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Gender Equality and Women's Participation in Islamic Fundamentalist Groups

A Case Study of Java, Indonesia

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List of Abbreviations

CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CV	Curriculum Vitae
DDI	(Dewan *Dakwah Islamiyah*, Indonesia Islamic *Dakwah* Council)
DPR	(Dewan *Perwakilan Rakyat*, House of People's Representatives)
FPI	(Front *Pembela Islam*, Islamic Defenders Front)
FUI	(Forum *Ukhuwah Islamiyah*, the Brotherhood of Islamic Forum)
GAPAS	(Gerakan *Anti Pemurtadan dan Aliran Sesat*, the Front Against Apostasy and Deviant Sect)
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
IAIN	(Institut *Agama Islam Negeri*, the State Islamic Institute)
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IPAC	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict
ISIS	Islamic State of Syria and Iraq
LDII	(*Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic *Dakwah* Institution)
LEMKARI	(*Lembaga Karyawan Dakwah Islam*, Institution Employee of Islamic *Dakwah*)
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, bisexual and Transgender
LIPIA	(*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab*, Institution of Islamic and Arabic Science)
MHTI	(*Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Muslim Women)
MMI	(*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*, Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly)
MUI	(*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, Indonesian Ulema Council)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
PII	(*Pelajar Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Students)
PK	(*Partai Keadilan,* Prosperous Party)
PKS	(*Partai Keadilan Sosial*, Prosperous Justice Party)
SIDIK	(*Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer*, Study and Information of Contemporary Islamic World)
UGM	Universitas Gadjah Mada
UN	United Nation
YPP	(*Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian*, Institute for International Peace Building)

List of expressions and technical terms

Important terms that occur in the text from Indonesian (I) and Arabic (A) are listed. Derivations are given only if speakers are aware of the word's origin, or when the word exists in both Indonesian and Arabic languages. Terms that only appear once in a text are not included.

Amar makruf nahi mungkar (A): Enjoin good, forbid evil

Aurat (I<A Aurah): A Woman's body parts that should be covered and it is varied in different situations among different groups)

Ayah (A): A Qur'anic verse

Bid'ah (A): Innovation in religious matters

Cobaan (I): Tests from God

Dakwah (I<A da'wa): "Call," instructions to other Muslims and non Muslims about the practice of Islam manifested in various social activities

Dukun Jawa (I): A Javanese shaman

Hadith (A): A various reports containing the Prophet Muhammad's sayings, actions, and habits

Haram (I <A Harâm): Forbidden

Ikhlas (A & I): Sincerity, devotion, purity.

Jakarta Charter / Piagam Jakarta (I): Historical documents arranged by the Islamic groups and the national parties to eliminate the difference between religion and state on 22 June 1945

Jama'ah (A): Religious followers

Jihad (A<I): Efforts or struggle

Jihadist: A Muslim who participates in a *jihad*

Jilbab (I): An Indonesian term of *hijab*, a head covering worn by some Muslim women in public

Kafir (A<I): The infidel, the Christians, the Jewish, and the Atheists

Kampung (I): A Village

Kenek angkot (I): A mini bus driver assistant

Kodrat (I): Natural destiny as a woman, for example, women's ability to give a birth

Mubah (A): It is an action denoting as neither forbidden nor recommended / permissible

Musrik (A<I): Believing other than Allah

Nafkah (I>A Nafkh): Maintenance, to give a living such as money, food expenses, accommodation, security and protection of the family

Niqab (A): A woman's cloth which completely covers the body that includes the face

Pancasila (I): The official moral principles of Indonesian life and society

Pengajian (I): It can have several definitions. Its activity is basically learning Islam by doing some activities such as Qur'anic reading or listening to seminar about Islam

Pesantren (I): An Islamic boarding school

Polygamy: The practice of having more than one wife at the same time

Raiding: In this study, the raiding is defined as a sudden attack into some places that according to Islamic fundamentalist groups, are having un-Islamic activities. Such as sweeping night clubs, bars, prostitutes place, and closing illegal churches. The raiding is often anarchic

Sharia (A): Islamic legal system derived from the Qur'an and the *hadith*

Sunnah (A): In Arabic, it literally means 'habitual practice.' The traditional social, legal custom and practice of the Islamic community

Surah (A<I Surat): A chapter in the Qur'an
Syirik (I<A Shirk): The sin of practicing idolatry
Taqwa (A): God's conscious piety
Ummah (A): Community
Uztad (I): An Islamic teacher
Walikota (I): A city mayor
Wanita Salihah (I): A pious woman

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1.   Chapter 1 (Introduction)

1. Foreword

Throughout the history of Indonesia, Muslim women have joined a movement to show their political views or to support national movements to gain independence from the colonisation: women's involvement in society is not a new phenomenon. Cut Nyak Dien and Cut Nyak Meutia are some examples of Indonesian Muslim women who helped armed resistance against the Dutch colonists. According to Sydney Jones (2017), a researcher on terrorism in Southeast Asia and a director of Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Indonesian women have been more actively involved in social movements and voicing their political views when compared with women from other Southeast Asian nations and the Middle East. In the 1920s-30s, some Muslim women even participated in an Islamist national groups, notably Sarekat Islam and Indonesian Islamic Union (*Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia*, Permi) and had leadership roles in them. Some of them were even jailed. After Indonesia got its independence, more Muslim women began to participate in the two largest Islamic organisations namely Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.[1] Nevertheless, women's involvement in Islamic organisations did not mean that many of them were raised to the status of leaders in the public arena. In fact, the numbers of women in politics is still low, as it is illustrated by Kofifah Indar Parawansa, the current minister of Social Affairs of Indonesia, that in 2004, only 11.5 % of women sat in the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, House of Representatives).[2]

This thesis seeks to investigate the roles of women in Islamic fundamentalist groups that have stereotypically been associated with male leadership: why are women drawn to Islamic fundamentalist groups in Indonesia and what have they contributed?. In addition, this issue will be examined from an international standpoint, where a seeming

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[1] Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC). "Mothers to Bombers: The Evolution of Indonesian Women Extremists." Jakarta, IPAC Report No. 35, 2017, 2-3

[2] Parawansa, Khofifah Indar. "Enhancing women's political participation in Indonesia." *Women in Parliament: Beyond numbers* (2005): 82-90, p. 84

contradiction arises. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) states that women should have freedom of movement and expression, so if these women are voluntarily seeking to join and participate in Islamic fundamentalist groups, should there be intervention from the state if they are oppressed in the process?

1.2   Defining Islamic fundamentalism in an Indonesian context

The fall of the dictatorial regime of Soeharto, the second President of Indonesia in 1998, was accompanied by a rise of piety movements that successfully attracted women to join them. NU and Muhammadiyah are Muslim organisations that promote moderate views on Indonesian Muslims, but unfortunately according to Jusuf Wanandi (2002), they have lost their ability to consistently attract Muslims to join. The smaller Islamic groups that promote fundamentalist and radical views have taken NU's and Muhammadiyah's place in recruiting women.[3] These smaller groups are fundamentalist and appear to these women to promote the 'true' version of Islam. This 'true' version of Islam attracts women to become involved in related meetings and activities such as *dakwah* that Mohamed imran bin Mohamed Taib (2012) translates as 'calling Islam,' or Islamic proselytism, or 'an introduction to the belief and the practice of Islam to Muslims and non-Muslims.'[4]

Islamic fundamentalist groups advocate their views on uniformity within a multicultural society, claiming that followers can become 'good Muslims.' They promote intolerance towards religious minorities and even other Muslims. They will call other religious minorities as *kafir* (the infidel, the Christians, the Jewish and even the atheists)*,* and this word has a bad connotation in society, being synonymous with 'untrustworthy,' 'people who disobey God,' or 'people who do not agree with Islam.' As this thesis seeks to examine the role of women in Islamic fundamentalist groups, the following section will

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[3] Wanandi, Jusuf. "Islam in Indonesia: Its History, Development and Future Challenges." *Asia-Pacific Review* 9:2 (2002): 104-112. p. 104-108

[4] Bin Mohamed Taib, Mohamed Imran. "Neofundamentalist Thought, *Dakwah* and Religious Pluralism among Muslims in Singapore." ISA eSymposium for Sociology 3 (2012), p. 4-6

provide a more comprehensive definition of 'fundamentalism' in the context of Indonesia.

1.2.1 Religious fundamentalism

For the purpose of this study, I shall define the term 'fundamentalism' in line with the way it is practised in Indonesia. Antoun (2001, p. 3) defines fundamentalism as a religiously based cognitive and affective orientation to the world characterised by protest against change and the ideological orientation of modernism. From Antoun's definition, fundamentalism is derived from a transnational, a transcultural and a reaction to modernity.[5] However, Michael Emerson and David Hartman (2006) have argued that the term 'fundamentalism' is primarily applicable to theologically conservative and Biblicist U.S. Protestant practising in the beginning of the 20th century. The term 'fundamentalism' was first used to describe a movement in opposition to modernity where secularism provides liberal freedom in society.[6] In relation to protest against modernity, Max Weber in Emerson and Hartman (2006) states that modernisation equals rationalisation of world where life is regulated by policies, procedures, science and administration and in which deities have no role.[7]

The definitions of religious fundamentalism above indicate that not all fundamentalists are violent. Religious fundamentalists are not considered violent by definition: more key to the definition of 'fundamentalism' are a group that use texts and religious tradition as a moral source and ethical guide that determine their relationships with other people. Nevertheless, from a doctrinal point of view, fundamentalist teaching can lead to the call of justifying violence or acts of violence derived from their religious beliefs and interpretations of a sacred text. Azyumardi Azra (2014) argues that the doctrine of *Jihad*

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[5] Antoun RT. 2001. "Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jew Movements." Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira in Emerson, Michael O and Hartman, David. *The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism.* Annual Review of Sociology, Vol 32 (2006), pp. 127-144: 130.

[6] Emerson, Michael O and Hartman, David. "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism." *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol 32 (2006), pp. 127-144, p. 130.

[7] Ibid, 127-129

(efforts or struggle) can be easily used to justify violence and holy war against people who believe in other religions, and even among the Muslims.[8] Greg Fealy (2004), a senior lecturer and fellow in Indonesian politics at the Australian National University (ANU) declares that the Islamic fundamentalist groups in Indonesia are not only committed to the religious or spiritual 'fundamentals' of their faith, but they hold a political interest, often with militant overtones.[9]

The characteristics of fundamentalism above are relevant in examining fundamentalism in the context of Indonesia. Islamic fundamentalist groups use sections of Qur'an to justify the fact that they are practising the correct version of Islam. They oppose other practices of Islam in Indonesian society. This means that they are intolerant of other groups, and seek legitimacy in opposing various interpretations of Islam. Salient Islamic fundamentalist groups include HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), Salafi-Wahabi, LDII (*Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Institution), Tarbiyah/PKS (*Partai Kesejahteraan Indonesia*, Prosperous Justice Party), and GAPAS (*Gerakan Anti Permurtadan dan Aliran Sesat*, the Anti Apostasy and Unorthodoxy Movement) (see their profiles in the Appendix). According to Muhammad Ali (2005), these groups have aimed to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, have formed Islamic political parties, and have sometimes engaged in terrorist attacks, acts of violence towards religious minorities, and continue to make demands for local regulations to implement their own version of *Sharia* law (the Islamic law that governs behaviours towards his or herself, family, and society. The teaching is based on the Qur'an and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad).[10]

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[8] Azra, Azyumardi. "Religious-Linked Violence and Terrorism: A Response to James Veitch" in *Dealing with Diversity: Religion, Globalization, Violence, Gender and Disaster* in Indonesia, edited by Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, 227-239, Geneva: Globethics.net / Yogyakarta: Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies, 2014, p. 229

[9] Fealy, Greg. "Islamic radicalism in Indonesia: The faltering revival?." Southeast Asian Affairs (2004): 104-121, p. 105

[10] Ali, Muhammad. "The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia." *American Journal of Islamic Social Science* 22.1 (2005): 1-27, p. 2

1.2.2   Anti Pancasila

Nadirsyah Hosen (2005), an expert in *Sharia* and Indonesian law states that in the Indonesian context, the Islamic fundamentalist groups share the common goal of establishing an Islamic state based on *Sharia* law and replacing *Pancasila* as the national ideology. They support the seven words removed from the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) in the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution 1945. These seven words were. "*Dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya*" (with the obligation for adherents of Islam to follow Sharia, or Islamic law).[11] Douglas E. Ramage (1995) further goes on to state that the Jakarta Charter was rejected, however, as Mohammad Hatta, the first Vice President of Indonesia in 1945 argued that other parts of Indonesia that have many non-Muslims such as West Irian would not join an Islamic Indonesia.[12] As a result, the abolition of the seven words from the Indonesian Constitution 1945 caused many reactions from Islamic groups in Indonesia.

Martin Van Bruinessen (2011) asserts that Muhammadiyah and NU, which have been in Indonesia since 1912 and 1926 respectively agreed to the abolition of the seven words phase since it helped the democratic transformation of the country in 1945. Muhammadiyah and NU believe that the Islamic teaching has to be relevant in modern society and in all situation.[13] His argument is supported by Fealy that states Wahid Hasyim, the head of NU in 1945 concerned with preserving the unity of Indonesia, and therefore determined that Islam should not be granted special treatment.[14]

Meanwhile, Fealy further argues that other Islamic groups were disappointed with its abolition. After its abolition, those groups began promoting *Sharia* law and their belief

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[11] Hosen, Nadirsyah. "Religion and the Indonesian constitution: a recent debate." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36, no 03 (2005): 419-440, p. 419

[12] Ramage, Douglas E. *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance.* Psychology Press, 1997, p. 14

[13] Van Bruinessen, Martin."Proceedings of Indonesian Muslim and Their Place in the Larger World of Islam" (Paper Presented at the 29th Indonesia Update Conference, Australian National University, Canberra, 30 September 2011), p.10-11

[14] Fealy, "Islamic radicalism in Indonesia," 108

that an Islamic state must take a form of a caliphate.[15] They claim that if the law was created by men, people potentially would no longer obey it[16] and the Islamic fundamentalist groups aimed to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia as a first step to establishing a global caliphate.[17] Giora Eliraz (2004) concludes that the idea of placing the caliphate state as a conceptual authority asserts that the highest rule belongs to God. Consequently, the political order has to be based on the will of God to rule the earth.[18] Therefore, the man-made national ideology *Pancasila* must be replaced.

1.3   Why do Indonesian Muslim Women Participate in Islamic Fundamentalist Groups?

This thesis seeks to explore why women in particular are drawn to Islamic fundamentalist groups. Many scholars have argued that grievances and trust in a flawed theology are the main causes that inspire women to participate in a fundamentalist movement. This phenomenon is caused by globalisation that presents the world as liberation for many aspects in life and it appears to be a threat to become a battle zone. Eduardo Mendieta (2001) looked at social theory to give response regarding the threat of globalisation. They are threats of the mass, the crowds, the dehumanisation, hedonism, consumerism, and paganism. As a result, these threats have affected economic growth, illiteracy, and the increase of violence.[19]

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[15] Ibid, 106

[16] Fealy, "Islamic radicalism in Indonesia," 108

[17] Ibid

[18] Eliraz, Giora. *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension.* Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004, p. 29.

[19] Mendieta, Eduardo. "Society's Religion: The Rise of Social Theory, globalisation, and the Invention of Religion," in *Religions / Globalisations: Theories and Cases,* edited by Hopkins, Dwight N and Lorentzen, Lois Ann, 46-66, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001. p. 57-58

Veldhuis and Staun (2009) developed the root causes and factors that played important roles in this issue. Those factors can be seen at the macro level as well at the micro level. At the macro level, one has to look at political, economic and cultural causes. The political factors particularly relevant to women in Indonesia consist of poor integration, alienation, discrimination, and deprivation. While the cultural factors consist of globalisation and modernity, clashes between Muslims living in the West and conflicts between radical and moderate Muslims. At the micro level, factors that draw women to Islamic fundamentalist groups are found at the social as well as individual level. At the social level, causal factors include social identification (identity crisis or threats to their groups), and network dynamics (social rules, friendship bonds, and social influences). On the other hand, at the individual level, the causal factors consist of physiological characteristics (depression, anxiety, sensitivity to humiliation and seek for identity), personal experiences and rationality (their motivation for participating the group). [20]

In the Indonesian context, Fealy argues that Indonesia and Muslims in Indonesia are facing multi-faceted crises including economic, political, cultural and moral elements. The Islamic fundamentalist groups believe that the *kafir* have economic and military power which is exploiting the Islamic community. Further he goes on to say this is seen as a global Jewish and Christian conspiracy against Islam, where the Jews and the Christians are also bringing Western culture revolving around materiality and status in the world. They view this as a serious threat.[21] In my interview with Donna Swita from an NGO called *Solidaritas Perempuan*, she states,

> Islamic fundamentalist groups believe that when people become less religious, it is the impact of modernisation. God will give them a reminder through social problems or natural disasters. The social problems might take the form of corruption, rape, drugs, alcoholism, and prostitution….The natural disasters might be the tsunami in Aceh as it was in 2004 or the earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2006. (Donna Swita, personal interview, March 30, 2016)

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[20] Veldhuis, T and J. Staun. *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009. p. 23-60

[21] Fealy, "Islamic radicalism in Indonesia," 108

Therefore, some Muslim women shoulder their responsibility to be an agent of change. They joined Islamic fundamentalist groups to promote *Sharia* law to be implemented in Indonesia in seeking to rid society of warnings from God. Swita goes on to state, "The fact that many government officials are corrupt means that Islamic fundamentalist groups do not trust democracy in Indonesia and for them, this is the major social problem that has to be solved by establishing an Islamic state." (Donna Swita, personal interview, March 30, 2016). The implementation of *Sharia* law within an Islamic state in Indonesia is seen to be able to solve the corruption, injustice and other social problems as *Sharia* law regulates family law and devotional matters. If Indonesia became an Islamic state and complied with its *Sharia* law, (they say that) there would be no corruption, immorality and injustice in society since *Sharia* law covers its punishment. Interestingly, according to Fealy, the movements do not only promote to solve social problem, but the movements also appear to provide a spiritual marketplace by providing trends of refashioning piety and promoting prosperity.[22] Therefore, women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups is more than about women want to be agent of change to solve social problems, but women themselves are interested in transforming themselves to be pious and get some benefits in the movements.

1.4   Women's Roles in Islamic Fundamentalist Groups

Women are drawn to Islamic fundamentalist groups because of the tangible bonuses. David Lehmann (2010) argues that Islamic fundamentalist groups do not only provide salvation, but also religious instruction, social activities, worship services and other social activities.[23] Women contribute to do *dakwah* and have the same role as men to establish *amar makruf nahi mungkar* (enjoin good, forbid evil) to combat sin in soci-

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[22] Kitiarsa, Pattana. "Toward a Sociology of Religious Commodification," in *Sociology of Religion*, edited by Turner, Bryan S, 563-583, Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2010, p. 564

[23] Lehmann, David. "Rational Choice and the Sociology of Religion," in *Sociology of Religion*, edited by Turner, Bryan S, 181-200, Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2010, p. 190

ety, build justice and importantly, claim their 'position' in society. Women's roles are varied and women are supported to be whatever they desire to be agents of change through *dakwah* activities. For example, participating in a political party to manage the women's programs, being a preacher to spread the message of Islam to other women, and even engage in the raiding that consists of sweeping night clubs, bars, brothels and closing down illegal churches along with male counterparts.

The concept of *jihad* however, has inspired many women to get actively involved in Islamic fundamentalist groups. Yet, *Jihad* is often understood and practised differently among women in Islamic fundamentalist groups. Some of them view *Jihad* as a personal spiritual struggle against sin, whereas, some others view *Jihad* as an actual battle against the enemy of Islam. Therefore, the concept of *Jihad* is manifested into two forms; nonviolent and violent. The latter raises issues related to justifying violent and committing acts of violence. The concept of *Jihad* that is not manifested violently is shown by two of my informants EV and NA, a preacher at HTI and a member of Salafi/Wahabi respectively. They do not want to engage in violent acts, but they support the acts of violence committed by another informant PP, who is actively engaging in the raiding activities along with her male counterparts in GAPAS. When I asked EV and NA why they did not want to get involved in a 'direct action' as it was conducted by PP to combat sins, they said that everyone has their own 'part' in defending their faith, and they chose to do it in a smooth way.

Even though non-violent activity does not directly have anything to do with violence, in my view, *dakwah* activity that is manifested in a form of religious sermon is problematic. The preachers may condone acts of violence due to the contents of their sermons. In my interview with Dete Aliah, a managing director for *Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian* (YPP), she states, "Many ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) simpatisan went to Syria after going to *pengajian* (an activity of learning Islam by reading Qur'an or listening to seminar about Islam) at some *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school). When we confirmed it to the preacher, the preacher normally did not realise that he has caused many people support ISIS." (Dete Aliah, personal interview, April 1, 2016). Since

most of my participants work on teaching and support *dakwah* activities*,* these women are able to almost anyone and are able to spread the ideology of justifying and supporting any forms of violence.

The facts that women are awarded roles in spreading violent and non-violent forms of fundamentalism means that women join these groups of agents of change in so‾ciety. In examining women's roles as agents in Islamic fundamentalist groups, it is worth questioning whether in taking initiatives in joining groups, women are expressing their right to freedom of expression and participate in the public sphere or whether they are voluntarily surrendering their agency as they become oppressed by fundamentalist ideology.

1.5   Women's Freedom According to CEDAW

Women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups is basically supported by a democratic society that guarantees women's freedom to freely join any movements to openly exercise their political view or just simply exercise their equal right as citizens. It is protected by Article 18 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that states, "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching,"[24] and Article 7 (c) of CEDAW that states, "States parties shall take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure that women are on equal terms with men. This includes the rights to participation in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country."[25]

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[24] UN General Assembly, *ICCPR*, art, 18 (1)

[25] UN General Assembly, CEDAW, art 7 (c)

Notwithstanding, women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups result negative impacts on women. One of my informant is an ex member of PKS/Tarbiyah explains why she decides to quit, "The teaching is not flexible. The religious teaching is strict. Ethically, women are always told off in regards to relationships with males and it made me, as a woman feels oppressed. ." (AN, personal interview, April 15, 2016). In addition, the manifestation of religious teaching has caused harm to other Muslims and non-Muslims such as they spreading hate towards religious minorities, and sparkling conflicts between fundamentalist Muslims and moderate Muslims.

The fact that many women remain in Islamic fundamentalist groups has to be taken into account: it cannot be so oppressive that they feel that they cannot stay. However, the movements offer the benefit of being comfortable in a group. By looking at the macro as well as the micro levels, women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups is understandable: they want to become agents of change in society and also gain tangible benefits in their own experience. Thus, one cannot overlook the harms caused by religious teaching that according to AN, the teaching is discriminatory for women in which this is also supported by CEDAW's Concluding Observation for Indonesia 2012, paragraph 15. It states that the increased influence of fundamentalist religious groups advocate restrictive interpretations of *Sharia* law that result in discrimination against women.[26]

This issue brings a challenge to a black-and-white view of human rights and gender equality. On one hand, women have the right to participate in a religious movement and become agents of change in society. In contrast, the religious teachings that result in discrimination against women and promote intolerant views can negatively can violate women's freedom by directing women to see things as black and white, and that there is only one truth. As I am interested in exploring to what extent women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups challenge gender equality, I will examine religious activi-

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[26] Human Rights Committee, "Concluding observations for Indonesia 2012," para. 15

ties called *dakwah* and its benefits and consequences that challenge gender equality. My research questions are as follows.

1.6   Research Questions

How does women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups challenge gender equality in Indonesia?

Sub questions,

  (i) What kind of religious activities that are practised as a form of gender equality?

  (ii) What benefits and consequences do women get by participating in Islamic fundamentalist groups?

1.7   Methodology

This study involves multidisciplinary analysis. The approach is adopted due to the challenge to gender equality posed by women in Islamic fundamentalist groups in terms of social phenomenon. This research adopts a qualitative method in social science methodology and applies a socio-legal approach as well. The primary focus of this study is to answer the research question. Therefore, this study relies on analysis of secondary sources of literature studies. UN human rights documents, NGO reports, extensive reading of academic books and journals inform this research. In addition, this research draws from primary sources, namely 12 interviews with women in Islamic fundamentalist groups, women who are ex members of Islamic fundamentalist groups and some experts from NGOs that focus on the issues of feminism and Islamisation of religion in Indonesia. However, domestic and international law are used in order to construct feasible comprehensive alternatives for conflict resolutions in this case, particularly the laws relating to women's rights.

2.   Chapter 2 (Thesis Data)

This chapter consists of two sections that includes lists of interviews. Firstly, I shall present my informants' names that I shall use pseudonyms, rather than their actual names, but rather identify them using initials based on the Islamic fundamentalist group to which they belong. Secondly, I shall present some names of people working in NGOs concerned with Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. The informations regarding the Islamic fundamentalist groups discussed in this study are provided in the Appendix.

2.1   List of Interviews

For the purpose of this study, I traveled to some cities in Java, Indonesia to interview some informants. My informants are divided into three categories; 6 women who are active members of Islamic fundamentalist groups, 2 women who are ex members of Islamic fundamentalist groups and 4 people working in NGOs concerned with Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. The cities I visited to interview the 6 women who are active in Islamic fundamentalist groups were in Cirebon, Pekalongan, and Yogyakarta. Whereas I interviewed 2 women who are ex members of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Jakarta. They shared their experiences in Islamic fundamentalist groups from when they lived in Malang and Surabaya.

3 people working in NGOs focusing on Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia were interviewed in Jakarta and 1 person was interviewed in Cirebon. My inability to provide more informants were due to my limited access to Islamic fundamentalist groups' meetings and activities. To get involved in Islamic fundamentalist groups' activities, one has to have much time to get to know them since they are not open to strangers who are curious about their religious activities. Furthermore, my inability to have more informants was also due to the limitation of my time and money as a student.

2.1.1 Active members and ex members of Islamic fundamentalist groups

Group	Initial	D/M/Y of interview	Status
HTI	EV	27/03/2016	Active member
PKS/Tarbiyah	UM	04/04/2016	Active member
	AN	15/04/2016	Ex member
LDII	DY	02/04/2016	Active member
	ER	28/03/2016	Ex member
Salafi/Wahabi	NA	27/03/2016	Active member
	IN	06/04/2016	Active member
GAPAS	PP	26/03/2016	Active member

2.1.2 People working in NGOs

i. Rosidin, a director of Fahmina-*institute*. He is an experienced activist and re-searcher in the fields of human rights and victim advocacy.[27] Date of interview was 26th March 2016.

ii. Donna Swita, *Solidaritas Perempuan* (Women's Solidarity). She is the head for division of sovereignty of women over sexuality. Date of interview was 30th March 2016.

iii. Dete Aliah, a managing director for *Yayasan Prasasti Pedamaian* (Institute for International Peace Building). She is a board member of the organisation and has been doing a research on ""The Perception of the Grass Root Islamic Organisation

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[27] "Profile." Fahmina Institute. Accessed July 16, 2016. http://fahmina.or.id/en/profile/

towards Democracy Practice in Indonesia."[28] Date of interview was April 1st 2016.

iv. Lies Marcoes-Natsir, an executive director of *Rumah Kita Bersama* (*Rumah KitaB*). She is a leading gender expert and a researcher in Indonesia. Date of interview was 28st March 2016.

3. Chapter 3 (Theoretical Framework)

In this chapter, I shall provide a theoretical framework for my discussion. I shall rely on Rachel Rinaldo's theory (2010) on "Women and Piety Movement" to help me analysing the movements' religious activities that provide benefits and carry consequences to women. I shall use Paulo Freire's theory (2004) on "Pedagogy of the Oppressed" to discuss critical consciousness on women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist group. It helps me to develop a consciousness of freedom and assert a sense of women in Islamic fundamentalist groups' rights and responsibilities and not simply submit to the prevailing ideology.

3.1 Women's participation in piety movement

In chapter 1, I have explained that fundamentalism does not directly link to violent. Yet, fundamentalist teaching has a potential to direct members in a fundamentalist movement to support, justify, and engage in a violent act due to its traditional teaching of its sacred text. Therefore, even though not all members of Islamic fundamentalist groups are violent but fundamentalism is a gateway to violent radicalisation by the definition of

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[28] "Dete Aliah." Prasasti Perdamaian RSS. Accessed June 20, 2016. http://www.prasastiper-damaian.org/team/dete-aliah/

the European Commission (2006) that states, 'the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views, and ideas which could lead to act of terrorism,' (EC, 2006).[29]

Rachel Rinaldo (2010) used the term 'piety movement' in her piece should not be problematic to analyse the issue of fundamentalism in this research. However, Rachel Rinaldo's term still relies on the same definition of 'fundamentalism' to discuss women and piety movement, that the movement tend to seek 'religious revival' in their religious teaching and practices towards theological conservatism.[30] According to her, the increase of women participating in piety movement is because women are opt to the call for a return of traditional value as globalisation is seen to produce inequality. Seen from a macro structural explanation, women's participation in piety movement not only seek for refuge due to social change but women want to be modern and at the same time still being pious. Women in piety movements do not fully reject modernity, but they want to apply the fundamentalist teaching as their way of life to be discipline for themselves. For example, women want to be educated and participate in the public sphere, but at the same time they do not want to lose their identity as a pious Muslim. While seen from micro explanations, one needs to look at individual's motive in participating in a piety movement. Confronting rapid social change, inequality and materialism, Mahmood in Rinaldo states the importance to analyse women's individual agency in this regards. In women's conscious effort, they actually want to be pious selves, such as they want to learn Islam deeply and obey all the religious rules in order they can feel close to God. Therefore, the agency is not only about liberation or submission, but it can be a form of produce a self.[31]

Furthermore, Rinaldo expresses that religious movement can mobilise collective action and it can establish a strong bond among its members. Once members become

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[29] European Commission. "Terrorist Recruitment: A Commission's Communicating and Addressing the Factors Contributing to Violent Radicalisation." MEMO/05/329, Submitted to the European Commission in Brussel, September 21, 2005.

[30] Rinaldo, Rachel. "Women and Piety Movements," in *Sociology of Religion*, edited by Turner, Bryan, 584-605, Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2010, p. 584

[31] Rinaldo," Women and Piety Movement," 587-590.

close, they will create a community that can empower, not only individual but also community. The importance of group identity can also reduce social alienation. In addition, religious activities can empower individual to pursue their dreams. On the other hand, even though piety movement helps women to become agent of change, but Rinaldo notes that its conservative religious teaching such as providing a night curfew for women, does not help feminist agenda to promote gender equality. Also, women's agency that can produce a self may be viewed as a religious compliance than individual's liberty.[32]

3.2   Critical Consciousness

The rigid religious teaching promoted by Islamic fundamentalist groups is explored by Paulo Freire's theory on "Pedagogy of the Oppressed". Freire uses the term "critical consciousness" to explore individual liberation of oppressed people. Critical consciousness is known as the ability to perceive social, political, and economic oppression and to take action against its manifestations in society. Even though it is too early to make a claim that women in Islamic fundamentalist groups are oppressed people, but based on Rinaldo's statement, it is stated that Islamic fundamentalist groups' teaching hamper feminist agenda to promote gender equality. Therefore, it can be seen that the religious teaching in Islamic fundamentalist groups is potential to limit women's ability to criticise its teaching.

Critical consciousness helps the "culture of silence" to become more critical. Freire uses the term "critical consciousness" in exploring a model of education, specifically discussing a "banking concept of education" where "the teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorise, and repeat … in which the scope of the action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits." [33] In this study, the oppressor/the teacher illustrated by Freire is defined as "the Islamic teaching practised by women in Islamic fundamentalist

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[32] Rinaldo, "Women and Piety Movement," 590-599.

[33] Freire, Paulo. "The banking concept of education." (2004) *Educational foundations: An anthology of critical readings* (1970): 99-111, p. 164

groups." While the oppressed/ the students is defined as "women in Islamic fundamental-ist groups."

He goes on to state that, "knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing." However, the banking concept is oppressive to society as a whole because,

1. the teacher teaches and the students are taught;
2. the teachers knows everything and the students know nothing;
3. the teachers thinks and the students are thought about;
4. the teachers talks and the students listen - meekly;
5. the teachers disciplines and the students are disciplined;
6. the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply;
7. the teachers acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher;
8. the teacher chooses the program content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it;
9. the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his or her own professional authority, which she and he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students;
10. the teacher is the subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects. [34]

Based on the characteristics of the banking concept of education, it is expected that the students will develop less critical thinking, are passive and are easy to adapt to the world. Furthermore, to gain more students, the banking concept changes the consciousness of the students by treating them as individual cases, as marginal persons who diverge from the general structure of a "good, organised, and just society." In fact, the oppressed are not marginalised people but rather are people who live inside the structure that makes them "marginalised." The banking education provides solution to this, that is to transform the structure so that the marginalised people can become "themselves." However, the banking education will never ask the students to critically consider reality. The banking approach will dehumanise and domesticate them instead. People will not see themselves "with the world" but they see themselves "in the world" and this will serve

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[34] Ibid

oppression, control over the way they think and action in the name of "preservation of culture and knowledge."[35]

In order to establish critical consciousness, rather than passive submissive, Freire presents the "problem-posing method" that, "does not regard cognisable objects as his private property but as the object of reflection by himself and the students."[36] The students can be critical, express their view and engage dialogue with the teachers. The problem posing education is aimed to exercise the students' knowledge and true knowledge to challenge the students' knowledge so that the students response to that critically. Freire gives an example of a conversation between a peasant who is using the banking concept and a teacher who is using the problem-posing method as followed,

> A peasant: "Now I see that without a man there is no world."
> A teacher: "Let's say, for the sake of argument, that all the men on earth were to die, but that the earth itself remained, together with trees, birds, animals, rivers, seas, the stars …. Wouldn't all this be a world?"
> A peasant: "Oh no, There would be no one to say: 'This is a world.'"[37]

To sum up, Rachel Rinaldo's theory on women and piety movement shall help me to analyse women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups to more than just solving problems in society. Women want to find agency in themselves to become agent for change and develop pious self in themselves. Whereas, Freire's banking concept of education shall be useful to analyse women's compliance to religious duties that do not help to promote gender equality because the movements have repressed women's critical consciousness in receiving religious dogma as the only truth.

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[35] Ibid, 166-169

[36] Ibid, 169-170

[37] Ibid, 170

4.   Chapter 4 (Discussion)

What kind of religious activities that are practised as a form of gender equality?

This chapter shall deliver the religious activities practised by women in Islamic fundamentalist groups. These activities are using a term *dakwah* that has been popular in Indonesia. *Dakwah* activities however, are practised as a form of gender equality by women in Islamic fundamentalist groups because the activities provide women to contribute to build an Islamic society in the public sphere. Meanwhile, *dakwah* activities also challenge gender equality because in the principle, *dakwah* does not fully give women's freedom and its practice has been discriminating women.

4.1   The phenomenon of *dakwah* and its impact on women

This thesis uses the spelling *dakwah* derived from the Arabic spelling *da'wa* that literally means call or invitation. Johan Meuleman (2011) states that *dakwah* is aimed to strengthened and deepened the faith of the Muslims and help them to live their life in accordance to Islamic principles. *Dakwah* activities have been considered as highly appreciated and grown particularly strong and have adopted many forms and new aims in Muslim societies. He further goes on state that *dakwah* is now used to unite Muslims world wide, but on the other hand, *dakwah* is also used to form a new modern nation-states with different conflicting political interest and religious tradition.[38] Therefore, to achieve its goal, the activity of *dakwah* has been institutionalised internationally that has nothing to do with a particular state and has been influencing various countries for the establishment of an informal policy. In the context of Indonesia, the growing numbers of *dakwah* activities promoted by Islamic fundamentalist groups emerged after the fall of Soeharto regime. *Dakwah* activities are transformed into many forms such as giving social welfare,

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[38] Meuleman, Johan. "*Dakwah*, Competition for Authority, and Development." *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkunde* Vol. 167, no. 2-3 (2011): 236-269, p. 238

academic corporations that include giving scholarships that is channeled through private foundations, holding social activities and trainings that provide networks, giving charity and financial aid, building community solidarity, and other development activities.

The problem with the rapidly growth of *dakwah* activities promoted by Islamic fundamentalist groups is whether *dakwah* protects Islam itself as a religion or ruin Indonesian multicultural society and women's rights. The content of *dakwah* activities often promotes 'the true version of Islam' supporting patriarchal tradition in all layers of Indonesian society to treat women unequally. ER attended many LDII's *pengajian* and she said that people were not allowed to engage in dialogue. Women are also taught to believe everything the preacher says without questioning its truth. ER states, "Women in LDII stated that a husband slaps a wife in the face is a form of religious education. Whereas to me, it is clearly domestic violence and women have to stand for it." (ER, personal interview, March 28, 2016).

The violence that lies in Islamic fundamentalist groups' ideology is problematic especially for women who are taught to see any forms of violence justified by religion as a norm. In Freire's banking concept of education, it is noted that students become container into receptacles to be filled where the students are only allowed to memorise and repeat fixed phrase, "Four times four is sixteen."[39] It means women in Islamic fundamentalist groups are made to repeat what their religious leaders told in black and white concepts. This ideology is definitely problematic to gender equality that unfortunately is not supported by popular elite politics. Gadis Arivia (2006) states that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the sixth President of Indonesia created a policy included the abolition of women's belly button on national television in his 100 working days programs with his cabinet when he was just elected. He stated that showing women's belly button is very disturbing. [40] In my view, among those urgent programs to develop Indonesia, abolishing women's belly button on the national television does not contribute to empower gender

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[39] Freire, "The Banking Concept of Education," 165-166

[40] Arivia, Gadis. *Feminisme Sebuah Kata Hati*. Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara, 2006. p. 92

equality in Indonesia. It instead shows that women themselves have to be responsible for their body in the public sphere. Society and the government would blame on women for criminality if women are not covered than enforcing criminal law.

According to Erich Kolig (2001) in post Soeharto, Muslim associations have more rooms to impose public piety which in turn contributed in politicisation of Islam.[41] Knowing that elite politics do not seem supporting gender equality in Indonesia, this benefits the movements to spread their conservative ideology in their *dakwah* activities and make alliance with elite politics such as PKS. Noorhaidi Hasan (2009) states that PKS remains consistent to be Islamic preachers during their political campaign and transform politicians to be preachers.[42] This means many preachers are not eligible to spread Islam, and *dakwah* activities can also be a vehicle by both fundamentalist movements and elite politics to achieve their goals that some of them are limiting women's freedom and keeping women in the domestic sphere.

4.2 How *dakwah* is practised by women in Islamic fundamentalist groups?

Indonesian society, in facts becomes more visibly pious especially after the fall of Soeharto regime. Political Islam and fundamentalist movements become re-emerge in response to the failing state that according to Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004) offer 'Islam as the solution' to fix the state.[43] The aim of *dakwah* that is to strengthen *Sharia* law and doctrinally focused on piety and to encourage external forms of devotions are now not only informed in mosques, but one can feel the atmosphere of *dakwah* everywhere in In-

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[41] Kolig, Erich. "Modernisation Without Secularisation? Civil Pluralism, Democratisation, and re-Islamisation in Indonesia." *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 3.2 (December, 2001): 17-41, p. 23

[42] Hasan, Noorhaidi. "Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da'wa Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* Vol. 6, No. 1 (2012): 17-47, p. 13

[43] Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Introduction: The Activism and Social Theory," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, edited by Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 1-33, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 11

donesia. All places seem to have *dakwah* atmosphere such as the rise of women veiling in the public sphere, religious sermons on TV, Islamic soap opera series on TV programs, celular *dakwah* to receive religious message, Islamic banking system, *Sharia* tourism, even *kost putri Muslimah* (Muslim women's boarding house) near campus areas and the state that provides more quota for *hajj* (Islamic pilgrimage). All these efforts are to support establishing Islamic society.

Women are encouraged to spread the message of *dakwah* in many forms and activities. Women's participation in *dakwah* activities is aimed to contribute to the development of Indonesia since Indonesia has 80% of Muslims who have witnessed colonisation, and experienced poverty and corruption. On my interview with Lies Marcoes-Natsir, a leading feminist in Indonesia states,

> *Dakwah* is a part of *jihad*. In the concept of *jihad*, everyone who does it will be in heaven. The concept of *jihad* changes women's belief because they can have the same position as men. *Jihad* can make women to have a productive role to be teachers or preachers. By participating in the activity of *dakwah*, women's status are elevated to have a bigger role in society. (Lies Marcoes-Natsir, personal interview, March 28, 2016).

The easiest form of *dakwah* is practised by IN, who is an active member of Salafi/ Wahabi to her family. She asked one of her daughters to quit working at one of Nokia offices after her daughter got married and asked her daughter to sell food from home instead. She explains, "The best people in the world are people who are willing to teach the message of Qur'an. So many people with universities degree I know quit their jobs as a doctor to work from home, because we can manage our prayer time at home easily and if we work from home, we will feel calm." (IN, personal interview, April 6, 2016). EV practises *dakwah* by being a woman preacher at HTI and gives a sermon to women in *kampung* (village) in Cirebon. Becoming a woman preacher, however can to some degree empower women to show an important framework to gain public representation, but the problem is the content of the religious teaching in HTI often uses the issue of the Arab spring to provoke people to believe that Islam is treated unjustly by the West. When I was attending her sermon in Cirebon, she raised an issue of suffering children in Palestine that

according to her it is caused by the West to draw women in *kampung*'s attention. Furthermore, the authority of knowledge in HTI does not go equally to both men and women. EV states,

> My task here is to give *dakwah* to women in *kampung*. The authority of religious knowledge that decides whether this is *haram* (forbidden) or *sunnah* (in Arabic it literally means 'habitual practice.' The traditional social, legal custom and practice of the Islamic community, but it is not mandatory) however, goes to men. The capacity of women is only to study and spread that information…. Men have to be leaders. Why? Because they are simply men. If there are 8 dumb men and 1 smart woman, the leader has to be a man. Women are moody, and however women have to take care of their family. Women emancipation means women have to 'do something' that has something to do with her *kodrad* (natural destiny for women, such as women's ability to give a birth). (EV, personal interview, March 27, 2016)

NA, who is also a teacher at Salafi women boarding school emphasises on the importance of giving women education as a part of *dakwah* activities. She states, "In my *pesantren*, women are focused on the domestic sphere such as managing household and learning how to be a good mother and how to take care of children. This is a part of obedience to husband." (NA, personal interview, March 27, 2016). The problem with *dakwah* spread by IN, EV, and NA is the content of their religious teaching that relies on women's *kodrad* to limit women's other possibilities. In fact, Indonesia itself does not support for gender equality that is stated in the 1974 of the Marriage Law that recognises a woman as the mother of the household.[44] This view can be used by the fundamentalist movements to impose their ideology that places women in the domestics sphere and hinder the reform of the 1974 Marriage Law. The danger regarding this kind of point of view is supported by Freire that sees this phenomenon can be repetitive from generation to generation since women will always be directed to receive, memorise, repeat the cultural norms without being able to challenge it.[45] Even though *dakwah* is used as a ladder for women to reach

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[44] *The 1974 of the Indonesian Marriage Law*. Law No. 1

[45] Freire, "The Banking Concept of Education," 164

heaven, but gender equality regarding women's participation in giving *dakwah* is seen only to facilitate women to perform duty to be a good wife and a mother. In the broader context, women's progress is in framed within women's *kodrad.*

Dakwah can be manifested through social and political activism. ER, who participated in Baiturrahman mosque before joining LDII, was not only promoted to sit in the DPR, but after she got her university degree, she was offered to teach at the university funded by the movement. According to ER, the movement does not exist anymore now, but the ideology of the movement is still channeled through some universities funded by the movement, and for the sake of *dakwah,* the movement has transformed to be more nationalist. Another case on how *dakwah* is manifested through social and political activism is showed by UM who participates in women's programs provided by PKS. Lanny Octavia (2012) states that PKS wants to strengthen its image as a caring *dakwah* party to recruit women by offering various programs. These programs include women Islamic study group, religious education, book club, social service and charity, entrepreneurship, and providing health care for mother and children. [46] By participating in these activities, PKS shows that women can participate in the public sphere, and interact with opposite sex but women have to earn husband's permission, support male leadership, and balance between family and *dakwah.*

Meanwhile, AN joined PKS/Tarbiyah when she was in high school and university to receive Islamic studies assistance from PKS/Tarbiyah's women members. PKS/Tarbiyah has channeled its *dakwah* in many public schools to assist Islamic studies to students that according AN, its teaching is burdening to women because it controls the way women's act. AN states,

> I rent a house with some women in Tarbiyah/PKS. The rule was really strict. Women cannot send a text to men after 6 PM since it has more *mudharat* (disbenefit). Women are also told off to *awas jaga mata* (watch your gaze) on men if we have activities together. If a woman wants to get married, she has to submit her CV (curriculum vitae) to her *uztad* (Islamic

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[46] Octavia, Lanny. "Islamism & Democracy: A Gender Analysis on PKS's Application of Democratic Principles and Values." *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 50, 1 (2012): 1-22, p. 14

teacher). The *uztad* will show her CV to men and men will choose to whom they want to marry. This marriage arrangement made it difficult for one of my friends who at that time had reached over the age of 30. She found it difficult to get married because society has considered her as a *perawan tua* (an old virgin) and no man wants to marry her. I felt sorry for her and this makes me wonder that why women are always chosen and why women do not have a right to choose to whom they want to marry? (AN, personal interview, April 15, 2016).

Women's participation in various *dakwah* activities held by PKS shows that *dakwah* promotes patriarchal tradition that determines a man as a leader, a provider, a woman is inferior than a man, and a woman does not make a decision because the action has to earn the husband's permission. However, regulating women's moral and sexuality in the public sphere in which the movement relies on *Sharia* law for the sake of spreading the message of *dakwah* should not be imposed. Lily Zakiyah Munir (2003) argues that *Sharia* law that supports for patriarchal tradition is ill defined by many local regulations in Indonesia. *Sharia* law is apparently practised differently and it does not successfully build justice such as combating corruption and giving equal social welfare to people. It instead concerns on *jilbab* (Indonesian term of hijab or veil) and controlling women's way of life. [47] This shows that there have been inconsistent practices of Sharia law and therefore, it has to be taken seriously because it would potentially encourage women to only focus on transforming themselves to look pious than understanding the substance of the religion. This phenomenon has been visibly emerging through many advertisements that promote 'women can be pious and at the same time beautiful by wearing *jilbab*.'

For the sake of spreading the message of Islam through *dakwah*, PP endorses polygamy. She is the second wife of an *uztad* in Cirebon who has many *jamaah* (religious followers). In my view, PP's marriage to this *uztad* is political. PP knows that her marriage to this *uztad* would help her to make alliance with many Islamic fundamentalist movements in Cirebon that is based at Al Manar mosque. This mosque has many radical

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[47] Munir, Lily Zakiyah. "Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Impact on Women." (Paper Presented at the Association of Asian Studies (AAS) Forum, the Hotel Hilton, New York, 27-30 March 2003), p. 7

Islamic groups that are actively doing the raiding. She is the only woman in the funda-mentalist groups who is actively engaged in the raiding and her actions are often anar-chic. Nevertheless, the idea of polygamy is seen as gender equality to PP since it helps her to make alliance with many radical groups to establish pious Muslim society by en-gaging in the raiding. PP states,

> It is women's responsibility to be a part of society by giving *dakwah* to show their reactions towards the current social conditions. *Dakwah* is aimed to spread Islam and educate people to follow Islamic law. It is women's obligation to eradicate sin in society such as doing the raiding, so it is just not just inside the house. By practising *dakwah*, women can have a productive role as well because it is conducted outside the house. (PP, personal interview, March 26, 2016).

Regarding to their polygamous marriage, PP and her *uztad* husband did not ask permission to the *uztad's* first wife. PP's reason is because she is a civil servant who does not need *nafkah* (maintenance, to give a living such as money, food expenses, accommo-dation, security and protection of the family) from the husband. Thus, she does not bur-den her husband financially and it should not be a big deal to the first wife. I myself met her and her husband during my interview. When I asked about their purpose on polyga-mous marriage, the husband strongly stated that polygamy is encouraged in Islam and it is written in *surah* (Qur'anic chapter) *An Nisa 4:3* for the purpose of *dakwah.* He further argued that taking another wife does not need the first wife's permission considering polygamy is a God's command. PP further explains,

> The idea of polygamy is to find a working partner. Also, the problem is all men are the same. They are all liars. So, I believe that all men want to do polygamy. It is just some men can stand and some others cannot stand not to do it…. Being the first wife should be lucky because normally society would perceive the second wife as a husband's grabber. So, the first wife should enjoy the fame. To practise polygamy, the man does not need to ask permission from the first wife because there will be a huge debate and cre-ate problems. Also, potentially the husband will not get the permission. But that is ok, because in *Surah* An Nisa 3:4 encourages men to do polygamy. (PP, personal interview, March 26, 2016).

Failing to ask permission from the first wife seems very common practice in connection with polygamy. ER states that, "Polygamy is widely practised by LDII *jamaah*. In most cases, the husband did not ask permission to do polygamy to the first wife, because if they do, the first wife will not give it." (ER, personal interview, March 28, 2016). Dete Aliah, on her interview with many wives of a *jihadist* (a Muslim who participates in *jihad*), explains, "I know those women look fine with their husbands to enter polygamy, but when I went to visit them, those women complained about her husband who wanted to marry another woman again. I know their feeling is repressed, but they cannot do much because it is religious obligation." (Dete Aliah, personal interview, April 1, 2016).

Realistically speaking, *nafkah* is often interpreted as a form of 'financial support' only in Indonesia. Nina Nurmila (2009) states that not all Indonesian women have both social and structural support of family since their parents might be passed away or live out of town[48] meaning many women would rely on their husband to give them *nafkah*. As PP stated that she does not need her husband's *nafkah* raises an issue regarding the obligation of a husband to 'give money' for his family in Indonesia. According to the 1974 of the Indonesian Marriage Law, Article 32 (2) emphasises the role of a husband as the head of the family who also has to be a provider,[49] is often interpreted as a support to polygamy as long as a man can provide financial support. This is, however problematic if a woman only sees *nafkah* is only in a form of financial support to permit polygamy. ER states,

> In polygamy, *nafkah* is given to both wives but men do not care if the money is enough or not. For the men it does not matter how much they give, it could be 1000 or 10.000.000 IDR, because according to the men, they still give *nafkah*. (ER, personal interview, March 28, 2016).

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[48] Nurmila, Nina. *Women, Islam and Everyday Life: Renegotiating Polygamy in Indonesia.* London and New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 81

[49] *The 1974 of the Indonesian Marriage Law,* art 32 (2).

The 1974 of the Marriage Law stipulates validity of polygamy if it has been performed according to religious requirement and all parties involved. Article 2 states that a marriage has to be registered. Article 3 to 5 further state,

Article 3
 (1) In principle in a marriage a man shall be allowed to have one wife only. A woman shall be allowed to have one husband only.
(2) A Court of Law shall be capable of granting permission to a husband to have more than one wife, if all parties concerned so wish.

 Article 4
(1)If a husband desires to have more than one wife, as referred in Article 3 paragraph (2) of this Law, he shall be required to submit a request to the Court of Law in the region in which he resides.
(2)The Court of Law referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article shall grant permission to the husband wishing to have more than one wife if:
   1. His wife is unable to perform her duties as wife;
   2. His wife suffers from physical defects or an incurable disease;
   3. His wife is incapable of having descendants.

 Article 5
 (1) In order for a request to be submitted to the Court of Law as referred to in Article 4 paragraph (1) of this Law, the following requirements shall be obtained:
   1. The approval of the wife or wives;
   2. The assurance that the husband will guarantee the necessities of life for his wives and their children;
   3. The guarantee that the husband shall act justly in regard to his wives and their children.
 (2) The approval referred to in paragraph (1) under the letter a of this article shall not be required of a husband if it is impossible to obtain the approval of his wife or wives and if she or they are incapable of becoming partner or partners to the contract, or if no information is available with respect to his wife or wives for the duration of 2 (two years), or on account of other reasons requiring the judgement of a Judge on the Court of Law.[50]

Polygamy practised by PP and her husband for the purpose of *dakwah* clearly does not meet the requirements of the Law. PP indeed does not have any economic motive but it does not mean her secretive marriage to the *uztad* is fair on behalf of the *uztad's* first wife. Furthermore, ER's explanation regarding *nafkah* also do not legitimate

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[50] *The 1974 of the Marriage Law,* Art 2, 3, 4, & 5

and guarantee a husband to act justly for being fair. It seems they only literally refer to *Surah* An Nisa 3:4 in legitimating their polygamy. According to a Muslim scholar, Abdullah Saeed in Nina Nurmila (2009), the content of the Qur'an is interpreted into three categories; textualist, semi textualist and contextualist.[51] It seems the fundamentalist interpretes An Nisa 3:4 in a textualist approach that is based on their literal reading. As a result, it violates many women's rights for instance, PP and her husband have forced the *uztad*'s first wife to sacrifice her feelings of sharing a husband with her, the *uztad's* first wife is not treated justly, and clearly PP is not aware of the importance of marriage registration that she does not have any Law protection. In addition, the rise of popular religious preachers who participate in the productions of tv programs such as Aa Gym and Muhammad Arifin Ilham who practise polygamy play a crucial role on influencing women to be permissive with their husband taking another wife. Women would think that 'my *uztad* said this and it is correct' and not develop themselves to be critical people. In most extreme cases regarding the practice of *dakwah*, Dete Aliah explains,

> My first informant is Rani (her real name is anonymous), who offered herself to be married to a *jihadist* who was in jail due to a bombing terror he conducted. He was punished 8 years in jail. Rani believed that this is for the sake of struggle dedication in spreading *dakwah* in Islam. My second informant is Sarah (her real name is also anonymous) who graduated from one of the best universities in Indonesia. She used to join JAT (*Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid)* that now is called JAS (*Jamaah Ansharut Sharia.* This group is affiliated and following the teaching of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, a terrorist and Al Manar mosque in Cirebon). Her husband used to be one of the *jihadist* but now he is arrested. For the sake of supporting *dakwah*, Sarah arranged married to her daughter who was 17 years old to marry a *jihadist*. So, when they have a baby, they would give a birth to a *jihadist*. (Dete Aliah, personal interview, April 1, 2016).

Summing up, the activities of *dakwah* that are practised as a form of gender equality bring impacts on women. Marcoes-Natsir states, "Women's contribution in *dakwah* activity is seen as women's emancipation because women feel like 'they have a place here' and these women are mostly consistent." (Lies Marcoes-Natsir, personal in-

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[51] Nurmila, *Women, Islam and Everyday Life,* 42

terview, March 28, 2016). On the other hand, Rinaldo states that women in Islamic fundamentalist groups may also disempower others.[52] This is resulted by religious teaching manipulates women's equality and represses women's ability to think critically and fight for women's rights. Women learn 'Islam is the solution' as the righteous and this ideology is hard to challenge because it is literally written in their sacred text and it is unlike philosophy such as feminism or communism that can always be challenged. Women would see that having freedom in a secular society is scary because they could lose grip and will not open for other possibilities.

However, *dakwah* is a huge commodity to get women to participate in succeeding the goal of the movements that is to establish an Islamic state and its *sharia* law in Indonesia. Nevertheless, *dakwah* can also be categorised as a woman urban lifestyle to raise their social status, and therefore, *dakwah* activity can reduce its religious value since it is only showing the image of piety and become a market for piety. Furthermore, the ideology of *dakwah* itself does not support gender equality in general because it focuses women to master the domestic tasks, permits polygamy that violates women's rights and supports criminality.

4.3   How is it challenged gender equality?

Siti Musdah Mulia (2006) states that in 2001, around 11.4 % Muslim women in Indonesia experienced violence. Mostly it consists of domestic violence such as husband-abuse, economic violence, sexual violence, harassment, husband's affair, and polygamy. Those violence were not be reported.[53]   She further argues that Islamic teaching should focus on the aspects of vertical to God (*hablun minallah*) and horizontal to people (*hablun min al-nas*). The horizontal aspect is very important to accommodate human beings treating each other equally and it applies for both men and women without looking

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[52] Rinaldo, "Women and Piety Movement," 599

[53] Mulia, Siti Musdah. "Menuju Hukum Perkawinan yang Adil: Memberdayakan Perempuan Indonesia," in *Perempuan dan Hukum: Menuju Hukum yang Berperspektif Kesetaraan dan Keadilan,* edited by Irianto, Sulistyowati, 131-175, Jakarta: The Convention Watch, Universitas Indonesia and Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2006, p. 143

at individual's ethnicity, language, social status and even religion (Q.S al-Hujarat 49:13).[54] In fact, Islamic fundamentalist teaching mostly focuses on the vertical aspect that results inequality.

Gender equality is challenged due to the Islamic teaching promoted by Islamic fundamentalist groups that emphasises on creating pious women to focus on the vertical aspect only. Women are focused on self transformation to be a good wife and a mother and therefore, women cannot be revolutionary. Women are not really engaged in the nation-state building because their roles are only supporters, especially PKS that according to Rinaldo (2010) considers gender equality does not exist within Islam and its goal to make Indonesia to be Islamic.[55] She further argues that many women cadres in PKS are educated but they would never achieve equality in the public sphere because PKS slogan is to realise *wanita shalihah* (pious women) to be an ideal womanhood.[56] In fact, Rinaldo found that transforming women to be *wanita shalihah* is the Islamic fundamentalist groups' purpose that recently to support a local government proposal to pass legislation requiring women to wear *jilbab* to crack down on the sex industry.[57]

Dakwah activities only focus on 'instant Islam' and the movements do not teach everything about Islam such as delivering other Islamic scholars' point of view regarding a particular issue. They only teach Islam based on their interest and interpret the sacred text literally as it is and thus, it has been violating women rights. Intellectual crisis in Indonesia is captured by media that has a great influence in spreading *dakwah* and promoting the idea of pious women on TV. However, it shapes public behaviour and gives psychological effects especially for people who spend most of the days at home and cannot afford to attend venues or other social activities held by the movements. In addition,

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[54] Ibid, 145

[55] Rinaldo, Rachel. "The Islamic Revival and Women's Political Subjectivity in Indonesia." *Women's Studies International Forum* 33 (2010): 422-431, p. 423

[56] Ibid, 436

[57] Ibid, 424

dakwah is also preached by popular *uztads* who practise polygamy to make society considers polygamy is permissible as long as the husband can treat his multiple wives fairly, has failed to promote gender equality because in most cases, it is only fair in the side of the man. Polygamy, however is allowed in the 1974 of the Marriage Law, but CEDAW has been criticising the practice of polygamy in Article 16 paragraph 27 of General recommendation. It states, "....polygamous marriages contravene a woman's rights to equality with men, and can have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependants that such marriage ought to be discouraged and prohibited…."

CEDAW and Article 27 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution guarantee equality in the public sphere for both sexes. Nevertheless, there are some national and local regulations that do not promote equality between men and women in the public sphere such as Article 34 of the 1974 Marriage Law that emphasises on a husband as the provider and a wife as the mother of the household. The issue of *nafkah* is problematic for working women in which women's job is considered as not as important as a man's job. For women in general, their understanding of *nafkah* limits women's opportunities in the public sphere especially in a working place. As a result, in 2014, according to CEDAW in action, Indonesia that had 49.7% female population and 50.3% male population could not distribute jobs in the public sphere equally for both sexes. It states that 34.5% women and 34.5% men worked in agriculture, 16% women and 21.5% men worked in the industry, and 49.5% women and 25.1 men worked as service employees.[58] Therefore, the state is encouraged to comply Article 2 (f) of the CEDAW to modify or abolish of the existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that discriminate women.[59]

The doctrine chosen by Islamic fundamentalist groups that does not want to use nonviolence interpretation can produce both domestic and public violations. Referring to PP's case in which she is engaged in the raiding for the purpose of *dakwah,* Rosidin, a director of *Fahmina*-Institute states,

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[58] "Indonesia." CEDAW in Action. Accessed May 20, 2017. http://cedaw-in-action.org/en/indonesia/

[59] *UN General Assembly, CEDAW,* art. 2 (f)

These women notice that there are many problems in society and the government does not have a good system to tackle the problem. These groups, basically do not have any capacities to solve problems because they would just raid straight away without following the legal procedures, used victim's perspective and there is no Law's article showed to address the case or a visum report from the doctor. As a result, their report is rejected by the police. Yet, these groups are close to society because they are friendly. They have gained a public trust. (Rosidin, personal interview, March 26, 2016)

To conclude, not only Indonesian criminal law is weak, but it also raises an issue of the existence of NGOs that are unknown in society so that people choose to rely on the Islamic fundamentalist groups to solve social problems. Therefore, all of these issues concerning women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups in Indonesia can be solved by some of them are enforcing criminal law and NGOs' socialisation in society. Sulistyowati Irianto (2006) argues that there is a big possibility for Indonesia to reform the Law since Indonesia has ratified many international instruments that guarantee equality and justice, and are supported by free press, freedom of speech and freedom to participate in the political sphere. But on the other hand, the bureaucratic system still corrupts and the mentality of Indonesian people who are still permissive towards corruption, violation of Law, and discrimination of the law [60] can hinder reform of the law.

In my opinion, gender equality is not the government's priority because according to Donna Swita, "The draft regarding bill of law concerning gender equality was rejected by the government and the political fraction that supported for its rejection was PKS. If the bill were passed, it would protect women and children because according to *Komnas Perempuan* (Indonesia's National Commission on Violence against Women) in 2015, there were 389 Indonesian policies that discriminated women." (Donna Swita, personal interview, March 30, 2016). This challenges gender equality because not only gender equality that is not the state's priority, but women themselves do not want to fight for

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[60] Irianto, Sulistyowati. "Mempersoalkan Netralitas dan Obyektifitas Hukum: Pengalaman Perempuan," in *Perempuan dan Hukum: Menuju Hukum yang Berperspektif Kesetaraan dan Keadilan,* edited by Irianto, Sulistyowati, 28-41, Jakarta: The Convention Watch, Universitas Indonesia and Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2006, p. 40

equality because they view women's *kodrat* is a primary role as a carer in the family or-dained by God. However, this cannot be blamed because women can choose whatever they want to be. Meanwhile, the ideology promoted by Islamic fundamentalist groups and the national Law that places women as the mother of the household play a significant in-fluence on women to choose to be inferior than men.

5.   Chapter 5 (Discussion)

What benefits and consequences do women get by participating in Islamic fundamentalist groups?

This chapter shall discuss benefits and consequences regarding women's partici-pation in Islamic fundamentalist groups. The benefits and the consequences are discussed in three sections that include; participation in the public sphere, raising self-empower-ment, and creating community empowerment. The fourth section shall discuss the chal-lenges to gender equality by looking at the consequences regarding women's participa-tion in Islamic fundamentalist groups.

5.1   Participation in the public sphere

The various activities of *dakwah* that offer 'Islam is the solution' becomes more popular for women because according to Wiktorowicz (2004) the state do not have simi-lar activities.[61] The social activities offered by the movements do not only include women to get actively involved in the public sphere to build a better society but importantly, women are convinced to be able to be a part of the problem solvers in community. EV, a woman preacher at HTI in Cirebon, has been actively participating HTI since 2003 when she was studying at one of public universities in Malang. She is a teacher, and on her

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[61] Wiktorowicz, "Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory," 11

spare time she is actively giving *dakwah* for women in some *kampungs* in Cirebon. It took me by surprise when I was attending her *pengajian.* The *pengajian* was occupied by many women carrying their babies, which I assumed that they are housewives. I asked permission to EV to interview those women, but she did not allow me. She said that I would receive the same answer to her. I then asked EV's motivations in joining HTI and its relation to women's role.

> I want to find the meaning of real life …. It is practised by *beribadah* (worship) to achieve *taqwa* (piety) to bring me to heaven…. HTI taught women to be responsible to what happens in society. Women's role is very important today, but we do not recognise the term 'gender equality.' It is unknown in Islam because it is a Western product. Women have to have both roles, productive and reproductive. Reproductive role is the main role for women, so every woman has to become a mother. A task of a mother is to educate her children. Islam sees working woman as *mubah* (permissible), meaning women can work as long as they do not forget their main roles as a mother. To become a good mother, HTI provides many programs for women. For example, we can teach women about the danger of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender), and how to fight against LGBT. We need community support since LGBT is a social problem. That's why I am here to empower women in this *kampung*. (EV, personal interview, March 27, 2016)

By being a woman's preacher at HTI, EV has shown that she can contribute something in the public sphere that is to educate women in *kampung* to empower themselves to be a 'better individual' by having both roles; productive and reproductive. Susan Blackburn (2004) states that it is quite rare to hear Islamic leaders agree on women taking public roles, normally women just remind silent, especially in political matters.[62] The benefit for EV as a woman preacher is she shows an example of a woman who can take part in a public role and mobilise mass, especially in the grassroot level as in *kampung*. She contributes to spread 'women knowledge' to help women in *kampung* to recognise their agency and capability. This activity is very informative for housewives in *kampung* who are not exposed to knowledge on how to be a good mother, and a wife. EV helps

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[62] Blackburn, Susan. *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 105-1-07

women in *kampung* to be agent for their life by recognising their women's roles to claim their 'parts' in a family.

The fact that EV educates women in *kampung* about the spread of LGBT, it shows that EV tries to include women in *kampung* to be an agent of change in society by addressing the issue of problem and providing solution. By engaging those women in public meeting and giving them social education, these women are potential to raise women's awareness of other social problems such as rape, drugs, and crimes in society. EV's contribution as a woman preacher may result women in general would consider a woman preacher is a common occupation and see equality between a woman and a man preacher. It is probably be easier and more comfortable for a woman preacher to approach other women audiences in raising women's issues in general due to gender bias, and therefore, society would always need a role of a woman preacher. HTI, however, has given a woman a place in the public sphere to handle women's issue and to inspire women to participate in the movement.

Nevertheless, as what has been stated by Rinaldo that women's participation in piety movements brings its consequence; that is to limit women's freedom in criticising religious dogma.[63] I have previously discussed that the ideology carried by HTI is problematic since they often brings Islamic issues in the middle east to waken people to engage in their movement. EV addressed LGBT behaviour and the growing strength of the LGBT community as one of social problems that women in *kampung* are encouraged to fight against it. Freire's declares that the teaching of the movement can perceive its followers to become the victim of the world and the teaching can also fight for their claim to not become a victim anymore.[64] HTI's teaching that said the West has repressed Muslims in the Middle East does not only spread hates towards religious minorities such as Christians that, historically brought by colonialism, but HTI's teaching can also provoke women to justify any kind of violent acts for the purpose of defending Islam.

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[63] Rinaldo, "Women and Piety Movement, " 599

[64] Freire, "The Banking Concept of Education," 165

Providing women's programs to become a good mother is also provided by PKS. UM, a housewife who has got a bachelor degree of politics from Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) is actively involved in women's programs provided by PKS. Although she got a bachelor degree, but she decided to be a stay-home mother for her kids. She said that her husband earns enough money, so she does not have to work. She further explains that if she worked, the kids would not be taken care of well. She shows her concerns over her kids' education at school in which one teacher has to handle many students. Therefore, being a housewife is a good decision to her family.

Her main role in PKS is managing women's programs called women empowerment. The activity focuses on family functionalisation and strengthening women's role in a marriage life. The activities have some trainings for women who will get married, in which the activities consist of introduction to children's education, how to adapt to a new family and how to manage household chores. These activities are also supported by many stakeholders such as experts, doctors, counselors, psychologists and academics. Regarding her participation in this program, UM states,

> Women have to be comprehensive. Women have to be able to see many things such as social, politics, economy, and family for backing up our next generation. Women also have to have life balance for being a mother, having a career and being active in society. That is why it is more suitable for me to get active in society to handle women's programs, because women's issue is urgent. In a family, roles of men and women are equal, just like 'double players' in badminton. It does not matter who can take the main role, he or she has to be given the chance. But, to take a leadership position, it should be a man because men are smarter, more objective, and have wider point of views. I experienced it myself in PKS, when my husband told me about a lady who had to replace her boss' position for a day because he was sick, that lady could not talk in front of the public. That lady asked my husband many times and did not feel confident. (UM, personal interview, April 4, 2016)

Women can get many benefits in PKS. PKS helps women to raise awareness of women's issues both in family and in society. PKS is also aimed to get women politically active by involving women into a cadre system. This opportunity can benefit women to

exercise their freedom to participate in the public sphere and show the importance framework to gain public representation, especially for educated stay home mothers. Importantly, PKS provides updated knowledge regarding women's issue by involving many experts to address the problems.

In contrast, women's programs provided by PKS do not fully promote gender equality. The women's programs are viewed for not being sustainable to solve women's problems. The contents of the programs are mainly about domestics similar to what EV and her HTI taught women in *kampung* in Cirebon. It focuses on how to be a good wife, how women manage household chores, how to take care of children, and how to deal with all of the 'women's domestic roles.' The purpose of this program is seen to support a man's roles who is the leader in the family and has more roles in the public sphere. On one hand, women's programs is indeed made to encourage women to participate in the public sphere and has successfully inspired many women to participate. But on the other hand, the issue brought in the public sphere is focusing on the domestic issues that oblige women to master those roles. In addition, men are not encouraged to get actively involved in the women's programs which I view the domestic sphere is only women's issue. Therefore, this program will never solve women's problems because it is only obliged women to master them and sustain the unequal division of roles between men and women.

EV's statement on 'working women is seen as *mubah* and UM's statement regarding men have to hold the leadership's position make discourse about women participation in the public sphere is very complex in Islamic fundamentalist groups. Thalib (1999) states that women in Islamic fundamentalist groups cannot adopt the Western lifestyle and place women in the same level as men at work in every position, because it is against the Qur'an and the *Sharia*. The men leadership is also derived from the Qur'an. He further testifies that these are based on two factors; men are naturally more capable to work outside than women and men carry burden of fulfilling family needs. [65]

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[65] Thalib, M. *Solusi Islam Terhadap Dilema Wanita Karir.* Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 1999, p. 114

Meanwhile, Shalih bin Fauzan bin Abdullah al-Fauzan (2005) states that women hold a position as the queen in the family, in which women have a right to lead, and be obeyed by the children. This concept, however has something to do with a mother-children relationship that obliges women to have full responsibilities over the household and child bearing that has to be under men's control.   Nevertheless, he further argues that women are permissible to work outside the house under certain conditions. As long as the work is extremely important, women have an important role on it and men cannot do it. For example, being a kindergarten teacher, a teacher at women's school, a nurse, or when the husband cannot provide financial in the family. Lastly, it is also permissible if the work is a part time job, so women do not have to stay outside often. He added that if women work outside there would create criminality and other social problems. [66]

This concept, however, still allows women to participate in the public sphere. Yet women cannot have full participation in any activities since the activities are selected and are only supporting men in the public sphere. For women who are in the grassroots and do not work, this is promising ideology since this idea can inspire them to be a teacher or a nurse to raise their economic, but for women who have more capabilities to handle more than just handling women's issues in society, this ideology can limit their movement and revolve women's status around in the domestic sphere. Contrary to EV's and UM's perspectives, PP insists that women can choose whatever they want to do. She is confidently convinced that both men and women have to work together to build social justice. PP's activities are joining GAPAS to do the raiding along with her male counterparts to combat sins in society. She and her group target Muslims who practise different practice of Islam and Christian believers. She accused the Al Maghfurlah group (another sect of Islam) of blasphemy and expelled them on the 24th February 2014, and accused the Nurul Qur'an Islamic boarding school of blasphemy and conducted a raid there.[67]

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[66] Al-Fauzan, S.F. *Fiqh Mukminat: Upaya Shari'ah Menjaga Keamanan, Martabat, dan Kemuliaan Wanita.* Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2005, p. 23

[67] International Crisis Group. "Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon." Asia Briefing 132, Jakarta/Brussels, 2012, 2-3

Further, she also targeted Christian believers by threatening and forcing an end to the breaking fast hosted by Radio Gratia, a Christian radio in Cirebon on the 8th of October 2012.[68] She states that,

> We are lacking of Islamic fighters. Muslims who do not conduct deviant practices have to be told off so they can get back to the practice of traditional Muslim …. The non-Muslims have to stop their activities such as spreading their preaching over the radio because the majority of the people in Indonesia are Muslims. The Christians have to respect and follow Muslim's way of life. (PP, personal interview, March 26, 2016)

PP's involvement in the raiding with her male counterparts that she also considers it as her contribution in the public sphere, however has something to do with her tough past life. When she was in the second grade of elementary school, her father passed away and her mother could not take care of 12 children. Therefore, she worked as a *kenek angkot* (a mini bus driver assistant) whose job looked for passengers in the street, and it is normally conducted by men. She used the money to pay for her education until early university and gave the rest to her mother. As a woman *kenek angkot*, she developed her militant point of view towards life, especially after she joined PII (*Pelajar Islam Indonesia,* Indonesian Islamic Students) that has a strong militant view in Islam.[69] She has been changing many Islamic movements that suit to her militant ideology but now she is only participating in GAPAS.

Being able to get out of poverty by working as a woman *kenek angkot* has showed that she was able to conduct 'men parts' in a workplace and this experience gets her to claim her capability to have the same parts as men in the public sphere. Interestingly, she was supported by her male counterparts in the movement. Even when I was interviewing her, she was busy receiving a phone call from her males counterparts regarding their religious activities. She states, "Men actually need women in the public sphere, but women

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[68] Ibid

[69] Ali, Mukti. "Puspita: Tokoh Gerakan Anti Permurtadan dan Aliran Sesat," in *Kesaksian Para Pengabdi: Kajian Tentang Perempuan dan Fundamentalisme di Indonesia*, edited by Marcoes-Natsir, Lies and Octavia Lanny, 163-180, Jakarta: Rumah KitaB, 2014, p. 165-166

have to put aside their ego not to be the leader. Don't worry, women can stir them from behind. Men as the leader is only for a form of formality. That is why women cannot be the President, a governor or other leaders." (PP, personal interview, March 26, 2016). Her view is also supported by a view of Karimah (2005) in Inayah Rohmaniyah (2014) that women, however have to work together with men in society because both genders are seen as an individual who is created as God's representative on earth and it is stated in *Surah* At Taubah [9]: 71] and Al Maidah [5]:2. Karimah also emphasises on the importance of women being knowledgeable to understand God's words in the sacred text, and receive equality treatment, but in the political arena, women cannot hold a position of leadership.[70]

This view brings a consequence to the issue of gender equality and Islam in general because PP's and Karimah's views fall into inconsistency in which there is a dilemma between women's freedom to be a leader and obey the religious dogma concerning male's leadership. Rohmaniyah (2014) views this issue as a hybridity of fundamentalism and feminism. Women in Islamic fundamentalist groups want to create their own roles in society, but they have to keep deconstructing their women's roles in order to suit to their Islamic teaching.[71] Therefore, it can be concluded that women in Islamic fundamentalist group support for women's freedom by the definition of women have to give the leadership for men. Even though women have capacity and capability to hold a leadership position, but women will always have to negotiate between God's words and their agency to become social agents of change. Women are not excluded but they keep reminded to focus on women's duty as a household caretaker before demanding for other roles.

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[70] Karimah, I. "Pemberdayaan Perempuan dalam Tinjauan Islam," Online Available HTTP:<http://annisa.majelis.mujahidin.or.id/artikel/hukum/pemberdayaan_perempuan_dalam_tinjauan_islam.xhtml> (Accessed 1 February 2015) in Rohmaniyah, Inayah. "Women's Negotiation of Status and Space in a Muslim Fundamentalist Movement," in *Gender and Power in Indonesian Islam: Leaders, Feminists, Sufis and Pesantren selves,* edited by Smith, Bianca J and Woodward, Mark, 135-154, New York: Routledge, 2014.

[71] Rohmaniyah, Inayah. "Women's Negotiation of Status and Space in a Muslim Fundamentalist Movement," in *Gender and Power in Indonesian Islam: Leaders, Feminists, Sufis and Pesantren selves,* edited by Smith, Bianca J and Woodward, Mark, 135-154, New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 151

5.2 Raising self-empowerment

The activities offered by Islamic fundamentalist groups can raise women's self-empowerment. Women are not only given a role to be agent of change in the public sphere, but according to Rinaldo, women's participation in a religious movement can help its members to cultivate individual agency and personal responsibility to raise member's self-esteem.[72] The first case is shown by AN who suffered from social alienation. Unlike Quintan Wiktorowicz' article that discusses al-Muhajiroun, a transnational Islamic movement based in the UK as a case study to point that alienation has caused many immigrants in the UK participated in a radical movement to show resistance,[73] AN's case shows that alienation may appear within local Indonesian society itself that does not include immigrants. AN is an ex member of PKS/Tarbiyah and delivers her situation regarding the issue of alienation,

> When I was in high school, I had so many problems. My family was broken, I could not get friends at school nor society and I was financially insecure. I thought being a religious person is the solution to become a better person. I was scared of not being religious. Then I joined PKS/Tarbiyah to get friends. PKS/Tarbiyah also helped me financially by giving me some scholarships and opening my doors to get opportunities to study in the UK and the US. On my spare time, I had to teach at some PKS' institutions….
> I stayed at a lady's house who was active as an activist in PKS for free. (AN, personal interview, April 15, 2016)

According to Veldhuis and Staun, social identification that includes identity crisis, social rules, and friendship bonds can cause individual aleaniation.[74] PKS/Tarbiyah has helped AN to cultivate her agency that according to Saba Mahmood (2005) is an individ-

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[72] Rinaldo, "Women and Piety Movement," 600

[73] Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam." (Paper Presented at "The Roots of Islamic Radicalism" Conference, Yale University, 8-9 May, 2004)

[74] Veldhuis & Staun, *Islamist Radicalisation,* 27

ual capacity to recognise his/her interests against tradition, custom and other obstacles.[75] PKS/Tarbiyah saw her as a potential activist for the movement but lacking of financial resources to support her dreams and in need of community support to raise her self-empowerment and save her from social alienation. By providing what AN needs; financial support to study and community that supports her activities, PKS presents as her saviour by directing AN to chase her dreams.

However, PKS/Tarbiyah benefitted AN to have an opportunity to study and have a new community. Recognising self agency also helps her to be completely fine to think and act differently as long as it does not hurt anyone and an individual should not feel alienated due to its differences. As a result, she later discovered that this group is not for her and decided to leave the group. However, she did not regret of ever joining, because the religious practice in PKS/Tarbiyah has helped her to be a critical person by comparing between PKS/Tarbiyah religious teaching and reality in life that mostly repress women's freedom. She states,

> I was not allowed to do anything regarding my hobbies such as painting and singing. I could paint, but I could not paint a mountain or a tree that according to them it is God's creation. Singing is also forbidden because it means showing women's *aurat* (women's body parts that should be covered and it is varied in different situations among different groups). I know many people in the group wanted to leave, but they cannot. They mostly want to have a boyfriend and have a normal life as youth, but they cannot because dating is forbidden. Most of them are afraid of losing friends and getting out of their comfort zone. They also do not see anything to compare between the teaching of PKS and other Islamic practices. I was lucky that I got some opportunities to study overseas, so I can compare PKS teaching to other Islamic practices. I met international students from Pakistan and they stated that the teaching of Islam is not that strict, and it should be flexible. (AN, personal interview, April 15, 2016)

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[75] Mahmood, Saba. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 8

Freire states that religious teaching chooses and enforces their belief and students have to comply.[76] This kind of teaching that does not allow women to challenge its teaching has a potential to reduce women's capability to seek for other references to find the truth and as a result, many friends of AN decide to stay in PKS/Tarbiyah and sacrifice their repressed feelings. The fact that many women wanted to quit but they are afraid of losing friends shows that to some degree women in Islamic fundamentalist groups need to have solidarity to raise their self esteem. Women feel insecure if they do not have a community to support them and are not confident enough to see things and take actions differently. Consequently, women are willing to deal with the rigid religious teaching in the movement to be exchanged with their freedom out there as long as they get what they need to raise their self-empowerment that includes community, social inclusion, and financial security.

On the contrary, the movement creates lifestyles that according to Anthony Giddens (1991) can increase the importance of self-identity and daily activity.[77] Creating pious disciplines that is manifested in practising *shallat* (the 5 daily prayers) along with its *sunnah*, reading Qur'an daily, practising its command to wear a big *jilbab* or a *niqab* (a cloth that covers women's body that includes her face) and other strict rules for the purpose of being close to God, it can be argued that the lifestyles are only for pursuing solidarity and affiliations within the group. Therefore, for those who cannot comply to the movement's religious rules, such as AN who wanted to paint or sing, will be excluded within the community. AN states, "Nobody wanted to be my friend when I left the group because I was seen as a sinner". (AN, personal interview, April 15, 2016). This movement apparently produces marginalisation, exclusion and feeling of repression for its members. Therefore, the movement will save women from the issue of alienation 'out there' if women only fulfill and comply religious duty. Meanwhile, an individual is not fully earn-

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[76] Freire, "The Banking Concept of Education," 164

[77] Giddens, Anthony. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991, p. 5

ing freedom to gain self respect and achieve personal capability as in doing their hobbies, or being independent.

Apart from the issue of alienation, the issue of poverty has brought women to have low self esteem as well. According to Veldhuis and Staun, at the macro level, economic factor causes an individual join a radical movement.[78] Meanwhile, according to Ivan Briscoe and Dr. Bibi van Ginkel (2013), poverty itself does not link to an individual's participation in a radical movement, rather one has to look at other issues such as governance, level of social exclusion, and level of decision making.[79] Referring to PP's case where she had to earn money outside the house as a *kenek angkot* as a young girl, has opened her door to become an activist in some fundamentalist movements, it means poverty indeed does not link to an individual's participation in fundamentalist movements, but the issue of poverty has to be taken into account in attracting people to participate in fundamentalist movements. Another case of poverty is also shown by IN who participates in Salafi/Wahabi movement. She is a junior high school teacher who has 7 children. Her initial motives in participating in Salafi/Wahabi is because she was facing a financial crisis. She and her husband who work as teachers at the same junior high school, their salary cannot support their family needs. Her eldest son was kicked out from school and joined in a band. While the younger son got cancer that forced her to spend so much money for the hospital. In short, not only she felt she can not support her kids financially, but she also felt that she could not educate all of her children well. Before she joined Salafi/Wahabi, she had gotten involved in some businesses and went to *a dukun Jawa* (a Javanese shaman) to help her financially. Unfortunately, none of her efforts was successful.

Later, she felt like she had to go back to an 'actual practice of Islam' and joined *pengajian* led by ibu Badriyah in Pekalongan to give her support emotionally. She states,

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[78] Veldhuis & Staun, *Islamist Radicalisation,* 24

[79] Briscoe, Ivan, Van Ginkel, Bibi and ICCT Policy Brief. "The Nexus Between Development and Security: Searching for Common Ground in Countering Terrorism." *ICCT Policy Brief* (2013), p. 4

The teaching of Salafi/Wahabi is following *Sunnah* practised by the Prophet Muhammad. It shows the actual practice of Islam because it is similar to the Islamic practice in Saudi Arabia. The actual practice of Islam is only the one practised by Salafi/Wahabi. And why are there so many different Islamic practices nowadays? It is because people made it up themselves and do *pembelokkan akidah* (deflect the creed or the belief system). Salafi/Wahabi's teaching is also challenging to me. People will think that me and my family are terrorists because we dress up like people in Saudi Arabia, but Salafi/Wahabi's teaching teaches me to be *ikhlas* (sincere) in facing these *cobaan* (tests from God). To me, how I dress up (she wears a *niqab*) can give me protection from 'naughty' men in the street who like to 'tease' or 'make fun' of women ….. My kids are now following me joining in the movement and they want to obey me. (IN, personal interview, April 6, 2016).

The facts that IN tried to look for emotional help to deal with her financial crisis and family matters by joining *pengajian* led by ibu Badriyah shows that she needs psychological comfort and personal salvation to deal with her *cobaan*. Wiktorowicz states that religious movement comes to make sense individual's experiences and events and interpret them in accordance to its teaching rationally and provide a rational support.[80] This is the first benefit IN gets in participating in Salafi/Wahabi, that she receives personal salvation to be able to interpret the meaning of life in facing her *cobaan* that she learns how to be *ikhlas*. Besides that, the teaching is quite rational to give IN freedom and protection over herself from men in the street to do a verbal and a physical sexual assaults by wearing a *niqab*.

Considering it is not common for Indonesian women to directly show their resistance over men's degrading treatment, because it can lead to criminality such as a rape and women would be blamed for their resistance actions, Salafi/Wahabi's teaching on encouraging its women followers to wear a *niqab* can help IN to articulate her self-empowerment to indirectly show her resistance and protection over the culture that subordinates women and educate men on how to respect women. This is empowering for women to be able to provide self protection, but on the contrary, this practice is not going to help soci-

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[80] Wiktorowicz, "Introduction: The Activism and Social Theory," 15

ety especially men to respect women in general because men will be unconsciously permissive to harrash women who are not covered.

IN's financial problem raises the issue of charity and education given by Salafi/Wahabi. According to Aswar (2016), Salafi/Wahabi has its political agenda to spread the traditional practice of Islam in many countries by giving so much funding for the purpose of *dakwah* activities that are manifested in education and building Islamic institutions that follow Salafi/Wahabi's teaching for the recruitment strategy. This strategy, however, is used for the purpose of Saudi Arabia to be known as the world's first provider of Islamic global education to create world alliances and legitimate Saudi as a country to be the main source of Islam.[81] To support Aswar's argument, Amanda Kovacs (2014) states that the teaching of Salafi/Wahabi opposes free thinking and teaches its members to obey and submit to its religious and political order. The teaching also exposes a positive image of the royal family and describes its country as the leader of the Muslim world and becomes the center of Islam since the country was chosen by God to promote Islam globally.[82]

Referring to IN's statement who strongly believes that the teaching of Salafi/Wahabi presents the trully version of Islam, can contribute to spread intolerant views among Islamic adherents since the teaching often accuses other practices of Islam in Indonesia as *bid'ah* (religious innovation) and *musrik* (believing other than Allah). They often criticise the religious rituals practised by NU such as *tahlilan* (a ceremony conducted by some Muslims to commemorate or pray for the death family that usually is held on the first day of the death until the day seventh, and then held on the day 40, 100, 1000) or *mitoni* (a ceremony for a seventh month pregnant woman for the safety of her baby). In my view, this teaching is problematic if they impose it in the public sphere considering there are so many Islamic practices in Indonesia.

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[81] Aswar, Hasbi. "Politik Luar Negeri Arab Saudi dan Ajaran Salafi-Wahabi di Indonesia." *JISIERA (The Journal of Islamic Studies and International Relations).* Vol 1 (Agustus, 2016): 15-30, p. 19-20

[82] Kovacs, Amanda. "Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalising Indonesia's Muslims." *German Institute of Global and Area Studies, GIGA Focus International Edition English 07* (2014), p. 3

As a Muslim, I am not even familiar with the Islamic practice practised in Karas Island, Papua told by my Dutch friend who has been recently conducting a field work for her PhD dissertation there. If Salafi/Wahabi claims that their version of Islam is the only truth, it should be left on their religious private sphere. Their tendency in accusing other practices of Islam, which I believe that they will do it to address the Islamic practice practised in Karas Island, Papua or other places in Indonesia, it could threaten individual's identity that according to Engin F. Isin and Patricia K. Wood (1999), is tied with values, communities and groups to an individual belongs.[83] Therefore, the teaching of Salafi/Wahabi brings a serious consequence. Even though IN is not actively involved for a change in society, but she supports for changing the structure in a multicultural society in Indonesia in creating a clash among Muslims and threatening an individual's identity.

The last example of how Islamic fundamentalist groups helps women to raise women's self-empowerment is shown by ER who was an ex member of a movement at Baiturrahman mosque and LDII. She participated in Islamic fundamentalist group out of her curiousity. Rifki Rosyad (2013) states that in Indonesia, Islamic fundamentalist movement is also channeled through a public mosque to spread their ideology to purify Islam for youth.[84] She was 16 when she joined a movement in Baiturrahman mosque. The aim of the movement was to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia by replacing the ideology of *Pancasila* and supported the seven words from the Jakarta chapter. The movement believed in an Islamic ideological concept "ila" (oneness) derived from "la ila haillallah" that means God is one. According to the movement, God has to be one and placed in the highest position in Indonesia. Therefore, all Indonesian Muslims have to obey God's commands by replacing *Pancasila* as the state's ideology. The concept of *Pancasila* is viewed as an incorrect implementation of the state's ideology because it does not use

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[83] Isin, Engin F and Wood, Patricia K. *Citizenship and Identity*. London: SAGE Publication, 1999, p. 19

[84] Rosyad, Rifki. *A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movement among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia.* ANU Press: 2013, p. 32

the concept of *shahadah* (the Muslim profession of faith; there is no God but Allah, and the Prophet Muhammad is the messenger of Allah). She states,

> As a high school student, I got attracted to the Islamic teaching offered by that mosque because the teaching provided very interesting Islamic training for youth. Islam was introduced critically. All things about Islam can be used to be materials for the discussion. The material taught were about NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia*, the Islamic state of Indonesia) and Shi'a. We were also made to think like an atheist to argue about God's existence critically. The teaching method used dialogue and focused on the knowledge instead of Islamic theology. The teaching was open to people and engaged people to have a dialogue rather than rhetoric, so the students were taught to think critically and see things objectively. We were all introduced about all religions and by the time we chose Islam as our faith, it was based on our conscious. The teaching was from Al-Khafi, an Islamic movement from Egypt which historically lived in a cave and its teaching aimed to purify Islamic teaching. Texts in the Qur'an can be negotiated with facts and life realities because Islamic teaching taught was not conventional unlike other places to learn Islam. (ER, personal interview, March 23, 2016)

ER's curiosity over the methodology of the teaching in Baiturrahman mosque has successfully cultivated her agency to learn how to think critically and helped her as a teenager to seek for self identity. In fact, in my experience, formal education system in Indonesia is mostly about 'a teacher gives and a student receives' and it is not common to see teachers allow students to speak up their mind and be critical over everything. This is due to the culture of feudalism that structurally obliges young people to show their respect to older people including to show respect to teachers. Therefore, younger people are not expected to say something that oppose older people's point of view because it might be considered as rude. Consequently, students become passive.

The Baiturrahman mosque, however, has benefited ER, who at that time as a teenager to be exposed to the learning methodology that gives her an outcome for her future. She became one of the smartest women members there and was promoted to participate in a national election to sit at the DPR. She is now a lecturer at one of private universities in Jakarta who concerns on the issue of Islam and gender equality. Furthermore, her ability to think critically has taught her to gain self respect by claiming her rights as a

woman and religion should not let its believers to place women in a second class citizen. She has been divorced twice. Her reasons regarding her calling for divorce was because her two former husbands saw things differently, that according to ER, they degraded women's position in marriage. Her friends at the movements accused her of being a 'bad wife' of not wanting to 'serve' her husband. Yet, she believes that she knows what she wants including her motivations to quit Baiturrahman mosque and LDII. She states, "The teaching does not encourage the students to attend formal education. Many of my friends are smart, but they left their formal education and alienated themselves in a secular society. Whereas, the teaching in LDII is too conservative and I was not given an opportunity to criticise everything. (ER, personal interview, March 23, 2016)."

Not only the teaching that degrades women, but the rise of fundamentalist movements also carry a consequence for youth. Although the movement can help youth to find their self identity, but the development of Islamic fundamentalism among youth can lead youth to confront the government of not supporting Islam. Especially students will refer to the regime of Soeharto that anti Islamic politics in Indonesia and help to develop the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The movement can also spread the idea of frustration as a Muslim living in a secular society. As a result, many youth will focus on spreading Islamic ideology to establish an Islamic state rather than focusing on 'realities' in which they have to focus on their education.

5.3 Creating community empowerment

George M. von Furstenberg (2006) states that most of religions oblige its adherents to conduct social obligations such as implementing effective social programs to not only offer inclusion in community but also achieve some goals such as to reduce poverty by holding charity.[85] All religious movements often involve women to participate in their social activities for the purpose of giving women education to empower women and

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[85] Furstenberg, George M von. "Detecting and Decomposing the 'Faith Factor' in Social Service Provision and Absorption." in *Faith-Based Social Services: Measures, Assessments, and Effectiveness,* edited by Boddie, Stephanie C and Cnaan, Ram A, 39-62, Birmingham: The Haworth Pastoral Press, 2006, p. 42

community. For women who were experienced alienation and identity crisis, having a sense of belonging and a strong bonding among its members within a community are important to support women's character development. Rinaldo states that religious movement provides women to create new forms of achievement in community and create productivity.[86] Other words, women's productivity can contribute to empower community.

Women's contributions to empower community have been shown by women in this study. PKS/Tarbiyah improves AN's quality as a woman by giving her access to education and some scholarships. In return, AN had to contribute to teach at some PKS/Tarbiyah's institutions to also practise her skill in teaching. AN's contribution in teaching for PKS/Tarbiyah's institutions, however can contribute to create better quality for PKS/Tarbiyah's students. By having good teachers, PKS/Tarbiyah could promote 'piety and knowledge' in their educational program that I believe it would attract more students since piety is currently a big market in Indonesia. UM who is a housewife and got a bachelor degree in politics from UGM was supported by PKS to handle women's programs aimed to empower community to have better women.

Not only PKS helps UM to boost her confidence, but PKS can also strengthen the bond among women members. PKS shows that women with a university degree do not have to feel ashamed or embarrassed if they cannot work or do something relevant to their degree because PKS can provide women with many networks to build a strong powerful community to solve women's issues. PKS provides solution to women's problems, partnership, and gets women to engage in an active collaboration among its members to produce more events, venues, and various discussions in community.

EV who is a preacher at HTI contributes to empower women in *kampung* to become more pious and knowledgeable. She creates a public leader among women in *kampung* and can transform condition for women in *kampung* to identify issue in community and create solidarity. ER who was promoted to become a member of DPR shows that she could represent her community to get involved in politics, and PP shows that she could

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[86] Rinaldo, "Women and Piety Movement," 595

create partnership with her male counterparts to do the raiding to achieve similar goal that is to establish an Islamic society. These roles, however, remind women that they have important roles in community. As the movements help women to recognise their roles in community, women would treat 'community' as theirs, in which women would take care and make efforts to develop their community.

On the other hand, Janine A. Clark (2004) argues that one must pay attention to this kind of religious movement that wants to re-islamise society by encouraging individual to be pious and bridging the gap between religious discourse and realities that often the religious teaching interferes the public sphere.[87] This is the risk of having fundamentalist groups implement their social activities in society. Rinaldo states that piety movement brings access to education to get its member to be educated so they can catch up with modernity and class considering modernity and class are significant to the development of economic and social integration. However, it may be religious movement requires women to become educated and be in a middle class for the purpose of the demand of religious piety.[88]

The movements require women to become educated and be in a middle class could mean that the movements want to 'create a place' for women to have access to religious knowledge equally, and sharing the same meaning and value in order women can have a strong bonding that can help community to achieve harmony. Yet, unfortunately, it does not apply for women in the grassroot. In fact, the religious teaching are informed differently to different social classes as it has been shown by EV's case that HTI aims women in *kampung* to master household, childbearing, and obey the husband. PKS that has many middle class followers creates 'middle class and elite women activities' and still promotes the idea of women have to master domestic tasks. Meanwhile PP or ER

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[87] Clark, Janine A. "Islamist Women in Yemen: Informal Nodes of Activism," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, edited by Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 164-184, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 168

[88] Rinaldo, "Women and Piety Movement," 589-590

who are already in the middle class, were encouraged to pursue their dreams to create partnership between men and women in the public sphere.

Thus, it raises an issue of gender equality that is manipulated for the sake of gaining female followers in Islamic fundamentalist groups. The low social level women with limited literacy skills are taught to cultivate their agency and capability by fully submitting themselves to create pious discipline. Whereas women in the middle and the upper class are taught to cultivate women's individual agency and capability to achieve their dreams but still have to support male leadership. ER and Donna Swita, an ex member of LDII and a woman's activist respectively state,

> There are different levels in LDII's teachings. If you belong to 'ring 1' then they would argue that women's positions are not just domestic ones. While if you are seen as 'low class people,' they would argue that women have to stay at home. Economical status influences women's position in society. (ER, personal interview, March 28, 2016)

> Aceh has successfully had a female *walikota* (mayor) from PKS, that ideologically disagrees with female leadership. And it is true, when she got the position as a *walikota*, she did not do her task as the *walikota* because she only did 'domestic stuff' such as managing finance. (Donna Swita, personal interview, March 30, 2016)

Therefore, it can be argued that empowering community by involving women to contribute to change does not mean empowering community in general because gender equality is still poorly applied in all levels of social status. Whilst religious ideology is still following patriarchal tradition, it seems there is no way out to create equal distribution of tasks between men and women in community even though women have already get the position as a leader. Freire argues that religious dogma that supports patriarchal community is justified to preserve culture and knowledge for the sake of achieving good and organise society.[89] Considering culture is dynamic, and if religious dogma is still supporting patriarchal culture, women's contribution in society will not generally produce egalitarian social change. Community empowerment that involves women would only

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[89] Freire, "The Banking Concept of Education," 166-169

encourage women to enjoy their participation in community but does not actually empower individual's capability that according to Amartya Sen (1995) is the freedom to achieve well-being.[90]

Summing up, women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups bring both benefits and consequences. Firstly, women participation in the public sphere benefits women to claim their 'part' in society, help women to raise self awareness to recognise, address and offer solution to women's issues, and be an agent to mobilise mass in raising the movement's followers. On the other hand, their religious teaching does not support gender equality because women's participation in the public sphere is to take care of women's issues to support male leadership. Women have to always negotiate between their freedom and their religious dogma that has to support male leadership. Consequently, women will always be discriminated in the public sphere.

Secondly, Islamic fundamentalist groups benefit women to raise self-empowerment by engaging in religious activities that can settle the issue of alienation, poverty and, identity crisis. Whereas the consequence is the teaching of the movement represses women's freedom for instance limiting women's activities, leading youth to oppose the state in hating Islam, supporting intolerant view and alienating women within the community if women do not obey the religious rules. Lastly, Islamic fundamentalist groups benefit women to create community empowerment by providing education, creating partnership between men and women in the public sphere, creating strong bond in community, and providing women's productivities to empower community. On the contrary, the consequence is the movements only empower middle-class to elite class women, but the empowerment still do not support gender equality. Religious teaching is manipulated to gain followers but do not actually promote equal freedom for women to contribute in producing egalitarian social change.

5.4   What are the challenges to gender equality?

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[90] Sen, Amartya. *Inequality Reexamined.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 49

The consequences regarding women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups challenge gender equality. The main challenge is due to the ideology promoted by the movements that represses women's consciousness to think with their fake consciousness. Women would be scared if they are not pious since the movements only see things in a black and white. Marcoes-Natsir states, "Women do not feel safe because they do not have rooms for imagination." (Lies Marcoes-Natsir, personal interview, March 28, 2016). Women will never have an equal opportunity as men that is limited to a woman's *kodrat,* and feel threatened if they do not obey their husbands. For these women, it might not be a problem for the sake of ideology, but women will lose a sense of security and let society to view women as inferior. The movements also create solidarity among women that is seen very important so that there is no 'individuality' and demand for 'individual rights.' As a result, women would be silent over injustice.

The fact that the movements promote conservative ideology raises an issue that they used patriarchal interpretation of the sacred text and it plays an important role to gender inequality. Marie-Aimée Hélie-Lucas (1999) testifies that there are three different things that differ Muslim society. Firstly, Islam has spread over countries and cultures that absorb different local traditions. Secondly, the Qur'an and the *Hadith* (a various reports containing the Prophet Muhammad's sayings, actions and habits) have been interpreted by different Islamic school of thoughts (sunni schools consist of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali, while Shi'a schools consists of Ja'fari and Zaidi) and the interpretations are on ongoing interpretations that provide an option for Muslims. Thirdly, political elements in every culture uses their power to decide which interpretation suits to the culture in accordance with circumstantial needs.[91] According to D.A. Spellberg (1994), in the history of Islam, Aisha's (the last wife of the Prophet Muhammad) involvement in the political battle defeated at the battle off the Camel in the second civil war, excludes

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[91] Hélie-Lucas, Marie-Aimée. "What is Your Tribe?: Women's Struggles and the Construction of Muslimness, " in *Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of Women,* edited by Howland, Courtney W, 21-32, New York: Palgrave, 1999, p. 24

women in the Islamic political life.[92] This history is used to remind women that women would not be successful to hold a leadership position. Therefore, this background is used by the fundamentalist movements to disagree on Megawati Soekarnoputri to be the fifth President of Indonesia in 2001-2004 and not support female leadership in general.

CEDAW's Concluding Observation for Indonesia 2012, paragraph 15 that states the increased influence of fundamentalist religious groups advocating restrictive interpretation of Sharia law have resulted discrimination against women.[93] The challenge of this patriarchal interpretation is there would be many middle class to elite class women who are capable of participating in the public sphere but they can not get equal opportunities. Thus, there would be low numbers of women who participate in the public sphere, especially in politics. If there is a woman who is supported in politics, she is made to be silent by not sounding any of women's rights in the political arena such as Fahira Idris, who is currently sitting at the DPR. Women would be seen as 'otherness' and society would always consider women's inferiority as a social norm that cannot be challenged. This kind of discrimination in the public sphere violates Article 7 (b) of the CEDAW that encourages the state to get women to participate and 'perform' in all levels of the government.[94]

A woman like PP, who acts anarchic in doing the raiding will justify her criminality by referring to Aisha's role who went to an actual war. This kind of teaching is possible to manipulate everything in politics and fails to grasp the substance of the religious teaching to be implemented in the Indonesian context. Furthermore, unequal distribution regarding women empowerment among women in Islamic fundamentalist groups as it is stated by EV that if women belonged to the 'ring 1,' the movement would argue that women's positions are not just domestic ones. While if women were seen as 'low class people,' the movement would argue that women have to stay at home, are seen to be

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[92] Spellberg, D.A. *Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past: The Legacy of A'isha bint Abi Bakr.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 104

[93] Human Rights Committee, "Concluding Observations for Indonesia 2012," para. 15

[94] *UN General Assembly, CEDAW*, art. 7(b)

problematic to CEDAW in general. The movements do not promote equality among women themselves, and therefore, it is the state's obligation to filter religious movements entering Indonesia that promote gender inequality and comply Article 2 (e) of the CEDAW that encourage the state, "....to take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise."[95]

Article 5 of CEDAW also encourages the state to modify the social and cultural patterns to eliminate practices that are based on the idea of inferiority and superiority of both sexes and recognise the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing of the children.[96] Not only the 1974 of the Marriage law that has violated this Article, but this Article encourages the state to support reinterpretation regarding religious interpretation to achieve gender equality. Hélie-Lucas (1999) states that women themselves have been working and challenging for reinterpreting the Qur'an by using feminist perspective towards human rights considering the interpretation of the Qur'an has been monopolised by male scholars.[97] Women Islamic scholars such as Asma Barlas, Amina Wadud and Musdah Mulia in Indonesia have strongly advocated reinterpretation of the Qur'an to be in accordance with current situation and applied equality between men and women. Unfortunately, both the state and most of Indonesian women seem do not show any supports.

Islamic fundamentalist groups promote to purify Islamic teaching and practice in Indonesia to be accordance to Islamic practice in Saudi Arabia can limit women's freedom in Indonesia. Generally speaking, Indonesian women have more freedom than women in Saudi Arabia culturally. Therefore, the state should choose the interpretation of Islam that is looking at culture relativism that according to Michael Singer (1999) produces different value and norms in each culture[98] to be implemented in the context of In-

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[95] *UN General Assembly, CEDAW*, art. 2(e)

[96] *UN General Assembly, CEDAW*, art. 5

[97] Hélie-Lucas, "What is Your Tribe?," 25

[98] Singer, Michael. "Relativism, Culture, Religion, and Identity," in *Religious Fundamentalisms and the Human Rights of Women,* edited by Howland, Courtney W, 45-54, New York: Palgrave, 1999, p. 46

donesia in order not to violate women's rights. Other words, purifying Islam by importing Arab culture to Indonesia as a representation of Islam in general can cause discrimination for Indonesian women in regards to women's freedom to advance and develop their potencies. This issue violates Article 3 of the CEDAW regarding the state to ensure the development and advancement of women for the purpose of guaranteeing human rights.

To conclude, the challenge to gender equality regarding women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups is women are not sure whether they are the victim of rigid ideology or make efforts to defend their faith. However, the consequences regarding women's participations in Islamic fundamentalist groups have violated various Articles of CEDAW. The teaching that promotes to purify cultural and religious traditions causes women equality in Islamic fundamentalist groups is not something that women earn naturally since they were born. Equality is something that women have to fight for its opportunity within the movements if only they are willing to. Gender equality in the movements mainly encourages women to only participate to enjoy the public sphere without giving an equal opportunity as men. Therefore, it is the state's responsibility to the danger of social change that affects women caused by Islamic movement, comply with CEDAW and gain support from civil society to promote gender equality.

6.   Conclusion

Women participate in Islamic fundamentalist groups in Indonesia because they want to be agent of change and develop themselves to be pious women. Islamic fundamentalist groups provide various activities of *dakwah* manifested in many form of social activities have given women roles to spread the message of Islam to establish Islamic society in Indonesia and claim their parts in the public sphere. In this study, women manifest *dakwah* activities by being a woman preacher, a teacher, and a social and political activist. On the other hand, the manifestations of *dakwah* activities mainly focus on transforming women to be pious that means to be a good wife and a good mother. Further-

more, for the sake of spreading *dakwah* in society, *dakwah* activities have inspired some women to commit violence and endorse polygamy.

Despite the fact that these women are labeled as 'oppressed,' not all of them are oppressed to an equal degree. These women benefit many things from the activities provided by the movements. Women have opportunities to contribute something in the public sphere, raise their self empowerment in dealing with the issues of social alienation, poverty and identity crisis, and help to empower community. Nevertheless, the consequences regarding women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups have to be taken into account because the movements do not give equal freedom. There is a scale of empowerment, and women who are at the top of the scale are empowered to pursue their dreams but support male leadership. In contrast, women who are at the bottom of the scale have to submit themselves to God by mastering the domestic sphere. Therefore, the movements do not only promote gender equality, the movements also fail to produce egalitarian social change in community.

Women's participation in Islamic fundamentalist groups challenge gender equality. It is mainly because their religious teaching promotes conservative ideology, uses patriarchal interpretation of the sacred text, and imports the culture of Arab as the 'actual practice of Islam' within Indonesian society. These all result inequality for women in Indonesia. The most challenging thing is women themselves do not mind with their inferiority because they perceive that it is their *kodrat* as a woman. Therefore, not granting an equal position in the public sphere is not a problem. Even though the Indonesian constitution recognises gender equality, but the 1974 of the Marriage Law that promotes a women to be the mother of the household hinder women to enhance their opportunities in the public sphere. As a result, jobs market are limited for women and if a woman is capable to do the job in the public sphere, she will get that position as a form of formality only and she will be made to be silent. These women fit the stereotype illustrated by CEDAW's concluding observation for Indonesia 2012, paragraph 12 regarding fundamentalist groups that result discrimination against women. Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalist groups offer 'Islam as the solution' in Indonesia is not a solution since its reli-

gious activities create more violence, and hamper women's development in the future since it is aimed at having women return into the domestic sphere and violate various Articles of CEDAW.

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Appendix

Biography of Islamic Fundamentalist Groups

1.   HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia)

HTI is one of the fundamentalist Muslim movements that has been in Indonesia for over a decade. This is a political party that aims to establish a Caliphate for the whole Muslim world. HT (Hizbut Tahrir) is an international movement that has a local branch in every city in many countries. HT was established in East Jerusalem in the early 1950s by Taqi al-Din al-Nabahi, a Palestinian judge. HT first reached Indonesia in the 1980s. The Indonesian pioneers of HTI are Abdullah bin Nuh who ran an Islamic school in West Java (Islamic Centre Al-Ghazali Bogor) and his son who had joined HTI as a student in Jordan. Later bin Nuh became acquaintance with Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, a former member of Lebanon's Hizbut Tahrir that had migrated to Australia, to recruit members and give *dakwah* in Indonesia. They gradually recruited on several university campuses. They trained their recruits through a system called *halqah* (cells). HTI was underground until Soeharto fell from his power before coming out publicly.[99]

HTI rejects democracy as practised in *Pancasila* due to various reasons. Firstly, democracy was created by human beings while a Caliphate was created by God. Secondly, democracy is based on a secular system that separates between the church and the state. The history behind the separation between the church and the state was a compromise between the church and intellectuals that against church authority. For HTI, it is incompatible with Islam. Thirdly, democracy is based on people's voices meaning people are given rights to revoke a law if it is necessary. HTI sees this as incompatible with Islam which gives all authority to the *Sharia* system. Fourthly, consensus in democracy allows people to disobey laws. Thus, one has to always refer to *Sharia's* text. To solve these problems, one needs to rely on religious expert, not leave the decision to the majority's voice. Lastly, democracy will make people have a freedom to choose their belief. Islam

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[99]   Ward, Ken. "Non-violent extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia." Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 2 (2009): 149-164, p. 150-151

does not force non-Muslim to convert, but forbids Muslims to be *murtad* (leave Islam). There is a women's division in HTI called MHTI (*Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia,* HTI Muslim women) that forbids women to have a career in the parliament if its aim is to work with a constitution that is incompatible with *Sharia* or support a secular President and a secular system. MHTI targets women do *dakwah* and be active politically in helping men to the establish an Islamic state. The material given in *dakwah* is about giving education, health and bringing up international issue to be discussed critically.[100]

2.   Tarbiyah/PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sosial*, Prosperous Justice Party)

PKS was established in July 20th 1998. PKS's first name was *Partai Keadilan* (PK) or the Justice Party in one conference at Al-Azhar Mosque, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta.[101] This is a *Tarbiyah* movement that in Arabic tarbiyah means 'education.' Tarbiyah/PKS members are mostly university students who meet at some small mosques to conduct *pengajian.* The *Tarbiyah* movement was adopted from the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic movement in Egypt founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. In the brotherhood model, they organise themselves into small cells, known as *usrah* (family). Within this unit is placed a strict ritual obligations, mutual support, Islamic knowledge and social activities such as providing health and welfare service.[102] Tarbiyah/PKS has established Nurul Fikri tutoring agency, Sabili magazine publishing, Khairu Ummah and Al-Hikmah *dakwah* agency and SIDIK (*Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer*, Study and

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[100] Gunawan, Roland. "Islam, Perempuan, dan Fundamentalisme di Indonesia" in *Kesaksian Para Pengabdi: Kajian Tentang Perempuan dan Fundamentalisme di Indonesia*, edited by Marcoes-Natsir, Lies and Octavia Lanny, 1-33, Jakarta: Rumah KitaB, 2014, p. 15-18.

[101] Ibid, 12.

[102] Bubalo, Anthony, and Greg Fealy. *Joining the Caravan*. The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia (2005): 88, p. 67

Information of Contemporary Islamic World). In 2004, it became a political party namely PKS.[103]

In al-Banna's view, Islamisation of the state is a gradual process that aims to create religious society.[104] Nevertheless, PKS is an Islamic fundamentalist group that is more rational because they support democracy, learn science and industry and have some social activities such as giving alms to poor and to orphans and helping victims of natural disasters. PKS has a cadre system that is spread throughout the system to educate its member. PKS is known for its political party and social activity, but some branches of PKS are indicated that they are violent. They are willing to send *mujahidin* (volunteer) to the Middle East (Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan). PKS has a department for women that consists of three departments; *Department Ketahanan Keluarga* (department of family strength), *Departement Kajian Perempuan* (department of women, children, and family studies), and *Department Peningkatan Kapasitas Perempuan* (department of women capacity improvement). The aim of all these departments is to win *dakwah* in society.[105]

3.   LDII (*Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic *Dakwah* Institution)

LDII was established in January 3rd 1972 by Nurhasyim, R. Eddi Masiadi, Bachroni Hartanto, Soetojo Wirjoadmodjo and Wijono in Surabaya, East Java that was known as LEMKARI (*Lembaga Karyawan Dakwah Islam*, Institution Employee of Islamic Dakwah).[106] In 1990, LEMKARI changed its name to LDII.[107] LDII has a relation with a organisation called Darul Hadist/Islam Jamaah established by Kiai Haji Nurhasan

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[103] Gunawan, "Islam, Perempuan, dan Fundamentalisme di Indonesia," 12.

[104] Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan*, 68.

[105] Gunawan, "Islam, Perempuan, dan Fundamentalisme di Indonesia," 13-14.

[106] Faizin, Faizin. "Konsep Imamah dan Baiat Dalam Pemikiran Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (LDII) Analisis Dari Perspektif Siyasah Syar'iyah." Muamalah: Jurnal Hukum Ekonomi Syariah 1, no. 2 (2016): 259-272, p. 260.

[107] Gunawan, "Islam, Perempuan, dan Fundamentalisme di Indonesia," 19.

Ubaidah Lubis in Kediri, East Java in the 1940s.[108] Darul Hadist/Islam Jamaah had been forbidden by the General Attorney of Republic Indonesia in 1971 due to its teaching that aimed to purify Islamic teaching from *bid'ah* and *khurafat* (superstitious) and focuses on the literal translation of Qur'an and *Hadith*. Further, Lubis also desired to use Islamic ideology as a national law base.[109]

Lubis studied in Makkah and aimed to implement militancy education just like the Wahabi in Saudi Arabia.[110] LDII recognises the concept of *imamah* and *bai'at* that are derived from Arabic words that mean 'imam/leader' and 'a person to be given oath of allegiance and loyalty to the leadership' respectively. An imam is supposed to be someone (a man) who has the best religious knowledge. Whereas the concept of *bai'at* is aimed to create a strong connection between the leader and the followers. The Imam has to give good examples considering the position of imam is to be responsible for people. LDII believes that government has to obey *Sharia* law because *imamah* is a person who can handle both public and religious matters. Therefore, people have to agree with the leader's decision.[111]

LDII tends to act exclusively among themselves because they are not open with their society due to the fact that their Islamic teaching that is not flexible. Often, LDII dehumanises other Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, LDII members will sweep the floor after other Muslims pray at their mosque. LDII has many branches in many countries such as Singapore, Australia, Saudi Arabia and the US. LDII does not affiliate in any politics in Indonesia but they let the members join political parties. LDII has a women's department that focuses on parenting, family education, empowering women

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[108] Setiawan, Habib, Robi Nurhadi, and Muhamad Muchson Anasy. After new paradigm: catatan para ulama tentang LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia). Pusat Studi Islam Madani Institute, 2008, 1.

[109] Dodi, Limas. "Respon Tokoh Masyarakat Kediri Terhadap Ideologi Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (LDII)." PhD diss., UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2015, p. 5-11

[110] Gunawan, "Islam, Perempuan, dan Fundamentalisme di Indonesia," 18

[111] Faizin, "Konsep Imamah," 261-272.

economically. In short, the women's department is advising women to work as long as women do not forget their *kodrad* as a wife and a mother.[112]

4.   Salafi/Wahabi

The word 'salafi' is associated with 'al-salaf al-salih' meaning 'the former pious people.' They are classical scholars who used Al Quran and *Hadith* as sources of Islamic teachings. The Salafi movement was established by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1794) and now recognised as Salafi/Wahabi movement. Wahab's teaching is known as fundamentalist Islam that aims to purify Islamic teaching, conduct its *sunnah* and oppose *syirik* (the sin of practising idolatry) practice. Wahab criticised *bid'ah* and *mushrik* (polytheist, worshipping others than Allah). Wahab believes that violence is needed to educate Muslims to follow the actual practice of Islam when verbal utterances do not suffice. The first violent act conducted by Wahab and his followers was in the 1740s. They demolished the graveyard of Zaid bin al-Khattab and cursed people by using some *dalils* (the assumed proof as a valid source of *Sharia*).[113]

Wahab and his followers gained more power when Wahab formed an alliance with Muhammad bin Sa'ud, a politician from Saudi Arabia. Later they established kingdom of Saudi-Wahabi modern. In 1974, they proclaimed that they were in favor of *jihad* and would fight against for those who have different understanding of *tauhid* (oneness of God) with them. As a result, they fought and even killed Muslims who have different understanding in their Islamic teaching and destroyed Islamic historical buildings in Haramain (Makkah and Madinah). Further, in 1920, to spread their Islamic ideology, they killed more than 400.000 Muslims that includes women and children.[114] They legitimated their action as a form of establishing *amar makruf nahi mungkar*. The Salafi/Wahabi

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[112] Gunawan, "Islam, Perempuan, dan Fundamentalisme di Indonesia," 19-20.

[113] Wahid, Abdurrahman. *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia*. Wahid Institute, 2009, 66

[114] Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam*, 67-69.

movement has a lot of money from Saudi Arabia and this becomes one of the factors why they have many followers in Indonesia. Salafi/Wahabi entered Indonesia in the New Order era through DDI (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah*, Islamic Missionary Council) that was known as Masyumi, a major Islamic political party that was banned by the first President of Indonesia, Soekarno due to its opposition to the revolutionary government of the Republic of Indonesia. DDI gave money for Indonesian students to study in the Middle East whose alumni have been spreading the ideology of Wahabi ever since. Further, DDI established LIPIA (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab*, Institution of Islamic and Arabic Science) supported by Wahabi funding. As a result, Wahabi has produced many Islamic books that use Wahabi's thinking, established schools and given free education. Further, to spread their ideology, accompanied by their wealth, Salafi/Wahabi is working with Ikhwanul Muslimin (a Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt led by Hassan al-Banna) who is known to have educated cadres but has no funding. The spread of this ideology is known as global Salafism/Wahabism and a combination of these two has resulted Islamic hardliners, and one of them is Al-Qaeda.[115]

5.   GAPAS (*Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan dan Aliran Sesat*, the Front Against Apostasy and Deviant Sects)

GAPAS was established by H. Salim Badjri in 2004 in Cirebon and now it is led by Andy Mulya. Badjri is a scholar of Arab descent and a senior teacher at IAIN (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri*, the State Islamic Institute), an executive of MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, the Local of Islamic Scholars Council) and a member of advisory of the Cirebon Islamic Centre. In 2001, he was one of the founders of the local branch of MMI (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*, Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly). In 2004 he established FUI (*Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah*, the Brotherhood of Islam Forum) aimed to combat immorality and 'Christianisation' in Cirebon which includes FPI (*Front Pembela Islam*, Islamic Defender Front) that is known as the country best known as the Indonesian hardlin-

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[115] Ibid, 70-71.

er group. Later in 2005, he set up GAPAS as a subsidiary of FUI. GAPAS and FUI actions include closing down Cahaya TV, a TV station owned by neo-Pentecostal Christians, accusing them of proselytising, various acts to stop Christian meetings such as preventing Easter celebration from being held, shutting Protestant churches and accusing them of being illegal and not having a permit to be a house of worship, attacking Ahmadiyah members, vandalising karaoke clubs, attacking Alfamart Stores that sell alcohols. Basically they are groups of raiders. Interestingly, the raidings are sometimes conducted with local authorities.[116] *Amar makruf nahi mungkar* is the reason why they are conducting raids. In Cirebon, there is one umbrella that becomes a house for many fundamentalist radical Islamic groups, most notably Al Manar.

Interview Questions

Active members of Islamic fundamentalist groups
1. What is your Islamic background? (this includes family and where did you learn Islam?)
2. Why did you decide to join this group and since when?
3. How was the recruitment process?
4. What benefits did you get from this group?
5. Did your family/ friends support your decision?
6. What do you think about your role in a family as a wife and as a woman?
7. Do you think a reproductive role is more important than a productive role?
8. How do you divide the division of labor in the house and at work? Have you protested?
9. What are your characteristics of happiness ?
10. Do you want to pursue further career?
11. To what extend do you obey your husband?
12. Do you agree if a husband beats or abuses a wife when the wife disobeys the husband? Have you experienced that?
13. How do you practise *dakwah* as a form of *taqwa* (piety) to God?
14. How do you maintain tolerance towards others (Muslims and non-Muslims)?

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[116] International Crisis Group. "Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon." 2-3

15. How do you maintain relationship with society? Do you get along with your neighbors or you have your own community? What do you normally do? Do you care about what people say if they talk about you?
16. What are your criteria of success?
17. Do this group meet your expectation?
18. Did you lose something by joining this group?
19. Do you know anything about human rights? How do you participate in public, give education and make a decision?

Ex members of Islamic fundamentalist groups
1. Why did you decide to join this group?
2. Why did you leave?
3. How did you leave?
4. What made you leave?
5. Did this group meet your expectation?
6. Did you lose something when you were in this group?
7. Do you take this as a life experience or do you regret?
8. Did you find many violations in this group?
9. What do you feel now after you leave this group?
10. Is it easy to leave the group? Or do they still want you to get back? What are their efforts to get you back in the group?

Experts concerning religious fundamentalism in Indonesia
1. What factors that made women join Islamic fundamentalist groups?
2. Do you think these groups will threaten women's rights and democracy in Indonesia?
3. What do you think about CEDAW's recommendation to Indonesia a to change the interpretation of the Qur'an and culture?
4. To what extent should we encourage / educate women to understand 'their roles'?
5. How should the state pay attention in the field of political, social, economic and modify cultural pattern that degrades women?
6. How should Indonesian government apply limitation on freedom of religion concerning this issue?
7. Do you think women in the movements understand human rights?