Soviet nostalgia in contemporary empire restoring nationalism

In texts by Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Prohanov

Lars Erik Wessel-Berg

Masteroppgave ved Institutt for litteratur, områdestudier og europeiske språk, Det humanistiske fakultet

UNIVERSITETET I OSLO

15.11.2016

Soviet nostalgia in contemporary empire restoring nationalism: In texts by Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Prohanov

Lars Erik Wessel-Berg

Master's thesis at the
Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages (ILOS),
Faculty of Humanities,
University of Oslo

Autumn 2016

2016

Soviet nostalgia in contemporary empire restoring nationalism:
In texts of Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Prohanov

Lars Erik Wessel-Berg

http://www.duo.uio.no/

Print: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo

Summary

Soviet nostalgia occurs in the current Russian society both on the personal and political level. There are several types of nationalist currents in Russia, but the one of interest in this study is the so-called «empire restoring nationalists», or the «*impertsy*». Other scholars have earlier found that the ideology of this current contains Soviet nostalgia. The aim of this study is to further explore the content of Soviet nostalgia in recent writings of selected current Russian authors in this current, with emphasis on finding which *aspects* of the Soviet Union these authors harbor nostalgia for.

First the following delimitations of the study are made: Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Prohanov are selected as the authors to be studied, on the basis of their centrality in the *impertsy* current. Regarding selection of texts to analyze, it's chosen to examine 516 of their articles published on specified web sites in 2014 and 2015 and four relevant books published in 2014, 2012, 2010 and 2004.

Next follow discussions of the concepts of nostalgia in general, political nostalgia in particular and Soviet nostalgia in special. It's also discussed how these concepts relate to the task of analyzing the selected *impertsy* texts with respect to Soviet nostalgia. More specifically, when it comes to nostalgia in general, a typology based on the categories of restorative and reflective nostalgias is introduced. Regarding the concept of political nostalgia, focus in this study is on the very content of Soviet nostalgia, not on how this nostalgia eventually is used for political purposes. Concerning the concept of Soviet nostalgia in particular, different scholarly views on it are presented, as well as their expected implications on interpretation of findings in the upcoming analysis of the *impertsy* texts. An overview of how Soviet nostalgia has developed historically in post-Soviet Russia is also given here. Here also nineteen indicators of Soviet nostalgia are extracted from the scholarly secondary literature on nostalgia in general, political nostalgia and Soviet nostalgia in particular. The purpose of the indicators is to function as a tool for detecting elements of Soviet nostalgia in the upcoming analysis of the selected *impertsy* texts.

Next the concept of nationalism in general is discussed, a typology of contemporary Russian nationalism is presented, and the contemporary *impertsy* current is positioned in the contemporary ideological landscape of Russian nationalism. A presentation of the development and the ideology of the «red-brown» predecessor of the contemporary *impertsy* current is also provided, as well the ideology of the contemporary *impertsy* current. Also

provided are biographies of Dugin and Prohanov, as well as earlier research on Dugin's and Prohanov's ideologies in general and on Soviet nostalgia-related aspects of these ideologies in particular.

Then follows the very analysis of the selected Dugin and Prohanov texts with respect to Soviet nostalgia. The same two approaches are used for all texts in the analysis: 1) When one or more of the nineteen indicators of Soviet nostalgia (produced earlier in the study) are observed in a given text, a context specific evaluation is made regarding whether the observation should be considered as a finding of Soviet nostalgia or not. 2) Other background knowledge about Soviet nostalgia and the *impertsy* ideology is also taken into account during the examination and analysis. This in order to detect instances of Soviet nostalgia in the given text which wouldn't had been detected with the use of the indicators of Soviet nostalgia alone.

Results for Dugin

It was found that Dugin is nostalgic for the feeling of «familiarity» (his term) with both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, the (perceived) innocence of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, tradition in itself and his three components of tradition – religion, hierarchy and collective identity, what he sees as some of the «real» effects of Marxism put into practice in the Soviet Union (i.e. the creation of nationalist (sic!) societies with national cultures, unique identities and strong traditions), Communism's social solidarity and social justice aspects, the influence (ideological and real political power) over territories in the former USSR and over other territories in Eastern Europe, the Russians' role as the «great people» (his term) relative to other and «smaller peoples» (his term), the (perceived) friendship between the peoples, the state's lost subjectness and independence, the ideological and political leadership over a global alternative to the Western one, the Russians' role as «the core» of a union (in both the USSR and the Russian Empire) of different peoples and cultures, the Russians' role as the integrating force in such a union, and for having control over strategic sectors in the economy of such a union.

In general, Dugin seldom expresses nostalgia for the USSR specifically. On the contrary, in most cases he shows nostalgia for features which the Russian Empire and the USSR had *in common* as he sees them, i.e. for features which in his view tie these two periods together, i.e. for Great Russia. However, in a smaller number of cases, he shows nostalgia which is a mix between nostalgia for the USSR and for Great Russia. No instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire *exclusively* were observed, however. That is,

many instances of nostalgia for features common to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were detected, but no instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire that weren't also considered to be features of the Soviet Union.

Among Dugin's nostalgias, his most intense ones seem to be, as a main rule, those for features which the Russian Empire period and the Soviet period had in common. His other nostalgias seem to be less intense and more ambivalent regarding to which degree they are directed towards Great Russia in general or the Soviet Union in particular. Thus, when it comes to the relative intensities of Dugin's nostalgias, in most cases it seems to be a correlation between the intensity of nostalgia and the object of nostalgia's perceived degree of continuity in time – from the Russian Empire period to the Soviet period: High continuity usually goes together with high intensity, while low continuity usually goes together with low intensity.

Results for Prohanov

Prohanov was found to be a nostalgist for the Soviet victory in the WWII, the heroes of the WWII, weapons from the WWII, Stalin, the Stalinist type of Soviet culture, the whole country in the whole Soviet period, the Red Army, the Soviet industry, the Soviet people, the unification of different peoples in the struggle for a common goal in the Soviet period, the Russian people's function as the organizing force in this struggle, (Stalin as) the strong leader who organized different peoples towards this goal, «the empire» in general, the Soviet civilization, the Soviet state, the «basis» (his term) of the Soviet state, the ideological postulates of the Soviet state, the «constants» (his term) which the Soviet ideology rested on, the Soviet values, the Soviet symbols, the Soviet leaders, the USSR as a great power in general, the USSR's geopolitical influence in the world (i.e. the USSR's status as a world power), the bipolar system of balance of geopolitical influence from the Soviet period, the USSR's position as a pole in this system, the USSR's geopolitical power over territories which were integral parts of the USSR/the Russian Empire and over other Eastern European countries, the Communist ideal itself, Communism's strategic goals, Communism's collective behavior, Communism's idea of the common future of the peoples, the view from the Soviet period that the US/NATO/the West are the enemies, the unity of the «red» (his term) worldview from the Soviet period and the «white» (his term) worldview from the Russian Empire period.

In general, Prohanov shows much more emotional engagement for the Soviet period than for the Russian Empire period. That is, in most cases he shows first and foremost *Soviet* nostalgia, and only to a lesser degree Russian Empire nostalgia. However, in a smaller number of cases, he primarily shows nostalgia for features which he perceives as being common to the Russian Empire and Soviet history, so in those cases he shows above all nostalgia for features of Great Russia. However, no instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire *exclusively* were observed. That is, it was detected some instances of nostalgia for features common to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, but no instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire which weren't also considered to be features of the Soviet Union.

Prohanov's nostalgias for objects closely associated (in time and/or subject) with the Soviet victory in the WWII and/or with Stalin usually have the highest intensities, while nostalgias for objects more loosely connected to Stalin and/or the victory usually have a lower intensity. Consequently, for most of Prohanov's nostalgias, it seems to be a positive correlation between the intensity of the nostalgia and the associative proximity to Stalin and/or to the victory in the WWII: High associative proximity usually goes together with high intensity, while low associative proximity usually goes together with low intensity.

Preface

The submission of this thesis for the Master's degree in Russian Area Studies to the University of Oslo Autumn 2016 marks the end of my Master's studies, and is as such in reality also a milestone in my studies of the Russian language, culture, history, society and politics so far.

My motivation for the choice of subject for the thesis is in short as follows: From my studies of secondary literature on (Soviet) nostalgia in contemporary empire restoring Russian nationalism, I have got the impression that these scholars have described nostalgias for only some main sides of the USSR. However, I believe that many empire restoring nationalists actually feel nostalgic also for other features of the USSR than those who fit neatly into the few main categories which have been used by these scholars. In other words, what I often have been missing is an exploration of the wider array of nostalgias for various aspects of the USSR. Therefore, I want to carry out an analysis on a level which is detailed enough that the analysis actually will produce information about «new» *specific features* of the Soviet Union which the authors are nostalgic for. It's nothing wrong with nostalgias expressed in terms of abstract main categories, but in order to reach my goal, my approach will be to construct such categories strictly bottom-up. This means that I will construct them only as generalizations upon individual nostalgias which I see as naturally belonging together, where at least many of these individual nostalgias are on a more detailed level than what I usually encounter.

I would like to thank my supervisor in the work, Professor Pål Kolstø at the Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages (ILOS) at the University of Oslo, for lending me several useful books, his reviews of preliminary versions of various parts of the thesis, and valuable feedback/advice throughout the study and writing processes. I would also like to thank Postdoctoral Fellow Jardar Østbø for his tips on electronic data acquisition.

Lars Erik Wessel-Berg

Oslo, 15. November 2016

Contents

1 Introduction

1.1 Problem

In this section I will explain the puzzling circumstances which have made me choose to study Soviet nostalgia in Russian empire restoring nationalism. As will be seen, the reflections which have led me to this choice are both of academic and personal nature.

Every year after the breakup of the Soviet Union surveys have been done in order to find out which proportion of the population of the Russian Federation still harbors Soviet nostalgia, and almost every year the surveys have indicated that over half of the population to some degree does (Wessel-Berg 2014, p. 8). In my view, nostalgia can be a powerful feeling, and these survey results suggest that Soviet nostalgia is a force which ought to be accounted for when making assessments of interactions between individual Russian citizens and the Russian society which surrounds them.

I find it plausible that the environment can induce Soviet nostalgia in an individual, and that it can be induced in parts of the population by politicians, independent ideologues, philosophers and others. However, I don't think that all nostalgia is induced in people intentionally, since I believe that it also can be produced by individuals themselves as a consequence of perceived or real losses experienced in their lives. All the same, Russia's dramatic and complex political history has made me particularly interested in Soviet nostalgia in the Russian political sphere. More specifically, I feel most motivated to study Soviet nostalgia in a political current where the chances of finding such a nostalgia are relative high, at the same time as the current being considered possibly can influence Russia's future. Partly for these reasons I would like to study Soviet nostalgia in the Russian empire-restoring nationalist current. i.e. the Russian *impertsy* current.

Another reason for this interest is that although several of the representatives of the *impertsy* current have changed their views repeatedly after the breakup of the USSR, the current has as such been relatively stable, seen in a Russian context, in at least one way: In a broad sense it has been around – in one form or another – all the time after the breakup of the USSR, although both its name and some of its ideas have changed through the years. Yet another motivating factor is that several personalities which were active in one of its roots, the empire-*saving* nationalist current, are still active in the *impertsy* current. The empire saving nationalists wanted to save «the empire» in the late Soviet period, while the *impertsy*, which

also can be called «empire restoring nationalists», are active in the Russian Federation and want to restore «the empire» after the breakup of the USSR. This connection between the late Soviet period and the present interests me, since it resonates well with my general interest for both the late Soviet period and for post-Soviet Russia.

However, what type of information about Soviet nostalgia in the *impertsy* current is most interesting to obtain? Different people will answer this question differently, but when it comes to me, I have noticed that when scholars have written about *impertsy* authors' Soviet nostalgia, they have usually described a few «large» abstract ideas in this Soviet nostalgia, apparently without breaking them down to a detailed level, i.e. to the level which can show which *specific* features of the USSR the authors are nostalgic for. It's a part of my motivation for doing this study that I want to increase the understanding of which specific features, on a more detailed level, selected *impertsy* authors are Soviet nostalgic for. From these specific features I will then construct a few more abstract main concepts denoting «larger» ideas in their Soviet nostalgias.

1.2 Scope

This section discusses the delimitations of this study.

In time: This study shall in principle explore the content of Soviet nostalgia in texts written by selected *impertsy* authors «recently». I will not show how Soviet nostalgia has developed in the selected authors' texts over time (e.g. through the 1990s and/or through the 2000s). However, how is «recently» understood in this study? This is a practical matter: I will argue in detail in section 1.4 that it's necessary to ensure that necessary amounts of relevant primary data (texts) are available for analysis. In practice, this implicates that many of the texts to be examined in this study were published in 2014 and 2015, while a few of them were published in the 2010s and 2000s. More details on the choice of texts are provided in section 1.4.

In geography: *Impertsy* nationalism within the borders of the contemporary Russian Federation is within the scope of this study. *Impertsy* nationalism outside of these borders, such as in Russian diasporas in other countries which were integrated into the USSR, is not.

1.3 Selection of authors and texts

Regarding which *impertsy* authors I should study, I choose Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Prohanov, so I will examine texts only by them. In short, I choose these two authors because of their significance in the Russian empire restoring nationalist movement. To be more specific, they are chosen on the basis of their biographies and ideologies. Section 4.4 treats their biographies and ideologies, so I explain the choice more in detail there.

In order to find out which concrete texts by Dugin and Prohanov I should examine with respect to Soviet nostalgia, I have performed a review of their authorships in the last years. It has shown that Dugin has written more books relevant to my study than has Prohanov, while Prohanov has written more articles relevant to my study than has Dugin. This difference will be reflected in the sort of texts I choose to examine with respect to Soviet nostalgia.

Furthermore, as learnt in section 1.2, I am in principle interested in exploring the content of Soviet nostalgia in the selected authors' «recent» writings. However, in practice it's necessary to go some years back in time to get sufficient text material for drawing reliable conclusions. Thus, taking into account the actual volumes of text produced by the selected authors over the last years, I choose to base my study on articles written mainly in 2014 and 2015 and on relevant books published in 2014, 2012, 2010 and 2004. To be more specific:

Considering Dugin, I choose to examine 107 articles by him, of which 80 were written in 2014 and 27 in 2015. These are all his articles published on the web sites *Zavtra* (www.zavtra.ru) and *Izborskij klub* (http://www.izborsk-club.ru/) in 2014 and 2015, plus potentially relevant articles by him published on the web sites *Russkaâ Služba Novostej* (http://rusnovosti.ru), *Nakanune.RU* (www.nakanune.ru), *Evraziâ* (http://evrazia.org) and *Russkaâ narodnaâ liniâ* (http://ruskline.ru), also these published in 2014 and 2015. In addition, I will examine three of his books: *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism* (Dugin 2014b), *The Fourth Political Theory* (Dugin 2012) and *Filosofiâ vojny* (Dugin 2004a).

Regarding Prohanov, I choose to examine 409 articles, of which 228 were written in 2014 and 181 in 2015. These are all his articles published on the web sites *Zavtra* (www.zavtra.ru) and *Izborskij klub* (http://www.izborsk-club.ru/) in 2014 and 2015, plus potentially relevant articles by him published on the web sites *Komsomol'skaâ pravda* (www.kompravda.eu) and *Russkaâ Služba Novostej* (http://rusnovosti.ru) in 2014 and 2015. In addition to this, I will examine his book *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»* (Prohanov 2010).

1.4 Notation

1. Reference style: The Harvard referencing style will be used.

2. Quotes and citings from web sites: Wherever I refer to (cite or quote from) documents obtained from web sites without page numbers, the in-text Harvard style paragraphs will contain «para.» followed by the relevant paragraph number(s) instead of the usual «p.» followed by page number(s).

3. Quotes of Russian originals: In long quotes, which are presented as separate paragraphs with indentation, I will retain the original Cyrillic characters. When it comes to short quotes, which typically are integrated into the body text, some of the originals will be presented in the original Cyrillic version, some will be transliterated into Latin letters using the ISO 9:1995 standard, and some of them will be translated by me into English.

4. Russian proper names: As a main rule, I will transliterate these into Latin letters using the ISO 9:1995 standard. Exceptions will be made for proper names which often aren't spelled in accordance with the ISO 9:1995 when written in Latin letters. I will write these in Latin letters and use a widespread spelling instead of the spelling which follows directly from ISO 9:1995.

5. Sources in Russian in the Reference list: All Russian names of authors, book titles, articles titles, journal titles etc. in the Reference list will be presented in Latin letters, transliterated using the ISO 9:1995 standard.

2 Method

In this section I will first provide information on the method I will use to solve the study's problematique. Then I will show the logical structure of this document, and how this structure is closely linked to the chosen method.

2.1 General

In order to ensure that all the selected *impertsy* texts are analyzed with respect to Soviet nostalgia in the same way, I will perform the analysis of them in a systematic way. This will be achieved by using the same two methods for analyzing all of them. The two methods will in reality be used virtually simultaneously, and can be outlined as follows:

1) The selected texts will be compared with a list of specific *indicators of Soviet nostalgia* which will be produced prior to the analysis. When an indicator of Soviet nostalgia is observed in a given text, a text-context specific evaluation will be done in order to determine whether this observation should be seen as a finding of Soviet nostalgia or not.

2) However, I consider it virtually impossible to predict in advance absolutely all the different ways Soviet nostalgia possibly can express itself in the selected texts. Therefore, also a more open-ended method will be used during analysis. In this method I will use my background knowledge of Soviet nostalgia, circumstances in the USSR/the Soviet period and of the selected authors to detect instances of Soviet nostalgia which probably hadn't been detected if only the indicator-based method had been used. As in method 1), also here a text-context specific evaluation will be done in order to determine whether each of these observations should be considered to represent a finding of Soviet nostalgia or not.

I expect that both methods will produce clear findings of Soviet nostalgia, but also observations which are more difficult to categorize as expressions of either Soviet nostalgia, Russian Empire nostalgia or both. Therefore, whenever in doubt whether a given observation should be interpreted as a finding of Soviet nostalgia, Russian Empire nostalgia or as both, it will be interpreted in the context of the whole mass of observations concerning this author.

I consider that the combined use of these two methods will ensure that all the texts will be examined with respect to the same (expected) possible signs of nostalgia (through method 1), i.e. by a consistent approach, at the same time as also other possible variants of Soviet nostalgia will be given a good chance of being detected (through method 2). To summarize, in

my view, the two methods combined will ensure that many of the instances of Soviet nostalgia are detected, and this will contribute positively to the study's reliability and validity.

Interpretations of observations made in the context of the text in question will be shown mainly in chapters 5 and 6, while interpretations of observations made in the context of all texts by the author in question will be discussed mainly in chapter 7.

2.2 Building a list of indicators of Soviet nostalgia

As discussed in section 2.1, one of the two methods which will be used in the analysis of the selected texts with respect to Soviet nostalgia presupposes that the texts are compared with a list of specific indicators of Soviet nostalgia.

In order to build such a list, I have performed a review of secondary sources on Soviet nostalgia. One of the conclusions of the review is that there exist several different views/descriptions of what Soviet nostalgia «is», but I don't see any clear-cut lists of specific indicators of Soviet nostalgia. It can be argued that this is because Soviet nostalgia isn't a structured phenomenon, but on the other hand specific indicators of quite many other apparently blurry phenomena have already been presented in social science.

Any case, I need such a list of indicators of Soviet nostalgia in order to use method 1) (see section 2.1), and will build it by extracting those indicators from various scholarly books and articles (secondary sources) on Soviet nostalgia which I have reviewed.

A challenge is that in most of these secondary sources there is a fluctuation between describing nostalgia in general and Soviet nostalgia in particular. It's noteworthy that «Soviet nostalgia» seems to be understood in the secondary sources on Soviet nostalgia as a simple subcategory of «nostalgia in general». With this I have in mind that all features of «nostalgia in general» are also features of «Soviet nostalgia», but not exclusively to «Soviet nostalgia». At the same time, in line with this study's problematique (section 1.1), I want to extract indicators which can be used for the detection of nostalgias for a wide range of features of the USSR. However, some of these indicators are originally formulated in secondary literature as if they are relevant to nostalgia in general, with no mentioning of Soviet nostalgia in particular. My review has shown that some of them all the same are relevant also for Soviet nostalgia in particular, in the way that they will be useful tools for detecting Soviet nostalgia, presupposed that appropriate subsequent interpretations of observations are done.

Consequently, when I build the list of indicators of Soviet nostalgia, I will also include some indicators which strictly speaking are just indicators of nostalgia in general. Only the *interpretations* of observed matches between indicators and text passages can determine whether observations represent instances of Soviet nostalgia. Thus, interpretations of observations will in this study always be made (implicitly or explicitly) in the context of the individual text where the given observations are made, but when necessary, also in the context of all the examined texts of the given author, as already outlined in section 2.1.

2.3 The logical structure of this study

In this section I will show the stepwise structure of this study, how this structure is linked to the chosen method, and how its steps correspond to different chapters in this document.

In the first step I explore scholarly secondary literature on nostalgia in general, political nostalgia and Soviet nostalgia in particular. On this basis I assemble a list of indicators of Soviet nostalgia. All this is done in chapter 3.

In the second step I explore the term «nationalism», present a typology of Russian nationalism, position the contemporary *impertsy* current in the ideological landscape of Russian nationalism, provide details on why I selected Dugin and Prohanov as the *impertsy* authors whose texts are to be analyzed with respect to Soviet nostalgia, and present earlier research on nostalgia-related sides of the two authors' ideologies. All this is done in chapter 4.

In the third step I analyze the large primary text material selected in section 1.4 with respect to Soviet nostalgia. The analysis is performed as outlined in section 2.1, i.e. partly by comparing the texts with the indicators of Soviet nostalgia extracted in the first step, and partly by using scholarly background knowledge, provided in the first and second step, about Soviet nostalgia, circumstances in the Soviet period and the authors. All this is done in chapters 5 and 6.

In the fourth step I summarize the individual nostalgias found for Dugin and Prohanov, discuss which trends can be seen in the findings, and whether they express mainly nostalgia for the Soviet Union, for the Russian Empire or for features common to the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. I also discuss the relative intensities of their nostalgias, compare Dugin's and Prohanov's nostalgias found in this study, and compare the results of this study with earlier relevant research. All this is done in chapter 7.

3 Nostalgia, political nostalgia and Soviet nostalgia

In this chapter I will present scholarly views on nostalgia, political nostalgia and Soviet nostalgia. I will also produce indicators of Soviet nostalgia. Both types of information will in chapters 5 and 6 be used to detect Soviet nostalgia in the selected Dugin and Prohanov texts.

3.1 Nostalgia in general: Typology

As Ekaterina Kalinina has pointed out, several typologies for the concept of nostalgia have been developed in the 20th century and so far in the 21th century (Kalinina 2014, pp. 49–55). Svetlana Boym suggested the typology which seems to be the most useful one for the purposes of this study: She pointed out that the word «nostalgia» originates in the Greek roots *nostos* and *algia*, where *nostos* means «return home», and *algia* means «longing» (Boym 2001, p. xviii, emphasis in original). These two types of nostalgias, reflective and restorative, have different traits:

Reflective nostalgia «thrives in *algia*, the longing itself, and delays the homecoming – wistfully, ironically, desperately» (Boym 2001, p. xviii, emphasis in original). It «cherishes shattered fragments of memory and temporalizes space» (Boym 2001, p. 49). It's a romantic longing for – and an attempt to understand – a time that could never be brought back, usually childhood or youth (Kalinina 2014, p. 232). It allows for contradictions and doubts in «truths» and traditions (Boym 2001, p. xviii). It may be a first step in working through traumas in the past, and can help a person to understand what's going on in the present and what's his/her position in the current world (Kalinina 2014, p. 148). Several scholars share the perspective that reflective nostalgists take a critical approach to the past and how it is presented to them. According to this stance, reflective nostalgists also have a creative attitude to the past, and look upon representations of the past seriously and ironically. (Kalinina 2014, pp. 150–151.)

In contrast, «restorative nostalgia stresses *nostos* [the 'return home'], and attempts a trans-historical reconstruction of the lost home» (Boym, 2001, p. xviii, emphasis in original). It reconstructs «emblems and rituals of homes and homeland in an attempt to conquer and spatialize time» (Boym 2001, p. 49). Furthermore, «[r]estorative nostalgia does not think of itself as nostalgia, but rather as truth and tradition». And due to its faith in this absolute truth, it denies contradictions. It «knows two main plots – the return to origins and conspiracy».

(Boym 2001, p. xviii.) It also attempts to reconstruct the lost home of the past, and is therefore often connected to «religious or nationalist revivals» (Kalinina 2014, p. 51).

Another scholar, Andrew Higson, has views on nostalgia which adds perspectives: He considers that a «desire of returning home usually takes one of two forms»: The first form is a wish to «return to an ideal childhood» as a time of innocence. (Higson 2014, pp. 124.) This corresponds to reflective nostalgia in Boym's terms. The second form is a wish to do a «patriotic reconstruction of the homeland as an ideal place, where the homeland is synonymous with the concept of nation» (Higson 2014, p. 124). This nostalgic image of the homeland has a high potential to lead to political nostalgia and nationalist speech (Kalinina 2014, p. 52–53). This form corresponds with what Boym calls restorative nostalgia.

3.2 Political nostalgia

Soviet nostalgia is an example of a political type of nostalgia. This section is about the roles of nostalgia in politics, how these roles affect my position as a researcher in this study, and how political nostalgia relates to reflective and restorative nostalgia.

3.2.1 The roles of nostalgia in politics and in this study

Nostalgia can be a powerful political force. A factor which contributes to this is that nostalgia has a built-in affective power. As Linda Hutcheon puts it, «[n]ostalgia is not something you perceive *in* an object; it is what you 'feel' when two different temporal moments, past and present, come together for you, and often carry considerable weight. [...] [I]t is the element of response – of active participation, both intellectual and affective, that makes for the power» (Hutcheon 1998, para. 15, emphasis in the original). This built-in affective energy of nostalgia provides nostalgia with a high potential for being a force within politics.

In Maya Nadkarni and Olga Shevchenko's opinion, nostalgia is in itself not political, but «politics are nonetheless at work, both in what these practices accomplish and in who does the labeling and naming of practices as nostalgic» (Nadkarni and Shevchenko 2004, p. 518). In this study, however, the focus of the analysis will not be on what Soviet nostalgia accomplishes. Neither will it be on who labels and names practices as Soviet nostalgic. The focus here will be on the content of Soviet nostalgia in itself, that is, on sides of Soviet nostalgia which are really not particularly political in Nadkarni and Shevchenko's view. My role will be to detect Soviet nostalgic content in selected *impertsy* texts, i.e. to label/name

certain parts of these texts as Soviet nostalgic, i.e. as a type of political nostalgia. According to Nadkarni and Shevchenko, this act of labeling/naming might actually be seen as a political act. In order to avoid involuntarily becoming a political actor, it will therefore be important to think carefully when deciding what's Soviet nostalgic and not in the *impertsy* texts.

3.2.2 Reflective and restorative nostalgia in political nostalgia

No consensus has been established regarding how reflective and restorative nostalgia relate to political nostalgia. On the one hand, from the descriptions of reflective and restorative nostalgia given in section 3.1, it could be tempting to conclude that the sentimental reflective nostalgia always is unpolitical, and that the more action-oriented restorative nostalgia always is political. On the other hand, it's plausible that also reflective nostalgia in some instances might be political. «[M]elancholic longing for the past can in fact be an indication of a political stand point» (Kalinina 2014, p. 160). All the same, since politics is partly about making changes, I consider that the action-oriented restorative nostalgia has a higher potential than the sentimental reflective nostalgia for acting as a force in politics.

The implication of this on the upcoming analysis of the selected *impertsy* texts is that I expect the analysis to bring more examples of restorative than of reflective nostalgia. However, I will note and discuss all findings, both of reflective and restorative nostalgia.

3.3 Soviet nostalgia

In this section I will provide an overview over different views on Soviet nostalgia. I will also extract indicators of Soviet nostalgia.

3.3.1 Typology for nostalgia applied on Soviet nostalgia

In section 3.1 I introduced a typology of nostalgia in general. In section 3.3.1 I will discuss the implications of this typology on the concept of *Soviet* nostalgia in this study.

As learnt in section 3.1, in Svetlana Boym's typology, restorative nostalgia «attempts a trans-historical reconstruction of the lost home» and reconstructs «emblems and rituals of homes and homeland in an attempt to conquer and spatialize time» (Boym 2001, p. xviii, emphasis in the original; Boym 2001, p. 49). Thus, I suggest that expressions of nostalgia for Soviet emblems and rituals are indicators of restorative Soviet nostalgia.

Moreover, restorative Soviet nostalgists are nostalgic for «the myths of the powerful Soviet empire», and may wish to restore «the country's former military might and imperial strength» (Kalinina 2014, p. 151). Thus, I suggest that expressions of nostalgia for the USSR's power/strength and for the country's military might are indicators of Soviet nostalgia.

Furthermore, as we saw section 3.1, a «desire of returning home usually takes one of two forms», where one of them corresponds to restorative nostalgia (Higson 2014, p. 124). Restorative nostalgia attempts to reconstruct the lost home of the past, and is therefore often connected to religious or nationalist resurgences (Kalinina 2014, p. 51). This since desire of returning home, in the case of restorative nostalgia, is a wish to do a «patriotic reconstruction of the homeland as an ideal place, where the homeland is synonymous with the nation» (Higson 2014, p. 124). This nostalgic image of the homeland has in turn a high potential to lead to political nostalgia and nationalist rhetoric (section 3.1). When it comes to my study, the *impertsy* texts are, by definition, written by empire-friendly nationalists. Accordingly, this makes me expect to find more restorative than reflective nostalgia when analyzing them. The concept of reflective nostalgia is nevertheless relevant in this study: Firstly, in order to understand what the apparently blurry term «restorative nostalgia» is, it's an advantage to also exclude what it's *not*, and it's not reflective. Secondly, although I don't expect to find much reflective nostalgia in the texts, it's impossible to know *for sure* in advance whether they contain it or not. So I will look for reflective nostalgia too.

3.3.2 Soviet nostalgia in this study: aspects, objects and indicators

This section shows how the terms «aspect», «object» and «indicator» are used in this study.

In this study I will focus on which *aspects* of the USSR Dugin and Prohanov (eventually) are nostalgic for. I will call each such aspect of the USSR an *«object» of Soviet nostalgia*. Each *indicator of Soviet nostalgia* will point to an aspect of the USSR which the *impertsy* author in question possibly can be nostalgic for, i.e. to an «object» of Soviet nostalgia. I will here presuppose that a Soviet nostalgist can be nostalgic for one or more such objects of Soviet nostalgia. In accordance with this, Soviet nostalgia will not be seen as a binary variable which is either «on» or «off». I will look upon it as a qualitative property present to a varying degree and characterized by the aspects of the USSR which the author is nostalgic for, i.e. the objects he feels nostalgic for. In some of the cases I can also say something about the intensity of each of these nostalgias. This has consequences also for the

conclusion of the study: It will describe which aspects of the Soviet Union the author (eventually) is nostalgic for, and, when possible, also say something about the intensity of each of these nostalgias.

3.3.3 Views on nostalgia in general applied on Soviet nostalgia

This section presents some views on nostalgia in general and applies these views on Soviet nostalgia in particular.

Firstly, the conditions which may induce nostalgia can by theory be seen to «include a real or imagined experience of loss, and some kind of reminder of that loss, which stimulates the emergence of memories» (Kalinina 2014, p. 48). That is, when nostalgia is induced, «memories» of what was really or imagined lost become a part of the feeling of nostalgia. Thus, expressions of (perceived) losses suffered indicate nostalgia. Applied on *Soviet* nostalgia, expressions of (perceived) losses suffered by the breakup of the USSR indicate nostalgia for the USSR. This indicator is very flexible, since it can refer to many different aspects of the USSR.

Secondly, many scholars don't believe that Soviet nostalgists really are nostalgic for the realities of the former Soviet Union. These scholars often see nostalgia as a revisionist project, in which history is rewritten (Kalinina 2014, p. 20). These scholars have often stressed the gap between the real, traumatic history and the «nostalgic reproductions» of the past (Oushakine 2007, p. 452). Other scholars have formulated basically this same standpoint by stressing «utopian and illusory aspects of nostalgia, pointing out that nostalgia has little to do with history» (Kalinina 2014, p. 21). Consequently, descriptions of the USSR as a Utopia may indicate Soviet nostalgia.

Thirdly, especially some non-scholars consider that nostalgia is a psychological illness and an incapability to come to terms with one’s current everyday life. Especially restorative nostalgists for the USSR have in contemporary Russia been labeled by some critics as «sick» (Kalinina 2014, p. 150). Then it should be no surprise that nostalgia «continues to be avoided as a self-description» (Maria Todorova and Zsuzsa Gille 2010, p. 7). It is «often used to describe others and to mark political affiliation. To call someone nostalgic often becomes a vituperate term used against one’s opponents» (Kalinina 2014, p. 110). Applied on Soviet nostalgia in this study, I expect that the very word «nostalgia» will be rare in the Dugin and Prohanov texts which will be analyzed. Thus, in the analyses I will instead look for more indirect indicators of Soviet nostalgia.

3.3.4 Soviet nostalgia as a longing for lost innocence

One of the observations I made in my study of scholarly literature on nostalgia and Soviet nostalgia was that many indicators of Soviet nostalgia have one thing in common: They can essentially be seen as expressions of a longing for lost innocence.

The basic idea here is that people can feel nostalgic when they think about their childhood. They perceive their childhood as being an innocent period in their life, in contrast to their current life. Sigmund Freud stated in his essay «Screen Memories» (1899) that childhood memories don't fully reproduce an original event, because they also «disguise and replace it». Thus, a «childhood memory» isn't the original memory, but «a later version of it», which various current circumstances make an impact on. (Kalinina 2014, p. 218.) From this follows the view, shared by several scholars, that some Soviet nostalgists are people who experience nostalgia for their «lost youth, not for the Soviet state» (Kalinina 2014, pp. 150–151). I too see the risk that a person who had his/her childhood or youth in the USSR can confuse the objects of longing: He/she can express a longing for (aspects of) the USSR when he/she possibly maybe really are only longing back to their childhood/youth. This is relevant to bear in mind during the analysis of the Dugin and Prohanov texts.

A circumstance which adds plausibility to the suggestion that the concept of longing for lost innocence is important for Soviet nostalgia, is that in the USSR the state had a «paternalistic relationship with its citizens» (Kalinina 2014, p. 219): The «father», i.e. the state, took care of his «children», i.e. the citizens, by resolving all matters for them, which also included private matters (Dobrenko and Gunther 2000). So, when the USSR broke up in 1991, «the 'nation' suddenly left childhood and unexpectedly entered adulthood». After the breakup followed a process in which the country «grew up», and in this process «'innocence' became an important concept». (Kalinina 2014, p. 219.) I therefore suggest that expressions of the «innocent» Soviet period indicate Soviet nostalgia.

Which events after the breakup of the USSR triggered the feeling of lost innocence? After the breakup followed growing crime rates and inflation, which affected all citizens. Also followed unemployment, degradation of status and loss of economic wealth, although this affected fewer people. The irreversible rupture which the breakup of the USSR generated created a feeling of crisis and made many people feel that «all sense of stability and predictability and all unifying national ideas had disappeared. This disruption of normality or regularity, the disorganization of the orderly, self-evident universe of Soviet Union, made possible the nostalgic longing for a lost home and a lost stability». (Kalinina 2014, p. 45.) All

in all, the disruption of continuity with the past made possible a nostalgic longing for continuity with the past. Furthermore, the two associative fields of Dystopia and Utopia were created, where Utopia was (the image of) the «innocent» former USSR, while Dystopia was (the image of) the «sinful» post-Soviet Russia (Kalinina 2014, p. 219). Examples of post-Soviet Russia's perceived «sins»: Unrestricted capitalism, cynicism associated with the capitalism, consumerism accompanied by loss of true values, vulgarity and feelings of estrangement and homelessness due to the new conditions, and in addition, loss of a unifying national idea, induced by globalization and capitalism (Kalinina 2014, p. 221). The West was often associated with these «sins». It's not strange, then, that descriptions of foreign «enemies» have been frequent in Russian nationalist nostalgia (Boym 2001, pp. 54, 79, 171, 341).

The previous paragraph shows several perceived negative aspects of post-Soviet Russia. The corresponding perceived positive ideas of the USSR are: Lower crime rates, lower inflation, lower unemployment rates, higher social status (for some people), higher purchasing power (for some people), more stability, more predictability, more regularity, a higher degree of organization of society, planned economy (as opposed to post-Soviet Russia's capitalism and market economy), more true values, refinement (as opposed to post-Soviet Russia's perceived vulgarity), familiarity (as opposed to post-Soviet Russia's perceived estrangement and homelessness) and clearer unifying national ideas. Expressions of these aspects of the USSR can be seen as indicators of nostalgia for them. However, I must stress that what I am discussing here is not whether each of these perceived positive qualities of the USSR were «real» or not. I just relate to them as ideas, which may or may not correspond to how the USSR really was.

A related perspective for extracting indicators of Soviet nostalgia is that such nostalgia developed as a challenge to the utopian ideals which had been dominating in the transition period after the breakup of the USSR (Kalinina 2014, p. 21). Another view, presented by Alexei Yurchak, is that «living socialism» in everyday life in the USSR often was different from the state's interpretations of it, so an undeniable part of Soviet nostalgia is «the longing for the very *real humane values, ethics, friendships* [...] that the reality of socialism afforded» (Yurchak 2006, p. 8, emphasis in original). Finally, as mentioned by Mitja Velikonja, nostalgia in general can be seen as «a retrospective utopia, a wish and a hope for [...] true friendships [and] mutual solidarity» (Velikonja 2009, pp. 547–548). To summarize, I suggest

that expressions of nostalgia for true/real humane values, ethics, friendships and mutual solidarity are indicators of Soviet nostalgia.

3.3.5 The Stalin and Brezhnev epochs as objects of nostalgia

Both the Stalin and Brezhnev epochs had in my view aspects which seems to make them suitable as objects of nostalgia. In this section I will suggest some aspects of these epochs which Soviet nostalgists could feel nostalgic for.

When it comes to the Stalin epoch, an obvious object of Soviet nostalgia is Stalin himself and what's associated to him: Stalin led the country's transfer process from being a mostly agrarian country to becoming an industrialized one, and led the collectivization of the agriculture. He also led the country through the Second World War (WWII), and the country came out on the winning side in that war. He was also the top leader of one of the world's most powerful and military mighty countries; a country which spread its influence over Eastern Europe. It's true that Stalin led the harsh treatment and killings of millions of Soviet citizens, but I don't expect these sides of Stalin's epoch to be in the center of the attention for Stalin and Stalinist nostalgists. To sum up with respect to indicators of Soviet nostalgia, I suggest that nostalgia for the victory of the USSR in the WWII and for Stalin as a strong leader are indicators of nostalgia for the Stalin epoch of the Soviet period.

Considering the Brezhnev epoch, many Russians have criticized it for being a time without many important positive developments in the Russian society. But it can also be argued that it was a period of stability: The education system had mostly been built up during the Stalin and Khrushchev years, and was now supplying the centrally planned economy with relatively highly qualified personnel, and education was normally free. Unemployment was low and many people trusted the Soviet state as their provider of education services, free health services, stable wages and pensions – all in all stability and security – throughout their lives. On the other hand, living standards were generally lower than in the West (Ferretti 2007, para. 6). All the same, in the Brezhnev epoch the living costs were lower in comparison to wages/pensions for at least parts of the population than they became after the breakup of the USSR, especially in the 1990s. That is, some people had a higher social status and higher purchasing power in the Brezhnev epoch than they got after the breakup, especially in the 1990s. In the Brezhnev epoch many people also felt national pride – pride in being a citizen of one of the world's two super powers and in the country's military might (Ferretti 2007, para. 7). The idea that the USSR was the first country in the world that had built socialism, was a

country with authority and strength, respected in the whole world, were also parts of the Soviet identity (Ferretti 2007, para. 7).

However, I don't draw an absolute line between the two epochs with respect to Soviet nostalgia. That is, some of the indicators mentioned above for one epoch can, to some degree, also suit the other epoch. The main point in the context of my study is that they are all indicators of Soviet nostalgia.

3.3.6 The development of Soviet nostalgia

This section provides an overview of how Soviet nostalgia has developed historically in post-Soviet Russia. When making such overviews, it can always be argued that developments in society at a certain time are partially a product of developments longer back in time, but in order to keep this overview fairly short, it will go back only to the *perestroika* period:

During *perestroika* criticism of the Soviet system rose to unprecedented levels. As a consequence of this criticism and the discussions which followed them, little by little the image of the West in Russia improved. Soon the West was seen as «the normal world», while the Soviet Union more and more was projected as a model of how you should *not* do things. As a result, at this time the Russian national pride fell apart. (Ferretti 2007, para. 7, my emphasis.)

After the USSR broke up in 1991, followed the president Yeltsin years. This was a time of high expectations in Russia: Many people expected a quick rise in the standards of living and that Russia would be quickly accepted and integrated into the world, e.g. when it came to trade. Many believed that Russia, now newly freed from the Soviet Union, at last could choose its own way, a way that should lead to material prosperity and happiness.

But later in the 1990s it became clear to many Russians that many of the expectations they had in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s regarding development of the country and their own situation hadn't been fulfilled. To the contrary, what they had witnessed in the 1990s was a Russia where the political situation often had been chaotic, and many people were unemployed on a new and volatile labor market. Many had also experienced rising living costs due to high inflation rates, often not accompanied by corresponding wage/pension rises, and now lived below the subsistence level. At the same time, they had also seen the outselling of state-owned industry for minimum prices and the rise of the oligarchs. What's more, the Yeltsin government had frequently «imported» Western financial experts and Western ideas in the field of economics. So, when the economic conditions for many Russians

worsened during the 1990s, also the idea of the West as an ideal for Russia suffered (Ferretti 2007, para. 7). Partly for this reason, many Russians were searching for a new Russian identity at this time (Ferretti 2007, para. 7). Although Soviet nostalgia had never really died off in post-Soviet Russia, all these hardships encouraged the further development of the longing for Soviet times, at least for the USSR as the nostalgists remembered it.

Approximately simultaneously, Stalin's crimes against the Soviet population were increasingly repressed. The increasingly more positive image of Stalin as a leader allowed for a more positive mental image also of the Soviet state itself, and made it easier for people to feel strong pride in the Soviet victory in the WWII. This happened at a time when many people were in a search for a new Russian identity, so it's natural that Soviet nostalgia was further entrenched into many Russians' identities during these years. (Ferretti 2007, para. 7.)

After the turn of the millennium, the Soviet nostalgia in the Russian society developed even further. One development was overarching: After the breakup of the USSR, Russia had started to redefine its cultural and national identity. In this process many Russians turned to the past to rediscover the country's cultural and national roots (Strukov 2009). Soviet nostalgia participated in this way in the creation of a strong national identity in the period (Kalinina 2014, p. 16). Another development was linked to the one above, but was more specifically state based, namely that «[t]he Kremlin, feeling stronger after the turmoil of the 1990s», was seeking «legitimacy to its political, social and economic course, sustaining an image of stability». This was accomplished by creating an «emotional link of continuity with the past», especially with the 1970s. (Fosatto 2006, p. 10.) Soviet nostalgia can be such a link, so I assume that Soviet nostalgia enhanced the Kremlin's possibilities to get the legitimacy it wanted.

3.3.7 Indicators of Soviet nostalgia

In this section I provide an overview of the indicators of Soviet nostalgia I have extracted in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3–3.3.5. The extracted indicators are assembled in Table 1 below.

Each of the indicators names a perceived aspect of the Soviet Union which a Soviet nostalgic person possibly harbors nostalgia for, and possibly wants to restore. That is, each indicator names a different object of Soviet nostalgia.

The indicators are not meant to be either necessary or sufficient absolute criterions for Soviet nostalgia. Thus, in the upcoming analysis of texts with respect to Soviet nostalgia, it will be necessary to take the context into account when interpreting observations (see section 2.1).

Table 1: Suggested indicators of Soviet nostalgia

Category	**Indicator**
Most flexible indicators	Anything (perceived as) lost by the breakup of the USSR.
General ideas about the USSR	The USSR seen as a kind of *Utopia*, as opposed to post-Soviet Russia, which is seen as a kind of Dystopia.
	The Soviet period seen as an «*innocent*» time, as opposed to the (perceived) «sinful» post-Soviet Russia period.
	The Soviet period's (perceived) *stability*, *predictability* and *regularity* in general.
	The USSR's (perceived) high degree of *organization* of the society in general.
	The Soviet period's (perceived) *refinement*, as opposed to the (perceived) vulgarity of post-Soviet Russia.
Strength and the super power status	The *strong leader*.
	Pride in the *victory* of the USSR in *WWII*.
	Pride in being a citizen of a *super power*, a country with international *authority*, *strength* and *military might*, and of a country *respected* by other countries.
Emblems, rituals	*Emblems and rituals* of the USSR.
Choice of economic system	The Soviet *planned economy*, as opposed to post-Soviet Russia's capitalism.
Values and human relations	True/real humane *values and ethics*.
	Friendships and mutual *solidarity*.
	Feelings of *familiarity*, as opposed to feelings of estrangement and homelessness.
	Clear unifying *national idea(s)*.
Socioeconomic factors	The lower *crime rates* of the USSR.
	The lower *unemployment rates* of the USSR.
	The higher *social status* in the USSR (for some citizens).
	The higher (!) *purchasing power* in the USSR (for some citizens).

4 Nationalism, Russian nationalism and the *impertsy*

This chapter will first describe key terms in the field of nationalism, next provide an overview over the main currents in contemporary Russian nationalism, then present the *impertsy* current in Russian nationalism, and finally present the authors of the *impertsy* texts which I will analyze with respect to Soviet nostalgia in chapter 5 and 6.

4.1 Nation and nationalism

This section outlines how I understand the terms «nation» and «nationalism».

4.1.1 Nation

The term «nation» has not been sharply defined once and for all. Here follow some views on its meaning: Benedict Anderson considers that a nation is «an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion». (Anderson 1983, p. 6.) To Paul James, a «nation is at once an objectively abstract society of strangers, usually connected by a state, and a subjectively embodied community whose members experience themselves as an integrated group of compatriots» (James 1996, p. 34). To A. James Gregor, a nation is «an organized aggregate of people, associated by territory, language, economy as well as history, and united by a common sentiment» (Gregor 1998, p. 6).

Which of these shades of meaning of the term «nation» are the most useful in the analysis of the selected Dugin and Prohanov texts? The analysis will show that all of them are useful, but that the third variant is the easiest one to recognize in the texts. This since this variant specifies the relevance of language, economy, history and common sentiment.

4.1.2 Nationalism in general

Karl Deutsch and Ernest Gellner (cited in Kolstø 2016, p. 21), both pioneers in the study of nationalism, considered nationalism to be all strategies employed to homogenize the population of a country in order to build a common identity linked to the state. As they see it,

this link doesn't have to be a myth about «common descent» or common ethnicity. Aleksandr Verkhovsky and Emil Pain consider that nationalism is an ideology which «postulates that humanity – in accordance with the laws of nature or for sociohistorical reasons – is divided into autonomous units that differ in terms of a set of objective characteristics, including unchanging or slowly changing mindsets». And that «in the nineteenth century, these units were identified mainly with nations». (Verkhovsky and Pain 2015, p. 3.)

The first of the views above emphasizes commonalities inside the country which is the object of nationalism, while the second emphasizes differences between nations («units»). The analysis of the *impertsy* texts in this study will show that in some instances of Soviet nostalgia the author appeals to commonalities inside the country in focus, which is «Russia» (with somewhat changing meanings). In other instances of Soviet nostalgia, the author appeals to differences between the unit in focus, i.e. «Russia», and other units, often specifically «the West» or «the US». Therefore, both of the viewpoints above have proven to be useful in this study.

4.2 Typology of Russian nationalism

Today there isn't *one* specific «Russian nationalism», but several «Russian nationalisms» with partly differing ideological contents:

An important distinction is between *state-focused nationalism* and *ethno-nationalism*: Some types of Russian nationalism are mainly focused on the state, others mainly on ethnic groups. As Pål Kolstø points out, for some scholars the existence of state-focused nationalism is inconceivable, since they view nationalism as something which always is connected to an ethnically defined and based nation. However, if it's presupposed a definition of the term «nation» which allows for the «binding material» between the state and the people to be something else than ethnicity, both state-focused and ethnically based nationalisms are possible. (Kolstø 2016, p. 21, my emphasis). None of the meanings of the term «nation» suggested in this study (in section 4.1.1) presupposes that this «tie» has to be ethnical, so state-focused nationalism is possible here.

An overview over the main currents in contemporary Russian nationalism can be given in the form of the two-axis model which Sven Gunnar Simonsen suggested in 1996. In that model the various main currents are distinguished by their territorial orientations and characters. The model is shown in Table 2 (Kolstø 2016, p. 23; Simonsen 2001, p. 273):

Table 2: Typology of contemporary Russian nationalism

Territorial orientation	Character of nationalism	
	A. Mainly statist	B. Mainly ethno-centric
I. Empire-oriented	1. Empire-restoring nationalism *(soûzniki/impertsy)*	2. Supremacist nationalism
II. Core-oriented	3. Russian Federation nationalism *(gosudarstvenniki)*	4. Ethnic core nationalism

The two variables in the model should be seen as continuums, not dichotomies (Kolstø 2016, p. 23). The model presupposes the following four main types of Russian nationalism:

1. The empire-restorers *(soûzniki/impertsy)* are empire-oriented and have mainly state-focus. A combination of Russian nationalism and empire thinking made it possible to develop empire-oriented nationalism in Russia (Pain 2016, p. 46). It was formed by the Soviet official ideology, which emphasized both «the multi-ethnic character of the USSR» and the «greatness of that state». Moreover, it was in the form of «the Soviet Union that Rossiya had become a superpower, projecting its might – ideologically as well as militarily – around the globe». (Simonsen 2001, p. 273.) Thus, the Soviet period was important for the development of this type of Russian nationalism.

2. Supremacist nationalism is empire-oriented and has mainly ethnical focus. It combines an empire-oriented and an ethnical idea. It's empire-oriented in the way that it «has territorial ambitions outside Russia's current borders, also into areas that are not necessarily inhabited mostly by ethnic Russians». Its ethnical component is visible in its «acceptance of oppression of other peoples» to implement its territorial ambitions. (Simonsen 2001, p. 273.)

3. Russian Federation nationalism *(gosudarstvenniki)* is core-oriented and has mainly state-focus. This type of nationalism stresses the Russian Federation and accepts the borders of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in the Soviet Union as its borders, so it's core-oriented. It has less emphasis on ethnicity than ethnic core nationalism, and is mainly state-focused. In Russian Federation nationalism the country has to «define its own national interest» when neighboring states have other interests. (Simonsen 2001, p. 273.)

4. Ethnic core nationalism is core-oriented and has mainly ethnical focus. It prioritizes to promote the interests of ethnic Russians in a core area which is heavily populated by ethnic Russians. It can have territorial ambitions which converge with the geographical borders of the current Russian Federation, but those ambitions can alternatively be «both narrower and wider». (Simonsen 2001, p. 272.)

All of the texts which I will analyze in this study are written by authors who are nationalists of type 1 above, i.e. empire-restorers, i.e. *impertsy*. In section 4.3 I will inform more about the *impertsy* in general, and in section 4.4 about the selected authors in particular.

4.3 The «red-browns» and the *impertsy*

The «red-brown» current was a predecessor to the *impertsy*. Therefore, in this section I will first describe how the «red-brown» current developed, then its ideology, and, finally, the *impertsy* current.

4.3.1 The development of the «red-brown» current

Nationalism existed in the Soviet Union, both as non-Russian ethno-nationalism and as Russian nationalism. The Soviet state tolerated some stands and currents of Russian nationalism. Some of them were strongly statist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic, while others focused on the preservation of the Russian culture and Russian cultural values. But all of them had in common that they presupposed that the Soviet state will persist. (Kolstø 2016, p. 25.)

Russian nationalism outside of the USSR included two currents which would turn out to be relevant for Russian nationalism after the breakup of the USSR: *National Bolshevism* and *Eurasianism*. Both of them wanted to preserve «the Russian unitary state within the old borders». However, a difference between them in the Soviet period was that the National Bolsheviks trusted that the Bolsheviks would handle this task, while the Eurasianists developed «an own ideology for a post-Bolshevik, unified Russia», based on values which were common for all citizens and on Russian Orthodox Christianity. (Kolstø 2016, p. 25.) John B. Dunlop sees most Russian nationalists in the dissident movement after the WWII as *culturalists* (*vozroždency*) (Dunlop 1985, p. 10). For the culturalists it was important to «preserve Russian cultural traditions and cultural monuments». They were «concerned about decay at the Russian countryside» and some of them were Russian-Orthodox, but they were not skeptical to the borders of the Soviet state. (Kolstø 2016, p. 26.)

The so-called «red-brown» current was formed in the late 1980s and early in the 1990s, when some of the culturalists joined the people who wanted to save the «empire», the so-called «empire-savers». In 1992 the leading «red-brown» organization, the *National Salvation Front*, was formed. It consisted of: 1) Culturalists which had been anti-Communist dissidents in the Soviet period. 2) Hardcore empire nationalists, who some people called

«fascists». Aleksandr Prohanov was one of the empire nationalists. 3) «Red» state-focused nationalists. Among them was the leader of the Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov. (Kolstø 2016, pp. 28–29.)

When it comes to why the red-brown current emerged, John Ishiyama suggests that one reason was that both socialists and nationalists emphasized statist solutions:

> An important principle socialists and nationalists held in common, especially after the [sic] Lenin postponed the 'withering away of the state', was the emphasis on statist solutions to political, social and economic problems. The emphasis on statism was largely due to the lack of the emergence of clear national identities and the historic dominance of the state**.** (Ishiyama 2009, p. 489.)

Ishiyama suggests yet another reason: From 1989 to 1991 «dynamics of transition and the internal struggles within the ruling Communist parties [...] shaped the organizational confusion» which was to emerge after the breakup of the USSR. And this «organizational confusion, particularly the lack of a clearly demarcated left-right ideological spectrum», probably led «to greater far right voter support for the Communist past and the Communist successor parties» after the breakup of the USSR. (Ishiyama 2009, p. 486.) Another reason for the breakdown of the «distinction between left and right» ideologically in post-Soviet Russia was the unstructured and traumatic transition process after the breakup (Ishiyama 2009, p. 492).

4.3.2 The «red-brown» current's ideology

The «red-brown» political current in Russian nationalism is «sometimes referred to as 'National Bolshevism' or 'National Communism'» (Ishiyama 2009, p. 485).

The main aim of the so-called «red-brown» coalition was to keep the Soviet state unified, not to preserve the planned economy or Communism. They were state-focused nationalists and Soviet nostalgists who longed for the super power which no longer existed. (Kolstø 2016, pp. 20, 29.)

The ideological universe of the red-brown political current consisted of «neo-Communists and traditionalist Orthodox believers» who, «like the ideologues of late Stalinism», «adopted a conservative morality and opposed liberalism, pluralism and other primarily Western values. This stance was fundamentally related to the pre-modern vision of the world shared by Stalinism, Russian Orthodoxy and neo-Communism alike». (Slater 1998, p. 73.) And their historiography, like Stalinist historiography:

> defined the world entirely in terms of black and white. Both asserted the existence of a single, objective truth which brooked no contradiction, and both claimed that mankind could live rightly only by discerning this truth, this higher reality. There was no place here for doubt, ambiguity or self-reflection. (Slater 1998, p. 74.)

Furthermore, the red-brown movement was sure who its enemy was: In their perceived history of Russia, «the West was a constant opponent […] the antithesis of their 'imagined Russia'», and «represented technological progress, unlimited consumerism and spiritual barbarism» (Slater 1998, pp. 79–80).

The red-brown coalition was also in opposition to the Yeltsin supporters: While the Yeltsin supporters tried to make the population in the new Russian Federation loyal to the new Russian state, the red-brown opposition wanted the old super power back (Kolstø 2016, p. 3). Moreover, «Gorbachev's and particularly Yeltsin's policies had been inspired by Western political and economic theories», so the red-brown opposition «challenge[d] the reforms instituted by President Yeltsin from the start of 1992» (Slater 1998, pp. 79–80).

The red-browns lost the struggle for power in 1993, when they occupied the Russian parliament, and Yeltsin-loyal soldiers forced them to surrender. After this the «red» and the «brown» drifted apart, but they kept supporting a state-focused nationalism and caring little about ethnicity. (Kolstø 2016, p. 29.)

4.3.3 The *impertsy* current

The texts to be analyzed with respect to Soviet nostalgia in this study are written by two authors who are *impertsy*. The *impertsy* are contemporary successors of the above-mentioned red-brown political current which bloomed in the early 1990s. Therefore, I expected that many of the ideas of the red-brown current (section 4.3.2) could be recognized in the *impertsy* current, although they are not necessarily identical. And my analysis of the selected Dugin and Prohanov texts with respect to Soviet nostalgia corroborates this, since I observe that the essence of several of the ideas of the red-brown current of the 1990s are present in many of these texts, although many of them are written as late as in 2014–2015. Similarities observed are: Many of the texts adopt a conservative morality, oppose liberalism, pluralism and other primarily Western values, have a positive attitude to a pre-modern vision of the world, define the world in terms of black and white, don’t allow for contradictions and have no place for doubt, ambiguity or self-reflection. The West is often seen as the enemy and represents

technological progress and spiritual barbarism. And, as chapters 5 and 6 will show, several of these ideas turn out to be relevant to one or both of the selected authors' nostalgia.

4.4 The authors of the *impertsy* texts to be analyzed

As learnt in section 1.3, I choose to analyze texts written by Aleksandr Dugin and Aleksandr Prohanov. They are selected because of their centrality in the *impertsy* current and the influence they have had in parts of the intellectual and political circles in Russia. In this section I will argue their centrality and influence by presenting their biographies and ideologies. Since I want the presentations to also function as an overview of status quo in scholarly research on content of Soviet nostalgia in their writings, I will base the presentations entirely on other scholars' earlier research relevant to this subject.

4.4.1 Aleksandr Dugin's biography

Several scholars have written about Dugin's centrality among the *impertsy* and his influence:

Wayne Allensworth considers that «Dugin has influenced the post-Soviet 'patriotic' movement ideologically to a greater degree than any other nationalist publicist, especially through his association with Aleksandr Prohanov». Moreover, that Dugin's writings in *Den'/Zavtra*, a newspaper where Aleksandr Prohanov is editor-in-chief, «gave the 'patriotic' opposition the outline of an ideology that became the basis for Prohanov's efforts to unite 'Reds' (mainly grouped in the Russian Communist Party) and 'Whites' (the nationalists) around Russia's historical Eurasian mission» in the 1990s. (Allensworth 2009, p. 105.) Thus, Dugin was important for the development of the «red-brown» current in general and for Aleksandr Prohanov in particular. «[H]is writings have appeared on the pages of influential, elite-oriented newspapers, and he is [per 2009] a frequent participant in round-table political discussions in the Russian media» (Allensworth 2009, p. 105).

Stephen D. Shenfield remarks that Dugin is a «mystical philosopher and political theorist» who has «cultural and intellectual influence in Russian society» as a «prominent creative figure» (Shenfield 2001, p. 191). However, «[t]here is no evidence that Dugin's ideas have had any palpable influence on the general public» (Shenfield 2001, p. 198). All the same, «the influence that Dugin has achieved over at least some parts of the elite is by no means insignificant» (Shenfield 2001, p. 198). Shenfield views «Dugin's geopolitical ideas

[as] [...] clearly more influential than [...] the other, more openly esoteric, sides of his philosophy. Nevertheless, Dugin's position in Russian society is such that he cannot be dismissed out of hand as a figure of the 'lunatic fringe'». (Shenfield 2001, p. 199.)

Marlene Laruelle looks back and notes that Dugin was one of the people who in 1994 converted The Revolutionary Opposition into The National Bolshevik Party, «which combined their cultural demands with a glorification of the Soviet past». Basing himself on anarchism and terrorism, [he] developed the idea of forming an alliance between the revolutionary radicalism of the left and right». (Laruelle 2009, p. 43.) Dugin exercises a quasi-monopoly «over a certain part of the current Russian ideological spectrum. He is simultaneously on the fringe and at the center of the Russian nationalist phenomenon. He provides theoretical inspiration to many currents». And «[b]eyond the doctrinal qualities that makes him stand out among the spectrum of Russian nationalism, Dugin is noteworthy for his frenzied and prolific output of publications that began in the early 1990s.» (Laruelle 2008, p. 107.) He is «the most publicized Neo-Eurasianist», his «geopolitical writings are extremely fashionable», and «[h]is book on geopolitics is used as a textbook in many institutions of higher education» (Laruelle 2008, p. 11).

In sum, Dugin «has enjoyed the greatest public success of all the Neo-Eurasianists, and he most directly influences certain political circles» (Laruelle 2008, p. 115). He «seems to exert real influence on certain military and political circles and part of the presidential administration». In addition, he «has access to the Duma and supporters of all the parties represented in parliament». (Laruelle 2008, p. 11.) In fact, he «has connections with every one» of «the four nationalist parties (the presidential party United Russia, the CPRF, the LDPR, and Rodina)», and «some members of each of these parties openly acknowledge having been inspired by his theories» (Laruelle 2008, p. 113). Furthermore, he develops «a concept of Eurasia as the basis for a new ideology of Russian great power for the Putin establishment» (Laruelle 2008, p. 143). Regarding his relation to Putin, it has changed through the years: «Having at first enthusiastically welcomed Putin as a 'Eurasian man', since early 2005 Dugin appears to have become deeply disappointed by the president». This because Putin, in the view of Dugin, «hesitates to adopt a definitely Eurasianist stance». (Laruelle 2008, p. 114.)

4.4.2 Aleksandr Dugin's ideology

Dugin's ideology is partly based on Neo-Eurasianism, so I will first treat Neo-Eurasianism, then other traits of his ideology.

Scholarly views on Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism

What is *Eurasianism*? This ideology is, as stated by Verkhovsky and Pain:

> a philosophical-political movement active among Russian émigrés in the 1920s and the 1930s. N.S. Trubetskoi, P.N. Savitskii, G.V. Florovskii, and P.P. Suvchinskii laid out its fundamental principles in a collection of articles published in Sofia in 1921 under the title *Exodus to the East* [...] The authors identified Russia as a special cultural-historical type – «Eurasia». They stressed its ties to the Asiatic-Turkic world and counterposed it to Europe. (Verkhovsky and Pain 2015, p. 34, emphasis in original.)

In the Soviet period the Eurasianist ideology was based on values which were common for all citizens and on Orthodox Christianity. They wanted to «preserve the Russian unitary state within the old borders». (Kolstø 2016, p. 25.) Today, there is not *one* Eurasianism, but:

> myriad Eurasianisms – from the classic version seen in the founding fathers of the 1920s–1930s, to Lev Gumilev's version during Soviet times, to neo-Eurasianisms, such as that promoted by the infamous geopolitician Alexander Dugin, who is also a vocal supporter of an updated fascist doctrine. The collapse of the Soviet Union multiplied narratives on the theme of Eurasia. (Laruelle 2015a, para. 6.)

What is *Neo-Eurasianism*? As can be seen from the last quote above, it's an ideology which is a branch of the original Eurasianism. Neo-Eurasianism is the ideology of an «openly anti-Western political-ideological group that took shape in the mid-1990s. It is inextricably connected with [...] Aleksandr Dugin» (Verkhovsky and Pain 2015, p. 10). In the middle of the 1990s it «became one of the strongest currents of Russian nationalism» (Kolstø 2016, p. 30). As Anastasia V. Mitrofanova sees it, a «distinguishing feature of Neo-Eurasianism» is its «[p]ronounced orientation towards the unification of Orthodoxy and Islam», while this feature was not so pronounced for the founders of Eurasianism (Mitrofanova 2005, p. 53). Laruelle elaborates that Neo-Eurasianism*s* are:

> temporally diverse, insofar as their narratives have evolved over the past two decades. At the start of the 1990s they were used primarily to compensate for the Soviet collapse, offering a way of thinking about the suddenly fragmented post-Soviet space as a unity without referencing Communism. In the 2000s, the Kremlin's rehabilitation of the Soviet past as the key common dominator of Russian society, together with *nostalgia for the late Soviet decades*, weakened the originality of neo-Eurasianisms. They made their return, however, with the emergence of the Eurasian Union project – an old scheme promoted by Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev in 1994, but updated by Putin in 2011 to fit current tastes. (Laruelle 2015a, para. 7, my emphasis.)

Laruelle maintains that a common denominator of «the Neo-Eurasianist currents that emerged in the 1990s» is that they all «share an imperial conception of Russia» (Laruelle 2008, p. 115). And she considers that «[t]he Russian theorists of Neo-Eurasianism perceive the term 'Eurasia' only in its Russocentric aspects; for them, the past centuries have proven that Eurasia can only unite around Russia, as the *natural* power in Northern Asia» (Laruelle 2008, p. 204., emphasis in original). And that «the smallest common denominator for the highly disparate currents that constitute Neo-Eurasianism» is a «call for a political and economic rapprochement between the countries of the former Soviet Union as well as between them and the neighboring Asian powers» (Laruelle 2008, p. 206). And regarding Neo-Eurasianist strategy, Laruelle considers that the (Neo-)Eurasianist movement has «permanently oscillated between defining 'Eurasia' as either the space historically dominated by Russia or the whole of the Old Continent. This subtext has served to discreetly affirm that Russia's calling is to dominate both these Eurasias». (Laruelle 2008, p. 217.) Furthermore, Neo-Eurasianism «sees itself as a serene and respectable nationalism: one that is in tune with modern society [and] technological development» (Laruelle 2008, p. 211). When it comes to the question of preferred system of rule, the (Neo-)Eurasianists «challenge the democratic system» (Laruelle 2008, p. 214). Concerning the view on the Russian past, Laruelle claims that the Neo-Eurasianism «movement is free of Tsarist leanings» while it also «distances itself from the Soviet nostalgia of Gennady Ziuganov's Communist Party» (Laruelle 2008, p. 211).

Scholarly views on other traits of Aleksandr Dugin's ideology

Which other ideas/currents are visible in Dugin's ideology than (Neo-)Eurasianism, from a scholarly point of view? Shenfield is resolute that Dugin very much wants to combine Eurasianism with ethnic Russian nationalism», but that «[w]hat has always mattered the most to Dugin is undoubtedly mysticism» (Shenfield 2001, pp. 198, 255). All the same, Shenfield goes as far as stating that *the* central aspect of Dugin's worldview is «allegiance to the 'Tradition'» (Shenfield 2001, p. 192). Laruelle on her side claims that Dugin's «thought cannot be reduced to [just] Eurasianism», since he has supplemented Eurasianism with esoteric doctrines (Laruelle 2008, p. 207). Also «[t]he influence of Traditionalism [...] seems to be fundamental; it constitutes his main intellectual reference point and the basis of his political attitudes as well as his Eurasianism» (Laruelle 2008, p. 122). In addition, she suggests that Dugin «remains [...] deeply anchored in Christianity and [...] sees it (but only in its Eastern variety) as the repository of Tradition». But although «Dugin remains embedded in

Orthodoxy», he is also «attracted to neo-pagan conceptions, which exalt the body and harmony with nature». (Laruelle 2008, p. 123.) And she emphasizes Dugin's seemingly constant interest in tradition by stating that Dugin «continues even today to disseminate the Traditionalist ideas that have been his mainstay since the beginning» (Laruelle 2008, p. 114).

But what, more specifically, is «tradition» to Dugin? In Laruelle's view, one of his traditionalist ideas is that modernity is «harmful in that it destroys the preestablished hierarchical order» (Laruelle 2008, p. 121). Another is that «rationality is a mental construct and progress is a notion that bears no relation to reality», and on this basis «Dugin argues that the positivist foundation of contemporary science must be questioned in its very principle» (Laruelle 2008, p. 125). But at the same time Laruelle writes that he is «a militant proponent of the introduction of modern technologies in Russia, [...] calling for a 'modernization without Westernization'» (Laruelle 2008, p. 133). But in my opinion technology is a product of an interaction between science and handicraft, and positivist thought patterns have been important to develop science. Therefore, I find Dugin's wish to introduce modern technology to be in conflict with his apparent lack of acceptance of parts of the basis for this technology.

Another, and very central trait in Dugin's ideology is that, as Shenfield puts it, «[t]he geopolitical model on which Dugin relies takes the basic form [...] of a perennial confrontation between the land power of the central continental states of the Eurasian 'heartland', above all Russia and Germany, and the sea power of the 'oceanic' states situated on the fringes of Eurasia (Britain) or in the Americas (the United States)» (Shenfield 2001, p. 195). Allensworth adds that «Dugin sees the 'land' as 'traditionalist', integrationist, spiritual, anti-materialist, and views its values as tending toward collectivism and stability. The nations of the 'continent' have tended toward state-directed economies integrating diverse peoples under what Dugin sees as the benevolent leadership of a messianic great power in non-exploitative empires». (Allensworth 2009, p. 108.) In other (Laruelle's) words, Dugin «develops his own bipolar interpretation of the world», and this is a «division of the world into sea-based powers and land-based powers». Dugin links these two powers to «various classic couples of concepts from 'Russian thought' (Western Christianity/Orthodoxy, West/East, democracy/ideocracy, individualism/collectivism, societies marked by change / societies marked by continuity). The opposition between capitalism and socialism is seen as just one particular historical clash destined to continue in other forms». (Laruelle 2008, p. 117.) And in Dugin's world the struggle between these two civilizations goes very deep. An illustration of this is that, in Shenfield's opinion, this «opposition of sea and land assumes the

moral dimensions of a [...] struggle between good and evil» (Shenfield 2001, p. 196). And Dugin even «traces the contest to [...] a conspiratorial contest between ancient secret orders of Eurasianists and Atlanticists» (Shenfield 2001, p. 196). «He bases his ideology on conspiracy theories, presenting the new world order as a 'spider web' in which globalized actors hide in order to better accomplish their mission». This shows that «Dugin's geopolitical doctrine cannot function without creating enemies». (Laruelle 2008, p. 119.) And as Dugin sees it, «[t]he West is the only civilization which has not descended from 'real' tradition, and that is why all traditional religions should unite against it» (Mitrofanova 2005, p. 53). Anti-Westernism is common to Dugin (Laruelle 2008, p. 113).

It's a scholarly view that Dugin in several ways emphasizes continuity between the past, present and future. For example, Shenfield writes that Dugin exposes a «calm pride in the greatness of Russian civilization». His «erudition gives him a strong sense of continuity with Russia's great past and greater future» (Shenfield 2001, p. 206). Variants of this view are instances where scholars' statements implicitly or explicitly express a kind of continuity between Russian Empire period and the Soviet period. One example here is when Shenfield writes that «[i]n Dugin's reading of history, the Orthodox tsars of Holy Russia, the bolshevik revolutionaries of Russia and Germany, and the German Nazis embodied [...] the true and ancient values of Eurasia, and faced in the Atlanticist West a common enemy» (Shenfield 2001, p. 196). Allensworth is more explicit, since he claims that Dugin «sees continuities from the tsarist to the Soviet period as being more important than any manifest differences» (Allensworth 2009, p. 108). To summarize, Dugin emphasizes continuity between the Russian Empire period, the Soviet period, the present and the future.

When it comes to scholarly views on how Dugin relates to Communism, I find it relevant to first address his view on collectivism. Laruelle remarks that «what is most important for him is that right-wing and left-wing totalitarian ideologies are united in their refusal to accord a central role to the individual and to place it above the collectivity, be it social or national» (Laruelle 2008, p. 133). The fact that she points out that «the West» is characterized by individualism and «the East» by collectivism (Laruelle 2008, p. 117) also implicates that she sees Dugin as a collectivist.

Regarding which economic system Dugin prefers, Laruelle considers that Dugin wants «economic policies leaning toward socialism» (Laruelle 2008, p. 111). And that «[o]n economics, Dugin unapologetically stands 'on the left', even if this Western European classification is not necessarily applicable to the Russian political spectrum». Moreover, that

«Dugin repeatedly asserts that he has borrowed from certain socialist theories, in particular those on economics, because he is in favor of giving the state a crucial role in production structures». (Laruelle 2008, p. 132.) And regarding the broader subject of whether there are traces of Marxism in Dugin's ideology, Laruelle's position is that Dugin has «appropriated some Marxian ideas». This since «for him, the oppositions between labor and capital, Continentalism and Atlanticism, and East and West», which exist in his «Land vs. Sea» civilization worldview, are analogous. (Laruelle 2008, p. 132.) All the same, Laruelle states that Dugin rejects Communist ideology (Laruelle 2008, p. 142). She even adds that Dugin «has only negative things to say about Marxist-Leninism such as it existed in the USSR, and has, for several years, been a condescending critic of the Communist Party» (Laruelle 2008, p. 132). To attempt to summarize her view, Dugin is negative to Communism seen as a whole ideological package, but nevertheless positive to certain aspects of the ideology.

As to the relations between the Russian (*russkij*) people (*narod*) and the other, smaller peoples in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union, Allensworth says that Dugin in 2006 «insisted that the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union had acted to create and perpetuate a political nation 'belonging to a common civilization' based on the 'unification of various peoples around the Russian [*russkij*] nation [*narod*]» (Allensworth 2009, p. 116, bracketed text from Allensworth's original). That is, in both of these periods, the role of the Russians was to be the people which gathered the other, smaller peoples around itself, according to Allensworth. In Dugin's view, «[u]nlike the Russians, who are 'the empire's constitutive nation' (imperoobrazuiushchaia natsiia), the non-Russian peoples may benefit from cultural autonomy but not from sovereignty)» (Laruelle 2008, p. 139).

Concerning what kind of empire Russia should be in the future, Allensworth considers that Dugin wants Russia to form an «alliance with continental Europe (minus [...] Great Britain), led by Germany, plus India, Japan, and the Muslim fundamentalist states led by Iran. This would create a mighty 'New Empire', integrated economically and strategically, with Moscow as the natural center». (Allensworth 2009, p. 109.) Regarding Russia's role in this empire, Laruelle reports that Dugin in general considers that «Russian geopolitics [...] is responsible for restoring Russia's great-power status» (Laruelle 2008, p. 116). And she agrees that «his geopolitical theories restore to Russia the role of a global superpower» (Laruelle 2008, p. 142).

However, when it comes to the more direct question whether scholars outright see Dugin as a Soviet nostalgist or not, there is no scholarly consensus. The opinions vary not

only between different scholars, but some scholars may at first glance even seem to contradict themselves in different texts. When it comes to Laruelle, she claims that Dugin «rejects all Tsarist nostalgia» (Laruelle 2008, p. 112). But he «calls for a restoration of the Soviet Union», which, interpreted roughly should mean that she says that he is a restorative Soviet nostalgist (as defined in section 3.1). Moreover, Dugin «is the only Neo-Eurasianist to include in his political project not only the Baltic States but also the whole former socialist bloc. His Eurasia must even expand beyond Soviet space, for he proposes incorporating Manchuria, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Mongolia, as well as the Orthodox world of the Balkans; Eurasia world only reach its limits with 'geopolitical expansion right up to the shores of the Indian Ocean'». (Laruelle 2008, p. 118.) But all the same she says that Dugin «has never been a partisan of any return to the past», and that «[h]e does not play the card of Tsarist or Soviet nostalgia and sees himself as resolutely turned toward the future» (Laruelle 2008 pp. 132–133). So, surprisingly enough, it seems that, in Laruelle's view, neither to call for the return to the Soviet Union, nor to include the whole Eastern Europe in the plans for a political bloc, is restorative Soviet nostalgic – not even reflective Soviet nostalgic.

4.4.3 Aleksandr Prohanov's biography

Aleksandr Prohanov is a Soviet and Russian writer and journalist who was born in 1938 (Laruelle 2015b, p. 90). As Rosalind Marsh points out, his literary career «was on the wane in the 1990s, [but] experienced a meteoric rise in 2002, when he won the National Bestseller Prize for his national-patriotic novel *Gospodin Geksogen* (*Mr Hexogen*)» (Marsh 2011, p. 161). He's a long-standing writer of right-wing political fiction who harbors «serious right-wing political ambitions and a desire to influence government policy» (Marsh 2011, pp. 159, 183).

Concerning Prohanov's influence, he has been «one of the leading figures of Russian nationalism since the 1970s» and has been influential «in military circles and in nationalist associations» (Laruelle 2012, p. 564; Laruelle 2015b, p. 90). He is a well-known ideologue who is «embodying 1990s Russian nationalism», and has «identifiable nationalist influence over the decision-making community» (Laruelle 2012, p. 564; Laruelle 2015b, p. 90).

One of Prohanov's platforms for influence is his position as the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Zavtra* (Laruelle 2012, pp. 564–565), which «is the main platform for nationalist voices» in Russia (Laruelle 2015b, p. 90). *Zavtra* has been called both «ultra-nationalist» and «extreme-right», and is «one of the centers of production of nationalist discourse with a

Communist sensibility» (Kalinina 2014, p. 104; Marsh 2011, p. 159; Laruelle 2012, pp. 564–565). Also indicative for Prohanov's influence is that *Zavtra's* editorial board (per 2009) often is «presented as the main think tank of the [Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)] [...], and has direct access to CPRF leadership» (Laruelle 2009, p. 93). *Zavtra* is of interest in this study also because many of the Dugin and Prohanov texts to be examined here were originally published on *Zavtra*'s web site (www.zavtra.ru) (section 1.4).

I believe that it has also affected Prohanov's influence that he in 2012 launched the *Izborskij klub*, a «think tank that brings together around thirty nationalist ideologists and politicians» and lobbies the state (Laruelle 2015b, p. 90). This especially since the think tank has an antiliberal agenda and ambitions of influencing Russian politics (Aleksandra Samarina cited in Horvath 2015, p. 821). *Izborskij klub* is of interest in this study also because many of the Dugin and Prohanov texts to be examined in this study were originally published on this think tank's web site (http://izborsk-club.ru/) (section 1.4).

When it comes to Prohanov's relation to the country's political leadership, there have been several shifts: Marsh states that Prohanov endorsed the foreign policy of the USSR through his work as a foreign correspondent in the Soviet period, and during *perestroika* he become a «consistent supporter of the conservative opposition» to Soviet leaders. In August 1991 he was an ideologue of «the failed putsch of the State Emergency Committee against Gorbachev», and in 1993 he «defended the White House against Yeltsin's assault». Throughout the 1990s he opposed Yeltsin's regime. In 2000 he was willing to support Putin, but all the same subsequently opposed Putin. But late in the late 2000s Prohanov views seemed to change in a more Putin-friendly direction. Marsh suggests that the change happened because of «Putin's increasingly anti-Western, imperialist policies» at that time. (Marsh 2011, p. 161.) In other words, Prohanov at that time saw the society and politics in Russia as coming successively closer to his preferences (Marsh 2011, p. 167).

4.4.4 Aleksander Prohanov's ideology

In my review of the secondary literature on Dugin and Prohanov, I have noticed that there is a difference in how it stresses different kinds of information about them: In the studied secondary literature on Dugin there's much scholarly information on possibly Soviet nostalgic sides of his ideology, but less information relevant to his biography. In the secondary literature on Prohanov, it's the other way around, since it contains much scholarly information about his biography, but less on possibly Soviet nostalgic traits of his ideology.

When it comes to scholarly views on Soviet nostalgic traits in Prohanov's ideology, I frankly find that the studied secondary literature mostly repeats a small number of main ideas (viewpoints) over and over again.

In particular, there's one viewpoint which is expressed in many of the secondary sources which mention nostalgia in connection with Prohanov at all: That Prohanov is nostalgic for Stalin and Stalinism. That is, many of the scholars agree on this main point, although they express it in different ways. What I haven't found much of, however, are really detailed descriptions of the content of this nostalgia. Details I miss are whether there are any other objects of nostalgia which logically can be subsumed under this nostalgia, and, if so, what we can say about the links in-between each of these subordinate objects of nostalgia, about the links between these subordinate objects of nostalgia and the Stalin object of nostalgia, and, finally, more details on the immediate «surroundings» of his Stalin nostalgia, i.e. which idea(s) connect(s) this nostalgia to his (eventual) nostalgias for other aspects of the USSR.

Furthermore, several of the secondary sources mention that Prohanov is nostalgic for what they call the «empire» and the «state». To the degree such nostalgias are *Soviet* nostalgias, I haven't found much detailed information about them of the kind specified above. I also haven't found much detailed information in the secondary literature on whether Prohanov is nostalgic for other aspects of the USSR or not, and in case for which aspects.

That is, much seems to be unknown about the content of Prohanov's Soviet nostalgia. My study can hopefully contribute with much knew knowledge here. I want it to add knowledge about Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalin and other aspects of the USSR, but also detect nostalgias for aspects of the USSR which have been unknown until now.

I will now present an overview of the main views on Soviet nostalgia-relevant aspects of Prohanov's ideology I have found in the secondary literature.

First of all, there exists a scholarly debate on how to categorize Prohanov ideologically: One of the scholars who have voiced their opinions is A. James Gregor, who as early as in 1998 made a comparative study «between Italian Fascism and the new nationalism that ha[d] arisen in post-Soviet Russia», and concluded that it «seems totally unconvincing» that Prohanov's ideology is a Nazism, but that it «seems» to be fascism in it (Gregor 1998, pp. 1, 12). Rosalind Marsh, on her side, stated in 2011 that Prohanov in general shows a «peculiar mixture of Stalinism, Russian Orthodoxy, and neo-fascism», and called him a «neo-Stalinist and extreme nationalist» (Marsh 2011, pp. 166, 182). However, this «fascism/not fascism»

discussion doesn't seem to have concluded yet, and it's not the main subject of my study, so I'll leave it here.

Next, some broad considerations about Prohanov's ideology. From J. Stefan Lupp's perspective, Prohanov sees post-Soviet Russia as a «toppled, vanquished and captive civilization in a noose fashioned by an alien civilization» (Prohanov quoted in Lupp 2005, p. 212). (Marsh 2011, p. 162). In Marsh's view, Prohanov sees the West as an enemy of Russia and regards that «the only hope of combating globalization and the Westernization of post-Soviet Russia is a 'red-brown' patriotism based on the sovereignty of the state and a 'Russian Empire' that transcends the narrower notion of Russia as an ethnic state 'for the Russians' alone» (Marsh 2011, pp. 166–167).

Now to some statements relevant to Prohanov's nostalgia for «the empire» as such, Stalinism and «the state» as such. Regarding Prohanov's nostalgia for «the empire», this nostalgia doesn't always have to indicate Soviet nostalgia. It's a matter of interpretation, and the interpretation is context-dependent. Therefore, in my study I will discuss such interpretations is matter when the context is known. In all cases, when it comes to what other scholars have written about Prohanov's nostalgia for «the empire», Gregor has claimed (as early as in 1998) that Prohanov «has made eminently clear that his sole concern is the salvation of Russia, the restoration of its empire, and the renewal of its unique and defining 'spirit' (Gregor 1998, p. 9). I consider Gregor's claim to indicate that Prohanov is restorative nostalgic for «the empire». Furthermore, also Marsh has claimed that Prohanov has imperialist views (Marsh 2011, p. 167). Laruelle too has written about Prohanov's nostalgia for «the empire»: In 2012 she wrote that Prohanov wants to «legitimize Russia as an empire and the Soviet experiment as universal. Although Laruelle doesn't specify what exactly «the empire» means in this case, Russia's imperial past makes it, in my opinion, plausible to interpret Laruelle's statement as being about Prohanov's nostalgia for a lost empire in the past. In addition, in 2015 Laruelle claimed that Prohanov «has presented himself as an imperialist and a supporter of Stalinism» (Laruelle 2015, p. 90). In the same way as above, taking Russia's imperial past into account, I find it plausible to interpret the «imperialist part» of Laruelle's statement as being about Prohanov's nostalgia for a lost empire in the past.

When it comes to Prohanov's nostalgias on the state and on Stalin/Stalinism, some scholars have seen a connection between them. For example, M. Galeotti regarded (in 1998) that Prohanov «specifically appeals to the combat veterans of the 'Motherland,' that 'last contingent of statists,' who will rise to her defense and the defense of the state» (M. Galeotti

cited by Gregor 1998, p. 9). Gregor performs the linking by adding to Galeotti's statement that it's «clearly a matter of indifference to» Prohanov if «the accomplishment of all that [should] require either a Russian fascism, or a chastened Stalinism» (Gregor 1998, p. 9). Laruelle too notes Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalinism, when she writes that Prohanov «has presented himself as [...] a supporter of Stalinism» (Laruelle 2015, p. 90).

Finally, one of the subjects for discussion in section 7.2.5 will be various kinds of «unifications/conciliations» built-in in Prohanov's ideology. I will now provide some scholars' ideas about different kinds of «unifications/conciliations» in Prohanov's ideology, and in section 7.2.5 I will discuss certain findings in my study on the background/in the context of these ideas. Firstly, Wendy Slater claimed in 1998 that the «red-brown» political current supported by Prohanov represented a conciliation between «the national and the social, combining justice in national affairs with social justice». In Slater's view, Prohanov saw this as a conciliation of Orthodox Christian and pro-Soviet Russian nationalists. (Slater 1998, p. 72.) Secondly, Marlene Laruelle wrote in 2013 that Prohanov in 2010 discussed connections between «the Bolshevik Revolution, the industrial successes of Stalinism, and Cosmism» (Laruelle 2012, p. 565). Thirdly, Mitrofanova considers that Prohanov's ideology «mix[es] 'this world' with 'the other world'» and connects «'the other' world with 'this' one» (Mitrofanova 2005, pp. 27, 31). This statement is in line with Mark Juergensmeyer's claim that in Prohanov's ideology, «[c]onflicts of the real world are linked to an invisible, cosmic war: the spiritual struggle between order and disorder, light and darkness, faith and doubt». Thus, «[m]odern conflicts are seen as a direct reflection of the struggle between Good and Evil taking place in the other world». (Juergensmeyer quoted in Mitrofanova 2005, p. 22–23; Mitrofanova 2005, p. 31.)

5 Analysis of A. Dugin's texts

In this chapter I will present and discuss the individual findings of Soviet nostalgia I have made in the analysis of the selected texts by Aleksandr Dugin. Since many of Dugin's political texts are based on ideas from Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory (4PT), section 5.1 will also function as an introduction to the other sections in this chapter.

5.1 Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory

5.1.1 Dugin's views on Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism

According to Dugin, *Eurasianism* has, already from its first days in the 1920s, opposed the West's global domination and European universalism, and insisted that Russia is an «independent Orthodox-Eurasian civilization» (Dugin 2014c, para. 6). As Dugin puts it:

> Евразийство с первых дней своего существования в начала 20-х годов XX века всегда выступало против глобальной доминации Запада, европейского универсализма и за самобытную русскую цивилизацию. Поэтому евразийство является, действительно, антизападной идеологией, отвергающей право западного общества на установление своих критериев добра и зла в качестве универсальной нормы. Россия – самостоятельная православно-евразийская цивилизация, а не периферия Европы. (Dugin 2014c, para. 6.)

In the 1990s and 2000s the *Neo-Eurasianists* supported «tradition, the sacred, Christianity and other traditional confessions», in Dugin's view (Dugin 2014c, para. 16, my emphasis). In his view, Neo-Eurasianism is neither Communist nor fascist, i.e. neither left-wing nor right-wing, so its opponents at that time called it the «red-brown international» (Dugin 2014c, para. 18.)

I will discuss the following aspects of Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism in relation to Soviet nostalgia in the following sections: 1) The global domination of the West – in section 5.5.1. 2) European universalism, tradition and religion – in section 5.3.2. 3) The Russian civilization – in section 5.2.

5.1.2 The Fourth Political Theory (4PT)

Dugin states that the «last important ideological shift in the philosophy of Neo-Eurasianism» so far happened in 2007–2008, when «the basic principles of the Fourth Political Theory (4PT) were laid down» (Dugin 2014b, p. 12). Being the intellectual leader of the Eurasian movement (Dugin 2012, back cover), Dugin was at the forefront of this shift.

Dugin saw the background for his development of the 4PT as being his notion that «all previous anti-liberal ideologies (Communism, socialism, and fascism) [...] tried to fight liberal capitalism and they failed». He wanted to develop a political theory which could be used in the «opposition to globalization and its liberal democratic, capitalist, and modernist principles». (Dugin 2012, p. 194.) He presented – and still presents – The 4PT as that theory.

According to Dugin himself, the 4PT has been constructed as follows: First, certain aspects of communism and certain aspects of the so-called «Third Way» theories, among which are National Socialism and fascism, have been put together (Dugin 2012, p. 195). Of special interest in relation to Soviet nostalgia is which aspects of Communism have been integrated into the 4PT, so I will discuss this question in section 5.3. When it comes to the «Third Way» theories, Dugin rejected its «racist and narrow nationalist aspects» (Dugin 2012, p. 195). The resulting ideology was *National Bolshevism*, which is a mixture of the far Left and the far Right (Dugin 2014b, p. 12). Then he added tradition and «pre-modern sources of inspiration», which to him meant «the Platonic state ideal, Medieval hierarchical society, and theological visions of the normative social and political system (Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, Jewish or Hindu)». The resulting ideology was the 4PT. (Dugin 2012, pp. 195–196.)

The main principles of the 4PT are, as Dugin sees it, «social justice, national sovereignty and traditional values» (Dugin 2012, p. 196). I will argue that these principles are relevant for Soviet nostalgia. Social justice, traditions and values will be discussed in section 5.3, while national sovereignty will be discussed in sections 5.4.2 and 5.5.5.

Another circumstance relevant for the relationship between the 4PT and Soviet nostalgia is the concept of reversible time in the 4PT. Dugin argues: «In the context of modernity, turning back from one point in history to a previous one is impossible. But it is possible in the context of Fourth Political Theory». As an example of reversible time, he refers to the breakup of the Soviet Union: Before the breakup, he argues, Russians «were sure that socialism would proceed from capitalism, not vice versa. But in the 1990s they saw the opposite: capitalism following socialism». (Dugin 2012, p. 69.) How is this relevant to Soviet nostalgia? By the theory in section 3.3.3, few people would normally want to admit that they want to go back in time, i.e. that they are what Svetlana Boym called «restorative» nostalgists (Kalinina 2014, p. 150; Todorova and Gille 2010, p. 7). But the concept of reversible time in 4PT may function as a justification on the intellectual level to do just that – go back in time. Thus, this is a restorative nostalgic trait of Dugin's descriptions of 4PT.

5.2 The Land civilization vs. the Sea civilization

In many of the analyzed texts Dugin describes an opposition between what he calls the «Land civilization» and the «Sea civilization», which I hereafter often will call simply «the Land» and «the Sea», respectively. In some of his texts, «the Land» («*Suša*») means the continental territories/countries, e.g. Russia, while the «the Sea» («*More*») means the Atlantic territories/countries, e.g. the US. But in other texts he simplifies this by equating «the Sea» with «the West» and «the Land» with «the East». (Dugin 2004c, para. 40.)

According to Dugin, the Land and Sea have mutually exclusive traits: He attributes «Традиция, Вера ([…] Православие), Империя, народ, сакральное, история, семья, этика» to the Land, and «модернизация, торговля, техника, либеральная демократия, капитализм, парламентаризм, индивидуализм, материализм» to the Sea. (Dugin 2014c, para. 8.) Furthermore, to him, the Land represents continuity and hierarchy, while the Sea represents chaos (Dugin 2004c, para. 33). In several instances Dugin shows nostalgia for one or some of the traits of the Land civilization, and in the following sections I will argue that the mentioned «tradition», «religion», «hierarchy», «people» and «continuity» traits of his Land civilization are relevant to the question of Soviet nostalgia.

However, the Land and Sea civilizations also differ in other ways, in Dugin's view. To be specific, it can be seen that he considers that the following three oppositions in traits exist between the Sea and the Land: «Capital(ism)» (Sea) vs. «socialism» (Land), «estrangement» (Sea) vs. «familiarity» (Land), «sin» (Sea) vs. «innocence» (Land) (Dugin 2004c, para. 40). I will now discuss these oppositions with respect to Soviet nostalgia.

Capital(ism) (Sea) vs. socialism (Land): Dugin associates the Sea civilization with capital(ism) and the Land civilization with socialism. It's evident from the text-contexts that Dugin is an eager supporter of the Land civilization. Therefore, associations of the Land civilization with socialism are in themselves instances of nostalgia for the political ideology of the USSR. However, I will discuss the issue of Dugin's preferred political ideology further in the section about Communism (section 5.3).

Estrangement (Sea) vs. familiarity (Land): In section 3.3.4 I suggested that feelings of estrangement are essentially the opposite of feelings of familiarity, which makes familiarity the real object of nostalgia. The theory in section 3.3.4 also supports the conclusion that longing for familiarity in general is an indicator of nostalgia. But is it Soviet nostalgia, Russian Empire nostalgia or both in Dugin's case? The interpretational context here is that an overarching trend in the studied Dugin texts is that he often shows nostalgia for phenomena

which were common for both the Russian Empire and the USSR. (More about this trend in section 7.1.2.) The most plausible interpretation of his nostalgia for familiarity is therefore that he's nostalgic for familiarity with both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, without distinguishing between these two historical epochs.

Sin (Sea) vs. innocence (Land): Dugin associates the Sea civilization with falling in sin, while he associates the Land civilization with ascension (*voshoždenie*) (Dugin 2004c, para. 40). Thus, he wants his country to choose a path which leads it to ascension instead of falling in sin. This means that he implicitly makes innocence an ideal. And it follows from the theory in section 3.3.4 that general expressions of longing for innocence may indicate nostalgia in general. The interpretational frame in this case is, as said in the previous paragraph, the observed trend that Dugin, in the studied texts, often shows nostalgia for phenomena which were common for both the Russian Empire and the USSR. The most plausible interpretation is therefore that he's nostalgic for the innocence of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, without distinguishing between these two historical epochs.

Dugin has also preferences regarding choice of economic system and type of democracy. Regarding choice of economic system, Dugin's attitude is that he prefers planned economy or an economy which is a mix between a planned economy and a market economy (Dugin 2004b, para. 6). Is this Soviet nostalgia? He would open the door for an economic system similar to the Soviet type, but he would all the same accept an economic system which was not typically Soviet. His flexibility on this question leads to the conclusion that he doesn't harbor nostalgia for the Soviet economic system in the sense that he demands the restoration of the Soviet economic system as it was. On the other hand, he doesn't want this system to go, since he wants parts of it to stay/return. To conclude, he shows some signs of nostalgia for the Soviet economic system, but above all he seems flexible and pragmatic, within the mentioned limits, when it comes to preferred economic system.

Regarding preferred type of democracy, he wants limited democracy or a hierarchical system (Dugin 2004b, para. 6). Is this Soviet nostalgia? He would accept a system which is reminiscent of the Soviet (Communist party) system when it comes to focus on hierarchy, on the other hand he would apparently accept a higher degree of democracy which than was the case in the USSR. His apparent flexibility on this question leads to the conclusion that he doesn't harbor Soviet nostalgia for the Soviet totalitarianism in the sense that he insists on the restoration of it as it was. To conclude, he shows some signs of nostalgia for the Soviet

hierarchical system, but above all he seems flexible and pragmatic, within the given limits, when it comes to preferred type of democracy in society.

5.3 Tradition and Communism

The concept of tradition is central to many of the studied Dugin texts, and he connects it to the concept of Communism. The purpose of this section is to look into which elements of Soviet nostalgia can eventually be found in Dugin's descriptions of both concepts.

In some of Dugin's texts where the subject is (according to him) Communism, he all the same uses the terms «socialism» and/or «Marxism» instead of «Communism». When I cite/quote Dugin, I will reproduce his use of these terms, since my priority is on correct representation of the original content of these texts, not on creating a consistent *impression*.

5.3.1 Tradition and its connection to Communism

Tradition is an important object of nostalgia for Dugin. This is seen in several of the studied texts, for example when he says that he is «for tradition – as the antithesis of modernity» (Dugin 2014k, para. 18).

My perspective is that I see Dugin's term «tradition» as a composite concept. I will now try to evaluate each of its components with respect to eventual elements of Soviet nostalgia. My starting point in doing so is the fact that Dugin states that a traditional society in Europe has been characterized as a society where the church has been united with the state, estates of the realm have been present and collective identities have dominated (Dugin 2015b, para. 26). When it comes to «Russia», both the Russian Empire and the USSR were traditional societies from Dugin's perspective (Dugin 2015b, para. 29). He insists that both of these societies were characterized by religion (sic!), a harsh hierarchy and a collective identity. In his opinion, they were just two different versions of the traditional type of society: 1) Before 1917 the religion was Russian Orthodox, while after 1917 it was a «Communist quasi-religion» (his term). 2) Before 1917 the hierarchy consisted of «the tsar, nobility and aristocrats, and the ordinary people», while after 1917 it consisted of the Communist hierarchy. 3) Before 1917 the collective identity was the Russian empire's *sobornyj* identity, while after 1917 it was, in Dugin's words, the «collectivistic Marxist identity». (Dugin 2015b, para. 28.) An example of how Dugin expresses his support of the collective identity:

> Поскольку именно наше коллективистско-холистское мировоззрение остается образом жизни, формой бытия, формой стихийного мышления и основой ментальности русского общества. Это было верно и до, и после Революции 1917, после развала СССР и сейчас. (Dugin 2015a, para. 15.)

From the three points above I observe and conclude:

1) Dugin's concept of tradition is linked to Communism/Marxism through all of its three features. The links are the «Communist quasi-religion» (his term), the Communist hierarchy and the collectivistic Marxist identity. However, as seen in the three points above, his concept of tradition is also linked to the Russian Empire epoch through all of its three features. This knowledge impacts on the interpretation of the instances when Dugin expresses nostalgia for tradition: In my opinion, as a main rule, these cases shouldn't be considered to be either Soviet nostalgic or Russian Empire nostalgic, but connected to both epochs. However, eventual supplementary information, in e.g. the texts themselves, might show that some cases nevertheless show nostalgia for either the USSR or the Russian Empire.

2) In cases where Dugin expresses nostalgia for some/all of his three components of tradition, namely religion, hierarchy and/or collective identity, the interpretational situation is in principle the same as when he expresses nostalgia for tradition itself, i.e. as in point 1.

3) The situations in 1 and 2 can be seen as consequences of a phenomenon which is so widespread that I have observed it in most of the studied Dugin texts: Dugin rarely clearly differentiates between the Russian Empire and the USSR when he describes what he «wants», so he seldom expresses nostalgia for something which is specific for either the USSR or for the Russian Empire. That is, to him the Russian Empire and the USSR often seem to be just different versions of the same nostalgia object. It's what these two countries had in common, i.e. what ties them together, which most often are the primary objects of his nostalgia.

5.3.2 Aspects of Communism which Dugin rejects

Dugin is critical of Communism as a complete ideological package. For example, he states that Communism was «overcome by history and discarded», has demonstrated its «inefficiency and incompetence», and that «[t]he very idea of putting an end to [...] Communism [...] is an extremely liberating thing». (Dugin 2012, p. 33.)

But despite negative comments about Communism as a complete ideological package, Dugin is all the same interested in integrating some aspects of it into 4PT, while leaving others out. In this section I will specify which aspects he rejects, while in the next section (section 5.3.3) I will describe those he accepts.

Broadly speaking, Dugin rejects the basis for communism, fascism and liberalism. To him, «evolution, growth, modernization, progress [and] development» are parts of this basis. Instead of following a development-friendly ideology, he considers that people should follow his ideology of «conservatism and conservation». (Dugin 2012, p. 66.) I interpret his rejection of what he calls «evolution, growth, modernization, progress [and] development» of society as an expression of a longing for continuity with the past, stability and predictability in general. As pointed out in section 3.3.4, longing for continuity, stability and predictability are indicators of nostalgia in general.

Dugin also argues that Marxism is one of the modern ideologies, while the other two are capitalism and nationalism. He states that Marxism, as the other modern ideologies, is characterized by «materialism, atheism, mechanism and support of technological development», that Communists tie peoples to «atheist-material standards developed under Western condition» and are «opponents of tradition». Furthermore, as he sees it, Communism and the other two modern ideologies share a trait of global racism, i.e. Euro-centrism, i.e. universalism, which is in opposition to tradition. Dugin rejects all these traits of Communism. (Dugin 2014e, para. 11 and 13.) This rejection is also consistent with his nostalgia for the phenomenon which to him is their opposition, namely tradition (suggested in section 5.3.1).

Dugin also rejects «the Communist theories regarding historical materialism» and «the «material reductionism and economic determinism» of Marxism. This because they in practice led to the «destruction of the spiritual and religious heritage of those societies in which Marxism came to dominate». (Dugin 2012, pp. 48–49.) Considering nostalgia, I suggested in section 5.3.1 that Dugin experiences nostalgia for religion as a component of his nostalgia for tradition. His rejection of aspects of Marxism/Communism which made it difficult to exercise religion in Marxist/Communist countries strengthens that suggestion.

Another negative aspect of Marxism, as Dugin sees it, follows from Marxism's belief in the «miraculous power of scientific progress and technological development». (Dugin 2012, p. 59.) Dugin is against the Western belief in unidirectional development (Dugin 2014k, para. 18; Dugin 2012, pp. 48–49). Consequently, he is against this aspect of Communism.

5.3.3 Aspects of Communism which Dugin accepts

Dugin finds that Marxism is acceptable «in terms of its description of liberalism, in its criticism of the bourgeois system, and in revealing the truth behind the bourgeois-democratic policies of exploitation and enslavement which are presented as 'development' and

‘liberation’» (Dugin 2012, p. 49). Another advantage with Marxism is that it often correctly «describes its enemy, especially the bourgeoisie» (Dugin 2012, p. 50).

Dugin also likes that Marxism, «while being theoretically internationalist», *as it was put into practice* in the USSR and other Communist countries, created «nationalist» (sic!) societies with national cultures, unique identities and «strong traditional elements» (Dugin 2014b, p. 112). This stand strengthens my suggestion in section 5.3.1 that he is nostalgic for tradition. He sees this practice in contrast to the strict class principles which Marxism is based on, to the «theoretically internationalist» nature of the ideology, and to the ideology’s intention to, in principle, form all «socialist communities» the same way everywhere (Dugin 2014b, p. 112). Does this nostalgia for some of the results of Marxism put into practice express a kind of *Soviet* nostalgia? He experiences nostalgia for these results of practical Marxism, but in doing this paradoxically sets as a condition for his support that Marxism must produce partly different results than what should follow directly from Marxist principles. Thus, he is nostalgic for some aspects of what he sees as the «real» effects of Marxism on the Soviet Union, not for the intended ideology in these spheres.

Dugin also accepts Communism’s social solidarity and social justice traits (Dugin 2012, p. 195). By the theory in section 3.3.4, both social justice and social solidarity are normal objects of nostalgia. But do they signal *Soviet* nostalgia specifically? On the one hand, parts of the Russian *intelligenciâ* have been dreaming about social justice and social solidarity throughout long periods of Russian history. This dream was alive both in the Russian Empire and the Soviet epochs, so it wasn’t new to «Russia» in 1917. Therefore, it can be argued that the very ideas of social justice and social solidarity in themselves were aspects of the Russian idea already in the Russian Empire. With the revolution in 1917 followed an epoch when the country was ruled by an ideology in which social solidarity and social justice were more central values, at least on the declarative level. And Dugin himself even explicitly expresses (in e.g. the last citation above) that he wants to take the «social justice» and «social solidarity» aspects *from Communism* and into his ideology for the future (4PT). His explicit statements in this matter make me conclude that *his* nostalgia for social solidarity and social justice seems to be more of a Soviet nostalgia than a Russian Empire nostalgia.

5.4 Great Russia and the «great people»

The concepts of «Great Russia» («*Bol'šaâ Rossiâ*») and the «great people» («*bol'šoj narod*») are central to several of the Dugin texts I have studied. The purpose of this section is to explain these concepts and to show elements of Soviet nostalgia related to them.

5.4.1 Great Russia and the «great people» before the breakup of the USSR

To Dugin, Great Russia has so far existed in two forms, namely as the Russian Empire and the USSR. He sees the borders of Great Russia as having been roughly the same in the Soviet period and the Russian Empire period, and that they «in the period of Soviet power went through some, but not too significant, changes». (Dugin 2014g, in the 8. par)

But Great Russia had also political influence on territories outside its own physical borders. This influence was particularly large in the Soviet period, when the USSR form of Great Russia directly influenced Eastern Europe in general. (Dugin 2014g, para. 9.)

Regarding relations between the peoples inside Great Russia, «both in the Russian Empire and the USSR it was established a balance between [...] the core identity of the 'great people' and of the local identities of the 'small peoples'» (‘*malye narody*’) (Dugin 2014g, para. 8). What Dugin calls the «great people» was the Russians, while what he calls the «small peoples» were the other peoples in the Russian Empire and in the USSR. Although Dugin admits that the balance between Russians and the other peoples wasn't ideal, he insists that the «great people» was «uniting around itself the other peoples» in a «brotherly and friendly way» (Dugin 2014g, para. 11).

5.4.2 Consequences of the breakup on Great Russia

In this section I will discuss elements of Soviet nostalgia in Dugin’s descriptions of how the breakup of the USSR influenced Great Russia.

Dugin views the fall of the USSR as a catastrophe for Great Russia. One illustration of this is his claim that Great Russia in 1980s and in the early 990s experienced a crisis, was broken up and «changed until it wasn’t recognizable anymore» (2014g, in the 9. par). He also looks upon the breakup of the USSR as an event which meant the loss of Great Russia's sovereignty (Dugin 2014f, para. 1). And he several times expresses that he would like to resurrect Great Russia: E.g. under the Crimea crisis in 2014 he welcomes the reunification of

Russia and Crimea as «the beginning of the resurrection of Great Russia (USSR)» (Dugin 2014h, the last para.). Such expressions show nostalgia for Great Russia in general.

I observe that Dugin often distinguishes between various geographical territories when he is portraying losses (in general) produced by the breakup of the USSR. In general, he most frequently distinguishes between the territories which were integral parts of the USSR and other territories in Eastern Europe.

Concerning the territories which were integral parts of the USSR, and which Great Russia lost in 1991, the main rule is that they had in large also constituted parts of the Russian Empire. With the exception of the Baltic countries, they had in general also been integral parts of the Soviet Union in the interwar period. Probably for these reasons, when Dugin writes about the losses of these territories, he puts more emphasis on the importance of the *continuity* in their common history with the territories of the contemporary Russian Federation (RF) (e.g. in Dugin 2014d, para. 112) than when he writes about the losses of influence over territories of Eastern Europe countries which were never integral parts of Great Russia (neither the USSR, nor the Russian Empire). And his emotions for the loss of territories which were integrated into Great Russia seem strong. For example, when commenting on the loss of them, he bursts out that «[л]юбой русский, не осознающий распад Союза как национальную трагедию, – либо невежа, либо предатель» (Dugin 2014h, para. 23).

As learnt in section 5.3, by theory, longing for continuity is an indicator of nostalgia in general. But are the descriptions of the losses of territories of the USSR *Soviet* nostalgic? The emphasis on continuity from the Russian Empire period to the Soviet period signals that this is first and foremost nostalgia for the territories of Great Russia in general.

Considering the territories of Eastern Europe which never were integral parts of neither the Russian Empire nor the USSR, the situation is different. The USSR, with its strong political, economic and military influence on its «satellite states» in Eastern Europe, had more influence on large territories outside its own borders in Eastern Europe than the Russian Empire ever had. Thus, I see Dugin's expressions of loss of influence on the Eastern European territories which were never parts of the Russian Empire/USSR as primarily Soviet nostalgic.

5.4.3 Consequences of the breakup on the «great people»

On the general level, Dugin’s perception of the situation around the time of the breakup of the USSR is that when the «great people» (Dugin’s term), i.e. the Russians, began to «lose its

consciousness [Russian: *soznanie*] and strength», the smaller peoples from the Soviet period started to see the «brotherly Union» as a «colonial, imperial dictatorship» (Dugin 2014g, para. 11). From his viewpoint, after the breakup of the USSR, the question of «who will be the great people from now on» arose, and this question was related to the question of which identity Russia should have from then on (Dugin 2014g, para. 10). And it soon turned out that the (in Dugin's opinion) brotherly and friendly relations between the «great people» and the «smaller peoples» from the Soviet period were now gone. In Dugin's view, the post-Soviet states which had been parts of the USSR made «hatred to Russia the basis of their liberal-nationalist ideology, although in varying degrees» after the breakup (2014g, para. 11).

Is Dugin expressing Soviet nostalgia in his depictions of the loss of the Russians' status as the «great people» and the loss of the (perceived) friendship between the peoples? On the one hand, the «smaller peoples» in question have in part common history with the Russian «great people», stretching beyond the Soviet period and into the Russian Empire period. On the other hand, a difference between the Russian Empire and the USSR was that the Russian Empire in general was ideologically weaker than the USSR. In the ideologically more conscious USSR, the idea of fraternity of the peoples and the idea of the Russian people as the «great people» were pronounced, at least in long periods of the lifespan of the Union. Taking both of these two circumstances into account, I suggest that Dugin's expressions of the loss of the Russian people's status as the «great people» and the loss of the friendship between the peoples caused by the breakup of the USSR is primarily Great Russia nostalgia. Moreover, since nostalgia can be an expression of a psychological need to restore continuity with the past (by theory in section 3.3.4), I also suggest that the long common history of the peoples is at least one factor which promotes this nostalgia.

5.5 Balance of influence

The goal of this section is to identify elements of Soviet nostalgia in Dugin's descriptions of the loss of influence experienced by Great Russia because of the breakup of the USSR.

This section is logically connected to the preceding section 5.4, because the loss of influence of Russia which will be described in this section is a consequence of the fall of Great Russia (in its USSR form) treated in section 5.4.

5.5.1 Loss of influence in the world in general

Dugin's view on the Soviet period's so-called «bipolar system» of power/influence which existed in the Soviet period is that it was a «harsh geopolitical opposition between the US and the USSR, the capitalistic and socialistic systems. And both poles spread its influence far beyond the borders of their national territories». It was an opposition between the Russian and Western civilizations, i.e. the Land civilization against the Sea civilization, i.e. the Eurasianists against the Atlantists (as treated in section 5.2). (Dugin 2014g, para. 11.)

Dugin draws a picture of how the breakup of the USSR made the USSR (Great Russia) pole of the bipolar system of influence lose its strength, and how this in turn led to the transfer of influence from the USSR to the US – both in the world in general and in Europe in particular. In several of the studied texts, Dugin shows that he feels strongly about the loss of influence which «Russia» suffered as a consequence of this breakdown of the bipolar world. Specifically, he claims that the country lost its subjectness and independence – ideologically, conceptually, politically and strategically – after the breakup (Dugin 2014j, para. 14, my emphasis). Are his claims of such losses Soviet nostalgic, Russian Empire nostalgic or both? On the one hand, the USSR was a stronger project politically and ideologically than the Russian Empire was. This in itself indicates that claims like the last quote above are more Soviet nostalgic than Russian Empire nostalgic. On the other hand, I have observed (in the studied texts) that Dugin often is more nostalgic for Great Russia, i.e. for what the Russian Empire and the USSR had in common, than for the Russian Empire or the USSR specifically. Details about this trend are given in section 7.1.2. I find it hard to argue that what he calls «Russia», both in the forms of the mighty Russian Empire and the mighty USSR, didn't have subjectness and ideological, conceptual, political and strategic independence. Thus, I see these qualities as something which these two mighty units had in common, although not to the exact same degree. Thus, I suggest that Dugin's claims of Russia's lost subjectness and ideological, conceptual, political and strategic independence after the breakup of the USSR are primarily Great Russia nostalgic.

5.5.2 Loss of influence in Eastern Europe in general

In some texts/passages Dugin doesn't distinguish between the territories which were parts of the USSR and the Eastern European countries outside the USSR which the USSR influenced. This section is about these cases.

Dugin sees the transfer of influence in Europe from the USSR to the US after the breakup of the USSR as an American occupation of Europe (Dugin 2014a, para. 13). And he considers that «[к]рах СССР означал победу альтернативного американского полюса, который остался единственным и немедленно приступил к установлению собственного контроля над теми зонам, которые уходили из под влияния Большой России». He also specifies that the types of influence which Great Russia lost, both over the former USSR and the East European states which had been «only» under the direct political control of the USSR, were both ideological and real political. (2014g, para. 11.)

Are his expressions of loss of political and ideological influence Soviet nostalgic? When it comes to the newly independent states which in the Soviet period were integral parts of the USSR, most of them were also integrated into the Russian Empire. Therefore, I consider that his expressions of nostalgia for the political and ideological power over them are above all Great Russia nostalgic, not Soviet nostalgic specifically. However, regarding his nostalgia for the loss of political and ideological power over the Eastern European states outside of the USSR which were under Soviet control without ever being formal parts of the USSR or of the Russian Empire, I suggest this is more typically nostalgia for the USSR than for the Russian Empire. This since the Soviet Union exerted influence on more territories abroad in Eastern Europe than the Russian Empire ever did.

5.5.3 Loss of influence in the former republics of the USSR exclusively

In some texts/passages Dugin distinguishes between the territories which were integrated into the USSR and the Eastern European countries outside of the USSR which were influenced by the USSR. This section is about the cases where he does this distinction and makes it clear that he writes about loss about territories of the former USSR only.

These cases are similar to the cases where he doesn't distinguish between the territories of the USSR and the other Eastern European countries (mentioned in section 5.5.2) in the way that his nostalgia for lost influence in the former USSR territories seem to be above all Great Russia nostalgic, not Soviet nostalgic specifically.

However, a difference is that in cases when Dugin talks about the former USSR exclusively, he doesn't seem to express a sentimental nostalgia of the reflective type (term from section 3.1) on the ideological and political influence in these territories only. He seems to also expresses a willingness to let Russia make an impact on these territories. This type of

nostalgia is restorative, according to theory (section 3.1). See e.g. this passage from 2014, where he talks about the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev: «Он первым понял главный закон постсоветского пространства: территориальная целостность любого государства на территории бывшего СССР зависит от отношений с Россией. Если эти отношения приемлемые, целостность гарантирована.» (Dugin 2014i, para. 17.) In this particular quote, it's the passage's territorial aggression which makes it restorative nostalgic.

5.5.4 Nostalgia in Dugin's plans for the world in general

Dugin wants a «new global, Eurasian alternative to the Western vision of the world's future». In order to implements this alternative, he wants the world to become divided into four geo-economic belts: The Euro-African belt, the Asian-Pacific belt, the Eurasian belt and the American belt. (Dugin 2014b, pp. 60,73.) This division is consistent with his vision of multipolarity as the future world order. Is Dugin's goal of a multipolar world order Soviet nostalgic? He doesn't claim that he wants the bipolar world back, which would have been a Soviet nostalgic thing to do. Instead, as mentioned, he asserts that he wants a multipolar world. This should be a world with also other poles of power than the US and Russia. This doesn't indicate Soviet nostalgia in itself.

But Dugin also claims that «Russia is destined to become the leader of a new global, Eurasian alternative to the Western vision of the world's future» (Dugin 2014b, p. 73). And he was also in line with this wish for Russian leadership e.g. when he commented on the Crimea crisis in 2014: «Сейчас Путин стоит на один шаг от того, чтобы стать лидером мира, [...], сейчас это момент истины для нас, для России» (Dugin 2014l, para. 2).

Is Dugin's wish that Russia becomes the leader of this global Eurasian alternative Soviet nostalgic? I find it to be an expression of a longing for Russia to take back its role as a world power on the ideological level. Based on the Soviet experience, ideological power should normally also translate into some world power on the political level. The sum, i.e. being a world power both on the ideological and on the political level, is more reminiscent of the position of the USSR than of the Russian Empire, for two reasons: Firstly, the Russian Empire was in general ideologically weaker than the USSR. Secondly, the Russian Empire never became as politically influential in large territories in Eastern Europe outside of the empire itself as the USSR did, although the Russian Empire also had political influence abroad. To summarize, I see his wish that Russia becomes the leader of a new, global, Eurasian alternative more as Soviet nostalgic than Russian Empire nostalgic.

Another thing is how Dugin justifies his wish that Russia becomes the leader of the Eurasian alternative: Is that justification Soviet nostalgic? He argues that Russia more than once has become «the core of the union of many different peoples and cultures into one single civilization fusion», and therefore «Eurasianists believe that Russia is destined to play the same role in the twenty-first century» (Dugin 2014b, p. 68). So, essentially his argument is that the past should dictate the future in this respect. However, the Russian people was central to «the union of many different peoples and cultures» both in the Russian Empire and in the USSR. Thus, I suggest that statements which emphasize this Russian core role are both Russian Empire nostalgic and Soviet nostalgic.

5.5.5 Nostalgia in Dugin's plans for the Eurasian Union

Dugin wanted in 2014 to transform the CIS into what he calls a «Eurasian Union» (Dugin 2014b, p. 78). The Eurasian (Economic) Union came into effect in 2015, and by the end of that year it encompassed Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. This section is about what kind of relations Dugin wants for the countries in the Eurasian Union in geopolitical matters and about his preferred economic system for the Union.

Dugin wants the Eurasian Union to be an «autonomous political formation» based on Eurasianism (Dugin 2014b, p. 62). In his view, the Eurasian Union should continue the tradition of integration which was earlier led by «the Romanov Empire of Russia and, later, the Soviet Union» (Dugin 2014b, p. 51). That is, his very wish for integration within the Eurasian Union is not nostalgic for the USSR specifically, but for what he sees as common for the USSR and the Russian Empire.

Concerning relations between the countries in the Eurasian Union in geopolitical matters, Dugin sees the CIS as «an asymmetrical group of nation-states in which one of them, the Russian Federation, has the right to have partial geopolitical sovereignty, while the others do not have such a right» (Dugin 2014b, p. 78). Is this a Soviet nostalgic stance? On the one hand, it can be argued that RSFSR was the «big brother» in the USSR from the WWII on and till the breakup of the USSR in 1991, and therefore had more to say in deciding the Union's so-called «common» views on geopolitics. But all the same, it's one thing to dominate a union's so-called «common» stances on geopolitics, quite another to implement parts of *your own* sovereign one. Thus, Dugin's willingness to privilege Russia in the Eurasian Union when it comes to geopolitical sovereignty didn't have a direct parallel in the Soviet period, in my opinion. To summarize, I don't find this standpoint in itself to be *Soviet* nostalgic specifically.

Regarding choice of political-social system for the Eurasian Union, it's relevant what kind of division of power Dugin prefers for the Eurasian Union. He wants two levels of government: Local and strategic. He wants the local power to be implemented through several autonomies, which in general shall manage «civil and administrative issues; the social sphere; education and medical services» and «all spheres of economic activity» on their own territories. (Dugin 2014b, p. 63.) It's noteworthy that Dugin also prescribes a strategic level of power, which should be exerted by one single «strategic center» (his term) for the whole Union (Dugin 2014b, p. 66, my emphasis). He wants this strategic center to be a «rigidly hierarchical structure» in control of military and macro-level economic issues, among others. (Dugin 2014b, p. 63.) In other words, this will be a highly powerful military and economic center.

Turning more directly to the choice of economic system for the Eurasian Union, there is, from Dugin's perspective, «no ultimate truth – the recipes of liberalism and Marxism can only be partially applied, depending on the actual conditions of a society». «Control over strategic sectors of the economy» should be combined with free markets. The mentioned strategic center should perform «strategic control of the branches that form the basis of the economy», while medium and small-scale businesses should be given what he calls «maximal freedom». (Dugin 2014b, p. 65.) Are these ideas Soviet nostalgia? When it comes the strategic center's control over strategic sectors of the economy, this was built-in in the Soviet planned economic system if we see the Soviet central administration as the strategic center of the USSR. But although his wish for control over strategic sectors is strongly reminiscent of the Soviet economic system, his wish for free markets represents a serious deviance from the principles of the Soviet planned economic system. Thus, the economic system he wants, seen as a whole package/a unit, doesn't express Soviet nostalgia.

6 Analysis of A. Prohanov's texts

In this chapter I will present and discuss the individual findings I have made of Soviet nostalgia in the analysis of the selected texts by Aleksandr Prohanov.

6.1 The Second World War and the Soviet victory

This section treats Prohanov's nostalgia for the Soviet participation in the Second World War (WWII) in general and for the Soviet victory in that war in particular, as well as links with others of his nostalgias.

6.1.1 The victory and the significance of Christianity

In Prohanov's view, the Second World War (WWII) was something much more than just a geopolitical war. It was a holy war, Christ's war against «Hell, which came up from the underground». (Prohanov 2015d, para. 12; Prohanov 2015l, para. 17.) That is, it was «Christ's descent on Earth», and «Christ fought on the side of the Red Army» (Prohanov 2015i, para. 6; Prohanov 2014g, para. 5). And «the Russian people made an offer to Christ» through all the millions Soviet citizens who died in the war, and that offer «saved the world from the darkness» (Prohanov 2010j, para. 2). As this shows, Prohanov's perceived Christianity is important in his nostalgia for the WWII. This importance of his perceived Christianity also extends to the Soviet weapons associated with the victory, since he considers even them to be holy (e.g. in Prohanov 2015n, the last para.)

Moreover, Prohanov paints a picture where the USSR as such, including its people, and even Stalin, showed religious behavior during WWII. I exemplify this by this quote: «Во время войны Советский Союз являл собой огромный красный монастырь, [...] все молились [...]. Молился Сталин, выходя ночами из кремлёвского кабинета, открывая ворота в Успенский собор» (Prohanov 2015b, para. 2). His nostalgia for Stalin will be studied in more detail in section 6.2, but the point here is that passages like this show that Prohanov's perceived Christianity constitutes a connecting tie between his nostalgia for the WWII and his strong nostalgia for Stalin. This tie comes in addition to the more obvious tie that Stalin was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR during the war, and as such the top leader of a state participating in WWII.

Furthermore, Prohanov extends his nostalgia for the WWII to the whole Soviet society with the help of religion. By «extends» I have in mind that he extrapolates, i.e. «broadens», his nostalgia for the WWII, which in principle could have been restricted to the WWII in a narrow sense, into also other possible objects of nostalgia associated with the USSR. I don't speculate about his intentions here. I simply point to what I see as an effect – intended or not – of his writing. This «extending phenomenon» turns out to be relevant for many of Prohanov's nostalgias, so I will return to it whenever relevant.

I now change focus from the Soviet participation in the WWII in general to the Soviet victory in that war in particular.

Prohanov's perceived Christianity is central to many of his descriptions of the victory. An illustration of this is that he sees the Soviet victory as a religious one (Prohanov 2015d, para. 16). And in the same way as he sees the WWII as a holy war, he also sees the Soviet victory as «holy» («*svâtoj*») (Prohanov 2014f, para. 1; Prohanov 2015d, para. 12). More specifically, the victory is Christian (Prohanov 2015l, para. 17). In some passages, the victory in 1945 even *is* Christ (Prohanov 2015r, the last para.; Prohanov 2015i, para. 6). And this victory was a victory «of the light over darkness, of love over hate, of Heaven over Hell» (Prohanov 2014f, para. 2). It also turns out that Prohanov's perceived Christianity often is the «glue» that binds his nostalgia for the victory to nostalgias for other aspects of the Soviet society, and/or also to other time periods in the history of the USSR, as the following sections will show.

Why is Prohanov's perceived Christianity so important in his Soviet nostalgia, both in his nostalgia for the victory and as the «glue» that ties his nostalgia for the victory to nostalgias for other aspects of the Soviet society? I suggest that at least one explanation can be found by noting that Prohanov claims that the Soviet period was «deeply religious», in fact «one of the most religious periods» in Russian history (Prohanov 2014a, para. 46). An example of how he expresses this outlook:

> В якобы атеистическое советское время религиозность была настолько глубока, чтобы благодаря ей мы выиграли войну. Советский период является одним из самых возвышенных, мистических и религиозных периодов нашей истории. Просто мы причащались кровью на полях сражений, и нашей литургией была священная война 1941–1945 годов. (Prohanov 2014a, para. 46.)

Is this in line with theory on nostalgia? According to theory in sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, a person's nostalgia rests in principle on how that person in retrospect thinks the past was, not on how other people think it «really» was. So, if a person thinks that the Soviet period was

very religious, it's not strange that his/her Soviet nostalgia contains elements of nostalgia for what he/she sees as Christian elements in the USSR. That is, theory doesn't contradict the finding that Christianity in general is an important element in Prohanov's Soviet nostalgia.

More generally, from a theoretical perspective it's fully possible to feel nostalgia for an object which never existed in the way the nostalgic person «remembers» it (sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4). Consequently, from this theoretical viewpoint, the fact that there exist different views on how the past really was should not impact on our conclusions regarding whether nostalgia is present or not. This applies to the many cases in this study where there exist disagreements in society on how the past really «was».

6.1.2 The Soviet people and the Red Army: Linked to the victory

In this section I will show how Christianity often functions as a connecting link between the Soviet victory in the WWII and the Soviet people/the Red Army.

First to Prohanov's nostalgia for the Soviet citizens who actually died during WWII. The importance of his perceived Christianity is visible in the way that he claims that the millions of Soviet citizens who died during the WWII became martyrs of Christ (Prohanov 2015b, para. 6; Prohanov 2015d, para. 11).

But Prohanov also extends his nostalgia by including also those Soviet citizens in general and Red Army soldiers in particular who didn't fall in the war. He often does this by claiming that the sacrifices which (what he calls) the «holy» Soviet people and the «holy» Red Army made during the WWII are commensurate with the sacrifice of Crist, and that this makes the Soviet people and the Red Army holy. An example of this phenomenon is the following quote:

> Красная Армия, советский, русский народ понесли неслыханные жертвы – 30 миллионов убитых. И эта жертва, говорили монахи, соизмерима с Христовой жертвой. Эта жертва делает Красную Армию, советский, русский народ Христовым, священным народом. (Prohanov 2014g, para. 5.)

The result is nostalgia for the Soviet people and the Red Army in general. And the observation that he even associates the *contemporary* Russian youth with the victory corroborates the result. The following passage exemplifies this association: «Ты, сегодняшний молодой человек, ты, юнец, ты, седовласый старец, это ты – победитель. Это ты водружал над Берлином красное знамя Победы.» (Prohanov 2015o, para. 9.) That

is, he makes this association although the contemporary young people obviously weren't even born at the time of the war, and therefore couldn't possibly do anything useful during the war. An effect of this association is that he expresses nostalgia for the Soviet people as such, not only for the Soviet people at the time of war.

6.1.3 The Soviet state: Linked to the victory

A quite obvious link between the Soviet state and the Soviet victory in the WWII is that the Soviet state fought and won the WWII against Nazi Germany on the territory of the USSR (with some help from the Allies towards the end of the war). In this section, however, I will treat a less obvious link: I will show how Prohanov's nostalgia for the Soviet victory in the WWII often is connected with his nostalgia for the Soviet state by his perceived Christianity. In order to achieve this aim, I will sketch six different findings, where each of the findings will represent text passages where Prohanov associates the victory with the Soviet state in a way different from what he does in other passages.

The first finding consists of the passages where Prohanov emphasizes that the victory in the WWII was one of the values which the Soviet state rested on. In Prohanov's view, what he calls the «enemy» attacked these values during perestroika, and as a result of these attacks, the Soviet state fell. (E.g. in Prohanov 2015g, para. 42.) I see these passages as examples of expressions of nostalgia for the Soviet victory in WWII, the Soviet state and the (unspecified) Soviet values which the state rested on.

The second finding consists of the passages where Prohanov presupposes that the victory was a part of the basis, one of the symbols and/or one of the ideological postulates of the Soviet state. During *perestroika*, the «enemy», e.g. «the Gorbachevs» (Prohanov's term), destroyed all of them. (E.g. in Prohanov 2015i, para. 7.) I see these passages as expressions of nostalgia for the Soviet victory in WWII, for the Soviet state and for the (unspecified) basis, symbols and/or the ideological postulates which this state rested on.

The third finding is constituted by the instances where Prohanov expresses that the ideology of the Soviet system rested on multiple «constants» (Prohanov's term), among which the victory was the most important. The «enemy», e.g. «the liberals», attacked those constants during perestroika. I bring two examples of this line of thought:

> В богоборческий период перестройки, когда либералы, держа в одной руке церковную свечку, другой истребляли советскую мистическую эру, тогда главные удары наносились по константам, на которых держалась идеология советского строя. И главной из этих констант была победа, священная война. [...] Договаривались до того, что победу называли преступлением советского строя и жалели о поражении Гитлера. Советское государство пало. (Prohanov 2015b, para. 14.)

> Советское государство рухнуло в момент, когда у него отняли все смыслы, все константы, все идеологические основы. Но не смогли отнять одного – икону Победы. Эту икону мы перенесли через трагический и жестокий 91-й год в наши дни. Так раненый командир, обмотав вокруг пробитой груди своё полковое знамя, выносит его через топи [sic], овраги, через засады врага. Он выносит это знамя и, может быть, умирая, расстёгивает гимнастерку, и спасённое от врага знамя вновь начинает трепетать. (Prohanov 2015o, para. 7.)

Besides being examples of Prohanov's nostalgias for the Soviet victory in WWII and for the Soviet state, these two quotes are also examples of his nostalgia for his (not fully specified) «constants» which the ideology of the Soviet system rested on.

In addition, the last quote above is also a good example of the sentimentality on various aspects of the USSR which occur in several of the examined Prohanov texts. However, according to the theory in section 3.2.2, sentimentality is a trait of reflective nostalgia, while political nostalgia is categorized as restorative. Prohanov is an active nationalist, so based on this theory it would at the outset be tempting to assume that his nostalgia should be purely restorative, and not at all reflective. Therefore, if taking only this theory into account, it may seem surprising that several of the studied Prohanov texts are in part quite sentimental. But *I* don't find it contradictory that a person can have the restorative «hard» wish to change something in order to bring back (parts of) the past, while he/she still has kept the reflective and «softer» sentimental feelings for that past. This finding is also in line with my understanding of nostalgia as a phenomenon so complex and «floating» that its very nature needs an approach which is open to the possibility that a nostalgic person actually is able to feel sentimentality and a wish to makes changes at the same time.

The fourth finding consists of passages where Prohanov emphasizes that the idea of the victory was important to the Soviet people's ideas about Soviet history and Soviet leaders. When this idea was smeared during *perestroika*, the Soviet state and the country broke up. The following quote exemplifies such expressions:

> На протяжении четырёх лет перестройки послойно снимали все представления наших граждан о своём государстве. [...] Были затоптаны, высмеяны, осквернены все события, все герои Гражданской и Великой Отечественной войн. И сама Великая Отечественная война объявлялась чуть ли не преступлением режима. [...] В результате рухнули все представления нашего народа об истории, которая трактовалась как непрерывная череда злодеяний, изменились представления о лидерах, которых изображали либо безумцами, либо кровавыми палачами. Когда рухнули эти представления, вместо страны образовалось пыльное облако. И оно рассеялось после 1991-го года. (Prohanov 2015j, para. 5 and 6.)

Besides being an example of Prohanov's nostalgias for the Soviet victory in WWII and for the Soviet state, the last quote above is also an example of his nostalgia for Soviet history and leaders who he considers tried to do good things.

The fifth finding consists of descriptions in which Prohanov extends the significance of the victory backward and forward in time, so it affects his perspective on roughly the whole Soviet period. In some of these instances he makes an extension backward to the pre-WWII period in general, in other instances backward to the 1920s in particular (Prohanov 2014c, para. 12), and in yet another forward in time. In some of the descriptions the victory is a mysterious thing which even makes sense of the pre-war Stalin period. He even suggests that the meaning of the whole Soviet project maybe was to achieve the Soviet victory in WWII (Prohanov 2015b, para. 12). My main point here is that his associations of the victory with both the pre-war and post-war periods push his nostalgia for the victory in the direction of becoming nostalgia for the USSR as such. An example of these expressions:

> Победа – это высшее достижение советской эры, высшее проявление советского строя. Быть может, весь советский проект был задуман историей для того, чтобы в недрах этого проекта воссияла победа. Мистический религиозный характер победы делает весь советский период не богоборческим, не богопротивным, а богоносным и богооткровенным. Священная победа одержана священным народом, священными взводами и ротами, священными батальонами и полками, священными армиями и фронтами. Святая армия, святой народ, святые герои-мученики, святые полководцы, святой генералиссимус Сталин. (Prohanov 2015b, para. 12.)

Besides being examples of Prohanov's nostalgias for the Soviet victory in WWII, the last quote above is also an example of how he expresses his nostalgias for the Soviet period, the Red Army, the Soviet people, Stalin, and of how his perceived Christianity functions as a link between his nostalgia for the victory and these other nostalgias.

The sixth (and last) finding consists of the text cases where Prohanov claims that the USSR won the war thanks to the sum of the following three parties' efforts: 1. The Soviet people. 2. The Soviet state/the Red Army/the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 3. Stalin/the strong leader. (Prohanov 2010j, para. 1; Prohanov 2010f, para. 5). When Prohanov shows nostalgia in these instances, it's a mix of nostalgias for the victory (section 6.1.1), the Soviet people (section 6.1.2), the Soviet state (this section)/the Red Army (section 6.1.2)/The Communist Party, and Stalin/the strong leader (section 6.2).

6.2 Stalin and Stalinism

The aim of this section is to explore Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalin and Stalinism, how it's linked to some of his other nostalgias, and to explore his «mystical Stalinism» concept.

6.2.1 The intensity of the nostalgia for Stalin/Stalinism

Prohanov considers that Stalin was a very important figure in Russian history. This can be seen by the roles he dedicates to Stalin in many of his texts, e.g. a «strong leader, a military leader, a modernizer of Russia, a great ideologue, the savior and creator of a new and great state», as well as «the divine conquerer» (*«božestvennyj pobedonosec»*) who led the Soviet people to victory over «the black forces from Hell» during WWII (Prohanov 2015f, para. 4.)

Prohanov frequently calls Stalin «great» (*«velikij»*) and (more rarely) «beautiful» (Prohanov 2015b, para. 22; Prohanov 2015f, para. 2). He even claims that Stalin is «the speed of light», and that Stalin's role in the human and the Russian history actually can be formulated in the languages of mathematics and physics: «Сталин – это скорость света. Его роль описывается формулой E = mc в квадрате. Где E – история человечества, m – история России, c – Сталин.» (Prohanov 2015d, para. 17.) The intensity of his nostalgia for Stalin is also seen in other text passages, e.g. when he praises «the star of Stalin» which «continued to twinkle» despite the attacks on Stalinism under Khrushchev's, Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's rule (Prohanov 2015d, para. 5–6).

6.2.2 Links between nostalgia for Stalin/Stalinism and other nostalgias

A common denominator for several of the connections between Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalin/Stalinism and others of his nostalgias is the religious aspect. For example, his nostalgia for Stalin and Stalinism is linked in this way to his nostalgias for the victory (section 6.1.1), the Soviet people (section 6.1.3), the Red Army (section 6.1.3) and the heroes of the war (Prohanov 2015b, para. 12).

In section 6.3.1 I will describe Prohanov's nostalgia for the USSR's status as a world power. There is a link between this nostalgia and his nostalgia for Stalin: To Prohanov, Stalin is a Soviet epitome who other important leaders in the world respected and listened to, and in this way Stalin is at the core of Prohanov's nostalgia for the USSR as an important country

and power in the world. The following quote, in which Prohanov in 2014 comments on a visit of his to Yalta and on the Yalta Conference in 1945, exemplifies this:

> Мы оказались в Ливадии, в Ливадийском дворце под Ялтой. [...] именно в этом дворце в 1945 году сошлись Рузвельт, Черчилль и Иосиф Виссарионович Сталин. [...] Сталин своей тростью или зыбкой былинкой чертил на песке контуры будущего мира, а Черчилль и Рузвельт взирали на сталинский чертеж, на сталинский рисунок. И мы взяли отсюда землю, чтобы рассказать о великом времени, когда Советский Союз управлял историей, двигал время к русской победе. (Prohanov 2014b, para. 12.)

Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalin and Stalinism is also connected to his nostalgia for the type of Soviet culture which he considers typical of the Stalin period. This culture is in fact classical Russian and basically Orthodox, he claims (Prohanov 2010a, para. 5). Thus, he seems to welcome the domination of traditional Russian culture over traditional cultures of other, smaller peoples in the USSR. But the general domination of the Russian «big brother» over the smaller peoples in the USSR was more typical of the post-WWII period than of the pre-WWII period. Therefore, I suggest that this is first and foremost a nostalgia for the Soviet culture in the post-WWII period. Another point is that his emphasis on the Russian cultural roots makes it relevant to consider eventual nostalgia for (parts of) the culture of the Russian Empire. He seems to be nostalgic for the elements of the culture of the Russian Empire which were traditionally Russian (i.e. not the imported, Western parts), and for the Soviet culture which was built upon these elements.

Prohanov is also nostalgic for the Soviet industry, and his nostalgia for Stalin and for Stalinism is connected to this nostalgia. This is seen e.g. in Prohanov's claim that one of «Stalin's tireless activities» was «building of factories» (Prohanov 2010e, para. 2). Section 6.4 will treat his nostalgia for the Soviet industry in more detail.

6.2.3 Mystical Stalinism

A central component of Prohanov's view on Stalin and Stalinism is his mystical Stalinism.

Prohanov sees mystical Stalinism as the «[у]чение о Сталине как о таинственной, загадочной, соединяющей землю и небо категории» (Prohanov 2015d, para. 4). His view that mystical Stalinism «unifies the Earth and the Heaven» can be explained by Prohanov's view that Stalin won over Hell in WWII (Prohanov 2015d, para. 11). Taking into account this view, it's not very surprising that Prohanov also claims that Stalin was «a leader given by God to the human kind» (Prohanov 2015d, para. 10). Moreover, he claims that the entrance of Stalin on the scene of Russian history can't be explained by ordinary political science – no,

it's a «miracle» (Prohanov 2014e, para. 98; Prohanov 2015c, para. 28). And when it comes to the Soviet/Russian people, it had, as Prohanov sees it, a special role, since it had been given the mission to win over Hell (Prohanov 2015d, para. 8, my emphasis). Another way to put this is that mystical Stalinism is identical to «the Russian people's duty» to «transform darkness into light» and to «convert defeat into victory» (Prohanov 2015d, last para.).

Regarding the Stalinist period before the WWII, according to Prohanov's mystical Stalinism, its meaning was to «prepare the [Soviet] people for the victory» in the WWII. And everything what Stalin did, also in his first years in power, was done in order to prepare the Soviet people for the victory in the WWII and to achieve it. (Prohanov 2015d, para. 9.) In this way, mystical Stalinism gives meaning to all Stalin's actions before WWII and functions, from my perspective, as a partwise excuse of Stalin's actions in the USSR before the WWII: On the one hand, Prohanov admits that many «brutal and horrible» things were committed in the USSR before the WWII. On the other hand, he states that all this was done in order to win the WWII (Prohanov 2015e, para. 52). And he ensures that when Stalin won the WWII, he redeemed all his sins (Prohanov 2015l, para. 20). Stalin redeemed everything which later has been called «wrongdoings» and «crimes» committed by him (Prohanov 2014c, para. 15).

Another feature of Prohanov's mystical Stalinism is that it states that the Soviet victory in the WWII was pre-destined: Since this victory in the WWII was accomplished «long before the start of the war», it was accomplished already «in the very sources of Stalinism» (Prohanov 2010e, the last para.). And «the victory was impossible without Stalin. [...] Stalin *is* the victory» (Prohanov 2015d, para. 16, my emphasis). Taking into account how central the victory is to Prohanov's Soviet nostalgia (learnt in section 6.1), these passages also support my suggestion from section 6.2.2 that Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalin is a central component of his Soviet nostalgia.

The main points above are also consistent with my general suggestion in section 6.2.2 that Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalinism is tightly linked to his nostalgia for the victory, and that what Prohanov sees/presents as Christianity often functions as that link.

Another aspect of Prohanov's mystical Stalinism is his nostalgia for the unification of the leader (Stalin) and his people for the sake of working towards a common goal. Two examples of expressions of this: «Сталинград – это пламенный пример того, как народ и лидер соединяются в огненное единство», and Stalin «предложил народу Общее Дело, объединившее людей для выполнения непомерной задачи, которая открывала в человеке героя и победителя» (Prohanov 2010e, para. 4). A related aspect is the nostalgia

Prohanov shows for Stalin's (alleged) ability to unify different nations and peoples in the struggle towards a common goal. In addition, nostalgia for the Russian people's (claimed) ability to organize other peoples in the struggle towards this common goal is often intertwined with it. Furthermore, in some passages he even explicitly says that the unification took place within the frames of an «empire». The following quotes exemplify these three phenomena: «[Р]усский народ реализовал себя, как огромная мировая сила, освоившая необъятные пространства Евразии, включившая в это освоение множество других народов, организовавшая их на Общее Дело» (Prohanov 2010g, para. 4). «Сталин [...] научил или сделал так, что все нации, все народы служили этой башне, имперской башне. Вот и теперь надо точно так же сделать» (Prohanov 2015g, para. 37). «[М]ы Империя! И задача Империи – объединить все народы во имя служения общей наднациональной идее» (Prohanov 2015g, para. 36). That is, we have these four findings: 1) Nostalgia for the unification of different peoples in the struggle for a common goal. 2) Nostalgia for the Russian people's function as the organizing force in this struggle for a common goal. 3) Nostalgia for the strong leader at the top (Stalin) which personalized the organization of these different peoples towards a common goal. 4) Nostalgia for «the empire» in general.

It's also noteworthy that the last two of the three quotes above are expressions of what Svetlana Boym calls «restorative nostalgia» (section 3.1). This since they express a wish for the restoration of (parts of) a past. In this case this «past» is «the empire». Moreover, by theory in section 3.3.1, restorative nostalgia is often connected to nationalism. Thus, since Prohanov is a nationalist of the empire restoring (i.e. *impertsy*) type, I expected to find instances of restorative nostalgia for the «empire» in his writing, which was done here.

6.3 Geopolitical power, territories and ideology

In this section I will first describe Prohanov's nostalgia for USSR's geopolitical power in the world's power balance, for the lost territories and his references to what he sees as the «enemies» of the USSR. Then I will comment on his few explicit statements about economy in the studied material. Thereafter I will discuss whether he is nostalgic for various aspects of Communism. And, finally, I will discuss to what degree I have found nostalgia for aspects of the Soviet ideology in the ideology that he wants for Russia in the future.

6.3.1 World power, the bipolar system, the enemy, territories

Prohanov expresses nostalgia for the USSR as a «great power» (*«velikaâ deržava»*) (Prohanov 2015j, para. 4). I expected that he would most often use the expression «super power» *(«sverhderžava»)*, but he uses the expression «great power» considerable more often.

When it comes to loss of influence in the world in general, Prohanov expresses nostalgia for the USSR as a «world power» *(«mirovaâ deržava»)* (Prohanov 2015j, para. 4). This is nostalgia for influence on all territories in the world where the USSR was influential, and he expresses it in several passages (e.g. in Prohanov 2014b, para. 12; Prohanov 2015a, para. 31).

After the WWII, it was established a balance of geopolitical influence, in which the US/the West and the USSR were the two poles. From now on I will call this balance the «bipolar system». Prohanov harbors nostalgia for the position of the USSR as one of the poles in this bipolar system (e.g. in Prohanov 2015h, para. 4).

Related to the idea of the bipolar power system was the idea of the foreign enemy. The intensity of this idea varied over time throughout the Soviet period, but was always to some degree present, at least in parts of the Soviet population. It can be argued that in the USSR Great Britain was considered to be the principal enemy before the WWII, while the US, NATO and the West were seen as these enemies after the WWII (NATO only after its founding in 1949). The point when it comes to Soviet nostalgia is that reproductions in post-Soviet Russia of the idea of the enemy from the Soviet period can be seen as an indicator of a longing for continuity with this aspect of Soviet life. And, conforming to the theory in section 3.3.4, longing for continuity with the Soviet period is an indicator of Soviet nostalgia. And there are several cases where Prohanov shows that he sees the West, Europe and the US as enemies, and that he harbors nostalgia for this enemy idea (e.g. in Prohanov 2014c, para. 6; Prohanov 2014h, para. 39). For example, he states that «Америка – страна абсолютного зла» (Prohanov 2015k, para. 14).

These findings are in line with the theory in section 3.3.4, according to which nostalgia can express longing for continuity with the past. In these, cases such longing leads to the reproduction of the well-known enemy idea from the Soviet times. The findings are also consistent with theory in section 3.3.4 which implies that descriptions of (perceived) foreign enemies are frequent in nationalist nostalgia.

Prohanov also expresses nostalgia for the geopolitical power which the USSR had in other Eastern European countries than the USSR itself. For example, he mourns the losses of

the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to «Europe and the US» (Prohanov 2014c, para. 6).

Prohanov is also nostalgic for the loss of territories which had been integral parts of the USSR and for the corresponding loss of influence/power over these territories. Prohanov writes that this territorial loss was «colossal» (Prohanov 2015p, para. 7). It's true that the actual size of these territories changed through the Soviet period, especially around the time of the WWII. All the same Prohanov in several texts he describes them as if all of them were parts of the USSR throughout both the entire Soviet period and the whole Russian Empire period. However, most territories of the USSR *were* also integrated into the Russian Empire, so what Prohanov does is essentially to express nostalgia for what was common, territorially speaking, for those two epochs. Thus, I interpret this nostalgia as neutral in the sense that it's neither specifically Soviet nostalgia, nor specifically Russian Empire nostalgia.

6.3.2 Economy

Prohanov provides little information on how he sees economic matters specifically. However, I will make a few comments on the little data on these matters I have found in his texts.

Firstly, concerning choice of economic system, some passages indicate that Prohanov is very dissatisfied with the current economic system in Russia, and they may indicate that he harbors some nostalgia for the Soviet socialist administrative command system, which included the planned economy. However, these data (texts) don't tell clearly whether he would welcome the return of the Soviet economic system or not. (E.g. in Prohanov 2015q, para. 6; Prohanov 2015q, para. 12.) That is, if to be judged on the basis of the few data available, he might harbor nostalgia for the Soviet economic system, but it's unknown whether this nostalgia is reflective or restorative. But in all cases the data are so few that I don't generalize upon them.

Secondly, when it comes to more specific and everyday aspects of the Soviet economic politics, I have observed a few data which may point to nostalgia for the Soviet free medicine (health care), free education and free flats. An example: «По своим принципам и задачам [советская революция] была идеальной – это бесплатная медицина, бесплатные квартиры, бесплатное образование» (Prohanov 2015m, para. 73, bracketed text in original). However, the data concerning eventual nostalgia for the Soviet free medicine (healthcare), free education and free flats are so few that I don't generalize upon them.

However, people's preferences when it comes to ideology often have implications also on their views on various economic systems, so see also sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4.

6.3.3 Preferred ideology – Communism?

I have already treated Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalinism in particular in section 6.2, and will treat the role of Stalinism in his preferred future ideology for Russia in section 6.3.4. Thus, this section (section 6.3.3) is only about eventual nostalgia for Communism in general, not for Stalinism in particular. Another limiting circumstance is that Prohanov provides much less information about how he relates to Communism in general than to Stalinism in particular in, so I will treat Communism in less detail than what I did with Stalinism (in section 6.2).

The findings which concern Communism in general are: Prohanov harbors nostalgia for both some aspects of the USSR Communism ideology itself and some phenomena which can be seen as the result of an interplay between this imported ideology and circumstances special for Russia. To be more specific, he is nostalgic for: Firstly, for the Communist ideal itself. Secondly, for Communism's strategic goals, which in his opinion unified people «into a common society» and reconciled contradictions between them. Thirdly, for the collective behavior, which «bound people together into a single state and a unified society». Fourthly, for the idea of a «common future of the peoples» which follows from the first three points. (Prohanov 2015q, para. 4, my emphasis.)

6.3.4 Preferred ideology: A union of Stalinism and Orthodox Christianity

I will here attempt to provide a sketch of what kind of ideology Prohanov seems to want in Russian society for the future and then discuss this ideology with respect to Soviet nostalgia.

I consider that Prohanov's thoughts about the Russian idea are a natural starting point for making such a sketch. My point here is that Prohanov considers that the Russian idea has picked up «everything of the best from the thousand years long history of the tsardom» and from the «seventy years long Soviet history» (Prohanov 2015g, para. 1). Therefore, he wants the Russian state to «embody» (his term) his understanding of the Russian idea when it comes to politics, spiritual matters and economics (Prohanov 2015g, para. 1).

The Russian idea in the 21st century is to Prohanov what he calls «sensible Stalinism», which to him means a «synthesis of all the [Russian] imperial experience» (Prohanov 2010g,

the last para.). He hopes that this Stalinism will «be continued» (Prohanov 2010e, para. 11). That is, his nostalgia for this ideology is restorative in Svetlana Boym's terms (theory in section 3.1). What he wants is, more specifically, a Russian society which rests on «Stalinism spiritualized by the Orthodox Church», under the common leadership of a strong Stalinist leader and a Church leader – at least figuratively speaking (Prohanov 2010k, para. 10–11). This wish for a synthesis of all the Russian imperial experience, for a «Stalinism spiritualized by the Orthodox Church», and for a combined Stalinist and Church leadership in society, seems to point to an ideology which refers both to the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire.

In section 6.2 I elaborated the details of Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalinism, and they will not be repeated here. However, shouldn't Stalinism, with its apparent atheism and demolition of the Russian Orthodox Church, be incompatible with religion in general and with the Russian Orthodox Church in particular? Prohanov doesn't think so (Prohanov 2010k, para. 10–11). I suggest that his mystical Stalinism, in which he sees Stalinism as something mystical and religious (section 6.2.3), comprises an important part of the basis for his unification of experiences from the USSR and the Russian Empire: On this basis he unites Stalinism and Orthodoxy, and thus sees both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire as sources of inspiration for this united ideology. This suggestion is corroborated by the fact that Prohanov himself states that the contradiction between the Russian Empire and the Soviet epochs is «only superficial», and that they are linked by Stalin because he «preserved the 'Russian civilization' in the face of its complete extinction» in 1917 and in 1941 (Prohanov 2010d, para. 9). A slightly different way to express the above-mentioned unity is to say that it's a unity between the «red» worldview from the Soviet epoch and the «white» worldview of the Orthodox Church (Prohanov 2010d, para. 3).

6.4 The Soviet industry

Prohanov addresses the Soviet industry in various ways: In some passages he concentrates on the «Soviet military-industrial complex», in some on the «technological sector», in some on «Soviet factories in general», and in some on «Soviet factories with outputs useful for the Soviet armed forces» in particular. In this section I will subsume all these subcategories under my chosen main category «Soviet industry», which will encompass all these other terms.

Prohanov's nostalgia for the Soviet industry is visible, e.g. when he writes: «какой был могучий технологический сектор в Советском Союзе! А не спасло» (Prohanov 2014d, para. 76). In the following I will explore this nostalgia.

Firstly, there is a link between Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalin and his nostalgia for the Soviet industry, since he gives Stalin credit for the Soviet industry. I observe this link e.g. in passages where he gives Stalin much credit for the building of factories of various kinds (e.g. in Prohanov 2015d, para. 3). Also in passages where he applauses Stalinism as a «great modernization of the country» and sees Russian science, airplane-building and ship-building as integral parts of this modernization, the link is visible (Prohanov 2010b, para. 7). The link is also visible in following quote:

> Россия лишилась великой сталинской техносферы. Разгромлены заводы, [...], погибло множество ультрасовременных закрытых технологий. Когда гибнут кит или бабочка, это считается великой трагедией, их заносят в Красную книгу. В 90-е погибли киты и бабочки советской технологии. (Prohanov 2015h, para. 7.)

It's highly disputable whether this technology really was so great and ultra-modern as Prohanov seems to remember it, but that's not my main point here. The main point is that if Prohanov feels nostalgia for *his* image of this technology, he is nostalgic for it, regardless of whether his image of this technology represents the technology as it «really» was or not. This argument is also in line with the theory on nostalgia presented in sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4.

Secondly, Prohanov's nostalgia for the Soviet industry is also linked to his nostalgia for the WWII in general and for the Soviet victory in the WWII in particular. For example, he stresses that «the sole purpose of Stalinism was to prepare the people for the victory» in the WWII, and that Stalin's building of military plants was one of the actions which made the victory possible (Prohanov 2015d, para. 9).

Thirdly, Prohanov's nostalgia for the Soviet industry is in many texts linked also to his perceived Christianity. For example, in a passage about the Soviet space industry, he claims that Stalin first «offered two of his sons», then raised his third son, Jurij Gagarin (!), and let him carry the «brilliant star of Stalin's victory» into space (Prohanov 2010e, para. 7).

Fourthly, Prohanov's nostalgia for the Soviet industry is linked to his nostalgia for the Soviet civilization. An illustration of this is his claim that he loves «Soviet science and rockets» which «flew into space and made the Soviet civilization a space civilization» (Prohanov 2014a, para. 34).

I have so far addressed the links between Prohanov's nostalgia for the Soviet industry and other nostalgias, but will now turn to examples of how his nostalgia for the Soviet industry expresses itself in texts/passages on various subjects:

The first finding consists of certain descriptions of the *perestroika* period, in which I observe nostalgia for the Soviet industry in claims that the Soviet technosphere was «vandalized» *(«oskvernen»)* and given a bad reputation during *perestroika*. See e.g. this quote:

> На протяжении четырёх лет перестройки послойно снимали все представления наших граждан о своём государстве. [...] Осквернен военно-промышленный комплекс, который якобы выпил все соки из народного хозяйства страны и привёл народ к нищете. Поставлена под сомнение советская техносфера, ибо промышленность, как говорили в ту пору, осквернила нашу природу, отравила наши реки, изгадила небеса. (Prohanov 2015j, para. 5.)

The second finding consists of some passages in which he sees the late 1980s and the 1990s as a continuum. His implicit claim is that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin were traitors who broke up the Soviet Union and then dispersed its heritage. He sees the destruction of the Soviet industry as a part of the destruction of the USSR heritage in general, and mourns both of these destructions. I bring one text example:

> Гитлер, сожженный во дворе Имперской канцелярии, реинкарнировал в Горбачеве и Ельцине, и те осуществили гитлеровский план «Барбаросса». Они расчленили Советский Союз. Уничтожили коммунистическую партию. Разгромили армию и промышленность. (Prohanov 2010j, para. 3.)

The third finding consists of passages where he isn't explicit when it comes to which leaders are responsible for the loss of the Soviet industry. But it's evident that he sees the fall of various branches of the Soviet industry as hard blows to the Soviet state in general, and as a cancellation of the Soviet victory in the WWII. The following passage exemplifies this: «Испепеление советского государства с его институтами – армией, высокими технологиями, космической и военной индустрией. [...] Это и есть перечеркивание Красной Победы, реализация гитлеровского плана 'Барбаросса'» (Prohanov 2010h, para. 3). Taking into account how important both the Soviet state (section 6.1.3) and the victory in the WWII (section 6.1.1) are for Prohanov, this indicates that nostalgia for the Soviet industry is a quite central element of Prohanov's Soviet nostalgia.

The fourth finding is that Prohanov finds room for mentioning (branches of) the Soviet industry in even quite short lists of losses suffered because of the breakup of the USSR. One example of this: «[M]ы совсем недавно потеряли одно своё государство, Советский Союз. Эта потеря стоила нам дорого: колоссальные утраты территорий, населения,

исторического времени, финансов, техносферы» (Prohanov 2015p, para. 7). This indicates that the nostalgia for the industry aspect of the Soviet Union is important in his Soviet nostalgia.

The fifth finding is made in some of his descriptions of what he sees as the consequences of the economic policy in the Russian Federation in the 1990s. For example, he writes about Egor Gajdar that he «создал экономику, уничтожившую громадную промышленность СССР. Истребил великие заводы, драгоценные технологии, результаты индустриализации, стоившей стране стольких крови и мук» (Prohanov 2010c, para. 7). This quote also shows that at least one reason that the Soviet industry is important to Prohanov is that the price paid to build it was high («blood and agony»).

The sixth finding of nostalgia for the Soviet industry consists of some passages which point to the future. For example, Prohanov advises Putin to *re*build the «military-industrial complex» from Soviet times (Prohanov 2010i, para. 7). In passages where he expresses that he wants to restore parts of the Soviet industry, he expresses restorative Soviet nostalgia for these parts (in line with sections 3.1, 3.2.2 and 3.3.1).

7 Summary, discussions, conclusions

Soviet nostalgia has in this study been seen as an essentially fragmentary phenomenon. This means that I have studied nostalgias for various *aspects* of the Soviet Union/Soviet period. That is, in chapter 3 I have extracted indicators of nostalgias for various aspects of the USSR, shown in Table 1, while in chapters 5 and 6 I have reported and discussed individual findings of nostalgias for various aspects of the USSR made in the analyzed Dugin and Prohanov texts. The indicators extracted in chapter 3 have been used as a tool in that analysis.

Also in chapter 7 I will focus on nostalgias for various aspects of the USSR. More specifically, in sections 7.1 and 7.2 I will summarize and discuss the findings made of (Soviet) nostalgia in the examined Dugin and Prohanov texts, respectively. In section 7.3 I will compare Dugin and Prohanov when it comes to findings of (Soviet) nostalgia. In section 7.4 I will discuss the generalizability of the results of this study.

7.1 Aleksandr Dugin

In section 7.1.1 I will summarize the individual findings made in chapter 5 of nostalgia for various aspects of the USSR in Dugin's texts. In section 7.1.2 I will discuss interpretational challenges encountered during analysis. In section 7.1.3 I will present and discuss trends found in the individual findings, and other findings which haven't yet been addressed.

7.1.1 Summary of individual findings of nostalgia

This section summarizes main arguments and results from chapter 5.

Some of Dugin's nostalgias have their roots in his ideas concerning the concepts of *Eurasianism* and *Neo-Eurasianism*. Especially his ideas about the global domination of the West, European universalism, tradition, religion and the Russian civilization are relevant to the question of Soviet nostalgia, as seen below.

Furthermore, some elements of Dugin's Soviet nostalgia have their roots in some of his ideas in his *Fourth Political Theory (4PT)*. Here especially his ideas about social justice, traditions, values and national sovereignty are relevant to the question of Soviet nostalgia. Besides that, in Dugin's 4PT there is a concept of reversible time, which can function as an intellectual justification to «go back in time», thus to become a restorative nostalgist.

Nostalgia linked to Dugin's notion of a contradiction between the «Land» civilization and the «Sea» civilization: To Dugin, the Russian civilization is a Land civilization, while the Western civilization is a Sea civilization. Dugin supports the Land civilization, which (in his view) has the following features: 1) Socialism: His associations of the Land civilization with socialism are, considered separately from other statements, instances of nostalgia for the political ideology of the USSR (but see also below regarding Communism). 2) Familiarity: He's nostalgic for a feeling of familiarity with both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, without distinguishing between them. 3) Innocence: He's nostalgic for the putative innocence of both the Soviet Union and of the Russian Empire without distinguishing between them. 4) Economic system: He prefers planned economy or an economy which is a mix between a planned economy and a market economy. That is, he shows some signs of nostalgia for the Soviet planned economy system, but is above all flexible and pragmatic. 5) Type of democracy: He wants limited democracy or a hierarchical system. He would accept a system which is reminiscent of the Soviet (Communist party) system when it comes to focus on the hierarchy, but on the other hand, he would also accept a higher degree of democracy than there was in the USSR. That is, he shows some signs of nostalgia for the Soviet hierarchical system, but above all he seems flexible and pragmatic.

Nostalgia linked to tradition: Dugin is nostalgic for both tradition in itself and for the three components which he considers that tradition consists of in the Russian context: Religion, hierarchy and collective identity. He sees both «tradition» and its three components as common features of the Soviet and Russian Empire epochs. This is in line with the general phenomenon observed in most of the texts, that he seldom expresses nostalgia for either the USSR or the Russian Empire specifically. On the contrary, he mainly shows nostalgia for features which the Russian Empire and the USSR had in common.

Consequences of tradition's ties to Communism: Dugin's concept of tradition is linked to Communism/Marxism through all of the three components shown above. However, his concept of tradition is also linked to the Russian Empire epoch through all three features. Thus, his nostalgia for tradition can be interpreted as Russian Empire nostalgia, Soviet nostalgia or as both.

Nostalgia for Communism? Dugin is critical of Communism seen as a complete ideological package**.** He all the same accepts some aspects of it: 1) He is nostalgic for some of (what he sees as) the «real» effects of Marxism put into practice in the Soviet Union: The creation of nationalist (sic!) societies with national cultures, unique identities and strong

traditions. He isn't nostalgic for the Communist ideology in these spheres, however. 2) He accepts Communism's social solidarity and social justice aspects, and links them tightly to Communism. Thus, I see this more as nostalgia for the USSR than for the Russian Empire.

The aspects of Communism which Dugin rejects are: 1) Development in the society. I suggest that this rejection is an expression of a longing for continuity with the past, stability and predictability in general, which indicates nostalgia in general. 2) Materialism, atheism, mechanism, support of technological development and «global racism» (his term)/Eurocentrism/universalism. I suggest that this rejection is an expression of nostalgia for tradition. 3) The Communist theories regarding historical materialism and the material reductionism and economic determinism of Marxism. I suggest that this rejection is an expression of his nostalgia for religion, which is a component of his nostalgia for tradition. 4) Communism's belief in unidirectional progress.

Nostalgia for the losses of Great Russia's territories and influence: To Dugin, Great Russia has so far existed in two forms, namely as the Russian Empire and as the USSR. I divide his expressions of such a nostalgia into two main groups:

a) Dugin is nostalgic for the territories that had been integrated into the USSR which Great Russia has lost, as well as for the lost influence, political and ideological power over them. He emphasizes these territories' common history with Russia from the Russian Empire period and through the Soviet period (with some exceptions), so he focuses on historical continuity. Therefore, I suggest that this nostalgia is mainly for Great Russia. He also wants Russia to make an impact on (parts of) these territories, so I suggest that this nostalgia is restorative.

b) Dugin is nostalgic for Great Russia's loss of influence on territories in Eastern Europe outside of Great Russia itself. I argue that the Soviet Union exerted influence on more territories abroad in Eastern Europe than the Russian Empire ever did, so I suggest that this nostalgia is at a higher degree for the USSR than for the Russian Empire.

Nostalgia for the Russian people's status as a «great people»: According to Dugin, in Great Russia the «great people» (his term) was the Russians, while the «small peoples» (his term) were the other peoples in the Russian Empire and the USSR. Thus, I suggest that his nostalgia for the Russians' status as the «great people» is primarily for Great Russia.

Nostalgia for the friendship between the «great people» and the «small peoples»: I argue that the idea of friendship between the peoples was more pronounced politically in the

USSR than in the Russian Empire. However, Dugin doesn't emphasize this difference, so I suggest that *his* nostalgia for this lost friendship is primarily for Great Russia.

Nostalgia for influence in the world in general: Dugin is nostalgic for the subjectness and independence – ideologically, conceptually, politically and strategically – which Russia (in his view) lost after the USSR broke down. I suggest that this is primarily nostalgia for Great Russia, i.e. for these qualities seen as something which the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union had in common. All the same, within the limits of Great Russia nostalgia, this nostalgia seems to gets more inspiration from the USSR than from the Russian Empire.

Nostalgia in Dugin's plans for the world in general: 1) Dugin wants Russia to become the ideological and political leader of a new global, Eurasian alternative to the Western vision of the world's future. I argue that the Russian Empire was in general ideologically weaker than the USSR, and that the Russian Empire never became as politically influential in large territories in Eastern Europe outside of the empire itself as the USSR did. Thus, I suggest that this wish is more Soviet nostalgic than Russian Empire nostalgic. 2) His justification for the wish in 1) is that Russia has functioned as «the core» of unions before, and is therefore destined to do so also in the future. In my view, Russia was central to unions of many peoples and cultures both in the Russian Empire and USSR. Thus, I suggest that this «core argument» in itself expresses nostalgia both for the Russian Empire and the USSR.

Nostalgia in Dugin's plans for the Eurasian Union: 1) Dugin wants the Eurasian Union to continue the tradition of integration which he claims was earlier led both by the Russian tsars and by the USSR. I suggest that this wish for internal integration is nostalgic for what he sees as common for the USSR and the Russian Empire. 2) Concerning relations between the countries in the Eurasian Union in geopolitical matters, his stance is that Russia, as the only country in the Eurasian Union, should have the right to what he calls «partial geopolitical sovereignty» (Dugin 2014b, p. 78). I argue that this is not the same as dominating a union's so-called «common» stances on geopolitics, as it could be argued that the RSFSR did in the USSR. Therefore, I consider that Dugin's viewpoint isn't in itself Soviet nostalgic specifically, but all the same «imperial» in general. 3) Considering the choice of economic system for the Eurasian Union: His wish for control over strategic sectors is strongly reminiscent of the Soviet economic system, but his wish for free markets doesn't match with it. Thus, I suggest that the economic system he wants, seen as a whole package, doesn't express Soviet nostalgia.

7.1.2 Challenges and general trends in the findings

Interpreting Dugin's texts with respect to Soviet nostalgia provides some challenges.

Firstly, my review of these texts has shown that Dugin rarely states in a straightforward way that he longs for any aspects of the USSR *specifically*. One reason for this is that he often writes more about what he is *against* than what he is *for*, and this decreases his room for expressing explicitly nostalgia for anything at all. Another reason is that *when* he writes about the things which he supports, he often describes them in ways which are open to several interpretations. As an example, I bring the following passage:

> [Я] радикально против либерализма во всех его версиях, против капитализма, против атлантизма и глобальной финансовой олигархии, против США и американской гегемонии, против современной демократии (как власти меньшинств), против идеологии прав человека (где за основу берется западный человек), против мифов о свободном рынке, против индивидуализма во всех сферах и т.д. Но я также против материалистического атеистического коммунизма и фашистского расизма, шовинизма и ксенофобии. Я антилиберал, но не коммунист и не фашист. Я против Модерна. Я за Традицию – как полную антитезу Модерну. [...] Я сторонник евразийства и Четвертой Политической Теории. (Dugin 2014k, para. 18.)

In this quote Dugin is clear about many things, but it's hard to find anything which without any doubt can be characterized as Soviet nostalgia specifically. For example: He is against modern democracy, human rights and individualism, but all the same he doesn't state clearly what he wants instead. Another example: He writes that he is against «the myths of the free market», but he doesn't specify exactly what kind of economic system he wants instead. Secondly, in this study it's relevant to distinguish between nostalgia for the USSR and for the Russian Empire. However, in most of the studied Dugin texts he seldom clearly differentiates between the Russian Empire and the USSR when he describes what he «wants». Consequently, he seldom expresses nostalgia for something truly specific for either the USSR or the Russian Empire. The Russian Empire and the USSR often seem to be just different versions of the same nostalgia object to him. *It's what the Russian Empire and the USSR in his view had in common, i.e. traits which (according to him) tied them together, which most often are the primary objects of his nostalgia.* In line with this, he considerably more often expresses nostalgia for various «Russian» traits than for traits typical either of the USSR or of the Russian Empire. With «Russian» traits I here have mind those which he apparently sees as having been constants in the historical past before the breakup of the USSR, or at least didn't change that much because the shift from the Russian Empire to the USSR that he bothers to mention those changes.

Because of Dugin's above-mentioned tendency not to distinguish clearly between the Russian Empire and the USSR when describing what he «wants» from the past, many of the individual findings in chapter 5 together form a trend of nostalgia for traits which the Russian Empire and the USSR (in Dugin's opinion) had in common. Findings of nostalgia for the «Russian» in chapter 5 are in fact so many that they together build an interpretational frame for individual findings of nostalgia. This in line with the principles of the hermeneutic circle: The interpretation of the parts impact on the interpretation of the whole, and the interpretation of the whole impacts on the interpretation of the parts. Using these principles, in chapter 5 I have interpreted many other individual findings of nostalgia as being nostalgic for traits which the Russian Empire and the USSR (in Dugin's view) had in common. Excepted from this are the cases in which the content/nature of the findings themselves or the text-context of these findings have shown that the findings in question are exclusively Soviet or Russian Empire nostalgic.

7.1.3 Nostalgia for Great Russia, for the Soviet Union or for the Russian Empire?

As can be seen from section 7.1.2, one of the conclusions of this study is that Dugin seldom expresses nostalgia for the USSR specifically. On the contrary, a main trend is that he shows nostalgia for features which the Russian Empire and the USSR had in common as he sees it, i.e. for features which in his view tie these two periods together. Examples of nostalgias which follow this main tendency are: Dugin is nostalgic for the feeling of familiarity with both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, for tradition seen as a common feature of the Russian Empire and the USSR, for tradition's components religion, hierarchy and collective identity seen as features common for the Russian Empire and the USSR, for innocence seen as a common feature for both the Soviet Union and the Russian, for the loss of the Russian people's status as the «great people» in relation to other, smaller peoples, for the loss of Russians' role as the «the core» of a union (not necessarily the *Soviet* Union) between peoples, for the loss of what he sees as the friendship between the peoples in a union, for the loss of Russian leadership as an integrating force between the peoples in a union, and for influence in the world in general.

However, I also found some exceptions from the above-mentioned trend. In these exceptional cases Dugin shows nostalgia particularly for the USSR along with the mentioned nostalgia for Great Russia. One such exception was found during studies of Dugin's nostalgia

for territories and influence: When Dugin expresses nostalgia for the loss of influence in Eastern Europe outside of the USSR, I found him to be more Soviet nostalgic than Russian Empire nostalgic, i.e. more Soviet nostalgic than Great Russia nostalgic (section 5.5.2). Another such exception is that Dugin wants Russia to become the ideological and political leader of a new global, Eurasian alternative to the Western vision of the world's future. I have argued that this wish is more Soviet nostalgic than Russian Empire nostalgic. A third exception surfaced when I examined Dugin's attitude to Communism and what's related to that ideology: It turned out that Dugin is critical of Communism seen as a complete ideological package, but all the same he is nostalgic for some phenomena connected to Communism: Firstly, he is nostalgic for some of the «real» effects of Marxism put into practice in the Soviet Union – specifically the creation of nationalist (sic!) societies with national cultures, unique identities and strong traditions. Secondly, he is nostalgic for Communism's social solidarity and social justice aspects. Thirdly, when it comes to preferred economic system, he shows signs of nostalgia for the Soviet planned economy system, but seems above all flexible and pragmatic when it comes to economic system. Fourthly, considering preferred system of rule, he shows signs of nostalgia for the Soviet hierarchical system, but seems nevertheless above all flexible and pragmatic when it comes to preferred system of rule.

In contrast, I didn't observe any instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire exclusively. To be more precise, I detected many instances of nostalgia for features common to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union (as mentioned above), but no instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire which weren't also considered as features of the Soviet Union.

7.1.4 Intensities of the found nostalgias

The listing in section 7.1.1 shows my findings of objects of nostalgia in the Dugin texts. I will here attempt to do a ranking of their intensities. I let my impression of Dugin's emotional engagement when he writes about the various objects of nostalgia, and my impression of how often he writes about these objects of nostalgia, be the factors which decide their relative intensities. I am aware that such a method introduces an element of subjectivity, but consider that the very nature of the process of evaluating such a property as intensity of nostalgias in written texts in all cases is subjective.

Dugin's most intense nostalgias seem to be, as a main rule, for features which the Russian Empire period and the Soviet period had in common. Roughly and broadly speaking, the most intense of these nostalgias seem to be those which can be subordinated to the concepts of Great Russia or the «Land» civilization. On a more specific level, his nostalgias for tradition and its three components, religion, hierarchy and collective identity, seem to be the most intense ones. Then comes his nostalgias for «familiarity» and innocence. Next, his nostalgias for the Russian people's status as the «great people», for its role as the «the core» people, for the (perceived) friendship between the peoples, for Russian leadership as an integrating force and for Russian influence in the world in general.

Dugin's other nostalgias seem to be less intense than the ones above. As a main rule, they are also more ambivalent than the nostalgias above regarding to which degree they are directed towards Great Russia in general or the Soviet Union in particular. This applies to his nostalgias for the lost USSR territories, for the influence over those territories and for the ideological and political leadership in the world. It also applies to the phenomenon that he rejects Communism as an ideological package, but all the same is nostalgic for some of the «real» effects of Marxism in the USSR (the creation of nationalist (sic!) societies with national cultures, unique identities and strong traditions). Furthermore, it applies to his nostalgia for Communism's social solidarity and social justice aspects, to his nostalgia for the Soviet planned economy system which he combines with a flexible and pragmatic view on economic systems, and to his nostalgia for the Soviet hierarchical system which he combines with a flexible and pragmatic view on systems of rule. All these weaker nostalgias have in common that they are something in-between Great Russia nostalgias and Soviet nostalgias.

Thus, in most cases it seems to be a correlation between the intensity of nostalgia and the perceived degree of continuity in the object of nostalgia in time – from the Russian Empire period to the Soviet period: High continuity often goes with high intensity, while low continuity goes with low intensity. Maybe there is also a causal connection here: high continuity causes high intensity, while low continuity causes low intensity? Unfortunately, the data provided in this study are not very useful for answering this question.

7.1.5 Comparison of this study with earlier research

In this section I will examine to which degree the results of my study of Dugin's nostalgias agree with earlier research done by other scholars on (Neo-)Eurasianism in general and on

Dugin in particular. I will do this by comparing particularly interesting scholarly statements about (Neo-)Eurasianism and Dugin from section 4.4.1 with results of my study.

I will first look at Dugin's attitude to (Orthodox) Christianity and neo-pagan conceptions. In section 4.4.1 I mentioned that Marlene Laruelle in 2008 claimed that Dugin «remains [...] deeply anchored in Christianity» and «remains embedded in Orthodoxy», but is also «attracted to neo-pagan conceptions, which exalt the body and harmony with nature» (Laruelle 2008, p. 123). In my study I have observed how important (Orthodox) Christianity is as a part of the basis for Dugin's ideology: Firstly, he links the terms «faith», «the sacred» and «Orthodoxy» to the «Land» civilization when he describes the opposition between the «Land» civilization and the «Sea» civilization (section 5.2). Secondly, to him the Russian Orthodox religion in the Russian Empire and the «Communist quasi-religion» (his term) in the USSR were just two different versions of the «religion component» of the traditional society, and tradition is in itself central to his ideology (section 5.3.1). However, this doesn't mean that he stresses his perceived Christianity in all the texts I have studied: When he describes the loss of Great Russia (section 5.4), the Russians' loss of the status as the «great people» (section 5.4), the loss of influence over territories outside the current Russian Federation, the loss of the status as one of the two poles in a bipolar world (sections 5.5.1–5.5.3), or when he writes about his plans for the world and his «Eurasian Union» (sections 5.5.4–5.5.5), he uses less energy on (Orthodox) Christianity. To conclude, I agree with Laruelle that (Orthodox) Christianity is an important part of the basis for Dugin's ideology, but on the other hand (Orthodox) Christianity isn't visible in a big enough part of the text material to say that he shows that he is outright «*embedded* in Orthodoxy». And when it comes to Laruelle's statement that Dugin is «attracted to neo-pagan conceptions, which exalt the body and harmony with nature», my personal impression of the texts I have read in this study is that an overwhelming majority of them are so intellectual, and the tone in them is so «bookish», that I don't find them very suitable to «exalt the body and harmony with nature». However, I in my view, evaluations of this matter are highly subjective.

What is it to be a Soviet nostalgist? In section 7.1 I mentioned that I consider Soviet nostalgia to be a fragmentary phenomenon, which means that different persons can be nostalgic for different *aspects* of the USSR. One of those aspects can be the imperial aspect. (I am aware that most Communists in the USSR were very reluctant to call the USSR an empire, but in my view both the USSR and the Russian Empire were empires, so I use this word accordingly.) Laruelle claimed in 2008 that a common denominator of «the Neo-Eurasianist

currents that emerged in the 1990s» is that they all «share[d] an imperial conception of Russia» (Laruelle 2008, p. 115). Does my study corroborate this with respect to Dugin? I would say it does, because in this study I have showed how Dugin expresses nostalgia for Great Russia and the role of the Russians as the «great people» (section 5.4), for Russia's lost influence over the former Great Russia (USSR/Russian Empire) territories, over the rest of Eastern Europe and over other parts of the world (sections 5.5.1–5.5.3), and that he even integrates empire nostalgia in his plans for the world in general and for the Eurasian Union in particular (sections 5.5.4–5.5.5).

When describing an empire, one of the characteristics of the empire can be who constitutes the «core», the leading force, of it. Laruelle claimed in 2008 that «[t]he Russian theorists of Neo-Eurasianism perceive the term 'Eurasia' only in its Russocentric aspects; for them, the past centuries have proven that Eurasia can only unite around Russia, as the *natural* power in Northern Asia» (Laruelle, p. 204., emphasis in the original). My study corroborates that Dugin shares this Neo-Eurasianist view. This since I have shown in section 5.5.4 that Dugin considers that Russia is destined to become the core of the union of many different peoples and cultures in the future because it has been so several times in the past. However, I have argued (in section 5.5.4) that Dugin's assignment of this «core» role for Russia indicates Great Russia nostalgia, not Soviet nostalgia or Russian Empire nostalgia in particular.

It would be a Soviet nostalgic trait to wish for the return of the Soviet hierarchical system. Therefore, it's of interest to note that Laruelle (in 2008) stated that the (Neo-) Eurasianists «challenge the democratic system» (2008, p. 214). I have observed in my study that Dugin would accept a system which reminds of the Soviet (Communist party) system when it comes to the focus on hierarchy, but also that he would accept a higher degree of democracy than in the USSR (section 5.2). Against the background of Laruelle's statement, I expected that a conclusion of my study would be that Dugin unambiguously shows resistance and hostility towards the democratic system. Against this background I am surprised by the flexibility Dugin shows on this question. To conclude, my study points to a more flexible Dugin with regard to system of rule/democracy than what Laruelle did.

It would also be a Soviet nostalgic trait to wish for the return of the Soviet planned economy. Laruelle has written that Dugin «wants economic policies leaning toward socialism» and that «[o]n economics, Dugin unapologetically stands 'on the left', even if this Western European classification is not necessarily applicable to the Russian political spectrum» (Laruelle 2008, p. 111, 132). But I found in my study that Dugin prefers planned

economy or an economy which is a mix between a planned economy and a market economy. He would open the door for an economic system similar to the Soviet type, but would all the same accept a system not typically Soviet. (Section 5.2.) Therefore, I would like to refine Laruelle's statement that Dugin is «leaning toward socialism» in economic policies by adding that Dugin in my study turned out to be rather flexible regarding choice of economic system, so I don't see his «leaning toward socialism» as a fixed position, but as a wide interval.

But is Dugin *overall* a Soviet nostalgist, and if so, to which degree? Since I conclude in this study that Dugin is above all nostalgic for features common to the Russian Empire and the USSR, I will now discuss scholarly statements about both the Russian Empire and the USSR. When it comes to scholarly views on the Neo-Eurasianism movement in general, Laruelle stated in 2008 that it «is free of Tsarist leanings» while it also «distances itself from [...] Soviet nostalgia» (Laruelle 2008, p. 211). When it comes to Dugin in particular, in 2008 Laruelle stated, as we saw in section 4.4.1, that Dugin «rejects all Tsarist nostalgia», but «calls for a restoration of the Soviet Union» (Laruelle 2008, p. 112, 117), and that he «does not play the card of Tsarist or Soviet nostalgia» (Laruelle 2008, pp. 132–133). To what extent are these statements corroborated by my study?

I will first look into Laruelle's statements (above) about the Russian Empire period. At first I want to draw attention to the expression «Tsarist leanings»: It can, in connection with nostalgia, be understood in two ways: Either as nostalgia for the tsar personally, e.g. the tsar as God's representative on Earth, or as nostalgia for more impersonal aspects of the Russian Empire, such as for the state/organization of the Russian Empire. In my analysis of the Dugin texts I haven't found any instances where Dugin clearly shows nostalgia for the tsar personally. However, I have found several instances where Dugin has apparently showed nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire, but it has turned out that this nostalgia has really been for features common to both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union (a general trend described in section 7.1.2 with several examples in section 7.1.1). That is, I found no instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire exclusively. Consequently, whether I interpret «tsarist nostalgia» literally as «nostalgia for the tsar personally» or as «Russian Empire nostalgia» exclusively, my study corroborates Laruelle's claim that Dugin isn't a tsarist nostalgist. And as to Laruelle's statement that «Dugin does not play the card of Tsarist [...] nostalgia», my analysis and conclusion is the same as for the statement that Dugin isn't a tsarist nostalgist.

Secondly, I will now look into Laruelle's statements (above) about the Soviet period. In my study I have observed that most of the apparent instances of «Soviet nostalgia» turned out to be little more than instances of nostalgia for features common to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, i.e. nostalgia for features of Great Russia (general trend described in section 7.1.2, examples in section 7.1.1). However, in a few instances I all the same concluded, usually on the basis of historical circumstances, that Dugin harbors more nostalgia for the Soviet Union in particular than for Great Russia in general (examples given in section 7.1.1). In this way, Laruelle's statement that the Neo-Eurasianism movement «distances itself from [...] Soviet nostalgia», was corroborated with respect to Dugin by most of my findings, but not for all of them (examples given in section 7.1.1). The same is the case for Laruelle's claim that Dugin «does not play the card of [...] Soviet nostalgia». But her claim that Dugin «calls for a restoration of the Soviet Union», contradicts the first two ones. This last claim can be interpreted in (at least) two ways. The first interpretation, which I see as the narrower one, is that only explicitly expressed wishes for restoration of the Soviet Union should be interpreted as «calls». If I presuppose this interpretation, the results of my study disagree with Laruelle's statement, since my impression from the Dugin texts is that Dugin doesn't «call» for very much explicitly. This has to do with his descriptive style of writing. The other interpretation, which is the broader one, is that also implicitly expressed wishes for restoration of the Soviet Union should be interpreted as «calls». In this case the texts/passages in which I get glimpses of restorative motives when I read between the lines, i.e. look below the surface created by his descriptions, should be seen as «calls for restoration of the Soviet Union». Presupposed this interpretation, I agree that Dugin really «calls for a restoration of the Soviet Union» in a small minority of the studied texts/passages. One example of this is Dugin's expressed restorative nostalgia for the political and ideological influence over the former republics of the USSR (see section 5.5.3).

Furthermore, Dugin's attitude towards the past and the future is another characteristic of his nostalgia, I would say. When it comes to this attitude, Laruelle has stated that Dugin «has never been a partisan of any return to the past» and that he «sees himself as resolutely turned toward the future» (Laruelle 2008, pp. 132, 133). Does my study corroborate this statement? In some of his texts Dugin describes his plans for the future: both for the world in general and for his «Eurasian Union» in particular (see sections 5.5.4 and 5.5.5). I have noted that Dugin includes various elements from the Russian history in these plans, which makes some parts of these plans nostalgic (see section 7.1.1). I have found nostalgia for the past also

in Dugin's texts about many other subjects, specifically in texts about the «Sea» civilization vs. the «Land» civilization, tradition, Communism, Great Russia's territories/influence, the Russians as the «great people» and about the Russian influence in the world (chapter 5). So, rather than being «resolutely turned to the future», I argue that Dugin is turned both toward the future and the past. And when it comes to Laruelle's statement that Dugin has «never been a partisan of any return to the past», I would like to refine it. On the one hand, the fact that Dugin has at all bothered to develop both 4PT (a political ideology which he wants for Russia and the world in the future), and other plans for the future Eurasian Union and the world (sections 5.1.2, 5.5.4 and 5.5.5), shows that he cares a great deal about the future. On the other hand, as said, his plans for the future include several elements from the past. To conclude, rather than saying that he doesn't want any return to the past, I would have said that he wants a future consisting of some carefully selected new elements and some carefully selected elements from the past. In this study, I have concentrated on identifying those elements from the past; there are summarized in section 7.1.1.

I use other scholarly statements to link Dugin's attitude towards the past and the future even closer to his nostalgias. One such statement is Stephen D. Shenfield's claim that Dugin's «erudition gives him a strong sense of continuity with Russia's great past and greater future» (Shenfield 2001, p. 206). This claim is corroborated by my study, since the strong links between the Russian past and future are evident in Dugin's ideology: I see his emphasis on the Russian past in e.g. his stress on the (eternal) «Russian» qualities of tradition, religion, hierarchy and collective identity, which are qualities which he also wants for Russia in the future. On top of this, he even argues that continuity itself is a feature of his beloved «Land» civilization, which includes Russia, which really accentuates the importance of continuity to him (Sections 5.2 and 5.3.1.) Another scholarly claim about continuity is Wayne Allensworth's claim that Dugin «sees continuities from the tsarist to the Soviet period as being more important than any manifest differences» (Allensworth 2009, p. 108). This claim is in line with the trend noted in my study (section 7.1.2) that most of my findings of nostalgia are of nostalgias for features common to the Russian Empire and the USSR, i.e. for features of Great Russia. Dugin's tendency to see «continuities from the tsarist to the Soviet period as being more important than any manifest differences» makes it easier for him to be a Great Russia nostalgist than if he had seen those two periods as fundamentally different from each other. Without this view on continuity in time, his nostalgias would likely had been more «sprawling», i.e. more difficult to combine with each other. This since their objects of

nostalgia had likely been much more different from each other than what they are with Dugin's «continuity-in-the-past thinking».

To summarize, Dugin emphasizes continuity between the Russian Empire period, the Soviet period, the present and the future, and this is also seen in his nostalgia.

Furthermore, Aleksandr Verkhovsky and Emil Pain claimed in 2015 that Neo-Eurasianism is an openly anti-Western ideology (2015, p. 10). This is relevant in relation to Soviet nostalgia because adherence to a bipolar world view, with the US and the rest of the West as one pole, and the Soviet Union Soviet with its Eastern European satellite states as the other pole, may indicate Soviet nostalgia. In my study I have produced findings which support the conclusion that Dugin's ideology is openly anti-Western. More specifically, the anti-Western trait has been most easily observed in Dugin's descriptions of the opposition between the «Land» civilization (i.e. «the East», e.g. Russia) and the «Sea» civilization (i.e. «the West», especially the US). Here he associates the «Land» civilization with qualities which to him are positive (e.g. familiarity, innocence, socialism), while he connects the «Sea» civilization to qualities which to him are negative (e.g. estrangement, sin, capitalism) (section 5.2). To conclude, the claim by Verkhovsky and Pain has been corroborated in my study when it comes to Dugin. However, my point here is not to say that Dugin's ideology is pure Neo-Eurasianism, since the make-up of his ideology is a matter of scholarly discussions (as shown in section 4.4.1).

7.2 Aleksandr Prohanov

Here I will summarize the findings of nostalgias for aspects of the USSR made in chapter 6 in the Prohanov texts, discuss challenges and general trends in these findings, interpret these findings with respect to Soviet nostalgia vs. Russian Empire nostalgia, suggest intensities of the various nostalgias, and compare the findings in this study with earlier research.

7.2.1 Summary of individual findings of nostalgia

This section contains a summary of the main arguments and results from chapter 6.

The role of Christianity in Prohanov's nostalgias: Christianity, as Prohanov sees this religion, plays an important role for most of his nostalgias, in two ways: Firstly, he integrates his perceived Christianity into several of his very objects of nostalgia. Secondly, his

perceived Christianity links several of his nostalgias together in the way that their coexistence can be explained by it.

Nostalgia for the Soviet victory in the WWII: Prohanov considers that the WWII was a holy/Christian war and that the Soviet victory was Christ's victory. He sees the USSR as a religious country both during WWII and in the rest of the Soviet period. In this way, his nostalgia for the victory is extended to become an unspecified nostalgia for the whole country in the whole Soviet period. His nostalgia for the victory is also linked to his nostalgias for several other aspects of the USSR, and his perceived Christianity often functions as that link. His nostalgias for all these other objects have the victory as their common reference point. And he extends these nostalgias in place and time beyond the time and geographical limits of the actual WWII, which is observed in his nostalgias for weapons associated with the WWII, for Stalin and the Soviet state in general, for the Soviet people in general and the Red Army in general. Thus, he becomes not only nostalgic for the wartime Soviet people and Red Army etc., but even for the Soviet people and the Red Army etc. as such.

Nostalgia for Stalin and Stalinism: Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalin is intense and a very central element of his Soviet nostalgia in general, since it's closely connected to his central nostalgia for the victory, but also to his mentioned nostalgias for the Soviet people, the Red Army, the heroes of the WWII and for the USSR's status as a world power. Prohanov is also nostalgic for the Stalinist type of Soviet culture, which he sees as being partly built on traditionally Russian elements of the Russian Empire culture. Therefore, this cultural nostalgia is for both the USSR and the Russian Empire.

An important element in Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalin and Stalinism is his **mystical Stalinism**: Prohanov sees Stalin as divine. In agreement with mystical Stalinism, the meaning of the Stalinist period before the WWII was to prepare the Soviet people for the victory in the WWII. And everything Stalin did before the WWII, even the most brutal and horrible things, was, in agreement with mystical Stalinism, done in order to prepare the Soviet people for this victory and to achieve it. In this way, to Prohanov mystical Stalinism seems to function as a justification of his nostalgia for Stalin and Stalinism. It also adds other, broader aspects to his nostalgia for Stalin and Stalinism: 1) Nostalgia for the unification of different peoples in the struggle for a common goal during the Soviet period. 2) Nostalgia for the Russian people's function as the organizing force in this struggle for a common goal. 3) Nostalgia for Stalin as the strong leader at the top, personalizing the organization of these different peoples towards a

common goal. 4. Nostalgia for an «empire» in general. This last nostalgia is for both the Russian Empire and the USSR.

Nostalgia for the Soviet industry: Prohanov harbors nostalgia for both the industry the products of which were useful for the Soviet armed forces and other industry. This nostalgia is a quite central element of Prohanov's Soviet nostalgia as a whole, for two reasons: Firstly, he speaks about the loss of the Soviet industry in many of the texts I have studied. Secondly, his nostalgia for the Soviet industry is tightly linked to his nostalgias for Stalin, for the Soviet victory in the WWII, for the Soviet civilization and for the Soviet state.

Nostalgia for the Soviet state: Prohanov is nostalgic for both the Soviet state itself and for several entities which that state, in his view, rested on. He doesn't concretize these entities, but on the abstract level they are: 1) The Soviet values in general. 2) The basis for the Soviet state in general. 3) The Soviet symbols in general. 4) The ideological postulates in general and the «constants» (his term) in general which the ideology of the Soviet system rested on. 5) The Soviet leaders seen as people who tried to do good things. 6) The Red Army.

Nostalgia for power: Prohanov is nostalgic for the following power-related features: 1) The USSR as a «great power» *(«velikaâ deržava»)* in general. 2) The USSR's geopolitical influence in the world in general, i.e. for the USSR as a «world power» *(«mirovaâ deržava»).* 3) For the balance of geopolitical influence after the WWII and until the breakup of the USSR, in which the US/the West and the USSR were the two poles, also called the «bipolar system». For the position of the USSR as one pole in this bipolar system. 4) For the «enemy idea» of the Soviet period, when the US, NATO, the West etc. were labeled as the USSR's enemies. 5) For the USSR's geopolitical power over territories which were integral parts of the USSR/the Russian Empire, but became independent states by the breakup of the USSR. This nostalgia is neutral in the sense that it's neither specifically Soviet nostalgia nor specifically Russian Empire nostalgia. 6) For the geopolitical power of the USSR in other Eastern European countries.

Nostalgia for aspects of Communism: Here I treat nostalgia for Communism in general, not for Stalinism in particular. This since nostalgia for Stalinism was treated separately earlier in this section. Prohanov is nostalgic for the following aspects of Communism: 1) The Communist ideal itself. 2) The strategic goals of Communism, which in his view unified people into a common society and reconciled contradictions. 3)

Communism's collective behavior, which in his view bound people together into a single state and a unified society. 4) Communism's idea of the common future of the peoples.

Nostalgia expressed through Prohanov's preferred ideology: Prohanov wants Stalinism spiritualized by the Orthodox Church for the future Russian society, which means that he wants a synthesis of all the Russian imperial experience in the Soviet and Russian Empire epochs. He wants unity between the «red» worldview from the Soviet epoch and the «white» Orthodox Church worldview from the Russian Empire epoch. Thus, on this abstract, ideological level, he is both a Soviet nostalgist and a Russian Empire nostalgist. This prompts an interesting question: To what degree does this mean that the apparent findings above of nostalgia for various aspects of the USSR should also be interpreted as findings of Russian Empire nostalgia? In section 7.2.2 I will discuss this.

7.2.2 Challenges and general trends in the findings

Looking into Prohanov's expressions of Soviet nostalgia in general, it may seem a bit surprising how seldom they can be clearly classified as either reflective or restorative. On the contrary, most of the findings of Soviet nostalgia in Prohanov's texts are relatively neutral on what I would call the «reflective–restorative axis». One possible explanation for this might be that the relevant theory (sections 3.1 and 3.3.1) in general overestimates how strong the restorative element should be in nationalist nostalgia. Another possibility might be that the theory fits well to most nationalists' (eventual) expressions of nostalgia, while Prohanov simply isn't a typical nationalist in this respect. However, in general I can't see any really weighty reasons why a person couldn't possibly harbor nostalgia which at the same time includes both reflective feelings, i.e. «soft» and sentimental feelings, and restorative feelings, i.e. «hard» and action-oriented feelings. This is also in line with how Svetlana Boym, in her descriptions of several *actual* cases of nostalgia, does *not* treat the reflective and restorative nostalgias as being mutually exclusive (Boym 2001, pp. 49, 78–79). This realistic approach is also in line with my understanding of nostalgia as a complex phenomenon in the human mind.

As I noted in the preceding section, Prohanov wants Stalinism spiritualized by the Orthodox Church to be the ideology for the future Russian society. I will now discuss to what degree this means that the apparent findings of nostalgia for various aspects of the USSR summarized in the preceding section should be interpreted as being also findings of Russian Empire nostalgia.

In the studied texts seen as a whole I have observed that Prohanov in reality makes references to the Soviet period much more often than to the Russian Empire period. He simply talks a lot more about the USSR than the Russian Empire. In my opinion, it would be a mistake to ignore this obvious difference in attention he shows for these two historical periods when evaluating to what degree he is a Soviet nostalgist vs. a Russian Empire nostalgist. This especially since nostalgia is an emotional phenomenon (by theory in sections 3.1 and 3.2.1), and it should be reasonable to suggest that differences in emotional engagement often result in differences also in practical actions. The clue is that, despite the fact that some of his texts do contain references to circumstances typical of the Russian Empire, the massive amount of references to circumstances typical of the USSR shows that he in practice, i.e. in his daily text production, is much more of a Soviet nostalgist than a Russian Empire nostalgist (although he, as said, also is a Russian Empire nostalgist).

But against the interpretation above it could be argued that Prohanov talks much about religion in general and Christianity in particular in many of the analyzed texts. Furthermore, that Christianity was a feature of the Russian Empire, but not of the atheist Soviet Union, so his talk about Christianity points in the direction of Russian Empire nostalgia. Well, Prohanov himself has declared that he sees the Soviet period as «deeply religious», in fact «one of the most religious periods» in the Russian history (Prohanov 2014a, para. 46). In section 6.1.1 I have written more about this view of his. The essence here is that Prohanov, to put it mildly, sees Christianity as being absolutely compatible with the Soviet period, and not in conflict with it. Taking into account this, I don't find it plausible that *his* talk about Christianity in itself should indicate Russian Empire nostalgia. To Prohanov, Christianity seems to be «neutral» with respect to Soviet nostalgia vs. Russian Empire nostalgia, and not an indicator of Russian Empire nostalgia specifically.

Thus, we have a situation where my interpretation of some of Prohanov's passages/texts is that he wants an ideology which can be associated with both the USSR and the Russian Empire (Stalinism spiritualized by the Orthodox Church), but the main trend in the studied texts is that he in practice shows much more emotional engagement for the Soviet period than for the Russian Empire period. And while it's true that he writes much about his perceived Christianity as he sees that religion, *to him* that Christian Orthodoxy doesn't point more to the Russian Empire than to the USSR. In section 7.2.3 I will treat the consequences these observations have for Prohanov's nostalgias summarized in section 7.2.1.

7.2.3 Nostalgia for Great Russia, for the Soviet Union or for the Russian Empire?

As we learnt in section 7.2.2, a main trend in the findings is that Prohanov shows much more emotional engagement for the Soviet period than for the Russian Empire period. What does this mean to the nostalgias summarized in section 7.2.1?

Regarding the majority of the found individual nostalgias, in chapter 6 I chose to interpret them as being first and foremost expressions of *Soviet* nostalgia, and only to a lesser degree expressions of Russian Empire nostalgia. At the same time I admitted that this isn't a black and white-situation, especially since Prohanov's perceived Christianity is important both as a component in many of his nostalgias and as a link between many of them. (Chapter 6 provides the details about the influence of his perceived Christianity on the relevant nostalgias.) This points to some Russian Empire nostalgia in these nostalgias. This concerns all the individual nostalgias from section 7.2.1 which I don't specify below as belonging to «a minority of the found individual nostalgias».

When it comes to a minority of the found individual nostalgias, in chapter 6 I have argued how I link these findings to circumstances in both the Russian Empire and Soviet history. On that basis I chose (in chapter 6) to interpret them as above all nostalgia on features of Great Russia, i.e. nostalgia on features common to the Russian Empire and the USSR. I interpret the following individual nostalgias from section 7.2.1 as belonging to this group: Prohanov's nostalgias for the Stalinist type of Soviet culture, «the empire» in general, the USSR's geopolitical power over territories which where integral parts of both the USSR and the Russian Empire, for the unification of the «red» worldview from the Soviet period and the «white» worldview from the Russian Empire period.

For details on specific circumstances and arguments which apply to only one or very few of the found individual nostalgias, see chapter 6.

I haven't observed any instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire exclusively. To be more precise, I detected some instances of nostalgia for features common to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, shown in the previous paragraph, but saw no instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire which weren't also features of the Soviet Union.

7.2.4 Intensities of the found nostalgias

In this section I will attempt to determine the relative intensities of the nostalgias found in the Prohanov texts (shown in section 7.2.1). As the relevant factors in the evaluations of the intensities I choose Prohanov's emotional engagement when he writes about the various objects of nostalgia and how often/much he writes about them as. (The same method was used for the Dugin texts in section 7.1.4.)

I have already discussed general trends in these factors (in section 7.2.2), and have commented on the intensities of several of the individual nostalgias (in chapter 6). Here follow arguments and conclusions on that basis.

I consider that the most intensive of Prohanov's nostalgias are the following: The Soviet victory in the WWII, Stalin, Stalin as the strong leader who organized different peoples towards this goal, the Stalinist type of Soviet culture, the Red Army, the heroes of the WWII, weapons from the WWII, the Soviet industry, the Soviet period's enemy image of the US/NATO/West.

The following of Prohanov's nostalgias seem a little weaker: the «empire» in general, the Soviet state, the «basis» (his term) of the Soviet state, the ideological postulates of the Soviet state, the «constants» (his term) which the Soviet ideology rested on, the Soviet values, the Soviet symbols, the Soviet leaders, the USSR as a great power in general, the USSR's geopolitical influence in the world (the USSR's status as a world power), the bipolar system of balance of geopolitical influence from the Soviet period, the USSR's position as a pole in this system, the USSR's geopolitical power over territories which where integral parts of the USSR, and over other Eastern European countries, the Communist ideal itself, Communism's strategic goals, Communism's collective behavior, Communism's idea of the common future of the peoples.

The weakest of Prohanov's nostalgias are, as I see it, the ones for: the whole country in the whole Soviet period, the Soviet people, the unification of different peoples in the struggle for a common goal in the Soviet period, the Russian people's function as the organizing force in this struggle, the Soviet civilization, the unification of the «red» worldview from the Soviet period and the «white» worldview from the Russian Empire period.

Thus, expressions of nostalgias for objects which Prohanov closely associates (in time and/or subject) to the Soviet victory in the WWII and/or Stalin usually have the highest intensities, expressions of nostalgias for objects which he more associates to Stalin/the victory

usually have a little lower intensity, while nostalgias which he associates the least to the victory and Stalin usually have the lowest intensities. Consequently, for most of Prohanov's nostalgias it seems to be a positive correlation between the intensity of nostalgia and the associative proximity to Stalin and/or the victory in the WWII: High associative proximity often goes together with high intensity, while low associative proximity often goes together with low intensity.

Finally, is there also a *causal* connection here, in the sense that there is any evidence that high associative proximity to Stalin and/or the victory in the WWII causes high intensity nostalgia, while low such associative proximity causes low intensity nostalgia? A necessary – – but not sufficient – demand to a cause is in general that it must precede the effect. Unfortunately, the Prohanov texts studied don't give information about what came first in his thinking – the associative proximity or the intensity. Thus, already at this early stage in the process of identifying eventual causes and effects the data fail to provide a steady basis for conclusions regarding eventual causality, so no conclusions regarding causality are drawn.

7.2.5 Comparison of this study with earlier research

As we learnt in section 4.4.2, Rosalind Marsh claimed in 2011 that Prohanov has imperialist views, and Marlene Laruelle stated in 2015 that Prohanov «has presented himself as an imperialist and a supporter of Stalinism» (Marsh 2011, p. 167; Laruelle 2015, p. 90). When it comes to Marsh' statements that Prohanov is an imperialist, they have been corroborated by my study. This since I have concluded that he harbors nostalgia on «the empire» (section 7.2.1). In section 7.2.2 I have shown how I have interpreted the majority of findings of nostalgia in this study, and in section 7.2.3 I have argued how these interpretations have led me to the conclusion that Prohanov, in his daily text production, is more nostalgic for the USSR than for the Russian Empire. Applying this on the empire question, I agree with Marsh that Prohanov is nostalgic for «the empire», but want to add that this «empire» idea/nostalgia of his doesn't seem to be neutral, in the sense that it seems to tilt more in the direction of «the USSR empire» than of the Russian Empire.

When it comes to Marsh' statement above about Prohanov as a supporter of Stalinism, in section 4.4.2 we learnt that she in 2011 called Prohanov a «neo-Stalinist» (Marsh 2011, p. 182). I have concluded in my study that Prohanov harbors nostalgia for Stalin, and I have ranked Stalin nostalgias as one of the most intense of his nostalgias (sections 6.2 and 7.2.4). I have also found that Stalin nostalgia is one of the two most central of his nostalgias (sections

7.2.1 and 7.2.4). Thus, my study fully corroborates this statement from Marsh. In addition to this, my study provides information on many links between this nostalgia and others of his nostalgias (section 6.2). I haven't found this information in the secondary literature about Prohanov, so it seems to be new (section 6.2).

Now I will discuss some scholarly statements about the role of Christian Orthodoxy in Prohanov's ideology. This Christian Orthodox side of Prohanov's ideology is relevant to Soviet nostalgia roughly for two reasons: Firstly, my study (section 6.3.4) has shown that Prohanov harbors nostalgia for an ideology which rests on Stalinism spiritualized by the Orthodox Church. Secondly, it has also shown (in chapter 6, section 7.2.1) that Prohanov's perceived Orthodox Christianity plays important roles for many of his nostalgias, included many of the nostalgias for aspects of the Soviet Union: both as links between various nostalgias and as integral parts of objects of nostalgia. Thus, my study has added details on *in which ways* Prohanov's perceived Orthodoxy is important to many of Prohanov's Soviet nostalgias, and has provided many examples of this importance.

The first scholarly statement about the role of Christian Orthodoxy in Prohanov's ideology comes from Marsh. In section 4.4.2 we saw that she in 2011 stated that Prohanov shows a «peculiar mixture of Stalinism, Russian Orthodoxy, and neo-fascism» (Marsh 2011, pp. 166). One of the findings in my study is that Prohanov wants a Russian society that rests on Stalinism spiritualized by the Orthodox Church, under the common leadership of a strong Stalinist leader and a Church leader (section 6.3.4). Thus, both the Stalinism and Orthodox components in Marsh' so-called «mixture» have been corroborated by my study. (The question whether Prohanov's ideology has fascist elements or not is outside the scope of my study, as shown in section 4.4.2). Furthermore, I have suggested (in sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.4) that Prohanov's mystical Stalinism, in which Prohanov sees Stalinism as something mystical and religious, comprises an important part of the basis for this unification of experiences from the USSR and the Russian Empire. Thus, my study has added this perspective to Marsh' statement.

Scholars have also made statements about a mix in Prohanov's ideology on another level: In section 4.4.2 we saw that Anastasia V. Mitrofanova states that Prohanov's ideology «mix[es] 'this world' with 'the other world'» and connects «'the other' world with 'this' one» (Mitrofanova 2005, pp. 27, 31). In section 4.4.2 we also learnt that Mark Juergensmeyer considers that in Prohanov's ideology «[c]onflicts of the real world are linked to an invisible, cosmic war: the spiritual struggle between order and disorder, light and darkness, faith and

doubt», and «[m]odern conflicts are seen as a direct reflection of the struggle between Good and Evil taking place in the other world» (Juergensmeyer quoted in Mitrofanova 2005, p. 22–23; Mitrofanova 2005, p. 31).

In my study, I saw many examples of ideas which point to Prohanov's mixing of «this world» with «the other world», especially when I analyzed texts concerning his mystical Stalinism in section 6.2.3. For example, that Prohanov considers Stalin as a leader given by God, that both the Soviet people and Stalin had been given the mission to prevail over Hell in battle (i.e. the WWII), that the whole meaning of the Stalinist period in Soviet history was to prepare the Soviet people for the victory in WWII, that both the Soviet people and Stalin fulfilled their missions, that mystical Stalinism is identical to the Russian people's duty to transform darkness into light and to convert defeat in to victory, and that mystical Stalinism unifies the Earth and the Heaven (section 6.2.3). How is this relevant to Soviet nostalgia? I have concluded (in section 7.2.1) that mystical Stalinism is an important element in Prohanov's nostalgia on Stalin, thus it can be concluded that mystical Stalinism's mixing of «this world» with «the other world» is an important element also in Prohanov's nostalgia for Stalin in general. Taking into account that his nostalgia for Stalin is one of the most intense and central parts of his Soviet nostalgia (sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.4), this mixing of «this world» and «the other world» becomes indirectly one of the most important traits of his Soviet nostalgia in general. Thus, my study has added to the understanding of the roles of both mystical Stalinism in general and of Prohanov's idea of mixing of «this world» with «the other world» in particular in Prohanov's Soviet nostalgia.

When it comes to Prohanov's idea of conflicts as reflections of struggles in «the other world», I have also found more explicit expressions of it than I presented above. In general, this idea has been seen in many of his texts which have the Soviet participation/victory in the WWII as their explicit subjects. For example, in section 6.1.1, I found that Prohanov sees the Second World War (WWII) as something much more than just a geopolitical war. It was shown that he sees it as a holy war, as Christ's war against «Hell, which came up from the underground» (Prohanov 2015d, para. 12; Prohanov 2015l, para. 17), as «Christ's descent on Earth», and that he seems convinced that «Christ fought on the side of the Red Army» (Prohanov 2015i, para. 6; Prohanov 2014g, para. 5). And in section 7.2.1 we saw that that Prohanov not only considers that the WWII was a holy/Christian war, but even that the Soviet victory was Christ's victory.

To summarize regarding Mitrofanova's statements about mixing of «this world» with «the other world» and seeing conflicts as reflections of struggles in «the other world», my study has corroborated them regarding Prohanov and has added information about these aspects of his (Soviet) nostalgia.

7.3 Comparison of Dugin and Prohanov

In this section I will first compare the contents of Dugin's and Prohanov's nostalgias, then compare these two authors when it comes to whether they first and foremost seem to be nostalgic for the Soviet Union, for the Russian Empire or for Great Russia, and, finally, compare the intensities of their nostalgias.

7.3.1 Content of nostalgias

Some of the individual nostalgias for Dugin (section 7.1.1) and for Prohanov (section 7.2.1) aren't easily comparable across the authors. When it comes to the individual nostalgias which relatively readily *are* comparable across the authors, I choose to organize them into four main categories, based on their objects of nostalgia. My four categories are: 1) The role of the Russian people in a «union». 2) Influence/power/ territories. 3) Features of Communism. 4) The state.

Next, I will specify which of Dugin's and Prohanov's individual nostalgias belong in each of these four categories, and will compare the two authors within the frames of each of these categories:

Both Dugin and Prohanov – Communism-related: A similarity between Dugin and Prohanov is that neither of them is nostalgic on Communism as a whole ideological package, only for some of the traits and/or practical effects of Communism: Dugin is nostalgic for some of the «real» effects of Marxism put into practice in the Soviet Union, namely the creation of nationalist (sic!) societies with national cultures, unique identities and strong traditions. He is also nostalgic for the social solidarity and social justice aspects of Communism. (Section 7.1.1.) Prohanov is nostalgic for the Communist ideal itself, Communism's strategic goals, Communism's collective behavior and Communism's idea of the common future of the peoples (section 7.2.1). (He is also nostalgic for Stalinism in particular, but I will treat that aspect separately below.) Thus, while Prohanov is nostalgic for certain aspects of Communism which were actually «intended» in Communist ideology, most

of Dugin's so-called «Communism-related» nostalgias are for «side effects» of Communism not really «intended» in Communist ideology (exceptions: social justice and social solidarity). It can be argued that several of the traits of Communism (i.e. the USSR version of communism) partly had their roots in the traditional Russian culture and society, so that they also can be attached to the Russian Empire period. All the same, I see them as being more characteristic for the Soviet period than the Russian Empire period, since they in the Soviet period were a part of the state's ideology in a society more politicized than the Russian Empire society was.

Both Dugin and Prohanov - The state: Dugin is nostalgic for the state's lost subjectness and independence (section 7.1.1). Prohanov is nostalgic for the Soviet state itself and for several aspects of this state: The «basis» (his term) of the Soviet state, the ideological postulates of the Soviet state, the «constants» (his term) which the Soviet ideology rested on, the Soviet symbols and the Soviet leaders. (Section 7.2.1.) To conclude, the two authors are similar in the way that they harbor nostalgia for «the state». However, a difference between them is that while Dugin doesn't differentiate clearly between the Soviet state and the Russian Empire state, Prohanov's frequent references to the Soviet period contribute to the impression that he above all is nostalgic for the Soviet state, and only to a lesser degree to the Russian Empire state. Prohanov's above-mentioned explicit references to various aspects of the *Soviet* state specifically of course also point in this direction.

Both Dugin and Prohanov - The role of the Russian people in the «union»: Dugin harbors nostalgia for the Russians' role as the «great people» (his term) among other, «smaller peoples» (his term), for the Russian people's role as the «core» of a union of different peoples and cultures, and for the Russian people's role as the integrating force in such a union (not necessarily the *Soviet* Union). (Section 7.1.1.) Prohanov, for his part, is nostalgic for the unification of different peoples in the struggle for a common goal in the Soviet period and for the Russian people's function as the organizing force in this struggle (section 7.2.1). A striking similarity between the two authors is that both of them are nostalgic for a union of the Russian people and other peoples, and for a special role designated for the Russian people in such a union. That said, a difference between them is that Dugin puts a heavier emphasis on the «greatness» of the Russian people compared to the other peoples, while Prohanov to a higher degree stresses various kinds of «commonalities» between those peoples (e.g. common struggle towards common goal). Another difference is that Dugin attaches his nostalgias for the Russian people's roles in a union above all to Great Russia in

general, i.e. to aspects common to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Unions, while Prohanov first and foremost attaches them to the *Soviet* Union (although he to some degree also attaches them to the Russian Empire).

Both Dugin and Prohanov - Influence, power and territories: Dugin harbors nostalgia for the ideological and political leadership in a global alternative to the Western one, for ideological and real political influence/power over territories in the former USSR and other territories in Eastern Europe (section 7.1.1). Prohanov, for his part, is nostalgic for the USSR's status as a world power/great power (i.e. for the USSR's geopolitical influence in the world), for the bipolar system of balance of geopolitical influence from the Soviet period, for the USSR's position as one of the two poles in this system, for the USSR's geopolitical power over territories which were integral parts of the USSR/the Russian Empire, and for the USSRs geopolitical power over other Eastern European countries (section 7.2.1). Thus, the two authors are similar in the way that they harbor nostalgias for world influence/power, for influence/power over territories which were integral parts of the USSR and territories of other countries in Eastern Europe. But they also differ: Dugin stresses, to a higher degree than Prohanov, that his Russian alternative of influence was, and will be, both a political and ideological alternative to the Western one. On the other hand, Prohanov is more nostalgic for the political power struggle between the USSR and the West in the Soviet period, for the bipolar power balance between the USSR and the West from that time, and for the USSR's powerful position as one of those two poles.

The four categories above have in common that they can be viewed as different subjects which both Dugin and Prohanov treat (write about). Dugin and Prohanov treat these subjects differently, which leads to the two authors' different stressing of various aspects within each of the subjects, which in turn lead to the above-mentioned differences in individual nostalgias within each of these four categories.

However, the comparison has also shown that not all central individual nostalgias fit into one of the four categories above. What I am talking about here are individual nostalgias which instead are typically expressed clearly by only one of the authors, while being next to absent in the other author's texts. It's possible to group many of them into different main categories, but these categories are characteristic of only *one* of the authors. I have found two such categories:

Dugin - Familiarity, innocence and tradition: Dugin is nostalgic for the feeling of «familiarity» (his term) with both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, and for the

(perceived) innocence of both the Soviet Union and of the Russian Empire. He is also nostalgic for tradition in itself and for what he sees as the three components of tradition: Religion, hierarchy and collective identity. (Section 7.1.1) He sees both tradition in itself and its three components as features both of the Russian Empire and the USSR. Thus, all his individual nostalgias in this category are for features which (to him) are common to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.

Prohanov - The victory in the WWII, Stalin and their closest associations («extensions»): Prohanov is nostalgic for the Soviet victory in the WWII, for Stalin, and for various aspects of the USSR which he associates with the victory and Stalin (Section 7.2.1). The closest are the Red Army, weapons from the WWII, the heroes of the WWII, the Stalinist type of Soviet culture, the Soviet industry in general, and the Soviet period's «enemy» image of the US/NATO/the West.

I suggest that this comparison in general has shown two things:

Firstly, that some of the differences between Dugin's and Prohanov' nostalgias can be seen as variants of nostalgias which are common to both authors on a rather abstract level. Secondly, others of the differences between Dugin's and Prohanov' nostalgias reflect the simple fact that the two authors choose to write on partly different subjects. Thus, these nostalgias are for objects which are subordinated subjects which are widely/frequently treated by only *one* of the authors. I suggest that these differences in nostalgias are due to differences in the two authors' world views in general and/or in their ideologies in particular, and that they even provide hints of such differences.

7.3.2 Nostalgia for Great Russia, for the Soviet Union or for the Russian Empire?

The aim of this section is to gather in one place all the conclusions already drawn (in preceding sections) regarding the question whether Dugin and Prohanov are mainly nostalgic for features of the Soviet Union, mainly for features of the Russian Empire or mainly for Great Russia (i.e. for features common to the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire).

Considering Dugin, he seldom expresses nostalgia for the USSR specifically. In the majority of the findings he instead shows nostalgia for features common to the Russian Empire and the USSR. All the same, in a minority of the findings he shows nostalgia particularly for the USSR along with this nostalgia. (Learnt in section 7.1.3.) To summarize with respect to Dugin, he expresses above all Great Russia nostalgia in the studied texts.

Regarding Prohanov, I interpreted the majority of the findings of nostalgia as being mainly expressions of *Soviet* nostalgia, and only to a lesser degree expressions of features common to the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. However, in a minority of the findings, he first and foremost expresses nostalgia on the last-mentioned common features. (Learnt in section 7.2.3.) To summarize with respect to Prohanov, he expresses above all Soviet nostalgia in the studied texts.

However, I didn't observe any instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire exclusively – neither in the Dugin texts, nor in the Prohanov texts. To be more precise, I didn't detect any instances of nostalgia for features of the Russian Empire which aren't, in my opinion, also features of the Soviet Union. (Learnt from sections 7.1.3 and 7.2.3.)

7.3.3 Intensities of nostalgias

In this section I will compare the intensities of Dugin's and Prohanov's nostalgias in general and their Soviet nostalgias in particular.

The intensities of Dugin's and Prohanov's nostalgias *overall*

My analyses of all the selected Dugin and Prohanov texts has shown me that the two authors have different writing styles: Prohanov has a more openly patriotic and colloquial style than Dugin, whose style is more intellectual and philosophical. A consequence is that Dugin's expressions of nostalgias have more often turned out to be «hidden» as pure *descriptions* than what has been the case with Prohanov's. However, in my view, this doesn't mean that Dugin's nostalgias in general are less intense than Prohanov's, only that it more often has been necessary to look beneath the surface to detect Dugin's nostalgias than Prohanov's. Taking this difference into account, I haven't seen any overall mentionable difference in how frequent Dugin and Prohanov express nostalgias or in their emotional engagement when they do express nostalgias. That is, as sections 7.1.4 and 7.2.4 demonstrate, I have found differences between the two authors concerning intensities of individual nostalgias, but I have no basis for concluding that anyone of the two authors overall is more nostalgic than the other.

The intensities of Dugin's and Prohanov's *Soviet* nostalgias

It's easy to misrepresent the complexity of the nostalgias found for Dugin and Prohanov when generalizing on them. Thus, the arguments below aren't meant to fit every each of the found nostalgias, but to show some main trends for comparison.

As learnt in section 7.1.4, Dugin's most intense nostalgias were, as a rule, for features which the Russian Empire period and the Soviet period had in common. His less intense nostalgias were, as a rule, more ambivalent when it came to which degree they were directed towards Great Russia in general or the Soviet Union in particular.

When it comes to Prohanov, it's seen in section 7.2.3 that the majority of his nostalgias were first and foremost for the Soviet Union, and only to a lesser degree for the Russian Empire. A minority of his nostalgias were above all for features of Great Russia, i.e. for features common to the Russian Empire and the USSR. As seen in section 7.2.4, Prohanov's most intense nostalgias were, as a rule, for objects closely associated (in time and/or subject) to the Soviet victory in the WWII and/or to Stalin. His less intense nostalgias were, as a rule, for objects more loosely connected to Stalin/the victory.

7.4 Generalizability of Soviet nostalgia results

Generalizability to other texts of the same authors?

In this study, I have analyzed a selection of Dugin and Prohanov texts with respect to Soviet nostalgia. The selection consists of 516 articles published in 2014 and 2015 and four books published in 2014, 2012, 2010 and 2004 (section 1.4).

When it comes to the selected articles, 308 of them were published in 2014 and 208 in 2015. Many of these 516 articles are duplicated on other web sites than the web sites I referred to in section 1.4. Taking this into account, the selected articles seem to constitute a large share of all the articles published by these two authors during these two years.

When it comes to the four books, I have selected them on the basis of book reviews, books summaries, previews/browsing of potentially relevant books, and references made to them in scholarly secondary literature. A criterion for the selection has been the given book's ability to contribute to the primary source material, i.e. to contribute with Soviet nostalgia-relevant data.

But can the results of this study be generalized to other time periods than 2004–2015 for Dugin and 2010–2015 for Prohanov? I don't find that recommendable, for two reasons: Firstly, I haven't studied any primary data (texts) published by these authors before or after these periods. Secondly, while it could be argued that it's not very probable that authors' Soviet nostalgias in general change rapidly, on the other hand both Dugin and Prohanov have changed several of their viewpoints through the years (see sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2). Thus, I wouldn't count on that this hasn't happened also to views relevant to (Soviet) nostalgia.

Generalizability to other authors in the *impertsy* current?

It's possible to argue that Dugin's and Prohanov's centrality in the *impertsy* current should make it safe to generalize the results of this study to other authors in the *impertsy* current. I agree that in many cases this «centrality argument» is a weighty one, since a current often is characterized by largely uniform opinions among its supporters. However, when speaking about the *impertsy* current, the current in mind encompasses people and milieus with often conflicting views in many matters, and this can easily be reflected in conflicting (Soviet) nostalgias between them. It's not even necessary to look outside of my own study in order to find illustrations of this feature of the *impertsy* current: The comparison of Dugin and Prohanov in section 7.3 has shown that there are several differences between Dugin's and Prohanov's nostalgias – both when speaking about nostalgias in general and Soviet nostalgias in particular. Thus, I don't find it advisable to generalize the results of my study to the *impertsy* movement in general.

Another thing is that the results of this study can be used to build hypotheses for content of Soviet nostalgia in texts by other *impertsy* authors. These hypotheses can then be tested by doing analyses of suitable texts by those authors. My study can thus be used in theory building for Soviet nostalgia in the *impertsy* current in general. However, if the purpose is to build theory for Soviet nostalgia on the detailed analytical level which I have operated on in this study, I consider it advisable to analyze authors which in sum reflect the specter of variants of Soviet nostalgia which I suspect exists within the current on this detailed level.

Generalizability to other currents in Russian nationalism?

As seen in section 4.2, there isn't one «Russian nationalism», but several «Russian nationalism*s*» with partly different ideologies. One way of looking at these ideological differences is to see them as consequences of differing views on the state, ethnicity, the «empire» and the «core», a typology which I have described in section 4.2. Other typologies have been developed by other authors. However, my main point here is simply that due to these differences in the ideological traits of the various Russian nationalisms, the results of this study aren't generalizable to other ideological currents of Russian nationalism.

References

Allensworth, W. 2009, «Dugin and the Eurasian controversy: Is Eurasianism ‘patriotic’?». In: Laruelle, M. (ed.), *Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia*, Routledge, London, pp. 104–122.

Anderson, B. 1991, *Den föreställda gemenskapen: Reflexioner kring nationalismens ursprung och spridning*, Verso, London.

Boym, S. 2001, *The Future of Nostalgia*, Basic, New York.

Deutsch, K. W. 1966, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationalism*, MIT Press, Cambridge.

Dobrenko, E. and H. Gunther (eds.) 2000, *Socrealističeskij proekt*, Akademičeskij proekt, St. Petersburg.

Dugin, A. 2015a, «Pod strategiej Rossii zapad naŝupal moral’nuû osnovu». In: *Zavtra*, 30.09.2015, [online]. Available from: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/pod-strategiej-rossii-zapad-naschupal-moralnuyu-osnovu/, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2015b, «V sisteme cennostej Rossii net mesta ravenstvu i bratstvu». In: *Russkaâ Služba Novostej*, 08.08.2015, [online]. Available from: http://rusnovosti.ru/posts/382541, [read 09.03.16].

Dugin, A. 2014a, «Esli kievskaâ hunta zateet graždanskuû vojnu, Rossii pridetsâ načat’ kontrterrorističeskuû operaciû». In: *Nakanune.RU*, 08.04.2014, [online]. Available from: http://www.nakanune.ru/articles/18866, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2014b, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, Arktos, London.

------. 2014c, «Evraziâ v setevoj vojne: evrazijskie seti nakanune 2015 goda». In: *Evraziâ*, 08.12.2014, [online]. Available from: http://evrazia.org/article/2609, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2014d, «Geopolitika razvala SSSR». In: *Russkaâ narodnaâ liniâ*, 21.01.2014, [online]. Available from: http://ruskline.ru/video/2014/01/21/geopolitika_razvala_sssr/, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2014e, «Global’naâ set’ liberalov protiv ‘uderživaûŝego’». In: *Evraziâ*, 04.10.2014, [online]. Available from: http://evrazia.org/article/2582, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2014f, «Otkazat' v priznanii». In: *Zavtra*, 26.04.2014, [online]. Available from: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/otkazat-v-priznanii/, [read 14.03.16].

------. 2014g, «Ot korporacii k sivilizacii». In: *Izborskij klub*, 11.04.2014, [online]. Available from: http://www.izborsk-club.ru/content/articles/3011/, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2014h, «Rubež projden». In: *Evraziâ*, 27.03.2014, [online]. Available from: http://evrazia.org/article/2488, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2014i, «S Kryma načnetsâ vozroždenie». In: *Izborskij klub*, 12.03.2014, [online]. Available from: http://www.izborsk-club.ru/content/articles/2717/, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2014j, «Točka nevozvrata uže projdena». In: *Zavtra*, 24.05.2014, [online]. Available from: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/tochka-nevozvrata-uzhe-projdena/, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2014k, «V mire bez Rossii nezačem žit'». In: *Zavtra*, 05.08.2014, [online]. Available from: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/v-mire-bez-rossii-nezachem-zhit/, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2014l, «Vyderžat' blef SŠA». In: *Zavtra*, 03.03.2014, [online]. Available from: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/vyiderzhat-blef-ssha/, [read 09.03.16].

Dugin, A. 2012, *The Fourth Political Theory*, London: Arktos.

Dugin, A. 2004a, *Filosofiâ vojny*, Moscow: Âuza, [online]. Available at: http://arctogaia.org.ru/article/1283, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2004b, «Vvedenie: Geopolitika kak sud'ba». In: *Filosofiâ vojny*, Moscow: Âuza, [online]. Available at: http://arcto.ru/article/1012, [read 09.03.16].

------. 2004c, «Glava 1. Paradigma Konca». In: *Filosofiâ vojny*, Moscow: Âuza, [online]. Available at: http://arctogaia.org.ru/article/126, [read 09.03.16].

Dunlop, J. B. 1985, *The New Russian Nationalism*, Praeger, New York.

Ferretti, M. 2007, *Nostalgia for Communism in Post-Soviet Russia*, 17.12.07, Universiteta del Tuscia, Viterbo:, [online]. Speech on working seminar in The European Network for Contemporary History, Paris, 17.12.07. Available at: http://www.eurhistxx.de/spip.php%3Farticle39&lang=en.html, [read 09.11.15].

Fosatto, F. 2006, «Vladimir Putin and the Russian Television 'Family'». In: Mendras, M. (red.), *Les Cahiers Russie/The Russia Papers*, no. 1, pp. 1–15, [online]. Published by Center for International Studies and Research (CERI), Paris. Available at: http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/cahier_1.pdf, [read 15.11.15].

Gregor, A. J. 1998, «Fascism and the New Russian Nationalism», *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 1–15.

Higson, A. 2014, «Nostalgia is Not What It Used to Be: Heritage Films, Nostalgia Websites and Contemporary Consumers», *Consumption Market and Culture*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 120–142.

Horvath, R. 2015: «The Euromaidan and the crisis of Russian nationalism», *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 43, No. 6, pp. 819–839.

Hutcheon, L. 1998, «Irony, Nostalgia and the Postmodern», University of Toronto, Toronto. Published the 19.01.1998 as an article at the web site of: University of Toronto English Library. Available at: http://library.utoronto.ca/utel/criticism/hutchinp.html, [read 31.12.15].

Ishiyama, J. 2009, «Historical Legacies and the Size of the Red-Brown Vote in Post-Communist Politics», *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 485–504.

James, P. 1996, *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, Sage Publications, London.

Kalinina, E. 2014, *Mediated Post-Soviet Nostalgia*, Södertörn University, Huddinge.

Kolstø, Pål 2016, «The ethnification of Russian nationalism». In: Kolstø, P. and H. Blakkisrud (eds.), *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp. 18–45.

Laruelle, M. 2015a, «Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasian Union: Terminological Gaps and Overlaps». Published as «policy memo no. 366» in July 2015 at the web-site «PONARS Eurasia», [online]. Available at: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/eurasia-eurasianism-eurasian-union-terminological-gaps-and-overlaps, [read 03.05.2016].

Laruelle, M. 2015b: «Russia as a 'Divided Nation,' from Compatriots to Crimea: A Contribution to the Discussion on Nationalism and Foreign Policy», *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 88–97.

Laruelle, M. 2012, «Larger, Higher, Farther North … Geographical Metanarratives of the Nation in Russia», *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 557–574.

Laruelle, M. 2009, *In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Laruelle, M. 2008, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, Woodrow Wilson Press/Kohns Hopkins University Press, Washington DC.

Lupp, J. S. 2005, «Western Ideas or Essential Tools», in: J. P. Hogan (ed.), *Cultural Identity, Pluralism and Globalization, Volume 1: Cultural Pluralism and Democratic Freedom*, the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, pp. 187–264.

Marsh, R. 2011, «The 'New Political Novel' by Right-Wing Writers in Post-Soviet Russia», *Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 159–187.

Mitrofanova, A. V. 2005, *The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy: Actors and Ideas*, ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart.

Nadkarni, M. and O. Shevchenko 2004, «The Politics of Nostalgia: A Case for Comparative Analysis of Post-Socialist Practices», *Ab Imperio*, 2/2004, pp. 487–519.

Oushakine, S. A. 2007, «'We're Nostalgic but We're Not Crazy': Retrofitting the Past in Russia», *The Russian Review, Vol.* 66, No. 3, pp. 451–482.

Pain, E. 2016, «The Imperial Syndrome and its Influence on Russian Nationalism». In: Kolstø, P. and H. Blakkisrud (eds.), *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, pp. 46–74.

Prohanov, A. 2015a, «Aleksandr Prohanov: Donbass predavat' nel'zâ. Esli èto slučitsâ, Rossii ne pomogut nikakie antikrizisnye mery». In: *Komsomol'skaâ pravda*, 13.02.2015, [online]. Available from: http://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26341/3224169/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015b, «Čudotvornaâ Pobeda». In: *Zavtra*, No. 9 (1110), 05.03.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/chudotvornaya-pobeda-/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015c, «Mir sotvorën lûbov'û». In: *Zavtra*, No. 42 (1143), 22.10.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/mir-sotvoryon-lyubovyu/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015d, «Mističeskij stalinizm». In: *Zavtra*, No. 19 (1120), 14.05.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/misticheskij-stalinizm-/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015e, «My – deti Svâtoj Rusi». In: *Zavtra*, No. 23 (1124), 11.06.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/myi-deti-svyatoj-rusi/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015f, «My – stalinisty!». In: *Zavtra*, No. 51 (1152), 24.12.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/stalin-4/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015g, «My žili v unison s èpohoj». In: *Zavtra*, No. 51 (1152), 24.12.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/25-let-zavtra/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015h, «Pepel devânostyh». In: *Zavtra*, No. 48 (1149), 03.12.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/pepel-devyanostyih/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015i, «Pobeda budet za nami». In: *Zavtra*, No. 4 (1105), 29.01.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/pobeda-budet-za-nami/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015j, «Pohorony otmenâûtsâ». In: *Zavtra*, No. 28 (1129), 16.07.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/pohoronyi-otmenyayutsya/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015k, «Prohanov: Amerika – strana sumašedših, a âponcy – èto narod-mučenik». In: *Russkaâ Služba Novostej*, 13.08.2015, [online]. Available from: http://rusnovosti.ru/posts/383155, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015l, «Prohanov hočet pričislit' Stalina k liku svâtyh». In: *Komsomol'skaâ pravda*, 18.06.2015, [online]. Available from: http://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26395.4/3272311/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015m, «Prohanov: Moldaviâ otvalilas' ot Rossii, kak nasosavšijsâ klop». In: *Russkaâ Služba Novostej*, 08.09.2015, [online]. Available from: http://rusnovosti.ru/posts/386199, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015n, «Religiâ Pobedy». In: *Zavtra*, No. 18 (1119), 07.05.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/prohanov/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015o, «Russkie nepobedimy». In: *Zavtra*, No. 6 (1107), 12.2.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/russkie-nepobedimyi/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015p, «'Stop' vragam Otečestva». In: *Zavtra*, No. 28 (1129), 16.07.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/blits5-2/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2015q, «Tragediâ centralizma». In: *Zavtra*, No. 51 (1152), 24.12.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/tragediya-tsentralizma/, [read 17.04.2016].

------. 2015r, «V ternovom venke revolûcij …». In: *Zavtra*, No. 2 (1103), 15.01.2015, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/v-ternovom-venke-revolyutsij/, [read 25.03.2016].

Prohanov, A. 2014a, «Bez voprosov». In: *Russkaâ Služba Novostej*, 20.01.2014, [online]. Available from: http://rusnovosti.ru/posts/300411, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2014b, «Krym čudotvornyj». In: *Zavtra*, No. 29 (1078), 17.07.2014, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/kryim-chudotvornyij/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2014c, «Mistika russkoj pobedy». In: *Zavtra*, No. 20 (1069), 15.05.2014, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/mistika-russkoj-pobedyi-2/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2014d, «'My – sovetskie lûdi'». In: *Zavtra*, No. 41 (1090), 09.10.2014, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/myi-sovetskie-lyudi/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2014e, «'Ne zlite Rossiû!'». In: *Zavtra*, No. 21 (1070), 22.05.2014, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/ne-zlite-rossiyu/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2014f, «Odinnadcatyj stalinskij udar». In: *Zavtra*, No. 19 (1068), 08.05.2014, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/odinnadtsatyij-stalinskij-udar/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2014g, «Strelâûŝaâ ikona». In: *Zavtra*, No. 43 (1092), 23.10.2014, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/strelyayuschaya-ikona/, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2014h, «Vsem smertâm nazlo». In: *Zavtra*, No. 18 (1067), 01.05.2014, [online]. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/content/view/vsem-smertyam-nazlo/, [read 25.03.2016].

Prohanov, A. 2010a, «Blaženny mirotvorcy». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/1-kreiser-_682.html and http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-2-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010b, «Carstvie nebesnoe tebe, modernizaciâ!». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-3-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010c, «'Domovogo li horonât…'». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-2-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010d, «Imperskaâ partiâ». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/1-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010e, «Iosif Stalin – russkij kosmist». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-2-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010f, «Krasnyj gigant i černyj karlik». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-3-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010g, «Mednyj vsadnik i hromaâ lošad'». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-2-kreiser-_682.html and http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-3-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010h, «Neopalimaâ pobeda». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-6-kreiser-_682.html and http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-7-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010i, «Novyj Putin: iz kukolki v babočky». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-5-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010j, «'S pobedoj vas, dorogie moi!' Krasnaâ ikona pobedy». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-7-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

------. 2010k, «Vtoroe preobraženie Putina». In: *Krejser «Iosif Stalin»*, Èksmo, Moscow, [online]. Available at: http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-8-kreiser-_682.html and http://bookz.ru/authors/prohanov-aleksandr/kreiser-_682/page-9-kreiser-_682.html, [read 25.03.2016].

Shenfield, S. D. 2001, *Russian Fascism: traditions, tendencies, movements*, M. E. Sharpe, New York.

Simonsen, S. G. 2001, «Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes», *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 263–288.

Slater, W. 1998, «Russia's Imagined History: Visions of the Soviet Past and the New 'Russian Idea'», *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 69–86. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523279808415391, [read 05.05.2016].

Strukov, V. 2009, «Possessive and Superlative: On the Simulation of Democracy and Nationhood in Russia». In: *The Russian Cyberspace Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 31–39. Available at: http://www.digitalicons.org/issue01/pdf/issue1/Possessive-and-Superlative_V-Strukov.pdf, [read 14.12.15].

Todorova, M. and Z. Gille (eds.) 2010, *Postcommunist Nostalgia*, Berghahn, New York.

Velikonja, M. 2009, «Lost in Transition: Nostalgia for Socialism in Post-Socialist Countries», *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 23, No 4, pp. 535–551.

Verkhovsky, A. and E. Pain 2015, «Civilizational Nationalism», *Russian Social Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 2–36. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2015.1074010, [read 05.05.2016].

Wessel-Berg, L. E. 2014, «Sovjetnostalgiens utbredelse og innhold», unpublished bachelor's thesis, University of Oslo.

Yurchak, A. 2006, *Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.