Patterns of Deployment

Driving Forces of German Military Participation in Multilateral Missions in Africa

Iselin Stalheim Møller

Master Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies
Department of Political Science
University of Oslo
April 28, 2015
Patterns of Deployment

*Driving Forces of German Military Participation in Multilateral Missions in Africa*

Iselin Stalheim Møller
April 28, 2015
Patterns of Deployment, Driving Forces of German Military Participation in Multilateral Missions in Africa

Iselin Stalheim Møller

http://www.duo.uio.no/

Trykk: CopyCat
Abstract

German government decisions on military contribution to multilateral missions show an uneven pattern. This thesis explores German practice of military deployments abroad by examining and comparing the decision-making processes of five cases where Germany either participated militarily in a multilateral mission in Africa, or refused to do so. The variables threat to national interests, prestige, alliance/partner value, and electoral politics, are assessed to explain the decisions of participation and non-participation. Additionally, the study brings in the concept of strategic culture, which is suited to explain variations in the attitudes towards the use of force. The thesis argues that multilateral commitments and the security relationship to partner France is key to understand German military engagement in Africa. Partner value and prestige provide a solution to the puzzle of why Germany provides support to military missions in states far from its own territory, that do not concern direct German national interests.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Robin Allers at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), for valuable advice and guidance on the thesis, as well as Janne Haaland Matlary at the University of Oslo for putting me on the right track early in the research process. I am also thankful for the interviewees taking their time and giving me valuable and relevant input for my research. I would also like to thank Rune Busch for reading my final draft, corrections, and support.

Word count: 32.498
Table of Contents

1. Introduction and background ................................................................. 11
   1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 11
   1.2 Background: The evolution of German use of force .............................. 16
2. How to understand German security policy behavior ............................ 23
   2.1 Strategic culture ............................................................................... 24
   2.2 Literature review - military contributions and burden sharing ........... 28
   2.3 Theoretical explanations .................................................................... 31
     2.3.1 Threat to national interests .......................................................... 31
     2.3.2 Prestige ......................................................................................... 33
     2.3.3 Alliance/partner value ................................................................... 34
     2.3.4 Electoral politics ................................................................. 37
   2.4 The hypothesis .................................................................................... 39
3. Research design - why comparative case study? .................................... 40
   3.1 Comparative case study ..................................................................... 40
   3.2 How to select relevant cases? ............................................................... 41
   3.3 Unit of analysis .................................................................................. 42
   3.4 Use of sources .................................................................................... 42
4. Analyses .................................................................................................. 44
   4.1 DR Congo 2006 ................................................................................. 44
     4.1.1 Threats to national interest, and Prestige ..................................... 46
     4.1.2 Partner value ................................................................................ 48
     4.1.3 Electoral politics .......................................................................... 48
     4.1.4 Strategic culture .......................................................................... 49
     4.1.5 Conclusion ................................................................................... 50
   4.2 Chad/CAR 2007-2008 ....................................................................... 51
     4.2.1 Threat to national interest, and Prestige ..................................... 53
     4.2.2 Partner value ................................................................................ 54
     4.2.3 Electoral politics .......................................................................... 54
     4.2.4 Strategic culture .......................................................................... 55
     4.2.5 Conclusion ................................................................................... 55
4.3 Libya 2011 ........................................................................................................ 56
  4.3.1 Threat to national interest ........................................................................... 58
  4.3.2 Prestige ........................................................................................................ 59
  4.3.3 Alliance value ............................................................................................... 61
  4.3.4 Electoral politics ........................................................................................... 62
  4.3.5 Strategic culture ........................................................................................... 63
  4.3.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 64
  4.4 Mali 2013-2014 ............................................................................................... 66
  4.4.1 Threat to national interests ......................................................................... 69
  4.4.2 Prestige .......................................................................................................... 70
  4.4.3 Partner value .................................................................................................. 73
  4.4.4 Electoral politics ............................................................................................ 76
  4.4.5 Strategic culture ............................................................................................ 78
  4.4.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 79
  4.5 CAR 2014 .......................................................................................................... 80
  4.5.1 Threat to national interest, and Prestige ...................................................... 83
  4.5.2 Partner value .................................................................................................. 84
  4.5.3 Electoral politics ............................................................................................ 86
  4.5.4 Strategic culture ............................................................................................ 86
  4.5.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 87

5. Comparison, and Conclusion ............................................................................. 88
  5.1 Comparison ........................................................................................................ 88
  5.2 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 93

Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 97
1. Introduction and background

1.1 Introduction

“Are we doing what we can to stabilise our neighbourhood, both in the East and in Africa?”
Joachim Gauck, President

“Indifference is not an option for a country like Germany.”
Ursula von der Leyen, Defense Minister

“Germany is too big to merely comment on world affairs from the sidelines.”
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Foreign Minister

At the Munich Security Conference 2014, the new German government announced a shift in its foreign and security policy. In coordinated, but separate speeches the German President Joachim Gauck, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated that Germany would take more responsibility for international crisis management, and not exclude military engagement (Gauck, 2014, Steinmeier, 2014a, von der Leyen, 2014). The statements caused sensation and widespread debate. The burden of two world wars still makes security and defense policy, and especially the use of force, a sensitive issue in Germany. Deployment of the armed forces, die Bundeswehr, in military operations abroad is among the most disputed issues in German foreign policy. The decision-makers have to balance high external expectations that Germany could and should contribute more in international military missions, against a national political and public 'culture of military restraint' (Oppermann, 2012:504-505; Guérot, 2013:5; Allers, 2013:6; Major and Mölling, 2014b:27). Thus, the announced shift in German foreign policy at the beginning of 2014 was welcomed by those who would like to see Germany stepping up (Economist 2014), but also criticized and perceived as militarism (Augstein, 2014; Meiritz, 2014).
The new signals from the government can be placed at the core of an on-going debate on the development of German security policy after reunification in 1990, and the topical question whether German behavior is becoming 'normalized' (Longhurst, 2004:6; Maull, 2012a; Oppermann, 2012; Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:1). The question of normalization concerns German use of force and participation in military operations, and 'normal' in this context means whether German governments behave more like comparable European powers, notably France and Great Britain, in its foreign and security policy practices (Maull, 2011:99; Oppermann, 2012:506). A common account of the recent development of German security policy behavior has been that German policymakers make unpredictable decisions, and that an uneven pattern of military participation confuses and frustrates the partners and allies (Maull, 2011:114; Miskimmon, 2012:393; Oppermann, 2012:502; Stahl, 2012:598; Allers, 2013:5; Brose, 2013:5). The unexpected decision to abstain in the United Nations Security Council on a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011 has been seen as the most prominent and recent example of this development (Maull, 2011:114; Major and Mölling, 2014b:7).

This thesis will explore German practice of military deployments abroad by examining and comparing the decision-making processes of military contributions to multilateral missions in Africa. To examine what factors influence a state’s decision to make a military contribution I turn to the burden sharing literature. The German relationship to France is crucial to the decision-making processes as Paris is the core partner in engagements in Africa, and initiated all the relevant missions.

German engagement in Africa is relevant for several reasons. Military participation in missions in African states has evolved to become an established part of German security policy, and the engagement in Africa can be placed at the core of the broader debate on the evolvement of the use of force. Africa was one of the first targets of out-of-area Bundeswehr deployments after the end of the Cold War (Longhurst, 2004:60), and the German army has participated in a series of peace and security initiatives since then. A majority of current Bundeswehr engagements takes place on the African
continent (Bundeswehr, 2015a), and it is reason to expect that Africa will continue to be the main theatre for international crisis management (Major and Mölling, 2014b:15; Tull, 2014:1). Additionally, Africa is a priority for the current German government. The government has presented new general guidelines for its Africa policy (Bundesregierung, 2014a). The biggest parliament and government party, CDU, has declared Africa as a main priority for this legislature period, emphasized through an expert discussion on security in Africa (Kauder, 2014). Lastly, the government pointed specifically to crisis management in Africa when announcing the shift towards a more active and responsible security policy in the first half of 2014 (Gauck, 2014; Hollande and Merkel, 2014; Repinski and Hoffmann, 2014; Tull, 2014:1). However, German military involvement in Africa presents some puzzles. While France and Great Britain have direct interests in Africa because of historical extensive colonial activity, Germany is a less evident and more reluctant actor in African crisis management (Matlary, 2009:117). The patterns of military deployment and level of engagement reveal a changing behavior, which suggests an unpredictable German security policy. Scholars argue that German decision-makers have been struggling to define German interests in the region, and that a lack of strategy has led Berlin to justify its engagement by pointing at the need to support France (Major and Mölling, 2014b:15; Stahnke, 2014; Tull, 2014:3). In light of a continued and possible strengthened security engagement on the African continent, a deeper understanding of the driving forces behind military participations is required.

My research question is:

**Why does Germany sometimes provide and sometimes refuse to make a military contribution to multilateral missions in Africa?**

To explain the question of why Germany sometimes participates in military missions, I conduct detailed analyses of the decision-making processes of five cases where Germany either provided military contribution to a multilateral mission, or refused to do so. The cases of participation are: (1) the EU military mission EUFOR DR Congo

---

1 Updated on April 7 2015
in 2006, (2) the EU training mission EUTM Mali in 2013-2014, and (3) the military mission EUFOR CAR 2014. The cases of non-participation are (4) the EU military mission EUFOR Chad/CAR in 2007-2008, and (5) the NATO mission in Libya in 2011.

The missions differ in a number of important ways such as geographical location, political objectives, level of military contribution, and historical context. Still, they share similarities, which make them relevant for comparison. In addition to being cases where German policymakers had to decide whether to make or withstand a military contribution, they all concern the bilateral partnership to France, and they were authorized by a UN Security Council mandate. A further discussion of why the cases are relevant will be addressed in chapter 3.

To answer the research question I build on the burden sharing literature, and especially the theoretical framework of Jason W. Davidson's comparative study *America’s Allies and War* (2011). Davidson's study is highly relevant as it seeks to find the answer to why allies sometimes contribute militarily and sometimes refuse to do so (Davidson, 2011:2). Davidson examined changing state behavior by assessing the explanatory variables of (1) threat to national interests, (2) prestige, (3) alliance/partner value, and (4) electoral politics (Davidson, 2011:14). Additionally, to assess the specific traits of German security policy I will examine the concept of strategic culture. Strategic culture has gained widespread support in international relations studies during the past decades, and is especially suited to explain change and continuity in security policy behavior (Lantis and Howlett, 2007:94-95), as well as variations in the attitudes towards the use of force (Hyde-Price, 2004:325).

The study will fill a gap in the extensive scholarly literature on German security policy. Studies on German military participation tend to focus on single crisis situations, and often the most contentious, and robust missions, such as participation in Kosovo in 1999 (Maull, 2000; Auerswald, 2004), Afghanistan in 2001 (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012), the refusal of the war in Iraq in 2003 (Longhurst, 2004; Baltrusiatis,
2008; Maull, 2011), and the abstention in the UN Security Council on a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011 (Maull, 2011; Rinke, 2011; Miskimmon, 2012; Oppermann, 2012; Stahl, 2012; Allers, 2013; Hansel and Oppermann, 2014). There are also case studies on German engagement in Africa (Berg, 2009; Tull, 2009; Schmitt, 2012; Brummer, 2013). However, I have failed to find a study comparing the driving forces of German military engagement in Africa in several cases,² and under different governments. To analyze and compare several cases allows me to assess how multiple factors vary and interact under different conditions, which imply a more thorough assessment of their possible influence on the decision-making process (Davidson, 2011:14). Hence, this study provides a meaningful contribution to the understanding of German security policies. Secondly, this study will contribute by focusing on Germany's bilateral partnership to France, which is at the core of European security cooperation.

Conflicts and instability in African countries increasingly concern the European threat agenda (Matlary, 2009:19). This is evident through several European ad hoc responses to crises on the African continent as well as longer-term capacity building initiatives (Vines, 2010:1091). This study will also contribute to a broader understanding of the use of force in international relations in general as the smaller missions and contributions studied here are typical examples of the new trend in western military intervention. The long and resource intensive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have made the western community less willing to intervene and deploy its own forces in extensive and risky missions. Both Europe and the USA have become increasingly risk-averse, and the trend goes towards more limited, ad hoc coalition missions without prolonged engagement on the ground (Baltrusaitis, 2008:1; Maull, 2014a). Discussions on why states choose to use force are of fundamental importance as there are “considerable human, military, and economic costs associated with going to war” (Haas, 2009). All interventions analyzed here are so-called ‘wars of choice’ (Auerswald, 2004), which involve less vital interests than ‘wars of necessity’, and thus, are dependent on policy makers varying judgments and interpretations of the particular political contexts.

² Schmitt (2012) compares EUFOR DR Congo with EUFOR Chad/CAR.
This study aims at explaining which factors such judgments were based on.

A deeper understanding of German security policy behavior has several possible policy implications. How Germany sees its own role in crisis management and the question of what makes Germany act militarily is of utter importance for the European and international partners. Traditionally, France and Great Britain have been the leading forces in European security policy (Matlary, 2009:48). Germany’s increased economic strength and prominent political role since reunification in 1990, makes Berlin increasingly important in all types of decisions and policy development in Europe, including the field of foreign and security policy (Allers, 2013:6; Guérot, 2013:5).

This thesis will argue that multilateral commitments and the security relationship to partner France is key to understand German military engagement in Africa. The findings suggest that partner value to France and prestige were the most important driving forces of German participation in military missions. Partner value and prestige provide a solution to the puzzle of why Germany provides support to military missions in states far from its own territory, that do not concern direct German national interests.

Before I proceed to a brief literature review of the most relevant scholarly works on burden sharing in military missions, and a more thorough explanation of the theoretical variables that will be used in this comparative analysis, I will give a brief background of the evolvement of German use of military force after the end of the Cold War.

1.2 Background: The evolvement of German use of force

German foreign and security policy is based on a policy developed in West Germany after the Second World War (Maull, 2011:98). The war experiences demanded a clear break with the non-democratic and militaristic practices of the past, and German
security policy and the use of military force, had to be re-learned (Longhurst, 2004:25). Wide-reaching legal measures were imposed on Germany from abroad to prevent the state from fighting another war again (Longhurst, 2004:27; Maull, 2011:98). The preventive measures were fully supported by the new German leaders who endorsed a role that Maull defines as a ‘civilian power’, oriented around military restraint, multilateralism, and democratic values (Maull, 2011:98). It was essential to establish post-war Germany as a reliable and credible ally among the Western partners, and to prove that Germany could live up to its obligations within the transatlantic alliance and on European integration (Maull, 2011:98; Oppermann, 2012:504). German policymakers were committed to get rid of the suspicion that Germany again could chose a ‘Sonderweg’, a special path (Longhurst, 2004:141; Oppermann, 2012:504). The rearmament of West Germany in the 1950s took place within a Euro-Atlantic setting (Longhurst, 2004:29). The West German armed forces were legally assigned a restricted role concentrating on defense of national and alliance territory against the threat from the East. There was a “widespread conviction that West Germany should maintain a low profile in security matters” (Longhurst, 2004:2), and this notion became deeply rooted in the German public, in the foreign policy tradition, and in the Basic Law (Lantis, 2002a:22).

The end of the Cold War meant a greater room for maneuver for German security policymakers, the geopolitical territory changed and Germany faced no strategic threats for the first time in its history (Lantis, 2002a:22). Additionally, reunification of East and West Germany meant that Germany was given full sovereignty (Allers, 2013:13). The expectations towards German security policy behavior changed radically. Many scholars now expected Germany to get rid of the constraints, seek a more ‘normal’, assertive role in international relations (Lantis, 2002a:23), and pursue a security policy based on its own national interests rather than those of its allies (Longhurst, 2004:7). In addition, the allies expected Germany to increase the level of activity, take more responsibility, and shoulder a bigger share of the burden in international crisis management (Oppermann, 2012:504). However, the unified Germany insisted to stay with the established line and pursue "a consistent and
predictable foreign policy” (Haftendorn, 2012:16). Maull argues that the main features of German foreign and security policy established during the Cold War are intact, except for the use of military force (Maull, 2011:98). The development after 1990 shows a greater willingness to use armed force (Longhurst, 2004:56). German policymakers immediately started to make use of their new security policy tool in increasingly bold peace operations. All the political parties, except the far left party Die Linke, went through a “re-thinking process” during the first half of the 1990s, which resulted in the widely shared belief that “the united Germany had no alternative to also take military responsibility under multilateral peace operations in the future” (Maull, 2011:98-99). Military participation in Africa were among the first results of this shift towards acceptance of the necessary use of force. Already in the final phase of the Cold War, Germany participated in an international peace mission to Namibia in 1988/89 (Maull, 2011:98). In 1993, the German government sent 1,640 soldiers for transport, logistic, and engineering work to a UN peace-enforcing mission to Somalia (Longhurst, 2004:60). An important event in the process towards broader military involvement was a decision from the Constitutional Court in 1994 on “out-of-area” deployments. The court ruled that the German Constitution permits military action beyond self-defense as part of a multilateral operation conducted by the UN, EU or NATO, as long as the missions are approved by the parliament (Longhurst, 2004:64).

The first intense combat experiences for the German Bundeswehr took place in the Balkan wars, where German forces participated in aerial attacks in Bosnia in 1995, and in Kosovo in 1999 (Maull, 2011:99). The involvement in Kosovo has been considered a decisive moment in German security policy (Miskimmon, 2012:393), and a breach of a taboo (Longhurst, 2004:69). Kosovo differed from any previous engagement because the Bundeswehr engaged in an offensive military operation against a sovereign state without a UN Security Council mandate (Longhurst, 2004:70). The proponents justified participation by pointing at the broader goal of a common European foreign and security policy, as well as German prestige, and the “perception of Germany

---

3 Die Linke was established in 2007, the predecessor in the 1990s was the PSD - Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus.
around the world” (Longhurst, 2004:65). Additionally, the German government made a strong humanitarian argument stating that Germany had a moral obligation to participate (Longhurst, 2004:71). Chancellor Gerhard Schröder argued that the basic principle of “never again war” had to be reinterpreted in light of the massacres in Kosovo, and that it was Germany’s responsibility to stop the killings (Longhurst, 2004:71-72).

While the development in the 1990s and especially the deployment to Kosovo suggested that German security policy was changing towards 'normalcy', events during the 2000s indicate that the role of the Bundeswehr remained contested and limited (Longhurst, 2004:77). The German military involvement in the US-led war in Afghanistan is to date the biggest engagement. Chancellor Schröder declared “unconditional solidarity” with the US ally after the attack on September 11 2001 (Maull, 2011:101). However, Germany was reluctant to contribute to Afghanistan, and the deployment was authorized by a vote of confidence in the German parliament in November 2001. It was especially parliament members from the government coalition parties SPD and the Green party that were skeptical (Longhurst, 2004:84). Chancellor Schröder argued that the deployment of 3,900 German soldiers to Afghanistan was important in light of Germany’s international responsibility, the transatlantic relationship, and for Germany to be seen as a reliable ally, able and willing to contribute to international security (Longhurst, 2004:85). The confidence vote was supported by a narrow margin, 336 to 326 votes (Longhurst, 2004:86). The engagement in Afghanistan remained a difficult issue. The government has struggled to talk about that German soldiers are fighting in a war, and to handle the war victims (Martinsen, 2013). It was not until 2010 that Defense Minister Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg publicly used the word 'war' about Afghanistan (Allers, 2013:15).

Germany became more reluctant to engage in the US war on terror in 2002. The increasingly unilateral American policy thinking collided broadly with the multilateral approach of German policymakers (Longhurst, 2004:87). In 2003, the German government said no to participate in the war in Iraq, because the goal to overthrow
Saddam Hussein was not found to be morally or factually justified (Maull, 2011:102). The decision was strongly criticized and Germany was accused of undermining the transatlantic partnership. France and Germany stood against the USA and Great Britain in the UN Security Council, and the war in Iraq had to be fought without a UN mandate (Maull, 2011:106). Several European states supported the war and the decision on Iraq revealed a deep lack of consensus in European security policy, and raised doubt about the EU’s, and especially the Franco-German duo’s capacity to push for a common policy (Longhurst, 2004:91). The German decision to say no could be linked to a broader feeling of unease at government level as well as among the public, about the necessity of Bundeswehr deployments (Longhurst, 2004:94). However, Germany did support the Iraq war through other means, such as permitting over-flight rights and relieving American soldiers of some of the burden by conducting surveillance tasks on American military bases in Europe (Maull, 2011:107). The development of the German security policy during the early 2000s largely failed to live up to the external expectations towards a normalization of the use of force (Longhurst, 2004:94).

Africa has evolved to become an established part of Berlin’s foreign and security policy during the past ten years (Tull 2014:1). Seven of the 13 missions the Bundeswehr currently is involved in abroad, take place in Africa. However, a clear minority of the soldiers serving in foreign missions is stationed in Africa. Of around 2.480 German soldiers abroad only 495 are in African countries (Bundeswehr, 2015a). The military engagement in Africa show similar traits of changing behavior that has characterized German security policy during the past years. In 2006, Germany participated in the EU mission in DR Congo and sent combat troops to a military mission in an African country for the first time (Tull, 2014:2). The decision was taken under significant pressure from the EU and France against the will of the German public (Schmitt, 2012:59). The deployment was regarded a breach of taboo (Tull, 2014:1-2). However, it did not lead to a reversal of the German cautiousness towards

---

4 Status updated on April 7 2015. The biggest numbers of soldiers are stationed in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
military engagement. Germany refused to join the next EU mission to the same region in Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008, which France initiated. Germany and other EU countries also refused to establish a new EU mission to Congo in 2008, proposed by France and Belgium (Tull, 2014:2). Scholarly work on military engagement in African countries reveals a reluctant German approach. Berlin has been setting strict limitations on what the soldiers can do, combat troops are mostly ruled out, and the soldiers are often tasked with less risky assignments such as training, logistic and medical support. This is also true for the most recent deployments to the European missions to Mali and the Central African Republic in 2013 and 2014 (Major and Mölling, 2014b:17).

In 2010, Germany launched a comprehensive defense reform, aiming at smaller units focusing on international conflict prevention and crisis management (Major and Mölling, 2014b:16). Major and Mölling argue, “there is a growing gap between a military that is more capable and a government more hesitant to use this instrument in a way that mirrors the uses of its partners” (2014b:18). The Libya-crisis in 2011 and the German decision to abstain in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on the no-fly zone, and not take part in the following NATO-operation against the Gaddafi-regime, is the most consequential and contested security policy decision in recent years (Maull, 2011:94; Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:2). Germany was widely accused of being unpredictable and letting domestic considerations decide in important foreign policy issues (Allers, 2013:8). Major and Mölling argue that the abstention on Libya “symbolized the low point of Germany’s poor track record on defence policy over the last decade”, and that it served as “a key trigger to rethink German security and defense policy” (2014b:7).

The German government, the grand coalition, which took office in December 2013, has announced a change toward a more assertive and active German foreign and security policy. It is too early to assess whether the rhetoric is followed by real changes, but there are some examples of action that indicate a development towards less restraint (Major and Mölling, 2014b:6). One of the first decisions the newly
elected Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier took, was to initiate a review process of the foreign policy and an unusual open debate on the future direction. Interest groups, analysts, researchers, and the public were invited to give their answers to the question: “What is wrong with German foreign policy and what, if anything, needs to be changed?” (Steinmeier, 2014b). The government has also established a commission, which is tasked to carry out a review on the parliamentary authorization process of military deployments, and whether it should be adapted towards more flexibility (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014a). In August 2014, the German government decided to send weapons and provide training to the Kurdish Peshmerga in the fight against the terrorist group The Islamic State in Iraq. The decision was unprecedented in that Germany took sides in a regional conflict (Kaim and Perthes, 2015). However, the decision also reveals German preference for training and conflict prevention, and reluctance and aversion against involving German soldiers in military operations (Kaim and Perthes, 2015). Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier have also taken a clear leader role in the Ukrainian crisis and have managed to keep Europe together on sanctions against Russia (Kaim and Perthes, 2015). The third Merkel government’s higher level of foreign policy ambition has been noted in the security policy community (Kaim and Perthes, 2015). The think tank European Council of Foreign Relations ranked the German foreign policy as Europe’s clear leader in 2015 in their annual foreign policy scorecard (ECFR, 2015).
2. How to understand German security policy behavior

Government decisions on military participation have been at the core of the ‘normalization’ debate since 1990 (Maull, 2012a:142; Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:1). The overview of the development of the use of military force indicates a trend towards more engagement and an increased willingness to commit to challenging military missions (Maull, 2011:98). At the same time, German military contributions have often been limited and restricted (Major and Mölling, 2014b:17). Thus, the scholarly debate is divided between the ones who argue that the development is evidence of a more ‘normal’ Germany that pursue a more assertive and interest-driven security policy, and the ones seeing an unwilling and reluctant security policy actor, still constrained by the limited policies on the use of force established under the Cold War (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:1). These varying assessments on whether German security policy behavior is defined by change or continuity reveals a lack of common understanding of the patterns of Germany’s use of force (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:1-2).

The term ‘normalization’ is widely used in scholarly work on German policymakers’ decisions to make military contributions, however, it is a somewhat problematic term. The notion that changes in German security policy behavior is reflecting a development towards ‘normalization’ would imply that Germany has been conducting ‘abnormal’ policies diverging from international norms for acceptable and expected behavior, which not has been the case (Maull, 2012a:133). In contrast, the specific traits of German security policy behavior, emphasizing multilateralism and alliance solidarity, a pro-European approach, predictability and credibility, has served the German national interests very well on the international arena (Maull, 2012a:142). Secondly, it is not clear what the standards for ‘normal’ behavior are. The strong multilateral approach characterizing German security behavior after the Second World War could be considered ‘normal’ German behavior. Such an understanding of the notion is supported by the fact that decisions that depart from Germany’s multilateral commitments, such as Libya in 2011, have been met with strong criticism (Maull,
The term could also be interpreted as whether German behavior depart from empirical dominating behavioral patterns (Maull, 2012a:134). These international standards of ‘normalcy’ have mainly focused on a less restrained use of military force, in addition to a more assertive and national-interests driven security policy, resembling the practices of France and Great Britain (Maull, 2012a:142). It is clear that German attitudes towards the use of force differ from German and French attitudes (Maull, 2012a:143). However, these standards are contradictory, as a more assertive or interest-driven German security policy not automatically would imply a greater willingness to use military force. Oppermann’s study on the ‘new normalcy’ of German security policies suggest that the decision on Libya could be seen as expression of a shift in German policymakers' understanding of Germany as a 'normal country', which make them "attach less weight to international demands and to allow more room for domestic concerns" (Oppermann, 2012:503). Lastly, there is an argument against the concept whether there is possible or desirable for Germany to become ‘normal’. Maull argues that Germany’s special geopolitical and economic position in Europe, as well as the specific historic experiences with war and the use of military force, imply that Germany cannot be regarded a ‘normal’ state and that it neither is in Germany’s interest to become ‘normal’ (Maull, 2012a:134). The differing attitudes between Germany and the other comparable European powers towards the use of force can be aligned to varying strategic cultures or foreign policy role conceptions, which reflects the specific state’s different history, geography, and culture (Hyde-Price, 2004:325).

2.1 Strategic culture

The concept of strategic culture has gained wide support in international relations studies during the past decades, and has a long tradition in studies on European and German security policy behavior (see Lantis, 2002a; Hyde-Price, 2004; Longhurst, 2004; Maull, 2011; Schmitt, 2012). The development of German behavior after reunification often failed to meet realist scholars’ predictions. As a major power in a multipolar world, Germany was expected to seek to maximize its prestige and follow a more assertive, national interest-driven security policy as ‘normal’ powers, as well as
develop a more normal relationship to the use of military power (Longhurst, 2004:6-7). Instead, German policymakers continued to pursue a limited and restrained security policy (Lantis, 2002a:23). Scholars of strategic culture refuse the assumption of uniform rational actors in international relations. They argue that historical experiences of war and use of military force, as well as specific national characteristics, shared beliefs, and attitudes shape current security policy choices (Longhurst, 2004:17). Therefore, a rich understanding of a state’s security policy behavior needs to include the specific culture, “the *milieu* in which German thinking about the security and the use of force is produced” (Longhurst, 2004:7). The specific strategic culture influences the decision-making process as it sets the range of what foreign policy decision-makers consider appropriate, suitable, and legitimate choices (Longhurst, 2004:142; Maull, 2011:97; Oppermann, 2012:505). The strategic culture does not suggest concrete targets to be achieved, but gives guidance on suitable security policy choices (Maull, 2011:97).

Strategic culture scholars argue that the different European attitudes towards the use of force are rooted in different historical experiences of especially the Second World War and the Cold War (Hyde-Price, 2004:325). The French strategic culture emerged from the experiences of occupation, which led to a belief that France needed a more assertive security policy being able to defend and protect itself (Hyde-Price, 2004:325). Great Britain had a more positive experience of the use of force and the efficacy of military power, as it had a central role in the allied operation that fought the Nazi-forces (Hyde-Price, 2004:326). Similarly, the experiences of the Second World War and Cold War obviously weigh heavily on the German strategic culture (Longhurst, 2004:2). Scholars agree upon a set of themes to explain the specific characteristics of German strategic culture, including the aversion to the use of military force and aggression, multilateralism, humanitarian values and democracy, consensus-building, and predictability (Lantis, 2002a:26; Longhurst, 2004:138; Schmitt, 2012:65). The concept of Germany as a 'civilian power' has gained much prevalence in studies on German security policy and will be used in this analysis. The civilian power concept sums up the central tenets of German strategic culture in three
guiding principles: (1) ‘Never alone’, (2) 'never again', and (3) 'politics before force' (Maull, 2011:98). The guiding principles were consolidated in West Germany during the Cold War, and can still be observed (Maull, 2015:224). 'Never alone' points to the multilateral character of German foreign and security policy, and the importance of preventing Germany from ever again choosing a special path (Allers, 2013:16). Emphasis was put on successfully binding Germany to the western partners in Europe, France and the European Union, as well as the transatlantic relationship to the USA and NATO to prevent German dominance (Maull, 2011:98). German governments have shown a near reflexive multilateralism to establish itself as a reliable and trustworthy partner (Oppermann, 2012:506). Germany also committed to Western values of human rights and democracy, and turned the back to the non-democratic and militaristic past, in the principle of 'never again' (Maull, 2011:98). Finally, a basic principle of German security policy was the skepticism against the use of military force, 'politics before force' (Maull, 2011:98). The principle does not imply that the use of military force categorically is ruled out. Lantis argues that it rather implies “an aversion to the unilateral use of significant military force”, and a reluctance to commit “ground troops in combat operations” (Lantis, 2002a:39-40).

Most strategic culture studies focus on the political decision-makers within the national strategic community, because elites hold the most detailed knowledge of security issues (Lantis, 2002b:107; Longhurst, 2004:21; Maull, 2011:97). Strategic culture is seen as a vital tool to investigate continuity and change in a state’s security policy behavior (Lantis and Howlett, 2007:94-95). Thus, the concept can say something about the evolution of German practices of the use of military force (Longhurst, 2004:5). Changes can be fine-tuned when issues challenge or pressure the existing strategic culture. The political elites will then reinterpret the specific situation in different ways because it does not easily fit with the established basic beliefs (Longhurst, 2004:18; Maull, 2011:98). Basic principles can also come into direct conflict with each other (Lantis, 2002a:39). This was arguably the case of the guiding principles of 'never alone' and 'politics before force' in the 1990s. Commitment to the partners now meant participation in out-of-area operations. Thus, German
policymakers had to adjust the aversion against the use of force to the new realities and increase the willingness to deploy Bundeswehr forces so that they would avoid being downgraded to a junior partner in the international security community (Longhurst, 2004:145). Fundamental change of a strategic culture is rare and occurs through specific traumatic events, which make the existing strategic culture collapse (Longhurst, 2004:18), such as the end of the Second World War (Longhurst, 2004:25; Maull, 2011:97).

Critics argue there is a risk that culture can explain everything and nothing, and have claimed that the concept is tautological because of the difficulties of separating independent and dependent variables (Lantis, 2002b:95). The concept is contentious as scholars are divided on whether strategic culture can be regarded a falsifiable theory (Longhurst, 2004:19; Schmitt, 2012: 60-62).

This study supports the notion that strategic culture must be treated as an independent variable, with its own causal effect. However, this does not mean that strategic culture alone can produce a specific outcome. Strategic culture affects the outcome of the decision-making process indirectly through shaping how decision-makers assess and attach weight to other drivers that produce an outcome (Oppermann, 2012:505). Thus, the civilian power concept is used in the analysis to examine whether the decision to participate or not could be rooted in a specific German strategic culture that influences the decision-making processes and the security policy behavior.

I will now turn to existing literature on burden sharing and alliance/coalition cooperation in conflict situations to explain the research question. I will mainly borrow from Jason Davidson's comparative theoretical framework on allies’ support decisions (2011). The core explanations assessed are (1) threats to national interests, (2) prestige, (3) alliance/partner value, and (4) electoral politics.
2.2 Literature review - military contributions and burden sharing

The relevant works laid out here suggest that explanations of why states decide to contribute military to multilateral missions must include factors at both the international and domestic level.

Bennett, Lepgold and Unger studied five different explanations, drawn from the scholarly literature on alliances, on why six states decided to contribute to the 1991 Gulf War (1994:39). They found that both external and internal pressures affected the decision-making process. International factors like state dependence on the alliance and perceptions of threat explain political leader's incentives to contribute, while internal dynamics often constrained the political ability to support as well as how the states contributed (Bennett et.al, 1994:40; Davidson, 2011:13). The case study found that German leaders preferred diplomatic over military means (Bennett et.al. 1994:65), that they did not consider direct security interests at risk (Bennett et.al. 1994:66), and that they were concerned with the possible consequence of US abandonment if they did not contribute to the mission (Bennett et.al. 1994:67). Thus, alliance dependence best explained why Germany decided to contribute, while internal factors such as public and political resistance to military support were found to explain why Germany only contributed economically and not militarily (Bennett et. al. 1994:67).

An article by David P. Auerswald (2004) examined the behavior of five key NATO members during the 1999 Kosovo war. Auerswald's integrated decision model found that states' varying level of support widely can be explained with electoral policy arguments, "institutionally weak executives would provide minimal support for intervention because leaders are concerned more about retaining office than about possibly advancing their state's interests." (Auerswald, 2004:656). This was particularly evident in the German case. Members of the junior partner in the Schröder coalition government, the Green party, opposed the use of military force and the government complied with many of the party's demands (Auerswald, 2004:656). Correspondingly, institutionally strong executives focused more on their state's interest
than their own political tenure (Auerswald, 2004:657). Baltrusaitis criticized Auerswald's model for being restricted to 'wars of choice', in which direct threats are insignificant (2008:107). By failing to account for threats the possibility of generalization to other cases is limited (Baltrusaitis, 2008:108).

Baltrusaitis' 2008 study on coalition burden sharing in the 2003 Iraq war supported that the institutional structure of government had an effect. Baltrusaitis' complex decision model included several factors: balance of threat, historical learning, collective action, alliance dependence, public opinion, domestic structure, and the role of legitimacy. The study found that parliamentary accountability constrained the ability of a state to contribute military forces to an international coalition, especially when threat and the state's possible gains from participation were low (Baltrusaitis, 2008:v). Baltrusaitis’ findings concluded that German domestic politics such as Chancellor Schröder’s prospects for reelection in the up-coming general election, heavily influenced government decisions. However, the alliance with the US also played a role, as the German government provided support, which did not require parliamentary approval (Baltrusaitis, 2008:340-341). Baltrusaitis provided valuable insights on the decision-making process to contribute to security coalitions, which he argued differ from alliance burden sharing (2008:28). While both terms refer to forms of multinational military cooperation, alliances are generally more formal arrangements (Baltrusaitis, 2008:28), while coalitions are by definition ad hoc and temporary (Baltrusaitis, 2008:32). In addition, their purposes often differ. Alliances are typically formed in the anticipation of future events, while coalitions are formed in response to a specific crisis that has emerged. Baltrusaitis argued that the differences would lead to different dynamics of burden sharing in coalitions in which states bargain their support levels in a bilateral environment rather than through a bureaucratic structure. This increases the leverage of the contributing state against the coalition initiator (Baltrusaitis, 2008:32). Baltrusaitis’ insights are relevant for this thesis and suggest that the bargaining process in the bilateral relationship between Germany and France leaves German policymakers room for political influence.
In 2012, Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman published an article comparing caveats or national restrictions on allied contributions to ISAF in Afghanistan. They found that caveats varied according to the political institutions in the contribution states. Troops from coalition parliamentary governments were more restricted than contributions from presidential or majoritarian parliamentary governments (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012:67). The German contribution was the most constrained (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012:76), due to the strong parliamentary powers over military deployment (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012:77). The scholars also tested the alternative theory of strategic culture, and acknowledged that it "is impossible to discuss German behavior in Afghanistan, for instance, without considering the weight of the past upon the present day" (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012:80). However, the cultural approach could not explain the variation in caveats (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012:81).

All the works laid out here provide valuable findings. However, the studies fail to provide general explanations for military deployment valid across different cases. Hence, Jason W. Davidson's book *America's Allies and War* (2011) is highly relevant as it seeks to explain whether allies contribute militarily on multiple cases (Davidson, 2011:2). Davidson's comparative case study has examined burden sharing between the US and three NATO-allies: Great Britain, France, and Italy, in seven different conflict cases, among others Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Davidson examined the changing state behavior by assessing threat to national interests and prestige, alliance value, and electoral politics (Davidson, 2011:14). He found that states most often made up their minds based on whether the target threatened their interests, or whether their prestige was affected. However, alliance value was the most important factor in a third of the cases (Davidson, 2011:175). Electoral politics arguments were rarely relevant (Davidson, 2011:176). Davidson’s framework is based on neoclassical realist theory. The theory is realist as it expects states to seek to maximize their security in an anarchic international system (Davidson, 2011:14). Neoclassical realism goes beyond neo-realism by seeking to explain the behavior of individual states instead of the outcomes of state interactions. It focuses on interests, preferences and power, as well
as the possible impact of domestic variables on a state’s security policy behavior (Chafer and Cumming, 2010:1142). Davidson did not find support for the alternative constructivist theory of the impact of identity and international norms on the state's behavior. Arguments on norms and identity mainly served as legitimations for government decisions towards war skeptical domestic publics and politicians (Davidson, 2011:177).

This study applies Davidson's approach on five cases of German participation and non-participation in military operations in African countries. The theoretical framework is supplemented with insights from other scholarly work and theoretical models. The works laid out in the literature review suggest that domestic politics and the institutional structure of government have a greater bearing on decision-making processes in Germany than Davidson's study suggest. I will now give a more detailed overview of the explanatory variables.

2.3. Theoretical explanations

2.3.1 Threat to national interests

Threats are at the core of security policy decision-making: “Security policy (...) can be usefully defined as the policy addressing whatever poses a threat.” (Matlary 2009:15). However, that does not mean that threats must be the most important factor, or even necessary, to make a military contribution (Davidson, 2011:17). States’ security interest has traditionally been defined as concerning existential threats (Matlary, 2009:16), but when western states deploy today they often do so far from their own territory, and “they do not fight for their own survival as peoples” (Matlary, 2009:38). A western state’s security policy has expanded from border defense to risk management, serving a variety of political interests (Matlary, 2009:17). This development opens for changing interpretations of threats, the range of different interests that might be threatened, and when the extent of a threat qualifies for use of
military force (Matlary, 2009:19). This study will use Davidson’s rather narrow definition of what constitutes a threat to a state's national interests:  

“A direct or potential - due to geographical proximity - threat to the state's territorial integrity or its citizens, the state's economy (including significant economic interests abroad), or a natural resource of major economic or security significance” (Davidson, 2011:16).

Davidson’s definition intentionally excludes threats to a state’s values or international law (Davidson, 2011:17). This is a weakness of the theory, which might make it less suited to explain the driving forces of military participation. A development towards a broader understanding of security interests indicates less emphasis on traditional and narrow national interests in explaining security policy action. The multilateral military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and DR Congo, serve as examples of humanitarian motivated interventions (Matlary, 2009:24). Matlary argues that ‘doing good’ has become increasingly important in western democracies' security policy decisions (2009:20), and that the military tool is used “in defence of values such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights” (Matlary, 2009:22-23). A neo-classical realist theory appears to ignore these perspectives of a value-driven, humanitarian approach to security policy behavior (Chafer and Cumming, 2010:1142). However, Chafer and Cumming argue that neo-classical realism “does take account of this ‘idealism’ seeing it as a useful means of mobilizing public support behind a policy that might not be intrinsically appealing” (2010:1143).

Policy statements and actions will suggest whether the decision-makers found German national interests to be involved (Davidson, 2011:16). However, statements do not necessary equal interests, "especially not in the sensitive and secretive area of security and defence policy." (Matlary, 2009:79-80). Whether a conflict situation poses a threat to a state can be assessed by the state's ability to provide the necessary capabilities to the relevant crisis management operation. Davidson argues, "one should expect the

---

5 The cases of this study do not concern existential threats.
A state's prestige is the social recognition of a state's relative power and the judges of a state's prestige is the countries’ international partners (Davidson, 2011:17). German security policy behavior has traditionally been restrained and limited. While this behavior often is seen as Berlin is trying to evade its international responsibilities (Maull, 2011:95), it is necessary to recall that the often criticized 'culture of restraint', originally was imposed on West Germany after the Second World War (Longhurst, 2004:2). To keep a low profile was the only responsible and possible German security policy. However, the end of the Cold War and the German reunification has risen the international expectations to German engagement in international military missions to that of a ‘normal’ power (Oppermann, 2012:508). The expectations are related to the notion that major international powers have specific responsibilities concerning international crisis management (Maull, 2011:115). Military contribution gives status and influence (Matlary, 2009:92), and a western state’s foreign and security policy commitment is to a large extent measured by the willingness to use force and put your own troops at risk in conflict zones (Rinke, 2014:120). Matlary argues that states that do not deploy their forces abroad, do not count in the EU or NATO (2009:88). Multilateralism contributes legitimacy to modern military missions (Matlary, 2009:41). The larger the support, that is military support, the greater is mostly the mission's legitimacy. Mere political or financial support is less valued than soldiers are (Davidson, 2011:6). Thus, the social recognition of German relative power is increasingly based on its ability to contribute to multilateral missions. To refuse to participate could lead the allies and partner states to believe Germany is neither willing nor able to engage in military action (Davidson, 2011:17). The possible damage of not participating is bigger when the international community stands united behind a mission, while divisions on a specific mission means that prestige may not be affected
in the decision to participate (Davidson, 2011:18). Proximity to the target as well as geographical or historical ties, increase the partners’ expectations on a military contribution (Davidson, 2011:18).

Prestige is related to the previous discussion on threats. When the use of military force no longer is reserved to border defense and the state’s survival, one should expect the state's stake in the relevant multilateral setting being an equally important driver than eliminating the threat in question (Matlary, 2009:97). Matlary points for example to studies that suggest that Sweden deploys in Africa "not primarily in order to solve a crisis there, but to enhance the standing in the EU" (Matlary, 2009:97).

2.3.3 Alliance/partner value

German policymakers put extensive weight on multilateralism and alliance obligations (Matlary, 2009:78; Maull, 2011:100; Oppermann, 2012:506). However, the mere existence of alliance relations and partnerships is not sufficient to explain whether Germany decides to take part in a military mission. The record shows a divergent behavior. Davidson uses the concept of alliance value to explain variance in military contributions and burden sharing. The value of the relationship at the time has implications on a state’s willingness to contribute to the military mission that the ally or partner state has initiated (Davidson, 2011:15). There are stronger incentives to contribute to maintain and strengthen the alliance or partnership when value is high. Conversely, "if a government has low value for an alliance, it has little incentive to make sacrifices for its ally." (Davidson, 2011:15). Several factors can explain value variance, the state's possibilities for influencing the ally is especially critical (Davidson, 2011:15). A relatively stronger ally is also valued more because there is potentially more beneficial for the state to cooperate closely with an ally with greater capabilities (Davidson, 2011:16).

The alliance to the USA and NATO is the most important in German security policy, while the Franco-German bilateral partnership is the core relationship in Europe (Maull, 2011:100). The signing of the Élysée treaty, a treaty of friendship between the
two states in 1963, was a significant formalization of the close cooperation (Schwarzer, 2006:12), and security and defense policy was one of three priorities. Security cooperation was deepened and expanded with the establishment of the German-French Defense and Security Council, and the Franco-German brigade. The 40th anniversary of the Élysée treaty was a new opportunity to intensify the bilateral relationship. The establishment of a German-French Council of Ministers, the appointment of secretary-generals for German-French relations in both countries, and more frequent ministerial meetings between the two governments, secured even closer cooperation (Schwarzer, 2006:14). In 2010, Paris and Berlin adopted the ‘Franco-German Agenda 2020’, which among other things promised closer cooperation on defense (Major, 2012). At the 50th anniversary of the Élysée treaty in January 2013, new initiatives on a revival and deepening of the security policy partnership were taken (Bundesregierung, 2013a:4). However, despite the close relations there are still significant differences between the two states’ approach to security policy and the use of military force. Analyst Major argues that cooperation often has stranded at well-intentioned statements and rhetoric of friendship, while actual cooperation and outcomes have been lacking because of “diverging priorities, different strategic cultures, domestic considerations, a lack of mutual understanding, and disappointing past experiences” (Major, 2012). While Berlin mainly sees military force as a tool to act against a military threat collectively defined by the partners, Paris considers it as a normal security policy instrument to be applied when national interests are at stake (Major, 2012). Allers emphasizes that Germany does not want to be a great power in foreign policy, while the main focus of French security policy is to maintain the role as a European and global security policy actor (2013:14-15). Furthermore, German security policy is mainly Eurocentric, while France has a global approach (Major, 2012). The differences have made France seek closer security cooperation with Great Britain, such as the St. Malo agreement at the 1998 Franco-British summit, which paved the way for the European Security and Defense Policy, as well as a commitment to cooperate more closely on Africa policy (Chafer and Cumming, 2010:1129). The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya is another example of Franco-British security policy leadership (Major, 2012). France and Great Britain are the EU’s biggest military
powers and are closer in terms of strategic culture than France and Germany (Major, 2012).

Still, Franco-German relations are perceived as key for German military engagements in Africa. Foreign policy analyst Maull argues, "military action in Africa has mostly been about being a good ally to France, and the Franco-German capacity to act, rather than about direct German interests in Africa" (Maull, 2014c [interview]). Analyst Keller points out that even if Berlin put great efforts into the Franco-German security relationship, German decision-makers also find cooperating with France in Africa problematic. They are "afraid that they are being used to help France fulfill its own national interest", and are a little hesitant to just follow suit when France asks for greater engagement in Africa" (Keller, 2014 [interview]).

France was originally the leading nation in the Franco-German duo, but its position started to wane after the German reunification and during the 2000s (Schwarzer, 2006:13). While France has relied its power on an ambitious foreign and security policy, German power has been based on a strong, export-oriented economy. The strong focus in the EU on economic issues after the financial crisis in 2008, has contributed to a rising inequality between Germany and France (Demesmay and Kempin, 2013). Still, accounts emphasize that both Paris and Berlin need each other (Schwarzer, 2006:7; Major, 2012; Demesmay and Kempin, 2013; Allers, 2013:17). Their traditional pro-European approach and decisive role in European integration means that a well-functioning Franco-German duo is important for the EU (Major, 2012).

European integration is a fundamental part of German foreign and security policy (Maull, 2012b:39). Germany’s traditional rejection of unilateralism meant that the development of a common European foreign and security policy opened up a new room for maneuver and broadened the scope of German foreign and security policy action (Maull, 2011:100).
2.3.4 Electoral politics

Public opinion on conflict engagement and the use of force is increasingly relevant as security politics become 'normalized' (Matlary, 2009:38). Since the use of force no longer is reserved cases of existential survival, security and defense policy is increasingly becoming a policy field like others in which the domestic arena influences the decision-making process. Issues as why, how, and where to deploy are negotiated in the public arena (Matlary, 2009:38). Thus, western democratic leaders have to take account of the attitudes and tolerance towards the use of force among domestic actors, or otherwise risk being punished in the next election (Davidson, 2011:18). However, the relative importance of domestic opposition depends on several factors. The most significant are situations where the government risks losing votes to the opposition, such as when the opposition parties and the majority of the public agree in opposing the government decision. Public opposition is less relevant in situations where the government and opposition parties agree (Davidson, 2011:19). The decision must also have the potential to influence the next elections if the public is to be electorally relevant. In competition with all other political issues must the decision to provide or refuse military support, be perceived as so important that it would influence the voting behavior for a significant share of the public (Davidson, 2011:19). Furthermore, the relative importance of public opinion is related to the parliamentary strength of the government. A strong public opinion on a decision of military deployment is more significant in cases of a parliamentary weak government, whereas a parliamentary strong government would be less afraid of losing a slight margin of voters to the opposition (Davidson, 2011:19). Davidson argues that it is rare for governments to face an electorally relevant public opposed to their policy because there is rarely opposition to security policy decisions. The government has access to secret intelligence, and, thus, is presumably better informed about threats, the importance of prestige, and alliance value than the political opposition and the public (Davidson, 2011:20). However, the political structure in Germany, in which the formal powers in the security and defense field are vested in parliament, suggests that the domestic variable is significant (Matlary, 2009:157). The Parliamentary Participation Act gives
the German Bundestag power over every aspect of military deployment, such as assignment, the legal framework, duration, capabilities, mission strength, geographic orientation, and costs (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz, 2005). Existing scholarship accounts that domestic political and public opinion put significant limitations on German security policy behavior (Matlary, 2009:152; Oppermann, 2012:505; Miskimmon, 2012:399). Military deployments are among the most salient foreign affairs issues among German parliamentarians (Oppermann, 2012:509), and the increased number of parties in the Bundestag after the Cold War could lead to increased opportunities for contesting government foreign policy choices (Oppermann, 2012:508). Furthermore, increased political contestation could trigger stronger mobilization for foreign policy issues in the public, which again could lead to increased relevance of public opinion in decisions on military deployment. As the German public is highly skeptical of the use of military force, a stronger emphasis on public opinion would presumably lead to constraints on the German readiness to deploy (Oppermann, 2012:509). The coalition structure of German governments might put additional constraints on the security policy behavior, as the government junior coalition partner often heads the foreign ministry (Schmitt, 2012:64). Consequently, foreign and security policy becomes an issue of internal bargaining and compromise to reach consensus (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012:70). The bargaining process makes it likely that the less enthusiastic members of a coalition demand national reservations on a deployment, which the more enthusiastic members have to accept to prevent the government from collapse (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012:70-71).

The starkly contrasting French political structure is worth noting. In a European perspective, the French executive power is especially strong. There is no need for parliamentary approval of any aspects of troop deployments abroad (Matlary, 2009:162), and the French “public approves nearly all use of force” (Matlary, 2009:163).
2.4 The hypothesis

The relative effect of prestige being at stake is expected to have the same effect on the decision-makers as whether the state was facing a threat to its national interests (Davidson, 2011:23). Thus, in cases with low threat and/or prestige it is less likely that a state provides military support, while in cases with high threat and/or prestige it is more likely that a state provides military support. When the public opinion is electorally relevant it is expected to trump the other variables (Davidson, 2011:22). Thus, as the political and public domestic arena in Germany often is critical towards military deployments abroad, it is expected that in a case of the public being electorally relevant, Germany is likely to refuse military support. The German political structure with strong parliamentary powers over military deployments is likely to put restrictions on participation, and the level of engagement. In cases where the public opinion is irrelevant, high alliance value and high threat/prestige would lead to military support. It is harder to predict the outcome in cases where the public opinion is irrelevant, and the two international factors are split (Davidson, 2011:22). Davidson suggests that high alliance value alone should be sufficient to lead to support. Similarly, prestige should alone be enough to provide support, but it is underlined that the level of alliance value and prestige is likely to have an effect on the outcome (Davidson, 2011:22).

The core argument of this study is that Germany participates in multilateral military missions in Africa to live up to its multilateral commitments, mainly to preserve or strengthen the relationship to France, as well as supporting European integration. Thus, partner value to France is expected to be the most important factor in the decisions on whether to make military contributions. When partner value to France is low, Germany is less likely to provide support. Conversely, when partner value is high, Germany is more likely to provide support. Additionally, I argue that Germany is concerned about meeting external expectations to preserve and strengthen its prestige and position in the EU as a reliable and responsible partner. Electoral politics and strategic culture is expected to constrain the level of participation.
3. Research design - why comparative case study?

Qualitative case study research in contrast to quantitative research tends to analyze a small number of cases to get in-depth knowledge about a specific phenomenon. Case study research is a fruitful approach when there are few events of a specific phenomenon or if the events are important in its own right (King et. al., 1994:4). Case studies are especially relevant in peace and conflict studies were the objects of study often are rare and unique events like wars and conflicts, which are challenging to generalize and compromise into statistical data.

The research question should determine the research method. As this thesis investigates the driving forces behind German participation in missions in Africa, I will conduct in-depth analyses of the political processes leading up to the decision to participate or not to participate. Then, I will compare the cases to each other. Descriptive inferences about a phenomenon should distinguish the systematic component from the non-systematic (King et. al., 1994:34), and a comparative analysis provides tools, which a single case study does not to distinguish between variables (Gerring, 2007:43).

3.1 Comparative case study

The comparative case study compares a small number of cases, which vary in space or time (Gerring, 2007:28). Case studies are especially good if the researcher wants to prioritize internal validity, that is, (1) try to explain the causal relationship between phenomena (George and Bennett, 2005:22), and (2) that the indicators chosen are good measures of the concept the researcher tries to explain (Adcock and Collier, 2001). Case studies offer insights into intentions, reasoning, and the procedures that influenced the decision, establishing a reasonable causal relationship (Gerring, 2007:45). However, this comes at a cost, and limits the generalizability of the study (Gerring, 2007:37-38). In this study I try to explain the causal connection between political processes and the decision to provide or refuse military support in a few, rare events. The comparative case study should provide reasonable tools to answer that
question. However, the method is limited when it comes to testing hypotheses. Although I try to find support for the hypothesis that Germany participates in military missions in Africa to preserve and strengthen the relationship to France, the conclusion I draw from the analysis is uncertain, and should be regarded a step towards explaining German military behavior.

3.2 How to select relevant cases?

I will conduct detailed analyses of the decision-making processes of five examples where Germany either provided military contribution to a multilateral mission, or refused to do so. It is crucial when trying to tease out the most important explanations of events that the dependent variable under study actually varies between the cases (King et. al., 1994:129), that is, participation and non-participation. This will help me to distinguish between when a variable actually produced the outcome and when it did not.

The cases of participation are: (1) the EU military missions EUFOR DR Congo in 2006, (2) the EUTM Mali in 2013-2014, and (3) the EUFOR CAR in 2014. The cases of non-participation are (4) the EU military mission EUFOR Chad/CAR in 2007-2008, and (5) the NATO mission in Libya in 2011.6

The missions are very different in a number of important ways, such as geographical location, political objectives, level of military contribution, and historical context. Still, they share similarities that make them relevant for comparison. The similarities also provide a framework for analysis, so that I am able to distinguish between variables that are relevant between the cases and those that are not. The cases are chosen because they are relevant to compare, as all cases had a real possibility to lead to deployment (see Mahoney and Goertz, 2004). The most central factor for being relevant is obviously that all concern cases in which German policymakers had to decide whether to make a military contribution to a mission in an African country or not. Additionally, all cases concern the bilateral partnership to France, as France

6 The cases will be discussed chronologically in the analysis.
requested German military participation. All five cases are examples of France either taking unilateral action to intervene, or initiating and pushing for a multilateral military reaction to a crisis. Furthermore, all the missions were authorized by a UN Security Council mandate. The decisions to participate or not, are taken under three different governments, which allows the study to say something about the evolution of the use of military force over time. Simultaneously, the choice of cases is guided by the time proximity of the missions, relevant to explain the varying behavior of participation and non-participation. The list of cases is not exhaustive. Germany has engaged in other UN-mandated missions in Africa, initiated by France, in the same period that could have been relevant for analysis, such as the naval anti-piracy EU mission off the coast of Somalia beginning in 2008 (Weber, 2009). However, time and scope limitations made a selection of cases necessary.

3.3 Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is decision-making processes about German participation in military operations in Africa. To study this, one have to determine whom the policymakers are. German security policy decision-making has three key actors: the chancellor, the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defense. Additionally, the German parliament plays an important role, as it must approve all troop deployments (Schmitt, 2012:64). Thus, the government has to work closely with the parliament to secure backing for a military mission (Schmitt, 2012:64). The ministry of defense and the ministry of foreign affairs consult the relevant parliamentarians ahead of a new mission proposal to anticipate what kind of contribution the Bundestag would accept (Saideman and Auerswald, 2012:77). The policies and statements of the government are the primary source for evaluating the decision-making process. I also consider to what extent the parliament had influence over the decision-making.

3.4 Use of sources

Foreign and security policy decision-making processes are maintained in secrecy. Thus, there are considerable challenges related to obtaining source material. To meet this challenge the study draws on multiple primary and secondary sources such as
government declarations, press statements, parliamentary protocols, speeches, press reports and media interviews, as well as existing scholarly work, and think tank reports. The choice of texts "is guided by the advice that ‘if a discourse is operative in a given community, it is expected to materialize in those texts whenever the debate is sufficiently important’" (Schmitt, 2012:63).

In addition, I conducted first-hand interviews with seven politicians and analysts in October-December 2014. One of the interviewees requested confidentiality. The other relevant interviewees are listed in the literature. The experts were relevant scholars I had come over during my research. The politicians were members of parliament in the relevant Defense and Foreign Policy Committees. However, it was significantly harder to get access to parliamentarians than analysts. This shortcoming was remedied by my participation at a high-profiled seminar on peace and security in Africa in the Bundestag in Berlin on December 3 2014, arranged by the largest parliament group and government party, the CDU/CSU. Central parliamentarians held keynote speeches, and the topic of Germany's role in crisis management in Africa was further analyzed in a panel debate. The interviews were based on an interview guide (Bryman, 2008:442), five interviews were conducted by telephone, one in a direct meeting in Berlin, and one by e-mail. The interviews lasted around 20 to 40 minutes. As mentioned, most of the interviews were on the record, and additionally taped, which is relevant for the question on reliability.
4. Analyses

4.1 DR Congo 2006

The EUFOR DR Congo was an operation to support the UN force, MONUC, in supervising the 2006 election process in DR Congo (DRC) (Chafer and Cumming, 2010:1134). DRC was devastated by years of civil war and inter-state conflict and MONUC was established to facilitate a transition process. The democratic election was an important step in this process (Schmitt, 2012:66), but associated with great risks and the UN turned to the EU late December 2005 and requested it to consider the deployment of a support force (Schmitt, 2012:66). On March 23 2006, the EU Council agreed to send a military force to support MONUC in situations that represented a danger to the election process (Tull, 2009:47). The duration of the mission was limited to four months from July 30 to November 30 2006 (Schmitt, 2012:66). The EUFOR mission was made up of around 2300 soldiers from 21 EU members and Turkey. The biggest part of the force was not deployed to Kinshasa, DRC, but to a French military base in Gabon as support forces (Brummer, 2013:9). The EU was under pressure to accept the request for support from the UN (Olsen, 2009:254). "Rejecting the UN request would send a devastating message", because the EU had committed that the common European security and defense policy should be an instrument of effective multilateralism serving to strengthen international cooperation and security (Tull, 2009:47).

Germany was a significant contributor to the mission. It provided the operational head quarter in Potsdam, the German Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck was appointed EU Operation Commander, and Germany was with 780 soldiers (500 combat forces and 280 support forces to logistics and sanitary tasks) the largest troop contributor together with France (Brummer, 2013:15). However, about two thirds of the German troops were deployed to the support mission in Gabon (Brummer, 2013:15). The mission was a co-leadership between Germany and France that provided the force commander on the ground (Tull, 2009:50). Germany was also among the biggest financial contributors (Vines, 2010:1095).
There were three key actors involved in the decision to participate in the mission: Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU), Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD), and Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung (CDU) (Brummer, 2013:2). The grand coalition consisting of the two biggest parties in the German parliament, the conservative CDU and the social democratic SPD, ruled 70 percent of the seats and the new political leadership enjoyed great popularity (Schmitt, 2012:66).

Despite the significant level of support, Germany was a reluctant contributor to the mission (Olsen, 2009:254; Tull, 2009:48). Several restrictions on the German engagement diminished the country's role as a co-leader (Brummer, 2013:15), and affected both the design of the mission as a whole, and delayed the planning process (Tull, 2009:49). There were only a handful of EU countries that were able to lead the operational headquarter (Schmitt, 2012:67), and Germany was the only country without an excuse to not lead the mission (Tull, 2009:48). Accounts suggest that the political decision-makers reacted differently to the external expectations and the Defense Ministry was the most reluctant. Minister Jung wanted to rule out deployment of the battle group and a German lead role (Brummer, 2013:10). On a meeting with other EU defense ministers on March 6, Defense Minister Jung presented a list of conditions for German leadership: the consent of the government of DRC, a robust mandate from the UNSC, substantial military participation by other EU member states, geographical concentration on the capital Kinshasa, and mission duration restricted to four months (Tull, 2009:49). The Foreign Ministry was more enthusiastic. Foreign Minister Steinmeier supported the EU mission and that Germany should be part of it, and argued that Germany already had participated in missions in Africa (Brummer, 2013:13). However, Steinmeier also emphasized that members of the governmental parties were skeptical of the mission, and agreed to some of the limitations set by the Defense Ministry such as a time-limited mission, UN Security Council mandate and support from the government of DRC (Brummer, 2013:13). It was Chancellor Merkel that took the decision to provide combat troops to DRC and agreed on the leadership role (Schmitt, 2012:68; Brummer, 2013:12). The decision was taken against the will of
Defense Minister Jung (Schmitt, 2012:68), but Merkel did commit to some of the restrictions that Jung and Foreign Minister Steinmeier had stated (Brummer, 2013:14).

On March 19, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana received the consent of Congolese President Joseph Kabila (Tull, 2009:49). The following day defense ministers from eight EU member states gathered for an informal meeting in Berlin and agreed that if the EU decided on a military mission, Germany and France would lead it together (Brummer, 2013:8-9). The EU Council agreed on a mission on March 23, and on April 25, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 that authorized the EU to deploy a military mission to DRC. On April 27, the EU Council authorized the deployment of EUFOR DR Congo (Tull, 2009:47). It was decided that Germany was to assume the strategic leadership at the operational head quarter, while France took charge of the tactical level on the ground in the capital Kinshasa On May 17, the German government decided to participate in EUFOR RD Congo, and on June 1, a huge majority of the Bundestag approved the government’s proposal (Brummer, 2013:9).

The decision to participate and the design of the contribution were the result of balancing strong external pressure from the partners in the EU and especially France, and domestic public and political opposition against military intervention (Tull, 2009:54; Schmitt, 2012:59; Brummer, 2013:9).

4.1.1 Threats to national interest, and Prestige

The DRC mission was the first time Germany deployed combat forces to a mission in an African country and the mission has been regarded as a break of taboo (Tull, 2014:1-2). However, there is no evidence that the situation in DRC was a threat to German security. There were no vital interests at stake and the country was neither part of German sphere of interests (Tull, 2009:54). As mentioned, German decision-makers put rather wide-ranging limitations on its participation to reduce risk. Low threat makes it harder to justify potential costs of lives or money (Davidson, 2011:16).
Scholarly work suggests that the German decision-makers were committed to strengthen or preserve Germany's prestige. Germany was under pressure from the EU, and especially partner France to contribute militarily and to take a leader role in the operation (Olsen, 2009:254; Tull, 2009:48; Schmitt, 2012:67; Brummer, 2013:8). The partners expected Germany to contribute soldiers because of its commitment to the newly agreed and suitable Franco-German battle group to the European Union (Brummer, 2013:8). High Representative Solana wanted to test the battle group concept and put extra pressure on Germany so that the mission could be fulfilled with the battle group (Schmitt, 2012:67). On a Franco-German summit on 23 January 2006, Chancellor Merkel and the French president Jacques Chirac confirmed that the EU would respond positively to the UN's request and that both countries would provide a significant military contribution, but Germany declined to provide the battle group (Tull, 2009:48). The battle group was mainly staffed with German soldiers, which meant that Germany would bear the burden if the mission failed (Brummer, 2013:11). Merkel stated that German contribution and a co-leadership role were dependent on high contribution from the EU members (Brummer, 2013:12).

Chancellor Merkel took the decision to provide combat troops and agreed on the leadership role to prove German multilateral obligations (Schmitt, 2012:68), and demonstrate German leadership in Europe at a critical time for European integration. Both France and the Netherlands had recently voted no to the European Constitutional treaty, and Germany was to acquire the EU Council Presidency in 2007 (Brummer, 2013:11). To refrain from contributing would have weakened Germany's position in Europe, "it would have displayed a lack of solidarity with other EU member states and would also have called into question Germany’s commitment to the development of the European Union as a security actor" (Brummer, 2013:11). Schmitt argues that Merkel assessed that Germany's position and reputation would be damaged if Berlin refused to take the expected leading role (2012:68). Accounts suggest that the EU's wish to strengthen the credibility of the common security and defense policy was a central motivation for the EUFOR mission, and that the situation on the ground in DRC was secondary (Olsen, 2009:253).
4.1.2 Partner value

Chancellor Merkel's most important reason to agree to the EU mission was the aim of strengthening the bilateral relationship to France (Schmitt, 2012:71). Merkel had to give something back to France in exchange for declining the use of the battle group (Brummer, 2012:12). The German-Franco relationship had deteriorated during the previous government and through Merkel's efforts to strengthen the relationship with the USA. A good relationship with partner France was necessary to secure the German standing and leader role in the EU (Brummer, 2013:12). Foreign Minister Steinmeier argued that the EU mission and the German military contribution would demonstrate the Foreign Ministry’s support for both the UN and the European Union (Brummer, 2013:13). A German diplomat said, "The way we assessed it was that it was good for the EU and good for Congo. As such, we should be part of it" (Schmitt, 2012:68).

Some accounts argue that the initial German reaction was negative towards French pressure. German decision-makers were not prepared for the UN request on a EU military participation in DRC, and the first reaction was that France tried to push the EU to conduct a new military operation (Schmitt, 2012:66). As Ehrhart puts it, "behind-the scenes dealing between Paris and New York placed Germany in a position in which it could not refuse to take on the leadership role." (2007:2).

4.1.3 Electoral politics

There was considerable skepticism against the German contribution to DRC among both policy makers and the public. As mentioned, there was considerable skepticism within the leadership trio responsible for the decision to participate. Defense Minister Jung emphasized a lack of experience in Africa, and the risk of over-stretching the German forces that already were involved in Afghanistan, as well as the dangers to the soldiers’ lives in Congo (Schmitt, 2012:67). Jung did not rule out an EU mission, but he was clear that German engagement only would be possible in a European framework. He did not want to field any combat troops, or a German leadership role (Brummer, 2013:10). The reluctance could be because the Ministry was preoccupied
with the transition from territorial defense to an intervention army, as well as resource pressures, argues Brummer (2013:10). However, Jung was not alone. Foreign Minister Steinmeier justified restrictions on the German contribution by emphasizing that members of the governmental parties were skeptical of the mission (Brummer, 2013:13). The parliamentarians were questioning the utility of military force as well as the potential dangers involved (Schmitt, 2012:69). The opposition parties were also critical. However, the grand coalition enjoyed an overwhelming majority, and there was unlikely that the parliament would oppose the government, only six months after the general elections in September 2005 (Schmitt, 2012:69). The mission was approved with a majority of the votes. In total 440 MPs voted for the mission and 135 voted against. Two of the opposition parties, the liberal party FDP and the radical left party Die Linke, voted no (two parliamentarians from FDP voted yes) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006:3260). The FDP criticized the government for approving the mission, and argued that Bundeswehr soldiers unnecessarily were exposed to danger and "carelessly" sent to a conflict zone (Leersch and Peter, 2006). The leader of the FDP, Guido Westerwelle, was strongly against the mission and characterized it as "risky" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2006). The majority of the opposition Green party, Die Grünen, supported the government and voted for the mission (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006:3260-3261).

The German public was strongly against German engagement and leadership in Congo, 57 percent of the German population opposed a mission (Schmitt, 2012:69). The media contributed to the hostile attitudes. The mission was presented as being highly dangerous for the German soldiers (Schmitt, 2012:70).

4.1.4 Strategic culture

The German use of military force in Congo was unprecedented in an African context, and the decision conflicted with the central principle of 'politics before force' in German strategic culture and the aversion to use of combat troops. The German government used moral value-based arguments to justify the decision of military participation. The goal to support the democratic transition in DRC was emphasized.
Foreign Minister Steinmeier stressed that it was Germany's responsibility to support the democratic process in DRC, and that it was right to participate in the mission (Schmitt, 2012:71). Additionally, the government explicitly linked the German contribution to the European engagement and European interests. German soldiers "are portrayed as being Europeans" (Schmitt, 2012:70). Thus, the government emphasized other aspects of the strategic culture, 'never alone', and 'never again', to justify the deployment (Schmitt, 2012:71). Additionally, the restrictions the policymakers put on its participation, suggest a reluctance to use force.

4.1.5 Conclusion

The analysis of the decision-making process that led to German military participation in EUFOR DR Congo suggests that the most important factors for German policymakers were partnership value to partner France, as well as prestige in the EU. It shows that Germany values its reputation as a reliable leader among the EU partners. The driving forces were intertwined. Germany was dependent on a good standing in the EU ahead of the important council presidency. France is Germany's most important partner in the EU and the Franco-German relationship has been the backbone of the EU integration process. Thus, Germany needed a good relationship with partner France in the challenges that lay ahead. This notion seems to have overridden the initial unease related to the French pressure for a deployment. There was significant domestic opposition against the mission, but the public opinion was not electorally relevant. However, the political objections within the government and the parliament played a role in setting restrictions on the German contribution. German strategic culture cannot explain the decision to participate. However, the analysis suggests that the concept at least influenced how the decision-makers referred to and justified their decision. The analysis suggests that they adjusted and reinterpreted the principles of strategic culture to the specific decision-making situation.
The EUFOR Chad/CAR mission from January 28 2008 to March 15 2009 was targeted at limiting the regional consequences of the Darfur conflict in Sudan on neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The Sudanese government rejected a mission in Sudan (Tull, 2008:2). The insurgency in Darfur had led to huge movements of refugees, and in late 2005, the crisis had spread to destabilize the border area to eastern Chad. One million people were in need of humanitarian aid (Berg, 2009:57). Tull describes the Darfur crisis as a proxy war “pitting the Sudanese and Chadian governments against each other. Both sides seek to destabilize each other by supporting insurgents.” (2008:2). France is a former colonial power in both Chad and CAR. French military has been present in Chad since 1986. In 2008, the force consisted of 1,400 soldiers, six fighter jets and surveillance planes (Tull, 2008:2). Scholarly work agrees that France pushed the EU to deploy a military mission to the region (Berg, 2009:57; Chafer and Cumming, 2010:1137; Schmitt, 2012:72), and suggests that it largely served French interests (Berg, 2009:67; Schmitt, 2012:73; Koepf, 2014a:10). Germany was highly skeptical of the mission and refused to contribute with military personnel at an early stage of the planning process (Berg, 2009:63; Schmitt, 2012:73). However, the government did not veto the mission in the EU Council and agreed both to commit financial resources and to send military personnel to the operational head quarter in Paris (Schmitt, 2012:74).

On 15 October 2007, the EU Council decided to create the EUFOR mission (Berg, 2009:61). The mission would serve as the military component of the UN police mission that was to be deployed (Berg, 2009:57). Its mandate was to protect civilians, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons, facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid and ensure the safety of UN personnel and facilities (Berg, 2009:61). The troops were deployed in eastern Chad and in the northeast of the Central African Republic. It was conducted as part of the European Security and Defense Policy, under agreement of the governments of Chad and CAR, and under the mandate provided by the UN Security Council resolution 1778 of September 25 2007. It was a so-called
bridging mission and the UN took over from EUFOR on March 15, 2009, in both Chad and CAR. The mission was the largest to date, with a total of 26 countries contributing, 23 EU members and three non-members, Albania, Croatia, and Russia (EEAS, 2009). The main contributor was France that provided about 2100 of a total of 3700 soldiers, as well as the force commander (Tull, 2008:3). France also had to pay most of the mission’s costs (Berg, 2009:63). The EU had great difficulties with assembling enough troops and equipment. Five conferences were necessary until a satisfactory level was reached, and France decided to fill the gap (Berg, 2009:63). The launch of the mission had to be postponed from November 2007 to March 2008 (Berg, 2009:64). Scholars account that the reluctant contributions reflected the EU member states’ unwillingness to participate (Tull, 2008:1; Berg, 2009:63), and suggest that the reason why they did not veto the mission altogether is found in the EU states' partnership to France (Tull, 2008:1).

The crisis in Darfur became a central issue in the presidential election campaign in France in the summer of 2007 (Berg, 2009:59). It became especially important for Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to do something about the dramatic refugee crisis (Schmitt, 2012:73; Koepf, 2014a:9). Kouchner initiated a summit on Darfur in Paris in July 2007 and travelled to Sudan and Chad ahead of the conference to convince the Chadian president to accept a UN mission to the country. Kouchner had to promise president Déby that the military component should be an EU-led mission. However, Kouchner had not cleared his promise with the EU leaders (Berg, 2009:60; Schmitt, 2012:73). Germany had the presidency of the EU Council at the time and opposed the suggestion. Accounts indicate that Germany did not allow France to announce a common European security and defense operation at the Darfur summit (Berg, 2009:60; Schmitt, 2012:73). Evidence point to that there was great opposition against Kouchner’s ideas even in the French government (Schmitt, 2012:73).

The political leadership in Germany was the same as in the case on DR Congo, Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU), Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD), and Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung (CDU). The grand coalition consisting of the
conservative CDU/CSU and the social democratic SPD, ruled 70 percent of the seats in parliament.

This analysis suggests that lack of interests, and low value of partner France can explain the non-participation in the mission in Chad and CAR.

4.2.1 Threat to national interest, and Prestige

The decisive arguments behind the decision to refuse to participate in EUFOR Chad/CAR were that neither German nor European interests were involved (Schmitt, 2012:74-75). Instead, the German government considered that the mission was conducted to defend French interests in the region (Schmitt, 2012:75). Germany had an embassy in Chad at the time, which meant that Germany could make its own analysis of the situation (Berg, 2009:63).

In September 2007, Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier met with President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Kouchner in Meseberg in Germany and the German government clearly stated that Germany would not participate in the mission. It is argued that the reason was that Steinmeier "had trouble seeing any German interest in the mission" (Schmitt, 2012:73). Additionally, Berlin feared being “dragged into an operation serving French interests (...), in a former French colony, without a clear exit strategy.” (Schmitt, 2012:73). A German internal document described the French suggestion as "vague" (Schmitt, 2012:73). Officially, Germany argued that the Bundeswehr was involved in Afghanistan and the Balkans and that there were no forces available for another deployment (Schmitt, 2012:76). Such claims often indicate that insufficient national interest is at stake. A military official admitted that Germany could have contributed if it wanted, but that it was no interest in participating (Schmitt, 2012:76). However, to highlight other military engagement could be an attempt to preserve German prestige, despite the refusal to contribute. The possible damaging effect of not contributing is likely more significant if the international community stands united behind the mission, and the mission was the largest to date. However, accounts suggest that the European community was reluctant and unwilling to
contribute, despite the high number of participants. France pushed for the mission, and took the greatest burden, which indicate that German prestige was not significantly affected.

4.2.2 Partner value

Influence is key in explaining variance in alliance value (Davidson, 2011:15). The course of events leading to the establishment of the mission suggests that France, and especially Foreign Minister Kouchner unilaterally took the initiative to deploy an EU mission to Chad. Germany reacted strongly on the French solo initiative ahead of the summit on Darfur in July 2007. Additionally, Germany perceived that Paris pushed for a European mission to defend French interests in the region. This notion was apparently supported by experiences from the previous EU mission to DR Congo (DRC) in 2006. Several accounts note that the Bundeswehr was dissatisfied with the military participation in DRC (Schmitt, 2012:74), and that German policymakers became suspicious of French intentions after the mission in DRC (Vines, 2010:1101). There is reason to assume that the French connections and support to the Chadian regime did not lessen the suspicions that France was acting in its own interests in Africa (Tull, 2008:3; Berg, 2009:61). Additionally, Germany was criticized from France for the inflexible position regarding the duration and geographical scope of the mission to DRC (Brummer, 2013:15). Accounts like these suggest that the German government had relatively low value for the partnership with France ahead of the mission in Chad/CAR. At the same time, the reason why Germany did not veto the mission can be found in the close relationship to France. Nicolas Sarkozy was newly elected French president and Germany did not want to embarrass France (Berg, 2009:63; Schmitt, 2012:74). The German government also cared about their reputation as a consensus-seeker in the EU, and to block the mission against the will of the rest of the EU members was considered arrogant (Schmitt, 2012:74).

4.2.3 Electoral politics

The government's standing was less beneficial now, compared to the situation ahead of the mission to DRC in 2006 (Schmitt, 2012:72). However, the decision on whether to
participate militarily in Chad never became a huge public debate, because the German government early decided on non-participation (Schmitt, 2012:75). Nevertheless, a discussion on a possible military engagement in response to the Darfur crisis took place over a longer period, and opposition leader Guido Westerwelle (FDP) was strongly critical of the government's approach to military engagement. Westerwelle accused the grand coalition of pursuing a 'Militärangebotspolitik', "that is, a policy of prematurely offering German contributions to international military missions" (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:9). Westerwelle criticized Defense Minister Jung “for carelessly abandoning the ‘culture of restraint’ when he appeared to suggest in November 2006 that Germany would stand ready to deploy the Bundeswehr to Darfur should this become necessary” (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:9).

### 4.2.4 Strategic culture

The decision not to participate in the military mission fit with the central principles of German strategic culture. Schmitt's work reveals that the decision was justified with references to German strategic culture, and the aversion against the use of force (2012:75). The principles of 'never again', and 'never alone' were also intact, as German policymakers did not find the aim of the mission to be justified, and argued that the mission was about French national interests, not European interests.

### 4.2.5 Conclusion

The main argument for not making a military contribution was that the government perceived neither German nor European interests to be involved. Additionally, it has been argued that Germany was valuing its partner France relatively less. France left Germany out of the initial decision-making process, despite that Germany held the presidency of the EU Council, and Germany had bad experiences from the last European mission in DRC. Nevertheless, the Franco-German partnership played a role and can explain why Germany did not block the mission, and supported it with other means. The decision fitted with the traditional German strategic culture, which was used by the policymakers to justify the decision to stay out of the mission.
4.3 Libya 2011

The crisis in Libya was part of the so-called Arab spring, the anti-authoritarian protests that swept over several Arab countries starting in 2010. The protests against Dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi started early in 2011. The regime violently suppressed the protests and Gaddafi threatened to systematically liquidate the insurgents (Maull, 2011:103). The German government was in general supportive of the popular uprisings in the Arab world, and condemned the Libyan regime. Germany pushed for sanctions and a weapon embargo against Gaddafi (Maull, 2011:107; Stahl, 2012:588), which were imposed on February 26 2011 by UN Security Council Resolution 1970. Serious considerations on military action against Gaddafi and a no-fly zone started in the beginning of March. The first initiative came from the Arab League, but France was leading the process in Europe and NATO. Paris started preparing for a no-fly zone after the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé visited the Arab League in Cairo on March 5-6 (Rinke, 2011:46). On March 5, the opposition National Transitional Council declared itself as the only legitimate body representing the Libyan state, and its leaders visited the EU a couple of days later to ask for recognition and a no-fly zone (Rinke, 2011:46). On March 10, France was the first country to recognize the Council, on President Nicolas Sarkozy's initiative (Rinke, 2011:47).

The German coalition government consisted of the conservative party CDU and the liberal party FDP as junior partner. The key actors in the decision-making process were Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU), Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle (FDP), and Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière (CDU) (Maull, 2012b:35). It was clear from an early point that Germany was skeptical towards military action to protect civilians in Libya (Maull, 2011:107). When Merkel, Westerwelle, and de Maizière met on March 9, they agreed to oppose military action (Rinke, 2011:46). Rinke suggests that the German government was annoyed with Sarkozy as Berlin saw the recognition of the National Transitional Council as French unilateralism (2011:47). The German policymakers stressed the importance of a regional approach and set "seemingly unrealizable conditions", such as approval from the Arab League as well as
participation from Arab states as prerequisite for an approval of the use of military force (Maull, 2011:107). However, when "France and the UK provided what chancellor Merkel was asking for - a regional approach which brought in Arab League support and a UN resolution" (Miskimmon, 2012:396) Germany still refused to support. On March 17, Chancellor Merkel repeated her skepticism on “a military intervention with a highly uncertain outcome” (Rinke, 2011:50). The same day, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973 that imposed a no-fly zone and authorized member states "to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country". The resolution was adopted with 10 votes in favor, none against, and five abstaining. Germany abstained together with Brazil, China, India and Russia (UN, 2011).

The abstention was an unprecedented move from the German government. Germany took a stand against all its most important allies, France, the USA and Great Britain, for the first time since the Second World War (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:2). The implementation of the no-fly zone started two days later under the leadership of Great Britain, France and the USA. NATO took over the command of the military operation by the end of March, and Germany did not participate (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:2). Germany was also widely isolated among other European partners in the European Union, Portugal voted for the resolution in the Security Council, and Sweden, Norway, and Italy joined the NATO operation in Libya (Maull, 2011:108). Additionally, Germany presumably weakened the operation because of the withdrawal of AWACS surveillance plane crews and naval units from the Mediterranean (Maull, 2012a:135; Keller, 2014 [interview]).

The decision on Libya was harshly criticized nationally and among the allies (Stahl, 2012:592; Rinke, 2011:44). The main critique concerned that the decision "failed to live up to the expectation of Germany's most important allies, damaged Germany's reputation as a trustworthy member of the western alliance and risked isolating the country from its partners" (Oppermann, 2012:503). Additionally, the criticism touched upon the principle of 'responsibility to protect', which concerns whether the
international community has a responsibility to take military action to protect civilians from government violence (Maull, 2011:103; Rinke, 2011:44-45). The French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé declared that the European common security and defense policy from now on could be considered dead (Stahl, 2012:592). Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said it was a "scandalous mistake", and "possibly the biggest foreign policy debacle since the founding of the Federal Republic" (Oppermann, 2012:503).

The possible driving forces behind Berlin's decision in Libya are subject of a vast amount of scholarly work, but the explanations diverge (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:2). This study suggests that a lack of interests and a miscalculation of the damaging effects on German prestige contributed to the abstention. There was also considerable domestic opposition against participation.

4.3.1 Threat to national interest

The German government did not consider the Libya conflict as a threat to its own security, nor to its national interests (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:14). German national interests were a central justification for non-participation from the three key political actors. Chancellor Merkel argued that military involvement in Afghanistan contributed to German security, and that this was not the case in Libya (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:14). Defense Minister de Maizière justified German non-participation by explicitly stating that Germany reserved the right “in the German interest, to say: we will not be involved this time.” (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:14). Berlin found it impossible to vote for the Libya mission and then not participate in the military operation (Rinke, 2011:52; Miskimmon, 2012:396-397; Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:15), which Berlin in no case was willing to (Maull, 2011:108). Foreign Minister Westerwelle stressed the risks to the German armed forces, skepticism of a military solution, and a possible lengthy military involvement (Miskimmon, 2012:396). Westerwelle stated in the Bundestag the day ahead of the vote in the Security Council, "We do not want or are allowed to become a war party in a civil war in northern Africa. We do not want to end up on the wrong path, so that in
the end German soldiers are part of a war in Libya" (Stahl, 2012:589). States must believe that the allied mission is likely to succeed to be willing to provide military support (Davidson, 2011:17). The German government did not believe in the military mission, and advocated a political non-military solution in Libya (Miskimmon, 2012:397; Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:14). The fact that the government was preoccupied with other issues at the time supports the argument that it was not in German interest to be involved in Libya. Chancellor Merkel prioritized the Eurozone crisis (Haftendorn, 2012:22-23), as well as domestic energy questions in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:12).

However, Germany took action to protect German interests involved in the Libya crisis. On February 26 2011, 134 employees of the German oil and gas company, Wintershall AG, working in Libya were evacuated by the German air force (Miskimmon, 2012:395). On March 3, the German embassy in the capital Tripoli was closed down because of the increasing fighting in the country (Rinke, 2011:46). Still, Libya was neither of political nor economic importance for Germany. Unlike France, the German government had distanced itself from the Gaddafi-regime long before the crisis started in 2011 (Rinke, 2011:47). The German-Libyan trade was not significant, and in contrast to France and Great Britain Germany had prioritized energy imports from Russia and Eastern Europe instead of the Middle East (Miskimmon, 2012:402-403).

4.3.2 Prestige

Evidence points to that the German government did not consider its prestige and reputation among the Western partners to be at stake ahead of the vote in the Security Council. The potential damage inflicted on a state's prestige when refusing military contribution, is bigger if the international community is united in supporting the mission (Davidson, 2011:17-18). Scholarly work suggests that Germany did not stand alone in being critical towards military action in Libya. Also eastern and southeastern states in Europe were appalled by how the British and French enforced their policies on Libya (Rinke, 2011:48). More importantly, Germany was "caught somewhat by
surprise by the USA's decision to support the Franco-British plan" (Miskimmon, 2012:398). USA was initially skeptical towards a no-fly zone in Libya (Rinke, 2011:48) but changed its mind shortly before the vote (Miskimmon, 2012:398; Stahl, 2012:588). It is suggested that a visit by Foreign Minister Clinton to the Golf-region was essential for the U-turn, as the US was confirmed that Arab states were prepared to participate in a military mission in Libya (Rinke, 2011:49). Berlin was under pressure to support the resolution. The British Prime Minister David Cameron and Foreign Minister William Hague called Berlin on the day of the vote (Rinke, 2011:52; Miskimmon, 2012:398). On March 17, Berlin was informed that the mission would be approved even if Germany abstained (Rinke, 2011:52). That information meant that a German abstention would not be decisive in any direction, thus, the information was received with relief in Berlin, according to Rinke, “if the resolution would fail because of the lacking German vote, would the costs for the disagreements with the allies had to be calculated differently” (Rinke, 2011:52). However, the government's "compensatory measures" to relieve the allies from some of the burden (Maull, 2011:108), suggest that Berlin expected the decision to be somewhat unpopular and wanted to dampen the negative effects by demonstrating responsibility in other missions. Defense Minister de Maizière promised NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to increase German participation in Afghanistan when he confirmed that Germany would abstain on Libya (Rinke, 2011:52). Germany decided to send up to 300 more troops for NATO-AWACS surveillance flights in Afghanistan (Oppermann, 2012:514). Additionally, Germany supported the mission by permitting overflight rights and the use of German military infrastructure, as well as providing ammunition (Maull, 2012a:135).

The strong criticism that followed the abstention suggests that the government miscalculated or underestimated the international costs of non-participation. The fact that the government found it necessary to stress that German alliance solidarity was strong provide support for this argument. Defense Minister de Maizière argued that the increased engagement in Afghanistan was a clear sign of German alliance solidarity, and stressed that the German government supported the goals of the resolution that the
"horrible dictator, who kills his people, has to go" (Deutschlandfunk.de, 2011). Also Chancellor Merkel underlined that the abstention should not be interpreted as an expression of neutrality towards Gaddafi’s regime, and that Germany supported the goals of Resolution 1973 (Stahl, 2012:591).

4.3.3 Alliance value

Several partnerships were relevant in the decision-making process. The USA’s initial critical stance on military action in Libya may have played a role for the German decision, and Great Britain tried to convince Berlin to change its mind, but it is German value of partner France that will be examined here. While Germany already had diverged with the USA and Great Britain on the 2003 Iraq war, Libya was the first example of a break with the closest European partner, France, in a high-stake case in the UN Security Council (Rinke, 2011:44).

States value allies that listen to their views (Davidson, 2011:15). Evidence points to that the German objections on military action in Libya were not heard, and that Germany did not have the opportunity to influence the ally on whether and how to use force. Several factors indicate that the German government had low value for ally France at the time: Berlin was annoyed by Paris’s decision to unilaterally recognize the transitional council in Libya (Rinke, 2011:47). At the G8-meeting in Paris on March 14-15, concluded the French Foreign Minister Juppé that there was broad agreement on the French plans to impose a no-fly zone, despite significant German disagreement (Rinke, 2011:48). President Sarkozy sent a letter to all members of the Security Council and proposed all necessary measures to be imposed to protect civilians against Gaddafi’s regime, despite German objections (Rinke, 2011:50). Foreign Minister Juppé also canceled the planned first visit with Foreign Minister Westerwelle at short notice on March 17, and travelled instead to New York to participate at the Security Council meeting (Rinke, 2011:50). Lastly, London called to convince Berlin in the final hours, not Paris (Rinke, 2011:52; Miskimmon, 2012:398). According to Miskimmon, Berlin felt sidelined by France and excluded from the Franco-British process at the Security Council (2012:397). The dissatisfaction was
evident in the German criticism of the mission. The political elite argued that the mission had not been thought trough and was not well planned (Miskimmon, 2012:397), and tried to discredit the allies’ motives by pointing at how the former colonial powers have dominated the Africa agenda in the EU (Stahl, 2012:591). Foreign Minister Westerwelle indicates that Germany valued the traditional partners less when stating that Germany was not isolated in the abstention on Libya because it had voted in line with four other big states (Stahl, 2012:590-591).

4.3.4 Electoral politics

All three key decision takers, Merkel, Westerwelle, and de Maizière, agreed on the abstention (Rinke, 2011:52), but it was especially Foreign Minister Westerwelle that was criticized afterwards (Miskimmon, 2012:396). As Foreign Minister, Westerwelle obviously played an important role in the decision-making process, in addition, his role as party leader for the FDP and the up-coming regional elections in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate have been suggested relevant for the decision-making process (Maull, 2011:111; Oppermann, 2012:515; Miskimmon, 2012:399). Both the FDP and Westerwelle scored poorly in the opinion polls and the election results were seen as crucial for Westerwelle personally, as well as the overall standing of the coalition government (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:7-8). The decision to abstain has, thus, partly been seen as “an FDP electoral tactic” (Maull, 2011:111; Miskimmon, 2012:399), and an attempt to “taking advantage of the crisis to reverse the party’s political fortunes” (Oppermann, 2012:515). Westerwelle allegedly overruled advice from career diplomats in the Foreign Office to vote in favor of the resolution (Economist, 2011).

The government had solid public backing for the decision to keep Germany out of the military mission in Libya (Rinke, 2011:44; Stahl, 2012:595). All parties supported the decision (Maull, 2011:111). The big public debate and criticism from the opposition, the SPD, the Green party and Die Linke, arose after the vote (Stahl, 2012:589; Miskimmon, 2012:399). A poll conducted ahead of the vote showed that a vast majority of the German public was against German military engagement in Libya (88
percent against, 8 percent for). However, a majority meant that the German government should have supported a no-fly zone against the Gaddafi regime (56 percent "yes", 34 percent "no") (Oppermann, 2012:515). However, the voters did not reward the FDP in the elections, and the results were a disaster for the government junior party (Oppermann, 2012:515).

Hansel and Oppermann argue that there were rather Westerwelle’s personal beliefs and the long-standing anti-war policy of the FDP than the up-coming elections, which explain the critical stance on Libya (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:16). For example, they point to Westerwelle’s opposition against external intervention in the popular uprisings in the Arab world (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:8). As mentioned in the cases on the missions to DR Congo and Chad/CAR, Westerwelle was a vocal critic of the previous grand coalition, and of what he perceived as “a trend towards a less restrained approach to military options in the German foreign policy discourse” (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:9). The FDP had not consistently opposed Bundeswehr deployments, but emphasized that use of military means must only happen in exceptional circumstances, when all other means have been exhausted (Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:9).

4.3.5 Strategic culture

The Libya case is an example of the basic principles of the German strategic culture coming into conflict. The German government was unwilling to become involved in another military operation, and promoted a political solution, 'politics before force'. However, the abstention in the UN Security Council inevitably led to a breach of the principle of 'never alone' as Germany was isolated from all its traditional allies. Additionally, it can be argued that Libya was a breach with a value-oriented German foreign and security policy and the principle of 'never again'. The government justified the decision to stay out of Libya by referring to the aversion of the use of military force. Foreign Minister Westerwelle argued that Germany was not "allowed to become a war party" in North Africa. German policymakers have mostly avoided using the term 'war' when German soldiers have participated in military operations (Stahl,
Maull suggests that Libya was a case where military restraint was wrong, and a breach with German strategic culture (2011:114). The uprisings against Dictator Gaddafi were demanding democratic rights and Gaddafi answered with massive human rights violations. Maull argues that the situation in Libya could be compared to Kosovo in 1998/99 in which German decision-makers justified the participation by pointing at a German responsibility to engage against cases of massive human rights violations and risk of genocide (2011:103). Thus, to engage against Gaddafi would have been legitimate and in line with the current strategic culture (Maull, 2011:114). The fact that the mission in Libya had a UN-m mandate, and gained regional support provided additional legitimacy.

Central to the critique from the allies was the question of whether the Libya decision implied a shift in German security policy orientations towards privileging "short-term calculations over traditional multilateral commitments" (Miskimmon 2012:405). Scholarly accounts suggest that the Libya case is part of an on-going development towards a more domestic interest-driven security policy in which Germany increasingly avoid responsibility within the EU and NATO (Maull, 2012b:36; Hansel and Oppermann, 2014:14). Such an evolvement suggests a changing strategic culture.

4.3.6 Conclusion

Central for the decision-makers to abstain on Libya was a lack of German interests in the conflict. The government did not consider its prestige to be at stake. The strong external and internal reactions afterwards indicate that the German policymakers miscalculated to what degree German prestige in fact was involved. Additionally, Germany's relatively low value of France, and a feeling of being sidelined in the decision-making process, probably had an effect and contributed to the low interest. However, multilateral commitments still played a role, as Germany provided indirect support to the mission, and increased its engagement in Afghanistan. There is reason to assume that domestic factors, such as the significant aversion against the use of force in the government coalition party FDP, were underlying factors contributing to the abstention. Skepticism against the use of military force is a central principle of
German strategic culture. The German government justified the decision to stay out of the mission by pointing at the need for political solutions. However, the Libya abstention broke with the principles of 'never alone' and 'never again', and partner states and scholars have suggested that Libya might be a result of a changing German strategic culture putting less emphasis on Germany's multilateral commitments.
4.4 Mali 2013-2014

German contribution to the EU training mission to Mali has taken place in several steps under two different governments. The contributions decided in 2013 and 2014 will be analyzed here. The recent increased deployment in February 2015 (Bundeswehr, 2015b) will not be discussed. Germany has also deployed soldiers to the African-led mission, AFISMA, and the later UN mission, MINUSMA in Mali, but the focus of this article will be on the European mission.

The unrest in Mali escalated when the capital Bamako was hit by a military coup in March 2012, which deposed President Amadou Toumani Touré and destabilized the poverty-ridden country (Lacher and Tull, 2013:1). Tensions had been growing between elites from rival tribal and ethnic groups in the north of the country for some years, and the situation escalated into a violent conflict in January 2012. Extremist groups, among them the regional al-Qaida group Al-Qaida in the Muslim Maghreb, took control over Northern-Mali (Lacher and Tull, 2013:1), and imposed a brutal sharia-regime, which made hundred thousands flee the region (Allers, 2013:9). When the Malian interim President Traoré begged for rapid military help (Kolb, 2013:1), France took unilateral action and intervened on January 11 2013, to stop the extremists' offensive towards the central parts of Mali and Bamako (Lacher and Tull, 2013:4). France is former colonial power in Mali. Humanitarian reasons played an important role in justifying the intervention, but fear that the crisis could threaten French security interests were the main motives for involving, argues Koepf (2014a:10). Several French people had been taken hostage the past years and the terror groups threatened with attacks in France. Paris had first planned for an African-led support mission, AFISMA, led by the West-African economic union ECOWAS to intervene in Mali (Allers, 2013:9). The French intervention included air forces and ground troops, and 4000 French soldiers (Allers, 2013:10). It managed to stop the extremist offensive and was perceived a success (Lacher and Tull, 2013:6). However, it would take many months until the French army could hand over the responsibility to the Malian or AFISMA troops (Lacher and Tull, 2013:5). The French President
Francois Hollande declared that the operation in Mali would last as long as it had to (Kolb, 2013:1). The intervention influenced the EU discussions that had taken place on French initiative on a deployment of a European training mission to Mali, EUTM Mali, that was to train and prepare Malian soldiers to lead the operation (Allers, 2013:9; Lacher and Tull, 2013:4).

The German government at the time was Chancellor Merkel’s second coalition, consisting of the conservative CDU and the liberal FDP. Merkel, Foreign Minister Westerwelle (FDP), Defense Minister de Maizière (CDU), as well as Development Minister Dirk Niebel (FDP) were the key actors in the decision process (Jungholt and Meyer, 2012).

The EU started discussing a possible military engagement in Mali in the fall 2012. The German and French Foreign Ministries discussed the conflict in October 2012, and the French Foreign Minister expressed his worries that Mali could turn into a second Afghanistan (Gebauer, 2012). Chancellor Merkel publicly gave a green light for German participation in a training mission at a Bundeswehr meeting on October 22 (Merkel, 2012). The next day Foreign Minister Westerwelle ruled out any German combat troops to Mali (Spiegel Online, 2012b). The German government was informed ahead of the French intervention (Federal Foreign Office, 2013a), and Defense Minister de Maizière immediately expressed his support, stating that it was "consistent and right" (Leithäuser, 2013). On January 14, Foreign Minister Westerwelle repeated that the German government would not send any combat troops to assist France (Federal Foreign Office, 2013b). The government decided to contribute with two transport planes that should transport African soldiers from the neighboring countries to the capital Bamako in Mali (Allers, 2013:10). The German contribution was later extended to also include air-tanking support for French air force bombers (Allers, 2013:10).

On February 18 2013, the EU Council launched EUTM Mali at the request of the Malian authorities and in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2071
(2012) and 2085 (2012) (Bundeswehr, 2015b). 23 member states contributed military personnel to the mission (EEAS, 2013). A vast majority of the parliament mandated the first German military deployment to Mali on February 28 2013. Only the party group Die Linke voted against (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013a). Germany was willing to contribute up to 180 soldiers to EUTM Mali, mainly engineer soldiers, sanitary personnel, as well as logistical support, and up to 150 soldiers for transportation support and air tanking for French air force bombers to the African-led military operation AFISMA. The missions were mandated for one year (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013a). On French request Germany had already on January 17 started air transport support, but needed a mandate from the parliament to also meet the request on air tanking to help French air strikes. The government ruled out any German combat troops on the ground (Allers, 2013:10). Germany’s contribution was now the second biggest after France (Allers, 2013:10).

The next deployment to Mali was mandated in February 2014. Germany now had a new government after the federal election on September 22 2013. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s third government was a grand coalition consisting of the conservative party CDU, and the social democratic SPD as junior partner. The Foreign Minister was Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD), who also had the post in Merkel's first grand coalition, and the Defense Minister was Ursula von der Leyen (CDU). The new government was sworn in on December 17 2013, and the three central decision-makers announced already in January 2014 that Germany would increase its engagement in Mali (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2014; Pfister and Repinski, 2014; Merkel, 2014). The government decision was taken on February 5, and sent to parliament for approval (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014b). On February 20, a strong majority of the parliament approved to strengthen the EU training mission and increase the number of troops from 180 to 250 soldiers (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014c). The Franco-German Council decided to send soldiers from the Franco-German brigade to Mali, the first ever joint deployment in Africa and in the framework of a EU-mission (Bundesregierung, 2014b:18). In June 2014, the parliament decided to continue the
deployment to the multinational UN mission MINUSMA, which took over from AFISMA in Mali (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014d).

The following analysis suggests that the most important arguments for German participation in Mali were partner value to France and prestige.

4.4.1 Threat to national interests

There is no evidence that the crisis in Mali posed a direct threat to German security or national interests (Bartels, 2014 [interview]; Keller, 2014 [interview]; Koepf, 2014b [interview]). Germany was represented with an embassy in the capital Bamako, but there were almost no bilateral trade or significant investments (Federal Foreign Office, 2013c). The terror groups in Mali were of little direct threat for European states (Kaim, 2013:2). Still, the possible risk for European and German security was central in the decision-makers' justification of the decision to participate in the mission. It was important to prevent international terror groups from establishing "a safe haven in northern Mali", argued Chancellor Merkel and promised assistance, “We know that the Malian forces are too weak to respond. Thus, they need support from abroad" (Merkel, 2012). Development Minister Niebel said that to prevent Mali from collapsing is a "fundamental interest", (Jungholt and Meyer, 2012). Foreign Minister Westerwelle underlined in a visit to Bamako in November 2012 that "a stable Mali is of major importance for the security in Europe" (Deutsche Welle, 2012). Both Foreign Minister Westerwelle, and later Defense Minister von der Leyen defined Mali and Africa as Germany's neighborhood (Knuf and Szent-Ivanyi, 2013; Pfister and Repinski, 2014). Defense Minister von der Leyen also pointed to German commercial interests in a stable and booming Africa, and defined Mali as the focus of the government's increased engagement at the continent (Pfister and Repinski, 2014). Africa experts acknowledged that the unstable situation in Mali indirectly could affect European interests through increased refugee flows to Europe, a flourishing drug trade and rising risk of being taken hostage (Hille, 2012; Kaim, 2013:2).
It is necessary to assess concrete actions as well as statements to determine whether a target actually pose a threat. The German government demonstrated its interest in Western Africa by extensive travels to the region when the discussions on an EU training mission started in 2012 (Hille, 2012). Defense Minister von der Leyen carried out one of her first visits abroad to Mali in February 2014, and argued that the Bundeswehr had capacity for more deployments since the Afghanistan operation was ending (Tagesschau.de, 2014). The government decided to increase the deployment to EUTM Mali a couple of days later, and von der Leyen underlined that up to 250 German soldiers were a substantial contribution to the European training mission of almost 600 soldiers (Leithäuser, 2014). However, it was a small contribution compared to the several thousand French soldiers fighting in Mali. The German deployment had several caveats, the government was quick to rule out any combat troops, and let France bear the burden of launching the combat mission in 2013 (Major and Mölling, 2014a:4). The first transport planes that were offered had significant limitations. The planes were reserved for flying African soldiers to Mali, and Berlin ruled out transporting French troops or munitions (Neukirch and Repinski, 2013). The total support was later extended, but the German soldiers were mandated to conduct less risky training tasks far away from the front lines. The government refused a request of a bigger military engagement and increased instead the financial support. Development Minister Niebel (FDP) argued, “The sharpest sword against extremism is development policy” (Spiegel Online, 2013a). Military contributions are more costly than mere political or financial support, and thus, often indicate a stronger commitment to the target (Davidson, 2011:6).

4.4.2 Prestige

Accounts suggest that prestige and the German damaged reputation as a reliable and trustworthy ally after the much criticized decision on Libya, played a role in the decision-making process to participate in Mali. There is obviously hard to say what Germany would have done in Mali if the Libya case had been different. Two of the analysts interviewed pointed out that Germany probably would have participated in Mali anyway because of the long German military engagement in Africa and other
countries (Keller, 2014 [interview]; Koepf, 2014b [interview]). In support of such an argument is the fact that the German Bundeswehr already had been involved in training measures in Mali years before the Libya case (Drechsel, 2013). However, it is argued that the Libya decision and the isolationist position Germany placed itself in, served as a “key trigger to rethink German security and defense policy” (Major and Mölling, 2014b:7). It was central to prove that Libya was a unique case and that Germany could be trusted to contribute in international crisis management (Keller, 2014 [interview]).

German decision-makers were under hard external pressure to contribute in Mali from partner France, but also African countries pushed Germany to contribute more (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2013). One of the analysts interviewed suggests that it was the external pressure that drove Germany to participate in Mali (Koepf, 2014b [interview]). Evidence points to that the German government wanted to meet French expectations. The contribution was “offered quicker and with far less fuss than in previous cases” (Major and Mölling, 2014b:14). The government also went as far as it could without a parliament approval, to provide logistical air transport soon after the French intervention in 2013 (Allers, 2013:10). Additionally, the decision to deploy the Franco-German brigade to Mali in February 2014 (Bundesregierung, 2014b:18), was perceived as a significant step (Wiegel and Sattar, 2014). There are indications that Berlin felt pressured to deploy the brigade to not inflict damage on German prestige. The decision came after Paris in 2013 had threatened to terminate their contribution to the brigade because it never was deployed (Stalinski, 2014).

The damaging experiences from Libya were only one factor indicating that German prestige would suffer if it did not contribute to Mali. Policy statements promising a more active security policy, as well as initiatives such as the “Enable and Enhance Initiative” (E2I) also provided impetus for deployment, and suggested that Berlin was committed to enhance its prestige.
Defense Minister de Maizière was advocating a more active German security policy when German or European interests were at risk (Allers, 2013:17). De Maizière told the Bundeswehr to be prepared for more external missions when the debate on a training mission to Mali started in October 2012, "As a powerful member of the international society will Germany more often be asked to take responsibility, also militarily" (Spiegel Online, 2012a). The next government intensified this policy line. One of the first things Chancellor Merkel’s third government did was to announce a more active foreign and security policy. Foreign Minister Steinmeier, Defense Minister von der Leyen, and Bundespresident Joachim Gauck fronted the new agenda early in 2014 at the Munich Security Conference, but the debate had started months earlier (Bittner and Naß, 2014). The trio signaled that Germany would take more responsibility in international crisis management and engage in joint military actions abroad. President Gauck declared that Germany should make a more substantial contribution to conflict prevention to be a good partner: “Germany must also be ready to do more to guarantee the security that others have provided it with for decades.” (Gauck, 2014). Steinmeier and von der Leyen related Germany's growing responsibility in crises and conflicts to its growing size and power in the world. Von der Leyen stated that Germany was ready to “enhance our international responsibility” (Von der Leyen, 2014). She pointed specifically to the missions in Mali and the Central African Republic, which also was launched in the first half of 2014. Foreign Minister Steinmeier stated, “Germany is too big to merely comment on world affairs from the sidelines.” (Steinmeier, 2014a).

Additionally, German prestige was implicated in the broader goal to enhance European security and defense cooperation and the Franco-German duo as the motor of this integration process. Scholarly work and interviews suggest a discrepancy between German ambition and initiatives, and results and actual involvement (Keller, 2014 [interview]; Major and Mölling, 2014b:7; Puglierin et al., 2014). Germany refused to participate in joint military missions at the same time as the leadership was pushing forward theoretical initiatives on security and defense cooperation among the EU members (Major and Mölling, 2014b:7). Germany launched the “Pooling and Sharing”
initiative in 2010 (Major and Mölling, 2014b:7), and the “Enable and Enhance Initiative” (E2I), which became part of the final declaration at the EU Council summit in December 2013 (Puglierin et al., 2014). There are indications that Merkel's personal prestige was involved in the decision to participate in Mali, firstly because she was under pressure after Libya. Foreign Minister Westerwelle came under most criticism, but the case also raised questions as to the Chancellor's handling of foreign policy (Miskimmon, 2012:396). Secondly, the E2I was perceived as Chancellor Merkel prioritized security policy project or doctrine (Allers, 2013:17; Puglierin et. al., 2014). The concept was outlined at a meeting for the Bundeswehr in October 2012 when Merkel first announced that Germany would participate in the training mission in Mali (Merkel, 2012). The concept is based on the notion that the European Union and NATO cannot solve every security policy problem alone, thus, partner countries in fragile regions should be trained and equipped to take responsibility for their own security (Merkel, 2012). E2I remains a theoretical concept (Puglierin et al., 2014), but the training mission in Mali was a good example of the idea behind the concept (Major and Mölling, 2014a:4). It would probably have been damaging for German prestige and for Chancellor Merkel not to contribute to a mission that represented her own doctrine.

Another initiative that signaled to the partners that the government was willing to take more responsibility was the establishment of the Rühe Commission, tasked to examine the parliamentary approval process for military deployments, and to consider earlier deployments (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014a).

4.4.3 Partner value

Evidence points to that the relationship to France was an important driving force to participate in Mali.

In France, Francois Hollande from the socialist party was President since May 15 2012. The conservative Chancellor Merkel had developed a close relationship to the former President Sarkozy, and the duo was the central leaders in the European
economic crisis. President Hollande did not share Merkel's economic agenda (Haftendorn, 2012:24). The euro crisis was Chancellor Merkel’s top priority and the government had given less priority to security policy (Techau, 2013). Maull argues that, "the second Merkel-government allowed the Franco-German cooperation on military issues in the context of the European security and defense policy to erode. France was consistently asking and pushing for closer cooperation (...), and Germany was dragging its feet" (Maull, 2014c [interview]). Germany took significant steps towards intensified security cooperation and better relations with their French counterparts in 2013 and 2014.

On January 22 2013, the German and French political leaders celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Élysée friendship treaty, a symbolic gesture to underline the important relationship between the partners. The German government characterized the Franco-German relations as the “heart of Europe” (Bundesregierung, 2013a:1), and declared that France and Germany would continue “their close consultation in important questions of foreign policy” (Bundesregierung, 2013a:4). Mali was high on the agenda and Chancellor Merkel supported the French intervention, while President Hollande thanked Germany for the political support (Bundeskanzlerin, 2013a). The commitments on closer cooperation were reaffirmed in a joint declaration on May 30 2013 (Bundesregierung, 2013b). When Merkel was reelected as Chancellor, she and Foreign Minister Steinmeier made the first symbolic foreign trip to Paris to visit President Hollande and Foreign Minister Fabius, the day after the new government was sworn in on December 17 2013 (Bundeskanzlerin, 2013b). On January 21, Foreign Minister Steinmeier visited Fabius in Paris again, and the meeting resulted in a joint declaration promising more strategic discussions and cooperation on security and defense policy (Auswärtiges Amt, 2014). In February, several members of the German government traveled to Paris to participate in the Franco-German council. The results were a broad common engagement for security and defense policy in general, and in Africa in particular, expressed through both statements, new initiatives and real action. The Council decided to send soldiers from the Franco-German brigade to work together in Mali to conduct training measures. In addition, the foreign ministers agreed
to travel together to crisis regions in Europe's neighborhood as well as to cooperate on crisis prevention (Bundesregierung, 2014b:18). Media reported that there was harmony and a good mood at the meeting (Simons, 2014). President Hollande stated that France and Germany stay on same side on all big issues, “like Eastern Europe, Syria, Iran or Africa” (Simons, 2014).

Influence is critical when determining partner value, and the significant degree of cooperation and contact in the decision making process on Mali indicates that the German government was consulted during the process, which suggests that "also Paris had learned from the diplomatic mistakes during the Libya war" (Allers, 2013:17). There was frequent contact between Berlin and Paris ahead of both German decisions to contribute to Mali (Federal Foreign Office, 2013b; Gebauer, 2014a). Steinmeier had been at the phone with Fabius the same day as he announced that Europe could not leave France alone in Mali, and that Germany considered increasing its engagement in January 2014 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2014). Policy statements from Berlin suggest that the increased engagement in Mali was done to relieve France of some of the burden (Gebauer, 2014a). However, accounts suggest that Paris first of all saw the German deployment as an important advancement towards a common Africa strategy, as the relatively modest contribution would not significantly ease the burden from the French combat troops in Mali (Wiegel and Sattar, 2014). The commitments to work together on security in Africa were confirmed by President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel at the EU-Africa Summit on April 2 2014, and President Hollande emphasized that the German support and contribution to Mali was valuable for the intervention (Merkel and Hollande, 2014).

Some of the sources I interviewed emphasized that the Franco-German relationship was important as a tool to make Europe act together (Bartels, 2014 [interview]; Keller, 2014 [interview]). As one foreign policy analyst phrased it, “Strengthening the European Union and security and defense policy is a mutual goal that is shared in Berlin and Paris. We need to prove that EU is an efficient actor in international affairs and especially in security affairs, and to show (...) that we can solve problems
together.” (Keller, 2014 [interview]). SPD-parliamentarian and chairperson of the Defense Committee Bartels confirmed in an interview that there was an important driving force for the government to make Europe act together, “We do not want any solo efforts. Just as Germany should not go a special path, neither should other countries. France should not be forced to do it alone.” (Bartels, 2014 [interview]). Statements from Defense Minister von der Leyen provide proof to this view. She declined when asked whether Germany is now moving together with France in Africa, "For me this is a European task. (...) The mandates are shaped neither by Germany nor France. In Mali 23 are nations working together to train the Malian security forces." (Leithäuser, 2014).

4.4.4 Electoral politics

The perception that Germany had sidelined and isolated itself in the security policy earned broad recognition among the political elite and security policy community, and was expressed through various calls for more engagement in Mali. The opposition even used the same arguments as the government: Foreign policy expert Gernot Erler in the opposition party SPD justified the deployment to Mali by stating that Germany cannot sideline itself and let other do the work (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013a). The criticism against the government was instead that Germany was not doing enough, especially towards partner France (Allers, 2013:11). The president of the Bundestag, CDU-politician Norbert Lammert, stated that he understood the initial two transport planes that the government offered, rather as "the first demonstrative signal that we are not positioning ourselves like in Libya" (Spiegel Online, 2013b). The only party group that voted against the deployments was the small left party, Die Linke (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013a; Deutscher Bundestag, 2014c).

Again, mainly Foreign Minister Westerwelle came under criticism for being reluctant, ruling out combat troops at an early stage, and limiting the room to maneuver (Allers, 2013:11; Neukirch and Repinski, 2013). Westerwelle was also criticized from his own. Defense Minister de Maizière was indirectly criticizing Westerwelle by stating “I think we should talk more about what we are doing, and not about what we are not doing”
(Neukirch and Repinski, 2013). However, the tension was only rhetorical. There were no disagreement between the central decision-makers on actual policy, and Chancellor Merkel, Defense Minister de Maizière, Foreign Minister Westerwelle, and Development Minister Niebel agreed already in October 2012 that Germany would contribute logistically, but not send combat troops (Jungholt and Meyer, 2012). The reluctance to engage more could be explained by domestic factors. As mentioned in the previous chapter on Libya, Westerwelle's beliefs were rooted in a long-standing anti-war policy of the FDP. The critical stance had backing in the public. The Bundeswehr feared that it was sent on a badly planned mission, as a "pay-off for Libya" (Jungholt and Meyer, 2012). 59 percent of the German public was against a mission to Mali, according to a survey conducted on January 16-17 2013, before the first German deployment to Mali, but after the French intervention. The opposition was especially strong among supporters of the government party CDU, and Die Linke (Spiegel Online, 2013b). Additionally, only one of three supported to assist the French soldiers in their fight against Islamists (Spiegel Online, 2013b). A survey conducted when Defense Minister von der Leyen had announced to increase the engagement in Mali in January 2014, found that 61 percent of the public objected that the Bundeswehr should engage more in international crisis regions (Spiegel Online, 2014a).

The domestic political situation changed when the third Merkel government came to power. The grand coalition is one of the strongest in German history. The two governmental parties CDU and SPD hold 80 per cent of the seats in the parliament (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013b). The popularity gave the government more room to maneuver. It probably also had an effect that Westerwelle no longer headed the foreign ministry. Foreign Minister Steinmeier, together with President Gauck, played the central roles in fronting the new more active German foreign policy (Bittner and Naß, 2014).

---

7 The survey did not specifically ask about the mission to Mali
8 The first grand coalition in the 1960s had 90 percent of the seats (Economist, 2013)
4.4.5 Strategic culture

The government-initiated debate on a new role for German security policy could indicate a changing strategic culture. However, a closer look at both speeches and actual engagement reveal less dramatic changes. The contribution in Mali was severely restricted and focused mainly on the tasks the German Bundeswehr is comfortable doing, conflict prevention through military training, which find resonance in German strategic culture. Evidence points to that even the limited military contribution was hard to justify. Foreign Minister Westerwelle was criticized by humanitarian organizations for mixing humanitarian and military tasks to make the participation more politically acceptable (Spiegel Online, 2013c). The policymakers justified the participation by claiming that the crisis was threatening German and European security. The war on terror is perceived an acceptable use of force. German policymakers also emphasized that Germany had a different relation to the use of military power than France (Allers, 2013:14-15). Lastly, Defense Minister von der Leyen downplayed German engagements by emphasizing that out of 14 out-of-area Bundeswehr deployments, only three involved combat troops (Leithäuser, 2014).

The debate and criticism that was triggered by the announcements at the Munich Security Conference in the beginning of 2014, reveal how sensitive and difficult it still is to discuss the use of military force in Germany, and indicate that the German strategic culture is strongly rooted in the society. Several foreign policy parliamentarians underlined that they would not accept a shift away from a cautious, restricted security policy (Meiritz, 2014). Defense politician Agnieszka Brugger from the Green party stated, “Across the partisan divide, there's a consensus that we do not want to depart from the culture of military restraint” (Dick, 2014). However, this was also the message in the government speeches in Munich. They were careful to emphasize German restraint in the use of military force, and underlined that sending in the troops must be last resort (Gauck, 2014; Steinmeier, 2014a; Von der Leyen, 2014). Thus, despite the big debate that the speeches triggered, the content was not suggesting a big shift in German security policy behavior, or a shift in German strategic culture.
4.4.6 Conclusion

The analysis suggests that high value for partner France and prestige were the most important driving forces for the German government in the decision to participate in the mission in Mali. Berlin was signaling both through statements and initiatives that it wanted to prove more important in international security relations. Several cooperation initiatives suggest a high value of partner France and that Germany aimed at enhancing the bilateral relationship. Policy statements confirm that the wish to assist partner France was important for the decision-makers, frequent contact between central decision makers from the two countries indicate a high level of cooperation on the deployment. Partner value is intertwined with prestige. Germany wanted to prove to its closest European partner that it was credible and could be trusted to support in security issues. To not offer support and soldiers to the EU training mission in Mali would most likely have hurt German credibility. Domestic constraints probably contributed to the restrictions on the contribution. The government had to balance high external expectations on a contribution, and a domestic political unwillingness to being dragged into an uncertain war. At the same time, the damaging experiences from Libya contributed to a greater willingness to contribute to Mali. Again, German strategic culture was used to justify the decision to provide German soldiers to a mission. The principle of 'never alone' was reinterpreted to also mean that it was a German responsibility to hinder France from acting alone, and to make Europe act together. It can be argued that the principle of 'politics before force' was intact as the main focus of the German contribution was the training mission. Thus, the German soldiers were mainly tasked with conflict prevention measures and not combat, which is far more controversial.
4.5 CAR 2014

The violent conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) escalated after a coup that forced President François Bozizé to flee in March 2013. Rebels had advanced on the capital Bangui in December 2012, and the mainly Muslim Seleka rebels led the coup (Weber and Kaim, 2014:2). Seleka was a coalition of several militias that now started fighting the mainly Christian Anti-Balaka rebels. The violence escalated into civil war with religious and ethnic causes (Weber and Kaim, 2014:1). On November 21 2013, the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius warned that the "country is on the verge of genocide" and announced a UN process towards an African-led international intervention, which included France (Reuters, 2013a). As a former colonial power, France had 400 troops stationed in CAR, mainly protecting the airport in Bangui, as well as other French interests in the country. However, France was now considering deploying additionally 1.200 soldiers (Reuters, 2013a). UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon was also considering a UN peacekeeping force (Reuters, 2013a).

On December 5 2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2127 authorized both an African-led International support mission to CAR, MISCA, as well as an increased deployment of French troops to support the mission (UN, 2013). The prime minister in CAR, Nicolas Tiangaye, had asked for military assistance (Simons, 2013). The French government acted immediately and a 1.200 strong force started arriving in CAR already on December 6 (Simons, 2013). Both President Hollande and Foreign Minister Fabius explained the need to intervene in CAR with humanitarian motives and warned of genocide (Koepf, 2014a:9). The African Union-led MISCA mission was launched on December 19 (Weber and Kaim, 2014:3).

Chancellor Merkel’s third coalition government, consisting of CDU and SPD, was sworn in on December 17 2013, at the same time as the discussions on a contribution to a mission in CAR emerged. Merkel, Foreign Minister Steinmeier (SPD), and Defense Minister von der Leyen (CDU) were the three central decision-makers in the deployment to CAR.
The French request on military support came at a meeting with European Union foreign ministers on December 16. Germany rejected any troops support ( Reuters, 2013b). The State Secretary of Defense, Christian Schmidt (CDU), stated that Germany would offer nothing more than air support (Heyer et al., 2013). Berlin was also reluctant to contribute financially. Parliamentarian and defense policy spokesperson Hans-Peter Bartels (SPD) argued that the "German government has to say: We won't pay here", because central Africa does not concern Germany's sphere of interests (Heyer et al., 2013). As a former colonial power with a still significant presence in the country, France surely had the best knowledge and experience of CAR, but this was also problematic as France hardly could be seen as a neutral actor (Weber and Kaim, 2014:3). At the EU Council summit on Defense and Security on December 19-20 2013, the French President proposed a common EU fund to meet the challenge of financing military operations in light of declining defense budgets in Europe (Spiegel Online, 2013d). Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that even if there were good reasons to engage in CAR, the EU and Germany were not going to pay for French Africa missions when the EU was not involved in the decision-making process ahead of the intervention (Spiegel Online, 2013d).

In the beginning of January 2014 it was clear that the French intervention had largely failed to stop the violence in CAR (Borowski, 2014), and a debate on a European deployment developed quickly. On January 20, the EU foreign ministers agreed to send a EU military mission to CAR (EU Council, 2014a:16). The mission was to involve around 800 soldiers and the goal was to restore security in the capital Bangui and to stabilize the situation so that international organizations were allowed to provide humanitarian support (Weber and Kaim, 2014:5). The mission was a bridging mission and should be replaced by a UN or African-led mission after six months (Weber and Kaim, 2014:5). Media reports suggest that Chancellor Merkel had vetoed any German soldiers on the ground in CAR already by the turn of the year (Gebauer, 2014b). Additionally, Foreign Minister Steinmeier rejected a Swedish initiative to deploy the EU Battle group, which Germany was part of at the time (Spiegel Online,
Instead, Germany was willing to contribute with four airplanes for transportation of personnel, tanking, and medical aid (Spiegel Online, 2014b). Defense Minister von der Leyen emphasized that the Chancellor, Foreign Minister and herself agreed on no combat troops to CAR (Pfister and Repinski, 2014). In her government statement on January 29, Chancellor Merkel announced that the government would support France in the European bridging mission in CAR "if necessary", but excluded combat troops (Merkel, 2014).

On January 28, UN Security Council resolution 2134 passed a European mission to CAR that was authorized to take "all necessary measures" (UN, 2014). On February 10, the EU Council established the military mission EUFOR CAR to contribute to a secure environment in the capital Bangui and Bangui airport (EU Council, 2014b:2). The EU struggled to provide enough troops and four conferences were necessary to reach a sufficient level to be able to launch the mission (Pöhle, 2014). The German position changed slightly during the process. On a conference on troop levels on February 25, the German government announced that it was willing to increase its engagement to send soldiers to CAR to the headquarters in Greece and in Bangui. Combat troops were still out of question (Gebauer, 2014b). In a letter to the EU governments on March 11, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, urged the EU to provide sufficient troops and warned of the consequences of a failure to deliver: "In the long term, the EU would risk losing its credibility. Indeed, our deployment has been announced to our partners in the Central African Republic and in the region, to the African Union and to the U.N." (Croft, 2014). Additionally, France pushed the EU to contribute. The EU was dependent on a relatively large contribution from non-EU member Georgia to finally reach the necessary level of about 1000 soldiers (Gebauer, 2014c; Pöhle, 2014). On April 1, the EU launched the EUFOR RCA mission. France provided the force commander on the ground, while Greece provided the operational head quarter in Larissa (EU Council, 2014c).
The German government needed an approval from the parliament to participate in CAR. On April 10 2014, the German parliament mandated up to 80 German soldiers to be deployed to the mission until February 28 2015, in addition to air transport for the wounded and staff to the headquarters in Larissa and Bangui (Bundesregierung, 2014c).

I argue that partner value and prestige had strongest influence on the decision-making process in CAR. Additionally, humanitarian arguments played a role.

4.5.1 Threats to national interest, and Prestige

There is no evidence that the crisis in CAR was a threat to German national interests. Policy statements and the limited contribution indicate that national interest not was at stake. Combat troops were never an option and the German government made sure that the soldiers were not exposed to danger by requiring that someone else ensured the safety at the airport in Bangui (Leithäuser, 2014). That Berlin was unwilling to expose its soldiers to risk was also evident through Steinmeier's strict rejection of the use of the EU battle groups. Steinmeier also argued that German capabilities were of greater use somewhere else (Spiegel Online, 2014b). Additionally, Germany had little experience in CAR, the embassy was closed in 1997, and trade relations were limited (Federal Foreign Office, 2014). The fact that Development Minister Gerd Müller was the first representative of the German government visiting Bangui in March 2014 (Pöhle, 2014), also provide evidence for that the conflict in CAR was not assessed a security issue.

Prestige was a more important driving force than threat. Again, it was important for Germany to prove to the allies and especially partner France that it was a reliable ally. A limited, rather symbolic contribution of "an airplane and some soldiers to the mission head quarter" would demonstrate German will of taking more responsibility and strengthen the common European security and defense policy, argue Weber and Kaim (2014:8). The German government emphasized that the German contribution, and especially the medical air support, was needed by the partners (Leithäuser, 2014),
which indicates a wish to enhance prestige by proving important for the allies. Germany also stepped up its contribution at a critical point when the mission threatened to fail. On January 18 2014, Foreign Minister Steinmeier stated that Germany was not requested to contribute with combat troops (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2014). However, other accounts suggest that France requested more support apart from logistical and financial aid, and that German troops would have been welcomed (Reuters, 2013b; Koepf, 2014 [interview]). Publicly, President Hollande acknowledged that France was carrying the biggest burden in CAR, but thanked Germany for contributing necessary logistical and financial support (Hollande and Merkel, 2014). Defense Minister von der Leyen and Foreign Minister Steinmeier justified the decision to not do more by emphasizing German engagement in other crisis regions such as Afghanistan, Kosovo (Leithäuser, 2014), and the training mission in Mali (Spiegel Online, 2014b). Nevertheless, again the German contribution was criticized for being too restrictive. A former Bundeswehr Inspector General criticized the government for sending the wrong signal to the European partners by refusing to send troops into combat at such an early stage in the planning process (Pöhle, 2014). However, Germany was not alone being reluctant to engage significantly in CAR. As mentioned, the launch of the mission had to be postponed several times because of failure of the EU members to provide the necessary level of troops and capabilities. Thus, German reluctance had a lesser effect on its prestige than if Germany was dragging its feet alone. Germany's weak ties to CAR also lessened the expectations of a significant German contribution. On the other side, Germany is a big power and has a special responsibility through its commitment to European integration. It would have been damaging for the reputation of the whole EU, but especially for Germany and France and the Franco-German capacity to act, if the EU failed to launch the mission.

4.5.2 Partner value

Again, the relationship to France is key to understand why Germany contributed to the mission in CAR. The decision-making processes to both CAR and Mali took place in the same period, thus, the steps towards intensified security cooperation with France
during 2013 and 2014, as they are listed in the Mali case, are widely relevant for CAR as well. I will mention some of them again as they are of importance for explaining the driving forces behind the participation in CAR.

CAR was on the agenda when Chancellor Merkel visited President Hollande on her first foreign visit on December 18 2013 (Bundeskanzlerin, 2013b). However, at the EU Council Summit the next day, there were tensions between Merkel and Hollande on the issue of French military operations abroad. Berlin was tired of French unilateralism and readiness to intervene, and the French habit of asking the European partners to financially support French-initiated missions (Rinke, 2014:122). Chancellor Merkel rejected President Hollande's proposal to create a common EU fund to finance military operations. However, the fact that Berlin, despite these objections on French unilateral behavior, still participated in both Mali and CAR, suggests high partnership value to France. Statements from Chancellor Merkel suggest that France responded to Merkel's feedback at the EU Council. At a joint press conference with President Hollande ahead of the EU-Africa Summit on April 2, Merkel stated that both states had worked hard to turn the French engagement in CAR into an EU engagement (Hollande and Merkel, 2014). Evidence also points to frequent contact between Berlin and Paris in the days around the EU foreign ministers summit on January 20 2014, at which the decision to establish the EU mission to CAR was taken (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2014).

Another sign of high alliance value was that the German government explicitly linked the contribution in CAR to French needs. In her government statement on January 29 2014, Chancellor Merkel declared that the government was considering "how Germany if necessary can support its ally France in the European bridging mission in the Central African Republic" (Merkel, 2014). She then underlined the phrase "if necessary", which indicates that a possible contribution was not primarily in Germany's interest, but something it would do for its ally if needed. Foreign Minister Steinmeier declared that Europe could not leave France alone in Mali and CAR (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2014). Lastly, the government argued that the
increased contribution to Mali was done to relieve France from some of the burden in CAR (Wiegel and Sattar, 2014). Koepf argues that Paris acknowledged that Germany did not have any interests in CAR, "The French would have loved Germany to be much more active in the Central African Republic. But there is an understanding that Germany does this for Franco-German relations, and that they would not do more." (Koepf, 2014b [interview]).

4.5.3 Electoral politics

The public opposed that the Bundeswehr should engage more in international crisis regions (Spiegel Online, 2014a; Demmer et al, 2014). However, the public opinion was not electorally relevant. Chancellor Merkel's third government was newly elected and enjoyed high popularity. Additionally, the opposition was not united in their stance on participation in CAR. The Green party supported the government, while the left party was the only party group voting against (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014e).

4.5.4 Strategic culture

The case of CAR is the one in which moral and humanitarian arguments to engage were most strongly expressed. The notion that Germany has a special responsibility to engage against genocide and ethnic cleansing, made a German contribution more likely, argue Weber and Kaim (2014:5). One foreign policy analyst interviewed argues that "the moral responsibility to do something to help the people, who feared for their life, were persecuted, and under threat of genocide" was the original driving force to engage in CAR (Keller, 2014 [interview]). Defense Minister von der Leyen used humanitarian arguments to justify the decision to deploy soldiers to the distant country, "From a purely humanitarian perspective, we can't look away when murder and rape are taking place daily" (Pfister and Repinski, 2014). The government justification of participation was clearly in line with the principle of 'never again'. However, it partly collided with the principle of 'politics before force'. Parliamentarian and defense policy expert Niels Annen (SPD) warned against "military participation on autopilot" if human rights violation become a criteria to engage (Demmer et al., 2014). Annen's statement reflects the aversion against military involvement. However,
the limited German contribution could hardly be seen as a break of German strategic culture. It was important to hinder France from doing it alone, and the German engagement focused on making Europe act together.

4.5.5 Conclusion

I argue that partner value and prestige had strongest influence on the decision-making process in CAR. Germany did what it felt it had to for the Franco-German relationship. The moral and humanitarian arguments do not change this reasoning, and are not sufficient to explain the decision to deploy. If Germany's main aim was to stop the humanitarian crisis, a much more substantial contribution would have been needed. Instead, the contribution was limited and rather symbolic. Thus, the German contribution demonstrates the unwillingness to get military involved, in line with German strategic culture. Additionally, the principles of not standing aside when Europe takes joint action, 'never alone', and the clear references to German responsibility in cases of genocide, 'never again', suggest that the mission was in line with German strategic culture.
5. Comparison, and Conclusion

5.1 Comparison

A comparison of the case findings reveals that partnership value and prestige are the most important factors explaining the outcome of the decisions. The cases suggest that Germany is more likely to provide military support when it values its partner France, and perceives its prestige to be at stake. The findings are summarized in the below table. The variables threat, prestige, and partner value are given the values low or high. Low means that the decision-makers did not perceive it as a driving factor for deployment, while high means that it was a driving factor in the decision-making process. The variables electoral politics and strategic culture are given the values support or oppose. Support in electoral politics means that the predominant view in the domestic arena was supportive of participation in the mission, and vice versa. The value is an assessment of the attitudes in the political and public arena combined. For example, the Congo case is given the value 'oppose' because of the strong public and political opposition against German military participation within the opposition, and more significantly also within the government parties in the Bundestag as well as the government leadership itself. Conversely, Mali is given the value 'support' because the political class mostly supported German participation, despite opposition in the public. Support in strategic culture means that the decision was in line with German strategic culture, while oppose means that it broke with the basic principles of strategic culture.

Table 1. Driving forces of decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Prestige</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Electoral</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>OPPOSE</td>
<td>OPPOSE</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAD/CAR</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>OPPOSE</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBYA</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>OPPOSE</td>
<td>OPPOSE</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The table shows that partner value and prestige are the only factors with a consistent result in all the cases. The table also shows that the variables partner value and prestige point in the same direction in all the cases. High prestige and high partner value led Germany to provide military support, while low partner value and low prestige led Germany to refuse participation.

The other variables do not give a consistent result and therefore cannot explain the varying outcomes. Threat to German national interests was not involved in any of the cases. While a lack of interest in the conflicts was the most important explanation in the two cases of non-participation, the three cases of participation show that the external variables partner value and prestige trumped lack of interest being involved. Nor the variable electoral politics can explain varying behavior, as the case of DR Congo differs from the others. As mentioned, it was considerable public and political skepticism against the German contribution to DRC. However, the domestic opposition was not electorally relevant, and the external factors, partner value and prestige, trumped the domestic opposition and led to substantial participation. DRC is the only case where Germany contributed with combat troops. In the other cases, domestic opinion points in the same direction as the outcome. The German attitudes were predominantly supportive of participation in the missions to Mali and CAR, while the domestic opinion in Chad/CAR and Libya was opposing German participation.

Strategic culture is not sufficient to explain whether Germany participates. The decision to deploy combat troops in Congo broke with the central aversion against the use of combat troops. The validity of this argument can be discussed as the principle of 'politics before force' does not imply that robust military means categorically should be ruled out, which German history after reunification clearly demonstrates. Nevertheless, strong opposition within both the government and the public suggests that deployment of combat troops was not considered unproblematic and that the decision broke with the majority's understanding of the use of force and German strategic culture. German strategic culture was also opposed in the case of Libya. German policymakers clearly
broke with the principle of 'never alone', and it has been argued that the decision to stay out of Libya was a break with the principle of 'never again'. The analysis suggests that the decisions on Chad/CAR, Mali and CAR were in line with German strategic culture.

The analysis suggests that partner value was the core explanation in German decisions to provide support to multilateral missions in Africa. High value to partner France was the most important factor in all the decisions to provide support, in DRC, Mali and CAR respectively. Additionally, findings suggest that German multilateral commitments and partnerships even had an effect on German behavior in the cases where Berlin refused military support. Despite a relatively low value of partner France and lack of interest to engage in both Chad/CAR and Libya, Berlin was careful not to block the missions, and provided support with other means. The case study suggests that Berlin did not believe in the EU mission to Chad/CAR and feared that it was conducted to defend French interests. Still, Berlin did not veto the mission because of the close relationship to France. Similarly, despite significant objections against the use of military force in Libya, it was important for Berlin that the German abstention did not block the UN Security Council mandate. Germany also provided support that did not need parliamentary approval. Additionally, Berlin increased its engagement in Afghanistan as a way of compensating for its non-participation in Libya. The German practice of indirect and limited support to missions where they refused military support has also been seen in other conflicts, amongst the Iraq war and the Golf war as referred to in the introduction chapter.

Prestige was the other important explanation in the decisions to provide support. This result is somewhat surprising in light of the prevailing impression of Germany as a reluctant contributor in international crisis management that shirks responsibility. However, the cases suggest that German policymakers attach weight to what the partners expect of Germany, and of meeting those external expectations to avoid being downgraded as partner and to preserve and strengthen its position within the EU. A perception that German prestige was at stake played a role in all the three decisions to
participate, in DRC, Mali and CAR. The analysis of the Libya case suggests that German prestige in fact was at stake. However, the policymakers miscalculated the damaging effect the refusal to participate had on their prestige. The case study on Mali shows that there was a prevailing perception that Germany had to position itself differently than in Libya, which suggest that German policymakers are concerned about their standing among the partners.

Furthermore, a comparison of the cases show that the variables partner value and prestige covary. When prestige is high, partner value is also high, and when prestige is low, partner value is low. This was also a finding in Davidson's study (2011:175). Davidson does not know why this is so, but speculates that states, who value their relationship with the mission-initiator, are likely to also share many interests and, thus, share crisis and threat assessments (Davidson, 2011:176). I would suggest another explanation. When a state values its partnership, it is likely that the contributor state will strive more to meet the partner’s expectations on participation. A refusal to do so would presumably not only damage the state’s prestige, but also the relationship with the partner state. Thus, it is more at stake when a state values its partnership with another state that requests military participation. Germany’s efforts to not block a mission and provide support despite refusing to participate military, is both an expression of German multilateral commitments, as well as Germany preserving or strengthening its prestige. Partnerships and multilateralism are fundamental to German security policy. Thus, it is not in Germany’s interest that its partners believe it cannot be trusted. Chapter 2 described how France turned to Great Britain for security cooperation when Germany demonstrated a limited and restricted security policy. Thus, German failure to meet French expectations affected the Franco-German relationship negatively.

It is likely that my findings would have been different if some of the cases examined were examples of threats to German national interests. Davidson's study examined a broader range of cases in different conflict regions in the world, and found that threat/prestige was the most important factor, while alliance value was the second
most important (Davidson, 2011:175). However, cases of German participation in missions in Africa, which this study has analyzed, suggest that partner value is the most important factor.

I also find that even if the variables electoral politics and strategic culture cannot explain the outcomes, they had an effect on the design of the contributions. The cases confirm that military participation is contested decisions in Germany. Evidence points to that the significant political opposition against a German participation in the DRC led to restrictions on the contribution. In Libya, domestic political opposition had a significant effect on the decision to not participate. The contributions to Mali and CAR had several caveats. A significant amount of scholarly work on German military participation, mentioned in the literature review in Chapter 2, suggests that the political structure in Germany with strong powers over military deployment vested in parliament, and coalition governments make the field of security policy subject to bargaining and compromise. This study confirms that the need to reach consensus between a number of different political actors within the coalition government, and in parliament, leads to restrictions on the military contributions.

The study provides an explanation of where the reluctance among German policymakers comes from. While other studies conclude that internal dynamics, the structure of coalition governments and parliamentary accountability constrained the political ability to support (Bennett et.al. 1994; Baltrusaitis, 2008; Saideman and Auerswald, 2012), this study contributes to the understanding of German use of military force by bringing in the concept of strategic culture. By adding strategic culture, it is possible to go beyond merely stating that internal electoral politics influence decisions, to suggest what the constraints are based on. I argue that the German political structure is rooted in the historical experiences of war and the need and will to break with the militaristic. Several wide-reaching and preventive measures were externally imposed on West Germany after the Second World War to hinder German dominance. The preventive measures were endorsed by the German leadership and public, and became part of the German psyche and the Basic Law. The
structure of coalition governments and strong parliamentary accountability can be seen as such preventive measures. The German aversion against the use of force is best maintained in a system that constrains the political ability to participate in military missions. The neoclassical realist approach does not encompass how historical experiences might influence security policies and a government’s actual capacity to act. The concept of strategic culture is not sufficient to explain the outcome of the decision-making processes, but can explain the skeptical attitudes among policymakers and the public. The strategic culture does not determine policy choices, but sets the room to maneuver in as its influences how the decision-makers understand their possible choices. Strategic culture is subject of policymakers’ constant interpretations and reinterpretations. The cases show that the policymakers interpret the situations differently, most evident in the roles of Foreign Minister Westwerwelle and Defense Minister de Maizière in Libya and Mali. The cases suggest that de Maizière and Westerwelle saw Germany’s role in international crisis management differently. Westerwelle was promoting a culture of military restraint, while de Maizière was more willing to accept that the use of military force sometimes is necessary, and expected from a major power as Germany. Similarly, Foreign Minister Steinmeier took immediate initiatives to promote a more active foreign policy when he came to power. The cases of Mali and CAR provide evidence for that the restrictions on military engagement is not only result of harsh internal bargaining processes, but rather a result of an unwillingness to engage militarily that can be explained by German strategic culture. As mentioned, the political environment was widely supportive of a German contribution to Mali, and emphasized the need of getting rid of the Libya stigma. Similarly, the newly elected government enjoyed wide popularity ahead of the decision to participate in CAR and there was no electorally relevant opposition. Still, the government imposed several restrictions on the German contributions in both missions and ruled out combat troops at an early stage.

5.2 Conclusion

What can the findings say about change or continuity in German security policy and a ‘normalization’ of German behavior? This study has examined five decision-making
processes of military deployments under three different governments. The analysis suggests that German interests in the African countries did not drive participation. The strongest argument against participation was that German interests not were involved. The analysis suggests that partner value to France and prestige were the most important driving-forces of German participation in military missions. Partner value and prestige provide a solution to the puzzle raised in the introduction of why Germany provides support to military missions in states far away from its own territory, that do not concern German national interests. Multilateral commitments and the security relationship to France is key to understand German military engagement in Africa. This is also the case in the cases of non-participation. Germany strives to provide some support in all the cases and is careful not to block the missions. Additionally, the cases show that Germany values its relationship with France as a tool to make Europe act together. The goal of European integration is central to German foreign policy decision-makers, and evidence points to that German military participation in Africa is used as means to preserve and strengthen the relationship with France, European security cooperation, and Germany’s position in the EU. The impression that Germany is turning towards a more interest-driven security policy in which domestic interests and electoral politics are given relatively more weight than external factors and multilateral commitments, is not confirmed in this study. The case of Libya has been suggested as one of the clearest expressions of such a development. This study argues that the decision on Libya was rather a result of flawed policies, and a severe miscalculation of the damage inflicted on German prestige. The participation in Mali and CAR and especially the signals from the government at the beginning of 2014 provides support for such an interpretation. It was important for German policymakers to emphasize that Libya was a unique case and that it could be trusted to contribute in Mali and CAR. It is in the German national interest to keep valuable partnerships and to enhance its role and position in the EU. Hence, it is necessary to attach weight to multilateral commitments.

Is Germany becoming ‘normal’? This study shows how problematic the term can be. German security policy behavior in Africa is 'normal' in many respects. First, it is
normal German behavior characterized by a reluctance to use force and to provide combat troops, and with a strong emphasis on partnership and multilateral commitments. These are familiar traits of German security policy behavior. Secondly, it can be argued that this is 'normal' behavior in the Western world. The number of soldiers from Western countries in peacekeeping and military missions in Africa has clearly declined over the past 20 years. Thus, the aversion to put its own soldiers at risk at the front line is not unique for Germany (van der Lijn, 2014). Additionally, multilateralism is the key to legitimacy for international military missions. Thus, it can be argued that German behavior increasingly is becoming in line with the 'normal' western security policy behavior. Furthermore, it is problematic to use France as a standard for ‘normal’ behavior in missions in Africa. In contrast to Berlin, Paris perceived its interests to be threatened in the cases examined here. The French colonial history and significant involvement in the French speaking Africa, and also in Africa in general, means that French security and economic interests were involved on another level. A state is naturally expected to be willing to accept more costs, and put both money and soldiers at risk when national interests are affected. Thus, it is problematic to use France as a baseline of 'normalcy'. The cases show that France was the biggest contributor and/or was pushing the most for the missions, while Germany behaved more like the other states in the EU. It is rational for a state to avoid risk when national interests are not involved.

The cases provide insights into why Germany participates in missions in Africa, which are valuable as Africa is the most important theatre for operations. However, it is difficult to say what effect these insights would have in other conflict regions where France does not have such a dominant position. This should be an object of further research. Future research should also try to examine German behavior in cases where national interests are threatened.

It is too early to conclude what the effects of the government signals in Munich in 2014 might be for German security policy, and whether there will be a shift in the German use of force. However, it is possible to draw some conclusions on policy
implications from this study. The Franco-German relationship is stable and close, but sometimes the partners value each other more. The cases suggest that Germany values France more, and, thus, is more likely to provide military support when France includes Germany and listens to its views. The two cases of non-participation clearly indicated that Germany felt left out of the decision-making process, and that France took unilateral initiatives without informing its closest European partner. Similarly, the case of CAR showed that Chancellor Merkel reacted on French unilateralism and demanded that the French intervention in CAR had to be turned into a European mission before France could expect any European economic support. Multilateralism is a central tenet in German and international security policy, and it does not like to see other countries acting unilaterally either. Paris could learn from this that if it wants Berlin to make a military contribution to a mission it should include Berlin in the decision-making process from the start and avoid unilateral military initiatives. However, it is also necessary to pay attention to the German attitudes to the use of force. The development of German security policy behavior is evolving towards a greater willingness to use force, but norms and cultures change slowly.
Bibliography


Berg, Patrick, 2009. "EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Serving French Interests", pp. 57-69, in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (Eds.): *The EU as a Strategic


Bundeswehr, 2015b. "Die Ausbildungsmmission in Mali (EUTM Mali)", February 26. Available at http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/ einsatzbw/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP315EyrpHK9pP Ku1PjUzLzixJLqIDcxuxQ0NScHKpRaUpWql1pakhufm5iTqZeZl5avX5DtqAgA0m0SIA!!/ (Accessed March 31, 2015)


Koepf, Tobias, 2014b. Telephone interview. Associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (areas of expertise: French, German, and EU Africa policies, West Africa and the Sahel Region, terrorism in Africa). November 11.


Miskimmon, Alister, 2012. "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis", 
*German Politics* 21 (4): 392-410.

Foreign Policy Angers Allies”, *Spiegel Online*, January 22. Available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german- approach-to-crisis-

the Good of Africa or Europe?", *International Peacekeeping* 16 (2): 245-260

Oppermann, Kai, 2012. "National Role Conceptions, Domestic Constraints and the 
New 'Normalcy' in German Foreign Policy: The Eurozone Crisis, Libya and 
Beyond", in *German Politics*, 21(4): 502-519.

Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz, 2005. March 3. Available at http://www.gesetze-im-

Pfister, René and Gorden Repinski, 2014. "Nicht zur Seite schauen", *Der Spiegel* 5, 
January 27. Available at http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-
124719294.html (Accessed October 24, 2014)

Pöhle, Sven, 2014. "Germany reluctantly sends troops to CAR", April 11. *Deutsche 
Welle*. Available at http://www.dw.de/germany-reluctantly-sends-troops-to-
car/a-17559721 (Accessed October 10, 2014)

Puglierin, Jana, Sebastian Feyock and Yvonne von Diepen, 2014. "Ertüchtigen statt 

Repinski, Gordon and Christiane Hoffmann, 2014. “Russland ist derzeit kein 
Partner”, *Der Spiegel* 24 June 7. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-
127396605.html (Accessed September 15, 2014)

November 21. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/us-
centralafrica-france-idUSBRE9AK0ZI20131121 (Accessed March 9, 2015)

Reuters, 2013b. "Germany reacts coolly to French request on Central Africa", 
December 19. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2013/12/19/us-centralafrican-france-germany-idUSBRE9BI06L20131219 
(Accessed March 11, 2015)


