’Helping them where?’

A critical discourse analysis of the Norwegian debate on burden-sharing following the Syrian refugee crisis

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Abstract

The Syrian refugee crisis has both highlighted the limitations of, and created new possibilities for, burden-sharing in refugee protection. This thesis conceptualises burden-sharing as an international norm. The implementation of international norms, however, depends upon domestic political processes, actors and structures. The thesis therefore conducts a critical discourse analysis of the Norwegian political field, until late September 2015. The analysis uncovers three dominant discourses in the political field - the humanitarian discourse, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, and the ‘nation-state’ discourse. These discourses take part in a ‘discursive battle’ over conflicting norms, meanings and values. The outcome of this battle, in turn, shapes the political space for burden-sharing. In particular, the hierarchical relationship between the different discourses has significant consequences for Norwegian burden-sharing initiatives. The thesis argues that the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse maintains discursive hegemony in the field. However, it also highlights aspects of discursive transformation as well as reproduction. As the humanitarian discourse gradually has been accorded a stronger role, actors who are largely identified by this discourse have attempted to transform the discursive structure and the political space for burden-sharing.

In terms of the Syrian crisis, the thesis argues that the discursive hegemony of the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse results in the priority of financial burden-sharing over physical burden-sharing initiatives, and a lack of political will to implement and develop innovative protection measures. Regarding future refugee crises, the findings imply that the Norwegian commitment to burden-sharing is likely to be greater when it comes to European initiatives than global initiatives. This is largely the consequence of a friction between the humanitarian discourse, which emphasises global and European solidarity alike, and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, which promotes a more cautious approach to burden-sharing. Significantly, they both attach value to Norway’s European identity. Finally, the findings highlight the need to develop more nuanced theoretical approaches addressing the complex relationship between international norms and national politics.
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And to Max - for all your love, support, and endless, endless patience.

The responsibility for any omissions or mistakes is mine alone.

Oslo, 13 December 2015

Linn Marie Reklev
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>CEAS</td>
<td>Common European Asylum System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Admissions Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>NOAS</td>
<td>Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers</td>
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1 Introduction

1.1 The Syrian refugee crisis

In 2011, pro-democracy protesters in Syria were targeted and killed by national security forces. The violence caused public outrage in many areas, and the situation gradually escalated. Opposition groups eventually took up arms, and after months of increasing political tension and violence, the Syrian civil war broke out. According to the UN, more than 250,000 people had been killed as of August 2015 (UN, 2015), and more than 7.6 million people internally displaced (IDMC, 2015). The situation has also had major implications for Syria’s neighbouring countries, as they have experienced a continuous mass influx of refugees. As of November 2015, there are more than 4 million Syrian refugees located in Syria’s nearby region, mainly in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Egypt (UNHCR, 2015a).

The severity of the crisis has led to a deteriorating situation for the Syrian refugees who remain in the region. Most of the refugee population is living in local communities, not in refugee camps. Rent is therefore a major expense. The livelihoods opportunities available are usually to be found in the informal sector, where the conditions are particularly bad. As a consequence, many Syrian refugees are living in extreme poverty, lacking access to basic services and health care (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2014; NRC, 2015; Philips, 2013). Children and young people are disproportionately affected, especially due to their lack of access to education both inside and outside the refugee camps. The NRC reports that in August 2015, more than three million Syrian refugee children were not attending school (Skarstein and Ayad, 2015). Furthermore, the refugees in the region are also negatively affected by the increasing financial difficulties of the international humanitarian system, which is continuously underfunded. These financial issues forced the World Food Programme to cut food assistance to 1.6 million Syrian refugees in the first half of 2015. They are still at risk of having to make further major cuts (Reuters, 2015). This desperate situation has consequently led many Syrian refugees to risk their lives by crossing the
Mediterranean on dangerous boat rides, often with the help of human smugglers, in search for a better life in Europe (UNHCR, 2015b). Moreover, the protection challenge in the region is further enhanced by the fact that few countries in the region have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention (Shiblak 1996: 38). This means that the refugees are not sufficiently protected by international judicial frameworks.

The crisis has also had a serious impact on neighbouring countries and regional stability. In Lebanon, Syrian refugees amount to a fifth of the entire population. This has serious consequences for infrastructure and an already challenging political situation (Jones and Shaheen, 2015). The crisis has caused rising unemployment, wages have decreased and the cost of food and public services has increased (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2014). The negative impact on host countries and local communities has led to tensions between the local population and the refugees, and to problems relating to the quality of refugee protection. Many Syrian refugees are only provided with a limited legal status, as host states are worried about increasingly strained public resources and services. For instance, in Jordan, the government has restricted the access of Syrian refugees to health care services (European Commission 2015a; Zetter and Ruaudel, 2014; Philips, 2013). Both Lebanon and Jordan have recently strengthened their border control, and incidents of refoulement and deportation of refugees are regularly reported (European Commission, 2015a). The Syrian conflict is considered today to be the “largest humanitarian crisis since World War II” (European Commission, 2015). It is therefore imperative to find international solutions to the immediate protection needs of the people affected, also beyond the region, to ensure that their rights and welfare are safeguarded, and at the same time ease the burden and prevent the region affected from facing serious destabilisation.

1.1.1 Response: Burden-sharing?

As a response to these circumstances, burden-sharing has been presented by the international community as a necessary part of the solution to the crisis. Syria’s neighbouring states are hosting an unsustainable share of the refugee ‘burden’. Other states must therefore also contribute. Burden-sharing initiatives including
resettlement, humanitarian admissions and financial aid have thus been implemented by states, often in cooperation with UNHCR. These initiatives aim to provide some relief to the countries in the region as well as to provide more effective protection to the refugees, through the support of third countries located outside of the region. Notably, burden-sharing has traditionally been a tentative principle in refugee protection. Even though scholars note that burden-sharing is an underlying principle of the 1951 Refugee Convention, there are still no specific formulae, rules or regulations for such burden-sharing initiatives (Feller 2006: 525). However, the exceptional circumstances caused by the Syrian refugee crisis have arguably created new possibilities for burden-sharing, as these initiatives have been crucial in the international response.

The question of burden-sharing in refugee protection also goes beyond the Syrian crisis. Overall, the world is experiencing a dramatic increase in displaced persons, both within and beyond the borders of their countries, as a consequence of conflict and humanitarian disasters. Nearly 60 million people across the world were displaced in 2015 (Skarstein, 2015). This number will likely continue to grow in the foreseeable future as long as political solutions are nowhere to be found. It is therefore imperative to find new and innovative policy solutions in refugee protection. Moreover, the Syrian case highlights how the negative consequences of displacement do not affect all countries equally. Rather, it is often developing countries that face the greatest challenges (Skarstein, 2015), which in turn can lead to further destabilisation and conflict. Enhanced burden-sharing between states could thus play an important, and necessary, role in the future of refugee protection.

1.2 Research question and objectives

This thesis will look at the relationship between burden-sharing as an international norm, promoted by the UNHCR and other international actors, and domestic policies and practice - in this case Norwegian refugee protection politics. More specifically, it aims to analyse the ‘downloading’ process of an international norm to a specific national context, which is characterised by domestic political contestation, processes
and institutions. How burden-sharing is interpreted and implemented is dependent upon the outcome of domestic political processes, not simply factors at the inter-state level. The thesis therefore addresses these national processes in depth, and analyses the domestic political discourses – and the power relations between them - that create the political space for burden-sharing in practice. Thus, the research question addressed in the thesis is stated as follows:

"What are the dominant discourses addressing burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway following the Syrian crisis? In what ways does the hierarchy between these discourses shape the political space - for action on this issue and, in the longer term, for burden-sharing in refugee protection?

In response to this research question, the thesis argues that the dominant discourses addressing burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway following the Syrian crisis are a humanitarian discourse, a ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, and a ‘nation-state’ discourse. It argues that the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse maintains discursive hegemony in the field, and thus provides the premises for the political debate on burden-sharing. However, as the crisis expanded and reached Europe’s borders in the time period up to late September 2015, the humanitarian discourse has been accorded a stronger role. In particular, grassroots movements in Norway have supported a humanitarian discourse that goes beyond party political divisions, and thus pushes to transform the boundaries of the discursive practice. These processes of discursive reproduction and transformation, and the power relations between the discourses in the field, have significant implications for Norwegian burden-sharing politics.

1.2.1. Scope and clarifications

Some clarifications must be made in the preface of this thesis. Firstly, as the Syrian refugee crisis has become more severe, many comparisons have been made in public forums between European countries and how many refugees each country has been willing to accept. This has led to many misunderstandings with regard to what type of protection measures have been put in place, and what states have and have not agreed

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to do. These misunderstandings have often occurred because it is common to compare the number of asylum seekers arriving in individual countries to the number of places that different countries have offered for resettlement, temporary protection and other special forms of protection measures. However, the number of asylum seekers arriving in each country is to an extent beyond the control of the individual country, although different political and social factors make some countries more appealing to asylum seekers than others. The special protection measures, on the other hand, are completely under the control of the country in question, and represent an explicit form of solidarity – with the refugees themselves, with countries that are experiencing a larger part of the refugee ‘burden’, or both. These latter forms of protection measures are part of what will be conceptualised in the thesis as burden-sharing initiatives. The discussions on asylum numbers will, however, still impact political actors in the field. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between these categories in order not to confuse ‘apples and oranges’ in the political debate.

As the Syrian refugee crisis has grown, in combination with large refugee and migrant flows from other countries, Europe has experienced its own crisis. Large influxes of refugees have been attempting to cross the borders of Europe for a long time, but the situation quickly exacerbated in August 2015. In consequence, European border countries such as Greece, Croatia, Hungary and the Balkans have experienced a mass arrival of refugees entering their countries. This has resulted in a debate on burden-sharing within Europe, at least within the EU, in the form of so-called relocation as well as burden-sharing between Syria’s neighbouring countries and third countries mostly located in Europe and North America. Hence, the discussion about burden-sharing in Norway is now centred around two different aspects, where one relates to global solidarity, and the other relates mainly to European solidarity specifically. These aspects of burden-sharing will be addressed in the thesis, as they are both essential parts of the Norwegian debate. Yet, they will be separated analytically.

Another research challenge is related to the issue of distinguishing the consequences of the Syrian refugee crisis specifically from other situations of conflict, poverty and
violence. The emerging refugee ‘crisis’ that the world - and in this context, Europe in particular - is not simply the result of large numbers of Syrian refugees. Rather, this is a complex composition of refugees and migrants from different countries of origin. Most political protection initiatives that are made must be seen in the context of this complete picture. This makes the research question posed in this thesis more challenging, since it demands an analytical separation between the Syrian refugee crisis and other refugee situations that is not always possible in practice. However, the Syrian crisis is the largest single refugee crisis in the world. Therefore, this specific situation arguably has particularly severe consequences, as well as an effect on actors’ perceptions of the crisis, which distinguishes it politically from other situations. Moreover, although some burden-sharing measures – notably, the European relocation schemes – do not distinguish Syrians from other refugees who are entitled to protection, most other initiatives, including resettlement and financial burden-sharing, can be directed specifically at the Syrian crisis. In this way it is still possible, at least to an extent, to separate the discursive practices and policy initiatives addressing the Syrian crisis specifically from more general initiatives.

1.2.1.1. Limitations
Like all research projects, this thesis has certain limitations. Firstly, it only addresses the Norwegian context. The ’downloading’ process of the burden-sharing norm specifically, and international norms more generally, may occur very differently – or very similarly - in other national contexts. Hence, the thesis simply aims to show that the implementation of burden-sharing in practice is dependent upon specific domestic factors, without aiming to provide more specific knowledge relating to these processes beyond the Norwegian context. Secondly, due to time and resource constraints, it has been necessary to delimit the empirical material with reference to a specific time period. I have chosen to limit the empirical focus of the second case, the “European crisis”, from mid-August to late September 2015, more specifically until the EU meeting in Luxembourg on 14 September. This time period also overlaps with the local election campaign in Norway. However, the field has been in constant development since the summer of 2015, and is likely to continue doing so after this
thesis is finished. In consequence, the thesis has some shortcomings in terms of addressing the most recent policy developments in the field. However, it still highlights some significant aspects of, and dynamics in, the field that remain relevant also as the field is changing.

1.3. Why ask this question?

The topic of the thesis is important for several reasons. Arguably, this research project contributes to the field on the theoretical level as well as the policy level. Firstly, despite its great political relevance - especially as a subject of constant political debate in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis - the role of burden-sharing in refugee protection has not been extensive in academic scholarship. Even though several scholars have addressed the issue of burden-sharing in depth (see e.g. Suhrke, 1998; Barutsciski and Suhrke 2001; Thielemann, 2003; Thielemann and Dewan, 2006;), I would still argue that the size of this literature does not match its political relevance, particularly not in the field of political science and international relations. The thesis thus aims to address this gap between policy and research by placing burden-sharing at the centre of its analytical attention. Furthermore, the case of Norway has not previously been addressed in scholarship on burden-sharing in refugee protection in this way. The choice of case is therefore a contribution to the literature in itself. In general, this thesis is a response to the need to find solutions to a dramatic political reality. The world is facing increasing challenges in terms of dealing with large refugee flows and providing them with adequate protection. These challenges are especially great in the context of the Syrian crisis, due to its massive scale. It is therefore imperative to find new and innovative solutions in refugee protection, for instance through more extensive burden-sharing initiatives.

1.3.1. Making a theoretical contribution

The thesis also aims to address what can be perceived as a shortcoming in mainstream IR scholarship, namely that it often neglects the role of domestic politics. A central analytical focus of the thesis is the complex relationship between international and domestic politics. In particular, it looks at how burden-sharing, an arguably tentative
norm in international refugee protection, is processed in a specific domestic political context. In this domestic context, different actors have differing beliefs, values and worldviews. It is therefore not given how such an international norm is interpreted by, and implemented in, states. Moreover, the perceptions of domestic political actors are not static, but can and will change over time, as a response to changing ideational and material factors. This complex relationship is rarely addressed in depth in academic literature on international norms. Rather, IR theory tends to characterise states as homogenous actors. For instance, structural realism promotes the ‘black box assumption’, which treats the sovereign state as a ‘black box’ where domestic actors and politics are considered to be largely irrelevant for how the state acts in the international system (Mearsheimer 2009: 78). However, a more nuanced approach to this international-domestic relationship is addressed in the ‘Europeanization’ literature in the study of politics. The Europeanization literature emphasises the ‘downloading process’ of ideas and practices developed at the overarching European level to the specific domestic contexts of the different member states. The outcomes of this process depend upon inherently domestic factors - actors, processes, and institutions. Clearly, states also take part in an ‘uploading process’, as the EU is constituted by the states themselves. However, each individual state only has limited power to shape norms and policies at the international level, as they are the result of contested international processes. Therefore, the ‘downloading’ process still involves norms and policies that have developed largely outside the individual state’s control, and consequently will have differentiated outcomes in different domestic contexts. It is this ‘downloading process’ that will be analysed in the thesis.

Similarly, Ted Hopf has criticised constructivist IR theory for its neglect of the domestic sphere in foreign policy analysis. He thus develops a theory in which he argues that the origins of foreign policy are developed in the domestic sphere. In this thesis, Hopf’s approach will be ‘turned on its head’. Instead of focusing on domestic factors as the origins of a state’s foreign policy, the thesis will analyse how international norms and policy are implemented at the domestic level. The theoretical foundations are the same, however – domestic actors are mainly influenced by
domestic norms, ideas and practices, also when they develop international policy. Hence, domestic actors, institutions and processes must be at the centre of analysis.

The thesis thus provides a theoretical contribution to the field by combining three different theoretical strands – constructivist norm theory in IR, ‘Europeanization’ theory, and Hopf’s bottom-up constructivism – in order to make sense of the complex relationship between international norms, ideas and practices, and the domestic sphere in which they are processed and implemented. The thesis aims to show that an in-depth analysis of domestic discursive structures and domestic actors enables a strengthened understanding of the possibilities for the implementation of international norms, such as burden-sharing. A constructivist approach that remains at the interstate level of analysis is not sufficient. Consequently, in the words of Hopf (2002: xiv), the thesis essentially aims to “bring society back into social constructivism”.

1.4. Analytical framework

The thesis conducts a critical discourse analysis, based on Norman Fairclough’s approach, of the competing political discourses in Norway concerning burden-sharing in refugee protection. Discourses are clusters of ideas that provide the social world with meaning. The thesis defines a discourse as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 1). In the Norwegian political field of refugee protection, competing discourses that represent differing worldviews take part in discursive ‘battles’. The outcomes of these battles determine the legitimate scope for political action in terms of burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway. Further, CDA emphasises the role of power and ideologies in the discursive field. Dominant discourses will always highlight some perspectives and marginalise others. It is the dominant discourse that first and foremost provides the premises for the political debate and relevant policy outcomes. However, the power structures in the discursive field can be transformed by social actors or by changing social practice. The power element inherent in discursive practice is therefore of central importance in the thesis.
There is not one single way to conduct a critical discourse analysis. Therefore I have applied an eclectic selection of Fairclough’s analytical tools in the textual analysis, consisting of the tools that I have deemed the most appropriate for this specific research project. Moreover, I apply Fairclough’s three-dimensional model as the overarching analytical framework. This model examines closer the three levels of CDA: text, discursive practice, and social practice. These dimensions will be analysed in this order for analytical purposes, though it is important to always be aware of the ‘feedback effects’ of the model. The three dimensions are mutually constitutive. Text and discursive practice constitutes social practice, but changes in social practice may also constitute changes in text and discursive practice.

1.4.1. Selecting empirical material

The thesis employs two different types of empirical material: articles, mainly from Norwegian national press and political party websites, and interview material from interviews with key informants. A major challenge in CDA is to choose and delimit the empirical material that will be used for analysis. However, in a discourse analysis the material does not need to be representative for the total population of texts and actors in the field. Rather, the data selection should be representative for certain prominent and differing ideas, meanings and worldviews in the specific context. It is therefore most important that the material is large enough to cover different perspectives of reality (Bratberg 2014: 40). The texts and interview material that is analysed here is thus the result of a careful selection of key ideas presented by key actors in the field. Further, since a discourse analytical approach is not claiming to cover the full range of actors, ideas and discourses within the field, one cannot expect that the empirical selection is made on entirely objective grounds. Instead, it is inherently based upon the researcher’s interpretation, and knowledge, of the field (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 78). The two forms of empirical material are employed in the thesis for slightly different purposes. The texts constitute the most prominent and significant ideas and worldviews in the political field. The empirical material, on the other hand, is applied mainly to help develop a greater understanding of the political field, and shed light upon the analysis.
1.5. Structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 provides an empirical backdrop for the analysis, and an attempt to account for actual developments ‘on the ground’ in relation to burden-sharing in refugee protection. The chapter explains the concept of burden-sharing by drawing upon relevant ideational trends as well as policy developments in international refugee protection. It also introduces the most significant forms of burden-sharing, and addresses how burden-sharing has been part of the response to the Syrian crisis.

Chapter 3 presents a theoretical and analytical framework for analysing the role of international refugee norms in Norwegian politics. The chapter also introduces Fairclough’s three-dimensional model to CDA, and explains how this model will be applied in the analysis. Finally, it presents the empirical material that is selected for analysis.

Chapter 4 and 5 presents the analytical dimensions of the thesis, through which the research question will be answered. Chapter 4 presents a brief background of Norwegian refugee protection in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, and the specific analytical tools that will be applied. It further provides an analysis of text and discursive practice. It also addresses the hierarchy between the discourses in the political field, and the effects of changing power relations between them. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of social practice and political implications. It focuses on policy implications in relation to two key issues: 1) the implications for Norwegian burden-sharing policies in relation to the Syrian refugee crisis specifically, and 2) the long-term implications for burden-sharing in refugee protection more generally. It also discusses the implications of social practice in relation to the broader theoretical framework addressing the relationship between the international and the domestic sphere. Finally, chapter 6 provides the concluding remarks, including a summary of the thesis’ main findings and implications for further research.
2 Burden-sharing in Refugee Protection

This chapter will provide an introduction to the issue at hand, namely burden-sharing in refugee protection. The chapter aims to present an empirical backdrop for the analysis, and attempts to account for actual developments ‘on the ground’ in relation to burden-sharing in refugee protection. This may cause a somewhat ‘artificial’ and impossible distinction between burden-sharing as a normative idea, derived from notions of morality and solidarity, and burden-sharing as a policy concept that provides a basis for actual and observable policy initiatives and practices. Still, the purpose of this chapter is to present, to the furthest possible extent, an empirical account of burden-sharing in international refugee protection activities in general, and in the international response to the Syrian refugee crisis in particular.

Subchapter 2.1. begins by presenting a brief overview of the international refugee protection regime, which provides the framework for norms, policies and practices relating to refugee protection initiatives. It also presents burden-sharing as a normative principle in this regime. Subchapter 2.2. discusses how burden-sharing initiatives are practiced, mainly through financial burden-sharing, resettlement, temporary protection, and other complementary forms of protection. Further, subchapter 2.3. presents the European framework for burden-sharing, which will be of particular importance in this thesis. Subchapter 2.4. presents previous burden-sharing initiatives in refugee protection, most notably the response to the Yugoslavian crisis in the 1990s and UNHCR’s permanent resettlement schemes. These experiences have contributed to shaping international and Norwegian actors’ perceptions of burden-sharing today. Subchapter 2.5. elaborates upon how the emergence of certain ideational and normative trends in international politics has strengthened the call for burden-sharing. Subchapter 2.6. explains how burden-sharing has been central in the international response to the Syrian refugee crisis, whilst subchapter 2.7. discusses the European response to this crisis.
2.1. The International Refugee Protection Regime

In the aftermath of World War II, there was increasing international focus on the importance of protecting displaced populations, as a response to the large numbers of European refugees. This concern resulted in the establishment of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Convention gives host countries and the international community a legal obligation to protect refugees when their own states are unable or unwilling to do so (Ferris 2011: 1-6). Initially, international refugee law is based on two core principles. Firstly, it defines refugees as - and thus provides protection to - persons who sought refuge abroad because they were persecuted in their home countries. Secondly, it embraces the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits states from rejecting or forcibly removing refugees if this act puts the refugees at risk of persecution. In addition, states also have a duty to respect and adhere to the basic standards of treatment of refugees as provisioned by the Convention (Chetail 2014: 29; Hammerstad 2014: 72). However, as Chetail (2014: 26) notes, the definition of ‘refugee’ has expanded as the international refugee protection regime has become more interconnected with international human rights law and standards. In essence, the aim of international protection is “to fill the gap created by the failure of the refugee’s own state to fulfil its obligations towards its citizens” (Hammerstad 2014: 72). These initial protection ideals embraced by international refugee law lay the foundation for what has eventually developed into an international refugee protection regime, which Barnett defines as “a structure of laws, rules, and principles and a network of states, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations to govern those who are forced to flee their homes because of fear for their lives” (Barnett 2010: 106).

2.1.1. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The international refugee protection regime consists of a range of international and domestic actors. However, the framework for the regime is first and foremost developed, upheld and protected by the UNHCR. The UNHCR is responsible for promoting and protecting refugee rights, and is considered to be the "key institutional actor in the international refugee regime” (Hammerstad 2014: 9). It was established in
1950 and its major task was to aid and protect the 1 million refugees that remained displaced after World War II. Gradually, the scope of its responsibilities and activities was expanded (Ferris 2011: 23; Loescher 2001: 35; Hammerstad 2014:165). The UNHCR’s statute duties are now wide-ranging and include promoting and supervising international legal conventions, advocacy activities on behalf of refugees aimed at promoting state measures to improve their situation, promoting refugee admission, providing assistance, and co-operating with states. Still, protection is ultimately the agency’s “raison d’être” (Ferris 2011: 28; Hammerstad 2014: 73; 174). This involves both physical protection, which is essential for refugees at risk in the short term, and legal protection, which is necessary to ensure a long-term solution for the refugee (Goodwin-Gil cited in Hammerstad 2014: 73). Hammerstad (2014: 73) thus notes that a “solution to the refugee’s problem is found when he or she is again able to enjoy the national protection that full citizenship in a state accords. Only when such a solution is found does the UNHCR’s obligation to provide protection cease.” In general, it is the UNHCR that sets the overarching international standards for refugee protection today, in terms of both normative and policy developments.

2.1.2. Burden-sharing in the international refugee protection regime

Burden-sharing between states is a significant normative principle in the international refugee protection regime. The regime is arguably founded upon an implicit recognition that states have a common responsibility for displaced populations. Feller thus stresses that the 1951 Refugee Convention regime “rests on notions of international solidarity and burden and responsibility sharing” (Feller 2006: 525). Refugees are considered to be individual rights holders. Whenever the state in question fails to protect the rights of its own citizens, this responsibility falls upon the international community as a whole. Burden-sharing initiatives may thus be necessary to ensure refugee protection in practice, especially in crisis situations where affected countries alone are not able to provide the refugees with protection that meets international standards. The main rationale for burden-sharing is thus to ensure more effective refugee protection, defined here as ‘quality protection’ (Feller 2006: 529). Perhaps most importantly, Feller (2006: 533) argues that effective protection must be
“understood to involve asylum seekers and refugees being given a genuine and realisable prospect for a durable solution”. A durable solution is defined as a solution that will allow the refugees to “rebuild their lives in dignity and peace” (UNHCR, 2015d). The ultimate aim of refugee protection is to find a permanent, and adequate, solution to the displaced person’s situation. Burden-sharing can thus be necessary to achieve durable solutions in refugee crises when such a solution cannot be provided within the current refugee hosting country.

The normative significance of burden-sharing in the international refugee protection regime is highlighted by the UNHCR’s strong focus on encouraging increased burden-sharing in its policy and advocacy activities. It advocates burden-sharing as a key protection strategy, and has been the most prominent proponent of burden-sharing schemes since the 1990s (Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001; Orchard and Miller, 2014). For instance, the UNHCR’ Executive Committee meeting in October 2004 provided a conclusion document entitled Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations. This document stresses the importance of solidarity with host countries of mass influxes and the value of, and need for, enhanced burden and responsibility sharing in these situations (UNHCR, 2004). Hence, it aims to establish burden-sharing as an international refugee norm. In 2004, the UNHCR Executive Committee consisted of 66 member states, which provided this document with significant weight and legitimacy (UNHCR, 2015c).

However, even though burden-sharing is an underlying normative principle in the international refugee protection regime, and an important concept in the academic debate, it has been a tentative principle in terms of policy developments. Feller (2006: 525) notes that the 1951 Convention “offers no agreed indicators, much less formulae, for such burden and responsibility sharing”. Instead, the specifics concerning state responsibility in different refugee situations are often unclear. This has put constraints on the scope and conditions for these initiatives, and there has consequently been a difference between normative developments and policy implementation with regards to burden-sharing in refugee protection. Despite the concept being of normative
significance, it is not embedded explicitly in international refugee law. However, as this chapter will show, burden-sharing has still been a guiding principle for several international and regional protection initiatives. Further, several scholars note that the development of a refugee protection system that has burden-sharing at its core, and well-established rules, regulations and principles to guide such burden-sharing initiatives, could potentially lead to significant improvements in the international refugee protection regime (Feller 2006: 533; Barutciski and Suhrke 2001: 99). As the Syrian refugee crisis presents an extraordinary situation for the international community, it may also create new possibilities for enhanced burden-sharing in refugee protection policy.

2.2. Burden-sharing in practice

Burden-sharing in refugee protection can take several forms. When discussing refugee protection it is common, from a Western perspective, to distinguish between protection-in-regions-of-origin and so-called ‘physical’ protection. The former entails providing humanitarian aid and assistance, most often in financial terms, to displaced populations in the areas nearby their country of origin. The latter refers to the actual provision of temporary or permanent asylum, or other forms of complimentary protection (Betts, 2006). The case for financial burden-sharing and protection-in-regions-of-origin is often supported by arguments of efficiency. Betts (2006: 167) argues that protection-in-regions-of-origin suggests a shift towards specialisation based on states’ comparative advantage in terms of physical or financial support for protection. Since states located in the Global North normally have greater financial capacity, and the provision of physical protection in third countries is viewed as a costly and time-consuming process, it is argued that developed states can help more refugees more effectively by providing aid to the countries that are already hosting them. Protection-in-region-of-origin can also include the provision of humanitarian aid. However, financial burden-sharing is arguably also the “easiest” form of burden-sharing, especially so for wealthy countries. This is not necessarily a problem in itself, as financial aid is a crucial contribution to host countries with low capacity. However,
it is not necessarily sufficient burden-sharing in the context of a refugee crisis where the refugee numbers in the host countries becomes unmanageable.

An important form of burden-sharing in ‘physical’ refugee protection occurs through the process of resettlement, often on a mass scale during refugee crises. Resettlement is defined by the UNHCR as “the selection and transfer of refugees from a state in which they have sought protection to a third country that admits them – as refugees – with a permanent residence status” (UNHCR cited in ERN, 2015a). Resettlement programmes are therefore a way for countries to express solidarity with (usually developing) states that are more severely affected by conflict and that host a large number of the world’s displaced population, as well as with the refugees themselves. Resettlement is also considered by the UNHCR to be a ‘durable solution’ to the refugee situation, alongside voluntary repatriation and local integration (ERN, 2015a). Hence, resettlement is a valuable ‘physical’ burden-sharing tool because it can provide effective protection.

In situations of mass influx of refugees, burden-sharing schemes can also provide various forms of temporary protection, which involves providing temporary asylum and potentially limited protection to displaced persons at risk (Thorburn, 1995). It offers security to a larger number of refugees in need of immediate protection than would otherwise be the case, because the provision of temporary asylum is less resource demanding than permanent asylum. Temporary protection schemes usually fall under the category “complementary protection”, which is defined by UNHCR (2014) as “formal permission, under national law or practice, to reside in a country extended by that country to persons who are in need of international protection even though they do not qualify for 1951 Convention refugee status”. This can include several forms of protection statuses, such as “subsidiary protection” and “humanitarian protection” (UNHCR, 2014). Thorburn (1995) argues that temporary protection policies and programmes are not – and should not – be perceived as representing a solution to the refugee situation in itself, but as an important stepping-stone towards a durable solution. Temporary protection policies ensure the fulfilment
of basic human rights on the one hand, whilst allowing states to maintain control of their asylum admissions on the other. However, they must be included in a comprehensive protection system based on burden-sharing principles. This involves extensive cooperation between all actors involved, in order to find appropriate solutions. Temporary protection is therefore an important, but insufficient, burden-sharing tool, which needs to be accompanied by a more comprehensive approach to refugee protection. It is important, however, to distinguish between temporary protection defined as providing protection to collective groups harmed by a particular humanitarian crisis through special schemes, and temporary protection in national regulations that involve a certain time period before regular asylum seekers can apply for permanent stay in a country. It is the first category that will be addressed here, as only this represents actual burden-sharing.

2.3. The European framework for burden-sharing

The EU is a significant actor in the international refugee regime generally, and in the area of burden-sharing specifically. As the EU has become gradually more integrated in several policy areas, the question of sharing burdens and benefits on a range of issues has become a political priority. This also includes the field of refugee and asylum issues. Accordingly, the EU has gradually developed institutions and regulations that enable burden-sharing in refugee protection. These regulations also have consequences for some European states that are not members of the EU, including Norway. Hence, the European framework for burden-sharing will be of particular significance in this thesis. Norway is strongly influenced by EU practice – including by regulations it is not bound by.

2.3.1. The Common European Asylum System

“Solidarity” is a central foundational principle of the EU (Vevstad, 2015b [interview]). This puts certain demands on the member states when it comes to sharing the burdens as well as the typical free trade benefits that are commonly associated with membership. In particular, the principle of solidarity – in terms of
The Lisbon Treaty thus expects the EU to implement certain measures to address the issue of responsibility-sharing in situations where this is deemed necessary. The issue of EU burden-sharing in the context of refugee and asylum politics was rendered particularly relevant during the Balkan crisis in the 1990s, when the European continent was faced with a large inflow of refugees (Thielemann 2003: 259-260). Since 1999, the EU has therefore been working to establish and implement a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The aim of CEAS is to harmonise the refugee and asylum practices within the EU. For instance, CEAS includes an Asylum Procedures Directive, which “safeguards and guarantees access to a fair and efficient asylum procedure” (EC, 2015b), and a Reception Directive, which aims to “ensure better as well as more harmonised standards of reception conditions throughout the Union” (EC, 2015b). An explicit burden-sharing tool in CEAS is the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive, which is “an exceptional measure to provide displaced persons from non-EU countries and unable to return to their country of origin, with immediate and temporary protection” (EC, 2015c). The Temporary Protection Directive is to be implemented in situations of mass influx where the standard asylum system is unable to cope with the situation (EC, 2015c). It has not yet, however, been put into use.

2.3.2. The Dublin Regulations
The Dublin Regulations address the issue of refugee rights, and is a particularly important burden-sharing initiative in the EU context. Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein are also part of the Dublin system (UDI, 2015). Specifically, the regulations establish a system that determines which country within the EU is responsible for examining a particular asylum application. They are founded upon the country of first asylum-principle, which entails that an asylum seeker can be sent back
to the first EU country he was registered in, if certain criteria are met. One important purpose of the Dublin regulations is to ensure equal treatment and predictability for the asylum seekers coming to Europe (Ekeløve-Slydal, 2015 [interview]). It is further aiming to prevent so-called “asylum shopping”, where the applicant is “lodging multiple applications in an effort to seek asylum in the country offering the most attractive regime of protection” (Mouzourakis 2015: 20). However, it is important to note that the Dublin-Regulations also contains certain exemption rules that enable countries to waive the principle of return to first country of asylum, for instance if the first country of return does not meet certain reception standards. In addition, the Dublin III Regulations that were put into force in January 2014 aim to strengthen measures of responsibility-sharing and equal treatment, and enhance protection (Vevstad, 2015b [interview]).

2.4. Previous burden-sharing initiatives

This section briefly addresses how burden-sharing has been applied as a practical policy concept in specific refugee protection initiatives, in particular during the Balkan crisis in the 1990s, as well as in UNHCR’s permanent resettlement scheme. These experiences have contributed to shaping the perceptions of international and Norwegian actors when it comes to possibilities and challenges created by burden-sharing in refugee protection.

2.4.1. Historical burden-sharing schemes

Two major historical burden-sharing initiatives have been particularly successful. The first was a response to the situation of the more than 1 million people who were displaced after World War II, which resulted in a massive resettlement process. The second was a large-scale resettlement scheme established to provide protection to Vietnamese refugees after 1975 (Suhrke, 1998). The most prominent case of a large-scale burden-sharing scheme in recent times, however, took place in Europe in the 1990s as a response to the crisis in Yugoslavia. This represents one of the few cases in which European countries have provided temporary protection to displaced persons through such a scheme, even though to some extent “the lines became blurred
between the concepts of resettlement, humanitarian evacuation and temporary protection” (Koser and Black 1999: 523; Barutscki and Suhrke 2001: 102). The burden-sharing scheme was established to ensure that Macedonia would accept the large refugee flow from its neighbouring countries, which it had initially refused. Macedonia was at risk of severe national destabilisation due to the mass influx. The scheme therefore aimed to transfer refugees from Macedonia to third countries. Overall, the programme was quite successful (Barutscki and Suhrke 2001: 105-106).

Yet, it also highlighted some of the challenges related to temporary protection schemes. For instance, a majority of Bosnian refugees that received protection in Norway chose not to return to Bosnia when the conflict was over (Solberg, 2015). In the analysis, it becomes apparent that this experience with burden-sharing in physical refugee protection has contributed significantly to shaping the perceptions of Norwegian actors today, in particular with regards to temporary protection. The Bosnian refugees became rooted in Norwegian society, which created a range of dilemmas for the Norwegian field.

2.4.2. UNHCR’s permanent resettlement scheme

There have also been several attempts to establish more permanent and stable regulations for burden-sharing initiatives during the past decades, yet with limited success. Around the new millennium, the UNHCR started several new processes aimed at strengthening the international refugee protection regime, in which burden-sharing was an essential aspect. These initiatives included Global Consultations, the Agenda for Protection, and the Consultation Plus Initiative (Feller 2006: 528; Hammerstad 2014: 156). The Agenda for Protection presented six goals that aim to strengthen the Convention regime. One of these goals was to “share burdens and responsibilities more equitably and build capacities of host States to receive and protect refugees” (Feller 2006: 527). Similarly, the agency’s Convention Plus Initiative created a Framework for Durable Solutions, aiming to ”create new norms on burden-sharing in three areas: the strategic use of resettlement, ’irregular’ secondary movements from South to North, and targeted development assistance in refugee-and refugee-hosting regions” (Hammerstad 2014: 156). However, Hammerstad (2014:
notes that in reality, the area of resettlement was largely ignored in this process. Still, the UNHCR has been successful in creating a permanent small-scale resettlement system. In this system, the countries that participate in the scheme, which are all located in the global North, resettle a certain quota of vulnerable refugees each year with the help of UNHCR. However, only a small number of states, 28 in total (as of 2015), take part in the programme. Norway is one of them (UNHCR, 2015e; Suhrke 1998: 397).

2.5. Explaining the ideational foundations of burden-sharing

The development of burden-sharing as a concept in international refugee protection, and the evolution of the international refugee protection regime itself, has not taken place in a vacuum. Rather, it has emerged in relation with broader ideational trends, which have had concrete impact on policy and practice in the international as well as in different domestic spheres. This subchapter will elaborate upon some of these ideational developments and discuss the normative foundations for burden-sharing in refugee protection. Firstly, it will address the notion of ‘solidarity’, which relates to burden-sharing specifically. Secondly, it will address the human rights regime and other, broader ideational trends in IR that have contributed to strengthening the call for burden-sharing.

2.5.1. The call for solidarity

The call for burden-sharing in refugee protection is derived from an understanding of rights and responsibilities in international politics. Solidarity is the primary motivation for this particular form of political organisation. With regards to burden-sharing, solidarity can be directed at two different sets of actors. Firstly, burden-sharing in refugee protection can be driven by solidarity for the refugees themselves. The UNHCR defines international solidarity as “a fundamental principle according to which States shall respond to the needs of refugees in a spirit of humanitarianism” (UNHCR, 2014). This view promotes burden-sharing in order to ensure the rights of
refugees. However, this solidarity can also refer to states responding to the needs of other states that are disproportionately affected by heavy refugee flows. In this regard, Thielemann (2003: 257) argues that solidarity as a motivation for burden-sharing can represent a “recognition of specific obligations between members of a group”, based on commitment to, or concern for, other members of the group. Regional or international groups of states can recognise, and act upon, such solidarity with other states by accepting a part of the refugee ‘burden’.

2.5.2. Human rights and other influential ideas and concepts

The development of the human rights regime has been particularly important in framing why effective refugee protection is important and how it can occur. The international human rights regime and the refugee protection regime have both emerged from the liberalist idea that the state has a responsibility towards each individual, and that all persons have certain inalienable rights. Over time, although international human rights law and refugee law initially were considered to be two distinctive strains of international law, these have become increasingly interlinked and overlapping. Humanitarian action in general, and refugee protection in particular, has increasingly been viewed through the language of rights (Chetail 2014: 19; Ferris 2011: 40; Feller, 2006). This has in turn increased the number of ways in which actors deal with refugee protection, and contributed to conceptualising certain standards for effective protection. As Hammerstad (2014: 83) notes, embedding refugee rights “into the universal language of human rights norms” has created a “scope for the widening of the international community’s will and ability to deal with refugee problems in more ways than asylum”. Moreover, the interpretation of refugee rights in the light of human rights norms also involves certain assumptions regarding what constitutes a durable solution to the refugee situation. Feller (2006: 518) argues that when a person seeks refuge because she is unable to exercise her fundamental human rights, “this is, in legal terms, the realisation of human rights”. Consequently, effective refugee protection leading to a durable solution must ensure that the refugee regains her ability to exercise these fundamental rights.
Other key principles in IR have also contributed to the call for strengthened refugee protection and burden-sharing. These include Protection of Civilians, the Responsibility to Protect, and human security. PoC has gradually become an umbrella concept guiding humanitarian policy and practice, as well as providing the overarching framework for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. Following this trend, PoC has also become a central principle of refugee management. Today, there is a strong focus on creating a “culture of protection” in all aspects of the humanitarian field (Lie and De Carvalho 2008:1). Hence, the increased international focus on PoC stresses the need to ensure protection for civilians affected by conflict through innovative protection and policy measures, which can include burden-sharing initiatives. Further, the concept of human security emerged in IR in the 1990s. According to Gasper (2005: 222), this concept “highlights the distinction between the security of states and the security of persons, and re-visions the latter as not merely the physical safety of individuals but their ability to hold and secure basic goods”. Similarly, the R2P agenda rests on the notion that the international community must protect the rights and security of individuals if their own sovereign state is unable or unwilling to do so. This responsibility thus legitimises, and in fact calls for, humanitarian invention by international actors if the sovereign state fails its responsibility and, arguably, if the criteria proposed by just war theory are met (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002). The R2P agenda has been highly challenged and contested, especially due to its interventionist nature and the implications for state sovereignty and security. However, both R2P and human security are concepts in IR that put the needs of individuals at the centre of political attention and which emphasises the international community’s responsibility for them. In general, the development of concepts, policy and practice in IR that emphasise the rights of individuals and the responsibilities of states to protect them contribute to explaining why burden-sharing has become an increasingly important concept in refugee protection.

2.5.3. Normative developments vs. implementation

Burden-sharing has become a concept of refugee and asylum governance that can contribute to providing durable solutions to the refugee situation, solutions that
adequately protect the refugees’ rights. For instance, resettlement is a burden-sharing mechanism that constitutes a durable solution. However, it is important to note that the developments in rights-based refugee protection have been much stronger at the normative level than at the level of implementation. Moreover, the 1951 Convention promotes a very strict and Eurocentric view of refugees when it conceptualises the refugee as a person who fears persecution because of her political or civil status (Hathaway 1991: 6,7). This implies that in practice, collective groups of refugees fleeing from war and crisis, such as the Syrian refugees, are not automatically entitled to international protection purely on the basis of the 1951 Convention, because they do not necessarily fear individual prosecution as such. To address this protection gap, national policies often enables the de facto protection of these refugees groups, for instance on a humanitarian basis (Hathaway, 1991). Further, some regional conventions, including the OAU’s *Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa*, are also created to be much more liberal on this issue (Hathaway 1991: 16). Still, there is no international legal mechanism as such providing collective protection in these situations.

### 2.6. Burden-sharing in response to the Syrian Crisis

The UNHCR has together with more than 150 partners been in charge of coordinating the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee crisis (UNHCR, 2015b). The response has consisted of a diverse set of protection initiatives in the region and beyond. A major part of UNHCR’s operations in this regard is focused on emergency humanitarian assistance in the region. However, the agency has also facilitated several burden-sharing initiatives. In 2013, when it was clear that the humanitarian situation was deteriorating rapidly, the UNHCR stressed that “enhanced solidarity measures from European countries are now required as a matter of urgency”, and encouraged states in particular to “show further solidarity with countries hosting Syrian refugees in the Middle East region” (UNHCR, 2013). Burden-sharing has remained at the core of UNHCR’s approach to protection as the crisis has continued. In the UNHCR’s Global Appeal 2015 Update (2015f: 134), it is stated that “special attention will be devoted to the resettlement and humanitarian admission of Syrian refugees” in order
to secure durable solutions. Hence, international burden-sharing initiatives are considered to be imperative for the effective protection of Syrian refugees.

Of course, the UNHCR can only facilitate such burden-sharing measures, and must do so in close cooperation with relevant states. With regard to the Syrian crisis, the agency has promoted both permanent and temporary protection schemes. The two main burden-sharing initiatives facilitated in response to the crisis have been resettlement and humanitarian admissions. In addition, the agency has also encouraged states to generally show flexibility in their asylum processes and provide complementary forms of protection “when persons are found not to meet the 1951 Convention criteria” (UNHCR, 2013). UNHCR has highlighted that all such flexible admissions programmes must be based on certain core principles of refugee protection. This includes respecting the principle on non-refoulement; providing access to basic services available as well as medical and psychosocial support; and the establishment of funding schemes to cover travel costs associated with resettlement (UNHCR, 2014). In the physical protection initiatives, the agency is particularly concerned with ensuring the protection of the most vulnerable refugee groups, including persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTI-community, survivors of sexual and gender-based violence and torture and elderly refugees (ERN, 2015b). Below is an overview of the primary forms of burden-sharing initiatives to provide protection for Syrian refugees.

2.6.1. Financial burden-sharing and protection-in-regions-of-origin

Financial burden-sharing, and other forms of protection-in-regions-of-origin, has been the most extensive form for burden-sharing in the response to the Syrian refugee crisis. The EU is the largest aid donor to date (as of August 2015), having contributed €3.9 billion in humanitarian, stabilisation, economic and development assistance to Syria and neighbouring countries since the crisis commenced. This funding provides vital services, including emergency food supplies, shelter and cash and rent assistance, clean water, emergency medical supplies and protection, provisioned in cooperation with local and international humanitarian partners (European Commission, 2015a)
The UK is one of the largest individual contributors of humanitarian aid, having donated £900 million for humanitarian support within and around Syria as of 2015 (DFID, 2015).

2.6.2 Resettlement

In addition to the regular resettlement programmes that several European states have already implemented, the UNHCR has also initiated an enhanced resettlement strategy aimed at Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2013). This is to ensure that vulnerable Syrian refugees receive sufficient, much-needed protection, and at the same time prevent that refugees from other countries lose their opportunity for resettlement. Norway and Sweden currently have the largest resettlement programmes for Syrian refugees in Europe (Orchard and Miller 2014: 59-61; UNHCR, 2015g). The UNHCR is also coordinating a Resettlement Working Group, where refugee host states from the wider region participate to discuss and give feedback on resettlement and temporary protection programmes for Syrian refugees (ERN, 2015b).

2.6.3. Humanitarian Admissions

In response to the crisis, the UNHCR has facilitated a Humanitarian Admissions Programme to ensure more effective protection. They provide temporary protection to Syrians who have sought refuge in Lebanon and other neighbouring countries, by granting them temporary residence in Europe or North America. Humanitarian admissions is an expedited asylum process that gives an opportunity to “secure the immediate protection and rapid departure of refugees with urgent and compelling needs while UNHCR is in the process of up-scaling its resettlement programme in the region” (UNHCR, 2013; ERN, 2015a). HAP thus has two main aims; to provide protection to especially vulnerable Syrian refugees, and to support the countries most heavily affected by this mass refugee influx by encouraging burden-sharing between states (Philips, 2013). Germany has the largest humanitarian admissions programme among the European countries, aiming to provide temporary protection to 10,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon in the years 2013-2014 (Orchard and Miller 2014: 55-
Austria and Ireland are also among the countries that have established a humanitarian admissions programme in response to the crisis.

2.6.4. Other forms of complementary protection

Several countries have also established various forms of flexible admission schemes for Syrian refugees in order to make protection and asylum procedures more accessible. This includes the provision of emergency educational scholarships for Syrian students who were forced to quit their studies, enhanced possibilities for family reunification, medical evacuation, and private or individual sponsorships. Further, other innovative, complementary protection measures have also been implemented. For instance, France and Brazil have started issuing different forms of humanitarian and asylum visas that enable Syrian refugees to access the countries temporarily and apply for normal asylum during their stay (UNHCR, 2015g).

To facilitate these different burden-sharing schemes, UNHCR has organised two major international conferences on the resettlement of Syrian refugees, where states were encouraged to make pledges for resettlement and other forms of admissions. The first conference was the High Level Segment on Solidarity and Burden-sharing with Countries Hosting Syrian Refugees, held in October 2013. In this early stage of the crisis, the UNHCR was aiming for pledges for a total of 30,000 places of temporary or permanent protection places. In the aftermath of this conference, a Core Group on Resettlement was established. This group is chaired by Sweden and consists of 23 resettlement/admission states, the EU, IOM, and UNHCR, and aims to “further coordinate efforts and mobilise support” for additional pledges (ERN, 2015c). As the crisis has continued and escalated, the UNHCR has had to encourage states to additionally increase their pledges. During the International Conference on the Resettlement of Syrian Refugees in December 2014, states were therefore encouraged to provide another 100,000 places for Syrian refugees in 2015-2016 (ERN, 2015b). In total, the UNHCR reported that, including resettlement places and visas granted under all other forms of admission schemes, 130,408 places had been made available for
third-country protection for Syrian refugees as of 7 October 2015 (UNHCR, 2015g). However, major protection challenges still remain.

2.7. The European response: hesitant burden-sharing

A majority of the places made available for Syrian refugees are in European countries. (UNHCR, 2015g). However, as Eui and Fargues (2014: 2) point out, “European nations have responded to the refugee crisis in an uneven fashion”. Looking at the numbers of resettlement pledges and other forms of admissions provided by states, a few countries have been much more generous than others, also within the EU. For a long time, there was no coordinated European response in terms of the provision of physical protection to Syrian refugees. Instead, Orchard and Miller argue that collective European efforts have focused on “containing the crisis, and strengthening European borders” (Orchard and Miller 2014: 34). They have mostly been concerned with providing humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance to Syria and neighbouring countries. The type and extent of physical protection, and who qualifies as beneficiaries of the protection schemes, has mainly been decided at the domestic level and has therefore varied greatly between the different states. For instance, Germany and Sweden have been particularly generous in terms of both temporary protection and resettlement, as well as in providing asylum more generally (Eui and Fargues, 2014: 2; UNHCR, 2014).

As a response to this situation, in addition to the more general, deteriorating refugee- and migrant situation at Europe’s borders, the European Commission developed a European Agenda for Migration in May 2015. This agenda has been followed by two implementation packages that include guidance on European solidarity and responsibility-sharing in general, and on relocation and resettlement in particular. The agenda addresses both sides of the European burden-sharing debate. It includes regulations for burden-sharing between the EU and the region affected, through resettlement, and burden-sharing between European countries – through relocation. It also contains a range of criteria, including population, GDP and unemployment rate, to ensure a fair procedure between the different countries. The Commission proposed
in this regard to relocate 40,000 persons “in clear need of international protection” from Greece and Italy to other countries in the Schengen area, whilst also resettling 20,000 people from outside of the EU over a two year period (EC, 2015d). At the EU ministerial meeting on 14 September 2015, the states agreed to relocate the proposed 40,000 people, but did not manage to agree upon relocating an additional 120,000 refugees from Greece, Italy and Hungary within the Schengen area. The European Commission proposed this additional relocation scheme on 9 September because of the quickly exacerbating European refugee crisis (EC, 2015c). However, EU countries could not agree on whether relocation schemes should be voluntary or compulsory (Vevstad, 2015a). Moreover, since Denmark, Ireland and the UK have certain special treaty agreements, they have chosen not to be part of the relocation schemes. In addition, the Dublin regulations have been put under increasing pressure as the crisis has evolved. For instance, Germany has decided to waive the Dublin-return of all Syrian refugees in solidarity with EU border countries such as Italy and Greece (EurActiv, 2015).

In general, the divisive debate on whether the relocation schemes should be compulsory or not highlights some of the challenges for burden-sharing in refugee protection. Also within the European community, states are hesitant to implement burden-sharing mechanisms that demand certain capacities and resources from their national systems, even in a time of crisis. Simultaneously, however, the recent international and European policy developments also highlight some of the possibilities the Syrian refugee crisis has created for burden-sharing in refugee protection. Special resettlement schemes, humanitarian admissions programmes and a new relocation scheme for increased burden-sharing within Europe, have enabled enhanced burden-sharing in refugee protection.
3 Analytical Framework

This chapter will provide an analytical framework for the analysis. Critical discourse analysis presents a set of theoretical and methodological assumptions about the social and political world. These assumptions are in many ways a natural extension of constructivist theory. Thus, in this chapter I will draw upon three different theoretical strands within an overarching social constructivist framework: 1) the norms literature in international relations, which focuses on states’ adherence to international norms at the inter-state level of analysis; 2) the ‘bottom-up’ approach to constructivism presented in the work of Ted Hopf (2002) and others, which locates the origins of a state’s foreign policy choices in the domestic social structure; and 3) the so-called “Europeanization literature” in the study of politics, which analyses how international policies and ideas are “downloaded” and processed in a domestic political context.

The purpose of combining these three theoretical approaches is to create an analytical framework that highlights the complex relationship between the international and the domestic sphere in norm processes, and which emphasises the importance of domestic actors, ideas and practices in the implementation of international norms and principles. In order to analyse this domestic process in depth, I will apply critical discourse analysis as the methodological framework. CDA stresses the role of discourses in constituting the social and political reality of actors. Dominant political discourses define the space for legitimate political action within a certain field. Consequently, I argue that discursive practice in the political field determine how the international norm of burden-sharing is interpreted and implemented in Norwegian politics.

Subchapter 3.1. briefly discusses the interpretivist foundations of constructivism. Subchapter 3.2. addresses the dynamics between international norms and national politics. Subchapter 3.3. introduces the theoretical foundations of discourse analysis. Subchapter 4.4. addresses burden-sharing in refugee protection as grasped through a constructivist lens. Burden-sharing is conceptualised as an international norm that is processed and implemented in the Norwegian political sphere. The domestic political
sphere is characterised by discursive ‘battles’. Subchapter 3.4. then approaches CDA more closely as a research method. Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model is presented as the overarching model for the analysis. Finally, subchapter 3.5. discusses some research challenges that face CDA.

3.1. The interpretivist foundations of constructivism

The main constructivist assumption is that the world is socially constructed. Idealism thus lies at the core of this theory (Wendt cited in Barnett 2011: 155). We cannot neglect the role of ideas in politics and IR. In particular, the notion of widely shared ideas, that is, intersubjective beliefs and understandings, is important. These intersubjective beliefs constitute people’s knowledge and perceptions about the social world and their own role within it (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001:392) This emphasis on ideational factors reflects a deeper ontological and epistemological distinction between positivism and interpretivism in the study of social sciences. Constructivism is founded upon an interpretive epistemological approach. Interpretivism has as its starting point that all knowledge of the social world is dependent on human interpretation and on particular representations of reality, within a specific social and historical context. It thus rejects the possibility of attaining objective knowledge in the social sciences (Bratberg 2014: 32-34). In consequence, interpretivism stands in stark contrast to the positivist epistemology underlying rationalist theories, which emphasises the possibility of discovering objective, scientific truths about the social world.

3.2. Dynamics: international norms, national politics

Mainstream constructivism does not sufficiently acknowledge the role of the domestic sphere in determining the concrete outcomes of international ideas and norms. To address this shortcoming, I draw upon theoretical insights from the ‘Europeanization literature’, which discusses the relationship between the politics and policies of the EU and its individual member states. In particular, it emphasises the “downloading” of ideas and practices from the EU level to different national contexts.
Europeanization scholars point to the fact that member states are affected differently by EU politics. One explanation for the varied results of EU policies in different states is the different national characteristics, “which mediate the pressures coming down from the EU” (Bache and Jordan 2008: 14). Member states do not respond equally to the Europeanization process because of inherently different national institutions and processes. In essence, “external changes are interpreted and responded to through existing institutional frameworks, including existing causal and normative beliefs” (Olsen cited in Bache and George 2006: 62). Still, European policies, values and ideas significantly impact the national sphere, and contribute to shaping domestic discourses, identities and practices (Olsen cited in Bache and Jordan 2008: 25). The EU provides the premises upon which specific policy discussions are founded, policies are decided, and institutions are shaped. However, their specific outcomes depend on national factors. Hence, the Europeanization literature highlights the highly complex relationship between the international and the domestic sphere.

This thesis does not address the relationship between EU ideas and practices and its member states. However, the ‘Europeanization’ literature provides theoretical insights regarding the dynamics between the international and domestic sphere that can be transferred to other relevant research areas. The EU represents an external sphere beyond the state, in which states interact with other states. In this community, norms, principles and policies that are to guide state behaviour are developed. Similarly, this same process occurs in the broader international community, although this community is not as deeply politically integrated. Also in the UN and other international forums, norms and principles are developed for states to follow. These ideas and practices are ‘downloaded’ to different national contexts. Burden-sharing in refugee protection constitutes such an idea. It is therefore necessary to dive into the “black box of the state” to address in depth the role and impact of domestic agency, political contestation, and discursive interpretations to understand the premises for the implementation of this principle on the ground (Bache and Jordan 2008: 23).

3.2.1. Hopf: “Bringing society back into social constructivism”
On a similar note, in his work *Social Construction of International Politics: identities and foreign policies, Moscow 1955 & 1999* (2002), Ted Hopf criticises mainstream constructivism for focusing only on the inter-state level of analysis. In particular, he criticises constructivist norm literature because it “pays insufficient attention to the domestic context within which any international norm is embedded, especially the domestic discursive practice” (Hopf 2002: 278). Hopf argues that the origins of states’ foreign policy are to be found at the domestic, not the international, level. Each domestic society has a certain social structure, which is constituted by specific discursive formations that interact and compete with one another. All foreign policy makers are part of this discursive structure, which shapes their understanding of social and political reality. Consequently, it is not only factors at the international level that matter in shaping foreign policy. It is first and foremost domestic ideas, values and practices that constitute their perception of themselves, of the world, and of their own state’s role within it.

Hopf therefore argues that we need to “bring society back into social constructivism” (2002: xiv). This is partly what this thesis aims to do. Hopf begins his analysis at the domestic level, and observes how different collective identities at the domestic level create a specific social structure. This social structure “establishes the boundaries of discourse within a society” (Hopf 2002: 6). In turn, it creates the foundations for a state’s foreign policy. In this thesis, I begin the analysis at the international level and then take a step down to the domestic sphere. However, the theoretical argument is much of the same. The purpose is to bring the analytical focus to the domestic sphere, because it is at the domestic level that states’ policies, both foreign and domestic, are constituted and implemented. Hence, the analytical focus must be concerned with domestic actors. Further, Hopf’s criticism also highlights the usefulness of applying a discourse analytical approach to the study of the domestic sphere. He argues that “at best, normative constructivists describe the politics surrounding the contestation of a norm”, but do so “without delving into the social construction of the meanings of the discursive instruments being used in these struggles” (Hopf 2002: 279). A discourse analytical approach enables the researcher to delve into these processes. Moreover, a
bottom-up constructivist approach also addresses the critique often directed at the norms literature, which argues that this literature is unable to explain why some norms are supported and institutionalised whilst other are rejected (Hopf 2002: 281). As the Europeanization literature has noted, different factors relating to national politics matter in the ‘downloading’ of international ideas and practices. We are likely to find explanations for the empirical operationalization of norms at least partly at the domestic level. Hence, this thesis will aim to address these national political factors in depth, in particular the domestic discursive structure.

3.2.1.1. Constituting interests and identities
Constructivism conceptualises interests as socially constructed – constituted by actors’ ideas, beliefs and desires (Blyth 2003:697). As Hay puts it, actors’ “desires, preferences and motivations are not a contextually given fact – a reflection of material or even social circumstance – but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed, moral, ethical, and political) orientation toward the context in which they will have to be realised” (Hay 2011:67). This view of political interests is particularly relevant in the refugee protection debate, which is heavily concerned with values. In the refugee protection debate, domestic actors in Norway perceive their own interests, and their country’s interests, in terms of what is good and bad, right and wrong, desirable and undesirable. These perceived interests, in turn, generate given forms of behaviour, or specific policy decisions. The question of increasing resettlement quotas for Syrian refugees, for instance, cannot simply be reduced to an economic question, although some political actors may frame it in mainly economic terms. For others, this question will mainly be about morality, solidarity and helping those in need, independent of economic costs. For others again, it is about preserving Norwegian culture from foreign influence. In essence, debates on burden-sharing in refugee protection between Norwegian political actors are about ideas and values – also when they are phrased in a way that implies that they are about material interests.

The constitution of interests is closely related to the social construction of identities. Rather than accepting the identities of actors as pre-given, actors construct their own
self-identity based on their understanding of Self in direct relation to how they perceive the identities of Others (Hansen 2006: 5-7). Hence, identities are intersubjective. How actors understand their own identity has a decisive impact on how they interpret world around them and their own role within it. Therefore, actors also understand their interests in terms of their socially constructed identity’s characteristics. In constructivist IR theory, the actors in question are states, which construct their own identity in direct relationship with other states. In turn, they act in accordance with the perceived interests of this particular identity. However, Hopf argues that state identity is in fact constructed at the domestic level. Different collectively constructed identities at the domestic level take part in constituting the discursive formations that in turn create a specific social structure in society. Hence, different domestic actors have different perceptions of what the identity of their state is, and should be. This has more to do with national factors such as religion and class than with factors in the international system (Hopf 2002: 10). The discussion about burden-sharing in refugee protection is partly about what kind of state different national actors believe that Norway is and should be, and how they want Norway to be perceived by other actors in the international community – for instance, as a great humanitarian power, or a nation of peace. On the basis of these theoretical insights, discourse analysis is deemed the most appropriate analytical framework to address the issue of burden-sharing, because discourse analysis enables an in-depth analysis of the domestic social structure, and the perceived interests and identities of national actors. It thus enables a thorough analysis of how international norms are processed, contested, and implemented in a national context.

3.3. Discourse analysis

The domestic social structure is constituted by interacting and competing discourses. Discourses are clusters of ideas that construct the social world by providing it with meaning. Specifically, they give us a certain perspective on the world around us (Bratberg 2014: 30). Although there is no single agreement on what defines a discourse, Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 1) provide a preliminary definition as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the
world”). Dominant discourses constitute some ideas – and consequently, actions – as illegitimate and unthinkable, and others as legitimate and desirable (Yee 1996: 96). Hence, actors can never act completely independent of these discourses, which together constitute a specific social structure. Our own individual ideas are to some extent products of existing discursive structures, dependent on a specific social and historical context (Bratberg 2014: 30). However, this structure is also shaped by political agency. Actors may still challenge, and transform, the current social structure with new ideas. As Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 1) phrase it, “our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating and changing them”.

Discourse analysis “explores how the socially produced ideas and objects that populate the world were created and are held in place” and ultimately aims to “uncover the way in which reality was produced” (Hardy et. al. 2004: 19). More specifically, Bratberg (2014: 37) notes that discourse analysis has two important purposes. Firstly, it aims to analyse how a discourse is put together. Secondly, it aims to identify how different discourses relate to each other and are in conflict with each other. Importantly, discourse analysis highlights the role of language and communication in constructing social reality. Language represents the arena through which meaning is created and assigned to particular elements of the material world. Moreover, language takes part in shaping what is possible and not possible in the social world, by defining what can and cannot adequately be expressed in linguistic terms regarding specific areas of social and political life (Bratberg 2014; 32; 33; Burnham et.al 2008: 250; Fairclough 2003; 24).

3.4. A discourse analytical approach to burden-sharing

This subchapter aims to take the empirical knowledge about burden-sharing in refugee protection as presented in chapter 2, and approach it through a social constructivist lens. First, burden-sharing is conceptualised as an international norm, drawing upon constructivist theory on norms in IR. The subchapter then addresses how international norms shape the behaviour of states in international politics. International
organisations like the UNHCR play a crucial role in norm promotion. The second part will apply a ‘bottom-up’ approach to social constructivism. Here, I argue that the outcome of the domestic processes in which competing discourses ‘battle’ over different understandings of social reality, creates the discursive boundaries that delimit the domestic political space for action with regards to burden-sharing in refugee protection.

3.4.1. Burden-sharing as an international norm
Astrid Suhrke (1998: 398) argues that in the context of refugee protection, “the logic of burden-sharing starts from the premise that helping refugees is a jointly held moral duty and obligation under international law”. Hence, the call for burden-sharing in refugee protection is derived from a normative understanding of rights and responsibilities in international relations. Accordingly, burden-sharing will be conceptualised here as a norm in the international refugee protection regime. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) define a norm as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”. On the international level, a norm is therefore a specific set of ideas defining appropriate or desirable behaviour, which are seen as constitutive of states’ interests and identities (Checkel 1998: 327, 238; Finnemore, 1996a). Constructivist norm theory stresses that state action is driven largely by a so-called ‘logic of appropriateness’. This means that state behaviour is guided by social constructions such as “notions of duty, responsibility, identity, and obligation” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 913). In this view, states are primarily concerned with legitimacy when determining the appropriate forms of action, aiming to follow the social ‘rules’ guiding international society (Barnett 2011: 155)

This conceptualisation of the ‘logic of appropriateness’ also relates to the issue of identity. States often choose to comply with norms because they are concerned with how others view them, or how they view themselves (Fearon cited in Risse and Sikkink 1999: 8). Since identities are inherently intersubjective, they are dependent upon collective understandings of which normative characteristics and preferences a given identity possesses. Certain established norms in a particular social context will
therefore be constitutive elements of the collective identity belonging to a community of actors. Accordingly, states that see themselves as belonging to this community, and this collective identity, will feel a need to comply with these norms (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 8,9; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902). For instance, established norms can decide appropriate behaviour for a given identity such as “state”, or for a particular group of states such as “Western state” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902).

International norms thus shape the behaviour of states by defining their view of what is legitimate, desirable, and morally appropriate. In this view, if burden-sharing is constituted as an international norm, it is likely to shape Norway’s behaviour in the field of refugee protection in a certain way. In the ‘downloading process’, international norms and ideas contribute to shaping domestic discourses and practices.

3.4.1.1. The role of UNHCR in norm promotion

Finnemore (1996: 5) emphasises the important role that international organisations play in the promotion of international norms. She argues that “states are socialised to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interests by international organisations”. This highlights the importance of UNHCR’s role in promoting burden-sharing in refugee protection. Scholars have emphasised the UNHCR’s difficult position, caught between being heavily dependent on state interest on the one hand, and its responsibility as a humanitarian organisation to promote and protect humanitarian principles and refugee rights unhinged, on the other (Ferris 2011: 23). State interests undeniably have a strong influence on UNHCR’s policy and activities. The UNHCR does not have an independent funding base and therefore relies completely on funding from donor states for all its activities and operations. Consequently, critics have argued that the UNHCR first and foremost is an instrument of state power, largely or even fully driven by states’ interests (see Loescher 2001: 34; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). However, this is arguably not the case. By tracing the evolution of the organisation in the period 1950-2000, Loescher finds that “UNHCR policy and practice have been driven both by state interests and by the office acting independently or evolving in ways not expected nor necessarily sanctioned by states” (Loescher 2001: 33). Similarly, Michael Barnett (2010: 107) emphasises that the
UNHCR has significant “moral and expert authority”. The agency’s expert authority is clearly derived from its specialised knowledge and experience as the largest international refugee protection agency. It has also gained increasing moral authority because it is perceived to be “speaking and acting” on behalf of the refugee population and is “defending the lives of the weak and vulnerable” (Barnett 2010: 111). Such moral and expert authority gives the organisation the necessary weight and legitimacy to become involved in global politics whilst at least to an extent promoting its own agenda.

The UNHCR plays a leading role in facilitating, developing and changing norms, policies and practices regarding refugee protection at the international level. As mentioned, the agency has been the most decisive and prominent proponent of burden-sharing schemes since the 1990s (Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001; Orchard and Miller, 2014). This has also been the case during the Syrian refugee crisis, where the UNHCR has emphasised that burden-sharing is a key solution to the situation. In doing so, it has exercised moral pressure towards states, stressing the need for solidarity (UNHCR, 2013; Philips, 2013). It has also praised states that have implemented burden-sharing mechanisms, thereby appealing to ‘the good nature’ of states that see themselves as supporters of humanitarian values and human rights. In this way, especially due to its authority in international politics, the UNHCR has contributed to shaping states’ perception of what is legitimate and morally appropriate behaviour as a response to the Syria refugee crisis. This should accordingly have strengthened the role and implementation of burden-sharing initiatives in refugee protection, at the domestic as well as the international level.

3.4.2. Processing international norms in the Norwegian political field

Still, international norms are not usually congruent, and can be interpreted in different ways. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 893) note, “international norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms, which can produce important variations in compliance and interpretation of these norms”. In the context of burden-sharing, different interpretations of what such
burden-sharing should, and does, entail can result in very different state policies with regards to protection. It can, for instance, help explain why some states emphasise economic aid and as sufficient contributions to protection, whilst other states focus on providing asylum. Moreover, certain actors in the domestic sphere can be driven by domestic norms and ideas that even contest and oppose international norms. In this situation, it is not obvious that states will act in accordance with the norms and ideas promoted by external, ‘moral’ actors like the UNHCR. For instance, the increasing resistance and hostility in many European countries towards refugees, migrants and asylum seekers during the last few decades has developed alongside, and in contradiction to, the evolvement of the international refugee protection regime. These emerging political ideational trends have had a negative impact on European states’ willingness to provide asylum and protection (Hammerstad 2014: 57-63). They will also likely affect these states’ response to the Syrian refugee crisis and the call for burden-sharing. Agents and structures are mutually constitutive, and states have room for shaping the international structure whilst simultaneously being shaped by it. However, how these different norm interpretations come to be, and the ways in which individual states respond to international norms, is inherently dependent upon domestic political factors, and the complex relationship between the international and the domestic sphere. I thus argue that it is impossible to understand the premises of an international norm without thoroughly analysing the domestic contexts in which they are processed and implemented.

3.4.2.1. Politics as discursive ‘battles’
Each domestic political sphere is characterised by heterogeneous actors with different ideas, beliefs and worldviews. These actors take part in constant discursive ‘battles’ where competing discourses that are reflective of different interpretations of the world challenge and are in conflict with each other (Hansen 2006: 31, 32; Bratberg 2014: 29). Finlayson (2007: 549) argues that “politics is the place or moment where traditions and narratives can no longer be taken for granted, where the ‘web of belief’ is ruptured because rival traditions and narratives have clashed”. In this view, politics becomes a discursive process in which different actors are engaged in attempts to
establish fixed meanings of the social world that are compatible with their own world views (Barnett 2011: 157). Thus, “it is clear that what is distinct in politics is not the presence of beliefs but the presence of beliefs in contradiction with each other” (Finlayson 2007: 552). Contradicting beliefs in the political field regarding refugee protection also have implications for burden-sharing on the ground. It is the outcome of these discursive battles that determine the legitimate scope of action within a particular political field, especially because political discourses generate more specific policy suggestions (Hansen 2006: 21; Mahl, 2011). Thus, in order to address the question of implications for burden-sharing in practice, we must understand the discursive boundaries that shape the political space for burden-sharing.

Competing political discourses are expressed, and interact with each other, first and foremost through the use of language. It is through language these discourses are “generated, debated, adopted and changed” by different actors, such as political leaders, civil society, and the public throughout the political process (Schmidt 2011: 57). This discursive battle in the political sphere will either reproduce or eventually transform the current discursive structure. In the case of transformation, it can set new standards for appropriate political behaviour within this particular social arena. Importantly, however, politics does not only represent an arena for competition between discourses, but also for fractures belonging to the same discourse. A discourse only defines a particular framework for meaning and action, and there are several choices still to be made within these boundaries. Hence, there are often tensions and contradictions within a particular political discourse (Bratberg 2014: 31; Mahl, 2011). For instance, this has been the case in Norway, where different Progress Party politicians have, at least to an extent, expressed differing perceptions regarding the appropriate response to the Syrian refugee crisis.

3.5. Critical Discourse Analysis as Method

This subchapter will present Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis, and his concepts of power and ideological affects. It will also introduce some key concepts of CDA. Further, the subchapter will present Fairclough’s three-dimensional model
for CDA, which approaches analytically the relationship between text, discursive practice and social practice. This analytical framework combines detailed linguistic analysis and social analysis (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 66). The subchapter will also explain how this model will be applied to the particular analysis at hand. Finally, the subchapter addresses some key research challenges facing CDA.

3.5.1. Fairclough’s approach to CDA

In the thesis I apply Norman Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis, because this is the most developed approach of CDA in terms of theoretical and methodological tools (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 60). What distinguishes Fairclough’s approach to CDA from other discourse analytical approaches is its distinctive focus on the mutually constitutive relationship between text, discourses, and social practices. It thus combines “detailed linguistic analysis” with social and political theory (Bratberg 2014: 43). Fairclough (2003: 2) argues that CDA is “based upon the assumption that language is an irreducible part of social life (…) so that social analysis and research always has to take account of language.” However, social reality is also constituted by material reality and the non-discursive practices within it. Fairclough’s critical approach thus differs from Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist discourse analytical approach because it makes an explicit distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive elements of the world. CDA consequently enables the researcher to analyse the relationship between dominant discourses and actual, observable practices in the material world (Bratberg 2014: 43; 44).

3.5.1.1. Discourses and power

CDA pays particular attention to the way in which discourses contribute to creating and reproducing specific relations of power and hegemony in society. Some discourses are dominant within a particular field whilst other are suppressed. Dominant discourses will always, though often unintentionally and unknowingly, represent the interests of certain actors, whilst marginalising others. In particular, these discourses can determine who are legitimate representatives of a particular political discourse, or legitimate spokespersons on a specific political issue, because
they take part in constituting the social identities of different actors (Burnham et al. 2008: 250; 258; Bratberg 2014: 46). In consequence, they ultimately contribute to decide “who is allowed to contribute to the debates and whose views are excluded and suppressed” (Burnham et al. 2008: 258). This can have significant consequences for the people who are potentially negatively affected by the policies supported by a discourse, as they perhaps simultaneously have limited possibilities for shaping and changing the political agenda (Burnham et al. 2008: 258). Hence, actors do not have equal access to discursive influence in political processes. Moreover, dominant discourses provide legitimacy to specific policies and practices. They frame certain forms of political organisation as legitimate and desirable, whilst presenting alternative forms of such organisation as illegitimate. It is the dominant discourses in a particular social or political field that determine the political space for legitimate action. Fairclough refers to discourses that create, maintain and transform power relations in societies as ideologies (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 75). CDA aims specifically to uncover these underlying structures of power inherent in dominant discourses. Indeed, this is what makes this approach critical – it is committed to reveal who benefits from, and who is marginalised by, particular discourses in order to make social change possible (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 63; 64; Burnham et al. 2008: 258).

3.5.2. Key concepts

A central notion in the analysis is that of different fields within the political world. These are characterised by different discursive practices. In the thesis, the field in question is the Norwegian political field on refugee-and asylum issues, in which relevant national actors in refugee protection operate. Further, CDA’s emphasis on language implies that texts are important elements of the analysis. “Texts” in this instance are defined broadly as “any actual instance of language in use”, and refer to both written and spoken forms of language use. An instance of language use is conceptualised as a communicative event (Fairclough 2003: 3, 67). This definition will be applied here. Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 71) note that “communicate events not only reproduce orders of discourse, but can also change them through creative
language use”. In this way, agents in the political field constitute and maintain, but can also transform, the discursive boundaries that determine the political space for burden-sharing.

3.5.3. **Fairclough’s three-dimensional model**

CDA emphasises the relationship between text, discourse and social practice. These three analytical levels all have a constitutive impact on each other, where dominant discourses as expressed in texts and language are constitutive of social practices. However, these discourses are simultaneously shaped by material, non-discursive elements inherent in the very social practices they create. Hence, there is a mutually dependent, dialectical relationship between text, discursive practice and social practice, which together with non-discursive elements constitute our understanding of reality (Bratberg 2014: 44). Discourses are therefore both constitutive and constituted. The complex relationship between these levels of analysis is expressed in Fairclough’s three-dimensional model:

![Figure 3.1: Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for CDA adapted from Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 68)](image)

This three-dimensional model shows that every communicative event includes three dimensions. Any communicative event is:
1) A text
2) A discursive practice (text production and consumption)
3) A social practice

Every communicative event should be analysed with reference to these three different levels. Firstly, the text itself should be analysed in linguistic terms. Secondly, the analysis must look towards the discursive practice. This includes two perspectives – the production of the text and the consumption of the text. More specifically, it refers to how the author of a text have drawn upon existing discourses and genres in her production of the text, and how those who receive the text use existing discourses when they consume, understand and interpret the text. Thirdly, the analysis must look towards social practice, which refers to the wider social and political practices that the particular communicative event belongs to. However, since Fairclough’s approach to CDA emphasises that social practice consists of both discursive and non-discursive practices, social and cultural theory is also needed for sufficiently analysing the wider social practice, in addition to discourse analysis (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002: 68-69). It is the discursive practice that mediates the relationship between text and social practice, because it is in the active language production and consumption that “texts shape and are shaped by social practice” (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002: 69).

### 3.5.4. Applying Fairclough’s model

The analysis will be conducted over the course of two chapters, whereas chapter 4 will discuss texts and discursive practice, and chapter 5 will look into social practice and political implications. Fairclough’s three-dimensional model will be applied in the analysis as presented below:

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**I Textual Analysis**

The textual analysis relies on texts and interview material that express the views of prominent actors in the political field. It will centre around some core ideas that characterise the Norwegian political debate on burden-sharing in refugee protection after the Syrian crisis, in the context of two important political events: 1) The ‘Syria
agreement’ between a majority of Norwegian political parties represented in government on resettlement of Syrian refugees; and 2) the “European Refugee Crisis” in the time period August-September 2015.

II Discursive Practice
The discursive practice will be analysed on the basis of the core ideas derived from the textual analysis, and will focus on the production and consumption of the texts. This section will identify the dominant discourses in the field that compete, and are in conflict, with each other. In particular, the analysis will address the hierarchy between these discourses in order to understand how the power relations between the discourses shape the political space for burden-sharing in refugee protection. Consequently, it will enable an analysis of social practice that takes into account the hierarchy between these discourses.

III Social Practice
The social practice dimension will be discussed in chapter 5. This dimension will be discussed in relation to the discursive impact on two policy factors: 1) the implications of the discursive field for Norwegian policy regarding the Syrian refugee crisis; and 2) the long-term consequences for burden-sharing in refugee protection, from a Norwegian policy perspective. It will also address the implications of the analysis for the wider relationship between international norms and domestic spheres, the theoretical starting point of the thesis.

3.5.4.1. Intertextuality
In order to conduct a meaningful textual analysis, it is necessary to always see the text as part of a broader context. CDA also looks beyond the particular text in question, towards other texts and the intersubjective understandings that give them meaning (Bratberg 2014: 33). Fairclough thus emphasises the concept of intertextuality, which refers to “the condition whereby all communicative events draw on earlier events” (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 73). All texts relate to what has been expressed in other texts previously, for instance by using the same phrases and expressions.
Intertextuality will therefore be an important element in the analysis, because it explicitly addresses the relationship between individual texts, the discursive practice it is part of, and the broader social and political context (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 73; Bratberg 2014: 46).

3.5.4.2. Agents and Structures
Fairclough conceptualises the relationship between agency and structure as dialectical. All texts, discursive practices and social events “need to be seen as the outcome of a tension between structures and agency” (Fairclough 2003: 225). Discursive structures limit and define action to an extent, whilst agents simultaneously have ‘causal powers’, that is, a possibility to produce new texts, events and actions “in potentially creative and new ways” (Fairclough 2003: 224). An essential question in CDA is therefore whether the competing discourses within a particular political field contribute to reproducing or challenging the existing discursive structure. The ideological effects of hegemonic discourses are important factors in this regard, as they largely define the space for legitimate action. However, agents also have a possibility to challenge this discursive structure. This dialectical relationship between agents and structures will therefore be an important element in the analysis.

3.5.4.3. Non-discursive factors
Fairclough’s approach emphasises the role of both discursive and non-discursive elements in constituting social reality. The impact of non-discursive elements plays an important role in this particular case. The Syrian refugee crisis has enormous negative social and material consequences. People are killed, tortured, and drowned on their way to safety. They lack food, housing and medical aid. These are non-discursive elements that have a clear impact on the discursive practices within the political field. In particular, they matter in the way in which they affect the agents who take part in creating and reproducing relevant texts, discourses and social practices. The discursive dimensions create the space for political action on refugee protection, but they are simultaneously affected by wider non-discursive elements. For instance, the refugee crisis that hit Europe in August 2015 was likely to change at least some
agents’ perception of the situation and consequently what needs to be done about it. In turn, these agents were more likely to challenge the existing discursive structure and enable new practices within the field of refugee protection.

3.5.5. Selecting empirical material
Two forms of empirical material will be analysed. Firstly, the thesis will employ texts derived from the Norwegian national press and political party websites. Secondly, it will employ material from semi-structured interviews conducted in conversation with key informants in the political field. It is important to note that these forms of empirical material are different, and employed for different reasons. Whilst the texts constitute the most prominent and significant views and perceptions that characterise the political field, the interview material is employed first and foremost to shed light upon the analysis and to help develop a greater understanding of the political field, as well as a better grasp of relevant factual information. Since CDA considers both written and spoken language as constituting ‘texts’, both types of material will be analysed with the help of the same analytical tools selected from Fairclough’s list.

3.5.5.1. Choosing texts
The main empirical material that will be employed in the analysis is textual material, first and foremost news articles and opinion pieces. Importantly, a discourse analytical approach does not include the criterion of representativeness. A discourse analytical approach is not claiming to cover the full range of actors, ideas and discourses within the field. This is especially important when addressing an issue that has received enormous media attention and political focus, such as the Syrian refugee crisis. The texts that have been chosen for analysis in this thesis are thus not a representative selection of the whole population of actors and discourses related to burden-sharing in refugee protection. Instead, the texts have been selected on the basis of two criteria: firstly, they are derived from a set of key actors in the discursive field that have been particularly prominent during one or both of the political events that the analysis is tied to; secondly, they are chosen because they represent certain prominent differing ideas, meanings and discourses regarding burden-sharing. Addressing and analysing
competing discourses in the political field is a central part of the research question addressed in this thesis. It is therefore most important, as in discourse analysis more generally, that the material is large enough to cover different perspectives of reality (Bratberg 2014: 40).

3.5.5.2 Semi-structured interviews

The semi-structured interview is placed in “the grey area” between standardised and non-standardised interview forms (Burnham et.al. 2008: 240). They involve the researcher’s clear theoretical understanding of the research project when entering the interview setting, but at the same time is open for the respondents own interpretations and understandings, as well as allowing the respondent to approach new areas that can provide additional insights and new understandings (Burnham et.al 2008: 241). In an interview setting with persons that have such specific in-depth knowledge and expertise, the researcher is able to grasp particular insights that are useful for the research project, and which cannot easily be obtained from more general media sources. The purpose of my interview process was to gain a deeper understanding of the political field that could supplement the textual material, and to obtain in-depth knowledge that would help me when conducting the analysis. I was also aiming to attain factual knowledge of the issue at hand. Asylum policies in general can often be complex and difficult to grasp for a non-expert. This is especially difficult in the case of the Syrian crisis because the situation is escalating quickly, often changing on a day-to-day basis, and often causing the media and other institutions to make mistakes and report wrongful information. Since enhanced knowledge and understanding of the field was my main purpose, I chose to interview key informants that operate in institutions and organisations that are central in the Norwegian refugee protection field.
### 3.5.5.3. Overview of selected texts and interview material

Table 4.1: Overview of selected texts for analysis. Case I: The Syria agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Sandberg – Progress Party (FrP)</td>
<td>“Immigration threatens the welfare society” - Fremskrittspartiet 2 May 2015</td>
<td>Sandberg claims that Norway cannot afford high levels of non-Western immigration if we are to preserve the welfare state as we know it.</td>
<td>Party website article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harald Tom Nesvik – Progress Party (FrP)</td>
<td>“That is why we broke off the negotiations on Syrian refugees” - Aftenposten 5 June 2015</td>
<td>Nesvik explains why the Progress Party could not be part of the Syria agreement.</td>
<td>Op-ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erna Solberg – Conservative Party (Høyre)</td>
<td>“We will not receive refugees if we do not have houses for them” - Dagbladet 10 June 2015</td>
<td>Erna Solberg argues that the actual number of refugees that will be resettled depends upon the housing situation on the local level.</td>
<td>Newspaper article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonas Gahr Støre – Labour Party (Ap)</td>
<td>“A good response from Norway in an extraordinary situation” Arbeiderpartiet, 10 June 2015</td>
<td>Støre argues that the Syria agreement represents an important political compromise in such a serious situation.</td>
<td>Party website article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audun Lysbakken – Socialist Left Party (SV)</td>
<td>“That is why the Socialist Left Party broke off the Syria-negotiations” (”Derfor brøt SV Syria-forhandlingene) - SV, 10 June 2015</td>
<td>Lysbakken explains why the party could not support the final Syria-agreement.</td>
<td>Party website article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Society</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Syria Platform: John Peder Egenæs (Amnesty), Liv Torres (Norwegian People’s Aid), Gry Larsen (CARE), Anne-Marie Helland (Norwegian Church Aid), Ann-Magrit Austend (NOAS), Åsne Havnelid (Norwegian Red Cross), Tove R. Wang (Save the Children)</td>
<td>“Op-ed.: National voluntary work for Syrian refugees” - VG, 11 March 2015</td>
<td>Norwegian civil society organisations encourages increased financial support to Lebanon and the resettlement of 10,000 Syrian refugees in Norway.</td>
<td>Op-ed. The views of eight actors are represented in the text.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.2: Overview of selected texts for analysis. Case II: "The European Crisis"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audun Lysbakken – Socialist Left Party</td>
<td>&quot;It is completely true that the refugees must be helped where they are. And now they are in Europe&quot;. - Aftenposten, 01.09.15</td>
<td>Lysbakken writes about his own experiences during his visit to Lesvos, Greece.</td>
<td>Op-ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audun Lysbakken - Socialist Left Party</td>
<td>&quot;Solberg is hesitant to the EUs refugee dugnad&quot; (Solberg avventende til EUs flyktingedugnad) - Vårt Land 07.09.15</td>
<td>Lysbakken argues that the Syria-agreement has expired.</td>
<td>Newspaper article. Four actors’ perspectives are included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl I. Hagen – Progress Party</td>
<td>&quot;Carl I. Hagen wants to send all the boat refugees in return&quot; (Carl I. Hagen vil sende alle båtflyktningene i retur) - Aftenposten 20.08.15</td>
<td>Hagen believes that Europe will collapse under the pressure of too many refugees.</td>
<td>Newspaper article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siv Jensen - Progress Party</td>
<td>&quot;Piss convinced that it is better to help in the nearby areas&quot; - Dagens Næringsliv 06.09.15</td>
<td>Siv Jensen sticks with her recommendation to the municipalities to say no to settling more refugees.</td>
<td>Newspaper article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trine Skei Grande – Liberal Party (Venstre)</td>
<td>&quot;The Liberal Party wants an emergency meeting about the refugee situation” (Venstre vil ha hastemøte om flyktningesituasjonen) - Venstre 07.09.15</td>
<td>Skei Grande wants Solberg to organise an extraordinary parliamentary meeting on the refugee crisis.</td>
<td>Party website article.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trine Skei Grande – Liberal Party</td>
<td>&quot;The Liberal Party demands a new look at the Syria agreement” - NRK 04.09.15</td>
<td>Skei Grande believes that the Syria-agreement already has expired.</td>
<td>Newspaper article. The perspectives of four actors are included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erna Solberg – Conservative Party</td>
<td>&quot;Solberg is hesitant to the EUs refugee dugnad&quot; - Vårt Land 07.09.15</td>
<td>Solberg holds off the decision as to whether Norway will take part in the new European relocation mechanism.</td>
<td>Newspaper article. The perspectives of four actors are included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knut Arild Hareide, The Christian Democrats (KrF)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Civil Society*
Table 4.3: List of key informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Society</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pål Nesse</td>
<td>Senior advisor</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann-Magrit Austenå</td>
<td>Secretary-general</td>
<td>Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers (NOAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beate Ekeløve-Slydal</td>
<td>Political advisor</td>
<td>Amnesty International Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solveig Igesund</td>
<td>Political advisor</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureaucracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johan Meyer</td>
<td>Official</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Justice and Public Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research Community</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigdis Vevstad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Son Consulting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6. Research Challenges

Discourse analytical approaches have generally received much criticism from positivist social scientists that are concerned with methodological questions regarding causality, generalisation, validity and reliability. This subchapter discusses some of these challenges, and how CDA can address them.

Interpretivism rejects the possibility of making scientific, law-like generalisations about human action or the social world, because all social knowledge of the world is dependent on human interpretation. These interpretations are inherently unstable and
ambiguous, and are always in flux (Yee 1996: 100). Consequently, constructivism has often been criticised for its inability to draw causal inferences. For instance, King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that rationalist epistemologies are superior in explaining causal effects. However, social constructivists reject this criticism, and instead promote a broader view of causality. They highlight the ability of interpretivism to reveal partial and contingent causal explanations that take the subjective and dynamic nature of all social science explanations into account (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 394; Yee 1996: 103). Notably, Fairclough (2003: 8) stresses the ability of CDA to draw such contingent causal inferences. He refers to a form of causality in which the interpretations of certain texts can have certain causal effects in particular situations. However, since all social knowledge is dependent on interpretation, consumers can understand the same text in different ways. The researcher can therefore not hope to uncover an objective and eternal truth, because such ‘truths’ only represent alternative interpretations. Consequently, the establishment of linear causality is neither possible nor desirable.

Fairclough’s three-dimensional model also highlights another crucial point related to the issue of causality, namely the recursive dynamics of discourse. Text and discursive practice constitute social practice, but social practice is simultaneously constitutive of text and discursive practice. Hence, new texts can create changes in social practice, but changes in social practice may also constitute new texts. These dynamics make it impossible to establish straightforward causality claims, because causality goes both ways simultaneously. There is no ‘beginning’ or ‘end’ to the causal chain.

Interpretivism further rejects the notion that a researcher can be completely objective in her research. Instead, due to the subjective and interpretive nature of all social science research, they “expect each observer to produce her own effect on the evidence” (Hopf 2002:30). For instance, Fairclough (2003: 14) notes that all textual analysis is somewhat inherently selective, because the researcher always has personal motivations for asking specific questions about specific texts. These interpretivist
assumptions make it difficult for knowledge claims made by constructivist methodology to be either reliable or replicable according to positivist standards. They also imply that there is little possibility for generalisation. However, the study of particular cases can still provide a general theoretical understanding that to some extent can be applied to other cases (Hopf 2002: 30; 31). For instance, the particular discursive processes taking place in Norway on refugee protection, and the causal effects they have, will only be valid in these specific domestic contexts. Still, by understanding these processes, we can still develop some theoretical understanding of how the norm of burden-sharing can be promoted and challenged in different domestic contexts, and consequently also draw some tentative conclusions about the implications of different discursive structures for the implementation of this norm in general.

Overall, the methodological criticisms highlighted by positivist political scientists are generally not that problematic for discourse analytical scholars, as they “do not wish to be limited by the by the straitjacket of the traditional scientific approach to research” (Burnham et.al. 2008: 256). Discourse analytical research simply cannot be assessed by the same criteria as non-interpretive forms of analysis, because their epistemological foundations are inherently different. Instead, the foundations for validity lie in clear justifications of specific interpretations, as well as a clear definition of which documents are used for analysis and why, and the specific tools that are used in the analysis. The thesis will address these criteria specifically in the later chapters. The investigative nature of discourse analysis allows us to question widely accepted knowledge, meaning, and action. In turn, it provides a hypothesis-generating starting point for further research (Bratberg 2014: 54-56). CDA therefore largely represents an inductive form of social science research. However, the recursive aspect of Fairclough’s model also means that his approach to CDA includes a slightly deductive element. Pre-existing discursive structures take part in constituting all social and political activity. Thus, a research project applying CDA should address these pre-existing structures.
4 Constituting Burden-sharing in Norway: Text and Discursive Practice

This chapter will present an analysis of relevant texts and discursive practices that take part in constituting burden-sharing in the Norwegian political field. The main purpose of this chapter is to identify the dominant discourses in the political field, and the hierarchical relationship between them. This discursive structure, in turn, determines the scope for political action regarding burden-sharing in refugee protection. However, the chapter will also address the changing power relations between the discourses as the situation has developed until late September 2015, and how the dialectical relationship between agency and structure has resulted in processes of both discursive reproduction and transformation.

Subchapter 4.1. provides a brief background of Norwegian refugee politics in the context of the Syrian crisis. Subchapter 4.2. presents a selection of Fairclough’s analytical tools that will be applied in the textual analysis, whilst subchapter 4.3. discusses some analytical challenges. The textual analysis is presented in subchapters 4.4.- 4.6. It focuses on texts that express the opinions of central actors in the political field. The analysis is organised around two important events that have shaped the political debate in Norway on this issue – the so-called “Syria agreement” and the ‘European refugee crisis’. Analytically they will be treated separately, because - despite the short amount of time between them - the context was very different due to the quick escalation of the situation at Europe’s borders. This enables the analysis to identify and discuss factors of both continuity and change. Finally, subchapter 4.7. and 4.8. provide an analysis of discursive practice. They identify the competing discourses on burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway. Ideological effects and power relations will be central in this part of the analysis.
4.1. Norwegian politics of refugee protection following the Syrian crisis

Norway has been an important actor in the international response to the Syrian conflict. The country is the sixth’ largest humanitarian donor in this regard, directing the aid mainly towards the Syrian refugee population in Syria’s neighbouring countries, Lebanon in particular. Norway has also been actively involved in transporting chemical weapons from Syria for destruction (Orchard and Miller 2014: 47; Norad, 2015). Further, Norway is a prominent actor in terms of providing physical protection to Syrian refugees, especially in terms of resettlement. Norway has the second largest regular resettlement programme in Europe, in collaboration with the UNHCR. A significant share of the regular quotas has been used to provide protection for Syrian refugees. In addition to the regular scheme, the Norwegian government has established a specific resettlement quota for Syrians. In this regard, the scheme prioritises the resettlement of Syrian families with children (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013; Orchard and Miller 2014: 62). As of August 2015, Norway had pledged 9,000 resettlement places for Syrians, one of the largest resettlement pledges made by any Western country (UNHCR, 2015e).

A range of key political actors are involved in the Norwegian refugee protection field. These include political parties and individuals within them, civil society, public institutions, and the research community. The government parties – the Conservative Party and the Progress Party – clearly have the greatest political power in the field. However, as a minority government, they are particularly sensitive to competing discourses within the field. The Labour Party is the country’s largest political party, and is thus another powerful political actor. Further, the government-supporting parties, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party, have been active in the current debate, along with the Socialist Left Party. Also, a large group of civil society actors have been prominent in the political debate on the Syrian refugee crisis. Notably, 11 large organisations, including the Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian People’s Aid, Amnesty, Save the Children, Norwegian Church Aid, CARE and NOAS have
created “The Syria Platform”, through which they have coordinated their national political advocacy activities. There has also been a growing grassroots movement among the Norwegian public as the crisis has evolved. In particular, the grassroots organisation Refugees Welcome to Norway experienced a huge increase in support and engagement only during the few weeks when the crisis at the European borders escalated.

4.2. Analytical tools

In Analysing Discourse (2003), Fairclough presents a range of varied tools for textual analysis. These are not all supposed to be applied to the same analytical project – rather, as Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 76) notes, the researcher must choose the tools that are most appropriate for her specific research project. There is no set “recipe” for how CDA is conducted in practice. Fairclough’s approach thus enables a highly eclectic form of analysis. The purpose of this detailed textual analysis is, however, to address the “social effects of texts” (Fairclough 2003: 11). Hence, it does not simply include linguistic analysis but also ‘interdiscursive analysis’, ”that is, seeing texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate together” (Fairclough 2003: 4). In consequence, Fairlough’s analytical tools aim specifically to reveal the discursive processes inherent in texts. They enable a dynamic textual analysis that uncovers “how social agents make or ‘texture’ texts by setting up relations between their elements” (Fairclough 2003: 12). Moreover, since texts entail discursive processes, they also express underlying structures of power and hegemony. Thus, an important function of Fairclough’s analytical tools is to reveal these power structures. Below I present the analytical tools that I deem most appropriate for this thesis. In the analysis itself, however, not all these tools will be discussed explicitly in the analysis of every text. Some tools have also been removed over the course of the analysis.

Table 4.4: Selection of analytical tools for textual analysis, adapted from Fairclough (2003: 191-194; 1992: 108-109)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical tool</th>
<th>Related questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metaphors</strong></td>
<td>- How are metaphors used in the text to construct a particular view of social reality?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Difference** | Which (combination) of the following scenarios characterise the orientation to difference in the text?  
  a) an openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference; an exploration of difference  
  b) an accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, norms, power  
  c) an attempt to resolve or overcome difference  
  d) a bracketing of difference, a focus of commonality, solidarity  
  e) consensus, a normalisation and acceptance of differences of power which brackets or suppresses differences over meaning and over norms |
| **Intertextuality** | - Of relevant other texts/voices, which are included, which are significantly excluded?  
  - Where other voices are included, are they attributed, and if so, specifically or non-specifically?  
  - Are attributed voices directly reported (quoted), or indirectly reported? How are other voices textured in relation to the authorial voice, and in relation to each other? |
| **Assumptions** | - What existential, propositional, or value assumptions are made? Is there a case for seeing any assumptions as ideological? |
| **Discourses** | - What discourses are drawn upon in the text, and how are they textured together? Is there a significant mixing of discourses? |
| **Evaluation** | - To what values (in terms of what is desirable or undesirable) do authors commit themselves? |

### 4.3. Analytical challenges

As mentioned above, CDA faces several challenges with regards to validity and reliability. To an extent, discourse analysts counter this criticism because of their inherently different approach to the study of social sciences. However, a critical discourse analysis must still clearly account for what underlies a particular analytical interpretation and the implications that follow. This involves including a sufficient amount of quotes from texts and interviews throughout the analysis, so that these findings are well documented and exemplified for its readers (Bratberg 2014: 54).
will therefore include a substantive number of quotes in the analysis. The text are also easily accessible online, so that the readers can consider my interpretations of the texts. In the case of interviews however, exemplifying quotes will hopefully be enough. This will strengthen the reliability of the results, because it enables the reader to understand my interpretations, and for him or her to investigate whether they make the same interpretations from the same material.

Another challenge in the empirical analysis is related to the use of language. All texts and interviews are in Norwegian, and must be translated into English. Because CDA relies upon on a detailed analysis of language, some linguistic nuances risk being ‘lost in translation’. To address this issue, I include certain linguistic terms also in their original form. Since the texts are easily accessible, readers can also judge if they deem my translations to be appropriate.

Despite the acknowledgment that discourse analysis does not have to be representative in terms of data selection, some will argue that the challenge of bias remains. Not all actors are equally represented in the political field. Some make more noise, and some just get more attention. Hence, there will be more material related to some actors than others. Arguably, from a critical discourse analytical perspective, this is in itself a finding. A crucial aspect of CDA is to address the inherent power relations in the discursive field. The representatives for the dominant discourses within a particular political field will more likely be heard, because they are dominant. Hence, the uneven relationship between actors that becomes visible in the imbalance of the empirical material is not necessarily a shortcoming, but a discovery. In general, not all actors and all ideas must be covered to the same extent, if at all, in CDA.

4.4. Textual Analysis

During the initial analysis of the empirical material, I identified three dominant discourses in the political field of burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway. I have labelled these discourses the humanitarian discourse, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, and the ‘nation-state’ discourse. The humanitarian discourse is constituted
largely by international humanitarian and refugee protection norms, and stresses the need for global solidarity. The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse is heavily influenced by market liberalist economic ideas, and emphasises the importance of carefully balancing international demands with national concerns, especially with regards to economy and resources. Finally, the ‘nation-state’ discourse encompasses a view of Norway as an independent nation-state, which must act on the basis of its own domestic interests. In this way, the nation-state discourse constitutes a form of ‘protest’ against the humanitarian discourse and the prominent role of international norms in national politics. These three discourses take part in ‘discursive battles’ in the political field. The outcome of this battle shapes the political field for action in terms of burden-sharing. The power hierarchy between them, I argue, therefore has significant consequences for Norwegian burden-sharing initiatives in practice.

Before conducting the textual analysis, I developed a ‘guiding assumption’ about which of the political actors represented in the empirical material are likely to belong to each of these discourses. This ‘guiding assumption’ is based upon my knowledge of the political field, and the explicit political affiliations of the different actors. The purpose of this assumption is to provide an ‘analytical lens’ that highlights the mutually constitutive relationship between agency and structure in CDA, where the ideas and perspectives of agents are partly constituted by pre-existing discursive structures in the field. This 'analytical lens' thus enables us to recognize that the ideas expressed in the textual analysis do not appear from 'nowhere'. In this way, the guiding assumption also gives the analysis a loosely deductive point of departure.

It is reasonable to believe that relevant civil society is identified by the humanitarian discourse. In terms of political parties, it is likely that the left-wing Socialist Left Party also is largely identified by the humanitarian discourse due to its strong emphasis on international solidarity. The centre-left Labour Party is more difficult to place, and is likely to have fractions constituted by both the humanitarian discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. The market liberalist foundations of the Conservative Party imply that they are strongly identified by the ‘cost-and-capacity’
discourse. The Progress Party, on the other hand, is most explicitly critical to immigration, and it is thus reasonable to assume that it is mainly identified by the ‘nation-state’ discourse. The Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party are support parties to the government, but also traditionally have a stronger emphasis on international solidarity. I therefore assume that they are constituted by the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, but with significant fractions from the humanitarian discourse. It is important to note, however, that this assumption is only guiding, and subject to revision.

In the following analysis of the different cases, I will present the key findings from the analysis of the textual material. More specifically, I will highlight some core ideas that characterise the debate in the political field. These ideas do not in themselves constitute a discourse. However, when they come together in so-called ‘clusters’ of ideas that together form a particular view of the social world, then they represent a discourse. In this way, the core ideas presented in the textual analysis take part in constituting, and separating, the different discourses on burden-sharing in the political field. Still, there is a difference between the general notion of the role of ideas in politics, and the specific notion of ‘discourses’. In the analysis of discursive practice, I will show how the core ideas that characterise the political debate also take part in constituting broader discursive practice in the field. This will be exemplified through an analysis of texts and interview material. The textual analysis as it is presented here does not constitute the full analysis, but a summary of the most important findings derived from a more comprehensive, initial analysis of the entire empirical material.

4.5. Case I: the Syria Agreement

4.5.1. Background: the Syria Agreement

In spring 2015, the political parties represented in the Norwegian parliament entered negotiations on a special resettlement quota for Syrian refugees. Before the negotiations began, eight of Norway’s largest civil society organisations had joined
together and formed the “Syria Platform”, through which they strongly encouraged Norway to accept 10,000 Syrian refugees from Syria’s neighbouring countries for resettlement over a period of two years. They also called for a strengthening of Norway’s financial contribution to humanitarian aid in Syria and the region (Egenæs et al. 2015). Along the same line, the opposition parties and the government-supporting parties were also in favour of accepting an additional 10,000 Syrian quota refugees. However, the government parties were opposed to this suggestion. In consequence, the final agreement between the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Greens, the Christian Democrats, and the Liberals included the resettlement of 8000 Syrian refugees in Norway over a period of three years. The Progress Party left the negotiations early, despite being a member of the government coalition, because they were principally against increasing the total number of resettlement places for refugees in Norway. Instead, they wished to concentrate on providing aid in nearby areas (Nesvik, 2015). The Socialist Left Party also decided to break off the negotiations, because they did not find the agreement ambitious enough and could thus not support it (SV, 2015).

4.5.2. Identifying core ideas

In the initial analysis of the textual material from the Syria Agreement, I was able to derive certain core ideas that characterised and defined the debate. These core ideas are thus particularly significant in the discursive practice - both because they are partly constituted by the different discourses, and because they take part in constituting the different discourses themselves. In particular, I found conflict along the following ideational positions:

- “Helping them here or helping them where they are?” – how to prioritise different forms of burden-sharing initiatives.
- Level of commitment to international values and normative obligations.
- Different perceptions of what ‘morality’ among political actors entails in this context.
These core ideas are addressed individually below, supported by selected examples from the empirical material.

4.5.3. ‘Helping them here or helping them where they are?’

The Syria Agreement deals explicitly with Norway’s contribution to international burden-sharing initiatives. In this regard, the different actors in the political field have expressed conflicting perspectives regarding what forms of burden-sharing are most appropriate and desirable, as well as the extent to which Norway should contribute to international burden-sharing generally.

Civil society has been prominent in advocating extensive burden-sharing. In the op-ed “National duggnad for Syrian refugees” (emphasis added), eight of the largest humanitarian and/or rights organisations in Norway emphasise the need for combining burden-sharing measures in the response to the crisis. They argue that Norway must accept 10,000 Syrian refugees directly from Syria’s neighbouring countries over the next two years, as well as provide more financial resources for humanitarian aid to the region. They note that the capacity of Syria’s neighbouring countries, especially Lebanon’s, is “stretched to the breaking point”. Consequently, they argue that:

Norway, like other countries, must therefore increase the support to Lebanon significantly – also as a thank you for helping. In addition we must contribute by taking a larger share of those refugees that with difficulty can be protected in the nearby area.

They also suggest ensuring the provision of temporary protection:

This can be a combination of regular quota refugees – and that we provide temporary protection to more, like the Immigration Act has provisioned for, exactly in situations like this.

In this way, civil society emphasises the importance of combining financial burden-sharing and physical burden-sharing, in order to help as many as possible in the nearby region. At the same time, they insist on upholding the humanitarian value of protecting the most vulnerable by resettling those who cannot be adequately protected in the region. Hence, civil society draws heavily upon a humanitarian discourse in advocating a combination of burden-sharing initiatives.
However, some political parties take a very different approach to the issue. The Progress Party argues against physical burden-sharing – and resettlement specifically - because financial burden-sharing is more efficient. In an op-ed in *Aftenposten*, parliamentary leader Harald Tom Nesvik argues that the Progressive Party could not justify the agreement because it is politically irresponsible:

(…) To receive 10,000 refugees in Norway, is the absolute least efficient way to remedy the refugee situation in Syria (…) We show political responsibility by using the resources to help where the help matters the most.

Nesvik thus draws upon a humanitarian discourse, by emphasising how important it is that Norway contributes to helping Syrian refugees in such an extraordinary situation. However, this discourse is mixed with a ‘rationality’ discourse that emphasises efficiency and effectiveness. Rationality, not emotion, must drive Norway’s response to the crisis, because we have a commitment to helping these refugees in the most ‘sensible’ way. The rationalist perspective is further emphasised by the use of certain metaphors. In particular, Nesvik refers to the Syria agreement as “symbolic policies”. This metaphor implies that the Syria agreement simply is an expression of good intentions that has no real substance or impact. It is only ‘for show’ and will not truly improve the situation of Syrian refugees. The Progress Party’s solution stands in contrast to this, as a “politically responsible” solution. Further, Nesvik refers to a resettlement pledge as a “golden ticket”. This phrasing implies that resettlement is a disproportional form of protection for the very few compared to the desperate situation of the many. Hence, resettlement is framed to be morally unjust:

The Progress Party wants to give fewer people the golden ticket – but give more the possibility to get their basic needs covered.

Further, by referring to the potential negative consequences of quota refugees for Norwegian municipalities, Nesvik implies that providing help in the nearby region is also a better solution for Norwegian society. Hence, Nesvik’s arguments underpin a cost and benefit-perspective. Similarly, Prime Minister Erna Solberg from the Conservative Party also expresses a preference for financial burden-sharing. The
article “We will not receive refugees if we do not have homes for them” contains an interview with Solberg shortly after the Syria agreement was made public. Here, she expresses satisfaction with the agreement:

*The starting point from the Conservative Party’s and the government’s view was something else, but in the face of a parliamentary majority that could have agreed to receive a much higher number, then I think this agreement was good.*

This is an evaluative statement implying that receiving a high number of quota refugees is undesirable. In addition, Solberg states that the agreement to provide more help in Syria’s nearby areas is “incredibly important”. This implies that she prefers financial aid to resettlement in terms of burden-sharing measures. However, the statement is also seemingly an effort to resolve or overcome difference between the government and the parliamentary majority on this issue, as she still chooses to characterise the agreement as “good”. Regarding intertextuality, Solberg implicitly draws upon the civil society text when she uses the metaphor “national *dugnad*” (emphasis added) in reference to the efforts needed in terms of local settlement and integration of the refugees. “*Dugnad*” is a Norwegian concept that refers to a common voluntary effort for the good of all. In this text, however, Solberg uses the term to emphasise the challenge that comes with the resettlement process, rather than as simply a positive effort for the common good:

*This demands a large national “dugnad” to achieve settlement and a good integration programme.*

This statement expresses a value assumption implying that the resettlement of 8000 Syrians will be a great cost for Norway that will demand much from society. Hence, it can be characterised as an assumption with ideological effects, as it supports a ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse which emphasises national considerations, and economic and resources constraints.

However, some political parties also see the value in combining burden-sharing measures. When Labour Party leader Jonas Gahr Store expresses his satisfaction on the day the agreement is announced, he is particularly pleased that the agreement involves both resettlement and financial burden-sharing in the nearby areas:
Both have been important to the Labour Party.

Hence, he does not prioritise between these burden-sharing measures, or put one up against the other, like Nesvik and Solberg have done. By referring to the UNHCR’s call for physical burden-sharing in order to protect the most vulnerable, Støre acknowledges that both forms of burden-sharing are necessary components of an adequate protection strategy. In doing so, he draws upon a humanitarian discourse. In consequence, there is a distinction in the political field between those who stress the need to combine burden-sharing measures to provide sufficient protection, and those who view financial burden-sharing as preferable.

4.5.4. Commitment to international values and obligations

Actors in the field differ significantly in terms of their level of commitment to international values and obligations, in particular related to humanitarian and refugee norms. Unsurprisingly, civil society commits strongly to international principles. Throughout the Syria Platform’s opinion piece, the authors are continuously referring to humanitarian values, including the right to protection and the mandate of the High Commissioner. The text explicitly states that Norway has a normative international obligation to contribute to burden-sharing:

*Given the dramatic situation, it is our humanitarian duty to contribute more and better.*

This statement expresses a strong belief that international society has a common responsibility for the protection of Syrian refugees, and that this must be followed by concrete policies. Similarly, leader of the Socialist Left Party Audun Lysbakken also expresses a strong commitment to international humanitarian values. In the text where Lysbakken explains why the party left the negotiations, he highlights Norway’s obligation to take not just a share of the burden, but a *large enough* share. In general, Lysbakken and SV strongly commit to the principle of solidarity, with the refugees as well as the affected region, to the extent that they cannot compromise this position:

*(...) the final agreement involves an effort that is too small, and that comes too late. (...)*
International solidarity and responsibility should in this view be the primary driver of political action. However, there are disagreements in the political field about whether the Syria agreement adequately fulfils Norway’s international responsibilities. Unlike Lysbakken, who justifies his party’s exit from the negotiations because the agreement does not meet the standards of Norway’s international normative obligations, Støre applauds the agreement exactly because it reflects a commitment to these obligations:

*The UN High Commissioner has long said that there are about 10 per cent of the refugees in the nearby areas that cannot be given help or protection there. They have repeatedly asked the international society to receive more of these.*

In this quote, Støre emphasises the shared responsibility of the international community as a whole to respond to this humanitarian crisis. He thus highlights how important it is that Norway “take(s) our share of the responsibility” and help the most vulnerable. Hence, the text is underlined by a commitment to international principles and an appreciation of the Syria Agreement exactly because it enables Norway to fulfil its international responsibilities.

In striking contrast to these views, Per Sandberg on behalf of the Progress Party promotes a value-explicit perspective that is in conflict with the humanitarian perspective. The article “Immigration threatens the welfare society” refers to his speech at the Progress Party congress in spring 2015, which is partly a reaction to the Labour Party’s decision to resettle 10 000 Syrian refugees. Here, Sandberg draws heavily upon a sovereign nation-state discourse that stresses the superiority of national values and concerns over international normative commitments. This is expressed in particular through the intertextuality element in the text. The only other ‘voice’ included in the text is that of the Labour Party. However, there is no inclusion of other important actors or texts in the debate, such as international actors or civil society claims. References to international commitments are completely excluded from the text, which implies that Sandberg finds these arguments somewhat insignificant.

There is also a form of ‘middle ground’ in the political field between these two conflicting perspectives. Notably, Solberg expresses a more balanced view in terms of
prioritising a commitment to international normative obligations or focusing on national considerations. The text that addresses Solberg’s comments on the agreement contains some of her propositional assumptions of what can happen in terms of the agreement, when she refers to the decision that the quota scheme shall be evaluated in 2017:

This entails that there are some preconditions (...) we shall look at the results of settlement and the results of asylum arrivals.

Arguably, this statement contains an evaluation of values. By emphasising the need to consider these results, Solberg implicitly states that she is not unconditionally committed to the humanitarian values and the need to provide protection to vulnerable refugees who needs it. Rather, she considers this aspect in relation to, and perhaps even subordinated to, her consideration of the importance of maintaining orderly conditions in the Norwegian asylum system. In addition, she does not want to strain the municipalities and local communities. This way of thinking draws upon notions of rationality, capacity and costs.

4.5.5. Conceptualising ‘political’ morality

Another significant ideational distinction in the field is related to the perception of ‘morality’ among the political actors in the field, and what constitute ‘moral’ political acts in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis. This notion of morality is closely tied to the issue of commitment to international values or to national concerns. Firstly, the civil society text strongly expresses a perception of morality that embraces international solidarity, compassion and protecting those in need. Notably, one particular metaphor is often repeated in the text, namely “dugnad”. In this text, the use of this metaphor can be interpreted as an attempt to bracketing difference by focusing on commonality and solidarity, because the concept is deeply embedded in Norwegian national identity. Especially the formulation “national dugnad” (emphasis added) implies that the whole nation can and should come together in this common effort. To refer to the reception of 10,000 Syrian refugees for resettlement and/or temporary protection as a dugnad, implies that this act is assumed to represent something
morally good and desirable. Hence, the metaphor is applied differently by civil society than by Solberg.

The Labour Party takes a similar approach, as Støre emphasises the need for solidarity and community in the face of such an extraordinary situation. He is particularly pleased that the parties managed to achieve a broad majority agreement that included the support from the government (at least from the largest government party). The text thus expresses a clear focus on commonality and solidarity between the political parties that came together to support the agreement. In this way, Støre lifts the agreement, and the extraordinary humanitarian situation itself, ‘above’ the conflicts and deliberations of ordinary national politics:

*This case highlights some of the finest about the Norwegian political system: that we stand together across political lines when the seriousness of the situation requires an extraordinary effort to help other people.*

When emphasising this political solidarity, he does not include a reference to the parties that broke off the negotiations for one reason or another. This can be interpreted as a possible attempt to suppress domestic political difference in the desire to perceive and present Norway as united in its common efforts to undertake its international responsibility. Hence, in terms of evaluation, Støre encompasses a view of political morality that results in cooperation across party lines that embraces international norms and values.

In contrast, political fractions within the Progress Party express a very different conception of political morality in this context, which mainly concerns the consequences for Norwegian society. Sandberg claims that a high level of non-Western immigration is incompatible with the welfare society Norway has today. The text is characterised by the heavy inclusion of existential and value assumptions:

*Norway simply cannot afford to maintain a high non-Western immigration if we are to preserve the safe and good welfare state we have today.*
Firstly, this statement is an explicit value assumption as it deems the welfare state as ‘safe’ and ‘good’. Secondly, it is also an existential assumption as it factually states that the welfare state and high levels of non-Western immigration is incompatible. These assumptions can arguably be seen as ideological. They support the assumptions embedded in a political anti-immigration discourse that aims to universalise the perception of non-Western immigration as an inherently negative phenomenon. In the text, Sandberg draws upon two political discourses, namely the welfare discourse and the anti-immigration discourse, in a way that makes one (welfare) dependent upon the other (low levels of immigration). This form of discursive argumentation is also in line with an anti-immigration discourse, which emphasises the harm such immigration will do to Norwegian society. Furthermore, in terms of intertextuality, Sandberg emphasises an accentuation of difference between the Labour Party and his own:

*I think the voters now are beginning to realise that the Labour Party wishes to implement totally irresponsible immigration policies that in practice will abolish today’s welfare state...*(ref: the agreement) shows how important it is that the Progress Party holds government and pulls the immigration politics in a responsible and restrictive direction.*

This polemic statement reflects a conflict between the Progress Party and the Labour Party as it contrasts a “totally irresponsible” liberal immigration policy with a “responsible and restrictive” policy. Hence, a restrictive immigration policy is deemed morally good, even in a situation such as the Syrian crisis. This accentuation of difference also implies a conflict between the Progress Party and other political actors in the field that are supportive of the decision to accept more refugees. Moreover, this conflict is seemingly deeply embedded in norms, values and meanings. In Sandberg’s view, this is not simply about 10,000 refugees, this is about what kind of Norway one wants for one’s children. In this regard, it is the Progress Party that stands for preserving the resources and the welfare state that benefits the Norwegian population. Hence, in this view, ‘political morality’ means taking a stand against international demands that have perceived negative effects on Norwegian society, and prevent burden-sharing initiatives that negatively affect Norwegian welfare.

4.6. Case II: The ‘European Crisis’
To say that the refugee crisis at Europe’s borders began in the late summer of 2015 is arguably not quite correct. Thousands of refugees have approached European borders for safety over the past few years, whereas many have drowned as a result of dangerous boat rides organised by people smugglers. As the Syrian conflict developed, an increasing share of these refugees was Syrians. Moreover, it is debatable whether the situation can be characterised as a ‘crisis’ for Europe, compared to the situation in Syria’s nearby region and for the refugees themselves. Still, the situation escalated rapidly in August 2015. On 19 August alone, 2,500 refugees, many of them Syrians, entered the island of Thessaloniki in Greece. Greek authorities received much criticism for their degrading treatment of the refugees (NRK, 2015b), and the situation exploded across international media. As a consequence, the refugee situation at the borders of Europe was placed at the top of the political agenda. In particular, the picture of the three year-old Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi lying dead on a beach in Turkey after his family’s boat sunk, caused a public outcry across Europe (Hustadnes, 2015). This put further pressure on European politicians to act immediately. In Norway, the rapid escalation of the crisis also occurred in parallel with the final weeks of the local election campaigns. Since resettlement and integration policies are first and foremost implemented at the local level, refugee protection became a crucial issue in the election debates (Fredriksen, 2015). The analysis is based upon empirical material addressing the time period between late August until the EU meeting on the relocation scheme in Luxembourg on 14 September 2015.

4.6.1. Identifying core ideas

In the initial textual analysis, I was able to derive some key ideas from the empirical material addressing the ‘European crisis’, even though this case is admittedly much more comprehensive and encompasses a greater range of actors and issues. The analysis of this case highlights aspects of both discursive reproduction and change in the political field since the Syria Agreement. This is also reflected in the core ideas. In the context of the ‘European crisis’, I found division and conflict along the following ideational positions:
• Norway’s role in Europe, and the importance of European solidarity.

• Continued tension between international solidarity and national interests.

• The extent to which actors have been influenced by actual political and humanitarian developments.

• The desire to develop innovative solutions versus focusing on existing problems and constraints.

4.6.2. Norway’s role in Europe

One of the most striking developments from the Syria agreement to the ‘European crisis’ evident the empirical material is the increased focus on Norway’s role in Europe. Some actors strongly emphasise the need for enhanced European solidarity, and embrace a view of Norway in which it should take a pro-active role in Europe. Audun Lysbakken’ opinion piece exemplifies this perspective. He writes about his visit to Lesvos, where he went to “see the European refugee crisis with own eyes”.

The text is a response to the escalating crisis and limited political action. Lysbakken refers explicitly to the moral responsibility of European states to share the burden, a responsibility they have towards the refugees themselves and towards fellow states that are more heavily affected:

We must also have the debate about achieving an agreement to share the responsibility between European countries (...) Now each country acts for itself, and most are only concerned with one thing: to keep the refugees away from themselves.

In the text, he also compares most of Europe to Germany and Sweden, and implicitly presents these two countries as role models for the rest of Europe because they have showed the political will to accept large numbers of refugees. In terms of evaluation, this signifies that Lysbakken believes that Norway should take after these pro-active European countries. Similarly, in the article “The Krf-leader: Norway must waive the Dublin regulations for the Syria-refugees”, leader of the Christian Democrats Knut Arild Hareide draws heavily upon a European solidarity discourse and emphasises the responsibility Norway has as a European state. He also compares Norwegian
leadership to German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, who has been acclaimed for showing political leadership and solidarity in Europe:

_We have a common European responsibility. That is why I am asking Erna Solberg to look towards Angela Merkel and the leadership she has shown. Norway must also participate._

This reference implies that Norway should not simply measure its efforts against the majority of European states, but against the European ‘frontrunners’. The statement is thus also underlined by a value assumption that it is desirable for Norway to propose an asylum policy that is more heavily guided by humanitarian values. Further, Trine Skei Grande, leader of the Liberal Party, also draws upon a European discourse. She calls for a more active European role for Norway, especially during the process of developing new European burden-sharing mechanisms:

_We must immediately inform that we are part of the dugnad that the EU now should have (...) we have a responsibility, both formally, but also morally to be a part of this._

Norway’s European identity is thus clearly important to the Liberal party. Norway has a particular responsibility as a European country, despite not being a member of the EU. As a result, Lysbakken, Hareide and Skei Grande all want Norway to take a leading role in the development of European burden-sharing initiatives. Further, several civil society actors also embrace the notion of enhanced European solidarity. For instance, Pål Nesse (2015, [interview]) from the NRC puts great emphasis on the need to find lasting, joint European solutions, standards and practices in the field. These joint solutions would constitute “a public good” according to Nesse. Similarly, researcher Vigdis Vevstad (2015b, [interview]) notes that solidarity is a “basic concept” in the European context, which is now “being tested”. In this regard, Vevstad emphasises Norway’s identity as a European state, and that we could undertake a more proactive role in Europe as well as internationally.

However, not all the actors in the political field are fully convinced about Norway’s inherent European responsibility. Erna Solberg takes a more pragmatic approach to the question of European solidarity. In the article “Solberg hesitant to the EU’s refugee *dugnad*”, she responds to the ongoing EU process to relocate 160, 000
refugees internally on the continent in solidarity with the southern EU countries, which receive the largest numbers of refugees, Italy and Greece in particular:

*We must look at the composition of and the details in the programme that now shall be adopted in the EU before we draw a final conclusion (…) It is not certain that we want to accept anyone for re-localisation with the high asylum influx we are experiencing now.*

Here, Solberg expresses a propositional assumption of what will, and can be, the case in term of Norway’s role in the European relocation initiative. The argument that Norway’s relocation participation depends upon the number of asylum seekers implies that the government still believes that a high level of refugees in Norway is something that should be avoided. Further, it also implies that the government does not consider it sufficiently valuable to be part of a common European initiative simply on the basis of shared responsibility and solidarity. Rather, they approach the matter from a cost/benefit perspective, in which the specific conditions of the initiative must be considered as ‘good enough’ for Norway before the government can make a decision. Hence, Solberg does not necessarily believe that Norway should take a pro-active role in Europe. Instead, she prioritises what she believes will be best for Norway in terms of concrete policies and consequences.

The commitment to stronger European solidarity is not necessarily connected to a general commitment to international principles as it was expressed in the Syria negotiations. This is exemplified through the views of the Labour Party, where Støre in fact takes a similar pragmatic approach to Solberg when he comments on the European relocation initiative. In the text, Støre’s voice is textured in direct relation to Solberg:

*I agree with Erna Solberg. (…) Norway should be part of a European burden-sharing, but we have received more per capita than most countries in Europe. That must also count for something.*

This is a bracketing of difference between the government and the largest opposition party. Støre also rejects the need for Norway to play a pro-active role in Europe. Instead of comparing Norway to countries like Sweden and Germany, he simply refers to the majority of the European nations. As long as Norway is not worse than most,
there is no need to take the lead. Thus, in terms of evaluation, Støre values the need for good national integration to be prioritised ahead the need to show solidarity with Europe. This implies that the Labour Party has made a gradual move towards a more explicit cost-and-benefits perspective during the ‘European crisis’.

4.6.3. International solidarity or national interests?

The issue of prioritising international normative commitments and solidarity versus protecting (perceived) national interests, including ensuring welfare and good integration, remains a significant issue also during the height of the ‘European crisis’. In this regard, the Progress Party continues to emphasise the moral responsibility to protect national welfare. For instance, on the current situation, party leader Siv Jensen states that:

\[(...) \text{ it is obvious that this will demand a lot from Norway. The influx of asylum seekers will create problems and put our reception apparatus under considerable pressure.}\]

This is a propositional assumption that can be considered ideological. Jensen’s assumption that the number of asylum seekers undoubtedly will create problems for Norway is a particular assumption that not all actors necessarily will share. However, Jensen phrases it in a way that universalises this particular meaning. Universalization is an important part of discursive hegemony (Fairclough 2003: 58). This propositional assumption is arguably part of an anti-immigration - or at least an immigration ‘sceptical’ - discourse, as it supports the broader world view of non-Western immigration as difficult, negative and undesirable for Norwegian society.

There is an accentuated difference in the political field between this nation-centric perspective and the humanitarian perspective. For instance, Lysbakken places himself in direct opposition to the nation-centric perspectives of the Progress Party in his op-ed. Intertextuality is an important dimension in the text, and Lysbakken includes an explicit reference to Progress Party politicians:

\[\text{In every single country there is a Siv Jensen or Per Sandberg who meets people in need with a cold shoulder: “We must help them where they are. Somewhere else, just not here”}.\]
The voices of Sandberg and Jensen are attributed as oppositional to Lysbakken’s own worldviews. This represents a conflict over values. The use of the metaphor “cold shoulder” to characterise Jensen and Sandberg’s argumentation implies that he perceives their views as inhumane. This difference is further emphasised as Lysbakken himself proposes to “reach out a hand” instead. Hence, Lysbakken remains strongly committed to international solidarity.

Progress Party politician Carl I. Hagen expresses similar concerns as Jensen, though arguably in a more controversial manner. Hagen has eventually played a prominent role in the debate on the ‘European crisis’ and in the article “Carl I. Hagen wants to send all boat refugees in return”, he reacts to the crisis and the Norwegian debate. In this regard, he expresses great scepticism to the provision of physical burden-sharing in general as he “says no to both Syrian quota refugees and boat refugees”. In particular, Hagen argues that:

*Norway must do like Australia and say that the boat refugees cannot stay under any circumstances (...) This goes wrong for Europe. If the pressure gets too big, much will collapse.*

This is a propositional assumption that has clear ideological implications. That Europe will ‘collapse’ under the pressure of non-Western boat refugees is not a given fact, but a particular assumption that supports an anti-immigration discourse. Hagen draws upon a significant mix of discourses in the text. He draws heavily upon an anti-immigration discourse, and combines this with an efficiency discourse that refers to costs and benefits. For instance, he argues that Norway can help 25 refugees in the nearby areas for the same sum that we can help one refugee in Norway. The inclusion of this efficiency discourse contributes to ‘toning down’ the anti-immigration arguments. Moreover, Hagen also includes a welfare discourse:

*(...) to achieve a sensible societal development instead of, in the long term, social unrest, less welfare and large integration problems, yes, that is an extremely important issue for the Progress Party.*

In this way, the inclusion of the welfare discourse further strengthens the anti-immigration discourse. Since welfare implicitly is evaluated as a common good, especially in the social democracy that Norway is, the assumption that more refugees
will cause less welfare makes a higher number of refugees undesirable, perhaps even frightening, to Norwegians. Hagen’s significant mixing of discourses thus contributes to a strengthened anti-immigration discourse that applies elements from different discourses and political ‘camps’ to support his worldview. Hagen commits himself to national values of preserving national welfare and togetherness for the Norwegian population. In order to preserve these values, he believes it is necessary, and even desirable, to reject international normative commitments.

Some political actors propose more of a ‘middle ground’ between these two conflicting perspectives. For instance, Jonas Gahr Støre takes a more pragmatic approach, in which he attempts to balance a commitment to international solidarity with national concerns. He responds to an indirect quote from Lysbakken regarding the expiration of the Syria-agreement in the following way:

*The agreement has not expired. It is not right to jump on a higher number before we are ensured that the integration can happen in a good way.*

The use of the phrase “jump” in this context implies that deciding upon a higher number of quota refugees in this situation of increasing asylum numbers would be impulsive and thus irresponsible. Støre therefore advocates a more responsible handling of the agreement and the refugee process, which ensures “good” integration. The contrast embedded in the statement also implies that a good integration process cannot occur alongside a high influx of refugees. To ensure the successful integration of the refugees Norway receives is seemingly a more important concern than simply providing protection to as many displaced persons as possible. Hence, the text is underlined by a ‘rationalist’ cost and benefits-perspective.

Finally, the question what principles should be guiding in refugee politics also relates to more concrete priorities in physical burden-sharing processes. Regarding quota refugees, Ekeløve-Slydal (2015, [interview]) emphasises the difference between Amnesty and the current government in terms of who should be selected. She notes that previous governments have selected refugees for the permanent quota programme
on the basis of the most vulnerable-principle. However, the current government instead chooses quota refugees based on who is “most easily integrated”, and thus present less of a ‘challenge’ for Norwegian society. This implies an accentuation of difference over the meaning of the right to protection, including who should be prioritised and why, in the political field.

4.6.3.1 The legitimacy of the UN

A specific issue related to the relationship between the international and the national is the question of the legitimacy of the UN, and the appropriate role of UN policies and principles in domestic politics. Even though the UN traditionally is perceived in Norway as having great legitimacy, the debate on the Syrian refugee crisis has highlighted ideational conflict on this issue. This accentuation of difference over the normative value of international institutions in the domestic sphere is important, because it clearly matters in the implementation process of an international norm such as burden-sharing.

Hagen’s text expresses a particularly negative view of the UN. When the reporter confronts him with the fact that Australia has been criticised by the UN for their return policies, he says:

*It is obvious that if the UN can push the problem onto European countries, then they will. The UN is controlled by the countries that are dictatorships and the senders of refugees. What the UN says does not hold much weight for me.*

This statement presents a controversial view of the UN in a way that aims to universalise this particular meaning. It can therefore be defined as an assumption with ideological effects. This existential assumption thus supports a discourse that deprioritises and de-legitimises the UN as a significant reference point for national political action. However, actors with a humanitarian orientation have reacted to this attempted de-legitimation of the UN by certain groups in the political field. In particular, Vevstad (2015b, [interview]) criticises this political development, especially by stressing that it conflicts with Norway’s humanitarian tradition:
In my view, Norway could manage its humanitarian legacy better. We have contributed to undermining the UN’s role over time, for example by not acting in accordance with the UNHCR’s recommendations (...).

This statement expresses the value assumption that Norway should be a significant humanitarian actor, and that emphasises the legitimacy of UN principles in guiding domestic politics. In general, there is an accentuated difference over norms and meanings in the political field concerning what role and power the UN – and the international sphere more broadly - can and should have in the Norwegian context.

4.6.4. Influence by political and humanitarian developments

The dramatic development in the refugee situation has affected several of the political actors in the field, but to different extents. Arguably, this can be characterised as a distinct form of ideational influence and can thus be regarded as an ideational factor in the same way as the other core ideas, which addresses the aspect of ‘change’ specifically. Notably, some actors have been drawing more heavily upon a humanitarian perspective as they increasingly have felt the need to contribute more. For instance, the Liberal Party called for a renegotiation of the Syria agreement already in early September, because the refugee crisis expanded more than expected. This change of perspective is significant as the Liberal Party initially was a keen supporter of the original agreement:

We have a joint agreement (...) and that shall be renegotiated. Norwegian politics relies upon having a broad agreement to support such big efforts.

This statement implies that the change in actual events has had a significant impact on the perspectives of political actors. What was previously perceived as responsible and even commendable political action is now inadequate. Similarly, in the article “The Liberal Party wants an emergency meeting on the refugee situation”, the Party calls for an extraordinary parliamentary meeting to enable formal decisions concerning increased efforts and financial priorities. In particular, Skei Grande embraces the growing voice of grassroots movements as a reason for political action:

Luckily we see strong civic engagement in Norway to contribute. This engagement should also be strengthened with a joint effort from the political Norway.
This statement implies that Skei Grande believes that “political Norway” – defined as the political leadership – and its will to act, is not matching public opinion. The political leadership is seemingly no longer representing the majority of the Norwegian people on this issue. The emerging grassroots engagement has thus contributed to discursive change in the political field. However, Solberg’s voice - on behalf of the government - is also included in the article. She responds directly to Skei Grande’s statement:

*I believe there is no basis for saying it should be renegotiated. We will handle the asylum crisis and those questions independently of the context in that agreement.*

Solberg does not seemingly perceive the changing context of the crisis, or the increased civic engagement, as significant reasons for renegotiating the agreement and increase resettlement. Further, the Progress Party also remains largely committed to their previous discursive orientation. In the article “-Convinced that it is best to help in the nearby areas”, Siv Jensen is confronted with the recommendation to say no to settling more refugees, which she gave to all Norwegian municipalities a few weeks previously. The text is produced after Norwegian media has been full of pictures and stories of the escalating refugee crisis. Jensen is thus in a position where she must defend a strict asylum and immigration policy at a time when the public is becoming increasingly positive to Norway providing protection to refugees. However, she still maintains her position and reiterates the Progress Party’s stance from the Syria negotiations:

*I am convinced that it is best to help in the nearby areas.*

This is an evaluative statement, in which Jensen still commits to a particular set of judgments about how Norway best can respond to the refugee crisis. The text refers explicitly to the Syria-agreement, where Jensen argues that the Progress Party’s objections to the agreement have “become even more relevant” following the European crisis. Her perspectives on burden-sharing have thus not notably changed since the Syria-agreement despite the deteriorating situation. In sum, the ideational
perspectives of different actors have been influenced to different extents by political and humanitarian developments.

4.6.5. Developing innovative solutions

A significant difference between the various actors, which also has important implications for social practice, is the way in which they perceive the current policy challenges and possible solutions. In particular, there is a notable distinction between those who believe that ‘we can do this’ and who want to ‘use all the tools in the toolbox’, and those who focus on current problems, systemic limitations and resource constraints. This issue is thus related to the issue raised in 4.6.3 regarding influence of political and humanitarian developments, and whether the recognition of the evolving crisis initiates a desire to think new. More specifically, humanitarian actors have tended to emphasise the possibilities the Syrian refugee crisis has created for international refugee protection, and consequently highlighted the need to develop new solutions and systems, nationally and internationally. For instance, Ekeløve-Slydal (2015 [interview]) argues that the international refugee protection regime is now being tested, as the crisis has changed the premises for refugee protection:

(... this has created a situation where we see that Angela Merkel has shown political leadership by trying to establish a model for international responsibility-sharing within the EU when the international community needs to handle a situation of mass influx (...) (ref: a political leadership) of a dimension that we have not experienced before.

She further argues that the international refugee protection regime so far has “failed”, and has highlighted the need for change in terms of burden-sharing – or responsibility-sharing, which is Amnesty’s official term - in refugee protection:

The international community must reinvigorate the system for responsibility-sharing amongst states (...)

However, several humanitarian actors who are concerned with developing innovative solutions experience a substantial gap between their approach and that of political leadership. Ann-Magrit Austenå from NOAS (2015 [interview]) emphasises the lack of political will to find solutions to the current challenges. The political leadership frames the situation as an isolated problem for Norway, rather than a consequence of
an international challenge that we must find joint solutions to. Consequently, they focus on how to remove the “problem” from Norway, instead of, for instance, finding new measures for improved and more effective integration. This is also evident in the texts addressing the views of government politicians, which to a large extent focus on existing resource and financial constrains, and on the possible problems increased refugee numbers will create for Norwegian society.

4.6.5.1. Consequences for the Dublin regulations
The Dublin regulations are an essential tool for European burden-sharing in the refugee and asylum field. The implications of the Syrian crisis for these regulations are therefore an important aspect of the burden-sharing debate. During the course of the European crisis, there have been differing views among political actors about whether the crisis has been the end of the Dublin regulations as we know it, or if the system is still viable. Knut Arild Hareide has been one of the politicians arguing that Norway must stop the return of Syrian refugees to the European country of first asylum, which the Dublin regulations open up for. Specifically, the text is a response to Angela Merkel’s decision to stop Dublin-returns of Syrians from Germany. Hareide expresses openness to, or an exploration of, difference between himself and the government on this issue:

*I am challenging the government to put the Dublin agreement aside.*

Hareide also argues that the Dublin regulations in reality have “collapsed”. This is a propositional assumption that has concrete policy effects, because such a collapse would significantly change Europe’s refugee and asylum regime, and could potentially demand the development of new and improved burden-sharing measures. Moreover, Hareide highlights Merkel’s humanitarian engagement as he supports her decision to stop the Dublin-returns of Syrians. This implies that Hareide perceives this application of the Dublin regulations as inhumane, and as an obstacle for the safe treatment of Syrian asylum seekers. He thus draws upon a humanitarian discourse. Along the same line, civil society strongly encourages Norway to stop Dublin-returns.
Secretary-general John Peder Egenæs in Amnesty criticises the continued practice of Dublin-returns:

> It is not behaving in a manner of solidarity (“direkte usolidarisk”) to send Syria-refugees back to countries in the South (ref: of Europe).

The statement implies that the Dublin regulations as they are currently practiced are not viable as a burden-sharing instrument for a humane and acceptable European refugee and asylum policy framework. Moreover, some humanitarian actors argue that the Dublin-regulations have not succeeded in creating real burden-sharing in Europe. Otherwise, we would not be experiencing the current situation (Igesund 2015, [interview]). This implies that humanitarian actors commit to a new and improved burden-sharing system in Europe, possibly also to replace Dublin. This commitment has, however, not been expressed by the government parties or the Labour Party. In sum, the Syrian refugee crisis has for some actors highlighted the need to develop new refugee protection and burden-sharing measures, nationally and internationally, whilst others largely reject this need.

### 4.7. Discursive Practice

This subchapter will focus on discursive practice, the second dimension of Fairclough’s model, which modifies the relationship between text and social practice. As aforementioned, discursive practice consists of two main elements – the production and the consumption of texts. The three discourses that are presented here are derived from the core ideas identified in the textual analysis. These discourses can be considered as dominant in the Norwegian political field, and thus consequently as determining the political space for action regarding burden-sharing in refugee protection. The subchapter will begin by explaining the relationship between the core ideas in the field, and broader discursive practice. It will then present the three dominant discourses: the humanitarian discourse; the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, and the ‘nation-state’ discourse. It will discuss the clusters of ideas that constitute them, as well as the internal fractions within them. Further, the subchapter will discuss the hierarchy between these discourses, specifically related to Fairclough’s
concepts of hegemony and power. The dialectical role of agents and structures in the reproduction and transformation of discourses will also be central. In particular, changes in discursive structures from the Syria agreement to the “European crisis” will be of interests in this regard.

4.7.1. The relationship between ideational positions and discursive practice
Subchapters 4.5. and 4.6. have presented some core ideas, against which actors in the political field have positioned themselves differently. This has resulted in ideational disagreement and conflict over several issues regarding refugee protection and burden-sharing. However, these conflicts at the ideational level also relate to broader discursive conflicts. Discursive processes are expressed in texts. One of the main purposes of detailed textual analysis in CDA is thus to uncover and analyse these discursive processes. A discourse consists of a cluster of collectively shared ideas about the social and political world, which are internally coherent, and which together represent a particular worldview. By addressing the different ideas and ideational conflicts that are expressed across a range of texts, it is also possible to identify how certain ideas cluster together in a way that constitutes different discourses in the field. In this way, ideational conflicts expressed in texts can also be reflective of conflicts in broader discursive practice. In order to identify the dominant discourses in the field, and analyse discursive conflict and power structures between them, it is therefore necessary to look at the clusters of ideas that constitute them. These sets of ideas can, in turn, be identified through the core ideas that have been derived from the textual analysis.

The relationship between ideas and discourses is also highlighted by the way that different actors express different ideas. Even the independent ideas of actors are partly constituted by existing discursive structures, which they can never fully ‘escape’. In the textual analysis, it is clear that different actors largely remain within certain pre-existing discursive boundaries. For instance, civil society actors clearly draw upon a range of ideas that relate to humanitarianism in all the texts. In turn, these ideas clustered together constitute the humanitarian discourse in the field, which represents
a particular worldview. Below I will discuss the dominant discourses in the field with reference to the collective ideas that take part in constituting them.

4.7.2. The humanitarian discourse

The humanitarian discourse draws upon international ideas and norms embedded in international humanitarian law and the human rights framework, as well as more recently developed principles including PoC and human security. In the Norwegian context specifically, the humanitarian discourse is deeply rooted in the idea of Norway’s heritage as a humanitarian nation. Fridtjof Nansen is a concrete reference point in this regard. As the League of Nation’s first High Commissioner for Refugees, who was also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work with refugees, Nansen is an important example of Norway’s active role in humanitarian work, specifically in the refugee field. For instance, Pål Nesse (2015 [interview]) notes that:

*Norway is a country one looks to internationally in the refugee context (...) Out in the world (...) “everybody” knows that Nansen was the first High Commissioner (...) Norway has an international reputation when it comes to refugee work.*

Hence, the Norwegian humanitarian discourse is partly constituted by domestic actor’s specific perception of Norway’s identity as one that strongly values humanitarian principles, and who act upon these principles at home and abroad. According to this socially constructed identity, Norway should always be in the forefront internationally when it comes to humanitarian action. Further, in the humanitarian discourse the UN plays a strong role, having significant moral authority and legitimacy. The humanist values that the UN system is founded upon are inherently good and beneficial for humanity as a whole, despite its arguably imperfect practice. Consequently, the discourse emphasises that UN policy and recommendations, and the international norms and principles it promotes must be guiding Norwegian domestic politics independently of whether domestic actors perceive these recommendations as being inconvenient or undesirable for Norway’s ‘self-interest’. In general, the humanitarian discourse has as one of its defining features that international norms and principles must have a powerful place in domestic politics.
“Solidarity” is a significant *nodal point* in the humanitarian discourse, and provides the core argument for burden-sharing. Like in the international sphere, solidarity is understood in this discourse in two ways. Firstly, solidarity is directed towards the refugees themselves. This is based on traditional humanitarian values, including the need to protect civilians and vulnerable persons independently of who they are. The refugees are victims of war, and it is our moral duty as fellow humans to help them. Secondly, the concept of solidarity refers to states in the region and who are hosting a very large share of the refugee population. This concern is founded upon the conception that the whole international community has a responsibility for displaced populations, and that it is inherently unfair that some countries are this heavily affected by the crisis. These conceptualisations of solidarity are important reasons for burden-sharing action in the humanitarian discourse, which was apparent during the Syria negotiations.

Since the “European crisis”, the humanitarian discourse has first and foremost applied the notion of solidarity in the European context. The most prominent issue is perhaps the role that Norway should play in European burden-sharing initiatives. Some actors largely identified by the humanitarian discourse, including most of civil society and certain political parties, compare Norway’s engagement explicitly to that of Sweden and Germany, which have been leading in the European refugee protection response. Hence, the discourse promotes a pro-active humanitarian role for Norway in Europe. Interestingly, this notion of European solidarity has seemingly nothing to do with EU membership, trade agreements, or other more technical EU-related issues. Instead, it promotes a notion of European solidarity that Norway must contribute to simply because it is a European country and thus take part in a community based upon a notion of shared commitments and responsibilities. Arguably, these notions are at least supposed to be reflected in the Dublin regulations. However, since the “European crisis”, European solidarity and internal burden-sharing in the refugee field has seemingly become the central reference with regards to solving the refugee crisis
and finding new solutions. Consequently, the humanitarian discourse has put gradually less focus on physical protection initiatives directed at the nearby region.

Each of the different discourses promote a specific perception of morality. In the humanitarian discourse, morality is first and foremost embedded in the international. Norway has a moral responsibility towards affected states and the refugees themselves. This moral responsibility can only be fulfilled if Norway provides financial aid abroad and protection to vulnerable refugees at home. Hence, with regards to the “helping them here versus helping them where they are”- debate, which has been prominent in the Norwegian debate following the Syrian crisis, the answer is that both aspects are necessary. In particular, the humanitarian discourse emphasises the need to provide protection in Norway to the most vulnerable who cannot be protected in the nearby area. Protecting the vulnerable is a core humanitarian principle (Meyer 2015 [interview]).

“Dugnad” can be understood as another nodal point in the humanitarian discourse on burden-sharing. It is applied in relation to both international and national refugee protection initiatives, and encourages a joint voluntary effort on all levels of society because it is for the common ‘good’. This concept can therefore be explicitly tied to burden-sharing. Everyone is encouraged to do what he or she can so that Norway can take its share of the international “burden”. In this regard, the discourse emphasises ‘innovation’, ‘improvisation’, and a need to ‘use all the tools in the toolbox’. Therefore, many of its adherents have criticised the lack of political will among the political leadership to undertake innovative measures. Simultaneously, the discourse suppresses concerns for capacities and costs. These are things that will ‘work themselves out’ eventually. The most important thing is that we act now to help those in need.

The humanitarian discourse is also influenced by a strong rights discourse in the political field. Still, this perspective affects different actors in different ways, which causes certain fractions within the humanitarian discourse. Certain civil society
organisations, such as Amnesty and NOAS, draw heavily upon the rights discourse. They refer to the need to take individual rights and concerns into careful consideration in all refugee protection initiatives. Although human rights and humanitarian discourses often support each other, they also have certain differences that can lead to differences in potential policy outcomes. For instance, Meyer (2015 [interview]) notes that the dominance of the human rights perspective in the humanitarian field risks preventing the development of more innovative and efficient protection initiatives, which encompass the needs and interests of all stakeholders, including the population inside Syria and the host communities in the neighboring countries.

4.7.3. The ”cost-and-capacity” discourse
A mix of political and economic ideas constitutes the “cost-and-capacity” discourse. Although it addresses a deeply political issue, the discourse also draws heavily upon economic concepts, ideas and arguments. In particular, the cost-and-capacity discourse rests upon a notion of rationality, and a priority of costs and benefits-considerations in all refugee protection and burden-sharing initiatives.

‘Efficiency’ can be considered as a nodal point in the costs-and-capacity discourse. In particular, ‘efficiency’ is used as a “normative-political concept” that often justifies financial burden-sharing over physical protection initiatives (Betts 2006: 151). Betts (2006: 152; 167) notes that this justification is largely based on the principles of the “optimum allocation of resources” and comparative advantage, derived mainly from economic theory. In particular, comparative advantage in the burden-sharing field is based upon states’ comparative capacities for physical or financial forms of protection. Consequently, wealthy developed states such as Norway normally has a comparative advantage in terms of financial burden-sharing, especially as Norway often lies relatively far away from the crises areas. This argumentation has characterised much of the political debate on burden-sharing after the Syrian crisis. In the “helping them here or helping them where they are” debate, the proponents of the cost-and-capacity discourse have continuously stressed that it is more efficient and effective to provide financial aid because you can then help more people with the
same resources. Interestingly, they simultaneously suppress the humanitarian aspect of the discussion, which emphasises the need to helping the most vulnerable by providing them protection in Norway if they cannot be provided sufficient protection in the nearby region.

Regarding the relationship between the national and international, the cost-and-capacity discourse promotes a rather balanced view. In the cost-and-capacity discourse, the UN still is an important and legitimate institution whose recommendations are of value in the domestic political context. However, these must always be weighed against the concerns of national actors, institutions and capacities. In particular, the economic perspective is important in this regard. Since refugee protection is a costly process that demands great resources, this is a typical area where the cost-and-capacity discourse promotes a careful approach to the implementation of international norms and principles. In the textual analysis, it is clear that the perception that Norway lacks resource capacity regarding integration and settlement processes, especially at the municipality-level, has dominated much of the official government discourse on resettlement. This argumentation is derived from the cost-and-capacity discourse, and draws heavily upon an economic analysis of costs and benefits for Norwegian society. In turn, it suppresses moral values and concerns embedded in the humanitarian discourse. The apparent preference of the current government to resettle refugees that are more easily integrated, and thus often resourceful, rather than the most vulnerable, is a further example of the ideational frames of cost-and-capacity discourse. In this way, the interests of Norwegian society are prioritised above, or at least level with, the needs of the refugees.

The cost-and-capacity discourse also promotes a particular perception of morality. However, in contrast to the morality-notion conceptualised in the humanitarian discourse, this discourse promotes a form of ‘rational political morality’. Nesvik’s opinion piece presents a particularly good example of this way of thinking. He argues that it is morally right to conduct a rational and effective refugee policy that relies on the consideration of numbers, rather than conducting policies that are driven by
emotions and naivety. These policies hold symbolic value, but are not worth much when they do not result in effective protection. Again, the economic perspective at least partly constitutes the discursive frames of the discussion. However, this also implies that the cost-and-capacity discourse includes an element of the humanitarian discourse. The question of burden-sharing in refugee protection in the context of the Syrian crisis has an inherently strong humanitarian character. The domestic discursive struggle over the best way to help the Syrian refugees will most likely always be characterised by a certain humanitarian understanding. However, the reasoning for why we must help, how we must help, and the extent to which we must help - and consequently the practical policy implications for burden-sharing initiatives that follow – are grounded in different ideational perspectives and worldviews.

The economic aspects of the cost-and-capacity discourse matter significantly for the way in which this discourse shapes the political space for action in terms of burden-sharing in refugee protection. The strong focus on costs, combined with a suppression of the humanitarian perspective, delimits the political space. In contrast to the humanitarian discourse, which focuses on innovative solutions and an attitude that says “we can do this”, the cost-and-capacity discourse tends to focus on the limitations created by existing systems, institutions and resources.

4.7.4. The nation-state discourse

The nation-state discourse is characterised by a strong emphasis on the importance of internal national affairs, and preserving national culture and togetherness. A defining feature of the discourse is therefore its focus on Norway’s role as an independent nation-state. Not many actors in the political field are identified by this discourse, and it has mainly been represented only by certain Progress Party politicians. In particular, Sandberg’s text on the Syria agreement and Hagen’s text on the European crisis have been clear examples of texts mainly constituted by the nation-state discourse.

Importantly, the focus of the nation-state discourse on internal affairs diminishes the
role of the international community, and international norms and principles, in shaping domestic politics. The policies and recommendations from the UN become deprioritised, or even irrelevant, to the organisation of national politics. This also implies that Norway’s international identity is not an important element in the nation-state discourse, because the opinions of the international community is not considered something of great value. Rather, the nation-state discourse may be understood as being in opposition to discourses that emphasise the role of international norms and principles, such as the humanitarian discourse. In a sense, the discourse frames a form of protest against these worldviews, which are framed to be ‘naïve’, ‘politically correct’, and ‘repressive’ towards conflicting views and ideas, in particular those that are sceptical towards increased immigration. Indeed, it accentuates difference between these worldviews, and emphasises conflict over values, norms and meanings. In this way, the nation-state discourse also suppresses the humanitarian discourse because it dismisses the core foundations of the humanitarian discourse as simply reflecting naivety, gullibility, and as something that can be directly damaging for society. By attacking its deeply embedded notions of right and wrong, good and bad, the nation-state discourse de-legitimises the humanitarian discourse and the values it promotes.

In this context, the nation-state discourse is characterised by a high level of interdiscursivity. Hence, it includes significant elements from other discourses. Sandberg and Hagen’s texts are examples of creative discursive processes in which the nation-state discourse have been mixed with other discourses. Most notably, they have drawn upon an anti-immigration discourse, a welfare discourse and an efficiency discourse in their texts. The welfare discourse in this context is primarily applied in combination with the other discourses in a way that strengthens the overall argument that low immigration-, asylum-, and refugee numbers is desirable, because they have a negative affect on Norwegian welfare. In this way, the nation-state discourse moves the political focus towards the need to protect the welfare state. However, the extent to which the nation-state discourse relies upon other discourses varies between the different communicative events and consequently creates fractions and tensions within the nation-state discourse itself. For instance, the text where Jensen maintains her
recommendation to the municipalities to say no to settling the new quota refugees, expresses ideational elements from the nation-state discourse. However, there is a difference between that communicative event and that of Hagen’s, which explicitly diminishes the role of the UN and international refugee protection principles.

Political ‘morality’ is conceptualised by the nation-state discourse in mainly domestic, not international, terms. Political morality relates to the responsibility of political actors to its own society and its own people. National welfare, culture and togetherness are public goods that must be preserved, and it is morally right to do so. High levels of immigration, including quota refugees and asylum seekers, are damaging for these public goods. In particular, the fraction of the nation-state discourse that relies heavily on an anti-immigration discourse perceives non-Western immigration as threatening to Norwegian society. These refugees pose a particular challenge to Norwegian culture and social togetherness because of their very different religious, cultural and historical background. The anti-immigration discourse stresses how this will create great difficulties for society. Moreover, the nation-state discourse, especially the fractions that are heavily influenced by an anti-immigration discourse, mainly represents Syrian refugees as a ‘burden’ for Norwegian society, and growing refugee flows as a “pressure” on European states (Hagen, 2015). This arguably removes parts of the refugees’ individuality and leads to a form of de-humanisation. In consequence, the nation-state discourse marginalises the refugees as social actors, and risks excluding them from the political field.

4.7.5. Dominant discourses: overlap and distinction

From the textual analysis it becomes apparent that it is difficult to set clear boundaries for, or distinctions between, the different dominant discourses addressing burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway following the Syrian crisis. The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, for instance, includes an element of the humanitarian discourse when it addresses humanitarian issues and how to solve them. The market liberalist idea of efficiency that is embedded in this discourse is applied as a normative-political argument supporting financial burden-sharing and framing it as superior to physical
protection initiatives. But it does so within the frames of the humanitarian discourse, because it is in fact addressing the best ways in which to help the refugees. Further, the nation-state discourse draws heavily on the cost-and-capacity discourse when it emphasises the financial and resource burden that increased immigration will present for Norwegian society. Fractions of the humanitarian discourse also includes elements of the costs-and-capacity discourse when it stresses the need for new and innovative protection measures, such as temporary protection initiatives, also in order to address the resource perspective. Still, the outline of the dominant discourses show that there clearly is a discursive ‘battle’ taking place in the Norwegian political field regarding burden-sharing. This is a battle over conflicting norms, values and meanings, over what is right and wrong, desirable and undesirable. Significantly, there is also a discursive battle over what role the international aspect should play in domestic politics. It is not given that international refugee norms such as burden-sharing, or the UNHCR’s recommendations, are always guiding Norwegian refugee politics.

4.8. The discursive ‘battle’: hierarchy and power

This subchapter aims to address an essential aspect of the research question, namely the hierarchical relationship between the dominant discourses in the field. Firstly, it will attempt to establish the hierarchical relationship between the three dominant discourses, also in relation to Fairclough’s concepts of hegemony and ideological effects, within the time period addressed in the empirical material. Secondly, it will discuss the issue of discursive reproduction and transformation. It will emphasise the role of agents and structures, as well as the effects of changing non-discursive factors in transforming discursive structures.

4.8.1. Establishing the hierarchy

The issue of political power is important in establishing the hierarchical relationship between the discourses. Political parties have the most explicit form of power, and the discourses that constitute their worldview will consequently hold a certain position of power in the field. The textual analysis shows that the official discourse of the current Norwegian government is largely constituted by the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. In
particular, the Conservative Party is most clearly identified by this discourse. In the communicative events, Erna Solberg has a pragmatic approach to the refugee issue, consistently emphasising the cost element. Further, fractions of the Progress Party, including party leader Siv Jensen, are also strongly influenced by this discourse, even though the Progress Party is characterised by internal discursive fractions. Hence, the cost-and-capacity discourse is arguably the most politically powerful discourse on burden-sharing in refugee protection in the Norwegian political field.

The nation-state discourse is seemingly the weakest of the dominant discourses because only a few political actors, notably from the Progress Party, belong to this discourse. However, it is accorded a stronger role due to the fact that the Progress Party is in government. This provides the discourse with more power than what could be expected due to the relatively small explicit support from political actors. Moreover, as several elements of the discourse are considered controversial, the representatives of this discourse receive significant media attention and thus increase their ability to contribute to the political debate and shape the discursive field. In result, the nation-state discourse still contributes significantly to shaping the political space for action on burden-sharing.

The humanitarian discourse largely constitutes the views of a large group of actors within the political field. Civil society actors, researchers such as Vevstad, and political parties including the Socialist Left party, can clearly be identified by this discourse. Moreover, other smaller political parties, including the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, also belong to this discourse, even though they also include significant elements of the cost-and-capacity discourse in their discursive practice. In this way, the humanitarian discourse has significant power in the political field. Importantly, it also possesses a form of ‘moral hegemony’ that further increases its discursive power. The humanitarian discourse in this specific Norwegian field is derived from the wider, international discourse of humanitarianism, drawing heavily upon international humanitarian values and principles, especially those related to the refugee protection regime. As Barnett (2005: 731) notes, this discourse contains a
high level of moral authority, at least from within the boundaries of the discourse itself, because “humanitarians see themselves as agents of humanity”. In this view, the humanitarian discourse is a source of ‘good’, which provides it with a particular legitimacy in the political field. However, the discourse is simultaneously marginalised by the “costs-and-capacity” discourse and the nation-state discourse on this very basis. When these discourses frame the humanitarian discourse as ‘symbolic, ‘naïve’, and ‘unrealistic’, it de-legitimises the humanitarian discourse and the arguments that are applied in the political debate. Consequently, there is on the one hand a discursive battle for hegemony in the political field between the humanitarian discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. On the other hand, the nation-state discourse attacks the humanitarian discourse from below, by questioning and de-legitimising the core of the moral value basis of the humanitarian discourse. The outcome of this political discursive ‘battle’ determines the scope for political action on burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway.

4.8.1.1. Ideological effects
The dominant ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse has ideological effects that contribute to creating and maintaining specific power relations. For instance, ‘efficiency’ is a nodal point in this discourse. Importantly, Betts (2006: 152) argues that in the context of refugee protection, the concept of “‘efficiency’ provides a legitimating discourse” that supports and sustains a specific normative worldview. This is because ‘efficiency’ is only “meaningful from a particular standpoint”, which means that it may “implicitly privilege a specific set of interests or a specific normative perspective” (Betts 2006:152). However, by framing this particular notion of efficiency as a universal value that is inherently good, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse legitimises and sustains a refugee protection system that relies upon an inherently economic understanding of efficiency as a criteria for burden-sharing measures. In turn, this discourse limits the possibilities for developing a “more substantial conceptualisation of efficiency in the context of refugee protection” (Betts 2006: 168). This also has concrete implications for burden-sharing, as such a specific normative conception narrows the space for legitimate burden-sharing initiatives.
In particular, Betts notes that this particular use of the ‘efficiency’ concept in refugee protection represent a state-centric perspective of efficiency maximising. In turn, it “may exclude refugee perceptions” (Betts 2006: 153). This also applies for the nation-state discourse, which represents a similar, state-centric perspective. Hence, it is only the humanitarian discourse that includes the role of the Syrian refugees as social actors, and gives a real voice to their concerns. The humanitarian discourse is thus the only dominant discourse that may empower the refugees themselves. The exclusion of refugee perspectives from the political debate can have significant and negative policy implications for refugee protection initiatives, because it excludes the views of the very people that are most affected by these policies. In result, policy makers might ignore potentially negative policy consequences.

4.8.2. Discursive transformation: the role of agents and structures
The discursive frames that define the boundaries of the political field have arguably changed from the Syria agreement and during the recent “European crisis”. Dramatic non-discursive events have contributed to the rapid change in actors’ perspectives of the situation and what needs to be done. In consequence, non-discursive factors have contributed to transforming the discursive boundaries that characterise the political field. However, social actors have been the main drivers behind this change. Indeed, actors in the political field are constituted by the dominant discourses discussed above, and the discursive structures they create. Yet, social actors also have the creative power to challenge and transform these structures. The non-discursive developments of the crisis have initiated this transformation.

The growing civic engagement and grassroots activities have been a notable change since the Syria negotiations. This civic engagement is constituted by a humanitarian discourse that goes beyond traditional political divisions, and is simply aiming to help refugees that arrive in Norway, independently of political affiliation. This grassroots engagement has developed first and foremost as a response to the change in non-discursive social factors. Since the beginning of the ‘European crisis’, the public have
been faced with emotional pictures, videos and stories of people fleeing from war who are risking their lives at the borders of Europe. These images have made many Norwegians feel useless, and sparked a desire to ‘do something’. Arguably, these social changes have also led to an increasing perception among the public that the political leadership is not doing enough, and people therefore feeling the need to address this protection gap themselves. The actions and communicative events produced by the grassroots movements have been produced in new and creative ways that have pushed, and consequently contributed to transforming, the discursive boundaries of the political field. In particular, the movement’s politically ‘neutral’ discursive framework has broken down the separation between traditional ‘left’ and ‘right’ in Norwegian politics. The humanitarian concern for refugee protection and international solidarity has traditionally been the ‘property’ of the political left, and specific civil society organisations. This distinction has also been visible in the case of the Syrian refugee crisis, as is exemplified in the textual analysis. However, the grassroots movements have attempted to prevent the Syrian refugee question from being about party politics, despite it being an inherently political issue. In consequence, it has contributed to transforming the traditional political discursive boundaries in the refugee field. It has also accorded the humanitarian discourse a stronger role in the field.

The developments that have occurred in the time period from the Syria negotiations and throughout the ‘European crisis’ (until September 2015) have affected the hierarchical relationship between the dominant discourses in the political field. The growing grassroots movement has significantly contributed to strengthening the humanitarian discourse. The general change in public opinion has seemingly affected official government discourse, in particular Progress Party representatives who have been identified in part by the nation-state discourse. As Vevstad points out, Siv Jensen modified her anti-immigration arguments during the electoral campaign when she was faced with the strong Norwegian civic engagement (Vevstad, 2015). Further, actors within the political parties have also pushed for discursive transformation. Most notably, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats have gradually moved towards
a more explicit humanitarian discourse as the ‘European crisis’ has evolved. Indeed, these parties have been partly identified by the humanitarian discourse also previously, but with stronger elements of the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. Now, they have both pushed for new and pro-active measures in burden-sharing. This has contributed to changing the power relations between the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse and the humanitarian discourse, in particular since both parties are support parties for the current government.

In general, the nation-state discourse gradually was accorded a weaker role in the field from the Syria negotiations and throughout the “European crisis” during August-September 2015, as many political actors have been moving further towards the humanitarian discourse. However, as the nation-state discourse in itself constitutes a form of protest against the humanitarian perspective, the gradually more hegemonic position of the humanitarian discourse might eventually initiate a backlash from the nation-state discourse.
5 Social Practice and Political Implications

This chapter addresses social practice, the third dimension of Fairclough’s model. Social practice refers to wider social and political practices and dimensions, including social relations and power structures, which are constituted by both discursive and non-discursive factors. Discourse is in a “dialectical relationship with other social dimensions” (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 65). Thus, the social practice dimension addresses the relationship between discursive practice and social practice, because social practice is partly constituted by discursive practice. The chapter focuses in particular on the political consequences of the discursive practice in the political field (up until late September 2015) for burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway following the Syrian refugee crisis. Consequently, the chapter aims to address the second part of the research question posed in this thesis, which is “In what ways does the hierarchy between these discourses shape the political space - for action on this issue and, in the longer term, for future burden-sharing in refugee protection?” In this regard, the chapter will discuss two specific policy aspects: 1) the implications of the discursive field for Norwegian burden-sharing policies regarding the Syrian refugee crisis specifically; and 2) the long-term consequences for burden-sharing in refugee protection, in the Norwegian policy context.

In the analysis of social practice, it is important to investigate how the dominant discourses shape the political field in different ways, and thereby enable different forms of social practice. Further, an essential question in social practice analysis is whether discursive practice reproduces the discursive structure and thereby “contribute to the maintenance of the status quo in the social practice”, or if the discursive structure has “been transformed, thereby contributing to social change?” (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002: 87). The concepts of hegemony and power are also central aspects of this part of the analysis. Does discursive practice contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of specific hierarchical power relations in society, or “does it challenge power positions by representing reality and social relations in a new
way?” (Philips and Jørgensen 2002: 87). Indeed, as Philip and Jørgensen note (2002: 87), it is by addressing these types of questions that the research project becomes a “critical” project. Consequently, the final part of this chapter will focus on the relationship between discursive power and social practice.

Firstly, subchapter 5.1. will present an analysis of social practice. It will discuss how the different discourses in the field enable different forms of social practice, and how discursive hierarchy and changing power relations have had consequences for social practice. It also discusses the implications of the social practice analysis for the dynamics between the domestic and the international sphere, especially regarding the role of international norms in national politics. Secondly, subchapter 5.2. briefly addresses the feedback effects between social practice and discursive practice in Fairclough’s model. Subchapter 5.3. and 5.4. will discuss the policy implications of the discursive practice in relation to the different burden-sharing initiatives. It touches upon both short-term and long-term consequences.

**5.1. Analysing social practice**

This subchapter will begin by discussing how the dominant discourses enable different forms of social practice. Further, it will present an analysis of social practice with explicit reference to discursive hierarchy and power relations. Moreover, Philips and Jørgensen (2002: 86) stress that in social practice analysis, it is necessary to draw on social theory beyond that of discourse analysis. Therefore, the subchapter will discuss the social practice in relation to politics and IR theory on the international-domestic nexus and the role of international refugee norms in Norwegian politics, the theoretical starting point of this thesis.

**5.1.1. Enabling social practice**

The different discursive practices – the humanitarian discourse, the ‘cost-and-capacity discourse’ and the ‘nation-state’ discourse - vary significantly in terms of the political space they create for action, and the extent to which they enable new and different political practices by framing them as legitimate and desirable. Moreover, the
different discursive practices construct Norway’s identity in inherently different ways. This supports the theoretical notion derived from Hopf, claiming that state identity is constructed at the domestic level. It also has implications for social practice, as a given intersubjective identity generate specific forms of behaviour.

The humanitarian discourse deliberately widens the scope for political action in the field. By emphasising the importance of discovering new and innovative measures in refugee protection, including within the area of burden-sharing, it pushes the discursive boundaries for what has previously been perceived as possible and desirable. The discourse expresses an attitude that says ‘we can do this if we all work together’. Further, the humanitarian discourse constitutes Norwegian identity as a great humanitarian power, and frames this as a special ‘heritage’ within the field of refugee protection. It thus follows that Norway will play a central and generous role in European and international burden-sharing initiatives. In general, the international refugee protection regime will play a powerful role in Norwegian refugee politics. However, the humanitarian discourse also dictates that all measures in the refugee protection field must meet certain human rights and humanitarian standards. Hence, in some ways, the humanitarian discourse also narrows the space for legitimate policy alternatives. In particular, these limitations will likely narrow the possibilities for efficiency measures and resource saving initiatives as these often, though not necessarily, risk affecting such standards. The strong rights perspective embedded in the Norwegian humanitarian discourse implies that policy initiatives also will focus greatly on individual concerns. Finally, due to its priority of international values and refugee concern over national economic considerations, the discourse will likely suppress concerns for costs and resource capacities in policy development.

The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse is strongly influenced by a market liberalist economic perspective. This significantly affects how the discourse shapes the political space for action on burden-sharing. In particular, the ‘efficiency’ nodal point in the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse frames a very limited and specific set of burden-sharing policies as possible and desirable. The comparative advantage-principle that follows
from this will in a burden-sharing context usually prioritise financial burden-sharing over physical protection initiatives. The focus on efficiency, rationality, and costs will often take priority over human rights and humanitarian principles. This was arguably the case in the Syria agreement where adherents to the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse maintained that protection-in-region-of-origin was preferable without making a clear exception for the most vulnerable – despite UNHCR’s recommendations. The rationalist economic perspective promoted by the ‘cost-and-capacity discourse’ creates reluctance to refugee politics that can be considered ‘naïve’, ‘emotional’ or ‘symbolic’. Further, the discourse tends to focus on the limitations created by existing systemic conditions, institutions and resources. This discursive practice promotes a way of thinking that carefully balances international norms and values against national concerns, with the economic perspective playing a decisive role. It expresses a conception of Norway as a rational political actor, which takes it international responsibility seriously but at the same time cannot accept demands from the international refugee protection regime that will have a perceived, significant negative effect on the economy and the Norwegian system.

The explicit value foundations of the ‘nation-state’ discourse limit the political space to a greater extent than the other discursive practices. Since the discourse includes a strong anti-immigration element, it hinders Norway’s involvement in physical protection initiatives because that by definition would pose a challenge to the current welfare state, and perhaps even represent a form of immorality due to its consequences for the Norwegian people. The discourse will therefore not dictate policies that will involve higher levels of non-Western refugees immigration (including refugees) in Norway. Instead, it is likely to promote the strengthening of border control as a political strategy to prevent higher immigration levels. Hence, financial burden-sharing is seemingly deemed to be the only positive burden-sharing initiative in this discourse. Financial aid to the nearby region may also be considered desirable because it supports a strategy of ‘containment’, and may thus lead to fewer asylum arrivals in Europe. The nation-state discourse frames Norwegian state identity as that of a sovereign nation-state, which is not ‘bullied’ by other states or external
actors to implement certain policies. Norway must not be a ‘naïve’ player in the international sphere. Hence, it follows from this discursive practice that international institutions, norms and principles will play a diminished role in Norwegian politics.

5.1.2. Shaping the political space: hierarchy and changing power relations

The Syrian refugee crisis has highlighted examples of both discursive reproduction and change in the Norwegian political field. This has consequences for social practice. The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse has in many ways contributed to maintaining the status quo when it comes to substantive burden-sharing politics. Norway has generally had a restrictive refugee- and asylum system, and this has been reflected also in the response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Indeed, Norway has contributed significantly in the area of resettlement compared to other Western states, and has been an important contributor of financial aid. However, there have been few attempts by the political leadership to develop new or innovative policy alternatives, such as complementary forms of protection. The discursive practice of the political leadership also limited Norway’s resettlement contribution.

Due to its place at the ‘top’ of the discursive hegemony, the “cost-and-capacity” discourse can be characterised as the provider of the core premises of the Norwegian refugee protection debate. The ‘nodal points’ embedded in this discourse, including efficiency, costs and benefits-analysis, and resource constraints have contributed to shaping the frames for the discursive political debate, and consequently also the political space for action. All political actors have had to relate to these nodal points in their engagement in the debate, and cannot escape this discourse – in discursive practice nor in social practice. Of course, this is partly due to the fact that funds and resources are not inexhaustible. All political actors must deal with this material reality. However, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse is founded upon a normative-political conception of the role of market liberal economics and economic rationality in refugee protection that arguably goes beyond that of actual existing resources. In consequence, the hegemonic role of the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse amongst political leadership has limited the possibilities for presenting policy alternatives that
lie outside of this discursive practice. In this way, the Norwegian political field creates a limited political space for burden-sharing in refugee protection following the Syrian crisis, which is founded upon a narrow normative and political framework determining what is possible and impossible.

The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse’s role as the provider of premises for the policy debate has, however, also been challenged as the situation has developed within the time frame addressed in the empirical material. That the humanitarian discourse has been accorded a gradually stronger role, in particular as the grassroots movement have contributed to transforming the discursive space through creative language use, has represented the most notable aspect of discursive change in this time period. This has significantly strengthened the position of the humanitarian discourse in the hierarchical discursive structure, and arguably provided it with a form of ‘moral hegemony’ in the field. In turn, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse – and the actors largely identified by it – has been forced to seriously engage with the ideas and policy implications embedded in the humanitarian discourse, at least to some extent. For instance, Erna Solberg’s explicit reference to the need for a national ‘dugnad’ in order to implement the Syria Agreement (Hillestad, 2015), implies that she is engaging directly with the core concepts and nodal points embedded in the humanitarian discourse, even though she applies it in a slightly less ambitious manner. In general, the Syria Agreement is a form of compromise between the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse and the humanitarian discourse, as the cost-and-capacity discourse is inherently sceptical to the use of resettlement as a burden-sharing strategy. Moreover, as the ‘European crisis’ has evolved, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse and related actors have gradually had to justify their social practice also in humanitarian terms. The government’s decision in September to host a donor conference for states to raise money for UN programmes in the nearby region can be seen as a way to meet the challenge of the humanitarian discourse. Solberg herself explained the reasons for the initiative by referring to the need to “mobilise an international dugnad” (Hillestad 2015, emphasis added). In this way, the humanitarian discourse has increasingly challenged the premises provided by the cost-and-capacity’ discourse. It has thus
pushed the boundaries for what can be defined as legitimate political practice in terms of burden-sharing in refugee protection. It is attempting to transform and redefine the political space for action.

So why has there not been a more substantive change in social practice following this discursive battle? In some ways it is striking how the political leadership has continuously suppressed the policy alternatives of the humanitarian discourse as the discursive field has changed. There is seemingly little desire amongst the political leadership to ‘use all the tools in the toolbox’ or develop more ambitious burden-sharing initiatives beyond the intent to participate in the European relocation scheme in some way. The donor conference initiative still primarily encourages financial burden-sharing, and thus remains within the broader boundaries of the status quo discursive practice. Part of the explanation to this may be found in the nation-state discourse. Despite its relatively limited outreach in the political field, the nation-state discourse has disproportional discursive power due to the fact that the Progress Party currently is in government. Moreover, although there has been a strong humanitarian engagement in large parts of the population, others have also experienced increasing fear during the growing ‘crisis’. This has added to the Progress Party’s political clout. Thus, since the nation-state discourse is in stark opposition to the humanitarian discourse in terms of norms, values and meanings, the important political role of the nation-state discourse creates a further distance between the humanitarian discourse that defines civil society, several opposition parties and grassroots movements, and the discursive practices that constitute the political leadership. In consequence, a discursive conflict has arguably emerged between the political leadership and the rest of the political field, including the grassroots movements. This also highlights the dialectic role of domestic actors and structures. Which actors have political power clearly matters for the outcomes of social practice. The fact that the Progress Party is represented in government at this exact time has significant policy consequences. At the same time, the political actors within the field still act largely within the political space created by the current discursive structure. The Progress Party can thus not act
completely independent of the discursive frames created by the humanitarian discourse.

5.1.3. International norms, national discourses: shaping social practice

The Syrian crisis highlights several important aspects regarding the relationship between the national and the international, in particular regarding the ‘downloading’ process of international norms in domestic political processes. From the analysis, it becomes clear that the hierarchy between the dominant discourses in the political field largely shape the political space for burden-sharing in refugee protection, especially the extent to which Norway is willing to participate in physical protection initiatives. However, it is also clear that the hierarchical relationship between the different discourses determine the role of international refugee norms and principles in Norwegian politics. The analysis of discursive practice has highlighted how the international norm of burden-sharing and other refugee norms have contributed to shaping domestic discourses and practices. The Syria Agreement is a clear example of this. The negotiations were initiated by a combination of two ideational factors: 1) UNHCR’s call for increased burden-sharing with the nearby region; and 2) Norway’s desire to do something, whereby international burden-sharing was perceived to be the most appropriate and desirable form of action. Indeed, there was a domestic discursive ‘battle’ over the agreement and its scope, but the initial frames of the debate were created by international norms. The Syrian refugee crisis has thus exemplified how international norms - European norms in particular – contribute to shaping Norwegian politics.

However, the case of the Syrian crisis has simultaneously highlighted the importance of national factors, including domestic discourses, discursive interpretations and domestic political contestation in shaping the outcome of the ‘downloading’ process of the burden-sharing norm. The nation-state discourse presents a particularly interesting case in this regard. This discourse has emerged in direct relation to the international refugee protection regime, and as a response to the humanitarian discourse in the political field. However, it has developed in opposition to, or in
conflict with, the norms and values promoted by this regime. Hence, the international sphere has contributed to shaping the nation-state discourse, but this discourse in fact promotes a way of thinking that suppresses the role of the international in domestic politics. Domestic discursive interpretations of international norms are therefore essential for the outcome of the ‘downloading’ process. Further, the analysis of text and discursive practice also sheds light upon the discursive ‘battle’ that has occurred between domestic actors regarding burden-sharing. The discursive practices have differed greatly in their perceptions of international norms and values, and which concerns should weigh more heavily in the context of refugee protection more generally. It is not a given that Norwegian policy will be guided first and foremost by norms, principles and actors in the international refugee protection regime.

5.1.3.1. Effects of the discursive hierarchy
Since the different discourses vary in the way in which they frame the role of the international sphere in domestic politics, the hierarchical relationship between the dominant discourses in the field matters for the outcome of the ‘downloading’ process. The humanitarian discourse promotes a way of thinking that prioritises international solidarity over national concerns in the context of a refugee crisis. Hence, its status as ‘moral hegemon’ will contribute to strengthening the political awareness of the importance of international norms. However, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse remains the political hegemon, largely constituting the ideas and beliefs of the political leadership. This discourse always balances international demands with national concerns. Further, the disproportionally powerful political role of the nation-state discourse undermines the legitimacy of international refugee norms shaping domestic policy. In consequence, the international norm of burden-sharing has contributed to shaping Norwegian politics in terms of responding to the Syrian refugee crisis. However, it has only been one of several factors that have determined the space for political action. The current hierarchical system between the dominant discourses has created some, yet limited, space for international norms. Consequently, discursive practice has created a somewhat limited political space for burden-sharing initiatives in refugee protection in Norway. In future situations of mass influx, these
dynamics between the national and international will still apply. The hierarchical relationship between the domestic discourses that characterise the political field will largely determine the outcome of the ‘downloading’ process and thus the implications for burden-sharing in practice.

5.2. Addressing the feedback-effects of Fairclough’s model

Fairclough’s model emphasises the mutually constituting relationship between text, discursive practice and social practice. Changes in social practice may therefore also constitute changes in discursive practice, which in turn is expressed through text (Bratberg 2014: 46). Thus, specific forms of political practice also affect the different discursive practices and how they frame what constitutes legitimate political practice. This implies that the continuation of certain forms of burden-sharing over time, for instance, may lead to discursive practice shaping the political space in a way that promotes this specific political practice. Resettlement is an example of this. Norway has traditionally been a prominent actor within resettlement initiatives. Hence, this has been a dominant form of social practice in the Norwegian field. When the Syrian crisis emerged, the first response by the (then Labour party-led) political leadership was to contribute to burden-sharing through resettlement. As Meyer notes:

_We suggested resettlement before the UNHCR did (…) Norwegian discourse in this case was not driven by the UNHCR, but by wanting to do more, something concrete (…)_

Norway’s experience with resettlement has seemingly caused it to de-prioritise alternative measures. For instance, Meyer refers to letters that High Commissioner Gueterres sent to the Norwegian Mission in Geneva in the early phases of the crisis:

_(ref: Gueterres) encourages not only resettlement, but other instruments as well, i.e. temporary permissions, student visa, family reunification (…) Norway has never responded to these other instruments (…) (ref: this shows) an inability to think out of the box, at least in the short run._

That the alternative measures Gueterres suggested were never seriously considered implies that the discursive practice has largely evolved around the scope and scale of the Syrian resettlement programme, consequently neglecting other forms of ‘new’ and ‘untested’ forms of physical burden-sharing. Further, social practice is constituted by
both discursive and non-discursive factors. This means that changes in non-discursive factors that belong to the wider social practice also have a constitutive effect on discursive practice. Hence, non-discursive changes, such as the rapid increase in asylum seekers in Norway, will in turn affect the discursive practice and the hierarchy and power relations between the discourses in the field.

5.3. Policy implications: the Syrian crisis

This subchapter will elaborate on the policy implications of the hierarchical discursive practice as discussed in chapter 4, with regards to policy implications for burden-sharing in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis specifically. In particular it will address more closely the policy implications that were touched upon in the textual analysis. It will focus on implications for the different burden-sharing measures introduced in chapter 2: financial burden-sharing; resettlement; temporary (collective) protection; and other complementary forms of protection, as well as broader implications for Norway’s role in European and international initiatives.

5.3.1. Resettlement

Resettlement is traditionally the most prominent form of burden-sharing in physical protection in the Norwegian context. Several key informants emphasised Norway’s special role in resettlement. For instance, Vevstad (2015b [interview]) notes that Norway potentially could contribute significantly at the European level with its knowledge and expertise regarding refugee quota schemes. In this view, resettlement may become Norway’s pre-eminent contribution in the international burden-sharing debate. Still, the discussion on resettlement touches upon fractions of disagreement within the humanitarian discourse itself. Meyer (2015 [interview]) criticises the strong focus on resettlement in the Norwegian discourse on humanitarian policy vis a vis Syria, noting that it is difficult to justify from a purely humanitarian viewpoint this very differentiated treatment between refugees, when you could help many more with the same resources in the nearby region. Yet, most civil society actors identified by the humanitarian discourse stress that resettlement is an effective and necessary protection tool for the most vulnerable. This also has to do with the strong individual
rights-perspective characterising many actors identified by the humanitarian discourse. However, resettlement is a resource-draining and costly protection tool. Therefore, this is a policy area where fractions of the humanitarian discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ conflict with one another. The hegemonic role of the ‘cost-and-capacity discourse’ thus has significant implications for the role of resettlement policy addressing the Syrian refugee crisis. Further, there is also a fear among certain political actors largely identified by this discourse, and the nation-state discourse, that resettlement will further promote Norway as an asylum country (Ministry of Justice official, 2015 [interview]).

The analysis of the empirical material has implied a discursive change since the Syria negotiations. In turn, this may also lead to a change in social practice, that is, a change in the Syria agreement. Lysbakken, Vevstad, Skei Grande and other actors identified more or less by the humanitarian discourse have argued for a more ambitious agreement in the light of the new situation. However, the political leadership has remained reluctant to this also throughout the discursive changes, and apparently remain within the premises of the ‘cost-and-capacity discourse’. Further, fast-changing non-discursive structures are also likely to affect actors’ perceptions of resettlement. At the time of writing, Norway is experiencing a great increase in asylum arrivals on a weekly basis. These developments have continued since late August 2015, and will impact actors’ views of Norway’s participation in resettlement initiatives. In particular, the political hegemony of the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse likely results in the priority of ordinary asylum processes - which Norway in the end cannot strictly control – over new resettlement initiatives. The discursive practice may deem the combination of the two as too costly. In result, hegemonic discursive practice is likely to contribute to a status quo in social practice regarding resettlement. However, resettlement lies in the breakpoint between the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse and the humanitarian discourse. The humanitarian discourse is likely to aim to transform and re-constitute hegemonic discursive practice on this issue, but may not be able to do so if the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse gains increasing discursive power as a result of the changing asylum situation. On the other hand, the ‘cost-and-capacity’
discourse will de-legitimise enhanced resettlement as a policy alternative. The outcome of this discursive battle is naturally unknown, but is likely to be something similar to the status quo. As Ministry of Justice and Public Security official (2015 [interview]) put it:

“There is no question of not accepting any refugees for resettlement, but of how to prioritise different ways to help.”

5.3.2. Financial Burden-sharing

The hierarchy between the dominant discourses implies that financial burden-sharing will be the most important burden-sharing initiative for Norway during the continuation of the Syrian refugee crisis. Financial burden-sharing is dictated as a necessary policy by all the dominant discourses in the field. Thus, discursive practice will likely guarantee continued financial burden-sharing with Syria’s neighbouring region. The question is therefore not whether Norway will participate in financial burden-sharing, but the extent to which it will contribute. The different discourses enable different forms of social practice in this regard. Norway is a significant financial contributor in the region. However, actors belonging to the humanitarian discourse continuously argue that Norway can and should do more financially:

“We have increased the support to Syria, but not much to the UNHCR. The international donor community has not kept up with UNHCR’s financial needs. UNHCR’s budget is now less than 50% financed. In 2010 Norway was the 5th largest donor (...) in 2014 Norway was the 9th largest.” (Meyer, 2015 [interview]).

The Syria Platform also held as one of its main demands that Norway increases its financial support to the region to a total of 3 billion NOK. However, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse promotes a much more modest financial contribution, which also must be seen in context with asylum costs at home, the negative effects of the oil crisis on the Norwegian economy, and so on. Perceptions of existing resource structures thus contribute to determining the level of financial aid that will go to UNHCR’s programmes and the affected states. The nation-state discourse will further strengthen this discursive practice, due to it support among some actors within the government and its emphasis on the need to spend financial resources first and
foremost on national welfare policies. In consequence, Norway will certainly remain a significant actor in financial burden-sharing with the region. However, the financial contributions are unlikely to experience a dramatic increase due to the current discursive structure.

5.3.3. Temporary (collective) forms of protection

The empirical material highlights that temporary protection programmes is a specifically sensitive political issue. During the interviews, most of the key informants drew explicitly upon historical experiences with temporary collective protection when asked about why this has not been implemented as a response to the Syrian crisis. In particular, the temporary protection scheme granted to Bosnian refugees in Norway during the 1990s was a strong reference point across the spectrum of actors, including many civil society actors, representatives from ministries, and the research community. The main lessons learned from the Bosnian case was that the ‘temporary’ aspect of such protection may have deeply problematic consequences for the individuals that are affected (Austenå, 2015 [interview]; Igesund, 2015 [interview]). For instance, Austenå stresses the complex difficulties these programmes may have for individual asylum applicants:

*It is about the lives of individuals. (...) People become rooted and have children.*

The discussion, or lack of discussion, on temporary protection thus highlights the powerful rights perspective that is embedded in large fractions of the humanitarian discourse. Most of the informants noted that temporary protection is extremely challenging for the political leadership because they will be responsible for returning these refugees in the future. This is particularly difficult due to the strong individual rights-perspective in the political field. In particular, the representative for the Ministry of Justice (2015 [interview]) stressed that the “child perspective” is dominant in the Norwegian debate. Temporary protection measures become increasingly challenging when those who stay on a temporary basis have children in Norway. This leads to a range of difficult questions relating to the child’s rights and belonging.
Temporary protection is challenging for the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse and the nation-state discourse also for other reasons. A notable distinction between the Balkan crisis in the 1990s and the Syrian crisis today is the cultural and religious differences between the refugees. Although the Bosnian refugees were also Muslims, they were still European, and thus were similar to Norwegians in many cultural aspects. The nation-state discourse is especially negative to non-Western immigration. Hence, the ethnic and cultural distinctions between the Bosnians and the Syrians matter greatly for the way in which the discourse frames temporary protection as a policy alternative. Further, it is important to note the integration aspect. That the Bosnians were Europeans also made them generally more easily integrated in other European states like Norway, especially in the labour market (Koser and Black 1999: 533; 535). The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse wishes to prioritise refugees who are easily integrated in all burden-sharing initiatives. Hence, although this discourse is not founded upon explicit anti-immigration sentiments, the cultural and religious background of the Syrian refugees still matters in the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. Similarly, the same discursive structures may explain why the experience with large-scale burden-sharing in Europe as a response to the massive group of Hungarian refugees in the 1950s has not been more present in political memory. Hungarians are also Europeans, and the effects of a mass influx on Norwegian society were thus considered by dominant discursive practice to be more easily manageable.

However, the issue of temporary protection also underlines certain fractions within the humanitarian discourse itself – mainly between the rights perspective and the basic humanitarian value of providing humanitarian relief to as many as possible. Whilst several civil society actors highlight the problems related to temporary protection, other actors belonging to the humanitarian discourse, including Vevstad and Meyer, stress the necessity of implementing these schemes despite the challenges. This is because temporary protection will “provide more people protection more quickly” (Vevstad, 2015b [interview]). Interestingly, Nesse (2015 [interview]) also notes that temporary protection represents a protection solution that in some way compromises between humanitarian discourse and the cost-and-capacity discourse:
Still, the empirical analysis shows that so far, temporary protection has not been on the agenda of the political leadership. Moreover, Norway is not alone in being hesitant towards temporary protection as a response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Most Western countries have been sceptical to implementing HAP. Due to the scepticism among many actors in the political field towards this protection initiative and the challenges it presents for the political leadership, it seems unlikely that Norway will take the initiative in this area before a larger group of EU states does so.

5.3.4. Other forms of complementary protection

The empirical material shows that actors largely identified by the humanitarian discourse, have provided several policy suggestions that can foster alternative ways of providing protection to Syrian refugees. The most prominent suggestion is enabling the provision of humanitarian visas. Other proposals include enhanced possibilities for family reunification, and the provision of student visas to Syrian refugees who were not able to finish their higher education. Further, actors largely identified with the humanitarian discourse have argued for several policy developments that represents a form of indirect burden-sharing. These include providing refugees with the possibility to process their asylum applications directly at Norwegian embassies abroad, changing perceptions towards legal migration, and ensuring safe travel paths from the region into Europe and Norway. The latter policy suggestions do not represent explicit burden-sharing initiatives as such, but arguably contribute indirectly to burden-sharing by enabling more refugees to seek asylum in Norway more easily. Finally, the humanitarian discourse also promotes improvements in integration policies directed at the refugees that have been granted permission to stay. Humanitarian actors have emphasised the need to start the integration process earlier, and the need for increased focus on the competencies of the refugees and what they can contribute with in the labour market. These policy initiatives do not constitute burden-sharing, but are still
essential elements of Norwegian policy in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis. However, alternative forms of complementary protection have not been suggested by actors who are identified with the other discourses. The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse will likely oppose most new policy initiatives that increase state costs. In addition, this discourse’s focus on existing problems, and lack of will to pursue new solutions, will challenge the development of complementary protection initiatives.

5.3.5. Norway and Europe

The debate on burden-sharing following the Syrian refugee crisis, at least in the time period addressed here, has highlighted issues concerning Norway’s European identity and the extent to which Norway wants to play a prominent and pro-active role in Europe in this field. As the situation has evolved, there has seemingly been a discursive change on this issue. More actors are recognising that Norway must play a role in new European initiatives due to its European identity. There is arguably a growing recognition that Norway would benefit from taking part in such schemes, and that it is desirable from a normative perspective. Igesund 2015 [interview]) characterises the Norwegian debate as “changing” because there is a growing consensus among political actors that Norway must contribute at the European level in particular. This is exemplified by Minister of Justice Anders Anundsen’s expressed intention to participate in European relocation initiatives despite the Progress Party being strongly influenced by the nation-state discourse (Johnsen and Johnsen, 2015 (VG). However, there are still significant differences in discursive practice regarding the level of ambition. Should Norway be in the lead on this issue, or be satisfied with levelling with the European “average”? How much should Norway contribute with in terms of costs, resources, and resettlement and relocation places? The humanitarian discourse dictates a very ambitious level of commitment, whilst the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse calls for a more cautious approach.

Further, the empirical material reveals that an increasing number of actors in the political field believe that the Dublin regulations, at least in the way they are currently practiced, have failed to uphold a system of control, solidarity and burden-sharing in
Europe. Since Norway is bound to the Dublin regulations, changes in this system will affect Norwegian policy. Norway also has the ability to impact Dublin-related policy on the European level. It is still highly uncertain which direction the Dublin-regulations is headed, and whether it will result in improved or more limited systems for European burden-sharing. Several actors in the political field largely identified by the humanitarian discourse demand that the exemption rules of Dublin are applied, or that a new system is developed all together. However, the Norwegian government has still been reluctant to declare the failure of Dublin as it is practiced today. In light of the dominant discourses, there seems to be a conflict between the humanitarian discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse over what are the legitimate systems of governance within the European refugee protection regime. Still, it has become increasingly clear that Norway will be part of future European burden-sharing initiatives, including potentially permanent initiatives. This implies that the increasingly strong role of the humanitarian discourse have had implications for the government’s social practice.

5.4. Policy implications: burden-sharing in the long-term

The Syrian refugee crisis is an exceptional case in the area of refugee protection, especially in terms of the massive scale of the crisis and its wide-ranging geographical impact, which includes Northern states. Therefore it is not unreasonable to expect that the experiences from this crisis will have consequences for the way in which the international refugee protection system as a whole, and individual countries such as Norway, approach the issue of refugee protection in general. The Syrian crisis has highlighted numerous shortcomings in international and national refugee protection systems. This subchapter will discuss the implications of this for the long-term consequences for burden-sharing in refugee protection, beyond this particular crisis. It thus touches upon two different elements of burden-sharing: 1) burden-sharing measures in particular situations of mass influx; and 2) permanent burden-sharing measures. The section is concerned with Norwegian policy specifically. However, since the Syrian refugee crisis has had significant consequences for the European
system as a whole, and Norway’s refugee policies are closely tied with the rest of Europe, the section will also touch upon implications for the wider European system.

5.4.1. National burden-sharing initiatives

It is not easy, or necessarily possible, to predict future policy developments. However, certain tentative implications for Norwegian burden-sharing initiatives can be drawn from the experiences from the Syrian refugee crisis and the discursive practices that have characterised the Norwegian response, in particular regarding the policy response to future situations of mass influx. It is clear that there is no real challenge to financial burden-sharing in the discursive field, and financial burden-sharing will thus remain the least controversial form of burden-sharing in refugee crises in the future. Also in non-crisis, Norway is generally a significant provider of humanitarian aid, including to the UNHCR. However, the level of financial aid at a given time will depend on the hegemonic discursive practice. In addition, the prioritisation of financial burden-sharing over physical forms of protection is not a given. The humanitarian discourse questions this way of thinking. Moreover, the level of ambition will depend on non-discursive factors, especially those related to the economy. If the oil crisis continues, for instance, Norway is likely to experience another economic reality during future crises. This change in non-discursive structures is likely to change the perceptions of actors in the political field. This may in turn accord the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse with an even stronger role.

Regarding physical protection initiatives, the question of implications is more challenging. Traditionally, resettlement is Norway’s most valuable contribution to physical burden-sharing initiatives. The Syrian crisis exemplifies that special resettlement schemes are likely to be established in times of crises. However, discursive practice set out by the nation-state discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse also shows that cultural and religious factors will matter in terms of the extent to which Norway will take part in physical burden-sharing as a response to a particular crisis. This implies that the scale of physical burden-sharing initiatives in situations of mass influx to a certain degree will depend on where the refugee crisis
takes place and who the refugees are. To what extent will depend on the hierarchy between the dominant discourses. With regards to temporary protection, the Syrian refugee crisis highlights that each of the different discursive practices find this difficult for different reasons. Temporary protection is framed as an extremely sensitive issue by the whole political field. In particular, this issue highlights the strong discursive role of the rights perspective in the political field. It thus seems unlikely that Norway will implement a temporary protection programme as a response to a situation of mass influx, unless a significant number of European states set the standard first.

5.4.2. Norway and the international refugee protection regime

In the case of the Syrian crisis, Norwegian actors have responded differently to European discussions on burden-sharing initiatives than to the calls of UNHCR and other global actors. Of course, this may have something to do with the fact that, by being a member of the EEC and the Schengen area, Norway has a higher level of ‘legal’ commitment to European practices. However, the empirical material generally shows a different level of commitment to European notions of solidarity than to global notions of solidarity. This is to an extent related to the hierarchy in the discursive field. The humanitarian discourse promotes a strong adherence to all international norms, global as well as European. Hence, the prioritised commitment to European solidarity is likely derived from the political hegemony of the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse, which has a more balanced and cautious approach to burden-sharing. There has generally been a gradual change in the discursive field regarding European solidarity, which has gained increasing support also from the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse. In consequence, the extent of Norway’s participation in international burden-sharing initiatives seemingly depends upon the particular crisis’ impact on the European continent, and the European response. The political space for action is likely to be greater in the context of European solidarity and burden-sharing than in terms of global initiatives.
6 Conclusions

The unprecedented consequences of the Syrian refugee crisis for individuals and for societies, and the inability of the international community to handle the crisis in a satisfactory manner, have highlighted the need for developing improved ways to provide effective refugee protection. Moreover, the Syrian crisis is accompanied by several other large-scale refugee crises around the world. In result, the international refugee protection regime is facing an enormous challenge when it comes to handling situations of mass displacement. Greater burden-sharing is likely to be a necessary component of improved refugee protection strategies in future refugee situations.

6.1. Main Findings

The thesis has addressed the following research question:

"What are the dominant discourses addressing burden-sharing in refugee protection in Norway following the Syrian crisis? In what ways does the hierarchy between these discourses shape the political space - for action on this issue and, in the longer term, for burden-sharing in refugee protection?

It has argued that the dominant discourses addressing burden-sharing in the Norwegian field following the Syrian crisis are the humanitarian discourse, the ‘cost and capacity’ discourse and the ‘nation-state’ discourse. These discourses take part in discursive ‘battles’ in the political field, in which they compete and conflict with each other. The outcome of these battles, in turn, shapes the political space for legitimate action for burden-sharing in practice in Norway. In particular, the thesis has argued that the hierarchical relationship between the different dominant discourses has significant implications for Norwegian burden-sharing policy. The ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse maintains political hegemony in the field, and thus provides the premises for the debate on burden-sharing, which none of the actors in the field can ignore. However, the time period from the Syria Agreement and throughout the European crisis up until September 2015 highlighted aspects of discursive transformation as
well as reproduction. As the humanitarian discourse has been accorded a stronger role, and arguably achieved a form of ‘moral hegemony’ in the political field, actors largely identified by this discourse have attempted to transform the discursive boundaries and consequently widen the political space for legitimate action in terms of burden-sharing.

Regarding the political implications of discursive practice for Norwegian burden-sharing, the thesis has addressed four specific forms of burden-sharing: resettlement, financial burden-sharing, temporary (collective) protection, and complementary forms of protection. In terms of the Syrian crisis specifically, it has argued that the current hierarchical relationship results in the priority of financial burden-sharing over physical burden-sharing initiatives, as well as a lack of political will to develop and implement different forms of complementary protection and other innovative protection measures. Regarding future situations of mass influx, the findings imply that the Norwegian level of commitment to burden-sharing and solidarity is likely to be greater when it comes to European initiatives than global initiatives, at least if the humanitarian discourse does not have discursive hegemony.

In the thesis, burden-sharing has been conceptualised as a norm in the international refugee protection regime. The theoretical starting point of the thesis has been the role of international norms in politics, in particular the complex relationship between international norms and domestic politics. I have criticised norm theory in constructivist IR for remaining at the inter-state level of analysis, and consequently neglecting the crucial role of domestic political actors, institutions and discursive interpretations in processing and implementing international norms. Therefore I have drawn upon three different strands of constructivist theory in an attempt to ‘bring the social back into social constructivism’ and address the ‘downloading process’ through which international norms and policies are processed in a domestic context. The analysis has showed that domestic political processes, in particular the domestic discursive field, are essential in determining if, how, and to what extent international norms are implemented. The ‘nation-state’ discourse is an interesting example in this
regard. The nation-state discourse has developed in response to the international refugee protection regime, but it has developed largely in opposition to this regime and the values it promotes. In consequence, the powerful role of this discourse in the political field will have significant implications for Norway’s adherence to international refugee protection norms. This supports the argument that international norm theory in constructivist IR is unable to provide an adequate explanation for the development and implementation of international norms due to its lack of focus on the ‘black box’ of the state.

Critical discourse analysis has been a useful analytical framework for addressing this ‘black box’ in depth. CDA highlights the importance of power relations and ideological effects in discursive practice. This theoretical emphasis on power has been particularly relevant, as it has helped explain how and why the hierarchical relationship between the dominant discourses in the field have shaped the political space for burden-sharing. It has also been useful in explaining how this hierarchy has been challenged and to an extent, transformed, during the course of the two cases, and what the implications of this are for the political space. Further, the concept of power also highlights that possibilities for Norwegian burden-sharing in the future will largely depend on the specific hierarchical discursive structure in the field. In addition, Fairclough’s concept of ideological effects has contributed to revealing some of the deeply embedded power structures within the different discursive practices. For instance, the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse embraces a specific normative-political perspective of market liberalist economic rationality as inherently good, which in turn suppresses discursive orientations that are not founded upon this particular notion. Hence, CDA can be deemed a very relevant and appropriate analytical framework for the analysis of domestic political processes, also in combination with a broader social constructivist IR approach such as international norm theory.

6.2. Implications for further research

In terms of implications for further research, the thesis has touched upon two different, yet interrelated aspects of the research agenda in political science and IR.
They include 1) a more policy-focused research agenda, looking specifically at the concept of burden-sharing in refugee protection; and 2) a theory-driven research agenda, which aims to improve the theoretical understanding of the relationship between the international political sphere and the national political sphere in general, and a deeper understanding of the specific circumstances concerning the development and implementation of international norms in particular.

In terms of the first aspect, the thesis has highlighted the importance of burden-sharing as a political response to the enormous global displacement challenge. However, I argue that this has not been sufficiently matched in scholarly literature. Thus, increased academic focus – in several disciplines – on burden-sharing in refugee protection could be beneficial also from a policy perspective. Moreover, the main findings of the thesis imply that in-depth analyses of different domestic political contexts are crucial in order to understand the possibilities for burden-sharing, both in terms of the Syrian refugee crisis and future situations of mass influx. Hence, future research on this issue could involve applying a similar analytical framework of different national contexts, or involve conducting comparative studies. CDA has proven to be a useful analytical framework in this regard. However, a combination of different research methodologies addressing this issue would likely provide new insights in the field. Moreover, the analytical findings of the thesis imply that the extraordinary character of the Syrian refugee crisis has enabled possible new policies and practices in the field of refugee protection. In turn, this implies that the Syrian crisis represents a fruitful starting point for new research within the refugee protection field.

In terms of the second aspect, my findings imply that there is a need in IR to develop more nuanced theoretical approaches that address the role of norms in international politics, which better capture the complex relationship between the domestic and the international sphere. The ‘bottom-up’ approach developed by Hopf, and the ‘downloading’ process as theorised in the ‘Europeanization’ literature, could provide a
fruitful foundation in this regard. In this way, this thesis has also provided a theory-generating starting point for further research.
Afterword

In this thesis I have addressed a very relevant and extremely fast-changing political field. Due to the current dramatic political situation in Europe and in Norway for refugees and migrants, I have simply been unable to address the most recent empirical developments, as I had to remain within the scope and time frame of a master’s thesis. I had to delimit my empirical material somehow, and I was able to capture a very interesting period in the Norwegian field. However, there have been some drastic changes in the field since September. The humanitarian discourse has gone from a position in the discursive hierarchy through which it could push for a transformation of the existing discursive structure to a diminished role in the political field. The nation-state discourse, on the other hand, has been accorded a significantly stronger discursive position. Still, these changes also highlight the relevance of my findings. Firstly, I would argue that the current political dynamics show that the three discourses I have identified in the thesis still characterise the field. Even though the power structures between them have changed, it is clear that the nation-state discourse, the humanitarian discourse and the ‘cost-and-capacity’ discourse still constitute the frames of the debate. Secondly, the political developments also show that the analytical insights and dynamics highlighted in the thesis still apply. The hierarchy between the dominant discourses in the field clearly matters for Norwegian refugee and asylum policy. Now that the nation-state discourse has a stronger position in the discursive hierarchy, this has had concrete implications for Norwegian refugee politics, which has become more restrictive. Moreover, further changes in non-discursive factors have also contributed to changing the political field. A great increase in the number of asylum seekers in Norway over a longer period of time has resulted in a change in public opinion and many political actors’ perception of the situation. Hence, despite that the empirical material in the thesis reflects an “out-dated” political situation, I will argue that my findings have analytical value also beyond this specific empirical context.
Bibliography


Ministry of Justice and Public Security official (2015). Interview with author, 26 October


Appendix

Intervjuguide

Normer/prinsipper i flyktningebeskyttelse

- Hvilke (normer og) prinsipper oppfatter du som viktige i flyktningebeskyttelse, sett fra et norsk ståsted? Hvordan har de endret seg over tid, og hvorfor?
- Kan byrdefordeling forstås som en slags norm i internasjonal flyktningebeskyttelse?

Syria som ”definerende case”?

- Har Syriakrisen endret måten det internasjonale samfunnet, deriblant Norge, tenker og handler i forhold til flyktningebeskyttelse?

Den politiske debatten i Norge

- Hva mener du er de viktigste skillelinjene i den norske debatten om flyktningebeskyttelse?
- Har byrdefordeling i flyktningebeskyttelse vært et prinsipp som norske aktører har forholdt seg til tidligere?
- Hvordan mener du at den norske debatten om byrdefordeling har endret seg som følge av Syriakrisen? Hvordan har valgkampen har spilt inn her?
- Tror du flyktningkrisen vi har opplevd de siste par månedene vil ha en innvirkning på Syria-avtalen?

Norge og det internasjonale

- Byrdefordelingsinitiativer som en respons til den syriske flyktningekrisen har vært fremhevet av UNHCR som praktisk og moralsk nødvendig. Har norske aktører har blitt påvirket av dette?
- Hvordan blir Norge etter din oppfatning påvirket av den europeiske debatten om byrdefordeling?
- Mer generelt - hva mener du Norge kan og bør gjøre når det kommer til internasjonal byrdefordeling, og hvorfor?
- En rekke ulike byrdefordelingsinitiativer – humanitær admissions, kvoteflyktninger, finansiell byrdefordeling med nærområdende osv. Kan du si noe om forholdet mellom disse?

Langtidsperspektiv – implicasjoner

- Hva tenker du om langtidskonsekvensene av det vi ser skjer i forbindelse med flyktningekrisen i Syria nå, når det gjelder flyktningebeskyttelse i Norge generelt, og byrdefordeling specielt?
- Hva er de eventuelle hindringene for å etablere byrdefordeling som en norm i flyktningebeskyttelse?
Historisk perspektiv

- Byrdefordelingsinitiativer i stor skala har også blitt implementert i forbindelse med tidligere flyktningkriser – mest kjent under Yugoslaviakrisen på 90-tallet, men også etter andre verdenskrig og Vietnamkrigen. Hvordan har tidligere erfaringer med byrdefordeling i flyktningebeskyttelse påvirket den politiske responsen til Syriakrisen i dag?