

What factors contributed to the failure of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, 1972

Dawit Yemane Tekle



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Preface

May 2008, it was my first journey outside my home country Eritrea to Khartoum, Sudan. I lived in Sudan for 3 and half years as a refugee before I came to Norway. After staying 3 months in Khartoum as a refugee, I had the opportunity to work in Khartoum as a teacher. Sudan is the largest country in Africa and because of its natural resources the country was given the name “Mother of Africa”. Indeed the people of Sudan have been kind, helpful and hospitable to the Eritreans’ refugees who lived in Sudan for a long time. But it was my daily question why this country had suffered of civil war, starvation and corruption while the country is endowed with natural wealth.

I was in Sudan when the long and bloody civil war between North and South Sudan came to an end after the referendum in 2011, in which the South Sudan became the newest African state in the world. However, still a lot of questions remained unresolved between the two nations, consequently, there were continuous confrontation over the ownership of the oil resource over the Abyei region. Therefore, it was my personal interest to study and write at an academic research on the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, 1972. And I believe that the current problem between the North and South Sudan was the failure of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. Moreover, the people of South Sudan and Eritrea had a similar political development under the colonial rule during the 1970s, in which both countries were given a self autonomous status while majority of their population were in favour of independence.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank and give glory to the almighty God for His kind guidance and constant love throughout my life, without His help definitely I could not be able to finish this paper in due time. Therefore, it is my duty to give Him praise, worship and thanks now and forever, Amen.

Thanks are due to Anders Breidlid for all his comments, encouragement, and supporting throughout my entire work. Moreover, he provided me with additional materials related to the history of Southern Sudan. And I am very grateful for his feedback and he drew my attention to generate new ideas and concepts regarding the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (1972). Also, thanks to Eivind Myre from the Department of History UiO for his academic contribution on this research. And my friend Wilson has also contributed much on revising and giving comments to the paper during its final stage. My warmest gratitude goes to my beloved father and my wife Rahel for their spiritual, financial and moral encouragements right from the beginning of this paper until the final phase.

Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge my friends and brothers (Pastor Abiel, Pastor Tewelde, Bereket, Bisrat, Fessehay, Dawit, Luam, Josief and Simret), who have contributed directly and indirectly for this research paper and really their moral support gave me the strength to complete this research in due time.

Executive Summary

In 1972, representatives of the Northern Sudan and the Southern Sudan reached a historic agreement to end the first bloody civil war in Sudan by way of negotiations, in which the third party mediator (Ethiopia) had participated in the peace process. However, the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement had faced serious challenges for its implementation and as a result in 1983 it failed to bring sustainable peace between the two peoples. This thesis attempts to answer the research question: why the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement did fail? It thoroughly goes through the dominant conflict resolution theories and it uses a contemporary theory based on power-sharing and negotiation theory. The thesis will partly highlight the root causes of the war as the main cause for the beginning of the first civil war in Sudan. The thesis concludes with the final failure of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement by stating all the important factors: the social, economic, security and political dimensions.

Organization of the Thesis

This research thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction and provides a general introduction, presents the research design, methodology and the methodology underpinning the collection of sources and limitation of the research. Chapter two discusses the root causes of the civil war between North and South Sudan, a brief presentation of the first civil war from 1955 to 1972 and the military and political shifts prior to the formation of Anya Nya movement.

The chapter three provides a theoretical analysis to research paper. Under this topic I will discuss the theory of power-sharing and negotiation in light of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. Chapter four discusses the historical development of the Round Table Conference, the genesis of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, the legal terms of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, the implementation of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreements and the politics of Southern Sudan during the peace agreement. Chapter five will advance my hypothesis as to why the AAPA was a failure and reasons why the new civil war started in 1983. Finally, the research thesis gives the conclusion part.

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Abbreviations

AACC (All African Council of Churches)

AAPA (Addis Ababa Peace Agreement)

CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement)

OCRO (Oxfam Catholic Relief Organization)

DRC'S (Democratic Republic of Congo)

DUP (Democratic Unionist Party)

EU (European Union)

GOS (Government of Sudan)

HEC (High-Executive Council)

ICF (Islamic Charter Front)

IMF (International Monetary Fund)

KDC (Kuwait's Development Contribution)

LP (Liberal Party)

MSA (Missionary Societies Act)

NCA (Norwegian Church Aid)

NMF (National Military Forces)

NUP (National Unionist Party)

OAU (Organization of African Union)

PAF (People's Armed Forces)

PDP (People's Democratic Party)

PRA (People's Regional Assembly)

RTC (Round Table Conference)

SAC (Sudan Administration Conference)

SANU (Sudan African National Union)

SCA (Sudan Christian Association)

SOA (Sudan Open Archive)

SPLA (South People's Liberation Army)

SRA (Southern Regional Administration)

SRSGA (Southern Regional Self-Government Act)

SSANU (Southern Sudan African Nationalist Union)

SSF (Southern Sudan Front)

SSLM (Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement)

UN (United Nations)

UNHCR (United Nation High Commission for Refugee)

USAID (The US Agency for International Development)

USNA (The United Southern National Army)

WCC (World Council of Churches)

Chapter I: Introduction

As the largest country in Africa, Sudan is characterized by geographical diversity, which is reflected in its multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual populations. By the end of the 20th century, the country was failing to deal with complex religious and political tensions that threatened its territorial integrity. Despite the Round Table Conference (RTC), 1965 and Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (AAPA), 1972 which had attempted to address the first civil war between the North and South Sudan, security and stability did not achieve over the entire part of Sudan until the last Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005.¹

Two causes are traditionally put forward to explain the first civil war in Sudan. One is the division between the North and South based on centuries of exploitation and slavery campaign by the “Arab-North” against the “African-South” and the other is the British imperialist policy who split Sudan into “African” and “Arab” since there were no natural or historical divisions between the two regions.²

The Rule of Turko-Egyptian

The political change by the end of 18th century was considered as a turning point in the history of South, in which part of the Southern Sudan became a strategic territory for the expansion of the Turkish invasion. This period also witnessed massive Southward migrations from the North and a gradual extension of agricultural and sedentary way of life. European travelers and missionaries were coming to the South in search of cultivable land and to spread Christianity in the region. These massive foreign movements toward Southern Sudan changed the traditional way of life. Conflict over grazing rights erupted between the indigenous

¹Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmad, "Sudan Peace Agreements: Current Challenges and Future Prospects," *Working Paper - Chr. Michelsen Institute*, no. 1 (2010): 7.

² Douglas H. Johnson and Institute The International African, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*, African Issues (Kampala: The International African Institute James Currey, 2011), 1.

inhabitants and the new comers. The European travelers were not only spreading Christianity but also diseases among the populations.³

In 1805 after Muhammad Ali became governor of Egypt, he wanted to expand Ottoman/Egyptian influence along the Mediterranean and southwards towards Sudan. As part of his grand strategy, he conquered part of Nubia, Sennar, Kordofan and the Red Sea coast were becoming under the influence of Muhammad Ali. The well equipped and organized Egyptian armies defeated the long-established Funj kingdom in the region.⁴ One of Ali's political motives for invading the Southern Sudan was to obtain slaves for his army and use them as cheap labor force. Upon completing the conquest of Sudan, the government of Egypt in collaboration with the Northern people of Nubia, Sennar, Kordofan and the Red Sea engaged in slave raids against the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk of the Southern Sudan. Furthermore, the imposition of heavy taxes by the Turko-Egyptian regime up-on the Northern Sudan also meant that the people in the North needed more income to pay their taxes and therefore, the slave-raids were intensified among the Southern people.⁵

This situation in South Sudan created a political, social and economic division/gap between the North and the South. From the period of 1821-1879, the successive Turko-Egyptian governments brought an end to the kingdom of the Funji and created a centralized government in Sudan. As a result Northern Sudan was divided into 6 provinces with its own capital cities, boundaries and local councils. However, the Egyptian rulers were not able to create a centralized government in Southern Sudan due to local resistance from tribal leaders and prevalence of tropical diseases. As a result, Turko-Egyptian rule only achieved a weak integration of North and South Sudan.⁶

³ Anders Breidlid, Avelino Androga Said, and Astrid Kristine Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, New Edition ed. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2014), 90-91.

⁴ Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 10-12.

⁵ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 98-99.

⁶ Ibid.

The Rise of Mahdi

The high taxes and continued slave raiding by the Turko-Egyptian government led to the rise of the Mahdi in the 1880's. Muhammed Ahmed (the Mahdi) proclaimed himself as the redeemer of the Islamic faith and he promised to get rid of the Turks, Egyptian and the British out of Sudan. In 1881, the Mahdi followers (the Ansar) led a military campaign to unify the tribes of western, central Sudan and Southern Sudan. During this time the Dinka tribes supported him so that the oppression of the Turko-Egyptian rule came to an end. His disciples took the name "Ansars" which continue to be used even today by the Umma Party in Sudan. The rebel movement successfully controlled areas in Kordofan, Darfur, Bahr-el-Ghazal and by 1885 Khartoum itself fell under the mercy of the Mahdi which marked the end of the Turkiyya regime.⁷

The rebellion movement did not stop with the fall of Khartoum, it extended up to Egypt and the coast of East Africa. Although Mahdi and his followers were successful in defeating the Egyptian and the British, most of the Southern part of Sudan did not surrender to the hand of Mahdist government. Generally speaking, the rule of Mahdi had achieved major changes in the Southern Sudan. Unlike in the previous, Sudan was now divided explicitly along the religious line with the "Ansar" Muslim, in the North and the non-Muslim, in the South. While Northern slavery and cattle raids in South stopped during this period, inter-ethnic conflicts among the Southern people resumed as it was under the Turko-Egyptian rule.⁸

The Era of Condominium

An Anglo-Egyptian condominium was formed after the defeat of the Mahdi rebellion in 1899. Over the next three decades, the colonial government strove to bring the South Under its control. During the first ten years, the need to maintain peace and control violence in the country dominated the government agenda. The growing relations between the North Sudan and Egypt and their interests over the

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Andrew S. Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 21.

Southern Sudan, led the British government to secure the Southern area for an extended East African Empire. In order to stop the influence of North Sudan and Egypt over the South Sudan, they administered the South Sudan as a separate entity from the North Sudan.

Furthermore, the British government allowed missionaries to travel to the region to spread Christianity and the missionaries were allowed to open schools, provide health services and education. The British policy “divide and rule” in the early 1940s did not change the political, economic and social structure of the Southern people, still majority of the population lived in the rural area with little access to education.⁹

Decolonization

With the end of World War II in 1945, the British government changed its policy with regard the administration of South Sudan. The Condominium government established a transitional period in Sudan that paved the way for the independence of Sudan. One year later (1946) the Sudan Administration Conference (SAC) composed of representatives from the North Sudan and the Condominium government suggested the unification of South and North Sudan. Many South Sudanese rejected the idea of a union with the North in which they would be governed by the Northern parliament. Indeed, the South Sudanese nationalists wanted their own separate parliament. However, both the Northern nationalists and the Egyptian government rejected the British plan to give self-determination for Southern Sudan. For its part, the Egyptian government supported a united Sudan because of its vital interest in the Nile valleys.¹⁰

The process of decolonization and the end of the Condominium government in 1954-55 had increased the tension between the Northerners and Southerners. This period also determined the fate of Southern Sudan as whether the Southern Sudan remained part of Sudan or an independent state. In 1955 after a long discussion

⁹ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*.

¹⁰ Ibid.

among Southerners' elites, violence, strikes and protest were conducted in various major cities and towns to support the independence of Southern Sudan. However, the Northern government soon regained control over major cities and many Southerners who had participated in the riots were arrested.¹¹

Despite the resistance of the Southerners, both the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded a dual agreement to end the colonial administration in Sudan and facilitated the Sudanese 'self-government'. With the consent of the British and Egyptian governments, Sudan achieved its independence on January 1, 1956, with a conditional constitution. Many nations had accepted the independence of Sudan; the US was among the first foreign powers to recognize the new state of Sudan.¹²

In the process of handling the Sudan's independence, most of the civil services and administrative staff were increasingly put in the hand of the Northern Sudanese – largely the Southern Sudanese had very little role in the government office. The failure of the British government to create favorable political conditions between the North and the South led the country in to continuous chaos and conflict. The Arab-led Khartoum government botched to establish an autonomous government in the South, which led to a mutiny by Southern troops in the Equatoria region. The separatist Southerners showed their protest and began a low-scale civil war intended for the launching of an independent Southern state.¹³

The Post-Independence era

The post independence period was marked by a weak parliamentary system controlled by the pro Egyptian National Unionist Party (NUP), later named the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Umma Party. The newly established government instituted an Islamic administration, closing Christian missionary schools and expelling foreign teachers from the South. Following the General Ibrahim Abboud's overthrowing of the civilian government in November 1958, a

¹¹ Øystein H. Rolandsen, "Civil War Society? : Political Processes, Social Groups and Conflict Intensity in the Southern Sudan, 1955-2005" (Faculty of Humanities, University of Oslo, 2010), 3.

¹² John Pike, "Sudan-First Civil War," Global Security.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm>. (Accessed: 20 December, 2014)

¹³ Ibid.

number of Southern dissidents went into exile in neighboring countries, where they organized political and armed resistance against the Government of Sudan (GOS).

William Deng, a Dinka exiled in the Congo was among the leading dissident figures. While in exile he founded a political movement, Sudan Africa National Union (SANU), which led to the formation of the Anya Nya movement.¹⁴ Between 1960 and 1964 the Anya Nya launched attacks on major cities and towns in the Northern Sudan, although, they were much more poorly equipped (old rifles, bows, arrows and spears) than Sudanese armed forces. By this time, the Anya Nya forces began to attract and influence many supporters throughout the country. Historians argue that the political advancement of the Southern people in the 1960s pushed the GOS into a formal dialogue and peace talks with the Anya Nya movement.¹⁵

The 1965 peace deal between the Khartoum government and the Anya Nya forces did not bring political settlement, but at least it showed two important developments. For the first time, the Southerners formally stated a demand for the independence of Southern Sudan or regional autonomy. In addition, the GOS for the first time convened a constitutional conference to which many African nations were invited to take part in the conference. This implied that the conflict in Sudan then perceived as a regional issue.¹⁶

The impact of the first civil war was a turning point in the history of Sudan for two reasons. First, it led the Southern people to organize themselves to obtain self-determination by force, secondly, because the 1965 agreement brought the Southern to realize that a durable peace could not be achieved through a military alone. Despite of this, there was an early attempt to solve the conflict in Sudan by means of political dialogue, the civil war did not stop and it affected the social, economic and political conditions of Sudan in general, more particularly the South Sudan.

¹⁴ Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Sudan : The Elusive Quest for Peace*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 81.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Raphael Koba Badal, *Political Cleavages within Southern Sudan: An Empirical Analysis of the Redivision Debate*, in Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt-Short Cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1994), 107.

After the military government was overthrown by Nimeiri in 1971, the new GOS proposed a new agenda for the Southern Sudan and to restart the peace talks with Southern leaders. Nimeiri's political incentive for peace negotiation was admired by many of the Southern politicians as the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Southern Sudan.¹⁷

As Shinn (2004) describes the situation, the new GOS promised that his government would work for social justice for all Sudanese, including the Southern Sudan. It was in his interest for a long lasting peace and the right of regional autonomy for the Southern Sudan.¹⁸ Still according to Shinn the AAPA (1972) was Nimeiri's most important success in his sixteen years of rule. Under the AAPA, the Southern people were granted regional autonomy which allowed them to form the Southern Regional Administration (SRA) and a national assembly in Juba.

Both the GOS and the SRA agreed to form integrated or mixed national armed forces from both sides. The Southern regional government received a share of money from the central government and raise revenue from local taxation. Although the peace agreement was an important political development in Sudanese history, it did not address all the underlying issues. Following a bitter civil war, violations and mistrust between the two parties all the issues could not be entirely resolved by a single treaty.¹⁹

Political divisions within the Southern Sudan, particularly between the leaders of Abel Alier, from the Dinka tribe and Joseph Lagu, from Equatoria made the region vulnerable and the Northern politicians could easily manipulate the political dilemma in the South. Furthermore, the lack of economic development and the rise of an Islamic party led by Hassan al Turabi in 1980 brought an end to the 10 years of peace between the North and South. In October 1981, the GOS dissolved the Regional Administration of the South, led by Alier and that indicated the abrogation

¹⁷Rolandsen, "Civil War Society? : Political Processes, Social Groups and Conflict Intensity in the Southern Sudan, 1955-2005," 5.

¹⁸ David H. Shinn, "Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?," *Annales d'Ethiopie* 20, no. 1 (2004): 243.

¹⁹ Ibid.

of the terms of the AAPA. After 2 years (1983), Nimeiri further announced the creation of the three new Southern Regional States with separate governments-the Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazal which was against the protocol of the AAPA.²⁰

The failure of the AAPA led to Sudan's second civil war, which lasted from 1983 to 2005. The second civil war was much more destructive and violent than the first. It took the lives of many Southern people. With support of international and regional powers, both parties agreed to solve their differences based on a set of protocols and peace treaties, these treaties are collectively known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It was signed in January 9, 2005, between the GOS and the South People's Liberation Army (SPLA).²¹

This research paper, therefore, will focus on identifying and studying the factors contributing to the failure of the AAPA. In the process, we will assess the challenges that the AAPA was meant to address and how it collapsed and eventually ignited another civil war in the country. Moreover, the research will analyze the Power-sharing theory and negotiation theory in light of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. It is important to question why the government of Khartoum and Anya Nya forces did not commit themselves to the implementation of the AAPA. Therefore, it is the aim of this research paper to address such questions.

1.1. The aim of the Research

The focus of this research project is to discuss the conflict and the peace process between the North and South Sudan since the 1970s. It gives an overview of the background of the war, the process of negotiations and the impact of the peace process that changed the political structure of Sudan. The research project will only attempt to answer relevant questions with regard to the peace settlement of the 1970s, more specifically to the period of 1972 and the paper will discuss what

²⁰ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan : The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 88.

²¹ Einas Ahmed, "The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Dynamics of Post-Conflict Political Partnership in Sudan," *Africa Spectrum* 44, no. 3 (2009): 133.

factors contributed to the failure of the AAPA. Moreover, the research will address to what extent the political negotiations promoted relative peace for the Southern Sudan from 1972 up to 1983? Hopefully this paper will attempt to answer the research questions and would contribute to the academic knowledge to the history of Sudan.

Keohane, Verba and King (1994) argue that in order for a research project to be relevant “it should meet the two criteria of posing a question that is important in the real world, and contribute to the already existing literature.”²² My research project fulfills both the criteria. The peace agreement between the North and South Sudan could be taken as the best example where Africa’s longest civil war came to an end in the early 1970s. This proves that my research is important in the real world. And the other aspect is that this research project will contribute somehow for other scholars to use as a point of reference and would give them an inspiration for further research.

1.2. Research Question

This research paper at hand will answer the following questions on the basis of a thorough literature review as well as empirical investigation in which the war, negotiations and peace between North and South Sudan. “What factors contributed to the failure of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement? And under the main topic of the research question, I will try to answer the following sub questions:

- What were the legal aspects of the AAPA?
- Did the Southern Political groups and the government of Khartoum attempt to implement the AAPA?
- To what extent did the regional and international actors play a role in the implementation of the AAPA?

²² Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry : Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994), 15.

1.3. Sources and Methods of the Research

In order to answer my research question, I will rely on a qualitative research design. A qualitative research method tends to “focus on one or a small number of cases, to use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, to be discursive in method and to be concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some events or unit.”²³ The data are collected mostly from books, reports, official documents and journals which were published in the early 1970s. These sources contain vital information with regard to the political situation of Sudan during the 1970s.

Conducting extensive interviews would serve as a primary source for the research, but that was difficult at this time because of the unstable political situation in Sudan and since my research topic is mainly concerned with 1970’s history of Sudan, some of the primary materials will be founded from the archival documents of the CMI-Michelsen Institute Bergen, Sudan Tribune online archive and the Sudan Open Archive (SOA). Plenty of information and historical accounts can be found from Human Right Watch, Chicago Tribune, African Journal of Political Science, Operation lifeline Sudan and news and reports that were posted at the time of the events.

Textual analysis can be used to interpret the content and meaning of historical texts. Markula & Silk, assert that textual analysis is implemented as the focus on “interpreting the content and the meaning of already existing text.”²⁴ Hence, the aim of the research is to find out what is being expressed in the text in relation to the civil war in Sudan by referring the various literature sources.

²³ Ibid., 4.

²⁴ Pirkko Markula and Michael Silk, *Qualitative Research for Physical Culture* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 112.

1.4. Limitation and Delimitation of the Research

This research paper will discuss the issue of the first civil war and peace settlement between the GOS and Southern political groups. It starts by giving an overview of the root cause of the conflict, the period of AAPA (1972) and its failure. The research is paying attention to the AAPA of 1972 and it will not include every aspect of the second civil war in Sudan and the CPA of 2005.

The other limitation of the research is that it doesn't discuss the issue of Darfur and the war in the Eastern part of Sudan, although it is an important historical milestone in the history of Sudan. Lack of primary sources in a form of an interview, one could say, is a weakness of this research. However, there are two major reasons behind it. First the political situation in Sudan is very sensitive at this time, informants are unable to give objective information and the second is due to lack of time and financial constraints that makes it impossible to travel abroad and visit some relevant places and concerned officials.

Chapter II: Background Information

2.1. The Root causes of the civil war

This chapter highlights the background information of the first civil war in Sudan 1955-72. What were the root causes of the civil war and how the civil war affected the political and military developments in the formation of the first political movement (Anyanya I), that led up to the AAPA. The course of relationship between the North and South has often been explained by conflicts and wars. These conflicts and clashes could be associated with the legacy of the British colonial administration in the early 19th century. During the Anglo-Egyptian rule, the North and South were administered as two political units. Mareng (2009) mentioned that “the British government policy was to make each province as self-contained and independent as possible.”²⁵

During the condominium period, the British policy toward South Sudan did not aim at unifying the region with the Northern Sudan but they wanted to unify the Southern Sudan and Uganda as part of British East Africa Empire. For this reason the British had setup separate administration institutions, school curricula and trade license in the Southern Sudan. Later on in 1948 that policy was changed and the British and Egyptian government agreed to secure their dual strategic interest on the Nile River by unifying the North and South Sudan under one administration. As a result, there was little autonomy given to the South in which the governors of the three provinces could not regularly attend the governors’ annual meeting in Khartoum. Indeed, before the independence of Sudan it was clear that all the civil and administrative staffs were in the hands of an Arab dominated ruling party in the North.

Why were the British not committed to the autonomous status of the Southern Sudan? There are many ways one could answer this questions. In the first place, the Southern were not shown a unified interest to their identities due to lack of political,

²⁵ Chue D. Mareng, "The Sudan's Dimensions: A Country Divided by Ethnic and Religion," review of Review Paper, *African Journal of Political Science and International* 3, no. 12 (2009): 536.

educational and economic weakness during the early colonial period. And the Anglo-Egyptian government earnestly worked for the unification of Sudan due to their influences and strategic interests over the Nile valleys.²⁶

The other potential source of the conflicts was lack of understanding the nature of socio-ethnic relations between the North and South Sudan during the pre-colonial and colonial period. As Iyob & Gilbert stated in their book, “the making of contemporary Sudan and the Sudanese needs to be understood in terms other than a binary reduction of a perennial conflict between idealized caricatures of Arab or No-African/ and African or Non-Arab protagonists engaged in a zero-sum game of hegemony competition.”²⁷ This political supremacy had been seen as an ongoing conflict between the two groups (the Arab and Non-Arab) for a long time. Neither the colonial government nor the general assembly of Sudan after the independence had ever tried to solve the above ethnic clashes between the North and South Sudan. It was this ideological and historical legacy of Arab domination over the South which was considered as an attack against their identity. Therefore, initially this had ignited the war between the North and South Sudan.²⁸

After the independence, Sudan was “characterized by the wealth of a few and the poverty of the majority”²⁹ by which competition for resources was a major source of conflict between the North and South Sudan. The North had been given political, social and economic prosperity under the colonial rule, in addition to this they constructed modern transport systems, educational institutions and communication network and vital economic projects. Conversely, the Southerners were given a little opportunity for education, social service and economic development. As the wealth of the Sudan had never been equally distributed and shared to all the people

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan : The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 27.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ John Young, *The Fate of Sudan : The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process* (London: Zed books, 2012), 3-4.

of Sudan, consequently, this has led to an armed conflict by the South against the North.³⁰

2.2. The First civil war (1955-72)

With this background information in mind, it is very important to discuss how the post independent era escalated the war in the Southern Sudan. Historians sometimes called this period of turmoil as the “Any-Nya I guerrilla war.”³¹ In 1953, the first election for a self-governing Sudanese parliament was held. During the British decolonization, NUP was the largest party in the country and formed a government with Al-Azhari as the Prime Minister.³² The new government of Sudan adopted a new policy which was commonly known as “Sudanization” policy, which meant that all important administrative positions in the South would be held by Northerners.

It must be remembered that before 1953 the British government promised to establish a federal government and educated Southern Sudan to have a good position after the independence of Sudan. As more Northern officials, merchants, business men and military personnel moved to the South to take the place of the departing British about 800 posts were given to the Northerners, while only eight went to Southerners. The failure of the British government to guarantee the right of the Southern people and give them an equal position in administration of the South resulted in mutiny.³³ Even after the independence of Sudan, the process of Sudanization (New Sudan), and the formation of popular political parties that allowed the participation of all Sudanese people were underestimated and given little attention by the new GOS. The impact of these political imbalances among the Sudanese people were

not only disappointing to the educated Southerners but it was also looked upon as the changing of one master for another and a new colonization by

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Raphael Koba Badal, " Religion and Conflict in the Sudan: A Perspective," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 21, no. 3 (1990): 265-66.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

the North. It was also looked upon as a breach of promise made by the Northerners, what the Southerners finally got much less than they were promised or made to believe that they would get.³⁴

Likewise, Joseph Lagu, the commander of the Southern rebel army during the first civil war gave the following report in his autobiography:

We felt the Arab occupation indicated a possible renewal of the slave trade after the British left. The Southern Sudanese had always regarded the British as their deliverers and protectors, while they viewed the Northerners as slave traders and tormentors. The sudden departure of the British was a shock to most of us.... Fear and suspicion hovered over the South. It was not a true independence for the South, but the start of colonialism by the North, their traditional enemy.³⁵

Consequently, there were a number mutinies began in the Southern Equatoria region of Torit, Yambio and Nzara. On 18 August 1955, the first mutiny took place in Torit among the old colonial Equatorial corps. In the mutiny, there was an intense political activity among the educated Southerners and there were massive protests in the streets, involving many Southern people in the rally. The chaos intensified to the province of Equatoria where Northern officials and civilians were indiscriminately killed and shops looted. Moreover, Northern officials fled from the Wau and Malakal disorder and the British army was refused to intervene in the scene because the British government gave the political administration in the hand of the Northern Sudan in 1953 with the end of the condominium rule. The British officials, still nominally in charge of the Sudan's affairs, helped the Sudanese army in restoring peace and order. However, the Northern government soon crashed the

³⁴ Ibid., 266.

³⁵ Joseph Lagu, *Sudan: Odyssey through a State: From Ruin to Hope* (Sudan: Omdurman Ahlia University/MOB Centre for Sudanese Studies, 2006), 60.

uprising and hundreds of Southerners have been assumed involved in the uprising were killed and some 336 were known dead, 261 of whom were Northerners.³⁶

As Collins (2008) asserts, “when the first Northern troops cautiously entered Torit, it was complete the eerie silence hung in the air as a fateful omen for the beginning of a half-century of bloody, unrelenting civil war between Northern and Southern Sudanese in the valley of the upper Nile.”³⁷ In a similar way the Sudan Tribune (2007) reported the following,

the 18 August 1955 is not only national day, but it is also heroes day, it is a day when South Sudanese openly opened fire and told the government in Khartoum that enough is enough....., it is the day when other regions in South Sudan came together to give support to Torit mutineers and to shade their blood for the land God gave them without negotiations and argument.³⁸

Even though the uprising was crushed by the GOS, the sense of nationalism, identity and belongings among the Southern people would be a major motive for continuing their struggle for independence of Southern Sudan. On January 1, 1956, the British government announced the independence of Sudan and a state of Sudan was born-with unbalanced, ill-equipped, and unprepared government to run the country. The provisional constitution drafted by the British scholars left many issues unresolved –for example the issues of federalism and what would be the role of Islam in Southern region. Under this tense situation Sudan had conducted the parliamentary election and the new office appointed the Prime Minister Abdalla Khalil and the cabinet where most of the offices were dominated by the Umma party.³⁹

The new GOS led by Abdalla Khalil primarily concerned on enlarging the country’s agricultural sector and improving communication networks. However, as many

³⁶ Rolandsen, "Civil War Society? : Political Processes, Social Groups and Conflict Intensity in the Southern Sudan, 1955-2005," 4.; Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 66-67.

³⁷ *A History of Modern Sudan*, 67.

³⁸ Charles Olukok Ongao-Ihari Langairo, "18 August 1955", " Sudan Tribune: Plural News & Views on Sudan <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article23627> (Accessed: 24 January, 2015)

³⁹ Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur : What Everyone Needs to Know*, 42.

scholars viewed the socio-economic developments disrupted as the price of cotton was falling in 1957 and 1958. As a matter of this, there was no major development achieved neither in the North nor in the South during this time. And this period was also dominated by sectarian politics between the Sayid Abdel Rahman al Mahdi-the grandson of Mahdi and Sayyid Ali-Mirghani for succession of power in the parliament. Following the two years of civilian government, the economic status of the Sudan was hit by severe recession and ineffective government structure led to a coup by Ibrahim Abboud, the commander in chief of the Sudanese Military in 1958. Therefore, the first civil war between the North and South Sudan was a result of complex processes that I have mentioned in the above.

2.3. The military and political developments prior to the formation of Anya-Nya movement

After the mutiny of 1955, the situation in the Southern Sudan dramatically changed. In 1959 there was a shift in Southern administration by North, the broken promise of federalism for Sudan, and the deep-rooted cultural, religious and ethnic discrimination against Southern Sudanese by the North were some of the major significant changes.⁴⁰ As Collins assessed the situation, “the harsh repression of the Southern Sudanese disturbances after the 1955 mutiny had stunned the Southerners into momentary passivity, a brooding bitter silence awaiting a spark to ignite the conflagration that became known as the Southern problem.”⁴¹

Rolandsen claimed that after the army coup led by Abboud, the government did not bring significant changes to the majority of Southern Sudanese rather he intensified and continued the previous policies toward South Sudan.⁴² However, from an economic point of view, Natsios argued that the Abboud government brought temporary economic prosperity and relief to the people of Sudan and Southern Sudan. As part of his development, the government further strengthened foreign

⁴⁰ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 77.

⁴¹ Ibid., 78.

⁴² Rolandsen, "Civil War Society? : Political Processes, Social Groups and Conflict Intensity in the Southern Sudan, 1955-2005," 4.

relation with Western countries, USA-USAID and World Bank. As the USAID officer reported about South Sudan after his first visit (1989)

I remember seeing in many Southern garrison cities the shells of bombed out buildings that had been constructed with multicolored square stone blocks, a distinctive trademark of general Abboud's schools. In many areas, these blocks were the only evidence of development in the South and they were founded through foreign aid.⁴³

The Abboud leadership soon proclaimed a ten year plan of economic and social project, which developed three irrigation scheme plans in the eastern part of Sudan. These projects together took 75% of the total expenditures on agriculture. These economic policies again put more benefits to the regions that were already developed and gave less attention to the region of Southern Sudan. With regard to the cultural policy, Abboud's major development in 1960s was the introduction of Islamization and Arabization. This meant that Arabic language was introduced as medium of instruction in the schools, conversion to Islam was highly encouraged and Christian missionaries were stopped or placed under firm restrictions by the government.⁴⁴

As many scholars such as Rolandsen asserts, the Abboud regime was successful in his economic policy toward the South but his regime believed that the only way to unify the country was by way of spreading Arabic institutions and Islamic faith to the South. And that policy brought him an opposition to his party, particularly from politicians and missionary groups in the Southern region and they opposed the government's plan to introduce Islam and Arabic language in various schools.⁴⁵

In addition, the Abboud government authorized the Ministry of Education to take responsibility and promote the program of integration and Arabization of all South Sudan under one system. Thus Islamic institutions were opened, mosques were

⁴³ Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur : What Everyone Needs to Know*, 43.

⁴⁴ Saskia Baas, *From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians : Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam university press, 2012), 39.

⁴⁵ Rolandsen, "Civil War Society? : Political Processes, Social Groups and Conflict Intensity in the Southern Sudan, 1955-2005."

constructed and the Sabbath was changed from Sunday to Friday. And the government firmly imposed Arabic language in Juba and Rumbek secondary schools from which the majority of the Southern educated elite had graduated. The majority of elites in Southern Sudan regarded the government's policy as a continuation of Northern domination (Arab) over the minority of the indigenous Black Africa.⁴⁶

In 1960 the Missionary Societies Act (MSA), that regulated the various activities of the missionaries and forced students and teachers to strictly follow the application of Arabic language and virtually restricted the spread of Christianity among the Southern Sudan. The government further accused the missionaries "of endangering the integrity and unity of the country by encouraging the South to resist Arabization and Islamization."⁴⁷ Prominent figures from the South like Saturnion Lohure (Catholic priest), Joseph Oduho and Latuka school teachers educated at Bakhat al Ruda had shown their protest against the GOS. Because of their protest, they were forced in exile and there they founded the Sudan Christian Association (SCA) in 1961 and they were joined by William Deng Nhial, a young Dinka administrator from the Bahr-el-Ghazal. In 1963 they formed a regional organization which they called the Sudan Africa National Union (SANU) in Kampala.⁴⁸

Here they sought support from some 60,000 refugees who lived in Uganda and Congo (the former name of Zaire) and published the voice of Southern Sudan in London but they showed lack of unity among themselves. SANU was gradually becoming the major driving force for the beginning of armed struggle against the GOS in 1964. Around 400 volunteers, mostly Latuka had formed the nucleus of a guerilla force at Agu Camp in eastern Equatoria under the nominal command of Lieutenant Emedio Tafeng Odongi.⁴⁹ The cycle of violence became increasingly vicious as the government put more pressure on the civilians and the Southern educated left their towns and joined the guerrilla movement (the guerilla army was

⁴⁶ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 78.

⁴⁷ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan : The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 81.

⁴⁸ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 79.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

named 'Anya Nya' meaning the poison of snakes). As a former Anya Nya fighter Akolo Giir Thiik described this time:

It was like living under foreign occupation and we knew that somebody was constantly watching us.....These soldiers were behaving like criminals... and we had to leave for the bush to join the Anya Nya as that was the only way to escape the humiliation the Arab soldiers were bringing upon us.⁵⁰

When most of the civilians were arrested and tortured for their alleged role in the revolt, more and more people joined the rebellion in order to escape the suppression of the government. As I mentioned above, the exiled politicians eventually organized themselves and established SANU, which became one of the two Southern political parties leading to the autonomy government of the South.⁵¹

Abboud's policies did not only dismay the Southern people but also caused a major discontent among the most important Northern political parties. His government suspended and outlawed various political parties and was unable to reintegrate the Southern region as one part of Sudan. This resulted that his government was dangerous for the survival of the young nation as "a unitary state."⁵² In addition to this, when the Abboud government intensified his Arabization and Islamization policies, the massive campaign caused slow progress in the economic development in Northern Sudan. It seemed the government was unable to stop the fight against the insurgents (Anya Nya), whereas the insurgents were overwhelming the government indirectly by draining funds toward the army and this caused lack of social services within the Northern fringes.

As the repression was intense within the Southerners and the ambitious nature of the Abboud's policies toward Islam created a huge threat not only to the Southerners but also to the neighboring countries of Congo and Ethiopia.⁵³ As a result more and more Southern people had joined the rebellion forces against the

⁵⁰ Jok Madut Jok, *Sudan : Race, Religion and Violence* (Oxford: OneWorld, 2007), 60.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 59-60.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 60.

policy of the government toward Islam and the neighboring countries detested the Sudan's Islamic regime. In order to weaken the government, they increased their supplies to the Anya Nya forces with guns, ammunition and made the Sudan's conflict internationally known.

Sudanese scholars criticized Abboud's government as he was not well-educated and failed to be a qualified leader to articulate the 'Islamist project' and others felt that he had not brought a peaceful resolution to the civil war in Sudan. Although the Anya-Nya was not a dangerous threat to the Northern government during this time, its military activities were making the Southern problem very visible to the urban Northern Sudanese. It was this situation leading to the popular uprising among the Khartoum University students, teachers and other organizations.⁵⁴

The Southern armed struggle became an influential power among the Northern politicians, particularly in Khartoum. Consequently, in October 1964 the college students organized themselves into an uprising against the government of Khartoum, they demanding the resignation of the Abboud's regime and the establishment of a civilian government in Sudan. After that the Abboud regime was forced to leave power and a civilian caretaker government led by Sir al-Khatim Khalifa came to power.⁵⁵ Unlike the previous government, the new GOS believed that the ongoing conflict between the government of Khartoum and the Southern Sudan should be solved by means of negotiation and by acknowledging the issues in Southern Sudan.

Under the new civilian government, different political parties were allowed to be organized and the Southern Sudanese parties came together to form a strong political party called the Southern Front. Clement Mbor- had been a prominent figure in the Juba Conference of 1947 and the leader of the Southern Front. He was chosen as a Minister of Interior in the 'caretaker government', for the first time in the history of Sudan a person from Southern Sudan came to power. Moreover, the government of Khalifa made a lot of efforts to end the war in the South. The other

⁵⁴ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 80.

⁵⁵ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 215.

major development that had been taking place during this time was the beginning of political dialogues between the North-South Sudan. As a result of this, in 1965 the Round Table Conference (RTC) was convened to discuss and normalize the political relations between North and South Sudan.⁵⁶

Historically speaking the round table discussion was one of the most significant achievements of the Southern Sudan since the independence of Sudan. Because on the one hand it symbolized that the Northern politicians formally accepted that there was a need to consider the problem of the Southern people, what we call it “the Southern Problem”. That meant to give them an opportunity for political participation in the affair of Sudan and secondly, it showed us that the conflict in Sudan would never stop by means of war but through political dialogues and discussions. Therefore, chapter four will focus more on the formation of the RTC and the beginning of the political discussion as a means to solve the existing problem between the North and South. But in chapter three I will discuss some of the international relation theories that could explain and describe the nature of the conflict and peace agreement between the government of Khartoum and Southern Sudan.

⁵⁶ Joseph O. Abulemoi, *The Fragility of Sudan : A Study of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement* (London: Janus Publishing, 2011), 36-37.

Chapter III: Theory of the Research

3.1. Prelude

The aim of this thesis is to discuss what factors contributed to the failure of the AAPA and how that affected the relationship between the North and South. In order to make my research thesis competent and academically structured it is very important to discuss relevant theories that can explain and describe the nature of the civil war and the implementation of the peace process between the two parties (the GOS and Anya Nya movement). For our understanding, it is very important to explain first, what theory is all about? As Rourke (2007) defines, “theory is an idea or connected set of ideas about why things happen and how events and trends relate to one another.”⁵⁷

Rourke sees theory as a collection of ideas as to why and how events related to each other in the international arena. For instance using his theory it is possible to answer why the AAPA was a failure and how the various political developments within the country contributed to the failure of the agreement between the GOS and Southern Sudan leaders. However, Molloy (2004) explains “the purpose of theory is to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.”⁵⁸ The statement is revealing that theory is a method of understanding international conflicts by using theoretical strategies but theory must be ‘consistent with the facts and with itself.’

Therefore, using theory helps us to comprehend more clearly what has happened, predicts what may happen and gives us a better chance of evaluating the effectiveness of the theory. For this research study, I am going to use two theories: the Power-sharing theory and Negotiation theory. I will discuss the following theories below briefly.

⁵⁷ John T. Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage*, 11th ed. ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 18-19.

⁵⁸ Sean Molloy, "Truth, Power, Theory: Hans Morgenthau's Formulation of Realism," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 15, no. 1 (2004).

3.2. The Power-sharing Theory

Power-sharing theory may be broadly defined “as any set of arrangements that prevents one political agency or collective from monopolizing power, whether temporarily or permanently.”⁵⁹ Moreover, according to Abatan, Miti and others (2012) power-sharing means the involvement of all significant groups in political decision-making at the level of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and the army. Therefore, the aim of power sharing is to reduce majority of one party or ethnic group that in danger the security of other ethnic group.⁶⁰ Indeed many politicians have argued that power-sharing is becoming a useful tool to settle conflict and civil wars in Africa in the last two decades. The CPA of 2005, Liberia’s peace talks 2003, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC’s) of 2003 all contained elements of power-sharing. Power sharing arrangements bring various belligerents into joint governments and guarantee them an equal participation in the country’s politics.⁶¹ Moreover, Melani. C & Edmund. M (2012) claim that “this approach guarantees stability by giving all relevant groups a stake in the system.”⁶²

However, other scholars such as Abulemoi (2011), Weiner (1995) and Sowell (1990) point out that power-sharing sometimes fail to manage the post-civil war environment and can it itself pose a problem for conflict management.⁶³ According to them Power-sharing theory would encourage weaker parties to engage in continuous conflict with the government in the aim of achieving power-sharing status in the future government. Critics of power-sharing say that “such arrangements are inflexible; that they promote ethnic division and that they are unlikely to promote stability in the long run.”⁶⁴ Therefore, they believe that the

⁵⁹ Joanne Mc Evoy and Brendan O’ Leary, *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 3.

⁶⁰ Ella Abatan and Stephanie Kataro Miti, "Is Power-Sharing a Solution to Africa's Conflicts?," *Southern African Peace and Security Studies* 2, no. 1 (2012): 1.

⁶¹ Katia Papagianni, "Power-Sharing: A Conflict Resolution Tool?," *African Mediators’ retreat I*: 23.

⁶² Melani Cammett and Edmund Malesky, "Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 6 (2012): ,4.

⁶³ Abulemoi, *The Fragility of Sudan : A Study of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, 13.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

theory of power sharing can only be applied if and only there is a stable ground for democratic system in the country.

One of the positive aspects of power-sharing is that it encourages provision of political power, regional decentralization, military limitations between the warring parties and equal economic distribution of the state's resource. So far this study has discussed and analyzed the various concepts of power sharing. The various power-sharing relations between the GOS and the Southern people can be examined in the light of this theory. Let's elaborate the theory of power-sharing in Sudan by taking some practical examples.

Two years after the independence of Sudan, a parliamentary election was held in 1958 to invite all the various political parties in the country to form the Sudan's government. However, the distribution of political power in the parliament overwhelmed by the Umma Party and People's Democratic Party (PDP) and very few members from Southern Liberal Party participated in the election. The Southern Party at the parliamentary meeting discussed the issue of religion, language and the status of Southern Sudan in the future Sudan. Although the Southern politicians struggled for their rights, the Umma Party took major power in Sudan after the general election.⁶⁵

The other example is that after the Abboud government was forced to hand over power in 1964 and a civilian government was formed, the RTC of 1965 was created to resolve the existing problems between the North and South Sudan. More than three parties participated and the prominent among them were Southern Sudan Africa Nationalist Union (SSANU) and Southern Sudan Front (SSF). As part of the peace deal the government of Khartoum agreed to allow certain rights in the area of education, health and public works. However, RTC ended in deadlock, the Southern parties did not show a unified interest for the independence of Southern Sudan. Still RTC could be taken as an example of power-sharing to a lesser degree.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 199.

⁶⁶ Abulemoi, *The Fragility of Sudan : A Study of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement*.

The AAPA of 1972 can be taken as one of the best attempts of power sharing in the history of Sudan before the CPA of 2005. The Agreement had reached between the GOS and Southern Sudan, in that agreement for the first time the Southern Sudan got their autonomy status. The main agenda in the peace agreement was an equal distribution of national budget, economic development and equal share of political power in Sudan. As we can see it at the moment, the AAPA did bring a temporary peace settlement, by which the majority of the Southern people had participated in the administrative and legislative institutions of Sudan.

In the period from 1972 to 1982, the agreement created a peace situation in Sudan between the North and South. The peace deal lasted until 1983 once the GOS declared Shar'a law to be the base of the Sudanese legal system. As I have discussed in the background information, one of the main causes for the beginning of the first civil war in Sudan was an unequal distribution of power and wealth between the North and South Sudan. Therefore, I believe that lack of implementing the theory of power-sharing was a key factor for the second civil war in Sudan.

3.3. Negotiation theory

Since its independence Sudan were struggling a lot to end the longest conflict in Africa between the North and South Sudan. In this section, I will discuss negotiation theory as a possible theory in explaining the conflict in Sudan. First, let me define the concept of negotiation. As Hopmann defines “negotiation is increasingly viewed as a tool in which conflicts may be resolved in such a way as to produce mutual benefits for the parties rather than exclusive benefits for one at the expense of others.”⁶⁷

However, Iklé` defines negotiation as “a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching an agreement on an exchanged or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present.”⁶⁸

When negotiation takes place between two opposite parties, the main purpose of the

⁶⁷P. Terrence Hopmann, *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts* (Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 24.

⁶⁸ Fred Charles Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 2-3.

negotiation is that whether the negotiation results in an ‘agreement or stalemate’, whether the negotiation produces efficient mutual benefits between the two contender parties and is the negotiation may be evaluated in terms of distribution of benefits between the parties.

One of the strongest criticisms to the process of negotiation is that if the two parties do not agree on the premise of the agreements, what will be the outcome of the negotiations. If there is no an abiding condition in the negotiation, the aim of that negotiation is in jeopardy. Therefore, my emphasis is that the role of commitment, warnings, threats, and promises in negotiations has to be monitored by external powers to ensure the sustainability of the negotiation. But the question is that, how the AAPA can be evaluated in light of the AAPA.

The division of the North and South Sudan introduced by British colonial government, created differences of class, religion, linguistic and educational practices between the two groups. The British tried to isolate the Southern Sudan from the influence of the Northerners. As a result special administrative policies were put into effect, the so called the “Southern Policy”⁶⁹ that provided for the use of English language and denying trade licenses with the Northerners. After the cancellation of the Southern policy by the British in 1946, the social and political divisions were creating fear and mistrust in the mind of Southern Sudanese against the people in the North. These emotional and social boundaries between the two peoples created tensions and that continued to live after the period of independence.⁷⁰

In general terms, the discrepancy rates of modernization in the 1960s between the privileged people in North were relatively higher than the underprivileged people in the South. Accordingly, this unequal development of policies created by the Khartoum government built up tensions and political confrontations in the country. These situations were not only creating conflict in Sudan, but also allowed negotiation, mediation and compromise between North and South. How did the

⁶⁹ Jok, *Sudan : Race, Religion and Violence*, 52-53.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Northern and Southern leaders able to reach a peaceful settlement in the Addis Ababa, 1972?

The AAPA was the result of complex political negotiations between the GOS and South Sudan. But negotiations as a means to achieve peace was not an easy task, it required a lot of work and energy. First, both parties were under precarious conditions (conflicting interests) to accept the principle of negotiations. In this case we need to answer what factors forced the Khartoum government and the rebel group to accept negotiations as means to solve their conflicts/differences. These factors can be viewed as external and internal factors. Internal factor was the rise of a separatist group (the Anya Nya) from the Southern Sudan.

These groups emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with the GOS and eventually they demanded equal rights in Sudan's political system or if not self determination. The war between the two fronts also meant the death of many Northern soldiers in the battle field. It was therefore challenging to the GOS to continue the war for such a long period. And the external factor was that the role of international and regional groups such as the Emperor of Ethiopia-a prominent figure in the AUO, Uganda, the British, and All Organization Church. They convinced the GOS to come to a table of negotiation for the stability and integrity of Sudan specifically and for the regional peace in the Horn of Africa in general.

If the GOS failed to maintain the integrity of Sudan, the country would fall in the hand of extremist party such as the Muslim Brotherhood. They wanted to create an Islamic state inside and outside Sudan or Sudan would become one of the lost states in Africa, like Somalia. Thus two factors left the government of Khartoum with no choice, but to negotiate. Nonetheless, the Southern Sudan was also certainly affected by the long civil war. The war left them with a lot of casualties, cost thousands of lives, produced more and more refugees and internally displaced. Therefore, the South Sudan remained with no option but to mediate through the

regional and international communities as the best solution for them to end the war.⁷¹

In addition, the impact of this peace settlement through negotiations produced an urgent situation for the bargaining parties- in which Nimeiri's government balanced the army and bureaucrat staff between his forces and Southern forces. And both leaders determined to foster political dialogues as means to stop the conflict for mutual benefits. The impact of this negotiation process in the long run will be discussed in the next chapters.

⁷¹ Princeton N. Lyman, "Negotiating Peace in Sudan," *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*. <http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=21> (Accessed: 1 January, 2015)

Chapter IV: The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement

4.1. The Round Table Conference, 1965

This chapter will explore the peace agreement between the GOS and Southern Sudan. It includes the Round Table Conference (RTC) which happened prior to the formation of the AAPA. In 1965 unsuccessful dialogues had taken place in Sudan to end the first civil war between the North and South. This political dialogue was called the “Round Table Conference” (RTC). Although the RTC did not result in the formation of an independent state in Southern Sudan and to ease the conflict in Sudan, the political unity in the South became a major threat to the government of Khartoum to consider the “Question of Southern Sudan.”

The 1964 “October Revolution” had created a favorable atmosphere for peace talks between the North and South Sudan. Yet scholars disagree about the cause of the revolution and its impact toward the RTC/peace talks. Collins (2008) claimed that although the Anya Nya movement was not a dangerous insurgency during the 1964, its military capabilities and intelligence made the Southern issue very noticeable among the Northern Sudanese politicians and academicians. As a result, many politicians, teachers and college students were criticizing and calling the GOS for not doing enough to crush the rebels or to create a peaceful dialogue with insurgent group.⁷²

Scholar Wakoson (1987) on the other hand, emphasizes that the Anya Nya movement was not at all a threat to the GOS in Khartoum during the 1960s, but Abboud’s political policy toward the people of Sudan. During his rule, he banned all political parties, the Umma, NUP and PDP alleged of conspiracy against his rule and in Southern Sudan, the government extended Arabic institutions among the Southern people particularly in the field of education and religion. This led to an

⁷² Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 80.

outraged demonstration from the Northern parties including government workers and university students. Also in a similar way the Southern rebels intensified their attack on government strategies and carried out major offensives. Eventually, all these events led to the collapse of the Abboud regime and the beginning of the October Revolution.⁷³

Unlike to the above arguments, McClintock (1970) and International Crisis Groups (2012) believe that both the military success of the Southern rebels and the dictatorial nature of Abboud regime led to a political crisis called the “October Revolution”.⁷⁴ On October 22, 1964 the university students in Khartoum were demanding the resignation of the Abboud government and calling for a transitional government in Sudan. The initial stage of the demonstration was not so violent, but the police tried to disperse the uprising and injured students and killed Ahmad Quarashi among the protesters. On the following day more than 30,000 marchers, led by the university students and chanted anti government slogans in the street of Khartoum against the death of Quarashi. Soon on the 26 October, the Abboud government had no choice but to hand over power and decided to leave power without bloodshed.⁷⁵

In the aftermath of the “October Revolution”, the transitional government led by Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa held a meeting to discuss the issue of Southern Sudan. Many politicians agreed that the problem of Southern Sudan was not a secret agenda and had to be discussed thoroughly and resolved via political dialogues. Therefore, it was this political demonstration that gave a new chapter in the history of Southern Sudan. The RTC was held in Khartoum from March 16-29, 1965 and was composed of a twelve men committee, 6 from the North and the other 6 from the South. Again there was a hot discussion over the past and future relations, where the Southerners were demanding for federation and self determination of the

⁷³ Elias N. Wakoson, *The Dilemmas of South -North Conflict* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson, 1987), 90-91.

⁷⁴ David W. McClintock, "The Southern Sudan Problem," *Middle East Journal* 4, no. 24 (Autumn 1970): 466; International Crisis Group working to prevent conflict world wide, "Sudan: Major Reform or More War," (29 Nov 2012), 3.

⁷⁵ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 81.

region. At the end the conference three options were presented: unconditional unity, federation and secession.⁷⁶

The Southern representatives at the conference were divided as to whether the South remained a single political unit or an independent state. The representatives of the Southern Sudan fell into four groups called the two factions of SANU, Southern Sudan Front (SSF) and the Liberal Party (LP). The first faction of SANU led by William Deng, wanted a federation of Southern Sudan, he stressed that the federation of Southern Sudan should be decided by the opinion of the Southern people. The other factional group of SANU led by Aggrey Jaden, wanted self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan and ultimately cessation/independence of Southern Sudan. In the conference he presented the strongest statement than any other groups.

He said “there is nothing in common between the North and the South. If you want peace between us as neighbors, leave the South, so that we can have our independence.”⁷⁷ After the speech he left the conference and went straight to the airport. The SSF had a similar political view as SANU (Jaden) in favor of complete independence; most of the SSF were supporters of the SANU party. The LP stood for the autonomous administration of the Southern Sudan.⁷⁸ All the claims of the Southern Sudan were not accepted neither by the transitional government nor by the Northern political parties.

Moreover, during the conference most of the Southern parties were divided on their plan, some of them in favour of independence, while the other was in support of federation under the umbrella of one Sudan. They could not come up with a unified agenda for the independence of Southern Sudan. It is very important to question why the Southern leaders did not unite on their goal for the future of Southern Sudan. The reason might be many one of the prime problems within the various parties was the existence of individual interests over the national interests. Most of

⁷⁶ "Sudan: Major Reform or More War," 3.

⁷⁷ Bona Malwal, *Sudan and South Sudan from One to Two* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 38.

⁷⁸ Abulemoi, *The Fragility of Sudan : A Study of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, 37.

the party leaders were obsessed with individual interests, everyone wanted to be a leader in the party (a sense of cult leadership).⁷⁹

The other major problems within the political parties were regional and tribal sentiments, particularly among the leaders of Bahr-el-Ghazal, Torit and Juba. On several occasions, most of the leaders wanted to represent their own ethnic groups rather than thinking as a united nation. Being the leaders of the Southern Sudan they were unable to unify in their plan for self determination, these divisions gave a viable ground for the central government of Sudan to dismantle the various Southern parties easily. For a long time, the government of Khartoum had used these political differences as a strategy to divide the South on the basis of class, ethnicity and language.⁸⁰

After a long discussion in the conference, the GOS agreed to give limited regional rights to the South and they provided primary education, health service and public road constructions in Southern region. In reality the central government would still control the main economic, financial, state security and armed forces. The conference ended in a deadlock. They did not agree on key issues whether Southern Sudan should remain part of Sudan or a self-autonomous state. As Arnold (1991) expressed “the 1965 Round Table Conference could have formed the base for a peaceful and democratic relationship between the two sides, had it not been for lack of mutual confidence and a failure to negotiate in good faith.”⁸¹ The mistrust and insecurity among the Southern increased after the 1965 parliamentary election. Indeed the Southern were not only denied of their proposals at the conference but were also ignored to voice their opinions in the parliament.

On the other hand, scholars like Breidlid, and Malwal argue that despite the disunity that prevailed among the Southern Sudan, the representatives of the Southern Sudan had presented the wishes and aspirations of the Southern people in the conference. Mainly they presented their concerns about the political,

⁷⁹ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 219.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 220.

⁸¹ Guy Arnold, *Wars in the Third World since 1945* (London: Cassell, 1991), 399. & Abulemoi, *The Fragility of Sudan : A Study of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, 38.

educational and economic development of the region. In the conference they sought that the administration of the South, the police and prison services should be run only by the Southerners. In addition to this they wanted to recruit the Southern army and a mixed national army of the North and South.

In the educational sector, they rejected the policy of Arabization and Islamization in the school curriculum mainly in the South Sudan. This policy had been the cause of stagnation in the educational advancement of the South. And they also requested the immediate opening of girls' Secondary School, Malakal Secondary School and other Technical Institutes in Southern Sudan. Economically, representatives of the Southern criticized the GOS for not doing enough to encourage economic advancement in the region. There was no attempt made to address the unemployment issues and to raise the standard of living of the people. All foreign firms interested in the investment of natural resources in South were not permitted by the GOS, while Northern capitalists were permitted to invest and monopolize huge capital. Therefore, the Southern Front stood for the principle of welfare state and equal distribution of the natural resources.⁸²

After the election (1965), the Umma Party came into power, the new elected government led by Mohamed Ahmad Mahgoub served as prime minister for a year. Soon after the formation of a new government, there were massacres carried out by the Sudanese army and the security forces in the town of Juba, Wau, Bor, Yei, Torit, Malakal and Yambio because they had been considered as supporters of the rebel groups and wanted self determination of the Southern Sudan. This was a clear indication that the RTC was a failure in such a way and would not produce a best option for peaceful negotiations. As Sadiq-el-Mahdi came to power in 1966 the situation in Southern region was aggravated by his Islamic ideology. Sadiq wanted that the Sudanese Constitution to be according to the Islamic law. Al-Turabi was actively involved in a constitution committee along with other several members of the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) to draft the constitution of Sudan.

⁸² Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 221-22.

Under the new government led by Turabi was rejected the proposal of a secular constitution by the Southern Sudan and other members of the Northern intelligentsia. Later on by 15 January 1968 the final draft of the constitution was adopted by the National Assembly.⁸³ Therefore, as many scholars claim, the failure of the RTC caused the people of Southern Sudan to take decisive action at this time more than any time before. So, this situation left them with no option but to join the fight for their freedom.

This period also created another opportunity for the Southern Sudan to consider their previous weakness and established a better political organization. Colonel Joseph Lagu began to accuse and challenge the former leadership of Emilio Taffeng who led the Southern movement and eventually he took power and became the new supreme commander and he brought all the rival groups together in a more comprehensive and organized manner, the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM). During this time, the SSLM did hold a large part of Equatoria region and after 1969 this rebellion group had managed to represent the Southern Sudan in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (1972).⁸⁴

After 1969 the SSLM fighters extended military and foreign relations with the government of Israel in response to the expansion of Islam in the Southern Sudan. They received military training and aid from Israel in collaboration with the government of Ethiopia and Uganda. The rebels had tried to create a good contact with the Southern people inside Sudan and outside and raised funds for buying modern weapons from neighboring countries: Ethiopia, Central Africa Republic and Congo in order to increase their military capabilities.⁸⁵

⁸³ Gabriel Warburg, *Islam, Sectarianism and Politics: Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya* (UK: Bell & Bain Ltd, 2003), 147.

⁸⁴ Sudan Tribune, "The 1955-1972/First Sudanese Civil War/Anyanya Movement " <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot1989>.(Accessed: 24 January, 2015)

⁸⁵ Pike, "Sudan-First Civil War". <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm>

4.2. The Genesis of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (AAPA)

The RTC of 1965 was the first political dialogue to resolve the differences between the North and South. It was unproductive, however, the SSLM (former Anya Nya) movement stepped up its military attacks against the GOS and established a good political network within and outside Sudan. Within the Northern political parties, the Communist Party had supported the autonomous status of the Southern people and opposed an Islamic constitution in Sudan. During the RTC (1965) and the 1968 Constitution Committee, the Communist Party was in favour of the Southern Regional Administration (SRA). But in the middle of this situation General Jaffar Nimeiri deposed the new president of Sudan, Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub through a coup in May 1969.⁸⁶

In a statement to the nation, Nimeiri promised that his government would sincerely work for the peace and stability of Sudan. On that specific date (May 1969), he stated that his government would work for the social justice for all Sudanese people including the Southerners and he promised to resolve the failure of the previous government to solve the “Southern problem”.⁸⁷ As Alier the governor of Southern Sudan explained the situation, the peace negotiation with Nimeiri could not be successful mainly because of two possible reasons. The first reason was that the clash between Nimeiri’s regime and the members of the Ansar party led by Al-Mahdi meant that they could not agree to start a formal negotiation with Southern Sudan who was supported by the Israeli government. It was remembered that the GOS supported the Egyptian army during the Arab-Israel war in 1967. The second reason was that the political differences between the Nimeiri’s regime and the Communist party with regards to the question of the Southern Sudan had a different point of view. The Communist party advocated for the autonomy governance of the Southern Sudan in the near future.⁸⁸

⁸⁶Shinn, "Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?," 240.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Beshir Mohamed Omer, *The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace* (Khartoum: The Khartoum Bookshop, 1975), 155-57.

The leader of the Southern Sudan led by Joseph Oduho and William Deng came up with a new concept regarding the “Southern Sudan Problem” and formed a political dialogue with a new GOS as a means to achieve permanent peace in the Southern Sudan. In a similar way, Nimeiri took the first step to end the civil war between the North and South and concluded that it was in his interest to end the civil war and foster development in the South. Historians call it this peace treaty between the North and South as the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement.

Earlier the GOS held secret meetings with the opposition groups to discuss a possible solution to end the conflict. Both Lagu and Nimeiri concluded in a secret meeting that the war was becoming too costly and neither side could win a military victory. The only way to settle the conflict was by means of political negotiations. Strong reactions came to the GOS from the Northern political parties, specifically some Muslim groups rejected the peace talks as Nimeiri’s regime gave more concession to the Southern Sudan by allowing political “negotiation” and peace talks with the rebel group. On the other hand, the Southern politicians criticized Lagu for accepting the autonomous status of the Southern Sudan and made compromises with the Khartoum government on the independence of Southern Sudan. One of the fighters who expressed his reservations on the AAPA was John Garang.⁸⁹ Therefore, the AAPA was contentious issues among the Northern and the Southern elites

As part of the peace process, the Nimeiri’s regime played a key role in drafting a new document regarding the problem of Southern Sudan and he addressed the three main issues: Firstly, he acknowledged there was uneven development between the North and South Sudan under the former legacy of the Sudanese government and he promised his government would work for everlasting peace and equality between the two regions. Secondly, recognizing the “cultural and historical” differences between the North and South, so that the Southern might have the right to exercise their own culture within a united Sudan and have the right to “regional autonomy”.

⁸⁹ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 108.

Thirdly, Nimeiri proposed to extend the rule of law in the South, by inviting all Southerners to build a “united and democratic Sudan.”⁹⁰

Nimeiri further extended his political reforms toward the South Sudan by appointing Alier as vice president and Minister of the Southern affairs in August 1971 and recruited Southern policemen in the Southern province. In the field of economics, he allocated a huge budget for economic recovery and public construction in the region. In his educational policy, he opened Secondary Schools in major towns of Juba and Malakal and established the department of Christian affairs in the Ministry of Education. Nimeiri’s political reforms toward the Southern Sudan became a matter of discussion among the Northern politicians. Why did Nimeiri want to end the civil war peacefully? In the first place, Nimeiri had served as a captain in Juba between 1959 and 1961, when he was in the military service and he developed a sense of empathy and understood the discrimination of Southern Sudan by the Northern Sudan. According to Anthony Sylvesern, in the 1970s Nimeiri’s policy became popular in the South, he was considered as a man who guaranteed “a fair deal for the region”.⁹¹ Secondly, there was no doubt, however, that Nimeiri’s political strategy was to consolidate his power in the North by building a peace agreement with the South.

On 3 March 1972, a peace treaty was signed between the Southern Sudan and GOS which was known as the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (AAPA). AAPA was considered by many scholars as one of Nimeiri’s most significant achievements in the history of Sudan since 1970s. The North Sudan began to moderate its pro-Arabic stand and gave way for a new development in Southern Sudan. The peace agreement also invited other regional observers such as the World Council of Churches (WCC), All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) and Haile Selassie, the Emperor of Ethiopia who had taken a crucial step in the peace agreement. In addition to this, I will briefly address what were the legal terms of the AAPA and

⁹⁰ Ibid.; Joseph Lagu and Alier Abel, *Protest from the First Generation Leadership of the South in Horn of Africa*, vol. 8 (1985), 48.

⁹¹ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 241; Sylvester Anthony, *Sudan under Nimeiri* (London: Bodley Head, 1977), 185.

the views of the Northerners and SSLM during the negotiation process. It is important to ask whether the legal terms of the AAPA was a genuine step to narrow the difference between the GOS and the rebellion movement (SSLM) in the South.

4.2.1. The Legal Terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement

This section will briefly address some of the legal terms which were ratified by the peace agreement. The historic negotiations opened from 16-17 February, 1972 in the Addis Ababa Hilton Hotel with the blessing of Emperor Haile Selassie. On that special day, the Emperor of Ethiopia announced the aim of the peace talk was to ratify a plan for regional autonomy of Southern Sudan within a united Sudan, not a separate state which was originally demanded by the SSLM. The negotiations in Addis Ababa have representative from both sides. The Sudan government sent 9 men delegation, headed by vice-president and Minister for Southern Affairs, Abel Alier and Ezboni Mundiri with other 8 men led the Southern delegation in Addis Ababa.⁹² The draft of the AAPA and key points of the agreement and interim protocols were as follows:

- The provinces of Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile constituted a self-governing region within Sudan and shall be known as the Southern Region, based on the boundaries of 1 January 1956 (Article 4)
- The Southern Region had its own legislative and executive organs (Article 5).
- The High-Executive Council (HEC) headed by a president appointed by the president of Sudan on the recommendation of the People's Regional Assembly (PRA) such body shall supervise the administrative and direct public affairs on the Southern Region (Article 3)
- The official language of Sudan became Arabic and English to be the principal language in Southern Region.⁹³

⁹² Ibid., 109

⁹³ Sudan Open Archive, "Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan," (Digital Access to knowledge about Sudan, <http://sudanarchive.net> 1972), 2 (Accessed: 20 April, 2014); http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_720312_Addis%20Ababa%20Agreement%20o

- There was a temporary deal covering the first years where by the armed forces in the Southern region would consist of a national force called the Southern Command of 12, 000 officers and men of whom 6,000 would come from the South and the other 6,000 from the North.
- Juba was the capital of the Southern Region and the seat of HEC and the PRA.⁹⁴
- All citizens without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sex, economic, should have equal rights and duties before the law.⁹⁵
- Every person should enjoy freedom of religion, opinion, and the right to profess them openly.
- There was an extensive section dealing with revenue collection and grants for the Southern Region.⁹⁶ For detail information about the protocol see this website:
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_720312_Addis%20Ababa%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Problem%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf

Many of the participants expressed their rejection of the AAPA, but some representatives of the Southern Sudan had contented with the signing of the peace agreement. For example Abel Alier representative of the Southern Sudan said “I believed I had done my part in bringing both sides together, in formulating key policies that brought about the settlement, involved with the talks and helping to work out a mutually acceptable settlement.”⁹⁷ However, Woodward wrote about the AAPA while he was a student at the University of Reading, he said that the AAPA “was serious of compromise designed to give sufficient regional powers to appease

n%20the%20Problem%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf, "The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan." (Accessed: 01 April, 2015).

⁹⁴ "Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan," 10.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 10-11.

⁹⁷ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 249.

the South, while creating enough ties to bind the region into Sudan as a whole.”⁹⁸ Dr. John Garang on similar way supported Woodward’s idea by saying that the AAPA was a secrete strategy of Nimeiri to integrate the Anya Nya army into the national army and then destroy the Anya Nya forces from the Southern Sudan. Therefore, by looking at the various views, it seemed the agreement was very radical and ambitious in its nature, while the application of such agreement became a major challenge for both contenders in the near future.⁹⁹

4.3. The Implementation of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement

This section will provide the successful negotiations between the GOS and the SSLM the Addis Ababa in 1972 which brought an end to the first Sudanese civil war. Although suspicion and tension remained alive on both sides (Nimeiri and SSLM), the agreement did provide some basic principles for the rule of law (implementation of the agreement) as guiding principles for peace talks between the two regions.¹⁰⁰ The AAPA did accept by Nimeiri as goodwill to end the civil war and on 3 March 1972 he announced a formal cease–fire signed between the Southern Sudan and GOS. President Nimeiri declared the 3 March 1972 would be a holiday known as the “National Unity Day”.

As Collins describes “it was an historic but flawed agreements, for many of its articles were dependent upon mutual trust when there was none.”¹⁰¹ For a few years Nimeiri appeared to be a truly national hero, uniting all Sudanese people irrespective of ethnicity, religion and cultures. He took a pride in the international arena and was highly praised as a peacemaker in a war-torn country, Sudan. However, the AAPA was calling both parties to show mutual trust and collective work for the peace agreement.

Under the provision of the AAPA, the GOS appointed Abel Alier to be the president of HEC and PRA in South Sudan. The GOS declared a self-governing of

⁹⁸Shinn, "Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?," 243.

⁹⁹ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 251.

¹⁰⁰ Roy Licklider, *Stopping the Killing : How Civil Wars End* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 85.

¹⁰¹ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 112.

Southern Sudan (the provinces of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile within a united, Socialist Sudan). Within a few days Alier had selected his cabinet of eleven regional ministers seven of whom were exiled politicians, and the remaining politicians were from inside Sudan. HEC and PRA had the authority to deal with a specified list of regional matters that is maintenance of public order, internal security, efficient administration and the promotion of economic, social and cultural progress. In a real sense, the GOS had the upper hand in decision making by a two-third majority vote in the PRA and that gave the government unlimited power to determine and make decisions on the issue of Southern Sudan. Therefore, Nimeiri took advantage of this lack of lucidity to intervene on the issue of the Southern Sudan.¹⁰²

The other immediate issue facing this fragile government was the repatriation and resettlement of millions of Southerners in the refugee camps and internally displaced in Southern Sudan. In order to tackle the refugee crisis, Repatriation and Relief Commission was established to receive returnees coming from neighboring countries and resettle them to their homes. The United Nations High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Oxfam, Catholic Relief Organization (CRO) and the Red Cross remained active in Southern Sudan and provided shelters, vaccination, basic education and medical assistance for the refugee and war affected communities.¹⁰³

In March 1972, the UN Secretary General asked the UNHCR to release humanitarian aid in the Southern Region of Sudan, aimed at the return and rehabilitation of approximately 500,000 persons displaced within Southern Sudan and some 180,000 refugees who were expected to repatriate from neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Congo and Uganda. Moreover, the UNHCR further strengthened an airlift between the North and South and the construction of the Bailey bridge along the Nile River, technical assistance for agricultural schemes

¹⁰² Licklider, *Stopping the Killing : How Civil Wars End*, 86.

¹⁰³ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 112.

and access to health care assistance.¹⁰⁴ Without the help of these NGOs, it would not have been attainable for the GOS to rehabilitate half a million of Southern-refugees inside and outside Southern Sudan, because the GOS had experienced a brutal civil war and became difficult for the GOS to heal the wounds of the past. In many ways the GOS failed to allocate the appropriate budget to the Southern region to cover the basic needs of the people.

Moreover, the GOS opened a number of projects to recover the economic status of the Southern Sudan and the GOS gained huge amount of loans from the international financial institutions like the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the oil rich countries. More specifically, Kuwait donated a vast budget for the development of the Southern Sudan and had opened an office in Juba, the Kuwait's Development Contribution (KDC). The construction of the Jonglei Canal Project (175 miles between Jonglei and Malakal) was another significant development in the history of Southern Sudan because the canal was intended to enrich the flow of the White Nile River between the North and Egypt and to increase the agricultural output between the two countries. However, Southern politicians thought the construction of the canal was not aimed for the benefit of the South, but to enhance the economic development in the North.¹⁰⁵

In addition, some Southern leaders were highly critical of the project, fearing that the project could have an effect in the swampy Sudd area which would drain pastures and dry up wells and undermine the Dinka's pastoral life style in the region. Despite demonstrations against the scheme in Juba in October 1974 and wider criticism came from the Southern leaders (John Garang and Abiel Alier) and environmentalists, the Nimeiri government ratified the implementation of the project. This was another sign in which application of the AAPA was fragile and

¹⁰⁴<http://www.unhcr.org/4a3278f210a1.html>. UNHCR Archive Gallery Sudan 1972, (12 June 2009), (Accessed: 21 March, 2015).

¹⁰⁵ Ahmad, "Sudan Peace Agreements: Current Challenges and Future Prospects," 7.

weak by which the Nimeiri regime tried to violate the rule of law without requesting the will of the Southerners.¹⁰⁶

The other major challenges to the implementation of the AAPA was that the reintegration of the rebel fighters into the Sudanese army forces. As it was agreed in the AAPA, the armed forces in the Southern Sudan would consist of 12,000 national forces of which 6,000 came from the Southern Sudan. In a practical sense, the agreement ratified an equal composition of armies from both sides might join into the United Southern National Army (USNA) and an equal number of soldiers from both sides should be recruited in Khartoum to safeguard the country.

It is very important to question here how far the Southern government trusted the Nimeiri's regime and was committed to give some of its soldiers to reintegrate in the army. As I have mentioned it earlier some of the Southern politicians were very skeptical about the integration of the Ex-Anya Nya forces with the Northern army. Particularly, John Garagn and other exiled politicians expressed their objection that the integration of Anya Nya forces into the national army was Nimeiri's first strategy to weaken the Southern army.¹⁰⁷

Another important issue related to the transitional government was to prepare the way for the first general election to take place in November 1973. In a number of districts and towns registration of voters had taken place in the early 1973. As part of this process national census was also carried out in major villages and towns. Despite the poor infrastructure and unorganized voting system, this election was expected to develop confidence among the difference groups of citizens in the Southern region and different ethnic groups to form a new government based on equality, dignity and mutual respect.

¹⁰⁶ Jok, *Sudan : Race, Religion and Violence*, 70-71.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 68.

The long trauma, mistrust and cruelty caused over many years of conflict had to be consciously replaced by a spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness.¹⁰⁸ The 1974 election of the PRA, many Southerners began to feel the effect of the Southern government exerting power and authority over region of the South. There was a widespread sense of stability and peace and people could travel easily between cities and rural areas for trade, paid work, and to seek other kind of services.

4.4. The Politics of Southern Sudan during the Peace Agreement

4.4.1. The First Regional Government 1974-1978

As I referred in the previous section, the October 1973 election gave Mr. Abel Alier the mandate to establish the first elected Southern Regional Government (SRG) that lasted up to December 1977. As Breidlid and others claim despite poor economic developments and indirect interference from the GOS, the regional assembly managed to implement some basic development programs in the area of Education, Agriculture, roads and communications through the support of international partners and NGO's.

In supporting Breidlid's point of view, Nyibong argues that during the first regional government, the South exercised no autonomy in economic or educational sectors and the regional government received quite a little amount of money yearly of an average of 23.2% Pound from the central government for the development of South Sudan. As a result of this, few development programs ever really got under way. In addition many Southern veterans of the Anya Nya movement were not satisfied with the Southern government because the GOS failed to fulfill its promise to grant them positions and repatriation.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, this period also witnessed a major political rivalry among the Southern Sudan leaders who were not satisfied with the governance of Abel Alier. One of the reasons for the disagreement was that Aliers's dismissal of four ministers in 1974

¹⁰⁸ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 257.; Daniel Thabo Nyibong, " History of South Sudan " <http://pachodo.org/latest-news-articles/pachodo-english-articles/1749-history-of-southern-sudan-hoss>.(Accessed: 21 March, 2015)

¹⁰⁹ " History of South Sudan " .

and the arrest of these famous leaders within his political party (Oduhu and Clement Mbore), this heightened the tension. The opposition against Alier was uniquely strong among the Equatorians. Many Equatorians thought that the government in Southern Sudan was dominated by the Dinka senior politicians. The Dinka, however, felt discriminated not only by the Alier government but also throughout the colonial times. In 1978 his former opponent Joseph Lagu was unanimously elected as the president of the HEC and indeed he was supported by Nimeiri. The GOS took this opportunity to support Lagu's political power as a means to weaken and divide the government in South.¹¹⁰

4.4.2. The Second Regional Government 1978-1980

Lagu's election in 1978 was expected to balance the ethnic issue and to drive forward the social, economic and political administration of Southern people. Unfortunately Joseph Lagu did not success on major issues. Moreover, this period was expressed as a period of rival tension between the two prominent leaders in the Southern administration. The different political attitudes between the two leaders, divided the people of the Southern Sudan on the basis of class and tribal sentiments. Lagu was part of a military bureaucratic hierarchy, being trained in the national army and had a status as a soldier during the war. Alier was an elected politician before being made a minister by the Nimeiri in 1972. To make things worse both had a different ethnic background, Lagu was from a small community of Equatorian tribe, while Alier was from Bor and the Dinka tribe. This political difference was becoming one of the most important steps for Nimeiri to disintegrate the Southern people on the basis of ethnic differences.¹¹¹

Moreover, according to Collins the SRA could not create job opportunities for the repatriated Anya Nya army. More than 20,000 armed forces of the Anya Nya faced serious challenges in getting jobs in Juba and Khartoum, if the former soldiers continued without any job sooner or later they would take their arms and fight the GOS. Unlike Collins, Harir and Tvedt, argue that both the GOS and SRG could

¹¹⁰ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 258.

¹¹¹ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 133.

narrow the gap between the insiders and the new comers (Equatorians refugees). In relation to this a number of Equatorians had returned from Uganda following the fall of the former president Idi Amin in Uganda. The Equatorians were serving in various government positions in Uganda during the Amin's reign and now they sought exile in Southern Sudan after the fall of Amin's reign in Uganda. These people expected to get some jobs in their homeland after they came back from exile but they did not get anything, consequently, this led to a conflict and power struggle between the "returnees" and the "insiders".¹¹²

The administration of Lagu was accused of corruption and interference in the legislative and judicial system of the Southern administration. The unconstitutional use of power both in the legislative and judicial system really gave a way for president Nimeiri to easily intervene in the HEC of the Southern Sudan. Nimeiri and other politicians like Clement Mboro, Bona Malwal and Abiel Alier accused Lagu of corruption and ill political leadership in the regional administration. Eventually Lagu lost his influence in the South. Then in 1980 president Nimeiri used this excuse to unconstitutionally dissolve the SRA in Juba and to dismiss Lagu from power.¹¹³

4.4.3. The Third Regional Government 1980-1983

The election to the Third Regional Assembly took place by the end of May 1980 and brought Abel Alier back to his position as the head of HEC. Still the tribal rivalries were some of the core divisions within the Southern region. By this time many Equatorians were given an equal share of representation in the new cabinet election. He was concerned mostly with domestic issues and expanding programs which begun during his first term of presidency such as agricultural development, education and health care. The greatest disappointment for the Southern

¹¹² Terje Tvedt, Sharif Harir, and Afrikainstitutet Nordiska, *Short-Cut to Decay : The Case of the Sudan* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1994), 71-72.

¹¹³ Nyibong, " History of South Sudan ".

government was lack of economic development and it was totally dependent upon the GOS.¹¹⁴

Many Southern leaders accused the GOS for ignoring to allocate appropriate budget to increase the financial sector of the region. As a result by 1981 Nimeiri had no longer denied complaints of the Southerners, he sent the minister of finance, Badr al-Din Sulayman to the South and he agreed to open a branch office of Agricultural and Commercial Bank in Juba. Soon the GOS provided \$ 9 million from the Kuwaiti Fund to rebuild the Zande Cotton Project at Nzara. Despite all these efforts, the people of Southern Sudan were unable to come out of poverty, corruption and lack of unity among the Southern leaders.¹¹⁵ During the period of 1980s one of the major issues of contention was the issue of division or union of the Southern Sudan. Lagu, the former general of the Sudanese army wanted the division/decentralization of the Southern Sudan into three regions. Basically, his argument was “that the backwardness of Southern Sudan was due to the unmanageable size of the region and the remoteness of Juba, the regional capital.”¹¹⁶

Many Southerners believed that decentralization of the Southern region would develop the regions (Equatoria, Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile) uniformly. In his publication, *Decentralization* (1980), Lagu presented his opposition to the domination and growth of Dinka politicians in the regional government of the Southern Sudan, therefore, his main focus was on the decentralization of the regional and local economic structure. The tribal factor within the regional administration also reflected the different viewpoints and attitudes towards the state, the state administration and bureaucracy between the two main political rivals of Alier and Lagu.

On the other hand, Alier was more concerned about creating a bureaucratic government structures and regulations than Lagu. During his presidential time,

¹¹⁴ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 134.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 135.

¹¹⁶ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 261.

Alier focused on the development of democracy, institutions, and bureaucracy based on the Western style. However, Lagu rejected the idea of democracy and bureaucratic system in the Southern Sudan. He said that the Southern citizens had been a 'victim of officialdom', so they should therefore be liberated from institutional oppression."¹¹⁷

In 1981 the Regional Administration of South received a moral puff, in which twelve members of the National Assembly requested Nimeiri to dissolve the Southern government and the division of the South. Already the GOS had exploited the weakness within the Southern government. On October 5, 1981 both the Regional Assembly and HEC were dissolved and Alier's administration was also dismissed. Then Nimeiri appointed a new interim administration headed by Major General Gismalla Abdalla Rasa. He was a friend of Lagu and was supporting the division of Southern Sudan. Unlike the other leaders of the Southern Sudan, he was a novice (inexperienced) politician in the history and politics of Southern Sudan. His main task was to supervise the referendum on the division of the Southern Sudan.¹¹⁸

The reactions in the South were mixed. The people in favor of a re-division generally supported the closure of the SRA and the others saw it as part of a political strategy by Northerners to divide the South. The struggle between the two fronts made Nimeiri postpone the issue of division, but the GOS dissolved both the regional and national assembly and announced a new election in April 1982. In December 1982 president Nimeiri once again toured the Southern region, at one time he was considered as the peace maker of Sudan in 1972, but now he met a very fierce resistance against his regime. Students demonstrated by throwing stones, and invaded the HEC office in Juba, schools, shopping complexes and other business activities were destroyed.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Tvedt, Harir, and Nordiska, *Short-Cut to Decay : The Case of the Sudan*, 82.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.

¹¹⁹ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 136.

Despite of all this, the GOS quickly submitted the recommendations for the division of the South into three provinces that was called the Southern Regional Self-Government Act (SRSGA). The dissolution of Alier's government and the dismissal of HEC had clearly shown the beginning of Nimeiri's abrogation of the AAPA, which created mass uprising to his government. In May 1983, military grievances, failure to pay salaries and transfer of soldiers from the South to North, eventually led to a mutiny in Bor, escalating violence in Southern Sudan.

Later on many mutineers joined the rebel army in Ethiopia (the Anya Nya II rebels), that meant the beginning of the Sudan's Second civil war. Dr. John Garang began a long process of consolidating his control over the SPLM under the Ethiopian sponsorship. In a political manifesto in 1983, the SPLM announced a new war against the GOS and its intention to fight for a "New Sudan" of economic, social and political equality and rejected the division of Southern Sudan.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ John Garang, *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, ed. 2nd (London: Kegan Paul International, 1992), 125-29.

Chapter V: Factors for the failure of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement

5.1. Prelude

Before I am going to discuss the reasons that led to the failure of the AAPA, it is very important to look at the nature of the agreements and how the Sudanese scholars analyzed the peace agreement during the initial stage. Although some scholars saw a positive development in the AAPA, other scholars were skeptical to the peace agreement. For example, Nyaba describes this peace agreement as one in which the “South became a sub-system of the Nimeiri regime....an island of liberal democracy in an ocean of one party dictatorship and the personal rule of Nimeiri... which lacked or was denied the economic power and resources to develop the region.”¹²¹ For the Southern elites, managing the autonomous institutions in Juba gave them more challenges than chances, particularly in the field of administration, sharing economic resources and education.

Besides this, the Addis Ababa peace talks gave Southerners the first opportunity to govern themselves in modern institutions but that opportunity was not effectively used by the Southern leaders. Rather it opened up a chance to fight for power on the basis of ethnic, sectarian and regional lines over the political system of South Sudan. For a number of years the power of politics in Southern Soudan revolved around the dominant figure of Joseph Lagu, Equatorial region, and the Abel Alier, the Dinka. During the leadership of Alier (1972-1978), there was economic and political dominancy by the Dinka elites at the expense of Equatorians. Nimeiri took advantage of these weaknesses and transformed the HEC into a subsystem of his leadership in which he dismissed the leaders and promoted new leaders who were loyal to his government.¹²²

¹²¹ Iyob and Khadiagala, *Sudan : The Elusive Quest for Peace*, 86.

¹²² *Ibid.*

It is very useful to look at how politicians argue about the AAPA and their views upon the practical application of the peace treaty. One of the leading figures on relations between the North and South was Mohammed Omer Beshir, who served as secretary of the 1965 RTC. He wrote in his book which was published a year later, "it would be fair to conclude that during the first year following the agreement both the Northern and Southern Sudanese accepted the challenges of peace."¹²³ Beshir considered that the AAPA and the aftermaths of the agreement were the beginning of a more difficult and complex assignment-the advancement of economic and social services in the South and consolidation of the political unity of the Sudan. Politically speaking, the AAPA was a major achievement of Nimeiri's to stabilize and unite Sudan as one nation.

In response to the above argumentation, another famous figure in the history of Sudan is Nelson Kasfir, who was teaching at Dartmouth College in 1977 and was a former president of the Sudan Studies Association in USA. He made a political analysis on the issue of African Affairs in 1977. In that report he said that only four years after the signing of the AAPA (1976), the GOS, Southern leaders and regional governments remained committed in making the peace settlement to succeed. The agreements formed the rules for postwar politics in the South and became visible to be gaining a permanent and practical role in the political system of Sudan. Later on many obstacles put the agreement in danger.¹²⁴ Basically he argued that although the GOS and the Southern leaders had agreed to establish a permanent peace in Sudan there was no real commitment by the government of Khartoum to keep the agreement on track and tackle the various problems within the Southern region.

He further pointed out that continuous suspicion of the South over the North and a few scattered incidents served as reminders that the civil wars in Sudan could not be entirely resolved by a single treaty. For instance popular uprising toward the "Jonglei Construction" and wide spread protest of the Southerners against the GOS in Juba (1974) indicated that the peace agreement was in danger. The other

¹²³ Shinn, "Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?," 243.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 244.

potential threat to the peace agreement between the North and South Sudan was the integration of the Anya-Nya fighters in the National Army of Sudan, that led to the 'Akoba incident' where former Anya Nya soldiers staged mutiny in 1973-1974, and many of these guerrilla fighters and other top officials played a significant role when the fighting resumed in the 1980s.¹²⁵

Prior to the collapse of the AAPA in 1981, Nimeiri's minister of Culture and Information Bona Malwal wrote a book about the North-South relations. Malwal points out the three immediate problems in the relationship between the North and South: the role of religion in national politics, the system of government and the nature of economic and social development. He expressed his concern that certain Northern Sudanese were pushing ahead to create an Islamic state in Southern Sudan while rejecting the right of Southern Sudanese to exercise their own religion.

He also thought that the creation of a multi-party system within single-party of Sudan, encouraged the formation of several other autonomy regions in Sudan. Finally, he was concerned that Sudan was not distributing its wealth fairly and lacked efficient leaders to administer all parts of the country.¹²⁶ With this background information in mind, I will discuss some of the points of how the peace agreement came to an end and off course under this chapter I will present some of the factors which contributed to the collapse of the AAPA. This includes the social, political, economic and military issues related to the AAPA.

5.2. Security issues

This section examines previous experiences with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of South Sudan. The provision of the AAPA 1972 (Article 2) says that "the people's Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force called the Southern command composed of 12, 000 officers and men of whom 6,000 shall be citizens from the region and the other 6,000 from outside the

¹²⁵ Breidlid, Said, and Breidlid, *A Concise History of South Sudan*, 256.

¹²⁶ Bona Malwal, *People & Power in Sudan : The Struggle for National Stability* (London: Itacha Press, 1981), 249-68.

region.”¹²⁷ Under this agreement both parties agreed to establish the Southern Armed Forces (SAF) from both sides, still some questions remained unclear for example how the recruitment of citizens from the Southern region with armed forces should be determined and in what way they could achieve smooth integration of former Anya Nya combatants in the SAF.

Moreover, the agreement included the recruitment and integration of former Anya Nya soldiers from the Southern region within the People’s Armed Forces (PAF) in the Southern region. The joint military commission was to ensure smooth integration of the Anya Nya soldiers in the national force and by way of doing, it guaranteed peace in Sudan.¹²⁸ These questions were not discussed thoroughly during the peace agreement as a result mass protests were conducted in Juba, Bor and other part of the Southern region.

The failure of the agreement had already been anticipated by those who were involved in making the agreement. Mr. Abel Alier, the key negotiator in the peace agreement pointed out that it had been observed that the security agreement reached between the North and South Sudan was one of the most sensitive and challenging ones and had severely difficult issues to be resolved during the negotiation at the AAPA. Both sides did not trust each other due to the bad record of the oppression and atrocities created by the Northern Sudan in the early times, which made the Anya Nya fighters difficult to integrate in the national army. And during the RTC negotiations in 1965, the Southern political parties had systematically marginalized by the Northern politicians led by Al-Turabi and were not even invited for the coming parliamentary elections in the country.¹²⁹ Therefore, all this political developments were made less effective for the smooth integration of the Southern Army.

¹²⁷http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_720312_Addis%20Ababa%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Problem%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf. (Accessed: 01 April, 2015)

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Chol Gidion Gakmar, " Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and the Right of Former Combatants," (Committee of the Civil Project in Sudan, Issue Paper E-4, 1972), 3.

A report project paper written by Gakmar (1972) says that one of the most significant achievements of the AAPA was the absorption of Anya Nya into the regular army and police forces. 6000 guerrillas were absorbed into the Sudanese armed forces, leaving 32,000 to be absorbed into civil jobs. In supporting Gakmar's point of view, Abel Alier claims that shortly after the agreement was signed, a number of Anya Nya forces bulged from about 12,000 to some 18,000 men, in the hope of getting a better job in the regular forces. The GOS also motivated the Anya Nya forces to surrender their arms in exchange of money, food and better positions but many of the Anya Nya refused to join the national army because surrendering their army to GOS was considered to be a shame for them.¹³⁰

Nelson Kasfir disagrees with Gakmar by saying that there was a widespread belief in the continuous violation of the AAPA by the government of Khartoum on military issues. He added that "the mixing of soldiers from two recruitment streams in the same units under a single chain of command at the field level had become the most dangerous issue in the implementation of the agreement."¹³¹ Therefore, the process of reintegration of ex-combatants became a difficult task under the provision of AAPA. Although it was under control for a short time, serious violent incidents soon spread across the Southern region.

For example Captain Agwet an ex Anya Nya military, started a military operation and when his senior ex Anya Nya officers tried to convince him to order his troops to put down their weapons, he disobeyed and ordered the troops to shoot down the Sudanese forces and senior Anya Nya officers. After the incident most of the soldiers fled to neighboring country, Ethiopia. In addition to the above incidents, a number of ex Anya Nya soldiers who were peacefully integrated into the national army, later on resisted the policy of reintegration as the government of Khartoum ordered Kapoeta's and Rumbek's Anya Nya battalion to transfer them from the Southern region to Khartoum. Many of the Southerners believed that the transfer of

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Nelson Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics since the Addis Ababa Agreement," *African Affairs* 76, no. 303 (1977): 149-50.

soldiers was a political game of the North to dismantle and exterminate the Anya Nya forces in the Southern region.¹³²

In relation to this, there were a number of incidents which erupted throughout the region mainly in Juba (1974), Wau (1974) and Akobo (1975). These incidents primarily erupted due to the policy of reintegration and lack of job, facilities, education and health service among the former Anya Nya combatants. Moreover, the GOS was unable to pay the wages of the ex-Anya Nya workers (10,000) and many of them were ordered to leave their jobs. As a result, most of the soldiers were angry because they could not go back to their home with empty hands and some of them tried to go back to their village to cultivate their lands but many of other ex-combatants wanted to pick up their arms and fight for their rights.

It should be noted that the AAPA was expected to create a viable ground for peace between the North and South. However, it brought substantial critique among the Southern elites. Dr. John Garang one of the observers of the AAPA, said “the peace agreement was a deal between the Southern and Northern bourgeoisified bureaucratic elite and that the Northern elite dictated the terms while the Southern elite compromised the interest of the masses in return for jobs which had long been denied to them.”¹³³ In addition, it had been argued that the agreement was made between the government and former Southern officers, who had joined the rebels not for the sake of nationalistic motives but to escape the mass atrocity which was indiscriminately aimed at the Southerners.

Other scholars like Kasfir and Alier noted that the military relationships between the North and South were causing more tension than any other issues in the peace agreement. They added there was a widespread tension due to the continuous violation of the AAPA by the GOS on military issues. The military relationship began to deteriorate between the GOS and Southern military offices on the transfer of soldier from the South to the North Sudan. In May 1983, units of soldiers in the Bor, Pibor and Pochalla garrisons in the Upper Nile rejected the security policy of

¹³² Gakmar, " Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and the Right of Former Combatants," 4.

¹³³ Ibid.

the Sudan's government and soon the government tried to crush the mutiny by sending Special Forces to the region. Many of the Anya Nya combatants had fled to the neighboring country of Ethiopia and joined the small Anya Nya II forces, while others formed the core of the SPLM/A that Garang had created in Ethiopia. By July 1983, there were about 2,500 ex-Anya Nya soldiers who fled to Ethiopia and joined the army, another 500 gathered in the field of Bahr-el-Ghazal.¹³⁴

Reviewing the failure of the AAPA, the key players and mediators in the peace process particularly, the Emperor of Ethiopia, representatives of the All African Churches and other regional bodies did not discuss the political structures of the South Sudan. It seems, the very nature of the agreement did not define what it meant by "autonomy status" of the Southern region in relation to the Sudan's socialist party in the North. They did not analyze the political differences between the Northern and Southern Sudan. The Northern Sudan was led by the rule of one party-the Sudan's Socialist Party, while the Southern Sudan had given the opportunity to form a multi party system within one country. Two different political structures within one state would not speed up the integration of Southern troops with their counter part in the North. This sensitive security issue was not discussed at the peace agreement.¹³⁵

The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie would not advocate an independent state of South Sudan but would support the regional autonomy of South Sudan. By doing so his intention was to tackle the issue of secessionist movements within his country, Eritrea or elsewhere in Africa. Consequently, the intention of Ethiopia was to give Nimeiri unlimited powers over the South by allowing the regional autonomy of South Sudan. Therefore the reintegration processes of the Anya Nya combatants to the PAF were impossible from the very beginning because the Southern Sudan were conscious and suspicious about Nimeiri's intention to dismantle the Southern army in the long run.

¹³⁴ Shinn, "Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?," 245-46.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

5.3. Economic Aspects

Uneven economic development between the North and South was an important reason to the collapse of AAPA. The difference in economic prosperity between the North and South was vivid, indeed this peace agreement attempted to readdress these differences. This was a difficult task for the GOS and the newly established governor of the Southern region. The Southern government at this time should have prioritized the influx of refugees from the neighboring countries, creating a better condition for the ex- Anya Nya combatants including the process of demobilization, reintegration and salaries.

Under the provision of the AAPA 1972, Chapter IV and Article 11 highlighted the establishment of maintenance, administration of public sectors, promotion of trade and establishment of local industries in the Southern region. And Chapter VII and Article 25 also focused on the source of income for the SRA would be generated from the national treasury and by collecting source of revenue from direct and indirect regional taxes.¹³⁶

Based on the above premises, the SRG put its objectives in practice by increasing food production in the South with a view of achieving self-sufficiency, encouraging cultivation of cash crops with the aim of increasing commercial output and expanding communication and network system related to development. During the first Six Years Plan, the budget for the Southern Sudan increased from 4.1 million pounds in 1972/1973 to 10.0 million pounds in 1976/77.¹³⁷ The estimated total financial assistance received by the Southern government was 24.7 out of 38.300 million pounds given for the development of the region. The amount of these funds did not sustain the economic development in the region. Compared to the annual GDP of the GOS, the Southern region only received 20% of the national budget, this means that the Southern region only received a small portion of money from the national budget.

¹³⁶http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_720312_Addis%20Ababa%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Problem%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf. (Accessed: 01 April, 2015)

¹³⁷ Yongo Bure, "Development of the Southern Sudan: An Overview and a Strategy " (Germany: University of Bremen, 1989), 14.

Despite this, Bure claims that from 1972-1977 there was a number of projects implemented by the GOS in Southern region. However, the central government was more interested in large scale projects within Blue Nile state such as Gezira plantation, Mongola Agro Industry, and Nzara Agro Industrial complex, many Southerners thought that such development was manipulated by the GOS as a means to generate foreign currency to the Northern part of Sudan. However, Johnson disagrees with the above claim, by saying that there was not much development in Southern Sudan during 1972-1977 due to the lack of skilled man power, technical problems related to administration and corruption by the Southern government made the development projects unsuccessful.¹³⁸

According to the information from the Juba Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (1977), in July 1977, the regional government began the implementation of another Six-Year Plan for economic and social development of the South. For this project the central government allocated \$225 million for the development in the Southern Sudan. However, the inflation increased the development costs because of the worldwide price rises and rising costs of external capital. During the plan's second year, 1978, there was no economic growth in the South Sudan as a result, the region was badly affected by the economic situation and the Sudan government was unable to pay its debts to the US and IMF.¹³⁹

According to Johnson, this situation had an impact on the internal and external political system of the country. Sudan became increasingly dependent on the US not only to negotiate the rescheduling of the Sudan's debt and further loans from the IMF, but for the foreign aids through USAID (Sudan was the largest recipient of US foreign aid in sub-Sahara Africa, receiving more than \$1.4 billion in all). Internally, Nimeiri brought back his Islamist opponents (the Umma and the Muslim Brotherhood) in order to ensure his political stability in the country and he open up Islamic bank (free of interest rate). Due to this, the US and IMF imposed sanctions

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ "Economic and Social Development 1977/78-1982/83," (Juba: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1977), 228.

on their financial support and that resulted in reduction of the national budget and privatization of the national companies.¹⁴⁰

By the early 1980s the GOS had spent only \$45 million for development in the South accordingly the government cut down major development expenditures in the Southern region. After GOS called for the “National Reconciliation” and Nimeiri reformed the previous laws regarding the economic, social and political structure of North and South Sudan, particularly they aimed at dividing the Southern region into three regions. The disintegration of the SRA was the final blow to economic development of the region, this policy left the Southern region without independent sources of revenue. It endorsed the economic power in the hands of the central government and practically wrecked the economic independence of the South.¹⁴¹

5.4. The Adoption of Shar’a

In this section, I will discuss the role of religion in breaking down the relationship between the North and the South Sudan, which ultimately led to the collapse of the AAPA. Moreover, The AAPA of 1972 guaranteed the Southern people the freedom of religion in the country. In light of the agreement the GOS and the Southern Sudan agreed:

....“every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion and of conscience and the right to profess them publicly and privately and to establish religious institutions subjected to reasonable limitation in favor of the morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.”¹⁴²

After the first six years of rule, Nimeiri had achieved major success in creating temporary peace between the people of the North and the South. He had ended the first civil war through a political dialogue and mediation, while maintaining the unity and integrity of the country. His accomplishments, however was not liked by

¹⁴⁰Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce* ed. Revised Edition, Africa Issues (Kampala: The Fountain Publisher, 2011), 43.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴²http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_720312_Addis%20Ababa%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Problem%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf, "The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan",7.

the Northern politicians. Many politicians accused him of his autocratic rule and suppression of political parties from both the left and the right.¹⁴³

The growing resistance within the Northern part of Sudan and the decline of economic progress in the country caused Nimeiri to revise his former policy. As a result he turned the country into an Islamic state. However, scholars disagree with Nimeiri's new policy and why he turned Sudan into an Islamic state. It was true that the new policy that was adopted by Sudanese government definitely affected the early peace agreement (AAPA) of 1972. One scholar, Natsios (2012) argues that the growing of mass underground movement against his government forced him to consider his previous policy.

In 1971 there was an underground coup d'état against the GOS Sudan led by the Sudanese Communist Organization. The aspiration of the coup was to overthrow Nimeiri from power and to establish an Islamic state in Sudan. The coup was suppressed by the Sudanese security forces and its effect led to the massacre of the Ansar Army, the killing of Imam al-Hadi and driving Sadiq al-Mahdi out of the country.

Furthermore, Natsios and Warburg (2003) stress that the opposition to Nimeiri's regime did not stop after the crushing of the Ansar Army (1971). The growing of resistance against him ever increased. For example in July 2, 1976, another coup attempt inspired by the Ansar Army against him at the Airport of Khartoum as he was returning to Sudan from a trip to the United States. The agenda of the coup was to assassinate the president and his officers. However, the plane arrived earlier before the time of the plot. After the failure of this coup, the various leaders of the coup including Sadiq al-Mhadi were creating political alliances with the former enemies of Nimeiri such as Colonel Gaddafi (Libya), Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopian) and the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur : What Everyone Needs to Know*, 52-53.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; Gabriel Warburg, *Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 290-91.

These countries provided them with weapons, funds and bases of operations to support the coup. The ground troops came from two sources: first Sadiq al Mahdi's Ansar army from Darfur and the second, the Arab Legion, recruited and organized by Gaddafi to spread Gaddafi's grand strategy for expanding Arabization in the Sahara region. Therefore, Nimeiri had no option but to address his political dilemma and to tackle the internal opposition within the country. The only way to come out of this situation was the adoption of Islam as a political agenda to Sudan and by opening political dialogues with various Islamic political parties for the unity of Sudan.¹⁴⁵

Other scholars, such as Johnson (2011) and Kebede (1977) claim that it was not only the political resistances that made Nimeiri to introduce Shar'a as means to solve the crisis in Sudan but the economic recession of Sudan in the 1970's. Sudan enjoyed a period of relative tranquility and stability by the mid of 1970s. In the years following the AAPA, Nimeiri dismissed his former communist allies and shifted from earlier Soviet disposition to alignment with the Western World and Modern Arab countries.

The country began to attract foreign investments and obtained massive loans from the Western countries and turned Sudan into the "breadbasket of the Middle East."¹⁴⁶ At one time Sudan became one of the fewest countries in Africa that received a huge military aid in Africa after Egypt. After 1976, however, Nimeiri's popularity began to deteriorate as the country's economic situation got worse. The country's economy was badly affected by the rise of oil price, recession, inflation and mismanagement and corruption. It became a major problem in the country.

As the world's economy collapsed due to the fall in major commodities during 1976, the international financial institutions intervened and imposed serious measures on the nation's economy (money devaluation, reducing subsidies, lifting

¹⁴⁵ Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur : What Everyone Needs to Know*, 54.

¹⁴⁶ Girma Kebede, "Sudan: The North-South Conflict in Historical Perspective," *Contributions in Black Studies* 15 (1997): 20

prices, increasing cash crop exports, raising interest rate, freezing wage).¹⁴⁷ Thus, by the early 1980s the GOS had spent very little money for the development of South Sudan. Therefore, this was perhaps one of the main reasons behind the adoption of Islam by Nimeiri. If the GOS unanimously introduced Shar'a law as the constitution of the country, in return the country would get financial assistance from the rich Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

It seems both economic and political factors caused Nimeiri to stick on the application of Islam and economic cooperation with the Arab countries. However, the question is how the introduction of Shar'a and the economic depression affected the situation of Southern Sudan? And how did the slow economic growth in the early 1970s affect the Southern people? The introduction of Shar'a or the adoption of Islam shaped the economic, social and political situation of the Southern Sudan.¹⁴⁸

In July 1977, Nimeiri openly declared a political dialogue (Reconciliation) with his political rival Hassan al-Turabi the leader of Ansar Army. At one time Turabi had been sentenced to death as he plotted an attempt to assassinate the president of Sudan in 1976. In a secret meeting Nimeiri promised to renegotiate the key provisions of the AAPA, since Hassan al-Turabi and his allies did not support the regional autonomy of South Sudan. In addition to this, they agreed to root out the Southern troops in a systematic way. Al-Turabi wanted to establish a secular constitution for Sudan based on Islamic law and Arabic language would be the official language of country. If Nimeiri aimed to hold the Islamic parties within his administration, he would lead the country once again into a devastating civil war and he would lose his popularity among the Southern Sudan, which means the AAPA agreement would be in a very precarious condition.¹⁴⁹

As part of the Reconciliation process, Hassan al-Turabi used his new legal position to advance his own religious agenda in Sudan. By 1980 with the intention of

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 6-7.

¹⁴⁸ Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce* 43.

¹⁴⁹ Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur : What Everyone Needs to Know*, 54.

Islamization of Sudan, the National Islamic Front (NIF) officially declared the use of “jallabiya”, prohibition of alcohol drinking, mutilation of limbs for theft and violent crime. In short, Islam became an integral part of Sudan’s political, social, civil, criminal and economic lifestyle. Likewise, the new criminal and legal code of the Shari’a applied to all Sudanese, Northerners and Southerners, Christians or Muslims.¹⁵⁰

Gradually, the Shar’a law was applied into the Southern region and most of the penal codes were being applied normally against the Southerners and Western Christians. Christian missionaries were being suspended by the GOS in major cities and towns in the South and Arabic language were introduced as a medium of instruction in various primary and high schools. Therefore, the application of Shar’a was a major blow to the AAPA and the Constitution of 1973, and it therefore became the immediate cause to the second civil war led by the SPLM/A.¹⁵¹

5.5. The discovery of Oil

This sub-topic is more related to the economic crisis that I have discussed earlier. The discovery of oil in the Southern Sudan had also contributed a lot and it sparked fire to the ongoing tension between the two people. Since the establishment of the AAPA, the Northern politicians and the various leaders of Khartoum were concerned very little about the political, social and economic development of the South. The exploration of oil became a major source of tension between the Northern and Southern Sudan and it became particularly apparent after the establishment of AAPA. The exploration of oil was begun in 1964 by the Italian gas company Agip and the exploration was unsuccessful in its first stage. Later on in 1974, the Chevron Shell Company took its second phase and began its exploration in the Red Sea Zone (Muglad), along the region of Abyei and Malakal in Southern

¹⁵⁰ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*.

¹⁵¹ Natsios, *Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur : What Everyone Needs to Know*, 55.

Sudan. Moreover, by the late 1978 oil was discovered in Bentiu within the region of the South.¹⁵²

In relation to this, we need to answer two important questions. The first question is whether the discovery of oil/natural resource was part of the deal in the AAPA or not? Secondly, how the discovery of oil affected the AAPA in 1972. The AAPA permitted the SRA to utilize their natural resources and extract profit. However, the GOS broke the agreement by allowing the exploration of Chevron Company without the consent of the Southern people and the GOS did not discuss about the exploration of oil in Bentiu with the Southern politicians.

According to the Northern politicians, one of the obvious reasons why the GOS rejected to discuss the issue of exploration of oil with the Southern Sudan was that the discovery of oil might lead to the disintegration of Sudan. And specifically it would encourage the Southern politicians to claim their own territory and independence as they knew their region was endowed with natural resources. The second reason was that the importance of the region as a source of economic benefits for the Northern people. According to the AAPA, the Southern Sudan had the right to get a share of the natural resource of the Sudan. Because of that reason, the Khartoum government did not openly discuss about discovery of oil with them. Thus the GOS tried to undermine the development of the region by exploiting the region's potential oil resource.¹⁵³

Under this sub-topic, I shall discuss how scholars argue about the discovery of oil in the early 1970's as means to dissolve the AAPA and to redefine the political structure of the Southern Sudan. As Lesch (1998) discusses, after the discovery of the oil, the Northern government proposed a new policy with regard to the North-South boundary and Nimeiri suggested a new plan by placing the oil producing area into a new unity province closest to the North region. Not surprisingly, the discovery of oil near Bentiu in the Southern region led the GOS to re-draw the

¹⁵² Ibid., 58.; Shinn, "Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?," 248.

¹⁵³ Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Bloomington: Indiana University press, 1998).

boundary and tighten its control over the oil areas, which in turn sparked massive dissatisfaction among the Southern Sudanese population. Moreover, Nimeiri redrew the borders between the Southern and Northern Sudan to create “Unity province”, which stretched from the oil fields in Southern Kordofan to the Southern region.¹⁵⁴

Despite Nimeiri’s promises to improve education, health, road and other services and enhance economic development in Bentiu. However, the public demand of the Southern Sudan became stronger against the vice president of Alier for accepting the decision of the GOS. As vice president stated,

We believed that the incentives were satisfactory as far as the issue of refinery was concerned; we consequently cooled off.... I asked the public to calm down and accept the incentives and to respect the President’s decision, but we were not convincing. Public opinion in the South remained hostile and condemned me for not fighting physically, if need be.¹⁵⁵

Furthermore, Nimeiri decided to build a refinery in Kosti on the shores of the White Nile in Northern Sudan but actually the demand of the Southern people was the construction of a pipeline and refinery through Bentiu to Mombasa on the coast of Kenya. If the GOS had constructed the refinery and pipeline inside the Southern region it would have improved the economic status of the South Sudan such as construction of public schools, health centers, and education and that would improve the standard of living of the Southern people. The action of Nimeiri was conceived by many scholars as a deliberate plan to dissolve the AAPA and put the autonomy status of the Southern region under the control of the North.¹⁵⁶

As a result of this, the Southern regional autonomy would not have any control over its oil region and the flow of revenue and tax would have gone directly in the pockets of the Northern Sudan, while the Southern region would remain undeveloped and did not benefit economically from the oil. Therefore, the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 48.

¹⁵⁵ Gabriel Warburg, "Sudan: Diversity and Conflict in an Unstable State," (Taylor & Francis Group, 1993), 351.

¹⁵⁶ Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*.

discovery of oil that brought Nimeiri to redraw the boundary of Southern Sudan by putting the main oil rich regions specifically the Bentiu region and put them under the new boundary of Sudan in the Upper Nile region.

The new boundaries of the Southern Sudan were not according to the previous agreement of 1972 in which “the provinces of Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile, based on the boundaries as they stood on 1 January 1956, constituted as self-governing region within Sudan known as the Southern region.”¹⁵⁷ However, as I mentioned Nimeiri violated the right of Southern Sudan to use their resources and undermined the various agreements and protocols of the AAPA, which eventually led to mass resistance against the GOS. Certainly, many Southerners remained with no option but to join the opposition movement (Anyanya II) and fight for their rights. Their initial motto was to create a “New Sudan” in which the right and the participation of the Southern people had to be respected in the future “New Sudan”.¹⁵⁸

Unlike Lesch’s argument, other scholars like Alier and Khalid (2003) argue that the discovery of oil was not an issue during the 1972 peace talks. There was no discussion on the possible discovery of oil at the peace agreement but there was a provision signed by both parties on the discovery of natural gas and mining and these natural resources were exclusively reserved to the central government. Alier further argues that more than the discovery of the oil, the construction of the Jonglei Canal was the main cause for the collapse of the AAPA. The construction of the canal was part of the grand strategy of the Egyptian government to increase the flow of water to Lake Nasser. The construction of the canal would begin from the swamps of the Sudd in the White Nile in the Southern Sudan and GOS allotted

¹⁵⁷ Shinn, "Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?," 242.

¹⁵⁸ Elke Grawert and Christine Andrä, "Oil Investment and Conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan," (Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)2012), 17.

more than \$ 43 million for the construction of 360 kilometer long canal (twice the length of the Suez Canal) to a French company in 1976.¹⁵⁹

According to Abel Alier, the Southern Sudan was very skeptical to the construction of the canal for two obvious reasons. One of the first reasons was that the agreement of the canal was made between the GOS and Egypt, which excluded the Southern leaders to take part in the agreement. This was viewed as a violation of the peace protocols of 1972 in which the Southern people had access to use their natural resources. The construction of this canal was not only undermining the right of the Southern people but also undermined the 1972 peace agreement. Secondly, the agreement of the canal between the GOS and Egypt was to increase the agricultural output of both countries and increase the flow of water along the White Nile while decreasing the volume of the water in the Southern Sudan. By doing so the GOS made the Southern people more economically dependent under the leadership of the North.¹⁶⁰

Furthermore, Alier noted that since the beginning of the project in 1978, the canal did not create enough job opportunities for the local population who lived around the Sudd region. Alier also commented that the construction of this project would make the people of Southern Sudan economically dependent on the Northern Sudan and that action was Nimeiri's plan to obliterate the regional autonomy of Southern Sudan. Sooner or later the people of Southern Sudan began to question the leadership of the regional administration since it did not work enough for the development of Southern Sudan and more and more people lost hope on the Southern leaders.¹⁶¹

In addition to Alier's point of view, John Garang presented an interesting point on the "Jonglei Canal" in his doctoral dissertation in 1981 at Iowa State University. He argued that "the Jonglei Canal disrupts the traditional regimen of the Nilotic life in

¹⁵⁹ Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*, ed. Second Edition (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992), 214-16.; Mansour Khalid, *War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries* (London: Keegan Paul Ltd, 2003), 145-46.

¹⁶⁰ Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured*.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

the region. He preferred a combination of drainage, irrigation and mechanized farming by creating compact village centers.”¹⁶² As the government of Khartoum kept the construction of the canal secretly, there were massive riots by more than a 1,000 students and young people in Juba in 1974 against the plan of the construction. The demonstrators destroyed buildings and vehicles and the demonstration spread quickly to other part of the Southern region.

In short it can be concluded that although the discovery of oil had a long term impact on the collapse of the AAPA, its economic impact clearly showed after the collapse of the peace agreement in 1983. The GOS began to sell its oil production in the world’s market by the mid of 1980s. It seems the construction of the Jonglei Canal was the most influential factor on the life of the Southern people, specifically as it hurt the agriculture sector of the region.¹⁶³

5.5.1. The End of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, 1983

The AAPA was never popular with the Northern politician as the GOS began formal negotiations with Southern leaders to end the bloody civil war in Sudan. The various Northern political parties such as the Umma and DUP meant that the GOS granted too many concessions to the South and that would only encourage separatist tendencies in the country. Those who favoured an Islamic state including the Muslim Brotherhood and Umma parties also saw this agreement and the constitution of 1973 as a barrier for the creation of an Islamic state in Sudan.¹⁶⁴ But for a short time Nimeiri achieved an immense personal popularity among the Southern as he was the first leader who ever tried to bring sustainable peace between North and South.

As Johnson has pointed out Nimeiri’s initiatives for peace talks with the Southern leaders caused him internal pressure from the Muslim parties who rejected the autonomy status of the Southern Sudan. Consequently, there were two attempt of coup d’état made against him in 1975 and 1976. That became a major challenge for

¹⁶² Robert O. Collins, *The Nile* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 210-11.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 203.

¹⁶⁴ Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce* , 55.

his government and the continuation of AAPA (1972). Hence many politicians had argued that the inclusion of Islamic parties in the National Reconciliation Program and the re-drawing of the border of Southern Sudan marked the termination of the AAPA.¹⁶⁵

Furthermore, Johnson argues that the continuous threat from his enemies (the Muslim parties), forced his government to bring the Muslim parties into the government position. By doing so the GOS was able to maintain the integrity of the Sudan by calling the “National Reconciliation”. In supporting Johnson’s point of view Tvedt (2000) claims that the “National Reconciliation” was important to the Muslim parties. The agreement ratified the following points: termination of the National Front, abolition of the Ansar military training camps, re-affirmation of the 1973 constitution and the AAPA, freedom of religion both for the Ansar and the Muslim Brothers.¹⁶⁶

However, Nimeiri’s threat was not only the Muslim parties but economic reasons. The economy of Sudan was severely hit by the recession in 1976. As a result the World Bank, IMF, and Western donors put restriction on the financial sectors of Sudan. Therefore, the GOS brought the Muslim parties into a position to recover the economy of the country. According to Lesch the Muslim parties wanted a swift implementation of Shar’a Law and Sudan would be a part of an Islamic world. Therefore, the application of Shar’a became a means to generate foreign currency from the rich Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries.¹⁶⁷

In 1977, as a gesture of National Reconciliation, Nimeiri brought Sadiq al-Mahadi from exile and Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim brothers, from prison. Many Southern leaders such as Abiel Alier thought that the inclusion of the Muslim faction in the government position was a potential threat and would erode the autonomy status of the Southern Sudan. After Turabi became the prime minister of Sudan, Nimeiri changed the Sudan’s Constitution of 1973 in which Sudan was as a

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Terje Tvedt, *An Annotated Bibliography on the Southern Sudan, 1850-2000 : Vol. 2* (Bergen: University of Bergen, 2000), 890.

¹⁶⁷ Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, 47.

secular state with freedom of worship not only for Christians and Jews, but also for the followers of traditional religions as well.¹⁶⁸

But gradually Nimeiri adopted the law of Shar'a in Sudan after his government was challenged by the Islamic factions and he applied the Law of Shar'a in all aspect of Sudan's civil, criminal and social affairs including the Southern Sudan. In 1983 after the dissolution of the SRG, the Islamic Law (also known as the 'September Law') came into effect that indicated the final termination of the AAPA after 10 years of peace.¹⁶⁹ By all accounts, one of the other important events led to the end of the AAPA was the decision of the Khartoum leaders to decentralize the Southern administration into three (Equatoria, Bahr-el-Gazal, Upper Nile) that is contrary to the 1972 peace agreement.

For the Northern politicians the decentralization of Southern Sudan became a best strategy to disunite the power of Southern people based on ethnic and class divisions. Moreover, the General Chief in the Army of Southern Sudan (Lagu) had strongly supported the decentralization policy of Southern Sudan. He argued that progress could go forward more rapidly if the South were decentralized. Lagu saw the re-division of the South increased the influence of his ethnic group (Equatoria) over the Dinka majority in the political sphere of South Sudan. The issue of disintegration was first raised by the Central Committee of Sudanese Socialist Union. Most of the Southerners in the committee rejected the proposal, particularly Alier's administration strongly opposed the division of Southern Sudan. In the following year Nimeiri dismissed the Alier government and requested a referendum on dividing the South.

During the National Assembly in 1982 a two-thirds majority of Southern members rejected the plan, meaning that Nimeiri's plan for dividing the South Sudan became unsuccessful. Despite the opposition of Southern Sudan, the GOS with the help of Joseph Lagu at his side announced the decentralization of Southern Sudan on 5

¹⁶⁸ Warburg, "Sudan: Diversity and Conflict in an Unstable State," 350.

¹⁶⁹ Shinn, "Addis Ababa Agreement: Was It Destined to Fail and Are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?," 254.

June 1983. The former Sudanese Minister of the State for Foreign Affairs, Francis Deng concluded:

It is now obvious in hindsight that although the Addis Ababa Agreement in fact offered the nation the most promising basis for unity to this point, it was not initially intended by Nimeiri as a national accord that would endure over the long run. It was, in fact, a tactical move by a desperate dictator in search of a political base of representative power.¹⁷⁰

One thing we need to understand is that the two main beneficiaries of the AAPA, president Nimeiri and Joseph Lagu, disunited the Southern Sudan and were responsible for its breakdown. Therefore, the abolishing of HEC, the Regional Assembly it was not only violating the AAPA and the 1973 constitution of Sudan but it prospects the return of a new civil war between the North and South Sudan. After the implementation of the September Laws, Mutiny had occurred against the GOS as he ordered to redeploy the Southern battalion around Bor to the Northern part of Sudan. The Bor battalion refused Nimeiri's order and their protest had spread swiftly to other part of the Southern Sudan such as in Abei and Juba. The mutiny in Bor marked the beginning of the second civil war in Sudan which was commonly known as the SPLM movement.¹⁷¹

As a conclusion of this part, I believe that the AAPA came to an end was not because of one single factor but due to various political, social, economic and religious difficulties and internal division within the southern political parties that had developed during the early 1970s.

¹⁷⁰Francis M Deng, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 160.

¹⁷¹Rolandsen, "Civil War Society? : Political Processes, Social Groups and Conflict Intensity in the Southern Sudan, 1955-2005."

Conclusion

One of the most remarkable examples of modern international conflict management was the process which led to the signing of a peace agreement at the Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in February 1972. The peace settlement was made between the representatives of the central government and the leaders of Southern Sudan with the help of third party mediators and entered into an agreement ending the bitter and costly war. This peace agreement which was initiated by the president of Sudan (Nimeiri), opened a new chapter in the history of Sudan. Indeed, the agreement established a considerable degree of regional autonomy for the South, made progress for the Southern people to have representatives in the National Government, and opened up for economic cooperation. The agreement brought a decade of peace and security to the people of South. Nevertheless, there were some important aspects that made the agreement impossible not be considered as a model of conflict-resolution in Sudan.

One of the reasons for the establishment of AAPA was the involvement of the regional powers in the peace process. The initial peace talks for settlement was started by the Emperor of Ethiopia and then by the Church leaders. The civil war in Sudan was more complicated than any other civil war in Africa. It roots back to the complex historical developments during the colonial regime of the Turko-Egyptian, the Anglo-Egyptian and the post-independence leaders of Sudan that provoked the civil war between North and South. Therefore, without external involvement the peace agreement would not have been accomplished. The government of Israel, Uganda and Ethiopia were the key allies to the Anya Nya movement in Southern Sudan.

The civil war in Sudan, the illegal flow of weapons in the region complicated the peace and security of the region. As a result in 1971 in a secret meeting both the president of Sudan (Nimeiri) and the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie reached a mutual agreement to stop supporting rebels. In return, Ethiopia would play a key role in finding stable peace for the first civil war in Sudan. The role of Ethiopia in

the peace process could be considered as the best example in the history of Sudan but his political initiative could not create an independent state of the Southern Sudan.

In relation to this, the role of the churches, the World Council Churches (WCC) and the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC) were playing an important role. The churches had actively involved in drafting papers for negotiation and conducting various meetings with representatives of both the parties concerning the humanitarian situation in the region. In fact, the churches were further increasing their support to keep the negotiations on track. Without the involvement of Ethiopia, church leaders, and other regional bodies perhaps the peace agreement would not have been signed between the two parties.

The AAPA had also brought a new political structure in the Southern Sudan. The main provisions of the AAPA guaranteed the autonomous status of Southern Sudan that would be enjoyed by the South following the end of hostilities between the two parties. This peace treaty has given the Southern people a distinct border with the three provinces of Bahr-el-Gazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile with its capital Juba. Furthermore, the peace agreement allowed the establishment of a semi-democratic government in the Southern region and the Southerners had their own Executive body which was appointed by the president of Sudan, the regional council which controlled all aspects of the Southern policy and the Southern judiciary system which dealt with the legal system of the region.

Despite the degree of autonomy of the South, still there were major departments such as finance, army, and defense which were effectively administered by the Central government and that gave the GOS a superior position to determine major issues in the region's internal affairs. In addition to this, the Southern people enjoyed the freedom of speech, expression and religion. The official language in Southern Sudan changed from Arabic to English, and English became the second official language in Sudan after Arabic. For 10 years all these political changes had taken place until it was abrogated by Nimeiri in 1983.

Apart from its success, it is very important to look at the weaknesses of the AAPA. As I have discussed earlier the churches and regional powers, especially the emperor of Ethiopia had played a vital role on ratifying the agreement on March, 1972. Although the third party mediators were playing a crucial role in bringing both parties to the negotiation table, they did not develop well established task forces to impose the principle of “carrot and stick” policy if either party did not comply with the principle of the agreements. Above all, the peace makers of the world such as the UN, European Union (EU) and Organization of African Union (OAU) were not properly involved in the peace talks. Therefore, from the beginning, the agreement was not the final solution to end the first bloody civil war in Sudan.

One of the problematic issues concerning the AAPA was the reintegration of former armies of the Southern Sudan into a National Military Force (NMF). The military relationships between the SSLM and Northern forces created more confrontation than any other matter. Ending the civil war meant maintaining the armed forces of both units until mutual trust could be restored. The agreement called for the establishment of NMF with 6,000 from the SSLM (ex-Southern Combatants) and 6,000 from the North. As Kasfir postulates:

The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region with the aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a joint military commission taking into account the need for initial separate deployment of troops with a view to achieve smooth integration in the national force. The commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be in such an atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region.”¹⁷²

In other words, the agreement reflected that at some point it would be right to mix soldiers from both sides to ensure trust and security in Sudan and on the other hand by doing so it eliminated the identity of the SSLM units in the long run. By 1974 several issues arose in the minds of the Southerners. The first issue was the military

¹⁷² Kasfir, "Southern Sudanese Politics since the Addis Ababa Agreement," 149.

superiority of the 'old' units (the Northern Army) over 'absorbed' units (SSLM). After the signing of the AAPA the GOS was obliged to reduce its military presence in Southern Sudan to 6,000 but the number of the troops stationed in the South after 1972 were more than 18,000. Therefore, this indicated that a large number of Northern troops were stationed in the South that broke the principle of agreement.

The other issue concerning this agreement is that some Southerners also insisted that the military camps of old units had been placed to give Northern soldiers a strategic advantage in gaining control of the towns in the events of a military confrontation. Moreover, the methods of recruitment, military logistics, and the quality of weapons of the Southerners were less effective compared with Northerners. The soldiers from the North received modern armored personnel carriers, tanks and rifles while the Southern did not have it.

Consequently, the process of integration did not produce effective results. In major towns and cities such Yei, Juba and Akobo a number of soldiers from these regions were protesting against the integration policy. From its inception, the AAPA did not identify clearly what would be the impact of bringing both armies together to form the NMF. Historically, politically, and socially the two people had experienced dissimilar class divisions right from the beginning of the pre-colonial period up to the post colonial period. Therefore, there were suspicion and mistrust among the Southern soldier in the process of reintegration.

Concerning the economic progress, the agreement provided the Southern people an opportunity to increase the financial sector of the region, to develop public constructions and modern agriculture investment in the area. However, the GOS had given only 23.2% of the national budget from 1972-1978 to the South. Due to an equal distribution of the nation's resource, most of the Southern people remained under poverty. Major development programs were cut off as the country's economy collapsed internally and that brought anti-government protests spread all over the country.

As a part of this scenario, the agreement also endorsed an economic recovery for the demobilization of the ex-Southern combatants from the army. As I have discussed in the previous chapters, the commission of demobilization was intended to provide enough jobs, schools and training centers for the demobilized soldiers, Nevertheless most of the soldiers did not get what they had been promised. Most of the soldiers did not get paid regular salary even some of them were expelled from their offices as the economic situation worsened in the country in 1977. Later on most of the demobilized ex-Southern combatants became jobless and were not paid for a period of time. This meant that most of the ex-soldiers went back to the front and fought against the GOS.

Finally, during the peace agreement the Southern people did not show a unified national interest for the unity of the region. Class divisions, sectarian and tribal sentiments were major problems of the region. The power struggle among the dominant political leaders such as Alier and Lagu created a major setback for the peace agreement. The ideological, historical and political differences between the leadership of Alier and Lagu opened up a power vacuum in the administration of the Southern Sudan. That political division gave direct access for the GOS to intervene in the political affairs of the South by playing a double standard game.

In the final analysis, the AAPA had given relative peace, security and stability to the people of Sudan. Shortly, Nimeiri brought Sadiq al-Mahdi the leader of Umma party as the Prime Minister, and Hassan al-Turabi became Ministry of Justices in 1980. In September 1983, Nimeiri announced the imposition of Shar'a Law in Sudan. The new provision of Shar'a was applied to all Sudanese, Northern, Southern, and Christians. That marked the end of the AAPA and the beginning of a new civil war which we call it the second civil war of Sudan (SPLM).

Political map of Sudan (I)



(<http://www.lahistoriaconmapas.com/atlas/map-political/South-Sudan-political-map.htm>)

Political map of Sudan (II)



(<http://www.lahistoriaconmapas.com/atlas/map-political/South-Sudan-political-map.htm>)

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