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Racial tension and distrust in South Africa and Norway

Perception and policy, and what they can learn from each other

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Abstract: *Though race as a concept is academically discredited, it still fuels conflict around the world. Racial tension and distrust exist in every society, including Norway and South Africa, two very different countries. In South Africa, race, racial tension, and distrust permeate life and were exacerbated by Apartheid, while in Norway, race is ignored and racial tension and distrust stem from recent and increasing immigration. In this study, Norwegian and South African racial tension and distrust are explored and compared through in-person interviews in Cape Town and Oslo, and through statistics and researcher opinion. Then, legislation and NGO activity each country has in place to deal with specific aspects of racial tension and distrust are compared and recommendations are provided where the countries can borrow from each other. Norway and South Africa are compared because they seem to be very different countries, especially regarding race issues; the goal is to demonstrate that, while this is true, they are more similar than initially expected and that South Africa has much to teach Norway, not only the other way around. Finally, a further recommendation, that of implementing and expanding community gardening as a space for increasing interracial contact and thus reducing racial tension and distrust, is discussed in relation to South Africa and Norway. This recommendation is based on social psychologist Gordon Allport's intergroup contact theory. This theory is implicit in the in-person interviews, the problems participants perceived, solutions they desire, and in pre-existing NGO activity.*

Keywords: *racial tension, distrust, South Africa, Norway, intergroup contact theory, interracial interaction, contact, social media, access to employment, legislation, NGOs, community gardens*

1 Introduction

Today, race as a concept has fallen out of academic favor, with 'ethnicity' being preferred. Race is considered simplistic, and has several negative connotations, especially the idea that race is biological and genetic, and therefore that there are fundamental differences between groups of people. This has been discredited and most people do not think this way either. Those that do, most often connect (perceived) culture to race in their evaluation of others. However, race does have to do with the way people look, especially their skin color, which is based on a person's genetics, and still forms the basis for many debates and conflicts around the world. This is perhaps more apparent in South Africa than anywhere else, which is still struggling to do away with Apartheid legacies. 'Race' is used in South Africa and permeates South African life¹. Indeed, in South Africa, racial classifications stemming from Apartheid are the norm and used all the time.² Further, the same racial categories – Black, White, Coloured,³ and Indian – must be used to remedy Apartheid violations that were based on these categories.⁴

¹ Posel, 2001, p.59-56

² Ibid., p.56

³ The South African term for mixed race

⁴ Posel, 2001, p.56

In Norway, on the other hand, ‘race’ as a concept became unpopular after the Second World War, and Norwegians balk at the concept today. They use many other terms in its place, even though race and skin color feed racism and tension in Norwegian society. Instead, culture, ethnicity, and religion and beliefs are pointed out and discussed, while any mention of race and skin color is vehemently rejected. However, these discussed concepts are projected onto people based on their skin color and how they look. ‘Non-ethnic Norwegian’ has become a code word for non-White. This has led to a race debate that does not address race. While this does lead to more a nuanced discussion of group conflict and tension than in South Africa, it ignores a large and important part of racism and discrimination.

Norway and South Africa are so different that they seem impossible to compare in any meaningful way, and surely in terms of race issues, such as racial tension and racial distrust, only struggling post-Apartheid South Africa has something to learn from social democratic Norway, even despite Norway’s problems with racism? This is, however, a shortsighted, superficial analysis. Racism, and thus by extension racial tension and racial distrust, exist in every country, which therefore allows for the comparison even of South Africa and Norway. Gordon Allport, the leading authority on prejudice in social psychology, states that

our analysis of the dynamics of prejudice has universal validity. To be sure, the ways in which prejudice is manifested vary considerably from country to country [...] yet such evidence as we have from other countries indicates that the basic causes and correlates are essentially identical.⁵

Moreover, every country has strengths and shortcomings with how they deal with any issue, including racial tension and racial distrust. These qualities can be analyzed in many ways, including to ascertain whether practices could be exportable and importable.

Racial tension and racial distrust are not the same as racism. Race has to do with physical characteristics of groups and “is a form of ‘group identity’ [and] is [...] ‘a central determinant of social identity.’”⁶ Racism is

an ideological construct that assigns a certain race and/or ethnic group to a position of power over others on the basis of physical and cultural attributes, as well as economic wealth, involving hierarchical relations where the ‘superior’ race exercises domination and control over others.⁷

Instead of forming aspects of racism, racial tension and racial distrust are both a *result* of and a *cause* of racism. They would not exist without the social hierarchy of races that is racism, and they help to perpetuate this hierarchy. Racism is, then, a vicious circle driven by racial

⁵ Allport, 1979, p.xvii-xix

⁶ Bharat, 2005, p.84

⁷ ILO et.al., 2005, p.112

tension and racial distrust.

These concepts are rather simple: racial tension is tension or strain that exists in the relationships between different racial groups and racial distrust, hereafter simply called distrust, is mistrust or suspicion that exists between different racial groups. As with other social and racial phenomena, these occur and manifest at both the societal and individual level. Distrust plays a role in tension because distrust impacts strain; however, this study treats them as two respective concepts because they each have much to tell and provide a more nuanced study. Because, like racism, racial tension and distrust exist in each society, they must therefore be considered in degrees along a spectrum. The definitions of racial tension and distrust may be simple and logical, but this does not mean that they are not important, complex phenomena, which will be made clear herein. Most literature on racism does not deal with racial tension and distrust, but rather with explicit imbalances of power or the structure of racism.⁸ This study thus helps to fill a gap in racism research.

1.1 Research questions, methodology, and theory

This study aims to answer the following questions: How is racial tension and distrust similar and different in South Africa and Norway? How is racial tension and distrust being dealt with in each country, and what can they learn from each other? The goal of this study is, through focusing on public and professional perceptions of these phenomena, to compare racial tension and distrust in South Africa and Norway. A further goal is to determine what, if anything, they can learn from *each other* when it comes to tackling these issues.

Rather than highlight racial tension and distrust through a case study, such as in access to higher education or the treatment of immigrants, this study takes a general approach. It seeks to reveal the terrain of racial tension and distrust in both Norwegian and South African society and to identify both unique and shared perceptions and manifestations. This general approach, admittedly, could make it difficult to find meaningful comparisons, but it is necessary groundwork in research in racial tension and distrust. Suggestions for further research and case studies take shape based on the results presented here. The aim is to unveil similarities, thus illustrating that these two countries are perhaps not quite as different as they seem, but also to unveil differences, to highlight that racial tension and distrust are complex notions that are also unique to the situations of each society. In addition, comparing a country that prides itself on equality, yet is experiencing increasing racism, and a country that has a deep history of racism can act as an aid to help them better deal with their issues related to race.

⁸ See, for example: Pager, D. and H. Shepherd (2008). "The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets." Annual Review of Sociology 1(34): 181-209. and this article summarizing several American studies on racism: Holloway, K. (2015, 5 March 2015). "10 ways white people are more racist than they realize." Retrieved 8 May, 2017, from http://www.salon.com/2015/03/04/10_ways_white_people_are_more_racist_than_they_realize_partner/.

South Africa can learn from Norwegian principles and practices to ameliorate their situation and Norway can learn from South Africa to prevent deeper societal cleavages.

This study is inherently qualitative and utilizes two methodologies to generate wide-ranging and comprehensive results to answer the first two research questions. For the first question, standardized, open-ended in-person interviews with members of the public and human rights practitioners in Cape Town and Oslo were conducted to discover their perceptions of racial tension and distrust in their own country. Interviews, rather than surveys, were used to allow interviewees to provide their own opinions and insight, which allows a more in-depth look at these concepts.⁹ In addition, important insights or perceptions may not be asked about or be revealed in surveys. As racial tension and distrust are complex and occur at both the societal and personal level, interviews can better capture this complexity and extract commonalities. This is because they are more of a dialog than surveys are, even when the questions are standardized.¹⁰ Interviews do have drawbacks, however. For example, participants may misunderstand a concept or term, or prescribe different meanings to certain terms and concepts than the interviewer,¹¹ which can lead to skewed results. Finding a representative, non-biased sample can also be a challenge. Participants may also hold back or lie about certain pieces of information for fear of being judged, as well.¹² These drawbacks can be controlled for to an extent, but they will always exist in some form. Despite the drawbacks, interviews were chosen as the method best suited to discovering people's thoughts for this study.

For the second research question, an analysis of legislation and civil society activities was carried out. Government and the legal system arguably have the most important role in dealing with issues related to racism within their borders,¹³ therefore the nature of the research question requires the analysis of legislation to determine measures in place, as well as the comparison of this legislation to determine what the two countries can learn from each other. Civil society also plays an important role in many countries, including Norway and South Africa. Analyzing and comparing their activities is therefore also required by the research question for the same reasons just mentioned. Since the 1970s, interest has grown in "international comparisons, particularly in the social policy area, often as a means of evaluating the solutions adopted for dealing with common problems or to assess the transferability of policies between member states [*sic*]."¹⁴ The selection of sources is discussed below, in the relevant section. Taken together, these methods yield results from some of the most significant spheres of society – the people, law and government, and civil society – to reveal an overarch-

⁹ Warren, 2001, p.86

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.83

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.97-98

¹² Adler and Adler, 2001, p.515 and throughout

¹³ This can be inferred from ICERD, as well as other international human rights instruments generally

¹⁴ Hantrais, 1995

ing picture of racial tension and distrust, and current action being taken to improve interracial relations.

A further research question for this study is: what else can South Africa and Norway do to relieve racial tension and distrust? Social scientific and psychology research has found community gardens, which includes access to public spaces, to be helpful in this arena. Community gardening will thus be evaluated as a new solution for South Africa and Norway. It was selected based on its relative ease of implementation in Norwegian and South African society, its originality, the fact that it complements existing activities, and the fact that it is an activity that meets some requirements not currently being met in these countries. This will be elaborated below, as well as further on in the study.

Social psychology holds that attitudes follow behavior, which can turn enemies into friends through cognitive dissonance and self-perception;¹⁵ people can change their attitudes if they change their behavior. Originally developed by Allport, intergroup contact theory is based on several complex psychological processes that work to create prejudice, such as stereotyping and in-group/out-group psychology.¹⁶ To counteract these processes and change attitudes and thus behavior, contact theory recommends increasing interracial contact in sustained, equal conditions and with a common goal to help people feel safer and more trusting.¹⁷ The conditions under which this contact should occur are:

First, the contact should not take place within a competitive context. Second, the contact must be sustained rather than episodic. Third, the contact must be personal, informal, and one-to-one. Fourth, the contact should have the approval of any relevant authorities. Finally, the setting in which the contact occurs must confer equal status of both parties rather than duplicate the racial status differential.¹⁸

This contact reduces racism and discrimination¹⁹, and therefore reduces racial tension and distrust. This implies that a lack of contact, or negative contact, fuels prejudice, racial tension, and distrust. “Emphasis upon differences divides. Emphasis upon similarities serves to call attention to the common ground upon which cooperation between the various branches of the human family may proceed.”²⁰ Vast amounts of research support intergroup contact theory, showing that “intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice.”²¹

It must, however, be noted that intergroup contact theory has several limitations, only some of which are mentioned here. Through the decades, the list of conditions under which

¹⁵ Myers, 2004, p.89

¹⁶ Allport, 1979, throughout

¹⁷ Ibid., p.281

¹⁸ Jackman and Crane, 1986, p.461

¹⁹ Allport, 1979, p.281

²⁰ Ibid., p.116

²¹ Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, abstract

contact reduces prejudice has become long; “the proliferation of optimal conditions is in danger of rendering the contact hypothesis inapplicable to real-world situations.”²² To attempt to alleviate this issue, Pettigrew, a student of Allport and a prominent contact theory researcher, has distinguished between *necessary* and *facilitating* conditions for intergroup contact.²³ Further, “wider power structures [...] make conditions such as equality of status and cooperative interdependence either difficult to implement or applicable only within a narrow range of settings”²⁴ outside of the laboratory, and contact theory does not address these structures.²⁵ However, critics note that studying ideal social conditions can encourage social change²⁶ and a shift in interpersonal relations may indeed spark a structural change. Another issue is that prejudiced people tend to avoid intergroup contact,²⁷ making the impact of intergroup contact theory reduced only to those willing to engage in such contact, unless people are not given a choice in the matter, such as in social housing allocation, for example. Despite these issues, however, even intergroup contact theory’s critics call it “one of the most successful ideas in the history of social psychology,”²⁸ indicating that its issues are not insurmountable.

Allport and his work on prejudice and contact will be referenced in section 4 of this study, where community gardens as a way in which Norway and South Africa can implement contact theory in their societies is examined. Indeed, statistics from South Africa show that most people desire increased interracial contact²⁹ and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) states that higher levels of interracial contact are necessary for reconciliation and improved group relations in South Africa.³⁰ Norwegian researchers believe that Norwegians need more contact with immigrants and that integration should be better.³¹ In addition, segregation and a lack of integration and intermingling with other race groups was mentioned by interview participants both in Cape Town and Oslo, clearly showing the necessity of contact theory implementation in both societies, despite its limitations.

The following subsection summarizes relevant South African and Norwegian history. Section 2 details the results of the in-person interviews, while Section 3 compares law and policy, and NGO activities, which includes recommending how Norway can adopt South African principles and practice, and vice versa. Section 4 analyzes community gardening as a further recommendation to Norway and South Africa. The study concludes in section 5.

²² Dixon, et.al., 2005, p. 699

²³ Pettigrew, 1998, throughout

²⁴ Dixon, et.al., 2005, p.700

²⁵ Ibid., p.702

²⁶ Ibid., p.701

²⁷ Pettigrew, 1998, p.69

²⁸ Dixon, et.al., 2005, p.698

²⁹ SARB, 2015, p.15

³⁰ Ibid., p.12

³¹ Hammerstad and Mon, 2013

1.2 Relevant history of South Africa and Norway

The racial histories of South Africa and Norway are vastly different, and to understand their current situations of racial tension, their histories must be briefly summarized.

1.2.1 South Africa

Race, and racism, is a defining feature of South African history, from early colonial times to the present, and developed with the seizure of land under Dutch colonial rule in the early 1600s.³²

The first official policy of segregation was implemented in 1657, to protect the Dutch refreshment station and colony,³³ which resulted in restricted movement for non-Whites. Later, the mixing of races was forbidden.³⁴ As colonial expansion continued, the Dutch took over inter- and intra-tribe relations.³⁵ By 1700, many Khoikhoi found themselves servants of Dutch settlers.³⁶

In 1809, the Caledon Code was passed to regulate the use of indigenous and Coloured labor for Whites.³⁷ The Khoikhoi were required to have a fixed residence and carry a valid pass, restricting their freedom of movement and work.³⁸

Britain took over the Cape Colony in 1814 and soon called for the civilizing of Black people.³⁹ Ordinance 49 of 1828 gave passes to Blacks to work as laborers for White settlers.⁴⁰ Later, Blacks were moved to certain locations allocated for their settlement and further deprived of land,⁴¹ which was made official in the early 1900s.⁴² A commission was established to make decisions on ‘native’ education, land, law, marriages, and work,⁴³ thus setting an explicit foundation for what became Apartheid policy.

Many laws were passed in the first half of the 20th century that marginalized the ‘native’ population and other non-Whites. The Masters and Servants Ordinance deemed Blacks servants rather than workers, depriving them of legal protection, while the Mines and Works Act prevented non-Whites from holding any job other than manual labor.⁴⁴ The Native Lands

³² SAHO, 2011(a)

³³ SAHO, 2013(a)

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ SAHO, 2011(b)

³⁸ SAHO, 2013(b)

³⁹ SAHO, 2011(b)

⁴⁰ SAHO, 2013(b)

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² SAHO, 2013(c)

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Act set aside small land reserves for the non-White population, resulting in territorial racial segregation.⁴⁵ The Native Urban Areas Act only permitted their presence outside of these areas based on the needs of White residents and forbade property rights to non-Whites.⁴⁶ In 1947, the Sauer Commission endorsed total racial segregation.⁴⁷ The next year Apartheid came into force after the election of the National Party.⁴⁸

Apartheid was institutionalized systemic racial segregation, discrimination, and oppression of the majority non-White population by the minority White government. The Group Areas Act created racially segregated areas for each racial group to live and work in, making it illegal to live in an area designated for another race.⁴⁹ Forced removals therefore followed suit throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. Racial groups and different Black ethnic groups were forced to not only live apart from Whites, but also from each other to decrease their power.⁵⁰ Racial groups in South Africa were also forced to use separate public facilities than Whites.⁵¹ Contact between groups was thus limited. The Population Registration Act required everyone to be classified into one of four races and registered. Determining a person's race was seen to be ““common sense””⁵² and “a judgement about a person's ‘social status,’ as much as physical appearance,”⁵³ with skin color the most widely-used determinant.⁵⁴

Rural areas were overpopulated and environmentally degraded, becoming vast slums,⁵⁵ called townships. Poverty was widespread, and education, healthcare, service delivery, and access to employment were severely lacking for non-Whites.⁵⁶

1994 marked South Africa's first democratic elections⁵⁷ and its first non-White majority coalition government.⁵⁸ South Africa has made many positive changes, and the new Constitution is considered one of the most progressive in the world. For example, the new government had provided 3.3 million homes as of 2013⁵⁹ and Blacks have better access to employment.⁶⁰ However, much remains lacking, and many think nothing has changed since

⁴⁵ O'Malley, n.d.(a)

⁴⁶ O'Malley, n.d.(b)

⁴⁷ SAHO, 2013(c)

⁴⁸ SAHO, 2013(d)

⁴⁹ O'Malley, n.d.(c)

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ History.com, n.d.

⁵² Posel, 2001, p.62

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.65

⁵⁵ South African Government, n.d.

⁵⁶ Mngxitama, 2013

⁵⁷ SAHO, 2013(d)

⁵⁸ History.com, n.d.

⁵⁹ Brand and Cohen, 2013

⁶⁰ South African Department of Trade and Industry, n.d.

Apartheid.⁶¹ Only some examples include: in 2013, the housing backlog was 2.1 million homes,⁶² with a waiting list several years long; townships still house half of South Africa's urban population⁶³ and 60% of the country's unemployed;⁶⁴ the education system is in deep crisis;⁶⁵ and inequality and poverty still hits non-Whites the hardest, especially Blacks, who make up 80% of the population.⁶⁶ 57% of Blacks live below the lowest poverty threshold and 77% in total live in poverty. Those numbers are 28% and 49% for Coloureds, 9% and 27% for Indians and Asians, and only 1.5% and 7% for Whites, who only make up 9% of the population.⁶⁷ These inequalities and discrepancies show that race very much remains alive in South Africa.

1.2.2 Norway

Norway is well known for its social democracy, social welfare, and equality. It is considered a homogenous country, with little diversity. However, Norwegian history is full of international contact. Besides conflict with the official minorities, which are both racial and ethnic, there is little to no literature about past ethnic or racial conflict with other groups. This has come into being in recent years.

Historically speaking, Norway is perhaps best known for Vikings, who were skilled conquerors, seafarers, and tradesmen from the late 700s to the early 1000s.⁶⁸ Their expeditions brought them all around Europe, to North America, and even Baghdad.⁶⁹ Vikings took slaves, primarily out of a need for manual laborers and wives in their polygamic society.⁷⁰ There are no records indicating that the race or appearance of marriage slaves was of any importance. Indeed, if Vikings actively sought wives from abroad, then any physical differences could not have been considered important.

The Hanseatic League was a commercial organization of merchant guilds spanning Northern Europe, dominant from the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries.⁷¹ A Hanseatic League office was established in Bergen in 1360.⁷² Bergen became a large trading center and

⁶¹ Several interview subjects and others expressed this opinion during the author's field work in Cape Town in January/February 2017

⁶² Brand and Cohen, 2013

⁶³ World Bank, 2014, p.8

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.2

⁶⁵ Borgen Project, 2016

⁶⁶ Gradín, 2012, p.187

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.188

⁶⁸ Goodrich, 2016

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Lawler, 2015

⁷¹ New World Encyclopedia, n.d.

⁷² Hanseatic League, n.d.

a major European port.⁷³ Even before this, Bergen was an international town with lively economic activity.⁷⁴ Hanseatic traders eventually became citizens of Bergen,⁷⁵ integrating into society. Norway was also a part of both the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden; both Danes and Swedes settled in Norway,⁷⁶ with Swedes making up the bulk of immigrants, with Danes and Finns following.⁷⁷

Norway has five official minority groups: the Jews, Kvens, Forest Finns, Roma, and Romani, as well as the indigenous Sami people.⁷⁸

Most of the Jews came to Norway between 1880 and 1920⁷⁹ and faced harassment and legal discrimination during the Second World War.⁸⁰ They had a strong desire to integrate into Norwegian society⁸¹ and the 1,500 Jews in Norway have done so successfully, but still face some anti-Semitism.⁸²

The Kvens, now totaling 10,000-15,000,⁸³ were first mentioned in historical records in the 16th century.⁸⁴ The Norwegian government gave the Kvens tax benefits to permanently settle the North.⁸⁵ However, the authorities turned on the Kvens in the mid-1800s due to a rise of nationalism, resulting in expulsion, discrimination, and forced assimilation.⁸⁶

The Roma came to Norway in the second half of the 19th century.⁸⁷ Eventually there were calls to deport them, and they were stripped of their passports, because they ‘did not belong’ and were therefore not a target for assimilation policies.⁸⁸ They were allowed to re-enter Norway in the 1950s.⁸⁹ There are an estimated 500-750 Roma in Norway today, mostly in Oslo, and still face discrimination on all fronts.⁹⁰

The Romani were well-received until the Reformation, when they became the target of

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, p.128, 131

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.113

⁷⁸ UDIR, 2015, p.6

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.19

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.20

⁸¹ Ibid., p.21

⁸² Ibid., p.23

⁸³ Ibid., p.28

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.25

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.26

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.31

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.32

⁹⁰ Ibid.

deportation and execution.⁹¹ In the 1800s, rising nationalism forced assimilation on the Romani; many were illegally sterilized, and Romani children were removed from their families.⁹² Today, the several thousand⁹³ Romani face wide-ranging discrimination despite an official apology.⁹⁴

Now numbering several hundreds, the Forest Finns arrived in Norway in the 17th century.⁹⁵ They too were forced to assimilate during the wave of nationalism that required the assimilation of other minorities.⁹⁶

The first recorded mention of the Sami is from the year 98.⁹⁷ As Norway became populated by others, the Sami lost land and autonomy, but received some rights as national boundaries were drawn.⁹⁸ From the 1700s onwards, assimilation was forced on the Sami and their culture and way of life was severely threatened.⁹⁹ Today the 40,000 Sami people have their own parliament, and the Sami language is one of Norway's official languages.¹⁰⁰

Despite this diversity, and cultural revivals, Norway's policy of assimilation left its mark, and the country has a small population. Norway experienced mass emigration between 1850 and the 1920s; 750,000 Norwegians left before 1915, a massive number compared to the population of approximately 2.5 million in 1920.¹⁰¹ Coupled with the immigration of very similar close neighbors and the fact that Norway was not preferable during the 1950s,¹⁰² "the sheer magnitude of [the mass emigrations] has tended to drown or dwarf other forms of migration,"¹⁰³ eradicating the memory of immigration so much that the mindset when modern immigration started was: "Norway has not been a country of immigration."¹⁰⁴

Immigrants from farther afield, beginning with Moroccans, Turks, and Pakistanis, began coming to Norway in the late 1960s.¹⁰⁵ At first Norwegians protested the poor treatment immigrants experienced, while the press already worried about an increase in immigration.¹⁰⁶ The government was originally concerned for the well-being of these immigrants, and not for

⁹¹ Ibid., p.37

⁹² Ibid., p.37-39

⁹³ Ibid., p.36

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.40-41

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.42

⁹⁶ Ibid., p.45

⁹⁷ Gasky, 2016

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Nordnorge.com, n.d.

¹⁰¹ Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, p.115

¹⁰² Ibid., p.192

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.115

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p.193

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.195-6

a perceived threat to Norwegian society, but began to worry.¹⁰⁷ Public opinion soon changed and skepticism grew.¹⁰⁸ “Skeptical attitudes were basically explained by lack of knowledge as well as misunderstandings.”¹⁰⁹

Over time, the numbers of refugees and immigrants arriving grew, with a total of 724,987 immigrants residing in Norway as of 1 January 2017,¹¹⁰ out of a population of 5.25 million,¹¹¹ or 13.7% of the population. Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents make up 33% of Oslo’s population of 666,800.¹¹² The public debate, as well as politics, are currently centered around the integration of immigrants into society, keeping as many out of Norway as possible, and a perceived threat to Norwegian culture and ethnicity.

2 In-person interviews

One-on-one, face-to-face interviews with members of the public and human rights practitioners were conducted in both Cape Town and Oslo in order to capture their perceptions of racial tension and distrust in their country. One cannot study South African society without using racial terms and classifications;¹¹³ it would be improper to discuss South Africa in other terms, and to capture what is missing in Norwegian debate, the term ‘race’ was used in Norway, despite Norwegian dislike of the term.¹¹⁴ This study thus uses racial vocabulary.

The matrices utilized to select participants is provided in Appendix 1. Interviews in Cape Town took place between 19 January 2017 and 8 February 2017. All interviews took place in English. Interviews were conducted in Oslo between 10 February 2017 and 10 March 2017 and were conducted in both English and Norwegian.

The complete interview guide in both English and Norwegian is found in Appendix 2. One set of questions was developed for the public, and one for human rights professionals. However, these sets of questions were very similar, containing several of the same questions. The first section of each set asked for information on personal background, including age, race, gender, nationality, and home area. The second section of questions for the public asked for information about if they were employed, if they interact with people of other races at work, as well as information about whether they have friends of other races. The second section of questions for human rights practitioners included the same questions, save if they were employed. The third section was the largest and included questions about trust, perceptions of

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.196

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.203

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.206

¹¹⁰ SSB, 2017(b)

¹¹¹ SSB, 2017(c)

¹¹² SSB, 2017(a)

¹¹³ See footnotes 1-3

¹¹⁴ See discussion on page 2

trust, racial tension, its effect on society, action being taken, and more. Certain questions included a request to place their answers on a scale from 1 to 10. Human rights professionals were asked the same questions in the third section, from both a personal and organizational viewpoint, in addition to questions about the effectiveness of measures being taken to reduce racial tension and distrust.

Though the selection of participants was designed to cover wide demographics, participants in both cities were found using the snowball effect. In Cape Town, due to safety issues traveling in townships, participants from the townships were acquaintances of the hired guide, meaning that selection was not random. Other existing contacts were used to find participants, who then suggested other participants in true snowball effect manner. Participants happened to live in Cape Town's Southern Suburbs, which are predominantly English, while the Northern Suburbs are predominantly Afrikaner, who, according to interview subjects, view the topic differently despite being of the same race group. Despite these drawbacks, interview results corresponded well with findings in various publications of the most recent 2015 release of the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB), published by IJR. The findings in a report by the South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR), titled "Race Relations in South Africa 2016", shows both agreement and disagreement with the results of this study. The results of this present study and these two reports will be compared below.

In Oslo, participants were found using friends and contacts, as well as by hanging flyers around the city. As mentioned, race and racism is a very sensitive topic in Norway, one which many are unwilling to talk about. Therefore, those that were willing to participate in interviews were primarily students, Norwegians under 35, and immigrants. They all can be described as liberal. There is much lacking in the demographics of interview participants in Norway; men, those over age 40, and refugees are underrepresented. However, this study's interview results still correspond well to findings from a survey that was recently performed on behalf of the newspapers *Aftenposten* and *Adresseavisen*.¹¹⁵ The survey found that one-third of the Norwegian population believed that immigrants threaten Norwegian culture and that the other two-thirds did not, and that Norwegians aged 44 and under were markedly more accepting and positive towards immigrants than older Norwegians. The *Aftenposten* article¹¹⁶ about the survey states that Statistics Norway's most recent report on attitudes towards immigration¹¹⁷ also saw a rise in skepticism towards immigration, especially among the older generation and those who live in the countryside. Results from the present study cannot speak to the survey's findings on the older generation, but they confirm that those aged 44 and under are generally tolerant of, and positive towards, immigrants, and by extension people of other races. Participants' opinions about the countryside and a generational split were also in line

¹¹⁵ Baumberger, et.al., 2017

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ SSB, 2016

with the surveys' findings. The results of the present study and this survey, as well as other sources, will be compared below. The full interview results can be found in Appendix 3.

2.1 Cape Town

Participants in Cape Town were very willing to talk about race and all the difficult aspects and emotions that stem from race. Given the pervasiveness of race in daily life in South Africa, participants also had very strong opinions and did not need to think over their answers before replying. There was generally very high agreement between the human rights practitioners and the public regarding all questions they had in common.

Table 1 – Human rights practitioners (5 from 2 organizations), South Africa, demographics

Gender	4 women 1 man
Age	30 to 59
Race	0 White 0 Indian 1 Black 4 Coloured 1 Black self-identity
Location	4 suburbs 1 townships
Citizenship	5 South African 1 Congolese-South African 1 Mosotho-South African
Interracial work-place interaction	5 yes 0 no

Table 2 – Members of the public (32), South Africa, demographics

Gender	16 women 16 men
Age (24 to 69)	8 aged 18-29 14 aged 30-49 10 aged 50 and above
Race	8 White 2 Indian 13 Black 9 Coloured 2 Black self-identity
Location	21 suburbs 11 townships
Citizenship	30 South African 2 immigrants
Employment	30 employed 1 unemployed 1 retired
Interracial work-place interaction	32 yes 0 no

2.1.1 *Friendship and trust*

In the present study, all human rights practitioners had friends of another race while two-thirds of the public did. This is higher than the “SARB Briefing Paper 1 on national reconciliation, race relations, and social inclusion” found: 23.7% of respondents associate most strongly with those of the same race group,¹¹⁸ however many participants in the present study were not very close to those friends of another race.

Human rights professionals were slightly more trusting than the public, with averages of 6.6 and 5.7 respectively, where 0 was ‘no trust’ and 10 was ‘complete trust’. Safety and crime were mentioned by both groups as factors influencing trust.

2.1.2 *Group relations*

Both human rights practitioners and members of the public stated that there were high levels of distrust in society, and that race groups did not get along well. The personal average score for human rights professionals was 3.8 and their organizational average was 5, while the average score for the public was 4.46, where 0 was ‘no trust or getting along’ and 10 was ‘complete trust and getting along’. Personally, human rights professionals were more pessimistic than the public, but more positive from an organizational perspective. Even though a significant minority of the participants ranked trust slightly higher on the scale, the average

¹¹⁸ SARB, 2015, p.17

scores from this study's interviews match the data from the "SARB Briefing Paper 1" very well. The "SARB Briefing Paper 1" found that trust levels are "critically low", with 67.3% of respondents having little to no trust in other racial groups.¹¹⁹ Broken down by race, levels of distrust were almost similarly high across the board.¹²⁰

Both groups in the present study mentioned several lasting effects of Apartheid as reasons for high distrust and poor relations, which is supported by the "SARB Briefing Paper 1": "apartheid geography has largely remained in place [...] legislation is no longer required to sustain apartheid [...] many, today, experience a sense of deep social polarization in which out separateness reinforces racial prejudice [*sic*]."¹²¹ The "SARB Briefing Paper 1" further found that a majority of South Africans have little to no interaction with people of other race groups in daily life outside of work and shopping,¹²² highlighting continued segregation; both of which were mentioned frequently throughout most interviews conducted for the present study.

Members of both groups of interview participants thought the situation was improving, while some members of the public stated that it was getting worse. The existing data, though with significant discrepancies between them, generally support the beliefs the participants shared in the present study: the IRR report found that 55% of respondents believed race relations had improved since the end of Apartheid, and found that only 13% believed relations had gotten worse.¹²³ Conversely, the "SARB Briefing Paper 1" found that 61.4% of respondents felt that race relations had worsened or stayed the same since 1994.¹²⁴

2.1.3 *Impact on society*

Both groups in the present study also strongly agreed that racial tension and distrust were a huge problem for South Africa, which is also evidenced in the SARB statistics on distrust mentioned above. Both groups in the present study also mentioned the Apartheid legacy as a reason for this, as well as the connection between race and class. On a personal level, there was almost equal agreement, with human rights professionals averaging 7.2 and the public 7.3, where 0 was 'no problem' and 10 was 'the worst problem South Africa had'. From an organizational perspective, however, professionals were more positive, averaging 6.3. Though methodologies were different in the present study and the IRR report, they could have easily lead to the same result. However, they did not. The IRR report found very few participants

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.15

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., p.9

¹²² Ibid., p.12-13

¹²³ IRR, 2017, p.2

¹²⁴ SARB, 2015, p.9

considered racism to be a serious problem,¹²⁵ while most of the participants in the present study did. Participants in this study did also discuss many of the same problems noted in the IRR report, however, such as crime, corruption, and economic and employment issues, showing that there is broad agreement on South Africa's main issues. However, the findings of the present study do not support the findings of the IRR that race relations are generally sound.¹²⁶ The IRR report, however, acknowledged worrisome negative trends that can lead to a deterioration of race relations if they continue in a negative direction.¹²⁷

There was also high agreement in the present study about racial tension and distrust having a huge impact on South African society, which is supported by data in the "SARB Briefing Paper 1" that shows that 48.8% think that race is a primary source of division, only topped by economic inequality with 54.2%.¹²⁸ Interview participants in the present study mentioned economic inequality as a very large problem as well, confirming the SARB findings.

Members of both groups in the present study stated that this impact was uneven geographically, and mentioned the media and social media, and crime. Members of both groups also noted poor Black-Coloured relations in particular. While the scorings were high in both groups, professionals averaged higher, at 8, while the public averaged at 7.15, where 0 was 'no impact on society' and 10 was 'the biggest impact on society'.

2.1.4 *Measures*

Regarding actions being taken to combat racial tension and distrust, both groups mentioned spreading awareness, education, institutions investigating violations, and good laws on the matter. These findings are supported by existing data: the "SARB Special Briefing Paper" found, for example, that 69.7% of their respondents believed that the Constitution was either important or very important for the country.¹²⁹

However, in the present study, the public was very split regarding how much was being done, where some thought there was a lot and some very little. Professionals mentioned poor implementation of laws and government analysis of segregation, and differences in service delivery. This is supported by the "Special Briefing Paper", which found that confidence in various institutions was very split; 53.1%, 57.2%, and 57.7% had little to no confidence in the national government, in local government, and in parliament, respectively.¹³⁰ The "Special Briefing Paper" did not propose reasons for this lack of confidence, but its findings do corre-

¹²⁵ IRR, 2017, p.3

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.9

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ SARB, 2015, p.16

¹²⁹ SARB, 2016, p.5

¹³⁰ Ibid., p.6

spond to the present study's findings on perceptions of government work on racial tension and distrust, as well as the present study's findings stating that the government makes racial tension worse, which is discussed in more detail below. Many also believed the government was not doing enough, while some were happy with government action.

The two groups also mentioned the same categories of measures they believed should be taken, such as government reform and more government work on the matter, providing better education and raising awareness, and engaging the community. Professionals mentioned dealing with the emotional effects of Apartheid, which data from the "SARB Briefing Paper 1" supports,¹³¹ and the public brought up working on the inner-self and mindsets people have. Professionals talked about advocacy while the public discussed economic solutions. The present study's findings correspond to the findings of the IRR report, which also overwhelmingly cited better education, jobs, and service delivery¹³² as well as the need for all racial groups to work together as important to reduce racial tension and distrust.¹³³ The "Special Briefing Paper" further found that corruption was the largest perceived threat from political leaders,¹³⁴ which coincides with this study's participants' desire for government reform due to, among others, corruption.

2.1.5 Those aggravating the situation

The list of those making racial tension and distrust worse generated by the present study's participants was very short, and both groups agreed that politicians, some members of the public, and media and social media played a role. The only differences were that the public explicitly named the EFF and Malema, and radical groups, while practitioners did not. The IRR report on race relations also mentions the EFF and Malema's rhetoric as contributing to tensions¹³⁵ and political parties using race for political gain.¹³⁶ It also blames poor government work and policy, and their use of racial rhetoric, on the perpetuation of inequality between racial groups,¹³⁷ which many interview participants of the present study stated themselves. The confidence levels in institutions found in the "Special Briefing Paper", discussed above, also correspond to many participants' belief that politicians negatively affect racial tension and distrust.

¹³¹ SARB, 2015, p.6

¹³² IRR, 2017, p.3, 7-8

¹³³ Ibid., p.8

¹³⁴ SARB, 2016, p.9

¹³⁵ IRR, 2017, p.1

¹³⁶ Ibid., p.11

¹³⁷ Ibid.

2.1.6 *Topic of conversation*

Members of both groups mostly stated that race is a common topic of conversation, with four professionals (outside of work) and 25 members of the public discussing it either often or sometimes, with only one professional (outside of work) and seven members of the public discussing it rarely or never.

2.1.7 *Media and social media*

There were 13 public and four professional mentions of social media, and six public and three professional mentions of media in the present study, all of which were negative. The SARB document “Trust, Truth and the Media” contends that the importance of social media is growing¹³⁸ and should not be taken lightly,¹³⁹ even though 71.5% and 66.7% of respondents never obtained political news from social media or the internet, respectively.¹⁴⁰ However, complete distrust in social media and the internet was high, at 64.2% and 60%, respectively, while little trust was placed in social media and internet, at 17.5% and 18.2%,¹⁴¹ meaning that only a very small minority view the internet and social media positively. This corresponds well to the results of the present study, where none of the participants viewed social media positively. The Penny Sparrow case¹⁴² was mentioned numerous times by numerous participants as profoundly negatively impacting tension and distrust. Indeed, the IRR commissioned their new report on race relations in the wake of Penny Sparrow and a subsequent wave of racist social media comments,¹⁴³ clearly showing the significance of the impact of social media. The IRR report found an increase in personal experiences of racism from 2015 to 2016, and cited the growth of social media as a possible reason for this.¹⁴⁴

Even though trust in news from radio, newspapers, and television was higher in the SARB, opinion was still evenly split, with 41.7%, 35.9%, and 56.2% distrusting radio, newspapers, and television, respectively,¹⁴⁵ also corresponding well to the present study’s participants’ negativity towards the media in general.

Politics and employment permeated all the interviews as well, as discussed above.

¹³⁸ SARB, 2017, p.2

¹³⁹ Ibid., p.7

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.5

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.6

¹⁴² Penny Sparrow is a White woman who posted racist remarks about Blacks at the beach during the holiday season 2015. The case sparked outrage and had much national attention (Wicks, News24, 2016). Sparrow was prosecuted and found guilty of hate speech (Evans, News24, 2016).

¹⁴³ IRR, 2017, p.1

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p.6

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

2.2 Oslo

As stated previously, even though Norway rejects racial and color terminology, these terms were used in interviews, and were defined and explained to participants. It must be noted that, because Norwegians do not think in these terms on a daily basis, asking them to respond in regard to race made some participants uncomfortable, and many stated that it was important to acknowledge this, as well as their opinion that discussing race and skin color was very simplified and artificial as opposed to discussing culture, religion, and ‘background’ in general. Some participants, though all understood the reasoning behind the choice of words, still rejected such terminology, while some believed that it was terminology that should not be shied away from in Norway.

Because race is rejected and ignored in Norway, there is little research on the topic specifically. There is, however, interest in racism in the integration debate and in the far right. Therefore, the analysis of the results relies heavily on expert opinion on various subjects relating to racial tension and distrust. In addition, the national debate revolves around immigrants, culture, and ethnicity, and not race. However, race can be inferred because there is little concern about Nordic, European, and Western immigration or culture entering Norway, while there is heavy focus and concern on immigration from other parts of the world where the population is not White.

There was generally high agreement between the human rights practitioners and the public regarding all questions they had in common, including where there was disagreement within each group.

Table 3 – Human rights practitioners (6 from 2 organizations), Norway, demographics

Gender	3 women 3 men
Age	31 to 61
Race	5 White 2 official national minority 1 South Asian
Location	1 East Oslo 1 West Oslo 4 Nordstrand
Citizenship	6 Norwegian 0 immigrants
Interracial work-place interaction	6 yes 0 no

Table 4 – Members of the public (23), Norway, demographics

Gender	16 women 7 men
Age (21 to 66)	12 aged 18-29 9 aged 30-49 2 aged 50 and above
Race	15 White 3 South Asian 3 Asian 1 Middle Eastern 1 Black 1 mixed
Location	9 inner East Oslo 2 outer East Oslo 6 inner West Oslo 5 outer West Oslo 1 no response
Citizenship	16 Norwegian 3 naturalized 1 foreign-born parents 7 immigrants
Employment	18 employed 5 unemployed 3 never employed in Norway
Interracial work-place interaction	19 yes 4 no

2.2.1 *Friendship and trust*

In the present study, all human rights practitioners had friends of another race, while nearly four-fifths of the public did, both with varying closeness. This is higher than the 56% of Norwegians found to have close relations with immigrants in a 2013 survey conducted for NRK,¹⁴⁶ yet much closer to the 72% found to have general contact with foreigners by Statistics Norway's most recent survey of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.¹⁴⁷

Human rights professionals were more trusting than the public, with averages of 8.16 and 6.5 respectively, where 0 was 'no trust' and 10 was 'complete trust'. Further breakdown of the public revealed an average of 7.5 for Norwegian-born and 5.4 for foreign-born, discounting current citizenship. Members of both main groups stated that they had no differing levels of trust for race groups, that they had high trust, and that race was not a factor in trust,

¹⁴⁶ Hammerstad and Mon, 2013

¹⁴⁷ SSB, 2016, p.6

but that many other factors played a role. Members of both groups said that trust was situational. Both groups stereotyped.

The two groups differed in that some members of the public stated that they had low levels of trust and that there was distrust of both minority and majority groups. Some also mentioned the effect media has in trust levels. The averages for all Norwegian-born participants closely matched data on trust found by the World Value Survey and Eurostat. In 2009, Norwegian interpersonal trust attitudes were 73.73%, and trust remained at this level in 2013, making Norway one of the most trusting countries in the world.¹⁴⁸ This clearly means that immigrants settling in Norway are less trusting, but that their trust levels vary widely based on country of origin. This is reflected well in the findings from the present study.

2.2.2 *Group Relations*

Members of the public and human rights professionals mostly agreed that different race groups got along well and that there were low levels of racial tension. Professionals believed there were high levels of societal trust while the public varied quite a bit on this subject, as supported by the data on trust in Norway discussed above.

Both groups mentioned the negative impact the media has on trust levels and tension, discrimination, and a lack of intergroup interaction. This is supported by research from the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDI). IMDI published a report in 2009 about immigrants in Norwegian media, stating 71% of all news stories about immigrants were problem-oriented and implied that the cumulative effect of this practice is negative.¹⁴⁹ IMDI stated that Somalis are written about in a much greater proportion than their population size, and that they “are used to illustrate how integration is failing, also in articles that discuss other completely different groups.”¹⁵⁰ This practice paints a skewed picture of integration and of out-groups, thereby creating tension and distrust.

As previously mentioned, a survey found that while 56% of Norwegians had close relations with immigrants, they are much more likely to be friends with Nordic citizens and Western Europeans and much less likely to be friends with immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.¹⁵¹ This confirms that there is a relatively high level of race group segregation and low interracial interaction despite that SSB found that 72% came into general contact with immigrants.¹⁵² Regarding perception of racial groups getting along and trusting each other, the personal average score in the present study for human rights practitioners was 6.58 and their organizational average was 6.75, while the average score for the public was 6.23,

¹⁴⁸ Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2016, found by looking at Norwegian data in the first three interactive figures.

¹⁴⁹ IMDI, 2009, p.3-4

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p.4

¹⁵¹ Hammerstad and Mon, 2013

¹⁵² SSB, 2016, p.6

where 0 was ‘no trust or getting along’ and 10 was ‘complete trust and getting along’. The public was slightly more pessimistic, but only to a marginal extent.

2.2.3 *Impact on society*

Opinion varied in both groups about whether racial tension and distrust was an issue for Norwegian society. Opinion ranged from ‘not a problem’ to ‘a big problem’ in both groups. Both groups, did, however, agree that the problem was growing. The personal average for human rights professionals was 5.5 and their organizational average was 5.58, while the public’s average was 4.9, where 0 was ‘no problem’ and 10 was ‘the largest problem Norway had’. This shows general agreement that the problem of racial tension and distrust is significant, but not one of Norway’s biggest issues. The fact that, according to the survey carried out for *Aftenposten* and *Adresseavisen*, one-third of the population found immigrants and immigration to be a threat to Norwegian culture,¹⁵³ which can also be understood as race, fits the results of the present study; skin color is the elephant in the room regarding what ‘ethnic Norwegian’ means.¹⁵⁴ Members of both groups in the present study mentioned the rise of the right, the debate rhetoric, media and social media, Islamophobia, and the government as reasons racial tension and distrust are an issue, which are discussed below.

Though there was disagreement among both groups if racial tension and distrust have a small or large effect on society, cross-group agreement was high. Members of both groups stated that racial tension and distrust’s effect was regional and that there was low tension. This is supported by data found by a survey where respondents were asked about the threat of immigration to Norwegian culture, a clear indication of tension and distrust. Only 29% of those in large cities viewed immigration as a threat while the figure was 42% in rural areas.¹⁵⁵ “Those in cities have daily contact with immigrants and are more positive,”¹⁵⁶ according to SSB researcher Svein Blom,¹⁵⁷ while FrP politician Espen Teigen explained by stating that “in rural areas, people perhaps have a closer relationship to Norwegian culture.”¹⁵⁸

In the present study, human rights practitioners perceived less of an impact on society than the public, with the average for human rights practitioners at 4.87, and at 5.5 for the public, where 0 was ‘no impact on society’ and 10 was ‘the largest impact on society’. Both groups mentioned the rise of the right and the media and social media as contributing to the impact, while the public also focused on discrimination and employment. Studies have shown that discrimination in the job market has significantly disadvantaged minority groups in Nor-

¹⁵³ Baumberger et.al., 2017

¹⁵⁴ Kolshus, 2017

¹⁵⁵ Baumberger et.al., 2017

¹⁵⁶ Author’s translation

¹⁵⁷ Baumberger et.al., 2017

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., author’s translation

way.¹⁵⁹ Midtbøen and Rogstad found that the likelihood for a person with a foreign-sounding name to be called into an interview was 25% less than those with an ‘ethnic Norwegian’ name and background, making discrimination in the hiring process a “substantial hindrance to access to the work force.”¹⁶⁰ Regarding the rise of the right, Norwegian researcher Sindre Bangstad wrote that “academics who have studied the rise of the FrP argue that the party’s stance on immigration and integration is the most central element of its electoral appeal”¹⁶¹ and that FrP “discovered the electoral appeal of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment in 1987,”¹⁶² which was helped along by the recent refugee crisis and the culturalization of politics.¹⁶³

2.2.4 Measures

Regarding actions being taken to combat racial tension and distrust, both groups in the present study mentioned several measures, such as government action plans, integration policy and programs, Norwegian language classes, social organizations, the King’s speech of September 2016, and education.

Government integration policy includes three steps, where immigrants skip the first: 1) settling refugees in a municipality, 2) an introduction program consisting of Norwegian language and culture classes, and 3) employment.¹⁶⁴ Other organizations such as the Red Cross have activities aimed at integration as well, but are not a part of the official policy.¹⁶⁵

In the present study, the public was very split regarding how much was being done, especially by the government, where some thought there was a lot and some very little. Data on Norwegian trust in public institutions supports this finding. 6 of 10 had trust in the political system, just over 7 had trust in the legal system, and about 7.5 had trust in the police, according to the OECD in 2013.¹⁶⁶ These figures confirm that there is high trust, but also that a significant minority have low trust in public institutions, especially politics, and coincide with the participants’ disagreement on government action in the present study.

There were wide-ranging suggestions from both groups on what should be done. Those that the groups had in common included instating a new government, better integration policies and programs, working against stereotypes and generalizations, making institutions more inclusive, and more activities that expose groups and people to each other. Human rights

¹⁵⁹ Midtbøen and Rogstad, 2012, p.9-12

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.9, author’s translation

¹⁶¹ Bangstad, 2015

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ IMDI, n.d.(b)

¹⁶⁵ IMDI, n.d.(a)

¹⁶⁶ Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2016, figure 4

practitioners otherwise focused on various types of policy and the public on pro-active work, such as education, changing rhetoric, improving media representation of other race groups, and all-around improving employment for minorities.

Several political parties have also voiced in the media that better integration policies need to be implemented. In 2016, politicians from five center-left political parties, in cooperation with researchers, proposed an alternative to the current integration policy,¹⁶⁷ which covered many of the suggestions listed by participants in present study. The ten commandments for better integration, as the parties called it, included

- 1) integration from day one; 2) quick and widespread settlement of refugees; 3) common values for all; 4) everyone must participate; 5) better qualification for entry into and development in the workplace; 6) strengthening the arbeidslinjen;¹⁶⁸ 7) use schools, our most important integration arenas; 8) better offerings and clearer expectations of religious communities; 9) zero tolerance for racism, discrimination, and hate crimes; and 10) never parallel societies.¹⁶⁹

The proposal aims to provide quicker and more effective integration, expand integration services, make it easier for newcomers to gain employment through various measures, give Norwegians part of the responsibility for integration, promote social democratic values, and aggressively combat discrimination and hate speech against minorities.¹⁷⁰ The proposal, however, does attempt to restrict religious freedoms, such as forbidding hijabs, especially in schools.¹⁷¹ While this proposal does not cover, for example, a new government, changing rhetoric, and changing media representation, it does necessarily include better inclusion, working against discrimination and stereotypes, pro-active work, better employment, and exposing different groups to each other through employment, all of which interview participants in the present study wanted.

2.2.5 *Those aggravating the situation*

In the present study, the list of those making racial tension and distrust worse was varied, yet short, and there was very high agreement. Members of both groups mentioned politicians, Sylvi Listhaug in particular, the media and social media, Islamic radicals, the debate and its rhetoric, nationalist groups, and Hege Storhaug's book.

There is published professional opinion that matches these results. For example, a hate rhetoric researcher from Oslo and Akershus University College stated that Sylvi Listhaug's

¹⁶⁷ Christensen, et.al., 2016

¹⁶⁸ The principle that it is more beneficial to work than to receive welfare, and is important in work and economic inclusion.

¹⁶⁹ Christensen, et.al., 2016, author's translation

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

rhetoric and style is intentionally damaging and negatively impacting certain groups, while a media researcher at the University of Bergen stated that Listhaug's statements are polarizing.¹⁷² As another example, in her book *Islam, den 11. landeplag*, Hege Storhaug recommended removing certain verses from the Norwegian translation of the Koran; state regulation of the practice of Islam and closing mosques; forbidding the hijab, but not religious symbols from other religions; guarding borders with soldiers to protect Europe and Norway; only allowing the entry of those with Western mindsets; and paying Muslims to leave Norway.¹⁷³ Even members of FrP have said her suggestions went too far,¹⁷⁴ and researchers have criticized her selectivity of sources to base her arguments on,¹⁷⁵ but she still has many followers.¹⁷⁶

2.2.6 *Topic of conversation*

Members of both groups mostly stated that race (or ethnicity, in Norwegian parlance) was mostly a common topic of conversation, with all professionals (outside of work) and 16 members of the public discussing it either often or sometimes, with zero professionals and seven members of the public discussing it rarely or never.

2.2.7 *Media and social media*

In the present study, the media was mentioned seven times by human rights professionals, of which all but one was negative. The media was mentioned 15 times by the public, of which 13 mentions were negative, and two named media as a solution.

According to Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, in 2016 Norwegians trusted in the media 46% of the time, 42% in news organizations, and 32% in journalists.¹⁷⁷ Only 45% believed that the media is free from undue political influence and 37% from undue business influence.¹⁷⁸ Though the Institute claimed this as average levels,¹⁷⁹ the numbers show that the majority still did not trust in these most of the time and believed that there was political and business influence in the news. This coincides with the results from the present study, showing that there is skepticism to the media. Even if the levels were average, Norwegians in the present study were very aware of their skepticism of the media, as well as how the media nevertheless impacts them and group relations.

¹⁷² Enge, 2016

¹⁷³ Stokke and Ruud, 2016

¹⁷⁴ Ruud, 2016

¹⁷⁵ Mortensønn Jordheim, 2016

¹⁷⁶ Stokke and Ruud, 2016

¹⁷⁷ Hofseth, 2016, p.49

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

Social media was mentioned six times by the public, and every mention was negative, while human rights professionals mentioned social media eight times, seven of which were negative. Comments on online newspapers and Facebook posts make it easy for everyone to take part in public debates, including those who engage in online harassment, or internet trolling.

According to Ipsos Norway, in the last quarter of 2016, 81.6% of Norwegians had a Facebook profile and 81.3% were active users.¹⁸⁰ In a 2014 Institutt for samfunnsforskning survey on freedom of speech and the media, 31% of respondents received uncomfortable and/or disrespectful comments after having participated in online public debate, while 53% of these had experienced such comments up to 10 times and 12% up to 50 times.¹⁸¹ While the content of the argument and political stance was the most common reason for receiving such comments for the majority population, 18% of minorities stated they received them because of their appearance, and 22% because of their skin color.¹⁸² 36% of minorities further stated they received such comments because of their religion, 44% because of their nationality, and 27% because of their ethnicity,¹⁸³ indicating that there is little tolerance for ‘non-ethnic Norwegians’ in Norway. Bergens Tidende, one of Norway’s largest print and online newspapers, published a survival guide for participating in public debates online,¹⁸⁴ further indicating that internet trolling is a rather significant issue.

As discussed above, politics and issues with employment permeated all the interviews, as did an urban-rural divide regarding tension and distrust.

2.3 Comparing South African and Norwegian results

Results from South Africa and Norway yielded many differences as well as many similarities.

2.3.1 Differences

The differences between the two mainly had to do with their historical contexts as well as differences in relations, and participant agreement. In South Africa, all participants, despite their race, felt included as South Africans and have a feeling of national inclusion and identity, while in Norway national inclusion and feelings of belonging were lacking for non-Whites, even if they were Norwegian citizens. Findings in the “SARB Briefing Paper 1”¹⁸⁵ support this feeling of inclusion in South Africa, while the Aftenposten and Adresseavisen survey and

¹⁸⁰ Ipsos Norge, 2017

¹⁸¹ Staksrud, et.al., 2014, p.41-42

¹⁸² Ibid., p.43

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Bjerkestrand, 2016

¹⁸⁵ SARB, 2015, p.17

IMDI found that the Norwegian 'we' was perceived as challenged¹⁸⁶ and as not including immigrants.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, issues of integration were found in the present study to be amongst fellow countrymen in South Africa, which stemmed from Apartheid, while it was between Norwegians and 'outsiders' in Norway, resulting from immigration. In South Africa, participants believed that there were poor intergroup relations, while in Norway there was seen to be a lack of interaction and relations at all. Crime and poverty, and their relation to race, was mentioned several times in Cape Town as a big driver of racial tension and distrust. Islamophobia and racial isolation, on the other hand, were often mentioned as the main drivers in Norway.

In addition, while results were mostly positive or neutral in Norway, there was high disagreement amongst participants on nearly every question. This indicates that, while the problem may be smaller in Norway, solving it may be more difficult because there is a lack of agreement about whether racial tension and distrust are a problem at all and how big of a problem they are. In South Africa, results were overall very negative. However, there was high agreement among participants on almost every interview question. This indicates that, while the problem is massive and consumes South African daily life, finding solutions may be easier because there is high agreement between and across groups.

2.3.2 *Similarities*

Four main similarities between results in Cape Town and Oslo were found. They included the negative impact the media and social media had on racial tension and distrust, the negative impact of politicians and their rhetoric, issues of employment where minorities were at a disadvantage, and a lack of integration.

Members of each group in each city mentioned often the negative impact of the media and social media. Each mention in South Africa was negative, while in Norway, mentions were mostly negative. Participants saw racist comments and hate speech on social media, as well as media representation of non-White race groups, as huge issues affecting racial tension and distrust and their effect on society. South Africans were more concerned with social media, likely because of the high-profile Penny Sparrow case and others, while Norwegians were more concerned with media, negative or stereotypical media representation, and the public debate in general. However, both forms of media were pegged as a problem in both countries. People from both countries stated that the media always mentioned the background of a perpetrator if they were non-White and that representation of non-Whites in the news was stereotypical, sensationalized, negative, and one-dimensional. All these statements are supported in

¹⁸⁶ Baumberger, et.al., 2017

¹⁸⁷ IMDI, 2009, p.6-7

various reports from both South Africa and Norway.^{188,189,190,191,192,193} Participants also contended that the media played on racial problems and insecurities to sell more newspapers and subscriptions. People from both countries also stated that people believe that they can get away with racist and hateful comments on social media and that they are not held accountable for such behavior.

Politicians and their rhetoric was frequently mentioned in both Cape Town and Oslo, with more deep discussions on the matter occurring in Cape Town. South African politics is divided by race,¹⁹⁴ whereas this is not the case in Norway, making heightened South African pre-occupation with it reasonable. However, politics, politicians, poor government, and divisive rhetoric was perceived as a large issue in both countries. In Cape Town, many participants stated many times that politicians use race and racial tensions to pit race groups against one another and stoke fear as a political tool to stay in power, an issue which has even been written about academically.¹⁹⁵ In Oslo, participants stated that politicians and the government were doing the same, only in non-*racial* vocabulary, with which researchers agree.¹⁹⁶ Participants in both countries also called for new governments, political and governmental reform, and better official attention to these issues. Participants clearly thought that the current governments, their rhetoric, and their policies in both countries were severely detrimental to intergroup relations and trust.

Participants in both countries also pointed the finger at one specific person and one specific party as especially incendiary; Julius Malema and the EFF in South Africa and Sylvi Listhaug and FrP in Norway, whom South African and Norwegian researchers and the media have also blamed.^{197,198} These parties and people are creating and created by racial tension. Not only was politics and government in general an issue, but specific politicians and parties were an issue. Norwegians indicated that the situation would improve if Listhaug was removed from her position and if FrP were removed from the coalition. South Africans, however, did not make such statements because the Norwegian and South African political systems work very differently. However, South Africans mentioned that those who live in rural areas and those who are uneducated are most susceptible to Malema and the EFF, implying that

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p.6

¹⁸⁹ SAHRC, 1999, p.46

¹⁹⁰ IMDI, 2009, p.3, 14

¹⁹¹ Selisho, 2014

¹⁹² IMDI, 2009, p.14

¹⁹³ Selisho, 2014

¹⁹⁴ PRI, 2012

¹⁹⁵ Macdonald, 2012, throughout

¹⁹⁶ Enge, 2016

¹⁹⁷ Grootes, 2011

¹⁹⁸ Enge, 2016

education could result in their decline in popularity or that racial tension and distrust are created by structural issues more so than in Norway.

Issues of employment and minority disadvantage in employment were also frequently discussed in both Cape Town and Oslo. In Norway, the problem was in discrimination against immigrants and those with foreign-sounding names in the job market, and immigrants being passed over for Norwegians in the hiring process, no matter their qualifications or language fluency, all of which has also been found in research on discrimination in the labor market.¹⁹⁹ This discrimination served as a huge source of discontent for immigrants interviewed in Oslo, with participants stating that racial tension and distrust both causes this discrimination and results from it. They stated that Norwegians do not trust foreigners, so they did not hire them, while not being hired made foreigners distrust Norwegians. In South Africa, the issue was similar, but more complicated. Like in Oslo, participants stated that employers favor people of their own race group in the hiring process because they feel more comfortable with members of their own race and because they trust other races less and stereotype them. An important extension of this issue is problematic application of BEE, an affirmative action policy. Many stated that, though BEE is supposed to cover all disadvantaged race groups in employment, Coloureds do not get jobs because they are perceived to be ‘not Black enough’ for aid, while only Blacks benefit. This has also been written about academically.²⁰⁰ However, some participants believed that BEE only benefitted Coloureds and not Blacks. Moreover, many participants perceived many beneficiaries of BEE to be unqualified for the positions they filled, which is a common criticism of BEE.²⁰¹ These two issues, separately and taken together, were perceived to result in distrust of the employment system, businesses, and members of other race groups. They also stated that it was a large source of tension and distrust between Blacks and Coloureds. Participants in both countries desired an overhaul of the system and stated that this discrimination needed to be combatted, that merit should take precedence, and that qualified disadvantaged minorities needed to be employed. They believed that solving this issue would reduce much of the racial tension and distrust present in their societies. In South Africa, the respondents in the IRR report on race relations had these same views.²⁰²

Finally, participants in both countries saw increasing integration as vital to improving racial tension and distrust. They stated that there was either poor or very little intergroup interaction because integration was lacking in both countries. The main issue in increasing integration in South Africa was working to decrease the stark housing and geographical segregation of races left over from Apartheid. In Norway, the issue was avoiding housing segregation between Norwegians and immigrants and ghettoization, and increasing intergroup contact. All

¹⁹⁹ Midtbøen and Rogstad, 2012, p.9-12

²⁰⁰ Adhikari, 2004, p.168

²⁰¹ The Economist, 2013

²⁰² IRR, 2017, p.4

sets of participants believed this was crucial for reducing racial tension and distrust and improving intergroup relations. In addition to reducing and avoiding housing segregation through policy and official measures, in order to increase integration, participants in both countries stated that there needed to be more community and social get-togethers and more activities where groups can learn about each other. This therefore demonstrates the usefulness of intergroup contact theory, even though it cannot be applied to reduce housing and geographical segregation. Recommendations for increasing integration and intergroup contact will be discussed below.

Though South Africa and Norway are still vastly different, and their situations of racial tension and distrust are different, there are many significant commonalities.

3 Policy and practice comparisons

It is possible to analyze what each country has in place to address three of the four similarities revealed and discussed above. Laws and policies do not address racial tension and distrust themselves, but do address racism, which is both caused by, and results from, racial tension and distrust. Laws and policy also address many other aspects that influence or are influenced by racial tension and distrust, such as those mentioned by participants in the in-person interviews. NGO activities also address racism and other activities that have an impact on racial tension and distrust. In this section, legislation and policy regarding racism and equality, employment opportunities, and hate speech; and NGO activities aimed at racism and social integration, from South Africa and Norway will be compared. The selection of laws, policy, and NGO activities that are analyzed here was influenced by the responses provided by interview participants; these pieces of legislation were selected because they address problems that participants pointed out and the NGO activities were selected because they encompass actions participants mentioned and help increase contact. There are many other laws, policies, and kinds civil society engagement that could be analyzed for their impact on racial tension and distrust. However, this study will explore measures related to what most interview participants were concerned with to discover how their concerns are being addressed.

The goal is to discover what South Africa does better than Norway, and what Norway does better than South Africa, and to determine what they can take from each other to improve their policies and practices, and therefore their situations of racial tension and distrust.

Though an interesting finding that politicians and certain political parties and their rhetoric negatively affect racial tension and distrust, this is not easily addressed in legislation, policy, or civil society action, and will therefore not be analyzed here. Unpacking this finding and exploring how to remedy it in both South Africa and Norway would be an interesting and useful case for further study.

3.1 Legislation

The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA) will be compared to *diskrimineringsloven om etnisitet*²⁰³ (DLE) to analyze Norwegian and South African legislation on racism. South African Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) will be compared to the Norwegian Working Environment Act (WEA) and DLE to analyze steps being taken to improve employment and access to employment for minority races. The October 2016 draft Prevention and Combatting of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill (draft Bill) from South Africa will be compared to section 185 of the Norwegian criminal code (s185) and the Norwegian government “Declaration against hate speech” (Declaration) to analyze how the negative effect of comments on social media and in the media are being dealt with. It is important to note that this study is multidisciplinary in nature, not juridical, and only compares language and provisions in these specific pieces of legislation. It does not seek a deep analysis of the legislation nor take legislative techniques into account. In only one brief instance are other domestic legal sources considered.

3.1.1 PEPUDA and DLE

PEPUDA and DLE will be analyzed to determine South African and Norwegian efforts against racism and discrimination in general. DLE replaced a similar bill in Norway and came into effect in 2014, and will itself soon be replaced by a new equality and non-discrimination act. Recommendations provided here and in the section below are aimed at the law that will replace DLE. The current law is thorough and covers much, especially regarding employment, and Article 5 incorporates the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), but it does have some weak points. PEPUDA took force in 2003 and is a thorough, detailed, and specific piece of legislation, covering all areas of life. It includes many more, and better, provisions than DLE, but it, too, is not without flaws.

DLE prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, and beliefs, and “discrimination on the basis of national origin, descent, skin colour and language shall also be deemed discrimination on the basis of ethnicity.”²⁰⁴ Though these categories are “also” included as ethnicity in DLE and cover a wide range, DLE does not define what ethnicity is in the first place. The preparatory works for DLE state that “this list was chosen because it is hard to give a definition of ethnicity,”²⁰⁵ which does not help to shed light on what is meant by ‘ethnicity’. Not including such a definition is problematic because it is an often-misunderstood concept that people understand differently and is the main focus of this law. Despite this definitional

²⁰³ English: Ethnicity Anti-Discrimination Act

²⁰⁴ DLE, 2013, Article 6

²⁰⁵ Prop. 88L, p.62, author’s translation

lack, other important terms, such as equality,²⁰⁶ direct and indirect discrimination,²⁰⁷ and harassment²⁰⁸ are sufficiently defined. PEPUDA dedicates the entire first chapter to defining relevant terms of the act in a clear manner, but also does not define ‘ethnic and social origin’.²⁰⁹ Moreover, both race and color are a prohibited ground under PEPUDA,²¹⁰ but these are not defined to illustrate how these concepts are different. Overall, PEPUDA exceeds regarding definitions; the new law replacing DLE should include a section of definitions to clarify what is meant by ethnicity and other concepts and prohibited grounds, as PEPUDA does. However, both pieces of legislation should include more definitions. For example, PEPUDA defines some of the prohibited grounds, but not all of them.

Article 9 of the DLE forbids harassment based on ethnicity, religion, or beliefs, which constitutes “acts, omissions or statements that have the effect or purpose of being offensive, frightening, hostile, degrading or humiliating”, but does not designate a threshold or method to determine if such acts, omissions, and utterances constitute harassment. How is intention determined? Are the receiver’s feelings the only guide in determining harassment? Not including a test can lead to uncertainty and uneven responses. PEPUDA’s definition of harassment is similar and states that conduct must be persistent or serious,²¹¹ which provides a sort of test for determining harassment. However, according to the definition, persistency or seriousness must always be present for conduct to be deemed harassment. What falls under the definition is therefore narrow. What party decides seriousness, the victim or the court, and what happens if there is disagreement? In this case, both countries need to take from each other. The law replacing DLE should include a method of determining harassment as PEPUDA has, while PEPUDA should lower the threshold for what constitutes harassment, as DLE has.

PEPUDA Article 7 prohibits disseminating propaganda on racial superiority and/or inferiority, promoting racial exclusivity, providing inferior services based on race, and denial of access to opportunities and services based on race. DLE does not include any such specific prohibitions. In this instance, the law replacing DLE should adopt provisions like those in PEPUDA to increase the scope of the law. Of course, such acts may be much more common in South Africa than in Norway. Nevertheless, Norway should forbid such acts in equality legislation before needing such provisions is ever necessary.

PEPUDA binds the State and “all persons,”²¹² as well as requires Ministers to develop

²⁰⁶ DLE, 2013, Article 1

²⁰⁷ Ibid., Article 6

²⁰⁸ Ibid., Article 9

²⁰⁹ PEPUDA, 2000, Article 1, prohibited grounds

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid., harassment

²¹² Ibid., Article 24

regulations to bind companies, organizations, and clubs,²¹³ effectively binding all entities within South Africa. DLE, on the other hand, applies “in all sectors of society, with the exception of family life and other purely personal relationships”²¹⁴ and excludes the requirement for equal employment in private sector businesses with less than 50 employees.²¹⁵ PEPUDA leaves no room for discrimination, while DLE allows it in certain circumstances. The law replacing DLE should apply to all businesses in the private sector and should follow in the footsteps of PEPUDA and not allow for discrimination in personal relationships so as to enact changes on the individual level and to address interpersonal issues or incidents that do not amount to hate speech or hate crimes but are still discriminatory.

Overall, Norway’s DLE and forthcoming legislation can improve if it adopts and adapts provisions from South Africa’s PEPUDA. It would gain from being more definitionally specific, from including a test and threshold for harassment, from forbidding more conduct based on its prohibited grounds, and from widening its scope to bind more actors. However, PEPUDA can also gain from introducing certain DLE concepts and provisions, such as lowering the threshold for harassment, and should also include more definitions.

3.1.2 BEE, WEA and DLE

BEE was passed to remedy the economic and employment inequality between Whites and non-Whites resulting from Apartheid using primarily affirmative action.²¹⁶ For BEE’s purposes, ‘Black people’ are Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians.²¹⁷ BEE also establishes a Council and a Commission to, among others, monitor compliance, increase knowledge of BEE, advise the government, and draft codes of good practice.²¹⁸

In Norway, there is no employment legislation that exclusively takes on access to employment. The chapter of WEA that deals with discrimination in the workplace defers to DLE and other equality laws,²¹⁹ as DLE contains several provisions regarding employment. WEA states that its scope applies to all aspects of employment, but that discrimination with a just cause, and that is necessary to achieve the just cause, such as affirmative action, is lawful.²²⁰ Currently, affirmative action based on gender is widely taking place in Norway. In a report on affirmative action, Likestillings- og diskrimineringsombudet (LDO) writes that affirmative action principles based on gender are transferrable to “ethnic minorities.”²²¹ However, this is

²¹³ Ibid., Article 27

²¹⁴ DLE, 2013, Article 2

²¹⁵ Ibid., Article 20

²¹⁶ BEE, 2003, introduction/preamble/objectives

²¹⁷ Ibid., Article 1

²¹⁸ Ibid., Articles 4, 5, 13b, 13f

²¹⁹ WEA, 2016, section 13-1, p.47

²²⁰ Ibid., section 13-2/13-6, p.47-48

²²¹ LDO, 2015, p.10

much less common than affirmative action based on gender. Employers, especially in the public sector, do, however, encourage immigrants and those of ‘minority backgrounds’ to apply when posting job advertisements, and the government has required all state agencies and departments to call at least one immigrant to an interview, as long as they are qualified for the position.²²² Additionally, 12 state agencies have instated moderate affirmative action based on ethnicity.²²³ The government acknowledges that there are particular challenges in recruiting non-Westerners²²⁴ and that immigrants in general have a higher rate of unemployment, likely based on discrimination.²²⁵

BEE’s definition of ‘broad-based black economic empowerment’ in Article 1 states that one strategy for economic empowerment is “achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce”. The codes of good practice associated with BEE sets up targets that those bound by BEE must meet, and a timeframe within which to meet them.²²⁶ These codes of good practice are obligatory,²²⁷ which essentially makes affirmative action obligatory. Affirmative action can be disputed either positively or negatively, which will not be discussed here, but it is easy to see how this aids in remedying economic inequality and increasing access to employment.

This is a case where it is difficult to determine which country addresses the issue in a better manner. Racial affirmative action in South Africa is widespread and legislated, while in Norway, it is legislated, but not widespread or legally required. BEE requires affirmative action, but does not mention that those employed must be qualified, while in Norway, job applicants must be qualified for the position to benefit from affirmative action where it exists. Here, both Norway and South Africa can take from each other; affirmative action based on race or ethnicity can become more common and expected in Norway, and South Africa can update the law to assure that those employed via BEE are qualified. This will be discussed below.

Both WEA and DLE have provisions that state that job applicants have the right to obtain information about the qualifications of someone appointed to a position if they feel that they have been passed over for employment based on a breach of the law,²²⁸ and that employers must substantiate that discrimination did not take place.²²⁹ If discrimination is found to have taken place, victims can claim redress and compensation.²³⁰ BEE provides for investiga-

²²² Ibid., p.47

²²³ Ibid., p.48

²²⁴ Ibid., p.47

²²⁵ Ibid., p.48

²²⁶ BEE, 2003, Article 9

²²⁷ Ibid., Article 10

²²⁸ WEA, 2016, section 13-7/13-8, p.48-49 and DLE, 2013, Article 18

²²⁹ Ibid, section 13-8, p.49 and Ibid., Article 19

²³⁰ Ibid., section 13-9, p.49 and Ibid., Article 25

tions by the Commission, which can “institute proceedings in a court to restrain any breach of [BEE] or to obtain appropriate remedial relief.”²³¹ Though BEE does not contain provisions about access to information in employment, which would be beneficial for the non-Whites it is empowering,²³² it contains very similar provisions to DLE about investigating and redress. In this manner, both pieces of legislation are equal.

Besides what the two Norwegian laws have in common and what has been described above about DLE, DLE obliges the authorities²³³ and professional organizations²³⁴ to actively work towards equality. In addition, employers in the public sector and those with over 50 employees in the private sector are required to actively implement DLE²³⁵ and to report on the work they undertake to do this.²³⁶ BEE also requires “all spheres of government, public entities and organs of state [and] all public companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange [to] report on their [BEE] compliance.”²³⁷ In addition, it requires “all Sectoral Education and Training Authorities contemplated in the Skills Development Act [to] report on skills development spending and programmes.”²³⁸ In this way, BEE and DLE are very similar, with little to comment on besides BEE’s reporting requirement on skills development spending and programs. This goes a step further than DLE, making education and training regarding employment obligatory.²³⁹ This is helpful because such a requirement assures that there is concrete work being done to help people gain skills and therefore gain employment, which helps to proactively solve the problem of access to employment. There is nothing wrong with the fact that DLE only requires compliance reporting from the entities listed above because this also assures that employers are working towards employment equality. However, if skills development was provided for in the law replacing DLE as it is in BEE, more proactive steps to increase access to employment, especially for refugees and immigrants, would concretely help them gain work. In this case, though BEE and DLE are very similar in their compliance reporting, BEE’s requirement for education and training is a measure Norway and the law replacing DLE would benefit from, and that is easily adoptable.

As mentioned above, DLE incorporates ICERD as a part of Norwegian national law. Article 5 paragraph e subparagraph 1 of ICERD states that State Parties must eliminate racial discrimination in all forms and assure everyone “protection against unemployment.” However, besides DLE Article 18, there does not seem to be any Norwegian law or provisions aimed

²³¹ BEE, 2003, Article 13j

²³² This may fall under the scope of the Employment Equity Act rather than BEE

²³³ DLE, 2013, Article 13

²³⁴ Ibid., Article 14

²³⁵ Ibid., Article 20

²³⁶ Ibid., Article 21

²³⁷ BEE, 2003, Article 13g, paragraphs 1 and 2

²³⁸ Ibid., paragraph 3

²³⁹ Also provided for in Article 1, definition of broad-based black economic empowerment

at protecting against unemployment and aiding access to employment, at least not in DLE or WEA. BEE, on the other hand, heavily enforces and regulates its provisions through the Council, the Commission, strategies, and regulations. If this helps can be a subject for further study, but legislation including such strong and numerous provisions is more useful, at least in theory, for implementing provisions and improving access to employment for marginalized groups. DLE provides for enforcement of the law by LDO, but not for increasing access to employment besides reporting and a complaint procedure. Norwegian law could borrow from BEE in this manner to strengthen what is already in place.

Neither WEA nor DLE address increasing access to employment and economically empowering ‘non-ethnic Norwegians’ or immigrants as BEE does regarding race. As a piece of legislation, BEE is a very good document on increasing access to employment, economically empowering non-Whites, and promoting affirmative action. However, it faces sharp criticism and many call for its repeal because punishment from the government for employers that breach BEE is becoming harsher, rather than the government dealing with the root causes of these breaches: namely poor education for non-Whites.²⁴⁰ Analyzing this is not within the scope of this study and can be recommended for further study.

DLE covers well discrimination based on race in employment, but lacks provisions improving *access* to employment, which only exist in the government handbook, while BEE covers this well. BEE provides for affirmative action specifically to empower non-Whites and increase their economic participation. Though South Africa has PEPUDA and BEE, it could perhaps benefit from a piece of legislation tailored to discrimination in the workplace and in employment, like DLE. Given the scope of discrimination in access to employment in Norway, as found by Midtbøen and Rogstad,²⁴¹ and the fact that the government has admitted this is an issue,²⁴² Norway could benefit if it followed in South Africa’s footsteps and included access to employment for non-Whites and other marginalized groups in its laws and expanded affirmative action.

3.1.3 *The draft Bill, the Declaration, and s185*

The draft Bill of South Africa, and s185 and the Declaration all deal with hate speech, and will thus be analyzed together. The draft Bill and Norwegian law also address hate crimes, but this will not be analyzed because it was not mentioned at all in the in-person interviews. Hate speech is already illegal under PEPUDA in South Africa, however, the government has proposed the draft Bill to expand upon the prohibition under PEPUDA and to give effect to South Africa’s obligations under ICERD.²⁴³ The current version of the draft will

²⁴⁰ The Economist, 2013

²⁴¹ Midtbøen and Rogstad, 2012, p.9-12. See footnote 160

²⁴² See footnotes 224-225

²⁴³ Draft Bill, 2016, p.2-3

be analyzed here, though the final outcome may be very different. Hate speech is illegal under s185 in Norway and the Declaration states government concern for the scope of hate speech. S185 lists skin color as a prohibited ground, which is tantamount to race. This is important given Norway's aversion to the concept, but it is not mentioned in the Declaration. Though the draft Bill is longer and more specific than s185 and the Declaration, these documents contain very similar provisions.

The draft Bill recognizes that "the emotional and psychological impact of hate crimes and hate speech extends beyond the victim, to the group to which the victim belongs or is perceived to belong,"²⁴⁴ while only the Declaration in Norway acknowledges such impact beyond the victim. Norwegian hard law should recognize this as the South African draft legislation does. Such acknowledgement may not influence implementation or punishment, but official recognition of this aspect of hate speech is important because of the sense of security it instills. Officially demonstrating that hate speech impacts groups can help make these groups feel more secure and equal in society. Law functions not only as societal guidelines and punitive measures for wrongdoing, but also gives a sense of security to the population. If groups within the population are not mentioned in the law, even if they are protected by it, their sense of security cannot be complete.

In the definition of hate speech in s185, a person is guilty of hate speech if they willfully or with gross negligence publicly put forth a hateful statement, while the draft Bill would only cover intentional hate speech.²⁴⁵ This is a clear limitation for the draft Bill that should be rectified. Not all hate speech is intentional, and widening the net to include gross negligence would address more instances of hate speech. Moreover, this would be better for society in general, as people would be forced to confront their mindset and their prejudice if accused of hate speech, and when reading about such cases in the news. It is easy to dismiss intentional hate speech as the words of a radical or racist, but punishment for grossly negligent hate speech can cause reflection.

The Declaration and draft Bill highlight the value freedom of speech has in their respective societies, yet recognize distinct, similar limitations to this right. Both state that spreading hate is not to be tolerated. In addition, both lay out actions the government must take to hinder and prevent hate speech from taking place. However, the draft Bill is more specific, listing and detailing, among others, policing, education, training, and information campaigns,²⁴⁶ while the Declaration states government intent to actively work toward free dialog, raising awareness, addressing hate speech in public institutions, and better justice for hate speech victims. These are necessary actions that cover a wide range of solutions. The Declara-

²⁴⁴ Ibid., Preamble

²⁴⁵ Ibid., Article 4

²⁴⁶ Ibid., Article 9

tion would, however, benefit from heightened specificity as included in the draft Bill to give the government concrete methods and plans to develop and follow.

One major advantage the draft Bill has over s185 is that it addresses hate speech via electronic communications, or social media and the internet, explicitly:

any person who intentionally distributes or makes available an electronic communication which constitutes hate speech as contemplated in paragraph (a), through an electronic communications system which is accessible by any member of the public, or accessible by or directed at a specific person who can be considered to be a victim of hate speech, is guilty of an offense.²⁴⁷

This is an important addition given the spread of social media, and because of the prominent role social media has in racial tension and distrust, especially after the controversy of the Penny Sparrow case and others in South Africa. This take on hate speech addresses modern modes of communication and has adapted to a main way in which hate speech is put forth now. The inclusion of social media in the draft bill shows that South Africa is responding to changes in the times and technology and acknowledging their ever-growing importance in life. S185 does indeed state that the hate speech must be made publicly, which includes comments on the internet and on social media. However, Norwegian law has not acknowledged or explicitly adapted to modern forms of communication and an important forum in Norway. Neither does the Declaration, published in 2015, mention social media or the internet as significant arenas where hate speech and tolerance work takes place. Even if hate speech on social media is investigated and punished in Norway, social media's lack of being named in the law sends the message to the public that there is no accountability for what is posted on social media. The Declaration and s185 should be updated to explicitly include modern communication and social media, as South Africa has done with the draft Bill. Since social media is such a concern regarding racial tension and distrust in both countries, legislation should explicitly deal with it. South Africa seems to have customized their law to modern life, while Norway has not. To better deal with modern forms of hate speech and demonstrate accountability on the internet, Norway should amend s185 and the Declaration to explicitly include social media.

Norwegian law and South African draft law on hate speech are very similar, and neither can be deemed better than the other, as both countries can learn from each other to improve their relevant legislation. S185 is better in that it covers intent and gross negligence in hate speech, which is very important, and the draft Bill is better in that it explicitly addresses electronic communications and social media, which takes into consideration all modern hate speech fora. Though neither piece of legislation can be considered better than the other, the explicit inclusion of social media is a large strong point that Norway should adopt from South

²⁴⁷ Ibid., Article 4(1)(b)

Africa. Because social media played an important role in racial tension and distrust, hate speech law should explicitly cover it, as South Africa's does. At the same time, grossly negligent hate speech should also be punished, as Norway does and South Africa should.

3.1.4 Legislation summary

Overall, regarding racial tension and distrust, South African legislation and policy is more comprehensive and effective. This is not to say that Norwegian law is of poor quality, but it could certainly address more specific issues to reduce racial tension and distrust and other related issues. The historical context of each country likely influenced the specificity and detail of laws relevant to racial tension and distrust. The long history of racism, racial tension, and distrust in South Africa necessitates laws that more directly deal with this issue than in Norway, where these issues have not had such an impact on the country up to this point. However, to address these growing problems, Norwegian law and policy should gain such detail. As the problem grows and becomes more relevant, Norwegian law should be better equipped to handle it. At the same time, South Africa can learn from Norwegian law, especially in terms of widening the scope of certain legislation.

It must also be noted that implementation of these laws will play a vital part in how successful they are at reducing racial tension and distrust. In the in-person interviews, many voiced the opinion that South African law implementation is poor. Therefore, just because their legislation is detailed and of high quality does not mean that it is impacting society as intended. However, the same applies in Norway. This study only analyzes the laws and policies themselves, and does not seek to analyze implementation of these laws, which can form the basis for further study.

3.2 NGO activities

Racism, racial tension, and distrust are perceived as much less of an issue in Norway. Therefore, there are very few organizations dedicated to remedying the problem. There are several organizations that deal indirectly with racial tension and distrust by focusing on aspects that affect these, however only those that either have this as their main focus or are large, prominent actors in society will be described and analyzed. These include Anti-rasistisk senter (ARS), Norwegian People's Aid (NFH), and the Red Cross. As racism, racial tension, and distrust is a long-standing, massive issue for South Africa, there are countless organizations that work to remedy this. Because of their large numbers and diversity, only the Anti-Racism Network of South Africa (ARNSA) will be described and analyzed. These organizations were chosen for their focus on racism, education, and increasing and improving inter-group contact and integration. As with the legislation above, the work of these organizations will be explored, but not the implementation and impact of their work.

ARNSA was founded in 2015 in response to several racist incidents,²⁴⁸ and is already made up of 64 organizations and institutions, including religious groups, schools and universities, foundations, government departments, sports clubs, youth organizations, anti-racism organizations, museums, and government accountability groups. Given the diversity and scope of ARNSA members, they will not be addressed one-by-one, but as a whole. Of course, all the member organizations of ARNSA do their own work that directly or indirectly impacts racism, racial tension, and distrust. However, ARNSA was founded to give more strength and influence to these organizations, as well as expand their geographical reach, to make them more effective.²⁴⁹ ARNSA's foundation is in community and local work,²⁵⁰ which, when combined, provides a wider-reaching impact. ARNSA aims to use "the collective weight of multiple organizations and individuals and making local efforts national and bringing national efforts to a local level" to fight racism wherever it occurs.²⁵¹ The diverse collection of ARNSA member organizations does indeed touch all branches and aspects of society. ARNSA work encompasses five main activities: holding an annual conference, where interventions and campaigns are decided upon; anti-racism campaigns and raising awareness; research on racism in South Africa; advocacy and lobbying; and public education and training.²⁵² ARNSA is also responsible for Anti-Racism Week, held every March. Each day of the week has a different focus, such as being aware and being brave against racism, ultimately aimed at society becoming more just and equal.²⁵³ The different types of institutions and organizations in ARNSA participate in ways to further anti-racism in their particular field during Anti-Racism Week. For example, schools host assemblies on racism, sports clubs dedicate games to anti-racism, religious sermons focus on the importance of anti-racism, and workshops are held.²⁵⁴ Individuals are also able to participate in ARNSA and their activities.²⁵⁵

ARS is based in Oslo and has four departments: AgendaX, a social activity center for multicultural youth; JobbX, a career center for multicultural youth; the advisory office, which deals with complaints of racism and discrimination; and the political department, which participates in the public debate, holds lectures, produces and distributes information, and officially comments on laws and Norwegian compliance to international obligations.²⁵⁶ The aim of ARS is to reveal, document, and counteract racism, raise awareness on racist discrimina-

²⁴⁸ Spiropoulos, 2015

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ ARNSA, n.d., Guiding Principles, p.1

²⁵² Ibid., p3-4

²⁵³ ARNSA, n.d., Homepage

²⁵⁴ Kathrada Foundation, 2017

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ ARS, n.d.

tion, and mobilize minorities.²⁵⁷ ARS' website is designed as a platform for debate on, among others, racism, discrimination, immigration, and inclusion, and is open for anyone to write a post and submit it for publishing.²⁵⁸ The most important focuses of ARS' work is their youth engagement, which helps give them a feeling of belonging and inclusion into society; and their participation in the public debate, which aims to give voice to those who experience racism.

Both the Red Cross and NFH, prominent social organizations in and around Norway, engage in integration work and social inclusion for refugees and immigrants in Norway, which is Norway's main focus for building contact between race groups. The Red Cross in Oslo has six different offerings for immigrants, four of which focus on integration measures: Refugee guide, Norwegian language practice, activities at refugee reception centers, and support for young refugees.²⁵⁹ These activities are aimed at the long-term, at giving new arrivals a network in Norway and knowledge about Norwegian language, culture, and society.²⁶⁰ Red Cross work is built on volunteering, meaning that immigrants and Norwegians meet each other and work together in these activities. Refugee guide is an activity that matches two people together, the point of which is to build cross-nationality and interracial friendships. Support for young refugees pairs refugees between ages 15 and 23 who are in Oslo alone with adults to create friendships and pseudo-families. Volunteers also help teach immigrants and refugees Norwegian and visit refugee reception centers each week.

NFH focuses primarily on refugees and refugee reception centers in their integration and inclusion work, which, like the Red Cross, is done through volunteering. This work is based on skill- and knowledge-sharing activities; a volunteer goes to a refugee reception center and teaches refugees something they know, and learn something they are interested in from the refugees.²⁶¹ NFH states that "getting to know each other is the first step on the way to increased acceptance and tolerance,"²⁶² which forms the basis for their volunteering method. NFH also holds courses, such as their course for union representatives, where they teach DLE and other laws on equality and discrimination so that they are better equipped to identify and handle discrimination in the workplace, or their course for 'minority' women to help them enter the workforce.²⁶³ NFH also holds a course for refugees, which teaches them about the Norwegian welfare state, employment laws and rights, and how to apply for jobs on the Nor-

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Oslo Røde Kors, n.d.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Norsk folkehjelp, n.d.(a)

²⁶² Ibid., author's translation

²⁶³ Norsk folkehjelp, n.d.(c)

wegian job market.²⁶⁴ Three unique offerings from NFH include a ‘human library’, where people who often suffer prejudice can be ‘loaned’ and then asked any question in a workshop or event setting;²⁶⁵ a video campaign aimed at youth about the negative impact words can have on people;²⁶⁶ and a campaign revealing the truth behind many prejudices people in Norwegian society have about refugees and immigrants.²⁶⁷

NGO activities are very context-based for the society in which they exist, therefore it is not possible to properly discuss what is lacking per se and what works better than in another country. However, there are certain aspects of NGO activity that Norway and South Africa can take from each other to expand the work that is already being done. ARNSA work and participation is primarily based on membership in the organization and membership in member organizations, while work in Norway is done largely by volunteers. Volunteering is a useful aspect ARNSA could adopt to include more people in their anti-racism work and in reducing racial tension and distrust. It would expose more people to those of other races and cause them to interact and learn about each other, which, as we know from intergroup contact theory, is necessary for improving race relations and increasing trust. This would be a good addition to ARNSA’s work, as it would then be truly all-encompassing and have an even deeper impact on society. Norway, on the other hand, can adopt the concept of an anti-racism network that includes and involves many kinds of organizations and create a united front against racism, racial tension, and distrust, as South Africa and ARNSA has. Organizations working in concert have much more power than when they work alone, which Norway and Norwegian society can benefit from to prevent the worsening of racial tension and distrust. Combining this with pre-existing volunteering will increase awareness of the issue, and increase the impact NGO work has.

In all, NGO activity in both South Africa and Norway deals with many issues relating to racial tension and distrust, but more can be done to strengthen their work. Based on the analysis presented here, it seems that Norwegian NGOs apply intergroup contact theory more in their work than ARNSA does, however, their work with campaigns and education may bring this into play more than as is presented on their webpage. This can be remedied, as discussed, by increasing volunteering, while Norwegian work would benefit from a structure such as ARNSA.

4 A further recommendation: community gardens

So far, this study has analyzed policy and practice aimed at racial tension and distrust that is already in place in South Africa and Norway and has discovered that, despite draw-

²⁶⁴ Norsk folkehjelp, n.d.(b)

²⁶⁵ Norsk folkehjelp, n.d.(d)

²⁶⁶ Norsk folkehjelp, n.d.(f)

²⁶⁷ Norsk folkehjelp, n.d.(e)

backs in both countries, they are well-positioned to deal with these issues, even more so if they borrow policy and activities from each other. However, policy cannot necessarily increase interracial contact and NGO activities only reach those who have the intention to increase contact and to help others, and those who seek out volunteer work, so what more can be done in both countries, especially to further implement intergroup contact theory and involve as many members of the public as possible to increase trust and reduce racial tension? One possibility is community gardening.

As a reminder about intergroup contact theory, ignorance stemming from low levels of contact feeds negative, incorrect, and oversimplified beliefs about groups, which increases prejudice, racial tension, and distrust.²⁶⁸ “Close and sustained contact with members of different racial groups promotes positive, unprejudiced attitudes”²⁶⁹ because “interracial contact provides direct information regarding values, life-styles, and behaviors of other racial groups.”²⁷⁰ This demonstrates that people’s “negative attitudes are unjustified, which will lead to positive attitudinal and behavioral change.”²⁷¹

The NGO activities already being implemented in South Africa and Norway, discussed above, bring people of different race groups together and facilitate contact and interaction between them. Community gardens do this as well, however, they do so in a slightly different manner that ends up being very important: all members of all race groups begin truly equal in community gardening, whereas there is an inherent power differential in the activities described above. Activities raising awareness inherently give those spreading information a position of power over others due to their deeper knowledge of the subject and their implied superior morality compared to the target audience. Volunteering activities inherently give those donating their time a position of power over those communities they work in because they are extending a helping hand. In addition, as mentioned, only those looking for intergroup contact are likely to volunteer in this manner. Community gardening does not include a power differential in any way. It is an activity where people meet each other on equal footing from the start. Moreover, it is an activity that people may have several other reasons for participating in besides interracial interaction, meaning that it is an activity even prejudiced people who would normally avoid contact may engage in. This makes the interaction provided by community gardening less artificial, more equal, and has the potential to reach more people, which is beneficial in reducing racial tension and distrust.

Interracial contact in leisure activities is considered to be more genuine and sincere because participants are able to freely choose what activities they want to participate in and

²⁶⁸ Shinew et.al., 2004, p.341

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p.337

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

who they want to spend their time with.²⁷² However, little interracial contact occurs during leisure activities.²⁷³ Shinew, Glover, and Parry suggest community gardening in urban areas as a creative leisure activity that can aid interracial contact. There is much literature indicating that community gardens are and can be successful arenas for improving race relations and interracial contact. They carried out a study based on intergroup contact theory in Saint Louis, Missouri, USA to “examine whether urban community gardens are perceived as spaces in which people of different races can successfully integrate”²⁷⁴ and to determine if the literature is correct about community gardening facilitating intergroup contact theory.

Community gardening often takes place in low to moderate income neighborhoods and is aimed at creating community assets, such as fresh food, areas to mingle, and citizen empowerment.²⁷⁵ However, community gardens do not need to be exclusive to such neighborhoods and can exist and flourish anywhere. Community gardens foster a sense of community and create social capital by bringing neighbors together. They allow bonding within groups and bridging among groups.²⁷⁶

There are many reasons besides increasing interracial contact that members of the community would be interested in participating in a community garden: fresh food, being outdoors, working with/in nature, meeting new people, and a love of gardening.²⁷⁷ This is beneficial because community members who participate do so for various reasons, making engagement in the activity genuine.

The conditions for intergroup contact theory are mostly applicable to community gardening: gardening is non-competitive, it is a sustained activity leading to sustained contact, it is personal and informal and can involve one-to-one contact, and all parties have equal status. In addition, community gardens can have support from authorities if funded or facilitated by local government, NGOs, or other organizations, but this condition is not always fulfilled. Therefore, it can be argued that community gardening is able to facilitate positive interracial contact and reduce tension and distrust.

The study conducted by Shinew, Glover, and Parry found that both Black and White Americans strongly believed that community gardening brings together people of different racial groups (Blacks 4.04/Whites 3.91 out of 5) and people who would not normally socialize with each other (Blacks 3.96/Whites 4.03 out of 5).²⁷⁸ Results were similar when broken down by those with low contact with different racial groups and those with high contact, ra-

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p.338

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.338-339

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.339

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.348, table 5

ther than broken down by race.²⁷⁹ “The study’s findings did suggest that in many of the community gardens some level of interracial contact was occurring between the two racial groups”²⁸⁰ and that the findings “indicated that most gardeners felt connected to their community garden and many believed community gardening brought together people of different races.”²⁸¹ This is likely because community members that use the garden must work together for the garden to succeed.²⁸² Further, the community gardens were more racially diverse than the neighborhoods in which they existed, supporting the idea that even segregated areas have sites in which interracial interaction and contact can occur.²⁸³ The findings of the study also confirmed that community gardens foster a sense of community and belonging.²⁸⁴ These findings are important for both South Africa and Norway.

However, the results from the study also indicated that those with high levels of interracial interaction in the garden did not have significantly higher levels of trust than those with low contact.²⁸⁵ The authors state that this could be due to poor measurement, or because interracial contact in racially diverse gardens was minimal.²⁸⁶ Thus, though results were overall quite positive, community gardens are not a perfect space for increasing interracial contact and trust and are not a cure-all, but this is to be expected. There is no perfect solution. Community gardens still have potential to facilitate the development of interracial friendships, teach people about different racial groups, and counter stereotypes, which will lead to a reduction in prejudice, distrust, and racial tension.²⁸⁷ Community gardens can be used in conjunction with other practices to implement intergroup contact theory, increase interracial interaction, and decrease racial tension and distrust.

Community gardens as a space for interracial interaction is possible in both Norway and South Africa because community gardens actually already exist in both countries. Using community gardens to increase interracial contact is thus a matter of expanding and normalizing the practice. Even though the study detailed here has stated that community gardens work best in urban areas, which is true, they can be implemented in smaller, rural areas as well, meaning that their impact can be nationwide.

New NGOs could be established to facilitate community gardens, or NGOs like those analyzed above can adopt community gardens as one of their activities, or provide funding for them. The local government can also get involved with community gardens and support them.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p.349

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid., p.350

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p.351

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p.350

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

Other organizations and institutions, such as sports clubs, schools and universities, and religious communities, can also establish their own community gardens or provide support to pre-existing ones. They can even team up and form a garden together in order to bridge across groups, for example a Black church and a Coloured church in South Africa, and a church and a mosque in Norway. And, importantly, communities themselves can establish community gardens within their own areas. There are thus many opportunities for the facilitation and implementation of community gardens in Norway and South Africa. In addition, databases, where the race of garden members is secret, to facilitate better integration and hinder the working of prejudices, can be developed where people can search for gardens in their area and join.

Though feasible for both countries, the ease of implementation is not the same for both Norway and South Africa. However, the present study does not seek to identify a solution that will fit two different countries equally well, or claim that this is possible. Spaces in Norway, especially in big cities such as Oslo, are relatively physically integrated, making the placement of, and ease of implementing, community gardens easier than in South Africa, where geographical segregation is much more of a problem. In addition, the higher levels of trust that currently exist in Norway may make people more willing, or at least less skeptical, to establish or join a community garden. Due to the high level of spatial segregation in South Africa, organizations and institutions, and the establishing of inter-organization collaboration must be relied on to a much larger degree than in Norway, though this is also important for Norway. There must therefore be a higher level of coordination, such as in finding transport for groups to and from the garden if it is not within walking distance for all race groups involved. Workplaces would be an important facilitator of community gardens in South Africa because this is the arena of life where there is the most interracial mixing. Therefore, a garden for employees and their families would be the easiest and most effective way to successfully have a community garden where interracial contact takes place.

The difficulty of finding a space for a community garden is one not to be minimized, and is important for the implementation of this recommendation. Therefore, organizations or communities that wish to establish a community garden must work with the local government to find a suitable and legal space for the garden. However, this should not be too large an obstacle to seriously hinder the implementation of community gardens.

Though implementing community gardens has its difficulties in both Norway and South Africa, this does not mean they are an idea to be discarded. In addition, one must also not overstate the impact of community gardens, because, as stated above, they are not a perfect solution or a cure-all. However, they are a good addition to measures already being taken to reduce racial tension and distrust. They directly contribute to interracial contact and interaction in ways existing NGO activities do not, which will help in changing people's attitudes and reduce racial tension and distrust. Moreover, community gardens meet the requirements for the sorts of integration and interaction measures and activities participants of the in-person

interviews in Cape Town and Oslo desired. Community gardens bring different racial groups together, teach people about each other, and increase interaction and mingling, all stated by participants as something they felt they lacked in their country and wanted and needed more of.

5 Conclusion

The methodologies and analyses in the present study have found answers to the questions this study put forth. Regarding the first question – how is racial tension and distrust similar and different in South Africa and Norway – the interviews painted a very clear, detailed picture of racial tension and distrust, which was backed up by statistics and researcher opinion. There are high levels of distrust and racial tension in South Africa and high levels of trust and low levels of racial tension in Norway. There are low levels of interracial interaction in both countries, which is an issue for both that they recognize must be worked on. The size and effect of the problems were different, but both countries saw the relevance of the issue in their societies. The situation is very historically and contextually specific to each country, as obviously expected. Racial tension and distrust have come about under very different circumstances and in varying levels of severity. Allport was right when he said that manifestations vary considerably from country to country, as they do here. However, there were many similar significant manifestations and drivers of racial tension and distrust in these two very different countries as well, indicating that maybe such manifestations and drivers are common ones in racial tension and distrust.

The second question – how is racial tension and distrust being dealt with in each country, and what can they learn from each other – was also answered. Politicians, access to employment, the media and social media, and a lack of interracial interaction were large components of racial tension and distrust in both countries. Thus, a look at legislation and policy regarding discrimination and equality, employment, and hate speech, and NGO activities, which address three of these four issues, provided an understanding of the frameworks in place that deal with these issues and impact racial tension and distrust. Furthermore, comparing them revealed ways in which equivalent legislation and activities could be exported and imported to remedy shortcomings. Both countries could learn from each other, but it turned out that Norway could more frequently learn from South Africa, something many likely would not expect.

Intergroup contact theory and community gardens provided an answer to the question of what else South Africa and Norway can do to relieve racial tension and distrust. Community gardens provide a space where different race groups can be brought together under the conditions intergroup contact theory requires for successful interracial contact. Community gardens can also be implemented and facilitated in both South Africa and Norway, even though they do include some drawbacks. Combining community gardens with other activities that

increase interracial interaction, such as those already in place, provides a more comprehensive and interactive way to reduce racial tension and distrust in both countries.

Throughout the course of the analysis, questions have also been raised that could not be answered under the scope of the present study. Therefore, these provide suggestions for further study. Are the manifestations and drivers of racial tension and distrust found here common to other countries as well? Are there universal aspects of racial tension and distrust? How can the negative impact of politicians on racial tension and distrust be remedied? Only the content of the legislation and activities were analyzed here; how are they implemented and how does their implementation affect their impact on racial tension and distrust? How can their implementation be improved to increase impact?

This study has shown that, through shedding light on racial tension and distrust in South Africa and Norway, while these two countries are very different, they are also quite similar. This is an important discovery because it demonstrates that other seemingly very different countries can be analyzed and compared to help improve their situations as well, that countries can adopt laws and practices from others, as well as signifies that there may be universal aspects of racial tension and distrust. If this is discovered to be the case, then civil society, countries, and international organizations can work to better these issues to reduce racial tension and distrust all around the world. In the meantime, actors in South Africa and Norway can use this study, which, while primarily academic, is also geared towards practitioners in the field and towards lawmakers, who can learn about how racial tension and distrust function and manifest themselves, as well as improve and add to their activities and legislation. The in-person interviews can act as a societal voice for these actors to listen to and follow, thereby improving life for everyone in their country. The legislation and NGO comparison can act as a starting point for improving and expanding upon law and practice. This study has also demonstrated that race is still a worthwhile concept to study and should not be shied away from academically or practically. The vastness of public and human rights practitioner opinion on racial tension and distrust shows that this is something society thinks about and wishes to change, therefore indicating that race and related issues, such as racial tension and distrust, and remedies for these, must stay in focus.

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Appendix 1 – Participant matrices

M= one male, F= one female

Blank square= no participants

Cape Town

Age 18-29

	Township	Suburb
Black		M F F
White		F M
Coloured	F	F
Indian		F

Age 30-49

	Township	Suburb
Black	F F F M M M M M	F
White		M F
Coloured		M F
Indian		M

Age 50+

	Township	Suburb
Black	M	
White		F F M M
Coloured	M	F F M M
Indian		

Professionals: F F F F M

32 members of the public
5 professionals
37 participants in total

Oslo

Age 18-29

	East side	West side
Majority Norwegian	F F F	M F F F
Minority Norwegian	M	F F
Immigrant/refugee	M F	

Age 30-49

	East side	West side
Majority Norwegian	F F	
Minority Norwegian	M	
Immigrant/refugee	F	F F F M

(1 M Majority Norwegian did not provide where in Oslo he lived)

Age 50+

	East side	West side
Majority Norwegian	M	F
Minority Norwegian		
Immigrant/refugee		

Professionals: F F F M M M

23 members of the public
6 professionals
29 participants in total

Appendix 2 – Complete interview questions

Human rights practitioners – English

1. Background: race/gender/age/nationality/home area
2. Do you interact with people of other races at work?
 - a. If no, why not?
 - b. If yes, in what capacity?
3. Are you friends with anyone of another race (outside of work)?
 - a. If no, why not? Have you had friends of another race in the past?
 - b. If yes, how many? How close are you? How did you meet? When did you meet?
4. What are your personal opinions on other races in this country?
 - a. Why?
5. How much do you personally trust people of other races?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=completely)
6. How do you personally perceive different racial groups as getting along/trusting each other in general in this country?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=completely)
7. How does your organization perceive different racial groups as getting along/trusting each other in general in this country?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=completely)
8. How big of a problem do you personally think racial tension and distrust are?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=country's worst problem)
9. How big of a problem does your organization think racial tension and distrust are?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=country's worst problem)
10. What is your organization doing to reduce racial tension and distrust?

11. What do you think/know is being done by any other organization or the government?
12. Do you think what is being done is working, and how well?
 - a. Why?
13. What (more/else) do you think can/should be done about racial tension/distrust by NGOs/government?
 - a. Why?
14. (If there is not much work or perceived work on racial tension/distrust described in previous answers) Why do you think there is not currently much being done about racial tension and distrust?
15. Do you think anyone is trying to make racial tension/distrust worse?
 - a. If yes, who and how?
16. What do you think needs to be done in order to get these issues on the agenda?
17. Across the nation, how much does racial tension and distrust affect society?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=affects society most)
18. If things stay the same as they are now, do you think racial tension/distrust will be better or worse, or the same, in the future?
 - a. Why?
19. How often do you talk to others about race (outside of work)? (never, rarely, sometimes, often)
20. How many immigrants came to live in your country in the past year? How many refugees?

Human rights practitioners – Norwegian

Though not considered correct in Norwegian, the word ‘rase’ is used because it is directly related to the English word and concept ‘race’: a group with similar physical characteristics. The correct Norwegian word, ‘etnisitet,’ actually signifies a completely different concept: that of a social group with common traditions.

1. Bakgrunn: rase/kjønn/alder/nasjonalitet/sted hvor du bor
2. Omgås du folk av ulike raser på jobb?
 - a. Hvis nei, hvorfor ikke?
 - b. Hvis ja, på hvilken måte?
3. Har du venner av en annen rase (utenfor jobben)?

- a. Hvis nei, hvorfor ikke? Har du hatt venner av en annen rase før?
 - b. Hvis ja, hvor mange? Hvor nære er dere? Hvordan/når traff dere hverandre?
4. Hva er dine personlige meninger om andre raser i dette landet?
 - a. Hvorfor?
5. Hvor mye stoler du personlig på folk fra andre raser?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=stoler helt)
6. Hvordan oppfatter du personlig at andre rasegrupper kommer overens med hverandre generelt i dette landet?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=kjempegodt)
7. Hvordan oppfatter organisasjonen din at andre rasegrupper kommer overens med hverandre i dette landet?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=kjempegodt)
8. Hvor stort problem oppfatter du personlig at spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper er?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=det verste problemet i landet)
9. Hvor stort problem oppfatter organisasjonen din at spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper er?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=det verste problemet i landet)
10. Hva gjør organisasjonen din for å redusere spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper?
11. Hva tror/vet du blir gjort av regjeringen eller andre organisasjoner for å hjelpe rasegrupper å komme overens?
12. Tror du at det som blir gjort fungerer, og hvor bra fungerer det?
 - a. Hvorfor?

13. Hva (mer/annet) tror du kan/bør gjøres med spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper?
 - a. Hvorfor?
14. (If there is not much work or perceived work on racial tension/distrust described in previous answers) Hvorfor tror du det ikke er mye som blir gjort med spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper nå?
15. Tror du det finnes noen som prøver å gjøre spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper verre?
 - a. Hvis ja, hvem og hvordan?
16. Hva tror du må bli gjort for å skaffe disse spørsmålene nasjonal oppmerksomhet?
17. For hele landet sett under ett, hvor mye berører spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper samfunnet?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=det verste problemet i landet)
18. Hvis situasjonen forblir den samme som nå, tror du spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper vil være bedre eller verre, eller det samme, i framtiden?
 - a. Hvorfor?
19. Hvor ofte snakker du med andre om rase/etnisitet/rasisme (utenfor jobben)? (aldri, sjeldent, av og til, ofte)
20. Hvor mange innvandrere kom for å bosette seg her i landet i fjor? Hvor mange flyktninger?

General public – English

1. Background: race/gender/age/nationality/home area
2. Do you have a job?
 - a. If yes, where is it located?
 - b. If no, then last job (where was it located?)
3. Do you interact with people of other races at work?
 - a. If no, why not?
 - b. If yes, in what capacity?
4. Are you friends with anyone of another race (outside of work)?
 - a. If no, why not? Have you had friends of another race in the past?

- b. If yes, how many? How close are you? How did you meet? When did you meet?
5. What are your opinions on other races in this country?
 - a. Why?
6. How much do you trust people of other races?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=completely)
7. How do you perceive different racial groups as getting along/trusting each other in general in this country?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=completely)
8. How big of a problem do you perceive racial tension and distrust to be?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=country's biggest problem)
9. What do you think is being done (by government/NGOs/etc.) to help make different racial groups get along?
 - a. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=nothing, 10=main focus)
10. What do you think can/should be done about racial tension and distrust?
 - a. Why?
11. Do you think anyone is trying to make racial tension/distrust worse?
 - a. If yes, who and how?
12. Across the nation, how much does racial tension and distrust affect society?
 - a. Why?
 - b. Can you place it on a scale of 1 to 10? (1=not at all, 10=affects society most)
13. How often do you talk to others about race? (never, rarely, sometimes, often)
14. How many immigrants came to live in your country in the past year? How many refugees?

General public – Norwegian

Though not considered correct in Norwegian, the word 'rase' is used because it is directly related to the English word and concept 'race': a group with similar physical characteristics.

The correct Norwegian word, 'etnisitet,' actually signifies a completely different concept: that of a social group with common traditions.

1. Bakgrunn: rase/kjønn/alder/nasjonalitet/sted hvor du bor
2. Har du en jobb?
 - a. Hvis ja, hvor er jobben plassert?
 - b. Hvis nei, så tidligere jobb (hvor var jobben plassert?)
3. Omgås du folk av ulike raser på jobb?
 - a. Hvis nei, hvorfor ikke?
 - b. Hvis ja, på hvilken måte?
4. Har du venner av en annen rase (utenfor jobben)?
 - a. Hvis nei, hvorfor ikke? Har du hatt venner av en annen rase før?
 - b. Hvis ja, hvor mange? Hvor nære er dere? Hvordan og når traff dere hverandre?
5. Hva er dine meninger om andre raser i dette landet?
 - a. Hvorfor?
6. Hvor mye stoler du på folk fra andre raser?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=stoler helt)
7. Hvordan oppfatter du at andre rasegrupper kommer overens med hverandre generelt i dette landet?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=kjempegodt)
8. Hvor stort problem oppfatter du at spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper er?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=stort problem)
9. Hva tror du blir gjort (av regjeringen/NGO/osv.) for å hjelpe rasegrupper å komme overens?
 - a. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ingenting, 10=hoved fokus av regjeringen/NGO/osv.)
10. Hva tror du kan/bør gjøres med spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper?
 - a. Hvorfor?

11. Tror du det finnes noen som prøver å gjøre spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper verre?
 - a. Hvis ja, hvem og hvordan?
12. For hele landet sett under ett, hvor mye berører spenninger og mistillit mellom rasegrupper samfunnet?
 - a. Hvorfor?
 - b. Kan du plassere det på en skala fra 1 til 10? (1=ikke i det hele tatt, 10=det som berører mest)
13. Hvor ofte snakker du med andre om rase/etnisitet/rasisme? (aldri, sjelden, av og til, ofte)
14. Hvor mange innvandrere kom for å bosette seg her i landet i fjor? Hvor mange flyktninger?

Appendix 3 – Full in-person interview results with demographic breakdown

The in-person interviews yielded a vast amount of data and interesting insights. The author's expectations for responses in Cape Town were that most people would agree that racial tension and distrust are still a very important issue for South Africa. This expectation was met, with most participants responding in a similar way. However, despite the expectation that most people would respond similarly, there were larger differences than expected in personal trust levels, which were evenly split, and in racial groups' perceived getting along and trusting one another, though a majority agreed. Expectations for responses in Oslo were less certain given the sensitivity of the topic, but were that racial tension and distrust would be seen as less of an issue than in Cape Town and more focus would be on immigration than on racial minorities already living in Norway. These expectations were met. It was also expected that there would be more fluctuation in opinions, which was also met. Because race and racial tension is a sensitive, almost taboo, topic that is looked at through the often-misguided lens of ethnicity, it was not expected that responses would be as nuanced and detailed as they often were. The demographics of the participants will be used to show patterns in responses, which will be discussed under each question below.

South Africa – human rights practitioners

Question 1: Five human rights practitioners from two different human rights and anti-racism organizations participated in interviews in Cape Town. They were aged 30 to 59 and consisted of four women and one man. Four lived in suburbs, two in the Northern Suburbs and two in the Southern Suburbs, and one lived in a township. Three were Coloured, one was Black, and one was Coloured but identified as Black. Three were South African, while one was Congolese-South African and one was Mosotho-South African. Their demographics do not seem to influence their answers and no patterns emerge based on demographics. Perhaps with more participants, patterns could be discernible, but that is not the case in the present study. Their answers, which were often in agreement, to the interview questions are presented below.

Question 2: In their work, they interact with colleagues, complainants, the community, and stakeholders of another race.

Question 3: All answered that they had many friends of a race other than their own and four answered that they were close or very close to these friends. One stated that most of her close friends were of the same race group as herself. Four met these friends through work, two through school and university, one met them through mutual friends, and one through their neighborhood, church, and other social organizations.

Question 4: When asked about their opinions on other race groups, two stated that they do not see any fundamental differences between races and one stated that they do not see race,

while one stated that culture and behavior is more important than race and that they must always be conscious of this because looking past the surface was sometimes difficult for them. One stated that they are generally good people but that it depends, one stated that there is a sense of entitlement in Black and Coloured youth, one stated that non-Whites needed to move on from Apartheid hurt. One participant gave very frank opinions about other races, but it is not possible to speculate why. It could be that they were the youngest or that they identified as a race other than their legal race, or that they were from a township, or just that it was their personality to respond in such a way, or a combination thereof. This participant stated that Coloureds are very racist and are widely perceived to be racist, that Blacks still see Whites as superior, and that Coloureds are blatantly racist by choice while Whites were accidentally racist.

Question 5: Regarding trust in race groups, one responded that they were taught to fear Blacks during Apartheid, and that they are therefore, for example, hesitant at night if a Black man approaches, but not if it is a White man. They are conscious of these prejudices. One also acknowledged that they stereotype. Another stated that trust is situational, and another said that they will trust anyone until given a reason not to trust them. One stated that they trust totally, one that there are different levels of trust for each group, and one that there are no differing levels of trust for each group. Participants were asked to rank their trust on a scale with 1 being no trust and 10 being complete trust. There was the most variation in answers for trust than any other question, with 6, 7, 3.5, 10 for an average of 6.6, while one refrained from answering.

Question 6: Four participants stated that there was a high level of distrust between racial groups in South Africa, one said that groups pretend to trust other groups, and one said that groups do not get along with each other. One participant stated that groups try to mingle with each other, but there is still unequal treatment across groups. Reasons given for this were that there is still lasting Apartheid thought, lasting Apartheid housing segregation, socio-economics, and media and social media. One stated that there are large problems between Blacks and Coloureds in today's South Africa, while interactions with Whites were less of an issue than before. When asked to score their personal perception of group interaction on a scale where 1 was no trust or getting along and 10 was complete trust and getting along, each participant placed it on the low end of the scale at 3, 5, 5, 2.25, and 4 for an average of 3.8.

Question 7: Looking at group interaction from an organizational perspective, participants stated again that there was a high level of distrust and that groups do not get along due to segregation. One stated that their organization receives many complaints of inequality, but that the situation was slowly getting better in the Western Cape. On the same scale as question 6, participants ranked group interaction from the perspective of their organization, scores were slightly higher with 6,5,4,5 for an average of 5, with one abstaining.

Question 8: Two participants stated that racial tension and distrust were a huge problem, and two stated that it was a big problem while one stated that racial tension and distrust

was polarizing, another that the race issue obscures all other problems in South Africa, and another that this problem defines the economy and is a major source of inequality. Reasons given for this were that race and socio-economics are still connected and that race groups are in economic competition with each other. Other reasons given were that there was still resentment over the past and that some still cling to the past, stereotypes of groups, accusations across groups, disjuncture between people, social media, and little interaction between groups. Xenophobia and dislike of immigrants was also mentioned. One participant stated that South Africa still had a long way to go in addressing the issue of race. Ranking how big of a problem the participants personally perceived racial tension and distrust to be on a scale where 1 was no problem and 10 was South Africa's worst problem, they all placed it high on the scale with 6, 8, 8, 7, 7, for an average of 7.2.

Question 9: When answering how big of a problem racial tension and distrust are from an organizational perspective, different answers were provided. Three stated that it was a big problem. That it is a defining factor of the economy and is a source of inequality was again mentioned. One stated that everything is racialized in South Africa. The reasons given to explain why racial tension and distrust is a big problem were poor reconciliation after Apartheid ended and that propaganda is perpetuated by the government and the people. One participant stated that their organization was very concerned about the race issue and another at the same organization stated that they receive some very serious complaints regarding race problems. Another participant at the same organization said, however, that they are receiving fewer cases than before, but was unsure if that was because the situation was improving or if cases were underreported. Participants were asked to rank how big of a problem racial tension and distrust are from an organizational point of view. Their scores were lower than their personal perceptions at 6.5, 8, 8, and 3 for an average of 6.3, with one choosing not to rank.

Question 10: In response to what the participants' organization is doing to improve racial tension and distrust, the responses in one organization were thus: two people said they were doing very little, and others said that they do investigate issues, seek redress, perform mediation, inform on rights, and hold workshops on diversity. They are also dealing with racism and hate speech on social media. The responses in the other organization were thus: they bring people of different racial groups together, hold social activities, hold group discussions on problems and solutions, have peer educator programs, and educate and raise awareness about social and racial issues.

Question 11: Participants listed several different measures the government and other organizations are taking to reduce racial tension and distrust. At the same time, they were critical to some of these actions. Spatial and geographical segregation and housing issues are being addressed, but no one was looking at this issues in a larger context. Uneven service delivery and police allocation with positive bias towards the suburbs in Cape Town has been exposed and a solution is being discussed with the City of Cape Town. Other organizations do workshops and spread rights awareness. Racial tolerance education has been implemented in

Western Cape schools. Institutions and organizations investigate violations and see redress. Regarding the government, they said that they have good policies, such as criminalizing racism and racial hate speech legislation, but that the implementation is poor and the legislation is ineffective. In addition, one participant was critical that there was no outreach being done on the part of the government.

Question 12: Regarding how well measures being taken were working, most participants had a negative view. Three said that it was not working, one said that government programs were not working well, and one said that organizations have an impact, but that their resources are often too limited to have meaningful impact. Race is still being looked at in South Africa in isolation, and not in a big picture context, according to one participant. One stated that there needs to be more outreach and dialog with the people, rather than with experts and the government, to identify issues to be addressed. One said that what was being done was working in some ways and not in others, and one said that it was working well. They stated that many are aware of their rights and are more willing to lodge complaints, but the deterrence effect of all the aforementioned measures in place were unknown. One stated that there had been adequate progress to date, and another said that there has been more progress in urban areas than in rural areas.

Question 13: Participants had many ideas for what more could be done by the government and organizations. There were several ideas about engaging the community, such as encouraging dialog within communities, holding community discussions and mediations, establishing a dialog with communities to understand their experiences and feelings and use the information gleaned to address needs and to foster relationships. Apartheid was also brought up; Apartheid and its effects should be dealt with openly and mourned by everyone, and the Apartheid ‘us vs. them’ mentality needs to be broken down. More advocacy and sustained action was suggested, as was better education. It was suggested that the government provide more funding to organizations working on racism, further develop laws, and do more in general. One participant also suggested better equipping and raising the visibility of equality courts.

Question 14: This question was asked only if the participant did not perceive much action being taken to reduce racial tension and distrust and was not applicable to two participants. The other three cited too much bureaucracy and too little capacity, a lack of understanding, not enough healing post-Apartheid, proposed actions being either too general or too specific, and underprioritizing. It was stated that the government is too political and not out for social good, that everything that is being done is just damage control, and that there is too much focus on law and not on education. Some of these answers do not directly answer the question, but point out critiques.

Question 15: To get racial tension and distrust on the agenda, two participants stated that their organization should enter into dialog with the heads of the organization to develop more programs, and, in the same vein, two stated that their organizations should increase their work

and expand their impact to other areas. The following suggestions were each given by one participant: resource limitations and ineffectiveness should be addressed, raise awareness, more advocacy, engage perpetrators, talk about the issue no matter how uncomfortable it is, their organization should assure current processes are properly followed and give better guidance to the government, and the government should budget better.

Question 16: Participants had very clear ideas about parties making racial tension and distrust worse. Four stated that politicians make it worse, and three said that the politicians use racial tension and distrust to stay in power. Two said that people who won't let go of Apartheid or post-Apartheid anger make relations worse. One said the media makes the situation worse by using tensions and distrust to sell papers, and one said that people who need a cause negatively impact the situation.

Question 17: Four participants stated that racial tension and distrust have a huge impact on society and one reiterated the high levels of trust between racial groups. One participant said that the impact is felt especially in the low and middle class, and by youth. Another also said that the types of racism and the impact of racial tension and distrust is uneven across the provinces. One stated that everything has a racial foundation in South Africa. One said that not much has changed since the days of Apartheid, especially regarding resource distribution and inequality, and another said that the impact on society is fueled by crime and violence, and by those who view crime as a Black phenomenon. Media and social media add to the impact racial tension and distrust have, according to one participant. Poor law application was also seen by one participant to broaden the impact. One participant described the poor relations between Blacks and Coloureds as heightening the impact because Coloureds view Blacks as receiving all the benefits in post-Apartheid South Africa, while those who are rich can extract themselves from the issue due to their money. Participants were asked to rank the impact of racial tension and distrust on society on a scale, where 1 was no effect on society and 10 was the greatest effect on society. All rated it very high, with 7, 8, 8, 10, 7, for an average of 8.

Question 18: If the situation and the measures taken stay the same, four participants believe that the situation would be worse in the future and two said the situation would continue to deteriorate and that it was a vicious cycle, while one believes that it would be the same. Those that think the situation would get worse cited that a lack of education would not change behavior and inequality in schools would create differences between children that would perpetuate the problem. They said that there would not be understanding of others and that there would be no change in people's perceptions if the situation stayed the same as it is today.

Question 19: When asked how often they talk to others about anything having to do with race outside of work, three answered 'often', one answered 'sometimes', and one answered 'never'.

Question 20: Guessing how many immigrants and asylum seekers/refugees came to South Africa in the last year yielded very varied responses. One guessed 100,000 immigrants

and 300,000 asylum seekers/refugees, one guessed 1.5 million and 500,000 respectively, and one guessed 10,000 and 20,000 respectively. Two did not wish to make a guess. The most recent correct numbers were 73,352 immigrants in 2014²⁸⁸, and in 2015 62,159 asylum seekers²⁸⁹, but only 2,499 had their application approved²⁹⁰.

As stated above, the demographics of the human rights practitioners did not seem to influence their responses and no patterns were discerned. However, not surprisingly, the participant from an NGO focused more on funding from the government than did the other respondents who work in a primarily legal institution, who more frequently mentioned legal aspects surrounding the issue. It is interesting that all the participants viewed racial groups as getting along better from an organizational perspective than in their personal view, and that they personally viewed racial tension and distrust as a bigger problem than they did from an organizational point of view. The reason for this is not known, but perhaps they were able to separate the influence their organization's work has from their personal responses and answer as if they were a regular member of the public when asked for their personal views.

South Africa – members of the public

Question 1: 32 members of the public participated in interviews in Cape Town. They were aged 24 to 69 and consisted of 16 women and 16 men. Eight were aged 18-29, 14 were aged 30-49, and 10 were aged 50 and above. Eight were White, two were Indian, 13 were Black, and nine were Coloured, but two of them self-identified as Black. 21 lived in suburbs (members of all four race groups) and 11 lived in townships (nine Blacks and two Coloureds). Two were North American immigrants that had lived in Cape Town for four or more years, while the rest were South Africans. White townships do not exist, and access to White farm workers was not possible, so the Whites interviewed all lived in the suburbs. There is also a difference between White Afrikaners and White English, but no White Afrikaners were interviewed, purely because the snowball effect did not yield any to speak to. Similarly, the Indians interviewed also both lived in suburbs.

Question 2: One participant was unemployed and one was retired, while the rest were employed, either full- or part-time, in either the suburbs, the central business district, or surrounding towns.

Question 3: All, including those currently not working, interacted with people of another race in the workplace in various capacities.

Question 4: Nine participants were not currently friends with anyone of another race. Eight of these participants were male and one female, three lived in suburbs and six in townships. One was a White immigrant to South Africa, two were Coloured, and the rest were

²⁸⁸ SSA, 2015

²⁸⁹ SIHMA, 2015, slide 7

²⁹⁰ Ibid, slide 17

Black. Five of these nine had had friends of another race in the past, while three had only had colleagues of another race in the past. The friendship history of one participant is uncertain. Three of those that had had friends of another race in the past lost touch, the friend of one passed away, and the last participant did not give a reason for the end of the friendship. 23 participants were friends with someone of another race. Three were very close with these friends, six were close, six were not very close, eight had varying levels of closeness, and four either had or had had a romantic partner or spouse of another race. 10 met these friends through work, six met them through school, six through a mutual person, four through their neighborhood, three met their friends during the Struggle, two met them through their children, and one person each responded that they met these friends through sport, at church, at parties, as children, or on a dating site.

Question 5: This question asked participants to give their opinions on other race groups. Six said that they are all humans, four said that the person themselves and their behavior was important and that race was not. Two said that education and socio-economic status was more important than race. Two stated that they had been conditioned to think a certain way about each group. Four said they had no specific opinions about different race groups, one said that they had opinions on cultures and not races, and six said they no problem with other race groups.

Participants also had other opinions on each specific race group. They said about Whites: they complain about Black racism, they are still entitled and want to keep their privilege, they are scared to participate in the race debate, they do not understand the situation of non-Whites, and they are friendly. Three said that many are still racist, three said that Whites still see themselves as superior to the other race groups, and one said that other race groups still see Whites as superior as well. They also said that White Afrikaners are sincere and trustworthy while White English were not, that White Afrikaners are racist and White English are not, and that White Afrikaners see themselves as superior. Of Coloureds they said: Coloureds do not think they are good enough, they liked Apartheid better, they are blatant racists, Coloureds think they are better than Blacks, they are lazy and stupid, their drug use was high, and they are mostly friendly. Opinions about Blacks were: that crime is Black, that Black culture fuels stereotypes about them, that they are angry and left behind, and four said that Blacks were entitled.

It is apparent that opinions about each race group frequently contained several contradictory sentiments and beliefs. They also had general opinions not attached to any specific race group: that the younger generations are better at integrating and being inclusive while older generations fit stereotypes more readily, that some people are resentful of democracy, that non-Whites were resilient, and that all race groups have an us-vs-them attitude.

Question 6: Trust in different race groups varied widely. Seven participants said that they have little to no trust in others, seven said that they were generally trusting, and seven said that trust was context-based. Four stated they were skeptical of others, one stated that

they did not like to interact with other race groups, and three stated that they give the benefit of the doubt to everyone. Three stated that they had different levels of trust for each race group, while one said they had no different levels of trust per race group. Six said that race plays a role in their levels of trust due to ingrained stereotypes about the groups, and two said that they try not to make assumptions. Five were very aware of safety concerns and crime, and three said that the stereotype is that crime is Black. Eight stated that trust is based on behavior rather than on race, three said that socio-economic status affected trust more than race did, and one said that culture had a more important impact on trust than race. Eight participants stated that trust must be earned. One participant said that everyone only looks out for themselves, and one said that they always have a plan B to protect themselves. Two participants said they did not trust Coloureds, one said they do not trust Whites, and one said that Whites do not trust non-Whites. However, one participant said that working together with people of other races helps to build trust.

Participants were asked to place their trust on a scale, where 1 was no trust in other race groups and 10 was complete trust in them. Two participants ranked their trust in each race group respectively. The average of these scores was used. One person chose 1, three people chose 3, four chose 4, seven chose 5, three chose 6, two chose 6.5, three chose 7, two chose 7.5, three chose 8, one chose 9, and one chose 10 for an average level of trust of 5.7. 15 participants rated their trust in other race groups at 5 or lower, and 15 rated their trust above 5. Two refrained from ranking their trust. Despite the wide range of trust levels, 19 ranked their trust in the middle of the scale between 4 and 7.

Both genders were split nearly down the middle, with eight women and seven men placing their trust on the low end of the scale and seven women and eight men on the high end. Participants were also split nearly down the middle regarding where they lived; nine people in suburbs and six in townships placed their trust on the low end of the scale, and 10 people in suburbs and five in townships on the high end. Coloureds were also nearly split down the middle, with three on the low end of the scale and four on the high end. Those aged 30-49 were also nearly split evenly, with eight on the low end and six on the high end. Those aged 18-29 were split evenly down the middle. Both Indians interviewed scored their trust on the low end of the scale. Six of eight Whites scored their trust on the high end of the scale. Both unemployed participants scored their trust on the high end of the scale. Half of those aged 50 and above placed their trust on the high end, while three placed it on the low end (the other two in this age range refrained).

Question 7: When asked how they perceive different racial groups as getting along and trusting each other, nine participants stated that interaction is not good and that groups do not get along. 13 participants stated that there is a lot of suspicion and distrust between racial groups. Six participants said that there are a lot of stereotypes, generalizations, and assumptions made about different race groups. Three stated that there was no change from the Apartheid era and eight stated that there is a lot of segregation between race groups. Five stated that

members of different race groups stick together and look out only for each other, including politically and in business. Three said that race is used by politicians for their own gain. Four participants stated that there is a lot of racism, including on social media, and one stated that people do not think they will get in trouble for saying or posting racist things. Two participants stated that race groups do not understand the situations of other race groups and where they are coming from. Two said that there is unequal treatment of the different race groups. One stated that one must always be careful around members of other race groups.

Other negative perceptions mentioned were that some people are just nasty, that people want to keep what they have, that racism and tensions fester and then become exposed, that there is politeness only on the surface, that race groups have conflicting values, that race groups blame other race groups for various problems, that people do not want to try integrating with each other, and that the situation is getting worse.

Of specific groups or relations, participants stated that there are differences between Blacks and Coloureds, that Whites and Coloureds have a better relationship with each other than either group does with Blacks, that Coloureds are antagonistic, that some members of other race groups hate Blacks while some overcompensate in their interactions with Blacks because of Apartheid, that Blacks do not get along with either Muslims or Indians, that Whites have lost jobs to Blacks, and that non-Whites still think Whites are superior. Two stated that Whites fear Blacks while another two stated that Blacks still do not trust Whites.

However, not all participants thought the situation was as bad as the majority did. Two said that the interactions and trust depended on the area of the country, and two said that interaction and trust was better in urban areas than in rural areas, while one said that the situation was different in the Western Cape compared to the rest of the country. One participant said there was a fair amount of trust between racial groups and five said that trust and interactions were getting better, even if it might be happening slowly. Three participants stated that the fact that members of different race groups work together helps interactions and trust. Two said that things work well on a daily basis, but that this gets overshadowed, and another two said that one often only hears bad stories about racial tension and distrust. One participant stated that distrust started out as based on race, but has now become distrust based on socio-economic status. Two participants stated that youth are more accepting than other generations.

When asked to rank how they perceived race groups as getting along and trusting each other where 1 was not at all and 10 was completely, two selected 1, three selected 2.5, four selected 3, two selected 3.5, three selected 4, three selected 4.5, six selected 5, one selected 5.5, three selected 6, four selected 7, and one selected 7.5 for an average score of 4.46. No participants refrained. 23 participants ranked trust and getting along at 5 and under, while nine ranked it above 5. This is a clear majority, 72%, for poor relations, but a notable minority, 28%, saying relations are not poor stands out.

The demographic breakdown of those that were in this minority was as follows: five were female and four were male. Two were aged 18-29, three were aged 30-49, and four were

aged 50 and above. Four were White, three were Black, 1 was Coloured, and 1 was Indian. One was a foreigner and one did not have a job, while the rest were South African and were employed. Six lived in suburbs, and three lived in townships. Half of the Whites, Indians, foreigners, and unemployed interviewed were in this minority.

Question 8: When asked how big of a problem they perceived racial tension and distrust to be in South Africa, 11 participants said they were a huge problem and 14 said that it was either a big or very big problem, while one said it was South Africa's biggest problem. Two called it a time bomb and one said it was 'the big elephant in the room' and two more stated that it bubbles below the surface and rears its head from time to time. Two said that it was not South Africa's biggest problem, but that it was still a huge problem. Three stated that it was a problem not talked about or acknowledged. One stated that it was a bit of a problem and one said that different race groups get along 'okay'. One stated that it was a problem, but not in interaction on the individual level. One participant said that it was a particularly huge problem in Cape Town, and another said that it was a very huge problem for the Western Cape. Two participants stated that the problem of racial tension and distrust is given more weight than it should and six stated that socio-economic issues are either an important factor in the race issue or are more important. Three participants stated that some people see the current situation in South Africa as a perpetuation of Apartheid and/or the Apartheid mindset. One said that race divides the country, one said that race is read into every interaction, and two said that racial tension and distrust are the enemy of progress and economic success. Another stated that differing trust levels in different race groups was a problem. Two stated that the problem was getting worse, while two stated that the problem was getting better. One stated that it can get better, and another stated that it needs a lot of work.

Reasons given for racial tension and distrust being such a big problem were: four participants stated that South Africa is still very segregated and one said that intermingling is not a priority unless it is forced, and one stated that people do not want to mingle with those of other race groups, while another said that mingling with members of other race groups is perceived as a bad by some. One also stated that intermingling only goes one way because Blacks go to live and work in White areas. Five stated that politics get in the way of good relations and one pointed directly to Julius Malema as scaring people. Three participants stated that tension and distrust are a problem due to ignorance and misunderstandings, as well as stereotypes and prejudice. Two participants mentioned the negative effect of social media in racial tension and distrust. Two participants stated that non-Whites are jealous of Whites. Two mentioned the negative effect that 'White' school policies and poor relations have on education. One stated that people are angry. Only one person blamed a particular group, saying that White Afrikaners 'do bad things' and do not get along with other groups.

Effects of this problem given were safety issues and that some areas were unsafe for certain race groups, and that non-Whites feel uncomfortable doing certain things because of their race and being around Whites.

Participants were asked to rank how big of a problem they perceived racial tension and distrust to be on a scale where 1 was no problem and 10 was the worst problem. Three chose 5, four chose 6, eight chose 7, two chose 7.5, 10 chose 8, one chose 8.5, two chose 9, and one chose 10 for an average of 7.3. One participant refrained scoring. There was high agreement, with 28 participants scoring the problem above 5, while only three scored the problem lower, at 5. Those that chose 5 did not have much in common. Two were male and lived in townships, but one was Coloured and one was Black, one was aged 30-49, and other aged 50 and above. One was retired and the other employed. The third participant was female, Indian, aged 18-29, lived in the suburbs and was employed.

Question 9: Opinion was split when it came to measures being taken by the government or other organizations to reduce racial tension and distrust. Measures participants named were both vague and specific. Seven mentioned that there are some programs relating to race and culture, and one stated that there are programs that focus on other issues, but also ameliorate the race issue. Five stated that there was a lot of talk about, and attention given to, this issue. Four named the South African Human Rights Commission as helping racial tension and distrust, while a further two stated that there were other institutions working for equality. Seven stated that the Constitution and laws were good at working to reduce race issues and three mentioned that people are taken to court for racist statements or behavior. Four participants stated that giving employment through BEE was helpful. Providing housing and increasing housing integration was also mentioned as helping. One stated that the government supports programs relating to this issue. Three mentioned the bringing together of youths and adults to get to know each other and learn from each other, while two stated that there were education programs dedicated to reducing racial tension and another two stated that providing equal education and teaching local languages was helping. One participant believed that Heritage Day helped people learn about each other and therefore reduce tension. One participant mentioned an anti-racism newspaper campaign launched recently. One stated that any shared interest helps to unify people and reduce racial tension, such as sport, Zuma protests, and Fees Must Fall protests.

Opinions on how much or how little is being done, and by who, were also split. Four said that there was a lot happening to reduce racial tension and distrust, three stated that there was not a lot being done, four stated that a lot exists on paper, but is implemented poorly, and three said there is nothing being done. Five said that what is being done was not enough. Two did not know of anything being done to reduce racial tension and distrust. Regarding NGO work, seven think there is a lot of NGO work in this area, two said that NGOs are not effective because they lack funding, and one said that there are no NGOs working on this issue. Regarding the government, six said that the government is not doing enough and one said that what is being done by the government does not work. Two stated that the government is not doing anything, while two said that the government is doing a lot. One stated that things were

getting better, one stated that things were getting worse, and one stated that they have not perceived a change from Apartheid.

Participants were also quick to be critical when answering this question. Four stated that the government only wants to stay in power and only implements measures with this goal in mind. Two said that measures were too generic to make a difference. One stated each that workshops are artificial and do not work, that there is not enough community consultation, that only White traditions were adopted in most arenas post-Apartheid, and that there are no laws against racial hate speech.

On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 was nothing was being done by anyone and 10 was that reducing racial tension and distrust was the main focus of most actors, one scored 1, one scored 1.5, two scored 2, one scored 3, one scored 3.5, four scored 4, seven scored 5, two scored 6, three scored 7, six scored 8, and one scored 9 for an average score of 5.3. Three refrained from ranking on the scale. The split was nearly 60/40, with 17 participants scoring measures 5 and below and 12 scoring measures above 5.

The number of men (7/7), Whites (4/3), Blacks (7/6), those who live in townships (5/6), and those aged 30-49 (6/8) were split nearly evenly between the low end of the scale and the high end, respectively. Those who were women (10/5), Coloured (6/2), lived in suburbs (12/6), and aged 18-29 (5/2) and 50 and above (6-2) were more likely to score measure on the low end of the scale than the high. No group was inclined to score on the higher end of the scale.

Question 10: Even though four did not know what to do, participants ideas about what should be done to reduce racial tension and distrust were numerous and varied. However, they fell under a few general themes: government, education, economics, integration, and individual and collective actions.

For the government, three said that corruption must be gotten rid of, one each stated that a change in government was necessary, racism needed to be uninstitutionalized, integration policies should be developed, that politics should be unracialized, that racism and hate speech should be criminalized, that the government should lead by example and be more inclusive, that a body working on the race issue should be established, and that funding should be provided to NGOs.

Regarding education, 11 stated that better education was necessary, eight stated that there should be cultural and racial education programs, and five said that the wider public should be educated on the issue as well. Five stated that increasing understanding of others was necessary, and a further three mentioned raising awareness. Three said that skills training programs for Blacks needed to be developed. One each stated that it must be taught that Apartheid and racism is wrong, that teaching local languages was necessary, that there should be a better Apartheid museum in Cape Town, that there should be school exchanges sending learners to stay in townships, and that the rich should visit townships.

Regarding economics, five stated that economic redress, reducing inequality, and redistributing wealth was important. Three stated that more jobs should be provided to non-Whites, and one stated that there needed to be equal pay. Two stated that crime needed to be reduced, while one further stated that more resources should be allocated to the police. One stated that instead of BEE, an affirmative action policy based on socio-economic status rather than race should be developed and implemented.

Integration measures suggested were: holding community social get-togethers, integrating older people in community activities, desegregating housing and daily life, increasing non-White access to every public good, getting to know others, and including Whites in the process. Two participants stated that the freedom of movement needed to be increased, three stated that religion and sport should be used to facilitate interaction between race groups, and two stated that youth must be heavily involved in the process.

Individual and collective action was the largest category. Nine participants stated that individual change and a change in mindset was necessary to reduce racial tension and distrust. Five stated that removing labels and stereotypes was important. Two stated that people needed to get out of their comfort zone. Two stated that dealing with emotions stemming from Apartheid needed to happen, while one stated that Blacks needed to forgive Apartheid. Three stated that people needed to engage with the problem and with others in a positive manner, while another stated that society needed to acknowledge and own the problem. One each stated that superiority and inferiority complexes needed to be broken down, that the 'rainbow nation' sentiment needed to be abandoned, that people just should not be racist, and that if people see racism, they should speak up against it.

Other suggestions not categorized above included two participants each suggesting more nation-building work, grassroots work with communities, all sectors of society working together, and that South Africa needed more time. One participant each suggested a nationwide indaba, common projects based on common goals, starting over with a clean slate, making examples of racists as a preventative measure, protecting and encouraging culture, and building a culture of kindness.

Question 11: When asked if they thought there was anyone making racial tension and distrust worse, the list of culprits was short. 18 participants blamed politicians, with a further eight directly blaming Julius Malema and his party, the EFF (Economic Freedom Fighters). 10 blamed members of the public with two calling out those who are uneducated, and six blamed Whites. The media and social media were named three times. Two mentioned right-wing groups, and another two mentioned the Fees Must Fall student protests. One said that taxi drivers and their behavior makes distrust worse, and one mentioned the negative influence US President Trump has in South Africa. Two participants stated that they could not think of anyone making the situation worse.

Question 12: There was high agreement among participants that racial tension and distrust have a large effect on society. Eight stated that they have a large impact, five that they

have a huge impact, four that they affect everything, six that it was impossible to escape race, and one that the issue festers beneath the surface and one that it flares up off and on. However, two stated that they had little effect and one that they had no personal experience with an impact on society. Two stated that the effect of racial tension and distrust is felt differently all over the country, three stated that the effect is worse in rural areas than in urban areas, while two others stated that the effect is worse in urban areas than in rural areas.

Two stated that Apartheid still has a lasting impact on society. One each stated that racial tension and distrust break down society, that the problem is cancerous, and that it is getting worse. Three stated that economics and poverty affect racial tension, and one that racial tension and distrust is bad for the economy. Three stated that racial tension and distrust negatively affect development.

Many reasons were given for the negative effect racial tension and distrust have on society. Seven cited a lot of distrust, six cited crime and safety concerns as creating tensions, with three stating that people are fearful. Three cited segregation, three cited a selfish government, while two cited corruption specifically. Two each cited social media, that BEE only benefits Blacks, that lack of employment creates tensions, racial prejudices, growing inequality, and poor education. One each cited racial labels as separating people, that crime is associated with non-Whites, that Whites are let off the hook, that people use race to be nasty to each other, post-94 unrealistic promises yielded disappointment, that people are mostly only friends with members of their own race group, that there is competition between Blacks and Coloureds and that Coloureds are jealous of and do not respect Blacks, that Blacks still work for Whites, that there is unequal treatment based on race, that BEE only benefits Coloureds, that there is still a racial hierarchy, that there is resistance to integration and unity, that there is not a lot of investment in change, and that it is difficult to change people's mindsets. One did mention that a growing middle class and better education mitigate the effects of racial tension and distrust.

On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 was no effect on society and 10 was the biggest effect on society, one ranked racial tension and distrust 4, three ranked 5, three ranked 6, three ranked 6.5, seven ranked 7, two ranked 7.5, seven ranked 8, two ranked 9, two ranked 10 and two refrained from scoring, for an average of 7.15. The four participants that ranked the effect of racial tension and distrust as 5 and below were two males and two females, one was aged 18-29, two aged 30-49, and one was aged 50 and above. Two were Black, one Coloured, and one Indian, three lived in townships and one in the suburbs, one was retired and the rest employed. All were South African.

Question 13: When asked how often they talked to others about anything having to do with race, one answered 'never', six answered 'rarely', 13 answered 'sometimes', and 12 answered 'often'. The person who selected 'never' was an unemployed White mother who lived in the suburbs and viewed race as a taboo subject. No patterns were discerned in those who answered 'rarely', however, half of all Whites interviewed selected either 'rarely' or 'never',

while the other half selected either 'sometimes' or 'often'. Not many patterns were discerned regarding participants who answered 'sometimes' or 'often'. However, half of all women interviewed answered 'sometimes' and 13 of all 16 women interviewed either 'sometimes' or 'often'. Approximately half of all participants who lived in a township responded 'sometimes', and eight of 11 responded either 'sometimes' or 'often'. All but one participant aged 18-29 (7 of 8) answered sometimes. Seven of 10 participants aged 50 and above answered 'often' and five of nine Coloured participants also answered 'often'. 10 of 14 participants aged 30-49 selected either 'sometimes' or 'often'. 17 of 21 participants living in suburbs also selected either 'sometimes' or 'often'. Men were the most variable group, with four selecting 'rarely', five 'sometimes', and seven 'often'.

Question 14: When asked how many immigrants and asylum seekers/refugees entered South Africa in the last year, eight participants estimated immigrants below the actual number, 15 estimated above the actual number, and nine had no guess. Estimates below the real number of immigrants were generally at least 40,000 shy of the real number, while estimates above the real number were all in the hundreds of thousands and millions. The lowest estimate was 1,300 and the highest estimate was six million. 10 participants estimated asylum seekers/refugees below the actual number, 12 estimated above the actual number, and 10 had no guess. Estimates below the real number of asylum seekers/refugees were generally 40,000-50,000 or more too low, and estimates above were also in the hundreds of thousands and millions. The lowest estimate was zero and highest estimate was four million or more. No patterns in demographics were discernable.

Norway – human rights practitioners

Question 1: Six human rights practitioners from two different human rights and anti-racism organizations participated in interviews in Oslo. They were aged 31 to 61 and consisted of three women and three men. One lived in on the East Side of Oslo, and one on the West Side, while four lived in Nordstrand, which is in the east but considered West. Three were White, two were White members of an official minority, and one was South Asian. All participants were Norwegian citizens. As with the professionals interviewed in Cape Town, their demographics do not seem to influence their answers and no patterns emerge based on demographics. Their answers, presented below, were also mostly in agreement.

Question 2: In their work, they interact with colleagues, stakeholders, and interview subjects of another race.

Question 3: All answered that they had many friends of a race other than their own and closeness varied from not very close to good friends. One stated that most of her closest friends were of the same race group as herself. They primarily met these friends through social organizations, school, and work, while one each mentioned field work, social media, traveling, activism, and through their children.

Question 4: When asked about their opinions on other race groups, none of the participants stated an opinion, and rather discussed diversity and equality. However, one did admit that they have prejudices. One found the question absurd and one stated that they did not think about it much. Two stated that they have no specific opinions and that the individual themselves is more important. Two said that diversity is good, with one further stating that diversity is necessary for economic prosperity. Others stated that everyone is equal and has the right to be Norwegian, and that mixing is positive. One stated that many people struggle with being discriminated against.

Question 5: Regarding trust in race groups, three stated that their levels of trust in groups do not differ, two stated that they trust people too much, two stated that background is not important in principle and another two stated that many factors affect their trust, while one specifically mentioned language and communication as important for trust. Two stated that race comes into play out late at night, one that they are skeptical of strangers, and one that they stereotype people. One stated that they need a reason to distrust someone, and another that trust is situational, so they look for situational cues. Participants were asked to rank their trust on a scale with 1 being no trust and 10 being complete trust. Their trust was mostly very high, with 8, 10, 10, 5, 8, 8 for an average of 8.16.

Question 6: Participants stated that there is discrimination and prejudice as well as distrust both between the majority and the minority, as well as within the minority, including between the official minorities. However, one stated that this distrust is not foundational and another stated that there was no suspicion of others. Another stated that there is more interaction and trust within than across groups. It was noted that this distrust was media created and presented as worse than it actually is. One stated that group interactions work very well, indeed much better than people think. When asked to score their personal perception of group interaction on a scale where 1 was no trust or getting along and 10 was complete trust and getting along, each participant placed it on the high end of the scale at 6.5, 6, 6, 9, 8, 7 for an average of 6.58.

Question 7: Looking at group interaction from an organizational perspective, participants gave mostly the same answers. They added: that there is high trust in Norway, that politics influences how people think, that minorities have the same or more prejudices as the majority, that there is work to make the situation better, and that the public debate says there is a big problem, which creates feelings of alienation. On the same scale as question 6, participants ranked group interaction from the perspective of their organization, some scores were slightly higher and some lower with 6.5, 9, 6, 3, 8, 8 for an average of 6.75.

Question 8: Two participants stated that racial tension and distrust were a big problem and that the problem was growing, while another said that it has gotten worse. One said that the size of the problem depends on the region of Norway and another stated that it is a big problem in some contexts. One stated that it was not much of a problem and one that it was not a problem and that different groups get along quite well, while one stated that the relation-

ship between the majority and the minority was not good at this point in time. One stated that issues with feelings of belonging and exclusion were a bigger problem than tension and distrust, while another said that racial tension and distrust was not Norway's biggest problem, but that this problem was the most important one to solve. Reasons given for this being a problem were that Muslims are seen as a threat, that conflict is created by the media, the rise of the right, that outliers get a lot of attention, the reintroduction of biology into the debate, and that no justice for discrimination creates skepticism and distrust. Reasons given for this not being a large problem were that overall trust in people and the system is high, that people feel safe in society, and that working on discrimination creates trust. Ranking how big of a problem the participants personally perceived racial tension and distrust to be on a scale where 1 was no problem and 10 was Norway's worst problem, rankings varied quite widely with 5, 6, 2, 7, 5, 8, for an average of 5.5.

Question 9: When answering how big of a problem racial tension and distrust are from an organizational perspective, the same answers as above were provided. One stated that the problem was smaller from this perspective while another said that it was larger from this perspective. One stated that the debate creates feelings of not belonging in society, and one stated that there is high skepticism of outsiders in inspection agencies such as passport control. One mentioned that how their organization talks about this problem is very tactical and important. Participants were asked to rank how big of a problem racial tension and distrust are from an organizational point of view. Their scores were almost the same as their personal perceptions at 5, 7, 2, 7, 5, 7.5 for an average of 5.58.

Question 10: In response to what the participants' organization is doing to improve racial tension and distrust, the responses in one organization were thus: research, education and work with schools, holding workshops, and raising awareness on stereotypes and attitudes. The responses in the other organization were thus: raising awareness and providing education on discrimination, racism, anti-Semitism, and belonging, writing articles and participating in the debate, giving minorities a voice, represent and consult with people who have been discriminated against, give youth from minority backgrounds their own space, and holding the government accountable through commenting on new legislation and reporting to CERD.

Question 11: Participants listed several different measures the government and other organizations are taking to reduce racial tension and distrust. At the same time, they were critical to some of the government's work. Regarding the government, one stated that the government is doing a lot, while three stated that the government was not doing well addressing this problem. Three mentioned the action plans on anti-Semitism and hate speech as positive, but one stated that the lack of an action plan on racism was negative. Two each mentioned that the government is giving official attention to the issue, that there is an active integration policy, and that funding is given to organizations who work to address tension and distrust. One stated that the Oslo Police hate crime unit does positive against racial tension and dis-

trust, and one stated that the government should do more work to address attitudes towards Muslims. Four participants stated that there are organizations and NGOs working on the matter, while one also mentioned the work of the Norwegian Royal Family as having a positive impact. Organizations bringing people together to get to know one another were mentioned, as well as organizations that work for minorities in other respects also helps reduce racial tension and distrust. Tolerance education in schools, research, food and music festivals, and language classes and cafes were mentioned. Two also mentioned that people of other races and religions were beginning to show up in popular culture, which helps to normalize them, and one mentioned the positive effect of having journalists of various backgrounds reporting in the media.

Question 12: Regarding how well measures being taken were working, opinions were split. Two stated that the effect was small, two stated that some of the measures work, and two stated that they work well. One stated that what was being done was not enough, but that there was good potential and that more time was needed. One stated that what is being done in popular culture works and another said that work is primarily volunteer and that the effect would be limited if the government did not take on a larger role. Evidence given that measures are working was that there is societal awareness about the problem and the measures, that integration goes well and there is social mobility, and two stated that there is a lack of segregation. However, one other stated that segregation is growing.

Question 13: Participants had many ideas for what more could be done to reduce racial tension and distrust. Two stated that Norway needed a more positive and liberal government. One each stated that there should be increased government focus on the issue, that all aspects of integration should be improved, that there should be better discrimination reporting, that there should be economic policies put in place to avoid a race-class overlap, and that there should be racial benchmarks in employment and leadership as there are with gender. One each also stated that the psychology of negative attitudes should be addressed, that there should be more work against prejudices and generalizations, that the fear of Muslims should be reduced, that there should be more programs helping people get to know one another, and that there should be more inclusion in popular culture to normalize those of different races.

Question 14: This question was asked only if the participant did not perceive much action being taken to reduce racial tension and distrust and was not applicable to five participants. One of these participants commented, however, that the effect of all the measures being taken was unknown. One participant found there to be a lack of understanding that created self-fulfilling prophecies: a poor integration policy leads to poor integration, which leads to the government concluding that newcomers do not fit in.

Question 15: Many participants did not answer the question what they think should be done to get racial tension and distrust on the national agenda. The relevant answers given all included the government. They stated that the government could fund and facilitate various programs, that the problem should be analyzed deeply to clear up the truth of the situation and

address tensions from there, that there should be better knowledge, education, and critical thinking about other races and groups, and that politicians must take responsibility. One stated that there should be a new government.

Question 16: Participants had very clear ideas about parties making racial tension and distrust worse. Five stated that politicians on the right make it worse, with one specifically naming Sylvi Listhaug, the Minister of Migration and Integration. Three mentioned social media, two the internet, and one the media in general. Two also mentioned that Islamic radicals that confirm people's fears make tension and distrust worse. Two mentioned the public debate and the identity rhetoric used in the debate. One mentioned Hege Storhaug's book on Islam. Others that were mentioned were those that do not crack down on discrimination, nationalistic groups, White men with privilege, and a small number of minorities who perceive more racism than there is. A lack of critical thinking was also noted as making racial tension and distrust worse.

Question 17: It was mostly agreed that the effect racial tension and distrust has on Norwegian society is regional. Three stated that current events in big cities have an effect elsewhere in Norway, and two stated that areas with more intermingling have fewer issues while homogenous areas have higher tension and distrust. One stated that there is little impact and low tensions and that the public debate, and how crime is skewed in the debate, is what has the biggest impact on society regarding racial tension and distrust. Others cited that there is little diversity in Norway and that Norwegians are not used to differences, so they are therefore skeptical, but that a majority of them are not skeptical. Others stated that many Norwegians feel threatened by the advancements of others, and cited the rise of the right, social media, and Anders Behring Breivik's ideas. Participants were asked to rank the impact of racial tension and distrust on society on a scale, where 1 was no effect on society and 10 was the greatest effect on society. Most rated it on the low end of the scale, while two rated it high, with 4, 4, 4, 7.5, 6, 3.75²⁹¹, for an average of 4.87.

Question 18: If the situation and the measures taken stay the same, all six participants believe that the situation would be worse in the future. Their reasons included: the rise of the right and of nationalism, political reasons, problems would not be addressed, and that there are many solutions being created now that do not address the problem, that a lack of feeling of belonging creates gaps, which creates tension, and that Norway has been going in the wrong direction regarding this problem for the last two decades.

Question 19: When asked how often they talk to others about anything having to do with race outside of work, all the participants answered 'often'.

²⁹¹ This participant rated the effect in Oslo as 2.5 and in the countryside as 5. The average of these two was taken for their general score.

Question 20: Guessing how many immigrants and asylum seekers/refugees came to Norway in the last year yielded varied responses. Guesses for immigrants were as follows: 15,000, 30,000, 40-50,000, 70-80,000, and 10,000 with one refraining. Guesses for refugees were: 3,000, 7-8,000, 6,000, and 3,000 with two refraining. The most recent numbers were 67,275 immigrants in 2015²⁹², and 3,460 asylum seekers in 2016²⁹³ and 31,150 in 2015²⁹⁴.

Norway – members of the public

Question 1: 23 members of the public participated in interviews in Oslo. They were aged 21 to 66 and consisted of 16 women and seven men. 12 were aged 18-29, nine were aged 30-49, and two were aged 50 and above. 15 were White, three were South Asian, three were Asian, one was Middle Eastern, 1 was Black, and one was mixed race. Nine lived in inner East Oslo and two in outer East Oslo, while six lived in inner West Oslo and five in outer West Oslo. One did not wish to say where they lived. Seven were immigrants and 16 were Norwegian, of which three had been naturalized and one had foreign-born parents.

Question 2: 18 participants were employed, either full- or part-time, and five were unemployed, three of which had never had a job in Norway.

Question 3: All, including those currently not working, but one interacted with people of another race in the workplace in various capacities, besides those who had never worked in Norway.

Question 4: Five participants were not currently friends with anyone of another race. Four were female and one was male, while four were aged 18-29 and one aged 30-49. Three were White and two were Indian. One was an immigrant and four were Norwegian, of which one was naturalized. Three were employed while the other two were not. Two lived in West Oslo, one inner and one outer, while three lived in East Oslo, two inner and one outer. Four of these five had had friends of another race in the past. 18 participants were friends with someone of another race. Most participants stated that their level of closeness with these friends varied from acquaintances to very close, while six stated they were close and two that they were not. 11 met these friends through school and university, while three met them while studying abroad. Six met them through childhood and their neighborhood while three met them through work. Two each met them when they arrived in Norway, through their children, through social organizations, and student housing. Others mentioned sport, parties, and mutual friends.

Question 5: Many opinions were aimed at Norwegians and immigrants rather than race groups themselves. Five said they had no specific opinions about different race groups and four said that race was not important. Five stated that everyone, themselves included, had

²⁹² SSB, 2017(b)

²⁹³ UDI, 2017

²⁹⁴ UDI, 2016

stereotypes about others. Six participants each stated that they like immigrants and people of other races, that diversity was good for Norway, and that everyone is the same. One acknowledged that many immigrants have challenging lives in Norway.

Positive opinions included that immigrants are warm people, that there is no difference between Whites and non-Whites, that non-Whites and immigrants are underappreciated, and two stated that other races and cultures were exciting.

There were also several negative opinions. Three stated that there are people that try to take advantage of the system. Others mentioned that the Roma are problematic, that some immigrants do not follow the rules, that Muslims and Blacks are not polite, that the Somali mentality does not fit in in Norway. One stated that religion is taken too seriously and another stated that non-Muslims lack understanding of Muslims. One stated that the media representation of immigrants and other races is negative, which influences people. Of Norwegians, people stated that they prefer Norwegians over others, that they are not accepting, that they are selfish and self-centered, and that they have an inaccurate perception of history.

Question 6: Trust in different race groups was mostly quite high. Eight stated that they do not have different levels of trust for other race groups, four said that trust was situational, with three stating that race is not important for trust and 11 stating that trust is based on a lot more factors than only race. Two stated that they trust men less than women overall. Four stated that they have high trust and that trust in Norway is high and another four said that they do not fear other race groups. Three stated that they must get to know people before trusting them. Two stated that they trust that people are good and will behave properly. Two stated that they trust other groups less than they trust Norwegians. One stated that they have low trust and another that they are not quick to trust. Two stated that they do not trust Norwegians and one stated that Norwegians do not trust others. Two stated that media representations of other groups affect trust, three stated that stereotypes affect trust, language skills affect trust, and a lack of contact affects trust. One stated that they do not trust Somalis or Kurds.

Participants were asked to place their trust on a scale, where 1 was no trust in other race groups and 10 was complete trust in them. Three participants ranked their trust in different groups respectively. The average of these scores was used. One person chose 2, two people chose 3, one chose 5, five chose 6, two chose 6.5, three chose 7, seven chose 8, and one chose 10 for an average level of trust of 6.5, with one refraining. 18 participants rated their trust in other race groups above 5, and four rated their trust at or below 5.

Not many significant patterns in the group with low trust could be found. Three were women, but significantly more women were interviewed than men. One was aged 18-29 and the other three 30-49. Three were employed and one was not. Three lived in West Oslo, one outer and two inner, and one in inner East Oslo. The two most significant patterns were that all were non-White and were of non-Norwegian backgrounds; two were immigrants, but the two Norwegians were both naturalized. Averaging trust based on place of birth, regardless of

current citizenship, produced 7.5 for Norwegian-born participants and 5.4 for foreign-born participants.

Question 7: When asked how they perceive different racial groups as getting along and trusting each other, though most viewed it as positive, as seen in the rankings below, they generally emphasized negative aspects. Seven stated that different race groups get along well, three stated that it was context dependent, four stated that there is more foreign-foreign interaction than foreign-Norwegian interaction and another four stated that different race groups do not interact much, and yet another four stated that race groups tend to stick together. One stated that inclusion is poor. Two stated that there is little tension, while two stated that there is some distrust and tension. One stated that there is high distrust while two stated that there is high trust in Norway. One stated that different race groups do not get along as well as they should and another stated that they live together but do not get along. One stated that there was a hidden hate.

Four stated that there are tensions within the minority population and another four stated that Norwegians do not accept immigrants. One stated that distrust and racial tension is based on integration. Two stated that many people discriminate, and one stated that there is an us-vs-them mentality. Two stated that cultural differences create tension and one stated that one's acquired Norwegian identity is always at risk. One stated that it is hard to get a job if you are not White while another stated that Norwegians feel that jobs are threatened by outsiders. One stated that there are some problems in some schools. Two mentioned the problems that social media creates. Of specific group relations, one each stated that Norwegians created a hierarchy among the minority population, that Norwegians do not trust Blacks or Roma, and that Jews trust no one.

Participants also mentioned positive aspects. Three stated that racial tension and distrust is better in big cities than small areas, and two stated that the youth are more accepting than the older generations. One each stated that there is good integration, that there is a high level of respect between groups, that diversity works in Norway, that no one is superior to anyone.

When asked to rank how they perceived race groups as getting along and trusting each other where 1 was not at all and 10 was completely, one selected 1, one selected 4, one selected 4.5, two selected 5, one selected 5.5, three selected 6, one selected 6.5, seven selected 7, one selected 7.5, two selected 8, and one selected nine for an average score of 6.23, with two refraining. Five participants ranked trust and getting along at 5 and under, while 16 ranked it above 5. This is a clear majority, 76.2%, for good relations, but there is a small minority who say relations are poor, 23.8%.

The demographic breakdown of those that were in this minority was as follows: three were female and two were male. Two were aged 18-29 and three were aged 30-49. Three were White, one Black and one Indian. Two were immigrants and three were Norwegian, of

which one was naturalized. Three lived in West Oslo, two inner and one outer, and two lived in inner East Oslo. Three were employed and two were not.

Question 8: When asked how big of a problem they perceived racial tension and distrust to be in Norway, eight stated that it was not a big problem, four stated that it was a problem, three that it was a very small problem, two that it was no problem, and three that it was a big problem. Four stated that it was becoming more relevant for Norway, and another four stated that it is a small problem compared to other countries. Six stated that it does not affect society as a whole or everyday life. Two stated that it was a bigger problem than people wanted to acknowledge. One stated that it was an important, but not large, issue. Two stated that the problem of racial tension and distrust is contextual, two that the connection of race to class was a bigger issue, and two that it is an issue of integration. Three stated that it was a problem in the job market.

Reasons given for racial tension and distrust being such a big problem were: the rise of the right, hate speech, social media, media representations, poor debate climate (two participants), politicians (two participants), Islamophobia (three participants), dislike of the Roma, no justice for discrimination, racial profiling by the police, the mindset of the White majority, poor interaction (two participants), that it is hard to trust strangers, and that the older generations are less accepting.

Reasons that racial tension and distrust were not a problem were: that it does not influence behavior, that there is no us-vs-them mentality, that the youth and educated are more accepting, that there is no history of institutionalized racism in Norway, and that race groups get along well (two participants).

Participants were asked to rank how big of a problem they perceived racial tension and distrust to be on a scale where 1 was no problem and 10 was the worst problem. Three chose 2, two chose 2.5, two chose 3, three chose 4, four chose 5, four chose 6, three chose 7, one chose 9, and one chose 10 for an average of 4.9. Though a majority believed that it was a small problem, the split was 60-40. Those that ranked the problem on the high end of the scale were generally closely split in demographics: six of 16 women (37.5%) and 3 of seven men (42.8%). Four of 12 aged 18-29 (33%), four of nine aged 30-49 (44.4%) and one of two aged 50 and above. Only four of 15 Whites (26%) and five of nine non-Whites (55.5%). Three were immigrants and six Norwegian, of which one was naturalized and one born to foreign parents, showing that those of non-Norwegian backgrounds thought the problem was worse than Norwegians did. Five lived in West Oslo and four in East Oslo, slightly less than half of each group. Only one was unemployed.

Question 9: Opinion was split when it came to measures being taken by the government or other organizations to reduce racial tension and distrust. Measures participants named were both vague and specific. 11 mentioned various integration programs and activities, seven mentioned language classes and cafes, five mentioned social organizations, three mentioned government funding of programs and organizations, three stated that all public institutions and

two stated that the welfare system help the issue. Three mentioned sport as inclusionary. Five stated that school and education was working against racial tension and distrust and a further two stated that there was a focus on children regarding this problem. Four mentioned the ‘drikk te med en muslim’²⁹⁵ campaign from 2011. One each mentioned work placement programs for immigrants, the desire for diversity in job advertisements, the debate on integration, Utrop newspaper, the King’s speech on diversity from September 2016, government acceptance of foreigners, various government action plans, organizations informing public institutions about cultural differences, and activists claiming racial aspects of other movements.

Opinions on how much or how little is being done, and by who, were also split. Two stated that there was a lot being done, three stated that there was not enough being done, two stated that it was not a government priority, three stated that not much was being done, and one stated that nothing was being done. One stated that what was being done was not working well while one stated that what is being done is good quality work. Three stated that all measures are volunteer-based and not coming from the government and two stated that the government was doing a poor job. However, three thought the government was doing a good job.

Participants were also critical when answering this question. Two stated that Norwegians also need to participate in integration work. One each stated that the government should help people in Norway before sending aid abroad, that there was not enough minority representation in institutions, that profit is made on doing nothing to solve the problem, that the government has the wrong mindset regarding solving the problem, and that not many people are willing to deal with this problem.

On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 was nothing was being done by anyone and 10 was that reducing racial tension and distrust was the main focus of most actors, one scored 1, one scored 3, four scored 4, seven scored 5, three scored 6, one scored 6.5, four scored 7, and one scored 8 for an average score of 5.25. One refrained from ranking on the scale. The split was 60/40, with 13 participants scoring measures 5 and below and nine scoring measures above 5.

The number of women (8/7), aged 30-49 (5/4), aged 50 and above (1/1), non-Whites (4/3), immigrants (3/4), those living in West Oslo (5/5), and unemployed (3/2) were split nearly evenly between the low end of the scale and the high end, respectively. Those who were men (5/2), aged 18-29 (7/4), White (9/6), Norwegians (10/5), lived in East Oslo (7/4), and employed (10/7) were more likely to score measure on the low end of the scale than the high. No group was inclined to score on the higher end of the scale.

Question 10: Even though two did not know what to do, participants ideas about what should be done to reduce racial tension and distrust were numerous and varied. With some

²⁹⁵ ‘drink tea with a Muslim’ – author’s translation

overlap, their suggestions fell under a few general themes: government, education, integration, and public life.

Regarding education, seven stated that better education was necessary, four that stereotypes and generalizations need to be combatted, three that there should be a focus on youth, and two recommended raised awareness. One each recommended teaching kindness and manners and making kindergarten free.

Suggestions for integration measures was one of the largest categories. 10 participants stated that any activities that increase exposure to others and interracial interaction should be provided. Three each suggested providing more help to newcomers to Norway and making Norway and Norwegians more welcoming and accepting of others. Two suggested better language classes and better tailoring them to those who are illiterate. One each recommended better integration policies, better housing integration, assuring integration goes both ways and that both Norwegians and immigrants work for it, and not forcing integration at all.

Suggestions for changes in public life was another of the largest categories. Five stated that better employment opportunities for minorities needed to be provided, while two stated that discrimination in the job market needed to be removed. Three recommended changing the rhetoric in the debate, and one wanted even more attention given to the issue. Two stated that labels should not be used on groups or on people. Two others stated that media coverage of minorities should be more positive and work to raise awareness about their situations. One recommended doing away with religion all together because of the barriers between people it creates.

For the government, the largest group of suggestions, two stated that the government should continue as it is, but on a larger scale, two more stated that there should be an entirely new government put in power, and two stated that institutions need to be more inclusive. One each stated that aid should be provided to people in Norway before sending aid abroad, flaws in the welfare system should be fixed, better crisis help should be provided, that Norway needed to accept its international role and responsibilities, that there should be left-right compromise, and that racial profiling must be stopped. Five participants stated that the government should provide more and better funding to organizations working on integration and against racial tension and distrust and one that the government should encourage volunteering.

Question 11: When asked if they thought there was anyone making racial tension and distrust worse, the list of culprits was short, but longer and more varied than in Cape Town. Nine participants blamed the government, with a further seven directly blaming Sylvi Listhaug and three blaming FrP (the Progress Party). Three blamed government supporters and those with racist attitudes, and two blamed resentment of immigrants. Six blamed the media and three social media. Three blamed flaws in the system. Three blamed the public debate. Two mentioned discrimination in employment. Two mentioned the fact that Norwegians are not exposed to other groups. Two mentioned right-wing groups and one blamed ISIS. Two mentioned the negative influence US President Trump has in Norway. One each

mentioned Mullah Krekar, Norwegian reserve, police misuse of power, institutional mindsets, and Hege Storhaug's book. Two participants stated that they could not think of anyone making the situation worse.

Question 12: There was very split agreement among participants on how much racial tension and distrust affect society. Seven participants stated that racial tension and distrust have little effect on Norwegian society, two that it affects society somewhat, two that it affects a lot, and three that it affects everything. One stated that it affects everyone, while one stated that it only affects minorities. Two stated that the refugee crisis created tension and distrust and therefore affected society. Three stated that racial tension and distrust have a bigger effect in urban areas than rural, while one stated the opposite and that tension and distrust was very low in Oslo compared to other parts of the country. Two stated that racial tension and distrust are bad for Norway's progress and development. One stated that racial tension and distrust have a smaller effect than people think, and another stated that language has a bigger impact on society than racial tension and distrust. One stated that the impact was not as intense compared to other countries and one thought that the situation was getting worse.

Two participants stated that racial tension and distrust have varying impact, while others stated that racial tension and distrust is low when the economy is doing well, that racial tension and distrust affect feelings of belonging, and that they affect employment opportunities.

Many reasons were given for the effect racial tension and distrust have on society. Some reasons were neutral: two stated that everyone is thinking about the issue and one each stated that it is in the national news and that it is on the national agenda. Some were reasons that the impact is small: little diversity leads to less conflict, low levels of distrust, low levels of crime, and feelings of safety. Other reasons indicated why the impact is large: two mentioned an us-vs-them mentality, and one each mentioned the rise of the right, generalizations about groups affect thinking, some immigrants breaking the law affects how they are perceived, segregation, Islamophobia, the association of crime with immigrants, and that racial tension and distrust was an obstacle not being dealt with well.

On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 was no effect on society and 10 was the biggest effect on society, two ranked racial tension and distrust 2, one ranked 2.5, one ranked 3.5, six ranked 4, two ranked 5, three ranked 6.5, two ranked 7, one ranked 7.5, two ranked 8, two ranked 10 and one refrained from scoring, for an average of 5.5. 12 ranked racial tension and distrust as 5 or below and 10 ranked them above 5. Groups that were split nearly evenly between low and high were those aged 18-29 (6/6), those aged 30-49 (4/4), non-Whites (3/4), those that lived in inner East Oslo (5/4), those that lived in inner West Oslo (2/3), those that lived in outer East Oslo (1/1), and Norwegians (7/8). Those that were more likely to score low on the scale were women (10/5), those aged 50 and above (2/0), immigrants (4/2), those that lived in outer West Oslo (4/1), and Whites (9/6). The only group more likely to score on the high end of the scale were men (2/5). Employment did not seem to play a role.

Question 13: When asked how often they talked to others about anything having to do with race, two answered 'never', five answered 'rarely', 11 answered 'sometimes', and five answered 'often'. There were few patterns in those that answered 'never'; both were female, neither were White and neither were Norwegian born, though one held Norwegian citizenship. Those that answered 'rarely' were all female and three were aged 18-29 and two 30-49. Two were White, two were Asian, and two were Indian. Three were immigrants while two were Norwegian. Three lived in West Oslo and two in East Oslo, while two were unemployed and three were employed. Men responded only 'sometimes' or 'often', with five 'sometimes' and two 'often', with six and three women, respectively. Further breakdown for 'sometimes' was 10 Whites and one mixed, 10 employed and one unemployed, seven lived in East Oslo and three in West Oslo (the participant who did not provide location was also in this group), three were immigrants and eight were Norwegian, and four were aged 18-29, five aged 30-49, and two aged 50 and above. Those that answered 'often' were all Norwegians, of which two had been naturalized, four were aged 18-29 and one aged 30-49. Three were White, one Middle Eastern, and one Black. All lived in inner Oslo, with two in the West and three in the East. Four were employed and one was not.

Question 14: When asked how many immigrants and asylum seekers/refugees entered Norway in the last year, 18 participants estimated immigrants below the actual number, with two guessing closely, one estimated above the actual number, and three had no guess. Estimates below the real number of immigrants were generally at least 40,000 shy of the real number, while the estimate above the real number was about 30,000 too high. The lowest estimate was 1,000 and the highest estimate was 100,000. Six participants estimated asylum seekers/refugees below the actual number, nine estimated above the actual number (two of which were spot on for the year before), and four had no guess. Four accurately guessed 3,000. Estimates below the real number of asylum seekers/refugees were generally 1,000 too low, and estimates above were tens of thousands more. The lowest estimate was 300 and highest estimate was 80,000. No patterns in demographics were discernable.