Resilience: bridging the gap between humanitarian and development assistance

An analysis of the response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan

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Abstract

This master thesis studies the shift in the response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan, from a refugee response to a refugee and resilience response. This shift was initiated after the adoption of the resilience-based approach to the Syria crisis in the Jordan Response Plan 2015. As the meaning of resilience often changes depending on the context in which it is used, I analyse how resilience has been used and what effect it has had on the response to the Syrian refugee crisis. The main focus of the analysis is on the process leading up to and the initial stage of implementing the JRP 2015. To analyse this shift, I apply the theory of strategic action field as developed by Fligstein and McAdams (2012) to explain stability and change in the response. I argue that resilience has first and foremost been used at the policy level to mobilise support from a variety of actors for a new, comprehensive approach to the Syria refugee crisis. With the focus on national ownership in the resilience-based approach, the Government of Jordan has become increasingly visible in the response compared to their involvement during the refugee response. The vagueness of the concept, however, has opened up different interpretations of what resilience means, particularly whether resilience should include refugees. Resilience in the context of the Jordan response has been interpreted as resilience for vulnerable Jordanians and Jordanian host communities. I therefore argue that there is a gap between policy and implementation level, which have led to a sense of failed expectation among certain actors in the response. Moreover, the entrance of new actors into the response has engendered competition in the field which has fostered the duplication of coordination efforts. Although the process has had several shortcomings, I argue that the increased involvement of the Government of Jordan in the response has been positive as it has improved communication between the Government and the international community.
Foreword

The plight of Syrian refugees and how the international community respond to their plight will become an ingrained part of our modern history. With this thesis, I have wanted to shed light on one aspect of how the international community is adapting to the changing nature of the refugee situation in Jordan.

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Helene Kvam Sigmond

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Abbreviations

3RP Regional Response and Resilience Plan
HC Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT Humanitarian Country Team
IATF Inter-Agency Task Force
JRP Jordan Response Plan
MOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDG United Nations Development Group
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
RC Resident Coordinator
RCHC Resident coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator
WFP World Food Programme
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1 Introduction

International interest in migration and refugee concerns has in recent years largely focused on populations on the move, either on the individuals arriving in Western countries claiming asylum or on the challenge of providing humanitarian assistance to refugees in emergencies (Loescher and Milner, 2008). However, the number of refugees and the duration of their displacement are increasing (Loescher and Milner, 2011). According to UNHCR (2004:1):

A protracted refugee situation is “one in which refugees find themselves in a longstanding and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years of exile.”

It is a situation that has moved past the initial emergency phase but for which a solution in the foreseeable future does not exist (Loescher and Milner, 2008). The conflict in Syria has triggered the world’s largest humanitarian crisis since the Second World War. The conflict in Syria has resulted in a mass exodus of refugees. The conflict and the resulting mass displacement is not only a humanitarian crisis. It has also had economic, political and social impacts on the neighbouring countries in the region that have been host to the majority of Syrian refugees.

To address the protracted refugee situation in light of these broader impacts, there was a call to shift the response from what had predominantly been a humanitarian, refugee response, to a comprehensive response that address both the needs of refugees and the host communities. To facilitate such a shift, the international community adopted a resilience-based development approach to the Syria crisis which has informed the development of a refugee and resilience response at the regional level and at the country level.

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan to the Syria crisis 2015-2016 (3RP 2015) is a regional framework which seeks to “address refugee protection needs, the humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable, and the longer-term socio-economic impacts of the Syria crisis on neighbouring countries” (3RP, 2015:7). It brings together the plans developed under the national authorities of the five major host countries in the region, namely of the Arab

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1 A protracted refugee situation involves a refugee population of 25,000 persons or more for period of five years or more (UNHCR 2004).
Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Lebanese Republic, and the Republic of Turkey.

This master thesis will study the shift in the response at the country level, using the Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis 2015 (JRP 2015) as a departure point. The JRP 2015 is the national chapter of Jordan in the 3RP. The JRP 2015 is described as the first nationally-led effort of its kind, and “embeds the refugee response into national development plans” in order to address the needs of both refugees and vulnerable host communities (JRP, 2015:10).

Refugee situations are usually considered to belong to the realm of humanitarian actors. Humanitarian assistance is, traditionally, short-term, life-saving assistance. Development aid, in contrast, focuses more on long-term, structural vulnerabilities of societies and refugees have often fallen outside their purview. In response to protracted crisis, however, both these approaches can fall short of addressing the complexity that characterizes the situation, where there are both humanitarian and development needs, and, furthermore a gap between the traditional humanitarian and development assistance. The JRP 2015 seeks to bridge this gap.

Resilience is a central component to the shift in the response. Resilience broadly refers to the ability of individuals and communities to absorb stress and shocks when exposed to external hazards, natural or man-made, and the ability to recover (Levine and Mosel, 2014:3). Resilience-building is seen as important in order to reduce vulnerability and improve individuals and communities ability to deal with shocks. As there is increased focus on how recurring and protracted crisis is becoming the norm, resilience is being widely appropriated by the aid community. Resilience is seen as potentially serving as a concept around which humanitarian and development actors can converge. However, several challenges of using resilience both analytically and practically have been highlighted. Firstly, resilience is a malleable concept which has been adapted to fit different contexts, ranging from ecology to peacebuilding resilience (Menkhaus, 2013). This has led to question of whether resilience represents a substantial change in how aid is implemented, or if it’s just a buzzword. Secondly, there is no clear understanding of how to translate resilience from policy into practice (Mitchell and Harris, 2012).

By adopting the resilience-based approach in the JRP 2015, the response to the refugee situation in Jordan presents itself as an interesting case to analyse as it can shed light on how resilience is being translated from policy into practice. This thesis is interested in understanding what this shift represents and will therefore focus on the process leading up to
the JRP 2015 and the initial stage of implementation in 2015. The research question is therefore: how is the concept of resilience operationalised by the actors in policy-documents and how does it affect the response on the ground?

As the topic of study is a process of change, in my analysis I will apply the theory of strategic action fields as developed by Fligstein and McAdams (2012). This theory is concerned with explaining stability and change by studying how actors create and sustain a world order, by framing their actions in light of a broader purpose (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:3). The strategic action field in this case is the response to the refugee situation in Jordan. I am interested in understanding how resilience has been used in the strategic action field and what effects it has had on the operations on the ground. This is done by differentiating between a policy level and implementation level within the field. To understand the role of International Organisations (IOs) in the strategic action field, I will supplement this theory with Barnett and Finnemore’s theory on the influence of international organisations on policy-making (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999).

The sources of data for this thesis are both primary and secondary. I conducted semi-structured interviews in 2015 and 2016, the majority of them in March 2016 during a field visit to Amman, Jordan. Some interviews were also conducted in Oslo, or via Skype. Important sources are also documents such as the JRP 2015 and the 3RP 2015-2016, and other policy and strategy documents that have been important in the process leading up to the JRP 2015 such as the Refugee Response Plans by UNHCR, the UNDP “Position Paper on Resilience-Based Development Response to the Syria Crisis” (UNDG, 2013), and the National Resilience Plan (MOPIC, 2014).

The data gathered from the interview show a variety of perspectives on the successes and shortcomings of a resilience-based approach. Applying the strategic action field theory, I will argue that the refugee and resilience response joined in the JRP 2015 has not significantly affected the way actors on the ground operate. This can be attributed to a gap between policy and implementation level. Resilience has first and foremost been used at the policy level to mobilise support from a variety of actors, such as humanitarian actors, development actors, donors, and host governments, for a new, comprehensive approach to the Syria refugee crisis. This has created a change in the way the actors in the field think about the response. As such, the Government of Jordan has become increasingly visible in the response compared to their involvement during the refugee response. The vagueness of the concept has, however, opened up for different interpretations, particularly whether resilience should include refugees.
Resilience in the context of the Jordan response has been interpreted as resilience for vulnerable Jordanians and Jordanian host communities. However, the separation between refugee and resilience is regarded as artificial by implementing actors and has therefore not made much sense on the ground.

1.1 Protracted Refugee Situations

World-wide, there are more than 60 million refugees displaced by conflict or persecution which is the highest level recorded since the Second World War. Per 2015, the average duration of protracted displacement is 17 years (Crawford et al, 2015). Protracted refugee situations emerge largely from both a lack of political solutions in the country of origin which prohibit refugees from repatriation, and become protracted due to the response to refugee inflows in the host countries that are often characterized by restrictions on movement and access to livelihoods (UNHCR, 2004). As Loescher and Milner (2005) observe, “failure to engage with the host country reinforces the perception of refugees as a burden and a security concern, which leads to encampment and a lack of local solutions. As a result of these failures, humanitarian agencies, such as UNHCR; are left to compensate for the inaction or failures of the major powers and the peace and security organs of the UN system.” (Loescher and Milner 2005:19)

The concept of “burden-sharing” is an important principle in the global refugee regime (Betts and Durieux, 2007). In the Preamble of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (the Convention), it is acknowledged that large refugee populations can place an “unduly heavy burden” on host countries and as a refugee situation is a problem of international scope a solution cannot be achieved without international cooperation (Gottwald, 2014:1). Burden-sharing implies “an obligation on the part of states to support refugee protection beyond their own territory” (Betts and Durieux 2007:517). Lower income countries hosting refugees often use the term “burden-sharing” to direct attention towards the perceived and real inequalities in the distribution of costs of responding to a large influx of refugees and in protracted refugee situations (Gottwald, 2014:2). Hosting refugees often represent host governments with challenges that affect several aspects of society, such as; economic, political, security, environmental, developmental and infrastructural challenges (Gottwald, 2014:2). Since the majority of refugees are in low-income countries in the South,
the richer North are expected to support host countries in the South (Betts and Durieux, 2007:517).

UNHCR have launched several initiatives to develop more comprehensive responses to protracted refugee situations, such as the Convention Plus Initiative from 2002-2005 and the Framework for Durable Solutions, and before that two high-level conferences in Africa, namely the International Conferences on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA) I and II in 1981 and 1984 respectively. These initiatives have had in common that they have tried to “make the international response more reliable and effective, as well as to ensure greater equity in the sharing of responsibilities and burdens” (UNHCR, 2003). These initiatives have also, among others, promoted the concepts of “Development Assistance in Relation to Refugees” (DAR) and “Development Through Local Integration” (DLI) that have a particular focus on including development initiatives in the response in host countries. This was done in order to address both the needs of refugees but also the needs of host countries and the local populations, since hosting a large population of refugees for protracted periods have “long-term economic and social impact that, if not adequately addressed, can create conflictual situations and insecurity” (UNHCR, 2003). Further, it is pointed out that refugees often face restrictive policies that limit their freedom of movement, access to education, and access to a productive livelihood. Refugees therefore remain dependent on external humanitarian assistance, and their ability to make a positive contribution to the economy and society of the asylum country is limited (UNHCR, 2003). Promoting self-sufficiency among refugees was therefore an important part of the initiatives, and it was urged that the refugee situation should be included in the national development plans of the host country which it often was not. Host countries were to be assisted by donors to bear the burden of refugees and for them to allow refugees access to livelihoods (UNHCR, 2003). These approaches were therefore steps towards a holistic approach where humanitarian assistance to refugees was linked with national and regional approaches, and improved integrated efforts of both humanitarian and development actors (Loescher and Milner, 2005:73-74).

However, the implementation of these initiatives largely failed to live up to its expectation and refugees continued to rely upon international assistance (Crisp 2001:170). The reasons are the host countries reluctance to locally integrate the refugees and the donor countries hesitation in providing development assistance to host countries (Betts, 2004: 3-4). With declining donor engagement in protracted refugee situations since the 1990s, host countries are “less willing to engage in local solutions to protracted refugee situations”
Crisp also observes that the “donors felt that the refugee aid and development concept was being used as a means of mobilising additional development funding for some hard-pressed (and in some case badly governed) states, instead of constituting a genuine effort to resolve refugee problems” (Crip, 2001:172). These dynamics enforce each other, leading to failed efforts to assist refugees in the long term.

Solutions, therefore, are largely determined by the political economy conditions of a refugee situation. UNHCR attribute the challenge of lack of engagement to factors such as that refugees are not part of the political constituency of the host government and therefore not a part of the national development plans, and as a result the undertakings of development actors do not include refugees since development actors “will normally follow the priorities of the recipient government” (UNHCR, 2003:5). In these situations, Crisp and Slaughter argue that UNHCR has taken on the role of a “surrogate state, complete with its own territory (refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public services (education, health care, water, sanitation, etc.) and even ideology (community participation, gender equality)” (2009:8). This is described as weakening the responsibility of the host state further (ibid).

1.2 Comprehensive Approaches

UNHCR’s previous attempts at including development initiatives can be viewed as an attempt to better link humanitarian and development assistance. As bridging the gap between traditionally separate humanitarian and development sectors is part of the goal of the JRP 2015, I will here present an overview of the discussion and the challenges that have been pointed out.

In the transition from short-term to long-term interventions there is envisaged to be a “gap”. The gap is used to refer to the transition period from when the humanitarian operations is about to be completed and development projects are about to start (Suhrke and Ofstad, 2005:2). This gap can refer to a gap in funding, where there is a perceived imbalance between humanitarian and development assistance. It can also be used to refer to the need to institutionally bridge the gap, in other words to improve coordination between humanitarian and development assistance (Otto and Weingartner, 2013:35; Suhrke and Ofstad 2005:2).

In theory, humanitarian assistance is intended to be a short-term measure to alleviate the suffering of populations, affected by natural or man-made crisis, through the provision of basic needs such as shelter, water and medical assistance (Beswick and Jackson, 2011:75). It
sees its responsibility as providing the essentials that are needed to keep people alive until the crisis has passed, without making any long-term investments (Beswick and Jackson, 2011:75). Humanitarian activities are therefore mostly organised on a smaller scale and with a short timeframe (Suhrke and Ofstad, 2005). Humanitarian assistance, because of its timeframe and operational culture, do not emphasise local involvement, sustainability and institution building beyond the community level (Suhrke and Ofstad 2005). Humanitarian assistance is therefore more top-down implementation of relief activities, where external expertise is brought in who set up their own coordination structures. These coordination structures often work in parallel to existing structures.

Development actors on the other hand, are more macro-oriented and is guided by policy that typically emphasise “comprehensive project and programme planning, longer-term sustainability and institution building” (Suhrke and Ofstad, 2005). Ideally, development aid is delivered through and in close cooperation with the host government in order to promote national ownership over development initiatives (Beswick and Jackson, 2011:75). Government ownership is believed to increase efficiency of implementation of development activities as they will have increased stakes in its success. Government ownership will also be an important step in ensuring that development activities are aligned with government priorities, and it is expected that implementing partners should harmonise their priorities with that of the government. The principle of government ownership is recognized in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (the Paris Declaration) in 2005 and have over 100 signatory states (OECD, 2005; Sjöstedt, 2013).

To work around the government and bring in substantial external expertise is, however, from a humanitarian actors standpoint often essential to properly address the pressing needs of crisis-affected populations. In a crisis situation, the state might not have the capacity, willingness, or the knowledge of how to implement a comprehensive humanitarian response. As I will show, the case of the Syrian refugee influx to Jordan provides some new challenges for the international humanitarian community, as Jordan is a stable, middle-income country with a functioning central government.

Bridging the gap between humanitarian and development assistance became a prominent topic of discussion in the aftermath of the food security crisis on the Horn of Africa in the 1980s. During that crisis, it became apparent that humanitarian aid alone was not sufficient to respond to the crisis. Humanitarian actors were too focused on providing emergency relief and became criticised for not taking long-term perspectives into
consideration on how they deliver aid. Development actors on the other hand were criticised for not paying enough attention to household vulnerability and how short-term crisis can affects long-term development. The early thinking of linking relief and development was driven by the perception that disasters were increasing in frequency and as a consequence saw an increase in relief aid spending on the expense of traditional development aid (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994:1; Levine and Mosel, 2014a:3). It was held that, if relief and development assistance were linked, development would reduce the need for emergency relief over time and relief assistance would contribute to development.

This view assumed a linear progression of society going through different stages from relief to development. During the initial phase of a crisis, relief assistance is important to sustain people through periods of stress until the crisis has passed. In the next phase, when the crisis has passed, development aid can take over. This view is referred to as the “continuum model” (Levine and Mosel, 2014a:3). The idea of a continuum, where humanitarian actors exit and pass the torch along to development actors in a smooth transition, has been widely criticised for assuming a simple linear transition from relief to development and where linking mainly refers to the exit strategies of relief actors that prepare the ground for the next stage (Levine and Mosel, 2014a:3). Critics argued that there is a complex and ongoing interaction between humanitarian and development aid where humanitarian and development assistance happens simultaneously, referred to as the “contiguum” model (Simon and Levine, 2014a:3).

When crisis becomes protracted, humanitarian actors are finding themselves on the ground for several years, quite in contrast to the intended short-term function of humanitarian assistance. How then can a response to a protracted crisis situation improve? Humanitarian assistance is still needed, but there is a need to focus on more long term interventions that can decrease the dependence on humanitarian assistance. Today this is where the debate lies, and where the concept of resilience is increasingly being provided as a solution.

### 1.3 Resilience

To address the long-standing discussion about how to engage in protracted or recurrent crisis, the concept of resilience has provided renewed attention to the discussion about to how to engage in crisis contexts in ways that go beyond meeting immediate needs (Levine, 2014:1). Resilience has “emerged as a fusion of ideas from multiple disciplinary traditions”
Resilience as a concept is not new, and has been applied in a variety of disciplines such as ecology, psychology and physics in addition to being used within the humanitarian and development community (Bahadur et al, 2010). As a result of this fusion, reaching a common definition of resilience and what resilience programming is in practice has been a challenge (Mitchell and Harris, 2012:2).

There are some common denominators, however, in the many variations of definitions. Resilience can be broadly defined as the ability to absorb or resist shocks and stress caused by external disturbances, and the ability to recover (Levine and Mosel 2014:3). Resilience is often described using the language of system, referring to a system’s ability to absorb shocks and stress while maintaining its integrity (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010). This view sees resilience as a process, where the system’s ability to learn and adapt to external disturbances are viewed as important to its survival, and hence key elements in determining how resilient a system is (Carpenter et al, 2001).

As resilience has been adopted by humanitarian and development community, the concept has been adjusted to refer to the resilience of individuals and communities. As such, the concept can be understood as an outcome where individuals and communities are resilient. In terms of resilience of individuals and communities, resilience is commonly understood in relation to vulnerability. Vulnerability can be defined as “the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected” by shocks and stress (Mitchell and Harris 2012:2) and can be defined in terms of components such as livelihoods, social protection and governance (Cannon 2008:2).

According to Cannon (2008), the basic building block to determine vulnerability is “how satisfactory their livelihood is” and how resistant it may be to hazards (Cannon 2008:3). Livelihoods are what enable people to subsist and determines other aspects of life, such as the level wellbeing and capacity to protect themselves in face of shocks and stress. Livelihood activities also require a person to have access to and possess assets such as farmland, a skill, livestock, etc., or other income-generating opportunities (Cannon, 2008:4-5). Governance is an important factor in determining vulnerability as it is linked with the quality of social protection and the allocation of assets in a society (ibid). Resilient livelihoods are income-generating activities that are sufficiently robust and adaptive in face of crisis, which refers to the ability to maintain or restore their livelihoods after crisis. In addition, government institutions must also be resilient, meaning that they are “capable of remaining in operation to fulfil their relevant tasks in relief, recovery and the incorporation of measures that reduce
future vulnerability as well” (Cannon 2008:10). Building resilience will reduce the vulnerability of individuals and communities which in turn will enhance their ability to handle crisis better.

The aim of resilience programming is to ensure that shocks and stresses does not lead to a “long-term downturn in development progress” (Mitchell and Harris 2012:1). This is perceived as important steps to protect development advances from multiple shocks and stresses and is the main driver behind the appropriation of the concept by a broad range of actors such as donors, humanitarian and development actors.

There is often an expectation that resilience will reduce need for humanitarian assistance over time as individuals and communities become resilient and therefore less dependent on humanitarian assistance in the future. However, in the literature it is pointed out that it is not necessarily clear what resilience programming is. As the appropriation of resilience increases, there is a risk that it just becomes another label and that any activity can be framed as resilience-building (Levine and Mosel, 2014:8). There are also arguments that resilience should be freed from such technical arguments, as resilience can be better understood as a call for more investment in longer-term support to people who are affected by recurring or protracted crisis (Levine, 2014:3). Instead of trying to find a technical definition of resilience, the use of resilience must be based on the context in which it is appropriated. This involves understanding the processes behind vulnerabilities in a given circumstance in order to properly address the causes. Its focus on vulnerability in the immediate and long-term can therefore appeal to both humanitarian and development actors. This makes resilience an attractive concept to rally political will to change how aid is delivered (Levine 2014:2).
2 Method

2.1 Research Design: Case

This thesis is mainly concerned with a case. Case studies are useful when the object of the research is to explain some present circumstance, such as how and why some social phenomenon works (Yin, 2009:4). Since the object of the research is to answer how the concept of resilience is used and its effect on the Jordan response at the policy and implementation level, the thesis is ultimately concerned how a social phenomenon works. The case study method therefore lends itself as the most appropriate approach to answer the research question.

A case can be defined as a phenomenon that is delimited in time and space (Gerring, 2007). Demarcation of the time and space of a case can be challenging. In this research project, the temporal limitation has a natural start, namely the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011. It has, however, been more challenging to determine when the case study ends. I have chosen to study the response up until and including 2015. That is the year the JRP 2015 was launched and represents the first stage of the shift. A case study of a process that is still ongoing has an inherent weakness in that the situation on the ground is constantly changing. There have been interesting developments of the response in 2016, for example the JRP 2015 has now been replaced by its successor the JRP 2016-18 and the London Compact that took place in February 2016. However, in my data collection and the following analysis I have tried to be sensitive to the fact that the situation is constantly changing and hence the focus of the thesis is on the process and it does not try to determine whether the shift to a refugee and resilience response has been a success. This thesis will highlight one aspect of the process, namely how resilience has been used and its effects, and has attempted to gain insight into the early stage of the process which hopefully can provide better grounds for understanding future developments in the response.

The spatial limitations of the case also presented a challenge. The shift from a refugee response to a refugee and resilience response has occurred due to processes at both the regional level and the country level. A great deal of the policy development that has guided the shift, such as the introduction of the resilience-based approach to the Syria crisis, has been at a regional level and influences the response at the country level. Since the 3RP emphasis government ownership over the response is, the resilience-based approach is adapted to fit the
local context. Although the main focus of this thesis is the JRP 2015, it is therefore difficult to analyse the response in Jordan in isolation from regional policy developments.

Since the country responses are adjusted to the local context, the findings from this case study cannot readily be used to draw conclusions as to how resilience is used and its effect in other contexts. Although Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq are also a part of the regional response to the Syria crisis, the impact of the crisis on each individual country is very different. Therefore how the resilience has been incorporated into the country responses probably varies. How it varies would be interesting to study, however that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Conducting a case study implies that it is a case of something (Gerring, 2007). As such, the purpose of a case study is to “partly to shed light on a larger set of cases” (ibid). The external validity of this thesis, in other words the potential for making generalisations from this case study to other cases, is limited as it is highly context specific. How the international community and host government responds to a refugee situation is largely determined by several factors such as the socio-economic conditions in the country, population size, and the environment in which refugees live that can range from camps to urban environment in varying degrees. The response in Jordan is adjusted to fit the context. However, the findings can feed into the larger discussion of how resilience can be used in a refugee situation. As such, it can contribute to generate hypothesis for further study of the use of resilience in refugee situations.

2.2 Interview

Since a central part of my research is to gauge the perception of actors on the ground on the use of resilience in the context of a protracted refugee situation, interviews are an important source of data. I have tried to uncover the underlying motives of actors involved that has driven the process forward and the challenges of shifting the response as experienced by the actors themselves. I have interviewed individuals who were engaged in the policy-making process and implementation of projects, representing different UN agencies and INGOs. I also conducted interviews with representatives of donor countries. I was not, however, able to conduct an interview with a representative of the Government of Jordan. As it was the wish of some of my respondents to remain anonymous, I have chosen to anonymise all of my respondents.
Since policy documents often present the official version of events, they can conceal the informal process and considerations that informed decision-making concerning adopting a resilience-based approach and its implementation (Tansey 2002:767). Interviews can therefore provide information on the processes behind an official text and the underlying context that are not available from solely analysing textual data (ibid).

I have conducted twenty-two interviews during my research, the majority of which I did during a field visit to Amman, Jordan while some were done over Skype. In selecting my informants, I used a combination of reputation criteria and the snowball method. Reputation criteria are used to select respondents in the early phase of the interview process and it involves choosing the initial set of respondents based on their position and their involvement in the process (Tansey 2002:770). As I was working in Amman myself from 2014 to 2015, I had some overview of the actors involved in the process or had access to individuals who could point me in the right direction. I therefore conducted some preliminary interviews for my thesis in the summer of 2015 that were quite exploratory of nature. These preliminary interviews have contributed to highlighting some important aspects of the JRP 2015 that merited further study, which in turn informed my research question.

In preparation for my field visit, I contacted the Norwegian Embassy in Amman who was helpful in providing contact information of individuals from different UN agencies, international and national NGOs and donors that were in such a position as to know about the JRP 2015 at both a policy level and operational level. I contacted the suggested interview objects before my journey to Amman and I made appointments before I travelled while others were scheduled while I was there. After the initial interviews, the snowball method was used. This implies that at the end of the interview, I asked if they could suggest other potential respondents who were familiar with the process from a different organisation. This was a strategy in order to gain several perspectives of the issue. Using the snowball method is useful as it reduces the chance of missing relevant individuals (Tansey, 2002:771). This method proved to be very suitable since several individuals that were suggested were unknown to me yet provided important insight into the response. One pitfall with this strategy is that snowball sampling can introduce the possibility of bias, as one interviewee might refer to another respondent within their network who shares similar views on the subject (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013:87). I have tried to mitigate this challenge by contacting actors from different backgrounds in the initial stages of the interview process, first by reputation process and later
through the Embassy. As such, not all my respondents were selected through the snowball method.

I conducted semi-structured interviews. Compared to other interview formats such as structured interviews or unstructured interviews, the format of semi-structured interviews is suitable to my thesis as it allows the informants to expand on topics that they see as relevant and it allows for follow-up questions on key issues relevant to the research question. Structured interview would have required asking each interviewee a set of predetermined questions that are often close-ended and asked in the correct sequence. However, it can increase the risk of missing important aspects of the process that the researcher was unaware of before the interview. On the other side of the spectrum, unstructured interviews may provide too much information on issues that are not relevant to the research question. The interviews conducted in relation to this thesis were guided by a broad set of open-ended questions prepared beforehand. I allowed the subject to freely go into depth on key factors they found most relevant and I asked follow up questions during the interview in response to the information I was given. Semi-structured interviews do not pose strict requirements to the sequence in which they are asked. To ensure a natural flow of the interview I would change the order in which I asked questions so that the questions I posed would be relevant to what the respondent was talking about. Often the respondent would naturally cover topics on which I had prepared questions.

There are several methodological challenges with conducting interviews. When considering the sample of interviewees, some of the individuals I wanted to interview were not present in Amman during my field visit. I was later able to conduct Skype interviews with some of them, but not all. As is common in the international community, there had been a turnover of staff in several international organisations the last year which meant that some did not have intimate knowledge of the implementation of the JRP 2015. These organisations were therefore not interviewed. The majority of my respondents had been present in Jordan in 2015 and had insight into the implementation of the JRP 2015 and the current status. I was able to conduct interviews with individuals who had been present in Jordan during the process leading up to the JRP 2015 and after, which gives me an opportunity to look at the degree of which the resilience-based approach has changed the way actors on the ground operate. However, since the process leading up to the JRP 2015 was in 2014 and the JRP 2015 has been replaced by the new JRP 2016-2018, it is important to keep in mind that the memory of my respondents may have faltered.
Another factor is my own knowledge of the topic. A type of lingo usually develops in a community. It can therefore, as an outsider, be difficult to tap into and have a complete understanding of the operating environment. Key informants, or what you can call elite interviewees, have a vast knowledge of the subject built up after years of experience within the field. Although I did extensive reading of literature surrounding the subject before the interview, the knowledge my respondent’s possess is far superior and that is also why they are interesting interview subjects. This can mean that it is more difficult for the researcher to properly control the flow of the interview. It can also be an advantage. It can minimize the risk of bias in the line of questioning (Andersen, 2006:286). It is also a noted interview technique to not present oneself as too knowledgeable as this may conduce the subjects to summarise and clarify their own statements in order to ensure that the researcher understands what they mean (Andersen, 2006:290).

It can also, however, open up for measurement error as the rights questions may not be asked and information communicated by the respondent may be misinterpreted by the researcher (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013:88). Some initial interviews were therefore good in order to get the lay of the land and the interviews were open and topics discussed were broad. After the initial interviews, some recurring subjects became clear as they were of great interest to the respondents. These recurring topics were then used to guide my inquiry and as I became more familiar with the topic, I was able to challenge some of the respondents by presenting alternative views of reality.

All of the interviews were tape recorded at the expressed consent of the interview subject. This can also serve to minimise measurement error since my analysis will not depend on my memory of the interviews. The disadvantage of tape recording the interview is that the interview subjects may be more conscious of what they are saying and weigh their words more carefully than they would in an interview setting that is not recorded. However, in order to create an interview setting where the subjects felt they could express themselves freely, I emphasised, both in my first contact with the interview subjects per email and before the actual interview began, that none of those I interviewed would be quoted or directly referenced in the text. As mentioned above, as some of the respondents preferred to remain anonymous I have decided to keep all my respondents anonymous.

It is important to be aware that the respondent’s may have their own agenda, their own opinion of how to best understand the issue at hand, or they may be have a wish to present themselves to the researcher in a certain way (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013:88). That
respondents will present the “truth” is therefore unlikely (Andersen, 2006:288). Parts of the interview were questions that aimed at gathering information about the JRP 2015 process and therefore relatively fact-based as it focused on mapping actual events that have taken place. However, the narrative that is told will ultimately be coloured from the respondent’s perspective. The purpose of the interviews in this thesis was also to get information on how actors involved in the response understand resilience. Their perception is therefore important to uncover. It is their subjective understanding of the world and their perception of the other actors in the field. Epistemologically, I am not looking for an objective truth as to what resilience is. Rather, how the perception of a concept shape the interaction between actors and their actions on the ground. If there are different ways of understanding it, this is interesting and should be highlighted in the findings.

Although the external validity is limited, the advantage of a single case study is that it increases the chance of good internal validity. Internal validity is concerned with whether the researcher is observing and measuring what they intend (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982). Interviews are useful since they provide the researcher with data that is rich in detail, which in turn will better determine the causal conditions in a case (ibid)
3 Empirical Background

To understand the context into which resilience is introduced, this chapter will first provide a backdrop to the JRP 2015 by briefly discussing Jordan’s history with refugees, the impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordan, and the refugee response led by UNHCR up until JRP 2015.

3.1 Jordan and Refugees

At the end of 2015, there were approximately 633,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan of which roughly 20 per cent live in camps and 80 per cent live in urban areas (data.unhcr.org). The highest peak of refugee flow was in the first four months of 2013, when an average of 4,000 Syrian refugees entered Jordan daily (UNHCR 2013b). The numbers of refugees in Jordan has since become steady. This is related to how the Government of Jordan manages its borders. Although they have generally practiced an open border policy, due to security concerns they have tightened control at border crossings (UNHCR 2013b). By June 2015, Jordan ranked second when comparing number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants world-wide, with 90 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants. Lebanon tops the ranking with 209 per 1,000 (UNHCR 2015c).

Graph: Refugee influx to Jordan (Source: data.unhcr.org)

Traditionally, Middle Eastern countries are known for their hospitality and they have practiced a relative open door policy towards non-nationals, and in particular toward individuals from other Arab nations who have traditionally been exempt from visa regulations (Barnes, 2009:16). However, Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Once in the country, an individual that would otherwise have been categorized as a refugee according to the Convention, are not necessarily granted asylum in
the country (Barnes, 2009:16). Instead they are given the status of “guest”, although they use the term refugee (Mason, 2011).

Jordan does not have a specific legal framework concerning refugee protection and the determination of refugee status. Although asylum is mentioned, it is not clear how it would be applied and asylum is only granted in exceptional cases and usually at the discretion of the monarch (Zaiotti, 2006). To fill this legal void, the Government of Jordan and UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1998. The MoU establishes the parameters of UNHCR’s activities in Jordan. UNHCR is responsible for the refugee status determination process and for working towards durable solutions for refugees outside of Jordan, either voluntary repatriation or resettlement. UNHCR is required to find a durable solution for refugees within six months (UNHCR, 2014). Refugees are therefore residing in Jordan on a temporary basis. However, this six-month rule is not adhered to strictly. The MoU applies the same definition of “refugee” as found in the 1951 Convention, without the geographic and temporal limitations, and the Government of Jordan agrees to respect the principle of non-refoulement (Francis, 201). Zaiotti notes that due to the lack of formal provision regulating the status of refugees, policies have generally been formulated on an ad hoc basis and as a result “refugees have enjoyed few guarantees and minimal protection” (Zaiotti, 2006:334).

Refugee accommodation is generally a sensitive topic in Jordan and in the Middle East in general. The reluctance of signing the 1951 Convention is mostly attributed to the unresolved Palestinian issue. Jordan has hosted a sizeable population of Palestinian refugees for the last sixty years. In addition Jordan has played host to other refugees before the influx of Syrian refugees, primarily Iraqi refugees of which approximately 30,000 are registered with UNHCR. The Government of Jordan registered 400,000\(^2\) Iraqis as of March 2015 (data.unhcr.org). “They fear that future refugee populations like the Iraqis, if accorded the rights set down in the 1951 Convention may too end up remaining on their soil indefinitely” (Barnes, 2009:16).

### 3.1.1 Impacts of the Syria Crisis on Jordan

It has been a challenge for the government and host communities to absorb the large influx of refugees. As discussed previously, resilience refers to the ability to absorb or resist a

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\(^2\) Including refugees and other category of refugees.
stress and shock and recover from it (Levine and Mosel 2014). This begs the question, resilience to what? (Bailey and Barbelet 2014:4). Jordan has been met by two shocks: first, a demographic shock due to the large influx of refugees; second, an economic shock as economic engagement with Syria has become limited (Bailey and Barbelet 2014:4).

Economically it is the agricultural and food trade that has been severely affected with a 25 percent decrease in exports to Syria and 30 percent decline in imports from Syria. In addition, Syria was an important trade route for Jordan to access Turkey and Europe (MOPIC, 2013). The economic shock and decrease in GDP is compounded by an increase of its population. The majority of Syrian refugees live in the cities of Amman, Mafraq, Irbid and Zarqa which also have the highest number of poor Jordanian households (MOPIC, 2013). This is reportedly to have increased vulnerability of the poorest segments of the Jordanian population as there is increased tension between the local population and host communities (MOPIC, 2013). There is concern that the pressure of an increased population has led to a deterioration of quality of public services, such as double shifting of schools and there being fewer physicians per person (MOPIC, 2013). There are also concerns that Syrian refugees are crowding Jordanians out of the labour market as they accept work for lower wages, which in turn puts downward pressure on wages, mainly in the informal sector (MOPIC, 2013). In a study conducted by ILO and Fafo, the unemployment rate of Jordanians increased from 14.5 to 22.1 per cent between 2011 and 2014, and increased from 19 to 35 per cent unemployment among young Jordanians3 (Stave and Hillesund, 2015). It is found that Syrian refugees “do to some degree” push Jordanians out of the labour market (Stave and Hillesund, 2015:7). However, it can be difficult to isolate the impact of refugees from other factors that could affect unemployment rates since the level of unemployment was high in Jordan before the Syrian crisis. It could be argued that the Syrian refugee population has exacerbated pre-existing challenges rooted in the social, economic and political condition in Jordan (Francis, 2015:4).

3.1.2 Protection Environment

For UNHCR to be able to provide protection to refugees there must be an environment that allows for UNHCR to protect and assist refugees. This environment is often referred to as protection space (Barnes, 2009). Similar to the term humanitarian space, it can be understood

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3 Age group 15-24 years.
as the space in which humanitarian actors are allowed to operate. This can refer both to a physical space, for instance clearly delimited areas such as refugee camps, and to an action space which covers all manner of humanitarian action (Hubert and Brassard-Boudreau, 2014:16). Protection space can refer to the environment which “enables the delivery of protection activities and within which the prospect of providing protection is optimized” (Barnes, 2009:12). The space is fluid and can expand and retract. Proactive effort is therefore required for the creation and maintenance of the protection space (ibid).

In the context of Jordan, the MoU between UNHCR and the Government of Jordan has been an important step in creating a protection space for refugees in Jordan. The protection environment in Jordan is characterised by UNHCR as favourable, although fragile due to socio-economic challenges in Jordan. Since 2014, there have been noted some restriction in the protection space of refugees in urban areas (Francis 2015). Refugees have generally been allowed access to public services such as health and education in host communities; however, since November 2014 Syrian refugees have had to pay a fee to access health facilities similar to that of an uninsured Jordanian. Before July 2014, Syrian refugees were also able to move relatively freely between refugee and urban areas. It has been an official policy that all Syrian refugees are sent to camps in Jordan on arrival and can only leave through the bailout process (NRC and IHRC 2015:11). Through the “bailout” system, refugees were allowed to leave the camp if they had a Jordanian sponsor and paid a small fee. However, this was not enforced strictly as even Syrians who had not gone through the official “bailout” system were able to register for services outside of the camps. In the latter half of 2014 Jordanian authorities began enforcing official bailout regulations. It is estimated that 45% of refugees in host communities left refugee camps outside the bailout system (NRC and IHRC 2015:11). Syrian refugees in urban environments who cannot document that they have gone through the bailout process have therefore had difficulty in obtaining or renewing their service cards which they need to access public health facilities and schools (NRC and IHCR 2015:11). They also face possible relocation to the camps (Francis 2015).

In 2015, a study found that 86 per cent of Syrian refugees outside of camps were living below the Jordanian absolute poverty line, which is JOD 68 (USD 96) per person per month. The poor economic circumstances of refugees have been compounded by reductions in humanitarian assistance, such as cuts in WFP food assistance, and restricted access to legal income opportunities (NRC and IHCR, 2015:10). As a result, many refugees are “adopting negative coping strategies, including taking on additional debt, reducing food intake, and
taking children out of school” (NRC and IHCR, 2015:10). In 2014, a study showed that only 65 per cent of Syrian children are enrolled in school, and the enrolment rate starts declining from the age of 11. By the age of 15, less than 40 per cent of Syrian children are reported to be enrolled in school (Fafo and ILO, 2014).

3.2 Refugee Coordination

3.1 Response to Refugee Situations

UNHCR is a unique agency in that it has a mandate to protect refugees and the institute of asylum. In terms of response to a refugee crisis, the mandate of UNHCR empowers the agency to take an active role in the “effective coordination of measures taken to deal with this problem [the refugee problem]” (UNHCR, 2013). This also includes the right to “invite the co-operation of the various specialized agencies” and facilitate “coordination of the efforts of private organizations concerned with the welfare of refugees” to assist UNHCR in the performance of its mandate (UNHCR, 2013).

UNHCR does this through its Refugee Coordination Model (RCM). This is a multifaceted approach that aims to provide predictable and effective response to ensure that the needs of refugees are met, as well as advocating on protection matters with the host government by UNHCR’s representative in country. The UNHCR representative will also be responsible for the “[S]trategic planning for all phases of the response led by the Representative with operational partners in the development of a protection and solutions strategy, including development actors.” (UNHCR 2015a). At the operational level, a system of sectors is put in place to ensure service delivery to refugees, organised in thematic sectors such as Shelter, Health, Education and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). These sectors are chaired or co-chaired by other UN agencies, the host government, or INGOs. The RCM therefore aims to be an inclusive model. Host communities are also an important aspect of the refugee response, as it is “important for preserving asylum space and assuring the social cohesion necessary for a protective environment for refugees” (UNHCR 2015a). The approach to coordination will depend on the needs of refugees and the operational context. For example, the capacities and approaches of the host Government to the refugee situation will affect how UNHCR coordinates its response. Ideally, “[R]esponses are, whenever possible, led by the host Government and build on the resources of refugees and the
communities in which they live.’” However, implicit in this is that if host governments are not able or willing UNHCR will step in, as they are “accountable for ensuring the international protection of refugees”.

To accompany the coordination are Refugee Response Plans (RRPs), or Regional RRPs, that provide strategic direction for operational actors involved in the response and provides donors a coherent picture of the response (UNHCR 2015b).

The Refugee Coordination Model is relatively similar to, but should not be confused with the Cluster System led by OCHA. The cluster approach came out of the Humanitarian Reform, a reform of humanitarian response mechanisms initiated in 2005 in order to improve the predictability, effectiveness, and leadership of humanitarian response (Steets et al 2010). It was also initiated in order to fill perceived gaps in the response in cases where those affected were Internally Displace Persons (IDPs). The cluster approach entails nine clusters for issues such as education, health. A UN agency or INGO are assigned responsibility for a cluster, so that UNHCR is responsible for the protection cluster, UNDP responsible for the early recovery cluster and UNICEF and Save the Children co-chair the education cluster (Steets et al 2010:25). A Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) who is supported by an OCHA secretariat and who chairs the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) leads the overall coordination of the response (IASC 2009). The HC is often joined together with the Resident Coordinator (RC) position, denoted as the RCHC. The RC is responsible for coordination UN agency operations in a given country (Ferris 2011). Ferris also notes that there is an inherent tension between RCs, who in coordinating UN agency operations in a country is and depended on good relationships with the government and the HCs, who usually work with IDPs when strong advocacy is needed with the government to ensure that IDPs are protected” (2011:117).

The cluster system is implemented in response to a natural disasters or in conflict-related crisis where the affected are either only IDPs or a “mixed-situation” where both refugees and IDPs are affected. The “Joint UNHCR-OCHA Note on Mixed Situations Coordination in Practice” clarifies leadership and coordination arrangements in a mixed-situation where there is both a Humanitarian Coordinator and a UNHCR-led refugee operation. It also states, that in a setting where the affected population is primarily refugees and host communities, a Humanitarian Coordinator is not appointed and the cluster approach does not apply. UNHCR is to lead the “entire cycle of a refugee response, including inter-agency contingency planning, response, resource mobilisation and finding durable solutions” (UNHCR and OCHA 2014:1). UNHCR’s obligation in refugee situations “begins with
preparedness and continues through the emergency stage, ending only when solutions are identified” (UNHCR and OCHA 2014:1). This also includes during protracted situations.

As part of its core mandate, UNHCR promotes three durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. Voluntary repatriation, where and when feasible, generally requires measures to ensure that repatriation is voluntary and that refugees return to conditions where they are safe (UNHCR 2011:191). Resettlement of refugees to a third country is viewed as appropriate for refugees with “limited prospects for local integration or voluntary repatriation” (UNHCR 2011:197). This solution can also be an “effective mechanism for burden sharing and international cooperation, providing options to assist first countries of asylum consistent with the principle of international solidarity” (UNHCR 2011:197). Local integration is considered an option for who are born in the host country and would otherwise be stateless, refugees who cannot repatriate in the foreseeable future, and refugees who “have established close links to the host country” (UNHCR 2011:194). A legal framework for the integration of refugees is provided for States party to the 1951 Convention (UNHCR 2011:193).

3.1.1 Refugee Response in Jordan

In response to the influx of refugees, the refugee coordination model was set up to ensure that the protection and material needs of refugees entering Jordan were addressed. This coordination structure led by UNHCR and brought together different UN agencies, government agencies, NGOs and INGOs to ensure that there was a consistent response in terms of quality and coverage, that refugees were assisted properly and had access to basic needs. The initial sectors and initially there were for health, education, WASH and basic needs. Each sector is coordinated by a Sector Working Group (working groups) that is chaired by a UN agency and an INGO with the exception of the Sector Working Group for Health which was chaired by the Ministry of Health.
Diagram: Refugee Coordination Model in Jordan (UNHCR 2015)

To accompany this coordination structure there were a total of six RRPs (RRP1-RRP6) before the launch of the 3RP and JRP in 2015. The first RRP (RRP1) was launched in the beginning of 2012 and was quickly followed up by RRP2 a few months later. This was due to an increasing influx of Syrian refugees to Jordan which demanded a revision of the budgets and appeals as well as the response strategy as refugee camps were set up. The influx reached its peak between December 2012 and April 2013 when up to 3-4,000 refugees were arriving per day. From the middle of 2013 and 2014 the flow of refugees crossing the border became more stable and predictable. RRP5 and RRP6 were therefore year-long plans, for 2013 and 2014 respectively.

The refugee response was multifaceted. In camps there was a focus on camp maintenance with the aim of trying to provide the refugees with a sense of normality, with setting up supermarkets as well as setting up health facilities and schools. In urban areas, large scale cash and food voucher system programmes were set up under the WFP, while government services were the main providers of assistance to refugees by providing them with access to public schools and health services. According to one respondent, it is the policy of UNHCR to not build parallel systems and rather invest in capacity building and government services used by refugees.
This policy, however, was not new to the Syrian refugee crisis. UNHCR and other UN agencies, as well as INGOs have been present in Jordan working with other refugees such as the Iraqi refugees. Several UN agencies and INGOs and NGOs had been working in Jordan targeting Jordanians for many years as well. It is noted during an interview, however, that several of the UN agencies and INGO’s who were already in Jordan, shifted a majority of its activities away from development activities towards addressing the needs of refugees and the budget for humanitarian assistance in some organisations was said to have grown massively compared to its original size (interview).

The period 2012-2014, RRP1 through RRP6 was primarily a humanitarian response with the purpose of assisting refugees in Jordan. Several Quick Impact Projects were also implemented to address the immediate needs of host communities. UNHCR was also present in Jordan in 2012, working with mostly Iraqi refugees. The refugee response plans were supported by the Government, and UNHCR and its partners such as WHO and UNICEF worked with government ministries such as Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education to ensure refugees had access to public services.
4 Resilience in Regional and National Strategies

In this chapter I will present the main data that I will use in my analysis. This includes both documents and interview data. The main documents I will draw on is the “Resilience-Based Development Response to the Syria Crisis” (UNDG 2013) and the Jordan Response Plan 2015. Following this will be a presentation of the data collected during my interviews.

4.1.1 Resilience-Based Development Response

To address the impacts of the Syrian crisis on neighbouring countries, United Nations Development Group wrote a position paper titled “A Resilience-Based Development Response to the Syria crisis” (UNDG 2013). At the time the paper was written, the Syrian conflict had lasted three years, with no solution apparent in the near future. Meanwhile, the neighbouring countries have “stretched their already scarce socio-economic resources in response to the influx of Syrian refugees”, a process which compromises development gains in host countries (UNDG 2013:2). It is further stated that there is a “growing acknowledgement that current life-saving humanitarian funding and programming are neither sufficient nor sustainable” (UNDG 2013:2). What is needed is instead a more development-oriented approach to build resilience and “reduce the need for humanitarian assistance over time” (ibid). The resilience-based development approach is therefore presented as an “all-encompassing concept that frames a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable response” to the humanitarian and development challenges in the region (ibid). In the position paper, resilience is defined as:

“resilience refers to the ability of households, communities, and societies to withstand shocks and stresses, recover from such stresses, and work with national and local government institutions to achieve transformational change for sustainability” (UNDG 2013:2)

The resilience-based development response aim to achieve three strategic objectives: coping, recovering and sustaining. Coping refers to the resilience of local institutions, infrastructures, and basic services in order to respond to increased demand. Recovering refers to steps taken to ensure that vulnerable households, defined as IDPs, refugee and affected
communities, recover from the socio-economic impact of the conflict and consequent displacement. Access to livelihoods is here seen as essential, with equal access to economic opportunities for both men and women highlighted. Lastly, sustaining refers to the strengthening of macro-economic, social and political institutions in all host countries and vulnerable communities to ensure sustainability of development investments (UNDP 2013:9).

Further, the position paper presents several principles that should guide the resilience-based development response, the central of which is local and national ownership. Since the resilience response promotes a medium and long-term approach to the situation, “a strong national presence” is important in the planning, design, coordination and general oversight of such a response (UNDP 2013:6). National ownership is also important taking into consideration that the crisis impacts each country differently, and should therefore be sensitive to the specific context. Supporting governance structures in the response is also highlighted, since the neighbouring countries in the region are categorised as middle-income countries and there are therefore domestic resources the international support can build upon. This also implies that humanitarian and development actors avoid creating parallel systems of service delivery, and rather use and reinforce existing systems (UNDG, 2013:6).

4.1.2 The Berlin Communiqué

The Berlin conference was the first time the governments in the region and the international community met to discuss the wider ramifications of the Syrian crisis on host countries, in particular the adverse impact the mass influx has had on host countries. In light of the protracted nature of the crisis and “the continued pressures on host countries for years to come”, the need to adopt medium to long-term solutions were recognized. This involves adjusting the humanitarian and development response, which entails the need to increase development assistance to host governments and host communities. This assistance should be provided in line with priorities and objectives outlined in the national and regional response plans. To ensure predictability of the response, the increased use of longer-term and multi-year funding mechanisms are promoted (Berlin Communiqué 2014).

4.1.3 Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator Appointed
At the national level, there was appointed a new joint Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator to Jordan (RCHC) in 2014. Previously, there had been two separate individuals functioning as the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Resident Coordinator. In 2014, these functions were joined in one individual.

The appointment of a RCHC is regarded as an important part of the shift towards linking humanitarian and development assistance as it is described as the “critical first step in transitioning to a coherent UN leadership structure for the coordination of humanitarian and development assistance to Jordan” (Resident’s Vision 2014). The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) was also elevated to a strategic decision making forum, which was a step in this same direction.

In order to link humanitarian and development assistance to Jordan, there was a call to “work towards the inclusion of the Regional Response Plan 6 and the National Resilience Plan (NRP) within the medium and long-term sustainable development framework of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.” This could be accomplished by the “joint effort on the part of the UN, donors, IFIs, host governments and INGOs to articulate a coherent, nationally-led humanitarian, resilience and development response framework to the Syria crisis.” It was envisioned that principles of resilience “will function as the glue for bringing humanitarian and development assistance under one coherent framework” (Resident’s vision 2014). As part of the shift, a coherent framework would also be accompanied by one coordinated platform for humanitarian and development assistance in partnership with the Government of Jordan.

The RCHC therefore pushed for the shift, and the NRP and RRPs was joined in one framework called the Jordan Response plan 2015. JRP 2015 was also the national chapter for Jordan in the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015 (3RP).

The language in the position paper was incorporated into the RRP6 at the regional level, and by the Government of Jordan in the National Resilience Plan (NRP). The NRP was the Government of Jordan’s key document guiding efforts to mitigate the impacts of the Syrian crisis and was based on the Needs Assessment and Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan discussed above (Bailey and Barbelet 2014). It focused on host governments and public services. They also had different sectors, and for each sector Task Forces were set up to coordinate the response. The RRP6 incorporated components of the resilience in its approach with goal to assist more host communities in addition to its core aim of ensuring protection of refugees Bailey and Barbelet 2014. The RRP6 and NRP were therefore
complementary plans. The RRP6 represents the beginning of the shift as it incorporated some of the resilience language introduced in the UNDG position paper and increased its focus on host communities.

4.2 The Jordan Response Plan 2015

The principles in the resilience-based development response became important in guiding the formulation of the The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan for the Syrian crisis (3RP 2015) at the regional level and the Jordan Response Plan 2015 at the country level. The 3RP 2015-2016 a regional strategy and a policy partnership platform for the five neighbouring countries that are playing host to a large population of Syrian refugees; Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. Country ownership over the response is central in the 3RP, as argued for in the resilience-based approach in the UNDG position paper. The 3RP is made up of five very distinct and independent national chapters and The Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis for 2015 (JRP 2015) is the Jordan chapter in the 3RP.

The Jordan Response Plan 2015 is divided into three pillars: the refugee pillar, the resilience pillar, and the budget support pillar. The refugee component is guided by UNHCR and the resilience is guided by UNDP and in the JRP 2015 the refugee response and the resilience response are divided into two chapters. The budget support pillar is the costs incurred by the Government of Jordan in providing public services to Syrian refugees.

One of the stated reasons for this new resilience based approach is the recognition that the crisis is becoming protracted and “current life-saving humanitarian funding and programming are neither sufficient nor sustainable” (JRP 2015:25). The divide between humanitarian and development assistance presents a challenge for dealing with the outcome of the Syria conflict which is not just about the large movement of populations. It has also created economic, political and social challenges to the host countries that is not adequately addressed by the humanitarian response. It is therefore a situation where “the interplay of humanitarian emergency and long term structural vulnerabilities” calls for a more comprehensive and coherent approach (JRP 2015:25). The JRP 2015 therefore seeks to “bridge this divide” by adopting the principles of the resilience-based approach outlined in the position paper to UNDG. Bridging this divide entails reconciling programming objectives, funding mechanisms and operating systems that “often run parallel to each other in addressing short-term people- centered needs and medium to longer term systemic and institutional
considerations” (JRP 2015:25). The goal of using the development-oriented approach is “to build resilience and reduce the need for humanitarian assistance over time” (JRP 2015:25).

One of the other key components of the JRP 2015 is increased government involvement compared to the Refugee Response Plans. The JRP 2015 is government-led, nationally owned plan founded on the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005: ownership, alignment, and harmonization (JRP 2015:25). All assistance that goes to Jordan, should be aligned with the government’s main development priorities and harmonized with national systems for planning, programming and implementation (JRP 2015:23).

4.2.1 Coordination

The JRP 2015 functioned as an appeal for the response for 2015, however it also introduced a new coordination structure by establishing Inter-Agency Task Forces (Task Forces). To coordinate the JRP 2015 Inter-Agency Task Forces (Task Forces) were established in the autumn of 2014 in order to plan and write the Jordan Response Plan 2015, and similarly for the following Jordan Response Plan 2016-2016. This is done under the auspices of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and the Jordan Response Platform for the Syrian Crisis (JRSPC).

There are eleven Task Forces and each leads its own sector of the JRP. The Task Forces are chaired by the line ministry responsible for that sector, for instance Ministry of Education is responsible for the Education sector. For the JRP 2015, resilience and refugee responses were split into two different chapters. Most of the Task Forces cover both refugee and resilience however there are some sectors that are only under the resilience part of the plan and not in the refugee part, as shown in the diagram below. The sectors for Justice, Transport, Environment and Municipality are only under the resilience chapter.

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<th>Task Force Sectors</th>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Shelter</td>
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<td>Livelihoods and Food Security</td>
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It is also “composed of representatives from the government, the UN system, the donor community, and a national and international NGO with significant involvement in that sector” (JRP 2015:23). Each sector has one UN agency that acts as a Secretariat, and a representative of the donor community to act as a focal point in each Task Force. Task Forces are also supposed to have a coordinating and monitoring role of the implementation of the sector response plan. JRPSC Secretariat together with the government will work to coordinate the implementation of the JRP. It is also stated that it will “collaborate with ministries, donors, United Nations (UN) agencies and implementing partners to collect and classify information on aid flows and project implementation” (JRP 2015:12).

In order to ensure that assistance that goes to fund the JRP 2015 is used in a manner aligned and harmonized with the government’s own priorities, an approval process is set up through the online portal JORISS. There must be a project application submitted through JORISS for all projects that are to be implemented through the JRP 2015. An application must be written and submitted, and approved by the line ministry concerned with the project as well as by a committee chaired by MOPIC and the government Cabinet. This is intended to improve transparency and accountability over the money coming into Jordan, who receives it and what project the money funds. It also allows implementing actors to track their application in the approval process. Every project to be implemented must be matched with an objective in the Jordan Response Plan. This in turn will provide an overview of which objectives in the JRP are receiving a great deal of funding and which is not. It will thereby be clarified which objectives are not targeted and need more attention. Another new feature of the response is the Jordan Resilience Fund which was launched in March 2015 as a development fund for the JRP 2015. It is described as a tool to promote aid effectiveness, coordinate assistance and increase accountability and is jointly managed by the Government of Jordan, UN and donors (JRPSC 2015).

For the Jordan Response Plan 2016-2018 there are no longer two separate chapters for refugee and resilience, however refugee and resilience are still divided into specific resilience and refugee objectives and funding requirements are also broken down into funding for

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<th>Municipality (resilience)</th>
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<td>Social Protection</td>
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refugee activities and resilience activities. In terms of coordination, this remains “broadly unchanged” in the JRP 2016-2018.

“The Platform will continue provide overall oversight and guidance to the implementation of the JRP. It will review progress and appraise overall funding levels, providing recommendations accordingly. Task Forces, chaired by respective line ministries, will monitor progress against JRP 2016-2018 and will review needs and priorities.” (JRP 2016: 158).

The online portal JORISS will continue to be the main monitoring and reporting system for the JRP, where projects are submitted for approval, tracked and register of funds for the JRP (JRP 2016: 158). Discussions referring to the challenges of the creating a common coordination platform as introduced in the JRP 2015 cuts across the two JRPs.

4.2.2 Resilience

In the Jordan Response Plan 2015, the resilience-based development approach is adopted in order to “respond to and mitigate the effects of the Syria crisis on Jordan and Jordanian host communities” (JRP 2015:25). Resilience in Jordan is meant to cover gap between Jordan national development plans and the refugee, humanitarian plans. The development plans are for Jordan’s systemic, economic development activities, and the humanitarian assistance is for refugees. However, to link these two and to ensure that Jordanians development achievements don’t regress, supporting vulnerable Jordanians who are playing host to the vast majority of refugees in Jordan is seen as the “link”. Since they don’t fall into the refugee category, who are the main beneficiary of humanitarian assistance, and do not fall directly under the concern of broader, development goals, host communities and the public services provided at the municipal level that cater to both refugees and host communities have fallen in between “the gap”. Resilience is therefore meant to assist host communities in Jordan to address this gap.

The aim of resilience programming is two-fold: “first to ensure that shocks and stresses do not lead to a long-term deterioration in the wellbeing of a particular individual, household, system or institution, and secondly to build capacity to absorb future shocks and appropriately with related stresses” (JRP 2015:10).

Although refugee and resilience are separated into two different chapters, the sectors that cover both resilience and refugee have one overall objective. For example, the sector on Livelihoods and Food Security has as an overall objective: “to protect food security to save
lives, and enable livelihoods to cope with and recover from the impact of the Syria crisis, as well as strengthen the capacity to adapt to future shocks.” This overall objective is to be “met through the realization of specific refugee assistance and resilience-building objectives” (JRP 2015:11). In the sector for Livelihood and Food Security, there are three “refugee specific objectives” and four “resilience specific objectives”, as shown below in the table. The total funding requirements are listed for each sector and are divided into resilience funding requirements and refugee funding requirements.

Livelihood and Food Security Overall Objective:

To protect food security to save lives, and enable livelihoods to cope with and recover from the impact of the Syria crisis, as well as strengthen the capacity to adapt to future shocks.

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<tr>
<th>Refugee Specific Objectives:</th>
<th>Resilience Specific Objectives:</th>
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<td>1: Poor and vulnerable Syrian WGB; refugee and Jordanian host community households’ access to quality basic food improved.</td>
<td>1: More and better job opportunities created for vulnerable women, and young men and women.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Consumption of safe, nutritious, and diversified food promoted among WGBM Syrian refugee populations and vulnerable Jordanian host communities.</td>
<td>2: The local economies of the most-affected areas revived for sustainable employment and income generation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3: Coordination and evidence-based food security and livelihoods programming enhanced.</td>
<td>3: Pastoral livelihoods, rangeland and natural resources restored and preserved.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4: Availability of and access to quality food improved for Jordanian host communities.</td>
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4.3 Implementation Level
The official documents can only provide part of the overall understanding of how resilience is adapted in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. The goal of the master thesis is to uncover how resilience is translated from policy into practice by conducting interviews with actors familiar with the policy process and actors working on the ground. In the following section I present data collected from interviews.

4.3.1 Coordination

Task Forces

Findings from my data suggest that the Task Forces have not functioned as intended. They have come together to write the JRP 2015 and JRP 2015-2018, however they have failed to properly carry out other functions that they were supposed to perform, such as coordinate and monitor the implementation of the response. It is noted by the respondents that most of the Task Forces have not met for several months of the time, while a few, two or three, meet every couple of months. The Task Forces have therefore nominally existed for two years but have never been properly activated.

The main reason for this as stated by the respondents is the varying degree of capacity among different line ministries that are meant to chair the Task Forces. This creates uncertainties among operational actors who want a predictable and well-functioning coordination structures. They operate on a different time horizons, as humanitarian actors need and want to implement activities quickly and on a regular basis. There are few in the ministries who have a dedicated staff to work on the coordination of the response and are therefore they don’t have the capacity to chair Task Force meetings at a frequency required for operations on the ground to function. It is also noted that some government ministries don’t have enough experience and knowledge of how to coordinate a response, and therefore are not so interested in working with the Task Forces. Respondents have also commented on the lack of clear Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Task Forces. This has made it difficult for actors to fully use and support the Task Forces, as they don’t want to abandon a properly functioning coordination system under UNHCR for something that is unclear and seemingly not functioning. UNHCR coordinating system with Sector Working Group therefore remains the main coordination mechanism of the refugee response in Jordan.

Since coordination of resilience is envisioned to be through Task Forces, a properly functioning coordination structure for resilience activities is lacking. Coordination of
resilience activities comes down to the capacity and knowledge in the leadership of Task Forces and the Sector Working Groups. In one case, a WFP functions as a secretariat in the Livelihoods and Food Security Task Force and also leads the Sector Working Group. WFP can therefore function as a link between the two to facilitate resilience, however very much at the initiative of the UN-agency. Some resilience issues are brought up in the Sector Working Groups, and one respondent said: what is most likely to happen since the Task Forces is not functioning properly, is that the Sector Working Groups under the UNHCR will move into discussing development assistance.

The RCHC

As a couple of respondent’s noted that in a one UN system, all agencies are coordinated by a single leader and in Jordan this is supposed to be the RCHC. The RCHC office is the overall coordination structure of the UN and the main focal point with the government. However, the appointment of the RCHC has not led to a more coherent UN coordination, as was intended. The majority of the activity of the HC and the OCHA secretariat in Jordan is coordinating cross-border support from Jordan into southern Syria to assist IDPs. However, several respondents commented that the RCHC is also trying to increase his role in the refugee response. For instance, the RCHC elevated the Humanitarian Country Team to a strategic decision making forum as a step in “transitioning to a coherent UN leadership structure for the coordination of humanitarian and development assistance to Jordan” (UN Jordan, undated). However, since humanitarian assistance to Jordan primarily targets refugees, the RCHC is seen by several respondents as overstepping his mandate since it is UNHCR who is mandated with coordination and protection of refugees, as stated in the “Joint UNHCR-OCHA Note on Mixed Situation: Coordination in Practice” (UNHCR and OCHA 2014). The relationship between UNHCR and the RCHC office is described as being quite strained as a result.

There is therefore duplicate coordination structure, as the HCT led by RCHC and the IATF, led by UNHCR, are both functioning as a strategic decision making forum. Several respondents noted that it is the same people, going to the same meetings, discussing the same issues, with the exception of cross-border assistance which is only discussed in the HCT meetings. As one respondent noted, implementing actors would receive emails from them both, regarding the same issue, as if it were a competition about who sent the e-mail first. Another respondent exemplified this tension by referring to a visit of the new High
Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi to Jordan. When he came to visit UNHCR in Jordan, all the country directors of the INGOs and UN agencies were invited except for the RCHC, even though the RCHC is the most senior UN official in country. However, apart from being regarded as a waste of time, internal UN tension is not viewed by other actors as affecting their operations.

**Approval Process**

As previously mentioned, there is an online portal, JORISS, through which all projects have to be registered called JORISS. Overall, the respondents describe the approval process as cumbersome. It is impractical because it puts constraints on what is possible to do in terms of programming, and the process is often long and frustrating. As mentioned, every project has to be linked with an objective in the JRP. However, a project usually includes more than one objective. If a project contains four objectives, there must be four project applications registered with JORISS and each approved by the responsible line ministry. However, there may be objectives that address a wide array of issues, form health to education in one project. The project application linked with an objective under health should be approved by the Ministry of Health, and projects related to education must be approved by the Ministry of Education. This means that one project can be split into four different project applications, each processed by a different line ministry but all are part of one project. The approval process can take somewhere between two to six months. Project, as noted by respondents, are often be sent back and forth between the implementing actor and the line ministry if the ministry requests clarification on certain points or for other reasons sometimes unknown to the implementing actors. Some implementing actors have gone to the extent to hire an individual whose sole job it is to go to the different line ministries to sort out the bureaucratic procedures needed to get one project approved. If a project is split up between several line ministries, this can create a quite complex and time consuming situation. Implementing actors have therefore tried to be creative in getting through the approval process, anything to facilitate the process. This has then lead to some implementing actors to only have one overall objective for their project, and label as “activities” what would otherwise have been an objective, to avoid having too many objectives and too many projects. The consequence of this is that there are some objectives in the JRP that appear not to receive any funding or project activities, while in reality they are addressed but are labelled as “activities”.
For resilience projects, projects can go directly to the line ministry, get an official letter from them that they approve the project, and take it directly to the Cabinet for approval. It does not need to go through the same approval process as for refugee projects.

It must be noted that the approval process is not new. It has been a law in Jordan that any financial transfers to organizations from abroad must be presented to the government. This process was originally a mechanism in an anti-terror measures with the aim of curtailing international financing of terrorist activities. The same mechanisms have been adapted to the humanitarian response in Jordan, where all international funding that goes to finance assistance towards relief activities targeting refugees must be approved by the government.

4.3.2 Resilience

One of the main points of concern is the division between the “resilience” and “refugee” components of the plan. In the JRP 2015 the resilience component and refugee component are divided into two separate chapters and there are specific resilience objectives and refugee objectives. In the JRP 2016-2018, there are no longer two chapters but there are still separate resilience and refugee objectives.

Several respondents commented that they perceived the divide between refugees and resilience as artificial. The Government of Jordan interprets resilience to mean resilience projects that target vulnerable Jordanians and host communities. Some of the respondents argue that resilience is an outcome, not a target group, and resilience in terms of definition should not be synonymous with Jordanians. Another reason it is seen as artificial is that over 80 per cent of Syrian refugees reside in host communities and are relatively blended in with the population. To divide programming according to nationalities, whether you are Syrian or Jordanian, is therefore not seen as fruitful by several respondents. There should be resilience for refugees as well since they are the most vulnerable group and the most dependent on humanitarian assistance. Vulnerable Jordanians were also targeted in the RRPs since every refugee project that is implemented in Jordan must target 30 per cent vulnerable Jordanians, and 70 percent refugees. The exception is refugee projects in camps. However, this 70-30 rule has been transferred over to the JRP 2015 as well even though resilience, interpreted as assistance to Jordanians, was introduced. Following the logic of the JRP 2015, some respondents therefore commented that refugee projects should target 100 per cent Syrian refugees, and the 30 per cent that target Jordanians should be categorised as resilience.
The added value of using the concept of resilience is therefore questioned because, as one respondent put it, “the labels don’t fit”. On the question of whether the introduction of resilience has impacted their activities, the overall answer was: no it hasn’t changed their operations significantly. They were supporting host communities in their refugee projects before the JRP 2015 since 30 per cent of beneficiaries have to be Jordanians. Implementers on the ground, as some respondents commented, are more concerned with what was needed, targeting those who are in need across nationalities, which includes Jordan host communities. Assisting host communities are regarded as important in order to preserve a favourable protection environment for the refugees.

In terms of programming, due to the separation of refugee objectives and resilience objectives, a project must either be labelled as a refugee project or as a resilience project in the project application. It is noted by the respondents to be relatively arbitrary whether a project is a resilience or refugee project. It often depends on how the project is framed. For instance, a project that seeks to increase shelters in urban environments for refugees by giving apartment owners money in order for them to build an extra floor, and in exchange apartment owners allow refugees to live there rent free for a certain period: is it a resilience or refugee project? It can be described as a refugee project since it seeks to provide shelter for refugees. It can also be framed as a project that seeks to increase the housing stock in Jordan, which could then be categorised as a resilience project. One respondent noted that writing project applications has therefore become “an exercise in semantics.” When choosing which category to place a project, one respondent noted that they would pick the category which would make it easiest to get through the approval process, which in many cases would be the resilience category since the approval process for that is noted to be faster that refugee projects.

With the cumbersome approval process and poor functioning of the Task Forces, the divide between refugees and resilience creates obstacles for the type of programming is feasible. For instance, there is a program that seeks to establish a recycling plant that recycles waste from refugee camps. This will both create employment opportunities, be good for the environment, and it can produce compost that refugees can use for gardening. It is therefore resilience programming in that it is long-term, it will generate income, and be environmentally sustainable. However, since the project targets a refugee camp it is a refugee project, not a resilience project. In regards to a responsible line-ministry, it would have been natural to work with the Ministry of Environment. However, coordination wise the Task Force on environment has only worked with the resilience pillar of the response, not in the
refugee pillar. The project, although of a resilience character was labelled as a refugee project. Therefore, for implementing actors the separation between resilience and refugees is not always logical. However, it is noted that although this is a time consuming process they would rather be without, it doesn’t necessarily change what the implementing actors would like to do in the first place. The JRP 2015 is described by one respondent as being incredibly general, so in spite of there being some categorical constraints, the project will fit “somewhere”.

Its important to emphasise, however, that most of the respondents were of the opinion the introduction of the resilience-based approach to the response has made the need of vulnerable jordanians and jordanian host communities more visible, which was needed. Their needs are now more systematically incorporated into the response than they were before the JRP 2015. In the RRPs, some respondents noted that jordanians and host communities were included but not very systematically and more ad hoc. However, in terms of the effect resilience has had on the operations this has been limited. Vulnerable jordanians and jordanian host communities were already targetted through the refugee projects. Assisting vulnerable communities were also in the interest of those working with the refugees, since this would reduce tension between host communities and refugees and hence improve the protection environment. Several of the organisation are also already familiar with the concept of resilience and used the idea of resilience in their operations already, as a concept to reduce vulnerability and improve the ability of individuals and communities to deal with stress and shocks. Most of the respondents therefore interpreted resilience as resilience for Syrian refugees as well. That the Government of Jordan interpreted resilience to mean Jordanians has not meant that implementing actors has shifted their interpretation of resilience. Although in their communication with the Government they would switch to the Government’s interpretation of resilience.

Another constraint in terms of doing longer-term development type activities is donor funding. Some respondents are of the opinion that it took donors a longer time to adjust to the new protracted situation than the actors on the ground as donors have mostly provided short-term emergency funding. Humanitarian funding is usually only for six months at a time. This is a constraint in what kind of long-term projects can be implemented. The refugee situation in Jordan has been viewed as a humanitarian crisis where short-term funding is appropriate because a humanitarian response is supposed to be short-term, limited to the critical phase of a response. Short-term funding can also be more practical as the situation can change
drastically, and disbursement of funds must be quick in order to adjust the respond to new, rising needs. However, it took a while for the donors to realise that the refugees are probably going to be staying in Jordan for an indefinite period as the Syrian conflict is not improving. Implementing actors on the ground have worked on informing the donors that they are past the life-saving emergency phase and Syrians don’t need more blankets. One of the respondents commented that it has even been a challenge of retaining staff as they can only provide short-term contracts because the funding is short-term. Short-term funding has also been a challenge when linked with the long approval process. If a project is funded for six months, and is approved two months or more after it was supposed to start, there is a lot of aid bureaucracy in ensuring extensions for the project. It has been stressed however that donors have understood the challenge the approval process has presented to actors involved in the response and have been flexible with regards to project timelines.

Jordan being a Middle Income Country can also make it challenging for certain donors to provide long-term assistance since some countries have the policy of not providing development assistance to Middle Income Countries.

Lack of definition of resilience also creates challenges in terms of what separates resilience from development. Several donors have been concerned that a great deal of money going into Jordan is not reflected in the JORISS because the Government of Jordan determines the funding as development assistance to Jordan. The Government of Jordan wants to keep development assistance to Jordan separate from the JRP 2015 which is a response to the Syrian crisis. However, several donors would argue that the only reason funding is going to Jordan is because of the Syria crisis and therefore that money should be reflected in JORISS. It is JORISS the Government of Jordan use when they determine how much money is going to assist with the Syrian refugee situation. If money is kept out of JORISS, the gap is large and they can argue that they are not getting enough funding. According to some respondents, the donor community is working with the Government of Jordan in order to have their contribution better reflected in JORISS.

On the ground, few of the actors paid much attention to the divide between humanitarian and development assistance. They did more what they saw as necessary and within their capabilities. Most of the actors in the response have a dual mandate, and for them it was no problem to shift from short-term humanitarian relief to longer term development assistance. Even an actor with an explicit humanitarian mandate commented that they were doing projects that are more development in nature, since these projects would ultimately be
of the benefit of Syrian refugees. Actors on the ground focus their efforts on what is necessary and don’t see the need to label everything, and see this instead as a bureaucratic constraint set up by the donor community for transparency and accountability reasons and, as one respondent argued, also political reasons as donors can show more quick results from humanitarian assistance than development. In terms of resilience programming, in the first year of the JRP 2015 it is the actors who were present in the early stages of the emergency response that are now moving into “the gap” and doing more long-term, development type activities.

UNDP has focused on building institutional capacities at the municipal level in order to improve capacity to provide public services to both Jordanians and Syrian refugees. This will then build resilience of national capacities to cope with Syrian refugees, but the causal link between building resilience of institutional capacities and reduction of emergency spending. If Syrian refugees are not self-sufficient, they will continue to depend on humanitarian assistance for rent, food etc.

Overall, however, spite the challenges of the approval process, some respondents commented that the whole JRP process since 2014 has in many ways been a trust-building exercise between the international community and the government since the government is more engaged in the response.
5 Theory

To analyse my data and to answer my research question, I will use the theory of strategic action fields as developed by Fligstein and McAdams, which will be supplemented by Barnett and Finnemore’s theory of how international organisations influence policy.

5.1 What is a strategic action field?

Theory of strategic action field is fundamentally concerned with “how stability and change are achieved by social actors in circumscribed social arenas” (Fligstein and McAdams 2012:3). Strategic action fields are constructed social orders and are perceived as the “fundamental units of collective action in society” (Fligstein and McAdams 2012:9). Strategic action fields are socially constructed arenas in three important respects:

First, membership in the fields is based on subjective rather than objective criteria. This entails that actors that constitute a strategic action field have a sense of shared purpose which they identify with. Humanitarian actors often identify themselves with a broader humanitarian community.

This leads to the second aspect of strategic action fields, namely that the boundaries of strategic action fields are not fixed. They can shift, “depending on the definition of the situation and the issues at stake” (Fligstein and McAdams 2012:10). For instance, the boundary between humanitarian and development community are not necessarily clear-cut despite the recurrent focus on the ‘gap’ between them and their provisions for populations in need. There are several actors who have a dual mandate and don’t neatly fit into either category. UNICEF is an example of a UN agency with a dual mandate, and is a provider of both humanitarian and development assistance (Suhrke and Ofstad 2005). They also exist on the virtue that they help people and societies at large where it is needed and in that regard are not that different from each other (Slim 2000). The humanitarian and development community are similar since they both depend on external funding from donor states or other funding mechanisms. In relation to the donor community, the humanitarian and development actors form an aid community that constitutes a single strategic action field. The boundaries of the strategic action field can therefore shift depending on the situation (Fligstein and McAdams 2012:10).
Finally, fields are constructed in the sense that there is a shared understanding formed over time that guides the behaviour in the field. There are four categories of shared understandings (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:11). First, among the actors in the field there is a general, shared understanding of what is going on and what is at stake in the field. Second, distribution of resources in the field determines the distribution of power across the actors. There is therefore a “set of actors in the field who can be viewed as possessing more or less power” (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:11). This implies that actors occupy a general position in the field based on resource distribution and they have a sense of their own position in relation to other actors. Third, the field is characterised by a set of rules with which the actors are familiar. The “rules of the game” determines which actions are viewed as legitimate and meaningful within the context of field (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:11). Finally, actors within the field bring a “broad interpretive frame” through which they make sense of what other actors in the field are doing. However, there is not just one consensual frame that holds for all actors. How action is interpreted is expected to reflect the relative positions of actors within the strategic action field. In other words, actors are expected to view the behaviour of other actors from their own perspective (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:11).

5.2 Composition of a Field

With the interest in the dynamic of stability and change, elements from social movement theory are used to understand the strategic action fields as composed of incumbents and challengers. Incumbents are those actors perceived to be dominant in a strategic action field by wielding significant influence within the field. How the strategic action field is organised often reflects the interest and view of the dominant actor. The rules of the field tend to give them advantage, and the shared meanings bring legitimacy to the actor and support of their position within the strategic action field (Fligstein and McAdams 2012:13).

Challengers occupy a less privileged position within the field. Although they recognize the nature of the field, they can “articulate an alternative vision of the field and their position in it.” This, however, does not mean that challengers are usually in an open revolt against the incumbent. Normally, challengers conform to the prevailing order while “awaiting new opportunities to challenge the structure and logic of the system.” (Fligstein and McAdams 2012:13).
There are also internal governance units in the strategic action field that serve to facilitate the overall functioning and reproduction of the system (Fligstein and McAdams 2012:14). They do this by collecting and providing information about the field to both incumbents and challengers. This information is also used to inform the actions of all parties within the field.

5.3 What triggers change

The two main triggers of change in a strategic action field is change in a proximate field or the entry of “outsiders” into the field. Strategic action fields are assumed to be embedded in a web of other fields. These fields can either be interrelated or independent of each other. The state is an example of a field in which other strategic action fields interlinked, and can be regarded as a proximate field to the strategic action field in question. The strategic action field can often be dependent on proximate fields, such as the state, as the state is often a provider of resources for actors within a strategic action field and also creates the space that allows for the existence of the field (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012).

Outsiders are groups that have previously not been active players in the field. Outsider challengers often make the most effective adversaries because they are not bound by the conventions of the strategic action field and instead are free to bring new definitions of the situation and new forms of action to the field” (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:99).

There are several tactics challengers can deploy. As they often have fewer resources and few powerful linkages, it is not likely that challengers will go into direct confrontation with the incumbent. Instead, they will most likely form alliances with more powerful actors in the field, either with the incumbent itself or others. Alternatively, they can find a niche within the field not covered by the incumbent.

However, to create and utilize opportunities there must be actors within the field with social skill that can take strategic action. Strategic action is defined as “the attempt by social actors to create and sustain social worlds by securing the cooperation of others”. Social skills are useful in strategic action fields in order to forge political coalitions and promote cooperation with other actors. In order to do this, actors who work for change must be able to frame lines of action that will mobilise people “in the service of broader conceptions of the world and of themselves” (Fligstein and McAdams 2012:17). Persuasion is here a key, as
actors have to convince other groups that cooperation will serve their collective interests (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:15).

How actors in a strategic action field use their social skills depends on what role they occupy. Incumbent groups in a stable social world aim to produce and reproduce the status quo. The collective set of meaning that provides legitimacy and support of the incumbent group helps maintain the status quo. Actions of incumbent groups are viewed through an unquestioned, interpretive frame that relates the actions to the shared meanings in the strategic action field and are therefore taken for granted. Challengers, however, may use social skills in a different manner. They can assume the role of “institutional entrepreneur”. Outsiders are, as previously discussed, often the most effective adversaries to a field settlement. However, there are several obstacles for a challenger to overcome. The settlement in a field defines the “stable, predictable worlds and sources of meaning and identity for all participants in the strategic action field” (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:107). The field therefore has a cultural logic and organisational structure that will represent a barrier to a challenger. To overcome this barrier, “challengers must fashion alternative conceptions of control that simultaneously undermine the existing settlement, while providing animating vision for the field” (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:107).

5.4 Dynamics in the Field

There are two seemingly contradictory elements of strategic action fields. From one perspective, strategic action fields are characterised by the “concerted efforts of collective actors to fashion a stable consensus regarding rules of conduct and membership criteria that routinize interaction in pursuit of common aims” (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:92). There is therefore a constant reproduction of the routines of the field which maintains the status quo. This perspective implies that the interaction in the field is more cooperative that competitive and more about consensus than conflict. From another perspective, fields are characterised by interest, power and conflict. This perspective argues that fields are organized as a hierarchy or there are power structures that is dominated by “one or a small number of actors who set the rules and agenda for other groups (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:89-90)

Fligstein and McAdams make the case that there is a middle ground. They criticize institutional theory for placing overly focus on the routine reproduction of a field, which shape opportunities and constraints of the actions of actors. Explaining stability of institution
is at the core of institutional theory and change is assumed to be rare and rarely intentional. Explaining change is therefore one of the main weaknesses of most institutional theory. It implies too much consensus about what is going on in the field and focus too little on the actors’ position in the field, how rules in the field are made, and the use of power by actors. Rather, strategic action fields are “only rarely organised around a truly consensual ‘taken for granted’ reality” as actors are “constantly making adjustments to the conditions in the field given their position and the actions of other” in an attempt to marginally improve their position in the field (2012:11-12). The norm in the field is therefore “constant low-level contention and incremental change” as opposed to routine reproduction of the field. Even in settled fields there can be dissent and open conflict, at the same time as such fields exhibit a stable structure over time (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:12).

The dynamic in a strategic action field can therefore embody elements of both cooperation and competition between the actors in the field. Competition occurs when different actors compete over advantage in the field, the outcome of which depends on a combination of resources, strength of allies, and social skill. The winner is expected to gain access to more resource flows, while losers may get less but still remain in the field (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:15).

Cooperation in the field involves “building a political coalition to keep the strategic action field together” (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012:15). Ideally, a political coalition is based on cooperation and is founded on shared interests, such as more material resources to both parties, and a common collective identity.

The aid community can be characterised as a mixture of both cooperation and competition. In a detailed analysis of INGOs, Cooley and Ron (2002) find that INGOs compete with each other to raise money and secure donor contracts much like firms do in private markets (2002:7). Similarly, in case of international interventions, Ferris (2011) argues:

“Each of the actors has a different mandate, governance structure, and funding mechanism, making coordination difficult. Each also has an institutional interest in being seen to be active, particularly in high-profile emergency situations. That concern with visibility […] can lead to competition and turf battles between agencies eager to demonstrate their relevance and competence to donors (Ferris 2011:92).
Many of the largest international NGOs started out providing assistance in conflict situations, but have later expanded their activities to also involve long-term development assistance (Ferris, 2011:99). As I will argue in the next chapter, because of the increasing overlap in responsibilities and activities, it can be fruitful to regard both humanitarian and development actors as part of one strategic action field.

At the same time, INGOs and IOs that share a certain understanding of the world and share a common goal, for instance those who identify as humanitarian actors, can be expected to cooperate and share information (Cooley and Ron, 2002:17). Coordination also avoids duplication of efforts and more effective assistance. However, as emergency “hot-spots” tend to attract a great deal of funding, which in turn attract more aid actors hoping tap into the funding stream, more competition is likely to ensure (Cooley and Ron, 2002:12). This can encourage humanitarian actors who define themselves distinct from other types of actors in order to protect for themselves an area of the field (Collinson, 2014:31).

5.5 International organisations

The theory of strategic action field is good to provide a basic understanding of the main components that determine change and shape dynamics between actors in a field. However, to explain the response in Jordan and to provide an analytical framework to answer my research question, there is a need to supplement it. Although the JRP 2015 process has had a strong presence of the host government, the process has largely been led and implemented by international organisations (IOs). I will therefore supplement the theory of strategic action field with Barnett and Finnemore’s theory on how IOs exert authority and influence policy. To understand how certain concepts such as resilience can be used in fostering a shared understanding or action, I will look at how IOs can use so-called key words, or buzzwords, to form and provide legitimacy to action.

International organisations are, from a realist perspective, created by states to act as tools whose purpose is to carry out tasks and responsibilities that will serve the interests of the states. They can be created in order to solve collective action problems, reduce transaction costs and various other functions which the state finds are in their best interest (Keohane, 1984). However, constructionist scholars such as Barnett and Finnemore (1999) argue that although originally created by states, international organisations can act autonomously and exert significant authority in the international community. They can have their own agenda
on which they act and can often act in a manner contrary to the interests of the states which originally imbued them with power.

Drawing on Weberian arguments, Barnett and Finnemore (1999) argue that the source of authority of IOs can be understood by treating them as bureaucracies. The authority of bureaucracies stems from two main sources: “(1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and information” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999:707). A set of legalities, rules and procedures constitute IOs and provides it with purpose and guides its function. The authority is rational as it “deploys socially recognised relevant knowledge to create rules that determine how goals will be pursued” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999:707). The IOs can then act contrary to the interest of states as they can defend their actions as they “are performing ‘duties of office’ and implementing ‘rationally established norms’ “(Barnett and Finnemore 1999:707).

The second basis of autonomy and authority for IOs is derived from their specialized technical knowledge, training and experience that are not “immediately available to other actors” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 708). This knowledge is useful for IOs for them to effectively carry out their tasks. This can also give them power over politicians and other actors, which “invites and at times requires bureaucracies to shape policy, not just implement it”, giving IOs a great deal of influence (Barnett and Finnemore 1999:708).

The autonomy and authority of an IO can be exemplified using actors relevant to this thesis, such as UNHCR who, with its legal mandate to protect refugees and its long experience with relief efforts have been endowed it with an “‘expert’ status and consequent authority in refugee matters (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 110).

How IOs use this authority to influence the international community is interesting and relevant for this thesis, as it is largely IOs who are formulating policy and are responsible for their implementation. Their power is tied to their ability to structure knowledge, in other words how they classify information and knowledge, and fix meaning in the social world. In the debate around the definition of refugee, for instance, “UNHCR’s legal and operational definition of the category strongly influences decisions about who is a refugee and shapes UNHCR staff decisions in the field” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999:711). To fix-meaning to social contexts is similar to that of creating a shared understanding of the strategic action field, as it establishes the parameters and boundaries of acceptable action in a social context (Barnett and Finnemore 1999:711). To fix meaning to social contexts within the international aid community, “key words” (Williams 1983: in Cornwall and Brock 2005), or “buzzword”
(Cornwall and Brock 2005) has been used to define problems and solutions, and create the boundaries of legitimate action. According to David Mosse, at the policy level it can be expected that actors within the international aid community “devote their policy processes to constantly revising and re-framing development so as to shore up their legitimacy in a fast-changing political environment” (2005:1). These policy processes aim to provide “better theory, new paradigms and alternative frameworks” which are always needed (Mosse 2005:1). In the process of reframing policy, key words are used to create a sense of consensus which pulls actors together in pursuit of “a set of common goals for the well-being of all” (Cornwall and Brock 2005:1045). Such concepts are wide-reaching and conceptually vague, allowing different actors to invest different meanings to the concept. Key words are therefore useful in policy declarations and policy development “by lending the possibility of common meaning to extremely disparate actors”. Cornwall and Brock analyses the use of buzzwords by studying the use of the concepts “poverty reduction”, “participation”, and “empowerment”. In analyzing how resilience has been used, it is useful to analyze it as a key word. The concepts malleability as it is adapted to different contexts and situations, lends itself as a vague concept as resilience can mean anything (Levine and Mosel 2014:8). The power of key words derives not only from the concept itself, but from the other concepts with which it is associated. This is called the “line of equivalence”

Although the vagueness of a concept can serve a political purpose, this can also risk the concept becoming decontextualized from the dynamics at the implementation level and the concept can take on a different meaning (Cornwall and Brock 2005:1053). Mosse asks “what if practice is not driven by policy? What if the things that make for good policy are quite different from those that make it implementable?” (Mosse 2005:2). The result is a gap between policy and practice. The gap between policy and practice is by Schlichte and Veit (2007) attributed to differing social and political logics between those who develop policy, often at headquarter level in Brussels, Geneva or New York, and those who are tasked with implementing policy into practice. At the policy level at headquarters, there are bureaucratic requirements and need to frame their activities for political purposes, namely to make them attractive to donors (Schlichte and Veit 2007:25). In the field, “broad and often abstract objectives […] must be transformed into concrete projects” (Schlichte and Veit 2007:19). The implementation level is therefore steered by its own dynamics quite autonomous from the policy level. These dynamics that structure of the local social world, are often quite different
from the level where policy is developed. Policy, then, as it is adjusted to the local structure does not necessarily play out the way it policy developers envisioned.

Following the foregoing discussion, I will in this thesis expand upon Fligstein and McAdams theory of strategic action fields to analyse the field as composed of two levels: a policy level and implementation level. As I will argue in the next section, I see both the humanitarian and the development actors as constituting one strategic action field. Within this field there is a policy level and implementation level that are interlinked, but yet retain some autonomy and are characterised by different dynamics.
6 Analysis

6.1 Defining the strategic action field

The strategic action field in this analysis is the response to the Syrian refugee situation in Jordan, and the collective actors in the strategic action field are the UN agencies, NGOs and the Government of Jordan, who have been involved in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis on the ground. In terms of the humanitarian and development actors, they can be distinguished into two strategic action fields due to their different modes of operation. Furthermore, they can be distinguished based on their self-identification, as actors such as UNHCR and ICRC would identify themselves with the humanitarian community, and likewise UNDP and ILO would identify themselves with the development community (Suhrke and Ofstad, 2005). However, in this thesis, I will treat them as constituting one strategic action field for two main reasons. First of all, their mandate; the purpose of their existence, is to help a set target group: people in need. As pointed out, there are several actors, like UNICEF, which have dual mandates, and even those actors who might identify with just one of the communities may have overlapping responsibilities. This is, in part, related to questions of funding. All the actors in the concerned strategic action field depend on external funding in order to function. They are therefore influenced by the previously discussed dynamics of obtaining funds though the development and framing of policy that appear appealing to the donors. The second reason for why I will treat the humanitarian and development community as one field in this thesis is the foundation of the response in question; resilience in the JRP 2015. As resilience is envisioned to bridge the gap between the provisions of the traditional humanitarian assistance and developmental assistance, the goal should necessarily be that these communities do constitute one strategic action field. Furthermore, as the theory allows for competing interests between the actors in the field shifting boundaries between fields and argue for the existence of a shared understanding between the actors, as opposed to a more rigid notion of consensus, I hold it is fruitful to include the humanitarian and development communities in one strategic action field.

The donor community, however, will be treated as the proximate field. The donor community has strong links to the response in Jordan as they fund the response, and changes in terms of policy of donor governments or funding can affect the operations of the actors in the response. However, they are not part of the strategic action field since it is primarily
international organisations that have shaped policy and the strategy documents, and they do not implement activities. The relationship between them is therefore interlinked, with the strategic action field in question dependent on the proximate field in order to function.

The Government of Jordan could have been a proximate field, since the Government of Jordan was not greatly involved in the actual implementation of the refugee response led by UNHCR. One of its main roles as a state has been to determine the protection space in which the response takes place, and can in that regard be viewed as a proximate field that provides the parameters of the humanitarian strategic action field. I choose however to include them in the strategic action field as they have played a major role as the host of over half a million refugees and providing them with access to public services, such as water, education and health. Its involvement with the response has also greatly increased with the launch of the Jordan Response Plan 2015, making the government a visible player in the response and part of the collective action of the field.

6.2 Composition of the field

As to the composition of the field, UNHCR is treated as the incumbent in the analysis. The humanitarian response in Jordan, the Refugee Response Plans (RRPs), was led and coordinated by UNHCR. As posited in the theory of strategic action field, UNHCR as the incumbent wields significant influence within the field and the manner in which the strategic action field is organized. The refugee coordination model reflects the interest and view of the dominant actor. The structure of the refugee response is largely determined by UNHCR and has given the agency a certain authority over the field. This authority is rooted in its mandate, as the UN agency mandated with the responsibility to protect refugees and the institution of asylum. The organization of the field can be characterised as hierarchical since UNHCR was leading the response and brought legitimacy to the collective action of the other actors. Cooperation has been an important feature of the refugee response as INGOs and other UN agencies chaired and coordinated the Sector Working Groups. They also have a great deal of autonomy; they have their own resources and often a specialization within a niche, for instance UNICEF are unique in that they have a specific mandate to protect children.

It is expected that it is in the interest of the incumbent to produce and reproduce the status quo (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012). Features of the refugee coordination structure are also characteristic of an internal governance unit, where information and advocacy are
important functions. As head of the response they facilitate the flow of information by collecting data itself or from its partners for their own planning purposes, but also distribute information to all the actors involved in the response in efforts to avoid duplication of efforts, but also ensure that everyone is on the same page. In other words, ensuring that there is a shared understanding of what is happening in response, that efforts are concerted and that the actors are working towards a common goal. This serves to reproduce the status quo in the field. UNHCR also have an important role in advocating for protection of refugees, both with other actors within the field such as with the host government, but also outside the field to the donor community and the general public. The production of RRPs serves such a purpose, providing actors outside the field and within an overarching picture of the response. An important part of the RRPs is also to appeal for funding from the donor community, which is based on needs assessments produced by the actors involved in the refugee response. This ensures a flow of funding to the actors involved in the response, in the interest of the incumbent and its partners in the field.

Under the JRP 2015 coordination structure, the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis (JRPSC, i.e the Platform) fills the role of internal governance unit as it supports the “coordination and monitoring of the sector response plan’s implementation”. It aims to facilitate and guide implementation and monitoring of the response and to “ensure the alignment of assistance to the government’s main development priorities” (JRP 2015:12).

UNDP, the RCHC, and the host government are treated as challengers in the strategic action field. UNDP and the RCHC are the “outsiders” as they have not been active players in the refugee response, but have gradually joined the strategic action field as the response has shifted to a refugee and resilience response. They are therefore a part of the strategic action field in the analysis.

Drawing on the theoretical contributions of Mosse (2005) and Schilte and Veit (2007), I argue that to understand this strategic action field further, the field must be analysed is composing of two levels: policy level and the implementation level. The change in the response has occurred due to processes at both the regional and the country level. A great deal of the policy development that has guided the shift, such as the UNDG position paper which first proposed the resilience-based approach to the Syria crisis and the 3RP, has been at the regional level. With the emphasis on national ownership in the resilience-based approach, policy at the regional level is adapted to the local context at the country level where new policy in theory is to be turned into practice. There are therefore two processes that are
interlinked within the strategic action field, policy development and implementation. I argue that these two processes constitute two levels within one strategic action field because the actors in question are involved in the processes on both levels, and therefore by focusing on the dynamics of the actors I hold they constitute one strategic action field. However, as these processes happen at two levels that are relatively autonomous and that each have their own dynamics, I find it justifiable to separate the two levels within the strategic action fields.

6.3 What triggered the change towards a resilience-based approach?

As discussed previously, change in a strategic action field normally arises from change in a proximate field or the entrance of outsiders into the field (Fligstein and McAdams, 2012). Both processes have occurred in this case. As described in chapter 3, there was “a big push” from the donor community to get a regional strategy for the Syrian crisis in place (interview). The stated reason for this push was two-fold. First, it was becoming apparent that the Syrian refugee crisis would become protracted since the Syrian conflict was not abating. Furthermore, there was donor fatigue. The donor community didn’t want to continue funding an exclusive humanitarian response in the unforeseeable future. They wanted a new solution that was more sustainable in order to reduce humanitarian funding over time, a goal that was also reflected in the JRP 2015.

Reduced funding to the response in 2014 was also seen as a significant factor. The need for this shift became particularly clear when the WFP ran out of money in the autumn of 2014. This was a wake up call and illustrated the dependency of Syrian refugees on humanitarian assistance and their vulnerability to fluctuations in funding. Change in the proximate field, therefore, was an important trigger to change the response. It was in response to this that the UNDG formulated the position paper on resilience-based approach to the Syria crisis and adopted by and advocated for by the UNDP. Political, development and economic challenges merits a different response. It is too complex for traditional humanitarian assistance alone to address. These arguments, and sometimes the exact phrasings are found in the JRP 2015, for instance the stated need for a development-oriented approach to “build resilience and reduce the need for humanitarian assistance over time” (UNDG 2013:2; JRP 2015:25). UNDP has used the concept of resilience to frame a new vision of what a sustainable response should be. The resilience-based approach was
presented as a solution which would require a shift in mind-set of actors involved in implementing the response but also with donors, in order to collectively think beyond immediate priorities, and preferably using national systems in order to ensure increased national ownership over the response.

UNDP, as outsiders, had not previously been engaged in the refugee response in Jordan, and therefore they were free to redefine the situation and propose new forms of action and vision for the field. As theory of strategic action states, creating a new vision for the field while also undermining the current status quo are effective tools for creating change. By describing the current humanitarian intervention as an inadequate response to the situation, a problem was identified to which resilience-based development approach is the solution. Further, the refugee response in Jordan had taken place largely outside the purview of the government. UNDP argues that since the Government of Jordan is a Middle Income Country with well-functioning institutions, the response should utilize and support those resources. Their involvement would also ensure that the interventions are sustainable in the long-term. This line of reasoning is clearly a challenge to the status quo. The agency also draws on its authority as lead of the early recovery cluster. Although there isn’t a cluster system in place in Jordan, they draw on the same language by proposing coping, recovery and sustaining as important objectives in the response. The UNDP is therefore given a lead role in the resilience response at the regional level, and at the country level are supporting government institutions, at the municipal level in particular. However, as several respondents noted, development actors including the UNDP have had limited resources compared to the humanitarian actors.

The RCHC would also challenge the status quo. A RCHC was appointed to Jordan in 2014 and pushed for a change in the response. In the paper “The Resident’s Vision”, the RCHC describes the architecture for delivering humanitarian and development assistance to Jordan as “fragmented” (UN Jordan, undated). There were several planning structures such as the NRP and the RRPs, and the IATF and HCT. The RCHC therefore promoted an alternative vision of the response, with a coherent UN leadership structure for the coordination of humanitarian and development assistance to Jordan, where the principle of resilience “will function as the glue for bringing humanitarian and development assistance under one coherent framework” (UN Jordan, undated). The elevation of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to a strategic decision making forum is described as a step in the direction of a coherent UN leadership (UN Jordan, undated). This can be regarded as a challenge to the already existing IATF which was functioning as a strategic decision making
forum for the refugee response under UNHCR. The RCHC also pushed for that the RRP and the NRP should become included within a sustainable development framework for Jordan. This would be the JRP 2015, which was to complement Jordan’s own development strategies.

6.3.1 Strategic Action in the Field

According to theory of strategic action field, a challenger will most likely form alliances with more powerful actors in the field, either with the incumbent itself or others. Alternatively, they can find a niche within the field not covered by the incumbent.

However, to create and utilize opportunities there must be actors within the field with social skill that can take strategic action. Strategic action is defined as “the attempt by social actors to create and sustain social worlds by securing the cooperation of others” (Filigstein and McAdams 2012:17). Social skills are useful in strategic action fields in order to forge political coalitions and promote cooperation with other actors. In order to do this, actors who work for change must be able to frame lines of action that will mobilise people “in the service of broader conceptions of the world and of themselves” (Filigstein and McAdams 2012:17).

They can also choose to go to a proximate field in order to leverage their power vis-à-vis other actors within the field. In the period of 2013 and 2014, UNDP deployed tactics to gain support from the donor community on the resilience-based approach and would later forge a partnership with UNHCR at the regional level. The UNDP presented the position paper at a meeting with the EU development group, which is a consortium of almost twenty development agencies, including WFP, UNICEF, that were involved in the response in the region to gather support for the new approach (interview). UNDP and UNHCR came together and began negotiating a common appeal and response to the crisis in 2014 (interview). The final result was the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015 (3RP 2015). The push from UNDP was therefore more at a regional, policy level of the response. The RCHC would push for similar changes in the Jordan context.

For UNDP to realise the resilience-based approach in practice they would need to forge a coalition with the reigning incumbent in the field, UNHCR. Forging coalitions requires social skills. Social skills are an actor’s capacity to frame lines of action and challengers can “be expected to propose and seek to mobilize consensus around a particular conception of the field” (Filigstein and McAdams 2012:22). Resilience is such a concept around which UNDP tries to mobilise the actors involved in the response, among them UNHCR. Using resilience to frame the response is part of convincing other groups that
cooperation and adopting this new approach will serve their collective interests. To what degree cooperation ensues depends also on how the incumbent interprets the process as either a threat to or an opportunity for realization of collective interest.

Why did UNDP and UNHCR form a partnership at the regional level? According to interviews with UN officials engaged in the process, it was perceived as an opportunity for both parties to mobilize resources and skillsets that would benefit them both and the overall response. UNHCR saw it as a strategic shift that would bring development actors with different skillset than UNHCR and humanitarian actors, such as UNDP and the World Bank, into the response. Bringing in other development actors such as the World Bank was also expected to bring in additional funds from additional sources and push the response towards longer term, more sustainable solutions for the refugees (Interview). It also represented a strategic shift for UNDP and other development actors since there wasn’t a great deal of development funds going into that region of the Middle East since countries in the region are Middle Income Countries (Interview). Considering the vast amount of funding going into to fund the response to Syrian refugee situation, making oneself a relevant actor in the response would hopefully mean access to that pot of money.

While the relationship between UNHCR and UNDP is characterised as a partnership, the appointment of a RCHC in Jordan has been followed by a great deal of competition in the field. As described previously, the majority of the activity of the HC and the OCHA secretariat in Jordan is coordinating cross-border support from Jordan into southern Syria in order to assist IDPs. This can be regarded as an important niche in the field, since the UNHCR have focused on refugees, and IDPs fall under the mandate of HC and OCHA. However, the elevation of the Humanitarian Country Team to a strategic decision making forum in order to create a “coherent UN leadership structure for the coordination of humanitarian and development assistance to Jordan” (UN Jordan, undated) presents a couple of challenges to the status quo in the field. First, the IATF under UNHCR has served as the strategic decision making forum for the refugee response in Jordan. The statement implies transferring that this function should be transferred to the HCT, led by the HC and his OCHA secretariat. Second, this statement further implies that humanitarian assistance to Jordan, which primarily targets refugees, should be coordinated by the HCT. However, according to the “Joint UNHCR-OCHA Note on Mixed Situation: Coordination in Practice”, the HC and HCT are not to be implemented in a refugee situation. Mandates and responsibilities are therefore interpreted differently. As expected in a strategic action field, actor will interpret
legitimate action in the field depending on their relative position within the field (Fligstein and McAdams 2012:11). There is no consensus. Instead there is constant low-level contention as actors try to position themselves vis-à-vis others in order to gain advantage.

As some respondent’s noted, the RCHC was not given space in the field by UNHCR. The RCHC has therefore nurtured its relationship with the Government of Jordan in order to create space in the field. The RCHC functions as the main focal point with the Government and has pushed for government leadership over the response. The RCHC is also one of the main supporters of the Task Force coordination system. One important source of UNHCR’s influence in the field stems from its coordination structure. By supporting the government and the Task Forces as the primary coordination structure to replace the existing structure, this challenges UNHCR’s influence in the field. The Task Forces supported by the RCHC have however not been operational.

6.3.2 Resilience in Policy and Practice

In the process of reframing policy in the strategic action field, resilience has been used to create a sense of consensus which pulls actors together in pursuit of “a set of common goals for the well-being of all” (Cornwall and Brock 2005:1045). At the policy level, resilience has been used to advocate for an approach that would mobilise different actors in the field, humanitarian actors, the host government, and development actors.

The challenge of using the policy documents produced from a process that tries to get everyone on board, is it becomes vague and general. As a few respondents noted, disagreements that could potentially spoil the joint refugee and resilience response were smoothed over or ignored in order to move the process along. These were for example questions on what resilience was to mean in this context. One respondent noted that during negotiations, actors were unsure what kind of projects would be resilience projects, what would be refugee projects, since for instance education programmes for refugees are long term and therefore resilient in nature. At one meeting, one respondent recalled, the question of what resilience meant came up, but was overlooked and was not answered during the meeting. Forging this coalition was therefore a challenge, and it is noted that negotiations almost failed several times with one respondent comparing it to “negotiations with unions”. Some questioned the capacity of UNDP, as development actors have not traditionally been very strong in the Middle Income Countries in the Middle East. UNDP had not been part of the response previously and their sudden entry into the field were questioned by some of the
actors in the field. What were their motives and interests? It was also a challenge to get the Government on Jordan on board. The JRP 2015 was being produced simultaneously with the 3RP. However, the 3RP 2015 was a UN led plan and the JRP 2015 a government-led plan. They were sceptical of coming under a UN response and considered keeping the JRP 2015 outside the 3RP 2015. Eventually the coalition succeeded and the regional and national plans were launched. However, some of the issues that had been kept vague in order to get everyone onboard came to light when policy was to be implemented in practice. The policy did not play out at the implementation level in the manner some of those involved in the policy process had hoped.

In the 3RP, “[R]esilience is the ability of individuals, households, communities and institutions to anticipate, withstand, recover and transform from shocks and crises.” In a crisis situation, the goal of resilience is to “bolster” people’s ability to overcome the worst parts of the crisis and “return to a path of sustainable prosperity”. This understanding of resilience is therefore very much similar to that described in the literature review and that resilience is about getting back to the original trajectory of development as was before the crisis and not be set back. Resilience involves “investing in the capacities and resources abilities of those communities and institutions most affected by a crisis”. It is stated that for these reasons, “a resilience-based development approach to the Syria crisis is different from humanitarian relief”. The resilience approach also aims to empower those in need through “rapid employment generation, life skills training and inclusive governance” with the ultimate objective being “to create a viable path away from the need for direct assistance and toward self-sufficiency and sustainable human development for all affected communities” (3RP 2015:17). One interpretation of this is that refugees also constitute what you would describe as “affected communities”.

Resilience is therefore associated with reducing vulnerability of affected communities. Related to this is the concept of livelihood, and as discussed previously resilient livelihoods are viewed as central to reduce vulnerability in face of stress and shocks. In terms of resilience as process, the concept of national ownership and having government take leadership over the response are important aspects of the concept. This is reflected in the guiding principles of the resilience-based development response and is adopted by the JRP 2015.

The concept is wide-reaching and conceptually vague that leaves the question open: resilience for whom? This has allowed different actors to invest different meanings to the
concept. The Government of Jordan interpreted resilience to mean resilience building for only vulnerable Jordanians and Jordanian host community, not Syrian refugees. The logic presented in the JRP 2015 was therefore flawed. As it states in the JRP 2015, one of the aims of the response was to reduce humanitarian funding over time. Since most of humanitarian funding going to Jordan is to assist Syrian refugees, excluding them from resilience programs and excluding them from the labour market would inevitably not lead to reduced humanitarian funding. However, it had been the expectation of some that refugees would be included in the resilience-based approach. The logic behind the shift, then, was to have a more sustainable response that would lead to reduced humanitarian spending. An important part of the resilience-based approach was to introduce livelihood programming to the response. As one respondent commented, in order to reduce humanitarian funding, it would be essential “to shift from cash programmes and food vouchers from WFP towards livelihoods programming where refugees can maintain their skillset, could put their children through education and have a future beyond receiving cash handouts” (Interview). That is what the international organisations involved in the response wanted, and reduced need for humanitarian spending is what the donor community wanted.

The JRP 2015 contains two contradictory goals: On the one hand, one goal is to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development assistance. On the other hand, it is a goal to reduce the need for humanitarian funding over time. This contradiction can be linked with how one interprets what the divide is between humanitarian and development assistance. Jordan has had their own development plans from before the Syria conflict that focuses on Jordan’s economic development. These have been kept separate from the humanitarian response to address the needs of refugees. Resilience in Jordan is meant to be placed in the space between Jordan’s long term development plans and the short-term humanitarian response to the refugee situation. To ensure that Jordanians development achievements don’t regress, providing support to vulnerable Jordanians who are playing host to the vast majority of refugees in Jordan is seen as the “link”. Since they don’t fall into the refugee category who are the main beneficiary of humanitarian assistance and do not fall directly under the concern of broader, macro-economic development plans; host communities and the public services provided that cater to both refugees and host communities have fallen in “the gap”. Resilience is therefore meant to assist host communities in Jordan to address this gap. This also makes resilience separate to traditional development aid and refugee aid, as it focuses on addressing the impact of the conflict in Syria on Jordanians.
Several respondents commented that some projects under the resilience chapter in the JRP 2015 were development projects that had little to do with impacts of the Syrian conflict. It was further commented that several donors were reluctant to fund those activities. For instance, the sectors on environment and transportation in the JRP 2015 received no funding (JRSPC, 2016). Similarly, The Jordan Resilience Fund, the purpose of which is to fund objectives in the JRP 2015 that are underfunded, has received no money since it was established in early 2015 (interview). Considering that it was the donors who were one of the initial pushers for a new, sustainable and coherent strategy, the lack of funding of resilience activities suggests that the use of resilience-based approach in the JRP 2015 did not meet their expectations.

The interpretation of action within the strategic action field is determined by the position of the actor. For the Government of Jordan, it has been in their interest to get more funding to Jordan as they have carried a heavy burden hosting refugees. This position has been clear from the “Needs Assessment and Review the of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan” (MOPIC, 2013) and the following National Resilience Plan (MOPIC, 2014). It does not, then, come as a surprising that resilience is interpreted in a manner that benefits the Government of Jordan and Jordanians.

From the point of view of the donors, they had called for a more sustainable response as they did not want to continue funding open ended humanitarian response in the indefinite future. When refugees were not included in resilience projects and, moreover, when what they viewed as development projects were included under the resilience section, this served to undermine donor confidence. However, as some respondents commented, donors are often interested in quick output from their funding. There can therefore be other incentives that lead donors to prefer funding humanitarian activities rather than development activities. Similarly, Jordan being a Middle Income Country restricts funding activity of donors, some who have the policy of not providing development assistance to Middle Income Countries.

Another factor that is noted to have served to undermine the process is the perceived restriction of protection space of Syrian refugees in 2014 in parallel to the process that led up to the JRP 2015. One respondent described it as a contradiction that while the Government of Jordan restricted the access of Syrian refugees to public health services by setting a fee, they were also making the case that the international community should support their public services. However, when the access to these services was restricted, Syrian refugees were pushed into health services provided by the international community in the refugee response.
(Francis 2015). This would create incentives for the international community to set up parallel structures to assist Syrian refugees who no longer had access to public health services. This in turn would undermine the case of the Government of Jordan with the donors to get more funding. However, as the Government of Jordan argued, the reason why they set a fee was because they did not have enough capacity to cater to the refugee population due to lack of funding. It can therefore be viewed as a negative spiral, as while the Government of Jordan are seen as restricting protection space because of lack of funding, this in turn reduces donor incentives to provide funding to government institutions. However, change in the proximate field is likely to change this. As the flow of Syrian refugees to Europe increased drastically in 2015, this provided incentives for Western countries to increase funding to neighbouring countries hosting refugees.

With regards to the effect resilience has had on the operation on the ground, the respondent’s working at the implementation level said that the JRP 2015 and the introduction of resilience has not affected their operation. This can be attributed to a gap between policy level and implementation level. As Mosse asks, “what if practice is not driven by policy? What if the things that make for good policy are quite different from those that make it implementable?” (2005:2). The JRP 2015, as one respondent describes it, is so general that although the division between resilience and refugee is artificial, almost any project can be implemented. Further, as another respondent stated, implementing actors participated so that they could get in the objectives they wanted into the JRP 2015 that would allow their projects to be approved in the approval process. The JRP 2015 did not affect their projects. It was rather the other way around as “it’s not the plan that makes the project” (interview). Resilience is a label used to categorise their activities in the bureaucratic processes, but this process does not change their operation. The refugee response continues relatively as it used to as the refugee coordination model under UNHCR is still a well-functioning structure. It is not affected by the lack of functioning Task Forces. However, because of lack of functioning Task Forces there is not coordination on resilience activities. Resilience projects are approved more or less directly with the line ministries outside of the approval process which refugee projects must go through. Setting up more challenging bureaucratic processes for refugee projects rather than resilience projects further emphasises the impression that resilience has been used for political purposes to get projects that target host communities. The correct language is used at the implementation level to reflect the policy language in the JRP 2015 to get projects approved.
From the position of development actors and the RCHC, as discussed, have used the government to leverage their own position in the field. A few respondents therefore commented that some of the humanitarian actors worry that development actors will align themselves with the government even if that is not in the best interest of refugees. This is attributed to differences in organisational culture between humanitarian and development actors. As has been a challenge with development initiatives in previous refugee situations, development actors tend to align their work with the priority of the host government. Refugees are often not a priority of the host government since they are not part of their constituency. As the case has been in Jordan, UNHCR through its MOU have responsibility for refugees and for resettling refugees outside of Jordan. With the perceived restriction of protection space in 2014, this does not foster trust between the Government of Jordan and the humanitarian actors. When the Government of Jordan does not interpret resilience as resilience for refugees, development actors can be expected to follow suit. As one respondent questioned, to what extent is ownership over the response a carte blanche for the host government?

However, actors who have a close relationship with the Government of Jordan can use that connection to influence the Government of Jordan towards improving Syrian refugees’ access to labour market. It is mentioned in the Position Paper that the resilience-based development response is based on the assumption that refugees themselves can be valuable assets to their host community and should be considered a resource rather than a liability (UNDG 2013:8). It says that resilience should be for refugees as well. The language in several of the policy documents are also quite vague as to “resilience for who” question, as it contains wording such as “populations” or “affected” and “vulnerable” communities, not always differentiating whether it refers to the host population or refugees. This vagueness, as discussed, has opened up for different interpretation of resilience for whom, with the Government of Jordan interpreting resilience as resilience for Jordanians. However, it has also left room in which to discuss refugee accommodation, including sensitive topics such as access to livelihoods. While the concept of resilience in the context of Jordan is criticised by several actors involved in the response, both at the policy and implementation level, others have pointed to its importance in pushing the process towards a point where refugee accommodation can be discussed with the Government of Jordan. One respondent argued that it would not have been fruitful to discuss refugee accommodation from the basis of the refugee response. That discussion needs to come from a framework in which the Government
of Jordan is invested. Opening up the response to new actors from the development community and the private sector, which the resilience-based approach has provided legitimacy for, is a step in that direction.

Determining then what effect resilience has had comes down to what one expects resilience to accomplish. If the intention of resilience is to change the way actors think about response to crisis, introducing resilience has had a significant effect. Resilience has, as most of the respondents noted, initiated a shift in the mind-set of the actors involved in the process that might not have happened had it not been for the push of the resilience-based approach. As one respondent noted, if the JRP process with the resilience-based approach hadn’t been initiated, several aspects of the response would probably not have changed. There would probably have been an RRP7, and the government might not have become the visible actor it is now.
7 Conclusion

In light of the increasingly protracted nature of the Syrian refugee crisis, a resilience-based development approach to the Syria Crisis was adopted by the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan to the Syria Crisis 2015-2016 (3RP) and the five national chapters for the countries in the region, including the Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis 2015 (JRP 2015). This approach was adopted in order to address both humanitarian and development needs of Syrian refugees and the host countries in the region. Since resilience is a malleable concept and can take on different meanings depending on the context, I have been interested in understanding how resilience has been adjusted to fit the context of a refugee situation. This informed the research question of the thesis: *how is the concept of resilience operationalised by the actors in policy-documents and how does it affect the response on the ground?*

The JRP 2015 has been the locus of my analysis and I have studied the process that has led up to the JRP 2015 and the initial stage of implementation in 2015. My analysis is based on both policy documents produced in relation to this process as well as twenty-two interviews with actors involved in the policy-making process and implementation on the ground. I have tried to uncover the underlying motives of actors involved that has driven the process forward, and the challenges of shifting the response as experienced by the actors themselves.

My findings suggest that resilience has first and foremost been used at the policy level to mobilise support from a variety of actors, such as humanitarian actors, development actors, donors, and host governments, for a new, comprehensive approach to the Syria refugee crisis. Contrasted with the refugee response which has been dominated by humanitarian actors, the introduction of resilience has opened a space in the response in which both humanitarian actors and development actors can participate. In this manner, resilience is a step in the direction of bridging the gap between humanitarian and development assistance. This comprehensive approach has also entailed increased national ownership and the Government of Jordan has become increasingly visible in the response than they were during the refugee response.

The application of theory of strategic action field to study the change in the response, has allowed me to study the dynamic of change in the response which can be characterised by
cooperation and competition between actors in the response. This theory has been useful to explain the motives behind the shift, which were the perceived advantages of multiple parties involved in the response. A new, comprehensive approach would bring new resources and skills to the response which was suffering from donor fatigue in 2014. However, the entrance of new actors has also engendered competition over authority in the field as the actors try to position themselves vis-à-vis each other in order to gain advantage in the field. This tension is notably between UNHCR and the RCHC where there are tensions regarding mandates. This competition has played is in the analysis exemplified in a battle over coordination, where each actor derives authority from its coordination structure which is part of justifying their authority in the field. However, this has also led to duplication of coordination efforts, as new coordination structures are placed on top of the old.

By drawing on various theoretical contributions of Barnett and Finnemore (1999), Mosse (2005) and Cornwall and Brock (2005), I explain how the concept of resilience has been kept vague at the policy level, which has opened up for different interpretations of what resilience should be. This has then led to a gap between the expectations of policy and the manner in which policy is implemented. The Government of Jordan has interpreted resilience as referring to vulnerable Jordanians and Jordanian host communities, not refugees. This interpretation has led to the separation of refugee and resilience into two, separate project categories. This separation is regarded as artificial to actors implementing projects on the ground, and therefore arguably resilience was introduced into the response for political purposes and not because it made sense on the ground. I have therefore argued that there is a contradiction in the JRP 2015. Excluding Syrian refugees from resilience has also served to undermine a central element of the JRP 2015, which is the goal of reducing humanitarian assistance over time. Syrian refugees are the primary receivers of humanitarian assistance. By not interpreting resilience as resilience for refugees, it is not clear how humanitarian assistance is to decrease. Together with the perceived introduction of development projects into the resilience component of the response, this has served to reduce donor confidence. Certain components of the resilience pillar of the JRP 2015, including the Jordan Resilience Fund, have not received funding.

With its focus on national ownership, the involvement of the Government of Jordan in the response is one of the significant changes in the response due to the JRP 2015 and the resilience-based approach. Although the Task Forces have not been operational, the number of meeting arenas between implementing actors and the Government have increased.
Although some would describe it as inflation in cumbersome, bureaucratic procedures, it has also served as a trust-building exercise between the humanitarian community and the Government as there are more lines of communication between them.

As the situation for Syrian refugees in Jordan is continuously changing, how resilience is used and adjusted in response to the changing context of the response is an interesting topic for future study. This line of study is particularly interesting as livelihood opportunities for Syrian refugees in Jordan have increasingly become a topic of discussion in Jordan and in Western Countries since the launch of the JRP 2015. In light of this, it would be interesting to analyse how the dynamic between the policy level and implementation level continues to evolve and shape the response to the Syria refugee situation in Jordan.
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Annex

Interview Guide

Could you please tell me about your organisation’s role in the response?

Could you please tell me about the process that led up to the JRP 2015?

What have been the most important changes in the response with the JRP 2015 compared to the refugee response?

How has increased government leadership affected the response?

Could you please tell me about the Task Forces?

How is resilience used in practice in the JRP 2015?

How do you define resilience?

How has the introduction of resilience into the response affected how you operate?

What have been the main challenges of shifting to a refugee and resilience response?

How has the response changed with the entrance of new actors in the response?