Civilians under the Crossfire:

*A Comparative Case Study of Patterns of Lethal and Sexual Violence during the War in Bosnia 1992 - 1995*

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IV
This thesis is dedicated to all those who somehow fell victim to the brutalities of the war in Bosnia. I am sorry that I can’t do more for you at this time than to dedicate this work to you.

In hope of justice for all those who have and are suffering at the hands of war.

In hope of peace and security for all.
Abstract

The study of lethal violence and the study of sexual violence in war have mainly been two distinctive research fields within the literature on civilian victimization. Researchers and academics have tended to isolate these two types of violence, and chosen to focus either on the study of lethal violence or the study of war related sexual violence. Consequently, we have little knowledge about how these two types of violence relate to each other during war. One of the main focuses and questions within the scholarly debate is whether lethal and sexual violence correlate and thus whether lethal violence can be used as a proxy for sexual violence or not.

This thesis sheds light on how lethal and sexual violence relate, by applying the theoretical framework of Kalyvas (2006) “The Logic of Violence in Civil War” to explore how patterns of both lethal and sexual violence vary with levels of control. The analysis is conducted using the war in Bosnia & Herzegovina 1992-1995 as a case study, focusing on the within-variation of (sexual and lethal) violence and control.

This thesis argues that sexual violence and lethal violence are two fundamentally different acts of violence, and are therefore likely to differ even within the same war. The analysis shows that patterns of lethal and sexual violence do indeed differ, and that control relates differently to lethal violence than to sexual violence. A lower degree of control coincides with lower levels of lethal violence, but not with lower levels of sexual violence. Sexual violence is widespread in areas of both high (exclusive) control and lower (fragmented) control. This thesis thus demonstrates that control is a relevant aspect to take into account when explaining patterns of lethal violence during the war in Bosnia. However, control does not emerge as an important factor in explaining variation in levels of sexual violence. Future research should focus on other aspects in explaining variation in levels of sexual violence, but also focus on different forms of sexual violence.

This thesis serves as a first test of how both lethal and sexual violence vary with control, and is a contribution to the scholarly debate on lethal and sexual violence. By studying both lethal and sexual violence through one common lens, this thesis attempts to broaden the understanding of how sexual violence differs from lethal violence.
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1 INTRODUCTION

Under what circumstances do belligerents choose to utilize different types of violence against civilians, for instance why and when do belligerents chose to rape civilians instead of killing them? Why are some areas within the same conflict zone so much more violent than other? A genuine curiosity and interest in these two questions were the starting point of this thesis, which analyzes patterns of two types of violence, lethal and war related sexual violence, during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) 1992 – 1995.

While the study of lethal violence has been at the forefront in the academic field on war studies, and is characterized by a vast amount of literature, the study of war related sexual violence during war has only evoked the interest of researchers and policy makers in more recent times, particularly among political scientists (Cohen, 2013, p. 462; Valentino, 2014, p. 94). Researchers and academics have, however, tended to isolate these two types of violence and chosen to focus either on the study of lethal violence during war, or the study of war related sexual violence (Houge, 2015). Consequently, we have little knowledge about how these two types of violence relate to each other, despite the fact that some conflicts are accompanied by both high levels of lethal violence and high levels of sexual violence, while others have high use of one type of violence (for instance lethal), but low use of the other type of violence (for instance sexual). Additionally, how patterns of violence vary within the same conflicts is still one of the least understood aspects of war (Costalli & Moro, 2012, pp. 801–802), but compared to the study of lethal violence we know much less about the within-variation of sexual violence.

In this thesis, I attempt to study more closely how sexual violence relates to lethal violence by focusing on the within-variation of these two types of violence. I do this using the war in Bosnia (1992-1995) as a case study. In order to systematically and comparatively assess how these two types of violence relate, I study both types of violence within the theoretical framework of Kalyvas (2006) “The Logic of Violence in Civil War”, focusing on variation between different geographical areas (municipalities) with varying degree of control by the warring parties.

1 This is however, an emerging field. See for example work by E. J Wood (2010, 2006).
Kalyvas’ (2006) work emphasizes strategic interactions between the actors, and views violence as strategic and closely connected to characteristics of the battlefield, specifically control. The main argument is that violence is negatively correlated with levels of control. The higher the level an actor has over an area, the less control the actor will employ here.

The question of how strategic interactions between the warring parties affect choices to deliberately target civilians during war, has been subject to much discussion and research amongst political scientists (Downes, 2011; Kalyvas, 2006.; Valentino, 2014, p. 94; R. M. Wood, Kathman, & Gent, 2012). However, this discussion has largely been limited to the study of lethal violence against civilians. Kalyvas’ (2006) theory on how levels of control influence patterns of violence specifically focuses on lethal violence. However, Kalyvas’ (2006, p.20) argues that lethal violence serves as a proxy for violence in general, and thus implies that patterns of other types of violence, such as sexual violence, should coincide with patterns of lethal violence. But, the question of how levels of control coincide with patterns of both sexual and lethal violence is yet to be systematically explored. This thesis is thus an attempt at systematically and comparatively addressing that question, by studying both types of violence through Kalyvas’ (2006) theoretical framework on patterns of (lethal) violence and control. As such this thesis should be seen as a first and not final test on how patterns of both lethal and sexual violence vary with control within the same conflict setting.

There are two aspects to this thesis. First, I employ Kalyvas’ (2006) theory, a framework which has previously only been applied to the study of lethal violence, to study a different type of violence, sexual violence. Second, I apply Kalyvas’ (2006) theory to study a conflict which is outside the scope conditions of the initial framework. Kalyvas’ theory assumes an irregular non-ethnic war. The case study in this thesis is the war in Bosnia, which is characterized as an ethnic war. Although researchers have applied Kalyvas’ theory to study the war in Bosnia previously (see Costalli & Moro, 2012), they have only done so indirectly, without taking into account direct measures of control, but rather using the ethnic distribution in the population as an indicator of control. In this thesis, I focus on whether the warring actors had control and not the distribution of ethnic groups in the general population.

I find that control relates differently to sexual violence than to lethal violence. While a lower level of control coincides with lower levels of lethal violence, the same is not true for sexual violence. High levels of sexual violence occur both in areas of exclusive (full) control and in
areas of fragmented (lower) control, there is even some indication that levels of sexual violence might have been even higher in areas of fragmented control. I argue that this could partly be due to the fact that while lethal violence is tactic (in ethnic wars), sexual violence is mainly strategic. Tactic violence is used to eliminate a specific risk or threat, while strategic violence is used to influence others to act in a certain way (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 27). Furthermore, this could also be due to the fact that a lower degree of control forces actors to employ lethal violence against the enemy opponent, instead of the civilian population. For instance, more ammunition to kill the enemy actor means less ammunition to kill the civilian population. However, sexual violence is not perpetrated with the same military resources, therefore a lower degree of control does not constrain the perpetration of high levels of sexual violence.

1.1 Relevance and Importance of the War in Bosnia as Choice of Case Study

War in Bosnia broke out in 1992, following a referendum vote on whether Bosnia should succeed from Yugoslavia. The war was primarily fought along ethnic lines between three of the largest ethnic groups, the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosniaks (Kalyvas & Sambanis, p. 214, 2005). It is close to impossible to find one simple term to describe the war in Bosnia. Kalyvas & Sambanis (2005, p. 212) define the war in Bosnia as a case of symmetric nonconventional war, which points to the existence of a mix of irregular and regular forces fighting in territory defined by clear frontlines. However, Costalli & Moro (2012, p. 803) assert that the war in Bosnia eventually took on the features of conventional civil war. Despite its many complex features, the war in Bosnia is a particularly relevant choice for a case study in exploring the relationship between lethal and war related sexual violence.

The war in Bosnia is characterized by high levels of both lethal and sexual violence against civilians. Although it is difficult to accurately estimate the devastating effect the war had on civilians in numbers, the most recent and most accurate estimates state that the war resulted in 95,940 battle related deaths, of which 38,239 civilian victims, and 57,701 military victims (Tokaca, 2012, p. 116). Even more difficult than estimating the number of dead in the war is the attempt to estimate the amount of sexual violence and rape perpetrated during the war. Early estimates on the number of victims of rape ranged from 20,000 – 60,000. Later the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe settled the estimates at 20,000 victims of
rape during the war in Bosnia (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 3). More importantly for the purpose of this thesis, the use of both lethal and sexual violence exhibited great within-variation. While some areas experienced high levels of lethal and/or sexual violence, other areas had a complete absence of violence. In order to explore how patterns of control vary with patterns of sexual and lethal violence, some form of variation across space is necessary. Using the war in Bosnia as a case study provides me precisely with this kind of variation.

Furthermore, Bosnia is one of few cases where the use of war related sexual violence is comparatively well documented (Skjelsbæk, 2011, pp. 63–64). Reliable and systematic data on sexual violence is more difficult to obtain than data on lethal violence. While it is possible to obtain data on lethal violence that closely resembles the reality by using several sources, data on sexual violence is much more difficult to obtain. For instance, data on lethal violence can be obtained by counting civilian casualties during the war, by consulting NGOs and government bodies that might have some official records, or by gathering witness testimonies from survivors in the aftermath of the war, who may provide information on killed family members or neighbors. The Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo used a wide variety of such sources in their work on identifying and mapping civilian casualties during the war in Bosnia (Ball, Tabeau, & Verwimp, 2007, pp. 11–15; Tokaca, 2012, pp. 73–74). When it comes to victims of sexual violence it is simply not possible to monitor the extent through a method of counting during the war. Unless the victims themselves choose to come forth and testify, it is not possible to observe how many victims there are. Many victims may also be reluctant to testify because of the attached stigma and out of fear for reprisals. Equally important, the intensity of the fighting might also prevent access to NGOs so that obtaining testimonies during the war becomes nearly impossible, even if the victims want to speak out about what they have suffered. Therefore, while data may indicate that sexual violence is widespread in one conflict, systematic and detailed data on sexual violence throughout the conflict zone may still be lacking. Almost immediately from the onset of conflict in Bosnia, several fact finding missions and organizations were active in attempting to gather systematic evidence (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994a).

Looking aside from the advantages of available documentation and the spectrum of within variation which the conflict in Bosnia provides as a case study in this thesis, the war in Bosnia is also important in its own right. The war in Bosnia stands as a landmark case within the field of sexual violence. Although the use of sexual violence occurred in wars prior to Bosnia, it
was a largely neglected aspect of war. Excessive documentation on the widespread and systematic use of sexual violence during the war in Bosnia, put war related sexual violence on the agenda on the international arena, and eventually led the use of war related sexual violence to be regarded as an international security issue (Skjelsbæk, 2011, pp. 47, 63, 59).

However, while both the high levels of lethal and sexual violence during the war in Bosnia have evoked the interest of policy makers and researchers, the research approach to these two types of violence has been rather different. Consequently, there are two important gaps in the literature on violence during the war in Bosnia. First is the lack of systematic approaches to the study of patterns of sexual violence during the war. The study of lethal violence during the war in Bosnia has been subject to several systematic analysis attempting to explain patterns of violence (see for instance Costalli & Moro, 2012; Schneider, Bussmann, & Ruhe, 2012; Weidmann, 2011). Second and equally important, is the perpetrator bias which exist within the discourse on sexual violence during the war. All the warring actors employed sexual violence during the war. However, according to international observers and human rights organizations the actors employed such violence to a varying degree. Reportedly, the majority of the victims were Bosniak and the majority of perpetrators were Serb forces (Amnesty International, 1993, pp. 5–6; Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, p. 9; Skjelsbæk, 2011, pp. 23–24). The fact that Serb forces reportedly perpetrated the majority of sexual violence is almost used as a justification for focusing on sexual violence committed by Serb forces in the discourse on sexual violence. Consequently, victims of sexual violence perpetrated by Bosniak and Croat forces are often neglected (Simic, n.d.).

Arguably, by conducting a systematic, comparative analysis on each of the warring actors’ use of lethal and sexual violence during the war in Bosnia, this thesis can contribute to filling the current gap which exists particularly within the field of sexual violence during the war in Bosnia, and see if the theoretical lens of control is relevant for the study of lethal and sexual violence in Bosnia.

1.2 Research Question(s)

In this thesis, I attempt to study the relationship between sexual and lethal violence. I do so by employing one common theoretical framework, the framework of Kalyvas (2006) “The Logic
of Violence in Civil War”, to both the study of lethal and sexual violence. Kalyvas (2006) framework is a theory about how levels of (lethal) violence vary with levels of control. However, I chose to employ it on the use of war related sexual violence as well, arguing that control is a relevant aspect for all war-related violence. In order to systematically assess how patterns of both lethal and sexual violence vary with control, I posed the following three research questions.

*RQ1: To what extent can Kalyvas’ (2006) model on patterns of control and (lethal) violence explain how patterns of lethal violence and control varied during the war in Bosnia?*

*RQ2: To what extent can Kalyvas’ (2006) model on patterns of control and (lethal) violence explain how patterns of sexual violence and control varied during the war in Bosnia?*

*RQ3: How does sexual violence differ from lethal violence during the war in Bosnia?*

The aim of the first research question is to analyze whether Kalyvas’ model explains pattern between lethal violence and control during the war in Bosnia. The aim of the second is to analyze this for sexual violence. Assuming and arguing that sexual and lethal violence differ, I pose a third research question, which is to be answered through the analysis of the two first questions.

The nature of the research questions is descriptive rather than causal. This is due to the availability and nature of the data on lethal and sexual violence and the research design in this thesis. From the obtained data and research design is not possible to clearly state whether control results from the use of violence – i.e. violence is used to establish control, or if violence results from the level of control – i.e. the level of control somehow constrain or enable the use of violence. However, by answering each of the research questions in this thesis, I am able to infer whether patterns of control vary differently between lethal and sexual violence, and thus more closely assess whether and how lethal violence differs from sexual violence.

### 1.3 Theoretical Approach

At the core of Kalyvas theory is the question and understanding of how the degree of control affects levels of violence against civilians. Kalyvas’ main argument is that levels of violence
are negatively correlated with levels of control. Thus, the less control an actor has over an area, the more violence will be employed against civilians. More specifically, he proposes three concrete hypotheses, that (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 132, 204):

**H1:** Areas of exclusive control should have low levels of violence.  
**H2:** Areas of fragmented control should have the highest levels of violence.  
**H3:** Areas of shared control should have low levels of violence

Kalyvas’ theory focuses only on one type of violence against civilians, lethal violence. He argues that lethal violence can serve as a proxy for violence in general, thus assuming that the level of lethal violence during a war correlates with levels of other types of violence, such as sexual violence (Kalyvas, 2006, p.20). However, Kalyvas theory has so far not been applied to the study of other types of violence such as sexual violence. Although Kalyvas does not directly apply the theoretical framework to sexual violence, it is possible to infer an assumption that levels of control should have the same influence on both sexual and lethal violence, given his argument that lethal violence can serve as a proxy for civilian abuse. Thus, according to Kalyvas there should be no difference between the empirical findings in RQ1 on lethal violence and on RQ2 on sexual violence. What I find to be true for patterns of lethal violence and control during the war in Bosnia, should also be true for sexual violence.

Scholars have however questioned the assumption that levels of lethal violence and levels of sexual violence correlate (E. J. Wood, 2006). Although some conflicts are accompanied by high levels of both types of violence, others are not. Additionally, while some groups utilize both high levels of both types of violence, others groups use high levels of sexual violence and low levels of lethal violence. Thus, there is not only a cross-country variation, but also a variation across armed actors (E. J. Wood, 2009). The research on sexual violence doesn’t provide us with any clear answers either in regards to whether sexual and lethal violence follow the same pattern. While Cohen (2013) finds a positive but weak correlation between levels of battle related deaths and sexual violence, a study by Cohen and Nordås (2015) finds no correlation between levels of battle deaths and sexual violence. Although Kalyvas (2006, p.20) argues that lethal violence can serve as a proxy for violence in general, he makes an important argument on how lethal violence differs from other types of violence, in that it is

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2 Kalyvas uses the term “absent” instead of low, but since few of the municipalities during the war in Bosnia had completely absent levels of violence, I used the term low.
the absolute form of violence, it is an irreversible act which necessarily implies the ending of an individual’s life.

In this thesis I argue that war related sexual violence and lethal violence are two fundamentally different acts. The associated cost and utility of using lethal versus sexual violence potentially differs. These two types of violence may therefore also serve different goals. Thus, I argue that patterns of lethal and sexual violence differ. Arguably, patterns of control should then also vary differently for sexual violence as opposed to lethal violence.

1.4 Research Approach

This thesis is a case study of how patterns of both lethal and sexual violence vary with levels of control during the war in Bosnia (1992-1995). I apply Kalyvas’ (2006) theoretical framework to study this relationship between variation in control and two different types of violence. The research design in this thesis can at best be described as a hypothesis testing case study. In order to answer the research questions in this thesis, I study the within-variation of (lethal and sexual) violence and control on municipality level. For data on lethal violence at municipality level I used a dataset on the total number of killed civilians from the Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo. For data on sexual violence I used three different sources: reports about camps and sexual violence during the war in Bosnia by the United Nations Commission of Experts for the Former Yugoslavia ref (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, 1994d), a dataset from the local NGO in Sarajevo “Women Victims of War Association (Udruženje Zena Zrtva Rata)” which is available in the book “Monografija o Ratnom Silovanju i Seksulanom Zlostavljanju u Ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini”(Duderija, 2015), and finally news articles by Justice Report (www.justice-report.com), which is an online news source covering issues related to war crime in Bosnia. Data on levels of control was obtained using the assessment of the conflict zone provided by Helsinki Watch as a baseline (Helsinki Watch, 1993). In chapter 3 “Research Design and Method” I discuss more closely each of the data sources and how the analysis specifically was conducted.

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3 In English: Monography about Rape and Sexual Violence During the War in Bosnia. Hereafter referred to as the Monography.
1.5 Outline of Thesis

Having briefly accounted for the aim, questions, arguments and the method of this thesis in this chapter, I turn to chapter 2 next, which elaborates on the theoretical foundations of this thesis and gives a brief review on the current debate on lethal and sexual violence. In chapter 3 I discuss how the analysis was conducted, and challenges with the various data sources used. Chapter 4 provides background knowledge about the war in Bosnia, and the violence that took place. Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings from the analysis, and discusses the results. Finally, chapter 6 concludes and discusses the implications of the results from the analysis to the research field and the understanding of the war in Bosnia.
2 THEORETICAL APPROACH

This chapter lays out the theoretical foundation of the thesis, which is provided by the work of Kalyvas (2006) “The Logic of Violence in Civil War”. The aim of the chapter is to discuss how Kalyvas work relates to the broader research field on civilian victimization (both lethal and sexual violence), and how Kalyvas’ theory will be applied in this thesis.

In section 2.1 I outline Kalyvas’ (2006) theoretical framework, and discuss whether it is relevant to the study of violence during the war in Bosnia, and how it relates to a broader research field on civilian victimization. In section 2.2 I give a brief overview on the debate and research on war related sexual violence, and discuss whether and how control (and thus Kalyvas’ theoretical framework) is a relevant lens for the study of war related sexual violence.

2.1 The Logic of Control and (Lethal) Violence According to Kalyvas (2006)

The literature on lethal violence against civilians during war is a vast and constantly growing research field. However, prior to the 1990s scholars were primarily preoccupied with the causes of war, and not the consequences of war, such as violence against civilians (Valentino, 2014, p. 90). Although the 1990s brought about a change in this, with scholars posing questions such as why, when and where do armed actors kill civilians, scholars still argue that the severity of lethal violence against civilians in war is one of the least understood aspects of war (Ibid). The question of violence is not just a question of why actors in war employ violence against civilians or abstain from it. One of the greatest puzzles with war and violence is the great within variation of violence during the same war, and thus the question of why some areas are so much more violent than other within the same war (Costalli & Moro, 2012, p. 801). This thesis speaks to this literature.

Kalyvas starts his work “The Logic of Violence in Civil War” (2006) with the example of two Greek villages, Manesi and Gerbesi. In August 1944 a vicious massacre took place in Gerbesi, but Manesi was spared for violence. Two villages, similar in every observable aspect, yet a completely different outcome in regards to violence. Kalyvas goes on to cite several similar examples, including the ethnic Albanian village of Bukos in Kosovo, which
suffered severe violence by Serb forces, while its equally Albanian neighbor Novo Selo escaped violence (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 1-2).

A similar variation is observed during the war in Bosnia. Overall there were more military victims than civilian victims who were killed during the war, about 40 percent of those killed were civilian and the remaining 60 percent had the status as military victims (Tokaca, 2012, p. 116). However, in specific municipalities the civil military ratio was more than three, meaning that three times as many civilians were killed. The scale of the severity of violence ranged from a total absence of casualties to some specific areas where several thousand civilians were killed in a short period of time (Ibid, p. 127, 168, 174).

Interestingly and perhaps unsurprisingly, research on the variation of severity across civil wars shows that the factors accounting for severity are not the same as those accounting for civil war onset (Lacina, 2006). What initially causes the violence to erupt and what drives the violence once war has erupted thus differs. While there is great consensus that factors such as state capacity, regime type, and ethnic and religious diversity influence conflict onset, Lacina (2006, p. 287) finds that the same factors do not explain the severity of conflict. Lacina finds that it is democracy, rather than economic development or state military strength that is most strongly correlated with fewer deaths. Additionally, ethnic homogeneity seems to be related to more deadly conflicts (Lacina, 2006, p. 276). A similar argument is found in Kalyvas’ (2006, p. 138-139) work where he asserts that violence should be analytically decoupled from war itself. He goes on to argue that victory largely follows from full control over the conflict zone, and that factors such as state capacity are more important for the dynamic of violence rather than the onset.

Recent theories on lethal violence against civilians during war largely break into two categories, with one emphasizing organizational aspects and the other emphasizing strategic considerations. The former asserts that killing of civilians in war stems from organizational structures either within the group or the conflict environment. The latter asserts that violence is instrumental and strategic (R. M. Wood et al., 2012, pp. 686–687). In the former view violence is largely external in the sense that it is a given based on characteristics of the groups and/or conflict environment (Weinstein, 2006), while in the latter view violence is internal, in the sense that it is deliberately inflicted upon civilians in order to influence the conflict dynamics and is largely shaped by the strategic interactions between parties.
One of the most prominent works within the latter tradition, where violence is viewed as strategic, is the work of Kalyvas (2006) “The Logic of Violence in Civil War”. Kalyvas (2006) work is the theoretical foundation of this thesis, and the model according to which the analysis in this thesis is conducted. Thus, this thesis is placed within the tradition where violence against civilians is viewed as instrumental and strategic.

Kalyvas (2006) focuses on violence which is inflicted deliberately on civilians for the purpose of control. However, maybe more than contributing to an understanding of why violence takes place, Kalyvas’ work contributes to an understanding of where violence takes place. Thus, bringing us closer to an understanding of the puzzle of why some areas within the same conflict zone are so much more violent than other. Violence in Kalyvas model is not only inflicted upon civilians for the purpose of violence itself, but rather because it serves a goal or strategy, intended to shape the behavior of a targeted population. The strategic element of Kalyvas’ violence becomes particularly evident in the case where there are two or more actors producing the violence. Violence against civilians occurs due to and is influenced by the strategic interactions between the warring actors. These strategic interactions have implications for the perpetrated violence against civilians because warring actors need to anticipate their opponent’s strategy and the likely effects of their violence on civilians, and the violence thus reflects the strategic interactions between the parties (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 26 - 30).

The main elements in Kalyvas’ (2006) model are control, collaboration, and violence. The conflict zone consists of three different types of control: exclusive, fragmented and shared. Civilians are faced with the choice whether to defect (collaborate with the enemy) or denounce (collaborate with the actor in control). Armed actors seeking to maximize territorial control and collaboration must decide whether to use violence or not. Civilians can choose to collaborate with the actor in control over their area for several reasons, but a rather common causal mechanism that translates control into collaboration is coercion and survival maximization (Kalyvas, 2006, p.24). Civilians can thus choose to collaborate with the actor in control or defect. Actors can influence this decision by employing violence against civilians to deter them from collaborating with the enemy. Violence which is used to deter others from acting in a certain way is strategic, while violence which is used to remove a specific risk is tactical. Thus, violence in Kalyvas’ model is strategic (Kalyvas, 2206, p. 27). The type of control that prevails in a given region of a conflict zone affects the types of strategies
followed by actors. The warring parties try to shape popular support and deter collaboration with the enemy (defection), and one central way of doing that is through violence, which again is influenced by the type of control. Thus, the likelihood of violence is a function of control in Kalyvas’ model (2006, p. 12). **Kalyvas’ main argument is that violence is negatively correlated with control.** The higher the level of control exercised by an actor, the higher the rate of collaboration with this actor, and inversely the lower the rate of defection, and thus the need for violence⁴ (Kalyvas, 2206, p. 132).

The core logic is that actors only employ violence as long as the benefits exceed the costs. Benefits include the consolidation of control, which is achieved by elimination of actual defectors and more importantly the deterrence of potential defectors. The costs of violence includes the potential backfire effect of violence, as those affected by it may side with the enemy, and thus defect, even though they did not intend to defect prior to the violence. Here, information about potential defectors is essential. Information comes either from direct monitoring, when the level of control is high, or from denunciation when levels of control is lower, because monitoring is challenging in areas of control. The cost of violence exceeds the benefits in areas where one actor has exclusive control, because civilians lack the opportunity to defect to the enemy, given that the enemy has no territorial presence in these areas, and any denunciations are likely to be false. **Therefore, in areas of exclusive control there will be no violence⁵. This is thus the first hypothesis of the model.**

In areas of shared control there will be much defection, but no denunciation, and thus no information, because of the fear of counter-denunciations. The incentive to use violence is high, but because of the even higher cost associated with it, violence is counterproductive. Using violence might result in mass defections to the enemy. Kalyvas’ asserts that this is counterintuitive, because one would expect the actors to resort to violence in areas where they need it the most, which is in the most contested zone that corresponds to areas of shared control. **Therefore, violence will be absent in areas of shared control as well. This is the second hypothesis from the model.**

The core argument of Kalyvas’ theory is that violence is negatively correlated with control. In

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⁴ For a thorough discussion on potential causal mechanism see Kalyvas (2006) “The Logic of Violence in Civil War” chapter 4, p. 87-111.

⁵ Kalyvas used the term absent, however I use the term low in this thesis, as few areas had a completely absence of violence during the war in Bosnia.
zones of fragmented control, one actor has dominant but incomplete control. Here, there will both be defections and denunciations, and actors have both the ability and incentive to use violence. **What follows from this is that levels of violence will be highest in areas of fragmented control. Which is the third hypothesis of the model** (Ibid, pp. 200 - 204).

Kalyvas’ theoretical approach can be illustrated in the following way (Kalyvas, 2006, p.204):


Figure 1: Kalyvas model on violence and control

Actor A and actor B

Zone A1 actor A exclusive control
Zone B1 actor B exclusive control

Zone A2 actor A fragmented control
Zone B2 actor B fragmented control

Zone C actors share control

The aim of this thesis is to use Kalyvas’ (2006) predictions about how the level of control varies with levels of violence, as hypothesis about where I expect to see the highest levels of violence during the war in Bosnia. While Kalyvas’ model is limited to the study of lethal violence alone, I attempt to apply it to both the study of wartime sexual violence and lethal violence in order to assess more closely the relationship between these two types of violence.

Additionally, Kalyvas’ theory assumes a guerilla warfare where the front lines are largely blurred, and argues that the logic of defection is of limited value in ethnic wars (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 87, p. 181). The war in Bosnia has many definitions. Some define the war as a symmetric nonconventional war, while others emphasize the development into a conventional war (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005, p.14; Cotalli & Moro, 2012, p.803). Whatever definition is used about the war in Bosnia, the common nominator is the presence of clear frontlines.
Furthermore, the war in Bosnia can also be characterized as an ethnic war, which points to the fact that violence and fighting mainly took place according to ethnic lines. Thus, Kalyvas (2006) model is not directly and explicitly intended for a war such as the war in Bosnia. However, in the section below I argue that there are several reasons why Kalyvas’ (2006) model is a useful theoretical approach in this thesis. Although the same logic might not be relevant to the war in Bosnia, it is possible that control imposes some constraints on the use of violence against civilians, for instance.

2.1.1 Kalyvas’ (2006) Model Applied to Ethnic Wars

Rather than asking why Kalyvas’ (2006) model should be relevant when studying ethnic wars, such as the war in Bosnia, I take the opposite approach and ask why it shouldn’t? More specifically, I provide three reasons below why Kalyvas’ theory should be applied to the war in Bosnia. First (i) are Kalyvas’ own arguments, about the recurring elements of violence and civil war across contexts, and the failure of group divisions to account for the game on the ground. Second (ii), is the research on ethnic violence during the war in Bosnia, which has failed to directly take into account the role of control. Third (iii), is several important research contributions pointing to the common nature of all civil wars, regardless of the characterization as conventional, irregular, or ethnic.

(i): Given many of Kalyvas’ (2006) own arguments in “The Logic of Violence in Civil War”, it seems rather logical that levels of control should influence or constrain levels of violence against civilians in ethnic wars as well. Kalyvas (2006, pp. 5-6) argues that violence should be decoupled from civil war itself, and that regardless of the different goals actors may have, forms of violence, and the context within which the violence occurs, civil war violence displays some recurring elements. Why then should violence in ethnic wars follow a completely different logic? More importantly, even though the mechanism of violence might differ somewhat across conflicts, the influence or constrain posed by levels of control on violence is likely relevant across wars. Inherited in the concept of (civil) war is the territorial division of space (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 17), a division which is relevant across all wars, whether irregular, conventional, symmetric, or ethnic.

Kalyvas model assumes an irregular war. One of the key characteristics in the literature that set irregular wars apart symmetric and conventional wars, is less stable frontlines (Kalyvas,
However, while the frontlines may have been more stable during the war in Bosnia, the conflict zone consisted of areas which were both exclusively controlled, under fragmented control, and under shared control, according to the assessment made by Helsinki Watch (Helsinki Watch, 1993). This raises the question of whether the literature draws a too strong difference between irregular wars and conventional wars in terms of frontlines, or if the literature on the war in Bosnia has taken for granted the stability of frontlines and characteristics of the conflict zone. I argue that the stark divide between conventional and irregular wars in the scholarly debate often might lead to a pre assumption of the characteristics of a specific conflict zone, without further exploration, as seems to have been the case with the war in Bosnia, where scholars have assumed stable frontlines (for instance Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005, p.14; Cotalli & Moro, 2012, p.803).

(ii): Another reason why Kalyvas’ model is relevant for the study of violence during ethnic wars is the research and literature on ethnic war itself. Kalyvas (2006, p.5) argues that the often cited causes of ethnic division fail to account for the actual dynamics of violence, even where such divisions are deep. However, a central part of the research and discourse on violence during the war in Bosnia emphasizes precisely the importance of ethnicity in explaining levels of violence. For instance, Dulic and Hall (n.d.) argue that the ethnic security dilemma theory is better suited to explain ethnic cleansing (violence used to establish control over areas in ethnic wars, and the war in Bosnia). The ethnic security dilemma theory applies a key concept from IR-theory, the security dilemma, to explain mechanisms and violence in ethnic wars. The theory argues that violence results from a context of anarchy, which causes each group to fend for themselves in term of security. The increase of one group’s security automatically reduces the other group’s security, because each of the groups view each other as threats to own security. Violence is then used to gain demographic dominance over territory (Posen, 1993; Dulic & Hall, n.d. p.5). A closely related concept which is often employed in the study of violence during ethnic wars is polarization, which emphasizes the number and size of ethnic groups (Di Salvatore, 2016, p. 2). Costalli and Moro (2012) argue that polarization is well suited to explain levels of violence during the war in Bosnia. More specifically, they find that violence was highest where the number of ethnic groups was low, but the size of the groups similar. Dulic and Hall (n.d) come to a similar conclusion, finding that violence against civilians was highest in zones of ethnic parity (ethnic groups were of similar size).
Related to Kalyvas’ model these arguments and findings assert that violence should be highest in areas where neither of the actors have clear control, (this is if control is measured on the basis of the size of the ethnic population groups), hence in areas of shared control. This is in contrast to Kalyvas’ theory which asserts low levels of violence in areas of shared control (Costalli & Moro, 2012, p.805). Yet, neither of these studies account for control directly. Rather, they use the ethnic distribution of the population at municipality level as an indicator of mobilization resources, power and thus control. Kalyvas (2006, p. 112) argues that control is not simply a function of such numerical measures. If control was given based on the size of ethnic population groups, the Bosniak forces would then have won the war quite quickly as the Bosniak population clearly had a numerical advantage. However, this was not the case since the numeric advantage of the Bosniaks could not be translated into a military advantage. Furthermore, the argument that violence will be highest where two ethnic groups are of similar size is not directly applicable to the war in Bosnia, as there were three ethnic groups, but two opposing actors during the first phase of the war. The population consisted of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, but the Bosniak and Croat forces fought jointly against the Serb forces in the first and last phase of the war6. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Serb forces regarded both the Croat and Bosniak population as threats and targeted both groups with violence. If so, both the Croat and Bosniak population should then be regarded as one group.

In this thesis, I do not neglect the fact that violence mainly took place along ethnic lines. However, my contribution differs in two important aspects. Instead of using the ethnic distribution as an indicator of control, I use direct measures of control, and rather use the ethnic distribution as a control variable. Although actors may intend to use violence against the opposing ethnic population group, a low(er) degree of control could put constraints on the use of violence, for instance. Thus, alongside the role of ethnicity I bring into consideration another interesting and largely neglected aspect of the war in Bosnia and levels of violence.

There is also evidence and support in the scholarly literature that go in the direction of supporting the use of Kalyvas’ (2006) theory on different types of war beyond irregular wars. For instance, Mueller (2000) argues that the concept of «ethnic warfare» might be severely misguided, and argues that ethnic wars are not all that different from non-ethnic wars.

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6 See chapter 4.2 for a closer description of the war and warring actors.
Locyker (2010) points to the dynamic character of wars, and argues that the current common practice of labeling civil wars as either conventional or guerilla, which is generally meant to accurately characterize the type of warfare throughout the entire war period, fails to fully capture the changing character of warfare. Balcells (2010) study on violence during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) illustrates the importance of control in conventional wars as well. One of her findings is that war related factors, such as control, gain explanatory importance particularly after the onset of war and first round of violence. Specifically, she asserts that willingness to kill will be more acute in moments when armed groups are more uncertain about their control over territory. Balcells (2010) argument resembles the prediction and logic of violence from Kalyvas’ (2006) theory, which state that actors will use higher levels of violence in areas of fragmented control, compared to areas of exclusive control. The difference between these two areas is a lower degree of control, and thus a higher degree of uncertainty about control.

2.1.2 Kalyvas’ (2006) Logic Within the Broader Research Field

Although Kalyvas’ (2006) theory differs in several aspects from much of the research on lethal violence, the similar underlying logic is echoed in several other works. When an actor moves from a zone of exclusive to fragmented control, the actor moves to a zone where the level of control is lower, but the actor also moves to a zone where he is weaker. Essentially these different zones of control represent changes in the conflict environment and power shifts. Wood et.al (2012) argues that when warring actors face shifts in the conflict environment that are not an advantage to them, they turn to increased levels of violence. Hultman (2007, p.206), for instance, argues that warring actors increase their violence against civilians when they perform badly on the battlefield, for instance when they lose troops, and finds support for this in her research. In her study on the Angolan civil war, Ziemke (2008) comes to a similar conclusion. She asserts that massacres and the deliberate targeting of civilians are a function of battlefield losses. Her argument is similar to Kalyvas’ (2006) theory in that control is essential. However, contrary to Kalyvas (2006), Ziemke (2008) argues that it is not the sheer level of control that is important, but rather the directions of control. When actors experience that control is declining, they resort to violence. Moreover, actors do not only resort to more violence, but also to more brutal forms of violence such as torture and rape. Although the theoretical underpinnings are different within the research field, the different contributions coincide in that they reinforce the notion that actors resort to increased
levels of violence against civilians when they are somehow weakened or threatened by the opponent, either through the loss of troops or declining control.

In the first part of this chapter I have laid out the theoretical framework of this thesis, and argued that although the war in Bosnia is outside the initial scope conditions of the theory, control is a relevant and important aspect to take into account for ethnic wars as well. In the following I discuss whether and how the logic of control can be applied to the study of war related sexual violence. This thesis is a contribution to Kalyvas’ theory in two ways. First, it is a contribution in that it applies Kalyvas’ theory to a different type of violence, sexual violence. Second, it is a contribution in that it applies the theoretical framework to the war in Bosnia, an ethnic war, where the logic of denunciation is of limited value. Kalyvas’ (2006, p. 7) argues that his theory is only a first step, and should serve as a baseline that inspires an ongoing research program. This is precisely how the theoretical framework is employed in this thesis.

In the last section of this chapter, I focus on the research on war related sexual violence and discuss whether and how Kalyvas’ model is relevant and can be applied to the study of war related sexual violence.

### 2.2 Sexual Violence Through the Lens of Control

Precisely as killing of civilians in war is not a recent and new phenomenon, neither is the use of sexual violence and rape in war. Sexual violence and rape is likely as old as war itself (Skjelsbæk, 2011, p. 47). Yet, both the discussion and the research on the human cost and severity of conflict has mainly been limited to the number of killed civilians in war (Cohen, 2013, p. 462). Even today journalists and others frequently use estimates of the number of killed civilians in war to give an idea of the severity of the conflict. Additionally, in much of the quantitative research the number of deaths is used as the defining criteria of war. Although important progress has been made in the study of violence in conflict, it is only recently that sexual violence in conflict has moved from being a largely neglected aspect of conflict and war, to being at the forefront of academic research and international security discussions. From being viewed as an investable consequence of war, sexual violence is today widely acknowledged as a problem of international security (Cohen & Nordas, 2014, p. 418).
It was mainly the wars in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 90s that brought attention to the use of sexual violence in war. In both wars the use of sexual violence is described as widespread and systematic (Skjelsbæk, 2011, pp. 60-61). The rape of Bosnian Muslim women by Serb forces is acknowledged as a crime against humanity under international law, while the rape of Tutsi women is acknowledged as a form of genocide under international law (E. J Wood, 2010, p. 295). This widespread and systematic use of sexual violence and rape during the 90s gave rise to a new conceptualization and debate on sexual violence, the “rape as a weapon of war” – debate. The conceptualization of sexual violence in war as a weapon of war entails that sexual violence is used deliberately as a strategic tool of war. Which again implies a goal larger than the act itself (Houge, 2015, p. 7). Skjelsbæk (2001) offers a similar variation of this argument, asserting that for any weapon to be a weapon of war, including sexual violence, it must be part of a systematic political campaign which has strategic military purpose (Skjelsbæk, 2001, p. 213). Within the broader discussion of rape as a weapon of war, Leiby (2009, p. 449) suggests that sexual violence may serve a means to undermine the opposition by using sexual violence as a demoralizing tool.

While the war in Bosnia and Rwanda serve as ideal-types within the weapon of war paradigm, recent insight from research suggests that the weapon of war theory is far from fitting to be applied across conflicts (Houge, 2015, p. 7). For instance, the use of sexual violence in DRC was for a long time characterized as a “weapon of war”. However, this characterization has proved to be largely unfitting in recent research (Baaz & Stern, 2009).

Given the increased attention to sexual violence in conflict within the academic field, what do we know about sexual violence in conflict, except that it is likely not used as a weapon of war across conflicts? Research has not only highlighted many misconceptions about sexual violence in conflict, it has also successfully invalidated many of the claims and beliefs about sexual violence in conflict. For instance, research shows that the levels of sexual violence differ significantly across countries, conflicts and armed groups, which suggest that sexual violence is neither ubiquitous nor inevitable. Furthermore, sexual violence is not more likely in ethnic conflict, or in countries with greater gender inequality. In regards to the scale of sexual violence, it does not need to be strategic nor ordered to occur on a massive scale, and wartime sexual violence is more often tolerated than ordered. Whether tolerated or ordered,
state forces are more likely to be reported as perpetrators of sexual violence than rebel groups and militia (Cohen & Nordas, 2014; Cohen, 2013; Cohen, Green, & Wood, 2013). Finally, while the weapon of war – paradigm largely implies that sexual violence is a means used primarily against the opponent, in a cross-national study Cohen (2013) finds that sexual violence can also serve as a socialization mechanism for armed groups with low social cohesion. This can imply that the goal of the perpetrated sexual violence is not primarily to attack someone outside the group (for example the victim, society, or opponent), rather for some groups the goal of the sexual violence can serve functions within the group itself.

The research on sexual violence has undoubtedly provided us with new and more complex understandings of sexual violence. However, none of what I’ve discussed above tells us anything about the link between wartime sexual violence and control. Nor does the research on sexual violence tell very much about variation across space. Given that we know that sexual violence varies both across armed actors and across conflicts, it is likely that there is a variation across space as well. Only a few studies touch upon the role of control for perpetration of sexual violence in conflict, Leiby’s (2009) comparative study about wartime sexual violence in Guatemala and Peru, and Nilsen’s (2014) study on patterns of sexual violence in Colombia.

Leiby (2009, pp. 457-456) asserts that perpetration of sexual violence might signal a loss of control. Specifically, she notes that the use of sexual violence by the state fell dramatically after 1982 in the Guatemalan civil war. Only 11 percent of sexual offences occurred between 1984 and 1996, at which time the opposition was effectively defeated. On the basis of this observation, Leiby (2009, pp. 457 - 458) goes on to suggest that there might be a relationship between the role of relative power and the use of sexual violence by the armed forces. Leiby’s findings from the Guatemalan civil war suggest that when an armed actor is relatively stronger than the opposition (i.e. the opposition is weakened), the use of sexual violence declines. This is consistent with the literature on strategic interactions and the use of lethal violence, which I’ve discussed in section 2.3. Kalyvas’ (2006) theory asserts that the level of an actor’s control over an area is negatively correlated with the level of violence employed against civilians. Thus, violence against civilians will be lowest in areas where the actor has exclusive control. Generally, when an actor has exclusive control over an area that implies that the opponent is either effectively defeated in that particular area, or that the opponent does not have access to that particular area due to the relative strength of the actor in control.
over the area (Kalyvas, 2006, pp.210-211). Nilsen’s (2014) study on Colombia also sheds some light on control and sexual violence. Based on qualitative interviews with ex-combatants and individuals working with sexual violence in Colombia, territorial control emerges as a relevant aspect of the perpetrated violence in Colombia. She finds that much of the perpetrated sexual violence in Colombia takes place when an actor is in control of an area, and that the form of sexual violence that takes place at any time is influenced by the war dynamics in the area. One aspect is that sexual violence is used to express territorial domination over both land and population, and to demonstrate power relations (Nilsen, 2014, pp. 57-60, 83-84).

Apart from these two studies the logic of control for sexual violence remains a relatively understudied phenomenon within the sexual violence research field. I argue that it is both relevant and useful to explore the relationship between control and sexual violence more closely. What differs wartime sexual violence from sexual violence in general, is precisely the circumstances in which it occurs – in a conflict zone and perpetrated by warring parties. The literature has already shown us that strategic interactions within the conflict zone influence and put various constrains on the warring parties. For example, secure control over areas decreases incentives for lethal violence against civilians, while troop losses increase incentives for killing civilians (Kalyvas, 2006; Ziemke, 2008). Given that the literature asserts that strategic interactions influence or constrains the use of lethal violence, it is reasonable to explore whether and how strategic interactions constrain or influence the use of war time sexual violence as well. One form of strategic interaction within the conflict zone is territorial control (Kalyvas, 2006) which is the focus in this thesis. By employing the lens of control to the study of sexual violence as well, will not only shed light on whether and how control matters for the perpetration of sexual violence, but also possibly shed light on how sexual violence differs from lethal violence, if research indicates different patterns for sexual violence and control, then for lethal violence and control. The important question to ask here is therefore as follows. Is there reason to assume that patterns of lethal and sexual violence should vary similarly, and thus whether control should vary similarly for sexual violence as for lethal violence?

The literature on relations between control and sexual violence is limited. However, scholars have attempted to shed some light on the relationship between lethal and sexual violence. Yet, this literature does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether patterns of lethal and
sexual violence coincide. For instance, in a cross-national study, Cohen (2013) finds that battle deaths (a combination of soldier and civilian deaths, used as a proxy for civilian abuse) are positively correlated with overall levels of wartime rape, although the correlation is weak. This suggests that lethal violence and sexual violence may be associated in general. However, a later study by Cohen & Nordås (2015) finds no correlation between levels of sexual violence and lethal violence. Scholars are also opposed in the view of whether sexual violence and lethal violence should correlate.

Kalyvas (2006, p. 20) argues that lethal violence can serve as a proxy for violence within the conflict zone in general, thus arguing that lethal violence is correlated with other types of violence, such as sexual violence. Other scholars argue that sexual violence follows a different pattern than lethal violence. E.J Wood (2009) notes that in armed groups repertoires of violence against civilians, rape occurs in sharply varying proportions to other forms of violence against civilians; in some cases, the ratio is relatively high, in others very low. Some groups engage in extreme forms of violence such as ethnic cleansing and genocide without engaging in sexual violence. This observation is supported by Cohen (2013) as well. She does not find that extreme forms of violence such as genocide and ethnic cleansing increase the likelihood of wartime rape. In a study on wartime rape by American military personal, Morris (1996) finds that the peacetime rates of rape by American military personal are actually lower than civilian rates. More interestingly, she also finds that military rape rates in combat climbed to several times the civilian rates, while military rates of other violence crime were roughly equivalent to civilian rates. The ratio of military rape rates to civilian rape rates is substantially larger than the ratio of military rates to civilian rates of other violent crime. What this tells us is that the wartime setting leads to a significant leap in the use of rape, but not in other forms of violent crimes. Thus, this suggests that something about sexual violence is rather different from other forms of violence.

Furthermore, the perpetration of sexual violence demands a completely different form of act than the act of killing a person. First, lethal violence is the absolute form of violence in that the only consequence is the ending of a person’s life (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 19-20), while the perpetration of sexual violence does not automatically result in the death of a person. Second, while it is only possible to kill a person once, sexual violence can be perpetrated against a person over a longer period of time. For instance, a person can be raped several times and
over a longer period of time, and by several people. Third, sexual violence demands a completely different form of action from the perpetrator than killing does. The broader definition of sexual violence used in this thesis entails rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, forced prostitution, enforced sterilization. A similar definition is given by E.J Wood (2006, p. 308), who defines sexual violence as involving rape, coerced undressing and non-penetrating sexual assault. Within this broader category rape more specifically is defined as “the coerced (under physical force or threat of physical force against the victim or a third person) penetration of the anus or vagina by the penis or another object, or of the mouth by the penis” (E.J Wood, 2006, p.308). When rape is perpetrated using not an object (for instance a bottle or rifle which occurred during the war in Bosnia), but the perpetrators own body parts, rape involves the breaking of not only the physical boundaries and intimacy of the victim, but also of the perpetrator. While killing can be perpetrated from a distance by firing a bullet, rape and sexual violence in general cannot.

The comparison above has two interesting implications. First it might imply that the cost associated with sexual violence is different than the cost of lethal violence. In order to kill a person armed actors must use limited military equipment such as bullets as tools to perpetrate lethal violence, but in order to perpetrate sexual violence the tools are the soldiers themselves, regardless of which form the sexual violence takes. This is particularly evident when it comes to rape. Whether armed actors regard lethal and sexual violence as cheap or not is probably influenced by several factors, such as the amount of military equipment they possess relative to the opponent. If one actor has significantly less military equipment such as bullets, then using bullets to perpetrate large scale lethal violence would be costly. In this case sexual violence would be a cheaper form of violence. On the other hand, while it takes only a second to kill a person with a bullet, it takes considerably longer time to complete the form of rape, and even more so to perpetrate sexual slavery and forced pregnancy. In terms of time, sexual violence can be a costlier form of violence. Additionally, Cohen (2013, p. 465) argues that rape involves cost such as the risk of diseases for the perpetrator and emotional and psychological burdens. However, if rape is the result of a strategy commanded and forced from above, and not the result of soldiers individual will and lust to perpetuate rape, armed actors may ignore the individual risks to the perpetrator.

Whether armed actors regard sexual violence as a cheaper or costlier form of violence in terms of time-efficiency may depend on the military context and specific operation as well.
Sexual violence can for instance be more difficult to commit on a large scale during attacks in enemy controlled areas. Furthermore, there are also differences in terms of resource-demands between different forms of sexual violence. For instance, the perpetration of sexual slavery and forced pregnancy demands some form of organizing and planning in advance, as the victims must be in some form of detention over a longer period of time. Rape, however, can be perpetrated without much preparation. This could imply that organized forms of sexual violence are more easily organized and perpetrated in areas where actors have full control, and need not worry about constant attacks from the enemy. In areas where actors have no control over the territory it is likely easier to perpetrate rape during attacks, than to perpetrate forced pregnancy and sexual slavery.

Second, since sexual violence entails a completely different act(s) than lethal violence, the utility of these two types of violence is likely to differ. Although Kalyvas (2006, p.19-20) argues that lethal violence serves a proxy for violence in general, he does assert that lethal violence differs from other types of violence in that it is an irreversible act. Kalyvas’ (2006, p.27) differs between strategic and tactical use of lethal violence. Violence used to deter others from acting in a certain way is strategic, but violence used to remove a specific risk is tactical. When armed actors kill a large share of the population they remove and effectively reduce the population. If the killed population are members of the opponents ethnic group for instance, killing them means reducing the pool of potential recruits. By reducing the opponent’s pool of potential recruits, armed actors efficiently remove the risk posed by the enemy population. If armed actors instead perpetrate sexual violence on a large scale, for instance in some form of detention over a longer period of time, no such risk is removed. When lethal violence is employed against a large group of people, the intent is to remove that specific group of individuals. Scholars argue that the intent of sexual violence is often to inflict pain, harm, damage, or fear throughout entire communities through the perpetration of sexual violence (Leiby, 2009, p. 459; Skjelsbæk, 2001, p. 69, Seifert, 1996, p. 39). Evidently, the utility between these two examples of lethal and sexual violence differs.

Probably many more considerations could be added to the discussion above, and which of the considerations and arguments above armed actors emphasize is likely to be influenced by the specific context of the war. Sanin (2008, p. 5) argues that both structural factors and strategic features are important in understanding the behavior of each armed group. E.J Wood (2009, 2011) takes a similar approach arguing that the role of group leadership, hierarchy, goals and
aims, and organizational features (training, socialization) are important factors in explaining variation in armed actor’s behavior. Thus, in order to explain why armed actors, turn to a specific form of violence, it is important and necessary to consider a multitude of factors. The aim of this thesis is not to explain why each of the armed actors during the war in Bosnia employed lethal or sexual violence. The aim is to see how the relationship between lethal and sexual violence is similar or different, by focusing on how these two types of violence vary with different levels of control. While Kalyvas (2006, p.20) argues that lethal violence can serve as a proxy for violence in general, there are reasons to believe that patterns of lethal and sexual violence are likely to differ due to the completely different nature of sexual violence compared to lethal violence. If patterns of lethal and sexual violence differ, then control is likely to vary differently with sexual violence than with lethal violence.

This thesis is a first test of if and how control varies with patterns of lethal violence compared to patterns of sexual violence. In the following chapter I discuss and elaborate on how the analysis was conducted.
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

The overall aim of this thesis is to examine more closely a relatively unexplored relationship thus far, the relationship between wartime sexual violence and lethal violence. The literature within this field does not provide any clear answer to the question of what the relationship is, nor whether there is a relationship at all. In order to explore this relationship more closely, this thesis uses the concept of control to examine whether and how control influences both patterns of wartime sexual violence and lethal violence. Given the limited knowledge about this issue, I’ve chosen to conduct a case study on patterns of violence during the war in Bosnia. As such, this thesis can be seen as a pilot study on how both wartime sexual violence and lethal violence vary with control that could be expanded in future research. Furthermore, given the importance of the role of ethnicity in the literature and research on Bosnia thus far (Costalli & Moro, 2012; Di Salvatore, 2016b; Weidmann, 2011, Dulic & Hall, n.d), I’ve chosen to use the ethnic distribution of the population as a control variable.

The analysis is conducted by comparing levels of control, levels of sexual and levels of lethal violence across Bosnia’s municipalities. In addition to this, I control for the ethnic distribution of the population. As with most case study research, this thesis does not fit neatly into one category in terms of the research approach (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 5). This thesis incorporates different aspects of case study research designs, and employs different types of data, both qualitative and quantitative.

3.1 Choice of Research Design: The Case Study

Although the literature on case study research does not provide one explicit agreed upon definition, scholars have however come to agreement about the essentials of a case study. George and Benett (2005) define a case study as the “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (p.5). Gerring (2007, p. 19) takes a similar approach defining a case study as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is at least in part to shed light on larger class of cases”. To be able to take advantage of the benefits of a case study and shed light on a scientifically interesting phenomenon, the researchers must first ask what the chosen event for analysis is a case of (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 17). Levels of violence and control during the war in Bosnia are the focus of the analysis in this case study. However, the
The aim is to shed light on how control, according to Kalyvas’ (2006) theory, varies with both lethal and sexual violence in ethnic wars. There are several sub-types of case studies, depending on the research aim. As I’ve mentioned this thesis does not neatly fit into one particular category, instead it takes the features of several categories of case studies.

The approach is to some extent explorative. Case studies enjoy a natural advantage when it comes to exploratory research. A research design can be said to be explorative when a subject is either being encountered for the first time, or is being considered in a fundamentally different or new way (Gerring, 2007, p.40). This thesis is exploratory to the extent that it uses Kalyvas’ (2006) theory “The Logic of Violence in Civil War” to analyze both sexual and lethal violence. It is also to some extent exploratory in that it incorporates the degree of control over territory directly, rather than on the basis of the ethnic distribution, which the research on the war in Bosnia thus far has been limited to.

This thesis can perhaps best be described as a hypothesis-testing case study. In a hypothesis-testing case study the theory is of crucial importance, and the aim is to test more or less concrete theoretical arguments. In this thesis I take advantage of the within-variation of the case, by comparing levels of control and levels of violence across Bosnia’s prewar municipalities, and test three specific hypothesis from Kalyvas’ (2006) theory. The analysis is conducted in three steps. First, the hypotheses are tested for patterns of lethal violence. Second, the hypotheses are tested for patterns of sexual violence. Third and finally, patterns of lethal and sexual violence are compared.

A last but important question to address in terms of the case study research design is what kind of case Bosnia constitutes within the theoretical framework employed in this thesis. A useful approach for testing specific theoretical arguments is to choose a case study based on whether it is most likely or least likely to fit the theoretical argument (Levy, 2008, p. 12). The difference between these two designs is whether the theory predicts that a particular case is either likely or unlikely to be consistent with the theoretical predictions. A case where either the assumptions or scope conditions are not fully satisfied, or the values of some key variables point in the opposite direction, is a least likely case. Thus, the case is in the border zone of where we should expect to see the theory fit. If the case, despite being least likely, proves to be consistent with the theoretical predictions then the validity of the theory is strengthened. On the other hand, if a case which is likely to be consistent with the theoretical predictions,
but the analysis shows that the data does not support the expectations, then the theory is weakened.

Kalyvas’ (2006) theoretical framework “The Logic of Violence in Civil War” assumes a non-ethnic, guerilla war, evidently the war in Bosnia, which is characterized as an ethnic, symmetric war (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005, p.212; Costalli & Moro, 2012, p.803), constitutes a least likely case within the theoretical framework. The other important dimension to this thesis is that I apply a theoretical framework which thus far has been limited to the study of lethal violence, to analyze sexual violence as well. Some scholars argue that sexual violence and lethal violence are likely to correlate (Kalyvas, 2006), while other argue that these two types of violence are likely to differ (E. J. Wood, 2009; E. J. Wood, 2006). Thus, whether patterns of both sexual and lethal violence during the war in Bosnia constitute a least likely or most likely case design, depends on where (or whom) you look to in the scholarly debate. However, in chapter 2.2, I argue that there are several reasons to believe that sexual violence differs from lethal violence. Thus, I argue that employing a theoretical framework based upon lethal violence to study sexual violence, constitutes a least likely case. If the analysis confirms that Kalyvas’ theory either doesn’t fit for the study of ethnic wars or for the study of sexual war, then this thesis has established that ethnic war and/or sexual violence is outside the scope of where the theory fits. Another possibility is that the analysis shows that levels of violence do vary with levels of control, but not in the predicted direction.

### 3.2 Choice of Method and Use of Data

The section above answered the question of what this thesis is a case of, and what kind of case it is. This section answers the question of how the analysis specifically was conducted, and which data was used.

The analysis in this thesis takes the approach of the subnational comparative method. The subnational comparative method involves within-comparison of the case, rather than comparison across a smaller number of cases, and the unit of observations are the subnational objects within a territory, such as regions, cities, municipalities etc. (Snyder, 2001) . The research questions seek to investigate whether patterns of control vary similarly with both lethal and sexual violence. Thus, in order to answer the research questions, I compared areas with different degree of control during the war in Bosnia. The subnational unit of analysis in
this thesis is Bosnia’s prewar municipalities. For each municipality I gathered information on which of the parties was in control, the degree of control, the level of lethal violence, the level of sexual violence, and the ethnic distribution of that municipality.

Table 1: Variables in thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1</th>
<th>LEVELS OF LETHAL VIOLENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2</td>
<td>LEVELS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAIN EXPLANATORY VARIABLE</td>
<td>LEVELS OF CONTROL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTROL VARIABLE</td>
<td>ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to ensure that the analysis was comparable across each of the municipalities I gathered data for, I employed what George and Benett (2005, p. 67) call “the method of structure focused comparison”. The method attempts to standardize the data collection in order to enable the researcher to make systematic comparisons. The method is structured in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research aim, and asks these questions for each case under study. The research objective in this thesis is to investigate how levels of control vary with lethal and sexual violence. The following questions were asked for each municipality.

Table 2: Method of structured focused comparison

- Who is in control, and what is the degree of control (exclusive, fragmented or shared)?
- What is the level of lethal violence measured as the total number of killed civilians, and as a share of the population (to ensure comparability across municipalities of different population size)?
- What is the level of sexual violence, and what is the context in which it occurs (in detention, during attacks, several perpetrators)?
- What is the pattern of lethal and sexual violence in each municipality (is there high use of one, but not the other, low use of both, or high use of both)?
- What is the ethnic distribution of the population (does one group have clear majority or minority, or are the ethnic groups at parity)?

The method of structured focused comparison is not to be confused with the process of operationalization. A discussion of how each of the variables were operationalized and how “levels” are measured is discussed in the next section for each of the variables.
Additional benefits of a case study research design allow the researcher to be flexible with the analysis and to take use of all kinds of data, both qualitative and quantitative (Gerring, 2007, p.33). The data on the war in Bosnia was collected at municipality level, and several types of sources were used, both quantitative and qualitative. However, the case study approach implies that all variables, including the quantitative data, are treated in a qualitative manner as well (George and Benett, 2005, p. 28). The following data and sources were used to obtain information on the four variables in this thesis, levels of lethal violence, levels of sexual violence, levels of control and ethnic distribution.

**Table 3: Data sources for each variable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable 1</th>
<th>Levels of lethal violence</th>
<th>Database from the Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Database from Bosnian NGO “Women Victims of War Association” in Monography about Rape and Sexual Assault During the War in Bosnia (Duderija, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Online news source: <a href="http://www.justice-report.com">www.justice-report.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main explanatory variable</td>
<td>Levels of control</td>
<td>Helsinki Watch “War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 1993.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the data sources obtained had its limitations, and I attempted to make up for some of the weaknesses with each data source by combining information from multiple sources where possible, this was particularly true for data on sexual violence. A brief discussion of each variable and the data obtained follows below.
3.2.1 Dependent Variable 1: Levels of Lethal Violence

The data on lethal violence was obtained using one source, the Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo and it’s work on the number of casualties during the war in Bosnia, known as “the Bosniak Book of the Dead” (hereafter BBD). The BBD is the result of RDC’s aim to establish a country-wide database on the victims of the war in Bosnia. The BBD includes information on the number of both civilian and military casualties, and contains a total of more than 96,000 victims of war. However, only victims of direct causes (shelling, massacres, etc.) of war are included, meaning that individuals who died of indirect causes such as hunger or lack of medical care are not included. The RDC based its work on numerous and extensive sources of information to create the database. Witness statements, existing electronical lists, lists from books, reports, and press articles, names from grave tombs, newspaper memorials, government sources and microfilms are among the sources used (Ball et al., 2007, p. 11) The database is perceived as being of high-quality and reliable, likely providing the most accurate number of victims of war (Ball et al., 2007, pp 8-9; Tokaca, 2012, pp. 54-74). The RDC is no longer in function and the database is most easily available in hard copy in some of Sarajevo’s book shops. I obtained a dataset based on the work of RDC from Dr. Stefano Costalli.

The dataset contains the number of civilian and military victims for each municipality according to each war year. However, I only used the number of civilian victims, because the research aim is to explore how patterns of control vary with patterns of lethal violence against civilians. The dataset does not provide information on the victim’s ethnicity. Given that violence during the war in Bosnia mainly took place along ethnic lines, if such information was provided it could be inferred how much of the lethal violence each of the warring actors perpetrated for each municipality. Since such information is not provided, I assumed that the actor in control (in exclusive and fragmented areas) in one specific area perpetrated the majority of the violence. For areas of shared control, I do not make any assumptions about how much of the violence is perpetrated by each of the parties. Additionally, as the research aim and method involves comparing levels of sexual violence, data on civilian casualties for each ethnic group would only be useful if I had such data for sexual violence as well.

To ensure that the level of lethal violence was comparable across municipalities, I controlled for population size, and measured the percentage of the population killed. A similar control for sexual violence was not possible, since for many of the municipalities sexual violence is
only characterized as widespread without providing a number of committed rapes or other sexual abuses. Furthermore, even where numbers are provided it is highly uncertain that they represent the true extent of sexual violence in a given municipality.

### 3.2.2 Dependent Variable 2: Levels of Sexual Violence

Information about sexual violence was obtained using three different sources. A database from a Bosnian NGO, Udruženje Zena Zrtva Rata (the Association Women Victims of War), which includes the number of registered rape victims at municipality level (Duderija, 2015, pp. 45-51). Two reports from the United Nations Commission of Experts for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter Commission), Annex XI on sexual violence and rape (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c), and Annex VII on camps (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d). Finally, I used Justice Report\(^7\), which is an online news agency reporting about war crimes trials related to the war in Bosnia. Justice Report was used to search for articles about sexual violence for each municipality.

Information about sexual violence during conflict is in general particularly difficult to obtain for several reasons. For instance, victims may be reluctant to speak out because of fear of reprisals or due to the stigma they often face. The war in Bosnia is regarded as being one case where documentation on sexual violence is solid, and this was one of the reasons why I chose Bosnia as a case for the analysis. However, there are few sources that give detailed and systematic data at municipality level.

The one local NGO in Bosnia that had some systematic and comparable data on sexual violence on municipality level is the organization “Udruženje Zena Zrtva Rata” or “The Association Women Victims of War” in English hereafter (Association). The Association was formed in 2003, with an aim to gather victims who suffered sexual abuse and rape during the war in Bosnia. In addition to providing support for victims, the Association works with encouraging women to testify in court, and gathering systematic evidence of sexual violence during the war in Bosnia. The Association is independent, and defines itself as multietnic and multination in character. The Association has so far gathered a database of 25 000 raped and sexually molested people (alive and killed victims), in addition to a database on children.

\(^7\) Justice Report can be accessed using this link [http://www.justice-report.com/](http://www.justice-report.com/)
born as a result of rape. The Association Women Victims of War has about 4555 members of different religious affiliation and gender (although the large majority are women).  

It was during a visit to Sarajevo in December 2015 that I managed to get in touch with the Association Women Victims of War and obtain data for my research. The data was obtained through first contacting Saliha Duderija, Assistant Minister of the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees in Bosnia. Duderija is the author of the book “Monography about Rape and Sexual Violence During the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (2015) (hereafter Monography), which is produced in collaboration with the Association Women Victims of War (hereafter Association). During a visit to the Association, I was able to obtain a copy of the book, which contains statistics on the level of sexual violence at municipality level. The data is based upon the statements of 4,350 women and 225 men who were victims of rape during the war in Bosnia, and who have registered with the Association Women Victims of War database. The book provides the number of registered rape victims in each municipality. Based on the number of registered rape victims with the association, rape is reported to have occurred in 73 municipalities during the war, and the number of rape victims for each municipality ranges from 1 to a maximum of 280. Although this data was undoubtedly valuable in my research it is faced with several limitations.

First, no information is provided about the perpetrators of the rapes. For instance, 62 rape victims are registered to have been raped in Mostar during the war, but it is not possible to know whether all 62 victims were raped by one of the warring actors, or if several actors were responsible for the rapes within that municipality. Gathering information on victims of sexual violence is a sensitive subject, and the Association is highly concerned with maintaining the anonymity of the victims who chose to contact them. Therefore, they could not provide me with any other information than what was written in the Monography.

Second, the number of registered rape victims is likely to be far below than the actual level of rape victims, considering that many women and particularly men have most likely not chosen to register with the association. The number of estimated rape victims during the war in

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8 This information about the Association was obtained during a visit to Sarajevo in 2015, and is available only in a printed information brochure at the office of the Association. The Association can be found at the following address in Sarajevo: ul. Hamdije Cemerlica do-br 7 71000 Novo Sarajevo. The Association can be contacted at uredzenazrtva_rata@bih.net.ba, or number 00387 33 658 879/00387 61 272 000.

9 In Bosnian: Monografija o ratnom silovanju i seksulanom zlostavljanju u ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini.
Bosnia is 20,000 (Amnesty International, 2009, p.3), and the databased is only based upon the statements of 4,575 individuals. If the estimated number of 20,000 victims is correct, then the actual level of sexual violence is about 4 times higher than the registered level of rape. Furthermore, victims who were killed after being raped or died subsequently are not included. Therefore it is not possible to know how many the actors deliberately chose to kill after perpetrating the rape. For these reasons, the database is most likely not representative of the actual level of sexual violence.

However, this would not be a problem if the database was representative of the relative level of sexual violence. For instance, although there were likely more than 107 registered rapes in Sarajevo, and more than 9 registered rapes in Banja Luka, the relative level of sexual violence could still be representative, meaning that the level of sexual violence was much higher in Sarajevo than in Banja Luka. For the purpose of this thesis it is the relative level of violence across municipalities which is important, and not the actual level of violence in each municipality. But, when I compared the data from the Association with information from the United Nations Commission of Expert reports, it indicated that the level of sexual violence was far higher for several municipalities, than what is indicated from the number of registered rapes. For instance, Bosanski Brod has only 2 registered rape victims (Duderija, 2015, p. 45), but reports by the Commission indicate that rape was widespread in this municipality (Bassouini, 1994c, p.16). While the number of registered rape victims in several instances indicated a lower extent of sexual violence than reports by the Commission, the opposite was never the case. This underreporting could be due to several factors. For instance, the Association is based in Sarajevo, and many women may lack the opportunity to travel to Sarajevo to visit the Association. It might also be easier for women from some municipalities to come forth as victims of rape than for others. For instance, many of the stories about war rape during the war in Bosnia and in the aftermath focused on women from Foca, Prijedor and Visegrad – these areas became known for the mass rape which took place. Thus, the stigma of coming forth as a victim of rape and maybe the fear of not being believed could have been less for women from these areas compared to areas where high levels of sexual violence occurred, but which were not highlighted in the media or discourse on war rape. Due to the biases with the data, I strived to use multiple sources on information about levels of sexual violence.
In addition to the Monography, the United Nations Commission of Experts was used a source. The United Nations Commission of Experts (hereafter Commission) was established on 6th October 1992 with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 780. The Commission was established with the task to investigate and gather evidence on grave breaches of the Genève Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which included Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. At the end of its mandate, the Commission had conducted 32 field missions and gathered a vast amount of evidence, including 65 000 pages of documentation of allegations of breaches of international humanitarian law (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994e). The Commission conducted a separate analysis on sexual violence, Annex IX Rape and Sexual Assault. (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c), and a separate analysis on the use of detention sites Annex VIII Prison Camps (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d). Initially, I only used the report specifically devoted to sexual violence to gather information. However, one of the commission’s findings is that the majority of sexual violence occurred in some form of detention (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994e, p. 56), therefore I decided to assess the commission’s report on camps as well. The report proved to be very useful, as it contained more detailed information for some of the municipalities than what was reported in the report on sexual violence.

The Commission relied on three sources of information in its work. First, it received allegations of breaches of humanitarian law from various governments, non-governmental organizations, other United Nations bodies, and media reports. Second, the Commission conducted several field missions, and in total 32 field missions were conducted. Third, the Commission was assisted by the following governments, who conducted investigations and interviews of refugees primarily in their respective countries: Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States of America (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994e). The Commission relied on all three methods for the report on sexual violence, Annex IX, and conducted in total 223 interviews with refugees in Croatia (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, pp. 6–9). For the report on camps, Annex VIII, the Commission did not conduct any field investigations, but conducted an analysis based on submitted documentation and allegation by organizations and various governments (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d, pp. 8–9). Although the Commission strived to confirm all the information, it was not always successful in achieving this objective. Some allegations are provided by neutral and/or multiple sources, while others are not. Evidently, this is a serious methodological problem. However, in this
thesis the analysis and inferences are drawn based on a comparison of several municipalities and overall patterns of sexual violence, and not on the basis of single municipalities. Thus, the lack of reliable information for one or a couple of municipalities does not substantially affect the overall patterns, inferences and conclusions.

Both reports by the Commission were organized according to the municipality level, and the Commission attempted to make the analysis as systematic as possible by using a standardized format of questions for each municipality. The report on sexual violence contained a summary sheet for each municipality in which the following is answered: the identity of the victim and perpetrators (ethnicity and armed group), the date and location of the incident, the source of the report, the method of recording the information, and where possible an assessment of the extent and context of the rape and sexual assault (whether it occurred during attacks, or in some form of detention, such as victims own homes or organized detention sites). The report on camps includes several details, amongst them information on the location and name of the camps, information on control and identity of commanders and guards, information on the victims, and a description of the conditions (whether victims were provided with food, or were subject to mistreatment, and what kind of mistreatment, torture, sexual violence etc.). The summary sheets provide quite extensive information. However, information for all these factors was far from available for all municipalities. For my own research I extracted the following information for each municipality, who the perpetrators and victims were, what is the extent characterized as, and what is the context in which the sexual violence took place.

Rather than characterizing the level of sexual violence in terms of number, the Commission generally differed between general reports of sexual violence (not possible to state anything about the level/extent), isolated instances, organized and systematic forms (several detention sites), or widespread where the data indicated that high levels of sexual violence were perpetrated. For some municipalities the extent of sexual violence is described only as widespread, without further explanation on the context or number of rape victims for instance. This clearly poses a challenge in terms of the reliability of the data, as it is not evident which what constitutes widespread, or whether the term has been used consistently to describe the same pattern throughout the reports. Therefore, the reports by the Commission proved to have the opposite advantages and limitations compared to the database by the Association.
Although the reports provide very detailed information on both the extent and context for several municipalities, they do not always give a clear indication of the extent of violence as it in some instances is based upon the number of direct testimonies, submitted allegations or estimated by a third party. The interviews and documentation was also collected during the war in Bosnia, and largely focused on refugees who had escaped to Croatia, which has two implications.

First, areas which were subject to intense war fighting and battles may have been more difficult to access for organizations and resulted in a lack of reliable information. This would imply that areas which were highly contested (fragmented and shared control) may have been more difficult to access, than areas under exclusive control by one party. For instance, Helsinki Watch representatives were not able to closely explore the full extent of human rights abuses in Northeastern Bosnia, where each of the parties had largely fragmented control due to the heavy fighting in the area which prevented access (Helsinki Watch, 1993, pp. 189–190). Second, it was mainly refugees of Bosniak and Croat ethnicity which escaped to Croatia, where the Commission conducted its interviews. This likely created a bias in terms of the available extent of documentation on sexual violence committed by each of the warring actors. Violence mainly took place along ethnic lines, which means that Serb women were largely targeted by Bosniak or Croat forces. These women were more likely to escape to Serb-controlled areas or Serbia, than to Croatia where the interviews were mainly conducted. Third, among the sources the Commission relied on was media reports, which often are faced with several biases. For instance, media reports are likely to be biased to more urban areas and more easily accessible areas. News sources may further be selective in terms of not only which events they chose to cover, but also how they chose to portray those (Cohen & Nordås, 2011, p.11).

I combined the data from the Association’s database with the reports by the Commission, which together gave me an assessment of both the extent (level) and context of sexual violence. However, where indications of the extent of sexual violence were contradictory, priority was given to the information provided by the Commission. Since the Association’s database did not provide any information on the perpetrators, I assumed that the perpetrators were those stated in the Commission’s reports for each municipality. The Association’s database was thus of supplementary character to the reports.
Finally, I used articles by Justice Report\(^{10}\). Justice Report is a web based news source, providing information on war crimes trials related to the war in Bosnia. It is part of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), which emerged from the London – based Institute of War & Peace Reporting in 2005. The website has the option to search for key terms according to each municipality. For each municipality I entered the phrases “sexual violence” and “rape”, which gave me a collection of all articles for a specific municipality containing the words sexual violence or rape. Some articles provide testimonies by victims, who state the context and the perpetrators of the rapes, others contain information about members of armed groups sentenced for the perpetration of sexual violence, while some articles contain information on members of armed groups still on trial for sexual violence. Although some articles provide information on the alleged perpetrators of sexual violence, where no judgement has yet been given, I did not find this to be a problem because all the other data sources are largely based upon victim’s statements and allegations. The data from Justice Report was useful as a supplement to the Commission’s reports, particularly in identifying perpetrators of sexual violence for municipalities where no such information is provided in the reports. For some municipalities the articles from Justice Report even provided more detailed information on the context, which gave further indications of the extent of sexual violence in one particular area. The obvious limitation to the use of this data in my research, is that I was only able to use information from articles up to a specific date. For instance, if on the 13\(^{th}\) of March I was gathering information for the municipality of Gacko, I only included information about sexual violence and rape in Gacko in articles up until that specific date.

Evidently, each of the sources discussed above have their limitations and likely biases. By combining three different sources, I’ve strived to create an as compressive map as possible on levels of sexual violence at municipality level during the war in Bosnia.

The definition and thus operationalization of sexual violence is given by the data sources used. For the Association’s database it is limited to victims of rape, while the Commission’s reports and Justice Report articles include a wider definition of sexual violence, including victims of for instance forced pregnancy, forced prostitution, and sexual mutilation (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, 1994d). This is consistent with the broader category of sexual violence in the scholarly literature (see E.J Wood, 2006, 308). Although the data sources

\(^{10}\) [http://www.justice-report.com](http://www.justice-report.com)
include sexual abuse other than rape, the majority of the allegations concern rape perpetrated either in some form of detention or during attacks. Combining information from these sources some form of sexual violence is reported to have occurred in all but 9 of Bosnia’s prewar municipalities included in the analysis (in 54 of 63 municipalities).

In the analysis I compare the highest levels of sexual violence with the lowest levels. This categorization is mainly based on the assessment provided by the Commission’s reports (1994c; 1994d). Municipalities where sexual violence is described as widespread, or where there are more than two detention sites and reports of more than 50 victims are categorized as municipalities with high levels of sexual violence. Municipalities where sexual violence is reported, but the extent is unclear, are categorized as municipalities with low levels of sexual violence.

3.2.3 Main Explanatory Variable: Levels of Control

The main explanatory variable in this thesis measures levels of control. Data on different levels of control during the war in Bosnia was obtained from Helsinki Watch. During the war in Bosnia, Helsinki Watch conducted several investigations into human right abuses. These investigations resulted in the publication of two volumes on human right abuses in Bosnia, War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina Volume I and Volume II (Helsinki Watch, 1992; Helsinki Watch, 1993). Included in Volume II is an assessment of the level of and actor in control for each of Bosnia’s municipality. The territory is divided in municipalities which were exclusively or largely controlled by one actor, or under shared control (Helsinki Watch, 1993, p. 30, 189, 236, 293-294). However, Helsinki Watch does not provide any reliable information on levels of control for municipalities in Southwestern and Central Bosnia, due to the fighting that broke out between Bosniak and Croat forces in 1993 (Helsinki Watch, 1993, p. 296). Therefore, these municipalities are excluded from the analysis. In total 63 municipalities were included in the analysis.

The concept of control is maybe more intuitive than the actual measurement and operationalization. As Kalyvas’ (2006, p. 210) notes there are several ways to empirically measure control, such as using indicators capturing the level of, presence of, and access enjoyed by political actors in a given place and time. Based on data from Helsinki Watch (1993, p. 30, 189, 236, 293-294), I use an indicator of control based on political actors’ presence in a given area. This operationalization largely corresponds to Kalyvas’ theoretical
discussion on the different zones of control in a given conflict area. Kalyvas’ (2006, p. 210-211) talks about areas where one actor has exclusive control as areas where one party has full control, meaning that the opposing force is unable to have a presence and/or operate successfully in these areas. In zones of fragmented control one actor enjoys dominant and secure but not full control, which means that the enemy is able to have a presence in these areas, and thus the population has access to both actors, although unequal. In areas of shared control, both actors enjoy some control, but none of the actors have dominant control (Ibid).

Correspondingly, in Helsinki Watch’s assessment of the conflict zone in Bosnia, the difference between areas of exclusive and fragmented control is that the enemy is able to control slivers of territory in areas under fragmented control by one actor. For instance, in Northeastern Bosnia Serb forces had fragmented control over several municipalities; their control was fragmented because the opposing actors managed to control slivers of territory within the Serb controlled municipalities. Areas of shared control are operationalized as areas where each of the actors had partial control (Helsinki Watch, 1993, p. 30, 189 - 190).

Where it was possible, the assessment by Helsinki Watch on levels of control, was double checked against information from the Commission’s report on camps (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d), which contained a small paragraph on the war fighting and control for the majority of municipalities, but not all. The information largely corresponded to Helsinki Watch’s assessment of control.

The obvious limitations to the data on control over the territory of Bosnia, is that the data on control provides a very static picture of the conflict zone in Bosnia, and does not capture if any gradual or temporal shifts occurred in the level of control over an area. A more temporal varying source would have been preferable, but no such source which was easily accessible exists. To explore whether such shifts and changes occurred during the four-year war period in Bosnia for each municipality, would demand considerably more resources and time. I would have to try to allocate several and more detailed sources and preferably conduct both interviews and field trips in order to get the “full picture” of the level of control for each municipality. Given the limited amount of time and resources in a master thesis, I found such an approach to be infeasible. Furthermore, although the operationalization of the conflict zone provides a rather static picture, the story on the ground in terms of control was quite static as well. During the first months of the conflict zone Serb forces managed to establish some form of control over almost 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia. Their control over territory was
not seriously challenged until 1995 when Serb and Croat forces managed to retake control in several areas (Divjak, 2001, pp. 156-157; Cigar, 2001, pp. 208-213). The main sources on sexual violence, the Commission’s reports, are also based on the time frame from 1992 – 1994, during which no significant changes in the control over territory had occurred. It is possible however, that areas of exclusive control at some time towards the end of the war came under fragmented control.

The maps below are from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (2002a) assessment of the conflict zone in Bosnia. The maps only indicate areas under Serb, Bosniak and Croat control, and do not provide information on levels of control. However, they illustrate the static situation on the ground in terms of control. Areas in green indicate areas under control by Bosniak forces, areas in pink indicate areas under control by Serb forces, and areas in yellow indicate areas under control by Croat forces. The first map shows the conflict zone in July 1993, and the second map shows the conflict zone in September 1994.

*Map 1: Areas of control in Bosnia in July 1993 and September 1994.*
3.2.4 Control Variable: Ethnic Distribution

As I’ve discussed in chapter 2, section 2.1, much of the research on Bosnia thus far is centered on the role of ethnicity (see for instance Costalli & Morro, 2012; Dulic & Hall, n.d). Even contributions where the researchers take into account the role of levels of control, control is operationalized on the basis of the size of the ethnic groups (Costalli & Moro, 2012). Kalyvas’ (2006) argues that such measures of the level of control are bound to be insufficient to capture the real level of control on the ground, since control is influenced by many other factors, such as military organizational characteristics and access to war technology (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 112).

Although I don’t neglect the importance of ethnicity in explaining patterns of violence during the war in Bosnia, I argue that control is an additional factor important to take into account in explaining patterns of violence. An ethnic majority does not automatically translate into control over an area. As will be shown in the analysis, several municipalities where the Serb population was in minority, came under the exclusive control by Serb forces. Furthermore, it is possible and likely that the degree of control an actor has over an area influences how easy it is to perpetrate mass lethal violence. For instance, an actor may have an aim of removing a similarly large ethnic group in one area, but if that area is under fragmented or shared control and the opponent has a presence and thus is able to attack, the actor in control must choose whether to employ military resources against the civilian population or against the attacking opponent. In order to explore how patterns of violence vary both according to level of control and ethnic distribution, I chose to include information on the ethnic distribution for each municipality.

The data was obtained from the Commissions reports on sexual violence and camps (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, 1994d), which for each municipality include the results from the 1991 population census. Individuals could choose to describe themselves as Bosniak, Serb, Croat, Yugoslav or Other. I only included the numbers for the first three categorizes, Bosniak, Serb and Croat, as only for a few municipalities did a small percentage (less than 5 percent) describe themselves using the two latter categorizes.
3.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research Design

The research design in this thesis was chosen and constrained by several factors. First by the research aim itself, which is to investigate the relationship between sexual and lethal violence in a conflict zone. Second, by the current state of knowledge about this relationship, which is limited, and therefore a pilot study was chosen to be the best approach. And last but not least, by the availability of data and resources.

Central to this thesis and the analysis is the use of the sub-national comparative method. Using this particular method was considered fruitful for several reasons. First, using the sub-national comparative method, I ensured that the context was held constant. This is particularly important in regards to the scholarly debate on sexual violence. The research thus far shows a wide variation in the use of sexual violence both across and within conflicts (Cohen & Nordas, 2014; E.J Wood, 2006). Research indicates that even within the same conflict sexual violence does not serve one single purpose (Leiby, 2009; Nilsen, 2014). Conducting a case study across national units such as different conflicts would put me at risk of comparing quite different phenomenon of sexual violence. Comparing instances of sexual violence within the same conflict at least minimizes this risk, if not eliminates it. Second, a well-known critique against and possible bias of case study research is the danger of selection bias on the dependent variable. Selection bias on the dependent variable in case study research includes choosing cases with only one specific value on the dependent variable (George & Benett, 2005, p.23). In regards to the subject of this thesis, it would imply choosing cases with only high levels of sexual and lethal violence. By conducting a within-case analysis and comparing Bosnia’s prewar municipalities, which exhibited variation on all variables in the analysis, I was able to analytically explore the full spectrum of variation and avoid this selection bias. Furthermore, the central role of Kalyvas’ (2006) theory in the research design enabled me to interpret the analysis of two different phenomena (lethal and sexual violence) within one specific context. Without such an approach the analysis would simply be descriptive and the possibilities for contribution to the scholarly development of this field and theory building limited.

There are particularly three factors that are critical to the research design of a study, those factors concern (i) generalizability (external validity), whether the findings are valid beyond
the particular case(s) under study, (ii) internal validity, whether the causal relationship between two variables can properly be demonstrated (infer that X causes Y), and (iii) reliability, whether the study is replicable (Yin, 2004, pp. 45-50). Generally, case studies are regarded to be strong where statistical studies are weak, which is in regards to internal validity (George & Benett, 2005, pp. 18-19). Because case studies involve the intensive study of one or few cases generalizability is more difficult. Similarly, because the case study research design allows the researcher to be flexible with data and combine several methods and data, replicability can also be difficult.

Inherited in the definition of case studies itself, which I’ve discussed in section 3.1, is the researchers aim to through a detailed study of one or few cases, to generalize explanations and mechanisms to a broader set of cases. However, George and Benett (2005, p.30) argue that case researchers do not select cases that are directly representative of diverse populations, and therefore they do not and should not make strong claims about generalizability. This is indeed true for this thesis as well. When choosing the case to investigate in this thesis, the primary concern was not whether the case was representative of a diverse population. Rather, the main concern and focus was to choose a case which enabled me to study two different types of violence, and where the availability of data was relatively good. Violence during the war in Bosnia primarily followed ethnic lines, and thus the findings from this case study are at best only generalizable to similar contexts.

The possibilities to generalize the findings on sexual violence are maybe even more limited than for lethal violence. As I’ve already discussed the research on sexual violence indicates a wide variation in how sexual violence is used both within and across conflicts. Bosnia is together with Rwanda regarded as the ideal type within the weapon-of-war paradigm on sexual violence (Houge, 2015). Thus, it remains highly uncertain whether the findings can be applied to other types of conflicts where sexual violence is not necessarily employed as a weapon of war.

In regards to internal validity (causality) the minimum necessary factor is that a specific causal factor(s) (control, ethnic distribution), a specific outcome (levels of violence), and some pattern of association between those two to be stipulated (Gerring, 2007, p.71). By

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11 A fourth common criterion for judgement of the quality of a study involves construct validity which has to do with identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied. The operationalization of the concepts and data in this thesis was discussed in section 3.4.
assessing how levels of control vary with each of the two types of violence, this thesis stipulates whether there is a variation, and in which direction it goes. The selected research design in this thesis does not closely explore the causal mechanism between control and violence. This is due to the trade-off I faced when selecting the research design, between a research design which enabled me to explore the role of control for a larger sample of cases (within-case analysis of Bosnia’s municipalities), or chose a few specific cases which would enable me to assess the causal mechanism in greater detail (choosing one or two specific municipalities for detailed examination over time). I chose the first approach because the aim of this study was to investigate whether and how control at all is a relevant lens to use to better understand the relationship between sexual and lethal violence in war. On the basis of this thesis, future research could for instance focus on a few specific municipalities and conduct a process-tracing approach, in order to investigate the causal path between control and levels of violence. In general, case studies have the limitation that they can only make tentative conclusions on how much a particular variable contributes to the outcome in a class of cases (George & Benett, 2005, p.25).

In order to increase the possibility for replication of this thesis, I’ve attempted to be as transparent as possible in the specific research approach and data used. In the presentation and discussion of the results in chapter 5 I’ve attempted to be as explicit about the data as possible, by providing summary descriptions of patterns of lethal and sexual violence for relevant municipalities. This increases the potential for replication and enables other researchers to take use of this thesis and critically assess both my methods and results.

War in general is a complex phenomenon, and the war in Bosnia is no exception. In this chapter I attempt to provide sufficient background knowledge about the war in Bosnia according to the focus of this thesis and the subsequent analysis. The focus of this thesis is levels of control and patterns of violence during the war in Bosnia. In accordance with that focus this chapter focuses on the battlefield, the warring actors, and the use of violence against civilians during the war.

4.1 Bosnia: A Short Historical Overview

Bosnia’s history is a story about many things, but maybe most of all it is a story about struggle, power and resistance. Much of this is due to the fact that external actors occupy a central place in the story of Bosnia, both in more ancient and in newer times. Only in roughly 75 years, from 1878 until 1941, Bosnia experienced five different regimes (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p.34).

In 1918 Bosnia was integrated into Yugoslavia, About Yugoslavia it is said that it is one of those places where they produce more history than they can consume (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002b, p.xi). The first breakdown of Yugoslavia came in 1941 with World War II, when invasion by the Axis powers in April 1941 (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 37). With the military victory of the Partisans during World War II, Yugoslavia transcended into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, governed by a communist regime under Josip Broz Tito.

From 19945 until 1992 Bosnia was one of the six republics constituting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p.39-40). In 1980 Yugoslavia’s strong man Tito, who had imposed a centralized rule over the six republics, died. With the death of Tito Yugoslavia’s unity was threatened and political crisis emerged (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005, pp. 192-193). The death of Yugoslavia was a fact with Slovenia’s declaration of independence in June 1991, followed by Croatia later in 1991, and Bosnia in early 1992.

Compared to Croatia and Bosnia’s road to independence, the Slovene 10-day war for independence remains relatively undramatic in comparison. The Central Intelligence Agency compares Bosnia’s road to independence in the following manner “As fighting flared first in
Slovenia, then raged across neighboring Croatia, Yugoslavia’s central republic of Bosnia looked on nervously and waited for the worst” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002b, p.57, 81, 119).

One reason why the war in Bosnia was much more complicated and intense can be illustrated in the map below. Darker colored areas indicate municipalities where one ethnic group had majority, while lighter colors indicate municipalities where ethnic groups were more or less at parity. As can be seen from the map, the ethnic groups were intermixed in several areas.

The republic of Bosnia is situated between Croatia on one end, and Serbia on the other. Both who made claims to the territory of Bosnia during the war in 1992-1995, and provided support and supplies of military equipment to the Croat and Serb forces in Bosnia (Burg & Shoup, 1999, pp. 73-75). While Croatia had a significant population of Croat Serbs, they were largely concentrated to one specific region. In Bosnia on the other hand, the three ethnic groups, Bosniaks (43.7 %), Serbs (31.4 %), and Croats (17.3 %) were mixed throughout the territory, although in some specific areas either of the ethnic groups were in majority (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p.27).

The political system was dominated by the three ethnic groups prior to the outbreak of the war. While the Serbs supported continued union with Yugoslavia, Croat and Bosniak representatives opted for independence. Despite Serb objections, they declared independence in October 1991. On February 29 and March 1 a referendum on independence was held, in which Muslims and Croats overwhelmingly voted in favor of independence, but most Serbs boycotted. Following the results from the referendum violence broke out and by April 4 violence had escalated to full scale and war in Bosnia was a fact (Helsinki Watch, 1992, pp. 7-8).

The war in Bosnia can roughly be divided into three phases. The first phase concentrates on the years 1992-1993, and is characterized by the outbreak of war and Serb consolidation of control over large areas of the territory of Bosnia (Divjak, 2001, pp. 156-163). The Bosnian political leadership was unprepared for the attacks by Serb forces. As a result, Serb forces controlled approximately 70 percent of Bosnian territory before the Bosnian government mounted in effective resistance (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994b, p. 29). The second phase concentrates on the year 1993-1994, during which fighting between Croat and Bosniak forces broke out (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p.134-135). This period is also referred to as “the war within the war”. Fighting between Croat and Bosniak forces was mainly concentrated to Central Bosnia, but cooperation continued on many joint battlegrounds outside of Central Bosnia (Divjak, 2001, pp. 171-177). And the last phase concentrates on the years 1994-1995, during which Croat and Bosniak forces joined forces and through a joint offensive regained control over large areas of the conflict zone. A key factor in bringing the war to an end was a shift in the military situation on the battlefield. From the onset of the war and throughout the conflict the military balance had been heavily tilted in favor of the Serb forces, during the last phase of the war the military balance significantly shifted. During the first phase of the war Serb
forces were numerical and military superior to the Croat and Serb forces. However, by the summer of 1994 the Bosnian government managed to establish about 110 000 troops (including Croats), while Serb forces troops numbered about 80 000. The Serb forces faced severe challenges in terms of troop morale and command and control. These factors eventually offset their initial military strength (Cigar, 2001 pp. 208-214; Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005, p.213; Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 185).

The war in Bosnia was finally settled with the signing of the Dayton agreement in 1995. While the Dayton agreement ended fighting and violence, it also enabled the parties to continue their pursuit of fundamentally different goals by other means, through imposing a political system which favored nationalist politics (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 319).

4.2 The Main Actors and the Battlefield of 1992-1995

With a short overview over the history of Bosnia, and the war in 1992 -1995, I move to a brief introduction of the main characteristics and goals of each of the central actors during the war. The main parties to the war in Bosnia were Bosniak, Croat and Serb forces. A mix of irregular and regular forces fought on all sides during the war (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005, p.212; Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 32). Furthermore, armed police and local volunteers were also active participants in military activities in the war. One of the main characteristics of the war was the partake blurring of lines of conventional and unconventional war (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994b, p.4)

Looking aside from the internal fighting which occurred between Croat and Bosniak forces during 1993 and 1994, the two opposing sides during the war were the Bosnian forces (Bosniak and Croat forces) and the Yugoslav/Serbian side (Bosnian Serb forces and Yugoslav forces) (Helsinki Watch, 1992, p.32). When Bosnia declared its independence, it did not have one separate national army. Instead all members of Yugoslavia were gathered under one joint army, the JNA (Yugoslavian People’s Army) (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994b, p. 7).

The armed forces of the Bosnian government were represented by republic’s territorial defense units. These units comprised local defense forces separated from federal Yugoslav army. Many of the unit’s fighters were Bosniak, although Croats and Serbs fought with the Bosnian TO forces as well. The responsibility for command was with the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina whose seat was in Sarajevo. Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, was
surrounded by Serbian troops and therefore the Bosnian government’s communication lines were severely limited. Thus, in practice the TOs usually operated under the command of local and regional officers (Helsinki Watch 1992, p 32-33). The Bosnian government was unprepared for the war, and initially several areas were only defended by local paramilitary units, such as the Green Berets and The Patriotic League. The Bosnian side was severely challenged and constrained in military terms. It did not have any effective support from neighboring countries, such as the Croatian and Serbian side. Even though the Bosnian government managed to organize the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina into five corps command, consisting of about 70 000 troops by 1993, only 40 000 of these were armed (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994b, p. 29). The Bosnian government’s primary and fundamental aim was to retain control over as much of Bosnia’s territory as possible. In other words, between the Croat and Serb objective of partitioning Bosnia, it was ultimately about pure survival for the Bosnian government and state (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002b, p. 142).

Croatian forces fought alongside the Bosnian forces, represented by the Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatska Vijece Obrane - HVO). HVO fighters were mainly Bosnian Croats, armed and trained by the government of Croatia. The HVO was generally concentrated in areas of Bosnia where the Croat population constituted a majority. Also fighting on the Croatian side was forces from The Croatian Army (Hrvatska Vojska - HV), although the Croatian government denied this. Most of the HV forces within Croatia were based along the border with Bosnia, but were sent to areas in Bosnia when fighting broke out. The paramilitary forces of the armed troops of the ultra-right-wing Croatian Party of Rights also participated in battle during the Bosnia. These forces went under the name Croatian Armed Forces (Hrvatske Oruzane Snage - HOS), although they did not officially and legitimately represent the government of Croatia. The cooperation between the Bosnian government forces and the Croatian troops was at times and in specific areas extensive. In several areas the parties shared control. A formal military alliance was formed between Croatia and Bosnia in June 1995, and the short term goal of the Croatian troops was to reclaim territory from the Serb and Yugoslav forces (Helsinki Watch, 1992, pp. 34-35). However, the government of Croatia primary political objectives in Bosnia was to secure the position of the Bosnian Croat population, by developing a measure of political autonomy, either by working toward a partition of Bosnia with Serbs, or a confederal state with full Bosnian Croat autonomy (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002b, p. 144).
Bosnian and Croatian forces fought against local Serb armed groups from Bosnia, supported by paramilitary groups from Serbia and regular reserve forces from JNA (Yugoslavian People’s Army). Officially the Serbian authorities in Belgrade withdrew the troops of the JNA prior to May 19 1992. However, the Belgrade authorities claimed that 80 percent of the JNA troops were Bosnian Serbs, who would be free to remain in Bosnia and fight on behalf of the Serbian forces. Thus, the official withdrawal left behind at least 30 000 men with heavy military equipment to fight for the Serb forces in Bosnia (Helsinki Watch, 1992, pp.35-36).

The Serb goal was to achieve a territorial link between Serb-held areas in Croatia and Bosnia, and Serbia, which would constitute a “Greater Serbia”. In order to achieve this, Serb forces targeted several areas which were not military targets, but civilian areas with strategic importance to link Serbia with Serbian areas in Bosnia and Croatia (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994b, p. 5). The Serb war aim of creating a separate state from parts of the Bosnian territory led them to take the military strategic offensive during the war (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002b, p. 141).

At its most basic point, the war was ultimately about the portioning of Bosnia according to ethnic lines, which the Bosniak population and actors opposed. Although the short term objective of the Croatian forces initially was to reclaim territory from the Serb forces, in July 1992 a quasi-independent Croatian state was proclaimed within Bosnia, actively supported by the Croatian government (Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 39-45).

The battlefield during the war in Bosnia can be characterized as rather complex. Confrontation lines were in and around cities and villages, and access roads to them. However, they were not part of a continues line. For instance, several areas under control by the Bosnian government were completely unconnected geographically. Neither all Serb nor Croat controlled areas were contiguous throughout the territory. In many areas, the party in control was entirely or partly surrounded by either one of the other forces, or partly by both. This resulted in several battlefield theaters, each with its own characteristics within the conflict zone. This was for instance evident in the level of the black marked and trade that went on in these areas between the warring factions or through their lines. An example is Tuzla, which was entirely surrounded by Serb forces, but yet faced comparatively little

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12 The foremost example of the war’s complexity is the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. In 1993 Fikret Abdic broke with the Bosnian government and declared his own autonomous province, with main seat in Velika Kladusa. Abdic’s forces openly fought the Bosnian government’s forces, and instead chose to cooperate with Serb forces (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002b, pp.189-191).
bombardment. Black market goods flourished through Tuzla, arriving from Serbia through Serbian lines. The conflict zone also faced a gradual transformation in terms of centralization of control. During the earlier phase of the war paramilitary forces, police and civilians operated within different structures, sometimes alongside regular forces, and sometimes under no command and control. This situation existed until late 1993. After this the warring actors increased centralized command, and established control over paramilitary and special forces by integrating them into the army or disbanding them (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994b, pp. 5–7).

4.3 A Review of What We Think We Know about the Violence in Bosnia

The war in Bosnia gained widespread attention amongst policy makers and in the public opinion, mainly due to the horrors of violence against civilians during the war. Quite soon after the outbreak of the war pictures and news of concentrations camps, torture, massacres and rape emerged. Investigations by NGO’s revealed that torture, massacres and sexual violence was widespread and used systematically against the civilian population (Amnesty International, 1993; Helsinki Watch, 1992; Helsinki Watch, 1993). The term “ethnic cleansing” became characteristic of the violence during the war. Ethnic cleansing of an area entailed the forced displacement of the opposing ethnic group(s), through the use of various forms of violence to frighten the population to flee and not return to their homes. The aim of such violence was to ethnically adjust the map of Bosnia (Helsinki Watch, 1993, p.10-12).

The height of violence during the war in Bosnia was reached in July 1995, with the genocide in Srebrenica, in which more than 8000 young men and boys were systematically massacred (Mikaberidze, 2016, p. 213).

A common view on violence during the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s was that it was completely irrational and a result of ancient hatred. This view was widely upheld by both journalists, policymakers and even scholars (Valentino, 2014, p. 92). Luckily, scholars have renounced this view and attempted to more systematically explore the patterns of violence during the war in Bosnia. The scholarly debate on violence during the war in Bosnia has mainly focused on the role of ethnicity in explaining patterns of lethal violence. Weidman (2011) explores whether violence during the war in Bosnia was driven from above – violence as a means to create ethnically homogenous areas, or below – violence as a result of ethnic
resentment and fear. Weidman (2011) finds that the first account is particularly relevant for the early stages of the war, while overall the last account fits better with the large majority of Bosnia’s municipalities. Costalli & Moro (2012) argue that ethnic polarization (two relatively large groups exists) created strategic incentives for severe violence during the war in Bosnia, and that areas where the ethnic groups were at parity faced the most severe violence during the early phases of the war. Ethnic dominance, they argue, has a negative effect on violence because supremacy is easily achieved. However, as time evolves geographic location becomes the best predictor of severe violence, and areas close to the frontlines face the severest clashes. They argue that this occurs because actors first concentrate on consolidating control within municipalities, by removing the enemy population. When this is achieved they focus on external consolidation of control. Thus, they argue that high levels of lethal violence during the war in Bosnia were the results of high contestation on the ground. Another contribution to the debate and the role of ethnicity and violence during the war in Bosnia is the recent research by Di Salvatore (2016). Di Salvatore (ibid) asserts that areas with the presence of local minorities within territories controlled by the enemy ethnic majority were associated with more violence during the war in Bosnia.

Human rights violations were committed by all sides during the war, however, documentation indicates that the Serb forces were responsible for both the majority of killings of civilians, and accounted for the majority of sexual violence perpetrated during the war (Helsinki Watch, 1993, pp. 7-8, Skjelsbæk, 2011, p. 23-24, Amnesty International, 1993, Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, p.9). Recent estimates from the Research and Documentation Center on the ethnicity of civilian victims’ state that 31,107 of the civilian victims were Bosniak, 4,178 were Serb, and 2,484 were Croat (Ball et al., 2007, pp. 28–32; Tokaca, 2012, p.115-116). Surprisingly, the reasons for and the nature of this variation in how and why the warring parties employed such violence against civilians to such a varying degree has, sparked little debate and interest in the discourse and research on the war in Bosnia. Particularly in the field of war time sexual violence during the war in Bosnia, many academics and scholars have almost exclusively focused on sexual violence and rape perpetrated by Serb forces, due to the fact that the Serb forces accounted for a greater quantity of violence against civilians. Consequently, victims of violence perpetrated by Croat and Bosnian forces have often been neglected in the discourse on wartime rape and sexual violence during the war in Bosnia (Simic, 2015). Some scholars even conclude that rape and sexual violence perpetrated by Bosniak and Croat forces are solely instances of revenge, or that it is unplanned and
unauthorized as opposed to Serb forces use of sexual violence (Askin, 1997, pp. 263-281, cited in Duderija, 2015, p. 114-115; Stiglmayer, 1994, p. 138; Allen, 1996), despite the fact that evidence states that all warring parties employed sexual violence as a weapon of war (Helsinki Watch, 1993, p. 21)

There are few works which comparatively assess each of the armed actors’ use of lethal violence. This is surprising given the observed variation in civilian casualties according to ethnic lines. One exception is the work of Schneider, Bussmann and Ruhe (2012). In their study on violence by Bosniak and Serb forces they find that violence against civilians perpetrated by these two actors were largely influenced by the battlefield dynamics. For instance, they find that Serb forces decreased violence against civilians after a territorial conquest, and acted according to an overall strategic plan, while Bosniak forces increased violence following a territorial conquest, and employed violence when they had the resources to do so. This indicates a difference in the use of lethal violence between the stronger (Serb forces) and the weaker (Bosniak forces) actor. Furthermore, violence by Bosniak forces was more retaliatory than that by Serb forces, and increased in periods of Serb atrocities and clashes (ibid). A similar observation in regards to the different use of lethal violence by the actors was made by Human Rights Watch. In a report in 1994 on violations of the rules of war by Bosniak and Croat forces they note that Bosniak forces appear to have summarily executed civilians in smaller numbers but with greater frequency than Croat troops (Nizich, 1994, p. 31).

The widespread and systematical sexual violence provoked much attention internationally (Skjelsbæk, 2001, p. 211). The use of sexual violence reached such high levels that the term “genocidal rape” was used to describe the violence, and so systematic that terms such as “rape camps” emerged. Testimonies by victims and investigations by NGO representatives quickly revealed the many forms sexual violence took, and its systematic character. Rape was perpetrated in conjunction with attacks and in front of the victims’ family members, gang rapes were common, women were held in detention with the intention of impregnation, and brothels were set up in several areas. The systematic nature of the sexual violence led it to be described as being used as a “weapon of war” to humiliate and destroy the victim and their communities, and thereby the opponent (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, pp. 11–12). More specifically, the Commission revealed five patterns of sexual violence, (i) sexual violence with looting and intimidation before fighting in an area broke out, (ii) sexual violence during
fighting, (iii) sexual violence in detention facilities after control over an area was established, (iv) sexual violence in special rape camps for the purpose of impregnation, and (v) sexual violence in bordello camps for the sexual use of soldiers returning from the frontline (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, pp. 9–11). Amnesty International observed similar patterns of sexual violence, it occurred in areas by the party in control, in places of detention not specifically for rape, and in detention center organized solely for the rape or sexual abuse of women (Amnesty International, 1993, p. 8-9).

In terms of sexual violence during the war in Bosnia, Hansen (2000) argues that the representations of rape during the war in Bosnia are centered around conceptualizations of security in some form, and further identifies three specific forms of representations of the rapes. First, there is a representation of rape as a threat to national security, but as a result of normal “Balkan warfare”. Second, a similar representation of rape as a threat to national security, is the view that rape was a result of not normal Balkan warfare, but exceptional Serbian warfare. Third, is the representation of rape as a matter of not national, but feminist security, and the result of a patriarchal society (Ibid).

Furthermore, compared to the scholarly focus on lethal violence during the war, there is a lack of systematic analyses of patterns of sexual violence during the war. The only investigations into patterns of sexual violence are those by international NGO’s who devoted great resources in investigating and providing proof of widespread and systematic sexual violence during the war. However, neither of these investigations systemically explore the varying degree of sexual violence used by each of the parties. Although documentation indicates that all parties to the war used sexual violence as a weapon of war, but that Serb forces perpetrated the majority and acted on the basis of a government policy (Amnesty International, 1996; Helsinki Watch, 1993, p. 21), their conclusions and assessment of the use of sexual violence fails short of providing any explanations to this observed variation. Bosnia is generally upheld as the ideal-type within the weapon of war paradigm on sexual violence.

As the discussion above shows, the discourse and research on both lethal and sexual violence lacks a systematic, comparative analysis of each of the actors’ use of such violence. Additionally, the discourse on sexual violence has in particular deliberately focused more on sexual violence committed by Serb forces, thus contributing to a bias in the current discourse.
and understanding of sexual violence during the war in Bosnia. By comparatively and systematically assessing the use of sexual violence and lethal violence in all of Bosnia’s municipalities, and perpetrated by all of the three main actors to the war, this thesis attempts to correct the gap and the bias in the discourse on violence during the war in Bosnia.
5  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: CONTROL AND VIOLENCE DURING THE WAR IN BOSNIA

The aim of this thesis is to explore how sexual violence relates to lethal violence, by using the lens of control, based on Kalyvas’ (2006) theoretical framework. Kalyvas’ theory has only been applied to the study of lethal violence. However, in this thesis I apply the model to both lethal and sexual violence during the war in Bosnia. Kalyvas’ (2006, p. 20) argues that lethal violence can serve as a proxy for violence in general, thus assuming that control should vary similarly for both lethal and sexual violence. In chapter 2.2 I argued that patterns of lethal and sexual violence are likely to differ, also in regards to how they vary with control. On the basis of this I pose the following research questions:

RQ1: To what extent can Kalyvas’ (2006) model on patterns of control and (lethal) violence explain how patterns of control and lethal violence varied during the war in Bosnia?

RQ2: To what extent can Kalyvas’ (2006) model on patterns of control and (lethal) violence explain how patterns of control and sexual violence varied during the war in Bosnia?

RQ3: How does sexual violence differ from lethal violence during the war in Bosnia?

Kalyvas’ (2006) main argument is that levels of control and lethal violence are negatively correlated. The less control, the more violence. From his model the following three hypotheses were stated in chapter 2.1:

H1: Areas of exclusive control should have low levels of violence.
H2: Areas of fragmented control should have the highest levels of violence.
H3: Areas under shared control should have low levels of violence.

These hypotheses are tested for both lethal and sexual violence in this thesis. The analysis shows that control relates differently to lethal violence than to sexual violence. In terms of lethal violence, the analysis shows that control is a relevant aspect to study lethal violence in ethnic wars as well, but the data does not support the hypotheses. While Kalyvas’ asserts that
violence should be highest in areas of fragmented control, the data shows that lethal violence was highest in areas of exclusive, not fragmented control. Thus, the opposite of what Kalyvas’ asserts. More specifically, the data shows that areas under exclusive control where the Serb population lacked a majority were the most lethal. When we move from areas of exclusive control to areas of fragmented control, lethal violence decreases. However, this is not the case for sexual violence. In terms of sexual violence, it is difficult to infer from the data where the absolute highest levels of sexual violence occurred. However, the data indicates that sexual violence was widespread in both areas of exclusive and fragmented control. There is even some indication that sexual violence might have been even higher in areas of fragmented control. Thus, the opposite of the findings on lethal violence. In regards to Kalyvas’ (2006) model then, the data on sexual violence supports the second hypothesis that areas of fragmented control should have high levels of (sexual) violence, but not the first hypothesis, that areas of exclusive control should have low levels of (sexual) violence. In terms of the models last hypothesis, that violence should be low in areas of shared control, the data indicates this to be true for lethal violence. However, the data on sexual violence in areas of shared control is more contradictory and uncertain, and it is thus difficult to draw any inferences. In conclusion then, control is a relevant aspect for the study of lethal violence during the war in Bosnia, but violence and control do not vary in the predicted direction. In terms of sexual violence, there is no strong indication that levels of sexual violence strongly vary in either direction with levels of control, as sexual violence is both widespread in areas of exclusive and fragmented control.

In the following I present the analysis that leads up to these findings, and discuss the results. In chapter 5.1 I discuss and present the results for research question 1, on how lethal violence varies with control during the war in Bosnia. Under chapter 5.1 I discuss each of the three hypotheses from Kalyvas’ model in turn. I then turn to how levels of sexual violence vary with levels of control in chapter 5.2, following the same structure and logic. Based on the results in chapter 5.1 for lethal violence, and 5.2 for sexual violence, I discuss the final research question in this thesis, on how sexual violence differs from lethal violence.

The map below illustrates the distribution of control within the conflict zone during the war in Bosnia. As can be seen, Serb forces had exclusive control in almost all of Northwestern and Southwestern Bosnia. While Northeastern Bosnia was under fragmented control by the various parties, and also the most contested region during the war in Bosnia (Helsinki Watch,
1993, pp. 189-190). If Kalyvas’ (2006) model was correct for both lethal and sexual violence during the war in Bosnia, the highest levels of violence should then have been observed in Northeastern Bosnia.

Map 3: Areas of different levels of control during the war in Bosnia

5.1 Patterns of Control and Lethal Violence

This section answers the first research question in this thesis, which is as follows

*RQ1: To what extent can Kalyvas' (2006) model on patterns of control and (lethal) violence explain how patterns of control and lethal violence varied during the war in Bosnia?*
I find that the lens of control is a useful aspect to take into account for the study of lethal violence during the war in Bosnia. However, the data does not support the predicted variation between levels of lethal violence and control during the war in Bosnia.

In the following sub-sections, I review and discuss each of the hypotheses from Kalyvas model, and show how the data indicates different patterns than what is asserted by Kalyvas’ model.

5.1.1 Areas Under Exclusive Control → H1

The first hypothesis from Kalyvas’ model is that violence should be low in areas of exclusive control. In the following, I review and discuss levels of lethal violence for Serb controlled areas, before I turn to a brief discussion on violence in areas controlled either by Bosniak and/or Croat forces. Fighting between Bosniak and Croat forces broke out in 1993, but it was mainly centered to central Bosnia, which is excluded from the analysis. Thus, the focus in this thesis is on the two main opposing sides, the Serb forces on one side, and Bosniak and Croat forces on the other.

The following tables on the next page show areas under exclusive control by Serb forces, the ethnic distribution and the level of lethal violence for each area. The municipalities are organized according to increasing levels of lethal violence, measured as a share of the population. The first table (table 4) provides information on areas of exclusive control in the Northwestern region, where the Serb population was mainly in majority. The second table (table 5) provides information on areas under Serb exclusive control in Southeastern Bosnia, where the Serb population largely lacked a majority. Where the Serb population lacked a clear majority, the ethnic distribution is provided in percentage.
Table 4: Lethal violence in Municipalities exclusively controlled by Serb forces in Northwestern Bosnia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Number of killed civilians</th>
<th>% of the population killed</th>
<th>Ethnic distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Srbac</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laktasi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prnjavor</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skender Vakuf</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banja Luka</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanska Dubica</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titov Drvar</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sipovo</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jajce</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td>Bosniak 39% Serb 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donji Vakuf</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>Bosniak 55% Serb 39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrkonjic Grad</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosansko Grahovo</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Novi</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glamoc</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotor Varos</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>1.06%</td>
<td>Serb 38% Bosniak 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Petrovac</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>Serb majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanski Most</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>Bosniak 47% Serb 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kljuc</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>1.65%</td>
<td>Serb 50% Bosniak 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prijedor</td>
<td>4026</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
<td>Bosniak 44% Serb 42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the municipalities above are in the Northwestern region of Bosnia. As can be seen from the table above the Serb population was in a majority (ranging from 55 percent to 97 percent) in most of the municipalities (in 15 of 21 municipalities). Areas where the Serb population was in a majority are characterized by relatively lower levels of lethal violence. Measured in absolute numbers, all municipalities have below 200 killed civilians. Measured as a share of the population, all areas with the exception of Bosanski Petrovac (1.2 %) have below 1% of the population killed. In the remaining municipalities the Serb population lacked a clear majority. The Bosniak population alone or together with the Croat population constituted a majority, or the ethnic groups were at parity. The highest levels of lethal violence are found in

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13 However, the majority of lethal violence in Bosanski Petrovac occurred in 1995 during which Bosniak and Croat forces regained control. Thus implying that lethal violence was employed when control was threatened/changed.
these municipalities. With the exception of Jajce and Donji Vakuf, where the Bosniak population was in a majority as well, levels of lethal violence are above 1% of the population killed. Reports on Jajce and Donji Vakuf state that a large majority of the population managed to flee when the town was captured by Serb forces, after initially being defended by Croat and Bosniak forces (Bassiouni, 1994d, p. 125; Toal & Dahlman, 2011, p. 126). This aspect is not captured by the data, and might explain the low level of lethal violence in these areas compared to the remaining areas where the Serb population was in a minority. The fact that the highest areas of lethal violence are found in areas where the Serb population did not have a majority, could indicate that the violence was aimed on removing a share of the enemy population, in order to consolidate ethnic supremacy.

When the time variation in lethal violence is taken into account, the data indicates that the highest use of lethal violence was not only targeted on municipalities where the Serb population lacked a majority, but more specifically, violence was targeted on the municipality of Prijedor. Prijedor may have been so severely targeted because it was a strategically important municipality, providing a corridor connecting Serb controlled areas in Bosnia, with Serb controlled areas in Croatia (Bassiouni, 1994c, p. 39). 87.5 percent of those that were killed in Prijedor were killed in 1992. The number of killed civilians fell from 3522 in 1992, to 155 in 1993, and remained on that level throughout the war. In Sanski Most, which has the second highest number of killed civilians (1009) measured in absolute numbers, a similar ethnic distribution, and which is a neighboring municipality to Prijedor, only 45 percent of those killed were killed in 1992. In 1993 and 1994 the number of killed civilians fell from around 400 to around 100, and then increased again in 1995, when almost 400 civilians were killed.

The remaining municipalities have a similar pattern in variation over time. The increase in lethal violence in 1995 corresponds to changes in control over the territory. In 1995 Bosniak and Croat forces launched a joint offensive against the Serb forces, and managed to establish control over much of the Serb held territory in Northwestern Bosnia (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002b, p. 40, 379-396). Since the data does not provide any information on the ethnicity of the victims it is unclear which of the actors account for the increase in lethal violence in 1995. Serb forces may have increased violence in response to the pressure from Bosniak and Croat forces as their control was about to slip, or the civilian casualties may have occurred as a result of fighting between the actors, and thus may not be a result of executions.
Kalyvas (2006, p. 204) argues that if any violence is observed in areas of exclusive control, it is likely to be indiscriminate violence by the opponent. However, given that the operationalization of exclusive control by Helsinki Watch is based on the opposing actor’s lack of presence, it is unlikely that Bosniak (and/or Croat) forces were able to perpetrate lethal violence to the extent it is observed in the areas under Serb exclusive control, without any significant and long-term presence in the area. Furthermore, given that the majority of victims were Bosniak in this area, it is unlikely that they were targeted by Bosniak and/or Croat forces (Tokaca, 2012, p. 179)

What is more likely is that as Bosniak and Croat forces made progress in their offensive against the Serb forces, the areas under exclusive control moved in the direction of fragmented control by the Serb forces, before finally Serb forces completely lost control. As the Croat and Bosniak forces made inroads into the area Serb forces may have targeted civilians in a last attempt to secure ethnic supremacy or to deter them from attempting to join the Bosniak and Croat forces. If this was the case, then Kalyvas’ theory applies to the war in Bosnia in the second phase of violence. This indicates a two-step logic during the war in Bosnia. In the first phase violence is perpetrated based on reaching the aim of ethnic supremacy, therefore areas where the actor’s ethnic group lacks a majority are targeted. Then violence decreases and remains stable until the area of exclusive control moves in the direction of an area of fragmented control. As control is slipping and decreasing, violence is increasing. This supports Kalyvas’ hypothesis about violence being highest in areas of fragmented control. However, it might be that the variation in the change of control accounts for this increase, rather than the static level of control. Even though the areas were under fragmented control for a while, the opposing actor eventually managed to gain control. Thus, the areas did not remain under fragmented control for long.

This finding is echoed in other studies as well. Ziemke’s (2008) study on the Angolan war asserts that it is not the static level of control that is important, but rather the direction of the control. Similarly, Balcell (2010) argues that willingness to kill increases when armed groups are more uncertain about their control. This is in accordance with Kalyvas’ (2006, p. 204) argument that violence is negatively correlated with levels of control, that is in the latter phases of the war when changes in control occur, and not in terms of the static level of control.
This logic becomes even clearer when areas of exclusive control in Northwestern Bosnia are compared to areas in Southeastern Bosnia. Serb forces had exclusive control over most of Southeastern Bosnia, but the Serb population lacked a majority, as opposed to Northeastern Bosnia, where the Serb population had a majority in most municipalities. Lethal violence was highest in all of the municipalities where the Serb population lacked a majority. The table below shows this clearly.

Table 5: Lethal violence in areas under Serb exclusive control in Southeastern Bosnia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Number of killed civilians</th>
<th>% of the population killed</th>
<th>Ethnic distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han Pijesak</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.8 %</td>
<td>Serb majority (58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudo</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.8 %</td>
<td>Serb majority (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokolac</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0.8 %</td>
<td>Serb majority (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajnice</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1.4 %</td>
<td>Serb majority (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogatica</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>4.2 %</td>
<td>Bosniak majority (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foca</td>
<td>1788</td>
<td>4.3 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 52 % Serb 45 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad</td>
<td>1169</td>
<td>5.5 %</td>
<td>Bosniak majority (63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlasenica</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>5.5 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 55 % Serb 43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratunac</td>
<td>2208</td>
<td>6.2 %</td>
<td>Bosniak majority (64%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidently, the level of lethal violence is much higher in areas where the Serb population lacked a majority. While Prijedor has the highest level of lethal violence in absolute numbers, the municipalities in Southeastern Bosnia, where the Serb population lacked a majority, have the highest level of lethal violence measured as a share of the population. Interestingly, the time variation in the level of lethal violence also differs in these areas under Serb exclusive control, as compared to areas in Northwestern Bosnia. While lethal violence increased in 1995 for all the municipalities except Prijedor in Northwestern Bosnia, lethal violence was highest in 1992 and then significantly decreased in the municipalities in Southeastern Bosnia. The only exceptions are Vlasenica and Bratunac, where violence severely increased again in 1995. The increase in lethal violence for these two municipalities is likely linked to the Srebrenica genocide, which occurred in July 1995. Bratunac and Vlasenica are neighboring municipalities to Srebrenica. When the genocide erupted in Srebrenica violence may have spread to both Vlasenica and Bratunac. Many of those who attempted to flee the slaughtering in Srebrenica died in the surrounding forests and areas where they were hiding (Eager, 2011; Justice Report, 2013).
When the Bosniak/Croat offensive against the Serbs was initiated, it resulted in major loss of Serb-held territory in Northwestern Bosnia, meaning that areas of exclusive control gradually moved to areas of fragmented control, before Serb forces completely lost control, and thus the increase in lethal violence in 1995. However, areas in Southeastern Bosnia under exclusive Serb control did not experience a similar change of control during 1995. Therefore, the violence is concentrated to 1992. This comparison reinforces the two step logic of lethal violence in Serb-held areas. First, lethal violence is targeted in specific municipalities in order to achieve ethnic supremacy. In potential subsequent stages, when control slips, violence increases, and Kalyvas’ argument about negative correlation between control and violence gains support in explaining patterns of lethal violence, also for the ethnic war in Bosnia.

In conclusion then, in areas of exclusive control by Serb forces, lethal violence was highest in municipalities where the Serb population lacked a majority. This is contradictory to Kalyvas’ hypothesis that violence should be low in areas of exclusive control. However, when the time variation is taken into account, the data indicates that violence increased as Serb forces control was slipping due to the offensive by Bosniak and Croat forces in Northwestern Bosnia. Thus, lending support to Kalyvas’ logic that violence is negatively correlated with control. However, rather than the static situation of control, it is the direction of control that matters. Before I turn to the second hypothesis of Kalyvas’ theory and the areas under fragmented control, a short discussion on areas under exclusive control by Bosniak and/or Croat forces follows.

Only two municipalities are categorized as being under the exclusive control by Bosniak forces, by Helsinki Watch, namely Velika Kladusa and Cazin (1993, p. 30). However, fighting broke out between the Bosniak forces and Fikret Abdic’s forces (also Bosniak) in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foca</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogatica</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlasenica</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratunac</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the Bosniak/Croat offensive against the Serbs was initiated, it resulted in major loss of Serb-held territory in Northwestern Bosnia, meaning that areas of exclusive control gradually moved to areas of fragmented control, before Serb forces completely lost control, and thus the increase in lethal violence in 1995. However, areas in Southeastern Bosnia under exclusive Serb control did not experience a similar change of control during 1995. Therefore, the violence is concentrated to 1992. This comparison reinforces the two step logic of lethal violence in Serb-held areas. First, lethal violence is targeted in specific municipalities in order to achieve ethnic supremacy. In potential subsequent stages, when control slips, violence increases, and Kalyvas’ argument about negative correlation between control and violence gains support in explaining patterns of lethal violence, also for the ethnic war in Bosnia.

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Only two municipalities are categorized as being under the exclusive control by Bosniak forces, by Helsinki Watch, namely Velika Kladusa and Cazin (1993, p. 30). However, fighting broke out between the Bosniak forces and Fikret Abdic’s forces (also Bosniak) in
these areas in 1993 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002b, pp. 187-189). The Bosniak population was in a majority with more than 90 percent in both Velika Kladusa and Cazin. Generally lethal violence was low in areas under control by Bosniak forces, exclusive or fragmented. In Velika Kladusa 185 civilians were killed during the war period, corresponding to 0.34 % of the population, and in Cazin 104 civilians were killed, corresponding to 0.16 % of the population.

5.1.2 Areas under Fragmented Control → H2

Areas under both Serb and Bosniak (and/or Croat) fragmented control were situated in the Northeastern region of Bosnia, which was the site of heavy fighting between the parties, all of which were fighting for control over contested territory. According to Helsinki Watch neither of the parties managed to establish exclusive control in this region. This region is characterized as the most contested during the war (1993, p.189). Additionally, as can be seen from the table below, neither of the ethnic groups had a clear majority, with the exception of Zvornik. Thus, the ethnic groups were more at parity in this region. Costalli & Moro (2012) argue that violence in Bosnia was highest where the ethnic groups were at parity due to high polarization. Thus, according to both Kalyvas’ (2006) model and previous research, Northeastern Bosnia should have the highest levels of lethal violence. However, when compared to areas under exclusive control, the level of lethal violence is comparatively much lower in areas of fragmented control.

An important reason why the results in this thesis may differ from existing research on the war in Bosnia, is that the interaction between control and ethnicity has been overlooked in the previous literature. As discussed in chapter 2.1.1 and in chapter 4.3, the research on Bosnia has mainly focused on ethnicity and derived control on the basis of the ethnic distribution. I argue that the logic of polarization and using violence to achieve ethnic supremacy is highly relevant in ethnic wars, however actors are forced to take other considerations into account as well, when choosing where and how to employ lethal violence. For instance, control could constrain the use of lethal violence, because the presence of an enemy actor forces the actor to choose between employing military resources against the civilian population or the enemy actor. Given that military resources are limited actors must choose whether the threat posed by a large enemy population is bigger than the threat posed by the enemy actor. In areas of fragmented control, the threat of the enemy actor is likely to be greater.
The table below shows patterns of lethal violence for all of the areas under fragmented control by Serb forces. Areas in bold show municipalities where polarization was high (two similarly large groups).

Table 7: Lethal violence in areas under fragmented control by Serb forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Number of killed civilians</th>
<th>% of the population killed</th>
<th>Ethnic distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sekovici</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.18 %</td>
<td>Serb majority (94 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugljevik</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.19 %</td>
<td>Serb majority (96 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teslic</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>0.22 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 45 % Serb 30 % Croat 25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijelina</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>0.24 %</td>
<td>Serb majority (60 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Derventa</strong></td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0.28 %</td>
<td>Serb 40 % Croat 39 % Bosniak 13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modrica</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.33 %</td>
<td>Serb 36 % Bosniak 30 % Croat 27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Samac</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.37 %</td>
<td>Croat 45 % Serb 42 % Bosniak 7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odzak</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0.37 %</td>
<td>Croat 54 % Bosniak 21 % Serb 20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doboj</strong></td>
<td>396</td>
<td>0.38 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 40 % Serb 39% Croat 13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Brod</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>0.40 %</td>
<td>Croat 41 % Serb 34 % Bosniak 12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvornik</td>
<td>2133</td>
<td>2.63 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 59 % Serb 38 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidently, the only municipality where levels of lethal violence are on the same level as for areas under exclusive control by Serb forces, is Zvornik municipality where the Bosniak population had a clear majority. The remaining areas have a lower level of lethal violence regardless of the ethnic distribution.

This is interesting in two aspects. First, it is interesting because areas under exclusive control where the Serb population either lacked a majority or where the ethnic groups were at parity had the highest levels of lethal violence. For instance, in Doboj polarization between the Bosniak and Serb population was high, yet levels of lethal violence are much lower compared to areas of exclusive control with the same ethnic distribution. Second, the results indicate that lethal violence in Serb controlled areas was specifically directed at the Bosniak
population, but not the Croat. For instance, polarization between the Croat and Serb population was high in Bosanski Samac, yet levels of lethal violence are low. The Croat and Bosniak population constituted a majority together with 52 percent against a Serb population of 42 percent. This ethnic distribution is not that different from that of Zvornik, where the Serb population was in minority by 38 percent, compared to a Bosniak majority of 59 percent. Yet, levels of lethal violence are drastically different for those two areas.

The logic of polarization poses that violence will be targeted at those municipalities where there are two relatively large ethnic groups, in order to achieve ethnic supremacy (Costalli & Moro, 2012). If the logic of polarization is correct, areas where the Croat population was at parity with the Serb population, or where the Bosniak and Croat population together constituted a small majority, should have higher levels of lethal violence. Serb forces were opposed by both the Bosniak and Croat army in the first and third phase of the war (see chapter 4.3), thus both the Croat and Bosniak population were the enemy. However, the data above shows that this was not the case. Given that Serb forces had the upper-hand of control and the strongest presence, why then did they not focus on securing ethnic supremacy in these areas, as the logic of polarization asserts? Where an actor has exclusive control, the opponent lacks a presence, and the military resources can be employed against the civilian population, and thus the actor can concentrate on getting rid of the enemy population. In areas of fragmented control, the opposing actor has a presence, and can thus attack the actor in control frequently. This poses a threat to the actor’s control over the areas, and the actor is therefore forced to target the military resources on fighting the enemy. In Kalyvas’ (2006, pp. 26-27) model actors use violence strategically, to deter civilians from siding with the enemy. The war in Bosnia was fought along ethnic lines, and use of violence was likely what Kalyvas (ibid) defines as tactic, imposed to remove a specific threat or risk, namely the enemy population. This might be why Kalyvas’ predicted hypothesis about violence being highest in areas of fragmented control, does not gain support by the data in this analysis.

The table below illustrates the difference between areas of exclusive control where the Serb population lacked a majority, and areas of fragmented control with the same ethnic distribution. Evidently, municipalities with similar ethnic distribution, but different levels of control have very different levels of lethal violence. Thus, the data indicates that when control decreases, so does lethal violence employed against the civilian population.
Table 8: Levels of lethal violence in areas of Serb forces exclusive control compared to areas of fragmented control by Serb forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Number of killed civilians</th>
<th>% of the population killed</th>
<th>Ethnic distribution</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prijedor</td>
<td>4026</td>
<td>3.6 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 44 % Serb 42 % Croat 6%</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doboj</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>0.38 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 40 % Serb 39 % Croat 13 %</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foca</td>
<td>1788</td>
<td>4.3 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 42 % Serb 45 %</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Samac</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.37 %</td>
<td>Croat 45 % Serb 42 % Bosniak 7 %</td>
<td>Fragmented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion then, the analysis indicates that levels of lethal violence are comparatively much lower for areas under fragmented control, than for areas under exclusive control. Furthermore, the data also indicates that the use of lethal violence in Serb controlled areas was specifically targeted at the Bosniak population, although both Bosniak and Croat forces initially opposed the Serb forces during the war, and thus both the Bosniak and Croat civil population should have posed a threat.

For areas under fragmented control by Bosniak and/or Croat forces, no such clear difference between areas of fragmented or exclusive control is evident. This is due to two reasons. First of all, the use of lethal violence was generally much lower compared to the variation in levels of lethal violence in areas of Serb control, which ranges from 0 % to 5 % of the population killed. In Bosniak and Croat controlled areas the variation in the use of lethal violence ranges from 0% to about 0.5 % of the population killed. Second of all, few of the areas were under exclusive control by either of the parties in the three regions included in the analysis. Thus, the ground for comparison between municipalities with different levels of control is limited.
5.1.3 Areas Under Shared Control → H3

Kalyvas’ (2006) third hypothesis is that areas of shared control should have low levels of violence. Measured as a share of the population, the data on the war in Bosnia indicates that levels of lethal violence are low in areas of shared control. Measured in the total number of killed civilians, the only exception is Sarajevo, where several thousand civilians were killed, compared to a few hundred in the other municipalities under shared control. The following areas were under shared control by the main opposing forces during the war, the Serb and the Bosniak/Croat forces. Brcko is also categorized as an area of shared control, but in the section on Brcko in the Commission’s reports it is stated that Serb forces eventually managed to get the upper hand in control (Bassiouni & Commision, 1994c, pp. 20-22; 1994d; 1994d, pp. 88-107). Brcko still remained one of the most contested areas during the war, with Bosniak forces attempting to retake control several times (Shewfelt, 2007, p. 185). Thus, it is more likely that Brcko either shifted between or shifted from being an area of shared control to an area of Serb fragmented control throughout the war.

Table 9: Lethal violence in areas of shared control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Number of killed civilians</th>
<th>% of population killed</th>
<th>Ethnic distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosanska Krupa</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0.13 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 75 % Serb 24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihac</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>0.21 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 67 % Croat 25 % Serb 21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lopare</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0.35 %</td>
<td>Serb 56 % Bosniak 38% Croat 4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gracanica</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>0.40 %</td>
<td>No information about ethnicity available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>5183</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 49 % Serb 29 % Croat 7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brcko</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>0.40 %</td>
<td>Bosniak 44 % Croat 25 % Serb 21 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Levels of lethal violence are low compared to areas under exclusive control (by Serb forces)\(^\text{14}\), thus the data supports Kalyvas’ hypothesis that areas of shared control should have

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\(^\text{14}\) Lethal violence was low in general in areas by Bosniak and/or Croat forces. Furthermore, few areas are categorized as being under the exclusive control by Bosniak and/or Croat forces. Thus, there is little ground for comparison these areas with areas of shared control.
low levels of lethal violence. The time variation indicates a much steadier level of lethal violence during the war, compared to areas under exclusive control that saw a drastically increase in violence in 1992. This indicates that the use of lethal violence in areas of shared control may not have been as tactical as in areas under fragmented control, where a significant share of the population was killed during 1992, before levels of lethal violence drastically fell. The mechanism may be similar to areas under fragmented control. Where the opponent has a strong presence, actors concentrate military resources on the enemy actor, and not the enemy population. Thus, violence is not only counterproductive, but infeasible given that actors only have a limited set of military resources they must choose how to best employ. Ethnic supremacy is of little importance, if territorial control cannot be secured first.

5.1.4 Discussion and Conclusion

According to Kalyvas’ (2006) model levels of violence should be highest in areas of fragmented control, where the actor has a lower level of control. Applied to the war in Bosnia, the data and the analysis indicate the contrary to be true. Patterns of lethal violence are highest in municipalities of exclusive control. However, this inference is based on Serb forces use of lethal violence. Their use of lethal violence ranges from a complete absence in some areas to several thousand killed in a single municipality. The same variation in lethal violence is not observed for areas under Bosniak and Croat control. The level of lethal violence in these area ranges from about 20 to 200 civilian casualties. Furthermore, the ground for comparison between areas under exclusive and fragmented control by Bosniak/Croat forces is limited, as only two municipalities are categorized as being under the exclusive control by Bosniak forces.

More specifically, the analysis shows that areas under exclusive control by Serb forces, where the Serb population lacked a majority faced the highest levels of lethal violence (Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuc, Kotor Varos in Northwestern Bosnia, and Foca, Rogatica, Visegrad, Vlasenica, Bratunac in Southeastern Bosnia). However, the time variation in the use of lethal violence indicates that violence increased again in 1995 (mainly in Northwestern Bosnia), when Serb forces lost control over several of the municipalities under exclusive control (in Northwestern Bosnia). This indicates a two-step logic of violence during the war in Bosnia. First areas where the ethnic population of the actor in control lacks a majority are targeted in order to achieve ethnic supremacy. This occurs in the first phase of the war. Later, violence
increases in areas where the actors control is slipping, as the opponent attempts to regain control. This indicates that changes in the level of control increase lethal violence. When control decreases, violence increases. Because these areas do not remain under fragmented control for long, it is not the static level of control which is important, but rather the change in the direction of control that occurs. This finding is echoed in other studies as well (Ziemke, 2008; Balcells, 2010), and lends support to Kalyvas’ main argument that violence is negatively correlated with control.

When the static level of control is taken into account the analysis shows clearly that areas of fragmented control do not have the highest levels of lethal violence. The data indicates that lethal violence was used in areas under exclusive control to achieve ethnic supremacy. Areas where the Serb population lacked a majority in areas of fragmented control were, however, not faced with the same extent of lethal violence as areas of exclusive control. Thus, areas that have the same ethnic distribution, but different levels of control, also have different levels of lethal violence. High levels of lethal violence are only used in areas under exclusive control to achieve supremacy, but not in areas of fragmented control. The analysis does not support Kalyvas hypothesis that violence should be highest in areas of fragmented control, and lowest in areas of exclusive control. The data does however support Kalyvas hypothesis that areas of shared control should have low levels of violence.

Why doesn’t Kalyvas model work in explaining lethal violence during the war in Bosnia, in areas of fragmented and exclusive control? I argue that this is because violence in Kalyvas model is strategic. It is employed in order to deter others from supporting the opponent, and not tactically to remove a specific threat (Kalyvas, 2006, p.27). During the war in Bosnia violence mainly followed ethnic lines. This means that violence likely was used tactically to remove a share of the enemy population that posed a threat. This is particularly true for the Serb forces that employed high levels of lethal violence in the initial phase of the war against the Bosniak (and Croat) population. However, this is only true for areas under exclusive control. In areas of fragmented control actors are forced to employ military resources tactically against the opposing actor that is attacking, instead of concentrating military resources on removing the threat posed by the enemy civilian population. Thus, increasing the cost of employing lethal violence against the civilian population. More military resources devoted to killing a large share of the civilian population, means less military resources to fight the enemy actor.
5.2 Patterns of Control and Sexual Violence

Having applied Kalyvas’ (2006) model to the study of lethal violence during the war in Bosnia, I now turn to research question 2, and apply Kalyvas’ (2006) model to patterns of sexual violence during the war in Bosnia. Thus, this section discusses to what extent Kalyvas’ model can explain patterns of sexual violence and control.

Although Kalyvas’ model has yet not been applied to the study of sexual violence, Kalyvas’ (2006, p. 21) argues that lethal violence serves as a proxy to violence in general, and thus the same pattern as for lethal violence and control should apply to sexual violence as well. The analysis on lethal violence showed that lethal violence was highest in areas of exclusive control by Serb forces (where the Serb population was in a minority), thus according to Kalyvas’ the highest levels of sexual violence should be found here as well. However, the analysis indicates that the same patterns between lethal violence and control do not apply to levels of sexual violence and control during the war in Bosnia. The data indicates that sexual violence was high in both areas of fragmented and exclusive control. There is also indication from the data that sexual violence might have been even higher in areas of fragmented control. This is however difficult to state with certainty, as the data on sexual violence does not provide information on where the absolute highest levels of sexual violence occurred. As discussed in chapter 3.2.2, I differentiate between absent, low and high levels of sexual violence. High levels of sexual violence are areas where the Commission has stated that sexual violence was widespread, or where the term widespread is not used but the reports state that there were more than two camps and more than 50 victims. Areas where there are only reports about sexual violence, but no information on the extent of sexual violence, are categorized as low. Additionally, if the number of registered rape victims with the Association’s database is below 50, but reports by the Commission (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c; 1994d) indicate that sexual violence was widespread, priority is given to the reports by the Commission.

In the following sections I discuss levels of sexual violence according to each of Kalyvas’ three hypotheses, first for Serb controlled areas, then for areas under control by the Bosniak (and/or Croat forces).
5.2.1 Areas Under Exclusive Control → H1

H1 asserts that levels of violence should be low in areas of exclusive control. The analysis on lethal violence indicated that areas of Serb exclusive control, where the Serb population lacked a majority were most severely targeted with lethal violence.

The table below shows levels of sexual violence in areas under exclusive control by Serb forces, first in the Northwestern region and then in the Southeastern region of Bosnia. For each municipality, I provide information on the ethnic distribution (whether the Serb population had a clear majority of more than 55% compared to the other groups or not), the number of registered rapes in the Women Victims of War database, key information about the context and extent of sexual violence in the Commission’s reports, and finally I give an assessment of whether sexual violence was absent, low or high.

Table 10: Sexual violence in areas of exclusive control by Serb forces in Northwestern Bosnia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Serb majority</th>
<th>Number of registered rapes</th>
<th>Reports about sexual violence in Commission’s reports</th>
<th>Level of sexual violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Srzac</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prnjavor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celinac</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skender Vakuf</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosansko Grahovo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sipovo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanska Gradiska</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>During attacks.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Petrovac</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>In non-custody</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kljuc</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>In non-custody as ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donji Vakuf</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>In custody (6 women held)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanski Most</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>In camp. (women sent to rape camps in Doboj)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banja Luka</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>In camp and isolated events in non-custody</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrkonjic Grad</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanska Dubica</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Camp and brothel.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotor Varos</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Widespread rape in several camps and in non-custody</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prijedor</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Widespread in camps and non-custody</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glamoc</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laktasi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Two rape camps.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titov Drvar</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>In camp</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Novi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>One general report (women sent to rape camps in Doboj)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jajce</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>General allegation that Bosniak forces raped Serb women.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some form of sexual violence is reported in all but six of the municipalities in this region. With the exception of Jajce, all sexual violence was reportedly perpetrated by Serb forces. In Jajce there is only one general report that Serb women were raped by Bosniaks, thus it is unclear whether sexual violence was perpetrated while Jajce was under the control of Bosniak forces, or later when Jajce came under control by Serb forces. Sexual violence was mainly perpetrated in some form of detention (alongside instances in non-custody), with the exception of three municipalities (Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanski Petrovac and Kljuc), where it was reportedly perpetrated only in non-custody, in the victims own homes, or other places.

The analysis on lethal violence in areas under Serb exclusive control showed that lethal violence was highest in areas with ethnic parity or where the Serb population was in a clear minority. The data on sexual violence does not indicate any such clear patterns of whether levels of sexual violence are highest in areas of one specific ethnic distribution. Lethal violence was particularly high in Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kotor Varos and Kljuc. Based on the data in this thesis, sexual violence was most widespread in Prijedor and Kotor Varos, both in terms of the registered number of rapes, and according to the characterization in reports by the Commission (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, p. 34, 38). This means that sexual violence was widespread in only two of the four most lethal municipalities in this region. No clear pattern is evident when we look at the municipalities where sexual violence occurred in non-custody compared to areas where it occurred in detention, or compare areas where no sexual violence is reported to areas where sexual violence is reported to have been perpetrated to some extent. What is also interesting is that women from two of the municipalities in this region, Sanski Most and Bosanski Novi, were sent to rape camps in Doboj (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d, p. 79, p. 276), which is a municipality under Serb fragmented control. This implies that the Serb forces chose to perpetrate rape against these women in organized camps in Doboj where they had fragmented control, rather than using resources to operate such camps in areas of exclusive control.

The following nine municipalities were also under Serb exclusive control, but in the Southeastern region of Bosnia, where the Serb population mainly was in a minority.

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15 Jajce was initially defended by Bosniak forces before Serb forces managed to establish control (Shrader, 2003, p.30).
Table 11: Sexual violence in areas of Serb exclusive control in Southeastern Bosnia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Serb majority</th>
<th>Number of registered rapes</th>
<th>Reports about sexual violence in Commission’s reports</th>
<th>Level of sexual violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rudo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokolac</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>In camp (13 women held)</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Pijesak</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>In camp.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajnica</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>In one brothel.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratunac</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>During raids and in custody</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogatica</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Widespread. In camps</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlasenica</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Widespread. In camps.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>Widespread. In camps and non-custody</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foca</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>Widespread. In camps and non-custody</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sexual violence is reported to have been perpetrated by Serb forces in all of the municipalities under exclusive control in the Southeastern region. This region was also the most lethal region during the war in Bosnia, and the highest levels of sexual violence, measured as the total number of reported rapes to the Women Victims of War Association database, occurred here as well. With the exception of Bratunac, where there are 17 reported rapes and 2208 killed civilians, the highest levels of rape occurred in all the remaining municipalities with the highest levels of lethal violence.

In conclusion then, Serb forces perpetrated both high and low levels of sexual violence in areas under exclusive control. But contrary to the analysis on lethal violence that showed that lethal violence was used in areas where the Serb population was in minority, there is no indication that high levels of sexual violence were perpetrated in municipalities with a specific ethnic distribution. Sexual violence was mainly perpetrated in areas where the use of lethal violence was high as well, with some exceptions. In the Southeastern region of Bosnia widespread rape was mainly perpetrated in the most lethal municipalities, but in Northwestern Bosnia high levels of rape were perpetrated only in two of the most lethal municipalities. However, the data on sexual violence does not support the hypothesis that levels of sexual violence should be low in areas of exclusive control.

Velika Kladusa and Cazin are categorized as being under the exclusive control by Bosniak forces. In both areas the Bosniak population was in a majority by 90 percent. Velika Kladusa has 30 registered rape victims, while Cazin has 3 (Duderija, 2015, pp. 45-50). In the two municipalities exclusively controlled by Bosniak forces, the data indicates that sexual violence was perpetrated as a method of punishment against potential sympathizers of Fikret.
Abdic’s forces. Reports from Justice Report state that women were attacked in their own homes and raped as a punishment for their husband’s or other family members alleged support to Fikret Abdic’s forces, by Bosnian government forces (Dzidic, 2015; Brkanic, 2015; Justice Report, 2012). In terms of the number of registered rape victims, the data indicates that rape was more widespread in Velika Kladusa (30 reg. rape victims) than in Cazin (3 reg. rape victims), this could likely be explained by the fact that Fikret Abdic’s forces had their powerbase in Velika Kladusa (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002b, p. 187), and thus the pool of potential sympathizers and supporters was greater than in Cazin.

5.2.2 Areas Under Fragmented Control → H2

The second hypothesis from Kalyvas’ (2006) model states that areas under fragmented control should have the highest levels of violence. The analysis on lethal violence showed that lethal violence is lower in areas of fragmented control, compared to areas of exclusive control, which were the most lethal. If lethal and sexual violence follow the same pattern, levels of sexual violence should be low in areas under fragmented control. The data on sexual violence however indicates that high levels of sexual violence occurred both in areas of exclusive and in areas of fragmented control. There is some indication that sexual violence might have been even higher in areas of fragmented control.

The following areas were under fragmented control by Serb forces. As opposed to areas under exclusive control, where sexual violence was absent in six municipalities, sexual violence is reported in all areas under fragmented control. Odzak and Bosanski Brod were initially under the control of Croat forces, for a short period of time. While in control Croat forces perpetrated widespread rape of Serb women both in detention and in non-custody. When Serb forces took control over these municipalities, it is reported that they started raping Croat women in Bosanski Brod (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, pp. 16-19). There are no reports of rape in Odzak by Serb forces. It is also not stated who perpetrated rape in Modrica. Thus, with the exception of Odzak and Modrica, Serb forces are reported to have perpetrated rape in all municipalities.
**Table 12: Sexual violence in areas of Serb fragmented control**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Ethnic distribution %</th>
<th>Number of registered rapes</th>
<th>Reports about sexual violence (SV) in Commission’s reports</th>
<th>Level of sexual violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Brod</td>
<td>Croat 41 Serb 34 Bosniak 12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Widespread sexual violence in several detention sites.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odzak</td>
<td>Croat 41 Bosniak 21 Serb 20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No reports of SV by Serb forces, only Croat forces.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modrica</td>
<td>Serb 36 Bosniak 30 Croat 37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teslic</td>
<td>Bosniak 45 Serb 30 Croat 25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SV in several detention sites, including rape camp which held about 100 women.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bijeljina</td>
<td>Serb 60 Bosniak 31 Croat 9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Widespread SV in camps. Entire village of Janja turned into rape camp.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derventa</td>
<td>Serb 40 Croat 39 Bosniak 13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>General report that Serb forces raped and killed during an attack on Derventa.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Samac</td>
<td>Croat 45 Serb 42 Bosniak 7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Widespread SV in camp and house arrest in village where women were frequently raped.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doboj</td>
<td>Bosniak 59 Serb 38 Croat 13</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Widespread SV in camps. Only in one camp between 600-1000 women were raped daily.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvornik</td>
<td>Bosniak 94 Serb 41 Croat 6</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>Widespread SV in camps. Nearly 400 women held in just one camp.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekovici</td>
<td>Serb 94 Bosniak 6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>SV in rape camp which reportedly held up to 800 women</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugljevik</td>
<td>Serb 56 Bosniak 41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Men forced to have sexual intercourse in camp.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brcko(^{16})</td>
<td>Bosniak 44 Croat 25 Serb 21</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Widespread rape mainly in detention.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidently, high levels of sexual violence are reported in all but three municipalities (Ugljevik, Derventa and Modrica). Additionally, sexual violence was perpetrated in some form of detention in all municipalities as well, while in areas under exclusive control it occurred only during attacks and in non-custody for three municipalities. Reports on two of the municipalities in areas under exclusive control in Northwestern Bosnia also state that women were brought from areas under exclusive control to rape camps in Doboj (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d, p. 79, p. 276), which is under fragmented control. Additionally, as I discussed in chapter 3.2.2, areas under fragmented control were in the most contested region.

\(^{16}\) As I discussed in section 5.1.3 for lethal violence, Brcko was most likely an area under Serb fragmented control although it is categorized as an area of shared control by Helsinki Watch (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, pp. 20-22; 1994d, pp. 88-107).
during the war in Bosnia, and were thus difficult to access for NGOs and investigators collecting data on human rights abuses. Thus, there is a risk that data from this region is underreported. In view of this, the data indicates that sexual violence might have been even more widespread in areas of fragmented control, than in areas of exclusive control. This would then imply that the hypothesis from Kalyvas’ model, that violence should be highest in areas of fragmented control (by Serb forces), is supported by the data on sexual violence. However, since the data likely does not provide information about the absolute levels of sexual violence, this is difficult to state with certainty, but the data does support Kalyvas’ hypothesis that areas of fragmented control should have high levels of violence. But in view of the fact that areas of fragmented control had low levels of lethal violence, the data does not support Kalyvas’ argument that patterns for lethal violence and sexual violence are the same.

For areas under fragmented control by Bosniak and/or Croat forces, sexual violence is reported to have occurred in 13 out of 15 municipalities. Based on the information in the table below, sexual violence is highest in Tuzla and Zivnice. However, for several of the municipalities no information is provided on the perpetrators or the context of sexual violence. Furthermore, the data also indicates that there were several actors perpetrating sexual violence during the same period. For instance, in Tuzla all the parties are reported to have operated camps, but Bosniak forces allegedly operated the majority of detention sites (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, pp. 50-51; Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d, pp. 315-318). Even though Bosniak forces had the upper-hand of control in these areas, Serb forces managed to perpetrate sexual violence either by holding a group of women detained in private houses or by perpetrating sexual violence during attacks (Bassiouni & Commission, 199c, p.33, 48; Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d, p. 183). This could imply two things. What is central to areas under fragmented control is precisely the fact that the enemy manages to have a presence. Multiple perpetrators are only identified in areas under fragmented or shared control, not in areas where one actor has exclusive control. Thus, the results could imply that as long as one actor has some form of control the actor is able to perpetrate some form of sexual violence. The results could also imply that it is not so much about that actors must have a certain degree of control to perpetrate rape, but rather that actors chose to perpetrate rape in areas where they are able to fight the enemy. This could speak to the importance of sexual violence as a weapon of war during the war in Bosnia. For instance, in areas of exclusive control the enemy actor has no presence, and is not able to fight the enemy directly.
Areas under fragmented control are, on the other hand, the most contested zones of the war. However, it is difficult to draw any inferences from the data above alone. Nevertheless, the results do support the hypothesis that levels of violence should be high in areas of fragmented control.

*Table 13: Sexual violence in areas of fragmented control by Bosniak/Croat forces*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Ethnic distribution17</th>
<th>Number of registered rapes</th>
<th>Reports about sexual violence (SV) in Commission’s reports</th>
<th>Level of sexual violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gradacac</td>
<td>Bosniak majority</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banovici</td>
<td>Bosniak majority</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukavac</td>
<td>Bosniak majority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maglaj</td>
<td>Bosniak 45% Serb 31% Croat 22%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srebrenik</td>
<td>Bosniak majority</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15 Serb women held in camp by Bosniak and Croat forces jointly.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalesija</td>
<td>Bosniak majority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rape of Serb women in non-custody by Bosniak forces. Serb forces operated rape camp while briefly in control.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tesanj</td>
<td>Bosniak majority</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Serb women raped in camp by Bosniak and Croat forces. Group of women Kidnapped by Serb forces and held in camp.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuzla</td>
<td>Bosniak 48% Serb 22% Croat 4%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Widespread SV in camps and brothels by all actors. Majority of victims Serb women, and majority of perpetrators Bosniak.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zivnice</td>
<td>Bosniak majority</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Widespread SV in camps and brothels by all actors. Majority of victims Serb women, and majority of perpetrators Bosniak.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kladanj</td>
<td>Bosniak majority</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Serb forces took took women from camp Susica (in Vlasenica, under Serb exclusive control), and brought them to private homes in Kladanj.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olovo</td>
<td>Bosniak majority</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Serb forces raped and killed a number of unspecified people in village in Olova during attack.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zepce</td>
<td>Bosniak 47% Croat 40% Serb 10%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zavidovici</td>
<td>No info.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orasje</td>
<td>Croat majority</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Rape in custody by all actors.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 The Bosniak or Croat population was in a majority by more than 60 percent in several of the municipalities. Where one of the parties had a clear majority by more than 60 percent I only state which of the parties had majority, and do not provide the ethnic distribution in percentage.
5.2.3 Areas Under Shared Control → H3

The third hypothesis from Kalyvas’ (2006) theory is that violence should be low in areas of shared control. Measured as a share of the population, lethal violence was comparatively lower in areas of shared control, than in areas of exclusive control during the war in Bosnia. The data on sexual violence in areas of shared control is more difficult to interpret. The data material on areas of shared control is also very limited as the sample only consists of five municipalities. The table below shows areas that are categorized as being under shared control, and levels of sexual violence.

Table 14: Sexual violence in areas of shared control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Ethnic distribution</th>
<th>Number of registered rapes</th>
<th>Reports about sexual violence in Commission’s reports.</th>
<th>Level of sexual violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>Bosniak 49%</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>Widespread rape in several camps, private detention sites, and in non-custody by all actors. Majority of camps for sexual violence were run by Bosniak forces.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serb 29%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croat 7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihac</td>
<td>Bosniak 67%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rape by all actors in various rape camps, brothels and non-custody</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serb 18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croat 8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanska Krupa</td>
<td>Bosniak 75%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rape by Serb forces in two camps.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serb 24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lopare</td>
<td>Serb 56%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bosniak and Croat forces raped Serb women and took them to Tuzla.</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bosniak 38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gracanica</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some form of sexual violence is reported in all areas, except Gracanica. In Sarajevo and Bihac there are reports that all actors perpetrated sexual violence. The data indicates that the level of sexual violence was high in both Sarajevo and Bihac, where all the warring actors perpetrated sexual violence in several different camps and detention sites (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, pp. 14-15, 44-47; Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d, pp. 33-57, 281-303). In the remaining areas of shared control sexual violence was perpetrated by one of the actors, but the data does not indicate that the level of sexual violence was particularly high compared to Sarajevo and Bihac. In view of the levels of sexual violence in Sarajevo and Bihac, the data does not support H3, that levels of violence should be low in areas of shared control.
**5.2.4 Conclusion and Discussion**

Kalyvas (2006) theory asserts that violence should be highest in areas of fragmented control, and lowest in areas of exclusive and shared control. The analysis on lethal violence showed the contrary to be true for Bosnia. Lethal violence was highest in areas of exclusive control. According to Kalyvas’ (2006, p.26) argument that lethal violence can serve as a proxy for violence in general, the same patterns from the analysis on lethal violence and control should also be evident in the analysis of sexual violence and control. However, the data indicates that the same patterns are not evident for sexual violence and control, as for lethal violence and control. While lethal violence was low in areas of fragmented control, levels of sexual violence are high in areas of fragmented control. Furthermore, there is no clear indication from the data that levels of sexual violence either increase or decrease with levels of control. Sexual violence was both widespread in areas of exclusive and fragmented control. However, in areas of exclusive control sexual violence was only high in areas where lethal violence was high as well.

Furthermore, reports on two municipalities in areas of exclusive control by Serb forces in Northwestern Bosnia, state that women were transported from these two municipalities to Doboj rape camps, which was under fragmented control. This implies that what could be relevant for the study of sexual violence is not only where the sexual violence is perpetrated, but also patterns of transportation and organization across municipalities. However, the data indicates that control neither constrains nor enables the use of widespread/high sexual violence. Actors are able to perpetrate high levels of sexual violence both in areas of fragmented and exclusive control. Thus, this implies that other factors need to be taken into account in order to understand where actors chose to perpetrate mass rape and where lower levels of sexual violence occur.

Since the data does not provide information on the absolute levels of sexual violence, it is difficult to infer whether sexual violence was highest in areas of fragmented or exclusive control. But, the fact that women were transported from areas of exclusive control to areas of fragmented control, and the fact that high levels of sexual violence in areas of exclusive control were only limited to areas where lethal violence was high as well, could indicate that sexual violence was more widespread overall in areas of fragmented control. If so, Kalyvas’ (2006) second hypothesis, that areas of fragmented control should have the highest levels of violence, would be supported. Furthermore, this could indicate that high levels of sexual
violence (when employed as a weapon of war as in Bosnia) are deliberately employed where there is some kind of threat posed to the actor in control. In areas of exclusive control high levels of sexual violence are perpetrated (alongside high levels of lethal violence) to consolidate ethnic supremacy and ensure that the population doesn’t attempt to return in the future. In areas of fragmented control, the actor in control is threatened by the opposing actor’s presence and attack. Here, sexual violence is employed as a response to the threat posed by the opposing actor’s presence. For instance, either to increase own troops morale, decrease the opposing actor’s morale, or to decrease the morale of the civilian population and community. The United Nations Commission of Experts state that sexual violence was used to ensure that victims never returned home, and perpetrated in such a degrading and hurtful manner to ensure maximal humiliation and shame to not only the victim but also the victim’s community (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, pp.10-12). However, based on the data in this thesis alone it is difficult to infer what the exact intent or goal of sexual violence was. The literature on sexual violence asserts that sexual violence does not serve one single purpose even within the same war (Leiby, 2009, p. 447), thus levels of sexual violence are likely influenced by several factors, which is also true for the war in Bosnia. The International Criminal Tribunal form the former Yugoslavia states that sexual violence during the war in Bosnia was used as a form of torture, as a method of interrogation, as enslavement, as a method of forced displacement, and as a method of ethnic cleansing (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, n.d).

Thus, based on the analysis in this thesis different levels of control do not emerge as an important factor in explaining different levels of sexual violence. Additionally, as this thesis has shed light upon, sexual violence can take many forms. It can occur during attacks or in various forms of detention. If the intent of sexual violence is different, then sexual violence should also be different from context to context. If sexual violence is perpetrated in areas of exclusive control where the goal is ethnic cleansing, levels of sexual violence should decrease once the goal of ethnic cleansing is completed. However, if sexual violence is perpetrated as a response to the threat posed by the enemy actor in areas of fragmented control, levels of sexual violence should not decrease as long as the threat posed by the enemy actor is the same (or as long as the area remains under fragmented control). This has not been systematically assessed in this thesis, however exploring such differences in future research could provide a deeper understanding of how, when and where armed actors perpetrate sexual violence
5.3 A Comparison of Lethal and Sexual Violence

Having discussed research question 1 in section 5.1, and research question 2 in section 5.2, I now turn to the final research question in this thesis, and discuss how sexual violence differed from lethal violence during the war in Bosnia. In this section, 5.3, I discuss how sexual violence differs from lethal violence in terms of control. Then, in the following sub-sections 5.3.1 – 5.3.3, I present the comparison of sexual violence and lethal violence for each of Kalyvas’ hypothesis. Finally, in the last section I discuss some other findings from the analysis that shed light on other differences between lethal and sexual violence.

The analysis on lethal violence clearly shows that lethal violence decreases when we move from areas of exclusive to fragmented control. The analysis on sexual violence shows no indication that levels of sexual violence similarly decrease, when we move from areas of exclusive to fragmented control. Rather, the data indicates that high levels of sexual violence occurred both in areas of fragmented and exclusive control. The data also states that women from some areas of exclusive control were brought to rape camps in areas of fragmented control, thus implying that levels of sexual violence might have been even higher in areas of fragmented control (Bassiouni & Commision, 1994d, p.79, 276).

The example of the following municipalities illustrates these findings clearly in the table below. For each municipality the table provides information on population size, ethnic distribution, levels of lethal violence, and levels of sexual violence as stated in the Commission’s reports (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, 1994d), and as indicated by the number of registered rape victims in the Association’s database (Duderija, 2015). Areas in color were under exclusive control, while areas in white were under fragmented control.
Table 15: Levels of lethal and sexual violence in areas of exclusive control compared to areas of fragmented control (by Serb forces).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUNICIPALITY</th>
<th>POPULATION SIZE</th>
<th>ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION %</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CIVILIANS KILLED</th>
<th>% OF POPULATION KILLED</th>
<th>LEVEL OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE</th>
<th>REGION/LEVEL OF CONTROL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prijedor</td>
<td>112 000</td>
<td>Bosniak 44% Serb 42% Croat 6%</td>
<td>4026</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>High (85 registered rapes)</td>
<td>Northwestern Exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doboj</td>
<td>102 546</td>
<td>Bosniak 40% Serb 39% Croat 13%</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>High (68 registered rapes)</td>
<td>Northeastern Fragmented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foca</td>
<td>41 000</td>
<td>Bosniak 40% Serb 39% Croat 13%</td>
<td>1788</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>High (281 registered rapes)</td>
<td>Southeastern Exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Samac</td>
<td>32 853</td>
<td>Croat 45% Serb 42% Bosniak 7%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>High (29 registered rapes)</td>
<td>Northeastern Fragmented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The comparison of Prijedor (exclusive control) and Doboj (fragmented control) shows that two municipalities similar in every aspect only differ in terms of the level of control and the level of lethal violence. When we move from Prijedor, which was under exclusive control, to Doboj, where Serb forces had a lower level of control, lethal violence similarly decreases, but sexual violence does not. Additionally, although almost 10 times more civilians were killed in Prijedor, one of the most lethal municipalities, compared to Doboj, the difference in the relative levels of sexual violence and lethal violence is quite small. In Prijedor (exclusive control) the number of killed civilian victims is 47 times higher than the number of registered rape victims, while in Doboj (fragmented control) the number of civilian victims is only 6 times as high. The same is evident in the comparison of Foca and Bosanski Samac. Thus, relative to lethal violence sexual violence was much higher in municipalities under fragmented control.

Furthermore, given that the number of registered rape victims likely does not represent the
true levels of sexual violence, this difference might be even smaller in reality. For instance, reports on Doboj state that close to 1000 women may have been held in just one rape camp. This implies that the number of victims of sexual violence for Doboj would be 2.5 times higher than the number of killed victims. Additionally, simply in terms of the number of registered rape victims, the data indicates that sexual violence was highest in Foca (281). However, since the number of registered rape victims likely does not represent the true extent of sexual violence, and since the number of registered rape victims is based upon volunteer registrations with the Association, the data can be subject to different biases\textsuperscript{18}. Thus, it is uncertain whether sexual violence was that much higher in Foca than in the other municipalities.

The question to ask from these results is why a lower level of control coincides with a lower level of lethal violence, but not for sexual violence? In the analysis on lethal violence, I argued that the lower level of lethal violence in areas of fragmented control could be due to the fact that actors in areas of fragmented control must concentrate the use of military resources, such as ammunition and equipment, against the enemy actor, instead of the enemy population. The perpetration of sexual violence does however not require any use of the same military resources. This means that actors do not need to choose whether to employ resources against the civilian population or the enemy armed actor. More of one does not imply less of the other when it comes to perpetration of sexual violence. However, for lethal violence the opposite is the case. More ammunition to kill civilians, less firepower to fight the enemy actor. When faced with the choice of whether to kill the civilian population or the enemy actor, actors are likely to choose to first kill the enemy actor in order to decrease the opponent’s presence. Ethnic supremacy is of little value if the enemy actor cannot be defeated. Furthermore, it might be difficult to kill a large share of the population while the actor in control constantly is being attacked by the enemy actor. Therefore, lower levels of control could constrain the use of lethal violence, but not of sexual violence.

The fact that some of the data indicates that sexual violence might even have been higher in areas of fragmented control compared to areas of exclusive control could imply a strategic utility of sexual violence. I argue that lethal violence in ethnic wars is mainly tactic because it

\textsuperscript{18} In chapter 3.2.2 I discussed various biases with the data, for instance that women from some municipalities may have easier access to the Association. Foca is closer to Sarajevo than for instance Bosanski Samac.
is used to remove a specific threat posed by the enemy population, while sexual violence can’t be used tactically, because the act of sexual violence does not remove any specific threat. By killing a large share of the enemy civilian population the actor effectively removes a specific threat to its ethnic supremacy. By raping a large share of the enemy population no such threat is removed. However, sexual violence could be used to achieve ethnic supremacy if it is used to scare the population to permanently flee the area. But even such use of sexual violence would be strategic because it is used to deter the population from staying in the area. Strategic use of violence implies that the violence is used to influence a group of people to act in a certain way (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 27). Even when sexual violence is employed in order to decrease the morale of the civilian population or to break up communities through humiliation, it is still used strategically, because it is inflicted upon a group of people to influence the broader community to act or feel in a certain way. Furthermore, sexual violence was mainly perpetrated in some form of detention and often in specific camps where the civilian population was held for a longer period of time. If the intent was simply to scare the population to flee, it would not have been necessary employ resources to hold civilians in detention. Rather, sexual violence may have served a strategic tool not to influence the civilian population to act in a certain way, but to decrease the morale of the enemy actor, or to increase the morale for own troops. If this was the case, then it could indicate that the aim of lethal violence is the specific group of people that are killed, but the aim or end of sexual violence goes beyond the specific individuals that are affected. By employing sexual violence armed actors achieve some other overreaching goal or end, such as to decrease the enemy’s morale or destroy communities.

Furthermore, an interesting question to ask from the data on sexual violence, is why armed actors would choose to move women from areas where they have exclusive control, to areas of fragmented control to perpetrate rape, when the women could have been raped and held in detention in areas of exclusive control, where the enemy actor lacks a presence and is unable to frequently attack? This could be understood in terms of threat. For instance, high levels of sexual violence were only employed in areas of Serb exclusive control where high levels of lethal violence were employed as well (in areas where the Serb population lacked a majority). Here, the posed threat was likely the presence of a large enemy population. Thus, sexual violence is used alongside lethal violence to minimize the threat or risk to consolidating control posed by the enemy population. In areas of fragmented control, the main threat to control is the presence of the enemy actor. Since control already is achieved in areas of
exclusive control, the threat faced in areas of fragmented control is larger. Therefore, actors transport women to be raped and sexually abused in areas of fragmented control, to somehow minimize the risk posed by the enemy actor, either by attempting to decrease the opponent’s morale to fight or to deter the civilian population from attempting to join the opposing actor, for instance.

In conclusion then, the analysis shows that control relates differently to lethal violence than to sexual violence. Because lethal violence is perpetrated with ammunition, which actors need to fight the enemy, actors must choose whether to employ resources to fight the enemy actor, or to kill the civilian population. The perpetration of sexual violence is not constrained by a lower degree of control, because it is not perpetrated with the same resources that are used to fight the enemy directly. The data doesn’t give any clear indications of whether sexual violence increases or decreases with different levels of control. High levels occurred both in areas of fragmented and exclusive control. Without knowing more about the context and intents of sexual violence in the different municipalities, it is difficult to explain the observed patterns of sexual violence across municipalities.

### 5.3.1 Lethal and Sexual Violence in Areas of Exclusive Control

The first hypothesis from Kalyvas’ model asserts that areas of exclusive control should have low levels of (lethal and sexual) violence. The data indicates that neither sexual violence nor lethal violence was particularly low in areas of exclusive control. The analysis on lethal violence indicates that the highest levels of lethal violence occurred in areas of exclusive control by Serb forces, where the Serb population lacked a clear majority. These municipalities also had high levels of sexual violence. The Serb population was in majority largely in all municipalities in Northwestern Bosnia, where Serb forces had exclusive control. Lethal violence was highest in the few municipalities where the Serb population lacked a majority. In the Southwestern region the Serb population lacked a majority in five of nine municipalities, and both lethal and sexual violence was highest in these five municipalities. However, there are some municipalities in both regions where lethal violence was high but not sexual violence.

The tables below show municipalities with different combinations of levels of lethal and sexual violence in areas of Serb exclusive control in Northwestern Bosnia and in Southeastern
Bosnia. Municipalities where the Serb population lacked a clear majority are marked in bold. Municipalities in the Southeastern region of Bosnia are marked in blue, municipalities in Northwestern Bosnia are marked in black.

*Table 16: Levels of lethal and sexual violence in areas of Serb exclusive control*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lethal violence</th>
<th>Sexual violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low(^{19})</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanski Novi</td>
<td>Bosanska Gradiska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosanska Dubica</td>
<td>Srbac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prnjavor</td>
<td>Laktasi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banja Luka</td>
<td>Skender Vakuf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celina</td>
<td>Jajce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donji Vakuf</td>
<td>Mrkonjic Grad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glamoc</td>
<td>Bosansko Grahovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titov Drvar</td>
<td>Bosanski Petrovac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sipovo</td>
<td>Han Pijesak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudo</td>
<td>Cajnice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokolac</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanski Most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klijuc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratunac</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidently, most municipalities have either low levels of both types of violence or high levels of both types of violence in areas of exclusive control by Serb forces. This indicates that both high levels of lethal and sexual violence were used in areas under exclusive control, where the Serb population lacked a majority, to remove (kill) and displace the population, in order to establish ethnic supremacy.

\(^{19}\) Absent levels of sexual violence or lethal violence are categorized here as areas of low violence.
5.3.2 Lethal and Sexual Violence in Areas of Fragmented Control

The second hypothesis asserts that violence should be highest in areas of fragmented control. The analysis on lethal violence shows that lethal violence decreases when we move from areas under exclusive control (by Serb forces) to areas under fragmented control (by Serb forces). There is no indication however that sexual violence decreases.

The table below shows patterns of lethal and sexual violence for each municipality under fragmented control by Serb forces. In areas of fragmented Serb control the population groups were largely at parity. However, with the exception of Zvornik, levels of lethal violence are below 0.5% of the population killed in areas of Serb fragmented control. Sexual violence on the other hand was widespread throughout the areas listed in the table below. The most common combination in areas of fragmented control is low use of lethal violence, and high use of sexual violence. In areas of exclusive control, either low use of both or high use of both types of violence was most common.

Table 17: Levels of lethal and sexual violence in areas of fragmented control by Serb forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sexual violence</th>
<th>Lethal violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low20</td>
<td>Odzak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Derventa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modrica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ugljevik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Bosanski Brod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bosanski Samac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bijelina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teslic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doboj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sekovici</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brcko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zvornik</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 Absent levels of sexual violence or lethal violence are categorized here as areas of low violence.
5.3.3 Lethal and Sexual Violence in Areas of Shared Control

Since the data on sexual violence does not always indicate levels of sexual violence, it is difficult to draw any inferences from the comparison of lethal and sexual violence in areas of shared control. The hypothesis asserts that areas of shared control should have low levels of violence. The analysis on lethal violence supports this hypothesis when lethal violence is measured as a share of the population killed. The data on sexual violence indicates that sexual violence was not particularly low in several of the areas of shared control, particularly in Sarajevo and Bihac where all the actors perpetrated sexual violence in several detention sites.

5.3.4 Other Findings on Differences between Lethal and Sexual Violence

There are two other main findings from the analysis that shed light on some other differences between lethal and sexual violence. First, that levels of sexual and lethal violence do not correlate throughout the conflict zone, as already evident from the analysis. Although the highest levels of sexual violence in areas of exclusive control also occurred in the most lethal violence, it was not without exceptions. Three municipalities (Sanski Most, Kljuc, Bratunac) with high levels of lethal violence, did not have high levels of sexual violence as well. Furthermore, several municipalities have absent levels of lethal violence, but yet sexual violence was perpetrated. For instance, Laktasi has a complete absence of lethal violence. Yet, there are reports of two rape camps (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d, p.168). Bosanska Dubica has only 34 killed civilians, and 14 registered rape victims (Duderija, 2015, p. 45). In view of the fact that the number of registered rape victims does not provide the true levels of sexual violence, sexual violence might have been even higher than lethal violence Bosanska Dubica. Sekovici municipality has for instance only 18 killed civilians, and yet there are reports of 800 women being held in just one rape camp (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d, p. 303).

Second, that there is a variance in the use of lethal and sexual violence both across armed actors, but also across similar conflicts. Only areas under Serb exclusive control were subject to mass lethal violence, however the results indicate that this was not the case for sexual violence. While Serb forces perpetrated high levels of both lethal and sexual violence, Bosniak and Croat forces perpetrated high levels of sexual violence, but not lethal violence. Thus, relative to Serb forces use of lethal and sexual violence, Bosniak and Croat forces use
of sexual violence was higher relative to their use of lethal violence. Evidently, the absolute highest levels of sexual violence measured as the total number of registered rape victims occurred in areas exclusively controlled by Serb forces. Furthermore, according to the data Serb forces perpetrated mass rape in more municipalities than Bosniak and Croat forces. However, Bosniak and Croat forces did not abstain from the perpetration of high levels of sexual violence. They are reported to have been responsible for widespread use of sexual violence in several municipalities (for instance, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bosanski Brod and Odzak). The United Nations Commission of Experts for the former Yugoslavia made a similar observation on variation in sexual violence between the war in Bosnia and Croatia. Although sexual violence was used in both wars, it was much higher in Bosnia. In total, there were only five reported detention camps for sexual violence in Croatia (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, p. 12). Both wars occurred during the same period, for the same reason (succession from Yugoslavia) and were ethnic wars. Yet, sexual violence was much higher during the war in Bosnia. This suggest that it is not always control in itself that seems important, but also who the actors are, and what the context (or conflict) is, even when the context appears seemingly similar. Different actors may have different rationales that explain more of the variation than the levels of control. The inference that sexual violence is widespread both in areas of exclusive and fragmented control is based upon the Serb forces use of sexual violence, because the variation in areas under different level of control by Bosniak and/or Croat forces is limited.

In sum, control has been a useful lens to apply to both the study of sexual violence and lethal violence in order to understand one important aspect in which these two types of violence differ. However, the findings in this thesis indicate that while control is a useful aspect to take into account to understand variation in lethal violence, but that research should take other aspects and factors into account in order to explain variation in sexual violence.
6 CONTROL AND VIOLENCE IN WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR BOSNIA AND BEYOND?

In this final chapter of the thesis, I briefly conclude on the main results from the analysis before I move on to a discussion of the implications from the study for three specific areas: implications for Kalyvas’ theoretical framework and for further research on civilian victimization, implications for the war in Bosnia, and potential policy implications for prevention of violence against civilians in war.

6.1 Conclusion and Reflections from the Analysis

The aim of this thesis was to contribute to a closer understanding of how sexual violence relates to lethal violence in war. This was done by employing Kalyvas’ (2006) theoretical framework on control and (lethal) violence, to study both patterns of lethal and sexual violence during the war in Bosnia. There are three dimensions to this thesis that constitute new applications of Kalyvas’ (2006) framework. First, I’ve employed the framework to the war in Bosnia, an ethnic war, which is outside the scope conditions of the initial framework presented by Kalyvas (2006), but which I argued could potentially be a relevant context for the theory as well. Second, I’ve employed the framework to a different type of violence, sexual violence. Kalyvas’ (2006, p. 20) has mostly focused on lethal violence, but argued that lethal violence could be used as a proxy for violence in general, and thus assumed that sexual violence could be understood through similar mechanisms. I’ve argued that sexual violence is a fundamentally different form of violence. This thesis sheds some light on this. Finally, contrary to previous research on the war in Bosnia (Costalli & Moro, 2012) I’ve taken into account direct measures of control, rather than using the ethnic distribution as a proxy for control.

The analysis has demonstrated that control is a relevant factor to take into account in the analysis of lethal violence during ethnic wars. The analysis indicates that there is an interaction between ethnicity considerations and the level of control. Actors attempt to achieve ethnic supremacy, but a lower degree of control constrains the use of military resources needed to perpetrate mass lethal violence. In terms of sexual violence, the analysis
indicates that control relates differently to sexual violence than to lethal violence. A lower degree of control does not seem to constrain the perpetration of widespread sexual violence.

The table below summarizes the answers and main findings to each of the three research questions posed in this thesis. The following three hypotheses were tested for both lethal and sexual violence:

**H1: Areas of exclusive control should have low levels of violence.**
**H2: Areas of fragmented control should have the highest levels of violence.**
**H3: Areas of shared control should have low levels of violence.**

**Table 18: Research questions and conclusions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research question</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RQ1: To what extent can Kalyvas’ (2006) model on patterns of control and violence explain how patterns of control and lethal violence varied during the war in Bosnia?</td>
<td>Data only supports H3. Lethal violence is highest in areas of Serb exclusive control, where the Serb population lacked a majority, thus opposite of what Kalyvas asserts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ2: To what extent can Kalyvas’ (2006) model on patterns of control and violence explain how patterns of control and sexual violence varied during the war in Bosnia?</td>
<td>Sexual violence was widespread and high in both areas of exclusive and fragmented control. Some of the data indicates that it might have been even higher in areas of fragmented control. However, there is no strong indication that levels of sexual violence vary with levels of control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ3: How did sexual violence differ from lethal violence during the war in Bosnia?</td>
<td>Lethal and sexual violence does not correlate. Lethal violence was also employed to a much higher extent by Serb forces, but all parties perpetrated mass rapes. Lethal violence was tactic, while sexual violence was strategic. Furthermore, lower degree of control constrains the use of lethal violence, but not the use of sexual violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evidently, Kalyvas (2006) model does not fully explain neither the use of lethal violence nor the use of sexual violence, but the theory is more fitting in explaining lethal violence than sexual violence. The results are not surprising given that both the type of conflict and the type of violence is outside the initial theoretical framework, which assumes an irregular, non-ethnic war, and lethal violence.

In terms of lethal violence, the results in the analysis might differ from Kalyvas’ proposed model because Kalyvas’ focuses on strategic violence, not tactic (Kalyvas, 2006, p.27). I argue that lethal violence in ethnic wars is likely to be used tactically (to remove a threat) rather than strategically (to influence the population to act in a certain way). Since these two forms of lethal violence are used for different purposes, they are likely to be influenced by different mechanism. When violence is used tactically it is used to remove a specific threat, for instance a large enemy population, or a specific group of people. In such cases the lethal violence is only influenced by the presence of the threat. If the threat is a specific group of people, the threat disappears when that particular group of people is eliminated (killed or displaced). If lethal violence is used strategically, as it is in Kalyvas (2006, p. 27) model, it is a coercive form of violence inflicted upon civilians in order to influence the broader population (or armed opponent) to act in a certain way. Thus, the people that are killed are only killed as a means to influence a larger group of people. The violence is therefore not influenced by the presence or action of the particular group of people that are directly affected by the violence.

In terms of sexual violence, variation in control does not emerge as a particular important factor in explaining levels of sexual violence. I argue that this is because sexual violence is a completely different act than lethal violence in terms of resources. Control could constrain the use of lethal violence because lethal violence is perpetrated with the same resources that are necessary to eliminate the enemy actor, while sexual violence is not. Therefore, when control declines actors must choose whether to employ lethal violence to either kill enemy actors or the population. Furthermore, while lethal violence was used tactically, sexual violence might have been used strategically.

The analysis has however been based on a pre-given assessment of control during the war in Bosnia by Helsinki Watch (1993). Thus, the results might have been somewhat different if less static measures of control were used. Furthermore, I’ve only focused on two variables,
the interaction between levels of control and ethnic distribution. Actors are likely influenced by a variety of factors that affect the strategies and action they adopt in war. Population size, terrain, type of armed forces (whether conventional or irregular), are all factors that could be relevant in explaining patterns of violence. For instance, Dulic & Hall (n.d, p. 24) find that whether an area was strategic or not contributes to explaining levels of lethal violence perpetrated by Serb forces. The results could therefore also be influenced by omitted variables. Future research should attempt to take into account more sophisticated measures of control, and include other relevant factors likely to constrain or somehow influence the perpetration of either of the two types of violence.

This thesis has however fulfilled the goal of serving as a first test on how lethal and sexual violence vary with levels of control.

6.2 Implications and Reflections Beyond the Analysis

Maybe the most evident implication from this thesis is the fact that the analysis shows that lethal and sexual violence display diverging patterns. This indicates that lethal violence likely cannot be used as a proxy for sexual violence. Furthermore, the same factors that are relevant to explain lethal violence, are likely not equally relevant to explain sexual violence. Therefore, the study of sexual violence demands that researchers take into account different and maybe new aspects. As this analysis has shed light upon, sexual violence can take many different forms. Future research should also focus more on different forms of sexual violence, rather than just different levels of sexual violence.

In terms of sexual violence, an additional issue emerged through the work with the analysis. A challenge in terms of sexual violence is that even when it is employed strategically or as a weapon of war, it is difficult to find “hard proofs” such as military doctrines or other sources that state it as military strategy. This was also the problem during the war in Bosnia (Helsinki Watch, 1993, p.22). Interesting in this regards, is that reports received by the United Nations Commission of Experts suggest that organized detention facilities where sexual violence was perpetrated were quickly established almost immediately after the outbreak of fighting (Bassiouni & Commission, 1994c, pp.44-47; Bassiouni & Commission, 1994d, pp.281-303). This raises the question of whether perpetration of sexual violence as a strategy actually
demands a pre-organized plan and explicit strategy. If not, then this could indicate that the perpetration of high levels of sexual violence is a cheap strategy, in the sense that it doesn’t demand much organizing beforehand. Or, it could indicate that the actors during the war in Bosnia actually pre-organized and prepared the use of mass sexual violence as a weapon of war. This issue clearly deserves closer investigation.

This thesis also has important implications for the understanding of the war in Bosnia. As discussed in chapter 4.3, the majority of discourse on sexual violence has focused on Serb forces use of sexual violence, and dismissed the use of sexual violence by Bosniak and Croat forces as unplanned and unauthorized, or simply as instances of revenge (Askin, 1997, pp.263-281, cited in Duderija, 2015, pp. 114-115; Stiglmayer, 1994, p. 138; Allen, 1996). The analysis shows that the use of sexual violence by Bosniak and Croat forces simply cannot be dismissed as instances of revenge and non-systematic perpetrations of sexual violence. The data clearly indicates that all the warring actors perpetrated high levels of sexual violence, in a systematic and organized manner. This raises the question of why Croat and Bosniak forces perpetrated high levels of sexual violence, but not of lethal violence. Was sexual violence regarded as more useful than lethal violence? These issues should be further investigated, as they are theoretically important and interesting, because they say something about variation in armed groups’ repertoire of violence. These questions are however also important for the understanding of the war in Bosnia and the use of violence by each of the armed actors.
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*Politics & Society, 37*(1), 131–161.


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