realist arguments used to form this
attitude.

Additionally, the selection of both interventions executed by allies and non-allies will not only add to the variations of military interventions, but also add to variation in the alliance theory.

In these types of study, qualitatively studies, there are precautions that are important to highlight. As the analysis is based on a qualitative research design, any generalisation to a larger universe should be done with caution. In terms of validity, this study emphasises internal validity more than external validity, i.e. the ability to generalise findings (Bryman 2012: 390). Generalisation is not the purpose of this study, so I do not consider the challenge of external validity to be a major problem. To be sure, I cannot make definite claims on the extent to which the results can be generalised beyond Norway or beyond these five interventions.

As this subsection has shown, the selection of cases and the purpose of this thesis have taken form gradually. The selection of cases is used to get a wide variety of military interventions, humanitarian and non-humanitarian, as well as both executed by allies and non-allies. The reason for this wide selection is to see if there has been a return to the realist orientation that characterised the Cold War period. Simultaneously I want to study if the same logic is applied while handling interventions executed by allies and interventions executed by non-allies, as well as interventions that Norway also participated in.

### 3.2 Data Material

The study is a qualitative analysis of a variety of parliamentary debates, to study the balance of realist and idealist arguments in the Storting with regards to military interventions.

The study is based on primary sources and the data used are available to the public throughout the Storting’s home page. In this thesis, the empirical material is one particular type of data, namely *Stortingstidende*\(^7\). In connection with the 200-year constitutional anniversary in 2014, all parliamentary and government documents dating back to 1814 were digitalised as a collaboration between the Storting and the National Library. The digitalisation made it easier to get a hold of debates from times where Stortingstidende was

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\(^7\) *Stortingstidende* is the Minutes of the Storting, thus the instant written record of a meeting or hearing.
not digitalised, such as the debates linked to the interventions in 1999 and 2003. This means that there would be no problem finding the relevant debates for my five cases.

I started with a very broad search that included all Question Time documents at the Storting’s home page and entered, one by one the five cases (Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, Georgia, and East Ukraine) in the search box. Later on, I would use more specified searches such as only viewing questions answered by the Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, limit the time of the search to an interval of two years before and two years after the interventions, and limit the theme of the questions to areas such as NATO, the UN, international law, and international cooperation.

The main data material consists of Statements. The Minister of Foreign Affairs holds a Statement of foreign affairs in the Storting at least once a year. In addition, more Statements are held in connection with specific matters. These Statements are often held on the basis of a request from the Storting to be informed by the government. In response to such Statements, the content is debated in plenary and the government is thereby given input on policy design. Statements are usually followed by a debate; the subsequent debates are particularly rich sources as all party groups express their point of view with regards to the topic.

As the Storting dealt with the interventions through different types of parliamentary debates, I also examined relevant Question Times, white papers, and written questions – but this was not my main focus. However, the data material will be supplemented with Question Times. Parliamentary representatives can ask questions or interpellations to the government during the Question Times, which is held in the Storting every Wednesday. A government member will then answer these questions. This is a way for the members of the Storting to put a case on the agenda. The Question Time consists of two parts: The first part is called the ‘spontaneous’ Question Time when the questions are spoken orally and answered on the spur of the moment. The second part is the ‘ordinary’ Question Time when the ministers have prepared answers to questions sent in advance (The Storting's Rules of Procedure, §52 and §53). An interpellation is more important than a question, but must be answered in the same way by the relevant minister. There is a separate debate when the interpellant first presents the theme, the minister answers, and then there is a short debate when other parliamentarians are allowed to express themselves (The Storting's Rules of Procedure, §50).

It was important to supplement the Statements with Question Times for the cases being
brought up in the Storting, as there are not that many Statements and in certain cases the Statements occurred quite late into the intervention. To make sure that the analyses of the interventions capture the attitude the Storting had towards the interventions it was necessary to supplement them with Question Times. Therefore the most important documents are the Statements with the subsequent debates, but where I found it relevant and necessary I have included excerpts from Question Times. Additionally, one subsequent debate of a white paper was included in the final empirical material.

Data collection methods must be reliable. Reliability is based on the assumption of replicability; essentially it is concerned with whether we would obtain the same results if we could observe the same thing twice. If the same procedures are applied in the same way, different researchers who use the same procedure should obtain similar results, as long as the phenomenon studied have not changed (Yin 2003: 37). Therefore, it is important to reveal the procedures used, as well as data and analyses being verifiable, to minimise errors and bias (King et al. 1994: 25-26). In order to ensure the reliability of this study, I have been careful to refer clearly to where citations, paraphrasing, and other sources are taken from, as well as discussing throughout the analyses how I arrive at the conclusions I draw. By taking these measures, it will be easier for others to evaluate the findings.

Several topics that highlighted the debates connected to the five interventions were not included in the final analysis. These themes and arguments were not included because they did not concern the Storting’s attitude towards the interventions, but were rather debates about certain consequences of the interventions. Although some of these subjects may seem important in forming certain representatives’ attitudes towards future military interventions, it did not affect their opinions about the interventions themselves because they were about after effects. Elements that were cut were largely connected to the management of refugees, the financing of the operations, and the organisation of the humanitarian situation in the aftermath of the interventions. These three subjects seemed to be the overall themes that reappeared in the cases but did not seem to affect the Storting’s attitude towards supporting or condemning the military interventions in these five cases.

After reading through all relevant and semi-relevant documents, I narrowed down the material extensively. The documentation of the Storting’s attitude towards military intervention in the case of Kosovo is documented by 99 parliamentary posts by 30 different Storting representatives, in the case of Iraq is documented by 75 parliamentary posts by 14
different Storting representatives, in the case of Libya is documented by 44 parliamentary posts by 15 different Storting representatives, in the case of Georgia is documented by 19 parliamentary posts by 16 different Storting representatives, and in the case of East Ukraine is documented by 11 parliamentary posts by 11 different Storting representatives.

The empirical material on Kosovo consists of two Statements with subsequent debates, one interpellation with a subsequent debate, as well as excerpts of questions from eight Question Times. The empirical material on Iraq consists of one Statement with a subsequent debate, and excerpts of questions from five Question Times. The empirical material on Libya consists of two Statements with subsequent debates, and excerpts of questions from two Question Times. The empirical material on Georgia consists of one Statement with a subsequent debate, and excerpts of questions from two Question Times. The empirical material on East Ukraine consists of one Statement with a subsequent debate, and excerpts of questions from one Question Time. Statements may here refer to Statements on that case in particular, or other types of foreign policy Statements. The type of Statement in the different cases will be specified later on.

The Storting debates on some of the interventions were far more extensive than on some of the others. The material was in general much greater on the three interventions executed by allies than on the two interventions executed by Russia. Far less was said and written in the Storting on the Russian interventions in Georgia and East Ukraine than on the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya. This may be due to several reasons: prioritising, the duration of the interventions, and simple reasons such as the fact that these two interventions took place in August, a time when the Storting meet less frequently or not at all. Although there exists more relevant material on the three interventions executed by allies, the quantity of material on the two Russian interventions did not pose a problem.

Furthermore, in the debates on East Ukraine, it was hard to find debates or posts that addressed East Ukraine separate from the annexation of Crimea. However, the material chosen in the end consists of debates and posts that do not address Crimea particularly, but the annexation may still affect the Storting’s attitude, so that arguments and attitudes might be influenced by Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
As the study is qualitative, the attempts to count the occurrence of arguments are subordinate (Bratberg 2014: 57). The findings from the parliamentary statements will not first and foremost be classified according to quantitative count of occurrence, but rather by a qualitative assessment of centrality and importance in forming the Storting’s attitude towards the military interventions. That being said, the fact that some arguments are used by representatives from all parties or are frequently stated from one or several representatives will be highlighted. If representatives from all or almost all parties mention the same arguments, that can be linked to the consensus culture in Norwegian foreign policy. The main concern of the thesis is to examine how the interventions were portrayed in the Storting, and what arguments the representatives used to form their attitude towards the interventions. Although the thesis’ main focus is on a qualitative content analysis, it will be beneficial to supplement this with some quantitative reasoning. By counting how many posts in the debate review the arguments in question, the importance of certain arguments will be more visible, and will allow comparison among the interventions. A quantitative counting will also allow for a simple presentation of the balance between the idealist and the realist arguments.

Qualitative research score well on internal validity, as there here is less likely to misinterpreting data or causalities (Bryman 2012: 390). However, a challenge related to the question of validity concerns the interpretation of the documents and the texts being analysed. Here there is room for misinterpretation, which will weaken the validity of the study. To avoid this, throughout the study I demonstrate a clear decision trail, ensure interpretations of data are consistent and transparent, and give exact references to the Stortingstidende.

This subchapter has shown how the data material was chosen and collected. The focus has been on Statements, but the empirical data has been obtained from all relevant debates in the Storting’s database. Since the empirical analysis concentrates on the transcripts from the parliamentary debates, the challenge of drawing conclusions based solely on publicly available sources is not of any concern. Once the empirical material was gathered and selected, the transcripts from the parliamentary debates were explored by simple, qualitative content analysis techniques by using references and quotes. Additionally, some quantitative elements are included such as counting of arguments and topics discussed. By using the same categories of documents when analysing the five cases, the research material will allow comparison. The categorisation will be explained in more detail in the next subchapter.
3.3 Categories of Arguments

In order to analyse what formed the Storting’s attitude towards the five military interventions, I will examine each case while applying a set of three categories. The categories of arguments are alliance arguments, arguments based on international law, and alliance based on the protection of civilians. I apply these three categories to identify which arguments the Storting used to better depict the degree of realist and idealist interests underlying the decision of the Storting to support or condemn military interventions.

Within the realist category the expectation is to find arguments related to alliance solidarity, commitment to common security, Norway’s duties as a member of NATO, influence within NATO, the importance of NATO for Norway’s security, Norway’s duties as an ally of the US, and the importance of the US for Norway’s security. The overall expectations within this category will be that the Storting will discuss the security dilemma when it does not support operations by the US, that the Storting will not strongly condemn allies even if it does not support the choice to intervene, and as the international tension at the time of the interventions will be used to gain variance in this variable there will be greater condemnation of interventions executed by non-allies in times of high international tension.

Arguments concerning the category of international law will entail the extent to which justifications are based on the importance of support for the UN, a UN mandate, and articles from the UN Charter. The category of international law will primarily be expected to deal with the Storting’s legitimisation of the interventions, if the interventions are in accordance with international law, and what part of international law can defend the interventions. The establishment of the R2P will also mark a difference, as the interventions of Kosovo and Iraq occurred prior to the establishment of the principle, whereas the interventions of Georgia, Libya, and East Ukraine occurred after the establishment of the R2P. The expectation is that the establishment of the R2P will affect the Storting’s attitude regarding humanitarian interventions and the R2P will help the Storting to distinguish between humanitarian- and non-humanitarian interventions.

Arguments revolving around the category of the protection of civilians will first and foremost entail the representatives’ empathy with the civilian population, moral obligations. The expectations of arguments within this category is primarily linked to two main groupings;
helping civilians as it is the morally right thing to do, and references to earlier non-intervention in the 1990s.

These three categories will be used to describe and categorise the arguments that formed the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions in the period from 1999 to 2014. I will show how realist and idealist arguments manifest themselves in the Storting, and how the balance between the two idealist categories of arguments differs before and after the implementation of the R2P. Importantly, these categories allow for a more structured and focused analysis.

At times it may be a challenge to classify or categorise the arguments according to the three categories. I consider it likely that certain arguments can be hard to place. Certain arguments can seem to belong to one category but might be in another, for example something in the category in the protection of civilians might be an interest for Norway and therefore be in the realist category. However, I do not see it as much of a problem in this thesis, as I am studying public debates, and it is what is said in public that is of importance. My subject is not to study why the intervention occurred or what was really behind the government’s decision, but the changes in public foreign policy debate and thus the open debate in the Storting, and which types of arguments the representatives used. That is why hidden meanings or secret discussions are not an issue in my thesis.

### 3.4 Summary

This chapter has addressed case selection, data material, and the categorisation of the empirical material. It was important to have a wide variety of types of military interventions as well as interventions made both by allies and non-allies, to ensure diversity. It was also important that all parliamentary debates on the five interventions were reviewed to get a correct presentation and representation of the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions and the balance of realist and idealist arguments used in forming this attitude. The categorisation of the arguments will allow for an easier comparison among cases as well as a method to ensure understanding within each case.

In qualitative research, methodological strategies to ensure the ‘trustworthiness’ of the findings are applied. There are many considerations that should be addressed and treated with care when analysing documents. However, I believe that the material I have chosen will provide a good basis for the study as long as the reservations discussed in this chapter are taken into account, especially with regards to references to the empirical material. In the
analyses of the five cases, clear references to the specific debates, and page numbers of the arguments are presented.

The conclusion drawn from the analyses of the cases will be qualitative. However, where I find it necessary and important I will supplement the analysis with quantitative counting of arguments or categories of arguments.
4 Kosovo: Clearer International Guidelines

Ethnic tension escalated in Kosovo as the predominately Muslim Kosovo Albanians were striving for independence from Serbia. In 1996 an insurgency group called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged, launching attacks against Serb administrative offices and police stations. The Serb forces launched a brutal crackdown, and Kosovo civilians alleged to having supported or participated in the KLA were killed (Krieg 2012: 88).

On 23 September 1998, with the situation about to escalate, the Security Council issued resolution 1199 (1998). The resolution was a continuation of resolution 1160 (1998), and demanded, among other things, a ceasefire, improvement of the humanitarian situation, and dialogue between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership. Should the concrete measures demanded for in resolution 1160 (1998) and resolution 1199 (1998) fail, further action and additional measures to maintain and restore peace and stability in the region would be considered (Security Resolution 1199 (1998)). Five days later, the North Atlantic Council issued an ACT WARN for both a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo (NATO 1998). With Belgrade not responding to resolution 1160 (1998) or 1199 (1998), the Security Council passed a third resolution on 24 October 1998; resolution 1203 (1998) was a continuation of the two previous resolutions. None of the resolutions authorised the use of force.

The Serbs had refused to sign the February 1999 Rambouillet Agreement, which would have granted Kosovo’s autonomy (Davidson 2011: 75). After failing to solve the crisis diplomatically with a proposed Peace Plan in Paris in March 1999, NATO decided to intervene militarily with Operation Allied Force, against the will of Russia and China, and thereby without the consent of the Security Council (Krieg 2012: 89). On March 24, 1999, US planes led NATO into war for the first time in the alliance’s history. In early June 1999, Milosevic agreed to accept NATO’s terms, which were very similar to those he had refused earlier in the Rambouillet Agreement (Davidson 2011: 75).

Although the interveners used humanitarian rational to justify the intervention in Kosovo, ‘analysis since the war supports the view that the war violated international law’ (Davidson 2011: 83).

The expectation drawn from the theoretical framework is that the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions is influenced by alliance arguments, support for international law, and
the wish to protect civilians. Norway is expected to support its allies’ operations, especially in times of high international tension. However, as the intervention in Kosovo took place in a time of low international tension, one will not expect alliance dependency to be of high priority in the parliamentary debates. The lack of a UN mandate yields the expectations of a small country like Norway debating the legality of the operation, and as R2P is not yet established, the debate around international law with regards to humanitarian interventions is expected, including representatives discussing the concept of humanitarian intervention and the rule of non-interference. Arguments from the category of the protection of civilians are expected to form the Storting’s positive attitude towards this military intervention, as the intervention occurred without a UN mandate but with stated humanitarian goals. The parliamentary debates are thus expected to be especially concerned with arguments linked to non-interventions in the 1990s.

The analysis of the Norwegian Storting’s attitude towards the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999 are drawn from two Statements from the Minister of Foreign Affairs with subsequent debates, excerpts from eight Question Times, one interpellation with a subsequent debate, and one white paper with a subsequent debate. All debates are drawn from the 1998-99 and 1999-00 sessions, in the period between 14 October 1998 and 13 April 2000.

Before starting the analysis of the parliamentary debates, through the three categories of arguments, I will give a brief summary of what the Storting’s attitude on the military intervention in Kosovo was.

4.1 The Storting’s Attitude on Military Intervention and Overview of Arguments

The debates were characterised by consensus around NATO's involvement in Kosovo, with only one representative being against the intervention. The intervention was executed without a UN mandate, but many, including the Norwegian Prime Minister at the time, felt there was a humanitarian crisis that would lead to genocide. The representatives were concerned with the deficiency in international law to intervene militarily on humanitarian grounds; nonetheless the majority of the representatives stated it was imperative to intervene to protect the civilian population of Kosovo. The horrific consequences of the lack of involvement in Rwanda and Srebrenica had not yet influenced the arguments used to support the intervention, most likely because it was not yet clear for the representatives if and when one
could intervene on humanitarian grounds. The government parties backed the intervention by referring to Chapter VII of the UN Charter that allows for military action to restore international peace and security.

The arguments that characterised the debates were first and foremost from the two idealist categories: international law and the protection of civilians. The exceptions came with the subsequent debate about the Statement on NATO’s upcoming summit and the subsequent debate about the white paper on international operations. Furthermore, representatives from the Progress Party were the only ones using alliance arguments outside the two debates mentioned above.

There was a strong support (2) for the intervention in Kosovo.

### 4.2 Alliance Arguments

Due to the low international tension at the time, the expectation was that the debates about Kosovo would not focus much on alliance dependency. Still, as any international operation could be a possibility for Norway to show relevance and willingness, I expected the debates to place a certain centrality on such arguments.

Alliance dependency manifested itself in two debates in particular, with some exceptions. The exceptions came from representatives from the Progress Party. Danielsen (Frp) argued that the decision to support NATO’s threat of force against Serbia was ‘correct because it showed that Norway supports its allies’ (S.tid. 1998-99: 135; my translation). A fellow Progress Party representative stated that the presence of the Norwegian military had contributed to Norway marking itself as militarily in line with our allies (Røsfjorde (Frp): S.tid. 1998-99: 2905). They both stressed the alliance dependency logic of showing loyalty and support to secure Norway against future threats.

In the week prior to the intervention, Danielsen (Frp) stated, in reference to the ACT WARN, that for NATO to maintain its credibility, it was important not only to place threats, but also, if necessary, to implement those threats (S.tid. 1998-99: 2376). Precisely because NATO is vital to Norway's security, it is important for Norway to maintain NATO's

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8 The question was presented by Sissel Dagslet on behalf of Danielsen. However, as the question was part of the ordinary Question Time and submitted in advance, I've used Danielsen as the presenter of the question to prevent misunderstandings.
credibility and ability to function. By strengthening NATO, Norway strengthens its own security. Danielsen’s statements can thus be looked upon as securing Norway’s own interest. Danielsen (Frp) made it clear in the debate that his main concern was NATO’s credibility, and thus NATO’s ability to come to Norway’s rescue if needed.

One week later, in the subsequent debate about the Prime Minister’s Statement on the upcoming 50th anniversary of NATO, several other representatives shared Danielsen’s view concerning NATO’s credibility (Einar Steensnæs (KrF): S.tid. 1998-99: 2524; Leif Helge Kongshaug (V): S.tid. 1998-99: 2532).

Certain representatives emphasised it was important to support the intervention in Kosovo to show that Norway stood behind the decision of its allies (Thorbjørn Jagland (Ap): S.tid. 1998-99: 2520, Carl I. Hagen (Frp): S.tid. 1998-99: 2521). Steensnæs (KrF) emphasised that Norway had always been a strong and loyal member of NATO, and would remain so throughout this operation. He pointed out that this loyalty was clearly linked to our own national interest as a small state (S.tid. 1998-99: 2524). By showing loyalty and support for the intervention, these representatives accentuated that Norway secured its own interests within the alliance.

With the exception of the debate following the Statement on NATO’s upcoming summit, and the contributions from the Progress Party, the rest of the debates on Kosovo were not very concerned with alliance dependency. With the exception of the debates discussed above, in the remaining 63 parliamentary posts, only 7 had arguments linked to alliance dependency.

The Socialist Left Party supported intervening militarily in crisis that had grown to the extent that Kosovo did, however they advocated for the international community to get involved before the crisis reached that level, and not merely wait around until it was so bad that they had to ‘send in the marines’ (Solheim (SV) S.tid. 1999-00: 816). The Progress Party, although emphasising the importance that Norway as a small state couldn’t take the same responsibility as the US, warned against Norway becoming a so-called ‘free rider,’ as they claimed the Socialist Left’s strategy could lead to (Danielsen (Frp): S.tid. 1999-00: 815-16).

A white paper on how the Norwegian military could improve for international operations (St.meld. nr. 38 (1998-1999)) sparked the debate on alliance dependency in the Storting. In
the subsequent debate, one of the main concerns was Europe’s and Norway’s economic and military responsibility: ‘The US, with its 270 million inhabitants, has twice as much a defence budget as the EU with its 370 million inhabitants’ (Ingvald Godal (H): S.tid. 1999-00: 2777; my translation). Certain representatives highlighted the importance of strengthening Europe's ability to manage without the US in crisis situations where it was not natural for NATO as an organisation to engage directly (Steensnæs (KrF): S.tid. 1999-00: 2786). It was mentioned by several representatives that Norway needed to take responsibility to increase Europe’s military capability: ‘Building a task force is also a signal to our European allies about what they can expect from Norway – in short: our credibility’ (Eriksen (KrF): S.tid. 1999-00: 2780; my translation).

Participation in international operations that are important to the US and NATO is a way for Norway to show loyalty and willingness to share the burden. It is important for states that need alliances for protection, e.g. small states, to show they are willing and able to help others in the alliance. Arguments such as ‘If we expect help, we must always show solidarity to help others when needed’ (Rui (Ap): S.tid. 1999-00: 2783; my translation), ‘Norway is dependent on the assistance of our allies in NATO in a possible crisis situation’ (Restad (Sp): S.tid. 1999-00: 2782; my translation), and ‘By participating when others need our support, we show responsibility and strengthen our own security policy position’ (Fossli (Ap): S.tid. 1999-00: 2778; my translation) were frequently used by several of the parliamentary representatives in this debate. The expectations of arguments developed in the theory chapter on alliance dependency were thus seen a great deal in this debate.

**Discussion**

With the relatively low East-West tension, it was expected that the realist argument would not affect the Storting in any noteworthy way. With the exception of the debates following the Statement on NATO’s upcoming summit and the white paper on Norwegian military in international operations, there was little talk about alliance dependency, loyalty, or commitment. The Progress Party was the only party group using realist arguments in debates other than the two mentioned. In the excerpts from the eight Question Times and the debate following the Statement on Kosovo, no other party groups used arguments related to alliance dependency. With that said, in the two debates where all party groups focused on alliance dependency, two main strategic and security interests dominated: consolidating long-lasting peace and security in Europe, as well as ensuring that NATO as an institution could maintain its credibility as an effective military alliance capable of enforcing its interests if necessary.
There was great consensus in the Storting during these two debates that Norway should not be portrayed as a free rider, and that it was important to show support and participate equally with other allies, the US in particular.

This analysis does not support that realist interests can explain the Storting’s strong support for the intervention in Kosovo.

4.3 International Law Arguments

Due to the lack of a new and more extensive UN resolution and a Security Council authorisation, one could expect the Storting to be concerned with the violation of international law. However, the majority of the Storting stated that the intervention was in fact in accordance with international law. There was one exception: Hallgeir H. Langeland (SV). Langeland (SV) had been against the intervention from the beginning, and was particularly against how the intervention had been portrayed: ‘What was defined as a surgical humanitarian bombing has become something completely different’ (S.tid. 1998-99: 3403; my translation). He questioned how such a tragic situation could continue, and stated that the bombing needed to come to an end (S.tid. 1998-99: 3403). Although Langeland had been open and clear about his disapproval of the intervention and of Norway’s involvement, he was the only one who criticised the intervention in its entirety; with the exception of Langeland (SV) there was broad consensus in the Storting in defence of the intervention.

Contrary to Langeland (SV), several representatives argued that the intervention did have an acceptable mandate for the use of force against Serbia. The representatives were, like Langeland (SV), concerned that military interventions should not violate international law, but differed in the idea that this intervention did: ‘It is crucial that international operations … are in accordance with international law, which the intervention in Kosovo is’ (Restad (Sp): S.tid. 1999-00: 2782; my translation). The majority of the representatives stated that the legality of the operation was not contingent upon an authorisation from the Security Council.

Several of the representatives claimed a UN mandate was important in these situations, but the politics of the Security Council sometimes hindered the possibilities for agreement, as ‘… the grounds for putting down a veto against interventions at times are based on temporary motivations’ (Restad (Sp): S.tid. 1999-00: 2783; my translation). There was broad consensus in the Storting that it was unacceptable for the international community to know about
serious violations of international law without intervening, and clearer directions regarding what to do if permanent members of the Security Council vetoed were needed. According to the Storting, Norway had to be an advocate for the incorporation of humanitarian intervention into international law, and ‘… request for international law to find arrangements that address this obstacle’ (Restad (Sp): S.tid. 1999-00: 2783; my translation).

Tron Erik Hovind (Sp) referred to the circumstances where the UN was established, right after the Second World War, with all the memories of the war well in mind: ‘This was also a different time where wars mainly happened between states and not ethnicities within states, which explains why the UN Charter is unclear in circumstances where it is not possible to obtain permission from the Security Council’ (S.tid. 1999-00: 2000-01; my translation). There was a growing recognition that conflicts within states now had potentially far-reaching implications for international security. Now that wars mainly happened within states, the Storting called for clearer international law on these matters.

To avoid the dilemma of the protection of civilians and respecting a state’s sovereignty, Carl I. Hagen, leader of the Progress Party, suggested recognising Kosovo as an independent state (S.tid. 1998-99: 2480). Other representatives from the Progress Party also shared Hagen’s view (Gundersen (Frp): S.tid. 1998-99: 2520). Although this proposal was rejected by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it still demonstrates how strong the norm of non-interference stood.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk highlighted Chapter VII of the UN Charter as reason for the Norwegian government’s support of the intervention. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that although there had not been a decision in the Security Council, there had been discussions there that referred to Chapter VII of the Charter and on those grounds the government justified the intervention (S.tid. 1998-99: 2481). Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows for military action to restore international peace and security. The extensive killing of civilians was, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, not reason enough to intervene, but as the stability of the region was at risk, the intervention was in accordance with international law. The humanitarian situation thus came second to the instability of the region; it was not irrelevant but it could not be the decisive reason to intervene militarily according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The goal for the intervention was still to protect civilians, but the arguments used to be able to execute and justify the intervention had to be in accordance with international law. Therefore, the instability of the region, and not the
protection of civilians, was used to support the intervention. Due to the lack of international law, guidelines, and experience at the time for military intervention on humanitarian grounds, Chapter VII was used to justify their stand.

More than anything there was, according to the Storting, a deficiency in international law with regards to humanitarian interventions: ‘The situation in Kosovo shows us how inadequate international law is’ (Jagland (Ap): S.tid. 1998-99: 67; my translation). The Storting called for clearer international guidelines concerning humanitarian interventions. They requested international guidelines with regards to humanitarian crisis generally, and genocides specifically. In general, much of the debate involved the lack of procedures with regard to military interventions on humanitarian grounds. Instead of arguing about the legality of the operation, representatives channelled the difficulties surrounding this intervention into arguing to change current international law. All party groups mentioned the deficiency in international law up to several times, as illustrated here by some of the contributions; the Labour Party (Bjørn Tore Godal (Ap): S.tid. 1998-1999: 114), the Conservative Party (Godal (H): S.tid. 1998-99: 116), the Christian Democratic Party (Vollebæk (KrF): S.tid. 1998-99: 2481), the Socialist Left Party (Halvorsen (SV) S.tid. 1998-99: 2481), the Centre Party (Restad (Sp): S.tid. 1998-99: 2782), the Progress Party (Danielsen (Frp): S.tid. 1998-99: 2933), and the Liberal Party (Hove (V): S.tid. 1998-99: 2937).

There was a hope in the Storting that the intervention in Kosovo would encourage further work on international law with regard to humanitarian intervention: ‘I regard it as satisfactory that it can now be assumed that the practice established in the handling of the crisis in Kosovo can form a legitimate basis for the future’ (Restad (Sp): S.tid. 1999-00: 2783; my translation). Although humanitarian intervention remained among the most controversial issues in international politics at that time, the end of the Cold War had inspired considerable hope that, after years of paralysis, the UN would finally be able to respond effectively to a new generation of conflicts.

**Discussion**

With the end of the Cold War, the 1990s saw new types of international operations. It was relatively new that one could justify a military intervention based on humanitarian grounds. The question of states’ sovereignty in the era of humanitarian interventions characterised the
debates on Kosovo. Two things stood out in the arguments related to international law in the debates on Kosovo: First, according to the Storting the post-Cold War world lacked the right laws and guidelines to deal with the increasing concern for intervening militarily on humanitarian grounds. Second, it was important for the Storting, and especially the government parties, to justify the intervention on the basis of international law, hence the justification linked to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Considering the intervention’s scant basis in international law, it is surprising how coherent the Storting is on the matter of the intervention’s legality and the link to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

4.4 Protection of Civilians Arguments

As the 1990s had seen a number of horrific assaults on civilians, ethnic clashes, and non-interventions, the expectation was that there would be great incentive to support the intervention based on the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.

The positive attitude in the Storting towards an intervention was due to the reason for intervening, namely hindering a new genocide like that in Rwanda or a new massacre like that in Srebrenica. Erik Solheim (SV) questioned how NATO could hinder the Kosovo Albanian population from experiencing the same assaults as Srebrenica, Račak, and Drenica had. There was great consensus on wanting to protect the civilians, but there was little experience with humanitarian interventions in international law. As the ACT WARN did not gain results, it was clear to the Storting that an intervention was inevitable, as none of the representatives could ‘stand by and do nothing while a genocide occurred’ (Vollebæk: S.tid. 1998-99: 2480; my translation). Whereas the earliest debates did in fact discuss the theme of non-interventions in the 1990s, the majority of the representatives did not see the possibility of intervening based solely on the wish to protect civilians.

There were some exceptions, mainly from the Progress Party. Early on, there were disagreements between Danielsen (Frp) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding what international law allowed for. Danielsen (Frp) argued that extensive violation of human rights should allow for an intervention in accordance with international law (S.tid. 1998-99: 2481). Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk (KrF) rejected this idea, saying ‘We have had a genocide in Rwanda that is even worse than what we see in Kosovo today and we have had similar bloodshed elsewhere’ (S.tid. 1998-99: 2481; my translation). He argued that violations of human rights, attacks on civilians, and humanitarian crises in general were
serious and something the international community had a responsibility to prevent, but that alone did not allow for an intervention. What the world was in need of, according to Vollebæk, was developed international guidelines (S.tid. 1998-99: 2481). What he expressed was that it was very important to act in this case, and Norway wanted to intervene, but Norway had to follow current international law.

The disagreement first and foremost revolved around which opportunities there were to interfere, which institutes and rules existed, and how they could be used. The question that several representatives asked was if, in extreme situations, the international community could react, even if the aforementioned assumptions were not fully met (Johan J. Jakobsen (Sp): S.tid. 1998-99: 2528).

There was an interpellation from Danielsen (Frp) about resorting to emergency law to ensure a mandate for intervening in conflicts where violence, abuse of civilians, and humanitarian disasters had reached an unacceptable level, the possibility to react without an authorisation from the Security Council, and without support in current international law. The interpellation questioned whether NATO should intervene in conflicts where there were widespread or systematic human rights violations, with this as justification for intervening; consequently it also dealt with the dilemma between non-interference and fundamental human rights (S.tid. 1998-99: 2933-39).

Contrary to Danielsen (Frp), Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk saw no need to supplement the UN Charter when it came to the maintenance of international peace and security to legitimise the use of armed force with regard to humanitarian emergency. It was the government's view that the UN Charter provided the desired manoeuvre in such situations: ‘Genocide, crimes against humanity and the most serious war crimes are situations which will pose a threat to or violate international peace and security, and thus will fall under UN Charter Chapter VII’ (S.tid. 1998-99: 2935; my translation).

The remaining party groups supported the government’s view. If the Western countries allowed for humanitarian interventions without the authorisation from the Security Council, what would hinder other alliances and countries from doing the same? Although none of the other party groups supported Danielsen’s proposal, all of the representatives agreed a discussion on the difficulties for the international community to intervene into a state’s internal or external affairs was important, and more UN sanctions were needed along with
further development of international law (S.tid. 1998-99: 2933-39). All party groups agreed that situations such as that in Kosovo would and should lead to military intervention, however several of the party groups claimed the UN was capable of dealing with humanitarian interventions, referring to Chapter VII of the Charter. They all wanted it to be possible to intervene to protect civilians, but the other party groups stated they had to follow current international law, and according to international law at the time, intervening militarily to protect civilians was not justifiable.

**Discussion**

The representatives agreed the goal for the intervention was to protect civilians, and the protection of civilians was also a major part of why the majority of the Storting supported the military intervention. However, although the majority of the representatives did support the intervention, there was some confusion and disagreement as to how and why one could intervene. Representatives from the Progress Party wanted to intervene on the basis of the constant attack on civilians and violations of human rights, whereas the majority justified their stance on the intervention due to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and did not support an intervention solely on the incentive to protect civilians. The motivation all along was to hinder civilian suffering, but that same motivation was seen by few as reason enough to intervene.

**4.5 Case Summary: Deficiency in International Law**

Table 4.1 below presents an overview of all the values derived from Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Alliance Argument</th>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>Protection of Civilians</th>
<th>Storting’s Attitude</th>
<th>Idealist Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My expectation was that non-interventions in the past, like those in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995, would dominate the parliamentary debates, and that the lack of involvement by the international community in the past would explain why the Storting would support the intervention in Kosovo even without a UN mandate. Further, with the lack of an authorisation from the Security Council, the intervention was not in accordance with international law, and the expectation was that there would be extensive debates on the
legality of the operation. As the intervention happened in a time of relatively low international tension, and as the goal of the intervention was to hinder yet another horrific assault on civilians, the expectation was that alliance arguments would not be that significant in the debates.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that a humanitarian catastrophe alone was not reason enough to intervene, that one could not intervene solely based on the suffering of civilians. The majority of the representatives agreed that they could not support an intervention based on the protection of civilians alone. However, some representatives claimed that constant attacks against civilians should be reason enough to intervene; these representatives came mainly from the Progress Party.

Although the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was not authorised by the Security Council, the government justified the intervention on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the majority of the Storting accepted the view that the intervention in Kosovo complied with international law. This was not in accordance with my expectations, as the Kosovo intervention had a scant basis in international law. Although the intervention lacked resolutions allowing for the use of force and lacked an authorisation from the Security Council, the majority of the representatives still claimed that the intervention was in accordance with international law based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The reason for the broad consensus in support of the intervention in Kosovo was that the Storting wanted to prevent a new genocide due to non-interventions in the past. The motivation behind this intervention was thus mainly to protect civilians. In that way I would say that the circumstances of the 1990s and the gruesomeness of the Serbian attack on the Kosovo Albanian population did result in the majority of the representatives giving their support to the intervention, but it did not justify the intervention for them – for this Chapter VII was needed. Protecting civilians was the goal, but not the reason to intervene.

More than anything there was, according to the Storting, a deficiency in international law with regards to military interventions on humanitarian ground. Instead of arguments highlighting the failure to intervene in the 1990s, the debate was mainly about the lack of international guidelines in cases such as Kosovo, Srebrenica, and Rwanda.
representatives in the Storting stated that Norway could no longer stand behind a strict international law that allowed for states to repeatedly and extensively kill their citizens.

With a low level of international tension, there was no expectation of alliance argument highlighting the debate or forming the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention. Alliance arguments were few and concentrated around two debates, with the exception of representatives from the Progress Party. The arguments that were put forward mainly focused on the importance of Norway standing together with its allies to share the materialistic and military burden (securing Norway from future threats by doing so), and the importance of maintaining the credibility of NATO.

The majority of the Storting did not heavily emphasise realist interests in the debates on Kosovo. The exceptions came from representatives of the Progress Party as well as two specific debates related to NATO and international operations.

The analysis of the debates on Kosovo shows an overwhelming use of idealist arguments. However, with an intervention lacking basis in international law and occurring in times of low international tension, it was surprising that arguments linked to international law were used more by the Storting to justify their support for the intervention than arguments linked to protecting civilians. Nonetheless, idealist arguments provide the most convincing explanation for the Storting’s support of the intervention in Kosovo.
5 Iraq: the Strong No

Until 1998, Iraq’s programme to develop WMDs had been supervised by the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 1998 Iraq expelled the weapon inspectors. Iraq’s continuous failure to cooperate with UN authorities and IAEA inspectors or to allow them unrestricted access to possible production sites of WMDs triggered the Security Council to issue resolution 1441 (2002), granting Iraq thirty days to reveal all aspects of their weapons development programme. Without stating explicitly how the international community would react to Iraq’s non-compliance, resolution 1441 (2002) nonetheless created a clear obligation for Iraq to comply (Security Resolution 1441 (2002)). The failure to comply with resolution 1441 (2002) and several of its obligations led to the US intervening in Iraq on 20 March 2003, without the authorisation of the Security Council. The Bush administration argued that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a regional and global threat because of its chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) stockpiles, nuclear ambitions, and ties to terrorist groups (Davidson 2011: 133). Other countries, among them Norway, emphasised UN inspectors’ requests for more time to continue their investigations. The intervention in Iraq in 2003 was seen as highly controversial (Krieg 2012: 103).

The lack of a Security Council authorisation and backing in international law yielded the expectation that the Storting would be against the intervention. Additionally, international tension was low so Norway would be able to stand against and criticise the US without jeopardising their relationship. Simultaneously, the US is an ally, so the expectation is not to find major condemnation of the intervention, but still to find criticism for breaking international law. As there did not exist a sudden humanitarian crisis, the protection of civilians is not expected to affect the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention.

The study of the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention in Iraq is based on one Statement by the Prime Minister on 21 March 2003 with a subsequent debate, and excerpts from five Question Times, from 6 November 2002 to 26 March 2003.

Before starting the analysis of the parliamentary debates through the three categories of arguments, I will give a brief summary of what the Storting’s attitude on the military intervention in Iraq was.
5.1 The Storting’s Attitude on Military Intervention and Overview of Arguments

There was great consensus in support for the majority stance, namely against the intervention, with the exception of representatives from the Progress Party who were not happy with what the party considered a non-loyal standpoint.

As expected, arguments from the category of international law characterised the debate, and the majority of the debates focused on the lack of a Security Council authorisation. Although several representatives were concerned with the civilian population of Iraq and therefore arguments linked to the category of the protection of civilians were present, the protection of civilians did not affect the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention. Likewise, alliance dependency did not affect the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention much, with the exception of the Progress Party. However several representatives made sure to question the government about ensuring that Norway’s position would not jeopardise Norway’s relationship with the US and thereby Norway’s future security.

There was a moderate condemnation (-1) towards the intervention in Iraq.

5.2 Alliance Arguments

The lack of an authorisation from the Security Council, with no clear humanitarian goals for the intervention, and the intervention occurring with relatively low international tension, suggests the Storting would be critical of the intervention. However, as the US is a close ally, there would be no expectation of a complete condemnation of the intervention. Further, with Norway choosing not to participate nor support the US-led intervention in Iraq, one can expect some discussions around the implications this may have for Norway’s security.

Representatives Hagen (Frp) and Morten Høglund (Frp) slightly disagreed with the otherwise broad consensus in the Storting. They were fearful of what the choice not to support allies would mean for Norway in the future: ‘It is an unfortunate choice that the government and the majority of the Storting have taken in terms of our own future security’ (Hagen (Frp): S.tid. 2002-03: 2300; my translation). Høglund (Frp) expressed his concern about the division in NATO following the intervention in Iraq, and the consequences this could have for Norway’s security, as ‘NATO is the basis of our safety’ (S.tid. 2002-03: 2365; my translation). The overall fear expressed by the Progress Party was that the division of NATO
in this matter and the choice of the Norwegian government not to support the US-led intervention would affect Norway’s relationship to both NATO and the US, and thus jeopardise Norway’s ability to be protected if attacked.

The leader of the Progress Party, Hagen, mentioned the importance of Norway supporting its allies and the disappointment of Norway not joining the coalition in five out of his six entries in the chosen parliamentary debates. His arguments were expected alliance dependency logic: Norway should join the US and other NATO countries in the intervention in Iraq, as it would benefit Norway in the future. If Norway were to be threatened in the future one could no longer depend on the US to come to our rescue, as Norway did not show support and loyalty to the US when needed. Hagen (Frp) was critical of the stand the government had taken against the intervention, saying that by doing so we were abandoning our allies, and he was fearful of what the consequences of this stand would be, as ‘Our security has been dependent on the US, UK, and other NATO countries’ (S.tid. 2002-03: 2300; my translation). Other Progress Party representatives followed suit, and there was a disappointment in general from the Progress Party’s representatives with regards to the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention.

The representatives from the Progress Party were particularly concerned with the lack of commitment Norway showed to its allies; one aspect that naturally surfaced in the debates was thus the concept of free riders: ‘It is free riders like France, Germany and Russia, and unfortunately also partly Norway, which in reality has hindered the implementation of resolution 1441’ (Hagen (Frp): S.tid. 2002-03: 2300; my translation). Hagen continued, ‘We want the advantages of US and British forces, but we do not want to take any of the costs and burdens of doing so’ (S.tid. 2002-03: 2300; my translation).

The Prime Minister objected to the logic put forward by the representatives from the Progress Party, saying ‘The president of the US, our foremost NATO ally, assured me that our close and good cooperation both bilaterally and within NATO would continue …’ (S.tid. 2002-03: 2303; my translation). Further, the government parties rejected the Progress Party’s criticism: ‘For the Norwegian government this has not been a question of choosing between countries. For us, it has been a matter of defining our policy and following it consistently’ (Bondevik (KrF): S.tid. 2002-03: 2303; my translation). As the Prime Minister stated here, following international law was the main concern when choosing their stance.
The leader of the Socialist Left Party, Kristin Halvorsen (SV), took a completely opposite stand from the representatives of the Progress Party; she claimed that not supporting the US was a wise security policy decision, saying ‘Now we are in a situation where it may be easy for anyone to fear that Norway's security is threatened because our position differs from that of the US and the UK. It is a point that I think we should refrain from in this serious situation’ (S.tid. 2002-03: 2300; my translation). Contrary to Hagen’s fear of not following our allies and in that way putting ourselves in future danger, Halvorsen (SV) stated that, ‘Norway's position in this situation increases Norway's security and not the opposite because it can be a war that many people do not feel is legitimate, which could endanger the security of the countries [participating in the intervention]’ (S.tid. 2002-03: 2300; my translation).

**Discussion**

The main focus on alliance dependency came from representatives of the Progress Party. At this point the Progress Party was the third biggest party in Norway so it is not without importance. However, it was less surprising than critique from any of the other parties, and it was easier for the government to go ahead since the critique was only from one party.

Although all party groups, with the exception of the Progress Party, criticised the intervention, they did not condemn the US or other allies that participated in the intervention. This corresponds well with the assumption of arguments put forward in the theoretical framework. With the exception of the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party, there was not a lot of criticism towards the US or other allies participating in the intervention. Most representatives were negative to the intervention, and most representatives had wished for the US and the UK to give the weapon inspectors more time, but once the intervention was a fact, the main concern was how Norway could help to limit the damage of the intervention, and by doing so help the Iraqi population.

This review of the importance of realist arguments to explain the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions has shown that even in times of great disagreement with an ally, alliance value is very important to Norway. The fact that Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik had such close conversations with the president of the US and reassurances that the important and close relationship between Norway and the US would continue even with disagreement on the intervention in Iraq matches the expectations put forward in the theory
chapter. Although Norway did not participate in or support the intervention, throughout the parliamentary debates there was great focus on maintaining a good relationship with the US.

5.3 International Law Arguments

The expectation was that the debate and the Storting’s attitude would be characterised by the lack of a Security Council authorisation.

In the early phases of the debates, prior to the US intervening, the opposition was concerned with what the current resolution gave mandate for. The two debates I studied from late autumn 1998 showed an opposition concerned with a possible war. The opposition parties, especially the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party, were first and foremost questioning if a possible intervention of Iraq could occur in accordance with international law. Further, they wanted to know if the government considered the current resolution to allow for the use of force against Iraq. According to the government, a new resolution was not technically needed but definitely desired. If the Security Council confirmed that Iraq breached the ceasefire conditions, a new resolution would not be required, but this debate had to be brought back to the Security Council for a final decision, meaning there were procedural requirements that had to be met (S.tid. 1998-99: 360-61).

Contrary to the Kosovo debate, the debates on Iraq stressed the necessity of a UN mandate. Jens Stoltenberg (Ap) emphasised how important it was that interventions were in accordance with international law and authorised by the Security Council (S.tid. 2002-03: 1684). The majority of the Storting shared Stoltenberg’s viewpoint. With the exception of representatives from the Progress Party, the Storting agreed that without a new Security Council decision, the use of force against Iraq would violate international law (S.tid. 1998-99: 1684-90).

The day after the US intervened in Iraq, Prime Minister Bondevik (KrF) stated that Iraq put itself in danger by not obeying the resolutions, but the US did not have a clear basis in international law for the use of force without a new decision in the Security Council (S.tid. 2002-03: 2295-96). The Prime Minister stated that the international legal requirements to use force according to the UN Charter and the resolutions were present, but the procedural requirements had not been met. If the Security Council had agreed that the last chance for a peaceful solution was exhausted, that would have given an unquestionable basis in international law for the use of force against Iraq (S.tid. 2002-03: 2296). However, since a new decision was not yet taken, Norway could not support the intervention. The lack of
explicit Security Council authorisation made it impossible for the majority of the Storting to support the US-led intervention.

There was a division in the Storting. The Progress Party did not agree with the majority stance not to support the intervention, and certain representatives from the Conservative Party were mostly critical of the Security Council not legitimising the war (Oddvard Nilsen (H): S.tid. 2002-03: 2299). Nilsen (H), although supporting the government’s stand on the US-led intervention, stated that he ‘would not shed a tear if this regime disappeared’ (S.tid. 2002-03: 2299). This is quite illustrative of the Conservative Party’s stance in the debate following the Prime Minister’s statement. Together with the other party groups, with the exception of the Progress Party, the Conservative Party was against the intervention as it was not in accordance with international law. But the party was nonetheless content with the fact that someone was going against the regime and finally ending it. The Conservative Party stated that after 12 years of resolutions and pressure, the Security Council’s failure to agree on Iraq weakened the authority of the UN (Nilsen (H): S.tid. 2002-03: 2299).

In clear contrast to the Progress Party, Halvorsen, the leader of the Socialist Left Party, gave great support for how the government had handled the situation in Iraq. Nevertheless, she had some concerns with regards to how international law was being interpreted in this situation, mainly because international law does not authorise regime change (S.tid. 2002-03: 2300). She emphasised how important it was for small states, such as Norway, to maintain this practice, and that it was important that the basis for these types of decisions and operations emanated from international law, the Security Council, and the UN (S.tid. 2002-03: 2300). Åslaug Haga (Sp) and May Britt Vihovde (V) shared the support towards the government’s stance, but also shared the concerns of representative Halvorsen (SV) (S.tid. 2002-03: 2301-03). Although the Centre Party and the Socialist Left party had been supportive of the government’s handling of the US-led intervention in Iraq, they were critical of the turn the intervention took and the lack of disapproval of the US actions.

**Discussion**

As the intervention in Iraq lacked a UN mandate for intervening, this influenced the debates and the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention. The Storting, with the exception of the Progress Party, could not support an intervention that was not in accordance with international law and did not have an authorisation from the Security Council. The Storting,
again with the exception of the Progress Party, criticised the US for not allowing the weapon inspectors more time. With that said, several representatives made it clear that if the Security Council had reached an agreement, they would have supported the intervention.

5.4 Protection of Civilians Arguments

Arguments linked to the representatives’ feelings of moral obligation towards the civilian population in the country being intervened in can be expected in a humanitarian intervention. In non-humanitarian interventions, like the US-led intervention in Iraq, representatives are less expected to use arguments linked to the protection of civilians. That is not to say that the Iraqi people had not suffered under Saddam Hussein’s regime, but, according to the Storting, there was no new development on this matter. The reason to intervene was not humanitarian, which is reflected in the parliamentary debates. The protection of civilians was thus not used as an argument to support the intervention, although it was the main concern for the majority of the representatives once the intervention was a reality.

For several decades, the Iraqi regime had committed gross and serious assaults against countries in the region and against their own citizens. The Storting agreed that the Iraqi people had suffered under Saddam Hussein's despotic regime, through war and oppression (S.tid. 2002-03: 2295-2303). The majority of the representatives also brought up the dilemma that this regime had survived this long, and that Saddam Hussein had once again overlooked orders from the Security Council. The leader of the Labour Party stated that the fact that this despotic regime had been going on for this long put international law to a serious test (Stoltenberg (Ap): S.tid. 2002-03: 2298). Strict international law had hindered the international community from taking action before, and the Iraqi people had suffered due to this. Most of the representatives showed their discontent for the Iraqi political regime: ‘… [Saddam Hussein] has used chemical weapons against his own civilian population. He has killed more than 5,000 of his own … he has not hesitated to kill those who were critical of his regime’ (Nilsen (H): S.tid. 2002-03: 2299; my translation). However, none of these arguments were used to support the intervention.

Discussion

There was a consensus among the representatives in the Storting that the protection of civilians was their main concern and should always be the top priority. Saddam’s regime had throughout the years overlooked UN resolutions and oppressed and killed civilians. However,
according to the Storting there was no reason in international law to intervene in Iraq on humanitarian grounds. That being said, several of the representatives were content with a possible end of the despotic Iraqi regime. As a non-humanitarian intervention, the parliamentary debates on Iraq responded to expectations. It was not surprising that the suffering of civilians did not impact the representatives’ position on attitude towards the intervention. That being said, there were many representatives that heavily criticised the international community’s handling of Iraq over the last decades, and there was an overall mood in the Storting that the international community had failed the Iraqi people.

5.5 Case Summary: Violation of International Law

Table 5.1 below presents an overview of all the values derived from Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Alliance Argument</th>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>Protection of Civilians</th>
<th>Storting’s Attitude</th>
<th>Idealist Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

The violation of international law, no sudden humanitarian crisis, and the intervention occurring with relatively low international tension, yields the expectation that the Storting would be negative towards the intervention. All party groups, with the exception of the Progress Party, regarded the intervention as in violation of international law. Contrary to the majority view, the Progress Party claimed Norway was abandoning its allies, most importantly the US. No other party groups clearly supported their view. The Progress Party’s stance does not collide with the theoretical framework of Norway disagreeing with an ally in times of low international tension; it merely highlights one of the greater disagreements that did surface within these cases, even with the Norwegian consensus culture.

Although Norway did not side with the US on this matter, the majority of the Storting, with the exception of representatives from the Socialist Left Party, did not condemn the US for the intervention. Additionally, several of the parliamentary representatives made sure that Norway’s stance would not jeopardise Norway’s relationship to the US, and thus Norway’s future security.

Both the intervention in Kosovo and the intervention in Iraq happened without a UN mandate. The difference between the two interventions was that although the intervention in
Kosovo happened without authorisation from the Security Council, most representatives in the Storting agreed the intervention was in accordance with international law. Contrary to the intervention in Kosovo, most representatives claimed the intervention in Iraq violated international law as it lacked an authorisation from the Security Council, and they therefore could not support it.

Concerns for civilians were present, but were not used as reasoning to support the intervention, due to the fact that the Storting did not believe the intervening states operated on humanitarian grounds. This was as expected considering there was no existence of an acute humanitarian crisis.

The balance of realist and idealist arguments was largely as expected. The main arguments used by the Storting were arguments linked to international law. As expected, the Storting was not much concerned with the category of the protection of civilians to justify their stance on the intervention in Iraq. Furthermore, with the exception of the Progress Party, and the two debates discussed, alliance arguments did not appear.
6 Libya: R2P into Action

The ‘mainstream’ narrative of the Libya conflict and the following NATO-led intervention runs as follows: the Arab Spring had, by early 2011, led to two successful, nonviolent, uprisings. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt inspired the Libyan people who in mid-February ‘took to the streets.’ The nationwide, nonviolent, protests against the oppressive rule of Muammar Qaddafi led to Qaddafi ordering his forces to shoot the peaceful protesters, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties within three days. Due to the violence of the government, peaceful protesters launched a rebellion (Kuperman 2013: 107). The reason it is important to explain this ‘conventional wisdom’ is that this is the knowledge and information that most of the Western world, including Norway, had access to. That would be what the Norwegian Storting most likely based their arguments on.

This ‘conventional wisdom’ is challenged by many, such as Kuperman, who claims ‘[the problem] with the mainstream narrative is that it relies on two demonstrably false premises: that Qaddafi initiated the violence by targeting peaceful protesters and that NATO’s intervention aimed primarily to protect civilians’ (Kuperman 2013: 108). Many of the so-called peaceful protesters were armed, and government forces initially responded with rubber bullets and water cannons, but Western media reported events wrongly (Kuperman 2013: 108-109.) Furthermore, ‘NATO took actions that were unnecessary or inconsistent with protecting civilians, which fostered regime change’ (Kuperman 2013: 113).

Additionally, it is important to understand Norway’s participation in the intervention. Norway sent six F-16 aircraft and two military aircraft to the UN operation, which was based on the Security Council’s resolution 1973. However, Norway withdraw eight weeks before the rest of the alliance, on 1 August 2011, mostly due to the intervention taking a turn towards regime change, which is not in accordance with international law, nor something the mandate allowed for.

As the intervention featured a UN resolution, rising international tensions, and was based on humanitarian grounds, it would be expected that there would be broad support in the Storting in defence of the intervention. The intervention happened after the implementation of R2P and there would therefore be expectations of fewer disagreements in the Storting as to the legality of military interventions on humanitarian grounds. The expectations would be to find arguments mostly connected with the two idealist categories.
The study of the intervention in Libya in 2011 is based on four parliamentary debates in the spring of 2011, excerpts from two ordinary Question Times held 16 and 23 March 2011, a Statement by the Prime Minister with a subsequent debate on 29 March 2011, and a Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence, with a subsequent debate on the 9 May 2011.

The rest of this chapter will address the parliamentary debates on Libya in interaction with the theoretical framework and the categories of arguments. Before starting the analysis of the parliamentary debates, I will give a brief summary of what the Storting’s attitude on the military intervention in Libya was.

6.1 The Storting’s Attitude on Military Intervention and Overview of Arguments

There was broad consensus in the Storting in support of the intervention; none of the representatives were against the intervention. It was specified by several representatives that the establishment of the R2P had enabled the operation. As the intervention occurred in times of increased international tension there were some indications of alliance dependency, but not to a noteworthy extent. The non-interventions in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s were used numerous times by the opposition to justify why Norway should be an advocate for humanitarian interventions, take action in Libya, and motivate NATO and the UN to take action. However, the experience from Iraq was used numerous times by the government as a reason why one should not make hasty decisions. After the UN mandate was given, there was broad consensus in the Storting to support and send contributions to the intervention in Libya. At the time there was consensus that the situation was acute, and the representatives were content with the UN mandate, the regional support, and the broad alliance in Libya. The majority of the arguments were related to the protection of civilians, followed by international law. Thus there was an overall focus on idealist arguments, and there existed few arguments directly linked to the category of alliance dependency.

There was a strong support (2) for the intervention in Libya.

6.2 Alliance Arguments

Although the intervention occurred in accordance with international law and with authorisation from the Security Council, the increased tension would allow for some
discussion with regards to alliance dependency. However, it is not expected that alliance dependency would be the main focus of the Storting in a humanitarian intervention that is authorised by the Security Council. In fact, only 13 of the 44 parliamentary posts concerned realist arguments to any degree, and in none of the 13 posts where realist arguments were mentioned were these arguments main points.

The two first debates discussing the situation in Libya, a Question Time held 16 March and a Question Time held 23 March, did not indicate any alliance dependency logic in forming the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention. Out of the 24 parliamentary posts, in the two Question Times, none contained realist arguments (S.tid. 2010-11: 2950-53, S.tid. 2010-11: 3052-54). Out of the nine parliamentary posts in the Statement with the subsequent debate 29 March, four contained realist arguments (S.tid. 2010-11: 3133-40). The realist arguments came here from the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and the Progress Party. Out of the 11 parliamentary posts in the Statement 9 May, nine contained arguments linked to the category of alliance (S.tid. 2010-11: 3931-43). Five of the party groups, the Labour Party, the Progress Party, the Conservative Party, the Centre Party, and the Christian Democratic Party, accounted for these nine posts.

Prime Minister Stoltenberg (Ap) was clear that one must distinguish between the question of military command and what kind of management the operation in Libya had. The use of NATO command resources did not undermine the fact that it was the UN that was responsible for the operation; The Security Council had mandated a no-fly zone, and the Security Council was the supreme political body responsible for the operation, ‘Therefore, we should distinguish the command structures, where it is very appropriate that we use NATO command structures, from the political basis and the management of the operation’ (Stoltenberg (Ap): S.tid. 2010-11: 3054; my translation). However, as the operation utilised NATO command resources, it gave Norway a possibility to show their responsibility and competence to their allies.

By contributing militarily in Libya, Norway had both strengthened NATO and strengthened Norway’s position within NATO. This was important for several reasons: by strengthening NATO, and by keeping NATO relevant to the current world order, Norway secured its own future. It is therefore an important security concern and in Norway’s interest that NATO remains a vital and functional security organisation, which the member states benefit from. A
certain position or ‘standing’ within NATO is important for Norway to be heard for its security interests, wishes and needs. Therefore Norway’s military contribution in Libya was seen by several representatives in the Storting as a way to both ensure the organisation's further work and also to ensure that Norway retains or increases its influence and position in NATO: ‘Our participation in the operation also gives us a voice into it’ (Hansen (Ap): S.tid. 2010-11: 3937).

Several representatives also claimed the participation in Libya had shown that Norway took its share of responsibility within the alliance. During the situation in Libya, the US was less concerned with operating alone, and for the first time sought a more retrenched role. In this case, the US wanted Europe to take the lead, and the operation thus became an important testament to the European Allies. The operations in Libya thus gave Europe and Norway an opportunity to show their capability and capacity. Arguments such as ‘we participate and take our share of the responsibility’ (S.tid. 2010-11: 3134; my translation), ‘many things have been achieved by the Norwegian forces’ (S.tid. 2010-11: 3938; my translation), and ‘[The Norwegian military has] taken responsibility in this international operation that far exceeds our relative size in terms of military impact’ (S.tid. 2010-11: 3940; my translation) were seen throughout the two last debates.

It was mentioned in the Storting that Norway had been praised, by other allies, for its contribution and execution of the military intervention in Libya. Arguments such as ‘[The Norwegian defence] had a special responsibility for some of the most complex and demanding operations’ (S.tid. 2010-11: 3938-39; my translation), ‘Norway's contribution is drawn up as important and effective’ (S.tid. 2010-11: 3932; my translation), ‘Our planes are among the best suited weapons to use against defined goals’ (S.tid. 2010-11: 3936; my translation), and ‘[Norwegian efforts] reap recognition from our allies’ (S.tid. 2010-11: 3935; my translation) were used to bring this point forward.

**Discussion**

As expected, alliance arguments did not characterise the four debates on Libya. In fact, in the two first debates, arguments linked to this category were not mentioned at all. The alliance dependency logic, though present in the two debates following the two Statements, was employed infrequently, and not given a lot of attention. However, there were some arguments that were used by several party groups: how Norway’s participation had reaped praise from
our allies and showed we were capable and willing to participate in international military operations, as well as the importance of keeping NATO relevant. Although the intervention in Libya took place during a time of rising international tension, due to the mandate of the intervention and the humanitarian character of the operation, alliance arguments were not common or defining of the debates or the Storting’s attitude towards this military intervention.

6.3 International Law Arguments

The UN mandate and the establishment of the R2P combined with the suffering of civilians yield the expectation of a broad consensus in the Storting and a positive attitude towards the interventions in Libya among all party groups. The expectation is that the debates will be characterised by support for the intervention due to the fact that the intervention was in accordance with international law, and that these lines of arguments will be one of the main reasons for the positive attitude towards the military intervention in Libya. The establishment of R2P will simplify a military intervention on humanitarian grounds, and there will therefore be less division in the Storting around the legality of the operation compared to the case of Kosovo.

The day before the UN adopted Resolution 1973 on a no-fly zone over Libya, there was disagreement in the Storting as to whether a UN mandate was needed to intervene. The government, represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not rule out supporting a no-fly zone but he was hesitant to intervene without a UN mandate: ‘… a possible involvement of NATO is only applicable if there is a UN mandate …’ (S.tid. 2010-11: 2951; my translation). Contrary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, several representatives from the opposition parties were concerned about what would happen if a resolution did not arrive quickly. The leader of the Conservative Party, Erna Solberg, was critical of the government's lack of reaction against Libya, and she urged the government to take action to protect civilians, as she was concerned about the implication the situation in Libya could have (S.tid. 2010-11: 2950-51). The rest of the opposition parties, the Progress Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party, all supported the arguments of the Conservative Party’s leader. The opposition did not agree that Norway should necessarily wait for a UN mandate, or that a UN mandate was necessary for the legality of the operation.
Solberg (H) argued that the current massacre in Libya complied with the requirements of the R2P. Now that these types of military interventions, humanitarian interventions, had been regulated in international law, Norway had to stand as an example and urge a no-fly zone. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reminded the Storting that the Arab League welcomed a no-fly zone, not a foreign military intervention; however with a no-fly zone the next step could very easily be a military intervention (S.tid. 2010-11: 1951-53). It was important with regional support, and although the Arab League and the African Union had supported and welcomed an intervention in Libya, there was disagreement as to what an intervention would entail.

Much had changed in one week. When the Storting met up again on 23 March, resolution 1973 (2011) was adopted and the government had decided to transfer six F-16 aircraft to the military operations in Libya. Norway had gone from peace to strategic bombing in less than one week. The attitude in the Storting, and especially from the government parties, had changed. The UN mandate led to a broad consensus in the Storting in favour of the intervention in Libya (S.tid. 2010-11: 3052-54). All party groups supported the intervention, and stated that it was imperative that Norway contributed to the UN resolution on the protection of civilians (S.tid. 2010-11: 3052-54).

The legality of the operation was important to the Storting, and there was a broad consensus that, ‘Our involvement in Libya emanates from a long line of Norwegian foreign policy, namely the support of a UN-led world order where use of force is regulated by the UN Charter and UN Security Council resolution’ (Stoltenberg (Ap): S.tid. 2010-11: 3133-34; my translation). The Storting agreed it was ‘in Norway’s interest to have a UN-led world’ (Kolberg (Ap): S.tid. 2010-11: 3136). The support for the intervention was justified based on the support for the UN and international law, and several representatives emphasised the importance of supporting such an intervention as ‘it was in Norway's interest as a small state to help create a predictable and regulated world order’ (Søreide (H): S.tid. 2010-11: 3938; my translation). It was important to have a strong UN, as ‘Norway as a small country is dependent on a UN-led world order, and it has long been a goal for us to back up UN decisions that show decisiveness and determination’ (Vedum (Sp): S.tid. 2010-11: 3138).

There was broad consensus in the Storting that the dilemma between humanitarian interventions and state sovereignty should not lead to more civilian suffering, ‘It is not a
state's internal affairs when such a massive assault against civilian populations occurs’ (Stoltenberg (Ap): S.tid. 2010-11: 3134; my translation). Solberg (H) emphasised the dilemma between interventions and national sovereignty: ‘… Norway has been concerned that human rights and the individual rights should be strengthened relative to national sovereignty’ (Solberg (H): 2010-11: 3137; my translation). There was an overall agreement among the representatives that Norway had and should work actively to ensure that a country's right to sovereignty did not prevent all interference by the international community (S.tid. 2010-11: 3937). The Socialist Left Party, the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, the Centre Party, and the Liberal Party all stated that the establishment of R2P had enabled this military intervention (S.tid. 2010-11: 3133-39).

As the Storting was grateful for the support for a UN-led world, and an intervention in accordance with international law, several of the party groups expressed the importance of not violating international law. More specifically, that international law and the UN mandate did not allow for a regime change. The fear was that if the mandate was misused, it would be more difficult to reach an agreement in the Security Council in the future (S.tid. 2010-11: 3937). The Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party, the Centre Party, and the Liberal Party were concerned with the possibility of certain actors going for a regime change. They stated that although there was a strong wish for a regime change in Libya, the mandate did not allow for a regime change militarily. Norway ended up leaving the operation eight weeks before their allies, much due to this development.

**Discussion**

The UN mandate and the establishment of the R2P was expected to simplify a military intervention on humanitarian grounds, and there should therefore be less division in the Storting regarding the legality of the operation compared to the debates of Kosovo. There were some disagreements in the Storting between the government parties and the opposition parties before the UN mandate was given. Whereas the opposition parties urged the government to take action, and to minimise the attack against civilians, the government parties wanted to see the effects of resolution 1970 (2011) and wait for a UN mandate. The opposition party groups used the establishment of R2P to prove the legality of the operation, although R2P also entails an authorisation from the Security Council. When the UN mandate was given, there was broad consensus about the situation and towards the intervention in Libya. The debates on Libya differed from the debates on Kosovo, as R2P had created the
desired guidelines to handle humanitarian interventions. There were no longer doubt as to whether to intervene on humanitarian grounds, and there was a much broader consensus in the Storting.

### 6.4 Protection of Civilians Arguments

The protection of civilians was one of the main arguments the Storting used to defend the intervention in Libya. Statements and arguments where the Storting’s representatives felt empathetic with the endangered population and references to earlier attacks on civilians that did not lead to interventions will therefore be expected. 32 out of the 44 debate contributions included in the analysis on Libya concerned the protection of civilians, and all 15 representatives that are included in this analysis named the protection of civilians as their reason to support the intervention.

The first debate on Libya was characterised by disagreements between the governing parties and the opposition parties. The opposition was concerned that the legality of the operation and discussions in the Security Council would overshadow what they thought should be the main focus, namely hindering the killings of civilians (Solberg (H): S.tid. 2010-11: 2951). Non-interventions from the 1990s were therefore discussed by several of the representatives from the opposition ahead of the decision to intervene. Siv Jensen (Frp) specified there had been several cases in the past when the international community stood by and watched the slaughtering of innocent civilians because they were not able to arrive at a definite stance in international bodies like the UN (S.tid. 2010-11: 2952). The opposition feared that rigid international law could lead to a non-intervention like that of Rwanda in 1994, and thereby create a situation where the international community was unable to come to an agreement to prevent a possible genocide (Høybråten (KrF): S.tid. 2010-11: 2952). The opposition parties questioned what other measures could be considered to protect the civilian population in Libya, if the Norwegian government and the Security Council did not accept a no-fly zone (Søreide (H): S.tid. 2010-11: 2952). The opposition was fearful of ending up in a situation where the Libyan population was slaughtered due to a lack of will to act.

When the UN mandate was given, all parties agreed that the intervention was necessary, as ‘it was about the protection of civilians’ (Stoltenberg (Ap): S.tid. 2010-11: 3134; my translation). The Prime Minister stressed the importance of military intervention in Libya,
and the consequences it could have had if the resolution had not been implemented on time. There was a consensus in the Storting that if an intervention had not taken place, there would have been high civilian casualties (S.tid. 2010-11: 3054). It was important to the Storting that interventions on humanitarian grounds had become more accepted and regulated (S.tid. 2010-11: 3139).

The representatives’ empathy with the civilian population of Libya and their wish to help them characterised the majority of the debates on Libya. Arguments such as ‘We all feel responsible [for the civilian population of Libya]’ (Kolberg (Ap): S.tid. 2010-11: 3136; my translation), ‘It has moved us all’ (referring to TV footage of a despot slaughtering his own people) (Woldseth (Frp): S.tid. 2010-11: 3136; my translation), ‘The situation of the people of Libya is difficult’ (Jonas (Ap): S.tid. 2010-11: 3933; my translation), and similar arguments were used throughout the four debates.

Discussion

The arguments regarding the protection of civilians, helping civilians because it is the morally right thing to do, and references to earlier non-intervention in the 1990s, were very much characteristic of the debates on Libya. References to the non-interventions in Rwanda and Srebrenica were frequently used throughout the whole debate as expected. However, the early phases of the debates were marked by the opposition parties’ concern that the situation in Libya could lead to yet another non-intervention, that the Security Council could not reach an agreement, and that a historically strict international law could lead to the suffering of civilians yet again. Nonetheless, the government parties were reluctant to discuss a possible intervention prior to the authorisation by the Security Council. In that sense, the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention was again dependent on following international law. Even though the arguments for the protection of civilians and the references to the non-interventions in Rwanda and Srebrenica were frequently used throughout the debates and influenced the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention, it took the UN mandate for the majority of the Storting to support an intervention. Although the will to protect civilians was significant in forming the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention, a broad consensus was not present until the Security Council had authorised the operation.
6.5 Case Summary: The Centrality of Humanitarian Intervention

Table 6.1 below presents an overview of all the values derived from Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Alliance Argument</th>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>Protection of Civilians</th>
<th>Storting’s Attitude</th>
<th>Idealist Arguments</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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Norwegian participation in Libya served two purposes: it was possible to protect important values while taking on part of the burden as a loyal ally to NATO. As there was no tension between the realist and idealist interests, the representatives highlighted the idealist interests.

Norway’s military contribution was seen by several as a way to both ensure the organisation's further work and also to ensure that Norway retained or increased its influence and position in NATO, but it was not characteristic of the four debates or the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention.

The intervention in Libya was the first time the principle of R2P led to a military intervention, which was mentioned in all four of the parliamentary debates. The support for a humanitarian intervention was easier in the case of Libya than in the case of Kosovo, because of the UN mandate but also due to the further development of international law and the introduction of R2P. In the parliamentary debates the cases of Srebrenica, Rwanda, and Kosovo were frequently mentioned: Srebrenica and Rwanda as examples of non-interventions in the past that could no longer be accepted, and Kosovo showing that now there existed better tools to deal with humanitarian interventions than there were in 1999.

However, before the UN mandate was given there was a disagreement between the governing parties and the opposition parties. The opposition wanted to support and push for an intervention; they wanted to protect the civilians, and stated that the situation in Libya allowed for R2P to be put into action. The governing parties wanted to wait for a UN mandate and see if peaceful means could be adequate, while the opposition claimed there was no time for these measures, that national authorities had failed to protect their populations, and therefore Norway had to encourage the UN to take collective action through the Security
Council. All parties agreed that the international community had an obligation in Libya, but there was disagreement as to what measures should be taken.

Thus, the broad consensus did not occur until after the UN mandate was given. The majority of the Storting took their time to express support for the UN mandate, for an intervention in accordance with international law, and for a stronger UN. Additionally they expressed satisfaction with an international law that no longer hindered humanitarian interventions.

With regards to international law, several representatives mentioned the exploitation of the mandate to try to replace Qaddafi. The Security Council had made a decision on the use of military force for an arms embargo, for a no-fly zone and for the protection of civilians. It did not permit replacing Gaddafi or deposing him as the Libyan leader. This was an important point throughout the parliamentary debates, and led to Norway retreating from the mission on 1 August 2011.
7 Interventions by a Non-Ally

This chapter will address the Storting’s attitude towards two military interventions executed by Russia: the intervention in Georgia in 2008, and the intervention in East Ukraine in 2014. The chapter will show what forms the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions executed by states other than our main ally.

Both interventions will be categorised as non-humanitarian military interventions, directly comparable only to the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003. This intervention will be a good comparison in order to detect if there is a different balance between the three categories of arguments in the debates on the Russian interventions than there was in the debates on the intervention in Iraq. As a state’s policies can be restricted by loyalty to allies, which is applicable to how Norway’s membership in NATO restrains Norway’s relation to Russia, the debates on Georgia and East Ukraine are expected to differentiate from the debates on Iraq.

The US condemned the two Russian interventions (Rumer et al. 2017) and there would therefore be an expectation of condemnation from Norway too, as Norway is expected to support the US’s stance in these interventions. Furthermore, as international tension increased considerably following the annexation of Crimea, it is expected that the Storting’s attitude towards Russia’s involvement in East Ukraine will be more condemning than towards Russia’s involvement in Georgia.

The remaining part of this chapter will address the parliamentary debates on Georgia and East Ukraine in interaction with the theoretical framework and the three categories of arguments.

7.1 Georgia

On 7 August 2008, a five-day war broke out in South Ossetia, one of Georgia’s secessionist regions. At first the conflict involved only Georgian and South Ossetian forces, but within a day, Russian forces were involved to back South Ossetian forces. With this involvement, Russian military crossed national borders to attack a sovereign state for the first time since 1979 (Buukkvoll et al. 2009: 7). The intervention in Georgia occurred following the Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence and the NATO Bucharest Summit where Georgia and Ukraine’s potential memberships were going to be discussed. Both events angered Russia
Although there was some confusion in the beginning as to who attacked first, the Western view is that the Georgian government sent troops into Tskhinvali, in South Ossetia, on 7 August, which led to the Russian intervention (Popjanevski 2009: 155). From a Georgian perspective, the timeline might seem irrelevant as Georgia did not breach a sovereign border, and a country’s action to protect its territory does not require a prior attack by another state (Popjanevski 2009: 157). Nevertheless, Georgia’s use of force in South Ossetia provided Moscow with the pretext it needed to intervene in Georgia (Popjanevski 2009: 160). However, the actions that then followed occurred in undisputed Georgian territory (Nichol 2009: 6). Following the war, Russia recognised the independence of the two Georgian secessionist regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Bolgari 2011: 2).

Norway as an ally of the US, who condemned the intervention, will in a time of high international tension be expected to condemn the intervention as well. Furthermore, due to no sudden humanitarian crisis there will be no reason to support the intervention, and the implementation of R2P should make the differentiation of humanitarian and non-humanitarian interventions clearer. The expectation is therefore that the main focus will be on the violation of international law as well as alliance loyalty. There is no expectation of the protection of civilians affecting the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention.

The empirical material on the intervention in Georgia consists of one Statement from the Minister of Foreign Affairs 23 October 2008, with a subsequent debate 24 October 2008. There are also excerpts from two Question Times that took place 6 October 2008 and 4 December 2008.

*The Storting’s Attitude on Military Intervention and Overview of Arguments*

In the debates on Georgia, the Storting agreed that Russia’s use of military force inside Georgia’s territory violated international law. At the same time, it was important that Norway continued dialogue and cooperation with Russia, as nobody would gain from unnecessary tension between Russia and the rest of the world. The Storting was clear that it was neither in Norway nor in NATO's interest to break contact with Russia. However, this should not be seen as an acceptance or legitimising of Russia’s actions in Georgia, it should merely keep an important channel open to avoid increased East-West tension. The government parties did receive some criticism from the Conservative Party in particular for being too mild towards
Russia, however the majority of the Storting and the majority of the debates were marked by broad consensus, even from the Conservative Party. Arguments used were from the realist category of alliance dependency and from the idealist category of international law. No representatives used arguments relating to the protection of civilians.

There was a strong condemnation (-2) against the intervention in Georgia.

**Alliance Arguments**

As an ally of the US, Norway is expected to support the operations and stances the US take, especially in times of high international tension. This might explain why the opposition parties criticised the government for not taking a stronger stand against Russia, and for stating that nothing had changed in relation to Russia (Inge Lønning (H): S.tid. 2008-09: 42). The leader of the Conservative Party expressed concerns over Norway’s systematically weaker expressions towards Russia than the EU. According to Solberg (H) it was important that Norway, as a small state, strongly opposed and expressed its discontent when another small state experienced being defined into the sphere of interests of a much larger and more aggressive neighbour (S.tid. 2008-09: 290).

Although there were some disagreements as to the level of condemnation and critique one should have towards Russia, none of the party groups wished for increased international tension, the argument being that no one would gain from increased East-West tension (Olav Akselsen (Ap): S.tid. 2008-09: 41). Criticism against Russia for excessive use of force as well as the recognition of the two secessionists regions was correct; nevertheless several representatives advised against the language used by many of our allies: ‘Many have warned against a new Cold War, and I am afraid that some of our allies have resorted to a linguistic use that in the worst case can drive us in such a direction’ (Høglund (Frp): S.tid. 2008-09: 288; my translation). The Storting agreed that at this point Cold War rhetoric could be dangerous, and several representatives advised against the use of such rhetoric.

The Storting agreed to continue cooperation with Russia; more engagement in Russia was needed, not less. The Storting wanted to maintain a good bilateral relationship with Russia, and international proposals such as depriving Russia of its membership in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or other suggestions to exclude, isolate, or sanction Russia, due to the intervention in Georgia, were not supported by the Storting (Vaksdal (Frp): S.tid. 2008-09: 299).
International Law Arguments
There was consensus in the Storting that Russia’s intervention in Georgia was in violation of international law; in fact, none of the representatives disagreed. Certain representatives did state that Georgia was not innocent in the conflict, and that much of what happened in Georgia was unclear. However, regardless of Georgia’s role in the intervention, or ahead of the intervention, the intervention happened in undisputed Georgian territory (Jan Petersen (H): S.tid. 2008-09: 981). Thereby the intervention, according to the Storting, was in violation of international law.

Protection of Civilians Arguments
The expectation was that the protection of civilians would not be of interest for the representatives as a reason to support the intervention. Although the Russians did use the jargon of the protection of civilians as a reason to intervene, this was not perceived as correct from Norway’s point of view. The fact that Russia used the type of jargon normally associated with Western countries, that Russia normally criticises, was not discussed in the Storting. The protection of civilians was therefore not mentioned in the Storting, neither as a reason for support towards Russia’s military interventions or as a result of the intervention.

Case Discussion: Keeping Cooperation with Russia

Table 7.1 below presents an overview of all the values derived from Georgia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Alliance Argument</th>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>Protection of Civilians</th>
<th>Storting’s Attitude</th>
<th>Idealist Arguments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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With the violation of international law, no sudden humanitarian crisis, and the intervention occurring in a time of increased international tension, I expected the Storting to condemn the intervention. Furthermore, I expected a focus on alliance arguments and arguments linked to the category of international law in explaining the Storting’s negative attitude towards the intervention.

There was broad consensus in the Storting on the condemnation of the Russian intervention in Georgia. The Storting’s negative attitude towards the intervention was due to the violation of international law. The Storting agreed that regardless of Georgia’s behaviour prior to the
intervention, the intervention took place in Georgian sovereign territory and was thereby illegal. However, although Norway had to send a clear message of disapproval regarding states violating international law, it was important to continue a good relationship with Russia. Norway, although faithful to its allies, would not and could not follow the same rhetoric with regards to the condemnation of Russia. Some of the opposition parties criticised the government parties for a mitigating tone towards Russia, and a weaker stand against Russia compared with the EU’s statements. Still, none of the representatives supported exclusion of or sanctions against Russia, and none of the Storting’s representatives wished for increased East-West tension.

With regards to the debates on Georgia, much was as expected. The Storting condemned the intervention due to the violation of international law, emphasised the importance of Norway standing together with its allies, and there was no presence of arguments linked to the category of protecting civilians.

7.2 East Ukraine

There is a debate as to whether the events in East Ukraine, in self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast (commonly called the ‘Donbass’ region), in 2014 should be considered an invasion, intervention, or merely an aggression. ‘In spite of the factual evidence, some European media consider the question of Russian intervention to be simply a matter of opinion’ (Čech and Janda 2015: 2). In the early phase of the war, the separatists possessed very few armoured vehicles. On 12 June, the first tank convoy was observed on separatist territory. Although both Ukrainian and Russian military possessed these kinds of tanks (T-64s), in the days that followed more of these appeared only few kilometres from the Russian border. In the following months, the separatists increased their military equipment, but these gains in military equipment did not change the balance of the war.

From August on, there exists evidence that Russia had provided weapons to Ukrainian separatists, as well as there being the presence of Russian military in Ukraine (Čech and Janda 2015: 1). While people thought the war was near the end, large amounts of military hardware appeared in separatist territory. The type of military hardware that emerged (T72B3 version of the T-72s) were not used by the Ukrainian Army, and had been used exclusively by the Russian Armed Forces since 2013 (Čech and Janda 2015: 20-21). On 12 August, Russia declared that they would send a convoy of up to 300 trucks to East Ukraine, allegedly
carrying humanitarian aid. On 23 August, a convoy of 260 trucks crossed the border into Ukraine without permission from Kiev, the same day claims were made by US spokesmen that Russia was firing artillery rockets into Ukrainian (Flikke 2015: 25). On 13 September, Russia Today stated that the second convoy of 200 Russian trucks had arrived in Luhansk (Flikke 2015: 28).

With the intervention lacking a UN mandate, an increased East-West tension following the annexation of Crimea, and due to the lack of a sudden humanitarian crisis, the expectation was that the Storting would condemn the intervention. The main focus of the debate was expected to be on the violation of international law, and due to increased international tension, it was expected that this intervention would be condemned more, compared to the intervention in Georgia. Nonetheless, Russia is Norway’s neighbour, so it is expected that there will be discussions linked to how the intervention, the increased tension, and the condemnation of Russia will affect their relationship. There is no expectation of the protection of civilians affecting the Storting’s attitude towards the intervention.

The debate on East Ukraine consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Statement on 5 March 2015 and the subsequent debate, which took place 12 March 2015. Additionally, excerpts from one Question Time that took place 6 October 2014 are used.

**The Storting’s Attitude on Military Intervention and Overview over Arguments**

The debates on East Ukraine stated the Russian intervention was in violation of international law. The Storting’s attitude in the debates on East Ukraine was more condemning than in debates on Georgia. Several representatives stated it was important for Norway to show alliance solidarity; however the majority of the representatives stated the importance of trying to normalise Norway’s relation to Russia in the future. The Storting stated that Russia's behaviour in Ukraine was not acceptable but Norway and Russia had many strong interests in the High North, linked to natural resources such as fish, oil and gas, and thus Norway had to keep a relationship with Russia in these areas. Similar to the debates on Georgia, arguments used were from the realist category of alliance dependency and from the idealist category of international law.

There was a strong condemnation (-2) against the intervention in East Ukraine.
Alliance Arguments

The Storting’s attitude towards the intervention in East Ukraine was much as anticipated. All the representatives condemned Russia for the intervention, certain representatives claimed that the relationship was now changed forever, and although some representatives found this notion to be extreme, the majority of the Storting agreed it would not be possible to maintain a normal relationship with regards to defence cooperation at this point.

The representatives stated that Norway had everything to gain from alliance solidarity and that it was important to stand by its allies in a situation where Russia undermined European security and stability (Agdestein (H): S.tid. 2014-15: 2344). It was thus important for the Storting that Norway stood by its allies in the condemnation of Russia’s behaviour in East Ukraine.


Although all representatives agreed that Norway had to stand by its allies in the disapproval of Russia, several representatives agreed Norway was in a different position than other states further from Russia and with fewer historic ties to Russia. Four of the eleven representatives emphasised the historically good and important relationship between Norway and Russia in their statements (S.tid. 2014-15: 2334, 2342, 2344, 2346). Norway should support its allies’ stand against Russia, but at the same time Norway needed a relationship with Russia: ‘It is easy to sit in Washington, London, Madrid or other capitals, saying that we will not cooperate with Russia, but it is not so easy to sit in Oslo and Norway and say the same’ (Myrli (Ap): S.tid. 2014-15: 2345; my translation). The majority of the representatives emphasised the importance of Norway taking a different and less harsh stance than some of our allies. Nine of the eleven representatives stated it was important that Norway kept a good
relationship to Russia; the remaining two representatives did not mention any specifics about Norway’s future relationship to Russia.

Furthermore, several representatives stressed the importance of not building up a new Cold War, and abstaining from the use of Cold War rhetoric (S.tid. 2014-15: 2345-46). Lasting change in Norway's relationship with Russia was not a wise attitude. It was important to condemn violations of international law and human rights, but at the same time it was not wise to build up more East-West tension (Fylkesnes (SV): S.tid. 2014-15: 2346).

**International Law Arguments**
There was broad consensus in the Storting that the intervention in East Ukraine was in violation of international law (S.tid. 2014-15: 2334-2346). The lack of support in international law was the main reason for the condemnation of the intervention, as the intervention violated states' right to self-determination. All eleven representatives agreed that Norway had to react towards Russia’s behaviour and support the sanctions against Russia.

The Storting agreed that Russia’s intervention in Ukraine violated international law, and none of the representatives could support the intervention. Russia was heavily condemned for its involvement on another state’s territory; several representatives stated that Russia's aggressive behaviour in Ukraine challenged peace and security in this part of the world. It was important for the representatives that Norway condemned Russia’s use of force, and supported our allies in the East ‘who now feel their territories, their cultural identity, and their democratic rights are endangered’ (Halleraker (H): S.tid. 2014-15: 60; my translation).

**Protection of Civilians Arguments**
Vladimir Putin’s claim that the military intervention was due to humanitarian needs did not convince the Storting. In fact, none of the eleven representatives mentioned the protection of civilians as a reason to support the intervention or as a reason for Putin to intervene.
Case Discussion: Condemning Russia

Table 7.2 below presents an overview of all the values derived from East Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Alliance Argument</th>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>Protection of Civilians</th>
<th>Storting’s Attitude</th>
<th>Idealist Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Ukraine</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the violation of international law, no sudden humanitarian crisis, and dramatically increased East-West tension, the Storting was expected to condemn the intervention. Furthermore, I expected a focus on alliance arguments and arguments linked to the category of international law.

There was broad consensus in the Storting on the condemnation of the Russian intervention in East Ukraine, which the study showed was mostly due to Russia’s violation of international law. However, several representatives expressed the importance of cooperation with Russia especially with regards to the northern parts of Norway and the High North. Still, the majority of the representatives claimed that Norway’s relationship to Russia would need time to re-establish itself. Although several representatives stated it was important to have a normalised relationship to Russia in the future, the attitude towards the intervention in East Ukraine was much more condemning than the attitude towards the intervention in Georgia. As was the case in the debates on Georgia, evidence for any particular personal feelings of moral obligation to intervene among the Storting could not be found.

Many of the same arguments and attitudes that were present in the Storting debates on Georgia were present in the debates on East Ukraine. As expected, what distinguished them was the harder tone and higher level of condemnation in the case of East Ukraine, due to the increased international tension following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. There were many of the same arguments linked to keeping a good relationship with Russia, but many of the representatives stated that at this point in time that would not be possible.

With regards to the debates on East Ukraine, much of the result was as expected. The Storting condemned the intervention due to the lack of international law, there was no presence of arguments linked to the category of protecting civilians, and the increased international tension led to an increased condemnation of the intervention compared with the
intervention of Georgia in 2008. However, there was quite a lot of focus on Norway’s relationship to Russia, which is maybe not surprising, but noteworthy.
8 Comparing Military Interventions

The previous four chapters have analysed the Storting’s debates on five military interventions from 1999 to 2014, within the three categories of arguments: alliance dependency, international law, and the protection of civilians. The chapters have addressed the balance of idealist and realist arguments as used by the Storting in their attitude towards the interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, Georgia, and East Ukraine.

The review of the debates in the Storting shows there exists a strong consensus culture on important foreign policy issues such as military interventions. As members of the governing parties and other Storting representatives meet up together in confidential meetings, there was an expectation of few party-political disagreements in the Storting. Disagreements from the majority viewpoint came mainly from the Socialist Left Party and the Progress Party, and also, though to a lesser extent, from the Centre Party. The disagreements throughout the debates were quite predictable, as the Socialist Left Party and the Progress Party historically have separated themselves from the pack on matters of foreign affairs.

The purpose of my thesis was to study the Storting's debates on, and attitude towards, five recent military interventions to shed light on the relative explanatory weight of realist and idealist interests in Norwegian foreign policy. I wanted to uncover whether consideration of Norwegian security interests dominates or whether consideration of international law and the suffering of civilians are given priority even if it may adversely affect Norwegian security interests.

Table 8.1 below presents an overview of all the values derived from the five cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Alliance Argument</th>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>Protection of Civilians</th>
<th>Storting’s Attitude</th>
<th>Idealist Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Ukraine</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The chapter will begin with a description of the differences between the cases regarding the Storting’s attitude towards the interventions, followed by the predominance of idealist arguments in the Storting debates on the five cases.

### 8.1 The Storting’s Attitude towards Military Interventions

One of the main tasks of this thesis was to study the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions in order to shed light on the relative explanatory weight of realist and idealist interests in Norwegian foreign policy. The values presented in the table above help determine if the Storting’s attitude was realist or idealist driven.

The Storting debates revealed broad consensus and strong support for the interventions in Kosovo and Libya. Looking at their values in the table above, the only variable the cases have in common is the existence of an acute humanitarian crisis and that the intervention is led by an ally. The strong support for both interventions would suggest that with military interventions led by allies, where there exist immediate or grave attacks by the government against their own civilians, the Storting supports such an intervention, with minor regards for international law, as in the case of Kosovo when there was scant basis in international law for the use of force. However, the empirical support for this hypothesis would be stronger if the intervention in Kosovo had been executed by Russia. Had there been an intervention by Russia where there existed an acute humanitarian crisis, but scant basis in international law, it would shed more light on the relative explanatory weight of realist and idealist interests in Norwegian foreign policy. What the study of the parliamentary debate transcripts has shown however is that the majority of the Storting was not willing to support any intervention without linking it to what they claimed was appropriate legality at the time of the operation. The Storting was thus willing to bend international law but not without pretending that their support was in accordance with international law.

In the transcripts from the Storting debates, the representatives claimed that their disapproval of the three interventions, Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine, was due to the violation of international law. However, the condemnation of the two Russian cases was considerably stronger than the condemnation of the intervention in Iraq. This observation is not only based on the Progress Party’s deviation from the majority’s attitude, but also based on the language used by all representatives in the debates on the three interventions. The majority of the
Storting criticised the intervention in Iraq for violating international law, but the US was condemned by few for its actions; all in all there was moderate condemnation towards the intervention in Iraq. In the two Russian cases, Georgia and East Ukraine, there was consensus and a strong condemnation towards the interventions and the intervener; I would therefore claim that the difference in who the intervener was affected their attitude. The difference can be explained in realist terms, and alliance loyalty.

In all three cases the interventions violated international law. However, in the case of Iraq there existed UN resolutions involving sanctions. Although international legal scholars agreed that in the absence of explicit Security Council authorisation the intervention did in fact violate international law, Prime Minister Bondevik admitted he did not think a resolution subsequent to 1441 was necessary, even if it was preferred, because 1441 did not explicitly state such a requirement (see chapter 5.2). In that sense one might look at the difference in condemnation as partly due to the fact that several representatives in the Storting considered the intervention in Iraq as less of a violation than the interventions in Georgia and East Ukraine.

So far, the comparison of the Storting’s attitude has focused on cases that have similar outcomes, namely the Storting’s attitude. Kosovo and Iraq are two cases that in my model only differentiate on the level of an acute humanitarian crisis, but there was strong support for an intervention in the case of Kosovo and moderate condemnation of the intervention in Iraq. The Storting tried to portray the intervention in Kosovo as being in accordance with international law, when in reality it was no more legal than the intervention in Iraq. According to my variables, the level of government attacks against civilians in the case of Kosovo could explain the difference in attitude. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that the Storting did not justify their difference in attitude on the basis of the difference in government violence, but on what they claimed was a difference in international law.

This analysis of the Storting’s attitude towards military interventions does not seem to strongly support the notion of a return to a more realist foreign policy, at least not in the public debates. Based on these assessments, the Storting’s attitude seems to be mostly idealist driven, influenced by the existence of strong government violence towards civilians, as well as a need to link decisions to international law whether it is appropriate or not. That being said, the difference in condemnation between Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine is best understood in realist terms.
The balance between realist and idealist arguments used in the Storting’s debates will be discussed in more detail to see what that can tell us about the relative explanatory weight of realist and idealist interests in Norwegian foreign policy.

### 8.2 The Predominance of Idealist Arguments

The analysis of the Storting’s debates aimed to give a comprehensive picture of the Storting’s arguments for supporting or condemning five military interventions. What can the Storting’s argumentation tell us about interests in Norwegian foreign policy?

In the case of Kosovo, relatively low international tension meant Norwegian security interests were less affected and this case thus has little to say about the balance between the two types of interests, as the low level of international tension made the dilemma less urgent. Most realist arguments appeared in the debates on the upcoming NATO summit and Norway’s participation in international operations. These are both debates where it was my expectation that representatives would use alliance arguments.

The realist explanation would assume that increased international tension would push Norway closer to its allies. The high score on the alliance argument (shown in table 8.1) indicates loyalty to the US. In the case of Libya, there was high international tension, the intervention was in accordance with international law, and there was an acute humanitarian crisis. The Libyan case allowed for a more interesting analysis in the Storting, due to increased international tension, compared to the case of Kosovo. However, the debates on Libya indicated that realist arguments were only a minor factor in explaining the Storting’s attitude towards the operation, as the arguments used by the representatives to justify support for this intervention were based on the protection of civilians and the legality of the operation.

I expected the non-interventions in Rwanda and Srebrenica to figure prominently among the arguments for why Norway would support an intervention without a UN mandate. However, in the debates on Kosovo, the study showed that the principle of non-interference was still important for the Norwegian parliamentarians near the end of the 1990s. Although almost all representatives in the Storting supported the intervention in Kosovo, only a minority of the representatives discussed it as being legal due to the sudden humanitarian crisis.

Contrary to the debates on Kosovo, the debates on Libya were heavily marked by references
to Rwanda and Srebrenica, and compassion for the humanitarian crisis. It was unexpected that the failure to intervene in Rwanda and Srebrenica was mentioned more frequently and emphasised more in the debates on Libya than in the debates on Kosovo, since they were so much closer in time to Kosovo. However, the 1990s, from Srebrenica and Rwanda to Kosovo showed how difficult it was to achieve resolutions for humanitarian military interventions in the UN.

The establishment of the R2P had made military intervention on humanitarian grounds acceptable under certain conditions, and could now be authorised by the Security Council. With the establishment of the R2P, humanitarian interventions were, according to the Storting, more regulated within the UN system. That can explain why failed interventions in the 1990s were used as a justification when supporting and participating in the intervention in Libya, but to a lesser degree in the debates on Kosovo. The Storting was not willing to justify military interventions solely on the basis of protecting civilians and doing what is morally right.

The consensus and strong support for the intervention in Kosovo were surprising considering the intervention’s dubious basis in international law. The study shows that when civilian suffering is high and the intervener is a close ally, the Storting is willing to bend international law, but not without pretending they are on safe ground, which in the case of Kosovo meant justifying the operation on the basis of chapter VII of the UN Charter. Since the intervention violated the UN Charter that specifically states that the use of force is only allowed through Security Council authorisation, it was unexpected that the Storting tried to justify an intervention that had scant basis in international law by referring to the UN Charter.

In the case of Libya, the government parties waited for a Security Council authorisation before expressing their support for the intervention. The opposition parties expressed concern for the implication of waiting for an authorisation from the Security Council and stated that the operation was in accordance with international law due to the establishment of R2P. However, for an intervention to be legal an authorisation from the Security Council is still needed. Thus, neither the government parties nor the opposition parties were willing to support an intervention without it being, according to them, in accordance with international law.

For the Storting, both were in accordance with international law, but only in the latter case
was there, according to the Storting, legal basis to use the protection of civilians as reason to intervene. Representatives in the Storting had called for clearer international guidelines with regards to humanitarian interventions in 1999, and the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011 had clearer international guidelines in the form of R2P. Although the principle of the R2P did not actually change the current legal situation very much, as it is only an interpretation of existing law, my study of the parliamentary debates revealed that what the representatives felt was missing in 1999 was present in 2011.

For the representatives in the Storting at that time, the main difference between the debates in 1999 and 2011 was not the lack of a UN mandate in 1999, but rather the lack of clear interventional guidelines to handle the debate within. However, it is impossible to say if this is a trend; researchers looking at humanitarian interventions and the applicability of R2P say Libya might be an exception and Syria the norm. But we can say the establishment of R2P clearly marked a change in the arguments put forward by the Storting and their attitude towards military interventions on humanitarian grounds.

With the cases I chose, the realist and idealist interests did not, for the most part, pull in opposite directions. The minor exceptions are in the case of Iraq, and to a certain degree the two Russian cases. These three cases are the ones that come closest to showing a proper dilemma with divided interests.

In the case of Iraq, although the intervention took place in a time of low international tension, there is still a political price to be paid by not supporting a close ally. In that sense the interests are pulling in different directions, as this was an intervention that clearly violated international law, but by not supporting our ally there is a political price to be paid. The realist explanation would expect more shyness with regards to the security guarantor in times of high international tension. My study of the debates on Iraq partly supports this claim, as only the Progress Party said Norway should support the intervention due to national security.

The decision to not support the US was, according to the majority of the Storting, due to the lack of justification for the intervention in international law. At first this can be seen as supporting a claim that consideration of international law is given priority even if it may adversely affect Norwegian security interests. However, analysis of the parliamentary transcripts showed the majority of the party groups wanted to be reassured at multiple points
in time that Norway’s stance would not affect Norway’s relationship with the US. In that sense, consideration for international law was not given priority without regards to how it would affect Norwegian security interests.

The debates on Iraq show that although international tension was low enough to make criticism relatively low-cost in security terms, which was the case in 2003, the Storting representatives still remained committed to ensuring that the alliance and relationship to the US was not threatened. The debates also show that in times of low international tension the Storting will be more inclined to criticise interventions executed by allies. However, it would have been easier to support this claim if I could have compared with an intervention that had similar humanitarian conditions and violations of international law with another international climate where the East-West tension was higher.

In the two Russian cases there is a price for condemning Russia; this is related to Norway’s security situation, and there was quite a lot of focus on this issue in the debates on Georgia and East Ukraine. Throughout the debates on both cases, there was a wish among the majority of the Storting to avoid angering Russia unnecessarily, and to avoid adding to an already high East-West tension with Cold War rhetoric. Several representatives stated that Norway had to act different from allies who were using language that should be avoided.

The debates on Georgia and East Ukraine were quite similar. Many of the same arguments were used, and those arguments fit into the categories of alliance and international law. However, the debates showed there was more focus overall on realist interests in the debates on East Ukraine. Whereas in the debates on Georgia the majority of the representatives emphasised the importance of keeping a good relationship with Russia, and stated that sanctions and exclusions were not something they supported, in the debates on East Ukraine sanctions and exclusions were accepted by many as the right way to act. I argue this difference was due to increased international tension following the annexation of Crimea. In a realist explanation, Norway seemed to stand closer to its allies due to the increased tension. The difference in condemnation indicates that consideration for Norwegian security interests dominated.

In the case of Georgia, the balance between the realist and idealist arguments was quite equal. In the case of East Ukraine, there was a moderate predominance of realist arguments, which I argue could be explained by the increased East-West tension at the time.
In the debates on Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine, evidence for any particular personal feelings of moral obligation among the Storting representatives to intervene could not be found. Nonetheless, in the case of Iraq a great part of the debate was used on discussing the situation of the civilians there, but not in any way to justify an intervention. However, in the absence of an acute humanitarian crisis the Storting could not support military interventions with little basis in international law.

Overall, the debates analysed display both realist and idealist arguments. The findings derived from the five military interventions between 1999 and 2014 lead to the conclusion that realist as well as idealist interests play a role in Storting’s debates on military interventions. Yet, quantitatively, the Storting’s use of idealist arguments was significantly more extensive than the use of realist arguments.

In the debates on Kosovo, 34 out of 99 parliamentary posts (34 per cent) included realist arguments; in 28 of these (82 per cent) realist logic made up the main points. In the debates on Iraq, 20 out of 75 parliamentary posts (27 per cent) included realist arguments; in 14 of these (70 per cent) realist logic made up the main points. In the debates on Georgia, 12 out of 19 parliamentary posts (63 per cent) included realist arguments; in 6 of these (50 per cent) realist logic made up the main points. In the debates on Libya, 13 out of 44 parliamentary posts (30 per cent) included realist arguments; realist logic was not used in any of the main points. In the debates on East Ukraine, 9 out of 11 parliamentary posts (82 per cent) included realist arguments; in 5 of these (56 per cent) realist logic made up the main points. There was thus an overall trend that the protection of civilians argument and arguments linked to international law were used more frequently than arguments linked to alliance dependency.

That being said, there is an increasing use of realist arguments in the Russian cases, which I claim is due to an increase in international tension.

All in all, this shows that the majority of the arguments used are idealist arguments. In that way, there seems to be support in the empirical material for the 1990s suggestions that as an increasing number of foreign policy debates are being played out in public, idealist arguments are becoming more prominent. However, I do not detect an increasing amount of idealist argumentation throughout the Storting debates in the 21st century. What I do detect is an increasing number of realist arguments between the two Russian cases.

There is not a continuous increase in either idealist or realist arguments in the Storting when
studying the five military interventions from 1999 to 2014. The difference between them is case-by-case depending on the characteristics of each intervention; this study does not reveal a specific trend in this period that supports the findings that Stokke (2012) produced in his study on Norway’s peace engagement. However, as Stokke emphasised in his study as well, there is a change in Norwegian interests that also includes emphasis on the ideals of peace, democracy, and development, and it is harder to separate realist and idealist interests.

8.3 Summary

This chapter has compared the Storting’s attitude towards five military interventions in order to shed light on the relative explanatory weight of realist and idealist interests in Norwegian foreign policy.

In the Storting’s debates from 1998-2015, with emphasis on the military interventions in 1999, 2003, 2008, 2011, and 2014, quantitatively there was an overall trend that arguments linked to the protection of civilians and international law were used more than arguments linked to alliance. Out of the 248 parliamentary posts included in the empirical material of this study, 88 (35 per cent) included alliance arguments, and in 52 of these (59 per cent) the alliance argument was the main point. A majority of the parliamentary posts thus used arguments linked to the two idealist categories, and referred to the importance of following international law and protecting civilians.

However, by assessing it qualitatively, which this thesis has done, the trend is not so clear-cut. There does not seem to be a trend of an increasing number of either realist or idealist arguments used over time. What the study shows is that with increasing international tension, the focus on alliance arguments gained more importance in the debates in interventions where there existed moderate and/or non-acute humanitarian crises. In the non-humanitarian military interventions in Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine, it seems there was an increasing number of realist arguments as international tension grew.

I was also interested in which of the three categories the Storting used to openly justify their stance towards the five military interventions. This was also much of the reason why I chose to operate with two idealist categories instead of one. The members of the Storting were concerned with supporting the UN, and following current international law, which in this study was exemplified with the calling for the development of clearer international guidelines in the case of Kosovo, the disapproval of Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine, and the expressed
relief at having conceptual tools, i.e. the R2P principle, when facing the humanitarian crisis in Libya, as well as the reason why a UN mandate was needed before the majority of the Storting supported intervening in Libya. All five cases were marked by a wish to adhere to international law. The goal might have been to protect civilians, but none of the governments were willing to support an intervention without at least pretending to have backing in international law, as seen in the case of Kosovo.
9 Conclusions

This thesis has analysed positions taken and arguments used by the Storting to support or condemn military interventions, in order to see what this can tell us about the relative explanatory weight of realist and idealist interests in Norwegian foreign policy.

The Storting’s attitude towards the five military interventions varied from strong support to strong condemnation, and the balance of arguments ranged from strong predominance of idealist arguments to moderate predominance of realist arguments. What the debates on the five cases had in common was that the Storting justified their stance on the basis of international law, even when an intervention was not in accordance with international law.

Although Stokke (2012) found that Norwegian peace engagement was reoriented towards realist interests in the 21st century, he also found that the meaning of interests now included ideals of peace, democracy and development. This study indicates it is a question of degree, rather than either/or, when it comes to the use of realist arguments versus the use of idealist arguments. The study also shows that the types of arguments the Storting uses is strongly tied to the characteristics of the interventions, here focused on alliance, international law, and the existence of an acute humanitarian crisis.

Quantitatively the study shows the majority of the parliamentary posts entailed arguments linked to the category of international law and the protection of civilians. The Storting’s attitude towards military interventions was justified by the wish to protect the civilian populations, a feeling of responsibility to help, and international law. Only a minority of the posts related to justifications based on alliance loyalty, and in even fewer posts were alliance arguments the main argument. These findings fit in with studies showing that from the 1990s onwards more idealist arguments are used in foreign policy debate, as more of these debates are taking place in public.

That being said, this study indicates that much of what appears in the debates in the Storting is in line with the alliance theory's predictions about the behaviour of small states within alliances in conjunction with the East-West tension at the time, and this is especially shown by increased loyalty in times of high international tension, as exemplified in the debates on Iraq, Georgia, and East Ukraine. The study thus places itself together with other literature which points to the importance of alliance dependency. My small contribution to the
literature shows there is continuity with regards to alliance dependency in Norwegian security and foreign policy. Norway supports its allies, and does so even more when the level of international tension is greater.

As the analysis is based on a qualitative research design, any generalisation to a larger universe should be done with caution. However, the analysis has identified patterns and trends in the Storting’s debates on military interventions between 1999 and 2014 that may be of importance. It could therefore be interesting to do an analysis with a larger number of cases, e.g. all military interventions after the end of the Cold War, to evaluate the hypotheses about the value-based 1990s and the return to realism after the turn of the century, using the same explanatory factors applied to military interventions after 2014. Or one could study other small parliamentary states to see how they express themselves in public foreign policy debates. Furthermore, it could be interesting to extend the analysis to entail all public debates, such as statements in the media and speeches. As for cases after 2014, it would be interesting, considering how much emphasis the Storting put on R2P in the case of Libya, to do a comparison of the debates on Libya with the debates on Syria, as many opponents of the R2P state that Libya was the exception, and Syria is the norm.

Today, East-West tension is the highest it has been since the end of the Cold War. It will be interesting to see how this will play out with future US-led and NATO-led military interventions, especially military interventions with dubious basis in international law.
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