Social protection for enhanced food security in South Sudan

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“South Sudan provides a puzzle to donors who ordinarily work with and through national governments. In the absence of a functioning state, it remains unclear how donors can best provide development and emergency aid.”

Abstract

Food insecurity is the most common manifestation of protracted crises, and the proportion of undernourished people is three times as high in such context compared to other development countries (SOFI 2010). In order to achieve the 2030 Agenda of ‘Leave no one behind’, it will be necessary to have an increased focus on countries in protracted crisis, as it is in that particular context we face the risk of leaving the most vulnerable behind (FAO 2016). South Sudan is a country in such crisis, and in the absence of a functioning state, it remains unclear how donors who ordinarily work with and through national governments can best provide development and emergency aid.

Through a study of the current situation of South Sudan, this thesis firstly seeks to establish the level of capacity and will of the Government to provide basic services to the people. Concluding that the state fails to provide these services to their people, leaves the international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) with an increasingly difficult task to meet the needs of the people of South Sudan. This thesis finds three different challenges that are discussed based on extensive literature on the field and reflections and experiences shared on South Sudan by INGO representatives located in Norway. The three challenges that are worth looking further into when continuing the international engagement in South Sudan are; an increasingly toxic relationship between government and INGOs, the creation of parallel structures and its consequences, and the difficult task of balancing immediate response and long-term solutions.
Acknowledgements

Writing this thesis has been a process. A lengthy, challenging, emotional and hard process that has made me doubt both myself and many aspects of life. At the same time - the process has also been enlightening, interesting, rewarding and eye-opening on both a professional and personal level. Most importantly, it has allowed me to write about something I truly care about – a South Sudan that hopefully through the rights measures can be food secure and prosper peacefully.

First and foremost, I would like to thank all the eight people that gave me their valuable time to share their thoughts, experiences and reflections from their work with and in South Sudan.

I would like to thank my family for supporting me through this journey. I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to my mother, father, grandmother and Audun, who's constant support and unconditional love made this possible. With a special thanks to my mother, for ensuring that I had “physical, social and economic access, at all times, to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that met my dietary needs…” during the final stage of this process.

I would also like to thank friends and colleagues for support, understanding and encouragement throughout the process, I am sure you all know who you are. A special thanks to my colleague John Inge for guidance and helping me find the way at times when I was lost. Also, a thanks to my supervisor Dan Banik for being an inspiration, and for encouraging me to write about something I take great interest in.

Despite efforts to avoid that the document contain errors or mistakes, I am afraid that some have made it through to the final product. These and the contents of this thesis are my full responsibility.

Maria Elisabeth Lausund,
Oslo, 28.04.2017
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1 Introduction

1.1 Context

During the seventieth session of the General Assembly at the United Nation a resolution was adopted on “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity, which consists of 17 sustainable development goals and 169 targets (UN 2015a). Through the resolution, the Heads of States and Governments committed to ending poverty in “all its forms and dimensions, including by eradicating extreme poverty by 2030” (UN 2015a: 7/35). In committing to the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Member States recognized that the dignity of the individual is fundamental and that the Agenda’s Goals and targets should therefore be met for all nations and people and for all segments of society. This includes reaching first those who are furthest behind (UN 2016).

With the theme of the Agenda 2030 of ‘Leave no one behind’, it is important to have an increased focus on countries in protracted crisis, as it is in that particular context we face the risk of leaving the most vulnerable behind (FAO 2016). Food insecurity is the most common manifestation of protracted crises, and the proportion of undernourished people is three times as high in such context compared to other development countries (SOFI 2010: 12).

The Sustainable Development Goal number 2 is to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. The goal aims to end hunger and all forms of malnutrition by 2030, and needs universal access to safe, nutritious and sufficient food at all times of the year (UN 2015b). Ensuring that people are food secure has been, and remains, a core challenge to the security and stability of communities, states and the international system (McDonald 2010: 12). Although there has been great overall progress in reducing hunger, the progress is uneven and large differences exist across regions. Large populous countries such as China and India, played a large part in explaining the overall hunger reduction trends (SOFI 2015). The international hunger targets are still far from being met in the region with highest prevalence of undernourishment – Sub-Saharan Africa. The fight against hunger continues, as one in nine people in the world go hungry every day and are currently unable to consume enough food to conduct an active and healthy life (SOFI
If the trends we see today continue, addressing food security in protracted crises will be necessary in order to not leave anyone behind.

UN agencies warn that almost 5 million people urgently need food, agriculture and nutrition assistance in South Sudan, with numbers increasing in the months to come. The UN has declared famine for the first time in 6 years, famine has hit parts of South Sudan, with an additional 100,000 people facing starvation (WFP 2017a). Another 1 million people are classified as being on the brink of famine.

3.5 years have passed since the recent conflict erupted in South Sudan, and the two warring political leaders cannot seem to put their differences aside for their people. The years of conflict have severely undermined livelihoods. The upsurge in violence since July 2016 has had devastating effects, including in previously stable areas (WFP 2017a). There are constant reports, analyses, discussions, agreements and recommendations on the way forward as soon as peace comes to South Sudan. The wait for peace and the wait for the Government to take responsibility - a complete lack of political will, results in no action being taken. Whilst we are all waiting, the people of South Sudan are starving to death.

1.2 Purpose and structure of thesis

The humanitarian system is currently at a critical turning point. No longer an exception, crises have become the norm across regions and are characterized by increasing complexity and recurrence. As indicated by the 2010 State of World Food Insecurity Report: Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises, we are experiencing a strong tendency towards protracted crises with a combination of multiple risks and vulnerabilities: violence, poverty, displacement, natural disasters and poor governance.

Building risk-informed and shock-responsive social protection systems has been recognized as a critical strategy in strengthening resilience: in other words, enhancing the capacity of poor households to cope with, respond to and withstand natural and manmade crises (FAO 2016). This typology of social protection system is particularly adapted to fragile states and protracted crises where a significant portion of a population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease, and breakdown of their livelihoods.
As a direct result of food insecurity and livelihood disruption, those countries that are in the midst of protracted crises will usually receive a high proportion of humanitarian versus development assistance (Ibid). In these contexts, social protection systems have the potential to play a crucial role in bridging livelihood protection with longer-term development strategies. The urgent need to change the approach to addressing increasing humanitarian needs and to work towards innovative solutions has been highlighted by the international community through e.g. the 2030 Agenda.

There is no definition of protracted crises that is internationally agreed on, but protracted crises include “situations of prolonged or recurrent crises that lead to disruption of livelihoods and food systems; increasing rates in morbidity and mortality, and increased displacements” (SOFI 2015: 1). Countries in protracted crises require sustained approaches and a combination of lasting political, economic, social and environmental solutions. Policies and actions should also contribute to resolving and preventing the underlying causes of food insecurity (SOFI 2015: 1).

Around 42 per cent of South Sudanese are due to the protracted crisis food insecure, and the latest IPC analysis carried out in January 2017 indicates that food security continues to deteriorate at an alarming rate, and is expected to worsen in the months to come during lean season (IPC 2017). Something has to be done.

Therefore, based on the critical situation of food insecurity in the protracted crises of South Sudan, I will seek to establish the level of political will and capacity of the Government to deliver basic services to its people. I will thereafter look at the vital role of the International community and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and highlight three challenges in the given context that might be useful in further engagement for the INGOs in South Sudan.

1.3 Research question

The four major components of a research design are the research question, the theory, the data and the use of the data (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 13). In order to set a research question King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that ideally all research projects in social science should satisfy two criteria (Ibid.: 15). First, a research project should pose a question
that is “important” in the real world, and secondly it should make a specific contribution to our understanding of some aspect of the world. I argue that the specific research question developed for this thesis fulfils both these criteria. Firstly, the country chosen for my study is considered a level 3 crisis since the outbreak of conflict in 2013, which indicates a situation that requires the highest level of emergency response through global mobilisation (WFP 2014). The outlook for South Sudan in the time ahead remains bleak, and does not look promising in any area. Secondly, the specific contribution to understanding this aspect of the world is pointing at some important challenges that the INGOs face in South Sudan, that might be worth looking further into when continuing the international engagement.

I have developed the following research questions that will guide the analysis:

a) Does the Government of South Sudan fulfil the role of a state in delivering services to the people?

b) Does the role of the Government in South Sudan pose challenges for the International NGOs in aiding the people of South Sudan?

In this thesis, I will firstly give a detailed description of the methodological approach in this thesis, including research method, research strategy, research tools, types of data and sources, research quality as well as some critical reflections. Thereafter, in chapter 3 I will give an introduction to the theoretical concepts around the role of the state, models of accountability for providing social services, concepts of social protection and food security and how they are interlinked and highlighted in situations of protracted crises. In chapter 4, I will introduce the case of South Sudan through providing a brief history, current situation and context of relevance to the thesis. In the following chapter 5, I will analyse the role of the Government of South Sudan in light of the theoretical framework, before I introduce an adapted accountability triangle that highlights the important and crucial role of the International NGOs in service delivery to the people of South Sudan. In light of this adapted accountability triangle, I point to and discuss three challenges that might be useful to look further into when continuing the INGO engagement in the challenging times ahead in South Sudan.
2 Methodological approaches

In this chapter I will discuss the methodological approaches that have been chosen to best undertake the study. First I will give a short introduction to the research method, and why I considered it to be the best option. Thereafter I will give an overview of research strategy and methodological approach to retrieving empirical data for the analysis; document analysis and interviews. Finally, I will account for the methodological tools design the thesis builds on, assess validity and reliability, whilst making critical reflections about my choices.

2.1 Research method

Social science research, whether qualitative and quantitative involve the dual goals of describing and explaining, where some set out to describe the world and others to explain (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 34). To capture the complexity of social behaviour, some argue that case studies are the preferred option through establishing a more variegated set of tools, and that one can gain better understanding of the whole, by focusing on one part (Gerring 2012: 1).

Research methods are techniques that are used within a particular approach, to generate and analyse data to describe or explain characteristics, patterns and processes in social life (Blaikie 2007: 5). John Gerring (2012) presents principles and practices of case study research through building a house. He exemplifies choosing research methods through the two ways different ways one can learn to build a house; studying the construction of many houses, or studying the construction of one house. They follow different paths to the goal, but are studying the same subject. The same can go for social research, where researchers may choose to observe lots of cases superficially, or a few cases more intensively (Gerring 2012: 1). There are trade-offs involved in both methodological choices, but sometimes in-depth knowledge of an individual example can more helpful for general understanding, than less knowledge about a large number of samples (Ibid.).

A case study can mean many things, one of which the study is limited to only one case of analysis, with the aim of developing a holistic understanding of the specific case (Grønmo 2004: 105). According to Gerring a case study “may be understood as the intensive study of a single case, where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger
class of cases (a population)” (2012: 20).

The case study conducted in this research is a synchronic and diachronic single case study, comprising both spatial and temporal variation. The reason behind choosing a qualitative case study for this research being that case studies are identified with a holistic analysis, and a thick description of events (Ibid.: 49). Being a case study not limited to studying a specific point in time, has created some challenges when attempting to limiting empirical data to include in the study. This will be further addressed in the section 2.3.1 on document analysis.

2.2 Research strategy

Research strategy must not be confused with methods of data gathering and analysis, such as survey research, participant observation, case studies and grounded theory. The choice of a research method has a secondary role to play in answering the research question or advancing knowledge (Blaikie 2007: 3). The major task of designing social research is to work out how to answer the research question, which involves a lot more than how to gather data for analysis. What is required is a logic for generating new knowledge, and such logic is a research strategy (Ibid.: 8). Blaikie (2007) argues that there are four main types of research strategies, where I have chosen the deductive research strategy which begins with patterns or a regularity that has been discovered and established that needs explanation. Through a deductive strategy the researcher has to find or formulate a possible explanation, a theoretical argument for the pattern in the social phenomenon. The task is then to test the theory by deducing one or more hypothesis from it, and test it through collecting appropriate data (Blaikie 2007: 9).

In this study, I have chosen to lay out a theoretic base of specific theories, research and assumptions related to the research area. Thereafter, I applied these established concepts and theories to empirical material to answer my research question. This is referred to as a deductive research strategy (Blaikie 2007). This approach was chosen as I wanted to build upon the large amount of existing and established concepts, knowledge and theories in the field, and attempt to provide a deepened understanding and new thoughts on the complex situation of the Government of South Sudan and the International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) relate to each other.
2.2.1 Case: South Sudan

My thesis studies the difficult context of South Sudan, and how it is dealt with by Government and the INGOs to deliver services to the people. The conditions consist of complex causal relationships, where the context is crucial for these relationships. According to Yin (2009) choosing case study as a research method is preferable when one explores complex phenomena and want to see them in the light of its context. Therefore, I chose the case study as a research method for this task. It may be rational to choose single-case studies when one wants to test hypotheses, holistically examine a case and when one wants to expose or reveal aspects of reality (Yin 2009; Blaikie 2007; Grønmo 2004; Gerring 2012). Given all these rationales, I chose to look at a South Sudan in its current state as the case.

2.3 Research tools, type of data and sources

The reasoning behind my research question was a desire to gain deeper knowledge and better understanding of how social protection measures can contribute to enhancing food security, and how this could best be done in the context of South Sudan. Realising that for such measures to take place, it is necessary that there is both capacity and will from governments – and it therefore became a substantial part of my analysis. Making the data collected for this thesis into quantifiable statistics, has not been a goal. The goal was as mentioned to gain a deeper understanding about these certain aspects in a given context of South Sudan. It was therefore natural to use the qualitative methods of a case studies, as they are identified with a holistic analysis, and a thick description of events (Gerring 2012: 49). The most commonly used techniques for collecting qualitative data are interviews, observation and document analysis (Blaikie 2009: 39). As I did not have the opportunity to travel to South Sudan for field interviews, I chose to use mostly document analysis for empirical data, supplied by in-depth interviews conducted with relevant persons in Oslo, Norway.

An advantage of using document analysis was the possibility to process great amounts of data over relatively short period in time. The situation in South Sudan has been more or less either stagnated or deteriorating at many levels since 2013. Food insecurity in general has been an issue for long, as well as the lack of social protection measures by the Government of South Sudan. The international community and the non-governmental organizations have attempted to provide the necessary support for the people of South Sudan to survive for a long time. I therefore considered the data material of interest to my theoretical backdrop, to be sufficient
in amount and quality. The thesis is therefore mainly based on secondary sources, supplied with primary sources through interviews.

2.3.1 Content Analysis: the selection of documents and systematization of data

Data are systematically collected elements of information about the world, and can be qualitative or quantitative in style (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 23). A qualitative study based on documents as a source, is based on the systematic review of documents with the aim of categorizing content and registering data of relevance to the study (Grønmo 2004: 175). What is important to keep in mind, is that such secondary sources include data collected and analysed by others for other purposes than to fit my research (Blaikie 2009: 160). But a clear advantage of document as a source compared to other sources, is that it can provide valuable information of social conditions over longer time periods and wider space than for instance a respondent (Gronmo 2004:135). In this thesis, I based my study on written documents that are publicly available to all.

The data in this paper is collected from reports, strategies and evaluations from various organizations and institutions, news articles, books, research papers and various studies. Blaikie (2009) points out that when using documents as a source, it is important to evaluate how credible the individual documents are. I have therefore been critical of the publishers and to the greatest possible extent compiled data from recognized institutions and research centers, as well as obtaining the same type of data from multiple publishers. Articles and books on the subject were found through searches in the Library Database, syllabuses from different courses at the University in Oslo, the public library on related topics, the library at my workplace and Google. In addition, I accessed reports, resolutions, evaluations and assessment of recent date from international organizations via internet searches.

Written sources have been used in two ways in this thesis; with the first part of the document study devoted to establishing an overview of the field, and the second part of the document study was directly related to my research question and comprised my empirical data for the thesis. The second part of the document the study which was to review the literature that could potentially form the empirical data for the thesis. The data was gathered through a time frame from September 2015, when I first started the research for the thesis, up to March
2017, when the food security situation deteriorated further. This was a challenge in the data collection, as the general situation and specifically the food security situation in South Sudan is further deteriorating, there are constant news and updated numbers that are of value for the thesis. I therefore had to conclude my search, with some exemptions, by mid-March. This challenge of constant news updates, also reaffirmed the importance of my ambition to highlight the food security situation in South Sudan through this thesis, and also affirmed the importance of looking further into the challenges presented. Table 1 below provides an overview of some of the most important sources and documents that were used in the study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document/Source</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norad 2016</td>
<td>Report 6/2016 Country Evaluation Brief South Sudan</td>
<td>Donor engagement in South Sudan and evaluation of aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP South Sudan</td>
<td>South Sudan Consolidated Appeal 2014-2016</td>
<td>Strategic direction for humanitarian aid in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDP</td>
<td>South Sudan Development Plan</td>
<td>Government plans for Development before crisis emerged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFI 2010</td>
<td>The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises</td>
<td>The role food security can play in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD 2009</td>
<td>Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key concepts, findings and lessons</td>
<td>How service delivery is affected in fragile situations such as South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUCISS report</td>
<td>African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan – Executive Summary</td>
<td>Institutional capacity of South Sudan today, Human rights violations and other abuses during the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Social Protection for Enhanced</td>
<td>Comparative experiences for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa | enhancing such efforts in South Sudan
---|---
NGO law | Laws of South Sudan – Non-Governmental Organizations Act 2016 | Data for analysing the relationship between Government and

Table 1: Overview of some central documents used as empirical data

All the documents eventually produced a large data set. In order to continue the further research, I found it necessary to undertake a systematic reduction of all the material. This was done by systematically reviewing the documents, and categorizing the material into a matrix (see Appendix 1). It is through this review of the documents that the analysis began.

### 2.3.2 Interviews: the selection of informants and systematization of data

To add value to the categorized and systematized data from the secondary sources, I decided to include some primary sources and conducted eight in-depth informal interviews. The selection of informants was based on a systematic assessments of the potential persons that would be most relevant for the thesis (Grønmo 2004: 103). I used purposive sampling of informants, as it is recommended for qualitative research, which aims at establishing a good correspondence between the research question and the sampling, and therefore interviewing people who were relevant to the research question (Bryman 2004, 333). As my thesis specifically focuses on the challenges that the INGOs responsibility face when responding to social protection needs and food insecurity in the absence of a functioning Government in South Sudan, a purposive sampling meant recruiting informants from International Non-Governmental Organizations, and experts from the field, as well as individuals working in the donor community on South Sudan. Altogether I conducted eight in-depth interviews, lasting in between 45 minutes and one hour and a half. All informants are kept anonymous due to two reason. Firstly, due to the tense security situation for staff working in INGOs in South Sudan, as the thesis is written in English and will be accessible to anyone it could therefore have further implications. Another reason also being that I did not want the informants to feel limited to speak open and honestly about any of the topics, if being a representative for their organization would limit them. If the exchange of information is limited, and the researcher does not access the relevant information that the respondent has – it will affect the quality of the data (Grønmo 2004: 172).
Before conducting the interviews, I provided the respondents with some background information on my thesis as well as an interview guide (see annex II), this to ensure that the respondents had prepared some thoughts and reflections on the topics in question.

When carrying out the interviews, it was important to establish a space for good communication (Grønmo 2004: 167). During a qualitative informal interview, it is important that the conversation is flexible, and that the researchers must be open to initiative of the respondent, which was essential as the informants had different backgrounds, and therefore discussed different aspects of the topic. It is also important that the researcher guides the interview onto questions and topics that revolve around the topics that are relevant to the study. The interview guide functioned as my checklist during the interview (Ibid.: 168), to ensure that all topics were covered. I was also open for changing the order of the questions and asked follow-up questions based on how the interview developed. The data analysis therefore partly took place simultaneously with the data collection (Grønmo 2004: 168). The interviews were recorded and transcribed in order to ensure that all important information was obtained through the data-collection. The interviews were used for two purposes; one for comprising primary data on the particular research question, and two for broadening my understanding of the thematic field.

2.4 Research quality

2.4.1 Reliability

The reliability determines whether the collected data are accurate and credible (Grønmo 2004: 444). High reliability means that the research is carried out in an accurate manner, and it can be tested by conducting the same research to see if the same data apply. A challenge to this is normally that qualitative case studies are conducted on societal phenomena that change quickly.

A challenge with documents is according to Yin (2009) that they may be written or edited to bring out a particular view. To strengthen the credibility of the data I have therefore obtained the same information from several different sources. I have also compared the data to sources that are publicly recognized. An important question related to reliability is whether another researcher would get the same answers by conducting the same study (Yin 2009). Qualitative data, which diverges considerably, makes it less likely that researchers will get the same data
when conducting the research. One advantage of document analysis is that the written sources are durable and available in the same form regardless of time, place and researcher, which again strengthens reliability.

2.4.2 Internal and external validity:
Internal validity is the correctness of a hypothesis with respect to the sample (Gerring 2012: 217). This is again dependent on the relationship between research question, theory and analysis, and if the data collected is relevant to what one actually wants to examine. To ensure validity, it is also important to avoid misappropriating documents and research that does not support their own assumptions. In order to try to bring out different perspectives, I have therefore chosen to use different sources of information: UN agencies, INGOs, government and news. I have also attempted to include conflicting research and perspectives, that challenge my research.

Case studies are generally weaker with respect to external validity, as it includes – by definition – only a small number of cases of some more general phenomenon (Gerring 2012: 43). External validity can be strengthened by providing a rich description of the context studied, so that the reader has enough information to assess the applicability of the findings and conclusions in other contexts. In the particular with the situation in South Sudan, I assume that it would be challenging to transfer the full picture of findings and conclusions to any other context, but parts of it will likely be applicable. At the same time the food security in any context is a complicated and complex phenomenon, which requires special attention.

2.5 Critical reflections
Writing this thesis has been a dynamic process, as theoretical framework, research questions and use of data has been continuously adjusted as my knowledge of the subject increased. This is a challenging process, but I believe that this has strengthened the study through the flexibility to adjust in accordance with an increase in knowledge.

Choosing document analysis as one of the methods to answer my research question made it possible to obtain a broad data material in a relatively short time. This was necessary when I wanted to assess components of such a complex situation, over a broader time-period. I consider it a strength that I had access to a relatively rich data material from a wide range of
entities linked to food security and social protection in South Sudan. Nevertheless, it could be a weakness that the majority of the documents are produced by organisations and institutions within the international community.

Through the interviews with key people working with South Sudan through non-governmental organisations or political institutions I got a more nuanced understanding of how the theoretical aspects function in practice, and obtained valuable information from people with extensive knowledge working in South Sudan for many years. What is a limitation, is that my selected informants mainly represent the Norwegian INGOs. The thesis would benefit from interviewing representatives from the UN system, and in particular people involved in direct relief operations on the ground in South Sudan. However, the informants interviewed represent a broad variety of INGOs engaged in South Sudan.
3 Theoretical approaches

In this section I will provide a brief introduction to the role of the state, and present the accountability triangle – a model that identifies the accountability relationships within the state. Thereafter, I will introduce the concepts of social protection and food security, and how they are strongly interlinked and affected in fragile states.

3.1 The role of the state

The encyclopedia Britannica definition of a state is “a political organization of society, or the body politic, or, more narrowly, the institutions of government. The state is a form of human association distinguished from other social groups by its purpose, the establishment of order and security; its methods, the laws and their enforcement; its territory, the area of jurisdiction or geographic boundaries; and finally by its sovereignty. The state consists, most broadly, of the agreement of the individuals on the means whereby disputes are settled in the form of laws” (Britannica 2009). Max Weber defined the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Ibid.). Thomas Hobbes, defined the state as man subjecting himself to the rule of the state as the only means to avoid mutual destruction, which would be the result of contact with others. For Locke, the state springs from the need for protection of inherent rights, and said that the state is the social contract by which individuals agree not to infringe on each other’s rights to life, liberty, and property. Rousseau’s idea reflects that the nation itself is sovereign, and the law is none other than the will of the people as a whole (Ibid.).

Rokkan (1999) introduced the four processes of system building for building a state, although based on the European state-model it can be of use in other contexts. It derives from the concept of crises development, which constitute challenges, issues and policy options which need to be matched with corresponding institutional solutions. The processes are penetration, standardization, equalization of rights of participation and redistribution of resources/benefits (Flora et.al. 1999: 83). The penetration represents the state building through institutions for extraction of resources to cover a common defence, maintenance of internal order and adjudication of disputes, as well as political, economic and cultural unification at elite level. The standardisation represents nation-building, which includes conscript armies, compulsory schooling, mass media and establishing channels for contact between the central elite and the
peripheries. The equalisation of rights of participation is the establishment of political citizenship through privileges of opposition, organs of representation, organised parties, and bringing masses into participation. Lastly, redistribution of resources/benefits is the establishment of social citizenship – which is the social contract between state and citizens, including growth of public welfare services, nation-wide policies for equalisation of economic conditions through transfers and taxation (ibid.: 83). Rokkan (1999) saw the first two basic processes as the centre-generated thrusts through the territory, and the two last as opening up opportunities to the citizens. Rokkan (1999) claims that the state formation is a process of military-administrative centre formation and territorial consolidation (ibid.: 62). Rokkan (1999) also applies the three general terms used by Albert O. Hirschman (1970) to structures and processes of system maintenance (loyalty), within system communication (voice) and the transcendence of system boundaries (exit) (Ibid. 62).

The state has obligations to protect, promote and respect social and economic rights (FAO 2005). While the state should respect the right to minimum livelihood, it should also work towards progressive realisation of this right in given conditions (FAO 2005). According to the OECD (2009), ensuring that the essential needs of its population is met is one of the basic function of a state (OECD 2009: 18).

Through the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) report on Social Protection for Food Security (2012) it is stated that the right to adequate food and the right to social protection, should be incorporated into national legislation, to ensure that governments recognise and fulfil their duty to implement and deliver these basic human rights. This would also enable citizens to have a legal basis for making food security and social protection claims to hold the state accountable (HLPE 2012). Recommendations by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also follow this track stating that social protection programmes should include accountability mechanisms, which will ‘upgrade’ social protection from welfare to an enforceable entitlement, under the faith that this would lead to improved service delivery and greater effectiveness in reducing food insecurity, while building a rights based approach to social protection (Ibid.).

All countries should design and implement a comprehensive legally empowered social protection system to provide every citizen an opportunity for a productive and healthy life (HLPE 2012: 9). Delivering public services should be a top priority, especially in fragile states, if they are to make progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (OECD
It should also be a priority in fragile states, as strengthening the provision of essential services can contribute to the long-term process of state building, and may help rebuild the legitimacy of the state and to strengthen civic engagement (Ibid.). Social protection for food security should be underpinned by the rights based approach at every level; from governments signing up to global agreements, to national legislation, development and emergency aid and programme implementation.

### 3.2 The accountability triangle

Many governments are falling short on these obligations mentioned above, especially in reaching poor people (World Bank 2003). In order for states to meet this responsibility, governments and citizens together need to ensure that services reach the poor and vulnerable. Governments are able to deliver services effectively when there is accountability between the citizens and their leaders (OECD 2009).

The World Development Report produced by the World Bank (2003), identifies three different accountability relationships among citizens, politicians/policymakers, and service providers. These relationships form two routes to accountability, a long route and a short
route, and shows that service delivery is not only a technical task but also a process of
governance (World Bank 2003). As presented by the World Bank (2003), services reach the
public in a two-step process: policy makers allocate and providers produce the services.
Accountability between the policy maker and the provider of services is defined by a
compact, which includes service delivery standards, monitoring methods, rewards and
sanctions. This compact cannot fully specify outcomes, especially for services that are hard to
monitor, and the citizens is not involved in the service compact. Citizens have two potential
routes of accountability for securing essential services: a long route through the policy
makers, and a short route directly to the providers of such services.

The long route of political accountability is the more sustainable of the two (Ibid). The state,
established the system for choosing, designing, allocating and regulating essential services,
and the services are produced by a state agency or contracted out to a private provider. The
long route can also be referred to as voice, and involved the expression of citizen satisfaction
or dissatisfaction through established legal channels to voice public demands. The long route
is especially relevant to national-level policy decisions and centralised programmes such as
vaccination; where the short route is weaker (Ibid.).

The long route of accountability depends for its functioning of a legitimate and effective
state, and is therefore exposed to breakdown in fragile situations, becoming problematic or
even inoperative. The World Bank report (2003) states that this is especially the case in low-
income countries, where citizens have little power and little to say in relation to the
government, through for example non-competitive political systems. Accountability links
may be further disrupted by a repressive environment or by political distortions, by the
regime maybe favouring particular ethnic or regional groups, divert spending to military or
other uses, or grab resources for its patronage networks (Ibid).

The short route considers on what level the citizens can attain and ensure efficient service
delivery directly from the providers. Accountability is strongest when both the long and short
route to accountability work. Also presented in the World Bank report (2003) is the growing
body of research which demonstrates that “getting these accountability relationships right” is
the key to improving public services for the poor. Meaning that that accountability
relationships and routes are all working properly, reinforcing each other as a public service
delivery system. In particularly in fragile states, there is a need to strengthen the relationships
in the accountability triangle; between poor people and providers, between poor people and policy-makers, and between policymakers and providers. Public services underpin the social contract between states and citizens (OECD 2009: 11). Therefore, it is important that the INGOs take their responsibility to reinforce the accountability in these relationships, not undermine it (World Bank 2003). Reports, evaluations and other documents on international engagement in such contexts emphasize this particular aspect, such as the “Do no harm” Principle of the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. These Principles see state building as the central objective of international partnerships in fragile situations, prioritizing support to the legitimacy and accountability of states and strengthening their capability to fulfil the core functions. The definition of fragility that these particular Principles build on is “the lack of capacity and willingness of a government to perform key state functions for the benefit of all” (OECD 2009: 11). There are in total 10 Principles guiding engagement in fragile states, which are: taking the context as a starting point, ensuring all activities do no harm, focus on state-building as the central objective, prioritise prevention, recognise the links between political, security and development objectives, promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies, align with local priorities in different ways in different context agree on practical co-ordination mechanism between international actors, acting fast – but stay engaged long enough to give success a change, and lastly to avoid pockets of exclusion (OECD 2009). Still, the typical mode of delivering aid – through a project - is too often implemented outside and bypassing these key relationships. The project is typically financed by earmarked funds subject to donor-mandated requirements (World Bank 2003: 10).

According to the OECD article on Service Delivery in Fragile Situations (2009) sectors such as healthcare and water/sanitation provide the most politically neutral, and therefore offer the best opportunities for cooperation in difficult context – also across ethnic or ideological lines. Through this perception valuable services could be shielded from interference and disruption, whilst potentially providing entry points for dialogue and cooperation. This perception would probably be more promising in some context than in others, but service delivery can mitigate social exclusion, which is itself can be a driver of fragility and conflict (OECD 2009: 26). Basic service improvement may also be an entry point for major governance reforms. Quite opposite, Duffield and Prendergast (1994) have pointed out that it is impossible to be neutral within the logic of internal war, where war is aimed at disrupting the lives of people the aid seeks to sustain. They also argue that neutral humanitarian aid avoids the political reality and
looks past the need to also support participatory and accountable structures and institutions (WFP 2013: 10). According to Norad (2016) humanitarian assistance delivered to southern Sudan during the Islamist regime in Khartoum, was offered as political support as many international actors conceived the situation as a legitimate liberation struggle. In this way, providing humanitarian aid to sectors such as health care and water/sanitation is not a politically neutral arena. On the other hand, health services have been treated as non-political since at least the early days of the Red Cross, and has created arenas for cooperation between governments and the organisation (OECD 2009).

Long-term social and political changes supporting good governance have more chance of success if linked to reforms in service delivery providing results (Ibid.). When these improvements are visible to the public, they can lead to pressure for wider and more systemic reforms. According to the OECD article (2009) improvements in service delivery can potentially strengthen the left side of the accountability triangle (Figure 1) – the critical relationship between government and citizens, which can contribute to a legitimization of the system in a long-term perspective. A central challenge (and opportunity) in fragile states is thus to find ways of doing this, such as building mechanisms for accountability into service delivery initiatives. This can create a dilemma for INGOs in fragile situations where both routes are broken, in balancing short-term versus long-term objectives, to achieve humanitarian goals whilst also advancing the long-term sustainability. Meaning that the international community are helping deliver essential services in a way that builds accountability and ensures that government takes the ultimate responsibility.

3.3 The concept of social protection

Social protection is usually provided by the state, and is theoretically conceived as part of the state-citizen contract in which states and citizens have rights and responsibilities to each other (Browne 2015 quoting Harvey et.al 2007; OECD 2009; World Bank 2003). Social protection is a menu of policy instruments that addresses poverty and vulnerability, through social assistance, social insurance and efforts towards social inclusion – and it is primarily concerned with protecting and helping those who are poor and vulnerable, such as children, women, older people, people living with disabilities, the displaced, the unemployed and the sick (HLPE 2012: 13). It consists of a set of public initiatives that can lessen the impact of adverse shocks on the income of the population, and better equip the population to protect
itself by building a more solid asset base (Lustig 2001: 1).

3.3.1 Basic definitions

Social protection emerged as a critical response to the ‘safety net’ discourse of the 80s and early 90s (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2008). It was at the time conceptualized by the World Bank as “minimalist social assistance in countries too poor and administratively weak to introduce comprehensive social welfare programmes”, but as new thinking around sustainable livelihoods and rights-based approaches emerged – the broader potential of social protection began to be recognized (Ibid.: 64).

There is no consensus on the definition of social protection and its components among donors and development agencies (UNCDF 2012). The United Nations defines social protection as “a set of public and private policies and programmes undertaken by societies in response to various contingencies to offset the absence or substantial reduction of income from work; to provide assistance to families with children, as well as provide people with health care and housing” (UNCDF 2012: 104). According to Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) the conceptual definition of social protection describes “all public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups”. This is a definition that counters the traditional view of social protection as social safety nets, where Devereaux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) introduces the important aspect of viewing social protection as socially transformative. They state that the key objective of social protection to reduce the vulnerability of the poor, can be done through protective, preventive, promotive and transformative measures (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 25).

The poor are most vulnerable to crises and shocks, and are least able to cope with their economic consequences, yet the poor have little to no access to social protection and insurance mechanisms (Lustig 2001). This may force the poor to reduce food consumption and deplete their scarce assets, which will have irreversible and negative affects on their productive assets base, and further drive them into a vicious cycle of greater vulnerability and deeper poverty (Ibid.: 1). There is a need to build permanent institutional structures that help
reduce and manage risks that households face as a part of a sustainable strategy to reduce
poverty and promote social equity (Lustig 2001).

Social protection has risen rapidly up the development policy agenda (Norton, Conway and
Foster 2001; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004; Devereux 2012), and will likely continue
to be prioritized as it involves mechanisms specifically targeting the poor and vulnerable –
and therefore also contributes to the goal of the 2030 vision of leaving no one behind. Not
only can policy interventions such as social protection improves the well-being of poor, but it
can also be growth enhancing (Lustig 2001: 2). If the poor have access to mechanisms that
protect them from sharp downfalls in income, they are more likely to take risks in the
production and labour market spheres (Ibid.).

Governments across the world are often resistant to introducing social protection, especially
social transfers, because they have concerns about creating dependency among beneficiaries
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004: 15). But as evidence suggests, well-designed social
protection programmes do not necessarily create dependency, instead they help reduce
dependency within poor families and communities in the short-term, and reduce dependency
long-term by stimulating children’s participation in education and adults’ participation in
labour markets (Ibid.)

3.3.2 Types of social protection

Social protection is usually separated into two types; social assistance and social insurance
(Browne 2015). Social assistance consists of direct, regular and predictable cash or in-kind
resources transfers to poor and individuals or households, often with support from donors in
lower income contexts. Such transfers are non-contributory, meaning that the full amount is
paid by the providers – and is the primary form of social protection that is available in most
developing countries (Ibid.: 6). Social assistance involves mechanisms such as cash transfers
(unconditional or conditional), social pensions, in-kind transfers such as regular food
transfers linked with skills training or school feeding, and public works programmes (Ibid.).
Social insurance are contributory programmes, where participants make regular payments to
a scheme that will cover costs related to life-course events, e.g. maternity, unemployment or
illness (Ibid. 6).
Recent thinking on social protection emphasises ‘graduation’ and ‘self-reliance’, promoting sustainable livelihoods rather than dependence on hand-outs (Devereux 2012: 1). This refers to the ability of individuals or households to exit a social protection programme by passing an eligibility threshold, which can in some cases mean graduating out of poverty (Browne 2015: 25). Graduation can also refer to countries graduating from aid, as countries may seek to graduate from externally funded programmes to sustainable national programmes (Ibid.).

At a minimum, social protection systems include safety nets, which are programmes designed to provide people who are vulnerable to poverty, living in poverty or who are facing food insecurity or other forms of deprivation, with predictable and reliable support through food, cash or vouchers (WFP 2015c). In Africa and elsewhere, safety nets were promoted in the 1980s as a response to the (presumably short-term) adverse effects of structural adjustment (Devereux 2012). Though some safety nets had a developmental component, safety nets were largely associated with the idea of a short-term buffer - where social protection provided the newer term which incorporates safety net programmes including a role for renewed state involvement with a longer-term developmental approach.

What makes the focus on safety nets particularly interesting, is that one of the key features of safety nets is they provide direct income and consumption support to the poor and vulnerable (WFP 2015c). This is what distinguishes safety nets from other type of social protection interventions that are unlikely to benefit the absolute poorest and most vulnerable – and often benefit those who are in a position to seize economic opportunities. Safety nets, on the other hand provide assistance to the poorest and long-term help them take risks and economic opportunities (UN CDF 2012). Social protection interventions, especially safety net programmes, are considered by most development agencies to be key to ensuring pro-poor growth in developing countries, and is therefore a major contributor to reaching the 2030 agenda (Ibid.).

### 3.4 The concept of food security

Food is one of humankind’s most basic needs, and according to Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations - a fundamental human right. The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on halving the proportion of hungry people between 1990 and 2015, made considerable progress and the number of hungry people reduced by 100 million over the last decade (FAO 2014). Despite the overall progress, there is uneven
progress and large differences exist across regions. Large populous countries such as China and India, played a large part in explaining the overall hunger reduction trends (SOFI 2015). Where the international hunger targets are far from being met, is the region with highest prevalence of undernourishment – Sub-Saharan Africa. The fight against hunger continues, as one in nine people in the world go hungry every day and are currently unable to consume enough food to conduct an active and healthy life (SOFI 2015). The eradication of hunger is clearly set as a priority in the new 2030 agenda, through goal number 2: Ending hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture (UNGA 2015). By 2030, the Heads of States and Governments has committed to “End hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round” (Ibid.). This highlights the importance of addressing food security through social protection measures in order to ensure that no-one is left behind.

3.4.1 Basic definitions
The concept of ‘food security’ has evolved over time with different dimensions and scales; from global and national levels to community to individual households. At the 1974 World Food Conference, food security was first defined as “...sustaining a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices”. This reflects an earlier concept of food security where the focus was solely on the supply side and overlooked the multiple variables that affect the demand and access sides. In time, the focus shifted from national to individual levels and a new definition emerged from the 1996 World Food Summit as food security “existing when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 2002; Simmons 2003). Food security is characterized by FAO to having four dimensions; availability, access, utilization – and the stabilization of these three pillars over time.

3.4.2 Addressing food insecurity
States are the prime responsible for the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security (SOFI 2010). Food insecurity occurs when people’s access to the food that they produce themselves or to food in markets is disrupted – reducing the volume and quality of foods available to them (Simmons 2003: 9). Therefore, enhancing
food security not only enhances health and productivity, it also contributes to social wellbeing, economic development and national and global stability (Qureshi et al. 2015: 393). Human development, economic development, peace and security all depends on nations being food secure (Ibid.). Ensuring that people are food secure has been, and remains, a core challenge to the security and stability of communities, states and the international system (McDonald 2010: 12).

After decades of consistent gains in eradicating hunger, food insecurity is once again on the rise (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011: 20). As mentioned, the region with the highest prevalence of undernourishment is Sub-Saharan Africa (SOFI 2015). Much work remains to be done to eradicate hunger and achieve food security across all its dimensions – and much of the work to be done is moving to conflict affected and fragile states. It is argued that complex and protracted crisis has become the new normal, and humanitarian aid agencies need to take certain measures to adapt and create the most beneficial and appropriate approaches (SOFI 2015).

There are no conflicts in which additional hunger and food insecurity are not an outcome (Simmons 2013: 13). There is substantial empirical evidence that conflict has a negative impact on food security; raging from protests over rising food prices to using hunger as a weapon in war (Simmons 2013: 13). Ellen Messer et al (2000) also claim that wars where hunger and food insecurity is used as a weapon has affected nearly 24 million people in 28 countries in 2000.

Since 2008 – when rapid increases in global prices for major grains triggered outbreaks of civil unrest in many countries, there has been increased global attention on food insecurity and its effect. When national governance fails, recurrent food scarcity and famine become part of a circle of instability (Simmons, 2013: 4). While food insecurity can both result from and contribute to repeated rounds of armed conflict, there is consensus in the literature that conflict exacerbates food insecurity. Conflict can reduce the amount of food available, disrupt people’s access to food, limit families’ access to food preparation facilities and health care, and increase uncertainty about future needs for food and nutrition (Simmons, 2013: 4).

Simmons (2013) claim that when people’s access is being disrupted, the availability declines, which conforms to the theoretical background provided by Drèze and Sen (1991). Firstly Sen
radically changed the causation of starvation and famines from being a matter of availability to being a matter of access, changing the focus from food supply failure to food demand failure – or an entitlement collapse (Banik, 2007: 12). The entitlement approach focuses on ‘the ability of people to command food through the legal means available in society, including the use of production possibilities, trade opportunities, entitlements vis-à-vis the state, and other methods of acquiring food’ (Banik, 2007 quoting Sen 1981: 45). The entitlement approach focuses mainly on the individual and household command over commodities, which must be seen in the concept of capabilities that refers to the basic capacity that enable people to function.

Dréze and Sen (1989) state that both collaborative and adversarial features of public participation are required for successfully combating famines, undernutrition, and endemic deprivation. Banik (2007) argues that the ideal combination of both these features may be challenging and difficult to implement given social, political and economic constraints in many poor countries. Nonetheless, this does not detract anything from the main argument that both features are necessary for preventing famines and endemic deprivation. Drèze and Sen (1991: 279) further argue that it is ‘essential to see the public not merely as “the patient” whose well-being commands attention, but also as “the agent” whose actions can transform society’.

Being food insecure is deprivation of basic capabilities – as it affects everything. One can put it as simple as all development initiatives do not make sense, if providing people with food is not addressed (SOFI 2015). Food and nutrition assistance are critical for development – of both individuals and societies.

For the past decades, there has been developed several strategies to fill the gap between emergency aid and development efforts. But still, international efforts on food security is still separated by the two categories, and emergency aid tend to have missed opportunities in effects toward sustainable and long-term food security (Maxwell et al., 2012).

3.4.3 Food security in protracted crises

As previously states, food insecurity is the most common manifestation of protracted crises, and the proportion of undernourished people is three times as high in such context compared
to other development countries (SOFI 2010: 12). The State of Food Insecurity in the World report of 2010 produced by the World Food Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization, established that countries in protracted crises require special attention to address both immediate needs as well as long-term structural causes. Improving food security in protracted crises requires going beyond short-term responses in order to promote livelihoods over the longer term (SOFI 2010).

According to the SOFI 2010 report, the definition of a protracted crises is somewhat fluid, but has been defined as “those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, with the state having a limited capacity to respond to, and mitigate, the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection” (SOFI 2010: 12). Countries in protracted crisis usually share some characteristics, such as; the duration of crisis, the level of conflict, weak governance or public administration (or both), unsustainable livelihood systems and poor food-security outcomes and breakdown of local institutions (Ibid.). But for defining countries in protracted crisis the SOFI-report uses three measurable criteria; longevity of crisis, aid flows and economic and food security status.

Despite the additional needs for countries in protracted crises, they receive far less development assistance per person than the average for least-developed countries (SOFI 2010: 4). There is an urgent need for assistance in protracted crises to help the country on a constructive path to recovery.
Improving food security in protracted crises require going beyond short term responses in order to protect and promote peoples livelihoods over the longer term. People living in protracted crises are often forced to make adjustments in their way of life that require longer-term responses. Broader social protection measures help countries cope with protracted crises and lay the foundation for long-term recovery (SOFI 2010). Social protection and safety nets are reliable measures for mitigating and preventing violent conflict due to food insecurity. The SOFI report (2010) argues that social protection mechanisms targeting directly or indirectly food security, such as school meals, cash- and food-for-work activities, can make a vital difference in the long term, and helps bridge the gap between traditional humanitarian assistance and longer-term development assistance. Such efforts will be further elaborated and discussed in section 3.4. Brinkman and Hendrix argue that there is a need to overcome the policy and capacity constraints that prevent the most vulnerable and food-insecure countries from introducing and scaling up formal social protection systems (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011: 14).
Framework for Action

Through the resolution on the 2030 Agenda, the Heads of States and Governments reaffirm the important role and inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food Security and welcome the Rome Declaration on Nutrition and the Framework for Action (UN 2015a). As a result of the 36th session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) restated that countries in protracted crisis require special attention, and that appropriate responses for such context needs to be different from short-term crisis responses or non-crisis development contexts. A framework for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted was developed, containing 11 principles for action that can assist stakeholders in improving food security (CFS-FFA 2015: 2). The framework also highlights that evidence and evaluations bring forward the importance of accompanying immediate food and other basic need reliefs with longer term policies and actions to address underlying causes. The Principles describe how to address critical food insecurity and undernutrition and build resilience in protracted crises, in a manner that is adapted to the specific context, which avoids exacerbating the underlying causes – and contribute to resolve opportunities where they exist. Under Principle 1: Meet immediate humanitarian needs and build resilient livelihoods, a precondition is to align humanitarian and development policies and actions by “supporting appropriate and sustainable social protection programmes, including through predictable, reliable, rapidly scalable safety nets, to mitigate and manage food security and nutrition risks (CFS-FFA 2015: 4).

Another aspect highlighted in several of the Principles is the need to encourage local procurement and the use of local organizations in the implementation of humanitarian food assistance and livelihood programmes – to support economic recovery and development from a bottom-up approach. National and local ownership to food security and nutrition is emphasized in Principle 7: “Strengthen country ownership, participation, coordination and stakeholder buy-in, and accountability” (CFS-FFA 2015: 7). Principle 7 focuses on the states being the responsible for the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security. Therefore, all levels of government should establish and lead platforms and processes for coordinating the development, implementation and monitoring of policies and actions. The Principle also highlights the need to engage, where possible, the members of society affected and at risk in the decision making. Lastly, the Principle also highlights the need to coordinate and align support amongst stakeholders.
Principle 11 highlights the promoting of effective national and local governance, on developing institutional and organizational capacities by “Supporting and strengthening local and national institutional and organisational capacities in a sustainable manner, and complementing them where needed, avoiding to create or reinforce dependency on international assistance” (CFS-FFA 2015: 10). Also emphasizing the need to rebuild and support, if and where appropriate, informal and traditional institutions and organisations that help foster sustainable local livelihoods. It is therefore also important that when designing and implementing policies and actions – they should strengthen effective governance in the field of food security and nutrition (CFS-FFA: 10).

3.5 Social protection for food security

There are strong synergies between social protection and food security (HLPE 2012), and according to the State of Food Insecurity Report of 2015 social protection contributes directly to the reduction of hunger and malnutrition. Social protection systems have become an important tool in the fight against hunger, with more than 100 countries implementing conditional or unconditional cash-transfers that focus on promoting food security and nutrition, health and education (SOFI 2015). The expansion of social protection programmes has been critical for progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (Ibid.), and will be essential for progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda.

Through the 2030 agenda, all Head of States and Governments committed to “ending poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including by eradicating extreme poverty by 2030” (UNGA 2015). This entails that all people must enjoy a basic standard of living, including through social protection systems. The Head of States also committed to end hunger and to achieve food security as a matter of priority and to end all forms of malnutrition (UNGA 2015). International organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have important roles in designing and implementing safety net programmes and social protection systems to meet needs of food security and nutrition (Ibid.). Social protection systems often meet immediate food gap needs, and can help improve lives and livelihoods – which is a key factor to reducing the number of hungry people in the world.
Household-level vulnerability to poverty and hunger is most often associated with threats to livelihoods (HLPE 2012). Vulnerability can increase over time if households face repeated shocks that steadily erode their assets. One function of social protection is to install ‘safety nets’ to prevent this from happening – by providing cash or food transfers or public works employment during periods of crisis and during the annual ‘hungry season’, as an alternative to poor households having to sell their productive assets or take their children out of school to buy food, thus contributing to the long run reproduction of poverty (HLPE 2012: 11).

The many causes of food insecurity can be counteracted by a the large ‘menu’ of appropriate social protection responses, while complementing these efforts with additional programmes such as agricultural extension services might offer more sustainable solutions in the long run (Ibid.: 12). Food production by smallholder farmers can for example be assisted with input subsidies, complimented with agricultural insurance in case of harvest failures or livestock losses (Ibid.). Other social protection responses presented in the HLPE (2012) report is unemployment or underemployment to be addressed by public works programmes, lack of market access to food can be addressed on the demand side with food price stabilisation, or price subsidies, or on the supply side through grain reserve management. Inadequate access to food can be addressed directly, through transfers of food through supplementary feeding or school feeding or of cash-transfer (HLPE 2012: 12).

A useful way of classifying the sources of food insecurity can be derived from Amartya Sen’s ‘entitlement approach’, originally conceived as a tool for analysing famines. Sen (1981) identified four sources of food: production (what one grows), labour (what one works for), trade (what one buys), and transfers (what one is given) (HLPE 2012: 31). Food insecurity occurs when the sum of all food derived from these four sources is inadequate to meet minimum consumption needs at the individual, household or national level. Each source of ‘food entitlement failure’ can be counteracted with a social protection response as shown in Figure 3 (Devereux 2008; HLPE 2012).

Social protection programmes with food security objectives operate on different sources of ‘entitlement’ to food – production (e.g. input subsidies), labour (public works programmes), trade (food price subsidies, grain reserve management), and transfers (school feeding, supplementary feeding, cash transfers) (HLPE 2012: 31). Selecting the most appropriate mechanism or package depends on the objectives of the intervention, and its impacts will depend on the quality of design and implementation.
Organisations involved in designing social protection programmes for food security in nutrition have developed and tailored separate strategies for best effect. The WFP state that social protection systems should pursue a ‘twin-track’ strategy to maximise their positive impacts on food security, by providing essential assistance in the short-term and supporting livelihoods in the long-term (WFP 2013a). Social protection is most effective when it delivers social assistance or social insurance to food insecure people, while simultaneously protecting or building productive assets that contribute to economic growth and reduce the risk of future food insecurity, although this requires strong linkages from social protection to complementary sectors such as education, health and agriculture (Devereux 2010: 10).

Social protection and safety nets are reliable measures for mitigating food insecurity (SOFI 2010). In the past, safety nets have relied heavily on public works, but in the recent years a range of instruments such as conditional or unconditional transfers of food, cash or vouchers, school meals or take-home rations, cash- or food-for-work programmes, general or targeted food subsidies and weather based index-assurance have providing similar support (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011: 14). Devereux (2010) argues that public work programmes like food for assets/food-for-work (FFA) function primarily as social protection, but also support...
productive activities and income generation. A principle established by the World Food Programme in the 1990s was that the benefits of assets created by public works should accrue to those involved in the works – so the workers derive a double benefit: and immediate food or income transfer (livelihood protection) and the income generating potential of the assets (livelihood promotion) (Devereux 2010: 9).

FFA programmes produce immediate advantages for a community in terms of food security, whilst contributing to long-term benefits for the environment and for livelihoods that help build resilient communities (WFP 2015b). The FFA programmes are one of WFP’s key tools for providing food assistance to the most vulnerable. Using food, vouchers or cash transfers, they get communities participating in activities such as repairing irrigation systems, building bridges and roads and setting up community granaries (Ibid.). The programmes also have the additional benefit of increasing their beneficiaries’ ownership of the assets created, as communities identify their own needs and priorities and to select the activities for implementation. In this way, such programmes also contribute to capacity building and the scaling up resilience building through placing people at the centre of planning (Ibid.).

Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) argue that the particular effect of cash- or food-for-work programmes is very effective, especially in contexts after violence subsides. The type of programmes can be more difficult to implement when violence is still ongoing, but could also make an important contribution to the long-term perspective that is required in protracted crises (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011: 16). They also claim that food for work or food for training programmes not only increases access to food, creates jobs and enhance livelihoods, they also directly build peace.

There are several arguments for why providing food can be a better than providing cash for countries in protracted crises. Firstly, there is evidence that cash or voucher transfers are more appropriate in or near urban areas with better access to markets, although they have benefits such as allowing beneficiaries to purchase local food and stimulating local economies (WFP 2013a: 15). Secondly, deteriorating and difficult economic situations can also create unfortunate environments for cash-based. Thirdly, cash-based programmes may be complicated to implement and monitor as they are highly vulnerable to corruption, and require strong institutions (Ibid.).
Fundamental concerns about public works is that they provide inadequate social protection because they are discretionary rather than guaranteed and also limited in coverage. Second is that a short-term episode of low-paid employment on public works project is unlikely to have impacts that beyond the duration of this employment, raising questions about the sustainability and effectiveness of public works as a social protection intervention. Yet, these type of programmes are popular with policy-makers as they are self-targeting, they produce potentially valuable assets, and the avoid dependency (Devereux 2010: 8).

There are several critiques of social protection through employment, as it increases the calorie requirements precisely at a time where there is a strong case for reducing activity levels, as well as the administrative and logistic requirements of organizing public work programmes being much more demanding than those of direct distribution or feeding schemes (Drèze and Sen 1991: 96-97) Other critiques are that it can exclude women and the labour-constrained poor and that assets often deteriorate after the project ends – but these issues can be addressed by careful design, implementation and monitoring (Devereux 2010: 9).

School feeding programmes is also one of the success-stories of enhancing food security through social protection. The World Food Programme is the largest humanitarian provider of school meals worldwide covering close to all countries in the worlds – which constitutes around 368 million children from kindergarten to secondary school (WFP 2015a). In 2014 the WFP provided school meals to 18.2 million children in 65 countries, and contributed to development by creating an incentive to both attend as well as stay in school (Ibid.). The World Food Programme rely heavily on governments and partners to implement the program (Ibid.), which makes it essential that the government recognizes and prioritizes school feeding as an essential tool for the development and growth of children, communities, and society as a whole. Some criticize school feeding for not being an effective way of improving nutrition outcomes, as it fails to target children during the first 1000 days in their development (Browne 2015: 23).

Food and nutrition assistance are critical for development – of both individuals and societies. Being food insecure is deprivation of basic capabilities – as it affects everything. One can put it as simple as all development initiatives do not make sense, if providing people with food is not addressed (SOFI 2015). Such social protection programmes also combine the strengths of
humanitarian assistance with longer-term development assistance. Taking this into consideration with decisions-makers at national as well as international levels can in addition to improving food security in protracted crises, also strengthen communities and help build a more hopeful, prosperous and self-sufficient future (SOFI 2010:5).
4 South Sudan

South Sudan is one of the least developed countries in the world (Frafjord Johnson 2016; Norad 2016; UN CAP 2014-2016), and was included on the list of the Least Developed Countries, the LDCs, shortly after independence. The young nation is placed near the bottom of the UNDP’s Human Development Index, has the second lowest score on the World Bank’s fragility index, is defined as a level 3 crisis and ticks all the boxes of being a country in protracted crisis. With the resumption of war in 2013, and an escalation in conflict in 2016, the situation is rapidly deteriorating (Norad 2016: 10). South Sudan statutes a major challenge to the international community today, as it is such a complex situation with many actors involved.

This section does not explore the full historical background of South Sudan, but provides a brief overview of some historical and current lines that are of relevance to this thesis. Firstly, this chapter will provide a brief historical background, before I outline a few aspects of the current complex situation in South Sudan. Dwelling on the challenging history of South Sudan is important and provides a background crucial to understanding the situation of the country today.

4.1 Historical background

South Sudan has been through a continuum of colonization, from Turkiya in 1820 to 1881, the Mahdiya from 1881 to 1898, the Anglo- Egyptian Condominium from 1898 to 1956, and the state of independent Sudan from 1956 to 2011 (Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan). The European colonial era was one of the briefest on the continent, Sudan being the last African territory to be taken under European rule, and the first to shed it (Rolandsen and Daly 2016: 32). The British occupied Egypt in 1882, and realized that the only way to secure the Nile from being obstructed by the other European colonial powers, was to take control over Sudan (SNL 2015). It was obvious, that what mattered to the imperial strategists was the Nile, not the territory or the people (Rolandsen and Daly 2016: 32). This was the start of the British colonization of the southern Sudan, over a people that did not approve nor acknowledge the Sudanese government. The British colonial powers realised that the people of the southern Sudan had little in common with the Arabic and Muslim northerners, but needed to keep Sudan intact as one country mainly because of the role of the Nile. It was also important for the British to prohibit Islamic expansion further south in Africa (Horjen 2014:...
The British colonial “southern policy” was introduced, which included Passports and Permits Ordinance that controlled movement between Southern and Northern Sudan from 1922 till 1947 (Adar, Nyout Yoh and Maloka 2005). This policy resulted in isolation of the southern Sudanese from the Sudanese, also putting great efforts into limiting nationalistic ideas in the south. There were no economical investments or initiatives in the south, similar to those developing in the north. Enormous efforts on agriculture and irrigation in the north led Sudan to be a major global exporter of cotton, which was very convenient for the British textile industry (Horjen 2014: 22). Infrastructure such as the railway construction was developed in northern Sudan, and communication southward was never developed (Rolandsen and Daly 2016: 35). The colonial indirect rule system of government traditionally used by the British, let existing local power structures control the day-to-day government and administration in the south. This combined with the ban of Arabic in schools, also excluded the English speaking elite in the south from positions in Khartoum (Horjen 2014: 22). The British had clear opinions on the future of southern Sudan, to remain as part of the Sudan, as well as limiting the impact of Egypt controlling Sudan and supporting the nationalistic powers in Khartoum.

In 1947 there was a conference that the British Colonial Administration convened, where representatives from the north and the south, very reluctantly from the southerners’ side, agreed on a framework of a united Sudan (Adar, Nyout Yoh and Maloka 2005). A plan of economic, administrative and educational development was needed for the South to catch up with the North in order to be a functioning Sudan, but nothing happened and the southern Sudan was left with different Christian denominations as the only real administration. The southern Sudan was excluded from the developing political community (Atta el-Battahani 2006). The southern Sudanese were not heard, and could only hope that the British would protect them from the discrimination from the north (Horjen 2014: 23). The southern Sudanese were promised some sort of autonomy by the northerners, and therefore voted for independence from the British in 1956 (Horjen 2014: 23). Upon Sudan’s independence in 1956, the idea of an autonomous south was quickly shut down by the Khartoum government, which led to great dismay in the south. The few schools that existed for children of missionaries in the south were integrated in Sudan’s national education system – replacing English with Arabic as the teaching language (SNL 2016). The policies of the independent Khartoum government, were based on attempts to homogenize Sudan to create an Arab country with Arabic as the national language (Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan). The
conference of 1947 and the promises before the vote of independence are considered as historical events for the betrayal and dishonour of the Khartoum government towards the southerners (Horjen 2014: 24). Unrest emerged on many levels, and southern Sudanese soldiers went against the central government in Khartoum – which led to years of civil war.

The longest civil war ever fought on the African continent was the second Sudanese civil war that lasted from 1983 until 2005. Which followed, and in many terms also a continuation of, the first Sudanese civil war from 1956 until a peace agreement in 1972 (Horjen 2014: 26). The same motives and arguments was the root cause of both civil wars; the southerners wanted more autonomy, they wanted to have be a part of the economic development and they wanted their culture heritage to be respected and recognized (Horjen 2014: 26). The Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) was formed in 1983, the same year as the President in Khartoum introduced Sharia-law. Finally, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005, under which the south was granted regional autonomy along with guaranteed representation in a national power-sharing government (Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan 2011). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement later led to the referendum in 2011, which led to the desired independence of South Sudan.

The Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) was formed in 1983, as a response to the southerners’ dissatisfaction with the Khartoum government. In 1991 the SPLA were weak, due to the destabilizing effect of the change of regime in Ethiopia (Horjen 2014: 27). This led to a split in the SPLA; Riek Machar from the Nuer tribe tried to bring Lam Akol (shilluk tribe) and Gordon Kong (nuer) to go against the leader of the SPLA John Garang (dinka), but were not successful. The two new fractions of the SPLA wanted different things, with Machar representing independence of southern Sudan and Garang representing the New Sudan a secular Sudan without discrimination (Ibid.: 27). This was the start of the political disagreements within the SPLA, following ethnic lines and creating increasing ethnic tensions. The war between the southerners became more destructive than what was between the north and the south, more people were killed and towns were destroyed. The split within the party also led to the liberation movement being impaireed. When the war no longer represented the war between the arabs and muslims of the north, but now also within the southerners – people no longer felt that the liberation movement represented them.
In 2011 the international community celebrated the declaration of independence with the people of South Sudan after nearly five decades of civil wars. The hope was that this was the change needed to bring peace and a stable future for the young nation and its people (Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan 2011). But what happens with a people that has lived through 50 years of civil war? War and suffering has been a big part of people’s lives, and children have grown up feeling unsafe with a staggering hope of peace someday. Traditional values have been turned upside down, belief in and respect for law and order has disappeared when seeing that leaders of the country are never held accountable for their actions, the highly respected elders have lost their positions in the local communities to young boys with guns that now obtain more power (Horjen 2014: 47).

Having a common enemy, represented by the government in Khartoum, led the southerners to unite in resistance (Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan 2011). Nearly three years after independence, conflict erupted yet again, now triggered by a power struggle within the political party Sudans People Liberation Movement (Maxwell and Santschi 2014: 1). The conflict erupted in Juba, the capital, in December 2013 between the president Salva Kiir and vice president Riek Machar, and quickly took an ethnic dimension along the historical rivalry between the Dinka and the Nuers (Ibid.: 1). This making up the warring parties of the dinka President Salva Kiir from the governing party SPLM, and the nuer vice President Riek Machar representing the fraction SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO).

### 4.2 The current situation

With the outbreak of conflict in December 2013, the young nation returned to a stage of crisis and widespread armed conflict (Maxwell and Santschi 2014: 3). This was followed by renewed fighting in July 2016, leaving the future of the increasingly fragile country very unclear. The complex situation in South Sudan if further exacerbated by the crashing economy and an extremely toxic relationship with international actors (Norad 2016: 7).

Ongoing efforts to end the violent conflict through both ceasefires and peace agreements, as well as sanctions by the UN, has been initiated, upheld and pushed by the international community, particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) including the Troika (US, UK and Norway) and the United Nations. The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (the Peace Agreement) was signed by the warring parties in August 2015 through substantial international pressure, and there has been
minimal progress towards implementation (Maxwell and Santschi 2014; UNSC 2017). The hostile environment and lack of cooperation between the warring parties, forced Dr. Riek Machar to flee Juba, ending up in South Africa where his freedom of movement has been restricted (Sudan Tribune 2017).

The President Salva Kiir recently initiated a grass-root bottom-up National Dialogue, but the initiative has received mixed reactions. The SPLM-IO supports such initiative, but has concerns regarding the political context and the implementation modalities, as well as questioning the ability of the President to lead such an arena. Despite the fact that the peace deal has collapsed and serious fighting continues in many parts of South Sudan, the government, including the African Union (AU) and the IGAD member states, believe the peace deal is working. Meanwhile a significant number of troops in the armed opposition have refused to endorse the newly appointed Vice President Taban Deng, leading to a split in the opposition SPLM-IO (Sudan Tribune 2017). As the belief that the peace agreement is alive continues, war rages creating the famine in the country, people are fleeing and the South Sudanese continue to pay the price. The international community will, yet again, need to raise millions of dollars to treat the symptoms of the disease rather than its root causes (Ibid.). Many argue that reviving the peace deal and involving all parties, as well as stopping the war is key to preventing famines in South Sudan (Ibid.). The African Union (AU), IGAD and the United Nations (UN) have issued joint statements expressing deep concern over the spread of fighting and severe humanitarian situation in South Sudan, and has urged for immediate cessation of hostilities and inclusive political processes (UNSC 2017).

Depressing reports of near genocidal massacres and destruction of innocent people’s lives in South Sudan have been many the recent years. In response to the crisis the Peace and Security Council of the African Union established a Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS), to investigate the human rights violations and abuses committed during the armed conflict so far. The crimes committed by both sides in the conflict, were mostly carried out against the civilian population taking no active part in the hostilities. The Commission found that acts of murder, rape, sexual violence, torture and other inhumane acts of comparable gravity targeting civilians have been committed by both sides in the conflict (AUCISS 2014).

The President has recently for the second time issued a decree creating four additional states, rearranging the state administrative boundaries again. The decree brings to total number of
states to 32, from the original 10 states that were changed into 28. The opposition condemned the creation of new states, as well as the President actions when replacing and appointing governors that are pro-government (UNSC 2017). The country comprises 64 ethnic communities, and its ethnic diversity has previously been a great source of pride (Frafjord Johson 2016). There is a concern that the state divisions will not stop at 32, creating a country of states based on ethnicity. As previously mentioned, the fragile situation is further exacerbated by a crashing economy. December 2016 became the thirteenth month of triple-digit inflation, largely driven by the devaluation of the South Sudanese Pound and low oil production (UNSC 2017).

Lastly, the humanitarian situation is deteriorating significantly – with more than 100,000 people facing starvation and famine declared in parts of the country, with a further one million people that are on the brink of famine. 4.9 million people are severely food insecure, with this number expected to rise to 5.5 million at the height of the lean season in July (Ibid.). The number of people seeking refuge in neighbouring countries is increasing, and a high number are internally displaced across the country. The most recent estimates are around 1.5 million people that have fled to the neighbouring countries, and 1.9 are internally displaced (Ibid.). The operating environment is challenging and dangerous, due to ongoing military operations resulting in relocation of personnel and disruption of aid delivery in areas of high need, but on continues to respond despite the challenges caused by the Government (Ibid.).

South Sudan has enormous natural resources, but is one of the most underdeveloped areas in Africa, with close to no infrastructure (Frafjord Johnson 2016: 15). Despite massive agricultural potential and plentiful resources – only 4 percent of the arable land is cultivated. Over 53 percent of the population lives below the poverty line: with 55 percent of people in rural areas and 24 percent in urban areas (WFP 2013b: 5). Ninety percent of South Sudanese households depend on crop farming, animal husbandry, fishing or forestry for their livelihoods – which vary by state (WFP 2013b).

4.2.1 Protracted crisis

South Sudan is a country in protracted crisis. For defining countries in protracted crisis the SOFI-report (2010) uses three measurable criteria; longevity of crisis, aid flows and economic and food security status. The duration of the crisis in South Sudan has more or less
lasted for over three decades, including the struggles when South Sudan was part of Sudan (source), and as previously mentioned - the country has been declared a level 3 crisis since December 2013. The aid flows have been high, and emergency aid constitute over half of all aid (UN CAP 2014-2016). The food security status is more than 100,000 people facing starvation with famine declared in parts of the country, with a further one million people that are on the brink of famine. 4.9 million people are severely food insecure, with this number expected to rise to 5.5 million at the height of the lean season in July (UNSC 2017).

### 4.2.2 Fragile States Index

The Fragile States Index (FSI), created by the Fund for Peace and published by Foreign Policy, use 12 social, economic, and political indicators to analyse “how wars, peace accords, environmental calamities, and political movements have pushed countries toward stability or closer to the brink of collapse” (FSI 2016). The index ranks the countries accordingly, from most fragile to least fragile. South Sudan ranks number 2 most fragile country in the world, with a score of 113,8 of 120.

#### Indicator Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographic Pressures</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and IDPs</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Grievance</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Flight</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uneven Development</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and Economic Decline</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of the State</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Services</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Apparatus</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factionalized Elites</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Intervention</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Indicator scores for South Sudan on the Fragile State Index 2016.
This leaves South Sudan to be one of the most fragile countries in the world, with almost all indicators representing an extremely fragile situation. Some of the most relevant indicator scores for this thesis is the demographic pressures, legitimacy of the state, public service, and external intervention. Demographic pressures are defined through concerns related to population, such as food scarcity, where South Sudan scores a 9.9 of 10. Legitimacy of the state indicates level of corruption and other measures of democratic capacity, such as government performance where South Sudan is left at a score of 9.7. Public services are defined by provision of education, health care, sanitation and other services – which includes food assistance, and leaves South Sudan at the highest score of fragility. Lastly, it is interesting to look at the score of external intervention – meaning the level of foreign assistance as well as imposed interventions, such as sanctions or military invasions, also representing an extremely fragile situation (FSI 2016). The first years of independence has demonstrated that South Sudan is an extremely weak and fragile state, and is likely to be so in the foreseeable future (Rolandsen and Daly 2016: 158).

4.2.3 OECD Fragility Framework
The OECD Fragility Framework presents a new way to view state fragility. The new Fragility Framework characterizes fragility as “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks” (OECD 2016). Fragility can lead to negative outcomes such as violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies (Ibid.). The new OECD fragility framework represents a major shift in how fragility is conceptualised - as a mix of risk and capacities, over five different dimensions. The five dimensions include; economic, environmental, political, security and societal. Capacities are measured at state level, incorporating the various formal and informal mechanisms societies can draw upon to cope with negative events and shocks (Ibid.).
The OECD Fragility Framework also leaves South Sudan at the very bottom of the scale, as an extremely fragile country on close to all of the dimensions measured.
5 Analysis

In this section I will start off by analysing some aspect of the role of the “policy maker” in the accountability triangle, the Government of South Sudan, to deliver services to the people. I will in light of the accountability triangle provided in the theoretical framework, discuss how aspects of the capacity and willingness of the Government of South Sudan to perform key government functions. Concluding that the role of the Government of South Sudan is unable to be accountable to their citizens, by both lack of capacity and will to provide the people of South Sudan with basic services. Based on this conclusion, I present an accountability triangle adapted to the context of South Sudan, where the INGOs are breaking the ‘routes’ between citizens towards both the Government and the providers. Finally, in light of the adapted accountability triangle, I will look into three main challenges this adaptation brings with it; the increasingly toxic relationship between the Government and the INGOs, the creation of parallel structures, and the dilemma of balancing immediate responses and long-term solutions.

5.1 ‘Policy makers’

The policy makers in the accountability triangle represents the Government of the Republic of South Sudan. As discussed in the previous sections of this thesis, the state often fails to provide core services in fragile situations, and is therefore not seen as legitimate by the citizens (OECD 2009). As presented in section 3.2 the long route of accountability depends on a functioning, legitimate and effective state; thus it is exposed to breakdown in fragile situations, becoming problematic or even inoperative. South Sudan is an extremely fragile country, and I will therefore look into some aspects of how this has affected and affects service delivery. I will discuss this through institutional capacity and political will of the Government of South Sudan to fulfil a role of the state.

There is no single definition of a “fragile state” agreed upon by the international community, but there are some features that can be identified (OECD 2009: 17). Fragile states suffer deficits in governance that hinder development, with conditions that are too unstable for long-term planning and investment, with society focusing on short-term coping strategies to secure basic needs (Ibid.). Fragility may reflect the internal dynamics, or it may be a result of external factors such as natural disaster or regional conflict. South Sudan is as presented in
section 5.2.2 extremely fragile on the political, societal and environmental dimensions measured, and slightly less extreme on security and economy, but is all in all an extremely fragile state.

In fragile situations, however, the state often fails to provide core services such as health, education and water to the poor and is therefore not seen as legitimate by the citizens. Violence, corruption, budget allocations for sectors not benefiting the people and exclusion of particular ethnic or religious groups can further increase social insecurity and undermine the legitimacy of the state. A crucial aspect, is that while fragility has a negative impact on public services, there is evidence that improvements in service delivery can contribute to strengthening governance and reducing fragility. This should have major implications for how donors choose to engage in different fragile contexts. This requires well-designed and contextually adapted approaches, but also careful attention to ensure that enhancing service delivery in the short term can make a contribution to state building in the long term, and may help to rebuild the legitimacy of the state and strengthen civic engagement (OECD 2009: 29).

As previously mentioned, the new OECD Framework characterises fragility as “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks” (OECD 2016). The quality and availability of essential services, such as health care and primary education, is a key measure of governance. Public services, “giving back” to the people, underpin the social contract between states and citizens. The establishment of effective and durable public services is a first priority in situations of fragility and conflict (OECD 2009).

Inadequate service delivery signals fragility, and there are several problems that are specific to such contexts that can complicate service delivery; lack of government capacity, lack of political will and financial resources, and conflict (OECD 2009: 11). Operative definitions of fragility used by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and aid agencies emphasise the lack of capacity and willingness to perform key government functions for the benefit of all. Devereux (2010) also argues that these three reasons are often given for the limited provision of social protection in southern Africa are unaffordability, limited administrative capacity and lack of political will, although claiming that they are not binding.
5.1.1 Government capacity

The historical context of the institutional government capacity in South Sudan was previously mentioned in section 4.1, and this section aims to build on those references.

The government of South Sudan have serious challenges, some argue that it is partly due to history and the inheritance of a country without any strong institutions, whilst others believe that more could have been achieved during the past years (AUCISS 2015: 28). In South Sudan, decades of civil war mean the task is often less one of rebuilding than one of starting anew in terms of access to services and developing state capacity on local and regional levels.

During the years of colonial rule and the Khartoum regime, service delivery and social protection hardly existed. Development indicators were among the worst in the world, whether of health, infant mortality, maternal mortality, drinking water and sanitation, or food security (Frafjord Johnson 2016: 18). Frafjord Johnson (2016) argues that South Sudan had a difficult starting point, as the freedom fighters were not necessarily the ones that were best prepared for the political and democratic task of taking over the semi-autonomous government of Southern Sudan in 2005. She compares this to other countries on the continent, where liberation movements entered government offices of functional institutions that had been established during the colonial times. The political leaders that were to establish the government of South Sudan were military administrations, which were not really based on principles of the rule of law (Ibid.: 16). In addition, corruption and nepotism prevented the building of stronger and more effective institutions. The international community also struggled to adapt to the shift from emergency response, to state-building initiatives after the CPA (Interview 6, 2017; Interview 7, 2017). This was evident in the aid architecture in South Sudan, which is argued to have had unfortunate consequences through creating many parallel structures, as well as being a missed opportunity (Interview 6, 2017). Assistance from the international community to support southern Sudan in state building proved to be patchy and uncoordinated, and at times non-existent (Ibid.: 16). Frafjord Johnson (2016) believes that this was related to an effort of being perceived as impartial by not pre-judging the outcome of the referendum. Signals from Khartoum and the caution of donors and international stakeholders prevented institution building in case it would be interpreted as preparation for independence prior to the referendum (Ibid.: 17).
Another point made by Frafjord Johnson (2016) was that the time scheduled from the referendum to the declaration of independence 6 months later, was too limited to make much progress in institution building. She argues that South Sudan became a country without a state.

This is closely related to the historical background presented in previous sections, as the colonial powers and Khartoum regimes have to different degrees excluded Southern Sudanese from influential roles in the civil service, the private sector and in public life overall. The lack of investment in South Sudan has been systematic, both in infrastructure and service to people (Frafjord Johnson 2016; Rolandsen and Daly 2016; Horjen 2014). One of the informants (Interview 3, 2017) argues that this is only true to some extent, as some South Sudanese did live in Khartoum and have positions in government, as well as many South Sudanese studying abroad in Africa, Europe and USA. The informant (Interview 3, 2017) states that government structures were not new to these people, and it should therefore have been a better process of state building upon independence.

At the onset of the interim period, the south Sudanese inherited many problems and had few functional institutions to solve them with. Government institutions were concrete buildings with few people that were shuffling paper inside (Frafjord Johnson 2016; Interview 5). Yet there were thousands of people working in government on government payroll, which points to another big problem with the Government in South Sudan (Frafjord Johnson 2016). Although, being on the government payroll had kept some people from joining the rebels.

In the HLPE report on Social Protection for Food Security (2012) it is stated that every country should strive to design and put in place a comprehensive and nationally owned social protection system, that contributes to ensuring the realisation of the right to adequate food for all. The Government of South Sudan’s capacity to provide basic services to the people is low, and aid organizations therefore have to provide the vast majority of relief (UN CAP 2014-2016: 13). According to the UN CAP 2014-2016 there are 4.4 million people in need that are food insecure and lack the most basic of services (UN CAP 2014-2016: 13). It was also expected in the CAP that state capacity to deliver basic services will remain low, and the government spending will continue to prioritize security and military spending in the years to come (UN CAP 2014-2016; WFP 2013b). A major challenge that has confronted and continues to confront the state building process in South Sudan, is the literacy level as well as the lack of skilled people within the field (AUCISS 2014: 7). Only 27% of the population
above 15 years is literate, with the literacy rate for males being 40% compared to 16% for females (World Bank 2016). Low levels of economic development, as well as limited comparative experience with governance, in addition to those involved in such processes are overwhelmed and taking on too much are also identified as challenges to government capacity and state building (AUCISS 2014: 7).

A lot of research and many reports find that state-building initiatives have failed to deliver in South Sudan (AUCISS 2014; UN CAP 2014). International political relations may also limit what is possible in terms of engagement with states around social protection policies and programmes. Where political relations have broken down, donor governments in some fragile and conflict-affected situations have strict limitations on the extent to which they can directly support governments (AUCISS 2014). According to Rostad’s (2015) findings through field interviews in Yei River County, the weak infrastructure and lack of services provided by the state were repeated subjects. The need for better infrastructure and public services was the first issue raised whenever Rostad (2015) inquired about the challenges faced by the communities.

This section presents the enormous lack of capacity the Government of South Sudan face, but lacking from this pictures are the many plans, ambitions and efforts made for improving state capacity and service delivery. According to several of my informants (Interview 5; Interview 6), there was a lot of political will to implement and improve things after 2005 and through the interim period. He argues that government structures are improving, and it seems to be more dependent the political will lacking rather than capacity, also claiming that if there is a will, there is a way (Interview 3, 2017). Which brings us on to the next section.

5.1.2 Political will

Operative definitions of fragility, that are used by the DAC and aid agencies also emphasised willingness of states to perform key government functions. Willingness refers to an explicit political commitment to policies supporting human welfare, which can be reflected through actions and outcomes that is being implemented through an inclusive approach (OECD 2009: 18).

According to Devereux (2010) delivering a national social protection program can be done, and has been across Africa, if a government makes a commitment to deliver. A remarkable
achievement in South Africa, which reflects a degree of political commitment to social justice. Devereux (2010: 17) argues that the success in social protection that has recently been achieved in African countries have all been driven by a political decision from the top – and have been pushed forward from below by citizens, media and civil society activism. He argues that the main reason for why African countries do not have social protection systems in place is that their governments are not seriously committed to providing these forms of protection, and their citizens are not yet mobilising to demand their human right to social security. Only when governments and citizens prioritize social protection, will poor and vulnerable Africans get the comprehensive social protection systems that they so desperately need (Devereux 2010: 17).

There have been many attempts at by the Government of South Sudan both to provide basic services to their people, and also to ensure that external assistance contributes positively to the implementation of the Governments development plans. One of these examples is the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), where expanding and strengthening government provision basic services as well as establishing social safeguards for the poorest and most vulnerable - is a priority (SSDP 2011). The top priority in implementation of SSDP will be given to: (a) peace-building and actions that enhances security, (b) improving and expanding social services, and (c) rural development built on infrastructure expansion (SSDP 2011: XIV). These priorities will directly and sustainably improve the lives of people throughout South Sudan, and are mutually reinforcing and interdependent - where success with one will help others succeed, while failure in one will limit progress with others (Ibid.). Improved security will be critical for achieving renewed economic growth and for extending social service. Similarly, improvements in road transport infrastructure are important for generating agricultural growth and for the provision of basic social services. A Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy were among many of the strategies developed alongside the SSDP, with the objective to "ensure that the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) can effectively address critical institutional capacity needs required to implement the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), including through alignment of support from its international partners, and meet the essential requirements for viable statehood following independence” (SSDP 2011: 141).

A separate Aid Strategy was also developed in accordance with the SSDP, with the objective to “to improve the effectiveness of development assistance and humanitarian aid to South
Sudan in support of the implementation of the Government’s priorities, so that the people of South Sudan benefit fully from the aid which is provided to them” (Ibid.: 137). The plan further states that to accomplish this the Government has to work with development partners to ensure that development assistance strengthens government systems, increases accountability and supports economic growth. The Government states and recognises that “it is its own budget and resources that should be the main vehicle for poverty reduction and growth within South Sudan – development assistance should therefore be provided in line with government priorities as set out in SSDP” (Ibid.: 137). The plan also highlights ensuring efficient and effective delivery of essential public services and functions through provision of specialised training, and development and enhancement of in-country specialised training facilities (Ibid.: 142).

Many of the informants through my interviews which were present and working in South Sudan for the past decades, also confirms the level of ambition, genuine commitment and optimism during this time. One informant (Interview 6, 2017) agrees with this picture presented, of the genuine commitment to start off at the right place after independence in South Sudan. Arguing that this political scene was then hijacked by oil-money and political power-struggles.

The South Sudan Development Plan (2011: 138) also presents a separate section of the Aid Strategy on how aid is managed. It states that the vast majority of aid is managed by donors directly, or transferred to international or local NGOs that manage the funding and deliver services. A core objective for the SSDP is to build stronger government institutions and service delivery systems, and for this to happen the SSDP states that “aid must increasingly be manages by government institutions and use government’s chosen systems for delivering those policies” (SSDP 2011: 138). Aid has an important role in strengthening institutional capacity and systems through supporting capacity building and providing technical assistance. Aid should specifically support institutional capacity and systems through addressing systematic weaknesses in government institutions, more specifically service delivery. Collier (2007) argues that when analysing the impact of capacity building, there is a “chicken-and-egg problem”, meaning that until the country has turned itself around, capacity building is pretty difficult. The organizations train people to an international standard, but if there are no prospects – many will use this as a way out of the country. He therefore argues
that it actually makes sense for a country to import a ‘bunch of skills’ temporarily while it gets over the hump of reform (Collier 2007: 112).

In recent times, and especially after the outbreak of conflict in 2013 – the political will of delivering service to the people and good cooperation with international partners have been somewhat questionable. All informants unanimously agreed that there is no political will to provide services to the people in South Sudan today (Interview 1-8, 2017). A number of initiatives even seems to work for the complete opposite – controlling and reducing the space for International NGOs to work in, which will be further analysed in section 5.4.1.

Devereux (2010) states that “where the political commitment exists, financial and administrative capacity invariably follows”. He further argues that comprehensive social protection is absent from most African countries not because of resource constraints, but because of the lack of political commitments – which has fails to prioritize social protection (Devereux 2010: 11). In the majority of African countries, social protection has been, and remains, a donor-led agenda. The efforts of the international donor community have produced notable successes in some countries, where effective national social protection programmes have been established through donor-government partnerships, but in other cases – it has failed. According to Devereux (2010), a key point is that social protection is most likely to succeed if it is government-led from the start, which is directly connected to both capacity and will. Social protection programmes in protracted crises are generally relief-oriented, externally funded and of limited scale (SOFI 2010: 36). They resemble initiatives present in other contexts, but are lacking domestic commitments and capacity to make them a national system. Progress in social protection measures in protracted crises, can help bridge the gap between humanitarian and developmental initiatives, which will be further discussed in later sections.

One of the main aspects that this thesis argues is a visible sign for the lack of political will to deliver services to the people – is famine and high levels of food insecurity in itself. What further enhances this argument, is the lack of response to these situations, not to mention denying the severe situation. States are the prime responsible for the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security (SOFI 2010). South Sudan is currently facing the worst levels of food insecurity since independence due to conflict, high food prices, market disruptions and an escalating economic crisis (FAO 2015).
The food security outlook for 2017 remains bleak, with more than 100,000 people facing starvation and famine declared in parts of the country, with around one million more people that are on the brink of famine. 4.9 million people are severely food insecure, with this number expected to rise to 5.5 million at the height of the lean season in July (UNSC 2017). Before the Government of South Sudan acknowledged the serious situation of food insecurity in the country, they responded with statements such as "First and foremost, there is no starvation in the Republic of South Sudan, but there is food gaps and the government is currently working with humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP)...") (Government Response to the AUCISS Report 2016: 5)

The special report on crop and food security compiled by FAO and the WFP (2016) argues that the conflict has disrupted the functioning of all economic sectors, including agriculture and livestock, with dramatic repercussions on household food security. The people of South Sudan are predominantly farmers and war has disrupted agriculture for a long time (Al Jazeera 2016a). The situation has affected almost all communities of South Sudan, through loss of lives and assets, destructing livelihoods, restrictions of movements and loss of personal safety and security (FAO/WFP 2016). Expanding domestic food production in the times ahead is then essential to prevent further worsening of the situation and escalating food insecurity (FAO/WFP 2016).

Ending hunger and malnutrition relies heavily on sustainable food production systems and resilient agricultural practices (UN 2015b). To increase the productive capacity of agriculture, there is a need for more investment from both domestic and foreign sources, which unfortunately is not the recent trend in government spending. The agriculture orientation index, defined as agriculture’s share of government expenditures, fell globally from 0.37 to 0.25 between 2001 and 2013 (UN 2015b). There was a short timeframe where governments increased agricultural spending during the food price crisis from 2006-2008 (UN 2015b). The recent global trends for government spending not being favourable towards agricultural development, is particularly relevant in South Sudan. The government are not taking any responsibility of the devastating situation in the country, with recent accusations from the UN Secretary-General Guterres that South Sudan’s government is ignoring the plight of people suffering from famine, and the additional 7.5 million people in need of humanitarian aid and thousands more fleeing fighting (Al Jazeera 2017a).
Famine has become a tragic reality in parts of South Sudan, and many families have exhausted every means they have to survive (WFP 2017a). Meanwhile, the government of South Sudan spends (at least) 44 percent, and increasing, of its budget on military and security according to the finance ministry (Al Jazeera 2016a). International, regional and local voices are calling for the Government of South Sudan to step up and take their responsibility, but for the time being even humanitarian access remains a major challenge. It is absolutely necessary that unconditional humanitarian access from all parties involved in political conflict is required for the INGOs to facilitate delivery of assistance to the populations in need (WFP 2017a).

Improving food security can reduce tensions and contribute to more stable environments, but food assistance can also become a source of conflict and can undermine investment in local capacity. But if done right, the vicious cycle of food insecurity and conflict can be transformed into a virtuous cycle of food security and stability that provides peace dividends, rebuilds social trust and promotes human and economic development (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011: 1). Food assistance is argued to offer valuable peace dividends, as it can increase the legitimacy of the state, which is often undermined during conflict. For example, if horizontal inequalities in access to public services were a cause of conflict, a broad equitable distribution of food assistance is critical for peace building (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011: 15). For the legitimacy of the state to improve, it requires that government capacity to improve food security must develop alongside actual improvement of food insecurity. The role played by non-state actors and the international community must be clearly defined and reduced over time, with the state increasingly taking responsibility (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011: 15).

Even South Sudan’s “greenbelt” zone which includes the three Equatoria states—Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria, that have high agriculture potential with reliable rainy seasons and fertile soil, are now totally dependent on donations from aid groups (New York Times 2017: 4). The ‘breadbasket region’, that could potentially feed both the South Sudanese and neighbouring countries if prioritized, was considered one of the best educated, peaceful and agriculturally productive parts of the country. Many people have fled to camps for the internally displaced, and few want to return home, fearing their own government (Ibid.).
The political will has as presented in this section varied from genuine political will from the Government of South Sudan to improve service delivery and be accountable to their citizens, but has diminished and arguably disappeared over time.

5.2 The adapted accountability triangle

In a research conducted by Samuel Carpenter, Rachel Slater and Richard Mallett for the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 2012, one of the main conclusions was that “the available evidence suggests that social protection in fragile and conflict-affected situations is delivered predominantly by non-state actors, specifically international non-governmental organisations or UN agencies” (Carpenter, Slater and Mallett 2012: vii). As the previous chapters have argued, this is the definite case in South Sudan. In the absence of the Governments both will and capacity to deliver services, a heavy burden is placed on international humanitarian mechanisms (Darcy 2004). What further complicated the situation in South Sudan is that the International NGOs are not only experiencing this heavy burden of responsibility to provide the people with basic services, but they are also experiencing to be actively counteracted by the Government.

Below is an adapted accountability triangle, based on the original and ideal accountability triangle presented in the theoretical framework.

![Figure 6: The adapted accountability triangle](image)
According to Devereux (2011), the limited provision of social security in many African countries is often explained by the heavy presence of external donors, who are not accountable to local citizens and therefore cannot commit to providing support beyond their short funding cycles.

When INGOs are placed in such context, as the situation in South Sudan, receiving such tremendous responsibility of providing the people with basic services, it is important that there are well thought-out and planned strategies for the engagement, ensuring sustainability and long-term planning.

Devereux (2010) argues that it is of crucial value with government led social protection programmes, as very few donor-led programmes transform themselves into institutionalised national social protection systems. He further argues that it might be necessary to start with small-scale as a first step towards national systems, as the road from projects to systems is long and complex with very few cases in which this transition has been successfully achieved. But Devereux (2011) also argues that this is debatable, and many of the most successful social protection schemes in Africa were introduced as a large programme from the start. South Africa’s social protection system has some key features that Devereux (2010: 11) argues could have implications for other African countries, most importantly that it is government led, with very little donor involvement. This adapted accountability triangle poses many challenges, which I will discuss in the sections following.

5.3 **Breaking the “long route”**

As laid out in the theoretical framework, the international community is increasingly engaging in fragile situations and conflict-affected states, and have recognised that these situations require sustained attention and tailored approaches (OECD 2009: 3). To provide guidance for engagement in such contexts, as well as maximise the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm, the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations have been adopted (OECD 2009). Today it is widely accepted that the state has an irreducible role in the delivery of both basic social services and also justice and security, and it is proved through both theory and practice that no country has achieved significant and sustainable improvement in sectors such as primary education without government involvement (World Bank 2003: 11).
Cakravarti (2005) argues that there should be more focus on the role economic and political governance can play in achieving positive and sustainable development outcomes. He argues that good governance can be achieved by restructuring the international aid architecture and by moving away from the transfer of resources and poverty reduction measures, towards playing a more forceful role in the developing world to achieve the necessary political and institutional reforms. There is substantial research showing that aid is productive in countries with good policies and institutions (World Bank 2003: 11), therefore donors and INGOs need to make strategic choices for appropriate engagement and implementation mechanisms in each fragile context.

The international aid community in South Sudan is extensive and strong, consisting of 20 United Nations agencies and more than 150 INGOs – which have acquired extensive experience of working in the context over time. Of this extensive engagement, humanitarian assistance in South Sudan today represents over half of all international aid to the country (UN CAP 2014-2016). Up to the signing of the CPA in 2005, almost all aid to southern Sudan was humanitarian, motivated by the need to relieve human suffering. INGOs engagement in the interim period seemed to give positive results, service delivery improved from being non-existent, to some infrastructure was built and some progress in health and education (Norad 2016: 12). Unfortunately, this did not last long, and the positive indicators deteriorated. Post-independence, the INGOs started focusing on stabilising the state and reducing potential conflict with Sudan (Ibid.: 13). After the catastrophic resumption of war and the complex situation of South Sudan altogether, the international engagement has again shifted towards humanitarian initiatives – and even putting development activities on hold. Many organisations have withdrawn altogether, or downscaled their efforts and reduced number of personnel (Ibid.: 13). According to the Norad report (2016) donor spending in South Sudan has mainly focused on “delivering a peace dividend through state building and social services provision. Spending has remained high, even when success was minimal”. Many institutions or infrastructures were not there to be reconstructed, and existing local structures were often overlooked as they did not look like institutions in a functioning state (Ibid.:16).

Norad (2016) also states that it is surprising how few evaluations that have been done on humanitarian assistance after 2005, considering how important humanitarian aid has been and
still is in South Sudan. The few evaluations that exist focus on technical challenges and largely disregard the extent to which humanitarian aid is building political structures (Norad 2016: 26). The Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) which was a field-defining humanitarian operation is one of the humanitarian efforts that has been evaluated significantly. The studies argued that the OLS increased aid dependency and that OLS relieved the SPLM and the Government of Sudan from their obligations towards citizens and international actors of the need to work on political problems (Ibid.: 26).

Between 2005 and 2009, several project evaluations and reviews looked at internationally supported programmes, projects and policies, as well as the different aid instruments that were in use, such as the Multi-Donor Trustfund and the Common Humanitarian Fund (Norad 2016: 21). There was a lack of comprehensive understanding of whether funding mechanisms were delivering results and whether different types of intervention were mutually reinforcing or undermining each other. In 2009, an inventory of evaluations proved that each study only gave partial assessments of the assistance provided, and lacked specific results. Findings and results proved to only be relevant to the specific project, program or aid instrument being evaluated at the time, rather than examining a broader architecture and structure of the donor engagement. Therefore, in 2010 Aiding for Peace was published, addressing key policy issues on the relationship between development and peacebuilding, or aid and politics (Ibid.). Aiding the Peace stated that donors often worked with insufficient knowledge about local dynamics and drivers of conflict, and that assumptions that programme designs often were flawed. The report focused on the dominant notion that development would bring peace, stability and prosperity to South Sudan, which might have been flawed (Ibid.). It also pointed to the donors having a poor understanding of the local power relations, which created unsustainable programme designs which barely involved existing structures or communities. The aid was compartmentalised, scattered and unresponsive to demands of conflict prevention and peacebuilding (Ibid.).

Another main critique was also that even when political dynamics were clearly changing, the same type of projects continued to be funded through an unresponsive system. The donors did not sufficiently realize that transition from war to peace is not a technical exercise, but a political process that requires continued political engagement with government actors (Ibid.: 22). As previously mentioned in section 5.1.1 discussing the capacity of the Government of
South Sudan to deliver basic services, the international community struggled to adapt to the shift from emergency response, to state-building initiatives after the CPA (Interview 6, 2017; Interview 7, 2017).

The Norad Country Evaluation Brief on South Sudan (2016) provides several valuable lessons learned for development and humanitarian aid to guide future engagement in South Sudan. The report (Norad 2016) concludes that there are four main weaknesses in the international donor engagement in South Sudan; that donors lacked an overall strategic and prioritised plan and efforts post-independence was not adequately adapted, the practice was often apolitical and failed to engage with political issues at the local level, the donor community’s vision for South Sudan differs from the objectives of the government, and pooled funding contributed to fragmentation of funding mechanisms. According to the OECD, the international community in South Sudan has also failed to adhere to the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (OECD 2011).

On one hand, development partners underestimate the state-building challenges in South Sudan, and overestimate the capacity of the government to take on responsibilities of service delivery. This resulted in over-ambitious and unsustainable programs. On the other hand, the importance of efforts to strengthen national and local ownership and capacity were also underestimated. The donor community became increasingly overwhelmed by the extremely difficult contextual environment in South Sudan, and responded by creating parallel systems and delegating government functionality to foreign advisers to preserve the success of donor-funded projects (Norad 2016: 31).

5.4 Challenges to adapting the accountability triangle

In this section I will discuss three particular challenges the adaptation of the accountability triangle brings with it in the situation of South Sudan. These challenges would be interesting to look further into when continuing the international engagement in South Sudan.

5.4.1 Toxic relationship between government and INGOs

South Sudan’s situation is exacerbated by an extremely toxic relationship between the Government and international actors (Norad 2016: 7). The country provides “a puzzle to donors who ordinarily work with and through national governments. In the absence of a
functioning state, it remains unclear how donors best can provide development and emergency aid” (Ibid.: 8).

The toxic relationship has reached unprecedented levels and has serious consequences. Already this year, 12 aid workers have been killed in South Sudan. Counting at least 79 aid workers that have been killed since the outbreak of conflict in December 2013 (UN 2017a). The year of 2017 has seen an increase in attacks on aid workers, as well as looting of supplies intended for the people in need. It is a disgrace that these aid workers whom are dedicated to alleviating the ongoing suffering of the people, at a time where humanitarian needs have reached an unprecedented level, are targeted by Government forces (Ibid.).

Also, there has been many incidents where humanitarian access is being restrained by Government or oppositional forces. There are series of events where humanitarian operations have been hampered, and aid workers are denied access to key locations which results in people not being reached with aid, sometimes for months. The parties to the conflict, Government and opposition, are asked to uphold their responsibilities under international humanitarian law, and place the people first by giving aid workers unlimited access to all areas (UN 2017b). The UN Secretary General Guterres expressed the disapproval of the ignorance of country's president, Salva Kiir, stating that "a refusal by the leadership to even acknowledge the crisis or to fulfil its responsibilities to end it". Also expressing that "There is a strong consensus that South Sudanese leaders need to do more to demonstrate their commitment to the wellbeing of the country's people, who are among the poorest in the world" (Ibid.).

Recently, there was an attempt to increase taxes for NGO-workers (The Guardian 2017), which shortly after was reduced. One can argue that the timing of this was rather inappropriate considered the increase of need in the severe humanitarian situation the country is facing. Several of the informants argues that they do not think it is only related to restraining the INGOs, but mostly related to the desperate economic situation and trying bring money from wherever possible (Interview 5, 2017; Interview 6, 2017; Interview 2, 2017). One of the informants on the other hand emphasized the aspect of the Governments need to control the citizens in lack of other accountability measures – and therefore the need to control the INGOs in fear of them targeting and assisting the ‘government enemy’ (Interview 3, 2017).
Another example is the passing of two legislative Acts to govern, regulate and control non-governmental organisations. The reason for why this NGO-law can be interpreted as a strong political message to the international community, is that it is close to a copy-paste of a similar law in Sudan, where the only purpose of the law was to control and prohibit the activities of the NGOs (Interview 2, 2017; Interview 3, 2017). According to the NGO Act, its purpose is “to provide for establishment of a legal framework for the registration, co-ordination and monitoring of operations of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Republic of South Sudan, and for other related matters” (NGO Act 2016). In the NGO Act there is a list of 13 criteria that need to be included in an application to the Registrar, whose mandate is to establish and maintain a database of NGOs and their activities in South Sudan. It is thereafter up to the Registrar to approve any NGO in South Sudan, as “No Non-Governmental Organization shall operate in South Sudan unless it has been fully registered with the Commission” (NGO Act 2016). Additionally, “The Registrar may, after due enquiry, renew or reject Operational Licence of any Non-Governmental Organisation”. The Commission is also given the mandate to “monitor and evaluate all activities of the Non-Governmental Organisations” (NGO Act 2016). Lastly, the Act states that if there any activities being planned or conducted other than those agreed upon in the application, the NGO needs to obtain a written approval of the Registrar prior. The NGO Act does also describe in detail whom is allowed to be employed by these NGOs, insisting that one gives priority to South Sudanese nationals, that one only engages professional staff from abroad if there are no qualified South Sudanese nationals and one has to ensure that not less than 80 percent of the employees are South Sudanese nationals. These new requirements leave little room for the international NGOs to operate freely and adapt and meet the rapidly changing situation in South Sudan. Entering South Sudan is now a time-consuming and long process of registration, and barriers for the projects and activities are the need for documentation and reporting for the renewal of the registration, as well as excessive governmental supervision. According to several of the informants argued that they have not yet experienced the NGO-law in practice (Interview 1, 2017; Interview 6, 2017). However, they have experienced the local government staff referring to the law as “a knife to be used against any organisation they do not want in the area” (Interview 1, 2017).

John Ashworth in The Voice of the voiceless (2014), argues that there are many reasons behind this toxic relationship, with one of them being that “few international NGOs act as if
they really believe they are guests in someone else’s country” (Ashworth 2014: 122). This to portray the reality of what Ashworth (2014) argues are most NGOs in South Sudan, where they impose donor-driven agenda’s from their air-conditioned bubble. Ashworth presents the modern aid worker living in an air-conditioned bubble completely cut off from the local community, receiving large salaries, eating imported food, frequenting expensive restaurants and hotels, with several vacations from the ‘hardship’ station he or she is looking forward to leave sometime soon (2014: 116). He also describes the shift in the practice for NGOs on the ground in South Sudan, starting in the 1980s with preparing project proposals with participation of local actors, which they then seek funding from international donor agencies to support implementation. By 2000 a new process emerged; back donors such as USAID, EU and DFID would design proposals and invite international and local NGOs to bid for them (Ashworth 2014: 118). The winning consortium would have some input on the detailed design of the project, but it would be mainly donor-driven leading the NGOs to become ‘government contractors’. This creates an additional dilemma, where local people are aware that large sums of money are coming into the country via aid agencies, but they do not see results on the ground commensurate with the funding. As the NGOs often literally represent life and death options for those affected by them, it leads to no change.

The typical mode of delivering aid – through a project – is too often implemented outside and bypassing these key relationships. The Norad Country Evaluation Brief on South Sudan launched in November 2016 has evaluated both development and emergency aid to South Sudan over time, and concludes on this exact issue – “donors often bypassed government authorities to deliver services more effectively” (Norad 2016: 30). As laid out in the theoretical framework, there is a growing body of research which demonstrates that “getting the accountability relationships right” is the key to improving public services for the poor (World Bank 2003). INGOs have a responsibility to reinforce the accountability in these relationships, not undermine it (Ibid.). Even if social protection is provided primarily through non-state actors there is still be a need to respect state sovereignty and to attempt to involve the government, where possible. As a response to evaluations from the OLS which claimed that it increased aid dependency and relieved the Government of Sudan from their obligations, many or most INGOs distanced themselves from both the government and the opposition under a new large-scale humanitarian response (Norad 2016: 26).
Another issue that further exacerbates the toxic relationship, is what many refer to as ‘flagging’ or ‘labelling’ by the INGOs. Meaning the need to put the INGOs name on projects and emphasize that the project has been developed and implemented through this organisation. It has even become the norm after long-term international engagement in South Sudan, that local government or organisations tend to highlight the organisations logo in any document or banners as they believe it is expected by the INGOs (Interview 5, 2017). Many of the informants in the interviews conducted emphasized the importance of creating accountability through visibility. By bringing forward local government staff, where there is functioning cooperation and communication (Interview 6, 2017; Interview 5, 2017; Interview 3, 2017, Interview 2, 2017). Not labelling projects as the organizations project, but as local projects that INGOs assist in building capacity and providing technical assistance. One of the informants shared a story on how their organisation was approached by a Governor in a state, asking for what kind of projects the INGO would start implementing this time around. The informant had responded politely that the INGO did not have any projects or programmes available to implement, but if the Governor and the local community had something in mind – they could bring it to the organisation for discussion on how the INGO could assist. This led to a great deal of confusion and a tense relationship before the Governor understood the purpose of the what the informant had said. They were not here to impose some donor driven agenda, but to adapt to the local context and assist the local community in strengthening their capacities (Interview 2, 2017).

5.4.2 Creating parallel structures

Social protection platforms must not be developed in isolation, as they tend to be in countries in protracted crisis, but should be part of a broader process to inform decision-making on investment priorities alongside other social and economic sectors (SOFI 2010). Although, parallel approaches in cases such as South Sudan with an unwilling Government, seems to be the only available option. Over the long-term, INGO predominance in service provision is a non-sustainable solution. It removes the ‘policy maker’ from the accountability triangle, creating structures that are isolated. At present, external actors are divided in their approach. Some try to avoid government institutions altogether, due to documented human rights abuses and atrocities by government forces. Others focus on the local level, avoiding the central government as much as possible. While a third group continues to work with the government (Norad 2016: 19). It seemed that aid donors became increasingly aware of the
link between an improved situation for the South Sudanese people and the potential for sustained peace, but they lacked an understanding of the overall risk and possibly contradictory impact of donor engagement (Ibid.: 20). The OECD report from 2011 on the international engagement in South Sudan evaluating the ten Principles for Engagement in Fragile States, stated that the lack of capacity in South Sudan has led development partners to establish a large number of ‘parallel project implementation units’, in which the Government of South Sudan felt would undermine state systems in the long-term (OECD 2011: 13). The OECD evaluation of efforts in South Sudan also argued that bypassing the government in the delivery of basic services, will cause harm in the medium to longer term and there are growing concerns regarding the impact of corruption and aid dependency (Ibid.: 16). As stated by one of the informants – it is not sustainable to continue distributing food separate from the Government in many years to come (Interview 1, 2017), and as Rolandsen and Daly (2016) point out – South Sudan is an extremely weak and fragile state, and is likely to be so in the foreseeable future.

Through Rostad’s (2015) findings, as mentioned earlier, she also concludes with findings where many of the informants had little faith in the state being able to do much to help them. One of Rostad’s (2015) informants explained that they would try to draw the attention of an NGO to the matter, rather than Government institutions and officials. This puts great emphasis on the responsibility of the INGOs, as they may serve as a de-legitimation of the state apparatus if not implemented with great care. When the state is not the service provider the population has few incentives to pay taxes, and the state is less accountable to the citizens.

Even if social protection is provided primarily through non-state actors there is still be a need to respect state sovereignty and to attempt to involve the government, where possible. One way of approaching this is shadow systems alignment, which aims to ensure that the capacity of the state to deliver in the future is not undermined as well as avoiding duplication (OECD 2004). Shadow system alignment would organize aid delivery to be compatible with existing or future state structures – rather than duplicating or undermining them (Ibid.). The long-term aim would always be for the state to provide these services. Another option is to work with local government where possible, if and when it is difficult to engage with central government departments due to lack of capacity and willingness. Collier (2007) argues that in every society of the bottom billion there are people working for change, but they are usually
defeated by the powerful internal forces. The INGOs should be helping those heroes, but as Collier (2007) argues – so far, we have stood by and watched them lose. Many of the informants interviewed for this thesis pointed out the importance of identifying the ‘heroes’ in such fragile context. That although there is no national political will, there are still individuals on local level that are trying their best to make change happen. But in most low-income countries, local government has very limited ability to act independently (OECD 2009: 41). One of the informants stated that it is very difficult and unrealistic to depend on pointing out the ‘heroes’ in South Sudan, as the Government structures are so thoroughly controlled from the top-down and no local authority would want to contradict that in fear of losing their job (Interview 3, 2017). If there is someone that does not follow orders from the central government, or starts thinking differently, they are instantly replaced (Ibid.). Things change within hours in South Sudan if there are messages from ‘above’, although no one on local level will admit that it is ordered from the Government (Ibid.).

In contexts such as South Sudan, where governments are unable or unwilling to be engaged or are directly involved in widespread abuses of human rights related to social protection, then it is clearly sensible to work through international actors (Harvey 2009). But even in these situations, the long term objective needs to encourage states to live up to their responsibilities to protect against their citizens (Ibid.).

Ashworth (2014) wrote that “..the Church in its prophetic role needs not only to critique the past and present, but also to imagine a new future”. This is an important aspect of the INGOs role at this time in South Sudan – one needs to acknowledge and put in place systems for a possible legitimate government sometime in the future. This should be an important aspect of all projects and programs initiated, and therefore also include the above discussed elements. The donor-driven agenda needs to adapt to the reality of local context, and assist in building structures that are sustainable and context specific. The INGOs needs to acknowledge the strengths which the local partner brings into the partnership, and also the local partners legitimacy to lead the process as the host (Ashworth 2014: 122).

South Sudan made a great deal of progress on its development strategy. However, due to its lack of institutional and organisational capacity, it has relied heavily on development partner support and high levels of technical co-operation – all of which operate outside of government systems (OECD 2011). Especially through humanitarian delivery, it is important
to ensure strategic coordination with, and capacity building for, national counterparts to be strengthened to ensure alignment with national emergency response planning mechanisms and to increase the ability of national institutions to respond to emergencies (UN CAP 2014-2016: 24).

Some analysts, both African and Western, feel the situation is so hopeless that they have proposed a radical solution: an international takeover. The argument goes that South Sudans government is not an effective or legitimate state, and that is should be nudged aside to let the United Nations and the African Union run a transitional administration for 10-15 years. South Sudanese officials have said that they would violently oppose this (New York Times 2017: 4). This solution would provide a full parallel system, posing its own challenges and issues that has been looked into by several researchers.

The HLPE (2012) report argues that in situations of protracted crisis, it is particularly important that the INGOs providing food assistance develop and implement coherent strategies for promoting and actively supporting institutions building and good governance. In instances where fragile governments are constrained by limited capacity, INGOs providing food assistance that are involved in providing social protection can, over time, acquire indefinite responsibility for providing basic social services (Harvey 2009). South Sudan underscores the importance of using food assistance activities to constantly build the technical and logistical capacity of government and other local institutions to play more central roles in service provision and social protection (HLPE 2012), especially seeing the potential for using the potential previously outlined in section 4.2 in developing sustainable agriculture in the country. Strategic objectives through the UN CAP (2014-2016) brings forward the important aspect of strengthening national systems for delivering basic services to enable the state to be the primary provider of services. This will reduce the need for humanitarian aid over time. This includes working closely with line ministries, national NGOs, civil society and local communities, in implementing relief programmes. This to ensure that humanitarian organisations impart as much knowledge and capacity to national organizations as possible (UN CAP 2014-2016: 17). Which brings us onto a third challenge.
5.4.3 Balancing immediate response and long-term solutions

Building on the two previous challenges, is the third challenge the INGOs are facing in South Sudan – the need to balance short-term relief operations and long-term responses in order to ensure sustainable development. This is closely linked to what is discussed in the previous chapters on generally creating a conducive environment for service delivery.

A dilemma in fragile situations is balancing short-term versus long-term objectives for international NGOs (OECD 2009: 13). Donors and INGOs need to achieve humanitarian goals and save lives, whilst also advancing the long-term sustainability – meaning that the international community should help deliver essential services in a way that builds accountability and ensures that government takes the ultimate responsibility (Ibid.). Donor and INGOs programming for service delivery in fragile countries needs to be integrated with state capacity and governance. When the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), a multi-donor pooled fund that is still active, was evaluated in 2015, it was found to be instrumental through emergency aid provisions in saving the lives of South Sudanese. Although, the report also finds that the focus on traditional life-saving activities, led to missed opportunities for integrating resilience approaches that would ensure sustainability (Norad 2016: 27).

Most responses to protracted crises take place in a humanitarian context, which often limits the ability to address the real drivers of the crisis in a more comprehensive way (Ibid.). However, experience in many countries shows that linking short- and long-term responses in protracted crises, and promoting responses that address the underlying causes of crises, can support longer-term recovery, also in agricultural livelihoods and food security (SOFI 2010). Humanitarian food-security clusters in protracted crises can provide important platforms for strengthening linkages between immediate humanitarian responses and longer-term development assistance aimed at addressing underlying structural factors limiting livelihoods. The SOFI (2010) report argues that clusters can develop transition strategies to ensure a smooth handover to development structures and processes and bring together the main national and international partners active in the food security sector.

This could be an opportunity in South Sudan, moving from food aid to food assistance. Humanitarian food assistance is a significant feature of protracted crisis environments, as proportion of undernourished people is higher in such context compared to other development countries. It saves lives and helps address the scarcity or deprivation that
underlies many protracted crises, but it is also an investment in a country’s future (Ibid.). Emergency food support that safeguards nutrition and livelihoods and supports education provides a strong basis for food security in the longer term, and represents a potentially crucial investment in future development (Ibid.). The many operational and political challenges of working in protracted crises, however, should not be underestimated.

Most international commitments made in response to UN appeals for emergencies worldwide goes to food assistance through different measures. Forty-four percent of the original 2009 Humanitarian Appeal, consisted of food distribution and food-assisted programmes (Ibid.:32). It has therefore been discussed and evaluated that humanitarian aid – particularly prolonged food aid – can undermine local systems and potentially do harm. It has therefore, been more attempts at bridging the gap between humanitarian relief and more sustainable and developmental aid (Ibid.). As stated in the SOFI (2010) new tools are being developed for agencies working in protracted crisis environments, and the possibility of tailoring interventions to specific contexts has made it possible to provide more nuanced interventions and therefore also diminish the potentially harmful effects of prolonged relief assistance.

Humanitarian food assistance can also obtain development aspects, by improving disaster preparedness and risk reduction, as well as by safeguarding sustainable livelihoods (Ibid.). A good example of this, is how Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) was born by transforming pre-existing humanitarian assistance. For over 30 years, responses to food insecurity in Ethiopia were dominated by emergency food aid, and concerns regarding several operational shortcomings in the emergency appeal system’s ability to develop reliable safety net and sustainable solutions developed (Van Domelen and Coll-Black 2012). The PSNP reaches about 7.3 million rural people with transfers of food or cash to assist in food-deficit periods while generating community assets – was based in part on decades of experience in responding to individual disasters and famines through humanitarian food assistance (Ibid.). The PSNP is an example of how countries emerging from protracted crises can build long-term assistance programmes for vulnerable groups on the basis of experience with humanitarian food-assistance safety nets (Devereux 2012). By the early 2000s, the PSNP was launched by the Ethiopian government, providing an example of partnership approach, having reoriented a rural safety net to better respond to the needs of food insecure in Ethiopia (Van Domelen and Coll-Black 2012). As Slater, Bailey and Harvey (2015) argue that such programmes might be unrealistic when no social assistance mechanisms are in
place, when delivery mechanisms for existing assistance are disrupted by crisis or the objectives between humanitarian and safety net systems are too different.

In contexts where state capacity is especially weak or where violence and rights violations are perpetuating the crisis, the possibilities of such handover to an accountable Government is more distant (SOFI 2010). This was for years the case in southern Sudan, where conflict and associated human rights abuses caused famines. The limits of what humanitarian food assistance could achieve in the context were clear, as long as the underlying causes of hunger (the conflict and rights abuses that provoked the 1988 famine where 250 000 Southern Sudanese died) were not stopped (Ibid.). The post Consolidated Peace Agreement (CPA) 2005, represented the beginning of a period in which a transition to a humanitarian food assistance that could evolve towards more sustainable long-term solutions. Food distributions continued meeting immediate basic needs while also contributing to building communities’ confidence in the peace process (Ibid.). Returnees, in particular, received food assistance to help them during the first months of resettlement. Recent studies have shown that the provision of this assistance had one of the most significant positive impacts on reintegration and recovery for this group (SOFI 2010).

Addressing short- and longer-term food-security issues in protracted crisis situations is not a new idea, but what has changed is to which extent it is put into practice and mainstreamed (SOFI 2010). Donors and INGOs have highlighted the need to link humanitarian food assistance with longer-term efforts, and have increasingly recognized that this is necessary in order to move out of a situation of protracted crisis and address the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition while maintaining necessary support for humanitarian food assistance (Ibid.).

The SOFI (2010) report provides such an example from South Sudan, where the INGOs succeeded with livelihoods-based food-security programming in protracted crises. It requires a strong commitment to livelihoods approaches, a strong coordination effort with control over resources, and support for systematic assessment of the impact of interventions on livelihoods - but most importantly the involvement of local institutions and an engagement with parties in conflict are fundamental to the success (SOFI 2010: 26). The programme consisted of a livestock health programme to help control livestock rinderpest. The programme was initially introduced under the OLS as a ‘top-down’ programme, bringing formally trained animal
health workers and establishing a chain to deliver vaccines (Ibid.). As the OLS wanted to be seen as independent to the parties in the civil war, no local institutions involved which proved to be the downfall of the initial effort. According to the SOFI (2010) report the programme changes its strategy towards the a community-based approach which built on local and traditional institutions, which quickly achieved positive results. The OLS programme adapted to all three challenges presented in this analysis, and the programme vaccinated over 1 million cattle in 1995, compared with only 140 000 in 1993 before such challenges were addressed (SOFI 2010). There have been no confirmed outbreaks of rinderpest in southern Sudan since 1998 (Ibid.).

In countries such as South Sudan where one cannot rely on the support of the government and institutions, there are many successes of INGO implemented programmes in protracted crisis. Such as the key tools of WFP to provide food assistance to the most vulnerable - school feeding and FFA programmes that “help meet the immediate food needs of vulnerable people by having them build or boost assets that will benefit the whole community” (WFP 2015b). Using food, vouchers or cash transfers, they get communities participating in activities such as repairing irrigation systems, building bridges, soil conservation and setting up community granaries (Ibid.). The WFP have conducted a massive road rehabilitation project in Southern Sudan since 2006, which has improved links in the country and helped revitalized trade. The roads built so far have halved the average travel time to markets, schools and health centres and reduces cereal prices in locations with road access (WFP 2015d). Such programmes should be initiated as soon as the situation allows, to create employment and visible peace dividends. The WFP has also had programmes offering food assistance as an incentive for former combatants to learn new skills and abandon their weapons (WFP 2015b).

In South Sudan’s first year of statehood, the WFP focused on providing life-saving relief assistance through general food distributions; but then a country strategy was developed enhancing access to social services in support of good nutrition and learning (WFP 2013b). WFP’s strategy was guided by bridging the gap between short-term life-saving relief and the need to increase the capacity of state institutions and enhance partnerships to promote sustainable hunger solutions (Ibid.). The deteriorating humanitarian situation in South Sudan in 2017, has again led to focusing the INGOs efforts on life-saving relief operations. For the World Food Programme, general food distributions in February 2017 comprise 88% of the
Protracted Relief and Recovery Programme and 83% of the Emergency Operation (WFP 2017b). In addition to this, a small percentage of both programmes is the Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme. Meaning that there are currently no FFA programmes, and only 0.021% of the funding goes to school feeding programmes (WFP 2017b).

In a deteriorating protracted crisis context such as South Sudan, the challenge of balancing immediate response and long-term solutions is increasingly difficult. Programmes tailored to incorporate such sustainable components in order to bridge the gap between relief interventions and development efforts, are being pushed aside for life-saving assistance. But new initiatives such as the ‘Safe Schools Declaration’ that has recently been adopted by many countries, and among them – South Sudan, perhaps provides opportunities to striking that balance again (Regjeringen 2017). Mainstreaming food security through social protection measures such as School Feeding in the Safe Schools – is this an opportunity that cannot be missed?

First and foremost, humanitarian food assistance needs to meet acute individual needs, and therefore does not provide a substitute for other forms of international development engagement (SOFI 2010). While food assistance in protracted crises can be developmental in many respects, it should not be oversold and expected to be accountable to development objectives and principles; rather, it should be seen as part of a package of essential interventions in protracted crisis situations (SOFI 2010). What is needed to be looked further into and addressed in the continuation of the international engagement in South Sudan is how to do this exactly - improving aid architecture to better bridge the gap between classic humanitarian response and development efforts. Documents such as the Framework for Action developed in response to the SOFI (2010) report on addressing food insecurity in protracted crisis addressed this specific issue, on how to ensure a more coherent, predictable and comprehensive response to food insecurity within a humanitarian context – should be considered to a greater extent.
6 Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to answer the two research questions presented in the theoretical section. Firstly, I ask the question ‘does the Government of South Sudan fulfil the role of a state in delivering services to the people’? Through analysing the operative definitions of fragility used by the OECD Development Assistance Committee and aid agencies on lack of capacity and willingness to perform key government functions for the people, South Sudan fails on both measures. Some argue that it is partly due to history and the inheritance of a country without any strong institutions, whilst others believe that ‘if there is a will, there is a way’. The political will has varied from genuine political will from the Government of South Sudan to improve service delivery and be accountable to their citizens right after independence, but has diminished and arguably disappeared over time. Now, a political will is not only lacking – but the Government is impeding humanitarian access for the INGOs that in fact are delivering life-saving assistance.

For the accountability triangle give a picture of how the current situation of service delivery is in South Sudan, I present an adapted accountability where the INGOs are breaking the ‘routes’ between citizens towards both the Government and the providers. The research question to guide the next part of the analysis asked ‘does the role of the Government in South Sudan pose challenges for the International NGOs in aiding the people of South Sudan? Adapting the accountability triangle brings with it many challenges, where I discuss and present three of the main challenges derived from theory and data collected through interviews. The three challenges I present are; the increasingly toxic relationship between the Government and the INGOs, the creation of parallel structures, and the dilemma of balancing immediate responses and long-term solutions. On the challenge of the increasingly toxic relationship, the discussion concluding that there are substantial examples of how the Government is trying to control, limit and at times impede the humanitarian efforts, such as targeted killings of INGO employees, restrictive NGO laws, lack of humanitarian access. Whom to blame for this increasingly toxic relationship is a valuable discussion, with Ashworth (2014) observations claiming that “few international NGOs act as if they really believe they are guests in someone else’s country” (Ashworth 2014: 122). This to portray the reality of what Ashworth (2014) argues are most NGOs in South Sudan, where they impose donor-driven agenda’s from their ‘air-conditioned bubble’.
When INGOs are placed in such context, as the situation in South Sudan, receiving such tremendous responsibility of providing the people with basic services, it is important that there are well thought-out and planned strategies for the engagement, ensuring sustainability and long-term planning. An improvement of the relationship is definitely needed in the further engagements in South Sudan.

According to Devereux (2011), the limited provision of social security in many African countries is often explained by the heavy presence of external donors, who are not accountable to local citizens and therefore cannot commit to providing support beyond their short funding cycles. On the challenge presented on creating parallel systems, a conclusion is that INGOs have a responsibility to reinforce the accountability in these relationships, not undermine it (World Bank 2003). Even if social protection is provided primarily through non-state actors there is still be a need to respect state sovereignty and to attempt to involve the government, where possible. One way of approaching this is shadow systems alignment, which aims to ensure that the capacity of the state to deliver in the future is not undermined as well as avoiding duplication (OECD 2004).

Social protection in development contexts is deliberately state-centric, as it views building state capacity to deliver social protection as critical to ensuring sustainability and accountability, and as an integral part of supporting a social contract between a state and its citizens (FAO 2016: 16). But in a context such as South Sudan, where a state-led social protection development is not possible, balancing short-term and long-term efforts is important to ensure that systems are built, while demands for lifesaving assistance are being met (Ibid.: 17). Responses that save lives are of course indispensable, but specific to countries in protracted crisis there is a need to move towards improving support for livelihoods, social protection and risk reduction while retaining the capacity and flexibility of responding to acute crises (SOFI 2010: 46). There are several examples presented of how this can be done, such as the PSNP programme in Ethiopia, but in such contexts they are usually met by a somewhat capable and willing Government. A question that would be interesting to ask would be – in what way is the international community advocating for or potentially preparing for this in the context of South Sudan?
In a deteriorating protracted crisis context such as South Sudan, the challenge of balancing immediate response and long-term solutions is increasingly difficult. Programmes tailored to incorporate such sustainable components in order to bridge the gap between relief interventions and development efforts, are again being pushed aside for life-saving assistance. What would be interesting to look further into is the mainstreaming food security through social protection measures in deteriorating protracted crises. This could be applicable to new initiatives such as the ‘Safe Schools Declaration’ that has recently been adopted by many countries, protecting education in conflict situations, could perhaps provide a golden opportunity to striking that balance again. Does school feeding at the Safe Schools present such an opportunity that cannot be missed?

6.1 Further research

The need for further research on the role that food security through social protection can play in fragile countries such as South Sudan has been underscored by global events throughout the years. Rising food prices, food riots, natural disasters, food used as weapon in wars have resulted in policy makers and international agencies and non-governmental organisations devoting attention to the complex cause of food security. In fragile states and protracted crises such as South Sudan, where the situation is met with INGOs providing humanitarian aid through ensuring basic services to the people, it is of essential value to look further into what and how short-term responses can transform to longer-term recovery.

Food security issues such as malnutrition, global environmental change, and food safety, must be understood as multi-causal and multi-disciplinary challenges, and therefore require a great deal of research on the topic in several fields of study. Understanding the interactive nature of these food security challenges identifies important solution sets and reveals the need for better coordination between often disparate efforts to address core factors that contribute to food insecurity (McDonald 2010: 161). Global trends such as population growth, shifting consumption patterns, and climate change strongly suggest that the challenge of food security will remain a pressing concern for individuals, communities, states and the international system in the future. Even though food is one of humankind’s most basic needs – and a fundamental human right, there is far too little focus on this particular aspect in social, economic and political contexts. Maybe the 2030 Agenda will break the way for changing this.
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Appendix I

List of interviews

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Appendix II

INTERVIEW GUIDE (NOR)

Informasjonsark til informant

Rammer:
- Tid 45 min intervjutid + klargjøring
- Sted etter ønske fra intervjuperson
- Intervjuene tas opp for å hjelpe transkribering i ettertid
- Det vil foregå full anonymisering av intervjupersoner av sikkerhetshensyn
- Intervjupersonene har full reserveringsrett på både studien og enkeltspørsmål, og ingenting vil bli sitert uten deres samtykke.

Tema:
«Social Protection for Enhanced food security in South Sudan» – statens og internasjonale organisasjoners rolle og hvordan man kan bruke innsats fokusert rundt matsikkerhet.

Jeg forsøker problematisere at det i hovedsak er de internasjonale NGOene som driver ”social protection” i et land som Sør Sudan, der en fungerende stat er tilnærmet ikke-eksisterende. I et langsiktig perspektiv skaper dette et dilemma for det internasjonale samfunnet som ønsker å utvikle bærekraftige prosjekter og strukturer, samtidig som det oppleves problematisk å involvere og legitimere myndighetene som begår overgrep mot befolkningen. Deretter forsøker jeg å si noe om den kompliserte virkeligheten de internasjonale organisasjonene arbeider i, og videre trekke noen linjer til hvor man kan se muligheter. I lys av hungersnød, sultkatastrofe og en svært alvorlig matsikkerhetssituasjon i et land med enormt potensiale for jordbruk, refleksjoner jeg rundt mulighetene for å bruke dette som en vei videre.

“South Sudan provides a puzzle to donors who ordinarily work with and through national governments. In the absence of a functioning state, it remains unclear how donors can best provide development and emergency aid.” Norad’s Country Evaluation Brief Report 6/2016 South Sudan

Metode:
Hensikten med bruken av intervju i denne oppgaven er å supplere eksisterende sekundær litteratur rundt tematikken nevnt ovenfor med personlige opplevelser og erfaringer fra internasjonale NGOer i Sør Sudan, samt muligheter for veien videre.

Intervjupersonenes tanker og refleksjoner har to funksjoner for oppgaven. De fungere som samtaler der jeg som forsker på temaet får nye inntrykk, lærdom og tanker rundt temaet. Den andre funksjonen er at disse tankene kan bli brukt opp imot det teoretiske rammeverket som presenteres i oppgaven, og på den måten være med på å skape ny kunnskap.

Intervjupersonene er valgt ut basert på et strategisk utvalg, der deres bakgrunn, erfaringer og opplevelser rundt tematikken er blitt vurdert. De personlige og praktiske tilhøringene til tematikken vil sammen med eksisterende sekundær litteratur utgjøre datamaterialet i min masteroppgave.
Om spørsmålene:
Spørsmålene er delt inn i fire kategorier, hvor kategoriene mer eller mindre sammenfaller med arbeidsspørsmålene jeg forsøker å besvare i masteroppgaven. Til slutt åpnes det for at intervjupersonene kan dele tanker rundt temaet som det ikke har blitt gitt åpning og mulighet for tidligere.

Intervjupersonene får mulighet til å se på spørsmålene i forkant og underveis i intervjuet. Det er deres personlige opplevelser, reflekisjoner og tanker omkring temaet som er viktig å få frem.

Forebygging av feilkilder:
Det er intervjupersonenes personlige tanker og reflekisjoner som er ønskelig. Som intervjuer må jeg passe på å ikke skape filter og former som påvirker deres svar. Intervjupersonene trenger derfor ikke å ha kjennskap til teoriene som skal brukes i oppgaven fra før. Dette kan forme måten man velger å svare på.

Det inngår i intervjuer, mitt, etiske ansvar ovenfor intervjupersoner å søge for at intervjupersonene føler seg respektert og ivaretatt, og at de er innforstått med mulighetene til å avslutte intervjuet eller avstå fra å svare. Informanten vil anonymiseres fullstendig ved gjennomføringen av disse intervjuene, dette i hovedsak for å ivareta informantens sikkerhet i et svært vanskelig politisk og humanitært klima i Sør Sudan. Da masteroppgaven min skrives på engelsk, vil det være en risiko for at innholdet kan misbrukes og få uheldige konsekvenser dersom det ikke anonymiseres.

Spørsmål:

1. Politisk vilje blant myndighetene i Sør Sudan
   1.1. Hvordan opplever du den politiske viljen hos myndighetene til å levere standard tjenester til folket?
   1.2. Hvordan opplever du at humanitært arbeid generelt blir prioritert av myndighetene?
   1.3. Hva tror du er myndighetenes motiv bak initiativer som; NGO-loven, økning i kostnad for arbeidstillatelse, behandling av internasjonalt ansatte?

2. NGOer i Sør Sudan
   2.1. Hvordan oppfatter du rommet for internasjonale organisasjoner å operere i Sør Sudan?
   2.2. Har du noen reflekisjoner rundt hvordan NGO-loven oppleves for organisasjonene?
      2.2.1. Andel nasjonalt ansatte generelt i organisasjonen – og spesielt i selve implementeringen av prosjektene?

3. Prosjektimplementering
   3.1. Hvilken grad av samarbeid har dere med nasjonale og lokale myndigheter?
   3.2. Kan du ta for deg et eksempel på et samarbeid på lokalt eller nasjonalt nivå?

1 Myndighetene i Sør Sudan, ved Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development, har nettopp offentliggjort en ny og betraktelig høyere pris for arbeidstillatelse i Sør Sudan, hvor bla. stillinger som klassifiseres under ”professional/business class” forventes å betale 10,000 USD.
3.3. I et slikt samarbeid, i hvilken grad involveres myndighetene i selve implementeringen?

4. Matsikkerhet og veien videre
Med en forverring i matsikkerhetssituasjonen i Sør Sudan, og et økende press fra det internasjonale samfunnet for myndighetene til å ta ansvar for egen befolkning. Hvor kan man se muligheter?

4.1. Hvordan best «overføre» ansvaret for social protection tilbake til staten via internasjonale organisasjoners prosjekter?

4.2. Forventer du en endring i myndighetenes holdning nå som de tilsynelatende har anerkjent at det er hungersnød i noen deler av landet?

4.3. Tenker du en forventet økt internasjonal innsats for å forbedre matsikkerhets-situasjonen i landet kunne vært en mulighet for å bygge noe mer bærekraftig? Eks. Food for work/Food for assets programmer

Andre tanker rundt temaet?