Come Together:

The Effects of Power-Sharing on Peace and Democracy in Zanzibar

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Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences
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Abstract

After the Zanzibar presidential elections in October 2010 a Government of National Unity (GNU), incorporating both the winning party and the main opposition party, was established as a means to reduce the tension between the two main political parties. The GNU was immediately celebrated by supporters of both political parties and was by many understood as a promising step in the right direction for consolidating peace and democracy in Zanzibar.

This study investigates to what extent the power-sharing can be a plausible conflict management strategy, and it does so by using the GNU in Zanzibar as a case. Enhancing our understanding of the effects of power-sharing on the likelihood of peace and democracy is vital, as there is a widespread use of power-sharing arrangements within the field of conflict management. The research presented in this thesis is based on qualitative interviews conducted during fieldwork in Zanzibar in January-February 2013, as well as a document analysis.

The thesis outlines the most significant academic causal linkages on the effects of power-sharing on peace and democracy, showing that there is no clear-cut picture with regards to the success of power-sharing in bringing about the intended changes. In Zanzibar, power-sharing was successful in enabling the parties to reach an agreement, and led to an immediate improvement in the social relationships on community level. Furthermore, the supporters of the opposition party experienced less discrimination than prior to the establishment of the GNU, as well as a higher level of freedom of speech. The government was also perceived as more transparent and the practices of the democratic system were more constructive than in the past. However, the annulment and re-run of the 2015 presidential election in Zanzibar, and the political leadership’s inability to address the root causes to the conflict, lead to the main argument that the GNU may seem to represent more of a pause in the conflict between the political parties, rather than a durable solution. Furthermore, the aforementioned inability to deal with the causes of the conflict, and also the unsuccesfulness in separating the ruling party from the government, are factors likely to affect Zanzibar’s consolidation of peace and democracy in the years to come.
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Ann-Therese B. O. Kildal
Oslo, 25th of April 2016
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1.0. Introduction

The inclusion of power-sharing arrangements as a means to mitigate conflict has become an increasingly popular strategy in conflict management – in particular in societies characterised as deeply divided (Binningsbø 2013:89). The rationale behind the use of this conflict management approach is the belief that it is possible to reduce tension between ethnic groups through the implementation of institutional design to accommodate their differences (Lijphart 1977). However, the support for power-sharing as a viable conflict management strategy is contested, and some scholars are growing more pessimistic with regards to the promise of power-sharing arrangements as an effective tool to achieve durable peace (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Spears 2000:106; Spears 2002; Tull and Mehler 2005: 375). Furthermore, it has also been argued that the inclusion of power-sharing in negotiated peace settlements can have counter-productive effects on the quality of the democratic systems in which they are introduced, given that power-sharing arrangements often are established as the result of undemocratic processes (Jung and Shapiro 1995; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003).

After several failed attempts at ending the political stalemate between the ruling party Chama Cha Mapunduzi (CCM) and the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) in Zanzibar, power-sharing was considered the only viable option to reconcile the two parties. Consequently, a government of national unity (GNU) was established after the elections in 2010, incorporating both the winning party and the opposition (Bakari and Makulilo 2012). Limited scholarly work has been published on the effects of the implementation of political power-sharing in Zanzibar. As such, there is need for more thorough analysis of the positive and negative effects of power-sharing as a viable strategy in Zanzibar, both 1) regarding the immediate effects on the level of conflict and democratic practice and 2) the longer-term effects on the consolidation of both peace and democracy.

This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1., will contextualize and present the research statement as well as the objectives guiding this study. Section 1.2., provides a brief review of the power-sharing literature, which will illustrate the need for more thorough analysis of the effects of power-sharing. Section 1.3., will present the choice of methodology, including addressing some of the methodological concerns for this study. The final section, 1.4., will outline the research design and the structure of the following chapters.
1.1. Problem Statement and Research Aims

Within the power-sharing literature it has been claimed that power-sharing arrangements can be effective in ensuring that deeply divided societies make the transition into stable democracies (Lijphart 1977). The underlying notion of this theory is that differences between various social groups sometimes make it challenging, if not impossible, to co-exist peacefully within the same state. Thus, there is need for political institutions that can reduce the tension between the groups and thus mitigate the potential for conflict between the groups over the access to the state apparatus (Lijphart 1977:1).

Consequently, it is believed that power-sharing can promote both peace and democracy in societies affected by internal conflict. This makes the political developments in Zanzibar an interesting case for further analysis. The conflict between the political parties in Zanzibar has not only dominated the political sphere – political identities have entrenched nearly every aspect of life in Zanzibar to the extent that CUF would refrain from attend weddings and funerals if the person involved was from the opposing party, and vice versa (Matheson 2012:599). Moreover, the political situation in Zanzibar is complex and has to be understood in the light of historical and socio-economic developments in the isles, as well as its status as a semi-autonomous unit in the United Republic of Tanzania.

The introduction of a multi-party democratic system in Tanzania in the mid-1990s opened up a political sphere in Zanzibar where the discontent over the government that for long had been supressed, came to the surface. The electoral violence that came to the fore after the introduction of a multi-party political system in Zanzibar has by some been interpreted as a sign of a re-emergence of the Arab/African division salient in political life years prior to independence (Karume 2004; Killian 2008). Others are critical towards this assumption and denote the conflict to the political and economic marginalization of certain regions in Zanzibar, and the government’s reluctance to abide to democratic norms and practices (Matheson 2012: 597). Moreover, the violent demonstrations during the elections in Zanzibar have been interpreted as an outcry against and “dissension over issues of representation, control of the state apparatus, economic mismanagement, and identity formation” (Cameron and Dorman 2009:3). These various interpretations will be elaborated in more detail in the background chapter of this thesis, providing the necessary backdrop to understand the current situation in Zanzibar.
However, in order to clarify the relevance and the aims of this thesis, a brief introduction to the political situation in Zanzibar will be presented in the following. In Zanzibar, the transition from one-party rule to a multi-party system was accompanied by sporadic outbreaks of violence as well as human rights violations during the elections (Bakari 2001:1). During the electoral procedures, the ruling party CCM demonstrated how it controlled the elections, repressed the opposition and breached principles of human rights in its treatment of the opposition party and others critical towards the government (Cameron 2009:160). This was evident e.g. by the fact that supporters of the opposition experienced difficulties in getting registered as voters due to the politicization of central positions in state and administration (Matheson 2012:599). Between the elections, supporters of the opposition would also typically experience intimidation by the police and discrimination with regards to access to senior positions as civil servants (Matheson 2012:599). As such, instead of abiding to democratic norms and practices, it became increasingly difficult to differentiate between the political party CCM and the government, as political partisan entrenched more or less all aspects of life in the isles (Cameron 2009:160). As such it has been argued that even though a multi-party democratic system was introduced in Zanzibar in the 1990s, “…the mentality inculcated by 30 years of one-party rule lived on” (Anglin 2000:42).

Several peace agreements, known as Muafakas\(^1\) were initiated to reduce the tension between CCM and CUF, however, these had varying degrees of success (Matheson 2012; Oloka-Onyango and Nassali 2003:18-20; Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:67). When the third negotiated settlement ended in a political stalemate in 2008, many feared that the coming elections in 2010 would mean a relapse into violent confrontations between the government and the opposition (Matheson 2012:601). However, during the fall of 2009, reconciliatory talks between the leadership of the two contending parties commenced and commitment was demonstrated on each side to the conflict to come to an agreement. The commitment to see the process through was demonstrated on leadership level, as President Karume exerted the necessary push for the passing of a bill in the House of Representatives that opened up the possibility of conducting a referendum on the establishment of the GNU (ibid). When the referendum was held the 31\(^{st}\) of July in 2010, 66.4% of the people voted in favor of the GNU (Bakari and Makulilo 2012).

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\(^1\) Muafaka is the Swahili word for “agreement” or “accord”.

From the time the informal talks between the political leadership started, to the holding of the 2010 elections, the relationship changed significantly between the two camps. While the reconciliation started from top leadership in the two parties, gradually, the people in Zanzibar acknowledge their commitment to end the conflict, resulting in improving the relationship between the parties’ supporters (Moss and Tronvoll 2015). As such, when CCM’s presidential candidate, Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein won the election in October 2010, receiving less than 4000 votes more than CUF’s candidate Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad, supporters of both camps celebrated the results and a grand coalition incorporating both the winning party and the losing party was formed (Bakari and Makulilo 2012).

While the GNU had an immediate positive effect on the stability in Zanzibar, limited research has been conducted on the short-term and longer-term effects of the GNU on peace and democracy in the isles. Consequently, there is need for a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of power-sharing in Zanzibar. As case studies can provide in-depth understanding of the dynamics between power-sharing on the one hand, and peace and democracy on the other, this was considered the most suitable research design for analysing the effects of the GNU in Zanzibar. As such, this thesis will use the case study of the GNU in Zanzibar in the analysis of the research question; “What were the short-term effects of political power-sharing in Zanzibar on peace and democracy and what longer-term effects did the GNU have on the consolidation of both peace and democracy?” Through answering these questions, the thesis will analyse the extent to which power-sharing was a viable conflict management tool in Zanzibar.

There are several reasons why the GNU in Zanzibar makes an interesting case for further scrutiny. First, the decision to enter a power-sharing arrangement was decided by holding a referendum prior to the 2010 election in Zanzibar, where the Zanzibari were given the opportunity to decide whether the GNU should be established or not (Bakari and Makulilo 2012). As this ensured popular participation in the decision-making process, this may increase the local ownership to the process and plausibly increase the probability of the GNU fostering a peaceful and democratic system. Furthermore, the conflict in Zanzibar can be characterized as a low-intensity conflict, and the occurrences of political violence have led to relatively few casualties. This pushes forward the question whether power-sharing arrangements can serve as a conflict preventive mechanism and as a solution to political
stalemates. While case studies make it challenging to make generalizations to other cases, it still provides an opportunity for transferability of best practices to other cases that have some of the same characteristics where power-sharing is considered a plausible solution. Thus, an assessment of the effects of the GNU on peace and democracy in Zanzibar is of relevance for scholars and policy makers alike.

Furthermore, the analysis aims to serve as a contribution to the on-going debate on whether power-sharing is a viable solution to conflict in democratic regimes where the society can be characterized as deeply divided. Based on empirical data from fieldwork conducted on the Zanzibar islands, Unguja and Pemba, in January-February 2013 as well as secondary data, this thesis will discuss the potential outcome of including the opposition into the state apparatus and point to some of the challenges associated with this conflict management strategy in the case of Zanzibar.

The main findings from the analysis are the following: First, the GNU in Zanzibar was successful in fostering short-term peaceful relations between the political parties and its members on community level. In addition, there have been some notable improvements in terms of intimidation and discrimination of the opposition, and the overall population experienced increased freedom of speech after the instalment of the GNU. The GNU also had some short-term positive effects on democratic practices as the House of Representatives became more constructive after the GNU was installed. However, the GNU was implemented primarily on leadership of the government, and thus failed to include civil servant positions in the state apparatus. This led to the perception that the power-sharing was elite-based and that the benefit of the GNU was exclusively for the political leadership. The long-term effects of the GNU on peace and democracy is however uncertain. First, the findings indicate that there was a certain level of discontent with the GNU, as it had not been able to increase the standard of living on local level. In addition, the internal divisions within the GNU with respect to Zanzibar’s status in the union with the mainland, was read by some as a sign that the GNU would not be able to leave their political party interest aside. Finally, CCM’s annulment and re-run of the 2015 presidential elections in Zanzibar, sends worrying signals with regards to the positive long-term effect of the GNU on democracy. As the most violent instances between CCM and CUF have taken place over the mismanagement of the electoral procedures, the inability to conduct free and fair elections may in fact serve as a threat both to peace and democracy in the long term. Coupled with the inability to address the causes to the
conflict, the thesis argues that the GNU in Zanzibar may symbolize a mere pause rather than a solution to the political conflict in Zanzibar.

1.2. Literature review – current debate

This section will provide a literature review and exemplify the increasing focus on power-sharing and illustrate the rationale for why power-sharing is a sought-to solution in conflict management. Furthermore, it will point to some of the challenges associated with navigating in the literature on the topic. The third chapter of this thesis will provide a more comprehensive literature review of power-sharing as well as outlining the implication for this study.

There has been an increasing focus on power-sharing as a means to mitigate conflict, which is discernible when looking into the growing body of literature on the subject. Between 1948 and 1998 the number of negotiated peace settlements after civil wars was 38, of which 37 included some form of power-sharing institutions (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 319). More recent numbers confirm the trend of including power-sharing in negotiated peace settlements. Between 1989 and 2004 a total of 83 peace agreements were signed, of which 70 included some kind of power-sharing (Jarstad and Sundberg 2008). Different forms of power-sharing arrangements have been implemented as a means to end violence in internal conflicts all over the world. Instances where power-sharing has been incorporated into peace accords include e.g. Bosnia, Philippines, and Northern Ireland (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 318). Power-sharing has also been applied in negotiated peace settlements in several African countries, inter alia; Rwanda (1993), Democratic Republic of Congo (2002), Sudan (2005), Kenya (2008), and Zimbabwe (2009), (Brosché 2009; Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Lemarchand 2006; Spears 2000).

One might question what makes power-sharing an increasingly sought-to solution to end conflicts. One of the advantages of including power-sharing in peace settlements is that it increases the likelihood of getting the opposing groups to the negotiation table (Walter 2002). This is possibly due to its ability to alter the insecurity typically characterising the political

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2 These estimates include peace settlements after civil wars where civil war is defined as a civil conflict where the number of casualties exceeds 1000 battle deaths per year. Consequently, the number of peace accords in less violent conflicts are not included in these estimates, and as such, the real number of peace accords where power-sharing has been an integral part of the peace accord is likely to be significantly higher.
climate in which a peace settlement is negotiated. The promise of power-sharing in peace settlements can serve as an incentive for the opposing group(s) in a conflict to peacefully engage with its opponent (Walter 2002). The focus on democracy and “good governance” among Western donors and international agencies is also likely to have affected the focus on power-sharing as an important instrument in the field of international conflict management (Spears 2000:106).

Nonetheless, the successfulness of power-sharing is contested, and it is uncertain under what circumstances power-sharing will bring about the intended effects. While most scholars agree that power-sharing is reducing the conflict level when included in negotiated peace processes, some argue that power-sharing is not a plausible solution in the long-run as one runs the risk of brushing the root causes of the conflict under the rug. By not dealing with the root causes, scholars argue that the parties are merely putting the conflict on hold (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010).

In addition, some scholars are critical towards the use of power-sharing as a means to end conflict as they argue that such arrangements can have counter-productive effects on the quality of the democratic system in which they are introduced. Bogaards (2006: 120-121) lists three reasons for the increasing criticism of power-sharing. First, power-sharing is mainly focusing on elite cooperation, which is limiting mass participation and thus restrains the quality of the democracy. Second, there is a growing academic strand of literature arguing that there is a trade-off between power-sharing institutions and democracy. This strand of literature argues that as the decision to enter into a power-sharing agreement often happen behind closed doors, without the inclusion of popular participation. Consequently, it is argued that there is “no democratic way to establish power-sharing democracy” (ibid:120). Third, the critics argue that power-sharing institutions are reinforcing the differences between the social groups and thereby hampering the creation of a shared national identity (ibid). Thus, not all are convinced by the promise of power-sharing arrangements to bring about peace and democracy.

As such, there are diverging opinions with regards to the effects of power-sharing. One might question how it is possible for the scholars analysing the same phenomenon to arrive at diverging conclusions with regards to the effect of power-sharing on peace and democracy. When moving beyond the surface of the academic contributions on the topic, it is evident that
this can be at least partly linked to the methodological choices on the behalf of the scholars. Binningsbø (2013) argues that this, to some extent, can be explained by different conceptualizations of “power-sharing2 as well as other relates concepts such as “peace” and “democracy” in the scholarly work written on the topic. This is also acknowledged by Jarstad (2008a:108), arguing that two different strands of research is dominating the academic discourse on the topic; one focusing on power-sharing and conflict management, while the other focusing on power-sharing and democracy. In research focusing on power-sharing as a conflict management strategy, the main purpose of introducing power-sharing is to end violent conflict in the society in which it is introduced. The other strand, focusing on power-sharing and democracy, is based on theory of consociational democracy and inclusive governments. While these are not mutually exclusive and more often than not are linked to each other, there has been a lack of integration between the two (Jarstad 2008a: 111). Furthermore, scholars operate with different thresholds when assessing the successfulness of power-sharing on peace and democracy. Illustratively, while most quantitative researchers within the conflict management literature are assessing the successfulness of power-sharing with regards to its ability to serve as a short- and long-term solution to conflict, more qualitative oriented scholars often include other dependent variables, such as its effect on democratic practices and human rights.

As the literature on the effects of power-sharing on peace and democracy is diverging, a more thorough analysis is necessary in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of under what circumstances power-sharing can be a plausible solution to end conflict. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to include an analysis of both the prospects of peace and democracy when applying power-sharing in peace agreements, and in that way integrate the two fields of study.

1.3. Research Design and Sources of Information

In order to address the research question in an adequate and comprehensive manner, this thesis will use various sources of information. A triangulation of different sources of information is increasing the quality of the study, as it enables cross-checking of information. While there has been a growing academic interest in the political developments in Tanzania and Zanzibar the last couple of years, the access to information about the political developments in the isles is limited. This further increases the need for comprehensive
fieldwork to be conducted. Thus, this thesis’ analysis will draw on findings from 21 semi-structured interviews as part of a fieldwork conducted in Zanzibar in January-February 2013. The rationale behind using semi-structured interviews is related to the research question and the field of study. Semi-structured interviews are advantageous in attaining in-depth information on the effects of the GNU on peace and democracy in Zanzibar. Conducting these types of interviews also makes it easier to avoid misunderstandings of different concepts, as it allows the interviewer to readdress the same question in a different manner.

In order to assess the short-term effects of the power-sharing arrangement on peace and democracy in Tanzania, this thesis have chosen some indicators considered relevant to measure the changes after the GNU came about. As no baseline studies were conducted prior to the establishment of the GNU, the assertion of positive and negative developments will be based on the interviewees’ own perceptions about the situation. Short-term peace is operationalized as the social relationship between supporters of each of the contending parties; the occurrences of discrimination and intimidation of the opposition, as well as the occurrence of politically motivated violence since the establishment of the GNU up until the interviews were conducted. Democracy is operationalized as the implementation and functioning of the GNU; the effects of including the opposition in the executive of the government, the extent to which the power-sharing went beyond the political leadership through informal mechanisms of power-sharing, as well as the distribution of power in the GNU. Through this, the thesis will analyse the immediate effects power-sharing had on peace and democracy.

As the disputes between CCM and CUF have been particularly tense during the election, the long-term effects of the GNU on peace and democracy will be dealt with jointly. First, it will include an assessment of the degree to which the GNU was able to fulfil people’s expectation with regards to what the GNU would accomplish, with a specific focus on improving the standard of living. Another indicator is how the GNU dealt with CUF and CCM’s different stance on Zanzibar’s status in the Union with the mainland. Finally, the study will include an assessment of the 2015 general elections in Zanzibar based on news articles and reports from various local and international elections observers. In addition, it relies on testimonies from the interviewees on the challenges of the GNU at the time the interviews were conducted.
The methodological concerns related to the fieldwork and analysis of this thesis will be elaborated in more detail in the methodological chapter, where the quality of the research will be evaluated on the basis of the concepts validity and reliability. Additionally, it will triangulate the main findings with academic articles, reports and news articles.

1.4. Structure of the study

This thesis is divided into six chapters, including this introductory chapter. The second chapter following this introduction will present relevant background information to understand the current political situation in Zanzibar, and will provide the historical backdrop necessary to understand the conflict that led to the creation of the GNU. The third chapter will provide a more thorough assessment of the literature on power-sharing as well as outlining the theoretical implications guiding the analysis. The forth chapter will present the methodological design and assess the quality of the study with regards to validity and reliability. Additionally, it will discuss the most prominent ethical considerations of this study. The fifth chapter will present and analyse the main findings from the data gathered during the fieldwork. Further, it will triangulate these findings with other sources of information, such as academic articles, reports and news articles. The final chapter will summarize the main findings from the analysis as well as positioning how this relates to the overall literature on power-sharing as peace settlement.
2.0. Background

The turbulent transition from one-party rule to multi-party democracy in Zanzibar has challenged the notion of Tanzania as a peaceful haven in a region characterized by internal conflict and political turmoil. However, there are different accounts of the causes to the contemporary conflict in Zanzibar. While some scholars understand the CUF-CCM divide as a re-emergence of the racial-political divisions that appeared prior to the revolution in 1964 (Killian 2008; Karume 2004), others understand the conflict as a product of the ASP/CCM government’s repressive and discriminatory rule in the time between the revolution and the re-emergence of multi-party politics (Matheson 2012:597).

An understanding of the political processes taking place in the years prior to the revolution and unification with Tanganyika is thus essential to comprehend the current political discussions in Zanzibar. Therefore, this thesis will first present a brief historical account of Zanzibar under foreign rule and the political awakening in the isles. This is followed by a discussion of the most salient explanations for the conflict between CCM and CUF. As will be shown, the thesis’ interpretation of the political conflict in Zanzibar follows the line of Matheson (2012: 597) arguing that while the political leadership in CCM has portrayed the CUF as a reincarnation of the Arab-dominated ZNP/ZPPP, a more plausible explanation for the strong support for CUF is the political and economic marginalization of certain regions in Zanzibar, which is also linked to the different opinions about the current union structure with the mainland. Finally, this chapter will outline the turbulent elections as well as the attempts in reconciling the two political parties, which eventually led to the establishment of the GNU in Zanzibar.

2.1. Zanzibar under foreign rule

Zanzibar consists of two main islands; Unguja and Pemba, and is an archipelago located in the Indian Ocean outside the mainland of Tanzania. Zanzibar has a long mercantile history and was for a long period of time the most important commercial centre in East Africa, linking the hinterland to the rest of the world (Sheriff and Ferguson 1991). The role of Zanzibar as a commercial centre did not only affect the economic development in the isles but was also crucial in giving shape to the composition of the inhabitants in the archipelago (Hashim 2009: 15). Consequently, the population in Zanzibar trace their descent to inter alia
the African mainland, the Arab world, India, Persia, and the Comoros. Thus, the culture in Zanzibar is often referred to as a mix between Middle Eastern and African (Middleton and Campbell 1965:1). People in Zanzibar have traditionally lived peacefully side by side and it was believed that the shared religious identity – as most are Muslim – as well as the Swahili language and culture together served as a unifying force in the cosmopolitan isles, transcending the salience of racial identities. Illustratively, throughout the colonial era, Zanzibar was described by the British elite as islands of racial harmony in the coast of East Africa (Glassman 2011:5).

In the late 17th century the Oman conquered the Portuguese and captured Mombasa, actions which signalled the end of the Portuguese era in East Africa (Glassman 2011:27; Sheriff 1987:17). During the 18th century, the Sultanate grew in power in the Indian Ocean, and the economy rose due to an expansion of the clove production and increasing export of slaves from the African mainland (Middleton and Campbell 1965: 4-5). Today, Oman’s presence in Zanzibar and the influences from the Arab world is highly visible in the cultural and political life in Zanzibar (Sheriff 1987:15-17; Glassman 2011: 24; Topan 2009:57). However, more importantly is perhaps how the political economy of the clove plantations introduced a stratification of the isles’ inhabitants that followed racial lines under Arab rule (Bakari 2001:53). On the top of the socio-political ladder, you would typically find the Arabs that constituted the politically dominant class and whom enjoyed nearly monopoly of the plantations under Arab rule. The Indians/Asians constituted the middle class and dominated the trade and commercial sector in Zanzibar. At the bottom of the social ladder you would find the African and Shirazi people with mainland descent – most of whom were slaves, low-scale peasants or labourers (Bakari 2001:53).

However, Oman’s dominance in the region did not persist, and by the 1870s the presence of both Germany and Britain was increasingly serving as a threat to Oman’s control over Zanzibar (Depelchin 1991:15-16). Consequently, in November 1890, the Arab Sultan signed an agreement with the British that made the Zanzibari Sultanate a protectorate under British rule (Lofchie 1963:190). The British adopted a friendly policy towards the Sultan and the Arab population in Zanzibar during most of the colonial period, and from 1890s to the 1950s Zanzibar functioned as a multi-racial Arab-centred state (Glassman 2000: 426; Hashim 2009:9). Furthermore, the British operated within the already stratified political economy that had developed during the Oman heyday in Zanzibar (Bakari 2001:54).
In 1926, the British established the Legislative Council (LEGICO) – a political body representing each of the racial groups in Zanzibar. However, Africans were excluded from LEGICO until 1946 due to the perception that Africans had not yet reached the necessary level of maturity and therefore could not take part in important political decisions (Bakari 2001:55; Lofchie 1963:194-195).

While racial divisions existed under Oman and British rule, these racial categories were not considered politically important. However, this changed in the years leading up to independence of Zanzibar from the British rule. In Zanzibar, the years 1957-1964 is popularly recalled Zama za Siasa in Swahili, or “the era of politics” in English. It was during this period that the first multiparty elections took place in Zanzibar and the social divisions between the races where politicized (Campbell 1962:72). Today these racial categories are not as salient as they were during the independence struggle. However, the developments that took place under Zama za Siasa is still of relevance to the political discussions today, as there are diverging opinions about the justification for the revolution and unification with the mainland. As such, the following will provide a brief introduction to the most salient developments that took place throughout these years.

2.1.1. “Zama za Siasa”

The first political parties in Zanzibar evolved from the already established labour unions that were founded in the early 20th century initially created to protect the interests of the predominantly racial group they represented. For instance, the Arab Association was established with the objective of protecting the Arab landowners and owners of plantations (Middleton and Campbell 1965:46). In 1954 the first political party was established in Zanzibar: the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP). Its members constituted the intellectual elite among the Arab minority, and these were the first to carve out the contours of Zanzibar nationalism (Lofchie 1963:189). The second political party in Zanzibar was established in 1957 when the African Association and the Shirazi Association formed the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) (Babu 1991:225). The African Association had a stronghold in Unguja, while the Shirazi Association had a stronghold among the Shirazi community in Pemba (Lofchie 1963:194-195). Contrary to the ZNP, the ASP suffered from a lack of intellectuals and
consequently the ASP was largely inspired by Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Tanganyika to guide its ideological base (Babu 1991:230).

Given ASP’s stronghold among the African majority, ASP won the first multi-party elections in Zanzibar. At the same time ZNP strengthened its position. Many Zanzibaris who had settled abroad returned to Zanzibar to take part in the struggle for independence on ZNP’s side. ZNP was also successful in mobilizing people from different layers of society proclaiming a multi-racial nationalism (Babu 1991:227). Internal fractions within ASP, eventually led to the creation of the political party Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP), further weakening the ASP. The ZPPP had a stronghold among the intellectuals in rural areas as well as the people in Pemba, and the effect was that the ASP became increasingly dependent on the mainland for intellectual support (Babu 1991:232). The main difference between the political parties was that the ZNP and ZPPP wanted independence to come about swiftly, while the ASP’s main objective was to delay the independence due to its members’ lack of administrative and political experience (Lofchie 1963:186, 190). ZNP and ZPPP’s common stance on this matter enabled the political parties to ally and additionally, they found a common platform in marketing itself as anti-mainland rather than anti-African (Babu 1991:236).

During the Zama za Siasa in Zanzibar the gap between the political parties widened, and during the general election in June 1961 this came to the fore as six days of violent demonstrations (Lofchie 1963:186). In July 1963, new rounds of general elections were held in Zanzibar. The results showed that ASP won the majority of the votes but gained a minority of the seats in the legislature, which led to discontent over the election results. The disagreement arose due to a system of constituency voting rather than a proportional representation system. ZNP and ZPPP thus established a coalition government, leaving the pro-African ASP in the opposition (Anglin 2000: 41). In December 1963, the ZNP/ZPPP led Zanzibar into independence from British rule and at the time of independence, Zanzibar was a multi-racial Sultanate (Lofchie 1963:185). However, instead of liberating the people, granting them with the long-sought freedom they were promised, the government tightened the grip and continued a suppressive policy towards its citizens. An example of this was the government’s decision to ban the newly established political party, the Umma Party, in January 1964 and the raise of charges of treason against the leaders of the party. This created fear among the opposition, particularly members of the ASP who had developed close ties
with the Umma party. Additionally, the ZNP/ZPPP also instructed all police officers with mainland descent to be removed from their posts – a policy meant to please the anti-mainland supporters among the government supporters. However, the instruction was perceived by many members of the ASP as a move towards an Arabisation of all institutions in Zanzibar (Hunter 2010: 35). Given that a vast majority of the police were ASP supporters, this move turned the police force into a potential enemy of the government (Babu 1991:239).

2.1.2. Independence, revolution and union

The night of 11-12\textsuperscript{th} of January 1964, merely a month after Zanzibar was granted independence, the revolution in Zanzibar broke out. The African-dominated party ASP led the revolution and within days they overthrew the democratically elected ZNP/ZPPP coalition government and the Arab sultan (Glassman 2011:4). The revolution was planned and pursued by the unemployed, frustrated youth among the ASP members, arguing that their victory had been granted to the ZNP/ZPPP coalition in the 1963 elections by mistake (Babu 1991:239). The revolution was both ideologically and ethnically motivated. Ideologically, the ASP sought to introduce a revolutionary Marxist regime, and the ethnic motivation has been portrayed as a move to correct a long history of wrongdoing against the African population in the isles (Anglin 2000:41).

However, only a few months after the revolution Zanzibar seized to exist as a sovereign state as it merged with former Tanganyika. As previously noted, ASP had close linkages with the ruling party in Tanganyika, TANU – a relationship that had developed and strengthened throughout the struggle for independence in Tanganyika and Zanzibar (Campbell 1962). The 26\textsuperscript{th} of April 1964, the heads of state in Zanzibar and Tanganyika signed the Articles of the Union and established the United Republic of Tanzania, most commonly referred to as Tanzania. In 1965, a one-party system was amended in the constitution and ASP and TANU became the only legal political parties in Tanzania (Commonwealth Observer Group 2010:4). One-party democratic systems were established in several African states at the time, due to the perception that one-party rule was necessary in a transitional phase in order to promote national unity and ensure efficient socio-political development (Mpangala and Lwehabura 2011:48). In 1977, ASP in Zanzibar and TANU in the mainland of Tanzania merged to form the political party Chama Cha Mapunduzi (CMM). The move to merge the two parties helped consolidating Zanzibar in the Union, making it increasingly difficult to separate the party
from the government (Brown 2010:616). As CCM became a national party, steps were taken to ensure the holding of elections also in Zanzibar (Mpangala and Lwehabura 2011:54).

With the oil crisis that erupted in the early 1980s, Tanzania was forced to abide to the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001). During the same period a wave of democracy swept the continent, not leaving Tanzania astray. The request for multi-party democracy came from the opposition in Tanzania as well as the international community. Inter alia, the World Bank encouraged that good governance should be an integral part of the Economic Recovery Programmes (ERPs) (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001:39). From the mid-1980s and onwards, civil society groups pushed for a reform of the political system in Tanzania (Mpangala and Lwehabura 2011:56). After stepping down as chairperson for CCM in 1991, former president Julius Nyerere also played a vital role in the reform of the political system, advocating for a move towards a competitive political system (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001:39). Following the recommendation of the report by Nyalala Commission in 1991, a multi-party system was officially introduced in Tanzania in July 1992, with the amendment of the constitution opening up for the registration of other political parties (Mpangala and Lwehaburu 2011:56).

Authoritarian tendencies were adopted by several of the one-party democratic states that came about after independence – and Tanzania was no exception (Mpangala and Lwehabura 2011:48). As will be shown, the emergence of multi-party democracy in Tanzania opened up a political sphere in Zanzibar where the discontent over the government that for long had been supressed, came to the surface.

2.3. Conflict in Zanzibar – echoes from the revolution?

In Zanzibar, the political party Civic United Front (CUF) was established in 1992 and immediately gained substantial support from segments that were dissatisfied with the government. The strong support for CUF in the election in 1995, where the CCM candidate won the presidency with a marginal 0.4% of the vote, is compelling given that Zanzibar had been under one-party rule since 1964 (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:58). CUF has its strong-hold in Pemba where approximately 90% of the residents voted for the CUF in the election (Matheson 2012:595).
The strong support for CUF in Pemba, the island in which ZNP and ZPPP also had their stronghold prior to the revolution, has led some scholars to claim that the conflict between CCM and CUF in Zanzibar can be traced to the politicisation of racial identities during the Zama za Siasa (Killian 2008; Karume 2004). For instance, Karume (2004:16) argues that the CUF-CCM divide mirrors the pre-revolution racial divide, and that “Zanzibari politics is determined by racial loyalties that are certain to affect for a long time to come” (ibid). As racial identity seemingly played an important role early days of political awakening in Zanzibar, this is a convincing explanation for the political conflict. However, this explanation tends to brush everything that happened between the revolution and the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Zanzibar under a rug. Neither does it explain the support for the opposition among the younger generation in Zanzibar (Matheison 2012).

As such, Matheson (2012) presents a more convincing analysis of the cause of the contemporary conflict. He is critical towards the claim that racial and ethnic identity can account for the contemporary conflict between CCM and CUF as the support for the opposition do not correspond with the potential number of voters affiliated with the ZNP/ZPPP fraction. Instead, he argues that the support for CUF can be explained by the ruling of the ASP/CCM in the period between independence and the re-introduction of multi-party system in the 1990s (Matheson 2012: 595). He links the strong support for the opposition in Pemba to the political and economic marginalization of Pembans in the time between the revolution and today. Inter alia, one of the main sources of Zanzibar’s national GDP comes from the clove industry, most of which is cultivated in Pemba (Matheson 2012: 595-596). Despite the importance of the clove production for Zanzibar’s GDP, the social benefits from the production have yet to materialize in Pemba. Instead, most of the revenues deriving from the clove industry have been reinvested in Unguja (Matheson 2012:595).

Consequently, there is a significant disparity in the level of development in Pemba and Unguja, and Pemba has been poorly developed in terms of general infrastructure, such as roads, fast ferries and hospitals (Ramadhani 2011:12). The disparity in development is also discernible in the access to education, level of wealth and the child mortality rate (National Bureau of Statistics 2011: 16-17, 27, 120). Furthermore, the clove production is nationalised and monopolized by the Zanzibar government that sets the price for the cloves. There has been discontent over the way the government has managed the clove production among the inhabitants in Pemba, sometimes offering less than 50% of the marked value to the farmers.
The more developed Unguja Island is also where CCM traditionally has had its stronghold (Moss and Tronvoll 2015: 94). As such, the political and economic marginalisation of Pemba under CCM rule is a more likely explanation for the strong support of CUF. Moss and Tronvoll (2015:94) further argue that the geographical division between the isles largely overlap and reinforce the salience of political identities. As such, racial identities are of importance primarily in terms of rhetoric and the political leadership of CCM have utilized these pre-revolutionary social categories in order to increase their support base and delegitimize the opposition. Illustratively, CCM claims that CUF is the reincarnation of the Arab-led ZNP/ZPPP coalition government that was overthrown during the revolution executed by ASP in January 1964 (Moss and Tronvoll 2015).

Consequently, the thesis follows Matheson (2012:596) understanding of the conflict in Zanzibar, not as a conflict rooted in ethnic or racial differences, but rather over access to political and economic opportunities:

“We can conclude, therefore, that the only reason there are notions of ethnic politics or division in Zanzibar during the multiparty period is because CCM has tried to advance such an understanding; the factionalism which was immediately apparent after 1992 was instead the result of ASP/CCM’s discriminatory and repressive rule. CCM’s portrayal is an effort to legitimise the revolution, deflect attention from unpopular and unsuccessful rule, and to create an ‘other’ in order to unite its own supporters”. (Matheson 2012: 596)

Furthermore, the discontent over the union with the mainland can account for the strong support for CUF in Zanzibar. The structure of the union with the mainland, that still prevails to this day, is two-tiered and Zanzibar constitutes a semi-autonomous unit in the United Republic of Tanzania. As a part of the Union, Zanzibar is allowed to keep its own government; the Revolutionary Government headed by a popularly elected president. In addition, Zanzibar has its own legislation and judiciary represented by the House of Representatives (Anglin 2000:41). The Union President of Tanzania and the National Assembly are located in the mainland. The National Assembly on the mainland is the political body with the decision-making power in matters that are considered “Union affairs” (Tronvoll 2006: 228). The president of Zanzibar is also serving as one of two vice presidents in the Union government (Anglin 2000:41). Tanzania’s constitution, The Union Act (1964) outlines the areas of interests that were considered to be Union affairs at the time of the unification. These included inter alia external affairs, defence, police, immigration, citizenship, income tax, corporation tax and the constitution and government of the United Republic (Union Act 1964, §5(1) a).
The scope of what is regarded as Union affairs has increased from 11 to 22 over the years, and the centralization of political power in the Union has created what is perceived by many as an unbalanced power-sharing system – to the advantage of the mainland (Tronvoll 2006:241). As such, there are segments within the Zanzibar population that call for more self-determination, particularly among CUF supporters, as they fear that Zanzibar will become a region in Tanzania rather than a country on its own (Matheson 2012:597). The reluctance in the National Assembly to take the demands of increased self-determination on Zanzibar seriously has intensified the request for a different organization of the state (Tronvoll 2006:241).

The political leadership in CCM benefits from having close linkages to the ruling party in the mainland through the current two-tiered system (Karume 2004:10). As such, CCM has traditionally pushed for a continuation of the two-tiered model (Tronvoll 2006:229). CUF, on the other hand, wants a different organisation of the state, as it understands the union as politically and economically unfair (Karume 2004:10). This issue has been the main source of contestation in the political debates in the isles, and it is the most widely discussed topic during the general elections and the debates about the constitutional review in Tanzania. However, while CCM’s official stance is that they want to continue under the current structure, there are internal divisions within CCM as some CCM members also support a different organisation of the union (Moss and Tronvoll 2015).

Since the mid-1990s, the opposition has experienced discriminatory and intimidating treatment by the government, intensifying around the time of the election. Party affiliation is characterised as rather fixed in Zanzibar and has typically followed family boundaries rather than being something free of choice (Moss and Tronvoll 2015: 94). Furthermore, political identity has been closely linked to access to economic development and political influence. For instance, the opposition has also experienced discrimination in terms of employment in the state apparatus as civil servants. The Regional Commissioners (RC) in Zanzibar is appointed by the President, and they ought to be politically neutral. The RCs are responsible for appointing the District Commissioner (DC) whom in turn appoints the Shehas in each district. The Shehas are the executive officers on ward level, and function as the link between the local community and the government. As such, while these civil servants are supposedly politically neutral, they have traditionally been affiliated with the ruling party CCM and there
are numerous accounts of opposition supporters being denied equal treatment as CCM supporters (Matheson 2012:598).

In addition, the opposition has been subject to discriminatory treatment and intimidation by the police (Anglin 2000), as well as having difficulties in being registered in the Permanent Voters Register. In order to get registered in the Permanent Voters Register, you need a Zanzibar identity card (ZAN ID), and this requires that you hold a birth certificate and a letter from the Shehas, confirming your identity. As political identity in Zanzibar is well known among the citizens, the Shehas are well aware of which party the person in question supports. Further, the registration process in Zanzibar is highly political, and it has thus proved challenging for CUF supporters to get the introduction letter necessary to acquire a ZAN ID (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:203).

As such, political identities have been of importance not just during the elections, but also in the everyday life of Zanzibaris. It has also had an impact on social relations on community level, as the conflict between the parties made the supporters of the various political camps refrain from attending important social events, such as funerals and weddings (Matheson 2012:600). There has been a high level of antagonism between the camps, which arguably has affected the quality of life.

Apart from severe irregularities during the elections, the political partisan has affected the performance of the democratic system in Zanzibar, inter alia the performance of the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives main task is to scrutinise bills coming from the President and hold the government accountable for its policies. The political biasedness has also been influencing the functioning of the House of Representatives. However, the functioning of the House of Representatives the years prior to the establishment of the GNU has been highly political, and the debates were typically based on its members’ political affiliation. Typically, the CCM affiliated members would pass any bill coming from the President-headed cabinet, whereas the opposition would oppose almost everything that was proposed by the cabinet (Matheson 2012:597). Furthermore, the House was perceived as an “ineffective body, serving as a mere rubber-stamp on executive proposals” (Matheson 2012:597).
The previous sections have outlined some of the challenges associated with the democratic system that was introduced with the multi-party democratic system in the 1990s and the causes for the friction between the two parties. It has shown how the stark support for the opposition can be linked to the discriminatory and intimidating treatment of the opposition supporters, as well as differing opinions regarding Zanzibar’s status as a semi-autonomous part in the Union with the mainland. The following sections will present the conduct of the elections in Zanzibar that took place between 1995 and 2010, as well as the reconciliatory efforts that were put into place in the three Muafakas as well as the Maridhiano process. These political developments are crucial in understanding the establishment of the GNU, as well as the political climate in which the GNU was established.

2.3.1. The 1995 Election and Muafaka I

The first multi-party election after independence took place in Zanzibar the 22nd of October 1995, one week prior to the general election for the Union government (Anglin 2000:43). The period leading up to the election in Zanzibar had been characterized by biased news covering to the benefit of the ruling party, human rights abuses and the denial of the population’s basic right to register to vote and make an independent and informed choice of voting (Anglin 2000:43). In the 1995 election the presidential candidate for CCM defeated the CUF candidate with a marginal 0.4% of the votes (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:58). However, CUF’s unofficial figures showed that CUF was the righteous winner of the election and thus they refused to accept the results. In addition, the counting of votes was delayed with two days and CUF argued that this had given CCM the necessary time to manipulate the votes in their own favour (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:58).

Two days after the general elections CUF demanded that the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) would do a recount of the ballots. The political parties CCM and CUF were given the unofficial figures of the election results showing that CUF in fact received more votes than CCM. CCM, however, could not accept this result, arguing that leaving the presidency in the hands of CUF would mean a relapse into pre-revolutionary times and the restoration of Arab hegemony in the isles. The result was that the CCM wrote a letter to the ZEC not to publish the result, as they deemed the election not free and fair. While the ZEC delayed the election results, the political tension in the isles of Zanzibar was growing. When the results were announced the 26th of October 1995, and CCM candidate Dr. Salmin Amour was re-elected
with 50.2 percent of the votes, CCM dropped the demand for the election to be nullified (Anglin 2000:43). While the elections where not rigged, the counting of votes was, and in reality, CUF was plausibly the political party that had won the presidency (Anglin 2000:43). In fact, the group of international observers concluded that the elections and the compilation of votes suffered from severe mismanagement. Among other things, the election observers found that in some constituencies the number of recorded votes exceeded the possible number of votes (Anglin 2000:44). Even in concrete instances where the International Observation Group detected actual incidents of CUF votes being transferred to CCM, the ZEC did not do anything to correct the mistake (Anglin 2000:44).

The protests led to negotiations to secure peace in Zanzibar and these resulted in what is known as the first Muafaka\(^3\). The talks were initiated by respected elders in Tanzania in 1996, inter alia Brigadier General Hashim Mbita and the Honourable Joseph Sinde Warioba, and by February 1998 the Commonwealth Secretary General stepped in as a mediator to find a solution to the political stalemate. An agreement was reached partly due to the involvement of the Tanzanian Union government and the first Muafaka was signed in the House of Representatives the 9\(^{th}\) of June 1999 (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:64).

Muafaka I was dealing with the bias of the electoral commission, the problems of registration of votes as well as logistical issues (Bekoe 2010: 4). The agreement included inter alia reform of the constitution, electoral laws, state media organs as well as the ZEC. It also included the formation of a Permanent Voters Register, and should ensure that the political parties enjoyed the freedom to carry out planned activities as according to existing laws. The agreement further stipulated that CUF would recognize the Zanzibar government, and the return of CUF members in the House of Representative to attend sessions (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:65).

However, the Muafaka I was not successful due to lack of legal implementation (Bekoe 2010: 4). Merely two of the 15 items outlined in the first Muafaka were implemented; CUF recognized the Zanzibar government and resumed attending the sessions in the House of Representatives (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:65). The failure of the agreement to be implemented has been associated with the weaknesses in the mediation process with the

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\(^3\) ‘Mufaka’ is the Swahili word for ‘accord’.
Commonwealth as a mediator. One of the weaknesses was that there were no direct negotiations between the two contending parties. Instead, the Commonwealth met with each party separately and this did not enable the parties to find durable solutions to the conflict. Furthermore, the Commonwealth did not focus on the relational challenges between the parties (Mbunda 2009). As such, the process was characterised by a strong disbelief with regards to the opponents’ motive for engaging in the negotiations and there was a lack of trust between the parties. Thus, the main concern of the Commonwealth was to reach a final agreement, not taking sufficiently into consideration whether the parties were committed to implementing the items listed in the agreement (Mbunda 2009). As such, the talks were characterised by competition between the parties rather than seeking a common ground and solution through negotiations.

2.3.2. The 2000 election and Muafaka II
The failure of implementing the items in the first Muafaka intensified the polarized political milieu in Zanzibar and the 2000 election followed a similar pattern as the previous election. Consequently, CUF accused the CCM for manipulating the campaign through differentiated funding for the political campaigns, as well as denying the opposition party access to the dominant government media (Karume 2004:7). Serious allegations of misconduct of the elections followed (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:58). CUF refused to accept the result even though the CCM candidate Amani Abeid Karume won the election with 67% of the votes and CCM won 2/3 of the seats in the House of Representatives in Zanzibar (Karume 2004:7). International and national observers criticized how the election had been conducted and called for a new election. However, the ruling party accepted the results and refused to rerun the elections – something that intensified the political tension between CUF and CCM. This led to clashes between CUF and the police the 26th and 27th of January 2001, when CUF protested against the election results. The result was the killing of more than thirty people mainly residing in Pemba, several hundreds were wounded and more than 2,000 people fled to the neighbouring country Kenya (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:60). The demonstrators were effectively put to quiet by the police, something that was criticized by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and ultimately left the Revolutionary Government and the Union Government with a bad reputation (Mbunda 2009). Thus, the lack of political commitment to implement the Muafaka I is closely related to the violent upheavals in January 2001 (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:65).
The increased tension during the 2000 election led to a new round of negotiations, known as Muafaka II. Muafaka II adopted all of the items in the Mufaka I, with the addition of a few more items. This included the return of the refugees who had fled to Kenya, as well as the establishment of Inter-Party Commission (IPC) to ensure that a cordial relationship between the two parties could develop. In addition, it included the establishment of the office for Director for Public Prosecution (DPP) as a means to separate the DPP from the ruling party and the government (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:66). Part of this agreement was also the holding of by-elections in 17 constituencies in Pemba in May 2003, and these were relatively successfully conducted (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:61).

Contrary to Muafaka I, several of the items in Muafaka II were implemented. Some of the more important items were the reform of the ZEC and electoral laws. An important change in this regard was the reduction of power of the Director of Elections. The power of the local Shehas in the registration process was reduced. In addition, the requirement for duration of residency in order to be registered to vote was reduced from five to three years. The amendments also led ZEC to become more independent, as it opened for the appointment of two of its officers by the opposition. An additional two officers would be appointed on the advice of the House of Representative’s government business leader, and ZEC was to advice on who would be the Director of Elections (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:67). However, while the ZEC included two CUF officers, they did not act as such in practice, and there was a widespread perception that the ZEC was a mere extension of the ruling party (Matheson 2012).

By the end of 2003 most of the items in the Mufaka II had been implemented (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:67). However, the process of implementing the Muafaka II was criticized for unnecessary delays, and those items that had not yet been implemented were considered some of the more important items in the agreement (Mplangana and Lwehabaru 2011:67). These were amongst others; the reformation of the state media, judiciary and the ZEC secretariat in addition to the establishment of a permanent voter register. Furthermore, there were serious delays in implementing procedures that would ensure that the employment of public officials in state organs did not suffer from bias in terms of political affiliations. Also, the IPC had yet to see the day of light (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:67).
In addition, the by-election suffered from several weaknesses that threatened the reconciliation process between the two opposing parties. One of these weaknesses was the political parties’ nomination procedure in the election of candidates for the various constituencies. This led the ZEC to block CUF candidates from being listed in six of the 17 constituencies in Pemba, where CUF has its stronghold. The decision was upheld by the Zanzibar High Court the 13 of May 2003 as according to Zanzibar Electoral Law 49 (5), ZEC has the final decision-making power in cases involving electoral law (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:62). Voters supporting CUF dominated these six constituencies, something that was mirrored in the election results from these constituencies. Instead of voting for candidates from any of the other parties, a majority of the votes in these constituencies were spoilt. The reason was that during the campaign CUF urged people to vote for ghost candidates, also known as maruhani in Swahili. The result was that between 61% and 82% of the votes cast in these constituencies were spoilt (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:62).

2.3.3. The 2005 Election and Muafaka III

Despite some efforts to implement parts of the Muafaka II, by the 2005 elections this agreement had also failed to materialize (Bakari and Makulilo 2012: 199). In addition to the delay in implementing the Muafaka II, the agreement was criticized for not involving any other political party in Zanzibar. There was also a lack of ownership to the agreement due to the lack of popular participation. Consequently, there were serious doubts about whether the two political parties demonstrated the political will to alter the political game as well as the continuous difficulty in separating the interests of the ruling party, CCM, from the government (Mpanagala and Lwehabaru 2011:67-68). The 2005 election was not followed by the same amount of violent outbreaks as previous elections, but the CUF refused to accept the opposition party’s government until 2009 (Bekoe 2010:4). After the 2005 election, a third Muafaka was initiated, and talks took place between January 2007 and March 2008 led by the Union President Jakaya Kikwete (Matheson 2012:600). The Muafaka III agreement also included political power-sharing arrangements. However, the negotiations led to a stalemate and collapsed before the agreement was signed by both parties due to CUF’s lack of trust in CCM’s commitment to implement the agreement (Matheson 2012:600).

To summarize, the Muafakas were insufficient in ending the hostilities between the two contending parties. As such, the two Muafakas primarily served to postpone a political
solution to the conflict (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:198-199). The main reason for this can be attributed to the accords not taking sufficiently into account the question of governance, the question of who was eligible to run the country, and the dynamics of the processes that would determine the ruling party (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:198). Throughout these reconciliatory talks, the government of Zanzibar remained highly politicized and a mere extension of the ruling party (Matheson 2012: 600). Another issue, was that neither of the parties were willing to accept the other party as the ruling party, however, their reasons for this diverged. On the one hand, CUF put forward allegation of misconduct of the electoral procedures and had little confidence in the election process and ZEC. CCM, on the other hand, was not ready to give up power to the opposition party after being the ruling party in Zanzibar since 1964 (Bakari and Makulilo 2012: 198). It has also been argued that the failure of the two parties to end the hostilities can be denoted to their reluctance to understand and accept the identity of the contending party. CCM is understood as closely affiliated with the mainland and the Union (Mbunda 2009). CUF, on the other hand, is understood by its opponent as a reaffirmation of the Arab-oriented ZNP/ZPPP, advocates for Pemba nationalism in addition to being seen as reformers. Furthermore, these identities are exploited by the political elite in their efforts to gain support for their respective political parties (Mbunda 2009). The reluctance of accepting electoral defeat was also mirrored in another related aspect, namely the commitment on the behalf of the political leadership in Tanzania to find durable solutions to reconcile the parties. This was true in particular for the President of Zanzibar and the President of the United Republic of Tanzania (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:198-199).

2.3.4. Maridhiano process

The talks that eventually led to the introduction of a power-sharing arrangement in Zanzibar are popularly called the *Maridhiano* process. There is a perception that the talks started on the 5th of November 2009 when the President Amani Karume, and the Secretary General of CUF, Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad met for the first time (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:199). However, these talks were initiated as a result of Jussa, the Deputy Secretary of CUF requesting a meeting with Karume in July 2009. Throughout the meeting he convinced Karume, with one year left in office as the President of Zanzibar, that he would leave office with a negative legacy if he left his presidency with the isles in political distress. Reaching an agreement between the two divisions was assumed possible, as the parties had come close in

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4 ‘Maridhiano’ is the Swahili word for ‘reconciliation’.
reaching an agreement in 2008 given that a power-sharing arrangement was included in the third Muafaka. The result was that Karume committed to the reconciliation process and put down the Moyo Committee of Six, constituting members from both CCM and CUF (Matheson 2012:601). Thus, the first informal meeting between the Secretary General of CUF and the President of Zanzibar took place in the State House the 5th of November 2009 (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:199). Two days later, Karume was recognized as the President of Zanzibar by the CUF (Matheson 2012:601).

As the talks were informal they did not lead to a written agreement, but rather what has been referred to as a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ (Moss and Tronvoll 2015: 97). However, a series of measures were put in place in order to show commitment to the process, one of them being the passing of a bill by the House of Representatives the 29th of January 2010 (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:199). The bill included constitutional amendments that opened up for a referendum on the establishment of a GNU to be held prior to the 2010 election. There was little discontent over the promise of a power-sharing arrangement within CUF, as most of its members had been in support of a power-sharing arrangement since before the 1995 election (Matheson 2012:601). The discontent within CCM was more present; however President Karume put pressure on the House to pass the bill once it arrived (Matheson 2012:601). The bill opened up for the holding of a referendum prior to the general elections that were planned for October 2010 to allow the people of Zanzibar to decide whether a GNU should be formed after the elections – regardless of the outcome of the election (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:199).

From the onset of the Maridhiano process to the holding of the elections in October 2010, the political climate in the isles changed dramatically, as the political leadership urged the people to leave their political affiliation aside and focus on their shared Zanzibari nationality (Moss and Tronvoll 2015). The 31st of July 2010 the people of Zanzibar decided through a referendum that a GNU was to be established after the general elections in October the same year (Bakari and Makulilo 2012: 195). The question asked in the referendum was: “Do you agree with the new structure of Government soon after the election?” (Matheson 2012:601). In total 188 705 voted for the establishment of the GNU, and this constituted 66.4 % of the valid votes in the referendum (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:213). As such, the House of Representatives passed the 10th Constitutional Amendments. The amendments included that the winner of the presidency must appoint two Vice Presidents within seven days of taking
office. The First Vice President was to be appointed from the political party that came second in the Presidential elections, while the Second Vice President was to be appointed by the President among the elected members in the House of Representatives from the first party (Matheson 2012: 601-602). The President, and First and Second Vice President were to form a Revolutionary Government within 14 days, and the composition had to reflect the distribution of seats between the parties in the House of Representative (Matheson 2012:602).

The elections that took place the 31st of October 2015 were a test of the commitment to the reconciliatory process (Matheson 2012: 602). There is a widespread perception that the elections were the most fair and peaceful elections that had taken place in the history of Zanzibar (Matheson 2012: 602). When the ruling party, CCM, won the general elections in October 2010 the Revolutionary Government of National Unity was created, including the biggest opponent to the dominant party into the government (Bakari and Makulilo 2012). Whereas the elections were perceived free and fair by the people, there were incidents of electoral mismanagement also during the 2010 election and there were documentation that ZEC officials conducted double-voting in several constituencies – something which could have had an effect on the election results given that the CCM’s candidate Dr. Shein won the election with merely 3471 votes (Matheson 2012:602). Furthermore, the corrupted registration process of voters, where CUF would experience difficulties in getting registered and the illegitimate registration of under-age voters on the CCM side, challenged the notion of the 2010 elections in Zanzibar as free and fair (Matheson 2012: 602). However, in the spirit of reconciliation, the CUF presidential candidate, Mr. Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad accepted the results and the GNU was formed (Bakari and Makulilo 2012).

Dr. Ali Mohamed Shein from CCM was elected the President, and Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad from CUF was announced the first vice president. The President also appointed a second vice president from CCM; Mr Seif Ali Iddi. Overall, the GNU consisted of members from both the winning party CCM and CUF. The GNU in Zanzibar currently consisted of 22 members, of which 15 come from the winning party CCM and seven of the representatives come from CUF. 48 of the 82 representatives in the House of Representatives come from CCM whereas 33 of the representatives come from CUF (Bakari and Makulilo 2012).

2.4. Concluding Remarks
As this chapter has shown; some has traced the conflict between the political parties and the political climate experienced in Zanzibar since the mid-1990s back to pre-independence period in Zanzibar. However, a more plausible explanation for the conflict between CCM and CUF after the reintroduction of multi-party politics in Zanzibar is related to the political and economic discriminatory treatment of the less developed isle in Zanzibar and the increasing difficulties in separating the CCM from the government. However, the controversy regarding the revolution in Zanzibar and the unification of Zanzibar and Tanganyika in 1964 is still frequently disputed in the political realm of Zanzibar. As such, this chapter has included an assessment of the pre-revolutionary years. Furthermore, the cause of the conflict is linked to the question over the status of Zanzibar in the Union with the mainland, which is the most prominent divide between the two parties.

The discriminatory and unjust treatment of the opposition in Zanzibar as well as severe misconduct of the elections have been outlined in this chapter, followed by the reconciliatory processes between 1995 and 2010 to end the political contestation. Only with the introduction of power-sharing in the form of a GNU after the elections in October 2010, peaceful relations started to develop between supporters of the respective parties. As has been shown, this reconciliation process was significantly different from previous efforts to reconcile the contending parties, as the Maridhiano process largely took place outside formalised structures of the political parties. Unlike previous efforts to bring about peace and stability in the isles, this led to change in discourse on leadership level that also affected the general political discourse (Moss and Tronvoll 2015). In fact, political power-sharing was the only viable solution for CUF at the given time, as sharing of power was read as a sign of CCM’s real commitment to the reconciliation process. However, the success of political power-sharing is dependent on the real effects it has on the stability, and furthermore its effect on democratic practices. The following chapter will therefore outline the assumed causal mechanisms between power-sharing and peace and democracy. Together with the background chapter, these will form the basis from which the analysis of the effects of the GNU in Zanzibar on short and long-term peace and democracy will derive.
3.0. Theoretical Framework

This chapter will give a brief account of relevant theory concerning power-sharing and the expected causal mechanisms between power-sharing, peace and democracy. First, it will present the roots of power-sharing in the academic literature followed by a clarification of the conceptualisation of power-sharing. As this section will show, there are diverging conceptualisations of the term ‘power-sharing’ and other related terms, such as peace and democracy, which may have an impact on the conclusions deriving from the various analyses. Further, this chapter will assess the assumed causal linkages between power-sharing on the one hand, and peace and democracy on the other, including an assessment of the current literature on the topic. The main discussion will concentrate on empirical evidence from instances where power-sharing has been included in peace settlements. This does not constitute a comprehensive and exhaustive comparative analysis. Rather, these empirical examples are used in an illustrative manner that will enable the reader to understand the complexities and dilemmas of including power-sharing as part of peace agreements. Finally, the chapter will outline the theoretical implications for the data collection of this study that will be applied in the analysis when assessing the effects of power-sharing on peace and democracy in Zanzibar.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to come up with an all-encompassing theoretical framework that includes a complete list of perfectly defined concepts and how they should be operationalized. The purpose of including this section is rather to raise awareness of the numerous definitions of power-sharing, and thus highlight the importance of keeping these differences in mind when assessing various academic contributions in the following analysis, in order to avoid a biased assessment.

3.1. Defining power-sharing

3.1.1. The roots of power-sharing

A substantial part of the literature on power-sharing is inspired by the work of Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1999)\(^5\). Lijphart (1977) recognises that one of the necessary preconditions for a stable democracy to persist is the existence of a homogenous population and argues that “deep

\(^5\) Another well-known scholar, Stein Rokkan, is known to have referred to Lijphart at several occasions as “Mr. Consociation”, indicating Lijphart’s influence on the field of study (Lijphart 1999).
social divisions and political differences within plural societies are held responsible for instability and breakdown in democracies” (Lijphart 1977:1). Following the assumption that states consisting of several ethnic groups are more conflict prone than states where the population share a sense of national identity, consociational democracies have been argued to be a better institutional alternative for ethnically divided societies. Reynal-Querol (2002: 44-48) is among the scholars supporting this view, arguing that that consociational and proportional democratic systems are less prone to experience civil war (Reynal-Querol 2002:44-48).

As such, Lijphart’s theory on consociational democracies was offered as a solution, enabling societies divided between different ethnic groups to live together in stable democratic systems. The underlying notion is that in instances where power-sharing is installed, former adversaries are compelled to work together in a joint government with the aim of transforming former enemies into comrades. Because consociational democracies encourage inclusiveness and harmony rather than exclusiveness and competition, this form of democracy is believed to be particularly advantageous in producing peace in deeply divided and plural societies (Lijphart 1977). Moreover, formalized power-sharing is understood to foster a democratic culture that is more consensus-based and thus less conflict prone than majoritarian systems ruled by the principle of “the winner takes all”, which are more competitive (Lijphart 1977:1). Not only does Lijphart (1977) suggest that consociationalism provides a reasonable institutional design for democracies where the society is deeply divided, he also argues that consociationalism is the only viable alternative.

Lijphart (1977) emphasizes four different characteristics defining a consociational democracy. First and foremost is the grand coalition, consisting of the political leaders of all the politically salient groups in the society. How this is institutionalised may vary, and Lijphart (1977:25) lists some examples: “…a grand coalition cabinet in a parliamentary system, a ‘grand’ council or committee with important advisory functions, or a grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders in a presidential system.” The three remaining characteristics that he uses to define a consociational democracy are; mutual veto to protect minority interests; proportionality of political representation and group autonomy (Lijphart 1977:25).
Based extensively on the scholarly work done by Lijphart, international conflict management actors have become increasingly positive towards applying power-sharing arrangements in peace settlements. The inclusion of power-sharing in peace settlements have been particularly prevalent in what is often termed as ‘ethnic’ conflicts where the concept has been understood as a plausible instrument to hamper conflict in ethnically divided societies (Sisk 1996:11).

3.1.2. Defining power-sharing

Broadly defined, power-sharing can be understood as the inclusion “of political opponents in a joint executive coalition government” (Binningsbø 2013:89). While power sharing is widely applied, the term has been interpreted in various ways and there are diverging understandings of how to apply the concept as an analytical category. A literature review reveals that there is no consensus with regards to what power-sharing entails in practice. Some scholars understand power-sharing as the inclusion of opposing groups in the government (Mehler 2009), while others conceptualize power-sharing as both inclusion of the opposition and decentralization of the state (Jarstad 2001). Power-sharing has also been defined as “practices and institutions that result in broad-based governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society” (Sisk 2005: vii). The latter understanding of the term is not only focusing on the presence of power-sharing institutions, but moreover on the practices of power-sharing. As such, the effect is not only judged by the existence of power-sharing institutions, as this definition suggests a more informal understanding of power-sharing, including situations where power-sharing institutions may not be in place. To be sure, there is no one-size fits all when it comes to power-sharing agreements; it can be implemented either formally through amendments in the constitution or other written law, or be based on informal unwritten agreements (Schneckener 2002:218).

In addition to the aforementioned definitions, some scholars bracket power-sharing into different sub-categories and apply these to assess the effect of different forms of power-sharing when included in peace settlements. For instance, Hoddie and Hartzell (2005:86-91) differentiate between four different power-sharing provisions in their analysis; (1) central power-sharing; (2) territorial power-sharing; (3) military power-sharing; (4) economic power-sharing (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005:97). Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) operate with similar classifications.
The abovementioned conceptualisations and operationalization are mere examples of the different ways power-sharing is used as an analytical tool. As sound analyses build on precisely defined theoretical concepts that are operationalized into meaningful variables, the varied understandings of what power-sharing is, make it challenging to navigate and compare the already existing literature on the topic. To add further to the confusion when approaching the topic, there is hardly any unison definition of other relevant terms, such as peace and democracy. This further challenges the aim of attaining a complete understanding of the effects of power-sharing. Thus, rather than serving as clear guidelines, the various conceptualizations of power-sharing “cloud our understanding of power-sharing” as it makes it challenging to assert the true effects of power-sharing in peace settlements (Binningsbø 2013:90).6

It has been argued that one of the reasons why there are so many different analytical definitions of what power-sharing is, might be that the topic of investigation has caught interest in different strands of research. According to Jarstad (2008a:108-110) the research on power-sharing can be divided into two strands. Firstly, power-sharing as deriving from Arend Lijphart’s comparative study of Western European democracies and his theory on “consociationalism”. This field of study is concerned with the choice of democratic systems and the implications of various institutional designs on the prospect for peace and democracy in societies that are deeply divided along ethnic lines (Jarstad 2008a:108-110). Secondly, a related, however differentiated, field of study is emphasizing power-sharing as a conflict management tool (Jarstad 2008a:108-110). What binds these together is the belief that some democratic institutional arrangements are better equipped to accommodate peace in societies that are consisting of two or more communal groups. Due to the proximity of these fields of study, the literature within the two discourses tends to be dealt with interchangeably, while at the same time, there seems to be a “lack of integration between the two discourses” (Jarstad 2008a:111). Consequently, the unconscious employment of the concepts makes it challenging to obtain certainty about the true effects of power-sharing on peace and democracy.

Binningsbø (2013: 99) take note of Jarstad’s (2008) distinction between the academic strands. However, she argues that while democratic theory researchers analysing power-sharing are mainly concerned with stable democratic systems, their interest in power-sharing derives

6 For a comprehensive, however not exhaustive literature review on power-sharing, see Helga Malmin Binningsbø (2013) "Power sharing, peace and democracy: Any obvious relationship?"
from an aspiration to circumvent the upsurge of violent conflict. A stable democratic system is understood as a necessary precondition that can hamper full-scale conflict between divided people in plural societies (Binningsbø 2013:99). Consequently, “lasting peace is a fundamental dependent variable also among those primarily focusing on power sharing as a means to achieve stable democracy” (Binningsbø 2013:99). In addition, Binningsbø (2013:99) points out that scholars interested in power-sharing as a conflict management tool are also using democracy as a dependent variable, as they often include an assessment of whether or not power-sharing can foster democracy.

Nonetheless, Binningsbø (2013) argues along the same lines as Jarstad (2008b), pointing to the difficulties in making comparisons of the various contributions done on the effects of power-sharing due to the diverging conceptualisations and operationalization of the most central terms. Furthermore, the causal mechanisms that are suggested by the various researchers are differing; in effect, power-sharing can have four potential outcomes; peace, conflict, democracy and non-democracy (Binningsbø 2013:99). Whereas the diverging results may reflect the various conceptualisation and operationalization of the terms, it also reflects the reality. In some cases, peace accords where power-sharing arrangements are included attribute to peace, in other cases they do not.

To add further to the confusion, different researchers use various thresholds when determining the successfulness of power-sharing. Whereas quantitative researchers typically would deem power-sharing successful in instances where there is absence of violent conflict after its instalment, case study researchers would often include other expectations such as good governance and an improved human rights situation (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 92-93). Illustratively, Binningsbø and Dupuy (2009) argue that power-sharing included in the Lomé Agreement after the Sierra Leonean civil war (1999) was successful in ending the conflict, Sawyer (2004) criticizes the power-sharing arrangements in Sierra Leone for not being able to hamper the recurrence of internal conflict in the country.

As the following sections will show, several quantitative contributions to the field are supportive with regards to the potential of some types of power-sharing to alter conflict, whereas the in-depth case study analyses are in general more sceptical towards the promise of power-sharing to create stable democratic systems in divided societies. Binningsbø (2013) does not suggest a common framework for how one should study the effects of power-
sharing on peace and democracy. Instead she urges researchers to be specific about what they are analysing when researching the phenomena and concludes: “There may not be one ‘true’ power-sharing or one ‘truth’ about power-sharing. However, it is crucial that researchers and policy-makers are clear about which type of power-sharing they discuss in specific situations.” (Binningsbø (2013: 108).

This thesis supports Binningsbø’s (2013) recommendation to be specific about what aspects of power-sharing that will be analysed, and to be specific in the conceptualisation and operationalisation of what exactly the term power-sharing entails. The GNU in Zanzibar was included in the negotiated reconciliation talks between the main opposing parties as a conflict preventive mechanism to avoid a deepening of the political crisis and violent clashes to break out. Thus, this thesis is concerned with political power-sharing as a conflict management tool. Consequently, the research and empirical evidence presented will primarily focus on instances where power-sharing mechanisms are included as an integral part of peace settlements subsequent conflicts. However, as much of the literature on power-sharing as a conflict management tool derives from the literature on power-sharing from democratic institutions theory, the underlying assumptions will also draw on literature from this strand of research. However, the thesis will be specific about the underlying differences in conceptualisation and operationalisation of relevant concepts when discussing the findings from other researchers’ analysis.

3.2. Causal mechanisms – power-sharing and peace

As assessed in the previous section, there are contesting views with respect to whether power-sharing fosters peace, conflict, democracy or non-democracy. The following section will assess the findings from various analyses – both qualitative and quantitative. This will form the basis for the final section of this chapter, outlining the theoretical implication for this thesis, as well as the operationalization of the most relevant terms.

3.2.1. Does power-sharing foster peace?

Within the field of conflict management, the purpose of power-sharing institutions is two-fold. First, the ultimate aim is to bring about an end to the conflict. Second, and closely related to the first, is to avoid that the society relapses into violence (Sriram and Zahar 2009:11-12). As such, it is useful to evaluate the effect of power-sharing on peace in terms of
whether the inclusion of power-sharing in peace settlements are 1) serving as an immediate conflict reducing instrument, 2) whether the peace installed through power-sharing institutions is sustainable over time.

There are several empirical examples indicating that power-sharing arrangements can be useful in order to terminate internal conflicts. This is evident when looking at e.g. the internal conflicts in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia where power-sharing arrangements were formally and informally put in place to contribute to successfully ending the conflict(s) (Bieber and Keil 2009:337). Several large-N scholars also seem to arrive at the conclusion that power-sharing can have positive effects on peace and stability in the transition from conflict to peace (Mukherjee 2006; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Hoddie and Hartzell (2005:83-84) argue that when included in peace settlements, all forms of power-sharing is contributing to a peaceful transition from conflict to peace, however, the findings indicate that some forms of power-sharing are more effective than others when it comes to peace duration. The scholars differentiate between four power-sharing provisions in their analysis; (1) central power-sharing; (2) territorial power-sharing; (3) military power-sharing; (4) economic power-sharing (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005:86-91). The purpose of their study was to test how different forms of power-sharing provisions affect the peace duration and the time when the first post conflict national election is conducted (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005:97). Given that power-sharing creates a sense of security in a fragile post-conflict situation, they argue that territorial and military power-sharing can have a positive effect on the likelihood of crafting peace. However, territorial and military power-sharing is considered more costly than political power-sharing. Consequently, the inclusion of territorial and military power-sharing signals a higher degree of commitment to end the conflict. As such, the authors conclude that territorial and military power-sharing increase “the likelihood that peace will endure and democratic practices will be embraced” (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005:103).

Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) argue along the same lines as Hoddie and Hartzell (2005). Jarstad and Nilsson’s (2008) analysis is based on the dataset from Uppsala Conflict Data Program and includes 83 peace agreements that were signed after civil conflicts with 25 or more battle-related deaths per year. In these agreements the government constitutes at least one part to the conflict with one or more rebel groups, in the time period 1989-2004. The authors analyse whether political, military and territorial power-sharing attributes to peace when
implemented in peace accords, and thus they do not merely focus on the existence of power-sharing aspects in the peace accord per se, but on the implementation of power-sharing provisions. Their main findings are in the same line as Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) “that implementation of those power-sharing provisions that entail great concessions for the signatories reflects a high degree of commitment by the parties, and hence makes peace likely to prevail” (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008: 207). Further, they find that military and territorial power-sharing have a positive effect on peace, whereas political power-sharing does not contribute to peace (ibid: 217-218). Again in line with Hoddie and Hartzell (2005), the scholars link this to the fact that both military and territorial power-sharing are more costly for the contesting parties to the conflict, and as such increases the commitment to sustain the peace (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). However, they note some limitations to their own research when it comes to selection bias: It might be the case that the peace settlements that include only political power-sharing are the more difficult conflicts to be solved and thus can partly explain why these are more likely to resort to violence (ibid: 219).

Martin (2013) finds a similar pattern as both Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) and Jarstad and Nilsson (2008). Analysing 156 peace settlements signed in 1989-2008 he finds that “peace agreements which employ military and territorial power-sharing are significantly more likely to endure.” (Martin 2013: 332). His analysis includes peace settlements after internal conflict with a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths per year. He finds that 70 % of the agreements that include military power-sharing last at least 24 months and 60 % of the military power-sharing pacts last more than five years (ibid: 343). The evidence is even stronger for territorial power-sharing (ibid: 343). Furthermore, he differentiates between political, executive and legislative power-sharing and minority veto powers to assess the various effects power-sharing provisions have on the prospects for peace durability. His findings suggest that political power-sharing seems to have limited impact on the durability of peace, but that different provisions of political power-sharing have varying impact on the potential for peace. The results show a low, however statistically significant, effect of minority veto powers and legislative power-sharing on peace durability, and a negative correlation between executive power-sharing and peace durability (Martin 2013:343). To summarize: What these large-N studies have in common is that political power-sharing seems to have limited positive long-term effect on the prospects for a peaceful transition from conflict to peace.
Mukherjee (2006) has, however, analysed the effects of political power-sharing provisions on the prospects for peace durability by using a bargaining model. The author seeks to explain why some political power-sharing agreements lead to peace and while others resort to violence. The analysis includes 111 civil wars between 1944 and 1999 with at least 1,000 battle-related casualties yearly. Contrary to Hoddie and Hartzell (2005), the selection of cases also includes conflicts that end with military victory on the behalf of either the government or the insurgent group. He finds that in the 61 of 111 civil wars where political power-sharing was included in the peace agreement, 55.7% was able to end the conflict between the contending parties (Mukherjee 2006:480). However, the duration of the peace in these cases varied largely. 19 political power-sharing agreements fostered a peace lasting between 6-19 months, while in 24 cases the peace lasted for between 67-94 and finally, 18 political power-sharing agreements fostered a peace that lasted for 95-183 months (Mukherjee 2006:480). Moreover, the results from the analysis suggests that political power-sharing is more likely to lead to enduring peace if the political power-sharing is installed after a decisive military victory on behalf of the government, as this implies less bargaining power for the insurgent groups. As such, in a situation with decisive military victory, the insurgent groups have more incentives to accept the political power-sharing pact and less incentive to resort to conflict (Mukherjee 2006:34).

3.2.2. Does power-sharing end or solve conflict?

While several large-N analyses find support for the claim that power-sharing can foster the likelihood of ending internal conflicts, some scholars are critical towards power-sharing agreement as a measure that will lead to enduring peace. One criticism against the use of power-sharing in conflict resolution is that introducing power-sharing does not imply that the root causes to the conflict are dealt with. As such, by including power-sharing in peace settlements one is running the risk of merely putting the conflict on hold (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010). Consequently, while certain forms of power-sharing seem to contribute to end conflict, it does not necessarily solve conflict. Cheeseman and Tendi (2010) are critical towards the widespread use of power-sharing in conflict regulation, especially as solution to post-election crises, such as in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Further, the authors argue that while opting for power-sharing in some violent instances is unavoidable, the use of GNUs to solve political stalemates should be avoided. Furthermore, they argue that power-sharing can serve as a negative force as it "may encourage vulnerable leaders in fragile democracies to engage
in strategies to produce deadlock, in order to legitimate the creation of a unity government which within they are allowed to retain executive power" (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010: 225-226).

Along the same lines, Sawyer (2004) criticizes the political power-sharing arrangements that were included in the peace agreements after the Liberian civil (1996) and Sierra Leonean (1998) civil wars; namely the 1996 Abuja Agreement and the 1998 Lomé Accord. Both accords included provisions such as a ceasefire; a transitional government including the relevant armed groups; the disarmament and demobilisation of armed groups; and the holding of elections (Sawyer 2004:449). The author notes that the provision of power-sharing in both cases meant the inclusion of armed groups in a joint executive government, however, inter alia due to the absence of a third-party guarantee, these armed groups had little incentive to refrain from breaking the peace (Sawyer 2004: 451). Furthermore, the centralised political power-sharing institutions were not designed in a way that would support democratic reforms and lacked local participation in the transition from war to peace (Sawyer 2004: 451-452). Thus, he argues that while these peace agreements terminated the conflicts, they were not successful in hampering the recurrence of internal conflict in the two countries.

Drawing on findings from Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Somalia, Spears (2000) is of a similar view, arguing that political power-sharing often fails in practice, due inter alia to a number of obstacles that arise in the implementation phase of the power-sharing agreement. First, the promise of sharing power with the opponent is a less favoured option if the party to the conflict is confident that it will win against the opponent – either at the ballot or through military means. Similarly, Rothchild and Roeder (2005:29) are critical of the claim that power-sharing is a successful strategy when implemented in deeply divided societies that have recent experience with internal conflict. They are aware of the relative success of implementing power-sharing, and acknowledge that power-sharing enabled the democratic transition in inter alia South Africa, but are emphasising the cases where power-sharing has failed the test of time (Rotchild and Roeder 2005a:50). Additionally, they argue that there are several conditions that increase the likelihood of power-sharing institutions to have the intended effect, including; elite dominance, a culture of accommodation; sincere commitments; state strength; economic prosperity and equality; stable demographics; a constructive relationship with the international community (Rotchild and Roeder 2005a: 41-48). However, they note that these conditions are seldom present after intense internal
conflict. As such, they conclude that while power-sharing may be a preferable solution in a situation where continued conflict and authoritarianism is the alternative outcome, it might not lead to the intended effects due to the conditions under which these power-sharing initiatives are put into place. Instead, they argue that this is seldom the case and that sustainable peace is difficult to achieve through power-sharing institutions (Rotchild and Roeder 2005a:50).

When discussing the merits of power-sharing arrangements in crafting peace in Africa since 1999, Mehler (2009:462) argues that it is only Burundi (2003), Liberia (2003), Sudan (2005) and Côte d’Ivoire (2007) that can be said to have been relatively successful. Nonetheless, he is questioning whether this has anything to do with the power-sharing arrangements that were installed, and argues that “multidimensional power-sharing is not per se a success factor” (Mehler 2009:462). He claims that there might be other explanations to the success of bringing about peace: Even in instances where power-sharing arrangements are included and where peace is restored, we cannot know for sure whether it is the power-sharing arrangements or other factors, or several factors combined, that lead to peace (ibid).

In a similar line, Sisk and Stefes (2005) argue that it is not the power-sharing per se that has the potential to create peace. They criticize formal power-sharing – referring to it as consociationalism – for concentrating primarily on the political elite (Sisk and Stefes 2005:297). Further, they argue that the success of the political transition in South Africa was not limited to the introduction of a formalised power-sharing; also other practices of moderation and inclusion where important in deepening and expanding the political power-sharing beyond the political elite (Sisk and Stefes 2005: 294). As such, the authors argue that power-sharing institutions have to move beyond the formalised political institutions in order to include the citizens that constitute the contending groups. They focus on formal power sharing as an important instrument “in creating the conditions for negotiation of more durable political arrangements and in setting the state for broadening and deepening informal power sharing in auxiliary political institutions, in society and in the economy.” (Sisk and Stefes 2005: 297-298). Further, they argue that the failure of power-sharing in the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland and the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia is due to the fact that while formal power sharing was installed in these peace settlements, they never materialised into informal power-sharing arrangements (Sisk and Stefes 2005: 310-133).
3.2.3. Power-sharing or political commitment?

Following the former section, it seems that the researchers don’t necessarily agree that it is the power-sharing institutions that attribute to peace, but rather the signalling effect of the commitment to peace that the inclusion of power-sharing in peace settlements have on the parties to the conflict. This argument is also in line with the one posed by Hoddie and Hartzell (2005), Jarstad and Nilsson (2008), Mukherjee (2006) and Martin (2013), all suggesting that the type of power-sharing that is chosen sends a signal of the degree to which the different parties are committed to the agreement.

This is also supported by several more qualitatively-oriented scholars. Inter alia, Spears (2002) attributes much of the success to bridge peace in South Africa to the political leadership that showed a mutual recognition of the other party and convinced the other party that it was sincerely committed to the peace and reconciliation process by establishing a power-sharing system (Spears 2002:132). The role of commitment thus seems to be an important explanatory factor for whether power-sharing can be effectively applied to reduce the level of conflict between two parties.

Thus, it is interesting to look into the role of external mediation in the negotiation process, as one might argue that the role of the third party mediator might have an effect on the level of commitment held by the contending parties. Mehler (2009:465) denotes the relative successfulness in creating peace between the warring parties to the efforts of international peacekeepers in the case of Liberia. Mehler (2009:465) argues: “Only the strong and active presence of international peacekeepers – and not power sharing during the transition period – that achieved a respectable degree of stability and security”. This is similar to the view held by Zahar (2005:219), who argues that power-sharing institutions periodically has had positive effects on the political stability in Lebanon, and that the peace installed through the power-sharing institutions was contingent on the protection from external actors that served as guarantees for the peace. Studying 51 civil war settlements between 1945 and 2005, Mattes and Savun (2010: 511) argue that peace accords including international monitoring are likely to increase the duration of peace. Thus, an external guarantor might serve as a positive force in bringing about lasting peace.
3.3. Does power-sharing promote democracy?

As outlined in the initial section of this chapter, power-sharing – also known as consociationalism – has traditionally been conceived as efficient in promoting both peace and democracy (Lijphart 1977). As revealed in the previous section, several large-N studies find a positive relationship between certain forms of power-sharing and peace. However, the critics of power-sharing in peace settlement(s) argue that instead of promoting democratic norms and culture, power-sharing can have counterproductive effects on the quality of the democracy in place (Zahar 2005; Sriram and Zahar 2009; Rotchild and Roeder 2005b; Spears 2002; Lemarchand 2006; Jung and Shapiro 1995; Mehler 2009). The following section will include an assessment of the main critique against the use of power-sharing as a measure to create stable democratic systems.

3.3.1. Power-sharing = elite-centred?

One of the critiques against the use of power-sharing is that it easily becomes too focused on the political elite (Sisk and Stefes 2005: 294). Popular participation is understood as a threat to the stability of a state that is in a transition from conflict to peace, and as such, including the masses in the political decision-making process may jeopardize peace (Bogaards 2006:120). Secrecy is often a vital component in elite-brokered peace settlements, as it allows the political elite to make concessions without the fear of losing face in public – something which may alter the level of popular support they enjoy (Bogaards 2006:120). A consequence of this practise might be that the people are not included in the reconciliation process between the contending parties, which might serve as a hindrance to sustainable peace (Sisk and Stefes 2005:297). In some instances, the reluctance to involve the public may encourage further suspicion and polarisation between the adversaries and thus limit the potential for enduring peace (Bogaards 2006:120). Even in instances where democratic measures have been taken to ensure popular participation in the decision-making process, such as referendum, it is no guarantee that this will not lead to an increased polarisation between the contending parties (Bogaards 2006:120).

This has led to criticism of the use of power-sharing and illustrate what has been understood as a potential trade-off between power-sharing and democracy. Among the critics are Sriram and Zahar (2009) who are arguing that power-sharing might have long term negative effects on the society in which it is introduced. They argue “that power-sharing arrangements may
tend not only to result in undemocratic states, but towards states which are not responsive to the needs of the citizenry for security in ways in which may undermine human security and state legitimacy” (Sriram and Zahar 2009:12). They build their argument on the observation that power-sharing often means including individuals and groups into the government that have used violent means to push their demands for more state control. As such, these may not be in the right position to build a strong state that have the capacity to deal with violent opposition (Sriram and Zahar 2009:12). Furthermore, it has been argued that power-sharing arrangements demonstrate to potential rebel leaders that violence can be a viable instrument in the quest for political power even in democratic systems. This has led to the fear that the promotion of power-sharing can provide an incentive for insurgent movements to get access to power in the state apparatus, thus potentially increasing the level of violence (Tull and Mehler 2005: 375).

Other scholars point out that power-sharing arrangements might in fact undermine the democratic system as inclusion of some groups in effect lead to the exclusion of others. Additionally, it does not necessarily address the roots of the conflict between the parties (Spears 2002:123). Thus, while power-sharing institutionalism might be a viable option to terminate conflict, it is not an efficient way to ensure democracy (Spears 2002:123). Lebanon is an example of a case where power-sharing might be read as at least periodically successful in ensuring peace. However, it also had adverse effects on the transition to democracy (Zahar 2005: 220). If this holds true, the effect of installing power-sharing is working against the intention of creating a stable and peaceful democratic system.

On the other hand, the defenders of consociationalism argue that while consociationalism might have its drawbacks, there is no other viable democratic option for deeply divided societies (Bogaards 2006:120). Lijphart (2012) disagrees with the claim that consociational democracies are less democratic and instead he understands consociational democracies as more democratic as broad coalitions constituted by the political elite from different segments of the population enables the executive to represent larger portions of the population. Lijphart (1977:5) refers to the classical definition of democracy as “rule of the people, by the people, for the people” and determines the degree of democracy by the size of the portion of people that are being represented in the government.
3.3.2. Integration vs. accommodation

It is common to differentiate between integrative and accommodative approaches when solving conflicts in societies that are deeply divided (McGarry et. al 2008). The integrative approach promotes public homogeneity, and argues that cultural differences between communal groups in a society, should be privatized. Accommodative approaches, such as consociationalism and power-sharing, promote institutional design to accommodate differences. One of the criticisms against the use of power-sharing or consociationalism is focusing on the underlying assumptions of the theory regarding the nature of ethnic identities. In instances where power-sharing arrangements have been used to ensure minority representation, it has been argued that this can have counter-productive effects, as it increases the political salience of these identities (Bogaards 2006:120; Dixon 2012). This means that power-sharing institutions may be understood to institutionalise the differences between groups rather than aiming at moving beyond these group differences, thus opening up for the creation of a shared communal identity (Dixon 2012). Furthermore, the assumption that it is challenging or impossible for different ethnic groups to co-exist within the same state, has been linked to a primordialist perspective within the group identity literature, emphasizing the primordial characteristics that bind ‘ethnic groups’ together. Related to this argument, is that power-sharing as a solution to conflict does not deal with the root causes to the conflict, and as such, there is a likelihood that the conflict will re-erupt (McGarry et. al 2008).

Furthermore, power-sharing is criticised for being less democratic than other form of accommodating approaches, as it implies the removal of a potentially viable opposition that can hold the government accountable for its policies (Jung and Shapiro 1995). Furthermore, it is argued that consociation is an appropriate solution in societies where the politics has been deeply polarized and any relevant minority has sufficient bargaining power (McGarry et.al. 2008).

3.4. Summary and focus for data collection

The previous sections of this chapter have addressed the most important aspects of power-sharing of relevance to answer the research question at hand. To summarize; most scholars seems to agree that the inclusion of power-sharing in negotiated peace accords can increase the likelihood of the parties coming to an agreement. Furthermore, political power-sharing is by most scholars argued to be less prone to lead to enduring peace between the opposing
parties and this is linked to it signalling lower levels of commitment on the behalf of the adversaries. In relation to the effects of GNU on democracy, scholars are critical towards the ability of political power-sharing to lead to an enhancement of the democratic system when included in negotiated settlements. Moreover, the long-term effects of power-sharing on the consolidation of democracy is questionable, and instead of improving the democratic system, there are strong indications that when included in negotiated peace settlements, it may have long-term negative effects on the prospect of improving the democratic system. In the analysis, the effects of power-sharing on peace and democracy will be assessed in the light of these theoretical implications. The final section to this chapter will operationalize the variables used in the data collection phase of this project.

3.4.1. Operationalization of the variables

The power-sharing that was installed in Zanzibar after the elections in 2010 was a political power-sharing, where the opposition party was included in the executive of the government constituting a grand coalition. Furthermore, it included a proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives (Matheson 2012). As such, it did not include the two other aspects of power-sharing outlined by Lijphart (1977) mutual veto; and protection of minority interests. As we are analysing the effects of the GNU on peace and democracy, the GNU is considered the independent variable in the analysis.

The dependent variables to assess the effects of the GNU on short-term peace are operationalized into three main variables that must be seen in relation to the previous political climate in the isles. While the most scholars apply the definition of conflict in terms of the number of casualties (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003), this would make less sense in a low-intensity conflict in Zanzibar. Mehler (2009) understands peace in rather relative terms, arguing that “peace is when people think they are at peace” (2009:462). This rather constructivist understanding of peace is appealing, as how the society perceives the situation and the relationship between the adversaries is important as how we think about certain aspects are influencing the way we act upon it. Given the low levels of casualties in the political conflict in Zanzibar, the people’s perception about peace and stability will be used as an indicator of whether the GNU was successful in reducing the tension between the two political parties.
As outlined in the background chapter to this thesis, the conflict between the two political parties was discernible in all aspects of everyday life of Zanzibaris. As such, one of the operationalized variables of peace that will guide the analysis is the GNU’s effect on social relations between supporters of the ruling party and the opposition after the instalment of the GNU in 2010. Secondly, as the supporters of the opposition was inclined to experience intimidation and discriminatory treatment prior to the GNU was established, the interview guide included questions related to the treatment of the opposition between the GNU was implemented and the time when the interviews were conducted. Based on the responses from the interviewees, these have been divided into three sub-categories; the ability to get access to ZAN ID, instances of police brutality against opposition members and the ability to get employment in the state apparatus. A third variable to assess the effect of the GNU on peace is operationalized as whether there had been instances of politically motivated upsurge post-GNU.

The dependent variables to assess the short-term effects of GNU on democracy are operationalized into two main variables. As outlined in the previous section, one of the critiques against the use of power-sharing is the contra-productive effects it has on the democratic system, given the removal of the opposition. As such, the first variable is operationalized as the performance of the government after the GNU was implemented. Power-sharing is also criticized on the grounds that it is too elite-centred and thus fail to involve other aspects in society. Related to this, the second variable is operationalized by assessing how power-sharing had been implemented beyond the top-leadership of the government.

When assessing effects of the establishment of the GNU on the prospects for long-term peace and democracy, the indicators are constituted mainly by to what degree the root causes of the conflict were dealt with. In addition, it will include some of the challenges associated with the GNU that were brought up during the interviews that may affect the degree to which the GNU can be deemed successful. Firstly, this includes economic opportunities and the standard of living in the isles. Secondly, it includes a section on the internal frictions in the GNU at the time the fieldwork was conducted. As one of the most salient differences between CCM and CUF has been their stance with regards to Zanzibar’s semi-autonomous status the union between Zanzibar and the mainland, this will be the main focus. Thirdly, the prospect of the GNU to lead to enduring peace and democracy is evaluated on the basis of the
conduct of the 2015 election. Together, these will form a discussion on whether the GNU in Zanzibar was a useful measure in order to consolidate peace and democracy in the isles.
4.0. Methodology

“In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not.”

— Albert Einstein

While our analytical framework provides us with the conceptual glasses through which we can systematically analyse the social world, the methods applied gives us the tools necessary to gather sound information about the phenomenon of study. While the use of qualitative research can make it challenging to generalize from the findings, it opens up for a more comprehensive and thick understanding of the dynamics of power-sharing in Zanzibar. Broadly speaking, this chapter will present the research design for this study as well as the methodological concerns that underpin this study. Furthermore, the quality of the research will be assessed in relation to concerns regarding reliability and validity. This chapter will first present what is meant by validity and reliability and present the rationale behind applying a case study as research design for this thesis. This will include a brief assessment of the limitations and advantages associated with case study as research design. Further, it will present some of the methodological advantages and challenges associated with using semi-structured interviews. Finally, it will discuss the plausibility of relying on secondary and tertiary sources of information in the analysis, such as academic articles, reports and news articles.

4.1. Research concerns: validity and reliability

Validity and reliability are concepts that were first applied in the natural sciences and that are used to assess the quality of a research design (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:270). Broadly speaking, validity refers to whether we are measuring what we intend to measure (Bryman 2008: 149). More specifically, validity can be divided into external validity and internal validity. External validity concerns the representativeness of a sample for a population as a whole (Gerring 2007:217), meaning whether it is possible to make generalizations to a wider population based on one single case. The ability to generalize findings from research projects has been perceived as important to assess the significance of social science research, as generic knowledge can provide us information about a phenomenon that is not limited to the single case at hand. Some theorists suggest that qualitative and case-based research should be
evaluated according to other criteria, such as whether the findings are transferable to other cases (Small 2009). As will be shown in the subsequent sections, there are diverging opinions on the potential of case study research to generate generalizations that can be applied to a wider population of cases.

*Internal validity* also known as measurement validity, is concerned with the soundness within a single case. This entails inter alia whether the indicators chosen are appropriate in measuring the concepts that one intends to measure (Adcock and Collier 2001:530). As such, assessing the internal validity can say something about whether the indicators chosen in research design is fit for purpose. However, it is important to emphasize that internal validity does not mean that one increases the external validity in the form of its ability to produce generic knowledge, as it is concerned with whether the indicators are measuring what they intend to measure within that specific case (Bollen 1989:184). As outlined in the final section of the previous chapter, the indicators chosen for this analysis, derives from an assessment of what might be sound indicators to measure change as an effect of the GNU. While this increases the internal validity, it narrows down the prospect for generalizations. However, by applying indicators that are not context sensitive, this could have potentially hampered the purpose of the study – to gain in-depth knowledge about the dynamics of power-sharing in Zanzibar.

*Reliability* relates to whether it is possible to replicate a study and derive at the same results and conclusions, and according to Bryman (2008:31), “reliability is concerned with the question whether the results of a study are repeatable”. Thus, integral to the definition of reliability, is that the method is reliable if it is possible to reproduce the results and conclusions that derive from a study under circumstances where a similar method is applied (Golafshani 2003: 598). While the validity of a study can be corrupted by systemic errors, the reliability of a study can be distorted by random errors, i.e. in the classification of the sampled data (Adcock and Collier 2001:531). In order to the reliability of the study, the data gathered was carefully systematized before including it in the analysis.

In qualitative social science research, however, it is practically challenging, if ever possible, to replicate the exact same research project (Small 2009). However, by providing the reader with as much information about the research methods as possible, it is possible to increase
the reliability of a case study (George and Bennett 2005:106). By doing so, one makes it possible for the reader to scrutinize and compare the findings from the analysis with other analyses to assess whether differences in research design can account for diverging results deriving from the analyses.

4.2. Research design: case study

With the development of more formalised statistical methods in social science research in the 1960s, the use of case study as research design were by many perceived as a less scientific method compared to quantitative research designs (George and Bennett 2005:3). Some scholars considered case studies to fall short when it comes to the possibility of hypothesis testing and generalizing the findings from one case to a wider population of cases (Ljiphart 1975:160). However, the emergence of researchers having experience with two or more methodological approaches, and the increasing formalisation of both qualitative and quantitative methods, have contributed to a more nuanced debate on the potential that lies in case study research design and its potential in theory development and generalization (George and Bennett 2005:5).

George and Bennett (2005:17) define a case “as an instance of a class or a class of events”. Furthermore, they understand case study as a “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George and Bennett 2005:5). Correspondingly, Gerring (2007:20) defines a case study as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)”. Consequently, in their view, there is no inbuilt contraction between case study and the ability to generalize to a broader universe of cases – a view also supported by other scholars (Flyvberg 2006:225-226).

Whereas it is possible to make generalisations, which is a question of external validity (Gerring 2007:43), from one case study to a wider selection of cases, it is more challenging to do so when using case study research design than in instances where quantitative methods are applied. The methods applied in quantitative research often use randomly drawn samples from a universe of cases. As such samples are randomly drawn, they are considered to reflect the population of cases as a whole, and thus the diverging scores on the dependent variables are assumed to reflect the actual variation in the population (George and Bennett 2005: 30-
Case study researchers instead focus on the thorough investigation of one or a few cases, and often aim to uncover or refine theory about a particular causal mechanism (George and Bennett 2005: 30-31). As such, one needs to be more careful in arguing that the findings from a case study can be generalised to a wider selection of cases. Arguably, however, generalization is merely one way to accumulate knowledge about a phenomena, as there is a lot gain from case studies even when they are not easily generalizable to a wider population of cases. Extreme cases or cases that deviates on one or several important variables according to the theory guiding the study, can provide useful insight and be used when development and fine-tuning existing theory (George and Bennett 2005:111). Flyvberg (2006:227) goes as far as claiming that “formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas “’the force of example’ is underestimated.” As such, perhaps transferability is more suitable term to describe the external validity of case studies, as “applying words without adopting their meaning, constructing sticks-and-leaves airplanes that will never fly” (Small 2009:10).

To be clear, the case study for this thesis is power-sharing in Zanzibar as a means to end the political conflict in the archipelago. Consequently, political power-sharing applied as a conflict management tool constitute the population of cases. Given that the context in which power-sharing is applied to reduce conflict is different in each case, the generalizability of the findings from this thesis is limited. Furthermore, there is a limited number of similar cases in the whole of the population to which the relevance of political power-sharing in Zanzibar could apply. As such, the aim of the thesis is to produce some main findings that can serve as guidelines for other situations similar to Zanzibar where political power-sharing might be considered, and where the lessons from Zanzibar can be used to enhance the chances of successfully applying power-sharing as a means to reduce conflict.

A critique of the use of case study research design is that case study researchers are prone to suffer from subjective bias in the selection of cases based on the value of the dependent variable (Flyvberg 2006:234). This may make the researcher more likely to unconsciously or consciously highlight findings that are supporting his/her presumptions that are in line with the theoretical assumptions that guides the study (Flyvberg 2006:234). In quantitative research, selection bias is likely to understate the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In case study research, however, selection bias can potentially understate or overstate the relationship between the variables (George and Bennett 2005:24).
To be sure, selection bias is a potential pitfall also in quantitative methods, and Flyvberg (2006:233-235) argues that it is possible to avoid this by being aware of the pitfall of looking for reaffirmation of ones presumptions and critically question these along the way. Furthermore, the proximity to the data and the in-depth contextual knowledge acquired when applying case studies as research design, make it possible for the researcher to include other explanatory factors that were not included in the preliminary phases of the research, and thus reduce selection bias. As such, in order to avoid selection bias, the analysis will include other explanatory factors that may account for the findings in the analysis.

Typically, the advantages of using case study as research design, is where statistical analysis falls at short (George and Bennett 2005:19). Many of the concepts used in large-N studies in social science research are typically challenging to precisely define and measure. Thus, by lumping different forms of power-sharing together, the statistical methods run the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’. Contrary, one of the advantages of case studies as research design is that it is possible for the researcher to achieve high levels of conceptual validity (also known as internal validity as explained in the previous subchapter) (George and Bennett 2005:19).

To be sure, both large-N quantitative and small-N qualitative methods have their strengths and weaknesses, and what design is chosen depends largely on the research question at hand (Flyvberg 2006: 226). Consequentially, when choosing research design it is crucial to ensure that you are choosing a design that is able to answer the research question at hand in the most accurate way (de Vaus 2001:16). As this thesis aims at understanding and analysing complex political processes and the effects of the instalment of power-sharing on peace and democracy in Zanzibar, a case study would provide a research design that will enable us to answer the research question in a systematically and sound manner that also opens up the possibility of detecting other plausible explanatory factors that are not already vested in theory along the way. As outlined in the introductory chapter to this thesis, the instalment of power-sharing in Zanzibar deviates from many other cases where power-sharing is included in negotiated peace settlements. Consequently, one needs to be cautious in generalising the findings from this study to other cases where power-sharing has been applied to end political conflicts. This potentially reduces the external validity of the study, but it ensures the internal validity of the study. The external validity of the study and the transferability of knowledge produced about power-sharing in Zanzibar will be dealt with in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
4.3. Research method: field work

The limited access to secondary and tertiary sources of information made it essential to conduct fieldwork in Zanzibar to answer the research question at hand. In fact, Zanzibar as a political entity has received relatively little scholarly attention. This can be partly explained by the restrained academic freedom in Zanzibar and the historical difficulties in attaining a research permit for international researchers – in particular when it comes to sensitive issues such as the political life in the isles. In addition, the analysis rests on reports, news articles and academic literature published both prior to and after the fieldwork was conducted.

The fieldwork conducted for this thesis took place in January-February 2013 in Zanzibar. Throughout the field-work 21 interviews were conducted with individuals residing in both Unguja and Pemba. In addition to the fieldwork, I spent almost one and a half year in the mainland of Tanzania in the period January 2014-July 2015 working as an intern and consultant for the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam. In order to avoid conflicting roles, I did not conduct fieldwork while I was employed by the Embassy. However, residing in Tanzania and following the political situation closely, was very useful for my contextual understanding and arguably increased the reliability and validity of the study. In order to be considered useful and relevant, the validity and reliability of the study will be assessed in the subsequent sections.

4.3.1. Semi-structured interviews

In order to answer the research question in a sound manner, conducting semi-structured interviews were considered the most salient strategy. Purposive sampling is often recommended in qualitative research as this ensures you are attaining information from the most relevant actors and it ensures that the research question corresponds with the sampling (Bryman 2008:458). This can be done through snowball sampling, a technique that is frequently applied when recruiting interviewees (Willis 2006:148). In practice this means that you get in touch with a few individuals you think might be of interest to your study and ask them to refer you to other individuals. In the initial stages of the fieldwork, Hajj Mohammed Hajj, also assisting as a translator in several of the interviews, set me in contact with several relevant informants. This was particularly helpful when I conducted interviews in Pemba, the more underdeveloped and conservative part of Zanzibar. Most of the interviews were with
supporters of either of the two major political parties in the isles, representatives from civil society and journalists. Interviews were also conducted with the people representing the general public. Even though the number of respondents and the sampling strategy I employed do not enable me to generalize the findings to the population in Zanzibar as a whole, the data gathered provide in-depth understanding of what where considered the strengths and weaknesses of the GNU at the time of the interviews, thus increasing the internal validity of the study.

Conducting interviews in a foreign language and in a context that is culturally and politically different, means that some words and sentences may be interpreted differently from what the informants initially intended. Consequently, one of the advantages of using a semi-structured interview is that it enables the researcher to probe and cross-check the information provided, as well as clarify the meaning of concepts in situations where the content is unclear (Apentiik & Parpart 2006: 39-41). Throughout the interviews, cross-checking, follow-up questions and asking for clarification enabled me to attain more information than if the interview had been more structured, fixed and less open for the respondents’ own reflections (Bryman 2008:438). Another advantage of the semi-structured interviews is that it assures the researcher that the most prominent topics are covered throughout the interview, while at the same time as it opens up for the interviewees to present their own thoughts and ideas (Willis 2006:145). The main questions were asked in all the interviews, with varied phrasing depending on the interview. This implies that I can be confident that the variances in the replies was in most cases not due to the interview context, but rather represented real variation, and this is likely to have increased the validity of the study (Bryman 2008:194).

4.2.3. Conducting interviews

The primary concern regarding the decision as to where the interviews where to take place was to find a neutral place where the interviewees felt comfortable. However, what is considered a ‘neutral’ place and a place where a person feels comfortable, do not always coincide (Willis 2006:148). The location as well as time for the interviews is of importance as these factors may have an impact on the data gathering process as well as affect how the interviewees perceive you as a researcher (Willis 2006: 148). In many cases, this is beyond the control of the researcher. However, it is important to ensure that the location for the interview is somewhere the interviewee feels comfortable presenting their views. The
interviews conducted for this research took place in a range of different places, inter alia the interviewees’ homes, public offices, in hotels and restaurants.

The official language in Zanzibar is Swahili, and even though a significant number of residents in Zanzibar speak English, the level of competency varies largely. Furthermore, though some of the informants had a satisfactory level of proficiency in English, some felt more comfortable discussing complex and sensitive issues, such as politics, in their own local language. This led to the decision to make use of a translator during some of the interviews conducted in the data collection for this thesis. There are advantages and potential drawbacks of using a third-party interpreter when doing research. First, using a translator is potentially both cost- and time-consuming endeavour, as translating a language and back again requires double the amount of time than without the language barrier (Bujra 2006: 174-175). Aside from the practical issues arising from using a translator, some technical issues may arise – especially if the translator is not familiar with working with researchers (Bujra 2006: 175). Thus, the choice of translator is of immense importance to the outcome of the interviews. In such instances it may be necessary to seek advice from other researchers that have used a translator in the local context you are conducting the research.

The choice of interpreter for this thesis was the done after consulting with Sigrun Marie Moss, a PhD student with in-depth knowledge of the politics of Zanzibar as well as previous experience of working with a translator for her own research. She recommended Hajj Mohammed Hajj as a translator, whom she had worked with previously. In addition to assisting with the translation of several interviews, he also assisted in the process of applying for a research permit in Zanzibar. Attaining a research permit is a potentially time consuming endeavour, and thus his assistance made it possible to start conducting interviews shortly after arriving in Zanzibar. In addition he would assist in finding relevant informants that could provide information about the effects of GNU in Zanzibar at that time. Furthermore, he functioned as an ethnographer and could provide additional information at the end of the interviews, and often we would have lengthy discussion after the interviews had been conducted that helped clarify information that may be interpreted in different ways. In addition, most of the interviews were tape-recorded and this enabled me to re-address unclear points after the interviews had been done. Thus, this assisted in increasing the reliability and
internal validity of the study, as misunderstandings were avoided and thus gave more precise information about what had been said.

How the interpreter is perceived by the informants in the interview situation is of importance. Alike the researcher, the interpreter has a crucial role in creating a social milieu where the respondents feel comfortable sharing their perspectives and information. As discussed in the subsequent chapters, political identity is an important identity marker in Zanzibar, and most people are aware of other people’s political affiliation. In this situation, it can be challenging to ensure the neutrality of the interpreter. The interpreter’s political affiliation was discussed with the interpreter in advance of the interviews, where the interpreter claimed his neutrality in politics. However, through discussions with other researchers within the field and through subsequent discussions with the interpreter, it became clear that he was leaning towards supporting the opposition party. This can potentially have affected the interpretations, and thus affect the reliability of the study. In interviews with respondents supporting the ruling party, these may have felt uncomfortable being open about their views, in fear of retaliation. At one point, this made me consider using another interpreter when conducting the interviews. However, at the time when I was conducting the interviews, the relationship between the CCM and CUF camps had improved to the extent that I concluded that to change interpreter was unlikely to improve the reliability of the data collection.

When an interpreter is paid by the researcher, the power relation between a researcher and the interpreter is not an equal one. Furthermore, the interpreter can potentially distort or manipulate the information in the data collection. Thus, when using a third-party interpreter, there is always a potential risk that the interpreter has a lot of control over the information attained during the interview (Bujra 2006:176-177). However, the collaboration with the interpreter went smoothly, and a friendly and professional relationship based on mutual trust developed over the weeks I spent in the field. During my time spent in Tanzania, I also enhanced my own Kiswahili knowledge and this was useful when going back to the transcripts, as I at least could verify the general concepts that were discussed.

When conducting the interviews, the interviewees were given the choice of whether they wanted to be anonymised in the final version of the thesis. It is a researcher’s responsibility to ensure that the option of anonymity is available, so that it is not possible to identify the interviewee in the final output of the study (Scheyvens et.al. 2003:146). This might be
considered particularly relevant in a context where being outspoken about the political situation in the past has been associated with retaliation from the authorities. Several interviewees wanted to remain anonymous in the final output of the thesis, and information about the interviewees who wanted to be anonymous is listed in Appendix 1. For the sake of readability, I have chosen to give all of the respondents a number – also indicated in Appendix 1.

The anonymization of interviewees was done on the basis of ethical considerations, and this may to decrease the reliability of the study, as it would not be possible for another researcher to replicate the study. However, I considered ethically important to ensure the privacy of the interviewees and as such act in correspondence with the principle of “Do No Harm” (Wood 2006: 379). Furthermore reluctance to anonymize the interviewees could have potentially hindered some of the interviewees to talk freely and openly about the political situation, and in the worst case served as a threat to their security.

To further ensure confidentiality of the data, I assured to protect the interviewees’ identity by storing all the data gathered throughout the fieldwork in an encrypted folder on my personal computer. The official authority for data protection in relation to research, the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), approved the study’s handling of data in December 2012, and all notes, recordings and transcripts will be deleted after the submission of this thesis.

**4.3. Using secondary and tertiary data**

Reviewing the literature on Zanzibar, it becomes evident that even what you immediately assume as hard facts, in reality might be a distorted account of the actual events. Politics in Zanzibar has been characterized as being highly affected by rumours and diverging narratives of actual events (Glassman 2011). Some of these narratives and rumours have been repeated to the extent that they have been accepted as the real account of what took place. One example is the narrative of how the first political party was established in Zanzibar, and the following presents a brief description of the dominating narrative about this event.

The first political party in Zanzibar was established in late 1955 and was called “Hizben l’Watan Raia Sultan Zanzibar”, translated to English as “Nationalist Party of the Subjects of
His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar” (Lofchie 1963:191). It is a general perception that this party was established by semi-literate peasants in the remote and rural area Kiembe Samaki. That is contrary to most other nationalistic parties that emerged during the same period in other African countries, which were typically started by the political elite. By 1956, the intellectual elite among the Arab minority and members of the Arab Association in Zanzibar had become members of the party and renamed it Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) (Lofchie 1963:193). However, according to Glassman (2011), to claim that Hizben l’Watan Raia Sultan Zanzibar was the predecessor of ZNP is somewhat far-fetched as his analysis of the events taking place indicate that little that the establishment of the Hizben l’Watan Raia Sultan Zanzibar had few linkages to ZNP. Instead, Glassman (2011) claims that this narrative is likely to have been emphasized by the political elite in the Arab-dominated ZNP to enable them a broader support from the working-class in the rural area, and it served as a source of political legitimacy in the poor, rural areas.

This is merely one illustration of how rumours and diverging narratives are feeding into the construction of the historical accords in Zanzibar, and this suggests a cautious and critical reading of the literature. Thus, in cases where I have used news articles and national reports, I have ensured to cross-check this information against other sources of information. This is likely to increase the reliability of the study.

### 4.4. Summary

This chapter has evaluated the findings deriving from the analysis on the basis of validity and reliability. As internal validity refers to whether we are measuring what we intend to measure, the final section of the theoretical chapter has outlined the justification for the chosen variables found appropriate for the case. As shown, several measures have been taken in order to ensure the internal validity of this study, and while the external validity in terms of generalization might be limited, the concluding chapter of the thesis will argue that there is a certain degree of transferability to other cases.
5.0. Findings and Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the research question presented in the introduction to this thesis: "What were the short-term effects of political power-sharing in Zanzibar on peace and democracy and what longer-term effects did the GNU have on the consolidation of both peace and democracy?" Through answering these questions, the thesis will analyse the extent to which power-sharing was a viable conflict management tool in Zanzibar. This will be done on the basis of the defined indicators appropriate for analysing the short-term effects of power-sharing on peace and democracy, as well indicating the long-term effects of the GNU on the consolidation of peace and democracy in the isles, further elaborated in the following. The data collection is based on 21 interviews conducted in Unguja and Pemba, in January and February 2013, as well as some secondary sources. Information about the interviewees is listed in Appendix 1, while the interview guide is in Appendix 2. As noted in the previous chapter, the informants do not necessarily constitute a representative selection of the population in Zanzibar that is able to exhaust all perspectives on the effects of the GNU. However, the data collected may arguably provide information about the effects of the GNU on peace and democracy from the instalment of the GNU in 2010 to the time of the fieldwork not available elsewhere, and can thus be used as data in the analysis.

First, this chapter presents the main findings from the fieldwork conducted in Zanzibar, as well as discussing the short-term effects of the GNU on peace and democracy. This will include findings on the operationalized variables of peace outlined in the final section of the theoretical chapter. Secondly, the thesis will move on to assess the possible long-term effect of the GNU on peace and democracy in Zanzibar. This section will first present the main findings. A discussion on the long-term effects will follow.

5.1. The short-term effects of GNU on peace

As outlined in the final section of the theoretical chapter, the effects of power-sharing on peace will be measured by assessing the effects the GNU had on how people with different political party affiliations relate to each other in daily life, to what extent the opposition experienced discrimination and the stability in the isles after the GNU was introduced.
5.1.1. The effect of GNU on social relations

“We all are together, we all are at peace and we all have been united as Zanzibar.”

(Informant 6)

Included in all the interviews conducted during the fieldwork in Zanzibar in January-February 2013 were questions relating to the impact of the establishment of the GNU in Zanzibar on the social relations between supporters of the two competing political parties. The responses from the interviewees indicate that both parties to the conflict celebrated the establishment of the GNU. One interviewee responded the following when asked about people’s immediate reaction to the establishment of the GNU; “People from both parties, both CCM and CUF were very happy when they just heard about the GNU” (Informant 4). Moreover, all of the interviewees responded that the social relationship on community level had improved due to the establishment of the GNU. Several respondents exemplified this through narratives that prior to the establishment of the GNU, supporters of the two parties would abstain from attending important social events, such as funerals and weddings, if those being involved were supporters of the competing party. Inter alia, if you were a CCM supporter, it was common to refrain from attending funerals and weddings held by CUF, and vice versa (Informant 6; Informant 9; Informant 20). One respondent elaborated on this and concluded: “People are cooperating and in peace. They help each other and attend weddings and funerals” (Informant 6). Another informant, situated in Pemba, argued that the GNU had been a relief on the social interactions in Pemba, again by emphasizing that people were now attending weddings and funerals, as well as cooperating and working together in the local community (Informant 7).

Consequently, while not all respondents were positive towards the implementation of the GNU, all respondents argued that the GNU was successful in that it had enabled the people to leave their political affiliations aside and instead focus on their similarities. Many of them, also in Pemba, emphasized that they are the same people and that they are bound together by a common history, the same language and cultural background. One interviewee argued along these lines, claiming that the people were more united than they had been in the past (Informant 17). These testimonies also indicate that the political leadership’s willingness to join forces and the effort to restore stability in the isles was observed and adopted by the people. The political leaderships’ ability to change the public discourse has been analysed in
more detail by Moss and Tronvoll (2015), showing similar results. Thus, the responses from the interviews conducted as part of this thesis, confirm Moss and Tronvoll’s (2015) analysis as the people had a tendency to emphasise their shared national identity as Zanzibaris, rather than their affiliation to a political party after the implementation of the GNU. The improvement in social relations is also observed in other academic contributions on the establishment of the GNU, such as Bakari and Makulilo (2012) and Matheson (2012).

Thus, rather than cementing already existing communal identities, the introduction of power-sharing in Zanzibar seems in fact to have helped overcome these divided identities. This is contrary to the critique of power-sharing as a conflict management instrument, arguing that rather than creating a shared national identity it reinforces ethnic or communal identities (Dixon 2012). Furthermore, this also illustrates the fluidity of identities in Zanzibar, as noted by other scholars (Glassman 2011). However, the emphasis on a shared national identity in Zanzibar is contingent on the ability of the GNU to show the people that they are working together for the benefit of the population in Zanzibar. At the time the interviews were conducted, several respondents argued that the GNU was not as united as it had been when it was first established. Furthermore, they argued that the GNU still consisted of two different political parties with their own interests and they questioned the degree to which the GNU was committed to leave their political party affiliation aside in important questions relating to the future of Zanzibar, such as the structure of the union with the mainland (Informant 18).

5.1.2. Discrimination of the opposition

“Before the GNU, people could not speak; nobody had the freedom to say anything. But nowadays, people have the freedom to say what they want.”

(Informant 10)

Prior to the establishment of the GNU, the supporters of the opposition had experienced what can be called systematic discrimination in terms of access to political and economic resources based on their political affiliation. As outlined in the background chapter, the discrimination included the ability to get access to ZAN ID cards and thus be eligible to vote in the elections, employment opportunities in the state apparatus as well as being subjected to intimidating and sometimes violent treatment by the police. This was a source of distrust in the government and led to the perception among CUF supporters that the government was a
mere extension of CCM. As such, the topic of discrimination was included in the interviews. The responses from the interviewees were diverging, but there were some signals that there was less discrimination of the opposition than it had been in the past.

When it comes to the ability to register as a Zanzibari citizen and receive a ZAN ID, several of the respondents reported some improvements. An interviewee based in Pemba said in an interview that even though it was still a tedious process to get the ZAN ID cards, it was not as difficult as it had been in the past (Informant 6). A teacher and paralegal situated in Wete, Pemba, associated with CUF, confirmed this:

“That is also one of the developments from the GNU. Because before the GNU, it was difficult for CUF to get registered. They didn't get the ZAN ID, but nowadays they get it without any problem. That is another advantage of the GNU” (Informant 10).

Several respondents noted that it was still challenging for young people without a birth certificate to get an ID card, while it was no longer difficult to attain the letter from the Sheha confirming your identity (Informant 12; Informant 14). This might be linked to the reduction of the Sheha’s power in the process of accessing ZAN ID implemented as part of the Muafaka II (Mpangala and Lwehabaru 2011:67).

On the topic of discrimination in employment, the respondents were differing in their views. While several respondents indicated that there had been improvements in terms of the extent to which CUF supporters experienced discrimination after the establishment of the GNU, others were of the opinion that important positions in the state apparatus were still dominated by members from CCM. On the topic of employment in the government sector, a woman working for the Zanzibar Human Rights Centre noted that after the establishment of the GNU, there had been less discrimination of the opposition.

“To some extent it has changed how people are being employed. They now have a Committee for Public Services. Every public employment has to be announced in the media, and then they call for interviews. The best candidate will get the job. This was not like this before and now you just have to wait for the announcement” (Informant 16).

However, other respondents were of a different opinion. When asked about the challenges of the GNU, a respondent working as a journalist said that there was a scarcity of employment opportunities, and since the establishment of GNU nobody had been officially employed in the government sector. He noted that some people had been employed, but that this was done
in a “hidden manner” (Informant 12). Further, he argued that even though there were posts of advertisement for employment in the government positions, it was still more difficult for CUF supporters to get these positions. His argument was that the issue of employment was still under the control of the RCs or the DCs. As the RC is appointed by the President, most of them are affiliated with CCM, and they would prioritize any applicants with a CCM affiliation (Informant 12).

When asked about the new rules of employment, another interviewee responded that the government had a long history of appointing people according to their political background and family history. He also argued that the people in general did not get the information about the positions because they were not fully informed about the new employment rules and failed to recognize the adverts for the positions. Furthermore, he argued that it was still difficult for CUF supporters to get access to the more senior civil servant positions in the state apparatus, given that many of these were still appointed by the president (Informant 17). This was also noted by another interviewee, claiming that vice president Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad and a few others in the top leadership of the GNU were the only ones whom had benefitted from the GNU (Informant 14). This led to the perception among several respondents that there had not been a real change in the distribution of important administrative positions in the state apparatus – something that will be dealt with in more detail in the subsequent parts of this chapter.

When it comes to the intimidation and beatings of the opposition, the respondents noted a positive change. In Pemba, where the harassment of the opposition traditionally has been worse than in Unguja, the interviewees affiliated with CUF reported that the discrimination against CUF supporters had declined. A man employed in the Ministry of Health who had been previously active on the opposition side in Pemba, noted a positive change since the establishment of the GNU in 2010:

“There are changes, because the direct harassment to people is not there for the time being. Before, there was a direct harassment of some people, especially opposition supporters. But nowadays, since we have this Government of National Unity, we call it Seriakalia Moja Atikaifa, there is no direct harassment of people, especially not of opposition people” (Informant 9).

This view was also confirmed by a journalist working for Radio Micheweni in Pemba, noting that the harassment of CUF supporters in Pemba had declined after the introduction of the
GNU (Informant 12). Also a woman working for CUF’ Women’s Wing in Chake Chake, argued that the discrimination of the opposition had ceased after the introduction of the GNU (Informant 15). Moreover, all of the respondents affiliated with CUF noted that the discrimination and beatings of the opposition committed by the police had declined. This was also confirmed in an interview with an employee working for the Zanzibar Human Rights Centre, as she noted that human rights abuses now were of a more private than public character, meaning that there are fewer complaints regarding abuse and harassment of the people by the government (Informant 16). She also noted that discrimination in terms of access to tap water, as well as in which mosques you were welcome, were important issues that in pre-GNU years had been based on CUF and CCM membership. However, she argued that after the GNU came about, this discrimination was not as present as it had been in the past (Informant 16).

The effect of this was that people felt more comfortable expressing their opinions about the government without being afraid of retaliation of by the police. This was elaborated by several of the respondents, and one interviewee said the following:

“Now people can talk, they can say what they want and they can talk on the street, they can even sit together in one place and talk. But before, if you were meeting with three other people, the police would come and beat you and take you to the police office. But that has changed and it is one of the advantages of the GNU that we are enjoying now” (Informant 8).

Another respondent also noted an increased freedom:

“Another change is that people are free to speak. Also that is a positive change. Before the GNU, people could not speak; nobody had the freedom to say anything. But nowadays, people have the freedom to say what they want. This is very important. Before the GNU, if you said something, you would be jailed, you would be beaten. But nowadays it is not like that” (Informant 10).

Furthermore, most of the respondents seemed very willing to speak out about politics – something that several of them admitted to have been reluctant to do in the past. Illustratively, one respondent explained in an interview that one of the advantages of the GNU, in addition to peace and stability, was the increased freedom that the people enjoyed (Informant 9; Informant 18). When probing one of the interviewees by asking what kind of freedom he was talking about, his response was the following:

“I can say that all kind of freedom, including political, people they are free to speak compared to the past. Free to speak, they are free to invest compared to the past, because at that time those who were
allowed to invest should be the supporter or donor from the ruling side. But nowadays, everybody is allowed to invest” (Informant 9).

5.1.3. Security situation and violent upheavals

“But once CUF united with CCM in the Government of National Unity, CUF was so silent. Very silent.”

(Informant 9)

While the opposition in Zanzibar experienced less discrimination by the police in the first two years of the GNU, the isles were not free from political demonstrations and the attainment of demonstrators. The disappearance of the leader of a local non-governmental organization (NGO) Uamsho, Sheik Farid Hadi, in mid-October 2012 led to the outbreak of violent demonstrations in Unguja and more than 50 people were arrested as a result of the upsurge (BBC News 2012). Uamsho was particularly popular among unemployed and uneducated youth and proclaimed the message that they wanted Zanzibar to secede from the mainland (IRIN 2012). “Uamsho” means “awakening” in Swahili, and the NGO advocated that their purpose was to awake the people of Zanzibar. This was due to the perception among its members that the Zanzibari people had been asleep since the introduction of the GNU.

At the time when the interviews for this thesis were conducted, there was still a lot of uncertainty with regards to Uamsho’s sudden entrance into the political realm in Zanzibar. Given their call for secession and thus more autonomy for Zanzibar in the union with the mainland, it was argued that Uamsho was affiliated with CUF (IRIN 2012). There were diverging opinions about this among the interviewees (Informant 2; Informant 5; Informant 7). One interviewee reflected on this and argued that he did not think that Uamsho was from CUF as first vice president Maalim Seif also had supported the detainment of Uamsho:

“Because if they are from CUF, the first vice president Maalim Seif can say something about it. But until now, he has said nothing about the detainment. So I don't believe that they are from CUF. Because Maalim Seif can say: "Leave these people - why did you arrest these people?!" But he said nothing about that” (Informant 10).

Furthermore, several respondents emphasized that Uamsho had followers among CUF and CCM supporters alike. As such, the detainment of Uamsho was not understood as an attack on CUF supporters, but rather as a signal that the political leadership wanted to silence any threat to the peace that was installed after the GNU came about:
The Zanzibar government resists another formation of the union; they resist giving more power to the government of Zanzibar. So they thought that Uamsho are creating some kind of awareness to the people of Zanzibar. If we let them proclaim their views, they will be a disadvantage to the government, and that is why they decided to arrest them” (Informant 9).

However, the uprising of Uamsho as a politically active movement did not occur in a vacuum. Throughout the interviews it was indicated that the emergence of Uamsho in the political realm, possibly happened because of the inclusion of CUF in the GNU. After being included in the GNU, CUF had become less outspoken on the issue of the Union question than it had been in the past. One respondent said the following when asked about Uamsho:

“The purpose of Uamsho to engage in political life was to protect Zanzibar as well as CUF, the opposition party before this GNU. They are the one who are the speakers of the Zanzibar people. They are standing still to say everything to the people in Zanzibar. But once CUF united with CCM in the Government of National Unity, CUF was so silent. Very silent. Then people created other means, who will speak for us if CUF are not speaking anymore. Then Uamsho took advantage of that, to speak for the Zanzibar people. Because CUF they are not saying anything anymore. That is the reason why Uamsho decided to engage in the political life” (Informant 9).

As such, it is likely to assume that Uamsho utilised the political vacuum that arose (Informant 3). The notion that there is need for a different structure of the union government where Zanzibar remains as a semi-autonomous part of Tanzania is receiving increasing support in Zanzibar. Thus, Uamsho feed one of the dominating narratives that have existed in Zanzibar for many years equating everything that comes from the mainland as something harmful to life and society in Zanzibar. So while not all are supportive of the means used in order to advocate this message, many people both within CUF and CCM support Uamsho’s statement of requiring more autonomy for Zanzibar.

Furthermore, several of the informants based in Pemba argued that Uamsho received a lot of support from the local community (Informant 9; Informant 10). Uamsho is a Muslim based organisation, and as the majority of the population in Zanzibar are Muslim they receive a lot of support due to a shared religious identity. In addition, several of the respondents were positive towards Uamsho and argued that Uamsho was working for the benefit of the people of Zanzibar. Furthermore, they expressed criticism towards the grounds on which the government had attained them (Informant 13). Thus, despite the disturbance of the peace and stability that the people had enjoyed since the introduction of the GNU, the support Uamsho
received in the local community is likely linked to Uamsho’s main message that they wanted more self-determination for Zanzibar.

It should be noted, however, that most of the interviewees that were willing to talk about Uamsho were supporters of CUF. As most CUF supporters want a different structure of the Union with the mainland, this may account for why they were positive towards Uamsho’s claim for secession. Thus, this perception of the Uamsho may suffer from bias. Nevertheless, the emergence of Uamsho in the political life in Zanzibar gives a good indication of the existing sentiments in Zanzibar with regard to the request for a different organisation of the current state. Some interviewees also interpreted the silencing of Uamsho as a sign that the GNU was willing to use force to shut down any perceived threat to the peace and stability that had been installed (Informant 8; Informant 17; Informant 18).

5.2. The short-term effects of the GNU on democracy

Following from the previous sections, despite the violent instigations taking place in 2012, the GNU in Zanzibar seemed to have had some positive effects on peace and stability in the isles. The following will present some findings deriving from the interviews in order to assess the short-term effects of the GNU on the consolidation of the democratic system. The indicators include how the implementation of the GNU was perceived as well as how the respondents view the distribution of power post-GNU.

5.2.1. The functioning of the GNU

“The members of the House of Representatives are now speaking out, not as a member of a political party, but as a citizen of Zanzibar.”

(Informant 16)

The interviews included questions regarding the implementation of the GNU and how it worked in practice. Several of the respondents were content with the GNU, having a government representing both CCM and CUF. One respondent noted the following:

“But also the good thing about this GNU is that people have a government where CUF and CCM sit together, and if they want to pass anything, they will pass it together. They make a vote, and that vote is not only from CCM or from CUF. All together as they joined to make decision on whether to agree or disagree. This one is important, because before it was not like that” (Informant 8).
The respondents also expressed a perception of the government being more transparent than in the past. One respondent argued that more issues were being brought forward to the population than in the past and that people received more information than they did prior to the establishment of the GNU (Informant 17). Several other respondents confirmed this when asked about the advantages of the GNU on the political life in Zanzibar. One respondent reported the following:

“It is more transparent than before in the House of Representatives, where both CCM and CUF are represented and where you no longer can see the difference like before in that they provide more of a check and balance now that both parties are in the House of Representatives. They speak the same language and half of them are speaking out on issues that are difficult to speak out about and support things that are difficult to support” (Informant 16).

When asked for an example, the interviewee mentioned several backbenchers in the House of Representatives from CCM that in the past had opposed any suggestion coming from the opposition. However, after the GNU she noted that several of them had become more constructive in the House of Representatives and were now “speaking out, not as a member of a political party, but as a citizen of Zanzibar” (Informant 16). When probed about the reason for this change the interviewee responded that the GNU had “provided truth and transparency. They have to go with the wind and the citizens”. This was also confirmed by another interviewee: “Now, CUF and CCM supporters are together in most ways, even in the House of Representatives they discuss the matters of the government together without seeing any difference between them” (Informant 15). These responses are in line with Matheson (2012: 592) analysis of the GNU, arguing that the GNU led to political pluralism and improvement of the democratic environment as the members of the House of Representatives became more constructive compared to the past. Furthermore, this contradicts the argument that power-sharing always leads to states not being responsive to the needs of the citizenry (Sriram and Zahar 2009:12).

However, some interviewees claimed that there had been internal discontent in the GNU and that one should not underestimate the challenges related to the practicalities in the running of the government (Informant 3). As political power-sharing in practice means that two or more contending parties are forced to collaborate in a joint government, it would be rather surprising if the running of a power-sharing government was free from any internal friction. As the GNU was the first coalition government in Zanzibar since the re-introduction of the multi-party system in 1992, cooperation across political parties is also something new. As
such, the observation that the backbenchers were perceived as working jointly together at the
time of the interviews, including the increased freedom of speech as mentioned in the
previous section, indicate that the GNU had some short-term positive effects on the
democratic system in Zanzibar.

5.2.3. Power-sharing or position-sharing?

The GNU is a terminology. But in practice, everything remains as before.

(Informant 18)

An interesting finding from the interviews was that most of the respondents were critical
towards the GNU only being implemented in the top leadership of the government; they
criticized the GNU for not including a reallocation of positions between the two parties in
civil servant positions in the state apparatus. While most noted that it was a positive change
that CUF was included in the government through the GNU, they also noted that most of the
Regional and District Commissioners were still from CCM. They argued that this was a
weakness as the power-sharing remained primarily on the top-level, whereas the distribution
of power on district and regional levels remained the same. Furthermore, the appointment of
these senior civil servant positions were still largely in the hands of the President of Zanzibar,
who represents CCM (Informant 2; Informant 8; Informant 11; Informant 14). This was
elaborated by one of the other interviewees:

And what I have seen myself, a big problem is that they just decided to share the political post, like the
presidential posts; we have a president, a first vice president and second vice president. And then we
have the ministers, and they share the political posts, like the minister and the deputy ministers. But, if
you look for other areas, which myself I can say are the most important areas, like regional
commissioners, principal secretaries, directors, district commissioners, they are all just standing on
one side; on CCM side”  (Informant 9).

In addition to the Regional and District Commissioners, the respondents argued that it was a
weakness that the local leaders, known as Shehas, were also still mostly from CCM. The
Shehas function as the link between the people and the lower houses of government and has
substantial power in many aspects, such as the access to ZAN IDs. There was a perception
among the respondents that having Shehas that knowingly were affiliated with CCM was a
weakness, as it could make people refrain from bringing up issues before the Sheha
(Informant 8, Informant 14). One interviewee said the following in this respect:
“So all the Shehas are from CCM, no Sheha is coming from CUF. And because they are from CCM, if you want something from the Sheha, he is going to look for whether you are CCM or CUF. The Sheha knows which political party you are supporting; they know if you are CCM or CUF. And everything here must go to the Sheha first. And the Sheha will say: "No, this is ours." This is ours because he is from CCM. And if you are from CCM, you will get this position. But if they know that you are from CUF, they will not give you the position” (Informant 10).

Consequently, there was a widespread view that the power-sharing also should include lower-level government positions (Informant 12; Informant 14; Informant 13; Informant 2).

The issue of the uneven distribution of positions in lower level of the state apparatus is linked to the perception of the distribution of power in the GNU – something that was raised as a concern among several of the interviewees. A paralegal and teacher in Wete, Pemba, said the following when asked about the implications of not implementing the GNU in the lower levels of government:

“It affects the GNU, because some people say that it seems like CCM is still in power, because there are only a few ministers from CUF, and no other people who have higher position. So there is discrimination also under the GNU. But if there are some regional commissioners from CUF, or district commissioners from CUF, things would be equal” (Informant 10).

The discontent with regards to the distribution of power might be related to the lack of information about how the GNU would be implemented in advance of the referendum. As presented in the background chapter, the phrasing of the question posed in the referendum was; “Do you accept the new Government structure after the General Elections 2010?”. This question assumes a fully informed electorate – both when it comes to the current government structure and the one to be installed after the general elections. However, at the time of the referendum, not even the CUF knew what the GNU would mean in practice, as this was yet to be decided by the House of Representatives (Bakari and Makulilo 2012). This makes it plausible to question whether the awareness campaigns held in advance of the referendum were sufficient in providing the public with adequate information about the current government structure as well as the one the voters would accept after the general elections. As such, the public was voting for the unknown, as nobody were able to tell what a ‘Yes’ vote would mean in practice.

The lack of distribution of positions in the lower levels of government may be interpreted as an indication to the GNU being too much focused on the political elite. According to Sisk and Stefes (2005) this is one of the challenges with political power-sharing, as it often fails to
materialize into other more informal forms of power-sharing – something which is considered to increase the likelihood of success.

Moreover, several of the informants responded that it was reason to question the degree to which one could call the GNU a power-sharing arrangement, as the majority of the power was still in the hands of President Dr. Shein, representing CCM.

“But, still there is a problem because if you look for the government, although the opposition and the ruling party have decided to be together, the power is still on one side compared to the other. The power is within the ruling party” (Informant 9).

This was also noted by several other respondents arguing that the First Vice President, Mr. Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad from CUF, had little power compared to the Second Vice President from CCM, and thus that there had been little change in the distribution of power between the two parties (Informant 19). One respondent said the following:

“CUF got some ministers, but they don't have any power. They don't have any authority to say anything. What the GNU decides is in the hands of CCM. Especially the President. People always say that Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad, the first vice president, is an advisor, and he is not making any final decisions. The decisions are made by the president, and everything is done by CCM. But whatever the first vice president says, it is not taken into account anymore. That means, that the GNU is only by name. There is no government of national unity. The GNU is there by name, but it is not functioning at all” (Informant 7).

Other respondents echoed this as well, and a paralegal situated in Wete, Pemba pointed out the following to illustrate what he considered to be one of the challenges regarding GNU:

“Despite that some of the ministers come from the opposition party CUF, no other leaders are from the CUF. The first vice president of the GNU, is Maalim Seif, from CUF. The second vice president is from CCM. But the responsibility that Maalim Seif has is very limited. We didn't expect that actually. Because most of the important decisions are made by the second vice president and the president that are both from CCM” (Informant 10).

Furthermore, the respondents argued that it was questionable whether power-sharing was a sound description of the GNU and argued that a more precise description of the GNU was position-sharing (Informant 19). The disappointment of the lack of implementation of the GNU in the lower houses of government and the unequal distribution of power in the GNU are severe challenges that can potentially threaten peace and democracy in the isles. One plausible consequence is that it leaves the opposition with the impression that there will be no real changes to the political system through electoral procedures. Furthermore, the uneven
distribution of actual power may be read as a signal that it is only the top political leadership that benefits from the GNU.

**5.3. Long-term effects**

While the foregoing sections have focused on the effects of the GNU on peace and democracy in the first two years of the GNU, this section will include an assessment of the prospect for GNU as a durable solution to the political conflict in Zanzibar. This will include findings on the challenges associated with the GNU’s inability to sufficiently increase the standard of living for the population in the isles brought up in the interviews. Furthermore, it will include an assessment of the internal challenges that the GNU faced at the time of the interviews and how it dealt with the political parties divided opinions with regards to Zanzibar’s status as semi-autonomous in the union with the mainland. It will also rely on secondary data to assess the 2015 Zanzibar presidential elections. Combined these indicators will be used to analyse the degree to which the GNU might be understood as a durable solution to the political conflict in Zanzibar.

**5.3.1. Economic development**

“We thought the GNU would provide more opportunities and a better life, but life is still hard.”

(Informant 18)

The interview guide included open-ended questions with regards to the challenges associated with the GNU, and in what respect the GNU had not succeeded. This question led to some interesting responses, especially in terms of economic opportunities and standard of living in Zanzibar. Several of the interviewees emphasized that while they were content with the way in which the GNU had led to peace between the two political camps, it had failed to improve the standard of living for the general population of in the isles. One respondent noted the following: “Another challenge is that the people or the society expected a good life under the GNU. Their expectation was that the GNU would develop our economy, our life” (Informant 2). However, the respondents emphasized that the improvement of the living conditions were yet to come, and as such, the GNU had failed to fulfil the expectations of some people:
"I expected that with the GNU, life would be good. That life would be cheaper. But life is still expensive. Everything is hard, actually life is very hard. Even though there are some changes to the salaries, it is not enough.” (Informant 10).

The high expectations with regards to what the GNU would accomplish may be related to the campaigning in advance of the referendum. In fact, campaigning was prohibited on the grounds that the referendum was for the people and political party interests should not interfere with the opinion of the public. However, ‘Yes’-campaigns were openly executed, whereas the ‘No’-campaign largely took place underground. Furthermore, there were strong signals from the political leadership that voting for the establishment of the GNU was the same as voting for peace and development, whereas voting against it had negative connotations of conflict and violence (Bakari and Makulilo 2012:204). While the political parties did not take an official stance on the question of whether a GNU should be established, several key political figures openly supported a ‘Yes’ vote in the referendum (ibid). This is likely to have led to high expectations with respect to what the GNU would be able accomplish. For the people the GNU represented a hope for change in Zanzibar’s political life that would also affect people’s everyday life. The public seemingly interpreted this as a promise of increased standards of living once the GNU had been established (Informant 2). However, one respondent argued that this was beyond the aim of the GNU:

“People they thought, that because we have the GNU the money will come in our pockets, people thought that because we have the GNU the job will be easy. People thought if we have GNU, we will leave the door open when we sleep in the house. That is not the aim of GNU” (Informant 5).

While the main purpose of the GNU was to ensure peace and stability in the isles, the standard of living is not irrelevant for the perceived successfulness of the GNU. At best, the inability to bring about real changes to the inhabitants in Zanzibar may decrease the legitimacy of the GNU. At worst, it could lead to frustration and increased levels of tension, especially given the high levels of unemployed youth in Zanzibar.

5.3.2. The “Union question”

“If this is a Union, where is the government of Tanganyika? It is fused with the Union.”

(Informant 20)
Several of the respondents also noted that there were challenges within the GNU. For instance, the leader of the CUF Youth Wing in Stone Town argued that the GNU was not as united as it had been from the onset (Informant 2). In particular, the respondent argued that it was the question over the Union structure with the mainland that was the source of these internal challenges. This was also confirmed by other interviewees (Informant 3; Informant 18; Informant 19). As previously mentioned, CCM and CUF have traditionally proclaimed different stands regarding what is often termed the “Union question”. While CCM traditionally have proclaimed its support for the current two-tiered government structure, CUF have been in favour of a three-tiered government structure, or a contract-based union. A typical CUF statement in this respect would be: “If this is a Union, where is the government of Tanganyika? It is fused with the Union” (Informant 20).

At the time when the fieldwork was conducted Tanzania was in the middle of a process reviewing the Union Constitution. A Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) was appointed by the president of Tanzania with the purpose of collecting the views of the Tanzanian population on the new constitution in April 2012 (Collord 2014). The process of reviewing the constitution had a flying start and it was widely perceived that the CRC consisted of individuals that could remain neutral in the reviewing process (ibid). Furthermore, the initial phases of the Constitutional Review were highly participatory with a strong focus on the citizens’ opinions about the constitution (Tronvoll 2014:5). In Zanzibar, as well as in the mainland, the “Union question” was the most central issue in the discussions, often overshadowing other important issues in the debates. During the time when the CRC gathered the views in Zanzibar, the political leadership in the GNU would remain silent about the “Union question” when representing the government in public. However, they would have political rallies where the proclaimed the official stance of the party (Informant 1; Informant 18; Informant 19). One informant said the following:

“The political leadership does not talk that much in public about the union question, but in private party rallies, they do talk about these matters. The CCM wants the two-tiered government structure, while CUF wants a three-tiered structure. Either way there is going to be some changes” (Informant 20).

The people were educated about the union structure through pamphlets, brochures as well as awareness campaigns (Informant 16). Some of these were considered unbiased and the main purpose was to inform about the constitution and that the CRC would gather the views from
the people on the constitution (Informant 1; Informant 3; Informant 16). However, many of the interviewees admitted that they knew little about both the current constitution as well as what the alternatives would entail in practice (Informant 7; Informant 15; Informant 18). Furthermore, many argued that the people’s opinion about the Union was often in accordance with the political party they were affiliated with. Consequently, one of the respondents said the following regarding this:

> Actually, the people don’t have any information about the constitution. What they do, is that they follow their leaders. There are only a few people who know about the constitution - the educated people. But most of the people follow their political leaders. So if you are a CUF member, you will listen to Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad, and he will say that we need three governments. And on the other side, CCM, and their leaders say, ‘no we need two’. But they don’t know anything about the constitution. Even when you ask them what is in the constitution they will say; ‘we don’t know.’ And if you ask them: ‘What are your recommendations for the union structure?’ They will say, ‘we need two’, those from the CCM, because their leaders say that we need two. And those who are from CUF, they say, we need three, because Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad says we need three (Informant 10).

Whereas this study does not include a comprehensive review of the constitutional review process in Tanzania, the data gathered throughout the interviews indicate that the GNU did not enable the political camps to arrive at a common stance on the “Union question”. However, it is important to mention that not all CCM supporters are pro-status quo, and for instance Furthermore, one interviewee argued that there were several supporters of the three-tiered union structure also within CCM (Informant 8). This was also confirmed in an interview with an advisor working for a consultancy in Stone Town (Informant 19). He argued that one of the challenges to the GNU was the internal divisions within CCM regarding the union structure and the inability of the political leadership to reach a common ground.

This is echoed by Moss and Tronvoll (2015: 104-105), arguing that the constitutional review process in Tanzania has put the GNU in Zanzibar at a test. Furthermore, they argue that rather than increasing the division between CCM and CUF, CCM’s stand on retaining the current two-tiered government structure is pushing CCM supporters that are in favour of a different Union structure away from the party (Moss and Tronvoll 2015: 104-105). It seems unlikely that the two parties will be able to arrive at a common stance on the Union question, as the leaders of CCM have close linkages with the sister party in the mainland. The reluctance of CCM, both in the mainland and in Zanzibar, to let go of the political power was illustrated in the final stages of the constitutional review process. The second draft of the constitution, proposed by the CRC stipulated a three-tiered structure of the Union, with the
reestablishment of Tanganyika and Zanzibar as sovereign states, united in a federal union government. Additionally, it proposed that the Union matters should be reduced from covering 22 to only seven areas. However, the process stalled in the final stages as CCM’s political stance – due to CCM’s, both in Zanzibar and in the mainland, interest in remaining in the current structure of the Union (Collord 2014).

The dispute over the union structure and the inability of the GNU to reach a common stance on this issue, illustrates the challenges faced by CCM and CUF in reconciling in the most significant areas of disagreement. This can potentially serve as a threat to the GNU, but moreover the long-term stability in the isles, as it is uncertain how much longer the opposition is willing to be accept the authoritarian tendencies in the running of the state.

5.3.3. The General Elections 2015

“Whenever there is election, there is also hell.”

(Informant 10)

Certainly, the litmus test for the success of the GNU to produce peace and democracy is the election subsequent to the establishment of the GNU in 2010. The following elections in Zanzibar took place more than two years after the fieldwork was conducted. As such, no first hand data was collected on this matter. However, including information about the electoral process is important in order to assess the long-term effects on the consolidation of peace and democracy in Zanzibar. Consequently, the thesis relies on secondary data in order to include this aspect in the analysis.

The 2015 General Elections in both Tanzania and Zanzibar were held the 25th of October. The campaigns leading up to the election day were peacefully conducted and elections observers deemed the voting procedures to have been conducted professionally, peacefully and in a fair and free manner (TEMCO Election Observation Mission 2015:16). However, in the subsequent days to the election the Chairman of ZEC, Mr. Jecha Salim Jecha, declared an annulment of the election results. By the time of the declaration the presidential results from merely 21 of the 54 constituencies in Zanzibar had been announced. The annulment was declared on the grounds of “irregularities and gross violation of laws and election
regulations” (TEMCO Election Observation Mission 2015:16). The annulment came after CUF, had declared their victory in the morning after the election, the 26th of October 2015 based on unofficial figures. Shortly after Mr. Seif Shariff declared that he was ready to form a cabinet consisting of both CUF and CCM members, as according to the constitutional amendments accommodating the establishment of the GNU in 2010 (Ali 2015). International observers, who had also deemed the election free and fair with no major infringements, have supported the view of CUF and urged the ruling party to accept and release the results of the general elections (Kabendera 2016). Adding further suspicion towards the intent of ZEC: only the Zanzibar presidential elections that were annulled, whereas the Union election held at the same time was not annulled (Benjaminsen 2016).

This led to several talks between the political leadership of CCM and CUF to end the stalemate. The first talks between the sitting President, Ali Mohammed Shein, and the leader of the opposition, Seif Shariff Hamad, to solve the political crisis commenced the 9th of November at the State House in Zanzibar. In addition, the former presidents Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Amani Abeid Karume attended the closed-door meeting (Said 2015a). The 11th of November former President Dr. Salim Amour Juma joined the talks (Said 2015b). Despite the talks between the political leadership in Zanzibar and the international pressure CCM still urged for a new election to be held, whereas CUF claim they rightfully won the 2015 presidential elections and advocated that ZEC should release the results from the election (Fischer 2016).

In the aftermath of the annulment of the elections the international community expressed its concern regarding the reluctance to release the results from the general elections, and also expressed fear that the political impasse could lead to instability and violence in the isles (Kabendera 2016). After the annulment of the election the situation was growing tense in Zanzibar. There have been several reports of harassment and detainment of members of the opposition as well as journalists (Benjaminsen 2016). In addition, there were several instances of both CCM and CUF party offices set on fire (Wanjiru 2016). As a protest towards the annulment, the opposition urged its supporters to boycott the rerun of the election (Wanjiru 2016). However, at the same time, the CUF leadership urged the opposition to remain calm during the re-run (Benjaminsen 2016). Sunday 20th of March 2016, a new election was conducted in Zanzibar and due to the opposition’s boycott, the sitting President Shein received 91.4% of the total votes cast (Majaliwa 2016). The second largest party was
the Alliance for Democratic Change (ADC) and its candidate, Mr. Hamad Rashid Mohamed, got 3% of the votes (Majaliwa 2016). While there were fears among international observers that the new round of election would lead to violent demonstrations, the situation in Zanzibar remained nervous, but calm. This can plausibly be related the people following the Seif Shariff Hamad’s call to remain calm, as well as the strong military and police presence in isles (Benjaminsen 2016).

Meanwhile, the current President of Tanzania, Mr. John Magufuli, remained silent on the political situation in Zanzibar – in fact also silencing the Dar Es Salaam based newspaper Mawio by shutting it down after writing critical articles about the situation in the isles (Benjaminsen 2016). Furthermore, when asked to mediate in the conflict between CCM and CUF in Zanzibar, the President’s response was that he did not want to interfere with Zanzibar’s internal matters (ibid). However, at the same time he is responsible for the heavy presence of the police and military personnel in Zanzibar (ibid). The election in 2015 shows serious irregularities in how it was handled by the CCM leadership and its affiliated ZEC. As such, these data shows little evidence of change in terms of electoral procedures. Thus, there is reason to ask whether the GNU was sufficient in improving the democratic practices in Zanzibar.

5.3. Discussion of long-term effects

Regarding the long-term effects of the GNU on peace and democracy, the data presented above indicate that there have been limited improvements in how people perceive their economic situation. Further, the data shows the challenges faced by parties to reach a common stance on the “Union question”, which indicate that the GNU was not able to unite the parties on this important matter. Finally, the misconduct of the 2015 elections in Zanzibar indicates that little has changed when it comes to implementing democratic norms and practices. This section of the chapter will discuss these challenges in further depth and link them to the relevant literature.

Firstly, as the data shows the respondents were disappointed with the GNU’s reportedly inability to increase the standard of living in the local communities. One might question whether the inability of the GNU to increase the standard of living for the population in Zanzibar is a relevant critique of whether the GNU was successful or not as this was not the
main purpose of installing the GNU. However, this thesis argues that while economic development per se may not be a criterion of the successfulness of the GNU, it may indirectly affect the people’s perception of the legitimacy of the government and its effectiveness in bringing about positive change. Distrust in the government is a potential threat, and thus, one can argue that the people’s demands should be taken seriously. This follows Mpangala’s (2006) line of thought, arguing that in order to arrive at a durable solution to the conflict in Zanzibar there is need for a democratic system that moves beyond the liberal democratic model, thus; “socio-economic development should be at the centre of the process of building democracy” (Mpangala 2006: 68). Furthermore, as outlined in the background chapter, the lack of development in certain regions in Zanzibar, has been a source of discontent with the government. As such, the inability to change the lives of people to the better, might serve as a threat to the stability in the isles. However, given the political history in Zanzibar, there is little that indicates that the inability to immediately increase the standard of living alone will serve as a threat to the stability in the isles. As the data shows, the members in the House of Representatives were more constructive than they had been in the past and people enjoyed more freedom of speech. In addition, the social relations on community level improved substantially under the GNU. This is likely to mitigate the risk of not being able to increase the standards of living to a satisfactory level in the first two years of the GNU’s functioning.

Secondly, the GNU was able to bring about some positive changes in the functioning of the House of Representatives as the two political parties collaborated more constructively under the GNU than what they had done in the past. However, the inability to arrive at a shared standing on the “Union question” sends a signal that the two political parties faced challenges in deal with one of the most important aspects contestation between the parties. The constitutional review process further demonstrated that the CCM, in the mainland as well as Zanzibar, is averse to the idea of granting Zanzibar more self-determination. CCM Zanzibar fears that a three-tiered government structure of the Union will diminish its support base, and jeopardize its political position as the ruling power. This is at the core of the political debate in Zanzibar, and the strong linkages between CCM mainland and CCM Zanzibar is demonstrated in the unwillingness of Union President, Mr. John Magufuli to interfere with the misconduct of the 2015 elections in Zanzibar.

Thirdly, assessing the effects of the GNU on long-term peace is interesting in light of the conduct of the 2015 elections in Zanzibar. Historically, the conflict between the two parties
has intensified during most of the previous elections. However, during the 2015 election the international observers were surprised that the irregularities in the election did not develop into more violent demonstrations. Seif Hamad Shariff’s call to remain calm might be interpreted as signal that the opposition is willing to exhaust other peaceful means to solve the conflict. The GNU might have played a vital role in this, as the parties had time to build a more robust relationship and improve the political climate prior to the 2015 election. However, the misconduct had some negative effects on the security situation in the isles, demonstrated by the frequent human rights abuses in the run up to the re-run of the election in March 2016.

The annulment of the results from the 2015 elections symbolizes a new turn in the history of elections in Zanzibar. As previously described, allegations of misconduct of the elections is nothing new in this context. Outlined in more depth in the background chapter, the ZEC annulled the election results in 1995 on the grounds of irregularities, however dropped the call for a rerun of the elections when the results showed that CCM had won the election (Anglin 2000:43). In all previous elections, except the one held in 2010, the opposing party has put forward allegations of misconduct. Consequently, CUF has consistently argued that the ruling party has stolen their victory. Given that both TEMCO Election Observation Mission (2015) and international observers have deemed the electoral process as well as the conduct of the election on the election day free and fair, it is not an unlikely scenario that CCM in fact lost the 2015 election and that they are refusing to accept these results as this would imply that they would step down from power. Further, the data might sends strong signals that CCM still controls the ZEC, and that they are willing to do whatever it takes to remain in power. CCM’s reluctance to leave office, make it questionable whether the party is ready to take the necessary steps to ensure that democratic norms and rules are abided to.

As mentioned in the background chapter to this thesis, the conflict between the two political parties in Zanzibar has been over the electoral procedures as well as the “Union question”. As the GNU was incapable of addressing the causes to the conflict, this stipulates that the power-sharing in Zanzibar may be read as a pause to the conflict, rather than a solution. This is similar to the argument held by Cheeseman and Tendi (2010), claiming that political power-sharing runs the risk of putting the conflict on hold rather than solving the conflict.
To summarize, while the long-term effects of the GNU on peace still remains to be seen, the turns of events in the isles in relation to the elections, indicate that political power-sharing in Zanzibar was not sufficient in hampering a new round of irregular election. This is closely linked to the inability of the GNU to address some of the main causes to the conflict, most importantly ensuring the necessary electoral reforms in order to guarantee a legitimate and fair holding of elections.

5.4. Concluding remarks

This chapter has presented the main findings from the fieldwork conducted in Zanzibar in January and February 2013 and analysed the GNU’s short-term effects on peace and democracy in Zanzibar. Further, it has analysed the plausibility of the GNU in consolidating long-term peace and democracy by including findings on the challenges associated with the GNU gathered throughout the fieldwork, as well as assessing the 2015 elections in Zanzibar based on secondary sources of information. Furthermore, it has discussed the main findings in light of relevant theory. The following, concluding chapter will present the main findings from the analysis and some suggestions for further research as an implication of this study.
6.0. Summary and Concluding Remarks

Power-sharing has become an increasingly employed strategy to end conflicts in societies that are deeply divided. As this thesis has shown, there are diverging conclusions when it comes to power-sharing’s ability to bring about the intended effects. As such, more information about the effects of power-sharing on peace and democracy is required to grasp under what conditions the strategy is likely to be successful.

This thesis has analysed the inclusion of political power-sharing in conflict resolution in Zanzibar by answering the following research question: “What were the short-term effects of political power-sharing in Zanzibar on peace and democracy, and what longer-term effects did the GNU have on the consolidation of both peace and democracy?” By answering these questions, the thesis has analysed the extent to which power-sharing was a viable conflict management tool in Zanzibar.

In this concluding chapter the thesis will summarize the main findings and relate these to the research questions as well as assessing how they communicate with the overall literature on the use of power-sharing in conflict resolution. Secondly, it will present other factors not included in this thesis that may also function as explanations of the performance of the GNU in Zanzibar. Finally, the thesis will discuss the relevance of the case of power-sharing in Zanzibar by assessing the transferability of the case to other contexts.

6.1. Summary of findings

After the establishment of the GNU several scholars have been positive towards the implication of the GNU on the consolidation of peace and democracy in the Zanzibar isles (Matheson 2012; Nassor and Jose 2014). Matheson (2012:591) argues that the GNU “improved both democratic practices and community relations”. This is partially in accordance with the main findings from this study.
First, this thesis will argue that the establishment of the GNU had some positive short-term effects on peace and stability in the isles. The findings show that after the instalment of the GNU up until the time of the fieldwork for this thesis, Zanzibaris experienced an improvement in the social relationships on community level between supporters of CCM and CUF. Secondly, the opposition experienced less discrimination in terms of access to ZAN IDs, as well as a decline in intimidation by the police. This led to increased freedom of speech and people felt free to talk openly about the political challenges in Zanzibar without the fear of retaliation, both in Unguja and Pemba. However, discrimination in terms of employment opportunities in the public sector remained an issue. Furthermore, the detainment of the NGO Uamsho in 2012 threatened the notion that the government was ready for public demonstrations on the “Union question”, and sent signals to the population that any threat to the peace that had been installed would be silenced.

In terms of short-term effects on the consolidation of the democratic system, the findings are diverging. One the one hand, the findings indicate that the political parties in the GNU worked relatively well together and that the performance in the House of Representatives was more constructive than it had been in the past. On the other hand, many were critical with regards to the implementation of the GNU, given that the sharing of positions had primarily been implemented in the top leadership of the government. Consequently, lower level governmental positions were still controlled by CCM. These included inter alia the Regional Commissioners, District Commissioners and Shehas. Coupled with the impression that CUF in reality had limited power in the GNU, the perception among most of the interviewees was that the GNU had failed to bring about real changes to in the distribution of power in Zanzibar.

The findings on the longer-term effects of the GNU on peace and democracy may indicate that the GNU failed in serving as durable solution able to foster peace and democracy in Zanzibar. Firstly, the GNU suffered from internal divisions in the “Union question”. This was particularly evident in the constitutional review debate, as the two political parties failed to come to a shared standing on the issue. Secondly, the inability of the GNU to bring about satisfactory changes in the standard of living was perceived as potentially threatening to the legitimacy of the GNU. As the ‘yes’-campaign in advance of the referendum conducted prior to the GNU proclaimed that a yes for the GNU was a yes for peace and development, the inability of the GNU to increase the standard of living could potentially degrade the public
opinion about the power-sharing institution. Finally, the annulment and rerun of the 2015 Presidential elections in Zanzibar demonstrate the shortcomings of power-sharing in serving as a durable solution to the political conflict in Zanzibar. The inability of dealing with the underlying issues to the conflict and the unwillingness of CCM to abide to democratic norms and practices demonstrate the limitation of the GNU to foster a more democratic culture. The annulment and the rerun of the October 2015 elections may be interpreted as a sign that the GNU was a mere pause in the conflict between CCM and CUF.

6.2. Other factors influencing the GNU in Zanzibar

There are other factors that may well have been included in this study in order to broaden the perspective and deepening the analysis of the effects of the GNU. The limited scope of this thesis did, however, not allow for an inclusion of e.g. interviews with representatives from the mainland that could have helped explain the mainland influence in Zanzibar. Furthermore, it does not include the United Republic of Tanzania’s international relations and how this may affect its actions in relation to Zanzibar.

One might ask if there are other factors that can help explain why the GNU did not succeed to create a milieu where a free and fair election could take place. As outlined more in depth in the third chapter to this thesis, other forms of power-sharing arrangements, such as military power-sharing and territorial power-sharing, are increasing the likelihood of enduring peace (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Martin 2013). Political power-sharing is assumed less costly than other forms of power-sharing, and as such scholars argue that this reflects a lower degree of commitment on the behalf of the contending parties. As such, one might ask if power-sharing in Zanzibar would have proved more successful in the long-term if it also included other forms of power-sharing, such as ensuring employment of opposition supporters in the police and military in Zanzibar. Police and military services in Zanzibar are affiliated with CCM, and as such, ensuring the employment of opposition supporters could plausibly have increased the chance of the GNU to have enduring effects on the stability in the isles, as it would have raised the stakes for the CCM to distort the elections. Furthermore, it would have implied increased employment opportunities to the opposition supporters, and thus could have reduced the discontent with the government’s implementation of power-sharing. In relation to this, it is not unlikely that the absence of a third-party guarantor may have affected the outcome of the GNU. One might think that the mainland government may
well have served as a third-party guarantor, however, given its close linkages with CCM in Zanzibar it would hardly have been perceived as a neutral third-party.

Furthermore, commitment to solving the conflict was one of the main arguments outlined in the theoretical chapter. Aside other forms of power-sharing, some scholars also argue that a third party guarantor can help level out the commitment problem (Mehler 2009; Zahar 2009; Mattes and Savun 2009). However, the efforts to reconcile the political parties in the Muafakas included a third-party negotiator, but these efforts did not materialize in real changes to the political system. As outlined in the background chapter, the lack of commitment to the reconciliatory processes in the Muafakas has been argued to be one of the reasons why these were not successful in ending the conflict between the parties. The Maridhiano process was inherently different from the previous efforts to reconcile the parties as it happened through informal talks between the leadership of the political parties. Contrary, all of the Muafakas took place through formalized channels and the negotiations included the Secretary Generals from the respective parties (Bakari and Makulilo 2012: 199). It has been argued that the informal talks where the political parties engaged in direct negotiations was a sign of their real commitment to end the hostilities between the political parties.

**6.3. Broader relevance of the results**

In what way can the power-sharing in Zanzibar be used to shed light on other cases where power-sharing is installed? As mentioned in the methodological chapter of this thesis, case studies are less equipped to produce generic knowledge compared to statistical and comparative analysis. As such, this thesis will argue that the findings from this analysis cannot be used to produce generic knowledge about the relationship between power-sharing on the one hand and peace and democracy on the other. However, some of the findings might still be transferrable to other similar cases. What can be learned from the case of Zanzibar is that power-sharing is not per se the solution to political conflict. Whereas the GNU in Zanzibar was successful in immediately reducing the tension between the two political parties, it was not able to solve the root causes to the conflict. Consequently, in instances where power-sharing is considered a viable option to end conflict, the case of Zanzibar illustrates that sufficient measures need to be put in place to deal with the roots causes of the conflict.
6.4. The way forward for Zanzibar

*To know and to implement democracy, are two different things.*

(Informant 16)

The future of Zanzibar remains unclear at this point in time, and Zanzibar has yet to see a fully developed democratic system operating in the isles. As the findings from this thesis have shown, peace and democracy are strongly interlinked, and there are strong indications that a well-functioning democratic system is a necessary pre-condition for peace and stability in the isles. The prospect of achieving this in Zanzibar is contingent on the political leadership’s willingness to embrace democratic norms and practices, as well as implementing the necessary reforms of electoral procedures that can ensure a fair conduct of the elections. Furthermore, the GNU in Zanzibar demonstrates that power-sharing as a conflict management tool is not sufficient in its own. Had the implementation of the GNU been coupled with solving the root causes to the on-going conflict between CCM and CUF, the conclusion might have been different. The situation in Zanzibar at the time when this thesis is printed is fragilely calm. The future will hold whether the political impasse develops into violent turmoil or political reconciliation and reforms.
Bibliography


# Appendix 1 – List of Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant no.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
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<tr>
<td>Informant 1</td>
<td>Ally Abdullah Ally Saleh</td>
<td>Journalist, Constitutional Committee Member, Stone Town, Unguja</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>11.01.2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informant 2</td>
<td>Kalifa Abdalla Ali</td>
<td>General Secretary for CUF Youth Wing, Stone Town, Unguja</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>11.01.2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informant 3</td>
<td>Elisabeth Schwabe-Hansen</td>
<td>Senior Advisor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.01.2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informant 4</td>
<td>Abudalla Salama*</td>
<td>Shopkeeper, Stone Town, Unguja.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.01.2013</td>
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<td>Informant 5</td>
<td>Kalif Kassima*</td>
<td>Tourist guide, Stone Town</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.01.2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informant 6</td>
<td>Joseph Katembo*</td>
<td>Head of Department of Planning, Pemba</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>21.01.2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informant 7</td>
<td>Jumma Shehe Khalid</td>
<td>Farmer, Wete, Pemba.</td>
<td>21.01.2013</td>
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<td>Informant 8</td>
<td>Mohammed Ali</td>
<td>Business man, Dar es Salaam, Wete Pemba</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.01.2013</td>
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<td>Informant 9</td>
<td>Dr. Mohamed Mzee</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, Wete, Pemba</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>22.01.2013</td>
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<td>Informant 10</td>
<td>Salmin Kassim Hamad</td>
<td>Teacher and paralegal, Wete, Pemba</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>23.01.2013</td>
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<td>Informant 11</td>
<td>Omar Kalifía*</td>
<td>Chairperson CCM, Micheweni</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>23.01.2013</td>
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<td>Informant 12</td>
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<td>Radio Micheweni, Pemba</td>
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<td>Informant 14</td>
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<td>Teacher, Micheweni, Pemba</td>
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<td>Informant 15</td>
<td>Salama Fadi*</td>
<td>CUF Women’s Wing, Chake Chake, Pemba</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>25.01.2013</td>
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<td>Informant 16</td>
<td>Regina Hamad*</td>
<td>Advisor, Zanzibar Legal Service Centre, Stone Town, Unguja</td>
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<td>Informant 17</td>
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<td>Sterling Roop</td>
<td>Advisor, International Law and Policy Institute</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>07.02.2013</td>
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<td>Informant 20</td>
<td>Haji Fai Nhaali</td>
<td>Member of Revolutionary</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>07.02.2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informant 21</td>
<td>Issa Mohammed *</td>
<td>Director of information CUF</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>08.02.2013</td>
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*The request for anonymity has been complied with by using a substitute name. Thus, the name listed is not the interviewee’s real name.
Appendix 2 – Interview Guide

Introduce thesis and informed consent statement.

Background questions in relation to the respondents experience with politics in Zanzibar.

What was your reaction when you first heard about the Government of National Unity?

What was the general perception about the establishment of the Government of National Unity?

How is the relationship between CCM supporters and CUF supporters today compared to the past?

What are the benefits with the Government of National Unity in Zanzibar?

What changes did the Government of National Unity bring to Zanzibar? In terms of economy, political life, social relations?

What was your reaction to the emergence of Uamsho in the political realm in Zanzibar?

Do the opposition experience any discrimination by the government? (Do they experience harassment by the police, difficulties in attaining ZAN IDs or are they discriminated in terms of employment opportunities?)

What are the challenges with the Government of National Unity in Zanzibar?

How was the Government of National Unity implemented in Zanzibar?

How are the political parties collaborating in the Government of National Unity? (Distribution of power and positions in the government)

How is the Government of National Unity dealing with the different views on the Union structure?

How is the functioning of the Government of National Unity affected by the Constitutional Review?