From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union:

*From a policy of non-interference to a policy of non-indifference?*

Mari Hushagen Langerud

Masters thesis, Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History. Faculty of Humanities.

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

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Abstract

The subject for this thesis is the change from a policy of non-interference to non-indifference between the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and its successor, the Africa Union (AU). The purpose of the thesis is to explore explanatory factors for the different approaches to respectively a non-interference policy, by the OAU, and a non-indifference policy by the AU.

The term non-interference refers to the absence of foreign interference in national affairs, in this case where the OAU deliberately maintained a policy of not interfering with its members' internal affairs through interventionist actions. The term non-indifference hence refers to the approach of the AU, where the organisation on several occasions, with varied tools and approaches, have interfered in its members' internal affairs.

The OAU stated early that one aim for the organisation was non-interference. The charter had descriptions and processes on mediation, condemnation and peaceful processes, but the policy was to stay out of the neighbour's internal affairs as much as possible. During its existence from 1963 to 2002, the organisation engaged in conflicts on just a few occasions.

The AU has taken a different approach and has intervened to support constitutional political change, provide military interventions, and initiated several attempts to establish peace or end conflict through mediation and peace talks. In other words, an active role compared to what the OAU took. This change is interesting in itself, but so far, little research has been done on why the transition from one organisation to the other changed the policy from non-interference to non-indifference and why the change occurs. Relevant here has slo been to investigate the question of what time period this policy change takes place.

This thesis intends to first see how the OAU was established as a result of the Pan-African movement, and how the organisation followed a policy of non-interference as a guideline for the relations between the member states. Further, it will examine how the transition towards a policy of non-indifference in the OAU developed before it was replaced by the AU in 2002, seen in light of emerging changes internationally, and why the policy change occurred.

The thesis has been written based on mainly original documents from the organisations themselves and the United Nations, with the supplement of secondary literature when applicable. Some documents are retrieved from the AUC Library at the African Union's headquarter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Acknowledgement

Handing in this thesis marks the end of a five year long journey and several people deserves eternal gratitude, applause, and a decent amount of champagne.

Firstly to my supervisors. Karin Dokken, for all your valuable feedback, good conversations, ideas, encouragement, extensive knowledge of Africa, and the open-door policy through the process. You are really one of a kind. The same gratitude I feel to my co-supervisor Ingrid Lundestad, who through valuable guidance managed to put my ideas into a context suitable for historians.

To the Library and Archives Unit of the African Union, Addis Ababa, for valuable help during my stay, and maneuvering in decades of history.

To my parents for being supportive even when you, surely, must have questioned the sanity of your offspring. For teaching me to enjoy books, what it means to work for something, what responsibility is, building my confidence, and all good conversations along the way.

To my brother, for always questioning my sanity, for rarely agreeing with me, for always making me laugh, inspiring me to work harder and have more fun.

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Espen, thank you for keeping up with me these two years with ups, downs and distance. I promise that I will keep quiet about Africa now. At least for a week.

Lastly, I wish to dedicate this to my grandfather Lars. I miss you every day.

Oslo, 14.05.16
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List of Abbreviations

ALF.................................Africa Leadership Forum
AHG.................................Assembly of Heads of State and Government
AMISOM..............................African Union Mission in Somalia
APF.................................African Peace Facility
AU.................................African Union
AUPSC..............................African Union Peace and Security Council
CMCA..............................Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
COM.................................Council of Ministers
CSSD..............................Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation
ECOWAS..............................Economic Community of West African States
EU.................................European Union
FROLINAT..........................Front de Libération National du Tchad, National Liberation Front of Chad
GS.................................General Secretariat
IMF.................................International Monetary Fund
JAES.................................Joint Africa-EU Strategy
MOG.................................Military Observer Group
NATO.................................North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU.................................Organisation of African Unity
OSCE.................................Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe
PO.................................Peace Operation
RPF.................................Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC.................................South African Development Community
SG.................................Secretary General
UAMS.................................Union of African and Malagasy States
UAS.................................Union of African States
UN.................................United Nations
UNAMIR..............................United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNITAF............................Unified Task Force
UNOSOM..............................United Nations Operation in Somalia
1.0 Introduction:

Africans are on the front lines of humanitarian efforts, distributing life-saving aid in dangerous environments. Africans comprise the vast majority of peacekeepers in civil conflict on that continent. Africans for the most part lead peace negotiations for the wars being fought in Africa.

- John Prendergast

Despite a focus in the media on war and conflict, Africa is experiencing both economic growth and increased political attention from the international society of states. As John Prendergast relays, the people of Africa play a big role in their own security politics. Unquestionably, there are conflicts and unrest in parts of Africa, but at the same time African states are providers of peace, through the deployment of peacekeepers to several conflict areas around the world. This is despite having unresolved conflicts themselves on the continent where the United Nations and African regional organisations place troops in attempts to provide peace and stability.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of peacekeeping operations conducted on the continent has grown rapidly. During the same time period, the number of interventions performed by regional organisations in attempts to create stability in conflicts is also increasing. The African Union is one such regional organisation, established in 2002 and currently consisting of 54 member states.

The African Union (AU) is the successor of the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was established in 1963 with the official purpose of promoting unity and solidarity among the states, eradicating all forms of colonialism, and furthering cooperation on several fields such as economy, education and security. The OAU had a strong focus on

1 American activist and founding director of the "Enough project to end genocide and crimes against humanities".
3 AU: "List of countries who have signed, ratified/acceded to the Constitutive Act of the African Union". Accessed 17.10.15. http://www.au.int/en/AU_Member_States
non-interference among its members, which was firmly based in its charter. The charter further stated that the members "Declared their adherence to (...) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration".\(^5\) This meant that the organisation favoured a non-interference policy and territorial sovereignty of each member. When the organisation interfered in other states during the Cold War, it was usually with the peaceful means stated in the charter. This was seen during the Nigerian Civil war, the first period of the Chad crisis, and several border disputes among its members.\(^6\) The case in Chad later evolved into the first all-African peace operation conducted by the OAU.\(^7\) During the first decades of existence it rarely intervened in conflicts and did not succeed in using the means of the charter to prevent actions of mass atrocities such as in Rwanda. The organisation preached the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of the member states.

Their successor, the African Union, has gone in another direction described by scholars such as Paul D. Williams as a policy change from non-interference in the OAU, to non-indifference in the AU.\(^8\) Since the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council in 2005, more than sixty-four thousand uniformed peacekeepers have been sent or authorised to missions on the continent, and the organisation has an active role with the UN, NATO and EU in order to solve regional conflicts.\(^9\) The African Union has participated in, and even initiated and led, some peace support operations or interventions to maintain or establish peace in Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Darfur, the Central African Republic, and others.\(^10\)

This contrast, how the replacement of one organisation in favour of a new one, still with more or less the same actors and laws, can actually lead to a change towards a principle of non-indifference is interesting. Why did the two organisations take on different paths, and what led the OAU to change? How can such a change be explained? The subject for this masters thesis is the transition between the Organisation of African Unity and the

\(^{5}\) Ibid: Principles, article 3 (4)
Accessed 10.09.2015
http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_5_amoo.pdf
\(^{8}\) Proposed discussion of the term may be found in Williams, Paul: "From non-intervention to non-indifference; the origins and development of the African Union's security culture". *African Affairs* 106/423, pp. 235-279 (2007).
\(^{9}\) Danielle Renwick: (13.05.2015)
\(^{10}\) Ibid.

4
establishment of the African Union, and what effect this had on the will of the organisation to intervene in conflicts.

**Problem formulation and limitations of the thesis:**

This thesis intends to first see how the OAU was established as a result of the Pan-African movement, and how the organisation followed a policy of non-interference as a guideline for the relations between the member states. Further, it will examine how the transition towards a policy of non-indifference in the OAU developed before it was replaced by the AU in 2002, and why the policy change occurred.

A question emerging, is why the change from a non-interference policy to a policy of non-indifference and, in the case of the AU, even a right to interfere or be interfered in, and in what period of time did the policy change take place? To identify specific changes is essential, such as in the charters or political factions within the organisations that have influenced in processes of policy change. The changes can also come from pressure by external factors, institutions like the United Nations (UN) or international politics, which can say something about the motivation for change. It will be challenging, if at all possible, to pinpoint a specific date for such change, from non-interference to non-indifference. Parts of the process may have began as early as the final years of the OAU, whereas other factors of the change only came in place after the actual transition from OAU to the AU in 2002.

Thus, the time span of this thesis is long, starting with the years prior to the launch of the organisation of Africa Unity in the late 1950s. Here it will be natural to look into the actors who contributed, and the idea behind establishing the organisation. The OAU’s lifespan, and what the organisation did in the years following a non-interference policy is also necessary to explore to engage in a thorough debate.

I find it interesting to research how the transition from the OAU to the AU has changed the willingness of the organisation to intervene in conflicts in Africa, and look into whether or not it is possible to track this process of change, and why the member states changed their perspective. This is also where the knowledge gap is most visible in the historical literature I have come across. The question I will be working towards answering will therefore be:

*How and why did the OAU, later the AU, change its policy from non-interference to non-indifference, and when did the policy change take place?*

A few additional subquestions are necessary to give this thesis direction, and I will look into the following:
- What politics or thoughts internationally, as seen with changes in external factors such as United Nations, European Union or others, made the OAU find it necessary to change its non-interference policy?
- Is it possible to identify internal changes in the organisation that forced the acceleration of change in the policy?
- How did the transition from a non-interference policy of the OAU develop to a non-indifference policy as seen in the AU?
- During what time period did the OAU change its view on non-indifference?

The motivation for writing on this topic comes from a personal interest in the continent itself, the African Union, interventions and a general interest of the change in African security politics after the Cold War. The topic is complex, very wide, and there are several interesting aspects for a historian to look into. The historiography covered by this thesis relies within several fields of relevance for historians and political scientists today. It elaborates on topics where there are knowledge gaps. It is a story about contemporary African history, where sources at times are hard to find. It is an analytical narrative of important events in the history of Africa which have contributed to shaping the security politics of the region until today. It is a historical analytical narrative within diplomatic history, through its relevance for diplomatic relations among African states during the establishment and existence of a large organisation, and the complexity of the process.

To ensure that my project is feasible, some limitations are necessary. The first limitation was made in the initial process of choosing a topic, when the thesis was limited to investigating the OAU and the AU, rather than the phenomenon "African Peace and security" as a whole. That would necessarily include other organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and be a far more extensive project than the limitations of this MA thesis allow. A second limitation is done based on which time period to focus on. Despite the importance of Pan-Africanism for the development of the OAU, which dates back to the 19th century, this has been limited as the research questions do not particularly focus on the Pan-Africanism aspect. It will be necessary to look into the events prior to the establishment of the OAU, which contributed to the shape and political framework the organisation set for itself, but a long history of Pan-Africanism has been left out from the thesis, and replaced with a brief outline.
Therefore, this project will look into the period of time between 1958 and October 2015, which is when the annual UN assembly took place in New York, an event which produced documents that may be relevant for this thesis. It is possible to identify several events that are important to understand why the AU was established as it was by discussing the history of its predecessor. Providing the reader with perspective and understanding of the involvement of the OAU in peace and security questions in Africa prior to the AU will be a necessary part of the project. For the same reason, of providing insight and knowledge for the reader, the time span this thesis works with is quite long, bearing in mind that the change in policy did not take place quickly and abruptly. This approach allows for more thorough understanding of the development from non-interference to non-indifference.

**Conceptual framework and actors**

To grasp the concepts of non-interference and non-indifference policy, an introduction and elaboration on certain terms and principles, as well as an introduction of the actors, is necessary for the thesis.

*Peacekeeping* or interventions with the intention of creating peace and stability have been a part of international history for decades. For instance, on the African continent the tradition of peacekeepers stretches back over a period of more than 60 years, with a variety of missions and challenges.\(^\text{11}\) They are well documented by the United Nations, and several research projects have been conducted on them both separately and on comparative approach. The United Nations writes in the Capstone Doctrine of 2008 that peacekeeping is activities that tend to create conditions for lasting peace, through the application of a varied set of peace and security activities.\(^\text{12}\) These, according to the UN Capstone Doctrine, include:

- **Conflict prevention:** Where one involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.
- **Peacemaking:** Includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement, and where the Secretary General can offer "good offices" to provide resolutions.

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- **Peacekeeping**: Where the intention is to preserve the peace, and to assist implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. This can be achieved through a model where police, military and civilians co-operate.

- **Peace enforcement**: Includes use of force if necessary, but always with approval of the UN Security Council. The aim is to restore international peace and security where a threat to peace and security has been identified, peace has been breached or acts of aggression have been demonstrated.

- **Peace building**: A long-term process creating conditions necessary for peace. The aim is to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening the capacity for conflict management, and laying a foundation for sustainable peace and development.\(^\text{13}\)

These activities have traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. International Human Rights are an integral part of the UN peacekeeping operations, and international humanitarian law applies and should be known to those who take part in such operations.\(^\text{14}\)

Common to the terms, is that they, to a varied degree, are seen as interventions, as they intervene in state affairs. *Interventionism* was, in 1915, defined by historian Henry Green Hodges as "an interference by a state or group of states in the external affairs of another state without its consent, or in its internal affairs with or without consent".\(^\text{15}\) For the sake of clarity, the term *intervention* is used throughout this thesis to cover actions taken by a state, group of states or an organisation to insert themselves in another state's internal affairs. This can include, but is not limited to:

- Attempts to create peace and stability through intervening with military force based on humanitarian principles or with the aim of creating peace and stability.
- Mediation in processes aiming to create and/or maintain peace or to prevent conflicts from erupting.

The term *non-interference* is used by several scholars to describe the absence of foreign interference in national affairs. It was in 1970 defined by the United Nations in declaration 2625 (XXV) as a principle where:

\[
\text{No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever[sic], in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention}
\]


\(^{14}\) Ibid.


Accessed 23.04.16.

https://archive.org/details/doctrineinterve01hodggoog
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.\textsuperscript{16}

The term \textit{Non-indifference} refers to what a legal adviser of the African Union, Ben Kioko, describes as an "African idiom found in most African Cultures: you do not fold your hands and just look on when your neighbour’s house is on fire".\textsuperscript{17} This implies that when crisis occurs, you as a neighbour should not be a bystander.

Closely connected to this terminology is the principle of \textit{Responsibility to Protect}. The term was used for the first time in 2001, and was implemented by the United Nations World Summit in 2005. It states that each state has a responsibility to protect its own population from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The international community holds responsibilities, not only to protect, but also "to take necessary actions in a timely and decisive manner through the United Nations Security Council".\textsuperscript{18}

Due to the fact that peace operations or interventions are seen as legitimate by the international society only if it is conducted with UN approval, operations have been seen in connection with the UN. Out of 16 current UN peace operations around the world, 9 are in Africa.\textsuperscript{19} 80\% of the UN budget on peacekeeping operations is used there, but despite the clear presence of UN forces in African Peace Operations, the organisation does not have monopoly on them.\textsuperscript{20} Others have also intervened with armed force in conflicts, or with peaceful means. These initiatives have in Africa mainly come from regional arrangements such as ECOWAS, SADC, the OAU and in later years, the AU. More frequently than during the 1990s, the responsibility (or parts of it) is carried by regional organisations or security frameworks with UN approval. One of these is the African Union, based in Addis Ababa, which is one of two organisations focused on in this thesis. A tendency is that regional organisations such as the African Union take more of an active part for the responsibility or


http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm


\textsuperscript{18} United Nations: Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. 60/1 World Summit Outcome. (24.10.2005): 30 Accessed 01.03.2016


\textsuperscript{19} United Nations Peacekeeping fact sheet. Accessed 13.10.15


\textsuperscript{20} Renwick, Danielle: (13.05.2015) Last updated.
conduction of these operations, with the support of partners who provide technical, economic or logistical support. This support can come from the United Nations, NATO or the European Union.\textsuperscript{21}

Since the launch of the organisation in 2002, the AU has intervened to support constitutional political change, provide military interventions, and the less interfering peace initiatives of mediation and peace talks. In other words, an active role compared to what the OAU took. This change is interesting in itself, but little research has been done on why the transition from one organisation to the other changed the policy from non-interference to non-indifference, or if the change comes from the transition at all. The AU has on several occasions called upon reactions from the international society towards crises on the continent. Further, it has been active in peace and security operations on the continent in ways the OAU rarely was during its existence. The continent as a whole might appear to take more responsibility for its own security, as seen with the AU led contribution in Somalia (AMISOM).\textsuperscript{22}

The AU has worked towards a platform for security politics for the continent, taking a starting point from where the OAU left, as seen in the 2000 Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDC).\textsuperscript{23} One of the most noteworthy actions performed by the new organisation in order to change their policy was the establishment of a common Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).\textsuperscript{24} With the establishment of the AUPSC, several legislative additions came into place. In Article 4(I) the members agreed to the peaceful co-existence of member states and their right to live in peace and security. Article 4(J) states the right of the organisation to intervene in a member state in cases of grave circumstances, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22} AMISOM: AMISOM replaced the IGAD Peace support mission to Somalia in 2006. It was in 2007 authorized to the AU by the UN to deploy a peacekeeping mission, which has continued since then. The last approval by the UN was given in October 2014, continuing the AU lead operation until November 2015. Accessed 27.10.15 http://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/
\textsuperscript{23} AU: The AU in a Nutshell. Information site for the African Union. Accessed 17.10.15 http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
Article 4(H) states the right of being intervened by any member who requests it.\textsuperscript{26} This is a remarkable change from the OAU Charter's right to non-interference for each member. It is also unique compared to other organisations' security policy; no other charter for a security oriented organisation states the right of being intervened. This shift in policy from non-interference to a right of intervention and a right to be intervened happened at a time when responsibility to protect is widely debated in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{27}

The AU has taken a direction towards what Paul Williams defines as a \textit{doctrine of non-indifference}, rather than the previous OAU doctrine of non-interference.\textsuperscript{28}

The \textit{Organisation for African Unity} had a focus on state sovereignty, combined with encouragement of peaceful settlement through arbitration or mediation, and non-interference, more or less until it was replaced with the African Union. The United Nations had largely the same restrictive attitude in Africa at the time, and during the Cold War rarely conducted any operations in Africa, aiming to create peace and stability. It was more of an exception of rule if the OAU involved itself in its members internal affairs beyond condemning actions, or passing resolutions and declarations. The OAU worked towards abandoning all forms of colonialism, and towards economic growth and prosperity for the continent. The latter mentioned values were shared by its successor, but the AU has taken a different direction when it comes to the idea of non-interference and state sovereignty. It stands in sharp contrast with the firm policy of the predecessor OAU's policy of non-interference.

The OAU stated early on that non-interference was a goal. The charter had descriptions and processes on mediation, condemnation and peaceful processes, but the policy was to stay out of your neighbour's internal affairs as much as possible.\textsuperscript{29} During its existence from 1963 to 2002, the OAU engaged in conflicts on just a few occasions, as mentioned earlier.\textsuperscript{30} Several of the member organisations, however, still contributed to the UN forces internationally on separate initiatives. During the 1990s, the OAU was debating its own fundamental principle of non-interference, which so far had left a gap in engaging in security

\textsuperscript{27} Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect: About R2P. Undated. Accessed 10.12.15.
http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p
\textsuperscript{28} Paul D. Williams: From non-intervention to non-indifference; the origins and development of the African Union's security culture. \textit{African Affairs} 106/423, pp. 235-279 (2007) p.256
\textsuperscript{29} AU: About the Constitutive Act. Undated. Accessed 13.10.15
\textsuperscript{30} These operations will be addressed in chapter 2 regarding the OAU.
questions on the continent. Conflicts erupted into civil wars - and in the case of Rwanda even genocide, where the OAU never managed to fulfill its intention of using the articles in the charter to achieve peaceful settlements of the conflicts.

Why the African continent appears to have taken more responsibility for its own security cannot be completely understood without also investigating changes in world politics in general, and with UN's role in particular. The question of "who's keeping the peace" is raised and discussed extensively by several scholars such as Alexander Bellamy and Paul Williams. The UN has traditionally been the *peacekeeper* in Africa with several large operations, the majority taking place after 1990. It is also of relevance to see how the policy of responsibility to protect - or the principle of non-indifference - versus state sovereignty in Africa changed in line with the international debate on the question. Therefore, any changes from the UN towards the acceptance of regional arrangements such as the OAU and the AU with regards to international peace and security should be illuminated in the process of working towards an understanding of the change from the OAU policy to the AU policy. In particular, the understanding of the relations between the UN and the OAU, later the African Union, in questions of peace and security are of importance, as well as how changed behavior from Western States influenced the policy change.

**Literature**

The material on the OAU, the AU, policy of non-interference or interventions is comprehensive, and varied. Previous literature often has been related to measuring success rates in regards to interventions, efficiency and developing standards to utilise on future interventions. Specific singular events have been addressed, and biographies on political personalities of relevance exist. There are contributions that examines why the OAU failed in its mission to promote common African interests and maintain peace, where the explanations of failure often lie internal factors such as inner diplomacy or economy, or external factors like international politics. One example is Amadou Sesay, who has written about the limits of peacekeeping by regional organisations, focusing on the Chad-operation conducted by the OAU. Where the OAU, AU and UN have been present, and how peace operations have been conducted both during and after 1990 has also been written extensively on, such as work done

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31 See i.e. Paul D. Williams:(2007).
https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/14931/16000
by Justin Morris and Hilaire McCoubrey on peacekeeping after the Cold War era\textsuperscript{33}, or Jakkie Cillier and Kathryn Sturman, who write about the dangers of conflict and failed interventions as a motivation for action.\textsuperscript{34} Both academic research and evaluations from the participants are available on the topic, and several books of secondary sources. Accounts of the security politics of regional organisations are also available, as well as historical accounts of their establishment.

Much of the focus on Africa and security politics, and the focus on the policy change in general has, however, been from the schools of political science such as Tim Murithi, who believes that it may be too early to predict the effect of the policy change.\textsuperscript{35} Historians have written about Pan-Africanism, long-term effects of conducted interventions, the politicians present in decision-making processes, and diplomatic history. What happened when, where, and how, and often on very specific subjects such as one particular actors’ role in a process. What is missing is a narrative that can support the presentations from political science regarding the policy change from non-interference to non-indifference, which does not aim to measure effect or predict models, and sees the development in a long-term view. An attempt from a historical perspective can explain the policy change in light of international history and African contemporary history. The "lessons learnt" from the OAU and its influence on the policy the African Union has followed have not been thoroughly covered, but merely mentioned as an introduction to a topic. This is an important aspect in a research discussing why the organisation has chosen a different path than its predecessor.

The policy change and its influence on the will to intervene is less documented, with the exception of work done on Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act.\textsuperscript{36} There are few studies done on the transition from the OAU to the AU and its effect on the will to intervene in other African states in a broader perspective from the views of historians, which is the knowledge gap I wish to work in with this thesis. On security politics and political strategies of the OUA

\begin{flushleft}
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and AU, Eki Yemisi Omorogbe at Leicester University law faculty has written about the
delivery capacity of the African Union in terms of potential to take a role in resolving armed
conflicts on the continent. 37 His work is also linked towards the legality of the conductions.
Political scientist Paul D. Williams explains the change from non-interference to non-
indifference in light of security culture, by researching how cultural norms influence the
African Union's response to security processes. He does so by investigating the origins of the
AU security culture, but his presentation of the process towards a policy shift and elaboration
on history, is brief.38

Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy have written about how regional organisations
can fill gaps that the United Nations are unable to fill themselves. Their article focuses on
how the AU has come out onto the international playground as a necessity due to reluctance
from the United Nations Security Council.39 They have a particular focus on regionalisation
and contemporary peace operations in a global perspective on security, and the international
interventions in Africa, but write little about African interventions in Africa.

Conrad Rein has recently published an article about the relations between the United
Nations, European Union and the African Union regarding security in Africa, with particular
focus on the relation between the aforementioned actors and the "African solutions to African
problems".40 This article is very interesting, and presents solid information about the
cooperation between the African Union, the United Nations, and European Union, but lacks a
historical perspective to contribute to the discussions raised in the article, which could have
been a strength in a debate on the policy change that led to cooperation.

The United Nations have, with the Brahimi report and the Agenda for Peace report,
provided solid knowledge about previous challenges and future goals of peace operations, and
mention their relation to regional solutions. These reports also provides several aspects
towards understanding why the African Union has become of greater importance, but the
report alone does not give a historical presentation on the way towards policy change. What it

38 Paul D. Williams: (2007)
39 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams: Who's keeping the peace? Regionalization and contemporary peace
40 Conrad Rein: Enhancing Peace and Security in Africa through Institutional Cooperation. In Contemporary
does, however, is to provide a historical account on what the international society in the 1990s thought about the future of peace in the world, which in itself makes it a valid contribution as a primary source.

Oldrich Bures has several contributions on the relationship between regional peacekeeping operations and UN peacekeeping operations, with a focus on how regional organisations can be of support to the United Nations. He elaborates on the internal process of the United Nations towards the inclusion of regional arrangements, and compliments them, but there is no presentation in the article about the development in Africa. 41 Several books from African scholars are relevant, among them Olayiwola Abegunrin's book "Africa in Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century; A Pan-African Perspective" and John Akokpari et.al. "The African Union and its Institutions".

Missing in the history literature is why a change in policy from non-interference to non-indifference in the former OAU was necessary, seen in the light of the decision making actors who were involved in the process towards the launch of AU and the policy has followed since. These internal factors, what happened within the organisation that caused change, and what effects they had directly on politics that allowed a non-indifference policy merge are interesting. They say something about the motivations for the actors, and can contribute to an understanding of when non-indifference became the "right" policy. To grasp the whole picture, exploring the external factors that forced forward a change within the OAU is also necessary, such as policy changes in the United Nations, or world events that fueled debate. What international politics or trends made the African states find it necessary to change their own policies to ensure peace and security, and to a larger extent take care of themselves?

**Primary sources and methods**

John Lewis Gaddis presents historical narratives as simulations, an artificial modeling of what happened in the past involving both tracing of processes and structures over time. He writes that these accounts must combine the general with the particular, and uses the common characteristics of revolutions as an example. Despite sharing common features the details of each one differ. Further, he writes that historians could hardly write about revolutions without some prior assumptions as to what these are and what we need to know about them: it is in

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this sense they depend upon theory. They also, however, require facts. Without them, a link to the past is hard to produce. This, he says, results in a tailoring where historians seek the best "fit" given the materials at hand, without assumption that it makes us able to replicate whatever it is they cover, or that our work will "wear well" for all time to come.\textsuperscript{42} Gaddis also emphasises the importance of attempting to see things from the perspective of our subjects at hand.

Marc Trachtenberg on the other hand once wrote that historians never want to interpret history as a bunch of events strung together over time; rather the goal is to understand the logic that underlies the course of events.\textsuperscript{43} Why the OAU changed policy, or why the AU took a different path than its predecessor does not in itself explain from a number of separate events, but it can be enlightened or understood by investigating why initiatives towards change took place when they did; the logical appearance of the events. These words are important to have in mind when working with different approaches to the questions at hand.

During the production of an analytic narrative within this thesis, the utilisation of a wide range of primary sources has been necessary, first of all from the organisations themselves, and actors connected to them. By doing so, an understanding of the past and the opportunity to present events in the past which lead to a policy change is made possible. The creation of a narrative from which to analyse a policy change comes from the utilisation of a broad variety of sources, both written and oral, represented through African and Western contributions.

The Library and Archives Unit of the African Union is found under the Knowledge Management Division (KMD), and is the keeper of all documents from both the OAU and the AU. The archive consists of documents produced by all units of the organisations from 1963 and up to current day. The AU, has in addition, a functioning web page where publications from various assemblies and meetings are available for research, combined with an online library. Here I found not only official documents minutes and statements the organisation has published regarding their peace and security policies, but several other documents of relevance. Statements from member states can provide an idea of which opinions have


\textsuperscript{43} Marc Trachtenberg: \textit{The craft of international history: A guide to method}. Princeton University Press (2006):33
dominated in the different cases, and the decision making process. It also says something about cooperation with external partners, or challenges in the same processes.

One challenge is that the documents from the OAU period are not fully updated online, but during a 9 day stay in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February 2016, I was able to conduct archive research at the AU headquarters. Without sufficient access to the OAU documents, it would have been difficult to find primary sources regarding not only the OAU but also changes in the transition between the OAU and the AU. Trachtenberg mentions that when working with history, insight into the thoughts of key role players in charge of policy making is relevant, such as those found in records of formal and informal types.\(^{44}\) The archive visit also made it possible to see some documents from the AU that I had not succeeded in finding online. With these documents available the process towards a shift in policy was easier to grasp.

Unfortunately, the archives in Addis Ababa did not provide everything I had hoped to find, due to an archival mishap. In 2013, the archive shelves tipped over, meaning that approximately 1/3 or more of the library's content fell to the floor, leaving a complete chaos that the archive only this year managed to start sorting. When I came in February, the staff had barely begun sorting the documents by year into piles. Considering how massive the collection of printed documentation of the two organisations is when put into boxes on a shelf, words to describe the chaos are beyond my vocabulary. However, thanks to a very determined librarian and a most helpful archivist, I managed to get hold of the most relevant documents I had hoped to find, and also got access to a well-equipped library and an internal web-page with further documentation available from the organisation, which I have consulted frequently.

A further challenge was discovered in several of the documents, but mostly those that are either speeches or statements from member state representatives, working groups or the organisation as a whole, is that the language and content may be exaggerated compared to what the reality of the events was. The documents produced by the organisation are valuable for the understanding of internal processes that have forced the organisation towards change, but they alone do not cover the history this thesis explores. They say less about how external factors, hereunder the United Nations or international politics, and politics conducted by others towards the organisations, have influenced a policy change. To get a broader understanding, it has therefore been necessary to consult these external factors separately, for

\(^{44}\) Marc Trachtenberg (2006):141
instance through official UN documents from the UN Digital Archives. To get an understanding of how external factors have contributed to change, I also found it necessary to look into how the UN policy towards regional arrangements or organisations has been during the relevant time period, but particularly from 1990 and onwards. An understanding of the policy can be achieved through study of UN reports regarding peace operations, its relation with regional organisations on security, and documentation from the organisation. Relevant here is also secondary literature on intervention discussions and the debate on responsibility to protect, to set the topic in a broader perspective. This is to find a balance in language and truth, and extract the historical events correctly, has been time consuming. Above all, it has been an interesting learning process and a test of methodology and process tracing.

I have not faced the challenge of classified or restricted documents, as the documents used in this paper are open to those with access to the AUC library and archives, which hopefully have contributed to a balance. To compensate for the difficulties I had with finding primary sources on parts of the empirical chapters, I have consulted secondary literature from several sources to ensure that any holes in the thesis has been prevented. By being thorough in consulting several sources to confirm information, it is hoped that the accuracy of information and balance of the thesis has been achieved.

I have also had the opportunity of reading some interviews of former politicians who held positions within the OAU conducted by African journalists, which have given me live primary sources of a different kind than documents. They provided an insight into what political questions the politicians were concerned with, and are of relevance in order to understand the political framework. Some of the interviewees were a part of the transition process in the organisations, and getting their opinions on the process, differences, changes and African politics is interesting. It brings in different perspectives than interpretations made by scholars. A further contribution to bringing this history to life, are transcription of speeches held by prominent politicians, and written reports from observers at the time. Such documents give an insight that is hard to achieve only by reading books or official documents. They have been of great importance in creating a balanced presentation on the process, and their connections to Africa bring in another dimension compared to Western sources.

**Organisation of the thesis**

The thesis is organised through four chapters: introduction, two empirical chapters, and a conclusion. Chapter two begins with the years prior to the OAU, which is a necessity in order to understand what the organisation was founded on, and what consequences this had
for the policy of non-interference that the organisation followed. The chapter continues with the process of establishing the organisation, before the Charter of the OAU is elaborated on and compared with the charter of the United Nations. Further, the Cold War period and the OAU’s position and actions during this time is elaborated on, with the aim of providing a solid ground that the debate can be taken from. This part of the chapter also covers the first all-African peace operation in Chad, and examples of reluctance to intervene in conflict. The chapter ends with a summary of core findings.

Chapter three elaborates on the process of moving away from an OAU policy of non-interference towards the establishment of the African Union. The chapter begins with a recap of how the OAU acted during the years of Cold War, followed by the fall of the Soviet Union and how this event influenced the later policy of the organisation, and raised questions about perceptions of security. The chapter continues with an elaboration on the Kampala summit and Africa Leadership Forum (ALF), before the Agenda for Peace report is elaborated on as an influence for policy change in the United Nations towards regional arrangements. The next section demonstrates how the OAU through the 1990s varied between having good intentions and taking a passive role in brutal conflicts in Africa, and the role of some prominent politicians during this time, with an elaboration on external pressure. The process towards the Lomé agreement, which established the need for a new organisation is covered, followed by the changed relations between Africa and the international society.

Lastly follows the conclusion where main findings are presented and questions for future research on the field proposed.
2.0 Organisation of African Unity and the policy of non-interference

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to provide an understanding of what initial ideas, debates and processes that led to the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity, hereunder the Pan-African movement. This movement's ideas were the basis of the conditions African leaders agreed upon when they met in Addis Ababa in 1963. The thoughts of the movement can be traced back to the 19th century, but due to the fact that this thesis focuses on more recent events, the historical tracing of Pan-Africanism will not be elaborated upon in full here. A brief introduction to the subject will be given, as it is of relevance in order to understand the foundation the OAU was built upon, and the influence Pan-Africanism had on the non-interference policy the organisation followed throughout its existence.

Secondly, this chapter is intended to give an overview of the OAU’s policies of non-interference during the earliest years of the Cold War; namely, which limitations the Charter gave the organisation, and which restraints it put on itself in practice during a politically challenging time period. The research question and sub questions of this thesis implicates the need for this chapter to compare the two organisations. By presenting a narrative and analysing events that took place during this time, an understanding of the policy their successor follows will be easier to grasp.

Pan-Africanism: The years prior to the OAU

As mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the time prior to the establishment of the OAU in 1963. Firstly it was of importance in shaping the structure and policy of the organisation, and secondly to understand its establishment. It is also possible, as will be demonstrated through the chapter, to see early signs of a policy of non-interference from the founders of the OAU. This is where the relevance of Pan-Africanism comes in.

One may call Pan-Africanism an ideology, a movement or a philosophy, yet all these possible interpretations should be seen in connection. The movement is the people driving the ideas, or ideology, forward and developing it, whereas the ideology in itself is built upon philosophical ideas as well as aspects of humanitarianism. For this thesis relevance, the term Pan-Africanism has been used to describe an international movement of advocates and activists, who particularly from the late 1890s onward, encouraged the solidarity of Africans worldwide. This was based on the belief that such unity was of vital importance for the social,
political and economic progress of ethnic Africans, whether they live in Africa, the Caribbean, or elsewhere. Further, Pan-Africanism considers that Africans both on the continent and in the diasporas share a common history and destiny.\textsuperscript{45}

One name of particular importance in the history of Pan-Africanism is Henry Sylvester-Williams, a British barrister who believed that Africans and those of African descent living in the diasporas needed a forum to address their common problems resulting from European colonisation and exploitation of the continent. He, and others who believed in the Pan-African philosophy, found that the slavery and colonialism depended on, and even encouraged, negative and unfounded categorisations of races, cultures and values of Africans, which in turn produced racism. Sylvester-Williams and others who shared his ideas wished to eliminate this cycle of discrimination, and in 1900 he, and several black leaders representing various African diasporas, organised the first pan-African meeting.

Between 1900 and 1960, several larger conferences and meetings on the topic of independent African states were held around the world. The movement was global, with organisations and forums founded worldwide, and regular conferences on the subject were held. In the years after the two world wars, these conferences became more active than ever before.\textsuperscript{46} Both Europeans and Africans were present at many of the conferences, and several of the African attendees later became leaders in an emerging African intelligentsia working with nationalist struggle in Africa. The Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945 established a link between Pan-Africanism and African nationalism with the aim of total liberation of the continent.\textsuperscript{47} Among many prominent participants at these conferences and congresses were the later president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, and the Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah. He held an important position in the Ghanaian and African struggle for independence, and later in the establishment of the ideology of a United States of Africa.\textsuperscript{48}

Several organisations and groups worked towards achieving a liberated Africa. Some consisted of conferences with delegates from independence movements in areas still under colonial rule, whereas others consisted of heads of states in independent countries. Some were a combination of the two. With the politically changing environment in Africa in the post-World War II period, many nationalist leaders, such as Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Nnamdi

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} David J. Francis: \textit{Uniting Africa. Building regional peace and security system.} Ashgate (2006):13
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid: 11
Azikiwe of Nigeria and the aforementioned Kwame Nkrumah experienced an increase in confidence that their demands for decolonisation were just. Some states, among them Egypt, secured their independence already in the aftermath of the First World War, but these were exceptions.

Pan-Africanism as a political tool was, according to Kwame Nkrumah, much inspired by Ghandi's non-violence as a goal. Nkrumah is often credited as the main propagator leading to the popularisation of Pan-Africanism in Africa, as he converted the idea of a Pan-African unity from a mere vision into a practical possibility through the project of African Unity. In his book *Africa must Unite* (1963), he strongly advocated African unity as the only mechanism capable of addressing the diversity of problems that would face an independent Africa, among them threats to territorial integrity and independence. These two aspects are highly relevant for the discussion in this thesis’ focus on change from non-interference to non-indifference.

The first conference on Independent African States was held in Accra, Ghana, in April 1958, and attended by the independent states of Northern and Western Africa, represented by political parties. Ghana was the first state in Africa to become independent from its former colonist, Great Britain, and the symbolic value of the conference held there was therefore strong. Several topics for the conference were discussed, but of most relevance was 1) addressing problems of common interest, 2) formulating and coordinating methods aimed at accelerating mutual understanding, 3) considering means of safeguarding the independence and sovereignty of participating countries and assisting dependent African territories in their efforts toward independence, and 4) planning cultural exchanges and mutual assistance schemes. As early as 1958, it is possible to see traces of ideas that we also find in the OAU charter written a few years after the Accra conference: addressing problems of common interest and accelerating mutual understanding, with a strong focus on independence and sovereignty. It is interesting to see elements of what was to become core values of the Organisation of African Unity, and gives an idea about the influence Pan-

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49 David J. Francis (2006):12
51 David J. Francis (2006):16
53 At that time: Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic.
Africanism had on the organisation. This development of ideas was in accordance with Kwame Nkrumah's beliefs for Pan-Africanism to be a political instrument with pacifist techniques. These sentiments continued with both the OAU, and later the African Union, focusing on safeguarding the independence of African states as well as territorial integrity: in other words how to best prevent your neighbour from interfering in your internal affairs.

That same year another conference, this time unofficial, was held in the same city. According to an undated report written by George M. Houser, co-founder of Congress of Racial Equality, the conference was attended by 300 delegates from 65 organisations in 28 different African states. Houser himself was there on behalf of the American Committee on Africa. During the unofficial Accra conference in December, the colonies were represented by strong leaders of nationalist movements, and several organisations working towards liberation. One of the main discussions at the conference, according to Houser, was Pan-Africanism, and the importance of creating an African Commonwealth or a United States of Africa. The practicalities, structure and legal basis of such an arrangement was a much-debated question. Kwame Nkrumah stated in his speech at the opening session that;

We further hope that this coming together will evolve eventually into a Union of African States just as the original thirteen American colonies developed into the forty-nine States constituting the American community. We are convinced that it is only in the - interdependence of such a unity that we shall be able truly to safeguard our individual national freedom. We have no illusions about this being an easy task. But with the spirit and determination there, the goodwill and cooperation of our people, we shall, I am firmly convinced, reach our objective.

He was overall optimistic with regards to a solution where the African States together formed a United States of Africa, but this approach was not shared by everyone who participated in discussions on visions of a liberated Africa. The unofficial Accra conference in December 1958, where George M. Houser participated, was one of many where the future of the African continent was on the agenda, eventually leading to the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity. The journey there was, however, not a straightforward one, but with multiple fractions, ideas, alliances and actors involved. Nkrumah represented one of the more radical visions of a new Africa after the end of colonial rule, together with Sékou

Touré in Guinea and Modibo in Mali. Other representatives had a more moderate approach, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

The first Pan-African generation of leaders successfully struggled against colonialism in Africa, which inspired the creation of the OAU. However, they had to overcome internal divisions before a realistic cooperation for unity could take place. What the states in Africa at the time saw as problems of mutual interest differed. They agreed upon a common challenge with the liberation of colonies who were still under control of foreign powers, but each of the independence movements, or already independent states, had identified different challenges in their respective states. The views on how to best safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the states varied. While some saw it as a protective means to ally in a union, others were skeptical of the idea, based on a fear of giving up parts of their own liberty. This mindset was visible in the later establishment of the OAU.

Further, the question of how to assist dependent African territories in their efforts towards independence was also debated. What they did agree upon, however, was that they all strongly wished to protect their own independence, keep their neighbours out of their internal affairs, and maintain control of territories. In other words, the incentives for an (at the time) imagined organisation of African states to interfere in each others' internal affairs were non-existing, already before the organisation was launched. In light of international politics at the time, however, this favouring of non-interference can be understood. The states who had achieved freedom from colonial powers were not likely to be interested in giving up their own sovereignty based on an assumption that by doing so they would enhance the security of all. There was a number of challenges for the leaders of the independent states to overcome before they were to actually cooperate towards a union where security was an essential part of its fundament.

**Establishing the OAU: Ideas, actors**
With the signatures of thirty-two governments, the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity on the 25th of May, 1963 is regarded by many not only as the most important milestone in the Pan-Africanism movement, but also in African history.\(^57\) Prior to the independence of the African colonies, the shared suffering provided a basis for the growth of Pan-Africanism and a motivation to stay together for a shared cause.\(^58\) Kwame Nkrumah

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\(^{57}\) Number of members in the African Union is per 1.1.2016 counting 54 countries

made history before the establishment of the OAU by leading Ghana to independence, thus blazing the trail for other independence movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. He stated in his speech on Ghana's Independence in March 1957 that the independence of Ghana was meaningless without a total liberation of Africa, and further, that

(...) the new African is ready to fight his own battles and show that after all the black man is capable of managing his own affairs.\(^5^9\)

This quote is quite interesting, as it demonstrates the spirit dominating several African leaders of independence movements at this time; Africa had to take responsibility for its own affairs, and African problems required African solutions - in true Pan-African spirit.

Kwame Nkrumah represented the bloc of states who desired the United States of Africa as the new model for how African states would organise themselves after independence. He later became a prominent advocate of a United States of Africa (UAS). However, this project was not realised to the extent Nkrumah imagined, largely because several of the newly liberated states after their independence came into rivalry with their neighbours over issues such as border disputes. Examples here include the dispute between Mali and Mauritania over the Hodh desert border, and between Liberia and Guinea on the Mount Nimba region.\(^6^0\) Such disputes and conflicts made the basis for mutual trust and peace difficult prior to the establishment of the OAU, which later gave the organisation certain challenges towards reaching a united front in conflicts.

Prior to the establishment of the OAU, the independent states faced an uphill battle in creating the organisation due to differences in ideology and how relations between the independent states of Africa should be. This was in addition to differing opinions on the best organisational structure. The level of trust between the states, or lack of it, proved challenging. The Congo crisis that broke out after a secessionist movement declared independence for parts of the country from the rest of Congo in 1960 caused the African states to choose sides, and was largely responsible for setting the division between the parties even further apart, and caused political unrest.\(^6^1\) The next section examines these


\(^{6^1}\) There was in reality more than two blocs, but the two mentioned in this thesis are without question the most relevant.
discrepancies in the ideological camps on African unity, followed by a discussion of their differing opinions on organisational structure.

The idea of African unity took two different ideological paths, which Kwame Nkrumah opposed, as it did not promote unity. Ghanaian journalist and novelist Cameron Duodu described the African states as sleepwalking into three blocs, named the "Brazzaville bloc", "Monrovia Bloc"62 and "The Casablanca Bloc", until the Brazzaville bloc and Monrovia bloc joined forces.63 64 By 1960, most states had pledged allegiance to either of these three as a result of the disagreements on approaches to intra-African cooperation, political standpoints on the Congo Crisis, ideological standpoints regarding relations with former colonial powers, and their preference towards either the USA or the Soviet Union. This was clear already during the Addis Ababa Conference on Independent States in June 1960.

Winston-Salem University professor of political science, Guy Martin, describes the two groups as gradualists and Pan-Africanists in regards to how the different actors believed the structure of a possible organisation should be. The gradualists' approach was represented by the Brazzaville (later merged with the Monrovia group), with state leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta, Joseph Nyere and Nnamdi Azikiwe, who wished the process towards an organisation to be a gradual one, where integration within communications, science, technology, and economy would lead to political integration in the future. The Pan-Africanists (or Casablanca group) proposed immediate political and economic integration towards a United States of Africa. 65

The Monrovia group mainly consisted of francophone states urging a process towards African Unity as something that had to happen slowly. The group partly splintered from the former Brazzaville group. The Monrovia and Brazzaville groups eventually joined forces. They a shared language, political and economic interests, and many of the same colonial experiences. Several of the Monrovia members wished to continue relations with the former

62 The Monrovia Group was the successor of the "Brazzaville group" consisting of mostly Francophone states before it expanded. It came into place after the two groups joined forces: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. Expansion included: Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia. The name came from the Liberian capitol of Monrovia.


64 Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, it also included Morocco for a short period of time)

colonial powers, as a means of having diplomatic access and leverage internationally. They fronted national independence as a core principle for their group, which was to be clearly visible in the charter the OAU was founded on. They also wished to follow the international laws of the United Nations. Several of the members were former French colonies who wished to continue relations with their former colonial power. This was one of the main areas of conflict with the Casablanca group where Algeria, who had little interest in maintaining relations with their former colonial power, was a member. One of the main issues between the groups was whether to support the Algerian Independence Movement, National Liberation Front, in their struggle against their French colonist for liberation in Algeria. Another divisive question of was that of Congo.66

The Casablanca bloc had strong representatives, with Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, King Mohammed of Morocco, and Kwame Nkrumah representing Ghana. It was regarded as more radical than the Monrovia group, as it promoted a political union similar to the federal models of the USA or the Soviet Union. However, the political climate in the 1960s made it difficult to suggest giving up newly won independence for the sake of African Unity. Historian David J. Francis explains the fear of losing one's autonomy as one reason why the radical approach was dismissed by several leaders, and led to the preference for a slower approach, described by President Nyere of Tanzania as a "step by step process." 67 Again, it is possible to trace the foundation of the OAU policy of non-interference back to the earliest conversations about establishing an organisation for the African states.

The polarisation was not helpful in promoting unity in the early 1960s, as the two different points of view seemed irreconcilable. An actual sense of unity among all Africans was not likely, least of all in the shape of an organisation. However, some African leaders came to the realisation that if anything were to happen in regards to an organisation, certain initiatives had to be taken. Early in 1961, the President of Liberia, the Prime Minister of Nigeria and the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone decided to act as joint sponsors of a conference of the leaders of all independent African states, in promoting inter-African cooperation. The process of uniting Africa had more or less stagnated, which led to further separation between the states rather than actual cooperation.68 The basic idea was that all free states had access to the conference, and invitations were sent out to the 27 independent states.

66 Paul D. Williams: (2007) p.264
67 David J. Francis: (2006) :19
22 participated, but the Casablanca bloc decided for different reasons (among them Algeria's persistent struggle for independence and a wish to avoid the France-friendly delegates) to boycott the May conference in Monrovia, Liberia. This was, however, one of the first attempts to bring all states together, regardless of their political view.

The attorney general in Nigeria at the time, T. O. Elias, witnessed the politics that took place, and described in an article from 1965 that the participants who did come, managed to agree on a loose form of association for the independent states, in accordance with what the Monrovia and former Brazzaville group had promoted earlier. The emphasis of the participants was particularly focused on respect for territorial integrity, political independence, and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.69 This first conference of African Heads of State and Government culminated in plans for a second conference in Lagos, January 1962.70 The majority of the Casablanca bloc was still absent, which Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie expressed his regrets for.71 He also questioned whether it was correct to discuss two different groups in Africa, and underlined the Ethiopian feeling of belonging to one group of unity: the African.72 In the very same speech, Selassie spoke of the fact that with newfound independence " Came not just the right, but the duty, to deal with our own problems ourselves."73 Another important aspect of this speech was his elaboration on preventing conflict and interference both internally among African states, but also externally:

...The creation of a Organization of African States will provide the medium whereby intra-African disputes - and these will arise, for we are human and not angels - may be settled peacefully. It will serve as the mechanism through which sound and constructive measures for increasing co-operation among the nations of Africa will be originated, articulated and implemented. It will contribute to the creation and development of the atmosphere and spirit of mutual trust and confidence so essential to the coordinated and simultaneous advance of the African States along the path to liberty and prosperity. It will stand as a bulwark against the interference by one African State in the internal affairs of another and safeguard against the involvement of non-African nations in the affairs of this continent as a whole (...).74

In other words, Haile Selassie was a man with the ability to think not only about security, but also link security to independence, respect for borders, and territorial integrity. He predicted that the independent states would indeed experience disputes, and saw the necessity of a

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70 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
forum where states could meet. He foresaw that preventing interference from one state into another state's internal affairs was a highly relevant concern for Africa, and may have thought it likely in the future. In his speech he did not, however, predict that it in the future might be a necessity to interfere in other states. He was in some ways able to predict scenarios that Africa would face in the future. Haile Selassie's speech therefore holds great interest and relevance in the process of debating where the change from a non-interference to a non-indifference policy came from. As interpreted from the speech of the Emperor, state leaders were concerned about interference from outside of Africa, as well as conflict among states in the region, even before the OAU was established.

Two more additional meetings took place in June and December that same year, where the Casablanca bloc was absent, again due to Algeria’s persistent struggle for liberation. The Lagos conference resulted in the signing of the Lagos Charter in December 1962, which was a set of directives, laws and regulations that 17 of the 22 participants signed.

Late in 1962 there was still a question of where the third Assembly of African Heads of State and Government would be held, to ensure that all independent states would join, which so far had been a problem. With disagreements between certain states and the involvement of some colonies, not all options were acceptable to all participants, until Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia finally offered Addis Ababa to be the host. Ethiopia was the only state in Africa that had no history as a colony, and therefore had fewer ties to former colonial powers. Addis Ababa was confirmed as an acceptable option for both the Casablanca and the Monrovia blocs.

As seen by his active role, the Emperor was among several leaders in Africa who saw that measures had to be taken if the process of forming a unity among the African states were to happen. President Sékou Touré of Guinea, a member of the Casablanca group, approached Haile Selassie in an attempt to find a solution in order to reconciling the two groups. Kwame Nkrumah also had reached the same conclusion: that due to the political uncertainty at the time caused by the Cold War, issues would best be addressed in unison. With lobbying and a wide diplomacy network, the two groups agreed to join for a common meeting.

Between the 22nd and 25th of May 1963, 32 independent states met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to form a new organisation. Morocco and Togo were absent. Morocco due to their disputes and differences with Mauritania, whilst Togo withdrew their initial intention to

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75 T. O. Elias: (1965): 244
76 Ibid: 245
77 Cameron Duodu: (11.07.2013)
participate when their legitimate government was overthrown, and the highly respected president Sylvanus Olympio killed during the outbreak of violence. The aforementioned T. O. Elias was present for some of the negotiations, and his statement of the events are interesting, as they were written down not too long after the negotiation process. He wrote an article about the process for *The American Journal of International Law* in 1965. Here, he described the charter as a compromise made by texts from both the Casablanca bloc, the Monrovia bloc, and a third additional document prepared by Ethiopia in advanced of the Addis Ababa conference.

His observations of the conference, and description of events is a valuable primary source in order to understand the differing opinion that continued to be a feature of the organisation, making processes of mediation or taking measures to prevent conflicts difficult. The professor of public international law at Sheffield University, J. G. Merrils, on the other hand, describes the establishment of the OAU as evolving from a desire to coordinate African common interests, not a need to provide a means for regional conflict settlement.

It was, according to another inside source in the organisation, C. O. C. Amate, necessary to make several compromises to draft a charter. Even the name was thoroughly debated, before reaching a conclusion of Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as suggested by President Hubert Maga of Dahomey. This process of compromises eventually transformed into the general rule of the OAU. Without these compromises, forming even a loose political organisation would have been impossible, causing difficulties in gaining political leverage in the international system. The Casablanca group, for instance, only accepted the Charter's principles on respect for political sovereignty and non-interference on condition that their concerns for non-alignment in the Cold War and anti-colonialism were included too. This hesitation is an interesting insight into the variation states faced in their concerns; international politics, anti-colonialism, and security. These were to be questions the organisation had to work with for decades to come. The following sections discuss the set of compromises that eventually led to the OAU Charter, specifically examining the particularly contentious issue of non-interference.

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78 Both Togo and Morocco later signed the charter.
79 T. O: Elias: (1965): 245
82 David J. Francis: (2006) :23
The Charter: Rights, obligations and solutions

This section will look into how the Charter of the OAU was shaped, some articles of relevance to the thesis, and a brief comparison with the charter to the United Nations. To have insight into how external factors, such as how the United Nations saw regional security arrangements and their idea of non-interference, are interesting components to see in connection with the policy the African Union was to follow.

When the independent African states, with the exception of Togo and Morocco, signed the Charter establishing the Organisation of African Unity, it was done by relatively young, politically weak, and underdeveloped countries. They were all deeply concerned about the defense of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, which had been achieved through hardship. At the same time many of the states were receiving weapons and economic and political support from outside of Africa, which they depended on. Another concern for many was how to develop their human and natural resources, which until their independence had been exploited by the colonial rulers. For many, if not most, the level of trust towards their former colonial powers was low, but to some extent they depended on them for diplomatic relations. These concerns were to be taken into consideration in the charter.

The independent African states had agreed upon a quite extensive document of 11 pages, with 32 articles covering subjects such as budget, cessation of membership, language, rights and duties, structure, purpose and principles of the organisation. The charters of the former Casablanca and Monrovia blocs, a preparatory draft by the Ethiopian government, as well as the draft by Kwame Nkrumah regarding a Union of African States had been taken into consideration when forming the new Charter.

Four bodies of the new organisation were established through the Charter: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHG), the Council of Ministers (COM), the General Secretariat (GS), and the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA), the latter of which was in reality never truly utilised. The Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie described that it was "An idea to create a single institution to which we all belong,

84 C. O. C. Amate: (1986) : 60
based on principles to which we all subscribe". The new organisation also managed to come up with its first resolutions, among them the 14 pages that constituted the first "First Resolutions Adopted by the First Conference of Independent African Heads of State and Government". It addressed several issues, among them de-colonisation, apartheid and racial discrimination, African relations to the United Nations, general disarmament, cooperation in economic areas, social and labor matters, education and culture, health, sanitation and nutrition, and even established the General Secretariat with its base in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Reading the documents to utilise them as primary sources gave insight in what the states were concerned with, which allows for a different approach.

Despite being a Constitutive Act, the charter offers in its introduction and throughout the text interesting aspects on what the heads of state were concerned with during the development of the document, and what they foresaw to become issues. When reading the original document, it largely seems to be a rather straight-forward and general document, compared to for instance the Charter of the United Nations, which the founding fathers were inspired by and took into consideration. It is general, but also contains very specific terms, for instance which organs the organisation wishes to form, the purpose it serves, and where the inspiration for its establishment comes from. But the most striking aspect, is the mentions of the principle of sovereignty no less than three times, and the principle of non-interference once. This certainly underlines the importance the OAU placed on the principle of non-interference in state affairs, which it institutionalised similarly to the United Nation. On the other hand, it does not mention the idea of interfering in other states' internal affairs in order to achieve or maintain peace, as the United Nations Charter does.

The aforementioned Joseph Nyere wrote an article shortly after the establishment of the organisation, stating that the focus on non-interference was necessary, enforcing a norm that meant "that we must avoid judging each other's internal policies, recognising that each country has special problems". This aptly sums up the general spirit of charter: we

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88 OAU: Charter. (1963):1
89 Ibid: Pages 1, 3, 4
acknowledge that we have problems, but leave them to us. Much like Haile Selassie, Nyere valued the principle of non-interference, but also realised that the African states had challenges to overcome. In the Charter from 1963, article 2(1) b) states the purpose of the organisation to be to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Closely connected to this, article 3 states that:

The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:
1. The sovereign equality of all Member States.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.  

Article 3 and its sub-sections was named by T. O Elias as the "articles of faith" for the organisation, which was a good description for the hopes they symbolised. Shortly summarised, they elaborated on preventing and mediating conflict, and did not anticipate that any conflicts would actually occur, as it offered no solution in cases where peaceful tools of the organisation proved insufficient. Haile Selassie interpreted it to mean that African disputes would be protected from interference outside of Africa. This gave root to the skepticism several of the states held in regards of involving the UN Security Council, fearing this would draw in colonial powers or the superpowers of the USA and the Soviet Union. The principle of sovereignty led to an emphasis on reaching agreements and, conclusions through consensus, and quoting the South African political activist and journalist Colin Legum, became "The African way of doing things”.  

In chapter 6 of the charter, the member states "Pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter". There was in other words a strong desire from the members to keep their disputes to themselves, and prevent the continental politics from being used to advance the Cold War interests of outside nations. Each member was given the same equality, promised not to interfere in its neighbour's internal affairs, to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the others and their right to exist, and lastly to use peaceful means in solving disputes among themselves.

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91 OAU: Charter (1963): pages 1, 3, 4
92 T. O. Elias: (1965): 248
93 Haile I. Selassie: (1963): 287
95 OAU: Charter. (1963): Article. 6

Where the two Charters differ is that while the United Nations defines what is considered a violation of international peace and also the measures the UN can take towards resolution and the scope of such measures, the first draft of the OAU Charter had none of these. It simply stated that the OAU members solemnly swore their adherence to the aforementioned principles, and intended to follow them. The United Nations has specific procedures and ideas of proportionality in their actions towards resolving or even interfering in international crises, while the OAU had none in their 1963 Charter. The debate on whether or not the United Nations fulfilled this mission at all times is not a discussion for this thesis, but at least it can be stated that their charter in theory creates expectations for action certainly more than the OAU Charter. An additional difference between the two is that the payment of contributions was decided to be voluntary, albeit strongly encouraged, within the OAU, and with no consequences for those who did not contribute. The United Nations regulates this in article 19, with the loss of a member's right to vote if they do not fulfill their obligations.\footnote{Ibid: Article 19} In other words, the likeliness of the OAU to reach satisfying contributions in funds through member donations may have been less than for the UN, and made the organisation weaker in terms of funding any interventions on the continent by itself. A further distinction is that the power of the Administrative Secretary General (SG) was also limited on purpose, where the SG held fewer rights and opportunities to act on his or her own will than the UN Secretary General does.\footnote{This title was later changed to Secretary General.}

With this in mind, one can certainly ask whether the OAU became an organisation of importance on the international arena in the years to come after 1963, and if it would have been able to fulfill its original destiny in creating a basis where African problems could be solved with African solutions. Could such a general Charter actually be of relevance and give the organisation political leverage during the politically challenging years of the Cold War?

**OAU in the Cold War years: Non-interference**

When the OAU finally was established in 1963, its members sought to protect their independence and territorial rights not only from the world outside of Africa, but also from each other. The political picture of the world was dominated by the Cold War, where the
super powers sought new arenas to fight their proxy-wars and spread political influence.\(^{100}\) Africa was one region where both sides took interest, and access to natural resources contributed to the continuation of conflict. The Charter signed by the delegates in Addis Ababa favoured non-interference, territorial integrity and sovereignty, but had no stronger framework for a common security platform. The question of how this basis could be effective when facing world politics is relevant for this thesis, to answer where the policy change towards non-indifference came from.

Reading the Charter it can be said to be based upon either magnanimous assumptions that the Articles would be sufficient to make conflict an unattractive option, or too strong a faith in the tools and strengths the organisation had for mediation and peaceful settlement. It did not actually allow the idea of war or armed conflicts to be taken into consideration in the charter, and left the organisation with few tools to solve conflicts. The two main tools the OAU had, were the Commission of Mediation Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) and the Defense Commission, but both came up short when conflicts occurred. When reading original documents from the earliest years of the organisation, attempts to urge actors in a conflict to find peaceful settlement, or declarations where the OAU condemns conflicts, are frequent. One of many examples is the AHG/Res.58, where the Nigerian Civil War is discussed; the organisation offers the actors good offices to mediate, and urges the international society to assist the OAU in finding an African Solution to the problem.\(^{101}\)

The CMCA consisted of 21 elected members, which were chosen by the OAU Summit in Algiers in 1968, but despite being set out to be one of the four core pillars of the Organisation, it never became truly operational.\(^{102}\) The Defense Commission, which was established with the Charter's article 20, was there to work towards a common platform in regards to defense politics, but quickly proved to be of little effect; the third session for the commission was to be held in 1967, but due to a lack of response to the invitation sent out by the Secretary-General, the meeting was called off, and the Defense Commission did not meet again for several years.\(^{103}\)

It did not take long after its establishment before the OAU and its tools for conflict-management were tested. The very same year that the Organisation was founded in, 1963,

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\(^{100}\) David J. Francis (2006): 73
\(^{102}\) Katie E. Sams and Eric Berman: (2000): 46
\(^{103}\) C. O. C. Amate: (1986):174
Kisangani was seized by white mercenary troops who set up a rival puppet government in DR Congo in July, and Moroccan claims to parts of Algerian territory evolved into armed conflict by October. The two conflicts called for reactions from the OAU within a period of four months. At the same time, DR Congo was in its third year of unrest, and UN peacekeeping forces were still deployed there, while the OAU was unable to do much in the conflict. In other words, there were several issues testing the young organisation.

In the conflict between Morocco and Algeria, the Moroccan side expressed a wish to submit the dispute to the United Nations for resolution, whereas the Algerian government wished to have an extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers to generate an African solution to the problem. This right to ask for an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers was stated in the Charter of the OAU. This did not take place until both parties of the conflict had requested such a meeting, which demonstrates the slow reactions. Third party mediation in the conflict through mediators such as Emperor Haile Selassie, President Nasser and President Modibo Keita was more effective, as it at least made it possible for the parties to have diplomatic relations. The result was the Bamako communiqué, which evoked an ad-hoc Special Committee of Seven from the OAU to oversee the process. This committee did not manage to effect a legal settlement between Morocco and Algeria, but laid the ground for a tradition of an ad-hoc based approach to conflict resolutions in the OAU, where standing committees were established to work with a conflict of certain urgency. These committees were thought to be temporary, and worked exclusively with one conflict each. Even though the relation between Algeria and Morocco stabilised after diplomatic efforts, and to some degree calmed itself, the OAU decision to supervise the ceasefire and create a demilitarised zone to fully settle the agreement, never came into reality. One of the aspects from the Bamako agreement was that the OAU would take an active part in resolving the dispute over the following two years, but it failed to do so. Eventually, the matter were settled bilaterally, keeping the OAU out. The involvement of the OAU in the conflict was in other words limited to a mediator role. These early events show the limitations of the OAU in cases where a conflict evolved beyond what the Charter had taken into consideration regarding conflicts.

106 Katie E. Sams and Eric Berman: (2000):46
107 ibid.
Additionally, during the Portuguese attacks on Senegalese areas in 1969, and the landing of Portuguese troops at the beach in Conakry, Guinea, in 1970, the foundation of the OAU was also challenged. The OAU found itself unable to come up with a common agreement. The one area members managed to agree on was the passage of resolutions condemning the Portuguese government and call upon the international society to impose sanctions on Portugal.\textsuperscript{108} Thus, the results of the first test of the OAU’s capabilities to solve conflicts were rather mixed. On one hand, some diplomatic efforts and successes were made, with the effectiveness of the mediation from Selassie and Modibo Keita as examples. On the other hand, the OAU did not succeed establishing a legal settlement of the Morocco dispute. The actions of Portugal towards OAU members were also largely unsolved, where the organisation lacked tools to move beyond condemnation and mediation attempts. In reality, the OAU was largely sidelined.

The first two decades of OAU politics were marked by a number of such conflicts. The OAU had in its charter, and in the process towards drafting the rules and charter of the organisation, a strong focus on the respect for current borders, meaning the borders as they were when the decolonisation of the dependent states began. These borders were not necessarily ideal, and caused conflict. Numerous disputes connected to these borders occurred. In other words, the organisation had to work around border disputes among its members, intra-state conflicts, and independence movements simultaneously.\textsuperscript{109} Some disputes were solved through mediation with the OAU, or outside parties such as the UN, while others never came to a solution and resulted in armed conflict. On almost all of these occasions, the question of a Pan-African defense force came up. The arguments in favour or against such an arrangement were many. On one hand, the right of each member to defend itself and appeal to friendly countries for assistance to defend their borders or security was agreed upon. On the other hand, an agreement was established through the charter, which implicitly said that inviting foreign armed forces onto African soil, whether from the East or to the West, would be disastrous for African independence. A third aspect the OAU members took into consideration was the fear that inviting African countries to assist their neighbours could potentially divide Africa, undermining the principle of unity the OAU was founded on.\textsuperscript{110} A Pan-African defense force could be interpreted as suppressing the right of each member to self-defense by themselves, or through a request of assistance from others and by

\textsuperscript{108} C. O. C. Amate: (1986) : 174  
\textsuperscript{109} Markus Kornprobst: (2002): pp. 369-393  
\textsuperscript{110} C. O. C. Amate: (1986)
doing so, creating a gap between the states. Or, as an alternative interpretation: a step towards preventing non-African interference in African affairs.

The many disputes among its members were not easily resolved within the political landscape of the Cold War, and can partially explain the lack of effectiveness and action from the OAU. Several conflicts took place where the OAU was expected to offer a reaction or to mediate, but failed to do so. Border disputes were the most common, but also far more serious events took place without interference from the OAU. Political scientist Paul D. Williams points out that while the OAU had mediation opportunities, some conflicts evolved to a stage where the parties involved ended up reaching for outside assistance, undermining the OAU system. This happened in 1964 when Kenya, Tanganyika (Today known as Tanzania) and Uganda had to call on British troops to calm mutinous soldiers. France's assistance was requested by both Gabon (1964) and the Central African Republic (1979). Similar situations took place in Congo, where both the UN and mercenary soldiers were called on to restore order. The OAU themselves called on Britain to intervene with armed troops in Rhodesia(today known as Zimbabwe).111 This habit of seeking outside help undermined the OAU's role in Africa, as the organisation did not have the tools to take effective action.

One of the gravest examples where the OAU looked the other way during the early years of the organisation, was during the first Burundi genocide in 1972, where mutual mass atrocities were committed by Hutu and Tutsi groups. The Secretary General of the OAU at the time, Diallo Telli, visited Bujumbura(Burundi's capital) in May and told the news media present that "the OAU is essentially an organisation based on solidarity, my presence here in Bujumbura signifies the total solidarity of the Secretariat with the President of Burundi".112 This quote illustrates the lack of reaction and an alienation with a regional problem, but perhaps also the lack of knowledge about the severity of the situation. The president of Burundi, Michel Mikombero, was one of those responsible for the mass atrocities, which eventually lead to the killing of approximately 200,000 people.113

111 Paul D. Williams: (2007) p.264
Estimates for the conflict still remain uncertain, but the number most commonly referred to is between 180 000 and 200 000 people. Lemarchand supports this estimate.
It is quite striking how strongly the organisation followed its principle on non-interference and respecting of territorial sovereignty and right of each member to manage its own affairs, despite bearing witness to the atrocities that took place in their region. To read the expressed solidarity from the highest representative of the organisation, to a man directly accountable to these crimes, illustrates the blind spot the OAU had for certain events that took place on the continent.

In the case of Burundi, it should be mentioned that while the OAU was passive, the United Nations also did little except investigate accusations of genocide. On the other hand, there is the question of whether the OAU could have been expected to act further i.e, with physical intervention or sanctions, whilst following a policy of non-interference. Particularly in light of the fact that the United Nations maintained tendencies of non-interference policies towards African conflicts at the time, and that the OAU charter did not allow such interventions. This can be seen in for instance the UNs' list of peacekeeping operations conducted from 1948 to 2014 where interference in Africa, with the exception of Congo, is absent. It does not, however, indicate that the United Nations were not taking part in mediations. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the OAU chose not to act in the case of Burundi, but took a different path a decade later in the case of Chad, a conflict with completely different causes and course.

The statement from Dialo Telli demonstrates the flaws in the idea of solidarity among the members of the OAU: Solidarity among African leaders through non-interference versus the ability to prevent cruelties and violence against people. Preventing and ending violence against African people was one of the concerns the founding fathers of the OAU had in connection with their work against colonialism, as seen in the charter. When it came to it, however, the organisation faced the same problem of violence, though this time conducted by their fellow men, and had themselves through the charter allotted limited tools to handle it.

Burundi was not the first nor the last event on the continent where the OAU witnessed during the Cold War where it would have been expected to react. During the regime of Idi Amin, in Uganda, the OAU did little. In fact Idi Amin, who came to power after a military coup in 1971, was even elected chairman during the Kampala Summit in 1975 despite 800,000 of his countrymen perishing. Four heads of state boycotted the meeting. OAU’s

affiliation with Uganda during the regime of Idi Amin contributed to a weakening of the credibility of the organisation internationally, and was not only disastrous for the people of Uganda, but for the rest of Africa as well. An Ugandan Anglican bishop, Festo Kivengere, went as far to saying that the OAU’s lack of action contributed to the bloodshed that many African states faced during the years of the Cold War. He said that:

The OAU’s silence has encouraged and indirectly contributed to the bloodshed in Africa. I mean, the OAU even went so far as to go to (...) make Amin its chairman. And at the very moment the heads of state were meeting in the conference hall, talking about the lack of human rights in southern Africa, three blocks away, in Amin’s torture chambers, my countrymen’s heads were being smashed with sledge hammers and their legs being chopped off with axes.117

What is most interesting here, however, is a statement from the Government of Tanzania; on the Uganda situation, issued on 25 July 1975 by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, where they announce the boycott from the meeting, as reprinted in African Contemporary Record:

Individually as Africans, and through the OAU, we condemn the murderous acts of these regimes on every possible occasion and in every possible forum (...) But when massacres, oppression and torture are used against Africans in the independent States of Africa there is no protest anywhere in Africa. There is silence even when such crimes are perpetrated by or with the connivance of African Governments and the leaders of African States (...) the OAU never makes any protest or criticism at all. It is always silent (...)The reasons given by African leaders for their silence (...) is the non-interference clause in the OAU Charter. This agreement not to interfere in the internal affairs of another State is necessary for the existence of the OAU. A similar condition is accepted by members of the UN. But why is it good for States to condemn apartheid and bad for them to condemn massacres which are committed by independent African Governments? We have come to our decision [to boycott the meeting in Kampala] because we are convinced that the Organization of African Unity will deserve the condemnation of the world and of the peoples of Africa as an organization of hypocrites if it acquiesces, or appears to acquiesce, in the murders and massacres which have been perpetrated by the present Uganda Government. Tanzania cannot accept the responsibility of participating in the mockery of condemning colonialism, apartheid and fascism in the headquarters of a murderer, an oppressor, a black fascist and a self-confessed admirer of fascism118

The Tanzanian government here raises important aspects for this thesis; firstly, it demonstrates that the case of Uganda received attention by the members of the OAU, and that some members criticized the organisation for its lack of criticism and its silence. Secondly, the statements point out that the government felt non-interference to be a necessity for the OAU’s existence, which they emphasised with a comment regarding similar condition found in the United Nations: at the same time, the minister identified the non-interference clause as the argument used by Africa for their silence. Thirdly, the government went so far as to

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predict criticism from the international society towards the organisation, and expressed a fear of being accused of acquiescing. The reaction from Tanzania towards the meeting in Kampala and the government there, demonstrates that despite accusations against the OAU for their reluctance to address conflicts on the continent, this practice of "looking the other way" was not accepted by all, and not in every case. The description of Amin and his regime at the end of the quote is also worth noting: in the aftermath the OAU has been associated with the title "dictators’ club", where looking the other way on the internal affairs of your neighbour was indeed normal.\textsuperscript{119}

During this period, the African continent was marked by several conflicts and unrest. Many of the states pledged alliances to either the Soviet Union or USA in order to receive aid, which lead to proxy-wars, client states, overthrowing of several governments, internal conflicts, and some international conflicts. One of states who had alliances where the differing parts in a conflict had support from the superpowers is Angola, who went through several years of conflict in the 1970s. It refused the help of the OAU when the organisation offered assistance with mediation. The case of the war for control in Angola was complex: one side of the conflict had support from the communist regimes in Cuba and the Soviet Union, while the other side was supported by the USA, its western allies, and South Africa. The OAU had few means to use in the conflict, but passed a number of resolutions on the case, and even requested the OAU Defense Commission to create and dispatch an OAU Peace Force to Angola, which never took place.\textsuperscript{120}

The split within the organisation caused by the international political polarisation influenced the management of conflict on the continent for several years. This affected the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea; Mozambique, who hosted rebellions from the South African anti-apartheid movement while also going through civil war; the Nigerian civil war; and the conflict in Liberia. Often, states in conflict were supplied with weapons by one of the superpowers, which contributed to the continuation of the conflict. In these conflicts, the OAU was put on the sidelines, with few (if any) effective tools to use to solve the conflict, as it was limited by its own charter.

Attempts of mediation or resolutions condemning the actions of fighting parties was not necessarily the most effective way of handling disputes. During the liberation struggle in the Southern African region, the opposition attacked the white minority regimes, who in turn attacked the bases of these movements in states such as Botswana, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique. This caused the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to adopt the AHG/Res. 80(xiii) during the July 1976 session, where the delegates declared that any such attack from either South-Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) or South Africa would be considered an attack on Africa as a whole. In the case of such an attack, it was also a call for all OAU members to give their support to repel the aggression against the independent African state, and to consider themselves under a moral obligation to militarily assist the liberation movements, if the countries involved agreed to accept such help.121

This declaration was, however, of little real effect, as the OAU only followed up on the declaration to some extent, besides condemning attacks from the white minorities, and expressing solidarity with the affected states or movements.122 It is, however, interesting to read this source, as it provides a glimpse of the common ground shared by the organisation, which was one of the fundamental ideas behind the establishment of the OAU. While the actual effect of the aforementioned resolution was limited, the intentions behind it, common case and a moral obligation to assist others, is worth noting.

One further step the organisation took, was to revitalise the Defense Commission through resolution CM/Res. 635(xxxi) in 1978, with the intention of working towards an inter-African Military Force of Interventions that could contribute to easing tensions.123 This was, however, too late for the conflicts that had spiraled into brutality, where the OAU was a paralysed observer with little or no opportunity for action. The real effect of this revitalisation can be discussed, but when the Chad crisis broke out in 1980, the OAU for the first time intervened with armed forces in a sovereign state, in sharp contrast with its usual policy of non-interference. The process of deciding that it was time for action was not an easy one.

122 C. O. C. Amate: (1986) : 177
The first all-African Peace operation: Chad

Over an extended period of time, conflict in Chad escalated to full-blown civil war. Chad was one of the last countries to be colonised by European countries, when France declared ownership in April 1900. The conflict in Chad begun in 1965, and had two dimensions; one of ethnic and religious fractions, which eventually threatened the integrity of the regime, and secondly, the intervention by African and non-African states. Hereunder is included the occupation of disputed areas by Libya in 1972, followed by a full invasion by Libya in 1980, and later French/American forces who directly and indirectly involved themselves in the conflict.

The OAU did attempt to mediate in the conflict on several earlier occasions, after the Chadian head of state, Félix Malloum, raised a complaint on what he saw as a Libyan attempt to support the opposition, Front de Libération National du Tchad (FROLINAT), which attempted to remove him from power. FROLINAT was an opposition group established in Sudan in 1966, with the intention of fighting against the French-friendly and ethnicity-based regime of President Tombalbaye in Chad. Tombalbaye was assassinated by members of the Chadian Army in 1975, and was replaced by Félix Malloum. Malloum was replaced by Hissene Habré in 1978, who had served as prime minister under Malloum, and received support from 3200 French legionnaires. The inner conflicts of FROLINAT made it difficult to achieve their goal, but when they began a new offensive against the government forces in 1978, the country was more or less split in two between FROLINAT and the government in N'djamena. The progress of FROLINAT led to the establishment of an OAU ad-hoc committee on the Chad issue in 1977. The progress was temporarily stopped by French forces, which again caused conflict in FROLINAT. The leader of one of these fractions, Goukouni Weddeye, received support from President Ghadaffi in Libya, and in return

125 Ibid. p. 8
promised him control of certain parts of Chad. The same year, another ad-hoc committee was established to assist Libya and Chad in solving the conflict between them.\textsuperscript{128}

In 1979, the parties of the conflict came together at a conference in Lagos, and agreed upon the Lagos Agreement on National Reconciliation of Chad, facilitated by the ad-hoc committee on Chad in the OAU. In June 1980, a declaration of mutual agreement between Chad and Libya was announced, which introduced a new dimension to the conflict: Libyan military presence in Chad. Hissene Habré was expelled from N'Djamena by the Goukouni Weddeye government forces with assistance of Libyan troops in December 1980. Weddeye was president until 1982, when Habré took over. In conclusion, the conflict in Chad had multiple fractions and actors with interests, which made it a very difficult conflict to resolve, and the power position switched several times.

The OAU had the Chadian conflict up for discussion on several occasions, and did the complete opposite of what it had done in previous conflicts on the continent: it declared it as necessary to intervene in Chad to restore peace.\textsuperscript{129} The first attempt from OAU to send troops in 1980 was stalled by a lack of sufficient funding and the limited numbers of troops available. From reading the documents from the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, finding someone willing to take charge of the operation was also challenging.\textsuperscript{130} The Standing committee on Chad therefore initiated a meeting in Lomé, January 1981 to discuss the crisis further. The ad-hoc committee decided to try again to deploy a peacekeeping force, composed of troops from Benin, Congo, Togo and Guinea. The OAU saw it as necessary to

\text{(\ldots)} make one further attempt to find an African solution to the crisis, particularly with regard to the provision of the neutral OAU forces by requesting African States which were in a position to provide peace-keeping forces at their own expenses in accordance with conditions to be determined at the summit, it being understood that logistic and operational costs be met from voluntary contributions.\textsuperscript{131}

The force was unable to go to Chad as planned. As seen in the in the above excerpt from the document, the participants had to cover their own expenses, and were urged to support the fund the OAU set up for voluntarily contributions from member states. Without sufficient

\textsuperscript{129} OAU: Document AHG/Res. 102-103(XVIII), (1981).
\textsuperscript{130}Ibid.
funding from either the OAU or the United Nations this would be costly, and may have discouraged participation. During the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Nairobi, June 1981, the Assembly decided through resolution AHG/Res. 102-103 (xviii) to mandate the Chairman, President Arap Moi of Kenya to make diplomatic efforts towards states that could be willing to contribute troops to the proposed peacekeeping force, to relieve participants of the financial burden. This could also help share the burden of the expenses. The diplomatic efforts resulted in DR Congo, Senegal, Madagascar, Algeria and Nigeria deciding to join the four states that had already committed to a peacekeeping force. The mandate of the force was decided by the Assembly to be:

To maintain security and defence of the state of Chad until the formation of a Chadian national integrated army".

The resolution also underlined the importance of not interfering in the internal affairs of Chad:

[The Assembly of Heads of State and Government] requests that all Member States of the OAU support this Government in its efforts to maintain peace and security in the country and abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of the country.

Even in times where they actually decided to intervene, the members contradictory urged non-interference in the internal affairs of the state.

Of the involved states in the peacekeeping force, Nigeria was the most experienced. It had participated in several operations within the United Nations, among them the UN force to Congo between 1960 and 1964. The challenge of finding a state to oversee the operation was partly solved by their presence. Nigeria took the initiative to decree that all participating states should meet, plan and agree upon conditions for the mission before departure, as well as obtain a permission from Chad, which is a procedure the United Nations also operates with in their peacekeeping operations. The desire of the OAU to remain close to the United Nations was clear, as it adopted this condition of consent from the state.

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133 Ibid. Resolution on Chad, point 3.

134 Ibid. Resolution on Chad, point 2.


http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/04/24/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-nigeria/


Still unresolved were the fact that the financial issues of the operation; each of the OAU members had been requested to contribute at least USD $ 50,000 each, but at the beginning of the strategic meeting, only $ 400,000 had come in. Eventually, the US, Britain and France indicated that they would be willing to help with finances to the operation, which made the OAU decision to be operational by 17th of December 1981 far easier.\(^{137}\) The President of Chad asked, as one of the condition the OAU had set to deploy, the Libyan government to withdraw its troops. President Ghadaffi angrily did so almost overnight, which left a power vacuum the OAU peacekeeping forces had to fill quicker than expected. Despite the Nigerian wish for the forces to deploy simultaneously, one battalion from DR Congo and one from Senegal had already left. According to C. O. C. Amate, DR Congo was to take care of the medical needs of the operation, but went without medication or medical equipment. The troop from Benin found itself unable to go, because they had no uniforms or equipment.\(^{138}\) When the Togo contribution was declared unwelcome by the President of Chad, the forces that arrived came up short in many areas, forcing the Nigerian Force Commander to restructure in a way they had not prepared for. These flaws in logistics and lack of equipment is worth noting, as these issues have been solved differently by the successor of the OAU.

The personal representative of the OAU Secretary-General, responsible for monitoring the operation, was forced to depend on the United Nations Development Program's staff for secretarial services, as the organisation was unable to fund a secretariat itself. The fact that several of the contributing states approached outside states to provide financial and material support also undermined the OAU mandate, as well as the relations towards the Chad Government.\(^{139}\)

Requests for the United Nations' involvement in the Chad operation, are visible through correspondence in the UN digital archives, where a letter from President Arap Moi to the Secretary General and Security Council was sent in April 1982, informing the Secretary General about the AHG/RES.102 (XVIII) from the OAU. The letter informs the UN about the force that is to be sent, in addition to an observer group from Kenya, Zambia, Gabon, Algeria Congo and Guinea-Bissau.\(^{140}\) The same letter also requests the United Nations to "assist the OAU financially, materially and technically in the difficult task of deployment, maintenance

\(^{137}\) C. O. C. Amate: (1986):183  
\(^{138}\) Ibid.  
\(^{139}\) C. O. C. Amate: (1986):185  
and operation of this force". Enclosed followed a letter from the president of Chad, Goukouni Weddeye, where he expressed his support to the steps taken by the Chairman of the OAU, and pointed to the need of assistance to the OAU, "especially financial, to ensure the deployment and maintenance of the Pan-African peace keeping force in Chad". The elaboration on finance in Weddeye's letter supports the assumption that the financial aspect of the operation was difficult.

The United Nations passed resolution 504 in December 1982 where the intention of establishing a fund for assistance to the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad was expressed, based on voluntary contributions.

In the end, the peacekeeping force was unable to resolve the conflict, and halted. By 1982, rebel groups regained control, and Hissene Habré took over the presidency when Weddeye escaped. In 1983, Weddeye again raged for war when he asked France and the USA for military support to resist the Libyan interference in Chad. France, with backup from the US, intervened in Chad for Habré and his fraction. The following year, new conflict broke out both in the south of Chad, and at the border to Libya. In the following years, counter-strikes from both sides were frequent, until Habré was thrown out of power by one of his former advisors, Idriss Déby, who had support from Ghadaffi. Déby later became known for his authoritarian regime, and Chad is still in unrest today despite international presence in the region.

The limited success of the mission of the OAU has been discussed, but the remaining fact is that the operation was the first of its kind conducted by the OAU, and the first all-African attempt to intervene with forces to establish peace. It was successful in the sense that the organisation actually managed to agree to send troops, but the performance of the mission was rather unsuccessful in ending the conflict. It provided the organisation with several experiences that the African Union, but also the UN and EU since have taken lessons from.

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141 Ibid.


OAU: success in some fields?

The conflict management of the OAU is discussed by Patricia B. Wilde, Margaret A. Vogt and Monde Muyangwa among others, all writing about the mechanisms the OAU had for conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{144} The reactions in terms of mediation or resolutions passed by the organisation, or lack of such, in conflicts throughout the first 25-30 years is interesting. In regards to the research question for the thesis, it is clear that despite few examples where the organisation physically interfered in conflicts, it did, as demonstrated previously in the chapter, interfere through attempts of mediation. It would be wrong to say that the organisation was without significance and political influence, because despite shortcomings in several areas it had a function for the heads of member states to meet on a regular basis, to discuss topics they found relevant.

The OAU also functioned as an arena where the states could form a unified front in the United Nations, to promote African interests. The activities by President Arap Moi in regards to the Chad crisis is one such example, where his designated mission from the other Heads of State to approach the United Nations to seek support for the mission marks a unifying cause for many of the states. The organisation had some successes in the role it took in mediation processes, for example when it contributed to establishing diplomatic relations between Algeria and Morocco in 1964-65, the case of Somalia and Kenya, and Somalia and Ethiopia from 1968 to 1970. It also helped raise funds to support African states who tried to defeat Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau. In this regard, the policy of non-interference from the OAU in internal affairs of the members seems to have allowed for involvement in low-effort or low-cost causes, such as mediation and anti-apartheid support.

The anti-apartheid movements in Namibia, South Africa and Rhodesia received sympathy and support from the OAU. South Africa was more or less effectively blocked out from the OAU during the apartheid rule, when the organisation managed to take a political standpoint in regards to how to handle the apartheid regime. It promoted politics that eventually led to the exclusion of South Africa's participation in the UN Assembly in 1974. The organisation also managed to form a unified and coordinated political platform in the UN

through its observer mission in 1963, which provided this arena. The following years, the work of the Africa Group in the United Nations, which consisted of OAU member states, actively wrote letters and lobbied for the case of a free South Africa. One example is the UN document S/12100, which is a letter signed by the representatives from the Africa Group. At the time it consisted of Libya represented by Mansur R. Kikiah, Tanzania represented by Dr. Salim A. Salim, and Benin by Roger D. Paqui, urging an emergency meeting on the South African situation after the Soweto uprising in 1976 where a series of protests from youths against the introduction of Afrikaans as medium of instruction were met with police brutality. \(^{145}\)

A telegram from the president in Madagascar, UN document s/12101 is another, urging the UN to take measures against the Apartheid regime. \(^{146}\) The activities of the African group were noted by the United Nations, as seen for example by the references in UN Resolution 392/1976, where both of the above mentioned communications from Africa are used as sources to base the resolution. It consists of a rather descriptive text on the events in Soweto, and how the UN felt about it. It clearly states that letters from the representatives of the Africa Group were influential for the resolution, which stated that "the policy of apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and seriously disturbs international peace and security". \(^{147}\) The influence Africa had in the United Nations, and the cases they promoted or found themselves concerned with, are very interesting in regards to the research question of the thesis, as it demonstrates that the OAU was concerned with violence on the continent, and worked towards achieving reactions in the UN.

**Chapter summary:**
In the years prior to the establishment of the OAU, several prominent leaders in Africa and elsewhere promoted African unity, and took part in the Pan-African movement. Their emphasis on independence and territorial integrity was discussed in regards to how the ideas of a unified Africa was balanced. The establishment of the OAU was a gradual process, and the states involved disagreed on both the structure and aims of the organisation. The end


result was an organisation with a high focus on non-interference and state sovereignty. The Charter was, to a certain point, written in such a way that it did not take in consideration that armed conflicts were to occur, but relied on the oath members signed to solve their disputes in peaceful means through arbitration or mediation.

During the first decades of existence, the OAU and its charter were tested multiple times during conflict. Despite some success mediating in conflict and lobbying for African issues in the UN, the organisation generally failed to solve conflicts peacefully, with civil wars and border conflicts escalating several times. It did not manage to take steps towards interfering in Angola, Uganda, Burundi and other places, where mass atrocities took place.

During the Chad conflict, the OAU for the first time arranged for an all-African armed intervention in Chad, to resolve the civil war there. The success of it was limited at best, much due to logistical and financial issues, as well as challenges within the organisation. The vague support from the United Nations, where funds to support the operation were made on a voluntary basis, also contributed to the challenges. Shortcomings in logistics and the ability to effectively finance, launch and maintain made the operation challenging for the participating states. The financial burden the participating states had to take on may have been a factor that dissuaded the organisation from repeating such an operation later on. It did, however, become the first initiative from the OAU to solve conflicts with armed forces in the region.

The African continent on several occasions experienced conflicts where the international community and neighbouring states, could be expected to react. In most cases, some of which resulted in grave consequences, they failed to do so. A few states reacted separately to events that took place, as seen with Uganda.

The political climate of the Cold War that the organisation worked under for the first few decades of its existence was without doubt challenging, as it led to polarization between the member states, which made any strong measures difficult to take. It was a factor that contributed to the non-interference policy, as did the limitations of the charter. Without agreement within the organisation, taking steps towards resolving conflict became difficult. With the members either supporting (or being supported by) the West or the Soviet Union, proxy-wars and internal conflicts made it even more difficult to function effectively. The shortcomings of the organisation may, to some extent, be blamed on the rival political regimes.
3.0 From an OAU policy of non-interference towards the African Union, and a policy of non-indifference

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Organisation of African Unity during the years of the independence struggles and the Cold War's political influence on the continent, faced certain shortcomings in fulfilling its original purpose as a stabilising presence in Africa. Good intentions when establishing the organisation were not enough to prevent conflicts among its members from taking place, as believed when the Charter was drafted. The initial founding fathers had not made room in the charter for events of war or escalated conflicts, but relied heavily on peaceful settlement through arbitration, negotiation, mediation and conciliation.¹⁴⁸

This chapter demonstrates how the OAU gradually went from a rather strict policy of non-interference to questioning its own relevance and future, after failing to play an active role in preventing or resolving civil wars that raged the continent in the 1990s. It will first look into the steps taken towards the Kampala leadership forum in 1991, and the results that came from it. Further, the UN report "An Agenda for Peace" will be elaborated upon, and seen in light of the steps the OAU took shortly after the presentation of the report, which could be called a softening of their strict policy of non-interference and an acknowledgement of a need of change.

The Mechanism of the OAU and some of their work during the 1990s will be shed light on as a step in further progress towards a non-indifference policy, in close relation with political development in Africa and the world. Following that, the end of the OAU will be discussed, with a focus on emerging questions from certain politicians on the relevancy of the OAU, and the policy the organisation had followed so far. Lastly, brief account for developments up to today will follow, including AU’s relations with the UN and EU, which allows for evaluating what lessons the actors within or working with, the AU have learned. This will show the change towards non-indifference this thesis intends to explain; when and why the abandonment of the OAU policy and organisation came about.

Gradual process of change: Internally changed perceptions on security

During the first years of its existence, it became clear that the organisation to a large extent was unable to avoid the appearance of conflicts, and furthermore that the tools that it

had in order to resolve these conflicts were insufficient. As seen in chapter two of this thesis, several mediation processes were successful, but many failed and ended in conflict. The organisation did not often succeed in taking action beyond condemning parties of conflicts and urging them to resolve their disputes peacefully through a number of resolutions; in reality this amounted to no more than a slap on the wrist. The principle of non-interference contributed to making the organisation a mere observer suppression of rights and the brutality of many African leaders, and eye witness to severe human rights violations.\footnote{Karin Dokken: \textit{African Security Politics Redefined}, Palgrave Macmillan (2008):121} Several of the conflicts during the Cold War period were kept active due to the support from either the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Cuba, or the Western states with the US as a main contributor.

With the decline and fall of the Soviet Union, the access to money, weapons and political support for one side of many African conflicts disappeared or was weakened. More importantly was that the super powers' interest in Africa also faded, and left a vacuum of uncertainty for many. These changes would eventually contribute to a discussion within the OAU regarding what path the organisation was to take in the 1990s to prevent it from becoming irrelevant. Just a short year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the OAU had begun taking measures to fill the vacuum.\footnote{ALF: \textit{The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa}. Document prepared by the Secretariat of OAU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Kampala, Uganda (1991). Accessed 17.03.16 \url{http://www.africaleadership.org/rc/the%20kampala%20document.pdf}}

The Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa in June 1990 and the Kampala Leadership Forum in 1991 redefined security, and formed one measure from the OAU.\footnote{OAU: Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World. Document prepared by the member states of the OAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 9-11 (1990).} For the first time, the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government acknowledged in its final communiqué that there was a link between security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa. By doing so, the leaders also recognised that the challenge with security and stability faced by many African states had impaired both the states' and the OAU's ability to achieve the level of inter- and intra-African cooperation to integrate the continent. The document, as in the preface written by Obasanjo said, stated that integration was crucial to achieve socioeconomic development in Africa. Security and peace were now linked to good governance, democracy, economic and social development and
human rights. Most importantly for this thesis, however, is that it also recognised the need for a far more active role of African states in African conflicts.\textsuperscript{152}

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) had been an important supporter and partner in the process towards the leadership forum in Kampala. In 1990, together with the Africa Leadership Forum (ALF) which President Obasanjo of Nigeria launched in 1989, it initiated an expert consultative meeting in Paris where the implications of the end of the Cold War for Africa were discussed.\textsuperscript{153} The conclusion from this meeting was that Africa would remain in a multilevel crisis until a comprehensive solution that could produce stable conditions for development was found within Africa.\textsuperscript{154} In other words, without peace, Africa would not be able to meet the development that other parts of the world had achieved. It could take steps to increase its own security work to achieve development, or remain in a difficult situation with conflicts straining development and peace.

The meeting in Paris also recommended a conference on the subject, which through lobbying and a tournament of meetings by the ALF director Felix Mosha was made possible.\textsuperscript{155} During preparations for the meeting in Kampala, Mosha met with leading Africans, both public and private individuals, and by doing so grasped an understanding of the feasibility of arranging a conference. Four preparatory conferences were held, the first two in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to prepare and shape the idea and content of the conference. President Olusegun Obasanjo took initiative to invite the Secretary-General of the OAU at the time, Dr. Salim A. Salim, 1976, to attend the meeting.\textsuperscript{156} As recalled, Dr. Salim was known for his work in the Africa Group in the UN. Also invited was the executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.\textsuperscript{157}

During the Kampala Summit in May 1991, 500 participants came, including some heads of state, scientists, non-governmental organisations, and representatives from organisations related to women or youth. Obasanjo managed to lobby President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, who held the position as Chairperson of the organisation at the time, to

\textsuperscript{152} ALF: The Kampala Document (1991)
\textsuperscript{154} Olayiwola Abegunrin: \textit{Africa in Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century: A Pan-African Perspective}. Palgrave Macmillan, USA (2009)
\textsuperscript{155} Ib: 156
\textsuperscript{157} Olayiwola Abegunrin: (2009): 156
initiate a meeting in the OAU.\textsuperscript{158} This eventually lead to the Kampala document, which was discussed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) during the OAU Abuja Summit in Nigeria, 1991. It was opposed by the presidents Ghaddafi of Libya, Omar H. A. el-Bashir in Sudan and Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi. According to Obasanjo, this happened because:

\begin{quote}
It threatened the status quo and especially the power position of a few governments whose domestic hold on unscrupulous power rendered them vulnerable and insecure.\textsuperscript{159}
\end{quote}

The reluctance to adopt the document is interesting, as it might appear that the changes in international politics and their full consequences were not clear to all leaders yet. When Obasanjo was imprisoned in 1995, the subject was more or less taken off the agenda until he was released in 1999.\textsuperscript{160}

The message from Kampala to the Abuja summit was, however, that "the security and stability of each African country was inseparably linked with the security of all African countries", and further, “Africa cannot make any significant progress on any other front without creating collectively, a lasting solution to its problems of security and stability".\textsuperscript{161}

This is interesting; from the African states themselves, even if assisted by the OSCE, came the initiative to discuss the new security challenges of the continent. The conclusion that the security and stability of one was linked to the security of others, also marks a certain shift. It indicates that the state leaders had realised, somewhere along the way, that it would be more difficult in the new political picture to rely on non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes as they had before. It would be even more difficult to follow the previous policies of drafting resolutions and condemning actions of the member states, rather than taking a more proactive approach.

The leadership forum in Kampala in 1991 marked a shift in the mindset of the organisation in terms of what they defined as security, and in acknowledging that a different approach was needed to achieve development. After this meeting, the question of a new approach to security was discussed at an official gathering at the state level with the Abuja

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{158} The secretary general position of the OAU was the head of the permanent secretariat, while the chairperson of the OAU, and later African Union, is a rotating position changing every year.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Thomas Kwasi Tieku: Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union. In \textit{African Affairs} 103, pp. 249-267, (2004): 279
\item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid.:258
\item \textsuperscript{161} ALF: The Kampala Document. (1991):1
\end{itemize}
summit in 1991, rather than in restrained smaller groups within the organisation.\textsuperscript{162} It became a subject that mattered to all.

While the OAU may have previously appeared to be ineffective and more about words rather than action, something changed in the first period of the 1990s. The organisation made more progress in questioning their assumptions of security and peace than it had in the past. When the OAU was established, it mainly had three challenges: decolonisation, development, the and maintenance of peace and security. In 1990, most African states had achieved independence from its former colonial powers, with the exception of the South African apartheid regime.\textsuperscript{163} The major challenges left for the organisation were those of development, peace and security. With the acceptance that these were closely linked, the organisation realised it needed to renew its determination to work together towards peaceful and effective resolution of conflicts on the continent. The Kampala leadership forum also laid emphasis on effective participation of civil society in cooperation and development programs, thereby bringing or re-invigorating Pan-Africanism among the states in Africa. It was time to take measures aiming for conflict prevention, resolution and management with a new approach. The goal was to ensure that conflicts were not to be a factor hindering socio-economic development, as the Kampala meeting had so strongly linked as factors depending on each other.\textsuperscript{164}

\textbf{From conference to action: An agenda for peace, and establishing the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution}

The Kampala leadership forum in 1991 was the first of its kind for the OAU, and marked a certain wind of change in regards to the OAU’s security politics. The organisation was now chaired by Dr. Salim, the afore mentioned Tanzanian politician representing the Africa Group in the United Nations, who held a different view on the organisation than some of his predecessors and current colleagues. Despite the failure to fully adopt the declaration from Kampala, the fact that perceptions of security were discussed at all demonstrates a change in the organisation. Previously, non-interference was linked to security, but now new aspects of security were included. The OAU was not the only organisation changing its

\textsuperscript{162} Olayiwola Abegunrin: (2009): 156
\textsuperscript{164} Thomas Kwasi Tieku: (2004): 259
perceptions on security in the early 1990s. The United Nations was also going through change. The report "Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping" prepared by the Secretary-General (SG) at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for the UN is highly relevant to understanding the upcoming steps made by the OAU.

In the report published in 1992, which is more commonly known as "An agenda for peace", the SG presented several important points, and dedicated a full Chapter (VII) to the cooperation with regional arrangements and organisations, specifically mentioning cooperation with the OAU. In his chapter on early warning, under point twenty-seven, the SG specifically wrote about the importance of regional arrangements and organisations, and asked the

(...) regional organizations that have not yet sought observer status at the United Nations to do so and to be linked, through appropriate arrangements, with the security mechanisms of this Organization

The efforts of the United Nations to seek support from regional arrangements and organisations was not completely new at the time. It was also written down as a priority in the Charter of the UN, through Chapter VIII, where article 52 declares that nothing in the Charter

(...) precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

The difference, however, lies with the increased focus and a reactivation of this regional cooperation and a search for a more active use of it. The UN Charter deliberately provides no definition of regional arrangements, and by doing so allows flexibility for group of states to deal with issues in a way that is appropriate for their region. This element could potentially contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. This meant that potentially, the OAU could have taken action during crises in Africa if they had support from the United Nations, in an appropriate for their region. The Agenda for Peace report stated that no two regions were the same, and that cooperation and division of work had to be adapted to the

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http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm

166 Ibid: Point 27

167 United Nations: Charter. Article 52

realities of each case. The charter of the UN encourages the pacifist resolutions of disputes through such arrangements. Article 53, on the other hand, states that they should be utilised:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council(...)\[170\]

The legal framework for utilising regional organisations or similar arrangements was in place through the Charter of the UN, but with the Agenda for Peace this was awakened with new emphasis. The report from the SG underlined that the Cold War had made the use of the UN Charter Chapter VII challenging, and even working against resolving disputes.

The cold war impaired the proper use of Chapter VIII and indeed, in that era, regional arrangements worked on occasion against resolving disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter.\[171\]

The SG also very precisely formulated the purpose of regional arrangements in the past; they were to fill the absence of a universal system for collective security. In the new "era of opportunity", he predicted that they could:

(...)render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII.\[172\]

He saw the potential of regional organisations, specifically in terms of peace-keeping, peacemaking, post-conflict peace building, and lastly, in preventive diplomacy. The potential could be used to alleviate the burden of the Security Council and the United Nations, and according to the report contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs for participating regional organisations or agencies.\[173\]

The SG acknowledged that the UN for several decades had not considered the regional organisations in this light, not even when they originally were thought to play a part in restoring or maintaining peace in their own regions. He further stated that:

Today a new sense exists that they have contributions to make. Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it. Regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would encourage States outside the region to act supportively.\[174\]

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\[170\] UN: Charter. Article 53
\[171\] UN: Document A/47/277 (1992): Point 60
\[172\] UN: Ibid. Point 63
\[173\] UN: Ibid. Point 64
\[174\] UN: Ibid. Point 65
The Agenda for Peace Report made it clear that regional organisations such as the OAU, mattered, and were worth investing time and effort in. Including these organisations in processes could help build international consensus on how to resolve issues, and even be of an important symbolic value to the world outside of the region. Norman Padelford, professor of political science, wrote in 1964 that the effectiveness of the OAU would depend on the measure of harmony that could be developed among the states. With the reaffirming words from the UN Secretary General on the importance of the organisation, the major problem left for the OAU in order to increase their effectiveness as an actor of substance in Africa, was harmony among its members.

The Agenda for Peace report must have made an impression on the OAU. Just 10 days short of a year after the launch of the report, in 1992, the organisation met in Dakar, Senegal. During this meeting of the Assembly, the members took into consideration their 1985 Lomé Declaration on Security, disarmament and development in Africa, and the approach from the UN. They then decided to consider the effects of establishing a "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, in keeping with the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organisation". This was later referred to as the "Mechanism" for short. In the following year reports were made, and the conclusion of the process developed to a recommendation to proceed. In this process Dr. Salim was particularly active and later identified, in 1996, by NUPI senior research fellow Cedric de Coning (at the time First Secretary at the South African Embassy in Ethiopia) as the driving force behind OAU’s new focus on conflict management. The sources available from the organisation also show the influence of certain singular persons, such as Dr. Salim. The secretary general has indeed played an active role, which supports de Coning’s claims.

By June 1993 the "Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution" was presented during the session in Cairo, Egypt. The first pages of the document consists of summarised points on the achievements of the organisation so far, before identifying some of the major challenges. The one internal factor they identified as hindering socio-economic development for Africa, was the scourge of conflicts in and among

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175 OAU: AHG/Decl.3(XXIX) (1993): Point 11
http://www.academia.edu/2114620/The_OAU_and_peacekeeping
177 OAU:AHG/Decl.3(XXIX) (1993)
its countries, and hence offered a possible economic motive as an explanatory factor for the policy change addressed in this thesis. Peeling off exaggerations, the paper is also interesting as it offers some idea of the perception the organisation had of itself.

It further states the primary objective of the Mechanism: to anticipate and prevent conflict.\textsuperscript{178} This is worth noting; compared to the OAU Charter of 1963, elaborated on in Chapter two of this thesis, which did not in reality take into consideration that conflicts may occur, the organisation now established a branch with the sole purpose of not only preventing conflict, but \textit{expecting} it. Even more remarkably, within the same document, the opportunity to mount and deploy civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring was launched, albeit with a limited scope and duration. This change is radical compared to what the charter was based on, by opening up for a new structure in conflict management, and then adding a tool when the first step of conflict resolution proves ineffective. Under point 16, the organisation even added that in case of a spiraling conflict, assistance from the UN should be sought, and the OAU should offer its services in terms of practical contributions to the UN:

However, in the event that conflicts degenerate to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or where appropriate the services of the United Nations will be sought under the general terms of its Charter. In this instance, our respective countries will examine ways and modalities through which they can make practical contribution to such a United Nations undertaking and participate effectively in the peacekeeping operations in Africa.\textsuperscript{179}

This is also noteworthy: the organisation should deliberately seek assistance and cooperation with others outside of Africa, in contrast to the wish in the OAU's charter to keep external parties outside of Africa. In total, the intentions of the Mechanism were by Vogt and Myangwa summarised in three points;

1) Undertake peacemaking and peace-building activities in post-conflict situations,
2) In cases of full-blown conflicts, take on peace-building efforts.
3) Anticipate and prevent conflicts, and prevent them from developing. This would also be their primary focus, as it was believed that by concentrating their efforts here, time-consuming and expensive operations might be prevented.\textsuperscript{180}

These three intentions in the OAU declarations, and the choice of words in it, can be interpreted as an increased acceptance or realisation within the organisation that their

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid: Point 15
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid: Point 16
Accessed 03.04.2016
mechanisms for managing conflicts at the time were insufficient. The internal factor where
the secretary general shows a proactive role in regards to reform is important, but the fact that
it came through could not have happened without support from the rest of the organisation.
By establishing their own mechanism in order to work with conflicts, adopt the new measures
and emphasise on co-operation with the UN, the organisation may have thought they found a
way in to achieve one of the fundamental ideas behind the OAU: African solutions to African
problems, in true Pan-African spirit. Externally, the fact that the United Nations on paper had
stated the need to rethink security and cooperation with regional arrangements, may also have
contributed to a change in perceptions about non-interference within the OAU.

These events taking place in the early times after the end of the Cold War does
indicate a partial answer to one of the initial questions of this thesis, regarding what time
period the policy change in the OAU took place: it may have been evoked as an idea with the
operation in Chad but the experiences the organisation did there stalled further process until
international politics dramatically changed, and forced the discussion after 1990. It is, as
indicated in the introduction of this thesis, far more gradual than often assumed. These early
steps from the organisation, such as the Kampala Leadership Forum with following summits,
also shed light on the role external actors had in this process, and reveals some of the motives
these had for increasing their focus on regional organisations such as the OAU. Mainly, the
UN saw that it in the changing political environment, with increasing number of conflicts was
unable to be a provider of peace in every corner of the world, and that it by increasing their
attention to the OAU could have a valuable supporter to lean of for these challenges. This
interpretation is supported by the Agenda for Peace report, and also confirmed the changed
perceptions on security and peace within the OAU, explaining the process of a policy change.

**Changed perceptions on responsibility to protect, increased attention from
the world? The cases of Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda**

The establishment of the Mechanism, and the functions it was intended to fill, was an
important step in the non-indifference policy. In creating the Mechanism, the organisation
stated that it did not have the intention of being a bystander anymore, at least not on paper.
While the intentions were good, and the OAU in fact experienced some successes with the
Mechanism, the organisation did not manage to prevent conflicts from occurring or prevent
them from developing further in the 1990s. The following part of the thesis demonstrates
three such cases.
Somalia

In Somalia Siad Barré ruled with a military administration from 1969 to 1991, known to have exploited the political climate during the Cold War. Somalia at the time had a long history of conflicts, not only internally, but also with several of its neighbours - including Ethiopia and Kenya. During the period between 1990 and 1991, violence intensified, up to the point of lawlessness. Barré left Mogadishu in January 1991, and the Somali state collapsed.\(^{181}\) The succession of violence that followed led to a number of diplomatic missions dispatched to Somalia, while the situation developed into a human tragedy where 4.5 million people were at risk for famine-related diseases by 1992.\(^{182}\)

The situation was grave, and the SG of the United Nations at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, produced two reports to the Security Council, which resulted in Resolution 751. This resolution produced the legal framework for the UN Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM.\(^{183}\) The resolution also allowed for steps to be taken to create the UNITAF, Unified Task Force, an American-led operation deployed with the mission to create a secure environment in Somalia.\(^{184}\) The intention was to create supply routes and prepare the way for UNOSOM. UNOSOM was replaced in 1993 by UNOSOM II, with expanded mandates. These mandates were quickly tested, first with the attack on a Pakistani contingent, before the infamous murder of 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu, leading the US to withdraw. The rest of the contingent withdrew in 1995 and left, according to Gambian law researcher Abou Jeng at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research, the country more or less as they had entered it.\(^{185}\)

Where was the OAU in this crisis? President Meles Zenawi of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia was given a mandate during the crisis by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, to assist the Somali nation in restoring peace and reaching national reconciliation. Dr. Salim also conducted diplomatic efforts towards resolving the crisis. For most of the conflict, however, the organisation was unclear. They expressed a wish to be more included in the process during the Council of Ministers session in Ethiopia, January 1994. As seen from the documents from the meeting, efforts by the international

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\(^{181}\) Margaret A Vogt and Monde Muyangwa:(2009)
\(^{184}\) Abou Jeng: (2015): 252
\(^{185}\) Ibid.
society were praised, and further stressed the need for Africa to speak with a unified voice.\textsuperscript{186}

It even went as far as saying that it

Expresses its concern about the lack of progress since the Cairo Summit of the Central Organ with respect to a close working relationship, consultation and partnership that must exist between the OAU and the UN on the question of Somalia, and requests the Secretary General in this regard to do all that is necessary with the view to ensuring that important decisions are not taken on Somalia by the UN without consultation with the OAU and also requests the African Group in New York to bring its influence to bear on the Security Council, inter alia, through the Non-Aligned Caucus with the view to advancing the same goal.\textsuperscript{187}

Here, the organisation made it clear that they wished to be taken into consideration when decisions on Africa were to be made by the UN, but in reality the OAU was ineffective. Their expression of the lack of progress in their relationship with the UN is interesting, occurring soon after the establishment of the Mechanism.

**Burundi**

1993 was not a good year in Africa, and certainly tested the new Mechanism of the OAU. Not only did the UN operation fail in Somalia, as well as the OAU policy in the crisis, but Burundi also made it into the news when the country again experienced conflict. In 1994, two successive Hutu presidents were murdered which made the OAU take several steps towards resolving the conflict. The OAU Secretary General made several visits to Burundi. Julius Nyere, the aforementioned (at the time former) president of Tanzania was asked to mediate in a peace dialogue in 1995.\textsuperscript{188}

When Pierre Buyoya led a coup in 1996, the neighbouring states decided not only to condemn the coup, but even use economic sanctions. An all-female observer mission was deployed in 1997. When Buyoya initiated national dialogue for partnership for peace in 1998, the OAU encouraged it, and Julius Nyere was again included in the peace talks. They were, however, stalled when he passed away, and his work was continued by Nelson Mandela. The OAU was often to include "the elders" in processes such as in Burundi. The organisation continued to take an active role for the remaining peace talks, and participated in a number of meetings in both Arusha and New York on the subject.\textsuperscript{189} The OAU, followed by the AU, was in the years after the peace process active in condemning violators of the peace, until violence broke out again in 2015.


\textsuperscript{187} Ibid: Resolution on Somalia

\textsuperscript{188} Margaret A Vogt and Monde Muyangwa:(2000):10

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid: 12
Why the OAU decided to interfere in the conflict after 1994 is interesting. Why these signs of non-indifference in Burundi, when far less had been done in Somalia shortly before? Not only did the Secretary General involve himself personally, but the organisation sent prominent people to assist the peace process, and even a contingent of women to observe. The neighbouring states themselves took initiative to make it clear how they felt about the conflict.

The question is interesting, but difficult to answer. Some of the explanation may lie in the fact that there were very prominent actors involved in the process. One can assume that with names like Mandela and Nyere involved, a certain respect for these actors must have been felt by the parties of the conflict. Nelson Mandela was a newly released victim of the South African apartheid regime, a celebrated president, and a promoter of peace. Julius Nyere was also a respected personality in Africa, and held a good reputation internationally. Further, Dr. Salim was among the politicians within the OAU system who spoke of change, and as seen by his many travels to Burundi, had decided to be involved and show interest in the conflict. Cedric De Coning predicted in his note in 1996 that the OAU was prepared to assume more responsibility for peacekeeping in Africa.\textsuperscript{190} This must be said to necessarily involve interference not only through mediation, but also possibly with armed forces. He further wrote that the organisation could not be expected to accept responsibility for security in Africa while the UN looked after the rest of the world, as some members questioned the capacity of the OAU. He predicted that the situation in Burundi could deteriorate into a similar scenario as in Rwanda, and that the OAU could, on humanitarian ground or militarily, intervene if approved by the UN. This aspect is worth considering here, in light of their history of financial issues in Chad, in regards to how capable they would be to intervene on the ground.\textsuperscript{191} An armed intervention did not happen, but the note made by a renowned researcher who observed the politics take place is interesting, as it demonstrates a slight optimism for the OAU; perhaps they one day would have the capacity.

A possible explanation for the OAU’s involvement could also lie within the fact that the initiative for peace came from the state itself, Burundi. When Pierre Buyoya took initiative towards the other fractions within Burundi, he also signaled that he was ready to talk. This was not done in Somalia, where the flight of Barré left a power vacuum that was filled by clashes between clans, militia, and political groupings. A final explanation worth

\textsuperscript{190} Cedric de Coning: (1996):2
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
exploring lies within the fact that since the re-introduction of the Burundi conflict, another was taking place, which gave the OAU something to be concerned with and take heed in other conflicts: Rwanda.

Rwanda

While Siad Barré struggled in 1990 and eventually fled Somalia in January 1991, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), consisting of mostly Tutsis, invaded Rwanda from the northern border it shared with Uganda. The group intended to force forwards sharing of political power between the two main ethnicities in Rwanda. The OAU sent a neutral military observer group (MOG), but the group consisted of troops from Burundi, Uganda and DR Congo was not considered neutral enough, and collapsed. Simultaneously, the OAU launched a number of mediation efforts and a new peacekeeping mission, which eventually gave results.\textsuperscript{192} In 1993, the RPF and the government of Rwanda signed two protocols of agreement; one on the repatriation of refugees, and the second on power sharing.\textsuperscript{193} This peace agreement was known as the Arusha agreement, and came into place after mediation efforts from the OAU, United States, and several European countries. A United Nations peacekeeping force was sent in October, and NMOG was subsumed into this force. The main reason was the challenge the OAU faced with maintaining and financing the force\textsuperscript{194}

In 1994, following the flight crash and death of President Juvénal Habyarimana, violence exploded in Rwanda. The UN was given a new mandate on a peace keeping force, but struggled to secure it. The Security Council therefore asked the African countries to provide troops for a mission to Rwanda, which the OAU actually agreed to, and offered 6000 troops. This was linked to the condition that the West covered logistics and equipment, which it failed to do, resulting in a five month delay, illustrating that the challenges felt in Chad years ago were still very real. In the meantime, the task became too overwhelming for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was withdrawn.\textsuperscript{195} The OAU passed a number of resolutions and urged the international society to pay attention to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{192} Terry M. Mays: \textit{Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping}. Scarecrow Press (2003): 95
  \item \textsuperscript{194} Margaret A. Vogt and Monde Muyangwa: (2000): 11
  \item \textsuperscript{195} Ibid
\end{itemize}
the disaster, as seen in organisational documents, but to little use.\textsuperscript{196} What is worth noting through resolutions such as CM/RES.1514-1552 from June 1994, is that within the same document, both the financial situation in the OAU and the situation in Rwanda are addressed, specifically state the need of the international society and African states to contribute. During the same period, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 925, where the Council stated that it was

> Welcoming the cooperation between the United Nations and the [...] (OAU) and the contributions of the countries of the region, especially that of the facilitator of the Arusha peace process, and encouraging them to continue their efforts.\textsuperscript{197}

The genocide well known to the world today killed approximately 800,000 thousand to 1,000,000 million people within three months.\textsuperscript{198} It was brutal, and shocked the world. The genocide can be understood as a motivation behind the involvement and non-indifference the organisation showed in Burundi. The violence in Rwanda was taken to a new level for the African states, something they had not seen yet. This may have been an incentive for the organisation to act, knowing the chances for escalation.

These three conflicts, which took place early in the 1990s, shocked many. Despite some varied efforts from the OAU Mechanism in mediating in the conflicts, it failed to mediate agreements securing lasting peace. On the other hand, the involvement of the OAU is worth noting, as it actually agreed to provide peacekeeping forces to Rwanda, although it failed partially due to slowness from the UN and their own financial challenges to prevent the genocide. It put much more effort into the mediation in Burundi, and managed to come up with an agreement, though violence broke out again later on.

It was also important for the spark in international discussions on sovereignty for each state versus the responsibility to protect, a discussion that the OAU also participated in. The basic idea behind the responsibility to protect doctrine is that human rights sometimes trump sovereignty, as enshrined in Charter 2, article 7, with a critical eye turned on non-interference in domestic affairs. Each state is responsible to protect its own population from war crimes,


genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The debate that arose after the conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and the Balkans may have put a certain pressure on the OAU to reconsider their policy of non-interference. The brutality of the conflicts was an eye-opener, and their failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and in part in Burundi may have been motivational to reconsider their policy.

**Pressure from the international society and Structural Adjustment Programs: Incentives for action**

The conflicts of the early 1990s, were without doubt brutal and tested the organisation. The mediation efforts yielded mixed results. As the world bore witness to the conflicts raging Africa, international pressure also made itself visible in the African states, and forced reexamination of the strategies from Kampala. The attention received by the OAU from the international society the Rwandan genocide was high, and despite its efforts to act during the crisis, it received vast criticism. The question of how this could have happened in the view of the world emerged. Initially in this thesis, the question of what international politics or thoughts made the African States find it necessary to change their own policy of non-interference to ensure peace and security and to a larger extent take care of themselves, was raised. The conflicts the world witnessed in the 1990s were a wake-up call for many, and made both the UN, EU, NATO and USA take measures in their cooperation with the OAU, co-operations which was strengthened with the African Union. These measures were affecting the organisations.

Through this thesis, the challenge of the economic and logistical capacity of the OAU, as well as the limitations within the charter, has been raised. Regarding economic challenges the individual states were also challenged economically. Many African states experienced increases in the interests of the loans they had taken from western states, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank following the economic crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, leaving them struggling to maintain the loan conditions. When the Oil crisis hit the Western countries who so far had lent out money to the developing countries to increase the flow of capital from the south, and increase trade. Many took


additional loans to pay the increased interest, and in reality experienced an increase in debt with the global economic crisis. One example used by Herbert Jauch, labour researcher, is that the loan receiving countries paid back US$1662 billion between 1980 and 1992, but because of the high interest, the debt increased to US$ 1419 billion in 1992 – despite the repayments.

This further reflected their ability to support the OAU economically, as these payments were voluntary and not number one priority for many. The effect the debt had on the sovereignty and politics of many African states through loans from the IMF and the World Bank is interesting, and should be taken in consideration as an explanatory factor to why the OAU changed their policy.201

While the initial development loans came with few restrictions, the demands from the lenders increased in the 1990s with harder conditions in conjunction with the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). The term is worthy of attention, as it from the mid-1980s continuously through the early 1990s was used in connection with development, which was a factor contributing to security, and the opportunity the member states of the OAU had of contributing economically to the organisation. These could include certain restrictions and conditions in order to work towards achieving a level of "good governance", a terminology which includes characteristics of transparency, effectiveness and democracy, among others.202 The main elements of the SAPs had neoliberal features.

The conditions set by the lenders may have contributed to an incentive for increased action from members of the OAU to demonstrate a will to take responsibility towards achieving necessary conditions whereby economic growth and investment could flourish. Conditions which would also encourage peace. The SAPs were built on the condition that countries in debt had to repay it in hard currency, leading to a policy of "exports at all costs", which was only way for these states countries to obtain such currencies.203 These measures forced countries on a path of deregulated free market economies. The IMF and the World Bank, according to Jauch, more or less determined the loan receiving countries’ macro-economic policies, and took control over central bank policies of these states as well as over

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201 Susan George: A Fate Worse than Debt. Grove Weidenfeld (1990)
203 Herbert Jauch: (26.05.09)
public expenditure.\textsuperscript{204} He further points to the effect the absolute conditions of the SAPs and the strong constraints these had on the recipients: several of them experienced decline in women's health, since the condition of privatisation of services and elimination of subsidies meant that this, in combination with a fall of real wages reduced their buying power. The educational system suffered with the conditions of the SAPs, the health systems deprived, and industry suffered. With the hard conditions of the SAPs the economic capacities of the OAU members were also limited, and contributed to straining the organisation's budget.

In the mid and late 1990s, the international society in addition to applying the SAPs, also reflected on their perceptions on peace in the continent in the mid and late 1990s. Whereas the Cold War had been a time when the African continent was left to deal with its conflicts by itself, the brutality of the 1990s had forced a debate on interventions, hereunder the responsibility to protect, and the question of humanitarian intervention. The non-interference policy of the OAU had not been effective, and neither had the international society's approaches been, in regards to preventing or stopping conflicts in Africa. Several actors saw it necessary to debate the policy that had been followed so far, two of which were the United Nations and the United States.

For the USA, an early indicator of a change in policy came from a proposal from the House of Representatives, called the African Conflict Resolutions Act, with the intention of authorising assistance to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa. This happened in September 1994, shortly after the Rwandan Genocide. The text of the document specifies that the intentions of the act are of "national interest to the USA", as the assistance of capacity building would "help the United States avoid huge future expenditures necessitated by Somalia-like humanitarian disasters", and "reduce the need for United Nations intervention as African institutions develop the ability to resolve African conflicts".\textsuperscript{205} In other words, the USA saw it not only in the interest of Africa to work towards African solutions to African problems, but also as a benefit to themselves and the UN.

The United Nations, on the other hand, developed the idea of responsibility to protect, which culminated in the implementation of the principle at the United Nations World

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.

Summit in 2005. It states that each state has a responsibility to protect its own population from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.206

The acknowledgements from the United Nations and USA were of importance, as they contributed to confirming the perceptions the OAU had started to develop: it was necessary to question their own policy of non-indifference.

**Towards the African Union**

Due to the brutality of the conflicts on the continent during the 1990s, a certain realisation was occurring in the organisation: what they had been doing so far was not effective enough to prevent resolve conflicts that broke out. A political scientist and Africa researcher, Tim Murithi, observantly quotes in his article the Malian politician Alpha Konaré, who in 1998 said that it was "no longer tenable for African countries to remain silent in the face of atrocities being committed in neighbouring countries".207 Since the establishment of the organisation, the continent had been host to several brutal conflicts; however, the 1990s also provided some highlights, such as the end of apartheid and the ensuing membership of South Africa. With South Africa came President Tabo Mbeki who, together with President Ghadaffi of Libya and Obasanjo of Nigeria, was an advocate for a rethinking of the OAU. Mbeki was eager to create a new image of African states to attract foreign investments.208 He wished to reconstruct African identity, to make the continent able to play a role politically, but in order to achieve such a role the whole organisation had to be questioned.209

By 1999, the end of the OAU was approaching, when the OAU extraordinary summit in Sirté discussed how to make the OAU more effective after an invitation from President Ghadaffi. He was personally committed to the process, and his reform proposals are indentified as triggers of the revival of continental security cooperation by the director of Global Governance Institute, Benedikt Franke.210

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208 Karin Dokken (2008): 122

209 Thomas Kwasi Tieku: (2004):255

Despite the fact that the three aforementioned presidents agreed on the need for changes within the OAU, they did not agree on how these changes were to be conducted. Ghadaffi wanted to return to the geopolitics of what political scientist Thomas K. Tieku refers to as "black Africa", and a renewed commitment to Pan-Africanism.\(^{211}\) Obasanjo, on the other hand, imagined a reform of the structure of the OAU, to increase the ability of the organisation to handle issues regarding security, which were linked with development through the Kampala leadership forum, and stability.\(^{212}\)

The African leaders who met in Sirté decided that to accommodate the different views on the reformation of the organisation, the best alternative would eventually be to replace the OAU with a new organisation. There the Sirté declaration was issued on the 9th of September 1999. The Constitutive Act of the new organisation, the African Union, was adopted at the Heads of State and Government Assembly in Lomé in 2000. Then followed a meeting in Lusaka where the roadmap of the implementation was made, and an extraordinary OAU summit in 2001, again in Sirté. There the declaration of the establishment was adopted, specifying that the legal requirements would only become complete after the signatures of two-thirds of the member states ratified the Constitutive Act.\(^{213}\) With the Durban Summit in 2002 the AU was officially launched.\(^{214}\)

The African Union and new institutions

During the same meeting in Durban, the Peace and Security Council of the AU, which had been debated and recommended by the Council of Ministers (COM), was adopted by the assembly. This was a confirmation of the 2000 Solemn Declaration on the Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDC), where members had agreed on fundamental principles of cooperation in security, development, promotion of democracy and good governance.\(^{215}\)\(^{216}\) The African Union Peace and Security Council would replace the OAU Mechanism, and enter into force by December 2003.

\(^{211}\) Thomas Kwasi Tieku: (2004): 261
\(^{212}\) Thomas Kwasi Tieku (2004): 257
\(^{214}\) AU: AU in a Nuthsell.
With the African Union came a few changes in the legislation of the organisation. Despite the fact that the organisation was new in theory, it consisted of more or less the same members, and the same constitution as its predecessor. In the charter of the OAU, as we can recall from chapter 2, the focus was non-interference and sovereignty. The organisation lacked tools to use in cases where conflicts escalated beyond the point of peaceful resolution such as arbitration or mediation. With the African Union, certain additions to the OAU Charter were made, despite the frame being much the same. Both organisations had the principle to "Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States"\textsuperscript{217} in their Charter, and the principle of non-interference.\textsuperscript{218} Only the African Union, however, included the "articles of faith" as T. O. Elias described them, in the Constitutive Act's articles 4 h, i and j.\textsuperscript{219}

These articles, outlined in the introduction of this thesis, opened for the opportunity of the organisation and its members to "intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."\textsuperscript{220} Further stated that each had obliged to "Peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security."\textsuperscript{221} Finally, the articles declared "The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security"\textsuperscript{222}

According to a legal adviser of the African Union, Ben Kioko, the inclusion of these articles came from a concern regarding the predecessor's failure to intervene in order to stop the gross and massive human rights violations the organisation had seen in the past, such as the excesses of Idi Amin in Uganda and Bokassa in the Central African Republic in the 1970s and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.\textsuperscript{223} By providing the organisation with these new additions to the Constitutive Act, the heads of state and government also gave the organisation the necessary mandate of power to intervene in case of another episode like the Rwanda genocide. The members decided to pool their sovereignty to enable the African

\textsuperscript{217} AU: Constitutive Act. Article (3)b.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid: Article (4)G, and OAU: OAU Charter. Article 3(1).
\textsuperscript{219} T. O. Elias: (1965): 244
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid: Article (4)I.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid: Article (4)J.
\textsuperscript{223} Ben Kioko: (2003): 812
Union to act as guarantor and protector of the rights and well-being of people in Africa.\textsuperscript{224} The change of words in the Constitutive Act demonstrates the culmination of what this thesis has focused on: a gradual process towards a downplay of the previously more or less non-negotiable line of non-interference of the OAU.

Examining the first 15 years of its existence, the African Union can be said to have operated in a far different political environment than its predecessor. While the OAU for most of its time struggled under the political pressure of the Cold War, the African Union faces another reality. The Cold War, in combination with reluctance to act beyond the role of condemning actions or mediating in conflicts, limited the effectiveness of the OAU, conditions the AU have been spared of.

The 1990s were challenging and exhausted not only the UN system in many ways when it came to forcefully intervening in conflict, but also in security organisations such as NATO. Other parts of the world (Such as the Balkans) were in the 1990s also facing conflict, which required the attention of the United Nations. The clear message from the UN, as seen in the Agenda for Peace report, was that the United Nations had to work closer with regional organisations such as the OAU. It opened up for other organisations, that also had been involved in Africa, to rethink their own approaches.

Eventually, when the OAU was replaced in 2002, the process of reforming the organisation concluded what politicians such as Ghadaffi, Mbeki and Obasanjo already had realised: the current system was insufficient, and it was not realistic to try to maintain it with the this profile.

**The African Union and non-indifference: cooperation**

With the African Union, came also the establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council, AUPSC, which political analyst Musifiky Mwasasali describes as a "momentous event in the articulation of the non-indifference doctrine".\textsuperscript{225} The organ is intended to take a position from which it facilitates peace-making, conducts early warning and preventive diplomacy, establish peace support operations and, when needed, recommend intervention in member states to promote peace, security and stability. Mwasasali points out

\textsuperscript{224} Tim Murithi (2009):94
\textsuperscript{225} Musifiky Mwasasali: From non-interference to non-indifference. In The African Union and its institutions by John Akokpari et.al. (2011) :44
that the AUPSC executed more sessions in its first year than the Central Organ to the Mechanism of the OAU did in 10 years.\textsuperscript{226}

Furthermore, he writes that the African Union has been braver than its predecessor, as it has ventured into situations where the OAU most likely would not have had the courage to go. Where the OAU would either remain silent, restrain its reactions to condemnation or passing resolutions, the African Union has taken a more proactive approach. Since 2005, the AU has authorised more than 64 000 peacekeepers to missions in Burundi, Comoros, Darfur, Somalia, Mali and Central African Republic in an attempt to operationalise the non-indifference policy.\textsuperscript{227} The African Union Operation in Burundi (AMIB) from 2003 was the first operation wholly initiated, planned, and executed by its members. Tim Murithi identifies this as a milestone for the organisation in terms of implementing the non-indifference policy.\textsuperscript{228} One of the major tasks was to protect politicians who returned to take part in the transitional government, and reintegrate former militia members into the society. At the end of the mission, the UN evaluation team even concluded that the aim of the operation, to establish relative peace and prevent de-escalation in potentially volatile situations, was achieved.\textsuperscript{229}

An interesting aspect of several of these operations is that they have occurred in collaboration with other international institutions, such as the European Union, the US and NATO. They have established quite different relationships than they did with the AU’s predecessor. Logistical support and economic funding have become more common means of support, as seen with the European Union’s relations to the African Union. In 2004, the EU established 2004 the African Peace Facility (APF) by request from the African Union, and constitutes the main source of funding to supporting the AU’s efforts peace and security.\textsuperscript{230} The fact that the initiative to establish the institution came from African states is interesting in itself, and indicate a change of policy by how the AU is specifically showing an interest in inviting foreign help to develop their own security framework.

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{227} Danielle Renwick:(13.05.2015)
\textsuperscript{228} Tim Murithi (2009):98
\textsuperscript{230} European Commission: African Peace Facility information site. Undated.
Accessed 28.04.16
The UN has authorised the AU to deploy peacekeeping missions on several occasions, among them in Somalia through African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), where the AU holds main responsibility of the process. This comes in addition to operations where the AU is partnering with others. The sponsor of this operation is the European Union, which in October 2015 signed an agreement with the African guaranteeing a €165 million transfer that covered the AMISOM operation in Somalia from June to December the same year. This was a continuation of the support that was established in 2007.\textsuperscript{231} Perceptions of the African Union have changed within the European Union compared to the OAU, and the two organisations even share a Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) since 2007. The intention of the strategy has been a move beyond a donor/recipient relationship, towards long-term cooperation on "jointly identified, mutual and complementary interests".\textsuperscript{232}

During the crisis in Comoros, where Mohammad Bacar declared himself President of Anjou in 2007 despite being ordered by the authorities to postpone elections due to security, the AU insisted on sanctions.\textsuperscript{233} Mediation efforts from both the US and the Au to call for new elections failed, and eventually ended with a full intervention from the African Union. Tanzania and Sudan provided troops, Libya and the non-member Morocco the boat transport, France the transportation to the departure point, and the US offered moral support.\textsuperscript{234}

Despite an active role in conflict resolution and a policy of non-indifference, the African Union has not always been able to act accordingly to the Article 4 of its Constitutive Act. In January 2016 the organisation decided to not send peacekeeping forces to the crisis-hit Burundi, despite reports of grave violence, due to the government's announcement that any such interference would be seen as an invasion.\textsuperscript{235} However, the political efforts from the organisation to mediate in the conflict indicates that it matters to them. It should also be mentioned that when the AU forces went to Burundi for the first time in 2003, the


organisation managed to stabilise the country and make conditions for the UN forces adequate, even if the ceasefire agreement was not fully implemented.\textsuperscript{236}

The non-indifference policy is possible to see through a number of efforts conducted by the African Union. One such effort is, as Alex Vines, director of the regional and security studies at Chatham House points out, the fact that when 12 coup d'état took place between 2003 and 2012, the African Union suspended the membership of eight of them.\textsuperscript{237} Suspended membership in the OAU was never a subject, even in situations such as in Uganda during the regime of Idi Amin. This demonstrates in itself how the organisation so far has been far more willing to address unconstitutional changes of governments.\textsuperscript{238} It should, however, be mentioned that the organisation not has addressed the heads of state and government wh have extended their rule beyond what their state's Constitutions opens for. Alex Vines indicated in 2013 that figures demonstrated how the number of wars in Africa had decreased since the AU was established, while the local crisis had increased. He further pointed out that this may be a result of better African mediation efforts.\textsuperscript{239}

The changed relations between the OAU and the world, compared to the AU and the world is remarkable, and in particular the changes indicated above where the traditional client-recipient role of Africa has been replaced with one of more equal positions. This is particularly clear through the role the AU have held during events where it has demonstrated its non-indifference policy in regards to security questions.

\textbf{3.6 Chapter Summary}

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disappearance of the Soviet bloc in 1991, the political picture of the world changed, pushing forward a re-thinking of the OAU from within the organisation itself. African security policies in the eyes of the OAU, a policy that for a long time had been under influence of the international politics created by two competing super powers, had to be re-considered, and left several unanswered questions for the OAU. The entire principle of security had to be redefined, and would force forward a debate on the policy of non-interference that the organisation had applied so far. The policy

https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-147874791.html
\textsuperscript{237} Alex Vines: (2013): 91
\textsuperscript{238} BBC: Profile: African Union. Updated 05.02.2015. Accessed 06.05.16
\textsuperscript{239} Alex Vines: (2013): 93
stated in the charter, that required members to follow a line of non-interference and peaceful settlement, had to be re-thought when the organisation entered the new decade of post-Cold War politics. It did not know the full consequences, but soon came to realise that their importance as a "sphere of interest" had significantly faded, leaving a vacuum that had to be filled. The increased number of conflicts on the continent following the end of the Cold War forced forward a re-thinking of the policy the organisation had followed so far.

This internal process of the organisation began with the lessons learnt from the Chad experience in the 1980s, but rised as priority after 1990, simultaneously as the United Nations questioned their own approach to Africa. The OAU developed new strategies for conflict management and eased its non-interference policy. It even established mechanisms with the purpose to expect and solve conflicts, and opened for the opportunity to deploy small forces in conflict areas for a limited time. Facing severe conflicts in the 1990s, despite efforts on mediation and the expressed intention to work for peace and stability, the organisation lacked the capacity to deliver and the conflicts developed. At the end of the decade, central personalities of the organisation saw it as necessary to re-think the structure and the purpose of the organisation to make it able to meet the future, and advocated the necessity for change.

The realisation of a need of change on African security politics is also visible through the UN and EU system. The UN began the process with the Agenda for Peace report, which was followed by measures to cooperate closer with the African continent. The realisation of a need for change increased rapidly within the United Nations. It increased its attention to the OAU, and brought back to life articles in its charter that applied to the opportunity to utilise them in the challenges of securing peace in the region. The focus on the opportunity for such regional organisations to decide themselves what challenges they identified, and which means to apply to solve them, gave the OAU more room to take their own decisions, even thought this potential never was fully utilised of the organisation. The evaluation of the OAU ended with a decision to replace itself, with the African Union.

The African Union has from the beginning demonstrated a far more active role than its predecessor, and actively sought cooperation with external partners such as the UN and the European Union, which it co-operates closely with. Despite some downfalls, the organisation has still by far been more successful in working with peace and security questions. The economic challenges faced by the OAU has been less challenging for the AU, who consequently from the beginning have sought economic and logistical support from the external partners, with far more determined and targeted approach. The decisions from the
1990s made by the UN to cooperate more closely with regional organisations have influenced the African Union, who themselves often have identified ongoing peace and security challenges, and proposed resolutions based on a regional approach. The AU have also approached the international organisations differently than the OAU did, and their co-operation with the European Union is one such example. The formalised co-operation between the two regional actors is a result from an approach to the EU made by the African states themselves. This approach led to the establishment of a function within the EU system, JAES, to systematically work on their co-operation. One noteworthy aspect of this co-operation is that it holds more focus to mutual co-operation rather than former client/recipient relation.
4.0: Conclusion

Initially in this thesis the peculiarity of how the OAU, later the AU, changed its policy from non-interference to non-indifference was addressed, questioning an explanation on how and why the organisation with more or less the same members and constitution could develop so different policies.

With this thesis, the aim has been to create a narrative through utilising a variety of sources, from where to discover explanatory factors answering why the change from a non-interference policy to a non-indifference policy occurs, and how. The question of during what time period this change occurred has also been an essential part of the process. The thesis has been guided by the above mentioned research question, and the additional work questions:

- What politics or thoughts internationally, as seen with changes in external factors such as United Nations, European Union or others, made the OAU find it necessary to change its non-interference policy?
- How did the transition from a non-interference policy of the OAU develop to a non-indifference policy as seen in the AU?
- During what time period did the OAU change its view on non-indifference?

This thesis indicates important aspects explaining why the policy change from the OAU to the AU took place, and when the process began. The thesis has also found explanatory factors to what external influence that caused this change, and how the non-interference policy developed to a non-indifference policy.

Firstly, the policy the OAU followed were based on the charter and its limitations, which restrained the opportunities the OAU had to interfere in conflicts. On several occasions, some which have been elaborated on through this thesis, the charter's regulations of conflicts proved to be insufficient. The organisation never specifically stated as one of its intentions to be a provider of peace, due to the strong focus the founding fathers had on non-interference and on every state's right to rule their own internal politics. Still, the organisation took in consideration that tools for conflict solutions were necessary if peace was to be maintained among the members. Without peace, working towards common interest, development and elimination of apartheid would be difficult. The interests of the members therefore reflected the content of the charter, where it strongly advocates non-interference and

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sovereignty, and to protect the interests of Africa in a Pan-African spirit. The articles of the charter did not allow the idea of conflict to develop further than what could be solved with mediation or arbitration, a decision which would make the opportunities the organisation had to take measures in evolving conflicts limited. The charter was in other words in reality not absolute, but it limited the organisation, and gave it the necessary arguments for not interfering. By signing the charter the members also signed a pledge to solve their conflicts peacefully, but it said little about the role of the OAU in such situations. While the Organisation of African Unity during its existence experienced several conflicts on the continent, measures were rarely taken from the organisation to interfere in them, beyond mediation and arbitration. What this thesis has shown, however, is that even though the original charter contributed to regulating the organisation's opportunities in conflict, there were exceptions made from the non-interference policy, in regards of mediation. The charter and the policy that it implied on the members restrained the possibility for influence in Africa, which the organisation were to acknowledge in the 1990s, which was a motivation for evaluation of the policy.

Secondly: The OAU followed the non-interference policy rather strictly for a long time during the Cold War, leaving each state to handle their own internal affairs, and conflicts to remain unaddressed. This resulted on several occasions that the organisation failed to address atrocities conducted by some of its member states. As this thesis has shown, however, not all members was indifferent to what was taking place, but they refrained from interfering beyond what was the usual OAU policy of condemning actions conducted and urging and end to them. Even when separate members condemned such actions it also identified the non-interference policy as a core value of the OAU, as seen with the Tanzanian condemn of Idi Amin's regime in Uganda addressed in chapter two of this thesis. The long period of time that policy was followed has, through this thesis, been discovered to rely in the fact that the members of the OAU saw non-interference policy as a necessity for the existence of the organisation. Hence, protecting their own security and sovereignty, which as seen by the charter of the organisation, were core values for the members. The process of changing the policy did therefore take time.

A third aspect of the findings in this thesis demonstrates that a few exceptions to the non-interference policy were made by the organisation. It with some success took the role as mediator in some conflicts, but it did not manage to take on a role as a provider of peace. In mediation processes, the organisation was often undermined by its own members, who used
the UN channels frequently and hence set the OAU aside as actor in regional affairs, contradictory to the policy the organisation wished to follow: African solutions of African problems. With this undermining, the organisation did not manage to become an actor of substance when the end of the Cold War changed world politics, and Africa.

Fourthly, while the non-interference policy was strongly maintained during the years of Cold War by the organisation, it also attempted to promote common African concerns to the United Nations through the Africa Group, where the role of prominent members played a large role. As demonstrated in this thesis the activities conducted by the members of the group influenced the decisions made by the UN, in regards to on clear example with the exclusion of South Africa as a consequence of the Apartheid-regime. In particular, the role Dr. Salim A. Salim had during his period of representation in this group is relevant, as he also emerge as an important actor later on in the OAU.

As seen in this thesis, the process of policy change is not taking place over night, but is far more gradual. It began not with the change to the African Union, but with a realisation within the organisation in the early 1990s, evolving over a long period of time. Dr. Salim is present during many of these processes over a long period of time. He held an important position in the Africa Group in the United Nations for several years, and had the opportunity there to influence the politics the UN had in regards of question on Africa, and raised issues on several occasions. He was present during the Kampala leadership forum where the African perceptions on peace and security went through change, and held the highest position of the OAU for several years, which was at the end of the organisation's existence. His influence on the process towards change should therefore not be underestimated, and says something about the opportunity one person may have to influence a process. When he came to power as Secretary General of the organisation, his opportunity to exert influence towards a policy change were therefore easier. His close relations with the UN should not be underestimated either. His presence and that of the presidents Mebeki, Obasanjo and Ghadaffi, contributes to support the findings of the thesis where a gradual process with influence from prominent politicians was discovered.

The Africa group, where Dr. Salim served, managed to raise awareness of several other issues, including the conflict situation in Chad which was attempted to be resolved by an OAU peacekeeper force. Through the sources used in this thesis, it can be stated that the operation in Chad marks an ease of, and the first really remarkable exception from, the non-interference policy of the organisation. It indicates an explanatory factor to the question of
during what time period the change took place, as an indicator of early approach. It does, however, also mark an explanation to why the process of rethinking security policy in the OAU stalled for years after.

The operation in Chad was the first of its kind conducted by all-African contributors, and had limited success. As findings in the sources for this thesis have shown, the organisation were limited by the economical challenges, where states with already limited funds were asked to cover their own expenses. The lack of clear successes in the operation, combined with the economic burden of it, made the OAU refrain from intervening on such an operation again, and continuing the non-interference policy. It confirmed for the organisation its original purpose of non-interference. The inner politics of the organisation, seen through the involvement of Libya at one side of the conflict also indicates internal challenges of the OAU to stay true to the core value of unity in cases of conflict.

As a fifth explanatory factor, we found that the end of the Cold War changed the political arena not only for Africa, which made it necessary for the OAU to address its perceptions on security, but also for international actors who now had to address their work with security in on the continent. In other words, not only did the realisation of a need for change come from within the organisation in the early 1990s, but also external factors strongly contributed to the changed policy through a re-thinking of policy. One clear indicator is seen through the process of the Kampala Leadership Forum. This event was followed by a number of steps indicating a certain change of ideas within the organisation. In this thesis, the Kampala forum is highlighted as a clear shift in the non-interference policy, when the members changed their definition of security.

One factor contributing to the Kampala forum was the changing relation to the United Nations in the beginning of this period, hence supports the aforementioned argument of an external influence on the policy change. This is clear, as seen in this thesis' elaboration on the UN report "An Agenda for Peace", which acknowledged the need of a rethinking within the UN on how it cooperated with regional organisations on security such as the OAU. The following years the OAU took as consequence of the report, steps to change their relation with the UN, and measures to establishing their own mechanism for conflict resolution. The conclusion from the establishing process of the OAU Mechanism marks a clear change from the former non-interference policy, in the way the primary objectives of the Mechanism were written: it was to not only going to prevent conflict, but also expect their occurrence. The same decision even opened for an opportunity to mount and deploy military and civilian
missions for limited periods of time in conflict areas. This was a decision completely opposing the original charter of the organisation where non-interference was stated not only as a right held by the members but also a duty they were to follow. As seen through this thesis, the decision taken by the organisation was a step towards an alienation of one of its fundamental principles.

A sixth interesting discovery in explaining how and why the policy change came in place is that, despite positive attitudes towards change from old policy, the OAU to a large degree failed to follow their own intentions of taking an active role when facing the conflicts on the continent during the 1990s. At the end of the decade, several prominent leaders within the OAU, such as Mbeki, Obasanjo and Ghadaffi were therefore among those who realised that a re-thinking of the organisation. One key to such re-thinking was to find a different approach to the question of peace and security of the members, and the non-interference policy was identified as of low in terms of effect to prevent conflict. The limitations of the OAU and its charter therefore concluded the organisation to replace itself, and find a new approach within a new framework.

Initially in this thesis, the question of how the successor of the OAU have taken on a different approach, towards non-indifference, was addressed. Through the thesis, the high level of activity from the African Union has been demonstrated, in particular connecting it with the approaches the organisation has conducted to increase their co-operation with the UN and the EU. It has conducted several operations to establish, maintain or oversee peace processes since 2002, and as indicated in the findings of this thesis this has taken place with mixed results. The African Union have had the opportunity of learning from the mistakes of the predecessor, who wished to avoid external interference in African Affairs, which has been a clear advantage for the AU. The time of the OAU provided knowledge about what had proven to be ineffective and causing conflicts, and gave many answers to what the new organisation had to do to avoid the same errors. One of them was to seek support, a decision which has relieved the organisation's financial burden compared to the OAU’s. Based on the findings of this thesis, the policy of non-interference can therefore be said to never have been an option for the AU. The African Union has deliberately approached actors outside of Africa, but also sub-regional actors, to find necessary support, and by doing so opening up for a different approach to the question of interference. The organisation have from the beginning taken measures to work with peace and security on the continent, and sought support from partners how have been far more willing to support their efforts compared to the predecessor.
Despite not succeeding in taking measures to solve or address all conflicts, the AU has at least proven to be more willing than the OAU. The Constitutive Act of the African Union may have been a clear factor here, which states that members have a duty to respond in cases of grave concern, and even holds a right to be protected if they ask for it. The former limitations of the OAU has not restrained the AU.

When facing the choice of future policy in regards to African security the organisation chose deliberately the policy of non-indifference when it was established, by implementing article 4, an article based on the member states experiences from the past in the OAU, and the new expectations to organisation from the world.

**Future research**

During the work with this thesis I have discovered several aspects of security politics in Africa which still has not been investigated by historians, that holds potential for future researchers in this field. One thing striking as quite interesting, is that while extensive documentation is available of the Africa Group in the United Nations' activities, little research has been conducted. The importance of this group during the Cold War has not been elaborated on, which is curious. The activity level of the group, and the influence it had is interesting, and holds great potential for any curious researcher of history. There is a rich availability of sources within the United Nations, who in recent years has used resources to digitalise its printed documents from the earliest years of the organisation. These contains, as I have discovered throughout the process with this thesis, several interesting aspects of African history.

A further opportunity for historians with an interest in African history and security politics is the relations between the European countries, through for instance the relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the OAU during the Cold War, in regards to security questions. One possible approach could be to investigate what communication these two organisations had on security during this period.
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