The Revolution Will not be Organized?

*Organized and spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns*

Erlend Langørgen

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Masteroppgave i statsvitenskap, Institutt for statsvitenskap
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Abstract

What determine the onset of nonviolent campaigns? Recently a new quantitative literature has emerged on the topic. My thesis contribute to this literature as follows. First, I provide a clear conceptualization of organized and spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Secondly, I demonstrate that available quantitative datasets not provide information that allow researchers to determine whether an onset was spontaneous or organized. Third, I show that many theoretical arguments proposed as explanations of onsets of nonviolent campaigns assume organized onsets, or ascribe an important role to leadership. Fourth, I argue that there are theoretical reasons to expect that spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns have different causes. Finally, I provide a first assessment of whether spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns systematically differ. Although, my research design prohibit strong conclusions, my results are consistent with some systematic differences between organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns.
Preface

First, I want to thank my supervisor, Håvard Strand, who provided excellent advice and kind support throughout this project. Secondly, I want to thank my good friend Mads Motrøen, for taking the time to give thorough feedback to all chapters. I also want to thank Fritt Ord, for generous funding of this project. My parents and brother are always supportive, and have helped me through this project. I also want to thank all the friends who made me enjoy life at Blindern. Finally, I want to thank my girlfriend, Erle, for being the best person in my life.
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1. Introduction

With Why Civil Resistance works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan (2011) established that nonviolence is a viable, meaningful strategic alternative to violence in achieving major political goals. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) collect data on all known major nonviolent campaigns striving for regime change, secession and end of foreign occupation (hereafter referred to as maximalist goals) in the post WW2 period. Comparing these nonviolent campaigns with violent insurgencies against regimes, they demonstrated that nonviolent campaigns had a higher success rate than major violent campaigns in achieving their goals in the post WW2 world. Furthermore, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show that nonviolent campaigns have a higher chance of leading to democracy in the long term than violent insurgencies.

Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) surprising findings inspired a lot of empirical work on different aspects of nonviolent and violent resistance. Topics drawing scholarly attention in the wake of Chenoweth and Stephens’ (2011) seminal work include the determinants of onsets of nonviolent and violent political campaigns, and the determinants of their success in achieving their goals. These are the topics of interest in this mater thesis. I am primarily concerned with the determinants of onsets of nonviolence campaigns. More specifically, I address recent statistical studies of the determinants of onsets of nonviolent campaigns (e.g. Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, Butcher and Svensson 2014, Gleditsch and Rivera 2015, Braitwaithe et.al 2015, Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). The main claim I make in this thesis, primarily concerns these studies, and can be summarized as follows. The theoretical arguments in recent statistical work on onsets of campaigns tend to assume that campaigns do not start spontaneously, but because of the actions of leaders. However, the data used to test these theoretical arguments cannot ensure that onsets of campaigns not were spontaneous, and contain at least some instances of campaigns that started spontaneously. Since theory suggests that spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns have somewhat different causes, this mismatch between theory and data may distort analyses, and lead researchers to draw wrong conclusions about the support for their theoretical arguments. I cannot test whether my distinction between spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns alter the conclusions in recent research directly, but I provide a preliminary assessment, which give reasons for concern.
My study also have ramifications for studies of what makes nonviolent and violent campaigns succeed. Scholars of strategic nonviolence argue that preparations and actions taken before a campaign start can increase the chance of the campaign succeeding (Sharp 1973, Ackerman and Kruegler 1994). Some of these actions, such as making a strategically informed decision about where, when and how to launch a campaign against the regime, require that an established oppositional leadership initiate the campaign. Therefore, nonviolent campaigns starting spontaneously could have a lower chance of success than organized campaigns.

In this chapter, I first define central concepts used throughout my thesis. While presenting these concepts, I briefly clarify the main claim of my thesis. Finally, I present the outline of my thesis, summarizing the contributions of each chapter.

1.1 Defining central concepts

Almost all recent research on onsets of nonviolent campaigns rely on the Nonviolent and violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013), and all researchers accept the conceptualization of campaigns underpinning this dataset. This conceptualization of nonviolent campaigns is outlined in the work of Chenoweth and colleagues (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 12-15, Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, Day, Pinckney and Chenoweth 2014), and serves as the basis for this thesis. These researchers conceive of nonviolent campaigns as continuous series of purposive, overt nonviolent events with mass participation and discernible leadership. Here, nonviolent events refer to the deliberate employment of nonviolent tactics to oppose the regime. There has to be coordination between the events in a campaign, making campaigns more strategic than other forms of nonviolent resistance. (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 416-417). Day et al. (2014: 1-3) sketch a conceptual framework for different kinds of nonviolent resistance. In this framework, the only difference between spontaneous episodes of nonviolence and nonviolent campaigns, is that spontaneous episodes are improvised and disorganized, whereas campaigns are coordinated, organized and consist of purposively linked events. I rely on this conceptual distinction throughout this thesis.

Although nonviolent campaigns are more strategic than other forms of nonviolence, the onsets of nonviolent campaigns does not have to be strategic. The conceptual efforts of Chenoweth and colleagues (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 12-15, Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, Day, Pinckney and Chenoweth 2014) are primarily directed at distinguishing the
phenomenon nonviolent campaigns from other kinds of nonviolence, and facilitate comparison between the strategic employment of nonviolence and violence. However, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 119-123) argue that the first Palestinian intifada in 1987 was a nonviolent campaign that started with spontaneous mass demonstrations after four Palestinians were killed when an Israeli military vehicle struck their car. It is therefore clear that these authors believe coordinated, strategic campaigns can start spontaneously.

According to the operationalization in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, “campaign onsets occur when there is a series of coordinated, contentious collective actions with at least 1,000 observed participants” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 417). Since NAVCO 2.0 do not provide information about how such onsets come about, scholars cannot know whether the nonviolent campaigns part of NAVCO 2.0 started spontaneously, or as the result of deliberate, strategic decisions. Researchers would have to add supplemental information to determine this question1.

I supplement the conceptual work of Chenoweth and colleagues (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 12-15, Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, Day, Pinckney and Chenoweth 2014), by developing a clear distinction between spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns. The distinction these scholars draw between campaigns and other forms of nonviolence, also serves as the basis for my definition of organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns. Thus, I understand organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns as coordinated, strategic and purposeful initiation of nonviolent campaigns. There must be active, tactical leadership provided by some established oppositional group in organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Providing ideological leadership for those responsible for launching the campaign does not suffice. I fully develop definitions of organized and spontaneous onsets in my theory chapter.

The most important reason for choosing this particular conceptualization is based on the same argument Day et al. (2014: 2) use to distinguish between campaigns and other forms of nonviolence:” Research suggests that coordination, organization, and tactical sequencing of nonviolent actions have important effects on how campaigns unfold, are affected by repression, and ultimately succeed or fail”. Classical scholarship on strategic nonviolence

1 Furthermore, it is unclear whether Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) code onsets only after it is clear evidence of leadership and coordination between events. Examination of their NAVCO 2.0 dataset show that they code the first Palestinian intifada as starting in 1987, before it acquired coordination (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 124), suggesting that this might be an unresolved question.
suggests that active tactical leadership have important effects on the decision of where, when and how to launch nonviolent campaigns (Sharp 1973, Ackerman and Kruegler 1994). If the causes of organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns differ substantially, they should be separated in analyses. Mixing the two kinds of onsets in analyses could lead researchers to a flawed understanding of the determinants of nonviolent campaigns.

Furthermore, several specific theoretical mechanisms proposed as explanations of onsets of campaigns in the recent literature assume that the actors responsible for the onset are some kind of established oppositional leadership, who initiate mobilization based on strategic decision-making (e.g. Dahl et.al 2015, Butcher and Svensson 2014). Thus, these theoretical arguments are concerned with organized onsets of campaigns. Other theoretical arguments do not conform equally well to my distinction between spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns, but almost all theoretical mechanisms ascribe an important role to established oppositional groups in onsets of campaigns. Therefore, these mechanism are not concerned with explaining spontaneous onsets of campaigns where established leadership did not play an important role. Since these studies rely on NAVCO 2.0, researchers cannot know to what extent they test their arguments on spontaneous onsets of campaigns. Researchers failing to appreciate this feature of NAVCO 2.0, may wrongly evaluate the empirical support for their theoretical arguments.

1.2 The road ahead

In chapter 2, I review the literatures on strategic nonviolence and onsets of nonviolent campaigns. I demonstrate that most studies of onsets of nonviolent campaigns ascribe central functions to leadership and organization in their theoretical explanations for campaigns. Furthermore, I show that the literature on strategic nonviolence indicate that onsets of nonviolent campaigns initiated by tactical leadership systematically differ from other kinds of onsets of campaigns.

In chapter 3, I review the operationalization of dependent variables used to test theoretical arguments proposed by scholars studying onsets of nonviolent campaigns. I show that these datasets not contain information that allow researchers to distinguish between spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns. Furthermore, I show that these datasets contain at least some campaigns that started spontaneously.
In chapter 4, I develop my concepts of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns further. Additionally, I provide a framework for evaluating whether explanatory variables are likely to affect spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns differently. I employ this framework to formulate hypotheses about explanatory variables proposed in the literature on onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

In chapter 5, I present a research design that allow a first assessment of differences in the determinants of organized and spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

In chapter 6, I utilize the research design proposed in chapter 5. Although my research design does not allow strong conclusions, my results indicate that there may be systematic differences between the determinants of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns.

In chapter 7, I conclude that my thesis should give reasons for concern for scholars using statistical methods and currently available datasets to test variables that plausibly could have different effects on organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns. Furthermore, I discuss some potential avenues for further research.
2. Literature Review

The general topic of this thesis, popular uprisings against regimes, has inspired an overwhelming amount of scholarly writing. In this thesis I seek to address a very specific question related to this topic. Are organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns that start as the result of a strategic decision made by a leadership, which can plan and prepare the campaign in advance, systematically different from other kinds of campaign onsets? Since the literatures on strategic nonviolence and newer statistical studies of onset of nonviolent campaigns inspire my particular research question, I heavily emphasize these literatures in this review. There is a lot of other scholarly work related to the more general topic in these literatures, popular uprisings against regimes, but the insights provided by much of this work does not help answer my particular research question. Therefore, I eschew discussion of much outstanding work on the more general topic of popular uprisings.

In the first part of this chapter, I show that a common argument in the literature on strategic nonviolence is that campaigns directed by a leadership with knowledge of nonviolent strategy will be better able to utilize the full potential of nonviolent strategy, increasing the chance of success. Furthermore, I show that much of the recent work on onsets of nonviolent campaigns inspired by the strategic nonviolence literature distinguish between strategic and spontaneous nonviolence, either explicitly or implicitly, in the formulation of theoretical mechanisms based on the existence of a clear leadership acting strategically. These observations are the motivation for the research question in this thesis.

The literature on strategic nonviolence compare the effects spontaneity and strategy have on the chance of nonviolent action succeeding, but offer little discussion on differences in the causes of onsets of spontaneous and strategic nonviolent uprisings. I therefore end the chapter by presenting insights from other strands of literature concerned with the onset of popular uprisings concerned with differences between onsets initiated by strategic leaders and other forms of onsets, thus potentially supplementing the literature on strategic insight on this topic.
2.2 The literature on strategic nonviolence (flytt etter introduksjon, kort ned)

2.2.1 Historical development: a story of success

In his seminal work, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Gene Sharp (1973) initiated the study of nonviolence as a strategy (Nepstad 2015: 417). Sharp (1973) argue that the power of a regime relies on cooperation of its subjects, and that strategies of nonviolent resistance can utilize this reliance to create major political change. Furthermore, Sharp (1973) present 198 different nonviolent tactics, discuss various nonviolent events and campaigns and go into detailed discussions of how nonviolent campaigns can maximize the potential for success. Drawing inspiration from Sharp (1973), various case studies (e.g., Zunes Kurz and Asher 1999 and Ackerman and Du Vall 2000) demonstrated that nonviolence can create major political change across the world.

The study of nonviolence gradually became more systematized, with the emergence of comparative studies that included both successful and failed campaigns to determine what makes nonviolent campaigns successful (e.g. Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, Schock 2005, Nepstad 2011).

The work of Chenoweth and Stephan (2008, 2011) challenged the conventional wisdom that violence is inherently more efficient than nonviolence, by demonstrating that a higher percentage of major nonviolent campaigns than violent insurgencies reached their goals during the last century. Furthermore, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 215) established that successful major nonviolent campaigns are associated with a 50 % higher chance for democracy five years after the campaign, than their violent counterparts, controlled for levels of democracy and campaign duration. By uncovering these facts, providing insightful theoretical discussions, and systematic data on nonviolent campaigns, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) inspired a new wave of research on strategic nonviolence, including special issues of the *Journal of Peace Research* (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013) and *Mobilization: an international quarterly* (Nepstad 2015).

Whereas many previous studies focused on demonstrating and explaining the success of nonviolence, this new wave of research systematically address a large number of questions regarding nonviolence. Examples of questions subject to recent systematic empirical research include the effects of radical flanks (Chenowth and Schock 2015), how individuals are
affected by participating in nonviolence (Davenport and Trivedi 2013), and the determinants of onset of nonviolence (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).

2.2.2 Strategy


Policy entails the formulation of overarching goals, acceptable outcomes and tolerable costs for a campaign, and the choice to engage in nonviolent struggle. Strategy refers to broad, flexible plans and principles for interaction with the opposition during a campaign. It also includes planning of where and when to act and not to act and analysis of probable responses in given situations and how to utilize resources and tactics. Strategy is concerned with decisions on how to move reach, and move between partial objectives to reach the overarching goals of the campaign (Sharp 1973: 493, Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 7, 46-47).

Campaigns are the phenomenon that best enable the analysis of strategy in nonviolence, since they allow researchers to study the flexible, strategic employment of nonviolent tactics (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 10, Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 417, Day et al. 2014: 2). Tactics are decisions regarding how to conduct specific encounters with the opposition, including choice of nonviolent technique (Sharp 1973: 493, Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 7), making them observable at the event level.

Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) also distinguish between strategic planning and adherence to strategic principles. Strategic principles are generalized guidelines for how to wage an effective nonviolent campaign. Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) develop twelve strategic

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2 Ackerman and Kruegler (1994: 45-47) provide one of the most in-depth discussions of strategy, and distinguish between logistics, tactics, strategy, operational planning and policy as different aspects of strategy. Static operational plans are based on strategic considerations of techniques, probable responses and contingency planning made before engagement with the opposition, distinguishing it from strategy, which is the dynamic analysis of the same kinds of questions during a campaign. In the following, I use strategy to describe both these phenomena, but references to strategic planning before campaigns onset would be defined as operational planning correspond to what Ackerman and Kruegler (1994: 46) conceive of as operational planning.
principles which can increase the chance of nonviolent success, if flexibly adapted. Some of Ackerman and Kruegler’s (1994) principles of strategy, such as the maintenance of nonviolent discipline, do not strictly require strategic planning and decision-making, whereas other principles entail strategic planning and consideration.

2.2.3 Leadership, organization and strategy

The conception of leadership and organization in nonviolent campaigns in both the recent and classical literature are quite wide, and not strictly defined by most scholars. These terms are important in discussions of spontaneous nonviolence and strategic nonviolence.

It is sometimes hard to figure out whether differing statements regarding spontaneous nonviolence actually reflect disagreement, or different conceptions of leadership, strategy and organization. The following paragraphs attempt to summarize how leading scholars of strategic nonviolence understand the terms leadership and organization.

A wide range of entities can perform the function of leadership in nonviolent campaigns. Leadership can be concentrated, performed by a single individual, or a committee situated at the top of hierarchical command lines. Leadership can also be more dispersed, spread across multiple committees or individuals situated in a more network oriented organization, or in coalitions of organizations. This kind of leadership may be united and adhere to a plan of operations, or divided (Sharp 1973: 464-467, Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 27-28, Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 195, Schock 2005: 50). Clear leadership does not require formal organization, but clear leadership usually go together with identifiable organizations in practice (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 416)3.

Leadership in nonviolent campaigns consists of the functions of taking the primary decisions for how to conduct the campaign and of inspiring participants, giving them purpose and courage (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 27). Whereas the first of these functions entails control over tactical and strategic decisions during a campaign, the other functions are more ideologocial, and does not require strict control over the conduct of campaigns.

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3 This claim is supported by the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, which show that organizations are part of most campaigns at all times
For Sharp (1973: 462, 494), strategic planning and conduct of nonviolent campaigns require that a clear leadership directs the actions of campaign. Leaders choosing what tactics to use can build a strong organizational infrastructure for campaigns, ensuring that tactics are properly employed, and that strategic decisions are adhered to. A leadership controlling when, where, and how a campaign engages a regime with nonviolent means, is in a position where it can ensure a degree of strategic coherence not achievable for campaigns without this kind of tactical leadership.

However, Sharp (1973: 456-458) also emphasize the importance of leaders serving as spokesman for the oppressed. Furthermore, Sharp (1973: 468-481) argue that leaders can help facilitate mobilization by investigating grievances, formulate a feasible objective reflecting these grievances, generate public consciousness about the grievances and demands, and preparing the people to act. Initiation of nonviolent conflict against highly repressive regimes depends on the people casting of their fear. This requires a strong feeling of a wrong that must be righted, which leaders may help develop (Sharp 1973: 28, 456-457, 474). Leaders that do not direct the actions of a nonviolent campaign could possibly perform these functions. Thus, these functions are compatible with and external, ideological leader. However, Sharp’s (1973: 462-467) ideal leadership is inspired by Gandhi, and perform both ideological and tactical leadership-functions, with the overarching strategic considerations of the campaign in mind.

In sum, the classical literature on nonviolent campaigns, exemplified by the work of Sharp (1973) and Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) argue that both tactical and ideological leadership is important to the success of nonviolent campaigns, but emphasize that tactical leadership uniquely affect how campaigns are conducted, and their chance of succeeding.

2.2.4 Leadership, onset and linkages to success

Scholars of strategic nonviolence are well aware that nonviolence and nonviolent campaigns can emerge “spontaneously”, without deliberate planning or organization (e.g. Sharp 1973: 455, Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 6, Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 119, Sutton, Butcher and Svensson 2014, Butcher and Svensson 2014: 2). Indeed, a recurrent theme in this literature is how organizations and leadership making strategic decisions, as opposed to improvisation and spontaneity, increase the chance of success (Sharp 1973, Ackerman and Kruegler 1994). Thus, tactical leadership has a central place in classical explanations of the success of campaigns.
Parts of the strategic considerations that may increase the chance of success are decision-making in questions regarding where, when, and how to engage the regime (Sharp 1973: 497-498, Schock 2005). Most scholars arguing for the need for leadership, organization, and strategy have devoted their attention to theorizing how strategy and organization may benefit nonviolent campaigns, instead of theorizing how non-organized and/or non-strategic nonviolence may fail or succeed.

For example, Sharp (1973: 455) distinguish between campaigns that were deliberately planned and prepared, campaigns that started semi-spontaneously and campaigns that started spontaneously. The first of these categories correspond with my definition of organized onsets of campaigns. However, in his discussion of the dynamics of nonviolent action Sharp (1973: 462) assumes that campaigns are deliberately planned, implying the existence of a clear leadership. Thus, tactical leadership is at the core of Sharp’s discussion of how nonviolent campaigns can succeed.

It is therefore quite natural that spontaneous emergence of nonviolence is often not explicitly defined, or defined as a residual category by scholars of strategic nonviolence. Scholars of strategic nonviolence such as Sharp (1973) and Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) provide insights on how deliberately planned nonviolent campaigns can emerge, but do not offer much insight on how unorganized, spontaneous nonviolence start. This is explicitly acknowledged by Sharp (1973: 462), who calls for more research on the causes and dynamics of nonviolence that was not planned in advance.

A clear leadership with knowledge of strategic nonviolence and an organizational basis can increase the chance of success in several ways. Tactical leadership can ensure that all parts of the campaign are conducted according to a coherent plan and that participants eschew violence. Furthermore, leaders can increase the quality of a campaign through the promotion of fearlessness and nonviolent discipline, by training participants to perform specific tasks and educate them in nonviolent strategy, and by improving communication and coordination of the campaign (Sharp 1973: 477-480).

According to Sharp (1973: 494-495), skillful leaderships may drastically increase the strategic quality of a campaign. These arguments made by Sharp (1973), and his discussions of how to lay the groundwork for nonviolent campaigns, imply that tactical leadership and organization should lead to a higher chance of success in general.
Nonviolent leaderships are likely to be removed by the regime. For a campaign to be able to succeed, it is important that high quality is present already at the onset (Sharp 1973: 638). Leaders and organizations can promote nonviolent discipline and educate people about nonviolent strategy before and in the early stages of a campaign, making it possible for a campaign to continue without clear leadership if the initial leaders of tactical operations are removed. One example of this was the Indian liberation campaign in 1931, where the operations of Indian national congress was shut down, but protests continued (Sharp 1973: 636-639).

In a similar vein, Schock (2005: 29) argue that it might be necessary with loose coalitions of organizations, possibly cooperating through umbrella organizations for the conduct of nonviolent campaigns in autocracies. This is because the leadership of centralized organizations are relatively easy to shut down

Sutton, Butcher and Svensson (2014) outline a theory on when repression against nonviolent campaigns might backfire. Their proposed determinants of backfiring resemble both the arguments made by Sharp (1973) and Schock (2005). Sutton, Butcher and Svensson (2014: 4-6) argue that regime repression against campaigns that are prepared in advance, and have a pre-existing campaign infrastructure, are more likely to backfire than repression of spontaneous protests.⁴

Repression can lead to more fear and less mobilization, but also backfire by making people evaluating the regime more negatively, leading to increased mobilization against the regime. After a repressive event, a battle over information about the nature and meaning of the event occur. The government tries to frame itself in a positively and activists negatively.

Nonviolent activists who are able to spread information about brutality of repression and violation of social norms effectively are more likely to gain increased support; campaigns with their own media structure are best able to spread their own view of repressive events.

The most efficient strategy to overcome the fear of brutal repression is to employ tactics of diffusion, which lower the risk of participation. Diffusion may convert people’s opposition against the regime into action. It is easier to change to and coordinate tactics of diffusion

⁴ Sutton, Butcher and Svensson (2014: 5) employ Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011: 14) definition of campaigns, and define nonviolence not conforming to this definition as spontaneous, and argue that the key difference lies in campaigns being organized and intentional, as opposed to spontaneous nonviolence.
when campaigns have clear internal organization and leadership. Campaigns that are based on broad networks and coalitions of social groups are better able to mobilize support for activities after repressive events, increasing the chance of repression backfiring (Sutton, Butcher and Svensson 2014: 4-6).

Sutton, Butcher and Svensson (2014) test their theoretical arguments by combining quantitative data on nonviolent campaigns and repression of civilians. Although better data would be required to draw very strong conclusions, the available evidence support the theoretical arguments.

Ackerman and Kruegler (1994: 26-30) also emphasize the importance of tactical leadership in preparations to campaigns for achieving success. Five of the twelve strategic principles developed by Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) are concerned with the preparations to campaigns. These principles include the formulation of functional objectives, the development of organizational strength, the collection of material resources, cultivation of external support, and expansion of the repertoire of nonviolent tactics. Although ideological leaders could perform some of these tasks, such as the formulation of objectives and cultivation of external support, other principles, such as the development of organization and collection of resources would require more active, tactical direction of the preparations.

In their discussion of how to engage the regime, Ackerman and Kruegler (1994: 35-45) argue that a well-prepared, strategically informed decision on how to engage the regime can increase the chance of success considerably. These arguments suggest that established leadership with knowledge of nonviolent strategy are best suited to launch successful nonviolent campaigns.

To summarize, these arguments imply that resilience to repression increase the chance of campaign success, and most authors argue that resilience can be improved by deliberate preparations made by a leadership. These preparations include the development of organizations, and broad coalitions of participation before campaigns. Arguments made by some of these authors also imply that a strategic decision made by an established leadership about where, when and how a campaign should be launched, increase the chance of success. Most authors also argue that having a leadership and organizational basis during a campaign increase the chance of success by being better able to make strategic decision, conduct the
campaign coherently and maintain nonviolent discipline. If the preparations and work done by
the leadership before and in the early stages of a campaign are good enough, a campaign can
succeed when the initial leadership is removed. However, all else equal, good and cohesive
leadership is preferable at all times.

Thus, the typical process leading to nonviolent campaigns theorized by scholars of strategic
nonviolence can be described as a process where a clear leadership situated in some kind of
organized network or organization make strategic plans for nonviolent action and utilize
organizations for mobilization. The leaders control where, when and how the campaign
against the regime should be launched.

Clear leadership is required to make strategic plans. Scholars of strategic nonviolence, such as
Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) and Sharp (1973), contend that there are different degrees of
planning and different kinds of organizations and networks prior to the onset of nonviolent
campaigns. Although classical scholarly work on strategic nonviolence do not deny that
exogenous factors may affect the onset and success of campaigns, relatively little attention is
paid to systematically theorize such factors. Instead, the agency of leaders of nonviolent
campaigns is emphasized heavily.

2.3 The literature on the onset of organized nonviolent campaigns

The recent quantitative literature on the onset of organized nonviolent campaigns with
maximalist goals, inspired by the work of Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and enabled by the
collection of the NAVCO 2.0 data (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013), is still in its infancy.
Although this literature and my thesis are parts of a larger corpus, the literature presented in
the following sections is what I address most directly. To support my claim that theoretical
arguments in this literature primarily apply to organized onsets of campaigns, I present a
thorough review of this literature, presenting central findings and discussing assumptions
about the existence of leaders and planning in these contributions. I attempt to determine
whether the theoretical arguments and assumptions made in this scholarly work restrict
theoretical claims to organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns, or at least exclude the
possibility of spontaneous onsets of campaigns without significant ideological leadership.
This task is difficult for some articles, due to lack of explicit definitions of leadership and the
functions performed by leaders.
2.3.1. Civil War and Nonviolent Campaigns

Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) published the first article in this literature, and also presented the NAVCO 2.0 dataset utilized by most studies in the onset of major nonviolent campaigns. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) test whether a regression model specified in the much-cited study by Fearon and Laitin (2003) on the causes of civil war could explain the onset of nonviolent campaigns.

Given that the purpose of their replication is to investigate whether the causes of violent uprisings also apply to nonviolent uprisings, as argued by scholars who believe violence is a precursor to nonviolence, Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) understandably eschew discussion of the mechanisms leading to the onset of nonviolent campaigns. Therefore, Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) make no theoretical assumptions about leaders and planning.

Chenoweth and Lewis (2013: 422) find that the positive effect of population size is the only effect that is similar and significant for both onsets of nonviolent and violent campaigns. Furthermore, Chenoweth and Lewis (2013: 421-423) find that flatter terrain and more autocracy increase the chance of the onset of nonviolent campaigns, suggesting that these emerge under more difficult conditions than violent campaigns, and that violent and nonviolent campaigns are the result of quite different causal processes.

2.3.2. The manufacturing sector

Butcher and Svensson (2014: 7-8) argue that a large manufacturing sector increase the chance of the onset of nonviolent campaigns. They explain this with the creation of social networks with intensive ties usually found in this sector. A network within the manufacturing sector usually has ties to many other networks, and control resources that the state depends upon. All these factors make social networks more suited for nonviolent mobilization. The empirical analyses support their theoretical argument, by yielding significant positive coefficients for the size of the manufacturing sector in analyses with both the NAVCO 2.0 and SCAD datasets.

Butcher and Svensson (2014: 4) assume the presence of rational dissidents seeking regime change in their theoretical discussion. The dissidents favor nonviolence when they can mobilize many people from all parts of society rapidly. Social networks typically created by large manufacturing sectors are well suited for this purpose (Burcher and Svensson 2014: 4).
Since the stated purpose of the assumption of rational actors is simplification (Butcher and Svensson 2014: 4), it should not be taken as an absolute scope condition for the theory. Nevertheless, the assumption of leaders rationally deciding to initiate mobilization conforms to my conceptualization of organized onsets of campaign.

2.3.3. Diffusion of nonviolence

Gleditsch and Rivera (2015) and Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015) both argue that the onset of organized nonviolent campaigns may spread, and lead to onsets elsewhere. Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015:698-700) study authoritarian countries, and argue that a nonviolent campaign in one country can signal favorable conditions for nonviolent mobilizations to potential nonviolent campaign organizers in other countries, leading to onsets of nonviolent campaigns in other authoritarian countries.

Some potential nonviolent campaigns do not demand the opportunity for mobilization created by this kind of signal. Oppositional organizations that operate in countries with a history of organized nonviolence, can emulate previous campaigns, spend time on developing a mature organization, and mobilize previous participants in nonviolent campaigns.

Potential campaigns in countries with previous campaigns and nonviolent activity therefore rely less on opportunities created by campaigns in other countries than potential campaigns in countries without previous nonviolent campaigns (ibid.: 700-701). The empirical results give support for both emulation across autocracies, and the conditioning effect of previous domestic nonviolent campaigns (ibid.: 704).

Gleditsch and Rivera (2015: 6) also argue that nonviolent campaigns elsewhere increase opportunities for nonviolent campaigns at home. Nonviolent campaigns in other countries can alter the perceived balance of power between incumbent and regime, reveal dissatisfaction and the potential of nonviolence and provide opportunities for learning and emulation for dissidents. Dissidents can observe the use of specific strategies and tactics elsewhere, and apply them at home (ibid: 7).

Unlike Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015), Gleditsch and Rivera (2015: 9) argue that nonviolent campaigns mainly diffuse to neighborhood countries, since conditions are more similar, and since people receive more communication and news from countries that are geographically close. Consistent with Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik, Gleditsch and
Rivera (2015: 9) argue that diffusion should occur for non-democracies and not democracies where the conventional political channels offer avenues for affecting policy, and motivation is lower for nonviolent campaigns.

Furthermore, Gleditsch and Rivera (2015: 10) argue that democratic neighbors provide opportunities for organizers of nonviolent campaigns to do their work safely, and therefore should lead to a higher chance of the onset of nonviolent campaigns. The empirical analysis supports the neighbor-campaign diffusion hypothesis, and reveal that the support for global diffusion in their global sample of democracies and autocracies is driven by the campaigns in 1989.

Gleditsch and Rivera’s (2015) results on global diffusion may be consistent with the findings of Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015), who only include autocracies in their sample. Major events like the fall of communism in 1989 and different institutional settings, which are present due to the exclusion of democracies from Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik’s (2015) sample, may yield heterogeneous diffusion effects. Thus, global diffusion could have a substantial effect in some, but not all settings.

Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015: 699) assume that people have grievances that make them desire political change in autocracies. Similarly, Gleditsch and Rivera (2015: 6) argue that motivation to participate in nonviolent campaigns is stronger in non-democracies. Motivation might explain the different diffusion effects for democracies and non-democracies (Gleditsch and Rivera 2015: 15). Gleditsch and Rivera (2015: 15) also find that a higher percentage of democratic neighbors increase the chance for nonviolent campaign onset.

Neither Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015) nor Gleditsch and Rivera (2015) make explicit assumptions about what kind of process lead to the onset of organized nonviolent campaigns. Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015: 701) claim that large-scale spontaneous nonviolence is unlikely in autocracies, and speak of opposition groups and would-be opposition groups as the initiators of nonviolent mobilization (ibid: 698). However, it is not evident that Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik’s (2015) understanding of spontaneity is the same employed in this thesis. It appears most plausible that they have a stricter understanding of spontaneity than I employ, possibly not categorizing onsets inspired by ideological leaders as spontaneous.
Like Butcher and Svensson (2014), Braithwaite, Braitwaite and Kucik’s (2015) argument have organization as a central piece, since both manufacturing networks and previous nonviolent campaigns are seen as factors that increase the quality of organization and the ability to mobilize.

Gleditsch and Rivera (2015:6-7) also focus on explaining collective action problems and mobilization, and speak of pre-existing dissidents in their elaboration of theoretical mechanism, although they do not explicitly assume the presence of such actors, and argue that collective action can occur in many different ways, citing Lichbach (1995), who argue that mobilization can occur without planning and organization. Thus, their theoretical argument does not implicitly limit the scope of their claims to processes were established leaders of groups are responsible for mobilization.

Although Gleditsch and Rivera (2015: 10) state that “Nonviolent uprisings are sometimes portrayed as spontaneous, but this is misleading as campaigns are unlikely to see much mobilization without planning and organization”, they explicitly suggest that nonviolent tactics can be employed without much former organization (Gleditsch and Rivera 2015: 7). Therefore, the former statement can be interpreted as a statement about sustained, large-scale nonviolent campaigns, not the initial outburst of nonviolence. This is consistent with Lichbach (1995: 261), who argue that sustained campaigns need organization.

2.3.4. Resources, opportunities, modernization and grievances

Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015: 3) argue that nonviolent and violent campaigns achieve success in different ways. Nonviolent campaigns challenge the legitimacy of the government, and require mass mobilization to succeed, whereas violent campaigns seek to harm government capacity, and require military capability and territorial control. Therefore, structural conditions that favor the onset of violent insurgencies do not necessarily favor the onset of nonviolent campaigns, and vice versa.

Furthermore, a central finding in the literature on nonviolent action, is that nonviolence can emerge and succeed under all kinds of conditions, if the leaders of the campaign are skillful enough (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015: 3). Additionally, local contextual factors might be the most important determinants of the onset of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015: 2). Thus, structural conditions might not explain the emergence of nonviolent campaigns well.
Therefore, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) seek to test whether structural conditions can predict the emergence of nonviolent campaigns by testing variables deduced from four different general explanatory approaches: grievance approaches, resource mobilization theory, modernization theory, and political opportunity approaches. Of these theories, the political opportunity approach has most explanatory power, but some variables associated with grievances and resource mobilization also have explanatory power.

Even though these theories have some explanatory power, predictions are not very accurate (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015: 21). Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015: 21-22) argue that the lack of predictive power is due to the importance of agency relative to structure in explaining the onset of nonviolence, but that better data, such as information about small scale protests might improve the predictive power of structural theories.

Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) do not make new theoretical assumptions regarding planning and leadership in the process leading to onset of nonviolent campaigns. However, some of theoretical arguments assume leadership or organization, these specific arguments are discussed in the next chapter.

2.3.5. Mobilization potential

Dahl, Gates, Gleditsch and Gonzáles (2015) present a coherent game theoretical argument to explain when a dissident group will challenge the regime, and what tactic the dissident group will choose. In the game theoretical framework presented, a dissident group that chooses to challenge the status quo under the current regime can choose between nonviolence and violence. Both nonviolence and violence have the potential to coerce the regime and achieve a more desirable situation for the dissidents.

Whereas the success of violence depends upon the ability to inflict military costs or the threat of doing so, nonviolence depends upon non-compliance with the regime, undermining the ability of the government to achieve its political goals. Dahl et al. (2015) argue that both violent and nonviolent tactics become more effective with the mobilization of a higher number of participants, but that there are systematic differences in the functional relationships between mobilization and power and costs for nonviolence and violence.

Violent campaigns can entail low costs when participation is low, since participants can hide in remote areas, and the ability to kill does not depend on mass participation, making violence
relatively less costly and more effective when participation is low. Nonviolent campaigns become relatively more effective and less costly in comparison to violent campaigns when participation increase. Since nonviolent campaigns can have the ability to mobilize a higher number of participants than violent campaigns, nonviolence can be the most effective tactic, even if one assumes that violence is more effective than nonviolence for any number of participants, if this mobilization advantage is large enough for nonviolence.

This is not likely to be the case if the dissidents only are able to mobilize from a small group in a state, which often is the case in conflicts over secession and self-determination (Dahl et al. 2015: 4-14). The theoretical framework of Dahl et al. (2015) clearly relies on a dissident group being able to respond strategically to opportunities, implying that some kind of leadership function exists that directs and ensures the coherence of the group.

After describing the overarching theoretical framework, Dahl et al. (2015: 17-27) turn to specific variables that they argue are related to dissident groups, namely their motivation and mobilization potential. Dahl et al. (2015) argue that motivation for nonviolence and violence not are quite similar.

Grievances due to autocracy and ethnic exclusion can lead to both civil war and nonviolent campaigns, whereas actor characteristics differ more. Large, resource-rich groups with urban bases are more likely to have a large nonviolent mobilization advantage than small, poor groups based in the periphery. Descriptive statistics and regression model support these arguments, suggesting that nonviolence often is the preferred choice of the groups considered more powerful in the framework of Dahl et al. (2015).

2.3.6. Organizational claims and mobilization – a two-stage approach

White, Vidovic, González, Gleditsch and Cunningham (2015: 472-473) argue that it is necessary to focus on the process leading to large-scale collective action against regimes. Studies of major nonviolence and violence against regimes that neglect previous claims and small-scale collective action against regimes can potentially be misleading, since such studies might draw conclusions based on comparisons of countries without significant opposition to the regime and countries with major dissident organizations demanding change for many years.
Therefore, White et al. (2015) and Cunningham, Gleditsch, González, Vidovic and White (2016) develop a theoretical two-stage framework for studying the onset of nonviolent and violent action. The first stage required for the onset of nonviolence or violence is that some organized dissident group make claims for major political change directed at the government.

Although individuals with maximalist grievances directed at the regime probably exist most of the time, there is much variation in the presence of organizations expressing such grievances publicly (White et al. 2015: 473, Cunningham et al. 2016). Organizational claims are viewed as necessary for major nonviolent or violent collective action in this framework (White et al. 2015: 473): “Organizations making maximalist claims are important since it is organizations that generally coordinate the large-scale action that comprises civil war or non-violent campaign” (Cunningham et al. 2016: 4). This statement show that the authors are concerned with strategic nonviolence, but does not directly address the role of organizations and leadership in the onsets of campaigns. Instead the, statement suggests that the authors view established organizations as necessary for a nonviolent mobilization turning into full-fledged campaigns. “Dissidents” is mostly used to refer to challengers of the regime. Therefore, it does not seem like Cunningham et al. make general assumptions about the mobilization process to nonviolent campaigns.

In the second stage, available resources for mobilization is necessary for violent or nonviolent collective action to start. What kinds of resources are available determine what kind of mobilization that occurs.

White et al. (2015) apply their framework in a comparison of former Soviet members, and find that their framework applies well, with mobilization occurring only where organizations made active claims. Cunningham et al. (2016) employ the framework in a statistical study using the unreleased Governmental Incompatibilities Data Project (GDIP) data, which record claims regarding regime change, government composition and electoral legitimacy made by extra-governmental organizations in a random sample of non-consolidated democracies from 1960 to 2012.

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5 Note that White et al. (2015) include social networks in their definition of organizations, meaning that groups such as student activists without formal organization are labeled organizations. Cunningham et al. (2016) do not explicitly define what it takes to be defined as an extra-governmental organization in their data, but given that the same authors are responsible for both articles, I take the definition organization from the first article as the basis for theoretical arguments made by the authors.
In the first stage of their analysis, Cunningham et al. (2015) study the determinants of organizational claims, and find that both autocracy and anocracy increase the chance of claims compared with democracies. In the second stage of their analysis, Cunningham et al. (2015) restrict their sample to years with active claims, and study the chance of onsets of nonviolent campaigns and armed conflict, and find that anocracy increase the chance of nonviolent campaigns substantially, but not the chance of armed conflict in comparison to no onset of nonviolence or violence. Furthermore, Cunningham et al. (2015) find that autocracy, a large urban population and presence of INGOs increase the chance of nonviolent campaigns.

2.3.7 Other studies

Previously published studies by Cunningham (2013) and Asal, Legault, Szekely and Wilkenfeld (2013) align well with the framework developed by White et al. (2015) and Cunningham et al. (2016). Cunningham study the determinants of the strategy choice of oppositional groups in self-determination disputes in years where they make political demands, whereas Asal et al. (2013) study the strategy choice of organizations pursuing political goals on the behalf of minorities at risk. Thus, both these samples only include observations where organizations make claims on the government, and could be considered second stage studies in the framework of White et al. (2015) and Cunningham et al. (2015).

Cunningham (2013) code nonviolent campaigns based on NAVCO 2.0 and violent campaigns based on Armed Conflict Database (ACD). As demonstrated in the next chapter, organizations do not initiate all NAVCO 2.0 campaigns. Although Cunningham (2013) study groups such as Palestinians and Scots, a group is coded as active only when some group make demand for independence or increased self-determination.

Cunningham (2013: 301-302) tests a multitude of hypotheses with mixed results, but argue that groups choose strategies based on costs and benefits. Given the focus on organizations and strategic decisions, and the coding of nonviolent and violent campaigns, it seems like Cunningham (2013) assume that organization have full control over the initiation of campaigns and strategies, and make decisions strategically.

Asal et al. (2013) study individual organizations with political goals, and their choice of strategy. Therefore, their data ensure that an organization actually made a decision about choice of strategy when nonviolence or violence is recorded. In addition to resources and
opportunities, Asal et al. (2013) argue that organizational ideology matter for strategy choice, a claim that is supported by the effect of gender-inclusive ideology, which increase the chance of nonviolence compared to non-contentious behavior, but decrease the chance of strategies entailing violence.

Jernsletten (2015) argues that autocratic regimes with different kinds of party-systems have different capabilities to constrain mobilization. Single-party autocracies tend to respond as slowly as they can to increased opposition strength, which makes it more likely that single-party autocracies will see nonviolent uprisings than in other kinds of autocracies.

Multiparty autocracies are able to appease the opposition for a longer duration of time than other kinds of autocracies, which should make the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns increase over time. Both these hypotheses are supported by the empirical data (Jernsletten 2015). Jernsletten (2015) mostly use the term ”opposition” when discussing who can mobilize to nonviolent action, but also mentions ”masses” orchestrating revolutions, thus not excluding spontaneous mobilization.

In a recent master thesis, Sandanger (2015) studies the effect of repression on onsets of nonviolent and violent campaigns. Sandanger (2015: 34-39) argues that repression create grievances, but also constrain the opportunities for mobilization against the regime. Sandanger (2015: 34-39) theorizes when the opposite effects of repression will increase and decrease the chance for nonviolent and violent campaigns. Only one of the hypotheses that available data allows Sandanger (2015) to test receive support.

Sandanger (2015) finds that an increase in civil liberties increase the likelihood of nonviolent conflict relative to no conflict. The political opportunities approach which Sandanger (2015: 30-31) partially builds her theoretical argument on assume rational dissidents that respond to opportunities, and launch campaigns when grievances exist, and new opportunities arise. Thus, Sandanger (2015) also assumes that nonviolent mobilization is directed strategically by established oppositional actors.

In sum, the recent statistical literature on the cause of onsets of nonviolent campaigns have a strong theoretical focus on organizations, leaders and planning. Most scholars either explicitly or implicitly want to study onsets of nonviolence that are the result of strategic decisions and
planning by organized groups or leaders/dissidents who initiate and direct the nonviolent mobilization after they decide to launch a campaign.

In the next chapter, I demonstrate that most of the new quantitative studies rely on datasets where campaigns can be initiated spontaneously, i.e. not by deliberating organized groups.

The literature reviewed so far does not provide much systematic insight on how spontaneous mobilization to nonviolence may occur. Neither does it address the possibility that the tested variables may have different effects on spontaneous and strategic onset. To enable this discussion, I review selected studies on popular uprisings from other literatures that are particularly attentive to the mobilization process and spontaneous mobilization.

2.4 Spontaneous mobilization

Although many early contributions on popular uprisings, such as Skocpol (1979, 1982), were concerned with spontaneous mobilization, most of this scholarship tended to pay most attention to structural causes of revolutions, while ignoring the microfoundations for mobilization (Goldstone 2001: 162). Recent work on contentious politics and social movements have also tended to neglect spontaneity (Snow and Moss 2014).

A central insight of Olson (1965) is that in large groups, people have incentives to free-ride instead of participating in efforts to provide public goods that they desire, unless external enforcement or additional incentives to participate exist.

In large groups, the contributions of a single individual will not matter for the provision of the public good. If participation is costlier than non-participation for individuals, it will be rational for each individual to not participate, and enjoy the public good provided by the efforts of others. This is the “collective action problem”.

Olson’s (1965) problem led scholars to conceive of the mobilization process leading to collective action as a phenomenon in need of an explanation. His insight has influenced many fields of scholarly work, including the study of popular uprisings against regimes. Collective action analysis of mobilization in rebellions conceptualize outcomes sought by rebels such as regime change as public goods. The problem of providing such public goods yields a prisoner’s dilemma: Participation by everyone lead to higher benefits than costs for each individual, while the benefit created for an individual by his own participation is smaller than the costs created by personal participation for each individual (Lichbach 1996: 39-40).
Where the first generation of scholars inspired by Olson (1965) argued that this dynamic should lead to very few popular uprisings, later work has identified many different solutions to collective action problems, leading Lichbach (1994: 21) to argue that solutions to the collective action problems of rebels is probable.

This body of scholarly work has also been particularly concerned with the actual mobilization process, theorizing how various kinds of actors are able to solve collective action problems, and start popular uprisings against regimes (Lichbach 1998).


Solutions of spontaneous order are based solely on individuals, whereas solutions of contingent order are based on pre-existing networks, organization, institutions or structures. The latter distinction is ontological, since it is based on how one conceptualizes the actors involved in solving the collective action problem (Lichbach 1994: 10).

Lichbach (1996: 19) classify unplanned solutions based on spontaneous order as *market solutions*, unplanned solutions based on contingent order as *community solutions*, planned solutions based on spontaneous order as *contract solutions*, and planned solutions based on contingent order as *hierarchy solutions*. Lichbach (1995) present twenty-one different solutions to collective action problems that he classify with his typology and discuss the solutions with examples from literature concerned with rebellion.

Among these solutions, some are based on established organizations and networks. Organizations and leaderships possess several methods for solving collective action problems and mobilize to action (Lichbach 1995: 171-244). Although Lichbach’s discussions of how organizations solve collective action problems mostly is centered around violent insurgencies, and not necessarily apply directly to nonviolent campaigns where voluntary participation is more common, some of his arguments likely apply to nonviolent campaigns. Organizations

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8 Interestingly, Lichbach (1995: 50-61) discuss the solution “improve the productivity of tactics”, including consideration of the choice between violence and nonviolence, but only theorize how violence can be effective.
and networks can be able to provide coordination and infrastructure for mobilization. To be recognized as an established oppositional leader, you need a following. Leaders should be able to control this following to a certain extent, allowing them to ensure at least a certain amount participation in mobilizations they initiate.

Assuming organization is thus akin to assuming a solution to collective action problems, meaning that the task of explaining how free-riding was avoided and coordination of mass mobilization achieved become redundant.

That being said, scholars of nonviolence are quite attentive to explanations of mobilization processes in general. Recent scholarship of nonviolence, such as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) Dahl et al. (2015) have been particularly concerned with explaining the number of people joining nonviolent campaigns.

This is reflected in attention to cascade and threshold models for mobilization such as De Nardo (1985) and Kuran (1989). These models explain how increased participation and expectations of high participation can give massive participation by lowering the costs for individual participation (Schock 2013: 283). Thus, recent scholarly work on nonviolent mobilization have focused on how large campaigns with high participation can grow out of initial actions directed by the leaders of organizations/networks.

Another example of attention to the microfoundations of nonviolent mobilization is provided by Sharp (1973: 19-20), who argue that fear might be the major reason for why people obey a regime they despise, and that belief in nonviolent action of your group and information about nonviolent techniques can help people overcome this fear.

In a similar vein, Pearlman (2013) argue that emotions have major importance for explaining variation in nonviolent mobilization during the Arab spring. She finds that fear, sadness, and shame make people tolerate the current state of affairs, whereas anger, joy, and pride make people more willing to resist the regime.

The same kind of arguments are found in social psychology studies on popular uprisings, which argue that identification with a group and belief in successful action lead to mobilization. This argument is supported by survey research, psychological experiments, and anthropological studies (Goldstone 2001: 163-164). Goldstone (2001: 164) claim that group identification and belief in the efficiency of action are the major obstacles hindering protests.
However, the focus in this thesis is on differences between organized and spontaneous processes leading to initial nonviolent mobilization. Although both emotions and cascading dynamics are important in explaining variation in mobilization to nonviolent action, neither of these approaches provide much insight into why spontaneous mobilization occurs in some instances, whereas organized onsets and planning occurs in others.

Few studies aim to explain general variation in spontaneous and organized mobilization. There are however some common factors in explanations of spontaneous revolutions and popular uprisings and in the few studies I have come across that try to explain when spontaneous mobilization occurs, such as Snow and Moss (2014) and Opp, Voss and Gern (1995).

A recurrent theme in explanations of spontaneous uprisings is the presence of explanatory factors that facilitate coordination. Examples of source of coordination include city squares, extensive social networks, means of rapid efficient communication and events (Opp, Voss, Gern 1995, Snow and Moss 2014, Lichbach 1995).

Since spontaneous mobilization cannot rely on organization for coordination, other means for coordination must be available. Shared understanding of the environment is required for many of these variables to work. Community (Lichbach 1995: 111-114) fosters common knowledge and mutual expectations. Community also allow people to overcome pecuniary self-interest, and act in the interest of the group (Lichbach 1995: 120-126). Therefore, some kind of group identification may be required for spontaneous mobilization, and the presence of strong communal norms and a widely shared culture may increase the chance of spontaneous solutions. Ideological leadership can provide these kinds of preconditions for nonviolent campaigns, as made evident by Kuran’s (1989: 63-66) discussion of how Khomeini inspired the Iranian revolution.

Since community/group-identification are essential to all kinds of mobilization (Goldstone 2001:164), general expectations to differences in explanations boils down to a few simple points. Strategic onsets require the presence of oppositional organization/integrated social networks, and opportunities for these entities to operate. Thus, freedoms to assemble, organize, and move around freely should help facilitate strategic onsets of nonviolence. Following the same logic, states that are unable to enforce limitations to these freedoms should also provide more favorable conditions for organized nonviolent mobilization.
3. Review of operationalization of nonviolent campaigns

In the literature review, I demonstrated that many arguments about the mechanisms connecting variables to onsets of nonviolent campaigns in current statistical studies are based on strategic decision-making by a leadership.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that the construction of data used to test these arguments allow the inclusion of onsets not initiated by deliberating, organized groups. Thereafter I show that there were large differences in contentious politics and nonviolence preceding different campaigns. Neglecting this information leaves out information that may be essential to understanding how new nonviolent campaigns emerge.

In the recent quantitative literature on the onset of strategically conducted, major nonviolent campaigns, there exist three closely related ways to operationalize onsets. The dataset utilized by most scholars (e.g. Gleditsch and Rivera 2015, Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik 2015) is the NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013), Butcher and Svensson (2014) use NAVCO 2.0, but also create an approach to coding campaign onsets based on the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), collected by Salehyan et al. (2012). Finally, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) use the forthcoming Major Episodes of Contention dataset (MEC) to code the onset of nonviolent campaigns.

In the following sections, I outline each of these approaches. Then I argue that the definitions used to code onset in these approaches cannot guarantee that leaders of organized groups were responsible for the nonviolent mobilization, since these datasets do not provide information about prior nonviolent activity short of reaching the criteria for being part of a campaign.

Furthermore, I argue that even if all campaign onsets were directed by leaderships, arguments about the contagious nature of nonviolence (Gleditsch and Rivera 2015, Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik 2015) give us reasons to examine spontaneous nonviolent events more closely.

To show the relevancy of these arguments for statistical studies that assume leaders of organized groups are responsible for nonviolent mass-mobilization, I examine each of the datasets more closely. I devote most attention to the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, since this dataset is
most widely used in the statistical studies I address by far. To examine these datasets, I rely on descriptive statistics and case-studies.

The descriptive statistics utilize the SCAD data (Salehyan et al. 2012), which serves as a model for distinguishing between organized and spontaneous nonviolence (Day et al. 2015, 131). Comparisons of SCAD and the datasets used to study the onset of nonviolent campaigns demonstrate that there is much variation in the presence of such events before the onset of major nonviolent campaigns. This gives reason to question whether the onset of some nonviolent campaign contained in the datasets actually was the result of leaders of groups directing nonviolent mass-mobilization.

Additionally, I draw on case studies to provide depth and more information to my description of the coding schemes, and the Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD) led by George Lakey (2011). This approach does not follow any sampling strategy, but contain case-studies that can be used to corroborate datasets such as NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 418)

3.1 Operationalizations of campaigns and their onsets:

In the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, the onset of a nonviolent campaign requires the first event, the onset, to be followed by at least another nonviolent event within a year. These events must have at least 1000 participants who must make the same political demands, and there must be some kind of evidence of coordination across the events. These are absolute requirements for the inclusion of events in the dataset. Furthermore, only events where campaigners make maximalist demands of either secession, end of foreign occupation, or change of government are included (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 416-417).

When a series of such events occur, there is a nonviolent campaign. Campaigns are purposive, have discernible leadership, and primarily refer to strategic and coordinated nonviolent events, as opposed to spontaneous nonviolence. Campaigns often consist of one or many organizations, but campaigns can start and continue without organizations.

The NAVCO 2.0 dataset has annual observations of campaigns, and contain the known population of major violent and nonviolent campaigns from 1945 to 2006 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 416-417). The information about campaign onsets is gathered by a consensus
method, which include consultation of the literature and experts in nonviolent conflict. Research assistants studied each campaign to determine when the onset occurred (ibid: 419).

Butcher and Svensson (2014: 9) start their empirical analysis using NAVCO 2.0. They also use SCAD to create an alternative test of their hypotheses, based on similar coding criteria as employed by NAVCO 2.0. Like NAVCO 2.0, Butcher and Svensson (2014) code an onset in a country in a year when a nonviolent event with minimum 1000 participants targeting the central government with demands regarding human rights/democracy or elections occur.

These kinds of demands are maximalist like the NAVCO 2.0 demands in the sense that they threaten the power of government. Unlike NAVCO 2.0, however, Butcher and Svensson (2014) do not require multiple events and coordination across these events. Furthermore, Butcher and Svensson (2014) do not exclude spontaneous nonviolence. The SCAD data is gathered through keyword searches in Associated Press and Agence France Press, and thereafter coded by researchers (Salehyan et al. 2012: 505-506).

The unreleased Major Episodes of contention dataset collects data on episodes, not campaigns. As discussed in the introduction, Day et al. (2015: 3) distinguish between spontaneous episodes and campaigns by allowing episodes to contain spontaneous nonviolence. However, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) use the terms “episode” and “campaign” interchangeably, and place restrictions on the inclusion of events, which are very close to those used for campaigns in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The major episodes contained in Chenoweth and Ulfelder’s (2015) data therefore approximate nonviolent campaign well.

The coding scheme used by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015: 13-14) define an onset as a nonviolent event with at least thousand participants making demands of removal of a foreign occupant, removal of government, self-determination or secession. The first nonviolent event must be followed by at least another such event within a week for an onset to occur.

Furthermore, there must be some kind of, coordination across these events, like common leadership, slogans, or name. Additionally, the overall episode must last more than a week,

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7 Note that many nonviolent events last for a substantial amount of time in the SCAD data, 12.5% of the general strikes lasted more than a week, and 7.1% of the organized protests lasted more than a week.

8 I make this claim based on reconstruction of Butcher and Svensson’s (2014) dependent variable, which reveal that I get too few onsets if spontaneous nonviolence is included. See the accompanying R-script for details.
and participants must not use or threaten to use violence (although incidental violence on the 
outskirts of the events is allowed).

Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) use an annualized version of the data in their analyses. Since 
the full version of MEC is unavailable, I only have access to the annualized version of the 
data provided for replication. The information used to create the database was gathered from 
news archives like the SCAD dataset, which also was consulted by research assistant in the 
coding process (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015: 13). The table below summarize the criteria in 
the dataset for coding the onset of a nonviolent campaign.

**Table 1:** List of variables made to construct samples, and coding choices for each

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dataset (name and number of observations)</th>
<th>Days between events</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Goals included</th>
<th>Forms of nonviolence</th>
<th>Organizations and leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013)</td>
<td>Within a year</td>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>Regime change, secession, or removal of foreign occupant</td>
<td>Based on reading of nonviolence literature, therefore not restricted to a few of the many different kinds of nonviolence identified by Sharp and the literature.</td>
<td>Campaigns have discernible leadership, but campaigns can precede or outlast organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butcher and Svensson (2014) (940 in base mod.)</td>
<td>Single events</td>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>Human Rights/ Democracy (10) elections (1)</td>
<td>“demonstrations and strikes”, but also other kinds of visible mass nonviolence such as sit-ins</td>
<td>All events with more than 1000 participants included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chenoweth Ulfelder (2015), annualized</td>
<td>“occurring within one week of another”</td>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>Antigovernment (change of government), antioccupation, self-determination</td>
<td>“Typical illegal acts of civil disobedience like nonviolent occupations, sit-ins, boycotts and acts of noncooperation”.</td>
<td>Evidence of coordination across events. Coordination can be shared name, slogan, leadership or umbrella group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted in the literature review, Sharp (1973: 455) claims that nonviolent movements can start spontaneously, without prior planning or existence of a leadership. Campaigns may also start semi-spontaneously, after some preparations for limited action or efforts to make people willing to participate in nonviolence, such as the formulation and voicing of maximalist demands by organizations.

The current definitions of onsets of campaigns, requiring leadership or other forms of coordination between events, maximalist demands, and at least 1000 participants, do not allow us to distinguish campaigns that were started by leaders who directed nonviolent mass-mobilization after strategical deliberation from campaigns that started spontaneously or semi-spontaneously and obtained clear leadership later. Since the datasets do not tell us in which order the definitional criteria required for coding the onset of a major nonviolent campaign were met, the data does not give us any reasons to assume that leadership caused mass participation and maximalist demands.

Thus, the current criteria for inclusion and exclusion of nonviolent events in datasets used for studying the onset of nonviolent campaigns may include onsets where a leadership initiated mass mobilization and coordinated all activity. It is, however, also possible that the event coded as onset of a campaign was launched by an established oppositional leadership in an environment where nonviolent mass mobilization already existed, such as in the first Palestinian intifada (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 123-124).

Furthermore, it is possible for nonviolent mass mobilization to be initiated without clear leadership. The nonviolent mass mobilization might cause the evolution of a clear leadership at a later stage, leading to what the datasets define as nonviolent campaigns. In the latter two cases, leadership does not cause the onset of nonviolent mobilization, but lead to satisfaction of the definitional requirements for being the onset-event of a nonviolent campaign.

The multiple avenues to the coding of campaign onsets are not a problem for using these datasets to study the onset of nonviolent campaigns per se. However, if the latter two processes leading to the coding of campaign onsets are common, it will be a problem for studies where the theoretical arguments assume that established oppositional leadership are responsible for nonviolent mass mobilization.
Unless such studies incorporate information about how the onset came about or are aware of the different avenues to fulfillment of the definitional criteria for campaign onsets when drawing conclusions, results taken as tests of theoretical arguments may be skewed.

Even if the recorded onsets are organized, the presence of many nonviolent demonstrations may affect the decision made by leaders to initiate campaigns. Some studies control for previous nonviolent activity (e.g. Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015, Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik 2015). However, these studies use such variables to proxy for organizational learning. This can problematic, since their data on previous nonviolent activity does not distinguish between spontaneous and strategic nonviolence.

The literature on nonviolent campaigns offers arguments about the contagious nature of nonviolent action (Gleditsch and Rivera 2015, Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik 2015). The contagious nature of nonviolent action is not necessarily restricted to major nonviolent campaigns. If large groups of citizens spontaneously stand up against the regime a few times during a year, oppositional leaders may change their assessment of how ready people are to act in pursuit of major political change, and start mobilizing their own group. As argued by Kuran (1989), it is often hard for leaders to assess the potential for mass mobilization against the current regime. Not considering information about prior contentious political behavior short of civil war and major nonviolent campaigns may yield omitted variable bias in statistical analyses of the onset of nonviolent campaigns.

In the following sections, I use the SCAD and GNAD data to describe the environment of nonviolent action that nonviolent campaigns emerged from. I read the issuenotes for all events in SCAD that start in the same year as campaign onsets, and in the year prior to campaign onsets. This allowing a qualitative assessment of the environment of nonviolence that campaigns emerged from.

3.2 Comparison of NAVCO 2.0 and SCAD

NAVCO 2.0 covers the known population of maximalist nonviolent campaigns between 1945 and 2006 in the world, whereas SCAD covers Africa and Latin America between 1990 and 2013. When I exclude all NAVCO 2.0 campaigns not starting between 1990 and 2006 in
Africa and Latin America, I find the onset of 16 nonviolent campaigns, of which one onset occurred in Latin America.\(^9\)

I find nonviolent events starting in the same year and country in SCAD for 10 out of the 16 onsets from NAVCO 2.0. One of these cases, Egypt, appears to be unrelated with the campaign coded by NAVCO 2.0 based on the issue notes describing each event in SCAD. The lack of events connected to the remaining 6 events are potentially due to the rest of the campaigns being conducted with techniques not recorded by SCAD.

The keywords related to nonviolence used in the collection of SCAD are “protest” and “strike” (Salehyan et al. 2012: 505). Such automated approaches may result in especially high underreporting in datasets on nonviolent resistance, since many nonviolent resistance methods are subtle and context-specific (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 418).

The inability of SCAD to code events connected to these campaigns displays the limitations of utilizing SCAD in studying nonviolent campaigns. Noting these limitations in SCAD, I now turn to the limitations of using NAVCO 2.0 to test theoretical arguments simply assuming that organized leaders control the initiation of nonviolent action, by utilizing the overlap between SCAD and NAVCO 2.0. For this purpose, I identified all nonviolent events contained in SCAD that occurred in the year prior, or the year of onset of campaigns encoded in NAVCO 2.0. Thereafter, I read the issu enotes briefly describing these events in SCAD. This exercise allow me to assess the variation in nonviolent activity preceding nonviolence campaigns, and identify nonviolent campaigns that possibly emerged from spontaneous nonviolence. I rely on selected examples…

Madagascar saw the onset of a nonviolent campaign defined by NAVCO 2.0 in 1991. This campaign emerged from an environment without any nonviolence identified by SCAD in the previous year. Organized opposition launched a second NAVCO 2.0 campaign in Madagascar in 2002, with the first event that year being organized protests, according to SCAD. There had been some spontaneous protests in support of the opposition in 2000 with 300-500

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participants, according to the notes accompanying each event in SCAD, but no nonviolent events are recorded during 2001 by SCAD.

The Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD) includes case studies of both these campaigns. The case study of the first of these campaigns set the onset of the campaign to 1990, when the opposition organization Forces Vives started to plan nonviolent mass mobilization (the exact time when planning started is unknown), instead of in 1991 when mobilization occurred.

The second case-study identify Marc Ravalomanana as the leader for the campaign, and identifies him as responsible for organizing action. However, it also notes that it is uncertain what kind of groups where involved in the campaign and when they joined (Lakey 2011). Even though there is less information about the preparations for the second NAVCO 2.0 Madagascar campaign in GNAD, both campaigns appear to fit the onset process typically conceived in the theoretical arguments discussed in the previous chapter.

NAVCO 2.0 code the onset of two nonviolent campaigns in Nigeria during the time period covered by SCAD – the Ogoni movement in 1990, and the campaign against military rule in 1993. SCAD does not include events related to the Ogoni campaign during the onset year 1990 (events related to this campaign can be found in other years), but record many nonviolent events in 1992 and 1993.

The first three nonviolent events coded by SCAD in Nigeria in 1993 with demands regarding democracy, are all spontaneous protests starting in June. In the first two of these events, the actors participating are simply described as citizens by SCAD. in the event descriptions. The rest of the year is filled with nonviolent events where the participants make demands regarding the elections or democracy. Thereafter, there is a mixture of organized and spontaneous nonviolent events related to the elections. At least two of these spontaneous demonstrations had somewhere between 1000-10000 participants. Even though there may be organized nonviolent activity not recorded by SCAD. (NAVCO 2.0 report 11 new participant organizations in the year of onset), the plot and SCAD data indicate that there possibly was a number of major nonviolent events that took place before or at the same time organized nonviolence started (spontaneous nonviolence erupted shortly after elections in June).
Thus, there is reason to question whether established leaders of oppositional groups directed the nonviolent mass mobilization, or whether such leaders seized control of already mobilized masses. Organized actors may or may not have acted before the spontaneous demonstrations.

NAVCO 2.0 does not tell us which of these options are true, whereas SCAD (if accurate) tells us that no discernible leadership was in charge of the first nonviolent protests after the 1993 elections. GNAD does not contain a case study of this campaign, and the narrative for the campaign from the NAVCO 1.1 dataset (Chenoweth 2011) does not provide any details about the process leading to the onset. In their study of democratic transitions in Africa in the early 90’s Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 106) note that protests in Nigeria was largely spontaneous in the early phases.

In addition to the Nigerian campaign in 1993, SCAD gives reasons to question how the Tanzanian campaign in 1992 emerged, with records of a spontaneous demonstration for democracy in 1991, the same issue that the 1992 campaign was concerned with. Apart from these cases, a comparison of NAVCO 2.0 campaigns and SCAD events does not give reasons to question whether leaders of organized groups directed nonviolent mass mobilization.

Thus, it might be that leaders caused nonviolent mass-mobilization in most NAVCO 2.0 campaigns. Unfortunately, the sample of campaign onsets for which SCAD also provides information is too limited to draw conclusions about the plausibility of this assumption.

Additionally, more information about the mobilization process than what SCAD provide would be required to conclude. Consultations of other scholarly work, such as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 123-124) do however showcase that there are instances of campaigns in NAVCO 2.0 were leaders not were responsible for mass-mobilization.

The comparison of NAVCO 2.0 and SCAD is more conclusive regarding the potential pitfalls of ignoring nonviolent activity not part of major nonviolent campaigns. There is a lot of nonviolent action, both organized and unorganized going on outside major campaigns, although the variation in the level of nonviolence prior to campaigns is considerable.

Examination of nonviolent events regarding these elections and democracy/human rights in years prior to campaign onsets show that there were such nonviolence in 9 cases, whereas 4
cases had no such nonviolence. Further descriptive statistics regarding variation of different kinds of nonviolence found in SCAD is reported later in this chapter.

3.3 Examination of Major Episodes of Contention (MEC)

MEC identifies 38 onsets of nonviolent campaigns in Africa and Latin America between 1990 and 2013, including campaign onsets matching year and country for all NAVCO onsets apart from the onsets in Algeria in 1992 and Niger in 1991 (MEC define an onset in 1993).

31 out of 39 onsets occurred in Africa. Most of the onsets not encoded in NAVCO 2.0 happened after 2006, when NAVCO 2.0 coverage stops. Onsets include the start of the Arab spring in Tunisia, which started spontaneously in response to self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazazi (Pearlman 2013: 394). SCAD does not record any other nonviolent events than the spontaneous protests following this self-immolation in 2010, and thus indicate that the start of the campaign against the Tunisian regime was spontaneous.

This kind of information is not recorded in the replication dataset provided by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), which simply code the onset of the campaign in 2010. Thus, it is clear that we cannot assess whether there is a difference between spontaneous and strategic onset of nonviolent action with this dataset either, and that there are instances of nonviolent campaigns were leaders not were responsible for nonviolent mobilization included in the data.

3.4 Descriptive statistics

I now turn to descriptive statistics based on SCAD to demonstrate that neglecting nonviolent activity outside campaigns may lead to omitted variable bias. First, looking at events that fulfill all criteria for being part of nonviolent campaigns, I find 402 country-years with onset of major nonviolent events when I include spontaneous events, and 301 when I only include organized events.

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10 Since three onsets occurred in 1990, and SCAD do not contain information about nonviolence in 1989, I cannot say anything about previous nonviolence in these countries.

11 Apart from coordination, i.e. events that would be coded as nonviolence in the SCAD based analysis of Butcher and Svensson (2014).
Looking only at the spontaneous demonstrations, there are 202 country-years with such events. Since there are 1464 country-years covered by the sample, there are major nonviolent events in more than a fifth of the country-years covered by the sample. This shows that nonviolence with more than thousand participants making demands for democracy/human rights and elections occurred quite often in the sample, even in the absence of organized nonviolence.

A third of the events lack information on the number of participants. The impression we get from looking only at events with more than 1000 participants might therefore give the impression of major nonviolent activity being much more limited than what was actually the case. By including all non-violent activity related to democracy/human rights or elections, we are left with 824 country-years with non-violent activity, meaning there was such activity in 56 % of the country-years.

Most of these country-years only saw a few nonviolent events. However, 26.8 % percent of the country-years with events had 5 events or more, and 10.8 % of these country-years had 10 nonviolent events or more related to democracy/human rights or elections. There are countries with almost no nonviolence related to democracy/human rights and elections, such as Eritrea and Gambia, countries with a mix of years with and without nonviolence, such as Madagascar, and countries with nonviolence almost every year, such as Niger and Nigeria. Thus, there is considerable variation in both the presence and frequency of nonviolent events related to democracy/human rights and elections.

As argued by Bratton and Van de Walle (1995: 101-105), there may be linkages between other kinds of nonviolence, such as economic issues and democracy, at least in the African part of the SCAD sample. The start of the Arab Spring in Tunisia is a more recent example of protests where people made demands regarding both the current state of democracy and the economy. Including all kinds of nonviolent events in SCAD yields 1053 country-years with nonviolent events, which is 71.9 % of the sample.

Unless scholars are willing to assume that these kinds of nonviolent activity do not influence the probability of onset of coordinated nonviolent campaigns in Africa and Latin America from 1990 until 2013, this information should be included in analyses of onsets of nonviolent campaigns.
4. Theory

In the previous chapters, I have assembled support for two claims. First, I have showed that recent statistical studies of nonviolent campaigns tend to assume that leaders plan and direct nonviolent mobilization to nonviolent campaigns, or at least play an important role, such as providing ideological leadership for mobilizations. Secondly, I have showed that these studies use datasets where this assumption does not always hold.

In the previous chapter, I provided only a few examples and examinations of small non-random samples of the datasets in question. Spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns may in fact be very rare, making the empirical impact of this phenomenon small. Furthermore, even if spontaneous mobilization is widespread, campaigns require coordination. Coordination requires leadership and, according to NAVCO 2.0, in most cases involves organization (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).

It might be that the vast majority of the campaigns that started spontaneously acquired leadership from already established groups of oppositional actors. These oppositional leaders could decide to try to take control over nonviolent mobilization based on the same considerations they use to determine whether they should initiate nonviolent mobilization themselves.

This would mean that the ultimate decision that leads to satisfaction of the criterion required for coding campaigns is the decision of oppositional leaders to provide coordination, and that this decision is taken in more or less the same way for organized and spontaneous onsets. If this were the case, it would not matter to studies of causes of onsets of nonviolent campaigns whether the causes of spontaneous and organized nonviolent mobilization differ.

In the literature review, I provided only a few general considerations on how spontaneous and organized mobilization might occur. These are based on studies concerned with popular uprisings in general and not the particular phenomenon of nonviolent campaigns. The theoretical and empirical foundation for claiming that the causes of spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns systematically differ is not rock solid. Here, and in the following chapters, I will address these concerns.
4.1 Defining organized and spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns

In the introduction, I provided a preliminary definition of spontaneous and organized nonviolent onsets of campaigns. I defined organized onsets of campaigns as onsets deliberately launched by an established leadership, with control over where, when and how to launch the campaign. Spontaneous onsets lack this kind of tactical leadership.

In this section, I start out by providing the reasoning behind my conceptualization of spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Thereafter, I elaborate my definitions of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns further.

4.1.1. How to create a definition of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns.

My concern in this thesis is to create coherence between the theoretical arguments made in recent scholarship on the causes of nonviolent campaigns and data used to test these arguments. The most important concern is therefore to accommodate the theoretical assumptions and concepts in this literature. As previously discussed, scholars from this literature have a clear, well-specified conception of what organized nonviolent campaigns are. Furthermore, theoretical assumptions and arguments from this literature specifies how organized onsets of such campaigns typically start. Unfortunately, these theoretical assumptions and arguments do not provide the same kind of clear definition of organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns that Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) does for campaigns. Some of these scholars propose mechanisms relying on strategical decision-making and tactical leadership, whereas other arguments ascribe important roles to leaders and organizations, without precisely specifying which functions these actors perform. Thus, my choice of distinguishing between organized and spontaneous onsets based on tactical leadership is not self-evident. I provide the reasoning behind this decision in the upcoming paragraphs.

It is comparatively easy to determine whether nonviolent campaigns have active tactical leadership, since tactical leadership require the presence of a clear leadership directing each event. Either such leadership exists, or it does not. Therefore, it is possible to draw a sharp distinction between nonviolent campaigns and similar phenomena, such as spontaneous episodes. The same logic applies to onsets of campaigns, a clear, established leadership must decide where, when and how to launch the initial mobilization. If no such leadership launched mobilization, the onset was spontaneous. Furthermore, it seems logical to employ the same
distinction used to separate campaigns from spontaneous nonviolent episodes to distinguish between organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns.

Determining the presence and strength of ideological leadership appear much more difficult, since such leadership can affect nonviolent mobilizations to various degrees. A conceptualization of organized onsets based on ideological leadership would have to determine when the impact of ideological leadership becomes too weak to qualify as a spontaneous onset. One solution could potentially be to argue that there is some kind of ideological leadership in all onsets of campaigns, someone have to assume leadership functions facilitating collective action. However, cases like the Rosenstrasse demonstrations (Sharp 1973: 89-90), where 6000 protesters were coordinated by the arrest of their husbands in the Gestapo headquarters show that there are instances of campaigns starting with close to no prior ideological leadership. It seems like a conceptual stretch to argue that such campaigns started as the result of some kind of active leadership. Furthermore, even if a good way of separating the onsets inspired by ideological leadership from the spontaneous onsets were available, it would likely be much more difficult to apply in data collection than distinctions based on tactical leadership. Additionally, emphasis on lack of planning is consistent with commonsensical understanding of spontaneity as unplanned action.

Following the theoretical arguments presented in the literature review, there are also reasons to believe that tactical leadership significantly affect the decision of where, when and how to launch campaigns. Although agency and individual capability could matter a lot for where, when and how campaigns are waged, as suggested by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), it seems plausible that a decision-calculus of a tactical leadership initiating a campaign fundamentally differ from the decision-calculus of individuals who contribute to the spontaneous onset of a campaign. The literature on strategic nonviolence stress the importance of preparations and strategic considerations (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, Sharp 1973), whereas explanations of spontaneous mobilization stress the availability of coordination, and psychological factors (Opp, Voss and Gern 1995, Snow and Moss 2014, Pearlman 2013). Thus, we have theoretical reasons to believe that the distinction between onsets with and without tactical leadership might capture two systematically different causal processes. Having outlined the reasoning behind distinguishing between spontaneous and organized nonviolence based on tactical leadership, I now turn to elaborating the concepts of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns.
4.1.2. Elaborating the concepts

In the ideal-typical organized onset of a campaign, an established oppositional group both plan and direct the onset. This group would ideally have full control over the mobilization process. Having full control over the mobilization process entail being able to tell people where, when, how, and for what purpose they should act, and be able to know with a high degree of certainty that people would do as they were asked.

The latter point is important. A lone-wolf activist that does not know about other dissidents could plan to start a revolution by publishing a manifesto, but would not have much control over how others responded to his call for action. A group of activists situated in a social network could hold meetings and talk to members of the network, making it reasonable to expect large participation in future activities. The latter group of activists could therefore have a substantial amount of control over mobilization processes.

Thus, the group of people planning nonviolent action must belong to a reasonably large network or organization that they are able to direct. Nonviolent mobilization relies on voluntary participation, and not all participants will be closely tied to the leadership in all campaigns. Hence, this requirements cannot be extended to the ties between leaders and all participants, but should be valid for a substantial number of people.\textsuperscript{12} Investigations of likely support, and extensive activity to mobilize, followed by people responding to a proposed time, place, and method should count as planning and direction of onsets.

But what about event seizures, such as activists making the crowd sing a Catalan anthem at a concert attended by Franco (Johnston 2006: 205)? If the leaders of an established oppositional organization plan to turn a future mass gathering of people into the onset of a nonviolent campaign, and have done investigations about these people’s sentiments towards the regime, it counts as organized onset. Even though the organization does not initiate mass mobilization, it is responsible for turning the masses political. Thus, the organization was able to decide and control where, when and how to challenge the current regime, or in other words perform tactical leadership. This kind of onset is therefore defined as organized.

\textsuperscript{12} One could define a number based on the ability to facilitate bandwagoning processes, such as in Kuran’s model (1989), but this does not cater to literature on nonviolence.
Being more specific about how planners are situated in networks/organizations and the characteristics of these networks/organizations is difficult. In the literature review, I showed that scholars often include many different kinds of arrangements in their understanding of leadership. Furthermore, various authors seem to differ slightly in their conception of leadership. Thus, a restrictive, clear-cut definition of leadership could clash with the understandings of leadership held by some scholars of nonviolence. As Lichbach (1995) argue, how to conceive the actors involved in collective action is an ontological question. Indeed, as argued by scholars concerned with spontaneous mobilization, networks of friends, group-identification and community is essential to enable mobilization without prior planning. Thus, the criterion of belonging to a network and control the mobilization can reasonably be used to exclude cases such as Twitter activists that do not know other dissidents, but will likely still leave ambiguous instances of mobilization processes unless further operationalized.

Planners communicate about where, when, and how to launch nonviolent action. This is commonsensical. Judging whether a group of people responsible for nonviolent mass mobilization actually strategically planned the mobilization properly in advance is more difficult. If a group of friends meeting every week start discussing how they could create political change for the first time, and thereafter immediately start protesting, they planned their action in advance, technically speaking.

At the same time, it seems obvious that we do not want to define this nonviolence as planned in advance. This would place organizations adhering to the strategic principles proposed by scholars of strategic nonviolence in the same category as the abovementioned group of friends. Thus, it seems necessary to require that planners of nonviolent campaigns must be somewhat stable, and engage in planning of nonviolence to overthrow the existing political order on several occasions. This specification probably yields some ambiguity and would need to be operationalized further for empirical application.

In addition to setting requirements to the stability of the group of planners over time and to their control over their networks/organizations, some theoretical arguments in the recent literature on onsets of nonviolent campaigns require rational considerations of the
environment. Thus, deliberation based on how to best utilize the environment to create major political change should be part of planning.

The utility of this criterion is probably limited however, since this kind of information can be very hard to obtain, especially in a way that is feasible for the creation of large datasets. On the other hand, information about meetings and preparations prior to a campaign and about how those engaged in planning are situated in networks or organizations is more commonly reported in Global Nonviolent Action Database (Lakey 2011). This could therefore more feasibly be included in quantitative datasets. It is more plausible to assume rational planning if you know that leaders of an organization had many meetings on the topic of how to achieve regime change than if you know nothing about preparations and planning prior to a campaign.

4.1.3. Spontaneous and Organized onsets as two-stage processes

Having discussed the finer details of how we can distinguish organized from spontaneous onsets, I add another layer to my conceptualization of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns while simultaneously summarizing the concepts. Having primarily focused on how to identify organized onsets in the paragraphs above, I end this section by making some notes on how spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns can be identified.

The core characteristic of organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns, is that an established leadership make the decision of where, when and how to mobilize to the campaign. Conversely, the core characteristic of spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns is that an established leadership not was responsible for initiating the initial nonviolent mobilization to the campaign. However, the spontaneous mobilization must acquire tactical leadership and coordination to become a campaign. Opposite to this, established tactical leadership provide coordination before the initial onset of mobilization. Using these distinctions, we can characterize organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns as two-stage processes.

Spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns start with mobilization not initiated by tactical leadership (hereafter spontaneous mobilization). If spontaneous mobilization occur, coordination can be provided, creating a spontaneous onset of a nonviolent campaign. Organized onsets of campaigns start with coordination provided by tactical leadership. If this leadership decide to launch a campaign, and are successful in their mobilization efforts, an organized onset of a nonviolent campaign occur. I utilize these distinctions in my research design.
Having clarified how I conceive spontaneous onsets of campaigns, I clarify a few details related to such onsets. First, spontaneous mobilizations can consist of single events, or multiple events, thus constituting spontaneous episodes.

What does it take for a spontaneous mobilization to mark the onset of a nonviolent campaign? The key requirement is that there is some kind of continuity between the initial spontaneous mobilization and the campaign. I have previously suggested that spontaneous mobilization can lead to the creation of leadership, or that some kind of established leadership assume control and provide coordination of the mobilization. Here, continuity between spontaneous mobilization and a later campaign entail coordination was imposed on events and people part of the spontaneous mobilization. A campaign inspired by the spontaneous mobilization, but consisting of people that not were part of the spontaneous mobilization does not satisfy my criteria of continuity. Additionally, continuity entail that only a short time-period can pass between events part spontaneous mobilization and the onset of the nonviolent campaign.

4.2 Causes of strategic and spontaneous onsets – a theoretical sketch

Elements that give more room for organization and planning, such as freedom of assembly, organization, and movement, or lack of state capacity to monitor and punish dissidents, increase the chance of organized onsets. Given these circumstances, it becomes much easier to set up organization and plan a campaign against the regime.

Spontaneous action does not have established leadership that provides coordination. Thus, things that provide coordination, such as a central square where people go to meet up, or an event that make people expect that others will be ready to join up for protests, are particularly important for explaining spontaneous onsets.

A common denominator for variables that offer coordination, such as events and central squares is that they require community. Without shared understanding of the environment and the expectation that others interpret the environment the same way as yourself, you will have a hard time knowing where and when to meet up for action. Furthermore, socially integrated communities and networks can communicate well, and effectively spread information. Ideological leadership, may also contribute to this.
Other means of communication, such as social media can also contribute to better coordination. Gatherings of people you know belong to your group and likely share your sentiments towards the regime is another way coordination might be provided (e.g. The Iranian bazaars). These arguments boils down to the social integration of community/groups, means of communication, and availability of coordination.

Notice that all these arguments about systematic determinants of spontaneous onsets of campaigns are concerned with the initial spontaneous mobilization. None of these arguments specifically address why some spontaneous mobilizations acquire tactical leadership and become campaigns, whereas others do not.

4.3 Causes of strategic and spontaneous onsets – assessment of variables

In this section, I discuss whether we should expect variables tested as explanations of onsets of nonviolent campaigns in recent statistical studies to have different or similar effects on spontaneous and strategic onsets of nonviolence. I draw on the limited framework presented in the previous section and the theoretical arguments of the scholar advocating a given variable. I focus on variables that are accompanied by an elaborated theoretical argument.

Butcher and Svensson (2014) argue that a large manufacturing sector increase the chance of nonviolent campaigns. They emphasize how manufacturing creates socially integrated groups, often organized in unions, with power to hinder government access to valuable financial resources.

Since a large manufacturing sector tends to produce organization, we should expect a large manufacturing sector to primarily increase the chance of onsets of strategic nonviolence. If unions are prohibited, workers may still have strong informal organization that facilitate planning of strikes. Although spontaneous lightning strikes occur, especially when strikes are prohibited (Sharp 1973: 261), major strikes from the manufacturing sector will likely be planned, unless government and factory-owners are able to monitor and shut down all forms of formal and informal unionism.

Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015) argue that prior campaigns in a country makes nonviolent campaigns less reliant on emulation of campaigns elsewhere. They assert that mobilization require establishment of organization, which is facilitated by previous
nonviolent activity (ibid: 700). Thus, a central mechanism of their argument is the establishment of organization.

Indeed, the authors would have preferred to test their argument with data on oppositional organizations, but have to rely on a proxy based on previous anti-government protests instead (ibid 2015: 702-703). Therefore, their theoretical argument imply that previous nonviolent activities primarily should increase the chance of organized onsets of nonviolence.

Although their argument seems plausible and is empirically supported, it may not always be that nonviolent campaigns create lasting organizations. In some cases, organizations are repressed, and prior infrastructure for planning of nonviolent campaigns is destroyed, thus decreasing the chance of organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

Furthermore, even though nonviolent protests probably improve infrastructure and organization for planning nonviolence, protests may also provide an example that people not part of such infrastructures can emulate, yielding spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

Since Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015) use a proxy for prior protests to test their argument, I expect that their variable should have the same kind of effect on both strategic and spontaneous onsets. If the argument was tested with organizational data, as desired by the authors, I would expect a much stronger effect on strategic onsets.

The diffusion mechanisms proposed by Gleditsch and Rivera (2015) and Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015) could certainly be utilized by opportunistic oppositional organizations, but they could also plausibly inspire more spontaneous emulation. Thus, I expect that campaign diffusion has the same kind of effects on both spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

The effect of democratic neighbors proposed by Gledistch and Rivera (2015) is based on democratic neighbors providing safe-havens for planning. Thus, the mechanism in their argument should primarily increase the chance of strategic onsets of nonviolence.

A foreign safe-haven could however also make oppositional organizations more patient. Instead of trying to initiate and direct the mobilization of a nonviolent campaign, an oppositional organization could use the safe-haven to build an organization and spread information about the wrong-doings of the current regime. This could cause spontaneous
nonviolent mobilization. Still, I expect the organizational mechanism presented by Gleditsch and Rivera (2015) to primarily increase the chance of organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) formulate hypotheses for, and test a wide variety of variables. Based on their theoretical discussions, I expect four of the variables tested by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) to have different effects for spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns. These variables are elite divisions from the political opportunity model, organizational capacity and organizational learning from to resource mobilization theory, and the salient elite ethnicity variable from grievance theory. The reasoning underpinning my expectations are simple. It seems obvious that organizational strength within a country should increase the chance of organizations initiating mobilization, but I see no reason for organizational strength causing spontaneous onsets of campaigns. Being identifiable as part of political elites usually means that you have more followers that you can mobilize and engage in planning of political moves more commonly then ordinary citizens. The two elite variables indicate that oppositional elites are politically active within the country, and should therefore be strongly associated with planning and organized initiation of campaigns against the current regime. For the remaining variables tested by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), I do not see strong reasons to expect different effects on spontaneous and strategic onsets.

Even though resource mobilization and political opportunity approaches assume activists and entrepreneurs that rationally plan nonviolent action (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015: 7-12), variables such as youth bulges, elections, and regime instability could also provide resources, coordination and opportunities for spontaneous mobilization. Dahl et al. (2015), who argue that large, resource-rich urban groups are more likely to see nonviolence as the most favorable tactic than poor peripheral groups, also investigate this kind of structural variables. The nonviolent mobilization advantage of the former kind of group does plausibly increase the chance of both spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns, since they do not inherently contain information about the degree of organization or communal structure of society.

Cunningham et al. (2016) distinguish between the effects of autocracy and anocracy on organizational claims, and the effects on campaign onsets in years with active organizational claims. Anocracy increase the chance of nonviolence, whereas autocracy does not. Strict autocracy combined with high state capacity is likely associated with lack of opportunities to
establish formal or informal oppositional groups, and can make planning dangerous, due to lack of freedoms to organize and assemble, and the government killing dissidents.

Furthermore, if action is launched, there may be a higher chance of brutal repression. This could make nonviolent campaigns less likely in general. However, as indicated by Opp, Voss and Gern’s (1995) study of East-Germany, spontaneous mobilization may be relatively safer than organized onsets under such circumstances, and occur more frequently. Nonviolent campaigns are most effective and occur most frequently in urban areas with state control (Dahl et al. 2015).

It is more likely that states have strong control over ventral urban areas than over rural periphery. Therefore, we can expect a relatively strong state in areas where nonviolent mobilization is most likely in the most repressive autocracies. Although weak state control over peripheral areas could offer safe-spaces to plan campaigns, these kinds of conditions empirically tend to favor the creation of violent insurgencies (Dahl et al. 2015).

There are instances in the datasets of nonviolent campaigns that start without prior planning by leaders, and without leaders deciding where and when the campaign should start. Although I argued that we have reasons to expect some general differences in the causes of spontaneous and organized nonviolent mobilization based on literature on popular uprisings, This assertion does not have a strong theoretical and empirical foundation.

The reader may wonder how this is relevant to studies of the causes of onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Although I show that coding criteria used in the datasets do not provide us with knowledge about whether the campaign onsets were strategic or spontaneously, there may be very few instances of spontaneous onsets. Furthermore, campaigns require coordination, which require leadership and according to NAVCO 2.0 in most cases involve organization (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). It might be that the vast majority of the campaigns that started spontaneously acquired leadership from already established groups of oppositional actors. It could be that these oppositional leaders only take control over nonviolent activities under circumstances favoring successful nonviolent campaigns, meaning that leaders almost always make the ultimate decision leading to campaign emergence, based on the same kind of rational deliberation about whether the environment allows a successful campaign or not. This would lead to very similar causes of most spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns.
4. Theory

In the previous chapters, I have assembled support for two claims. First, I have showed that recent statistical studies of nonviolent campaigns tend to assume that leaders plan and direct nonviolent mobilization to nonviolent campaigns, or at least play an important role, such as providing ideological leadership for mobilizations. Secondly, I have showed that these studies use datasets where this assumption does not always hold.

In the previous chapter, I provided only a few examples and examinations of small non-random samples of the datasets in question. Spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns may in fact be very rare, making the empirical impact of this phenomenon small. Furthermore, even if spontaneous mobilization is widespread, campaigns require coordination. Coordination requires leadership and, according to NAVCO 2.0, in most cases involves organization (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).

It might be that the vast majority of the campaigns that started spontaneously acquired leadership from already established groups of oppositional actors. These oppositional leaders could decide to try to take control over nonviolent mobilization based on the same considerations they use to determine whether they should initiate nonviolent mobilization themselves.

This would mean that the ultimate decision that leads to satisfaction of the criterion required for coding campaigns is the decision of oppositional leaders to provide coordination, and that this decision is taken in more or less the same way for organized and spontaneous onsets. If this were the case, it would not matter to studies of causes of onsets of nonviolent campaigns whether the causes of spontaneous and organized nonviolent mobilization differ.

In the literature review, I provided only a few general considerations on how spontaneous and organized mobilization might occur. These are based on studies concerned with popular uprisings in general and not the particular phenomenon of nonviolent campaigns. The theoretical and empirical foundation for claiming that the causes of spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns systematically differ is not rock solid. Here, and in the following chapters, I will address these concerns.
4.1 Defining organized and spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns

In the introduction, I provided a preliminary definition of spontaneous and organized nonviolent onsets of campaigns. I defined organized onsets of campaigns as onsets deliberately launched by an established leadership, with control over where, when and how to launch the campaign. Spontaneous onsets lack this kind of tactical leadership.

In this section, I start out by providing the reasoning behind my conceptualization of spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Thereafter, I elaborate my definitions of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns further.

4.1.1. How to create a definition of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns.

My concern in this thesis is to create coherence between the theoretical arguments made in recent scholarship on the causes of nonviolent campaigns and data used to test these arguments. The most important concern is therefore to accommodate the theoretical assumptions and concepts in this literature. As previously discussed, scholars from this literature have a clear, well-specified conception of what organized nonviolent campaigns are. Furthermore, theoretical assumptions and arguments from this literature specifies how organized onsets of such campaigns typically start. Unfortunately, these theoretical assumptions and arguments do not provide the same kind of clear definition of organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns that Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) does for campaigns. Some of these scholars propose mechanisms relying on strategical decision-making and tactical leadership, whereas other arguments ascribe important roles to leaders and organizations, without precisely specifying which functions these actors perform. Thus, my choice of distinguishing between organized and spontaneous onsets based on tactical leadership is not self-evident. I provide the reasoning behind this decision in the upcoming paragraphs.

It is comparatively easy to determine whether nonviolent campaigns have active tactical leadership, since tactical leadership require the presence of a clear leadership directing each event. Either such leadership exists, or it does not. Therefore, it is possible to draw a sharp distinction between nonviolent campaigns and similar phenomena, such as spontaneous episodes. The same logic applies to onsets of campaigns, a clear, established leadership must decide where, when and how to launch the initial mobilization. If no such leadership launched mobilization, the onset was spontaneous. Furthermore, it seems logical to employ the same
distinction used to separate campaigns from spontaneous nonviolent episodes to distinguish between organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns.

Determining the presence and strength of ideological leadership appear much more difficult, since such leadership can affect nonviolent mobilizations to various degrees. A conceptualization of organized onsets based on ideological leadership would have to determine when the impact of ideological leadership becomes too weak to qualify as a spontaneous onset. One solution could potentially be to argue that there is some kind of ideological leadership in all onsets of campaigns, someone have to assume leadership functions facilitating collective action. However, cases like the Rosenstrasse demonstrations (Sharp 1973: 89-90), where 6000 protesters were coordinated by the arrest of their husbands in the Gestapo headquarters show that there are instances of campaigns starting with close to no prior ideological leadership. It seems like a conceptual stretch to argue that such campaigns started as the result of some kind of active leadership. Furthermore, even if a good way of separating the onsets inspired by ideological leadership from the spontaneous onsets were available, it would likely be much more difficult to apply in data collection than distinctions based on tactical leadership. Additionally, emphasis on lack of planning is consistent with commonsensical understanding of spontaneity as unplanned action.

Following the theoretical arguments presented in the literature review, there are also reasons to believe that tactical leadership significantly affect the decision of where, when and how to launch campaigns. Although agency and individual capability could matter a lot for where, when and how campaigns are waged, as suggested by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), it seems plausible that a decision-calculus of a tactical leadership initiating a campaign fundamentally differ from the decision-calculus of individuals who contribute to the spontaneous onset of a campaign. The literature on strategic nonviolence stress the importance of preparations and strategic considerations (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, Sharp 1973), whereas explanations of spontaneous mobilization stress the availability of coordination, and psychological factors (Opp, Voss and Gern 1995, Snow and Moss 2014, Pearlman 2013). Thus, we have theoretical reasons to believe that the distinction between onsets with and without tactical leadership might capture two systematically different causal processes. Having outlined the reasoning behind distinguishing between spontaneous and organized nonviolence based on tactical leadership, I now turn to elaborating the concepts of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns.
4.1.2. Elaborating the concepts

In the ideal-typical organized onset of a campaign, an established oppositional group both plan and direct the onset. This group would ideally have full control over the mobilization process. Having full control over the mobilization process entail being able to tell people where, when, how, and for what purpose they should act, and be able to know with a high degree of certainty that people would do as they were asked.

The latter point is important. A lone-wolf activist that does not know about other dissidents could plan to start a revolution by publishing a manifesto, but would not have much control over how others responded to his call for action. A group of activists situated in a social network could hold meetings and talk to members of the network, making it reasonable to expect large participation in future activities. The latter group of activists could therefore have a substantial amount of control over mobilization processes.

Thus, the group of people planning nonviolent action must belong to a reasonably large network or organization that they are able to direct. Nonviolent mobilization relies on voluntary participation, and not all participants will be closely tied to the leadership in all campaigns. Hence, this requirements cannot be extended to the ties between leaders and all participants, but should be valid for a substantial number of people.\textsuperscript{13} Investigations of likely support, and extensive activity to mobilize, followed by people responding to a proposed time, place, and method should count as planning and direction of onsets.

But what about event seizures, such as activists making the crowd sing a Catalan anthem at a concert attended by Franco (Johnston 2006: 205)? If the leaders of an established oppositional organization plan to turn a future mass gathering of people into the onset of a nonviolent campaign, and have done investigations about these people’s sentiments towards the regime, it counts as organized onset. Even though the organization does not initiate mass mobilization, it is responsible for turning the masses political. Thus, the organization was able to decide and control where, when and how to challenge the current regime, or in other words perform tactical leadership. This kind of onset is therefore defined as organized.

\textsuperscript{13} One could define a number based on the ability to facilitate bandwagoning processes, such as in Kuran’s model (1989), but this does not cater to literature on nonviolence.
Being more specific about how planners are situated in networks/organizations and the characteristics of these networks/organizations is difficult. In the literature review, I showed that scholars often include many different kinds of arrangements in their understanding of leadership. Furthermore, various authors seem to differ slightly in their conception of leadership. Thus, a restrictive, clear-cut definition of leadership could clash with the understandings of leadership held by some scholars of nonviolence. As Lichbach (1995) argue, how to conceive the actors involved in collective action is an ontological question. Indeed, as argued by scholars concerned with spontaneous mobilization, networks of friends, group-identification and community is essential to enable mobilization without prior planning. Thus, the criterion of belonging to a network and control the mobilization can reasonably be used to exclude cases such as Twitter activists that do not know other dissidents, but will likely still leave ambiguous instances of mobilization processes unless further operationalized.

Planners communicate about where, when, and how to launch nonviolent action. This is commonsensical. Judging whether a group of people responsible for nonviolent mass mobilization actually strategically planned the mobilization properly in advance is more difficult. If a group of friends meeting every week start discussing how they could create political change for the first time, and thereafter immediately start protesting, they planned their action in advance, technically speaking.

At the same time, it seems obvious that we do not want to define this nonviolence as planned in advance. This would place organizations adhering to the strategic principles proposed by scholars of strategic nonviolence in the same category as the abovementioned group of friends. Thus, it seems necessary to require that planners of nonviolent campaigns must be somewhat stable, and engage in planning of nonviolence to overthrow the existing political order on several occasions. This specification probably yields some ambiguity and would need to be operationalized further for empirical application.

In addition to setting requirements to the stability of the group of planners over time and to their control over their networks/organizations, some theoretical arguments in the recent literature on onsets of nonviolent campaigns require rational considerations of the
environment. Thus, deliberation based on how to best utilize the environment to create major political change should be part of planning.

The utility of this criterion is probably limited however, since this kind of information can be very hard to obtain, especially in a way that is feasible for the creation of large datasets. On the other hand, information about meetings and preparations prior to a campaign and about how those engaged in planning are situated in networks or organizations is more commonly reported in Global Nonviolent Action Database (Lakey 2011). This could therefore more feasibly be included in quantitative datasets. It is more plausible to assume rational planning if you know that leaders of an organization had many meetings on the topic of how to achieve regime change than if you know nothing about preparations and planning prior to a campaign. *Spontaneous and Organized onsets as two-stage processes*

Having discussed the finer details of how we can distinguish organized from spontaneous onsets, I add another layer to my conceptualization of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns while simultaneously summarizing the concepts. Having primarily focused on how to identify organized onsets in the paragraphs above, I end this section by making some notes on how spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns can be identified.

The core characteristic of organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns, is that an established leadership make the decision of where, when and how to mobilize to the campaign. Conversely, the core characteristic of spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns is that an established leadership not was responsible for initiating the initial nonviolent mobilization to the campaign. However, the spontaneous mobilization must acquire tactical leadership and coordination to become a campaign. Opposite to this, established tactical leadership provide coordination before the initial onset of mobilization. Using these distinctions, we can characterize organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns as two-stage processes.

Spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns start with mobilization not initiated by tactical leadership (hereafter spontaneous mobilization). If spontaneous mobilization occur, coordination can be provided, creating a spontaneous onset of a nonviolent campaign. Organized onsets of campaigns start with coordination provided by tactical leadership. If this leadership decide to launch a campaign, and are successful in their mobilization efforts, an organized onset of a nonviolent campaign occur. I utilize these distinctions in my research design.
Having clarified how I conceive spontaneous onsets of campaigns, I clarify a few details related to such onsets. First, spontaneous mobilizations can consist of single events, or multiple events, thus constituting spontaneous episodes.

What does it take for a spontaneous mobilization to mark the onset of a nonviolent campaign? The key requirement is that there is some kind of continuity between the initial spontaneous mobilization and the campaign. I have previously suggested that spontaneous mobilization can lead to the creation of leadership, or that some kind of established leadership assume control and provide coordination of the mobilization. Here, continuity between spontaneous mobilization and a later campaign entail coordination was imposed on events and people part of the spontaneous mobilization. A campaign inspired by the spontaneous mobilization, but consisting of people that not were part of the spontaneous mobilization does not satisfy my criteria of continuity. Additionally, continuity entail that only a short time-period can pass between events part spontaneous mobilization and the onset of the nonviolent campaign.

4.2 Causes of strategic an spontaneous onsets – a theoretical sketch

Elements that give more room for organization and planning, such as freedom of assembly, organization, and movement, or lack of state capacity to monitor and punish dissidents, increase the chance of organized onsets. Given these circumstances, it becomes much easier to set up organization and plan a campaign against the regime.

Spontaneous action does not have established leadership that provides coordination. Thus, things that provide coordination, such as a central square where people go to meet up, or an event that make people expect that others will be ready to join up for protests, are particularly important for explaining spontaneous onsets.

A common denominator for variables that offer coordination, such as events and central squares is that they require community. Without shared understanding of the environment and the expectation that others interpret the environment the same way as yourself, you will have a hard time knowing where and when to meet up for action. Furthermore, socially integrated communities and networks can communicate well, and effectively spread information. Ideological leadership, may also contribute to this.
Other means of communication, such as social media can also contribute to better coordination. Gatherings of people you know belong to your group and likely share your sentiments towards the regime is another way coordination might be provided (e.g. The Iranian bazaars). These arguments boils down to the social integration of community/groups, means of communication, and availability of coordination.

Notice that all these arguments about systematic determinants of spontaneous onsets of campaigns are concerned with the initial spontaneous mobilization. None of these arguments specifically address why some spontaneous mobilizations acquire tactical leadership and become campaigns, whereas others do not.

4.3 Causes of strategic and spontaneous onsets – assessment of variables

In this section, I discuss whether we should expect variables tested as explanations of onsets of nonviolent campaigns in recent statistical studies to have different or similar effects on spontaneous and strategic onsets of nonviolence. I draw on the limited framework presented in the previous section and the theoretical arguments of the scholar advocating a given variable. I focus on variables that are accompanied by an elaborated theoretical argument.

Butcher and Svensson (2014) argue that a large manufacturing sector increase the chance of nonviolent campaigns. They emphasize how manufacturing creates socially integrated groups, often organized in unions, with power to hinder government access to valuable financial resources.

Since a large manufacturing sector tends to produce organization, we should expect a large manufacturing sector to primarily increase the chance of onsets of strategic nonviolence. If unions are prohibited, workers may still have strong informal organization that facilitate planning of strikes. Although spontaneous lightning strikes occur, especially when strikes are prohibited (Sharp 1973: 261), major strikes from the manufacturing sector will likely be planned, unless government and factory-owners are able to monitor and shut down all forms of formal and informal unionism.

Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015) argue that prior campaigns in a country makes nonviolent campaigns less reliant on emulation of campaigns elsewhere. They assert that mobilization require establishment of organization, which is facilitated by previous
nonviolent activity (ibid: 700). Thus, a central mechanism of their argument is the establishment of organization.

Indeed, the authors would have preferred to test their argument with data on oppositional organizations, but have to rely on a proxy based on previous anti-government protests instead (ibid 2015: 702-703). Therefore, their theoretical argument imply that previous nonviolent activities primarily should increase the chance of organized onsets of nonviolence.

Although their argument seems plausible and is empirically supported, it may not always be that nonviolent campaigns create lasting organizations. In some cases, organizations are repressed, and prior infrastructure for planning of nonviolent campaigns is destroyed, thus decreasing the chance of organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Furthermore, even though nonviolent protests probably improve infrastructure and organization for planning nonviolence, protests may also provide an example that people not part of such infrastructures can emulate, yielding spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

Since Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015) use a proxy for prior protests to test their argument, I expect that their variable should have the same kind of effect on both strategic and spontaneous onsets. If the argument was tested with organizational data, as desired by the authors, I would expect a much stronger effect on strategic onsets.

The diffusion mechanisms proposed by Gleditsch and Rivera (2015) and Braithwaite, Braithwaite and Kucik (2015) could certainly be utilized by opportunistic oppositional organizations, but they could also plausibly inspire more spontaneous emulation. Thus, I expect that campaign diffusion has the same kind of effects on both spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

The effect of democratic neighbors proposed by Gleditsch and Rivera (2015) is based on democratic neighbors providing safe-havens for planning. Thus, the mechanism in their argument should primarily increase the chance of strategic onsets of nonviolence. A foreign safe-haven could however also make oppositional organizations more patient. Instead of trying to initiate and direct the mobilization of a nonviolent campaign, an oppositional organization could use the safe-haven to build an organization and spread information about the wrong-doings of the current regime. This could cause spontaneous nonviolent mobilization. Still, I expect the organizational mechanism presented by Gleditsch and Rivera (2015) to primarily increase the chance of organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns.
Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) formulate hypotheses for, and test a wide variety of variables. Based on their theoretical discussions, I expect four of the variables tested by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) to have different effects for spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns. These variables are elite divisions from the political opportunity model, organizational capacity and organizational learning from resource mobilization theory, and the salient elite ethnicity variable from grievance theory. The reasoning underpinning my expectations are simple. It seems obvious that organizational strength within a country should increase the chance of organizations initiating mobilization, but I see no reason for organizational strength causing spontaneous onsets of campaigns. Being identifiable as part of political elites usually means that you have more followers that you can mobilize and engage in planning of political moves more commonly than ordinary citizens. The two elite variables indicate that oppositional elites are politically active within the country, and should therefore be strongly associated with planning and organized initiation of campaigns against the current regime. For the remaining variables tested by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), I do not see strong reasons to expect different effects on spontaneous and strategic onsets.

Even though resource mobilization and political opportunity approaches assume activists and entrepreneurs that rationally plan nonviolent action (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015: 7-12), variables such as youth bulges, elections, and regime instability could also provide resources, coordination and opportunities for spontaneous mobilization.

This kind of structural variables is also investigated by Dahl et al. (2015), who argue that large, resource-rich urban groups are more likely to see nonviolence as the most favorable tactic than poor peripheral groups. The nonviolent mobilization advantage of the former kind of group does plausibly increase the chance of both spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns, since they do not inherently contain information about the degree of organization or communal structure of society.

Cunningham et al. (2016) distinguish between the effects of autocracy and anocracy on organizational claims, and the effects on campaign onsets in years with active organizational claims. Anocracy increase the chance of nonviolence, whereas autocracy does not. Strict autocracy combined with high state capacity is likely associated with lack of opportunities to establish formal or informal oppositional groups, and can make planning dangerous, due to lack of freedoms to organize and assemble, and the government killing dissidents.
Furthermore, if action is launched, there may be a higher chance of brutal repression. This could make nonviolent campaigns less likely in general. However, as indicated by Opp, Voss and Gern’s (1995) study of East-Germany, spontaneous mobilization may be relatively safer than organized onsets under such circumstances, and occur more frequently. Nonviolent campaigns are most effective and occur most frequently in urban areas with state control (Dahl et al. 2015).

It is more likely that states have strong control over ventral urban areas than over rural periphery. Therefore, we can expect a relatively strong state in areas where nonviolent mobilization is most likely in the most repressive autocracies. Although weak state control over peripheral areas could offer safe-spaces to plan campaigns, these kinds of conditions empirically tend to favor the creation of violent insurgencies (Dahl et al. 2015).

There are instances in the datasets of nonviolent campaigns that start without prior planning by leaders, and without leaders deciding where and when the campaign should start. Although I argued that we have reasons to expect some general differences in the causes of spontaneous and organized nonviolent mobilization based on literature on popular uprisings, This assertion does not have a strong theoretical and empirical foundation.

The reader may wonder how this is relevant to studies of the causes of onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Although I show that coding criteria used in the datasets do not provide us with knowledge about whether the campaign onsets were strategic or spontaneously, there may be very few instances of spontaneous onsets. Furthermore, campaigns require coordination, which require leadership and according to NAVCO 2.0 in most cases involve organization (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). It might be that the vast majority of the campaigns that started spontaneously acquired leadership from already established groups of oppositional actors. It could be that these oppositional leaders only take control over nonviolent activities under circumstances favoring successful nonviolent campaigns, meaning that leaders almost always make the ultimate decision leading to campaign emergence, based on the same kind of rational deliberation about whether the environment allows a successful campaign or not. This would lead to very similar causes of most spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns.
5. Research design

The purpose of the research design discussed in this chapter is to assess the impact of distinguishing between spontaneous and strategic onsets of nonviolent campaigns in statistical studies. For this assessment, I would ideally have data that allowed me to categorize all onsets of campaigns in NAVCO 2.0 or MEC as either spontaneous or organized. With such data, I could replicate recent statistical studies and give a simple, answer to whether the distinction between spontaneous and organized onsets alter the empirical results in these studies. Unfortunately, such data are not available in existing datasets. Therefore, I must take a different approach to investigate potential differences between spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns.

Given available data, I argue that the best way to address this question is to study the determinants of spontaneous mobilization. Comparison of the determinants of spontaneous mobilization and the determinants of campaign onsets identified by previous research can provide some evidence for or against my argument that spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns have different causes. In the theory chapter, I argued that the sources of coordination for initial nonviolent mobilization to spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns are different. This argument is the main theoretical foundation for my expectation that there should be differences in the explanations of spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns. In the previous chapter, I defined spontaneous onsets of campaigns as a two-stage process. I conceptualized the first of these two stages, the initial nonviolent mobilization, as spontaneous mobilization. Therefore, a study of spontaneous mobilization allow me to test the theoretical basis for my expectations that spontaneous onsets of nonviolent have different causes than organized onsets of campaigns. Consistent with my conceptual discussion of spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns in the theory chapter, I

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14 Aggregation of SCAD based on actors involved and demands made can be used to detect campaigns, since the presence of the same actor across multiple events indicate coordination (Day et al. 2015: 3). However, SCAD does not allow automated coding of campaigns. Campaigns often consists of multiple actors, making aggregation based on actors problematic (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: 417). Furthermore, the information about actors involved in an event is not systematic enough to allow reliable aggregation based on the involvement of actors in multiple events. Some organized protests are assigned generic categories of actors, such as “citizens” or “women”, meaning that one cannot know whether the same leadership was responsible for multiple events simply from looking at the presence of the same actor name across multiple events. Names changes, and events arranged by umbrella organizations consisting of many groups cold also yield errors in automated aggregation.
 operationalize spontaneous nonviolent mobilization as follow, using the events contained in the SCAD data.

Spontaneous nonviolent mobilizations are episodes, consisting of multiple nonviolent events, or one long-lasting event\textsuperscript{15} targeting the central government over issues of human rights, democracy or elections. The first events must be spontaneous, that is without clear leadership. If consisting of multiple events of short duration, only a short time-period can pass between each event. If consisting of more than two events, both the second and third event cannot have leadership.

The variables that I want to test the effect of are only available in a country-year format. Therefore, I aggregate the spontaneous mobilizations I identify to the country-year format. This aggregation transform the outcome on the dependent variable to \textit{country-year with onset of spontaneous mobilization}.

In the following sections, I first discuss the operationalization of my dependent variable further. Thereafter, I discuss what can be learned about from studying spontaneous mobilization. Following this discussion, I present the methodology I use in my analyses, discuss the reliability of my data and provide reasons for the focus of my analyses.

\subsection*{5.1 Spontaneous mobilization}

In the first paragraphs of this section, I provide the general reasoning behind my operationalization of spontaneous mobilization. Following this general reasoning, I discuss some of the quirks of my operationalization more closely.

Spontaneous events cannot be strategically coordinated with other events, and therefore allow me to identify spontaneous mobilizations. In the previous chapter, I defined a spontaneous onset of a nonviolent campaign as a process leading to a campaign where the leadership of the campaign do not control where, when and how nonviolent mobilization against the regime start, which mean that nonviolent mobilization occur before a leadership gain control over the campaign, and provide coordination between events. For a leadership to be able to provide strategic coordination between events in a campaign, they must be able to direct and

\footnote{This criterion is tailored to the SCAD data, which contain some nonviolent events that are coded as lasting for more than a month. As explained in the next section, the last sentence is also tailored to the SCAD data. Other parts of the definition should be transferable to aggregation of other event datasets with information about the presence of leadership.}
coordinate each event part of the campaign. Lack of any kind of leadership of a nonviolent event is therefore evidence of that particular event not being part of an organized nonviolent campaign. The same kind of inference cannot be made for a series of nonviolent events with leadership. A series of such events could be coordinated campaigns or they could be unrelated instances of nonviolent mobilization with leadership. Automated coding approaches using SCAD cannot determine this question. This is the reasoning behind my choice to focus on spontaneous events without internal coordination and organization provided by a leadership, and using such events to identify spontaneous mobilization.

I focus on episodes of spontaneous nonviolent mobilization to ensure continuity between initial spontaneous mobilization and possible organized campaigns. In my definition of spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns, I required that an established leadership did not control where and when nonviolent mobilization should occur. If a campaign obviously is a continuation of a spontaneous mobilization, the onset of the campaign was spontaneous. Examples of such continuity include participants in a spontaneous demonstration setting up a leadership that coordinate future events, or an established oppositional leadership joining and taking control over a series of spontaneous demonstrations.

If a series of nonviolent events of mass mobilization against the regime making maximalist demands is ongoing, the choice of potential leadership of campaigns regarding where, when and how they should launch a campaign is restricted. Since people already are mobilizing against the regime over the same kind of issues that an established oppositional leadership is interested in, the decision of the leadership is restricted to whether they should join the ongoing mobilization and try to coordinate and control it, or do nothing. Thus, such episodes of spontaneous nonviolent mobilization satisfy the criteria to the first stage of spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns, and constitute potential spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

The same kind of argument cannot be made for isolated nonviolent events. If a single spontaneous event occur shortly before a campaign, it likely influenced the decision of where, when and how to start a nonviolent campaign, since it might signal that people are ready to mobilize against the regime. Although it could be foolish to ignore information about this kind of event when explaining the onset, more evidence is required to determine that this event effectively restricted the campaign leaderships’ decision of where, when and how to launch the campaign. Whereas a sustained episode of nonviolent mobilization guarantees that
people would be in the streets regardless of what some leader wanted, a single event might not be followed by other events. The counterfactual to the onset of a campaign under these circumstances could be no protests, meaning the decision of where, when and how nonviolent mobilization to a campaign should occur effectively rested with the leadership of the campaign. More evidence of the single spontaneous event effectively restricting the decision of a future campaign leadership about where, when and how mobilization to a campaign is therefore required for such single events to mark the beginning of a spontaneous onset of a nonviolent campaign. Such evidence can only be gathered by studying the process leading to nonviolent campaigns closely. For these reasons, I operationalize spontaneous mobilization as sustained episodes of nonviolent mobilization. Having discussed the general logic behind my operationalization of spontaneous mobilization, I now turn to discussion of some of the details in my definition.

I implemented the criterion that both the second and third event of a spontaneous mobilization cannot have leadership to ensure that spontaneous mobilization actually restricted leaders’ choice of where and when to launch campaigns. Admittedly, this is somewhat arbitrary. One could argue that an episode where the first and third event are spontaneous, but the remaining five events are organized also should be excluded from the category spontaneous mobilization. Examination of the data do however indicate that almost regardless of the time-criterion I utilize, very few spontaneous mobilizations are excluded due to these kinds of exclusion criteria. Most spontaneous mobilizations consist few events, and of a majority of spontaneous events. Therefore, the effect of using additional exclusion criteria is minimal, and not worth the additional coding effort required.

My operationalization of spontaneous mobilization does not contain a more specific time criterion than a short time-period due to arbitrariness. Although NAVCO 2.0 use a time-criterion to define campaigns, requiring that not more than a year passes between the first and second event of a campaign, campaigns typically have a discernible beginning and end (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). Due to the lack of coordination between events, it is hard to identify the beginning and end of spontaneous mobilization. This make time criteria central in the detection of the beginning and end of spontaneous mobilizations, but also make the time criteria more arbitrary than for campaigns. This arbitrariness is a potential threat to robustness. The effects of variables should not hinge on a specific time criteria. To address such concerns over robustness, I employ several versions of the dependent variable in all my
analyses, based on different time criteria meant to capture “a short time-period” from my definition of spontaneous mobilization\textsuperscript{16}.

5.2 Drawing inferences about spontaneous onsets of campaigns from spontaneous mobilization

In this section, I discuss what we can learn about the impact of distinguishing between spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns from studying spontaneous mobilization. To answer this question, I start out by discussing what we can learn about spontaneous onsets of campaigns by studying spontaneous mobilization. This discussion allow me to discuss what we can infer from a comparison of the determinants of spontaneous mobilization and the determinants of onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

As discussed in the theory chapter, the question of how and why some spontaneous mobilizations acquire coordination is undertheorized. Due to the open-ended nature if this question, it is uncertain what we can learn about the determinants of spontaneous onsets of campaigns by studying spontaneous mobilization.

As discussed in the theory chapter, theoretical mechanisms explaining when, where and how oppositional groups will want to launch a campaign against the regime are based on these groups being able to mobilize a large number of people. Separate explanations of the decision to launch a campaign and the mobilization to the campaign cannot be found in recent statistical studies of onsets of campaigns. As discussed in the theory chapter, some theoretical mechanisms propose that leaders will decide to launch campaigns when they are able to ensure large participation, thus explaining both the decision to launch a campaign and the mobilization to the campaign in one argument. I cannot present a similar kind of theoretical argument for spontaneous onsets of campaigns, with a mechanism explaining both stages of spontaneous onsets.

Spontaneous mobilization is necessary, but not sufficient, for a spontaneous onset of a nonviolent campaign. Studying spontaneous nonviolent mobilization cannot tell us how the causes of the spontaneous mobilization and the emergence of coordination of spontaneous mobilization aggregate to determine where and when spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaign occur. This raises the question of what we can learn about the determinants of

\textsuperscript{16} I provide more details about the effect of different time-criteria, and of aggregation of spontaneous mobilization to country-years more closely in my analysis chapter.
spontaneous onsets of campaigns from studying the determinants of spontaneous nonviolent mobilization.

Spontaneous mobilization is necessary, but not sufficient for spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns by definition. Goertz (2006) argue that the importance of a necessary condition in explanations of a phenomenon increase when the necessary condition become rarer relative to sufficient conditions. This logic apply to the relationship between spontaneous mobilization and spontaneous onsets of campaigns. If most instances of spontaneous nonviolent mobilization acquire coordination and become campaigns, the determinants of spontaneous mobilization would likely also explain spontaneous onsets of campaigns quite well, and vice versa. Therefore, descriptive statistics telling us to what extent spontaneous nonviolent mobilization acquire coordination and become campaigns, can give us some well-founded expectations about how well the determinants of spontaneous nonviolent mobilization explain spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

Applying three different time criteria to identify instances of spontaneous mobilization during the NAVCO 2.0 coverage, I detect 60, 87 and 107 instances of spontaneous mobilization. In chapter 3, I used SCAD to identify potential spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns. I found little evidence that could indicate spontaneous onsets of most of the 16 nonviolent campaigns NAVCO 2.0 report that overlaps SCAD coverage. NAVCO 2.0 does not contain all campaigns that potentially could be covered by SCAD events due to strict requirements to participation and goals pursued by protesters in NAVCO 2.0 campaigns. Still, this evidence suggest that the process of acquiring coordination could have much larger bearings on the overall determinants of spontaneous onsets of campaigns. Thus, this evidence creates major uncertainty about what we can infer about the determinants of spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns by studying spontaneous mobilization.

In the above paragraphs, I have addressed what we can learn about spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns from studying spontaneous nonviolent mobilization. However, I have not addressed what we can learn about the effects of distinguishing between spontaneous and organized onsets in statistical studies of onsets of campaigns not making this distinction. If

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17 I employ three time criteria to ensure robustness. I present and discuss these three time-criteria in the next chapter.

18 Unfortunately, available quantitative data does not allow systematic studies of how and why spontaneous mobilizations acquire coordination. As made clear by the descriptive statistics reported, such studies could provide valuable insights about spontaneous onsets of campaigns.
spontaneous onsets of campaigns have different causes than organized onsets, this could obviously distort the effects of variables that affect the two kinds of onsets differently. However, if the number of spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns is very small, such distortion could be limited, even if the causes of spontaneous and organized onsets differ. Unfortunately, I do not have data that allow me to address this question extensively. Studies that actually examine the role of leaders of revolutions and nonviolent uprisings do offer many notable instances of uprisings starting without a leadership deciding that it was time to mobilize, including the Iranian revolution (Kuran 1989), the first Palestinian intifada (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), the Leipzig demonstrations (Opp, Voss and Gern 1995) and the Arab spring (Pearlman 2013). Taken together, this evidence suggest that spontaneous onsets of organized, nonviolent campaigns occur quite frequently.

Thus, establishing that spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns have widely different causes than all onsets of nonviolent campaigns studied together, would provide very good reasons for distinguishing between the two forms of onsets in statistical studies.

In sum, there is much uncertainty about how explanations of spontaneous nonviolent mobilization aggregate with the emergence of coordination to determine when and where spontaneous onsets of campaigns occur. This uncertainty make the validity of any inferences on spontaneous onsets of campaigns questionable. Therefore, inferences about the impact of distinguishing between the two types of onsets made from my research design should taken as suggestive and highly uncertain.

However, my theoretical expectations regarding the differences between spontaneous and organized onsets are based on arguments about the process of spontaneous mobilization. Therefore, a test of differences between the determinants of spontaneous mobilization and campaign onset address the theoretically motivated concerns for systematic differences between spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns. In the next sections, I discuss the reliability of the SCAD data, and briefly outline the statistical methodology I use to test the determinants of nonviolent mobilization.

5.2 Method

I want to investigate what impact my distinction between spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns have on recent statistical studies. For this reason, I want to approximate the analyses from these studies as closely as possible. I therefore replicate some of these studies,
and thereafter repeat the analyses with my new dependent variable for spontaneous mobilization. Finally, I compare the effect variables have on spontaneous mobilization and onsets of campaigns. Due to the uncertainty regarding how spontaneous mobilization relate to spontaneous onsets of campaigns, I focus on variables that I have theoretical reasons to expect will have different effects on spontaneous mobilization and organized onsets of campaigns. This approach allow me to assess the theoretical fundament for my claim that spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns differ causally. This is the best way to assess the impact of distinguishing between spontaneous and organized nonviolent onsets of campaigns with my new dependent variable, since I cannot establish general relationships between spontaneous mobilization and spontaneous onsets of campaigns.

Most of the recent studies of onsets of nonviolent campaigns use logistic regression or multinomial logistic regression. Studies that focus solely on the determinants of nonviolent campaigns compare years with and without onset of nonviolent campaigns, whereas those studies that compare the determinants of violent and nonviolent conflict use multinomial logistic regression to allow onset of violent conflict as an alternative outcome. As previously discussed, observations with large uncoordinated protests and observations with no nonviolent activity whatsoever are treated equally in these analyses. By emphasizing campaigns as a unique kind of challenge against the regime, due to the active, strategic coordination between events, scholars of nonviolent campaigns provide reasons to distinguish campaigns sharply from other kinds of nonviolent activity. I cannot make the same kind of sharp distinction between years with and without spontaneous mobilization.

I add a residual outcome category to the dependent variable, which I label organized mobilization. This category contain nonviolent episodes that start with an organized event, and target the central government with demands related to democracy/human rights or elections. These episodes do not qualify as spontaneous mobilizations, but resemble spontaneous mobilization too closely to be treated as any other instance of a country-year without onset of spontaneous mobilization. The primary purpose of adding this outcome to the dependent variable is to act as a control for phenomena that I am unable to distinguish sharply from spontaneous mobilization. An alternative would be to discard country-years with organized mobilization. However, adding the outcome to the analyses help assess the robustness of my results. If the determinants of spontaneous mobilization and organized
mobilization are similar, I may failed to capture a unique category of nonviolent phenomena with its own dynamics, as my theoretical arguments postulate.

What kind of phenomena are included in the residual category organized mobilization contain? SCAD contain many series of nonviolent events targeting the central government over issues of election, democracy or human rights that start with an organized event that is followed by other organized events. Most of these episodes does not correspond with campaigns in MEC or NAVCO 2.0. Some of the episodes not corresponding with campaigns probably lack coordination between events, and qualify as instances of spontaneous mobilization. However, differences between the goals I use to identify spontaneous mobilization and the maximalist goals used to identify NAVCO 2.0 campaigns and different requirements to participation could also explain the existence of such episodes without corresponding campaigns. Hence, some of the episodes starting with an organized event followed by other organized events could have coordination between the events. An example of this is mobilizations led by the Ladies in white on Cuba around 2010, which is coded as a campaign in the GNAD database (Lakey 2011), but fail to reach thousand participants. Such episodes conform to the conception of campaigns in the literature, and only differ slightly from the campaigns contained in MEC and NAVCO 2.0. Thus, coding the onset of a spontaneous mobilization when an organized mobilization occurred a few months earlier the same year could introduce reverse causality in my analyses, since it is possible that this spontaneous mobilization was inspired by the campaigns.

Organized mobilization could also possibly contain nonviolent episodes partially consisting of strategic, purposeful use of nonviolence that fail to qualify as campaigns. Examples of such episodes include attempts at initiating nonviolent campaigns that are quickly suppressed, or an oppositional group testing its mobilization potential. Organized nonviolence, including nonviolent campaigns, can sometimes inspire spontaneous nonviolent events. In sum, organized mobilization is a residual category, that probably contain episodes best characterized as spontaneous mobilization and nonviolent campaigns, and episodes not fitting either of these concepts. Since this category consists of an unknown mixture of various kinds of nonviolent episodes, I do not interpret effects on this outcome substantially in my analyses.
5.3 Data

Although I have discussed what kind of inferences I can draw from the SCAD data and the reliability of using the SCAD data to approximate NAVCO 2.0 and MEC (partially in chapter 3), I have not discussed the inherent reliability of the SCAD data. Some scholars suggest that conflict-event datasets based on news articles may suffer from reporting bias in the media (Weidmann 2016), a problem that could be larger for nonviolent than violent events due to lesser news-value of nonviolent event than violent events, leading to more severe underreporting of nonviolent conflict (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).

Compared with the most widely used protest data, the Cross-National Time-series Data Archive (Banks 2011), SCAD contain a much larger number of nonviolent events, suggesting that SCAD is less plagued by underreporting than comparable datasets (Salehyan et. al 2012: 509-510). Hendrix and Salehyan (2015) test the underreporting bias in SCAD further, using mark and recapture methodology. Mark and recapture estimation is commonly used to estimate the size of animal populations. Estimation is based on comparison of independent samples of the population. Joint detection of observations is used to estimate the number of observations not detected in any of the samples. If the news sources used to create SCAD contain the same kinds of systematic biases, the mark and recapture models may be problematic, since this would violate the assumption of independent samples of a population (Weidmann 2016: 208). Hendrix and Salehyan’s (2015) results indicate that SCAD capture 76% of all conflict events in Africa, and that SCAD more reliably capture large, significant events with casualties than small events. Since Hendrix and Salehyan (2015) find that there are systematic differences in which events their news sources report, the accuracy of their mark and recapture estimates are questionable. In sum, SCAD better captures events than the alternatives, but there are still questions about how good SCAD is at capturing nonviolent demonstrations.

5.4 Selection of articles to replicate

I choose to replicate two articles that test variables I expect have a different effect on spontaneous mobilization than on onsets of nonviolent campaigns. These articles are “Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?” (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015) and “Manufacturing Dissent: Modernization and the Onset of Major Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns” (Butcher and Svensson 2014). It is advantageous to replicate these
articles, since they are based on samples that have more overlap with SCAD than articles solely based on NAVCO 2.0, which allow greater statistical power in my reanalyzes.

Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) test a large number of the variables found in the literature on onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Replication of their study allow me to get a good overall first impression impression of determinants of spontaneous mobilization. Furthermore, replication of this article allows me to assess the theoretical foundations for my claim that organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns have different causes, since I expect four variables tested in this article to have different effects on spontaneous mobilization and onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

Butcher and Svensson (2014) present a strong theoretical argument for why a large manufacturing sector should increase the chance of onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Their clear theoretical discussion lead me to expect that the size of the manufacturing sector does not have a positive effect on spontaneous mobilization. Furthermore, Butcher and Svensson (2014) use SCAD to approximate nonviolent campaigns, in addition to test their arguments with NAVCO 2.0. In their approximation to campaigns based on SCAD, Butcher and Svensson (2014) do not distinguish between spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns, but it is possible for me to characterize their approximations of campaigns as spontaneous or organized using SCAD19.

19 Butcher and Svensson’s (2014) approximation to campaigns using SCAD have been a major source of inspiration for my operationalization of spontaneous mobilization, but due to my conceptualization of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns, I depart from their original approximation in several ways.
6. Analysis

In this chapter, I present and discuss the results of my comparisons of spontaneous mobilization and previous results found on onsets of nonviolent campaigns. First, I provide some descriptive statistics for my dependent variable, showing the consequences of my operationalization of spontaneous mobilization. Thereafter, I reanalyze the results of Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) and Butcher and Svensson (2014) with my new dependent variable.

In these comparisons, I first discuss the hypotheses for individual variables proposed by these authors and me. Thereafter, I compare the effects of the variables on spontaneous mobilization and on all kinds of onsets of campaigns. The first part of my reanalyzes addresses the general theoretical expectations I have to differences between spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns, whereas the second part provides an assessment of whether determinants of spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns tend to differ in general.

6.1 Dependent variable

Following the discussion in the previous chapter, I construct a new dependent variable for spontaneous mobilization, based on two stages of aggregation. In the first stage of aggregation, I combine events to code episodes of mobilization. The automated aggregation of events to episodes of mobilization require three different decisions on time criteria.

Firstly, I must specify the maximum number of days allowed to pass between the end of the first and beginning of the second event of a mobilization. Secondly, some events in SCAD lasts for a long time. I need to make a decision on the minimum number of days a single event must last before it qualifies as a mobilization. Thirdly, I need to make a decision on the maximum number of days that can pass after the end of the last-ending event in a mobilization, before the mobilization is over.

In the previous chapter, I argued that the time passing between the first and second event of a mobilization should be short, but that all the time criteria involved in aggregation of events are somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, I employ three different time criteria for my aggregation of events, resulting in three dependent variables. This allows me to assess whether my results are robust to these arbitrary coding decisions. I create one version of the dependent variable that
use 7 days for all time criteria, one version that use 30 days, and one version that use 60 days. These variables, and the resulting number of spontaneous and “organized” mobilizations are presented in the table below.

**Table 2: Aggregation of events to spontaneous mobilization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time criteria for Variable</th>
<th>Spontaneous mobilizations</th>
<th>Organized mobilizations</th>
<th>Years with onset of mobilization</th>
<th>Events in spontaneous mobilization, mean (% &gt; median=2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 days</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>2.69 (22.8 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>3.79 (38.9 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 days</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>3.2 (30.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Time criteria:** Maximum days between end of first and start of second event, Minimum days for a single event constituting mobilization, Maximum number of days that can pass after the end of the last-ending event in a mobilization, before the mobilization is over.

In the second stage of aggregation to spontaneous mobilizations, I aggregate episodes of mobilization to country-years, since previous studies and information on independent variables are based on the country-year format. This aggregation is not straightforward due to the occurrence of several mobilizations during some country-years. If several mobilizations took place during a country-year, I extract information about the first ongoing mobilization, discarding the other mobilizations that year. The reasoning behind this coding decision is based on arguments made in chapter 3.

It is problematic to explain a nonviolent campaign while ignoring very recent nonviolent activity over the very same issues addressed by a campaign. The same logic applies to nonviolent mobilizations. The country-year structure of my data makes it difficult to model these kinds of dependencies in the data, since such modelling would have to address multiple concerns related to the number of arbitrarily aggregated mobilizations and spontaneity.

When implementing my decision to extract information only about the first occurrence of mobilization in a country-year, I first look for events that are part of mobilizations starting the previous year. If I identify such ongoing mobilizations, the country-year is discarded from my analyses based on this dependent variable. After excluding such country-years, I extract information about the first nonviolent mobilization from each country-year. If this mobilization was spontaneous, I code the onset of spontaneous mobilization. Otherwise, I
code an organized mobilization. The table below provide descriptive statistics for the consequences of the second stage of aggregation to country years.

Table 3: Consequences of aggregating mobilization to country-years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time criteria for Variable</th>
<th>Country-years with first occurrence of mobilization spontaneous onset</th>
<th>Country-years with any kind of mobilization</th>
<th>Country-years excluded due to first occurrence of mobilization ongoing from last year</th>
<th>Onsets of mobilization in years with onset, mean (%&gt;median=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 days</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.53 (29.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.38 (30 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 days</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1.6 (39.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These statistics show that the number of spontaneous mobilizations is fairly consistent across my different coding criteria. It does not show the overlap between years containing onsets of spontaneous mobilization however. In total, my three versions of the dependent variable identify 283 unique country-years with an onset of a nonviolent mobilization. All three versions of the variable identify a new nonviolent mobilization in 165 of these country-years.

Furthermore, my three dependent variables identify 155 unique country-years where the first occurrence of a nonviolent mobilization was the onset of a spontaneous nonviolent mobilization. All dependent variables identify spontaneous mobilization in 37 out of these 155 country-years. Thus, the dependent variable differs a lot based on which time criteria I use in the coding process, underscoring the importance of using several versions of the dependent variable to ensure the robustness of results. As discussed in the previous chapter, I code episodes starting with a spontaneous event that is followed by two organized events as organized mobilizations. The implementation of this coding decision has minimal consequences for the data.

6.2 Replication of Chenoweth and Ulfelder

In their article, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) test the predictive power of their models using k-fold cross-validation, generating parameter estimates in “training datasets”, based on parts

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20 The R-script for this thesis contain functions that allow the reader to easily create new versions of the dependent variable with different time-criteria than I use in my analyses.
of the dataset and assessing the predictive power of these parameters on other parts of the
dataset. I am able to replicate the original results of Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), with the
R-code they provide, but do not report these results here due to space considerations.

Assessment of predictive power can be used to evaluate causal arguments (Chenoweth and
Ulfelder 2015: 15), and can help researchers avoid overfitting models in studies of entire
populations (Greenhill, Ward, and Bakke 2010), such as all known onsets of nonviolent
campaigns. However, statistics evaluating the predictive power of a model, such as the area
under the receiver operating characteristic curve, does not tell us anything about the direction
of the effect of independent variables in a model. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) specify a
large number of hypotheses regarding the functional relationship between their independent
variables and the outcome, but only provide tests and brief discussions of these hypotheses in
the online appendix accompanying their article. Since my theoretical arguments pertains to
the direction of effects, and not their predictive power, I focus on the results from Chenoweth
and Ulfelders’ (2015) appendix in my replication.

The results reported in the online appendix show that many of the relationships hypothesized
by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) not are empirically supported. A majority of the variables
tested by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) fail to attain significance, and some of the variables
in the political opportunity model have significant effects opposite of those hypothesized. A
concern with these analyses is that Chenoweth and Ulfelder’s (2015) models not are designed
to test causal effects, since their focus is assessment of predictive power. Examination of
correlation matrices for the models indicate that many independent variables are highly
 correlated with each other. Without a model for how the independent variables relate to each
other, a lot of common covariation between these variables is controlled away in the analyses,
leaving very little unique covariation between independent and dependent variable. This could
possibly make the analyses sensitive to minimal changes in sample or model specification.

In the theory chapter, I argued that four of the variables tested by Chenoweth and Ulfelder
(2015) should not have a positive effect on spontaneous mobilization. The four variables that
I expect should have different effects on spontaneous mobilization and organized onsets of
campaigns are elite divisions from the political opportunity model, the organizational capacity
and organizational learning variables from the resource mobilization model, and the salient
elite ethnicity variable from the grievance model. The table below summarize Chenoweth and
Ulfelders’ (2015) expectations to the result, the estimated effects of these variables, and my expectations for the effect of these variables on spontaneous mobilization.

For the other variables tested by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), I saw no strong reason for the mechanism to apply solely to organized onsets, but due to the lack of general theorization of spontaneous onsets of campaigns, I do not have very strong reasons to expect that the effects of these variables are similar on spontaneous mobilization and campaign onsets. Due to the uncertainty about how the determinants of spontaneous mobilization affect spontaneous onsets of campaigns, I focus on the four variables that I have formulated theoretical expectations to in my replication. However, I also report the general correspondence between the results of my analyses for spontaneous mobilization and the original analyses of Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015).

Table 4: Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>C and U hypotheses for campaign onset</th>
<th>Effect on campaign onset</th>
<th>My hypotheses for spontaneous mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salient elite ethnicity</td>
<td>Positive effect</td>
<td>5.09** (.224)</td>
<td>No positive effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational learning</td>
<td>Positive effect</td>
<td>.349** (.150)</td>
<td>No positive effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational capacity</td>
<td>Positive effect</td>
<td>-.135 (.370)</td>
<td>No positive effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime instability</td>
<td>Positive effect</td>
<td>-.243 (.324)</td>
<td>No positive effect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01***

As made evident by the table, two of Chenoweth and Ulfelders’ (2015) hypotheses regarding these variables do not hold. Indeed, the regime instability and organizational variables, have negative, albeit insignificant effects on the chance of onsets of nonviolent campaigns. These results are representative of a more general trend in the results of Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), with many hypothesized relationships not receiving empirical support, and some coefficients attaining significance with opposite effect of what Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) hypothesized.

When running the models specified by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) with my dependent variable for spontaneous mobilization, I obtain results that robustly support two of my hypotheses regarding the four variables discussed above. Neither salient elite ethnicity nor
organizational capacity have significant, positive effects in any model, supporting my expectations for these variables.

The other two variables contradict my hypotheses. Organizational learning has a robust, significant positive effect on spontaneous mobilization, attaining significance in all models. Regime instability has a positive coefficient in all models, and is significant at the conventional 0.05 threshold in two models, which mounts to decent evidence against my hypothesis regarding this variable. These results are reported in the table below, together with the coefficients from Chenoweth and Ulfelder’s (2015) analysis of campaigns onsets for convenient comparison.

**Table 5: Spontaneous mobilization – Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Spontaneous mob.: 7 days</th>
<th>Spontaneous mob.: 30 days</th>
<th>Spontaneous mob.: 60 days</th>
<th>Effect on campaign onset, Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salient elite ethnicity</td>
<td>0.463 (0.28)</td>
<td>0.179 (0.276)</td>
<td>0.107 (0.264)</td>
<td>509** (.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational learning</td>
<td>0.917 *** (0.177)</td>
<td>0.906 *** (0.183)</td>
<td>1.221 *** (0.179)</td>
<td>.349** (.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational capacity</td>
<td>0.82 (0.447)</td>
<td>0.423 (0.562)</td>
<td>0.68 (0.476)</td>
<td>-.135 (.370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime instability</td>
<td>0.614 ** (0.255)</td>
<td>0.268 (0.309)</td>
<td>0.493 ** (0.289)</td>
<td>-.243 (.324)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01***

Salient elite ethnicity is the only variable conforming to both my and Chenoweth and Ulfelder’s (2015) hypotheses. Organizational capacity has no effects on spontaneous mobilization or onsets of campaigns. The other two variables contradict my hypotheses, thus presenting a puzzle to my theoretical arguments. From a theoretical perspective, it seems odd that an organizational learning should have such a robust positive effect on spontaneous mobilization. I can speculate that this result reflects the importance of ideological leadership for spontaneous mobilization, a possible effect that I briefly mentioned in the theory chapter.

The regime instability variable increases the chance of spontaneous mobilization, but not the chance of onset of nonviolent campaigns. This contradicts both my expectations and the expectations that Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015: 11-12) derive from a political opportunity approach. Conditions that make it easier to overthrow the regime should make people more willing to participate in action against the regime, since the expected payoff increase.
Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015: 12) argue that oppositional elites could be more willing to support nonviolence than violence, meaning that elite divisions present especially good opportunities for broad nonviolent coalitions between elites and people. Therefore, the effects of elite divisions reported in the table above does not have a good theoretical explanation, apart from the theoretical arguments regarding this variable being wrong. I do not delve further into this theoretical puzzle here, but offer discussions on measurement validity of the independent variables reported above in the next paragraphs, which might shed light on the somewhat puzzling results reported in the table above.

The measure of elite divisions used by Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) is coup attempts in the last 5 years. Although coups are manifestations of elite divisions, it could also be that they tend to be the end of such divisions, leading to purges and suppression of the losing elite, making it unable to act against the regime. Furthermore, coups are violent, and may indicate that elites prefer to oppose the regime with violent instead of nonviolent means, meaning that the subset of elite divisions captured by this variable systematically exclude elites with nonviolent inclinations. This could be a possible explanation for the negative coefficient for the effect of Chenoweth and Ulfelders’ (2015) measure of elite divisions on onsets of organized nonviolent campaigns.

Low measurement validity could also possibly explain the positive effect of organizational learning on spontaneous mobilization. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015: 8) measure organizational learning with the number of demonstrations and riots during the last year, over a wide variety of issues. Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015: 8) gather data to construct this variable from the Cross-National Time Series Data archive (Banks and Wilson 2013). This dataset does not distinguish between spontaneous and organized events. Although spontaneous events could lead to the development of organization, such events could also indicate that people are willing and able to oppose the government without any direction by organized opposition. Therefore, the variable might capture events not directly contributing to organizational learning. To address this concern, I substitute the variable for organizational learning with a measure of the number of organized nonviolent events over issues of elections, democracy and human rights targeted at the central government during the last year. I create this variable using SCAD. Surprisingly, this variable has a positive, significant effect.
on spontaneous mobilization in all models. This result provides further evidence against the theoretical argument I proposed for the organizational learning variable.

Comparing the results for spontaneous mobilization and onsets of nonviolent campaigns reported above modestly support the more general proposition that spontaneous mobilization and organized onsets of campaigns have somewhat different causes. Two of the four variables discussed above have similar effects on spontaneous mobilization and on onsets of nonviolent campaigns.

Although one of these differences is theoretically unexpected, the results still indicate that there could be systematic differences between the determinants of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is highly uncertain how my comparison of all kinds of campaign onsets with spontaneous mobilization transfer to spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns. The uncertain evidence available do however suggest that the determinants of spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns might differ, providing reasons to investigate this issue further.

Comparison with the residual category organized mobilization allow me to get a better of impression of whether it is meaningful to distinguish spontaneous mobilization from similar phenomena. Three out of the four variables that I expect have distinct effects on spontaneous mobilization have different effects on spontaneous and organized mobilization. I find that salient elite ethnicity has a positive significant effect on organized mobilization with two of three version of my dependent variable.

Organizational capacity and organizational learning has a positive, significant effect with all versions of the dependent variable, whereas elite divisions has no significant effects on organized mobilization in any model. Since only organizational learning has a similar effect on spontaneous mobilization and the related phenomena contained in organized mobilizations, the evidence suggest that is meaningful to distinguish spontaneous mobilization from related phenomena.

21 Results that are referred to, but not reported in this chapter can be found together with R-scripts on the memory pen accompanying the thesis and on my github: https://github.com/langoergen/The-revolution-will-not-be-Organized---Spontaneous-and-Organized-onsets-of-nonviolent-campaigns.
6.3 Replication of Butcher and Svensson (2014)

I am able to reproduce the results from all of Butcher and Svensson’s (2013) models, utilizing the dataset and stata code they provide. After reproducing the results, I start out by making one alteration to the analysis of Butcher and Svensson (2014) based on SCAD. I recode the dependent variable from three into four categories, distinguishing between organized and spontaneous nonviolent mobilization against the regime.

To recode the dependent variable, I identify the first event targeting the central government with 1000 participants over issues of democracy/human rights or election taking place in years where a nonviolent onset is coded by Butcher and Svensson (2014). Thus, I retain all the coding criteria used by Butcher and Svensson (2014), and only make one change. My recoding of the dependent variable yield 69 spontaneous and 82 organized mobilizations.

Introducing this new dependent variable and rerunning the baseline model used in table 2 (Butcher and Svensson 2014: 18-19) produce the results shown in the table below. I find that a large manufacturing sector increase the chance of organized onsets, but not spontaneous onsets of nonviolence. This result is consistent with the expectations formulated in my theoretical chapter, and indicate that there may be systematic differences between the causes of spontaneous and organized mobilization. Since there are some instances of strikes coded as spontaneous protests in SCAD, this result is not entirely driven by SCAD considering all kinds of strike as having clear leadership by default.

As discussed in the previous chapter, using single events as potential onsets of nonviolent campaigns is problematic. A campaign does not need to be related to single events occurring before the campaign start. Therefore, I also compare the results for campaigns with my new dependent variable, spontaneous mobilization. Apart from this adjustment, I try to stay as close as possible to the original analysis of Butcher and Svensson.

In addition to the residual category of organized mobilization, I therefore add onsets of violent campaigns as encoded in Butcher and Svenssons’ (2014) original analysis to the dependent variable. If there were instances of both nonviolent mobilization and onsets of violence during a country-year, I code the year as an instance of nonviolent mobilization, since I am most concerned with the determinants of spontaneous nonviolence. This decision has minimal impact on the outcome variable. To further ensure comparability, I exclude...
observations not part of Butcher and Svenssons’ (2014) original sample, meaning that all observations from after 2009 and from Latin America are excluded.

The effect of the manufacturing sector on spontaneous mobilization does not become significant in any of my models, compared with the baseline of no onset. These results support my theoretical expectations and are reported in the table below.

**Table 6: Spontaneous mobilization – Butcher and Svensson (2014)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Original results Butcher and Svensson (2014)</th>
<th>Distinguishing between spontaneous and organized</th>
<th>Spontaneous mobilization - 7 days</th>
<th>Spontaneous mobilization - 30 days</th>
<th>Spontaneous mobilization - 60 days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of the Manufacturing sector</strong></td>
<td>NAVCO 2.0: 0.044*** (0.015)</td>
<td>Organized: 0.082*** (0.019)</td>
<td>0.029 (0.025)</td>
<td>0.042 (0.028)</td>
<td>0.023 (0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCAD: 0.054** (0.019)</td>
<td>Spontaneous: 0.011** (0.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01***, the results reported from the original articles are from the baseline models.

Although I do not give a substantive interpretation to the residual category organized mobilization, it is worth noting that the effect of the manufacturing sector is positive and significant in all model specifications, suggesting that there is a substantial difference not only between spontaneous mobilization and onsets of nonviolent campaigns, but also between spontaneous mobilization and other closely related phenomena.

**6.4 Discussion of results**

As discussed in the previous chapter, the analysis in this chapter does not allow strong inferences on the impact of distinguishing between spontaneous and organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns in statistical work, primarily due to the uncertainty about how the determinants of spontaneous mobilization affect spontaneous onsets of campaigns. However, the analyses provide a test of theoretical arguments that imply spontaneous nonviolent mobilization should have different explanations than organized onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Although the results do not support all my hypotheses regarding individual variables, a majority of my hypotheses are supported.

My analyses give reasons to believe that there might be differences in the causes of spontaneous mobilization and onsets of nonviolent campaigns, but a better research design is
necessary to address this question convincingly. Taken together with my theoretical arguments and descriptive statistics, I believe my analyses provide reasons to investigate the differences between spontaneous and organized onsets further.
7. Discussion

My thesis primarily contribute to the literature on onsets of nonviolent campaigns. I make the following contributions to this literature. First, I provide a clear conceptualization of organized and spontaneous onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Secondly, I demonstrate that available quantitative datasets not provide information that allow researchers to determine whether an onset was spontaneous or organized. Third, I show that many theoretical arguments proposed as explanations of onsets of nonviolent campaigns assume organized onsets, or ascribe an important role to leadership. Fourth, I argue that there are theoretical reasons to expect that spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns have different causes. Finally, I provide a first assessment of whether spontaneous and organized onsets of campaigns systematically differ. Although, my research design prohibit strong conclusions, my results are consistent with some systematic differences between organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns.

Three out of the five variables I tested behaved as expected, by not increasing the chance of spontaneous mobilization significantly. I argued that the theoretical arguments proposing these five variables as explanations of nonviolent campaigns primarily should increase the chance of organized onsets of campaigns, since these variables are linked with organization and clear leadership. If the null-effects on spontaneous mobilization also apply to spontaneous onsets of campaigns, conflation of spontaneous and organized onsets would lead to the estimates indicating effects that are weaker than the true effect these variables have on organized onsets of campaigns. Researchers using datasets that might include both spontaneous and organized onsets need to be aware of such possibilities. Otherwise, they might reach wrong conclusions about the support for their theories. The collection of data about the process leading to onsets of campaigns, encoding information about leadership, organization and linkages to previous nonviolent activity, would help ensure proper assessment of theoretical arguments.

Like the work of White et al. (2015) and Cunningham et al. (2016), my thesis is concerned with developing meaningful counterfactuals to the onset of nonviolent campaigns. The two-stage model developed by White et al. (2015) and Cunningham et al. (2016) is utilized to study both the determinants of potential onset of campaigns, that is years with active oppositional organizations, and the determinants of campaigns. By comparing onsets with
country-years that saw the presence of active oppositional organizations, Cunningham et al. (2016) are able to create a meaningful comparison, making it easier to give a substantive, theoretical interpretation of results.

My conceptualization of spontaneous onsets of campaigns can serve as the basis for a similar two-stage research design. Although I only study potential spontaneous onsets, that is spontaneous mobilization, future researchers could extend my research design by comparing spontaneous onsets of campaigns with country-years that saw spontaneous mobilization. This strategy would allow researchers to investigate why some spontaneous mobilizations acquire coordination and become campaigns, whereas others do not. This question is undertheorized and not empirically investigated. Due to lack of overlapping data on spontaneous mobilization and nonviolent campaigns, it was impossible to investigate this question here.

Another contribution of my thesis is to bring perspectives from the classical literature on strategic nonviolence into studies of onsets of nonviolent campaigns. Most recent research is inspired by social movement studies, or research on civil wars. An exception is Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), who propose that the weak support they find for structural variables having great explanatory power, could be the result of agency having great impact on the onset of nonviolent campaigns. In contrast, my claim does not concern the relative importance of structure and agency. I claim that different decision-calculus underpin organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns, which could mean that the effects of structural variables systematically differ between these two kinds of onsets. I only provide a very brief theorization of exactly how some structural variables could have different effects on organized and spontaneous onsets. Future research could extend this theorization, to more systematically determine whether the structural causes of organized and spontaneous onsets of campaigns are likely to differ. Future research could also theorize ideological leadership, and effects of ideological leadership on onsets of campaigns. By distinguishing between different paths to onsets of nonviolent campaigns, researchers could draw more precise inferences about the determinants of nonviolent campaigns.
**Literature**


