Can we say anything ethical about Digital Religion? Philosophical and methodological considerations

Charles Melvin Ess
University of Oslo

Introduction

Over the past decade or so, one of the most striking developments within Internet Studies and Media and Communication Studies (MCS) is the expanding development of explicitly ethical prescriptions and normative frameworks. This development is startling first of all as it seems to run directly contrary to defining commitments in the social sciences to notions of objectivity that entail “value-neutral” or “value-free” approaches. Nonetheless, leading figures in both MCS and Internet Studies have developed and argued for the inclusion of explicitly ethical norms and frameworks. For example, as we will explore more fully, Nick Couldry (2013) has taken a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics approach to shape a new ethics for digital journalism. Within Internet Studies, Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman have offered explicitly ethical recommendations for how to thrive as networked individuals (2012, 255ff.). Given that “thriving” is key norm in virtue ethics, such recommendations thus amount to endorsing virtue ethics in conjunction with otherwise strictly social scientific analyses (Ess 2015, 23ff.).

Perhaps most dramatically, the 2014 conference of the International Communication Association (ICA) focused on “Communication and the Good Life.” Where “the good life” is a defining topos of virtue ethics, the conference thematic thus indexes increasing interest in both virtue ethics and normative
approaches more broadly within media and communication studies (cf. Wang, 2015).

Digital Religion (DR) can be understood as an increasingly prominent domain within Internet Studies (Campbell 2013,680) and, in my view, MCS more broadly. Hence, as a further extension of these developments, I propose a normative framework as a new theoretical and methodological approach in DR. I justify this approach, rooted primarily in virtue ethics, in part because of its relevance to DR interests in *identity, community, and authority*. First, contemporary virtue ethics endorses a strongly relational sense of identity, one that I further specify in feminist terms of a relational autonomy. Relational autonomy then preserves individual *authority* and Kantian-based norms of respect for persons and equality of persons. Sustaining individual authority thus favors more egalitarian and democratic forms of *community*, in contrast with more hierarchical and non-democratic forms often affiliated with more fully relational selfhood.

I briefly suggest the applicability and fruitfulness of this framework for DR in two ways – first, as the basis of an ethical critique of a particular Bible study application that utilizes social networking media. Second, I sketch out how religious communities that endorse equality, respect for persons, and the virtue of loving could draw on this framework in the design and application of new communication applications.

I conclude by showing how this normative framework thus enhances Digital Religion and thereby Internet Studies more broadly as these are currently mapped and defined.
Normative approaches in digital religion: Preliminary objections and replies

Arguing for an explicitly normative approach in a strongly social scientific domain such as Digital Religion is risky: any normative approach will directly contradict long-established canons of analytical concepts and methodologies in the social sciences originally designed as value-neutral or value-free frameworks. Secondly, given that religious traditions, practices, and so on are centrally driven by specific value commitments defined within a given tradition – conceptual collisions and contradictions between a more external normative framework and the defining core values of a specific tradition seem all but inevitable.

To respond to the first concern: especially in a post-positivist age, we are acutely aware of the many ways in which positivist notions of value-neutral objectivity are, at best, heuristic ideals. A now rich and extensive literature documents how, e.g., Kantian epistemology, quantum mechanics, and/or more recent feminist critiques of the natural sciences (among others) demonstrate that all of our efforts to know and understand the world inevitably retain the traces and influences of our individual and collective value commitments and norms (e.g. Simon 2015). Since normative commitments cannot be avoided by human observers – we can minimize purely individual subjectivity and bias by making these commitments clear and explicit: doing so thus presents them for reflection, critique, and possible revision. Such reflexive critique thereby helps us better judge both the strengths and limits of any given scientific enterprise.
In response to the second concern: a key advantage of the virtue ethics I foreground here is a global heritage: it may thereby be less likely to conflict with established religious norms and practices.

**Expanding the theoretical and methodological toolkit of Digital Religion:**

**Virtue ethics**

Virtue ethics enjoys a literally global heritage. That is, virtue ethics emerges among more or less every religious and normative tradition we have record of (Ess, 2013). It is found in multiple indigenous traditions and explicitly developed in Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions as well as in Socratic, Platonic, and especially Aristotelian philosophies. The latter serve in turn as critical components of the Abrahamic religions. Lastly, virtue ethics defines many of the ethical impulses of Enlightenment rationalism, including its more secular versions, i.e., independent of any specific confessional or religious commitments and beliefs (Ess 2013, 207-212).

This global history and scope suggest that virtue ethics is *prima facie* more likely to cohere with both a great diversity of religious traditions as well as more secular-rational normative approaches. Virtue ethics is thus well positioned to meet the second objection to including normative approaches in DR: in many cases, at least, virtue ethics can cohere rather than clash with the ethical norms and approaches defining a given religion tradition. Moreover, a brief review of virtue ethics will show how it directly intersects Digital Religion’s defining interests in the themes of *identity*, *community*, and *authority*.

Virtue ethics characteristically begins with what appears to be a near-universal human concern: what must I do / become to be content with my life?
Here, “content” translates the ancient Greek term *eudaimonia* – literally, a well-spiritedness. This contentment is exemplified in undertaking a difficult challenge, such as mastering the skills of musicianship. Broadly, virtue ethics articulates a sense of the good life – a life of contentment and meaning – as emerging from our seeking to become more complete human beings as we pursue both (1) those virtues or excellences most interesting to us as individual persons (e.g., a craft, musicianship, etc.) and (2) those that render our relationships with others as mutually harmonious and fulfilling as possible. For Aristotle and Confucius, *friendship* is the premier example of human relationship that requires a suite of habits and skills (“virtues”) that must first be acquired and practiced in order for friendship to unfold and thrive. For example, Shannon Vallor (2010) highlights the virtues of empathy, patience, and perseverance as critical to friendship.

Broadly, there has been a remarkable renaissance of virtue ethics over the past few decades, partly in conjunction with the rise of feminist philosophies and ethics of care. In addition, virtue ethics attends to central features of our moral lives otherwise neglected by deontologies and consequentialisms, including “moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life, and the questions of what sort of person I should be . . .” (Hursthouse 1999: 3).

Moreover, virtue ethics is well established in information and computing ethics, starting with its central role in the foundational work of Norbert Weiner, “father” of cybernetics ([1950] 1954). Virtue ethics is also at work in MCS. As noted in the Introduction, Nick Couldry draws on Macintyre’s neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to develop an ethics for digital journalism as including both
professional journalists and citizen journalists. More fully: Couldry argues that
the virtues of accuracy, sincerity, and care are thus not simply virtues for
professionals, but, in my phrase, ethics for the rest of us as well (Couldry 2013;

**The risks of virtue ethics**

At the same time, however, virtue ethics entails a specific set of risks – at least
from the standpoint of high modern ethics and political philosophy as grounded
on specific understandings of the human being as a moral agent. Most briefly,
early modern philosophy developed a highly atomistic conception of the
individual – as either a *res cogitans*, i.e., a purely rational self (René Descartes
[1637] 1972) or a largely desire-driven, solely self-interested ego (Thomas
Hobbes [1668] 2014). These strongly atomistic conceptions are somewhat
ameliorated in Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). At the same time, Kant’s account of
rational autonomy is foundational for high modern conceptions of ethical norms
of respect and equality – and thereby the modern democratic-liberal state as a
political ideal (Ess 2013, 209f.).

Against this background, virtue ethics raises several profound risks. To
begin with, as its historical roots in preliterate societies might suggest, classical
virtue ethics rests upon strongly *relational* rather than *individual* understandings
of selfhood and identity. Relationality embeds self-identity and personhood
within the multiple relationships with Others that define a given person:
historically – and in some contemporary examples – this means that such a
relational self is deeply dependent upon a strongly hierarchical set of
relationships within which it must establish and sustain itself with maximum
harmony (cf. Ess 2013, 60f; 238-243).
Vis-à-vis digital religion’s interests in matters of identity (Campbell 2012, 686f.), a shift towards virtue ethics means first a shift towards more strongly relational selfhood. This shift then holds immediate implications for the further matters of community and authority (Campbell 2012, 682). To risk oversimplification: a more individual emphasis on selfhood frequently correlates with more egalitarian community structures and more openness to challenging the authority of existing institutions and traditions, including religious ones. So, for example, Knut Lundby has noted how Protestant churches encourage “the individual voice” more strongly than the Roman Catholic Church – with the upshot that “Protestant church structures are definitely being challenged” (2012: 36). By contrast, the more relational emphasis frequently correlates with more hierarchical community structures and greater insistence on obedience to authority. For example, the primary Confucian virtue of filial piety demands precisely the subordinate son’s obedience to his father – and, by extension, to the ruler of the state. Alistair Macintyre makes the same point in contemporary virtue ethics. First, MacIntyre articulates how the relational self is dependent for its sense of identity and being upon the larger set of community relationships that define it (1994: 28). Historically, of course, these communities have been strongly hierarchical, and thus require submission as a first virtue (1994: 190). Par contra, from radical reformers to democratic revolutionaries to modern conscientious objectors and various movements aiming at greater democracy, inclusion, and equality – all these rest on individual autonomy and agency as expressed in dissent from and disobedience to prevailing traditions, authorities, and hierarchical structures (e.g., King [1963] 1964).
These implications are amplified within Digital Religion, in fact, given the intentions and affordances of various forms of Internet-facilitated communication. On the one hand, especially in what Barry Wellman has identified as the “first age” of Internet studies, a great deal of attention and enthusiasm centered on the ostensible democratizing potentials of the Internet: distributed and sometimes anonymous communication capacities would ensure free and equal expression for all, thereby flatten hierarchies, and so usher in new and radically egalitarian forms of community (Wellman 2011, 18f.). By Wellman’s reckoning, we are now well into the third age of Internet studies: in this age, early optimism regarding Internet-enabled community and egalitarian-democratic authority structures, is all too easily countered by manifold examples, beginning with the tragic shifts from the “Arab Springs” of 2011 to the current Arab Winters (cf. Wellman 2011, 20). Similarly, challenges to extant institutional structures are easily made within Digital Religion, e.g., through the interactive and participatory functions of comment fields and ranking functions. Hence, by disabling or removing the ranking functions and comment fields of its YouTube channel, the Roman Catholic Church has more successfully instantiated and sustained its hierarchical structures via a top-down, “one-to-many” broadcasting model online (Campbell, 2012: 91f.). Protestant churches have been equally adept at both limiting online challenges to authority (e.g., Lomborg and Ess, 2012) as well as reasserting more traditional forms of authority in the face of such challenges (Cheong, Huang & Poon, 2011).

Given these backgrounds and developments, most especially within Internet Studies and Digital Religion – if we take notions of human beings as autonomous individuals coupled with democratic governance and equality as
normative, we will be rightly cautious about a virtue ethics that entails a more relational sense of selfhood.

**Relational selfhood and the virtue of loving**

The risks of relational selfhood to autonomy as grounding democratic norms and practices can be offset – first, by incorporating recent notions of relational autonomy within a virtue ethics that, second, highlights loving as a virtue.

To begin with, notions of relational autonomy incorporate critiques of modernist conceptions of autonomy and moral agency as excessively individualist, rational – and thereby overly masculine. Alongside these critiques, however, some feminists (e.g., Oshana 2006) recognize that modern conceptions of individual rational autonomy directly serve their emancipatory interests for women (among Others). Hence recent work reconfigures the notion of autonomy “...so as to be more sensitive to relations of care, interdependence, and mutual support that define our lives and which have traditionally marked the realm of the feminine” (Christman 2003, 143).

As a prime example, Andrea Westlund articulates how relational autonomy entails both independence from and relationship with Others: first of all, autonomy requires skills and abilities – virtues – that are learned only in and through relationship with Others. Westlund highlights the capacities for reflective endorsement of both one’s own acts and the acts of others as one such set of skills or abilities (2009, 26). Moreover, autonomy itself remains relational as it “requires an irreducibly dialogical form of reflectiveness and responsiveness to others” (2009, 26). These conceptions of relational autonomy thus recognize that “Some social influences will not compromise, but instead
enhance and improve the capacities we need for autonomous agency” (2009, 27).

Relational autonomy is further interwoven with the defining goals of virtue ethics. So Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper note that “autonomy is one primary good among others that a person needs to live a good life or to achieve human flourishing” (2014, 2). At the same time, Veltman explicitly conjoins virtue ethics with a Kantian deontological account of autonomy that grounds respect for persons as a primary value.

**Embodiment and loving as a virtue**

Sara Ruddick, a prime founder of the ethics of care, grounds a last but central component of virtue ethics. Ruddick (1975) develops an account of “complete sex,” as marked, for example, by mutuality of desire. Ruddick’s account rests in part on phenomenological accounts that stress the role of *embodiment* in defining our identities in non-dualistic ways (1975, 89). In this context, moreover, Ruddick foregrounds loving itself as a *virtue* – i.e., a practice that can be difficult at times and one that requires attendant commitments, on her showing, to a Kantian respect for persons and thereby equality (1975, 98f; for more extensive discussion, see *Ess*, forthcoming).

These understandings collectively constitute a normative virtue ethics framework that foregrounds loving itself as a primary virtue for a relationally autonomous (embodied) individual. *Contra* the risks of relational selves becoming totally dependent on hierarchical social structures and non-democratic regimes – relational autonomy remains here sufficiently individual, rationalistic, and independent as to ground foundational norms of (Kantian) respect for persons. As Ruddick illustrates, such respect for persons immediately
entails *equality*, as manifest first of all in a shared respect for one another as rational and autonomous persons. Finally, both Ruddick and the subsequent development of relational autonomy make clear that such equality is foundational specifically for gender equality. Such relationally autonomous selves will thereby continue to legitimate and require modern democratic states.

**Applying virtue ethics in Digital Religion**

The potential fruitfulness of this normative framework can be illustrated by applying it to a popular Bible-reading app, “YouVersion” (<https://www.youversion.com/>). YouVersion instantiates the correlation between relational selfhood and submission to (hierarchical) community and authority as it utilizes social media in a form of voluntary surveillance. For example, it records when, where and what you read – and when you don’t. It then engages you in a surveillance-based dialogue, regularly inviting you to read the text, alerting you to the latest stage in your selected reading plan and reminding you when you fall behind schedule. It further allows you to share your reading data with a designated “accountability partner” who will be informed should you fall behind your schedule. Still more widely, you can voluntarily publish your reading activity through social media – specifically through a social network of up to 150 friends. Finally, everything you read is recorded by LifeChurch.tv, ostensibly for marketing purposes (cf. Hutchings 2015).

YouVersion presents these practices of both lateral and hierarchical surveillance as designed to encourage your responsibility and accountability. At the same time, however, to use this app is to function first of all as a strongly relational self, one that is now electronically tethered to and constantly under
the surveillance and thus social control of one's larger communities. To echo MacIntyre, there may well be important virtues and practices to be acquired and refined through doing so, beginning with the virtue of accountability. At the same time, however, in this way YouVersion reinforces the dependency of a relational self on one or more communities – beginning with the self-chosen community of like-minded believers interested in reading the Bible. Such engagements, finally, seem to highlight submission to the authority of both these larger communities and the Bible as a sacred text.

Suppose that further research on the use of an app such as YouVersion developed strong empirical evidence of increasing dependence among its users upon larger communities – including communities marked by traditional hierarchies, including gender hierarchies. I would argue that a normative critique would then be justified – specifically on the grounds of virtue ethics, relational autonomy, and commitments to individual authority, equality, and respect for persons. First of all, such a critique would make a clear and explicit articulation of its ethical grounds and commitments, so as to thus be available for reflexive critique in turn; as discussed in the Introduction, such reflexive critique is a primary condition for normative approaches in the social sciences. Secondly, the conclusions of such a critique – specifically as rooted in normative commitments to (relational) autonomy and (gender) equality – are clear: where the practices and habits encouraged by such an app appear to diminish one's autonomy and foster subordination to hierarchical authorities, such usage should be regarded with suspicion, if not avoided and discouraged.

Secondly, the framework would be fruitful in terms of design. Shannon Vallor (2010) has examined how far the communicative practices afforded by
social networking sites (SNSs) either foster and/or hinder our acquiring and practicing the virtues central to friendship as a primary component in a good life or life of flourishing. These virtues include patience, perseverance, and empathy. Vallor finds that prevailing designs, affordances, and practices clustering around SNSs largely work against these primary virtues; our engagement with SNSs favors instead quick disconnects when communication is no longer pleasant or entertaining, thereby undermining our staying engaged with one another long enough to develop a strong sense of empathy with our communicants.

Vallor then argues that these analyses can be used in turn to guide design of new sorts of SNSs that better serve the aims of acquiring and practicing such virtues (2010: 168f.). Vallor thereby represents a growing number of ethicists and designers arguing for normatively-driven approaches to design in ICTs – for example, under rubrics such as “human-centered ICT,” “Fair ICT,” and “slow tech” (e.g., Patrignani & Whitehouse, 2014). These developments directly intersect with, and may offer new insights to, the thematic focus in Digital Religion on how technologies shape religion and vice-versa, especially as this research focuses on the negotiations between “the beliefs, discourse and tradition of a given religious group” and new technologies and their uses (Campbell & Lövheim, 2011: 1088). A natural extension here would be to develop normative guidance for future ICT design and implementations. As the YouVersion example suggests, a virtue ethics approach would first seek to carefully define and analyze what virtues and practices are fostered by specific technological applications within specific religious communities. Especially as such analyses highlight conflicts or tensions between the designs, affordances, and impacts of a specific ICT technology and the defining beliefs, norms, and
desired practices of a given community – these analyses should directly inspire suggestions for alternative designs better suited to fostering those beliefs, norms, and practices. More broadly, this normative approach could further explore how far current or proposed ICT technologies foster and/or hinder more generally shared virtues requisite for human flourishing. Here I have argued that these would include the virtues of loving, equality, respect for persons, and democratic norms and practices – as fostering and fostered by relationally autonomous selves.


We can now see how this framework fits within Digital Religion, Internet Studies, and MCS at large. To begin with, this framework brings into play recently developed philosophical understandings of relational autonomy – thereby directly contributing to what Wellman identifies as a chief focus of the third age of internet studies, namely, attention to how our interactions with CMC technologies involve new conceptions of selfhood and identity (2011, 21f.). This focus is one shared, as we have seen, within Digital Religion proper (Campbell 2012, 686f.; cf. Lagerkvist, this issue). At the same time, as we have seen, this framework directly intersects immediately conjoined interests in community and authority.

Moreover, this framework expands the theoretical and methodological toolkits of Digital Religion and Internet Studies to include an explicitly normative approach – one that should prove useful both for the sake of critical analysis of extant applications and practices as well as for design and deployment of technologies intended to preserve or enhance practices of virtue, beginning with
the virtue of loving. To my knowledge, this would be a relatively novel addition. On the one hand, this framework extends the appropriation of virtue ethics in media and communication studies more broadly (so Couldry 2013; Ess 2015). But within Internet Studies broadly, and Digital Religion as a domain thereof, explicitly normative approaches are generally avoided (e.g., Peng et al 2013). For her part, Heidi Campbell observes that attention to “the ethical and moral challenges posed by digital technologies” has been a component of Internet Studies more broadly (2013, 682). But her overview of Digital Religion – explicitly identified as “a subfield of Internet Studies” (2013, 680) – does not specifically identify an ethical focus as part of DR.

These recent maps of Internet Studies and Digital Religion thus strongly suggest that explicitly normative frameworks within these fields are more or less absent. Insofar as these maps are accurate, the normative framework developed here – presuming it indeed proves to be useful and fruitful in both analytic and normative ways – would hence represent a distinctive contribution to these domains.

References


