

Making History:

*Articulating Imagined Communities in the Norwegian and Danish
Referendum Debates for Membership of the European Communities in 1972*



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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates how imagined community identities were articulated in the days leading up to and immediately following the public referendum campaigns for membership of the European Communities in Norway and Denmark in the autumn of 1972. In what ways was national imagined community expressed and negotiated during the debates? How were other potential imagined communities, primarily the notions of a European Communities-based 'Europe' and the idea of a quasi-political, quasi-cultural Nordic fellowship, employed and articulated in relation to the national identities? These questions have become no less interesting after the 2016 British public referendum concerning its membership of the European Union and the accompanying discussion across all types of media about what "Brexit" means for, or says about, British identity. It is hoped that this paper in English can help to open up the cultural study of Nordic/Scandinavian and Norwegian and Danish relations to the European Union (previously the European Communities) to an international audience.

The paper will investigate these questions by synchronic analysis of how ideas and perceptions of national, regional and international identity were employed, debated and perceived in two Norwegian and two Danish national newspapers from the 20th September to the 5th October 1972. The study of such a short time span within a small source base can, of course, only provide a limited overview of the debate at the time. To attempt to mitigate some of the newspapers' potential bias, one newspaper in support of and one in opposition to membership were selected per country: *Politiken* and *Ekstra Bladet* in Denmark, and *Aftenposten* and *Dagbladet* in Norway. Though they are actors themselves, newspapers also, however, provide one of the best glimpses historians can catch into the general public discourse of a certain time during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Despite their unique difficulties as sources, their tripartite function as sources of information and knowledges, platforms for discussion, and shapers of public opinion makes them very interesting texts in which to attempt to uncover deeply held societal notions, such as identity, at a certain point in time. In order to throw light upon articulations of (inter)national belonging, the paper will touch upon lingual and rhetorical tendencies in the public debates and the use of the past in narrating, shaping and legitimising collective identity.

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The decision to focus my thesis on the Danish and Norwegian referendums for membership of the European Community in 1972 was made on the basis of two things. Firstly, the interesting new master degree in European Culture combined the disciplines of the history of ideas and cultural history and gave me a whole new perspective on the changeability of history and society, and thus on our present and how we see ourselves and our societies today. Deeply held structures within our world such as "the nation" are merely a few hundred years old, and the meaning and understanding of foundational concepts within our societies, such as "states", "sovereignty" and "history", have been changed and transformed through time. Questions of identity and different types of community popped up on many occasions during the course, and it was interesting to hear my Norwegian classmates' perspectives on the European Union and Norway's position "outside" of it. As a Dane who grew up in the UK amongst many other European nationalities at a European School run directly by the EU, I would happily identify myself as European as well as Danish, with a bit of British on the side for good measure. With their differing outcomes, the passionate debates surrounding the Norwegian and Danish referendum debates in 1972 seemed like an interesting point from which to investigate expressions and perceptions of national identity and their meeting with other potential imagined community identities, namely Europeanness and Nordicness. This hunch turned out to be true, and I shall attempt to convey some of the most interesting observations on the use of language and history in articulating collective identities, although I hope to steer well clear of attempting to explain the differing outcomes in the two countries as such or, gods forbid, suggesting that one decision was better than the other.

This paper has had a rewarding but intense and arduous birth. My first thanks must go to my lovely and enthusiastic supervisor, Line Esborg. Thank you, Line, for your support and your patience, your good humour and your very useful input right up until the finish line. It is very much appreciated. Thanks to Jacob Helmbæk for his suggestions and help in sourcing Danish material on the EU and to Morten Rasmussen in Copenhagen for providing me with his very valuable PhD thesis on Denmark's journey into the EU almost within seconds of me asking. Thanks to Ellen Krefting and Anne Eriksen for the thought, resources and dedication they've put into making their new joint master programme as interesting and relevant to the modern world as it can be and to Marie Nicolaisen for staying on top of all my many niggly administrative inquiries. Finally, thanks to Michael, Lis and Bob Djæfflings for their hawk-like proofreading skills. Any errors in the text are entirely their fault.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The emotive usages and understandings of how "we", as nations, regions and people, perceive ourselves and our, to make use of Benedict Anderson's famed term, "imagined communities" both inside and outside of the nation affect us all and shape the world that we live in and, subsequently, our sense of selves, no matter how or where we feel we belong. We also help to shape these communities and our understandings of them ourselves: They are, after all, a product of humanity and even economies and laws are shaped by human activity. Looking at these facets of our deepest sense of identity and belonging within the context of the debate about membership of the European Communities means looking at a time when perceptions of national identity were at a flashpoint of collective identity negotiations, where different people's versions or understandings of what their national identity involved were being debated. While much has been written on Norway and Denmark's relationships to the EC/EU from economic, political and legal perspectives in a variety of fields from international studies to history to law, much less has been written from the point of view of cultural history, particularly in Denmark. Cultural history and constructivist approaches, attempting to lay bare constantly-changing and deeply held concepts and characteristics within society, take on the reading of primary sources – in this case newspapers – in a different way by drawing out the non-empirical and the emotive and try to throw light on the constructs which we often see as fundamental to society and as part of ourselves, e.g. the nation.

In his famous book *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson loosely defines the concept of 'the nation' and related notions such as 'nationality' and 'nationalism' as "cultural artefacts" which have gradually become naturalised and integral to people's understanding of the world to the extent that they now "command ... profound emotional legitimacy" within society.¹ He uses the example of the grave of the Unknown Soldier to illustrate the symbolic power of the nation, where the bones of an unidentified individual become endowed with a particularly national significance and the soldier's identity attains meaning through its nationality.² He argues that the idea of the nation was popularised in the eighteenth century, once the "certainties" of earlier times – that one was directly tied to the unchangeable cosmic truths written in the pure and authentic languages of the holy scriptures; that the world was organised into hierarchies with absolute, divinely-ordained rulers at the top; and that time was

¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 4.

² Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 9-10.

constant and history cyclical – came to be replaced by an understanding of the world as dynamic, changeable and forward-moving.³ In this new, more uncertain universe, people's understanding of where they belonged and how they fit into the world came instead to be articulated through grand, joint narratives based on an understanding of the world and time as progressive, with identity shaped within groups sharing a common past and a common future.⁴ These narratives were built up within a certain group of people based upon common frames of reference, and one of the most important ways to add legitimacy to the communities' common identity narratives was to root them firmly in the "immemorial" past and give them a sense of permanence and stability through history.⁵

Anderson states that nations are imagined political communities which are by definition limited to include only a subset of the world's population and territory; that they must have sovereignty – the right and means to self-government; another notion – and finally, that they have to be imagined as a community of "deep, horizontal comradeship".⁶ As Line Esborg points out, Anderson does not by "imagined communities" mean that these groupings are simply fictional, but rather that the imagined community is a type of constructed collective identity which is not pre-determined to exist, but is continually negotiated and naturalised through countless interactions and negotiations over time and comes to be seen as integral.⁷ These imagined communities hold considerable power and have very real consequences for people's lives, to the extent that people are willing to go to war and die for them, and it can impact them whether they are inside or outside a certain community. Belonging to "your" particular nation has real-world consequences, not just in terms of murder or martyrdom, but in terms of who you are as a person, where you feel affinity for and how you – and others – perceive you within the wider world. And, as Esborg argues, these gradual and constant negotiations about the nation can be viewed as a 'daily referendum', forged upon its members' collective memories and ideas about the past and the will of its members to be a collective.⁸

³ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 4; 36.

⁴ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 11.

⁵ Anne Eriksen and Torunn Selberg, *Tradisjon og fortelling: En innføring i folkløstikk* (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 2006), 120; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*,

⁶ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 7.

⁷ Line Esborg, *Det norske nei til EU: En studie av motstand som kulturell praksis* (Dr. Art: University of Oslo, 2008), 21.

⁸ Esborg, *Det norske nei til EU*, 20.

In this thesis, I aim to investigate how national identity, grounded in the nation as an imagined community, was expressed, debated and legitimised within the Norwegian and Danish EC referendum debates, and how these fared alongside or against other types of potential imagined community identities, namely those of *Norden*⁹ and the idea of 'Europe' connected to the EC. While "imagined communities" are usually connected to the idea of the nation, more recent scholars have also used the idea of imagined communities based on a history of negotiation and legitimisation to investigate groupings on a larger or smaller scale than the nation, such as local, regional and international communities. Ulrich Beck, for example, argued for the idea of "imagined cosmopolitan communities" created in the face of common, global risks and aided by the spread of modern social media technology.¹⁰

Mogens Hobolth, a Danish political scientist at the London School of Economics, has proposed that Norden can be viewed as a 'regional imagined community'.¹¹ He states that although Norden as an imagined community lacks "strong ideas about sovereignty or patriotism", people from the Nordic countries "share a perception of each other as coming from stable, small, rule-of-law welfare states", share very similar languages and "recognize in each other a certain commonality as a basis for trust".¹² It should be added that as well as lingual, modern political and sociological commonalities, the Nordic countries also share a long, interdependent history. Nordic identity has a long history of articulated community and affinity (as well as dispute and indifference) coming into being through articulations and interactions between the Nordic nations, even if few would claim that Nordic identity is felt as keenly or has as solid a (modern) political foundation as the nation. The presence of some kind of co-Nordic community feeling is evidenced in things as diverse as the amount of academic research being undertaken as joint Nordic projects, the joint production of TV shows across Scandinavia and perhaps even in the rather suspiciously high amount of points

⁹ 'Norden', meaning "the North" in the Scandinavian languages, traditionally refers to the countries of Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The Scandinavian term 'Norden' connotes a stronger cultural-historical affinity than the literal English meaning of "The North", which would primarily seem to indicate a geographical location. In English, the adjective "Nordic" pertains to the same cultural affinity as Norden; however, no equivalent noun exists. Therefore, the Scandinavian term 'Norden' will be used in this paper. Its historical background will be covered in the section on context. Also, it should be pointed out that Scandinavia technically consists of Sweden, Denmark and Norway; however, within the context of the 1972 EC debates, where Scandinavia is evoked, it is meant to represent largely the same notion of community and identity as Norden.

¹⁰ See Ulrich Beck, "Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Communities of Global Risk", *American Behavioral Scientist* 55:10 (2011): 1346-1361.

¹¹ Mogens Hobolth, "European Visa Cooperation: Interest Politics and Regional Imagined Communities", LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series, *LEQS Paper* 34 (May 2011), 1-42.

¹² Hobolth, "European Visa Cooperation", 25.

that the Nordics usually allocate to one-other during the epitome of the year (Eurovision). And, as shall be seen, the idea of Norden was very much present – on both sides of the argument – during the EC referendum debates.

The reading of the European Communities in terms of European identity is done with some precaution. The European Communities and the modern European Union versions are just one manifestation of Europeanness, and many would even hesitate to qualify them as such. The notion of 'Europe' is both broader, older and less definite than the institution of the European Union. Many analyses of integration within the European Union have commented on the lack of success in instilling a sense of European identity in the Union's "citizens". A common diagnosis for this is that attempts at enforcing a common European identity have been too top-down.¹³ This idea that the EU was a project for and by the political and social elite could also be witnessed in the UK's Brexit debate and referendum in 2016. The Maastricht Treaty, with its initial declaration to EU citizenship, was initially narrowly rejected by a Danish referendum in 1992 and a slightly later French vote and had to be rewritten with more leeway for individual nation states and a less obvious pursuit of unity.¹⁴ In response to the failure of the initial Maastricht Treaty, the Edinburgh Agreement set out to nurture "a community closer to its citizens".¹⁵ Attempts to stir up, uncover or fabricate, if you will, a common European identity have included pushing such things as a European flag, a European anthem and even a European origin myth dating back to Antiquity and manifesting the EU as the natural heir to previous examples of (part-)European communities going as far back as to the ancient civilisations of Greece and Rome. The general assessment amongst scholars is that this project has failed to catch on with the general public, however. Toplak and Šumi write that

...in spite of a growing fashion of 'European' historiography in the last four decades that has been obviously welcomed/spurred by the European Union institutional structures, event-history in Europe still divides rather than unites

¹³ See for example J. G. A. Pocock, "What Do We Mean by Europe?", *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-) 21:1 (winter 1997), 12-29; Cirila Toplak and Irena Šumi, "Europe(an Union): Imagined Community in the Making?", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 20:1 (2012), 7-28.

¹⁴ Lene Hansen, "Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe" in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States* (London: Routledge, 2002), 50.

¹⁵ Birgit Nüchel Thomsen, *The Odd Man Out? Danmark og den europæiske integration 1948-1992* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1993), 9-11.

*(Davies, 1997, pp. 2-6). It is a series of historical narratives by winners and losers whose interpretations are far from consensual.*¹⁶

They suggest, however, that a successful European community identity may still emerge, particularly with the help of increasingly international (social) media and internet platforms helping citizens in European nations feel more connected across borders.¹⁷

Their emphasis on the need for the identity-shaping historical narratives to be uniting rather than divisive is quite interesting in light of the referendum debates, which are full of debates and contrasting interpretations of what the debaters' national pasts mean in connection to potential EC membership. It can also be argued that while different European nations have certainly been on the winning and losing side in historical events, many of the most significant events within modern European history – such as the French Revolution, the fall of the Iron Curtain and, most significantly of all, perhaps, the always-looming Second World War – are not really actual points of conflict in-between European nations anymore and *have* in fact become part of a joint European narrative. Moreover, the very fact that events within a *European* history are being discussed adds strength to Europe as a concept with strong roots in history, and its studying within a European Union context helps to connect 'Europe' and the EC/EU. At a more basic level, it is fair to say that some idea of 'Europe' and 'European' does exist, as evidenced by daily use of the terms, even if they may be very difficult concepts to define. Furthermore, despite the fluidity of its borders, few would argue that China is part of Europe or that France is not, furthering the idea that 'Europe' *is* a limited entity and that members of (most) European nations, at least geographically, recognise that they are part of Europe and that people in a neighbouring country are part of Europe, but that someone on the other side of the world is not. Whether the European Communities/the European Union has managed to manifest itself as the modern form of 'Europe' is certainly debatable; however, the frequent use of 'Europe' to stand in for "the European Union" in everyday speech and the relative acceptance of the adjective 'European' to denote things related to the European Union indicate that this has happened to some extent. Going back to Anderson's imagined community criteria, it is also worth pointing out that the EC/EU certainly has a claim on some kind of legal-political legitimacy, where the idea of Norden perhaps has a stronger claim to historical and cultural cohesion and interaction. Most importantly, however, the EC was frequently referred to as 'European', and

¹⁶ Toplak and Šumi, "Europe(an Union): Imagined Community in the Making?", 17.

¹⁷ Toplak and Šumi, "Europe(an Union): Imagined Community in the Making?", 25.

'Europe' frequently equated to the EC within both the Danish and the Norwegian 1972 referendum debates.

2. TRENDS IN NORWEGIAN AND DANISH EC/EU STUDIES

We also have an archive with a good deal of interesting material. What is to be done with it hasn't yet been decided. A part will be stored in the same way as our records index and the contacts network, and a part will in all probability be made available for research. We have a certain responsibility to history, to put it a bit emotionally.

Arne Haugestad, daily leader of the Norwegian People's Movement against EC membership, speaking to *Dagbladet* the day after Norway's no.¹⁸

In order to properly situate the thesis within existing academic research and theory, an overview of the history of Danish and Norwegian EC literature will be the starting point of this paper, followed by the referendums' historical context, then a methodology and theory section to set up the analysis. Even a cursory search for history literature concerning Norway or Denmark and the European Communities turns up some interesting and differing trends within the two nations' academic historical treatment of the 1972 referendums. Of the thirty top results that appear when you search for "European Communities Norway History"¹⁹ on the University of Oslo library's website, ten directly reference the resistance movement against EC membership just within their title. It is interesting to note that none of the top thirty results, meanwhile, primarily concern the movement *for* membership of the EC in Norway in 1972.²⁰ Some of the more prominent titles, which are also some of the most popular referred to in other secondary sources, *Against the Current: The Fight against the EC 1961-1972*, *The People Said No: Norwegian EU-Resistance from 1961 to Today* and *The EC Battle*,²¹ all reveal an interesting tendency to frame the Norwegian referendum debate as a fight, struggle or battle (the Norwegian term "kamp" can mean all these) and/or as resistance

¹⁸ Erling Ramnefjell, "Ferie for folkebevegerne: Sverre Jervel til Kilimanjaro, Arne Haugestad i norske fjell", *Dagbladet*, 27th September 1972, 16.

¹⁹ The exact search was "europeiske fellesskap Norge historie" on Oria (https://bibsys-almaprimo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/primo_library/libweb/action/search.do?vid=UBO [search conducted on the 2nd June 2017]).

²⁰ When works produced in 1972 itself are included, pro-membership works do come up, of course. These, however, are contemporary documents which were part of the debates themselves rather than later historical works.

²¹ The Norwegian titles are *Mot strømmen: kampen mot EF 1961-1972*, *Folket sa nei: norsk EU-motstand fra 1961 til i dag* and *Kampen om EF*.

against the EC/EU; something which was picked up on and examined as a cultural practice by Line Esborg following Norway's referendum for EU membership in the 1990s. The titles referring to a struggle or battle all hint at the ferocity with which the Norwegian debate was argued and the dichotomising effect that that had, at least for a while, on the Norwegian population.

Of course, many works take a more neutral, general approach to Norway's relationship to the EC, with Hilary Allen's *Norway and Europe in the 1970s* being particularly enlightening for those looking for a good, broad introduction to the subject, although it dates back to the 1970s itself; another common trend for academic works dealing with the referendums. Few of these more neutral, general history works are specifically or only about the 1972 referendum debate: Like Allen's work, most of these take a long-term approach or treat Norway's relationship to the EC or 'Europe' as part of a general history of Norway. Of the relatively few historical works available which primarily and explicitly concern the 1972 referendum, almost all of them are concerned with or actually written by (former members of) the Norwegian People's Movement against EC membership, as is the case with *The EC Battle* and *The People Said No*, which were published by the People's Movement against EC Membership itself and written by the prominent anti-EC politician Dag Seierstad respectively. As such, academic-historical coverage of the Norwegian referendum in 1972 seems to support the old trope that history is written by the victors; an idea further reinforced by the statement by the daily leader of the Norwegian People's Movement against Membership of the European Communities Arne Haugstad at the beginning of this section, whose thoughts were evidently already turning to protecting (or, some might say cementing) the People's Movement's legacy and "duty to history" a day after the result was revealed. It is interesting to note that the same article claims that the offices of the main pro-EC movement, "Yes to EC" were already deserted by lunch time on the day of the result, with the "Yes to EC"-movement's president declaring that the movement no longer existed on the election night and its daily leader unsure of the situation and not yet certain what to do with its material. This, coincidentally, corresponds to the general consensus amongst EC historians and political analysts that the pro-EC movement was much less organised and coherent than the anti-EC movement in Norway.²² The YES front's legacy, as a consequence, is likely to have fallen out of focus partially as a consequence of its own neglect.

²² A fact also supported by analyses in the four newspapers examined in this study.

While a lot of material has been written on Norway and the EC/EU over the years, it is fair to say that most of it takes the shape of political history or, more commonly, has been written within the social, political and economic sciences. This is also the case in Denmark; perhaps even more so, where coverage of the 1972 referendum debate tends to emphasise that pro-arguments were almost always economic in nature, and that it was these pragmatic arguments which won the debate. It is fair to say that the historical narrative of the EC referendum in Denmark has also been shaped by the outcome of the referendum, with most political and history literature on Denmark and the EC framed as Denmark's "path" to membership and other such phrasings emitting a possible slight whiff of determinism. Morten Rasmussen's *Joining the European Communities: Denmark's Road to EC-Membership, 1961-1973* has been particularly useful in providing a context for Denmark though it is, as almost all other history coverings of Denmark's accession into the EC, based in general history rather than cultural history. Relatively little Danish literature pays particular attention to the membership referendum and its history, with the most recent example, *Lille Land – Hvad Nu?* ("Little Country, What Now?"), dating back to 1979. Like that volume, these works tend to be based in political studies and usually primarily concern Denmark's contemporary situation within the EC rather than the referendum itself. A notable and highly useful exception has been another 1979 work, *Danmarks ja, Norges nej: EF-folkeafstemningerne i 1972* ("Denmark's Yes, Norway's No: The EC Public Referendums in 1972"), which is also the only known-of work which is a direct comparison between the two referendums although it also focuses on the NO fronts (this work published by the Danish Foreign Policy Institute is also political-historical in nature) rather than taking a general approach to the referendums. Though it is based in international relations, *European Integration and National Identity* ought to be mentioned as a very good introduction for those looking to investigate Norway and/or Denmark's relationship to the EU question and their respective backgrounds.

It is a common trait in the Norwegian and Danish EC/EU historiographies that a revival in interest occurred in the 1990s after a fairly low amount of academic activity in the 1980s. The Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish referendums on membership of the European Union in 1994 led to a flurry of activity in the academic world in the years both before and after the referendums, when Norway's repeated rejection of membership helped to reinforce focus on the anti-membership front within the country. The EU activity in three other Nordic countries probably also helped to reignite Danish academia's interest in the country's relationship to the EU, but, as Lene Hansen points out, all these four Nordic nations,

including Denmark, actually held public referendums on the EU in the early 1990s when the Danish population unexpectedly rejected the terms of the Maastricht Treaty.²³ Despite Denmark's early decision in favour of membership, this surprise result as well as other tensions with the EC/EU since the late 1970s led to Denmark being framed as a slightly different and more hesitant member of the EU than most of the other "continental" EU members within both Danish and foreign political literature.²⁴ This roughly coincided with a pique in interest which carried on into the 2000s in the relationship between 'Norden' and Europe across several different academic disciplines in which the Nordic countries²⁵ are commonly framed as "reluctant Europeans" or peripheral Europeans, and generally seen as opposed to ever closer union (such studies, of course, also all imply that the Nordic situations are comparable and can be viewed as a common entity of some kind even today, at least in relation to the EU).²⁶

3. CONTEXT

3.1 A Note on Similarities

Norway and Denmark's paths to the referendums on EC membership share many significant similarities which make comparison between them fruitful. Like many European nations, both countries became founding members of important transnational co-operations for peace and economic development in Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, most prominently the United Nations,²⁷ the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation²⁸, which implemented the Marshall Plan, and the Council of Europe, which includes institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights.²⁹ Furthermore, in May 1960 both Norway and Denmark joined the UK-led European Free Trade Association

²³ Hansen, foreword and "Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe", *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*.

²⁴ See for example Nüchel Thomsen, *The Odd Man Out? Danmark og den Europæiske integration 1948-1992*.

²⁵ Iceland is often excluded from these works.

²⁶ See for example Hansen and Wæver, "Preface" and "Introduction", *European Integration and National Identity*; Pertti J. Anttonen, "Introduction: Tradition and Political Identity", Pertti J. Anttonen (ed.), *Making Europe in Nordic Contexts* (Turku: Nordic Institute of Folklore, 1996), 7-40; Lee Miles, "Introduction", Lee Miles (ed.), *The European Union and the Nordic Countries* (London: Routledge, 1996), 5; and Uffe Østergård's cannon of work on European identity and Norden.

²⁷ "UN Member States", *On the Record* (<http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/founders.shtml>, last accessed 25th February 2017).

²⁸ This became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1961.

²⁹ Hans Martens, *Danmarks ja, Norges nej: EF-folkeafstemningerne i 1972* (København: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 1979), 52.

(EFTA), a seven-member European association created in response to the establishment in 1957 of the European Economic Community by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg.³⁰ The EFTA was an attempt to gain similar economic advantages through co-operation to those of the EEC³¹ without its political commitment to "ever closer union", established with the Treaty of Rome in 1957.³² Unlike the EC membership proposals, it was entered into without a referendum or much public debate.³³

After the war, both countries sought to align themselves with the United Kingdom, the largest financial presence within the EFTA and outside the EEC in Europe. The UK's eventual decision to pursue EEC membership in 1961, 1967 and 1970 was a driving force in the Norwegian and Danish governments' decisions to do the same. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the United Kingdom was widely regarded by Norway's politicians as the country's most important political ally and trading partner;³⁴ not least in relation to the EEC, as evidenced by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange's 1962 statement to parliament that "Norway's membership application must be viewed in response to [på bakgrunn av] the British membership negotiations".³⁵ The situation was much the same in Denmark, whose government before the first application in 1961 had gone as far as to elicit a promise by the British government that they would receive warning by the Brits prior to any future application for EEC membership so that Denmark's application may be submitted concurrently.³⁶ Public opinion polls in 1970 and 1971 even asked the Danish public "Are you for or against Danish accession to the Common Market on the precondition that England [sic]

³⁰ "EFTA", *A Dictionary of Contemporary World History*, 3rd edition (<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199295678.001.0001/acref-9780199295678-e-722?rskey=xfsjmH&result=691>, last accessed 25th February 2017).

³¹ The "Merger"/Brussels Treaty came into effect in 1967, combining the EEC, the ECSC and the European Atomic Energy Community under one joint council and commission – they become known as the "European Communities" (EC)

³² "EFTA", *A Dictionary of Contemporary World History*, 3rd edition (<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199295678.001.0001/acref-9780199295678-e-722?rskey=xfsjmH&result=691>, last accessed 25th February 2017).

³³ Yngvar Ustvedt, *Det skjedde i Norge, Bind 5: 1961-1972: Politisk engasjement og utdanningseksplasjon* (Norway: Den norske Bokklubben, 1990), 14.

³⁴ Kristin M. Haugevik, "Ledestjernen som forsvant: Storbritannia i norsk utenrikspolitikk", *Nytt norsk tidsskrift* 32:4 (2015), 34-346.

³⁵ Bernard Langer speech 1962, cited in Haugevik, "Ledestjernen som forsvant", 345.

³⁶ Martens, *Danmarks ja, Norges nej*, 52.

joins?" and "England [sic] has now decided to join the Common Market. Are you for or against Danish accession to the Common Market?" in 1972.³⁷

Both countries have been described as having primarily economic and pragmatic motivations in relation to pursuing European co-operation,³⁸ and a relatively high level of scepticism throughout the EEC's history,³⁹ particularly compared to other countries of a similar size and comparability, such as the more centrally located Belgium and the Netherlands. The occupation of Denmark and Norway by Nazi Germany from 1940 to 1945 strengthened nationalism in both countries in subsequent decades,⁴⁰ leading to a reluctance to give up independence in a European union, particularly one involving Germany. What's more, both countries had experienced previous invasions, military defeats or losses of independence which had led to politics of neutrality: Norway was the junior partner in a union with Denmark until 1814 and Sweden between 1814 and 1905. Denmark had suffered first the loss of Norway to Sweden, then lost Schleswig, Holstein and Southern Jutland (1/3 of Denmark's landmass) to Germany in 1864, which led to a public drive to "look inwards" that helped shape Danish politics, society and identity. As Branner and Kelstrup note, Denmark's "economic and geographic position has provided latent alternatives to continental European integration", not least through its close historical, social and political ties to Scandinavia and the Nordic countries but also, potentially, to the UK and even, possibly, the US.⁴¹ The same is the case for Norway, obviously through its even more peripheral geography viewed from continental Europe and its Scandinavian/Nordic ties, but also through its financial and political "Atlantic" ties to the United Kingdom and, particularly by the 1960s, the USA.⁴²

3.2 Scandinavia, the Nordic countries and co-operative efforts

Finally, for two separate nations, Norway and Denmark have unusually similar cultures and languages and share much history, having been in a Denmark-dominated union between 1397 and 1814, as well as their Scandinavian/Nordic ties and similar socio-political set-ups and

³⁷ Morten Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities: Denmark's Road to EC-Membership, 1961-1973* (Dr. Art: European University Institute, Florence, 2004), 375

³⁸ Martens, *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945*, 16.

³⁹ Hansen and Wæver, *European Integration and National Identity*, Preface.

⁴⁰ Alastair H. Thomas, "The Concept of the Nordic Region and the Parameters of Nordic Cooperation" in Miles (ed.) *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*, 18.

⁴¹ Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.), *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory and Options* (Odense: University of Southern Denmark, 2003), 14-15.

⁴² Haugevik, "Ledestjernen som forsvant", 344 and 346.

values, most prominently the comprehensive welfare state model. As has been hinted at already, the notions of "Scandinavia" and Norden express more than just geographical regions, and through the years, the "idea" or "imagined community" of Norden has manifested itself in multiple real-world projects and attempts at joint co-operations of different kinds. Several movements had attempted to create Scandinavian or Nordic co-operation or even some type of union in the century before 1972, and some had been successful. National romanticism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had given rise to the idea of a great Scandinavian reprise, first through the more romantic and intellectual Scandinavism movement and later through the more practical and less all-encompassing Nordism movement.⁴³ In 1875, the first attempt at an economic union by the three Scandinavian countries emerged through a currency union tied to the value of gold. It petered out during the First World War, during which a joint Scandinavian political agreement to remain neutral was upheld.⁴⁴ In the interwar period, Sweden, Norway and Denmark actively promoted the upkeep of the international rule of law through the newly established League of Nations, and 1919 witnessed the founding of the Nordic Association, which spread to Iceland and Finland in the early 1920s.⁴⁵

The literature disagrees somewhat about the effects of the Second World War on Nordic co-operation. Alastair Thomas points out that Sweden's decision to remain neutral damaged relations to occupied Denmark and Norway (the latter in particular), and that the national economies became less similar for a while, with Norway and Denmark taking until 1948 to recover while Sweden's economy actually rose by 20 per cent during the war.⁴⁶ Morten Rasmussen, meanwhile, notes that Danish membership of the Nordic Association rose from 3000 to 50.000 members during the German occupation.⁴⁷ Of course, this could be viewed as a protest move by repressed Danes, or perhaps even as an endorsement of the Aryan Nazi ideal, but at the very least, it goes to show that the idea of a Nordic fellowship remained present in Denmark during the war. Immediately following the liberation of Norway and Denmark in 1945, Sweden's prime minister suggested a common defence agreement, though the discussions fell apart in 1948 as the new Cold War split emerged, leaving Sweden as a neutral "buffer" and Finland in the shadow of the USSR while Norway,

⁴³ Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 28; Uffe Østergård, "The History of Europe seen from the North", *European Review* 14:2 (2006), 294.

⁴⁴ Thomas, "The Concept of the Nordic Region and the Parameters of Nordic Cooperation", 18.

⁴⁵ Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 28.

⁴⁶ Thomas, "The Concept of the Nordic Region and the Parameters of Nordic Cooperation", 19.

⁴⁷ Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 28.

Denmark and Iceland sided with the US and the "West", joining NATO at its foundation in 1949.⁴⁸ Hans Branner points to this tendency towards a lack of agreement in basic foreign policy as a prime explanation for why a common Nordic political union was not realised.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, it is arguable that this balance actually worked to ensure relative peace in the region during the Cold War, and the Nordic Council, which still exists today, was established in 1952, eventually joined by the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1972.⁵⁰

When EFTA negotiations concerning agriculture were slow to develop in 1968 and following De Gaulle's second rejection of Britain's EEC membership application, Denmark's government proposed a Nordic trade union, Nordek (Nordøk), during a Nordic Council meeting.⁵¹ The plans and negotiations went on for more than a year, but they didn't come to a satisfactory conclusion. The main tension was Denmark's and Finland's differing views of what Nordek would be or represent. As Rasmussen notes, Denmark's government and (to a slightly lesser extent) Norway's viewed Nordek as a step towards membership of the European Community.⁵² Finland, who were bound by their neutrality politics and their close ties to the Soviet Union, would and could not enter into a Nordic co-operation if it would lead the country closer to the EC. Therefore, in 1970, with the treaty due to be signed – Finland pulled out under possible pressure from Russia, and the negotiations collapsed.⁵³ The negotiations are thought to have gone on for so long partially because none of the Nordic countries wanted to offend the other nations or lose face by appearing to want to pull out.⁵⁴ Danish politicians briefly attempted to get a Scandinavian alternative, Skandek, set up instead, but it received less than a lukewarm reception, particularly considering that potential EC membership was now on the table again.

3.3 Differences and nuances

Of course, there are many differences and nuances between the two nation-states of Norway and Denmark which must be included to properly account for their political and cultural situations in 1972. Brief summaries of the two countries' specific contexts follow.

⁴⁸ Thomas, "The Concept of the Nordic Region and the Parameters of Nordic Cooperation", 20.

⁴⁹ Branner, "Options and Goals in Danish European Policy Since 1945: Explaining Small State Behavior and Foreign Policy Change", *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945*, 352.

⁵⁰ Bengt Jacobsson, Per Lægrend and Ove K. Pedersen (eds.). *Europaveje: EU i de nordiske centralforvaltninger* (København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets forlag, 2001), 160. GRY LARSEN

⁵¹ Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 59.

⁵² Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 59-60.

⁵³ Brunbech, Peter Yding. "Nordek", Danmarkshistorien.dk (<http://danmarkshistorien.dk/leksikon-og-kilder/vis/materiale/nordek/>, last accessed 7th March 2017).

⁵⁴ Yding, "Nordek".

3.4 Politics

For an outline of political events within Denmark, Norway and the wider world leading up to the 1972 referendums, please refer to the political overview (Figure 1) and timeline (Figure 2) included in the appendix.

3.5 Norway's Economy

Like many Western economies, Norway's economy recovered relatively quickly following the war, and the period from 1950 to 1970 became the era of strongest economic growth Norway had experienced with the country's gross national product rising by 3.4 per cent per inhabitant in these two decades and 3.1 per cent from 1970 to 1990.⁵⁵ The strong economy helped to pave the way for the growing welfare state.⁵⁶ Overall, Norway's industry was seen as the future, growing to encompass a quarter of the Norwegian workforce by 1969 with industries such as those connected to infrastructure, the oil industry (more on that later) and the extraction and production of materials such as aluminium and magnesium performing well.⁵⁷ In light of growing pressure from an increased international presence within Norway driving up competition, which had made traditional Norwegian industries such as wood processing and saltpetre extraction much less profitable, politicians of the 1960s sought a transition from Norwegian reliance upon a primary sector economy based upon the country's cornucopia of natural resources to more complex production industries, whose products could be exported at higher prices and profits.⁵⁸

By 1970, the primary sector had shrunk from 30 to 15 per cent of the workforce since the 1950s.⁵⁹ The politicians looked to boost the country's presence in the international economy through secondary-sector manufacturing which could increase Norway's exports and invested heavily in these areas.⁶⁰ These energy-intensive processes could be undertaken with the energy provided by another natural Norwegian resource, hydro-electric power, a factor which Allen points out had advanced and transformed Norway from one of Europe's poorest nations to a much more modern, strong economy without the need to rely on coal,

⁵⁵ "Langvarig vekst i norsk økonomi", Statistisk Sentralbyrå (<https://www.ssb.no/nasjonalregnskap-og-konjunkturer/artikler-og-publikasjoner/langvarig-vekst-i-norsk-okonomi>, last accessed 3rd March 2017).

⁵⁶ Tore Jørgen Hanisch. *Norsk økonomisk politikk i det 20. århundre: Verdivalg i en åpen økonomi*. Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget, 1999: 172.

⁵⁷ Yngvar Ustvedt, *Det skjedde i Norge, Bind 6: 1961-1972: Overflod og opprør* (Norway: Den norske Bokklubben, 1990), 207.

⁵⁸ Ustvedt, *Det skjedde i Norge, Bind 6*, 207.

⁵⁹ Hilary Allen. *Norway and Europe in the 1970s* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979), 18.

⁶⁰ Hanisch, *Norsk økonomisk politikk i det 20. århundre*, 173-174.

which was not widespread in Norway.⁶¹ Apart from their exports, the most important Norwegian presence in international trading was their shipping sector – Norway had the world's fourth-largest merchant navy in 1970, which mainly shipped non-domestic products due to the limited contribution of Norwegian wares on the global market.⁶² It accounted for 8.5 per cent of the world's shipping in 1970 (in tonnage).⁶³ In 1970, the Nordic countries were importing roughly a fourth of Norwegian exports (all members of the EFTA); roughly the same amount as the EC countries.⁶⁴

In the autumn of 1969, large oil reserves were discovered in the Norwegian North Sea territories. According to historian Einar Lie, the knowledge that the oil would dramatically expand the Norwegian economy had a significant impact on "political debate and decisions" even before the money began rolling in.⁶⁵ Others, such as Hilary Allen, claim that the implications of the oil discovery only really caught on among the public with the international economic crisis of 1973, where Norway's new oil money helped protect the Norwegian economy.⁶⁶ From what can be deduced from the two newspapers *Aftenposten* and *Dagbladet*, a few anti-membership arguments claimed that the oil would have to be split evenly between all the EC states if Norway were to enter; a claim which *Aftenposten* disputes.⁶⁷ Some segments of society and the economy struggled as a consequence of the increased internationalisation and subsequent competitiveness of the economy, however. In 1962, Norway's fishermen, who contributed upwards of a billion NOK to the country's economy annually, went on strike for the very first time, partially to object to the government's agreement to sell the frozen fish company Findus to the foreign giant Nestlé, and partially to protest against stagnating prices and the shrinking of wages within the fishing industry: While wages within the industry sector rose by a quarter in the period between 1956 and 1962, wages within the fishing sector fell by almost the same amount.⁶⁸ As was the case with Nestlé and Findus, there was a perception that large, foreign companies would come into the country, drive down prices and wages and meddle in Norwegian affairs. This was also a

⁶¹ Allen, *Norway and Europe in the 1970s*, 16.

⁶² Allen, *Norway and Europe in the 1970s*, 16.

⁶³ Stig Tenold, Martin Jes Iversen and Even Lange (eds.), *Global Shipping in Small Nations: Nordic Experiences after 1960* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 4.

⁶⁴ Allen, *Norway and Europe in the 1970s*, 18-19.

⁶⁵ Lie, Einar. "Oljen i norsk økonomi", Norgeshistorie.no (<https://www.norgeshistorie.no/oljealder-og-overflod/teknologi-og-okonomi/1909-oljen-i-norsk-okonomi.html>, last accessed 8th March 2017).

⁶⁶ Allen, *Norway and Europe in the 1970s*, 17.

⁶⁷ See for example *Dagbladet*, page 29, 30th September 1972 and "Opponents spread complete lie about oil policy", *Aftenposten*, 23rd September 1972: 7.

⁶⁸ Ustvedt, *Det skjedde i Norge*, Bind 5: 53.

major concern for nature preservationists as well as many nationalists who were worried that foreign interests would be allowed to take control of Norway's countryside and natural resources and destroy what they wanted for profits.⁶⁹ These types of concern would also come into play in the EC debate.

Only about three per cent of the land in Norway was suitable for farming, and only the southern tip could uphold agricultural production on the same scale as European countries to the south.⁷⁰ While both primary-sector areas such as fishing and forestry and secondary-sector industries were significant players in Norwegian export, Norway's agricultural sector was inward-looking and defensive of the heavy protections in place to safeguard Norwegian farming interests.⁷¹ The sector had seen a steady decline and, by 1970, made up less than four per cent of the gross national product. It was heavily dependent on subsidies, yet important areas of Norway's food, particularly grain, had to be heavily supplemented by imports.⁷² Urbanisation continued to grow through the late 1960s with 6,669 farms shutting down and a heavy, steady flow of people moving to the more urbanised southern and coastal regions throughout the 1960s.⁷³ Fishery, particularly in light of the meagre potential for agriculture in Norway, had played a very important part in the Norwegian culture and economy. Although exports were important for the sector, its members were not particularly enthusiastic about common markets in which fishing rights in Norwegian waters would potentially expand to include other members of that market. So while common markets may bring benefits for Norwegian fishermen in terms of export potential, they were highly suspicious of any co-operation in which Norwegian fishing rights could not be protected.⁷⁴ Despite their somewhat waning importance in terms of the national economic contribution, these two sectors became outspoken and influential critics of Norwegian EEC membership, and powerful funders of the anti-membership movement.

3.6 Denmark's Economy

The economical makeup of Denmark looked very different to its northerly neighbour at the time of the referendums. Like Norway, Denmark was looking to build up its industries from the 1950s and forwards. They were not, however, particularly well-established, and, rather

⁶⁹ Ustvedt, *Det skjedde i Norge*, Bind 5: 53.

⁷⁰ Allen, *Norway and Europe in the 1970s*, 15.

⁷¹ Allen, *Norway and Europe in the 1970s*, 17-18.

⁷² Allen, *Norway and Europe in the 1970s*, 20.

⁷³ Ustvedt, *Det skjedde i Norge*, Bind 6: 204.

⁷⁴ Cynthia Kite, *Scandinavia Faces EU: Debates and Decisions on Membership 1961-1994* (Dr. Art: Umeå Universitetet, 1996), 104.

like Norwegian agriculture, heavily subsidised and protected within Denmark. They would not benefit from the heavy competition that would be a consequence of opening up the market internationally, at least not initially. Overall, however, almost everyone believed that Denmark would be much better off financially inside the EC than outside of it now that the UK was joining. Even the opponents of membership generally agreed that Denmark would benefit financially in the short run. Foreign currency was in short supply, and the 1960s had seen Denmark borrow heavily abroad. When Norway voted no in the referendum, the Danish government froze all trading of currency until after the Danish referendum in order to avoid a panicked frenzy completely emptying the national coffers.⁷⁵ In both countries, the trading sector was vehemently for membership by the time of the first membership applications in 1961 already. Yngvar Ustvedt notes that membership of the common market would lead to direct, tariff-free access to three hundred million people in the rapidly growing Western European market that Norway already knew and traded with.⁷⁶ Both countries' newspapers mention several times that both Denmark and Norway (and Europe) are heading towards an economic boom which will ward off the worst of any potential job losses in the case of a no to membership; a prediction especially popular among the NO front (of course, the world was in fact heading towards the financial crisis of 1973).

In stark contrast to Norway, Denmark's agriculture was one of the country's most important sources of income, making up more than 50 per cent of the nation's income from exports.⁷⁷ The UK and, increasingly through the fifties, West Germany (FRG) were by far the biggest importers of the meat and dairy produce that made up most Danish agricultural exports: In 1957, agricultural export to the UK brought in 1.747 billion DKK (having fallen by almost a fifth of the total share in five years) while the value of exports to the FRG share had grown by 12 per cent, adding just under one billion DKK annually.⁷⁸ This brought the country into a complex situation in regards to Germany and Britain's positions within the EEC and the EFTA respectively, and through the 1960s, Denmark attempted a balancing act as a member of the EFTA while Danish governments worked to avoid being disadvantaged in terms of its German markets.

The introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) within the EEC in 1962 had disastrous consequences for Danish agricultural exports: Rasmussen notes that the

⁷⁵ See for example *Aftenposten*, "Den norske krone langt sterkere enn den danske", 10, 27th May 1972

⁷⁶ Ustvedt, *Det skjedde i Norge*, Bind 5: 15.

⁷⁷ Svein Dahl (ed.), *National Interest and the EEC/EC/EU* (Trondheim: Det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskab, 1999), 47.

⁷⁸ Svein (ed.), *National Interest and the EEC/EC/EU*, 47.

"export of pultry [sic] and eggs collapsed from 1962 onwards, while the export of cheese and live cattle began to feel the impact from 1965-1966. With a stagnating outlet to the other EFTA members, the crisis of Danish agriculture deepened during the 1960s" while members of the EEC rapidly increased their exports thanks to CAP subsidies.⁷⁹ While the EFTA had no common policy on agriculture, and therefore no particular benefit to Danish agriculture, Danish farming obviously stood to benefit tremendously from being included in the EEC's CAP. Rasmussen estimates that Denmark's balance of payment would improve by 1.25 billion DKK; a whopping 40.5 per cent increase after the transition period.⁸⁰ Unlike Norway's agricultural sectors, then, Denmark's farmers became some of the country's most enthusiastic membership supporters in 1972.

3.7 Geography and Periphery

The two countries' geography was also very different. Norway, as mentioned, was (and still is) mountainous, had masses of natural resources that could provide energy and power production and had very little land suitable for farming. Denmark, by contrast, was a small, flat nation (still is) whose fruitful soil was perfect for farming. The most significant geographical difference, though, may have been caused by the sheer size of the countries themselves: Where Denmark's population of five million people was spread over an area 43,000 square kilometres, Norway's four million were spread over an area of 385,000 square kilometres. Writing in 1979, Hilary Allen notes that "Even now northern towns and many of the small communities in the provinces remain far from Oslo in travelling time and in other things that shape people's outlook: economic activities, climate, and the social and cultural milieu".⁸¹

This caused a much greater distance (physical and psychological) between the north and south, cities and the country, not to mention between the "power elite" in Oslo and the small communities scattered around much of the rest of the country. During the referendum debate, a fair amount of name-calling occurred between "the elite" centre and "periphery Norway". As we shall see, this came into play in terms of framing ordinary Norwegian people's identity as in opposition to the "large" political men in Oslo. As Knut Heidar notes, there is also a second dimension to this periphery-identity:

⁷⁹ Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 26.

⁸⁰ Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 77; 90.

⁸¹ Allen, *Norway and Europe in the 1970s*, 15.

*The issues related to this theme have two dimensions, the first stemming from Norway's position as a nation of the European periphery. These issues are reflected in domestic politics like the European Union issue. Another cluster of issues is generated by the topographical/cultural nature of a country with a long coastline, difficult communications, varied regional economies, and a strong egalitarian culture.*⁸²

Writing about the 1994 referendum, Line Esborg notes that tying identity to Norway's expansive physical peripheries also helped to tie together culture and home; the large and mountainous regions prominent in internalised views of Norway, which provided a specifically Norwegian context that helped to generate emotive responses to the EU question.⁸³ Ivar B. Neumann argues along similar lines when he suggests that the central question within the debate concerning sovereignty and supranational politics was influenced by the popular (subconscious) perception "of 'Norway' understood as the Norwegian people, and 'Norway' understood as Norwegian territory". He continues: "If the people do not cover all of the territory, Norway cannot be Norway. 'The continent' is the town, 'Norway' is the countryside, and if that countryside is not populated, Norway is no longer Norway".⁸⁴ In Denmark, meanwhile, nowhere – and no one – was ever very far off. The centre-periphery factor came into play in the referendum when Norway's rural population voted strongly against membership while Oslo and a few other major cities voted in. In Denmark, by contrast, only Copenhagen voted no, largely due to its large presence of labourers, students and intellectuals.

3.8 History

A final comparative note goes to the history of the two countries. This will come into play during the analysis of the countries' understanding of their national identity in the analysis section of this paper, so some brief points will suffice for now. As has already been stated, Norway and Denmark were in a Denmark-led union for more than 500 years up until 1814, at which point Norway was quickly enveloped in a union with Sweden which lasted right up until 1905, meaning that (modern) Norway had only been an independent nation for 67 years

⁸² Knut Heidar, *Norway: Center and Periphery: Elites on Trial* (UK: Westview Press, 2000), Location 215 (Kindle).

⁸³ Line Esborg, "Mellom bakkar og berg", Eriksen, Garnert et al. (eds.), *Historien in på livet*, 253-255.

⁸⁴ Ivar B. Neumann, "This Little Piggy Stayed at Home: Why Norway Is Not a Member of the EU", Hansen and Wæver (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States* (London: Routledge, 2002), 115.

at the time of the EC referendum. During this time, the Nazis had occupied the country for five years between 1940 and 1945, during which Norway (to frame the country as one united whole) put up fierce resistance. This history of occupation, resistance and a will to independence became strong factors in the Norwegian EC membership debate, spurred on within the anti-membership movement, who, as Line Esborg discusses, articulated and made use of resistance as a cultural tradition and marker of identity.

As for Denmark, the loss of Skåne, Halland and Blekinge now in Southern Sweden in the eighteenth century, Norway in 1814 and a third of its remaining land mass to Bismarck's Germany in 1864 led to a serious national identity crisis in which Denmark was forced to acknowledge its loss of worldly power. Danes eventually reacted by giving up on militarism and began to look inwards, concentrating on national rather than international affairs, which eventually (at least according to the traditional narrative) set the country down the path towards the democratic welfare state. The drive to develop conditions, including culturally, also helped to bring on what is popularly referred to as a "Golden Age", with people such as Hans Christian Andersen and Søren Kierkegaard emerging within the arts and philosophy.⁸⁵ Meanwhile, the social reformer and clergyman N.F.S. Grundtvig further expanded general education in the 1850s and '60s, particularly among the agricultural classes, and helping to raise the rates of literacy to very high levels early on.⁸⁶ The annexation of Southern Jutland by the Prussians in 1864 and the subsequent Nazi occupation from 1940-1945 led to some German resentment which, as we shall see, lasted into the 1970s; however, the close proximity of Germany and the frequent traffic of people across the border certainly helped to thaw relationships. The Danish government's policy of co-operation with the Nazis during the war – which was adhered to by most of the people – does not read quite as well as the Norwegian resistance story (although of course Denmark also had a resistance movement). A very final, and very important, point is the way that the two countries are located within "geographical Europe": As already noted, Norway has a much more peripheral location in relation to the European "continent", whereas Denmark borders Germany and is part of that land mass itself.

⁸⁵ Odd Arvid Storsveen, "Nasjonal identitet i Norge og Danmark", *Nytt norsk tidsskrift* 3:4 (2004), 375.

⁸⁶ Vagn Dybdal, *Politikens Danmarkshistorie: De nye klasser 1870-1913* (København: Politikens Forlag, 1984), 51.

3.9 The Referendums

There was a strong connection between the two referendums concerning membership of the European Community with both the population at large and politicians. Both Norwegian and Danish politicians saw a result favouring membership in the one country as likely to help push in favour of a YES vote in the other, while the impact on the second country's vote in case of a no to membership by the first was more of an unknown.⁸⁷ Because Denmark was viewed as the more likely to vote yes, Norway's Prime Minister, Trygve Bratteli in Norway seems to have favoured the Danish referendum being held first in order to impact Norwegian voters in favour of a YES vote. His Danish counterpart, Jens Otto Krag, meanwhile, set out to hold the Danish referendum at the same day or after the Norwegian one, partially due to pressure from Danish anti-membership social democrats in his party, who wanted the Norwegian yes or no to inform Danish voters.⁸⁸ Bratteli, however, seems to have prioritised not being seen as attempting to manipulate the result through officially connecting the two referendums in order to avoid strengthening the anti-membership front's arguments. During talks between the two prime ministers at the meeting of the Nordic Council in Helsinki in February 1972, Bratteli rejected the idea of holding the referendums on the same day and did not ask Krag to put the Danish referendum first. In March, the Norwegians declared that their referendum would be held on the 24th and 25th September. Krag declared four days later that the Danish referendum would be held on the 2nd October.⁸⁹

Danish law required a majority of at least 5/6 of MPs to vote for a constitutional change (as allowing membership of a super-sovereign community would require), and in September 1971, only 141 mainland Danish MPs voted for the Danish accession to the EC, with 34 voting against, triggering a public referendum.⁹⁰ The vote in Denmark represented the largest voter turnout ever for a Danish vote, with just over 90 per cent of the population coming to the polling stations, as well as the largest percentage of yes votes in a Danish public referendum.⁹¹ 63.4 per cent voted in favour of membership while 36.6 per cent voted against. The Danish referendum was the tenth of its kind since the Danish population was asked whether to sell the Danish West Indies to the USA in 1916, and therefore a fairly tried and tested political event in Denmark. Where the Norwegian referendum was technically

⁸⁷ Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 328-329.

⁸⁸ Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 328-329.

⁸⁹ Rasmussen, *Joining the European Communities*, 330-331.

⁹⁰ "Danmarks 10. Folkeafstemning", *Politiken*, 28th September 1972: 4.

⁹¹ Hans Jørgen Nielsen, *EF på valg* (København: Columbus, 1993), 83, 85 (at least up until 1993, when this book was published).

advisory, the Danish one was binding, although it was always highly unlikely that Norway's politicians would attempt to go against the post-referendum majority. In Norway, 79.2 per cent of the electorate voted; a little lower than had been expected and just slightly less than at the last (municipality elections) before the referendum.⁹² 53.5 per cent voted against membership while 46.5 per cent voted for.

4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This thesis is a product of its own time and the academic climate currently prevalent within history and cultural theory. It builds upon the structuralist idea that meaning is constructed and not essential and denoted through language structures and being defined in relation to other things. The thesis naturally follows further poststructuralist developments which added the notion that meaning is never a constant and definitions are in a state of constant, slow change through being moulded by confrontations with alternate potential meanings and definitions. In contrast to structuralists' search for determinable, specific meaning in linguistic systems, poststructuralist study takes into account that exact meanings and definitions for social constructs cannot be pinned down, and that they can change both diachronically (over time) and from place to place. Poststructuralist discourse study is therefore intended to provide a *sketch* of particular socially and culturally relevant themes, statuses or currents (social constructs) at a particular point in history as well as the developments and relations of these two related discourses, always taking into account that these discourses and social constructs are dynamic and constantly in development through interaction with other discourses and new input.

In the introduction of his recent analysis of British euroscepticism as cultural history, Menno Spiering gives an excellent example of the impact that language can have upon cultural structures, a population's understanding of themselves and their place in the world. He notes that a 2013 speech by the then Prime Minister David Cameron for British membership of the EU was held in front of a blue screen simply stating the words "Britain and Europe"; a common lingual set-up in British coverage of the EU.⁹³ "The widespread

⁹² Tor Bjørklund, *Hundre år med folkeavstemninger: Norge og Norden 1905-2005* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005), 68.

⁹³ Menno Spiering, *A Cultural History of British Euroscepticism* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).

practice of talking about 'Britain and Europe' ... is a strong indication that the troubled relations are not just about political aspirations or disagreements", he notes. "There is a disconnect that goes much deeper than mere frictions between a member state and an institution. Apparently, we are dealing with two opposing concepts. The one is called Britain, the other Europe." He gives several examples of how these two concepts are employed in a bilateral relationship to one another time and time again even by British proponents of EU membership. Using this [figure of speech] is "so common that it is easily missed, like a smell that loses its potency the longer it lingers ... It is [a] matter of a perceived cultural distinction between Britain and Europe".⁹⁴ These types of linguistic set-ups may be viewed as simple turns of phrase; however, where used regularly within a certain socio-cultural set-up, they can hint at interesting commonplace characteristics or beliefs within a certain community. In a way, the more commonplace a certain articulation seems, the more deeply ingrained it may be within that culture, and thus, the more interesting it may actually be in terms of mapping out a cultural phenomenon.

4.2 Methodology

This study made use of four newspapers and covered all their issues from the 20th September to the 5th October 1972.⁹⁵ As the Norwegian referendum took place on the 24th-25th September and the Danish on the 2nd October, this period covered both the lead-up to the Norwegian vote and the aftermath of the Danish one. While this did cause a slight asymmetry in the amount of the debate which was covered before and after the referendum for the two countries, covering the same period for both countries was helpful in order to observe how the two campaigns made use of one another and how closely they interacted with one another (very, as it turns out) as well as in providing a sort of summary and analysis of the other campaign that in many ways mirrored the work of some history books later on. The four newspapers were chosen for their political stance on the referendum question as well as for their digital availability. It was hoped initially that the digitalisation of the papers could be used to provide some quantitative context in terms of the amount of use of certain terms over a longer period, for example, but unfortunately, it turned out that the quality of the files varies significantly from newspaper to newspaper, making these statistics unreliable. Having the newspapers available digitally as PDFs in Adobe Acrobat Pro allowed for the use of an

⁹⁴ Spiering, *A Cultural History of British Euroscepticism*, 68-87 (Kindle edition).

⁹⁵ *Politiken* had two issues unavailable for download, although they were looked through online (which did not allow for use of the labelling system). However; *Politiken* was also the only paper to publish on Sundays, so in terms of issues, the numbers are the same.

extensive colour-labelling categorisation and commenting system, both of which were easily searchable later. Different points of interest were assigned specific colours, such as lilac for pro-membership utterings and magenta for negative utterings about membership. In addition, comments can be added to colour-markings. Adobe Acrobat Pro includes a detailed comment function where it is possible to search for specific colours of highlight as well words, so in addition to colour-labelling, I made use of specific terms that could be searched for later, such as "ideology", "identity" and "history", to help group points of interest together into significant groups for analysis. The different search comments were also copied over to a comprehensive, searchable document. The labelling system (1), an example of a colour-labelled newspaper page (2) and an image showing the Adobe Acrobat search function (3) are included in the appendix.

4.3 The Newspapers

Of the two newspapers chosen per country, one opposed membership and one was for. In Norway, this corresponded to the two largest newspapers in the 1970s measured by circulation, *Aftenposten* and *Dagbladet*, with *Aftenposten* supporting the YES-to-membership front and *Dagbladet* supporting the NO front. In Denmark, the choice was a little more limited. *Ekstra Bladet* was an obvious choice – it was the only mainstream newspaper in Denmark which declared itself opposed to membership of the EC.⁹⁶ *Politiken* faced fierce competition in the selection process from the two other major Danish newspapers in favour of EC membership, *Berlingske Tidende* and *Jyllandsposten*; however, their archives have not been made available digitally yet, making them rather inaccessible from Oslo. As it happens, both YES-leaning newspapers are broadsheets while both NO-leaning newspapers are tabloids, though *Ekstra Bladet* takes the prize for the most tabloid tabloid for its liking of sensationalist headlines and the naked human form. That there may be a difference in the forcefulness of *Ekstra Bladet* and *Dagbladet* in making their arguments and assertions compared to their establishment rivals is worth keeping in mind; however, this was not found to significantly impair the coverage of the EC debates from one newspaper to another.

⁹⁶ Morten J.W. Hansen, "EF/EU modstand i Danmark", Danmarkshistorien.dk (http://danmarkshistorien.dk/leksikon-og-kilder/vis/materiale/ef-eu-modstand-i-danmark/?no_cache=1&cHash=d5e784e58e0a5da0c8e00f648086570a, last accessed 2nd June 2017).

4.4 Using Newspapers

Following the rapid growth of the public press in the nineteenth century, popular and specialist periodicals had become integral to early twentieth Europeans' understanding of the world.⁹⁷ Although radio and TV had challenged and shrunk newspapers' authority and dominance in public debate by the 1970s, they were still a highly important and widely consumed media outlet. As Peter Burke writes, newspapers had become a crucial and inexpensive way to spread information quickly and inexpensively by the twentieth century. Fast and cheap printing methods allowed newspapers to spread news about developments almost as soon as they happened; something which Burke argues led to daily newspapers spreading more information – and misinformation – than in-depth knowledge per se.⁹⁸ While spreading information – mediating news – are of course at the centre of what newspapers *do*, they also play at least two other just as important roles which will be important to this study.

Firstly, studying newspapers is some of the closest historians may edge to catching a glimpse of what people said, thought and thought about at a specific time. This point is made with some caution as such a glimpse will of course always be limited, biased towards the dominant narratives of the time and dependent upon a specific context which we may not be able to fully grasp today. For older newspaper texts in particular, where the events covered have strayed out of first-generation or even public memory, there is the further danger of there being no easy way to verify, dispel or challenge stories or presumptions which may appear. This also means, however, that they are a link, even if a not entirely reliable link, to another time that cannot be easily accessed otherwise, especially once it leaves public memory. As for more recent times, such as the Scandinavian EC debates of the 1970s, newspapers provide a counterbalance to the memory of those who took part, who do not necessarily remember everything or remember everything accurately themselves. As well as being a (faulty) reflection of the overall public debate at the time, newspapers also provide a direct look at the specifically *textual* debates and arguments going on at a certain time, and in this particular manner, they can be said to be an actual frozen image of the time for synchronic research; or, for an even better metaphoric term, a "recording" of the debate and

⁹⁷ Adrian Bingham, "Ignoring the First Draft of History? Searching for the popular press in studies of Twentieth-century Britain", *Media History* 18:3 (2012), 311.

⁹⁸ Peter Burke, *A Social History of Knowledge II: From the Encyclopédie to Wikipedia* (Cambridge: Malden Press, 2012), 2432 (Kindle edition).

arguments going on, as newspapers work for moving, diachronic research as well, allowing researchers to track and analyse changes and news inputs into debates and discourses.

Secondly, newspapers have an important *performative* aspect too. They do not only reflect the time that they were written – and read – in, they also play a major and significant role in shaping and adding to debates and discourses themselves. They are actors in as well as platforms for debate. They are not, to build on Burke, only carriers of information. They shape the information they convey: They select and deselect what to convey and how to convey it, they decide how to angle particular information (and knowledge), and they decide what to cover lightly and what to cover in depth. Though part of the layout of the newspaper is down to the ideals or conventions expected of the genre, they also – at least in part – decide on the paratext that will be presented. Coined by the literary theorist and structuralist Gérard Genette, paratext denotes all the things within a work apart from the text itself which helps locate, situate and ease interpretation of the text.⁹⁹ Examples relevant to newspaper articles could be headings, captions, images, graphs as well as the page location of an article or its font, placement and prominence on the page. Like individual articles within a newspaper issue, the newspaper itself can also be viewed as a text in its entirety – complete with its own paratext. This brings us on to some added complications with newspapers.

Newspapers are a bit of an odd mongrel when it comes to genre classification and analysis. They are texts in themselves and can be classified as their own genre type, but at the same time, they are also an assortment of different types of texts: "Standard" journalists' articles, adverts, opinion pieces, editorials, readers' letters, cartoons and – in Danish newspapers from the 1970s – photographs of perky, stark-naked female graduates voicing their opinion on current events. These all inform the debate individually, while adding to the discourse within that particular newspaper issue as well as to the view of the world brought on by the newspaper over time. There are many different utterings present in the newspapers, and almost as many different utterers. While some of them are stated by name, many others are anonymous or unknown to the public eye, making it impossible to find out more about them as actors. As for the identifiable – often well-known – people that appear in these newspapers, it is even more complicated. Some of them write articles themselves and under their own name; others have been interviewed by the paper. The latter's messages are therefore not their "own" anymore, but part of the utterings of the newspaper. Some are cited

⁹⁹ Gérard Genette, Marie Maclean (trans.), "Introduction to the Paratext", *New Literary History* 22:2 (Spring 1991), 261-262.

by the newspaper as part of a longer and varied article, while others again are cited by the newspaper in order for the newspaper or a different actor to dispute their claims.

Within the specific genre of newspapers, the ultimate power over their discourse could be said to lie with the newspapers themselves. That, however, leads down just as unwieldy a path. Each newspaper is at the same time a subject in itself and an amalgamation of several subjects – even when discounting all contributions made by and citations from the people mentioned above, including members of the public and politicians. The journalists, editors, proofreaders, layout experts, photographers and owners are all part of the newspaper. Some correspondents – mainly those who report from abroad – are named, but most of the articles written "by" the newspaper, all of the photos and all of the editorials are not attributed to anyone in particular. They represent the editorial line, certainly, but even here, it is not always possible to pin down a particular individual (most of the newspapers have three different editors who may be writing). Even with a definite editorial line (which all four newspapers do have in relation to the referendums), there are the adverts, which can buy space in the paper regardless of whether they adhere to or counter the editorial line. All four newspapers have countless adverts arguing both for and against membership regardless of the editorial line. In fact, *Ekstra Bladet* remarks on this in one article: They ponder the identity of the backer of a full-page "YES"-advertisement in their paper then later explain to readers that they do not censor adverts sent in.¹⁰⁰ While all the newspapers feature both articles and adverts campaigning for "the other side", it is important to bear in mind that it is the newspapers who hold the discursive power to decide what is and is not included in the newspaper and how it is set up within the paper's layout. ("The newspaper" shall be used from now to mean roughly the same as the newspapers' editorial groups or lines.)

4.5 Language and Rhetoric

Articulation of identity occurs – at least in large part – through language. This study will make use of some terms and ideas from the field of rhetoric, a field of study and independent discipline which has made a prominent and respected comeback in Scandinavia over the past few decades, especially as a discipline in Sweden and Denmark. Rhetoric is important in that it recognises and acknowledges the large role that emotion plays in making successful arguments; indeed, it is rare to have an argument on a political scale based solely on logic and

¹⁰⁰ "EF-kampagnes økonomiske bagmænd skjuler sig", *Ekstra bladet*, 27th September 1972, 5.

rationality be presented or received well. I will mainly make use of the well-known guide to modern rhetoric written by the Danish Professor of Rhetoric Jørgen Fafner, *Retorik: Klassisk og moderne*. The focus is on investigating identity constructs rather than employing rhetoric as a theory. The emphasis will, of course, be on employing rhetoric as an analytical device, thereby using it after the fact, rather than using it as a form of argumentative preparation in the Aristotelian manner. One of rhetoric's five components will be most useful for this analysis: *Persuasio* – the skill of persuading someone of the merit or credibility of your point of view. It should be noted that Fafner points out that *Persuasio* is just as much about making your recipients warm to your argument as convince them to convert to your point of view;¹⁰¹ however, in the analyses of the identity constructs within these newspapers, we are interested not so much in whether or not the arguments are persuasive anyway, but in how the three components of *Persuasio* can be used to shed light on how the newspapers – and all the utterers within their discourse – build up and use identities of belonging.

Persuasio covers three persuasive tools that may be used to argue your case; probably the most famous parts of rhetoric: *Ethos*, *logos* and *pathos*. In an argument carried by *ethos*, authority or expertise is used to convince the recipient of the argument's merit.¹⁰² Somebody can also carry charismatic or ethical weight. If a doctor, for example, makes a statement on a certain type of medicine, then the recipient is (hopefully) more convinced by the argument because the utterer is a doctor. Looking at arguments and constructs with the help of *ethos* within the discourses in the newspapers will be very helpful as it provides a way to acknowledge that some of utterings do have an identifiable and important utterer in the newspaper (such as politicians or someone putting out their opinion strongly based on their area of employment, for example). By using *ethos*, the force that a certain constructive uttering may carry due to its utterer can be analysed and taken into account without taking the focus away from the discourse and on to the individual actors. The second type of argumentative line, *logos*, is arguing from a logical, intellectual or rational line:¹⁰³ Citing empirical facts, pointing out that something is nonsensical or fact-checking a statement may all be examples of using *logos* to make an argument. The many economic arguments employed within the referendum debate appear to be *logos*-based. As shall be discussed, however, they may also fall under other categories. The final argumentative line is *pathos*;

¹⁰¹ Jørgen Fafner, *Retorik: Klassisk og moderne* (Denmark: Akademisk forlag, 2005), 44.

¹⁰² Jørgen Fafner, *Retorik*, 43.

¹⁰³ Jørgen Fafner, *Retorik*, 46.

constructing reasoning designed to appeal on an emotional or passionate basis. This type of reasoning is sometimes derided or besmirched as reasoning, but no well-functioning human being is never moved or persuaded by something due to emotion. The point that we understand our existence through emotions and intuition is an important one for the analysis section. The debate as to whether to join the European Community touched upon questions of belonging and emotional affinity, and many people saw their (imagined) community and national identity as being threatened. The debates were, of course, emotive and impassioned, and indeed, part of the reason for choosing to study this particular period and debate was that emotions were bound to be running high in campaigns which were widely perceived as determining not only national identity, but also the future of people's nations and own lives. A moment which is perceived as threatening someone's vision of the identity of the collective identity of the imagined community to which they belong is bound to bring up deeply-held beliefs about what that community *is*, *constitutes* or *stands for* and to bring to the surface internal conflicts about what that community (should) represent(s).

4.6 Identity

Eriksen and Selberg note that the modern idea of "identity" is derived from the Latin term *idem*, which translates to "the same".¹⁰⁴ Writing in 1982, Lauri Honko states that "identity" is a fairly recent popular term within academia and that it, like many other modern notions, started off within psychology and psychoanalysis. It was associated with individuals almost exclusively until the 1960s, when it also began to be applied to social groups.¹⁰⁵ The notion of identity can be viewed in two ways which almost seem to oppose one another at surface level. In everyday speech, someone's identity is more or less equivalent to who someone is as a person. In this *essential* view of identity, it is regarded the very *essence* of someone: the core traits, deep-set characteristics and unmoving "inner spirit" which define a person and differentiate them from others. Identity is viewed as the stable or set part of an entity (a core) from this perspective. Identity, however, can also be regarded as a changing and continually developing set of characteristics which, built-up over a long time with enough uses, comes to denote a certain entity or community. As Eriksen and Selberg note, this is a *processual* or *constructivist* approach to the notion of identity, which focuses on "how identity is built up,

¹⁰⁴ Anne Eriksen and Torunn Selberg, *Tradisjon og fortelling: En innføring i folkløstikk* (Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 2006), 75.

¹⁰⁵ Lauri Honko, "Folktradition och identitet", Aili Nenola-Kallio (ed.), *Folktradition och regional identitet i Norden* (Åbo: Nordiska instituttet for folkdiktning, 1982), 11-13.

maintained and changed, and how it is expressed".¹⁰⁶ By focusing on identities as constructs in continual (if slow and steady) development, it becomes natural to look at the processes surrounding how and why they exist rather than just what they are (in essence). As part of this process, identity is shaped and influenced by outside forces – it gains meaning through *relation* (and differentiation) to other entities,¹⁰⁷ and can be shaped and renewed through relational and lingual expressions in the discourse.¹⁰⁸ This is true for personal as well as national identity.

The Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication describes national identity as

*[t]he public image of an imagined community (Weber called it a 'community of sentiment'), projecting an illusion of unity reflected symbolically in a flag, a national anthem, and distinctive rituals, and culturally represented in discourse primarily via historical mythologies and a popular cultural cannon ... narratively constructed and transmitted by social institutions, in particular the educational system ... and the mass media (notably in national news and in media events).*¹⁰⁹

This is a definition which neatly ties together many of the terms, points and arguments hopefully expressed coherently in this first part of the paper. The educational (and academic) lens is very much situated within a specific imagined community; usually the nation, though writings on the EU and its frontrunners as well as on Norden do concern, make use of and articulate other looser, larger or alternative imagined communities. As we shall see, the mass media studied here certainly made sure that the referendums and the debates leading up to them became media events, and utterers within the debates made plentiful use of rhetorical devices, collective historical narratives and cultural cannon to reinforce or influence perception of both the national, regional and international communities which came into play in the referendum debates.

¹⁰⁶ Eriksen and Selberg, *Tradisjon og fortelling*, 76.

¹⁰⁷ Eriksen and Selberg, *Tradisjon og fortelling*: 76.

¹⁰⁸ Haugevik, "Ledestjernen som forsvant", 5.

¹⁰⁹ "National Identity" in Chandler, Daniel and Rod Munday, *A Dictionary of Media and Communication* (1st ed.). Oxford: OUP, 2016. (Online: <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199568758.001.0001/acref-9780199568758-e-1834?rskey=LZ7s1J&result=2832>, last accessed 18th March 2017).

5. ANALYSIS

5.1 Some Considerations

It must be said that there is so much relevant material to deal with within even this relatively short time-span within the referendum campaigns that several other papers could be written on the subject and return many other interesting insights and arguments than the ones which will be laid out below. By focusing on articulations of the collective identities expressing imagined communities, this paper does, of course, slim down considerably the amount of EC material that seems directly relevant, but even so, many other articles and angles could have proved enlightening in terms of themes such as national identity too. This paper is further constricted by the fact that this is a 30-point thesis, and that it is therefore half the length of most master theses, which means that there has only been space to include the observations I have found most interesting and relevant. The summarising and observations that arise below are of course based on my subjective reading of the source material, although efforts have been made to conduct this reading as consistently and objectively as possible within the confines of qualitative historical research, as laid out by the methodology section. The observations, translations and findings laid out below are relayed as carefully and accurately as possible. The translations are my own.

Efforts have been made to address trends and views held in previous literature on the Danish and Norwegian relationships to the EC/EU and to connect the articulations on Danishness and Norwegianness discovered within these debates to the large amount of work done on national, Nordic and European identity within and outside of (cultural) history. However, due to the succinct nature of this paper, its emphasis must be on the actual discoveries made from the debates within the newspapers themselves. Furthermore, much could be said about how the types of texts and utterings found within the newspapers vary greatly in length, depth, mood, conviction, forcefulness, genre and many other important aspects. Because the emphasis here is on the collective articulations of all the opinions, ideas, convictions, etc., about belonging and communities expressed within the newspapers, however, such variety and the significance that may be deduced from such differences in the texts will only be dwelled upon when deemed particularly relevant or when certain texts are analysed in detail. It is also hoped that the extensive historiographical, contextual and methodological sections have already added supplementary considerations and precautions to the treatment of the findings.

5.2 Making a Nation-Shaping Historical Event

HIGHFALUTING NONSENSE

The Social Democratic MP Robert Pedersen in the conservative [newspaper] B.T. joyfully recalls how he drove up and delivered his yes to the Common Market. He also writes: 'There is reason to believe ... that the consequences of membership will cause many to be surprised that Denmark in the EC is almost the same country that we were in the EFTA.' ... Denmark will never be the same country again, and even the proponents [of membership] haven't tried to make people believe that. Apart from Robert Pedersen, apparently.

Contribution, "Debate of the Day" in *Ekstra Bladet*, 4th October 1972.¹¹⁰

All four newspapers include numerous and recurring assertions that the referendum decision will become or has become a "historic" event in the days up to and after the votes. In Denmark, a *Politiken* editorial on the 1st October stated that the following day's vote was a "decision that has been called the most important in recent Danish history", for example.¹¹¹ Four days before the Norwegian vote, *Aftenposten*'s editorial concluded with the rather ominous words:

*[The government] has made a reasonable effort and we are convinced that they will be recognised for it – sooner or later, no matter how the referendum turns out. '[T]he People's Movement against Norwegian Membership in the EEC' can of course afford not to worry about history's judgement. It will just disappear [after the vote].*¹¹²

A *Dagbladet* article on the same day thought that "[f]or future historians, the governmental question and the way that it has been brought into [the] debate will surely be one of the most unusual aspects of this period which is now closing down".¹¹³ It may be a basic point, but an interesting one nonetheless that the newspapers themselves helped to create or at least reinforce the idea that the choice made by the majorities in the EC referendums would indeed be a "historical" event and an important part of each country's national history. As one later history source points out, the accession of Norway to the EFTA created very little interest

¹¹⁰ Contribution, "Debate of the Day" in *Ekstra Bladet*, 4th October 1972, 2.

¹¹¹ *Politiken*, "Til vejledning om EF", 1st October 1972, 14.

¹¹² *Aftenposten*, 21st September 1972, "Siste Gallup", 2. In Norwegian: "[Regjeringen] har gjort en hederlig innsats, og vi føler oss overbevist om at de også vil få ære av den – før eller senere – hvordan det enn går med ved folkeavstemningen. Vi mener og tror ikke det samme om «Folkebevegelsen mot norsk medlemskap i EEC», men den kan jo også være ganske ubekymret om historiens dom. Den forsvinner bare".

¹¹³ *Dagbladet*, 21st September 1972, "4 døgn igjen", 2. The Norwegian is "Jeg kunne likevel godt ha lyst til – nå på tampen – å komme med noen refleksjoner om regjeringsspørsmålet. For ettertidens historieforskere vil vel regjeringsspørsmålet, og måten det er brakt inn i debatten på, være noe av det mest eiendommelige ved den perioden vi nå er i ferd med å avslutte".

among the general public by comparison.¹¹⁴ This is natural in part: Unlike the EFTA co-operation, joining the EC would involve a supranational institution getting a say over Norwegian sovereignty, and the EFTA never involved the ideological commitments that the EC did, so the decision to join the EFTA did not have quite as great political significance. However, the many assertions within the newspaper discourses that Norway and Denmark would be radically different countries after the referendums – including such strong statements as *Dagbladet's* above that one epoch was closing down in favour of a new – should cause some consideration. Looking back with the benefit of hindsight and considering the two countries' different referendum outcomes, have either Norway or Denmark really become radically different countries compared to what they were before the votes, and have their different EC 'paths' turned them into much less similar to one another than previously? Did Denmark lose its sovereignty and independence as a nation when it entered the EC, as was one of the main NO-front arguments in both countries?¹¹⁵ Did Norway become the small, laughed-at isolationist state that the YES front foresaw? These would be bold claims.

This is not to try to deny that the referendums *did* have consequences for the countries; not just political and economic, but also in terms of self-understanding and perceptions of their respective nations. The very fact that these referendum decisions were hyped up to be history-changing will have had an effect on them actually being viewed as significant to their countries' history. The newspaper discourses influenced public opinion to view the referendum as greatly significant events and thus helped the referendums actually attain that significance. By being viewed as significant moments within the country's history, and as the end of an era and the beginning of a new, the referendums also became shapers of national identity by implying that something new or important would be caused by the nation choosing to join or not join. In this capacity, the utterances within the newspapers had a very real effect on forging these events as significant to the nations' self-understanding. Marking the referendums as historical events for the nations also marked them as points of (potential) change of the national identity.

For the YES front in the debates, the notion of historical change and new epochs also occurs relatively often through the idea of a "new" or rebirthed Europe, which is usually connected in some form to the idea that the nation stands at a historical crossroads. In the following example, *Aftenposten* published an interview with industrial director Alf Ihlen:

¹¹⁴ Ustvedt, *Det skjedde i Norge*, Bind 5, 14.

¹¹⁵ Bo Lidegaard, *En fortælling om Danmark i det 20. Århundrede* (København: Gyldendal, 2011), 321.

*In one generation, England, France, Belgium and the Netherlands have saved us from dictatorship and a lack of liberty. Against these countries, warlike warnings are now being sent and European national mistrust is being reawakened. Germany, France, Italy and England and the other EC countries now want to bury the battle axe. A new Europe of peace is being built up. For the first time in history, England is joining the continental powers. This is the historical challenge we're meeting. Let us show that we believe in a trusting and constructive European co-operation. To do this, we must answer with a clear Yes, Director Alf Ihlen says.*¹¹⁶

Here, we see a historical moment being articulated in relation to both Norway and 'Europe', and the reader is told that they and their nation Norway are in the middle of a "historical challenge" that they must meet, which has come about through England joining the powers on the continent "for the first time in history". In setting up the situation as a historical crossroads for the nation, Alf Ihlen (or the journalist reporting on the interview) marks out the referendum decision as a conflict between two distinct versions of what the nation should represent, with Norway and Norwegians as enthusiastic supporters of the new and improved peaceful, co-operative 'Europe' on the one hand, and a reactionary and distrustful anti-Europe nationalist Norway on the other.¹¹⁷ He offers up a potential collective European identity that seems hard to resist, with the help of a good deal of *pathos*. If Norway joins, it becomes part of the cool "new Europe" of peace which even the UK is joining. If it does not, it will be a miserable, ungrateful outsider. Ihlen's is clearly a vision of national Norwegian identity that is compatible with a broader European identity. Whichever way the people of Norway decide to vote, Ihlen paints it as a point of change in collective identity.

Although Ihlen speaks mostly about a "new" Europe of the future, there are clear references to historical events. The Second World War is brought up again and again in the debates, and one of the NO front's most recurrent arguments revolves around the misery that Germany or the European "continent" inflicted upon the peace-loving Denmark or Norway (or Norden) during their occupations. Here, Ihlen answers their accusation against 'Europe' and reminds readers of the Allied European forces that "saved us", and points out that the Norwegian nation would be ungrateful to reject them now. By doing this, he is also tying these other nations into Norwegians' collective identity. Framing the referendum as such an important historical and nation-shaping event contributed to it becoming a flashpoint or

¹¹⁶ "Politikere, ikke næringslivet som sto bak dannelsen av Fellesskapet", *Aftenposten*, 20th September 1972, 14.

¹¹⁷ This example will be referred to again later on.

pressure point for negotiation about what the national identity was and should be about. In order to address these points, both sides used the nation's past in order to present what they saw as being integral to the national identity. In the words of David Lowenthal, "to know what we were confirms what we are":¹¹⁸ People sketched out what they saw as constituting their national identity, and in order to do so, they referred to a common, parallel understanding of the past that everyone within the nation could be expected to know.

The study of how people's joint memories of the past are constructed and negotiated is known as collective memory, and it is a field which has become very popular and active across a number of disciplines in recent years.¹¹⁹ Aleida Assman, who explores the idea of *collective memory* as a built-up, instructive, shared memorisation of past events which serves to unify and create a shared identity and past for a community, draws in the psychological concepts of "semantic" and "episodic" memory in order to explore how personal experiences and memories can be transferred to the communal sphere and collective identity. Episodic memory is personal and constructed from events personally experienced on "your own body". Semantic memory, on the other hand, is dependent upon instruction in order to be learnt and includes knowledge such as that gained through internalised narratives of past events that happened before your own time, but which play a significant role in your understanding of your identity even so.¹²⁰ The newspaper debates are ripe with examples where people refer to events of the past or hint at well-known narratives that they clearly expect their fellow countrymen to recognise and understand. In the above example, we see Ihlen make a reference to a common and positive European past, set up against the NO front's narrative of the Second World War, in which he connects England, France, Belgium and the Netherlands into Norwegians' collective frame of reference in a way evocative of Anderson's shared imagined community between people who will never meet.

5.3 Articulating Belonging: Lingual Points of Interest

There are a few specific words and turns of phrase employed within the debates which say something significant not just about Norwegians' and/or Danes' views of what constitutes spheres of belonging and not belonging within the debates; a few also point to some unique

¹¹⁸ Cited in Esborg, *Det norske nei til EU*, 29.

¹¹⁹ Anne Eriksen, "Foreword", Anne Eriksen and Jón Viðar Sigurdsson, *Negotiating Pasts in the Nordic Countries: Interdisciplinary Studies in History and Memory* (Sweden: Nordic Academic Press, 2009), 7-8.

¹²⁰ Aleida Assmann, "Transformations between History and Memory", *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 75:1 (Spring 2008), 51.

peculiarities within these Scandinavian languages and, potentially, to the way that they view the world more generally.

"Us" and "Them" in the Debates

*All good people agree,
And all good people say,
All nice people, like Us,
And every one else is They*
Rudyard Kipling, "A Friend of the Family", 1924.¹²¹

"Us" and "them" and "we" and "they" are essential notions at the core of our sense of belonging and identity. The use of these pronouns is one of the easiest and most obvious ways to articulate collective identity; however, it is such an ingrained, extensively used and essential part of everyday language that it can be very difficult if not impossible to adequately and comprehensively deconstruct uses of these everyday terms.¹²² It is, however, possible to lay out some general tendencies on how they are used within the Danish and Norwegian EC debates. Many of them connect closely to the other articulations mapped out further below. In basic terms, it will suffice to say that pronouns such as "us", "we" and "our" denote belonging, whereas "them", "they" and "their" denote an outsider status thrust upon an *other* from the point of view of the utterer. An important component of identity is its *relational* aspect; identity attains meaning through being different to an 'other'.¹²³ This is no less true for aspects of national identity than for aspects of an individual's identity. It is through the meeting with other collective identities that a particular group of people – for example a (national) community – is made aware of the attributes that they have in common.¹²⁴

One way to approach the community-enforcing powers of the "we" and "us" is to look at these terms as possessing the persuasive powers of *ethos*; adding to the persuasiveness of an argument by appealing to the utterer's *ethical* personality, or positive character, such as moral righteousness or professional expertise.¹²⁵ Fafner points out that *ethos* is actually also an appeal to the emotive, as some form of bond between the utterer and audience is forged by prompting the audience to *trust* the utterer. At a fundamental level, when the utterer refers to

¹²¹ Cited in David Berreby, *Us and Them: The Science of Identity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008: 14.

¹²² While a lot has been written on particular "Us and Them"s, it has not been possible to source any works which deal with the particular semantic cultural implications of these common pronouns.

¹²³ Eriksen and Selberg, *Tradisjon og fortelling*: 76.

¹²⁴ Eriksen and Selberg, *Tradisjon og fortelling*: 101.

¹²⁵ Fafner, *Retorik*: 43.

"us" when presenting an argument to a certain audience, he or she is forging a sense of shared identity and belonging in which he or she becomes part of the same collective as their audience, forging a shared bond that will hopefully cause the recipients to trust the utterer and their argument more.

"Us" and "we" are used to mark out multiple different types of group who make collective statements within the EC debates. These could be seen as belonging to different levels within a hierarchy of communities based on size.¹²⁶ At one end of that spectrum, you could have particular private interest groups, such as a particular Danish town in the agricultural western part of Denmark, Danish housewives or Norwegian fishermen, representing a subset within larger spheres of collective identity; usually the nation.¹²⁷ Then come the larger, institutionalised entities, whose mandate for speaking are based on their claim to represent a very large part of the national population: The organised People's Movements against EC Membership and the Movements for Europe. Then come the many articulations of "we" and "us" as *the nation*. This is by far the most common and normalised use of a collective "we" within the campaigns and debates. Finally, there is a fair amount of articulations of a supranational "we" when constituting Norden – though at a much, much smaller scale than the use of a national "we" – and a somewhat smaller but nonetheless existent use of "we" to talk about 'Europe' or even "the West". All of these uses of "we" and "us" reflect the point that Benedict Anderson made about the aspect of the nation as constituting an imagined community of people who will never all communicate directly with one another, but nevertheless feel a connection and a shared cultural identity. Even the individuals constituting the smallest of these groups, such as the Jutland town, are unlikely to ever all speak directly with one another; yet they communicate as a unit and utter on behalf of a collective "we".

It is not as simple as each of these types of group always and exclusively representing their particular collective "we", however. In fact, the "smaller-than-nation" groups almost all speak on behalf of the nation at one time or another, using the national "we" to do so. This is the case, for example, in an advert in support of membership featuring the views on EU

¹²⁶ Hierarchy here is not meant to necessarily imply power or strength of affinity or belonging, but simply the sheer size by population or geographical reach. The examples listed here could be set up in many other different hierarchical orders; this is simply used as a way to illustrate different "us"es in use.

¹²⁷ These three groupings all took out adverts for or against membership during the debates. They could of course also be studied as collective identities in themselves.

jurisdiction of what appears to be a random assortment of lawyers, police directors, secretaries and even high-court judges. It neatly concludes with:

*Together with large and small European countries, Denmark will continue down this path to secure peace and establish better opportunities for ourselves and for those people in the world who are worse off than us. Therefore we who have signed this letter say a clear YES to Denmark's participation in the great European community.*¹²⁸

In this paragraph, two different "we" are represented: In the last sentence, the "we" speaks to all those lawyers and judges who have signed and paid for the advert (they are all listed by name and profession at the bottom of the advert). Within the context and audience situation that they are presenting to, they carry an *ethos* force themselves by virtue of their profession. In the preceding sentence, however, they also make use of the national "we" (or "us" and "ourselves") – which here is linked directly to "Denmark", forging a double (and possibly subconscious) bond of trust between themselves as represented within their group's collective opinion and the nation of Denmark. There are many parallels here to *Aftenposten's* interview with the Norwegian industry director Ihlen cited above, which concludes with "[t]his is the historical challenge we're meeting. Let us show that we believe in a trusting and constructive European co-operation. To do this, we must answer with a clear Yes, Director Alf Ihlen says", where a national "we" is clearly employed, but another collective "we" which also carries *ethos* force is also present: That of high-powered directors of industry or, considering the name of the article, the commercial sector.¹²⁹ There are also many examples of smaller, unofficial groupings or even individuals articulating the nation by making use of the national "we" in both countries as, indeed, happens in general everyday conversation all the time. One example is in an opinion letter in *Politiken*, when a reader asks "Can somebody please let *us* know if there are great ideological differences between northern or southern Europeans?"¹³⁰ It can also be argued that this "we" pertains to a slightly different type of collective identity which isn't quite equivalent to the nation; a collective identity which is particularly prevalent within the Norwegian debate in relation to the EC referendums, but which is also something of a peculiarity within the Scandinavian languages, as will be explored below.

¹²⁸ "Til de danske vælgere!", *Politiken*, 29th September 1972: 10.

¹²⁹ "Politikere, ikke næringslivet som sto bak dannelsen av Fellesskapet", *Aftenposten*, 20th September 1972: 14. The title translates to "Politicians, not the business sector, were behind the creation of the Community".

¹³⁰ Flemming Weile, "Forskelle mellem nord og syd", *Politiken*, 26th September 1972, 12.

Articulating "Folket" ("The People")

Friday Night's Little Café Line:

- But the country must surely get a government!

- To hell with that. Here, it is the people which reigns!

*Dagbladet, 30th September 1972*¹³¹

There are numerous uses of the term "folk" within the EC referendum debates in Norway and Denmark. The literal translation of the Norwegian and Danish (and Swedish) word "folk" is "people", just as the English "folk". The definitions in the Scandinavian languages and English are very similar: Dictionary.com gives the following definitions: 1) Noun: "People in general" (usually plural; folks), 2) Noun: "People of a specified class or group" (often plural), 3) Noun: "People as the carriers of culture, especially as representative of the composite of social mores, customs, forms of behaviour, etc., in a society". And, as adjectives: 1) "Of or originating among the common people: *folk beliefs; a folk hero*" and 2) "Having unknown origins and reflecting the traditional forms of a society: *folk culture; folk art*".¹³² While these meanings are very similar to Scandinavian ones, there are some slight differences: The official Danish Language Council lists the top definition as a "large group of people tied together due to common language, history and culture" with the synonym "nation" and, as subsets, "the population of a country viewed as an entity" and "the greater part of the population, in contrast to the political, economic or cultural elite".¹³³ The Norwegian Language Council lists "the population of a country, nation" as its top definition (with "to be one people", "our people" and "the Norwegian people" as examples and "race", "tribe" and "kin"/"relations" ["slekt"] as subsets) and, in the definite form "the people", "the citizens, subjects in a country" (with "the rulers and the people" as an example and "the general public" as subsets) as its second definition.¹³⁴ The English and Scandinavian meanings are certainly similar, but the top Scandinavian definition – "folk" as "the nation" – does not

¹³¹ "Fredagskveldens lille kaféreplikk", *Dagbladet*, 30th September 1972, 3. Norwegian text: "-Men landet må jo få en regjering! / -Til helvitte heller. Her er det folket som regjerer!".

¹³² "Folk", Dictionary.com (<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/folk?s=t>

¹³³ <http://sproget.dk/lookup?SearchableText=folk>, last accessed 28th May 2017).

¹³⁴ "Folk", Ordbok.uib.no (<http://ordbok.uib.no/perl/ordbok.cgi?OPP=folk>, last accessed 28th May 2017). These all have more definitions such as the American "folks" for parents, which aren't relevant to this use; the top definitions have been included here.

feature as prominently in English.¹³⁵ The Scandinavian use of "folk" to denote "the [entire] people" or the nation is much more prevalent than in English language and culture, including when the corresponding English term "the people" is taken into account, and its connotations are somewhat different.

This becomes particularly clear when "folk" or "people" is considered as an adjective or prefix, such as, to use examples which exist in English, folk music or folk culture. While these types of connotations to something *folky* also exist in Danish and Norwegian in the sense of pertaining to the culture of the "common" people with, perhaps, a slightly romantic or nostalgic undertone, is also commonly used to denote the nation as a whole: In Denmark, Parliament is known as *Folketinget*, the "People's Thing" or "People's Assembly".¹³⁶ Although this was in fact equivalent to the House of Commons until the cessation of Denmark's bicameral parliament in 1953, when the "upper house" was known as *Landstinget* – the "Nation's" or "Country's Thing" – the "People's Thing" came to represent the entire nation from this point onwards, including the elites.¹³⁷ The same use of "folk-" as a prefix to include the entire nation is present in Norwegian and Danish terms like "folkesjel"; the "folk soul" or "folk spirit", "folkekarakter"; the "people's character" and "folkeslag", which directly denotes the nation, but still retains a reference to "the people". When one thinks about it, the fact that "folk" can denote both "the nation" as a whole and the "citizens", "subjects" or "the greater part of the population" in opposition to the elites is rather interesting. "Folk" can denote the whole [nation] and part of the whole at the same time.

A good amount has been written about the "folk" term within Nordic cultural history; unsurprising considering the discipline's roots in *folkloristics* and folk culture. Oslo cultural historian Ole Marius Hylland claims that "[f]olkloristics have a somewhat unresolved relationship to the term 'folk'", noting that historians' difficulties with the term can be broken down into two questions: Who are "the people" and how should one relate to "the people"? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary for the historian/folklorist to position him or

¹³⁵ It is included within the fourth definition of "people" on Dictionary.com: "the entire body of persons who constitute a community, tribe, nation, or other group by virtue of a common culture, history, religion or the like".

¹³⁶ Dictionary.com defines a Thing, or Ting, as "(in Scandinavian countries) a public meeting or assembly, especially a legislative assembly or a court of law".

¹³⁷ Except the Royals, of course, who are not part of the electorate. "Landstinget, Gyldendal: Den Store Danske"

([http://denstoredanske.dk/Samfund, jura og politik/Samfund/Folketinget og parlamentarisme generelt/Landstinget](http://denstoredanske.dk/Samfund,_jura_og_politik/Samfund/Folketinget_og_parlamentarisme_generelt/Landstinget), last accessed 28th May 2017).

herself in relation to the group that he or she is defining as "folk".¹³⁸ He offers up three distinct definitions of how "folk" has been defined through time: First, there is the notion of folk culture as retaining the ancient knowledge and cultural "spirit" of the (nation's) people; the national romantic idea of the folk culture on which folkloristics was first founded in which the people ("folket") retained the *real* culture; they are held up as admirable. Second, there is folket (the people) as what may be deemed "the commoners": those in need of education and enlightenment, which implies that those defining folket consider themselves above them. Third, Hylland states that a new understanding of and positioning in relation to "folk" rose to prominence in the 1970s, when the (political/cultural) elite began to position itself as at the same level as the people and speaking on behalf of the people. He points out, however, that "the people" were still seen as in need of being helped or spoken for.¹³⁹ These three approaches to "folk" are enlightening for the field of folkloristics, but they do not quite address the use of folk- and folket to represent the nation as a whole, which would constitute a different employment of the term within cultural history, and which seems to have been articulated at least in part during the debates.

The most persistent way that "folk" is used within both debates is in the names of the NO fronts' official movements: "Folkebevegelsen mot norsk medlemskap i EF" in Norway and "Folkebevægelsen imod EF" in Denmark, translating to "The People's Movement against Membership in the EC".¹⁴⁰ This is a name with quite some force: Although "movement" is a common name for such political entities, it is worth paying attention to the way that the meaning of the word "movement" endows the group with a sense of dynamism, energy and forward-propulsion (this works just as well in Scandinavian). One might even tentatively suggest that it evokes the sense of being at a "historical" moment of change in its capacity as a forward-moving force as discussed above, whether intentionally or (more likely) not. The length of the name also made it likely that the public as well as articles would shorten their name – as indeed they usually did themselves – to the natural shortened version; simply "the People's Movement". And who could be against the people? Furthermore, it is not simply *a* movement; it is *the* movement against the EC. It is a central point in many comparisons of the two sister movements that the Norwegian one was much better organised, united and

¹³⁸ Ole Marius Hylland, "Betraktninger om en forstavelse: Innfallsvinkler til begrepet *folk*", Bjarne Rogand and Bente Gullveig (eds.), *Norden og Europa: Fagtradisjoner i nordisk etnologi og folkloristikk*, 178.

¹³⁹ Hylland, "Betraktninger om en forstavelse: Innfallsvinkler til begrepet *folk*", 179.

¹⁴⁰ Neumann points to this as well, but only spends a sentence on it: Ivar B. Neumann, "This Little Piggy Stayed at Home" in Hansen and Wæver, *European Integration and Nordic Identity*, 111.

coherent than the Danish one (as well as better funded).¹⁴¹ In a later diagnosis of the problems of the Danish campaign, one of the Danish members of the Movement reflected that "we had too many chieftains and too few American Indians".¹⁴² NO voters from the different political parties in Denmark never really managed to put their differences convincingly aside, and the Social Democrats; by far the largest party in Denmark, never joined the "People's Movement", setting up their own faction "Social Democrats against the EC".¹⁴³ Although the two opposition movements worked together, "*The People's Movement*" could not really claim to be the only one; let alone that it represented the whole people.

The Norwegian "People's Movement", on the other hand, seems to have managed to truly frame itself as *the* movement of *the people*. As discussed above, "the people" has multiple different connotations, with it being capable of connoting both "the nation" in its entirety *and* the people as opposed to the elite; a highly important narrative structure and marker of identity in Norway's history.¹⁴⁴ By framing themselves as "the people's movement", members of the NO front could claim to speak on behalf of both the authentic Norwegian people and the nation (and people) in its entirety. When speaking on behalf of the people against the elite, members of the People's Movement could reinforce their connection to the factions of society most likely to hold the same views on the EC as them – the "peripheries" where the traditional primary industries were found and the "masses", including the half-a-million Labour Party-voter workers who were not enthusiastic about their party leadership's line in favour of membership. By framing their movement as part of the "non-elite people" (or peoples), the NO front could articulate kinship and trust with that same section of the electorate; arguably another example of the use of *ethos* in order to convince someone to support your argument. At the same time, the People's Movement could still make use of the meaning of "folket" to evoke the entire nation; thereby gaining force when articulating their visions of national identity, as will be explored in the next section. It is worth pointing out how successful the Norwegian People's Movement appears to have been at promoting themselves under that shortened name within the newspaper discourse: Even *Aftenbladet* sometimes refers to the organised NO front as "the People's Movement" (something which was not really noticeable within Danish pro-membership articles).

¹⁴¹ See for example Martens, *Danmarks ja, Norges nej*, 104-105.

¹⁴² Bjørklund, *Mot strømmen*, 212.

¹⁴³ Bjørklund, *Mot strømmen*, 210-211.

¹⁴⁴ See for example Neumann, "This Little Piggy": 94-111, which outlines and argues for a historical, traditional perceived split between the "foreign" Danish/Swedish/German elite and bureaucracy on the one hand and the "real", authentic Norwegian *people* on the other.

A small, final point on the articulation of the "People's Movement": One unusual offshoot of the term employed in a *Dagbladet* article put it in another potential interpretative light.¹⁴⁵ In the article headed "Ferie for folkebevegerne", the leaders of the Norwegian Movement are referred to as "folkebevegerne"; "the people movers". The term "å bevege" can also mean to touch someone emotionally in the same way as the English "move" can do. The same idea is actually also present in "folkebevegelsen" (the people's movement): The emotive mover of the people. In a similar rhetorical observation, it is interesting to note that the "European Communities" is often written simply as "the community" in the debates – who would want to be outside of the community?¹⁴⁶

5.4 Determining the Will of the People

THE PEOPLE'S WILL

*If you ask the people what the people want
you'll receive a clear response
half the people plus a few
answer for the rest as well.
The answer that just about half gave
must not be changed.
The people is always one, you see.
The people is never two.*¹⁴⁷

After the Norwegian referendum result, the NO front in Norway was quick to phrase the decision – of 53.5 per cent of the vote – to reject membership as "the will of the people" which, again, retains the duplicity of representing both the whole and a part of the whole. Large parts of *Dagbladet* and the (extensive) coverage in *Ekstra Bladet* framed the result as a cleft between the people and the political elite, continuing the pre-result narrative with numerous statements such as "The people has spoken



¹⁴⁵ "Ferie for folkebevegerne: Sverre Jervel til Kilimanjaro, Arne Haugestad i norske fjell", 27th September 1972, *Dagbladet*, 16.

¹⁴⁶ Unfortunately, I did not pay particular attention to this from the beginning of the source analysis, so I would hesitate to make too bold a claim about its use. It seems to be used by both sides of the debate, though more by the YES front. When used by the NO front, as far as I can tell, it is always capitalised as "Felllesskapet"/"Fællesskabet" ("The Community"), which takes on a more formal air.

¹⁴⁷ Swedish poem from the Swedish newspaper *Svenska Dagbladet*, brought in *Aftenposten* on the 29th September 1972, page 6. The Swedish text reads "FOLKVILJAN: Frågar du folket vad folket vill / får du ett klart besked: / hälften av folket plus några till / svarar för resten med. / Svaret som lite drygt hälften gitt / ruckar man inte på. / Folket är nämligen alltid ett. / Folket är aldrig två".

its mind, but Parliament is incapable of acting out the will of the people due to its composition".¹⁴⁸ *Dagbladet's* editorial on the 26th uses "the people" six times within three paragraphs under the heading "A Joint Responsibility", claiming that:

*We must now hope that the wounds will be healed faster than if the EC had been entered with a completely split people. In the way that we have understood the advisory referendum, now is the time to act in agreement with the advice that the people has given. ... We therefore suppose that no political grouping in our country, and no business organisation, will cross the will of the people. They all have a clear responsibility that our relationship to the Community is sorted in a way which benefits our country and corresponds to the will of the people. [It is a pity that politicians have rejected a joint government of all parties]. Such a government could have strengthened our country's negotiating position and have had a reconciliatory effect on the split in the people.*¹⁴⁹

Within these sentences, "the people" is used both to reference the majority vote in the referendum, the population as a whole (intriguingly, it is also the whole people that is referred to in "a completely split people"), and the people vs. the elite. These varied uses of "the people" are also used with a "we" denoting the newspaper and an "us" denoting the people. In *Aftenposten*, the expression of the referendum result in terms of "the people" was less frequent, though it still pops up fairly regularly, e.g. in phrases such as "The president of the EC Commission Sicco Mansholt believes that *the people's no* is not all that dangerous for the Community".¹⁵⁰ Another example begins with "So, the Norwegian people has preferred to remain standing outside of the EC, at least this time round. Whether we will ever join, I shall not try to predict".¹⁵¹ It is also interesting to note the emphasis on the need for reconciliation; a strong tendency which emerges almost immediately following the referendum results, particularly amongst many on the NO front, despite the claims that "the people" got what they/it wanted.

After the result in Denmark, on the other hand, the papers (*Politiken* particularly) tended to write about the "population" rather than "the people", or to talk about majorities or use "Denmark" as a collective entity for the people of the nation. When "the people" is used, it is often the variant "the Danish people", which seems to indicate the entirety of the Danish population as a collective (elites included) rather than the people as opposed to the elite. Overall, the setting up of "the people" on the one hand and the "elite", represented by the out-

¹⁴⁸ "Hva tapte taperne? Hva vant vinnerne?", *Dagbladet*, 5th October 1972, 11.

¹⁴⁹ "Et felles ansvar", *Dagbladet*, 26th September 1972, 3.

¹⁵⁰ "Skuffelse i Europa over det norske nei", *Aftenposten*, 27th September 1972, 1.

¹⁵¹ Carl Fredrik Engelstad, "Et nytt ansvar", *Aftenposten*, 5.

of-touch politicians, on the other was much less widespread than in Norway throughout the debates, with tendencies even before the results leaning more towards consensus and reconciliation than in the Norwegian debate. A few otherwise highly passionate anti-membership articles even emphasise that the YES front politicians *are* representing the people and that their own opinions are based on their true beliefs of what is best for Denmark. Naturally, there were instances of attempting to set up an "us-and-them" between the people and the political elite; however, these statements do not quite seem to have caught on in the wider debate to the extent that it did in the Norwegian one. Of course, there truly was a greater difference between the pro-membership views of the parliamentary majority and the 53 per cent NO voters in Norway than in Denmark, where 65 per cent the population (as would be revealed) supported their politicians' yes. At the same time, however, the Norwegian referendum result was much more even than the Danish one, with 46 per cent of voters opting in on EC membership – "supporting" the politicians and going against what the victorious NO front in Norway in particular describes as "the will of the people". This is something that the poem and accompanying cartoon at the beginning of this section, showing a very Norwegian hybrid animal split down the middle – brought in a Swedish newspaper but reprinted by *Aftenposten* – also picked up on, which is not otherwise really discussed or disputed in *Aftenposten* or other by proponents of membership after the no. It is interesting to note that the time *Aftenposten* really challenges or pokes fun at the "will of the people" and the rhetorical set-up of it, it only does so by making use of a foreign observation on the matter – without any further discussion of it. Based on the voting figures, it may have been reasonable to assume that assertions that the referendum vote was "the will of the people" or "the people speaking" would be more widespread in the Danish debate than in the Norwegian. Perhaps the result of the Danish vote – in agreement with the majority of politicians – just did not invoke as great a need to assert itself as legitimate?

5.5 Articulating Collective Pasts and Collective Community

Overall, the values that the Norwegian and Danish utterers put forth as representative of their country are very similar. Both are framed again and again as highly democratic, highly developed welfare states which look after the vulnerable and protect human rights both inside their countries and in less economically developed countries across the world.¹⁵² These are

¹⁵² That being inside the EC will impair the ability of the country to work directly with LEDCs is a recurrent argument in the NO front argumentation, particularly in Norway.

portrayed again as integral to what the Danish and Norwegian nations mean. The assertions that these are essential characteristics to Denmark and Norway are made by both sides of the EC membership debate, but the predicted consequences of potential EC membership upon these "integral" values are, of course, highly different viewed through the lenses of the pro- and anti-membership sides. For opponents of membership, the EC threatens those very values. In hyping up opposition to membership, the NO front frequently makes references to events in Europe's past, framing the EC as the descendant of the nations which caused two world wars and endless devastation across the continent.¹⁵³ It is interesting that in doing so, the NO front actually also helps to equate the political institution of the EC with the *idea* of Europe through tying it in with 'Europe's' past. As mentioned, the Second World War is a frequent reference in both the Danish and Norwegian NO fronts' arguments. In Norway, this is usually framed in terms of Norway's (impressive) resistance to the Nazi occupation, with the EC as an evil, independence-robbing European force that "folket" must fight.¹⁵⁴ In Denmark, the same fierce call to action – active resistance – and quite the same level of dystopia are often lacking, with the focus being more on scare-scenarios of the Germans and coming back to "occupy" the Danish beaches and summer houses, for example. In one of the more extreme and sharp examples within the Danish debate, EC opponents in Århus (and *Ekstra Bladet*) make use of one of the most cherished and well-known acts of collective memory and remembrance rituals in Danish culture in an effort to present their argument as the freeing of Denmark from the Nazi occupation (the ritual is explained in the text):

THE FREEDOM LIGHTS JOIN FIGHT AGAINST THE EC

*The freedom candles are being set up again. On the 4th May 1945, candle lights appeared spontaneously in thousands of windows. Since then, the day of liberty has been marked in this way every year. Now the lights are appearing in the fight against the EC. The People's Movement against the EC in Århus want to send out word that candle lights should be set up the windows on Sunday. This symbol of liberty will be turned towards the EC.*¹⁵⁵

This article makes very explicit the reference to the war and to the use of a "symbol of liberty" in order to press home the point that Denmark once again needs to be "saved" from the grips of Europe's evil. Note the use of the word "fight" (kamp), as was prevalent in the Norwegian campaign in particular. Another recurring Danish advert from the NO front

¹⁵³ Some books make reference to a similar strand in the Norwegian debate, where the NO front connected the EC to the devastation caused by its many (nineteenth-century) empires. I have not, however, really witnessed this strand of argument in the debate.

¹⁵⁴ Much has been written on this, see for example Esborg, Baumann, Bjørklund.

¹⁵⁵ "Frihedsllysene til kamp imod EF", *Ekstra Bladet*, 30th September 1972, 14.

claimed that "A JA is the beginning of JAWOHL".¹⁵⁶ ("Ja" means "yes".) With these types of uses of the years of occupation and war, the NO front played on people's memories of the war and emotions (*pathos*) by making the EC representative of a dark and scary European "other"; a threat to Danish identity and the very existence of Denmark. It is possible that they went slightly overboard.

The YES front made use of almost the same historical narrative – that of occupation and resistance in the war – but turned it on its head compared to the NO front. One article in *Aftenposten* is sent in on behalf of the Union of Resistance Veterans for a United Europe (URPE), who must have held a good deal of authority as a group (*ethos*). It states that the URPE

encourages all freedom-loving women and men in Norway and Denmark to create a real basis for a European brother- and sisterhood by voting for an affirmative YES in their respective governments' appeals.

*- The Norwegian and Danish voters will in that way heighten the hope which was born under the slavery of Nazism to be able to create a real association of the European democracies against all the narrow-minded, nationalistic and imperialistic powers that are unanimous with suppression and slavery, it is stated in an appeal which is primarily intended for their comrades from the resistance fights in Norway and Denmark.*¹⁵⁷

Here, a very positive picture of the (eventual) outcome of the war is represented. The war is framed as a tragedy from which "a European brother- and sisterhood" can form – through membership of the European Communities. What's more, it is set up as a utopian alternative to "narrow-minded, nationalistic and imperialistic powers", making this European "brotherhood" a(n imagined) community which the addressee should undoubtedly want to join. In this scenario, the "nationalistic powers" become the evil "other". Although obviously referring to the darker past of European war and empires, the use of nationalism also evokes the "nationalist" and "isolationist" forces against EC membership.

Another interesting articulation of Europe and its warlike past comes from an article by the former Danish prime minister Hilmar Baunsgaard. In a much longer article in *Politiken*, he presents a similar vision of a utopian, peaceful Europe of the future:

Politicians of different orientations and with different societal visions but united by the thought of creating the co-operative Europe, which unlike the historical

¹⁵⁶ "Européiske motstandskamerater: Stem JA!", *Aftenposten*, 23rd September 1972, 3.

¹⁵⁷ "Européiske motstandskamerater: Stem JA!", *Aftenposten*, 23rd September 1972, 3.

Europe could contribute to peaceful co-existence between the nations of the world.

This new Europe has not been created yet. But it can be created. The EC is a station towards the new Europe; a station which moves the goal closer every time new countries join. Denmark should be in this Europe. Due to economic necessity, but also - and particularly - because this is where we have our place.

We can't live our life based solely on experiences from the past. We cannot control the feelings of the past, no matter how much respect we may have for where they come from. We have to act based on the conditions of the moment and with our eye on the future's opportunities.

For these reasons, I have said yes and on this background, I express the hope that this Monday will give us the population's clear and strong yes to the Europe of the future.

HILMAR BAUNSGAARD".¹⁵⁸

Rather than being a descendant of the warlike Europe of the past, as in the NO front's examples above, the EC here is represented as a "station" towards a "new Europe" in a manner that resembles the earlier YES front examples. In this vision, Denmark – and the Danish population – belongs within this (literally) imagined community; in fact, Denmark is *destined* to take up its rightful place within this European identity. Unlike the "historical" Europe, this Europe will further peaceful co-existence; fitting right into the commonly accepted characteristics and values of Danish identity as peace-loving, safe and caring towards others. With his statement that "We have to act based on the conditions of the moment", the appeal to economic necessity and his urging readers not to live in the past, he links rational *logos* arguments for why the Danish nation should join the EC with a utopian vision of a future European community.

5.6 The Economic Argument as *Pathos*

You wish for a happy family life. Yes.

The Common Market creates a happy family life. Yes.

Therefore, vote Yes to the Common Market.

*Yes to the EC.*¹⁵⁹

As covered earlier, the economic argument for joining was one of the most used by the YES front and seems to have been held as the most persuasive, both from what is reported in the newspapers and written about in the readers' letters, and from what secondary literature

¹⁵⁸ Hilmar Baunsgaard, "Derfor ja", feature article in *Politiken*, 1st October 1972, 16.

¹⁵⁹ Advert, *Politiken*, 1st October 1972, 41

reports. The Danish newspapers in particular are full of adverts, articles and arguments supporting a YES vote on the basis of the economy. Some of these are based on cold, hard economics and some even take on an unappetisingly threatening tone. One advert which keeps appearing lists everyday food items and estimates how much their price will rise by in the event that Denmark does not join the EC, for example. Many of the economic arguments, however, actually make an appeal as *pathos* arguments as well as *logos*. In his book on rhetoric, Fafter remarks that:

*In our culture in recent times, a cleft between pathos and logos has emerged. We mistrust the seductive powers of language and refer them to art. It makes us forget that the sensitive language also directly moves our passions outside of art; that is to say outside of the rational meaning that they offer. Nominally and rationally, we try to reduce speech to pure logos or just facts. Nevertheless, we do not understand our existence through the language of rationality, but through emotions and intuition. In this regard, the emotional pathos is a crucial part of the uttering.*¹⁶⁰

This idea, that much of what we hold to be convincing due to its rationality and the logic force of an argument, actually still has a base in *pathos* fits very well with many of the utterances that concern arguments made from an economic point of view. Although it would be silly to deny that self-preservation and self-interest play parts in people's motivations, it is fair to say that there was also an ideological aspect to much of the economic discussion surrounding EC membership. The advert in *Politiken* cited at the beginning of this section shows one way that the economic argument was presented as invoking the emotions: In appealing to a happy family life, the YES front was clearly presenting membership of the EC not just as in voters' self-interest, but also as in the interests of their loved ones. Many arguments take a similar if less blatant approach, with appeals to vote yes for the well-being of future generations of Denmark's population popping up regularly.

A similar but arguably more profound use of pathos is found in many other economic arguments. This can be said to directly appeal to the electorate's sense of Danishness or Norwegianness, and to their collective national identities. One such example is:

Tighter economic conditions will hit the weakest groups first and hardest. We must therefore stick to our social benefits - and improve upon them. Therefore, I choose the co-operation and vote yes".

Karl Skytte, Speaker at the Danish Parliament.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Fafner, *Retorik*, 49.

¹⁶¹ Karl Skytte, "Ja til samarbejde", Advert for membership, *Ekstra Bladet*, 29th September 1972, 21.

This type of economic argument goes right to the core of some of the attributes that are commonly held up to be Danish (and Norwegian): The welfare state, taking care of the "weakest groups" and protecting social benefits strikes right at the heart of what most Danes would consider some of the integral values of the Danish nation. Here, the economic argument also relies on *pathos*. There is, in part, a threat; an appeal to fear in the assertion that a bad economy "will hit the weakest groups first and hardest". There is also, however, a strong emotive and ideological appeal in the argument: By joining the EC, Denmark can afford to be even more Danish: Danes can reinforce their Danish identity by also joining the European Communities.

5.7 The Use of Norden

If you vote No to the EC today, you will at the same time be saying Yes to the rest of Norden, who we historically, culturally and politically are much closer to than the Continental European states, who just within the last century have caused our part of the world and the entire earth to enter into the two most terrible wars in the history of humankind.

Part of *Ekstra Bladet's* final front-page appeal, 2nd October 1972.¹⁶²

An interesting observation is that the idea of Norden seems to feature more prominently in both the Norwegian and Danish debates – and across both the yes and no newspapers – than most secondary sources seem to acknowledge. Even Nordek, usually portrayed as having petered out completely in popular support in 1970s in secondary literature, actually pops up a considerable amount in anti-membership arguments, where the idea of reviving negotiations for Nordek's close economic-political co-operation is forcefully proposed as an alternative to the EC. Unlike in the debates concerning Norwegian and Swedish referendums on membership of the EU in 1994, where Axel Eriksson writes that mentions of Norden or Scandinavia "were neither many nor in-depth",¹⁶³ a significant amount of mentions and articulations of Norden (and Scandinavia) pop up in the 1972 debates. Most of these mentions occur after Norway's no. They invade both the yes and the NO front's arguments

¹⁶² "Stem NEJ", *Ekstra Bladet*, 2nd October 1972, 1.

¹⁶³ Erik Axelsson, *Historien i politiken: Historieanvändning i norsk och svensk EU-debatt 1990-1994* (Uppsala: Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 2006), 275.

though, of course, in different ways. Though some attention naturally shifts away from the arguments of the debate in the Norwegian papers, particularly towards the ensuing governmental chaos, it actually happens to a much smaller extent than one may have thought, as a great deal of coverage continues to be devoted to the Danish debate.

The prominence that the Norden argument came to take on for both fronts is evidenced by its appearances in the newspapers: As seen above, Norden had been adopted as one of the main, front-page arguments for *Ekstra Bladet* on the day of the vote. *Politiken* put forward the Norden argument as one of its three main arguments the day before the referendum. And in Norway, coverage of Denmark's referendum became dominated by references to and arguments framed within Norden – again for both fronts. Already on the morning of his own personal loss in Norway, the Norwegian Prime Minister Bratteli stated that it would be in the interest of Norway for Denmark to enter the EC.¹⁶⁴ A statement of his – "Denmark does no favour to Norden by saying no" became one of the most-used references in the days leading up to the Danish vote. For the YES front in both Denmark and Norway, the idea that Denmark could become a link between Norden and Europe quickly caught on after Norway's rejection of membership.

On the 3rd October, after the Danish result was revealed, several politicians expressed the idea that Denmark would now take on the role, or duty, of "bridge-building" between Norden and the EC. Krag, the former prime minister Baunsgaard and the leader of the Liberal Party Poul Hartling all set up Denmark in this role in separate statements reported in *Politiken* (and *Politiken* itself uttered the same thought in its opinion piece), using metaphors such as "holding open the door", being "the connecting link" and, of course, "building bridges".¹⁶⁵ The leader for the Socialist People's Party – the only party to have been officially against membership – declared that "[f]or us, a no to the Community was a chance to heal ... deep wounds in Denmark's relationship to Norden. Now, we are severed from Norden and from Nordic politics".¹⁶⁶ It is mentioned seven times by different people within the first four pages in *Politiken* on the 3rd October that Denmark will become a bridge-builder; that Denmark has a commitment to close Nordic co-operation; that Denmark will help bring "Scandinavian culture" to the EC and that Sweden and Norway will probably be members within five years now that Denmark is. For the YES front, Norden is portrayed as a viable *supplementary* imagined community to both the national identity and a European identity.

¹⁶⁴ *Politiken* front page, 26th September 1972, 1.

¹⁶⁵ "Krag: vi må ikke glemme Norden", *Politiken*, 3rd October 1972: 3; "Sådan mener *Politiken*", *Politiken*, 3rd October 1972: 1 and 12.

¹⁶⁶ "Krag: vi må ikke glemme Norden", *Politiken*, 3rd October 1972: 3.

On the anti-membership front in both countries, Norway's no is framed again and again as evidence of the credibility of Norden as an *alternative* to the European Communities. Arguments range from the economic-political, with some utterers claiming that Norden is a better alternative for Norway and Denmark as they will have more economic independence and freedom of choice to trade with whom they want globally within a Nordic co-operation, to the utterly emotive appeals to a shared history and belonging.

A no will also be a yes to Norden, a yes to wanting to co-operate with Europe, but a co-operation that in the long run will develop into a more equal co-operation; a co-operation that is mutually agreed upon; a co-operation based not upon the Rome Treaty and the Davignon Report's criteria, but a co-operation that gives Scandinavia priority and creates opportunities for us to independently and on our own conditions influence and shape developments not only in our own society, but across the world and, thereby, does not make us into a province in a protected centre-oriented and power-oriented club ... [A no will bring] greater freedom and opportunities for the individual.¹⁶⁷

This quote, part of a long article by a Danish historian and prominent anti-membership campaigner, mirrors some of the earlier appeals by the YES front for Denmark to join the somewhat utopian "Europe of the future". Instead, however, he is arguing for a utopian Norden/Scandinavia which will have great influence "across the world" and deal with 'Europe' on Norden's own terms. He even uses the collective "us" in describing Norden and sets Norden up against Europe as a power and centre-oriented "club". Here, Norden and Europe are actually presented as entirely opposing collective imagined identities; a trend which reflects the general view of the NO front as expressed in the newspapers in regards to Norden and Europe.

5.8 History Written by the Losers

Mr Editor,

The Norwegian NO majority is a scorn and a slap to the face of the free, democratic Europe. This is Norway, the home of Nansen, we've got enough in ourselves. ... Why does Norway choose the market deal when we would be better off with membership? Well, you see, that only the dark Norwegian folk soul can

¹⁶⁷ Steen Danø, "Uansvarligt at stemme ja", feature in *Politiken*, 28th September 1972: 22.

Steen Danø was a general manager of several Danish businesses and became an well-known public debater in the 1970s. Another Danish newspaper, *Information*, described him as "quite simply the NO front's safest trump card within the business leader community" in his obituary in 1998.

tell you. We are many who are disappointed within Norway today. Disappointed at the majority of the Norwegian people, disappointed with the lack of will to co-operate in this country. We are also disappointed with the narrow-sighted elf's-hat-and-we-are-us-selves mentality.

*But it usefully shows that the Norwegian people are not yet mature enough to step into a community with the EC. That is a pity. But perhaps the time will come, and we must never give up hope that Ola Nordmann also – perhaps after some expensive life lessons – realises that his natural place is within the European Community.*¹⁶⁸

HOLGER DANSKE'S DEPARTURE

The Liberal newspaper Fyns Tidende is jubilant at the referendum result:

'The voters are truly awake and know when to strike. The fantastic voter turnout alone should lead to brave Holger Danske under his Kronborg Castle being provided not only with his freedom fighter's band - but also getting a voting pencil in his hand. There is life in him!'

*We can inform Fyns Tidende that Holger Danske on Monday at midnight put his sword in its sheath and took off northwards. For some time, his being has been damaged by grunting bacon pigs, and when he saw how the Danes threw away their country with the voting pencils, he was deeply disappointed. He would have informed Queen Margrethe of his decision, but she was busy in a meeting with Krag. No one recognised the old giant when he got on the first morning ferry at Elsinore and left Kronborg behind him. Holger Danske has been granted political asylum in Norway, where he is now honoured highly.*¹⁶⁹

There were many sore and disappointed 'losers' in the days after both the Norwegian and the Danish referendums, when many of the most passionate and emotive utterances within the debates surfaced. While the winning sides were busy urging unity and reconciliation (particularly in Norway where it was badly needed), celebrating and assuredly explaining people's reasons for voting the same way that they had advocated, many who had voted against the outcome were pushed to express their deepest disgust with their own countrymen. Many of them do so by evoking and ridiculing fun of the most deeply held national characteristics, figures and myths within their collective repertoire of references. Two of the best examples have been listed above. Ola Nordmann is a common personification of the average Norwegian dating back to at least 1844, when the poet and author Henrik Wergeland used him as a pseudonym.¹⁷⁰ He is often depicted wearing an elf's hat. The explorer Fridtjof Nansen, one of the most famous Norwegians in history, famously survived expeditions to the

¹⁶⁸ "Nei-flertallet", *Aftenposten*, 30th September 1972, 2.

¹⁶⁹ "Dagens debat", *Ekstra Bladet*, 5th October 1972: 2.

¹⁷⁰ "Ola Nordmann", *Store Norske Leksikon* (https://snl.no/Ola_Nordmann; accessed 8th June 2017).

North Pole and Greenland which could easily have killed him, doggedly powering through in the harsh environment. Normally, he would presumably be used to evoke positive visions of Norway, but here, combined with the images of the slightly dopey elf's hat drawn down to cover the eyes, the mention of the "dark" Norwegian folk soul, and the othering in the relation to the "free, democratic Europe", Norway (and its people) is depicted as a silly, stubborn loner by someone within the Norwegian imagined community. It is interesting that the reader uses some of the most common points of reference for Norwegians to shame his fellows. By doing so, he is providing a negative perspective on their commonalities, but he also, at the same time, reinforces the connection that he has with his countrymen. On a side note, the statement that "the Norwegian people are not yet mature enough to step into a community with the EC" is very interesting, and suggests a consciousness of the youth of Norway as an independent modern country. It is probably not a self-assessment or self-insult that would be found in the Danish newspapers. The traditional protector of Denmark, an ancient giant made of stone who's said to come awake in time of national crisis, gets a more respectable treatment by the losing side; however, he is used in a similar way to both connect to and chastise the Danish population and all their disgusting grunting bacon pigs. In both cases, some deeply-held characteristics of the national identity are held up, mocked, but ultimately also reinforced.

6. CONCLUSION

It is difficult to draw any very strong conclusions about notions which are as difficult to pin down as identity, national affinity and other deeply held convictions within society. Through looking at the meeting of different potential imagined communities within the referendum debates, one thing which has become clear is that, at least within this particular situation and at this point in time, no matter whether the utterer supports or rejects the idea of multiple or alternative communal identities, he or she always views these questions through the identity lens of the nation. Few if any opinions encountered within the debates proposed that the national should be removed or replaced. Those who were in favour of EC membership or wanted to be part of an ideological "new Europe" almost always explained their point of view through reference to the national, and those who wanted to remain out expressed their arguments in terms of what was best for the nation long-term. Even largely pragmatic arguments such as economic ones were often framed in terms of national identity and ideology.

Through the multiple, slightly differing meanings of the nation's "people"; through casual and often unconscious uses of the "we" to define broad community as the Danish or the Norwegian nation, utterers of all convictions helped to further cement the primacy of the nation as an imagined community. Even – or perhaps particularly – when disagreement with others within the national community arose about whether their national identity could be supplemented by other identities, the shared points of national reference used to argue helped to reinforce a sense of a common past, a shared present and a collective future. If anything, the national identities seemed to have been further solidified by disagreement within the national psyche thanks to the need to actually negotiate what was important to that national identity. Setting the referendums up to be important historical events, and thus identity-shaping moments for the nation, helped to add a new chapter to the nation's common historical narrative and to serve as reminders of the shared identity held by the people within it. The appearance of an 'other'; a 'they' helped to reinforce the primacy and coherence of the nation.

It is a basic and unsurprising point to say that those who opposed EC membership presented the EC as an alternative to the national identity community, while both the EC and Norden were portrayed as attractive supplementary and mutually inclusive communities by the YES front. While the EC and its manifestations as the warlike Europes of history was portrayed as a threat to the integrity and independence of Norway and Denmark in many NO front arguments, this was never the case with portrayals of the Norden, despite the region's fairly recent history of occupations and unequal unions. None of the opponents to joining the European Communities objected to the idea of a Nordic collective culture and co-operation, at least not within these newspapers. Norden was portrayed as a force for good by both sides. Of course, the modern idea of Norden was never perceived as threatening the sovereignty of the nation states, which is an important point. Perhaps the presence of a greater perceived international threat also made some of those opponents to the EC who most valued national freedom and independence warm to Nordic identity, at least during the referendum debates? Few things unite as well as a larger perceived 'other' looming from the outside.

7. APPENDIX

Figure 1) Overview of Political Parties around 1972 (at least one percent of the national vote)

Denmark (based on order of size following 1971 election. Total seats: 175 from mainland)*

Party name (English)	Party name (Danish)	Political stance	Votes (%) / MPs	General stance on EC membership
Social Democratic Party	Socialdemokratiet	Main left-of-centre party (formed government with support from the Socialist People's Party)	37.3 / 70	For EC membership, but with important opponents
The Conservative People's Party	Det konservative folkeparti	Conservative, right-of-centre	16.7 / 31	For EC membership
The Liberal Party/Venstre	Venstre, Danmarks liberale parti	Liberal, right-of-centre	15.6 / 30	For EC membership
The Social Liberal Party	Det Radikale Venstre	Social Liberal, central	14.4 / 27	For EC membership
Socialist People's Party	Socialistisk folkeparti	1959 spin-off of the Communist Party, became seen as most moderate of parties left of the Social Democrats	9.1 / 17	All 17 opponents of membership (only major party officially against)
(Christian People's Party/Christian Democrat Party)	Kristeligt folkeparti	Socially conservative; founded 1970 as reaction against liberalisation of porn	1.9 / 0	For membership
(Justice Party)	Danmarks retsforbund	Wanted free trade and barriers removed world-wide	1.7 / 0	Opposed EC membership
(Left Socialists)	Venstresocialisterne	1967 spin-off from SF	1.6 / 0	Opposed
(The Communist Party)	Danmarks kommunistiske parti	Communist	1.4 / 0	Opposed

**Greenland and the Faroe Islands elect two additional representatives each.*

The Social Democratic Party minority government was supported by the Socialist People's Party.

Norway (based in order of size following 1969 election. Total seats: 150)

Party name (English)	Party name (Norwegian)	Political stance	Votes (%)/ MPs	General stance on EC membership
The Labour Party	Arbeiderpartiet	Main left-of-centre party – always largest party overall in decades leading up to 1972	46.6/ 74	For EC membership, but many opponents
The Conservative Party	Høyre	Major right-of-centre party, conservative	18.8/ 29	For EC membership
The Liberal Party	Venstre	Socially liberal, central	9.4/13	Officially for: 8 for and 5 against
The Centre Party	Senterpartiet	Centre politics, based on protecting primary sector interests, particularly farming and fishing	9.0/20	Opponents of EC membership; only party officially against
Christian People's Party	Kristelig folkeparti	Christian, culturally conservative	7.8/14	Officially for; MPs split
(The Socialist People's Party)	Sosialistisk folkeparti	1961 off-spin from the Labour Party; more left- wing, anti-American/NATO foreign policy, lost their previous two seats in 1969	3.4/0	Opponents of EC membership
(The Communist Party)	Norges kommunistiske parti	Communist	1.0/0	Opponents of EC membership

*The coalition stepped down following increased tension between the coalition parties in 1971, replaced by a Labour Party minority government without election. The number of representatives for each party remained the same.

Figure 2) Timeline of national and international events, 1945-1973

Year	International, EEC/EC	Denmark	Norway
1945	End of Second World War	4 th May: Liberated after five years of occupation	- 4 th May: Liberated after five years of occupation - 5 th November: The Labour Party wins majority, remains in government for eighteen years
1948	Organisation for European Co-operation (OEEC) set up to implement the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery following the war. Helps to administer scarce resources, revoke expensive trade regulations and set up a joint commission to oversee intra-national economic decisions. Norway and Denmark are founding members		
1949	The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is established; Norway and Denmark are founding members		
1951	European Coal and Steel Community established at the Treaty of Paris (involves "The Six" - France, West Germany, Italy, Benelux): Aims to create a common market for coal and steel industries and remove trade barriers in these industries in order to make war between these countries unthinkable in future		
1957	Treaty of Rome puts into existence the European Economic Community (EEC), a common market for goods, capital, services and free movement of people with a common external trade policy		
1959	Seven members of the OEEC ("The Seven") set up the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in response to the EEC. The EFTA sought to avoid the joint politics (and the idea of closer political union) and some of the regulations of the EEC and maintain an "economic counterbalance" to the EEC block	Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK are members	Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK are members
1960	Proposals for a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) within the EEC proposed: This would be a serious advantage for agriculture within the EEC and disadvantage non-members	21 st February: Left-of-centre coalition government headed by Social Democrat Kampmann elected	

	who trade with the EEC		
1961	The UK applies for membership of the EEC on the 1 st August	The Danish government, pre-warned about the UK's decision, apply for EC membership on the 10 th August	
1962	The EEC introduces the CAP to protect farmers within the EEC from competition from imports from outside the EEC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Danish agriculture suffers dramatically as a result of being excluded from the CAP throughout the 1960s - 3rd September: The Social Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party (De radikale) form new coalition government; Social Democrat Jens Otto Krag becomes prime minister 	April 1962: Norway applies for EC membership following constitutional and political debate on sovereignty and whether to follow the UK and Denmark
1963	The French president De Gaulle rejects the UK's EEC membership proposal	The Danish EEC membership proposal is rejected by default	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Norwegian EEC membership proposal is rejected by default - 28th August-25th September: Right-wing coalition government following mining disaster and subsequent political cover-up crisis - 25th September: The Labour Party led by Gerhardsen back in government
1964		26 th September: The Social Democratic Party forms majority government, Jens Otto Krag remains prime minister	
1965			12 th October: Right-of-centre coalition of the Centre Party, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party takes over government. Per Borten from the Centre Party becomes prime minister
1967	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The "Merger"/Brussels Treaty comes into effect, combining the EEC, the ECSC and the European Atomic Energy Community under one joint council and commission – they become known as the "European Communities" (EC) - May: The UK applies for EC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - May: Denmark quickly follows the UK in applying for EC membership - The second Danish EEC membership proposal is rejected by default 	- July: Norway follows the UK and DK in applying for EC membership; enthusiasm within Norway's parliament has seemingly increased with only 13/ 169 members voting against the decision*

	<p>membership again</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - July: Sweden applies for "extensive, close and durable relations in a form compatible with continued pursuit of Swedish neutrality"; a more open, direct relationship with the EC bloc* - November: De Gaulle vetoes UK membership again 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The second Norwegian EEC membership proposal is rejected by default
1968		<p>The second French rejection of UK/DK/NO EC membership leads to rekindled interest in a Nordic Common Market (Nordek)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - New right-of-centre coalition government made up of the Social Liberals, the Conservative People's Party and the Liberal Party. Social Liberal Hilmar Baunsgaard is prime minister 	
1969	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Customs Union removes all remaining import tariffs on trade between the EC countries - April: De Gaulle resigns, improving the chances of potential UK (DK and NO) membership of the EC - July: The EC begins to re-examine membership for the UK, Ireland, Norway and Denmark 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The improved prospect of EC membership means interest in Nordek lessens again, particularly after the Finns drop out of the negotiations in March 1970 following disagreement with Denmark about the potential degree of closeness of Nordek to the EC - Skandek (Scandinavian economic co-operation) is proposed in Denmark; fails to catch on in Norway and Sweden and fades out by 1971 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 8th September: Election. Right-of-centre coalition led by the Centre Party's Borten continues as Prime Minister
1970	<p>30th June: Membership negotiation talks between the UK, Ireland, Norway and Denmark and the EC members open in Luxembourg</p>	<p>Winter/spring: The UK and Denmark reapply for EC membership</p>	<p>June: Norway applies for EC membership for the third time with 132 MPs supporting the decision and 17 against the application: Referendum announced</p>
1971	<p>30th June: The UK, Ireland, Norway and Denmark lay out their negotiating positions before the EC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 4th May: The Liberal-Conservative government accept the Social Democratic Party's demand that a referendum be held on membership of the EC: Referendum announced - 11th October: Social Democrats win outright majority: New government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 17th March: The right-of-centre coalition government led by Borten steps down following split caused by EC opinions. Labour Party back in power. Trygve Bratteli becomes prime minister

		led by Jens Otto Krag (his third term as prime minister)	
1972		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Danish PM Krag announces that Denmark will hold its referendum a week after Norway's. Has not alerted Norwegian politicians to this decision, and many Danish politicians believe this would have had a positive influence on Norway's pro-membership vote - 2nd October: Denmark's referendum on EC membership held - 3rd October: Result of referendum shows 63.3 per cent in favour of membership - 5th October: Jens Otto Krag steps down as Prime Minister, stating he has done his duty, replaced by fellow Social Democrat Anker Jørgensen 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Talks between Norway's PM Bratteli and Denmark's PM Krag reveal that Bratteli wishes to make it clear to public that they should not consider referendums depending on the other nation - January: Parliament sets date for EC referendum - 24th-25th September: Norway's referendum on EC membership held - 26th September: Result of referendum shows 53.3 per cent opposed to membership - 18th October: Right-of-centre coalition of the Christian People's Party, the Centre Party and the Liberals come into government led by the Christian People's Party's Lars Korvald
1973	1 st January: Denmark, Ireland and the UK become members of the EC		

Figure 3) Use of Colour Coding Labels and Searchable Tags/Terms

Colour-Coding Key:

Yellow: Worth noting about events within the country that the newspaper belongs to

Orange: Worth noting about events in the other country

Lilac: Positive about EC membership for the country

Magenta: Negative about EC membership for the country

Light green: Scornful of membership opponents

Dark green: Scornful of membership proponents

Red: Positive about Norway-Denmark's relationship and EC

Dark red: Negative about the EC and Norway-Denmark's relationship

Light blue: Norden/Scandinavia (general) in relation to Europe/EC and/or Norway/Denmark

Blue: Norden improved by EC membership/EC positive from Nordic perspective

Turquoise: Norden worsened by EC membership/EC negative from Nordic perspective

Salmon: Other

Grey: Used in Context section/already translated in notes-document

Specific Search Terms in Adobe Acrobat Pro Comments:

**The terms have been translated here from Danish*

"Rhetoric" ("Pathos", "Ethos", "Logos"): Particularly forceful use of one of these; usually Pathos, or a combination

"Identity" (Denmark, Norway, Norden, Europe): Articulation of (national) identity

"History": Use of history in articulating identity/EC stance

"Relationship": Mentions of one country influencing the other or identity comparison

Bridge (Norden): The argument that Denmark can be a bridge between Norden and the EC

"Folk": Uses of "the people"

"Reader": Reader's comment; reader's opinion piece

"Advert" ("yes advert", "no advert"): Explicit adverts within the newspapers

"Example": Good examples/illustrations of a common point/argument

"Brexit": Interesting mirroring of Brexit debate/events

"Use"/"Analyse": Definitely use/analyse entire article in paper

Usually, more than one term was used to label a particular note (e.g. "Norden Identity History"), which would give a better indication of what was being argued along with the colour categorisation of the comment (see above). It was possible to search for a particular search term within the "Comments" function in Adobe Acrobat, or to have all comments or a particular colour of comment shown on the right-hand side of the screen when viewing the newspaper.

Figure 4) Example of Labelling

Tirsdag aften **Aftenposten** 4. oktober 1972

Rekordvalg ga sterkt ja



To av de fremste danske EF-tilhengere jubler over den uventede store seieren. Økonomiminister Per Hækkerup (til venstre) og tidligere statsminister Hilmar Baunsgaard fra Radikale Venstre. (AP)

Aftenpostens medarbeider
IVAR GRANAASEN
København, 3. oktober.

Det usedvanlig store fremmet, på 88,8 prosent, var det aller mest overraskende resultat ved søndagens folketingsvalg i Danmark. Danskerne gikk mann av huse for å delta i den historiske beslutning, og fremmetprosenten er ny rekord. Ved det såkalte «nasjonale valg» i 1943 var det fremmet på 85,3 prosent, og ved valget i september ifjor var prosenten 85,6.

Nesten to millioner mennesker svarte ja i folkeavstemningen, og EF-motstanderne led svindende nederlag i de fleste distrikter. På landsbasis var det bare avdelt motstanderne nådde over 30 prosent av anslått stemmeberettigede.

Bare i København kommune og på Grønland var det klare motresultat. I København amt (fylke) var det imidlertid flertall for danske medlemskap i EF.

Danmarks beslutning vil trolig

allerede i formiddag styrke den danske kronen, og valutabørsen åpner igjen med samme optimisme som da børsen ble stengt for en uke siden. Tilroret til dansk industri vil også vise seg når aksje- og obligasjonsbørsen åpner, og alle eksperter regner med en rekorddaglig stigning for industriaksjer. Men har antydning at stigningen kan komme til å løpe opp i 20 prosent allerede første dag. Og det er høyt over tall at resultatet er en kraftig stimulans for dansk industri. Dette tyder også de positive kommentarer fra industri- og næringslivsledere på. Tilbak var jordbruksorganisasjonen storforbøyd med resultatet.

Finansminister Henry Grunhaug kunne ikke løse gull og grønne skener etter dansk huetred i EF, men antydning at det ikke er aktuelt med skatteforhøyelser med det forslå. Økonomi- og budjetministre Per Hækkerup og Hilmar Baunsgaard er imidlertid at Danmarks økonomiske vasskapskap ikke er løst, og antydning at EF-medlemskapet er et faktum.

Nesten alle de danske partier har vært splittet i markedsøkonomi og medlemskapet har vært sterkt

Etter det klare ja-flertall er det også ventet at markedsøkonomistandene blant sosialdemokraterne i Folketinget vil oppgi sin videre kamp. Denne oppfatning ble styrket etter at en av partiets livsteget etter at en av partiets livsteget markedsøkonomistandene. Svend markedsøkonomistandene plass var innenfor partiet.

Situasjonen nu er den at Norge er det eneste vest-europiske land som ikke har ordnet sitt forhold til det utvidede EF fra utvidet. Danmark har allerede på forhånd sagt seg villig til å ta på seg ansvaret for å sikre at Norge ikke blir utelattet. Utspillet er imidlertid at Norges EF vil formelt ikke foreta seg noe overfor Norge for en norsk regjering har gjort seg opp sin mening om hva den vil når det gjelder forhandlinger om en handelsavtale, og har presentert et utspill om dette i Brussel.

I Kommisjons-kretser betegner man Danmarks avgjørelse som historisk for Fellesskapet. EF har fått med seg litt av Norden, og man håper dette vil gi betydning som en brotør til en senere utvidelse — en gang i 1973-seiren — med Norge og Sverige. Formannen

Palme sier seg tilfreds

Stockholm, 3. oktober.

(NTB—TT) Sverige både støtter og respekterer det danske folks vedtak i EF-spørsmålet, sa statsminister Olof Palme i en kommentar til den danske folkeavstemningen i svensk fjernsyn natt til tirsdag. Han erklærte seg forøvrig enig i de tanker som statsminister Jens Otto Krag hadde gitt uttrykk for etter at utfallet var klart, nemlig at det nå er nødvendig med en styrkelse og utdypelse av det nordiske samarbeidet.

— Det er et sterkt ønske om et tettert nordisk samarbeide, og vi her i Sverige kommer til å gå inn for det, sa Palme.

Den liberale morgenvisjonen **Dagens Nyheter** skriver idag at «Norden og dermed Sverige har fått et brohode i EF». Avisen legger imidlertid til at man hverken skal forlange eller vente at Danmark går oppgaven med å være Nordens representant i EF-organene til sin hovedrolle.

Den konservative avisen **Svenska Dagbladet** skriver at den realisme i økonomiske spørsmål som preger danskene synes å ha gjort utslaget ved folkeavstemningen. De som har gått med på dansk til Krag og hans regjering, ved å støtte at den nordiske regjering var raske med å gå med på et forslag om å innføre en felles valuta, for den norske er det viktig at valget ikke gir alle som

Sosialden i Finland

Aftenpostens korrespondent
Helsingfors, 3. oktober.

Gårdagens kommunvalg i Finland ga størst fremgang for sosialdemokraterne, som øket sin andel av velgermassen med 3,1 prosent fra forrige kommunevalg. Også det konservative Samlingspartiet gikk frem, mens Velkko Vennamos Landsbygdparti ble valgets store taper.

Som helhet betraktet medførte valget en forskyvning på drøye to

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Heath: A svekker i

Roma, 3. oktober.

(AP og NTB-Reuter) Statsminister Edward Heath sa igår kveld at det er fullstendig urealistisk å tro at en britisk regjering som kommer til makten etter 1. januar 1973 da Storbritannia formelt blir medlem av Fellesmarkedet, vil trekke landet ut av EF.

Heath, som tidligere på dagen hadde sittet to dagers offisielt besøk i Italia, talte på en middag gitt av den italienske regjering.

Den britiske statsminister understreket at britiske regjeringer ikke har for vane å bytte traktater. Det er derfor ikke realistisk å regne med at en britisk regjering vil velge å kaste bort alle

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Danmark i betydningsfull posisjon i Fellesskapet

Aftenpostens korrespondent
FREDRIK BOLIN.
Brussel, 3. oktober.

I EF-hovedstaden Brussel puster man idag lettet ut etter at det nu er endelig klart at i hvert fall Danmark følger Storbritannia og Eire inn på medlemsplass i Det europeiske fellesskap fra 1. januar. Ifølge EF hilser idag Danmarks overveldende ja med stor glede, og innenfor Fellesskapet — ikke minst i Belgia og Benelux-landene — stilles det forventninger til Danmark som «det de» europeiske Nordens representant i EF. Fra 1. januar 1973 vil EF bestå av ni land, og på mange hold i EF fremheves det idag på ny at man håper at også Norge en dag vil slutte seg til Fellesskapet.

Situasjonen nu er den at Norge er det eneste vest-europiske land som ikke har ordnet sitt forhold til det utvidede EF fra utvidet. Danmark har allerede på forhånd sagt seg villig til å ta på seg ansvaret for å sikre at Norge ikke blir utelattet. Utspillet er imidlertid at Norges EF vil formelt ikke foreta seg noe overfor Norge for en norsk regjering har gjort seg opp sin mening om hva den vil når det gjelder forhandlinger om en handelsavtale, og har presentert et utspill om dette i Brussel.

I Kommisjons-kretser betegner man Danmarks avgjørelse som historisk for Fellesskapet. EF har fått med seg litt av Norden, og man håper dette vil gi betydning som en brotør til en senere utvidelse — en gang i 1973-seiren — med Norge og Sverige. Formannen

i EF's landbruksministerråd, den nordnorske landbruksminister Lardne, uttalte under søndets møte i Luxembourg i natt at han ia særlig vekt på at det danske medlemskap kunne åpne større muligheter for norsk og svensk tilslutning senere.

Danmark trer nu formelt og for fullt inn i alle EF's organer og i all planlegging. Statsminister Jens Otto Krag vil imidlertid sin plass ved stats- eller regjeringens bord i Paris den 19. oktober, der viktige retningslinjer for Fellesskapets utvikling i de nærmeste år skal trekkes opp. Det vil uten tvil styrke Danmarks stemme og innflytelse i EF i tiden fremover at et så stort flertall av danskene sa ja til Europa, og at en overveldende stor del av befolkningen gikk til valgsurenne for å si sin mening om EF-saken. På denne bakgrunn vil Danmark, som et av de fem små land i det nye EF, få en særlig

anovarsfull plass og kunne også en viktig innflytelse på den utvikling av EF som mange håper vil finne sted — i retning av mer direkte demokrati i avgjørelsesprosessen. Underhåndsdrøftelser som har funnet sted mellom de fremtidige medlemsland i EF tyder på at Danmark har gode støtter. U av landets medlem av EF-kommisjonen vil bli berørt særlig avans for landbrukspolitikken.

Campbell's suppe på boks er den raskeste suppen som fins.



Besindig feiring i Danmark

Aftenpostens medarbeider
IVAR GRANAASEN.
København, 3. oktober.

Mindre grupper av ungdommelige markedsøkonomistandere demonstrerte i natt utenfor Folketinget uten at det kom til noen sammenstøt. Enkelte steder i gatene ble det imidlertid brent plakater, men ellers så det ut til at markedsøkonomistandene feiret seieren innendørs.

Pass på —

TILBUD

Uke nr. 41, 4/10-10/10 1972.	Vel. uts. pris	K-pris
FS Oslo Skinken 450 g	25,50	22,20
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Brun lapskaus 1/1 boks	10,60	8,85
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3 KNAI fra Konfek



Please note: This is not intended to be read; it is merely for the purpose of showing labelling.

Figure 5) Example of Commenting System and Search/ Labelling Options on Adobe Acrobat Pro



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