Persistence of Populism
The Norwegian Progress Party, 1973-2009

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Acknowledgements

When I, as a student, was welcomed by the staff at Institutt for statsvitenskap (Department of political science, ISV) at the University of Oslo in 2003, I remember one the professors, Raino Malnes stressed – borrowing a quote from the famous English biologist Thomas Henry Huxley – that students in political science should ‘try to learn something about everything and everything about something’. Throughout my time as a student, I focused primarily on the first part of the advice. As a PhD student, however, I’ve tried to focus on the latter part by writing an in-depth analysis of the ideological and organizational development of one single party, namely Fremskrittspartiet (The Norwegian Progress Party, FrP). Whether or not I have succeeded is obviously up to the reader to decide.

It wasn’t always supposed to be like this. For a long time I didn’t realize that writing (almost) everything about something was impossible without a very limited research question. Consequently, my main research question has changed quite dramatically throughout the last six years – from being fairly broad to become even broader, before it gradually became narrower until I ended up with the single case study of FrP. Initially, I collected data under the assumption that the thesis would be a comparative analysis of all new protest parties in Norway, which would have included not only FrP but also the Greens, the Democrats (a radical-right split party from the Progress Party), the Coastal Party (a value-conservative party concerned with the interests of the periphery), and Red (a reformed Marxist-Leninist party).

After collecting the data, I entered the phase of scholarly megalomania. The thesis would still focus on protest parties, but the geographical scope was extended from Norway to Scandinavia, thereby adding Danish and Swedish protest parties to the empirical universe of relevant cases. Rather quickly I realized, however, that this idea was overambitious, to put it mildly. Instead of analyzing all Scandinavian protest parties, I decided to analyze the two most successful new party families in post-industrial societies exclusively, namely the Greens and right-wing populist parties. Through a research design inspired by John Stuart Mill’s method of difference, I wanted the thesis to systematically account for, on the one hand, the absence of a right-wing populist party in Sweden and the presence of such parties in Norway and Denmark, and, on the other hand, the absence of a pure Green party in Norway and Denmark and the presence of a Green party in Sweden.

Although the fruitfulness of this particular design was challenged when the Sweden Democrats experienced an electoral breakthrough in 2010 and a pure green party in Norway entered the parliament in 2013, I thought it would still be interesting to find out why this kind of populist parties had become much more institutionalized in Norway and Denmark respectively, and why only Sweden had a truly successful green party. However, again it became clear that even six cases were too many. The data needed to describe the green parties with the same level of thoroughness as the right-wing populist parties (with which I was more familiar) were very difficult to collect, if they existed at all.
So again I adjusted the number of empirical cases. From now on, the analysis would be restricted to right-wing populist parties only. Completely new draft versions of some of the chapters for the thesis were written, including a new introductory chapter. I carried out some pretty interesting interviews with key representatives in Sweden Democrats, Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party, and wrote one article (together with Ann-Cathrine Jungar) on the ideological similarities and transnational linkages between Nordic right-wing populist parties. But even if I had been able to gather comprehensive data from all the parties, including party statutes, annual reports, manifestos, internal magazines, and elections surveys, the kind of data I had on the Norwegian case was exceptional and by far more innovative than for the other two cases. At least to my knowledge, no one has ever analyzed a right-wing populist party using longitudinal surveys among party members and congress delegates. In the end, I therefore decided to follow the principle of a former colleague: ‘why study several cases when you can study one?’ That’s the short version of how this thesis ended up being an in-depth study of Fremskrittspartiet.

***

After having spent six years on a thesis, there are many people to be thanked, starting with the core research group involved in the project entitled ‘Political Parties and Democracy: Decline or Change?’ which this PhD has been a part of. This project and its participants have thought me a lot about research design, data collection and theoretical perspectives on political parties.

First and foremost, I am especially grateful for all the help, support and feedback I have received from my two supervisors, Hanne Marthe Narud and Knut Heidar. Tragically, Hanne Marthe passed away in 2012 – way too early. She was an excellent scholar, a helpful supervisor and, not least, an open-minded and socializing person. I will always remember our joint trips to the conventions of all parliamentary parties in 2009, where we gathered some of the survey material used in this thesis. It was a truly interesting, instructive and exciting political ‘road trip’. Knut stepped in as a supervisor after Hanne Marthe, and he has always offered me valid and well-reasoned opinions about the overall research design and conceptual challenges, as well as important comments regarding major and minor empirical details in the various chapter drafts. Moreover, he made sure to remind me as often as possible that I should stop postponing the actual writing and instead finalize the (goddamn) project.

Thanks also to the two other participants of the research group, namely Elin Haugsgjerd Allern and Rune Karlsen. Both of them have provided valuable feedback on my scholarly work.

In addition to the research group, I would like to express my gratitude for having received valuable comments from Paul Webb, Lars Svåsand and Jo Saglie on the introductory chapter at a small conference in Rosendal in 2013; from all the participants at an internal seminar at Sammenliknende politikk (Department of Comparative Politics), University of Bergen, in February 2013 on the chapter discussing the single-issue thesis; and from Duncan (McDonnell) on the concluding
chapter. In fact, Duncan was the only one to have read the concluding chapter before the thesis was submitted. Without his constructive feedback and supportive response only a few days before the deadline, I am pretty sure that the final version would have been significantly worse.

The final version would also have been more difficult to read without the magnificent and quick copy-editing by Susan Høivik. I am immensely grateful for her contribution to the increased readability, consistency and precision of the thesis. Thanks also to Michael McKeighen, Lars Petter Berg, and Mari Amdahl Heglum for helping me with various practicalities toward the end when I was almost out of energy.

Finally, I need to thank the Norwegian Research Council for funding my PhD and Instituut Politieke Wetenschap (the Department of political science) at the University of Leiden for letting me stay there as a guest researcher for half a year. These six months were great. The staff was very friendly and of high academic quality. Moreover, Leiden is such a beautiful city.

***

Writing a PhD could certainly be a lonesome journey. However, with many good colleagues it becomes significantly easier. ISV has been a truly stimulating and friendly institution beyond the specific research project on political parties. On different occasions, I have had the pleasure to discuss various issues related to my own thesis or political science more generally with several colleagues, including Kim Angell, Øivind Bratberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Dag Einar Thorsen, Martin A. Nome, Kristoffer Kolltveit, Atle Hennum Haugsgjerd, Ellen Stensrud, Øyvind Østerud, Raino Malnes, Larry Rose, Harald Baldersheim, Helge Hveem, Elisabeth Bakke, Dag Harald Claes, Karin Dokken, Åse Gornitzka, Ottar Hellevik, Robert Huseby, Oddbjørn Knutsen, Werner Christie Mathisen, Knut Midgaard, Trond Nordby, Bjørn Erik Rasch, Hege Skjeie, Anton Steen, Olle Törnquist, and Bernt Aardal.

A few senior colleagues deserve some extra credit, however. Bernt Hagtvet, whom I have come to know as a good colleague and friend through weekly public breakfast meetings at the Faculty of Social Science, has learned me a lot on historical far-right movements and parties. Moreover, his passion for the discipline as a whole and his role as a public intellectual has been an important inspiration. Tor Bjorklund, for his part, has always listened to my detailed questions about FrP. As an expert on right-wing populist parties for decades, Tor’s comments on some of my writings have been very much appreciated.

Going to international conferences and getting to know dedicated scholars from other countries are perhaps one of the most interesting parts of being in academia. For me, ECPR’s Joint Sessions have been particularly valuable for my academic skills and international networks, including the workshop entitled ‘Disassembling Populism (and Putting It Back Together Again)’ in Munster in 2010 and the workshop entitled ‘Patterns of Party Persistence, Decline and Disintegration’ in St. Gallen in 2011. Through these workshops I got to know great people like Ann-Cathrine Jungar, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Takis Pappas, Teun Pauwels, Matthijs

I would also like to mention the various conferences in the Nordic countries, including the annually national political science conferences in Norway, Sweden and Finland, the tri-annually joint Nordic Political Science Association-conferences (NoPSA), and the annual conferences in the Nordic Populist Network (NOPO). These workshops have been of crucial importance with regard to personal and professional friendship with political scientists across the Nordic region, as they have put me in touch with yet another group of great people like Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, Anders Hellström, Susi Meret, Hilmar Mjelde, Marie Demker, Kristina Boréus, Anders Backlund, Jacob Christensen, Lars Erik Berntzen, Andrej Kokkonen, Stefan Dahlberg, Henrik Friberg-Fernros, David Arter, Anders Widfeldt, Linda Mellner, Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen, Peter Söderlund, Karl Magnus Johansson, Timo Lochocki, Eelco Harteveld, Flemming Juul Christiansen, Niklas Bolin, Karl Loxbo, and Gissur Erlingsson. For the last couple of years, I have even had the pleasure of working with Ann-Cathrine, Elisabeth, Anders (Hellström) and Susi on a joint project on Nordic populism.

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Thanks also to my family. And last but not least, I want to express my sincere gratitude to Sarah. Thank you so much for waiting patiently. I know I’ve spent too many hours in my office. Now we can go hiking in the mountains – and even sleep in a tent if you want to.

Blindern, Oslo, May 2015
Anders Ravik Jupskås
“Sociology of politics deals with the consumer and ignores the producer”
Giovanni Sartori (1969: 210)
Abstract
In the literature on right-wing populist parties it is widely held that supply-side factors are crucial in order to explain these parties' electoral persistence. Yet, beyond stating truisms such as the importance of having a good organization and a great leader, we know very little about what kind of supply-side factors that are likely to facilitate electoral persistence. Based on an intensive, single-case study of the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP), this thesis argues that right-wing populist parties are more likely to persist if they (1) broaden the programmatic appeal, (2) maintain political legitimacy, (3) build an authoritarian mass party structure and (4) are led by mobilizing and, even more importantly, organizationally skillful leaders.
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Chapter 1: The Electoral Persistence of Right-Wing Populism in Post-Industrial Societies

The Puzzle

In the late 1990s, drawing on theories on populism and empirical observations of some right-wing populist parties, the German scholar Müller-Rommel (1998: 202) argued: “the prospects for the Greens [are] probably somewhat brighter than the prospects for the Right-wing populist parties.” His predictions proved incorrect. In recent decades, right-wing populism has – somewhat unexpectedly – become a distinct feature of party politics in Europe, North America and Australia (Betz 1994; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008b; Taggart 2000). We may even speak of a “populist Zeitgeist” (see e.g. Mudde 2004), substantiated by claims concerning populist elements of modern mass-media (Mazzoleni 2008), the populist rhetoric and strategies adopted by mainstream parties and established politicians (Mungiu 2007: 11; Pappas 2013; Canovan 2005: 77–79), and populist parties in power (de Lange 2007a). The most important indicator of this populist Zeitgeist seems to be the continuing support for right-wing populist parties in elections. Parties like Front National (National Front, FN), Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (the Austrian Freedom Party, FPÖ), Schweizerische Volkspartei (the Swiss People’s Party, SVP), and Dansk Folkeparti (the Danish People’s Party, DF) have repeatedly gained a substantial share of the vote in local, regional, national, presidential, and supranational elections.

Also in Norway, a right-wing populist party, Fremskrittspartiet (the Progress Party, FrP) – the empirical case in focus in this thesis – has managed to persist for many years. And while “persistence” might be defined simply as the ability to continue as an organization (see Rose and Mackie 1988: 534), this thesis sees it as a question of continuing success in the electoral arena. Parties which fail to gain mandates or stay in the national parliament are not perceived as being “persistent” parties.

The evident persistence of various right-wing populist parties remains a puzzle as regards theory assumptions as well as empirical observations. From a theory perspective, right-wing populist persistence would seem almost a contradiction in terms, given the numerous claims about the intrinsically ephemeral nature of populism. For example, Paul Taggart (2000: 99) holds, in his frequently-cited work, that populism is, “in its political expression, usually a short-lived phenomenon.” And Canovan (2005: 89) argues that “populist movements tend to be spasmodic, flaring up briefly and dying away almost as fast.” The main reason for the alleged transitory quality of populist parties is, according to Canovan (ibid.), “their stress on spontaneity rather than institutions;” and, according to Taggart (2000: 103), that they are “drawn towards a form of leadership that is practically very difficult to sustain in the long term.” These arguments have found their way into political science reference works. According to Palgrave’s Dictionary of Comparative Politics, for instance, “populist
movements are anti-establishment and protest-based; they are often built round a single leader […] and they tend to be unstable.”

These theory assumptions are certainly not without empirical support. Casting a prolonged shadow over research on populism, the Union de Defense Commerçants et Artisans (UDCA) – often simply called the Poujadist movement – founded in 1953 and led by the charismatic Pierre Poujade, entered the French parliament in 1956, before disappearing from French politics only a few years later (see Campbell 1956). Similarly, in the Netherlands, neither the agrarian populist Boerenpartij (Farmers’ Party, BP) in the 1950s and 1960s nor the more neoliberal populist Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn’s List, LPF) in the early 2000s (initially headed by the highly charismatic Pim Fortuyn) proved viable (Van Kessel 2011; Lucardie 2000: endnote 4). In Sweden, Ny Demokrati (New Democracy, ND) appeared out of nowhere, and entered the parliament, Riksdagen, with 6.7% of the vote in 1991. However, support eroded rapidly, and in the next parliamentary election in 1994 ND received a mere 1.2% of the vote (for details, see Rydgren 2006: 69-86). In 2000, the party was declared bankrupt.

Arguments concerning the “flash-in-the-pan” tendencies seem further strengthened if we include various right-wing populist parties in other post-industrial states outside Western Europe. In Australia, for example, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (ON) received 22.7% of the vote in Queensland state elections in June 1998, and 8.4% in the Australian federal election shortly afterwards. However, by the end of 1999 the party had already lost its momentum. Six years later, in 2004, support was down to 4.9% and 1.2% in these two elections, respectively. In more metaphorical language, “Pauline Hanson’s One Nation … was a shooting star that blazed spectacularly across Australia’s political skies during 1997 and 1998 before crashing in to earth in 1999. Only faint, smouldering traces now remain” (Leach et al. 2000: 1). In others words, standard theories of populism, as well quite a few empirical cases, seem to suggest that right-wing populist parties, lacking the kind of institutionalization needed in order to outlive their first leader and function in day-to-day politics, are likely to end up as short-lived vehicles of protest.

The puzzle concerns not only the populist elements of right-wing populist parties: the ability of parties with a strong right-wing orientation to persist electorally in post-industrial societies also calls for explanation. After all, the unmistakable anti-immigration profile in combination with authoritarian tendencies is not only part of the electoral “winning formula” of right-wing populist parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1995): these ideological features also tend to act as a gravitational force on the entire extremist right-wing milieu, attracting activists inclined to exhibit anti-democratic values and/or biological racism (see Art 2011). Given the presence of a strong anti-racist norm (Mendelberg 2001; Blinder et al. 2013) and the general increase in post-materialist attitudes (Inglehart 2008) in most post-industrial societies, any take-over by extremist elements is likely to lead to a significant drop in electoral support for the party in question. The electoral decline of Die Republikaner (The Republicans, REP) in Germany in the 1990s has often been explained – at least partly – with reference to the party’s recurrent flirts with extreme rightist groups like Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union, DVU) and the strong position of extreme rank-and-file party.

members (Decker 2008: 131). The failure of the British National Party (BNP) and the success of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) have been explained along similar lines (Cutts et al. 2011).

Briefly, then: it seems that right-wing populist parties’ emphasis on spontaneity and their dependence on leaders with charismatic authority (their populist flavor), as well as their magnetic attraction for extremist activists, make them particularly prone to rapid electoral decline and possible parliamentary disappearance. Seen from that angle, their continuing support in elections therefore remains a mystery. This thesis deals precisely with this simple yet puzzling question: Why and how have right-wing populist parties managed to persist electorally in post-industrial societies?

Through a theoretically informed and internal supply-side oriented single-case study of Norway’s FrP, this thesis argues that right-wing populist parties are more likely to persist electorally if they can manage to transform with regard to crucial programmatic, organizational and leadership dimensions. Such a party will need to broaden its programmatic appeal; develop a more institutionalized, centralized and socially rooted organization capable of outlasting the first charismatic leader, control the rank-and-file – and it will need to select leaders endowed with mobilizing skills and, in even more importantly, organizational skills. While the mobilizing aspect is particularly important for ensuring electoral persistence in an increasingly mediatized democracy, especially before organizational linkages have been developed and stabilized, an organizationally skilled leader is essential for building those linkages. In addition, right-wing populist parties need to maintain their reputation in order to remain a politically legitimate alternative in the eyes of the voters.

Of course, there are limitations as to what extent the findings from a single-case study are generalizable. There might be something unique about this particular case that limits the general validity of case findings. That said, the dual strategy to be pursued here – of developing an explanatory framework grounded in the literature, and selecting a case that deviates from most theory-based expectations – may not only enhance our understanding of the case in question, but may also help to explain the outcomes in similar cases where right-wing populist parties have managed to persist. As noted by Kitschelt (20007: 1202), “[b]y examining radical right-wing parties whose electoral trajectories are at variance with what systemic theories would predict, we can best probe into the explanatory efficacy of organisational processes”. Following the case-study logic advocated by John Gerring (2007: 20), this examination of a present-day Norwegian right-wing populist party should be seen as an “intensive study of a single case where the purpose … is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases.” Of course, any general theoretical claims should be explored and if possible substantiated through further empirical analysis of other cases.

This thesis offers two main contributions in terms of theory. Firstly, and most importantly, it develops an explanatory framework of right-wing populist persistence in which the party – rather than the voters, other parties, or the media – is in focus (see Chapter 2). Taking its point of departure in theories on issue competition in mediatized democracies, “routinization of charisma” (Weber 1964) in entrepreneurial parties, organizational linkages, and socio-psychological theories on prejudices and anti-racism, this thesis partly extends existing theories of right-wing populist persistence and partly presents new theory-based arguments. There is already a growing literature focusing on various internal supply-side
factors such as ideological appeal, policy discourse, party organization, the nature of party activists and leadership qualities (see Arter 2013; de Lange 2007b; Veugelers 1999: 86–89; Art 2011; Ivarsflaten 2006; Ignazi 1992; Rydgren 2005; 2009; Zaslove 2008; Betz and Johnson 2004). Still, as noted by Mudde (2007b: 11), “much more empirical study is needed to get a clearer view on what exactly defines successful from unsuccessful party organization, leadership, and propaganda.”

Secondly, this thesis makes a contribution to theory – at least within the literature on right-wing populism – by bringing mainstream perspectives on party organizations back into the study of right-wing populist parties. This includes work on organizational linkages (Poguntke 2002), centralization and seminal work on “party institutionalization” (see Panebianco 1988; Levitsky 1998; Janda et al. 1970). Although parties founded by a charismatic leaders tend to be seen as deviant cases in standard party formation typologies (also by Panebianco), mainstream literature offers a wide range of analytical perspectives which might be useful for explaining how successful right-wing populist parties have changed organizationally, and how such changes may influence their possibilities for electoral persistence.

From a methodological perspective, this study discards previously limited or poor measurements of programmatic breadth and party organization. Whereas programmatic breadth has tended to be measured in terms of the length of the party manifesto and/or number of (main) campaigning issues, this thesis views issue comprehensiveness from additional external and internal perspectives. In short, the former refers to the self-declared voting motivation of the party’s own electorate as well as issue ownership among all voters, while the latter focus on issue saliency among members. Similarly, whereas previous studies on populist party organizations have used expert surveys to determine the strength of their organization (Lubbers 2001; Van Spanje et al. 2006), relied on a limited and unrepresentative selection of informants (see Art 2011), or complained about not “getting inside the ‘black box’ of right-wing extremist parties” at all (Carter 2005: 67), this thesis employs an extensive range of data sources (party statutes, membership surveys, annual reports) to gain a better understanding of organizational change in populist parties. Most importantly, the thesis draws on three representative surveys among ordinary party members (carried out in 1991, 2000 and 2009) and two surveys among all party congress delegates (from 2001 and 2009). 2

Moreover, acknowledging that a party’s distinctiveness becomes clearer in comparison with other parties and in order to avoid making oversimplified claims about the uniqueness of right-wing populist parties, this study – where possible – explicitly compares the programmatic profile, organizational structure and qualities of the party leader with Norwegian parties representing the old left (Arbeiderpartiet, Labor Party, Ap), the old right (Høyre, the Conservatives, H) and the new left (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, the Socialist Left Party, SV). Whereas the two first were founded in 1887 and 1884 respectively, the immediate predecessor to the latter was founded in 1961, about a decade before FrP.

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2 Details about the membership surveys (1991, 2000 and 2009) and congress delegate surveys (2001 and 2009) can be found in Heidar and Saglie (1991), Saglie (2002) and Jupskås (2010)
In sum, these new methodological measurements and the explicit comparative perspective should provide a more complete and nuanced picture of right-wing populist transformation and how it relates to electoral persistence.

In addition to these theoretical and methodological innovations and improvements, this study also makes an important empirical contribution concerning the persistence of Norwegian right-wing populism over the last four decades. Although George and Bennett (2005: 69) correctly points out that “cases should not be chosen simply because they are ‘interesting’ or because ample data exist for studying them,” a comprehensive examination of one of Europe’s most successful right-wing populist parties, Norway’s FrP, is definitely worth a study in itself. While most other right-wing populist parties have been extensively covered in the literature – including single-case studies of BNP (e.g. Goodwin 2011), UKIP (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014), SVP (e.g. Skenderovic 2009), FN (e.g. Mayer and Perrineau 1996; Marcus 1995; DeClair 1999; Rydgren 2004; Shields 2007), FPÖ (e.g. Wodak and Pelinka 2002; Riedlsperger 1998) and LN (e.g. Zaslove 2011; Ruzza and Fella 2009) – there has been no such work on FrP. Even Sweden’s unsuccessful New Democracy has received more scholarly attention (e.g. Taggart 1996; Rydgren 2006; Westlind 1996). The British quality newspaper The Guardian’s (November 1, 2002) description of FrP as “Norway’s dark secret” is probably symptomatic of the lack of knowledge about this party among the European intelligentsia. It is to be hoped that this in-depth study will make it easier for other right-wing populist scholars to interpret various aspects of FrP more accurately, rather than presenting factually incorrect data and/or biased interpretations.

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The remainder of this introductory chapter consists of five sections. The first section presents an empirical overview of the rise of right-wing populist parties in post-industrial societies. Among other things, this overview demonstrates the validity of a simple distinction between electoral breakthrough and electoral persistence. Only about half of new right-wing populist parties have been able to persist in subsequent elections after breakthrough. The second section of the chapter provides a working definition of the main concept in this thesis: right-wing populism. Despite having an “awkward conceptual slipperiness” (Taggart 2000: 1),

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3 To be sure, there have been some studies of FrP, but they focus on cleavage politics and voting behavior (Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2002; Aimer 1988; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 1990), or the party’s role in the immigration policy discourse in Norway (Hagelund 2003b; Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Hagelund 2003a).
5 Notwithstanding its overall theoretical insights, the presentation of FrP provided by David Art (2011: 159–166) in his innovative work on radical right party activists and organizations contains several errors. Firstly, Carl I. Hagen left the party after the first annual meeting in 1974, and not as early as in 1973. This is important because it was Hagen who introduced the first party statutes in 1974. Secondly, it is also somewhat imprecise to claim that FrP has modelled itself after the Norwegian Labour Party (Ap). Indeed, this is what the party claims, but there are quite a few organizational differences between the traditional mass party and the organizational form adopted by FrP, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6. Thirdly, it is simply incorrect to state that “the Progress Party’s educational system has become by far the most developed in Norway” (Art 2011: 161). In 2009, the Progress Party had exactly 2 959 participants at their 149 courses (FrP’s annual report 2010: 20), while Ap had 7 700 (Ap’s annual report 2009/10: 20). Fourthly, FrP did not gain its first mayorship in 1999, but already in 1987. In fact, it gained two mayorships after this local election, but one of mayors did not take office until 1989 as the Conservatives (H) were given the mayor position the first two years of the election period.
populism in general (and right-wing populism in particular) may be defined as a thin ideology likely to be associated with specific programmatic profile, problems of political legitimacy, organizational structure and leadership style.

In the third section, I briefly present different theories of right-wing populist persistence focusing on the demand-side (unemployment, immigration, declining political trust, social isolation), political opportunity structure (party competition, cartelization, and the role of civil society) and internal supply-side (ideology, organization and leadership). While most of the demand-side oriented perspectives and theorizing as regards the political opportunity structures do not explicitly aim at explaining electoral persistence as they tend to focus on electoral breakthrough and/or electoral support more generally, they cannot be disregarded a priori as alternative explanations of persistence. However, it should be noted that both within-case and cross-case analyses tend to emphasize the crucial role played by internal supply-side factors in the phase of electoral persistence. After electoral breakthrough has resulted in increased access to the media and extensive public financial support, further persistence becomes increasingly a matter of programmatic and organizational innovation and adaption, and choices made by the party leader. Moreover, the presentation of the Norwegian case in the fourth section further indicates the importance of internal supply-side factors in accounting for right-wing populist persistence. Neither demand-side factors nor political opportunity structures seem to be decisive in explaining the persistence of a right-wing populist party in Norway, although they cannot be dismissed completely. The fifth and final section offers a short outline of the rest of thesis.

**The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Post-Industrial Societies**

According to Klaus von Beyme (1988), the rise of parties to the right of the mainstream right can be described as three different waves on the basis of based electoral support, programmatic orientation and the number of organizational links with interwar far right movements. The first wave (from 1945 until around 1970) was characterized by the weak remnants of the “old right” (Ignazi 1992). With the notable exception of Movimento Sociale Italiano (the Italian Social Movement, MSI), such parties were highly marginalized, electorally as well as ideologically.

It was not until the second wave in the mid-1950s, and then in the early 1970s, that parties to the right of the mainstream right experienced an electoral breakthrough. A new type of right-wing parties, often referred to as agrarian populist or anti-tax populist parties, entered the national parliaments in several post-industrial societies. Whereas the “old right” had been obsessed by fascist nostalgia and anti-democratic sentiments, this “new right” was characterized by a folksy populist and anti-establishment appeal (Ignazi and Ysmal 1992; Ignazi 1992). However, even though these new right-wing populist parties were able to attract a substantial part of the electorate based on anti-elitism, anti-socialism, anti-modernization, anti-statist populism? And are the Finnish agrarian populism and the Scandinavian anti-tax populism of the 1970s part of the same wave? Despite these problems of classification, however, von Beyme’s scheme serves as a useful heuristic tool indicating the electoral trajectory of right-wing populist parties.

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6 Indeed, these waves are probably less distinct than initially argued by von Beyme. Not only is it difficult in many countries to judge when the first wave stopped and second and third wave emerged (Klandermans and Mayer 2006: 270-271), the actual time-span and programmatic features of any specific wave seem hard to determine. Do the Poujadists in the 1950s and LPF in the early 2000s belong to the same wave of anti-statist populism? And are the Finnish agrarian populism and the Scandinavian anti-tax populism of the 1970s part of the same wave? Despite these problems of classification, however, von Beyme’s scheme serves as a useful heuristic tool indicating the electoral trajectory of right-wing populist parties.
many of them proved highly unstable – electorally and organizationally. The prevalence of protest motives among the voters of such parties, in combination with low levels of party institutionalization, made it extremely difficult to stabilize electoral support and maintain internal cohesion. In many cases they ended up as “flash-in-the-pan” parties (Taggart and Widfeldt 1993; Converse and Dupeux 1962).

The concept of a “flash-the-pan” party is historically closely linked with the first right-wing populist movement in Western Europe, namely the French Poujadist movement in France the mid-1950s. Named after its charismatic leader, Pierre Poujade, this movement criticized the French political elite and defended the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. As noted by Shields (2000: 26, 31), the movement should not be interpreted primarily as a “renascent fascism” but rather as the embodiment of “two distinct and opposing French political traditions, the revolutionary republican and the conservative-nationalist.” In 1956, the movement decided to run for election – and to the great surprise of many commentators, pundits and the political elite, it emerged with 11.6% of the vote. However, problems soon emerged, and after one term in parliament the party was left with only two seats. During the French Fifth Republic it disappeared from French politics.

This Poujadist movement tends to be seen as the first classic example of post-war populism in Europe. However, we should not forget a “proto-Poujadist protest movement” (Ignazi 2003: 35), characterized by strong anti-communism and populism, called Uomo Qualunque (The ordinary man, UQ) it Italy immediately after the war. As usual with populist parties, however, UQ declined rapidly after an electoral breakthrough in 1946, when it received 5.3% of the vote, and ceased to exist after only two years (see Setta 1975).

Since the French and the Italian cases, similar populist “flash-in-the pan” parties have emerged elsewhere. In Finland and the Netherlands, Landsbygdpartiet (the Rural Party, SMP) and the BP, respectively, mobilized on an agrarian populist agenda (Sankiaho 1971; Vossen 2012) from the late1950s to the early 1970s. And while the right-wing nature of the SMP may be questioned, at least the BP could be classified as a right-wing populist party, with its erratic policy mixture of law and order, opposition to foreign aid and EU integration, and defense of private initiatives and private property (Voerman and Lucardie 1992). Neither the BP nor SMP disappeared as quickly as French Poujadism, but they too were plagued by internal strife, and support therefore remained highly unstable throughout their existence (Matheson and Sänkiaho 1975). The BP gained national representation for the first time with three seats in the House of Representatives in 1963 and peaked with seven seats there and additionally two seats in the Senate in 1967. In the late 1970s, its electoral support dropped significantly; the party lost representation and vanished from Dutch politics without leaving any obvious successor party. The SMP also had its electoral peak in the early 1970s with 10.1% of the vote, but support declined rapidly. Particularly after the party joined the Finnish government in 1983 and thus had to leave behind what Sartori (1976) called the “politics of outbidding,” it was severely punished by the voters. In 1995, SMP was declared bankrupt.

In the Scandinavian countries, the second wave of far right politics reached Denmark and Norway simultaneously in “earthquake” elections in 1973. In the aftermath of the referendums on EEC membership for Norway, FrP (then known as Anders Lange’s Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention) gained a few seats in the Norwegian parliament, the Storting, while Fremskridtspartiet (the Progress Party, FrPd)
became the second largest party in Denmark. Both parties were led by fairly charismatic figures – Anders Lange in Norway and Mogens Glistrup in Denmark – and the main programmatic issue was anti-taxation policy. However, while the Norwegian party has persisted electorally for almost four decades, continuously increasing its share of the vote, the Danish party ended up losing all of its representation in the late 1990s, after a decade of heavy organizational and electoral turbulence (Ringsmose 2003).

In Sweden, a party based on anti-tax populism or neoliberal populism entered the scene much later than in Norway and Denmark. It was not until the two popular and unorthodox leaders Bert Karlsson and Ian Wachtmeister founded a party in 1991 and fielded candidates to the parliamentary elections a few months later that such a party passed the national electoral threshold of 4%. Previously such populist parties had existed only at the subnational level, most notably in the southern part of the country (Peterson et al. 1988). Unexpectedly, the ND became the second new party to enter the Swedish parliament in the post-war period – the first had been the Greens three years earlier. In stark contrast to the Greens, the ND proved short-lived. Already during its first years in parliament, support fell dramatically, leaving the party far below the electoral threshold in the 1994 national election. Less than a decade after the ND was founded, it was declared bankrupt and ceased to exist. The main reasons for its demise seem to have been the lack of strong organization, political incompetence, and factionalism and leadership problems (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005; Taggart and Widfeldt 1993; Rydgren 2006).

The third wave of far-right mobilization which emerged in the 1980s was both similar to and distinct from the second wave. On the one hand, populism continued to be key ideological aspect of these new right-wing parties (Mudde 2007a). Instead of criticizing the democratic system as such, the new right-wing populists accused the mainstream actors within the system – the existing parties and the “political class.” According the right-wing populist diagnosis, the established political parties had lost contact with “the people.” Current democracies were contemptuously portrayed as elitist partyocracies.

On the other hand, these populist parties seemed to be colored by nationalism or nativism rather than conservative agrarianism or anti-tax sentiments. The interpretation of the “the people” was different: these parties were referring primarily to the socio-cultural concept of “our people” and not the socio-economic concept of “ordinary people” (for different ways of interpreting "the people,” see Canovan 1999). Moreover, immigration and national identity emerged as key mobilizing issues, but in a different way than previously. In short, this ideological re-orientation of right-wing parties included the transformation from biological racism to the “equal but different” doctrine, developed in particular by a French far-right intellectual milieu called Nouvelle Droite (Bar-On 2001; McCulloch 2006). Instead of arguing in favor of racial hierarchies and the biological superiority of the white Aryan race, the new doctrine was based on the notion that all (national) cultures are of equal value and that these cultures are entitled to enforce distinct cultural qualities and the (perceived) purity of the nation. Thus, the previous aggressive nationalism in which nations were classified according to various criteria into successive levels of worthiness was replaced by a defensive nationalism promoting a mono-cultural society within the borders of the state. Against the backdrop of increasing political alienation among voters, and with rising unemployment rates
and immigrant numbers, this ideological innovation proved electorally successful in many countries (see Rydgren 2005).

In France, which is perhaps the most thoroughly discussed case in the literature (see Mayer and Perrineau 1996; Marcus 1995; DeClair 1999; Rydgren 2004; Shields 2007), FN experienced what may be labelled an electoral breakthrough – at least in terms of media coverage and political attention – in a by-election in Dreux in October 1983, gaining 17% of the vote. Since then, the party has, with only one exception (in 2007), received between 10 and 15% of the vote in all elections to the Assemblée nationale. However, an even more defining moment of French right-wing populism came when FN’s highly charismatic president and party founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, gained more votes than the Socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin, in the first round of the presidential elections in 2002, sending shock waves through the Socialist Party and the French political establishment, as well as other European political elites. Although Le Pen was massively defeated by the Conservative candidate, Jacques Chirac, in the second round, almost one in five French voters had voted for him as the Président de la République. Before Le Pen handed the party presidency over to his daughter, Marine Le Pen, in 2011, the support had been decreasing in various elections. However, as noted by Mayer (2013: 160), the result of the 2012 presidential elections “clearly indicates that the National Front has recovered from its poor performance in 2007.” France’s FN seemed to be here to stay.

In Austria, the electoral achievements of right-wing populism are perhaps even more impressive than in the French case. After appointing the charismatic Jörg Haider as party leader in 1986 and gradually transforming into a right-wing populist party in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Heinisch 2008), FPÖ finished second in national elections with 26.9% of the vote in 1999. For the first time in history since Austria became independent in 1918, the mainstream right – Die Österreichische Volkspartei (the Austrian People’s Party, ÖVP) – was no longer one of the two largest parties. After lengthy negotiations, FPÖ and ÖVP formed a government coalition, making the former the first right-wing populist party in office in post-war Western Europe. For FPÖ, government participation quickly resulted in intraparty conflicts, electoral decline and the formation of a breakaway party, Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (the Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ) (Luther 2011). However, already in 2008 the combined support for the two right-wing populist parties – FPÖ and BZÖ – surpassed earlier support for such parties, and FPÖ has remained by far the largest party. Again, the ability of a right-wing populist party to persist electorally was clearly demonstrated.

While continuing support for FN and FPÖ – the two most “usual suspects” in the emerging right-wing populist party family – are well-known in the literature, there are certainly several similar parties elsewhere with a fairly large and stable electoral base. A former agrarian party, SVP, has been among the most successful right-wing populists in Europe, receiving between 22 and 29% since the late 1990s. In Italy, Belgium, Denmark, and New Zealand parties like Lega Nord (Northern League, LN), Vlaams Belang (Flemish Bloc, VB), DF and New Zealand First (NZ) have existed for many years, garnering approximately between 5 and 15% of the vote in national elections, not to mention more deep-rooted

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7 Some scholars see Lega Nord’s participation in the first Berlusconi government in the 1990s as the first example of right-wing populist party in government. However, the party was more of regionalist secessionist party at that point.
footholds in specific geographical strongholds, such as the city of Antwerp for VB (Swyngedouw 2000) and the regions of Veneto and Lombardy in Northern Italy for LN (Zaslove 2011).

However, despite the growing number of persistent right-wing populist parties, there are also quite a few parties of the third wave that quickly disintegrated after breakthrough. In Germany, REP challenged the mainstream right-wing party CDU in the late 1980s. REP, which transformed from a conservative splinter party to a more typical right-wing populist party in the late 1980s, never made into the German parliament, but gained 7.1% of the vote in elections to the European Parliament in 1989. This result gave the party 6 seats, making it the largest party within this grouping in the European Parliament. However, in the subsequent election in 1994, REP lost all its seats, after intense leadership struggles and ideological disagreements (Decker 2008: 129-131). At the sub-national level, the party maintained a foothold slightly longer, but in 2001 the last seat in Baden-Württemberg was lost.

The above-mentioned LPF in the Netherlands is also part of the third wave, although it was somewhat exceptional in criticizing immigrants from a liberal point of view (Akkerman 2005). This party came from (almost) nowhere in the 2002 parliamentary election gaining 17% of the vote (Holsteyn and Irwin 2003) – making it the most successful new party in Western Europe since World War II. However, as many of the other cases of populist mobilization described so far, voters did not remain loyal; already one year after its breakthrough, support was down to 5.7%. The decline continued with undiminished strength; the 2006 elections left LPF was with 0.2% of the vote and no parliamentary representation. In recent years, a new Dutch right-wing populist party has emerged: Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de vrijheid (the Freedom Party, PVV) (Vossen 2011). In 2010, it gained 15.5% of the vote in the general elections.

Thus, there seem to be two kinds of populist parties: those parties which sooner rather than later fail after breakthrough ending up as short-lived flash-in-the-pan parties; and those that manage to persist after breakthrough, gradually cultivating their core voter segments. The number of right-wing populist parties which have proven incapable of maintaining support after electoral breakthrough supports the idea of the inherent instability in populist mobilization (UQ, UDCA, SMP, BP, FrPd, ND, ON, REP, LPF). These parties initially gained support very quickly, but soon experienced problems of political incompetence, power struggles and disloyal voters, before collapsing and disappearing as political alternatives.

Contrary to what was expected, however, there are also several right-wing populist parties that managed to persist after electoral and parliamentary breakthrough: we may note FN, FPÖ, VB, DF, LN and FrP. Some of these have continued to grow even further, establishing themselves as central actors within the party-political system. Before presenting some dominant theoretical explanations regarding the electoral growth and persistence of these parties, we need to define right-wing populism more precisely.

**What is Right-Wing Populism?**

Right-wing populism is definitely a contested concept. Not only is the question of what makes something (or someone) right-wing as opposed to left-wing profoundly debated among political scientists and others (see Bobbio 1996; Giddens 1994), many scholars disagree on how populism should be conceptualized (see Mudde 2004; Laclau 2005; Arditi 2007;
Canovan 1999; Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Canovan 1981; Taggart 2000). This section will primarily discuss the literature on populism, and – for fear of opening a Pandora’s Box of problems – touch only briefly on the different meanings of “left” and “right.”

As accurately observed by Panizza (2005: 1), “it has become almost a cliché to start writing on populism by lamenting the lack of clarity about the concept and casting doubts about its usefulness for political analysis.” This may come as no surprise. Roberts (1995: 84) noted already in the 1990s that “few social science concepts can match populism when it comes to nebulous and inconsistent usage.” Since then, it has been argued that populism is a “notoriously vague term” (Canovan 1999: 3); that it is “particularly confusing” (Weyland 2001: 1); or that it has an “essential impalpability” (Taggart 2000: 1). Some political theorists even argue that populism is a derogatory label invented – or at least used – by anti-democratic intellectuals in order to effectively dismiss legitimate democratic demands by “the people” (e.g. Rancière 2005; Fennema 2005: 12-13). However, even though the term has been inconsistently used by scholars or even misused by political elites or mainstream parties, it may still be analytically useful in the study of political phenomena.

Populism, as an analytical concept, most likely entered the toolbox of social science research at the end of the 1960s. Although various scholars may have used the concept earlier, the edited volume by Ionescu and Gellner (1969) entitled Populism. Its meanings and national characteristics based on a conference at the London School of Economics in 1967, was the first comprehensive study of politics of populism. The volume summarized a variety of different theoretical perspectives on populism, as well as providing numerous empirical analyses of alleged populist movements and parties across the globe. Not surprisingly, it became the classic reference in all discussions on contemporary populism and has had a major impact on subsequent research on populism. However, even though the editors claim already at the very beginning of the volume that “there can … be no doubt about the importance of populism” (Ionescu and Gellner 1969: 1), the authors were clearly in doubt as to how best to define and operationalize the concept. While some contributions viewed populism primarily as an ideology (e.g. MacRae 1969), others saw it as a specific kind of political movement or strategy of mobilizing the masses (e.g. Minogue 1969).

This conceptual division between populism as ideology and populism as strategy exists also today. We may add even a third approach, promoted primarily by Laclau and Mouffe, which sees populism as discourse. The latter is less fruitful for analyzing specific parties, as there is a tendency to juxtapose populism with ‘the political’ (e.g. Laclau 2005: 154ff), so it will not be further discussed here.

Scholars dealing with populism in Latin America have tended to employ a rather thick conceptualization of populism, including aspects related to the specific relationship between the populist leaders and their followers, poor institutionalization, and the lack of a specific class base and ideology. Roberts (1995: 88), for example, suggests a multidimensional conceptualization – or what he calls “synthetic construction of populism” – with the following five key properties: (1) “personalistic and paternalistic, though not necessarily charismatic, pattern of political leadership, (2) a heterogeneous, multiclass political coalition concentrated

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8 Fennema (2005: 18), for example, has argued that Betz’s (1994: 3–4) definition of populism is essentially an “attack on the common man” and which, as a consequence, “easily slips into an unwarranted defence of the political elites.”
in subaltern sectors of society, (3) a top–down process of political mobilization that either bypasses institutionalized forms of mediation or subordinates them to more direct linkages between the leader and the masses; (4) an amorphous or eclectic ideology, characterized by a discourse that exalts subaltern sectors or is anti-elitist and/or anti-establishment; (5) an economic project that utilizes widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods to create material foundation for popular sector support.”

Weyland (1999; 2001) disagrees, proposing a conceptualization which is unrelated to the economic profile of the movement. For him, populism is above all a political strategy rather than an economic doctrine. Yet, also his definition includes indicators of social basis, organizational features and leadership qualities. As a political strategy, populism is characterized by the following three characteristics: “[1] a personal leader appeals to a heterogeneous mass of followers who feel left out and are available for mobilization; [2] the leader reaches the followers in a direct, quasi-personal manner that bypasses established intermediary organizations, especially parties; [3] if the leader builds a new or revives an old populist party, it remains a personal vehicle with a low level of institutionalization” (Weyland 1999: 381).

Scholars working on populism in Europe – Western Europe in particular – usually define populism somewhat differently. Canovan (1999: 3) holds that general features of populism – at least its qualities in contemporary democratic societies – can be identified if we quit searching for specific ideological or policy content, and instead focus on what she calls “structural considerations.” With this point of departure, Canovan (1999: 3) defines populism as “an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society.” A more detailed definition is presented by Stanley (2008: 102), who argues that populism can be disentangled into four distinct yet interrelated concepts: (1) “the existence of two homogenous units of analysis: ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’; (2) the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite; (3) the idea of popular sovereignty; (4) the positive valorisation of ‘the people’ and the denigration of ‘the elite.’” Building on theories of various kinds of ideologies promoted by Michael Freeden (1998), Stanley also presents convincing arguments for seeing populism as a thin rather than thick ideology (see also Canovan 2002; Mudde 2004).

This presentation of the difference between how populism is defined in the Latin American and the European contexts is admittedly oversimplified. Indeed, there are scholars within these two geographical areas who merge insights from the two distinct perspectives on populism. For example, while Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008a: 3), similar to Mudde, Canovan and Stanley, see populism primarily as “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice,” they also claim that the “charismatic bond between leader and follower is absolutely central to populist parties and that populist leaders, since they need to be seen to be still ordinary men and women untainted by their association with the murky world of politics, tend to break the conventional linguistic registers and codes employed by the political class, adopting instead a ‘direct’ and at times even offensive language and style of communication” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008a: 7). Similarly, Zaslove (2008b) argues that populism could be regarded as a multidimensional concept – what he calls an ideal type – consisting not only
of a specific discourse or ideological appeal but also a specific institutional form. While the discourse, according to Zaslove (2008b: 324–325), “pits the common everyday, virtuous, and homogeneous people against both elites (politicians, intellectuals, the media), and against perceived outside threats (special interest groups, immigrants, feminists, ecologists),” the institutional features of populism is the existence of a “charismatic and populist leader […], a centralization of leadership and […] a low level of party institutionalization.”

This thesis makes no claims about the correct definition of populism; the analytical value of a specific definition should be seen in relation to the specific research question. However, it is often useful to disentangle comprehensive conceptualizations in order to be able to study empirically the extent to which different theoretical dimensions are actually related to each other. I will therefore adopt a minimal and unidimensional definition of populism, arguing that it is best seen as a thin ideology which “… considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543).

However, this definition does not imply that many other often-mentioned aspects of populism – such as charismatic leadership, lack of organizational infrastructure, diffuse or restricted ideological appeal – are regarded as irrelevant. On the contrary, they are still seen as logically related to populism, although not inherently a part of it. In more metaphorical language, they might be seen as what Vossen (2010) calls “flavor enhancers.” Due to the content of populism, a populist party will be inclined to favor charismatic or at least a strong leadership, to oppose the development of a strong party organization, and to encompass a rather diffuse ideological core beyond the ideological content of populism. However, following the theoretical approach in this thesis, the extent to which a populist party actually embraces these features must ultimately be an empirical question.

In terms of right-wing or left-wing orientation, most scholars agree that parties described as right-wing populists are indeed right-wing oriented, despite promoting themselves as the defending the common man, positioning themselves more centrist in economic policy in terms of state regulation and protectionism, and supporting parts of the welfare state (de Lange 2007b). Some might argue that this somewhat paradoxical situation demonstrates the anachronistic nature of the two concepts, “left” and “right.” However, defending the common man against the bureaucracy or immigrants, or promoting welfare chauvinism, does not make a party left-wing oriented. Moreover, the notion of being right-wing or left-wing refers not only to practical economic policy. The fundamental difference between right-wing oriented and left-wing oriented political thought is whether or not one supports the more abstract idea of equality (Bobbio 1996) – and in this sense, these parties are right-wing. As argued by Betz (1994: 4), these new parties reject “individual and social equality” and whatever “political project that seeks to achieve it.” In practice, this mentality is demonstrated through strong xenophobic appeals and an aversion towards social integration of marginalized and discriminated groups – whether “[…] dissenting voices, immigrants, homosexuals, Muslims, unmarried mothers, drug addicts [or] long-term unemployed” (Mastropaolo 2008: 36). In other words, right-wing populism is right-wing – as oppose to left-wing and agrarian-oriented – because ‘the people’ is defined in exclusionary rather than inclusive terms and/or seen as a morally conservative entity.
Explaining Right-Wing Populist Persistence: From Demand-Side to Supply-Side Factors

The literature on right-wing populism contains an extensive variety of theoretical perspectives. These include demand-side factors such as ethnic competition, declining political trust, deindustrialization, rapid economic change, and welfare state retrenchment; political opportunity structures such as party system cartelization, mainstream convergence, the role of the media and civil society; and internal supply-side factors such as ideology, organization and leadership (Mudde 2007a: chapter 9-11; for an informative overview, see e.g. Eatwell 2003).9

To be sure, most of these theoretical perspectives have been explicitly used to explain not the persistence of right-wing populism, but of right-wing populist support in general. However, in doing so, the authors are (perhaps somewhat unintentionally) also identifying factors which may increase or decrease the likelihood of populist persistence. In the short literature review that follows, I therefore include a selection of theories that may impact on right-wing populist persistence, without originally being developed for this specific purpose.

Initially, the rise of right-wing populist parties was explained primarily by demand-side oriented theories. Electoral support was seen as the consequence of modernization, globalization and erosion of party politics. Scholars interpreted right-wing populist success as either an idealistic “silent counter-revolution” (Ignazi 1992) against the progressive ideas of New Left mobilization in the late 1960s and early 1970s; as a materialistic consequence of the transformation towards a post-industrial society (Betz 1994); as the result of declining political trust and growing political cynicism (Fieschi and Heywood 2004); or as the result of ethnic competition over scarce resources and the reactivation of anti-immigration attitudes and xenophobia (e.g. Rydgren and Ruth 2011; Rydgren 2008). With a few exceptions, these various theories have received substantial empirical support. Perhaps least conclusive have been the results concerning the effects of unemployment. While being unemployed tends to increase the possibility of casting a right-wing populist vote and some studies find a positive relationship between unemployment and right-wing populist support at the aggregate level (e.g. Arzheimer 2009), most studies find either no effects, or even a negative effect (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Knigge 1998; Bjørklund 2007b).

More consistent are the expectations derived from theories of ethnic competition and social identity threat theories. The number of immigrants (Knigge 1998; Rydgren and Ruth 2011) and perceived ethnic (cultural) threat (Werts et al. 2012; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012) are both positively correlated with right-wing populist support; across various parties, having anti-immigration attitudes seem to be the strongest predictor for casting a right-wing populist vote (van der Brug et al. 2000; Ivarsflaten 2008). However, the effects stemming from immigration on right-wing populist support might be somewhat curbed by a comprehensive welfare state (Arzheimer 2009; Swank and Betz 2003). In line with theories of protest, political alienation and declining trust, political dissatisfaction also seems to increase the

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9 The electoral system is also often included as part of the opportunity structure. However, it serves mainly as an explanation of (failure of) electoral breakthrough (e.g. in the UK), and will not be discussed in this thesis.
support for right-wing populist parties (Knigge 1998; Werts et al. 2012), though protest-motives seem to hold for certain cases only (Ivarsflaten 2008).

A second strand of theoretical perspectives sees right-wing populist party success as the result of specific political opportunity structures. Most importantly, right-wing populist parties are expected to benefit from party system cartelization and strong convergence between the mainstream right and mainstream left. The argument is simply that this convergence will make it easier for a populist party to claim “they are all the same,” while presenting itself as fresh alternative to the existing order. Not surprisingly, empirical studies indicate that right-wing populist parties do benefit from the existence of grand coalitions (Arzheimer and Carter 2006) and party systems characterized by convergence between the established parties on a left–right scale (Abedi 2003; Müller-Rommel 1998), although a strong right-wing position of the mainstream right may also legitimize and hence increase the support for a right-wing populist party (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Further, a subjective feeling of strongly cartelized system among the voters seems to be conducive for right-wing populist party support (Pelizzo 2007). This may also be the case with the degree of party cartelization measured more objectively (Müller-Rommel 1998), although one study of Australia’s One Nation has indicated otherwise (Goot 2003). Favorable opportunity structures are also related to the strategic behavior of mainstream parties. More specifically, right-wing populist parties are likely to benefit if a mainstream party – regardless of whether it is the ideological neighbor (mainstream right) or ideological more distant (the mainstream left) – that helps politicize their main issue. This is likely to increase the salience of the new issue introduced by the right-wing populists and strengthen issue ownership (Meguid 2005).

Variation in demand-side factors and the opportunity structure help explain much of the variation in right-wing populist party support among countries. However, neither the demand-side perspective nor the opportunity structures seem to explain why right-wing populist parties fail to persist in some places, but not in others. Why have right-wing populist parties been more successful in the Belgian northern region (Flanders) but not in the southern region (Wallonia)? Why has no right-wing populist party been able to persist in Germany? And why did the Danish FrP cease to exist, whereas the case in focus in this thesis, Norway’s FrP, has flourished? While structural changes, including the emergence of post-industrial societies, (backlash against) post-materialist attitudes, cartelization and increased immigration, may create condition favorable to right-wing populist persistence, these conditions need to be successfully exploited by a populist actor.

Such arguments have since long been made in the general literature on (minor) parties (Pedersen 1982), but they were largely neglected in early studies of right-wing populist parties. However, more recently, several scholars have pointed to the importance of internal supply-side factors when trying to explain electoral persistence. According to Ansell and Art (2010: 42), the electoral persistence of right-wing populist parties (or “radical right” as they term them) “will have less to do with socio-structural or institutional factors than with their ability to navigate successive developmental stages in their political life-cycle.” In a similar vein, Mudde (2010: 1180) explicitly argues that while electoral breakthrough is related to the cleavage structure and institutional factors, electoral persistence is primarily the product of party factors: it is the right-wing populist parties themselves that ensure their electoral persistence (see also Art 2011).
In other words, perhaps electoral persistence is not primarily a question of fertile breeding grounds and/or favorable political opportunity structures, but is instead closely related to the party’s organizational development, ideological adaption, leadership qualities and strategic choices made at critical junctures. Let me now present and contextualize FrP’s electoral development, and briefly discuss the extent to which this development may be explained by demand-side factors and opportunity structure.

**The Norwegian Case**

The case in focus to be scrutinized in this thesis is Norway’s FrP – the Progress Party, Fremskrittspartiet. The party – initially called Anders Langes parti til sterk nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter og offentlige inngrep (Anders Lange’s Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention, ALP) – emerged in the early 1970s as part of what von Beyme (1988) later labelled “the second wave” of far right mobilization in Western Europe after World War II. Contrary to the first wave, which was restricted to extreme right groups like Nazi and fascist parties trying to reorganize and persist after being defeated in war, this wave was characterized by doctrines that were anti-taxation, anti-(universal) welfare state and more diffusely anti-partyism. Moreover, many of the emerging parties (like the French UDCA, the Dutch Farmer’s Party, the Finnish Rural Party and the Danish Progress Party) were organized as “movement parties” (Kitschelt 2006) with a fairly charismatic leader up front. Anders Lange’s Party was indeed such a party.

The electoral breakthrough happened in 1973. Only a few months after ALP was founded by Anders Lange, 5% of the electorate voted for it, and the party gained four seats in the Norwegian Parliament, the Storting (see Table 1.1) – one seat from each of the four largest and most urbanized counties in Norway (Oslo, Akershus, Hordaland and Rogaland). Lange was seen as a political outsider, although he had been secretary of the most influential right-wing organization in the interwar period, Fedrelandslaget (the Fatherland’s League).

Among the main reasons for this unexpected electoral breakthrough in what until then had been a quite stable party system were a growing discontent with the taxation system, crumbling party loyalties after a heated referendum in 1972 on Norwegian EEC membership (Rokkan and Valen 1974), the charismatic personality of Anders Lange, the increased role of television, and inspiration from similar developments in Denmark (Bjørklund 2000; Jupskås 2009). Regarding the traditional cleavages, the party seemed to represent the interests of capital as opposed to the interests of labor (Valen 1981: 67). However, a large share of its voters was not particularly right-wing oriented on economic issues, and many of them had previously voted for the Labor party (Bjørklund 1981: 16).

Electoral support at the national level remained unstable for more than two decades after the breakthrough in 1973, which partly reflects organizational discontinuity. The first of two party splits came already one year after the party had been founded. After being internally defeated by Lange and his loyal supporters, two prominent members, including the future party chairman Carl I. Hagen, defected from the party and created an ideological similar but organizationally different party, Reformpartiet (the Reform Party). However, when Lange died in 1974, Hagen became an MP (he was next in line on the candidate list) and was eventually able to merge the two parties.
Nevertheless, the party experienced significant electoral setbacks in the subsequent local elections in 1975 and after changing its name from ALP to FrP prior to the national election in 1977. With less than 1% in the municipality elections and just above 1% in county elections, the party gained only 41 representatives in local councils and 13 representatives in county councils (see Table 1.1). In the national election, the party even received less than 2% losing all its seats in the Storting. However, it continued to field candidates in the local elections. The results in the 1979 municipal and county elections were far from impressive, but the party almost doubled its number of elected municipal councilors and county councilors. Thus, the result reinforced the party leadership belief that the party would be able to re-enter the parliament.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the support remained marginal, but was steadily rising. In 1981, FrP passed the electoral threshold again and recaptured four mandates in the Storting – from exactly the same electoral districts as in 1973 (Oslo, Akershus, Hordaland, and Rogaland). The 1983 local elections gave the party 5.3% (at the municipality level) and 6.3% (at the county level) of the popular votes. The party had now more than four hundred local politicians. Prior to the 1985 national election, the party leadership was therefore highly optimistic and hoped for at least ten members of parliament (Annual report 1985/86: 3). The final result, however, almost ended up as a complete disaster. FrP only was able to capture two seats in two urban electoral districts (Oslo and Hordaland). However, despite losing two seats in the Storting, the overall electoral result paradoxically made the party far more influential. While the center-right parties – Høyre (the Conservatives), Kristelig Folkeparti (the Christian People’s Party) and Senterpartiet (the Center party) – controlled a majority of seats between 1981 and 1985, they now needed FrP’s support to retain this majority. In other words, FrP had indeed become a “relevant party” (Sartori 1976). Already in 1986, the party’s new power was firmly demonstrated when its two MPs voted together with the center-left parties, forcing the center-right government to resign.

In the late 1980s, the party increased its electoral support significantly. For the first time in the post-war period, the “immigration question” entered the political debate in the 1987 local elections (Hagelund 2003b), and FrP gained more than 10% (10.4% in the municipal elections and 12.3% in the county elections). Tor Bjørklund (1988) has succinctly characterized the election as a “protest election with a swing to the right.” Two years later – in the 1989 national elections – FrP support tripled to 13%. The number of MPs increased from 2 to 22 and the party was now represented in all but four counties – three primarily agricultural counties (Nord-Trøndelag, Hedmark, and Sogn og Fjordane) and the northernmost county Finnmark, where fisheries are important. The typical FrP voter was a blue-collar or white-collar worker in the private sector; middle-level educated; male; young (below 30); against the temperance movement; a supporter of riksmål10; a non-churchgoer; and living in the urbanized areas around the capital (Valen et al. 1990: 106). The party was particularly underrepresented among professionals and officials working in public sector and women, and to a lesser extent among the wealthy and the elderly, and people in the northern

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10 Officially bokmål: the most common written language in Norway today, based more on Danish than old Norwegian dialects.
part of the country. The most notable difference from the general population was the strong support among those opposed to Norway’s fairly strict alcohol regulations.

Table 1.1: General election results (ER, in %) and parliamentary seats (in figures) in Norway, 1973–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SV</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Ap</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>KrF</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>FrP</th>
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<td>16</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>12.2</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>76</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30</td>
<td>22.9</td>
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</table>


Note: The centrist parties are shaded. They will rarely be discussed in this thesis, except briefly in Chapter 6 on organizational linkages.

The growing success was not without problems. FrP soon became plagued by factionalism, which eventually resulted in a second party split. In contrast to earlier discussions about organizational matters, this was primarily an ideological conflict mainly between a liberalist faction and a nationalist faction, though there was also a faction called the “Christian conservatives.” The ideological disagreement between the liberals and the others made it difficult for the party to reach an agreement on issues like Norwegian membership in the EU and immigration (see Hagen 2007: 190–193), the role of Christianity in society in general and the schools in particular, and universal conscription (Iversen 1998: 113). While the liberal faction was pro-EU and basically pro-immigration (at least regarding skilled labor immigration), against the clause on teaching Christianity in elementary school, and highly critical towards the state’s compulsory male conscription, the two others factions argued in favor of the contrary. With regard to the emerging EU question, FrP adopted the slogan “Yes to EEC, no to Union” in an attempt to satisfy the different factions. However, while the slogan may have depolarized the internal debate, many voters were seemed confused about the party’s position. About 70% of those who voted for FrP in 1989 did not do so in 1993 (Aardal and Valen 1995: 29). FrP lost voters both to pro-EU and EU-skeptical parties, and as many as 20% stayed at home on Election Day. FrP emerged with no more than 6.3% of the vote.

It is difficult to estimate the size of the factions, but when the liberalist Pål Atle Skjervengen was elected FrP vice-chairman in 1987 he received 69 votes (63%) at the party convention, while the representative of the value-conservative faction, John I. Alvheim, received 41 votes (37%) (Ekeberg & Snoen 2001: 136).
After the poor electoral result, opinion polls showed that support continued to crumble. According to one poll published in the newspaper VG, less than 5% said they would vote for FrP. Only once since May 1987 had support been so low. Slowly but surely, open confrontation between the ideological factions became inevitable, and at the agonizing party convention in 1994 the liberal faction – including a majority from the youth organization, four MPs and party vice-chairman Ellen Wibe – left FrP.

Table 1.2: Election results (ER, in %) and seats, local and county level, FrP, 1975-2007

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Years</th>
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<th>County councils</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>1459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Table 1.1

Somewhat surprisingly, FrP was able to recover rapidly after the split. Already in the 1995 local elections, electoral support again passed 10%; and in the national elections in 1997 FrP even finished ahead of the Conservatives with 15.3% of the vote. The majority of these voters had previously voted for the Conservatives, Labour party or the Center party. FrP seemed particularly strong among younger cohorts, males, and voters with anti-immigration, anti-environmental, and pro-market economy attitudes (Aardal et al. 1999: 43, 98, 226). And while the anti-immigration issue was particularly salient in 1995, the voters in 1997 appeared more concerned with welfare and highly critical to the ability of the left-wing parties to improve it (Bjørklund 1999: 180-184, see also Chapter 3).

In parallel with growing support at the national level, FrP has also strengthened its position at the local level. In all elections after 1995, it has gradually increased its share of the vote and the number of representatives at the local level, reaching 17.5% and 1625 representatives at the municipal level and 18.5% and 40 representatives at county level in the 2007 local elections. However, in general, FrP has experienced greater difficulty penetrating the local level; electoral support has been much higher in national elections than in local elections.

At the end of the first decade of the 2000s, FrP had become the dominant right-wing party in Norwegian politics. In both 2005 and 2009, it gained more votes in national elections

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12 VG, 23.04.94
13 The conflict was reinforced due to Hagen’s turnabout with regard to the party’s anti-taxation policy mid-way in the election campaign in 1993.
14 Support in opinion polls a few months prior to the election was much higher. One poll in July showing 22% support for FrP sent “shock waves” through the political elite (Aardal 1999: 13)
than the Conservatives. And voter volatility, which initially had been very high, was decreasing (Aardal 2007: 27). In fact, between 2001 and 2005, it had among the most loyal voters: as many 61% of those who voted for FrP in 2001, voted for the party again four years later (Aardal 2007: 27). Also in a European perspective, FrP seemed to be extremely successful. Only in Switzerland (SVP) and Austria (FPÖ and BZÖ) did right-wing populist parties gain more support in national elections. The social structure of party support was fairly diverse, although FrP seemed overrepresented among workers and self-employed, low-educated, low-income voters and males generally (Berglund et al. 2011: 35; Bjørklund 2009).

Gradually, however, FrP has been able to reach new groups – including young women (Aardal and Narud 2007), voters in more rural areas previously dominated by the Labour party (in Northern Norway) or Christian People’s party (in Western Norway) (Berglund 2011: 190–191; see also Bjørklund 2007a), and Christian voters (Holberg 2007).

**Explaining the Unexpected**

This development of increasing electoral support was not expected. From large-N analyses we have long known that parties without the backing of organized social groups and parties not competing in the first competitive elections after the country was democratized are less likely to persist electorally (Rose and Mackie 1988: 537). With populist parties or parties founded on charismatic leadership, the likelihood of persistence is further reduced. Not surprisingly, many commentators and academics predicted a short lifespan for Lange’s new right-wing populist party. Drawing a parallel between French Poujadism and Lange’s anti-tax mobilization, an op-ed in August 1973 in a major quality daily was titled “When will the ‘Anders Lange balloon’ burst?” The contributor wrote: “My prediction is that Anders Lange’s Party will very quickly come unglued and that the voters […] will return to their ‘old’ [parties], at times imperfect but well-proven parties.”

After the parliamentary breakthrough in 1973, a highly-regarded tabloid, Dagbladet, wrote: “In all likelihood, we are dealing with a short-lived creature, but even such insects can cause much damage during their lifespan” (cited in Iversen 1998: 49). These sarcastic and pessimistic predications continued for a long time. Both after the 1975 local elections and after the 1977 national election in which the party fell below the electoral threshold and lost all seats in the Storting, FrP was given the death sentence (Iversen 1998: 69). Even Carl I. Hagen, who would later serve as party chairman for 28 years, said there was a real risk that FrP “might disappear from history.” In 1978, also Aftenposten was convinced that FrP phenomenon would soon be over; it argued that Hagen should stop chairing a party incapable of survival and find himself more “sensible employment” (Iversen 1998: 68).

Also scholars have occasionally issued similar predictions. In a comparative analysis from the early 1980s, Bjørklund (1981: 36) argued that a party combining tax-protest with old-school liberalism was more likely to succeed in Denmark than in Norway. As we now know, the Danish party ended up as failure, while the Norwegian party has survived and

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15 Moreover, election surveys showed an unexploited potential for further electoral growth. Almost 10% of those who did not vote for FrP said they had considered doing so: 9% in 2005 (Election survey 2005, N=2012) and 8% in 2009 (Election survey 2009, N=1782).

16 Aftenposten, 21.09.73 (Johan C. Løken: “Når sprekker Anders Lange-ballongen?”)

17 VG, 13.09.77
flourished. In a comprehensive thesis from the early 1990s, FrP was called a political “ephemeral phenomenon” (Hjelseth 1992) and with the intensifying disagreement over Norwegian EU membership in early 1990s, party chairman Carl I. Hagen was asked provocatively by a journalist from the Norwegian News Agency (NTB) if this was the “beginning of the end” for FrP.18 Similar questions were put forward after the ideological confrontation between the liberalist and populist faction at the party convention in 1994.19 Even as late as in 2006, scholars were questioning FrP’s ability to outlive its long-standing chairman, Carl I. Hagen (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 278). To what extent was the support based on rooted loyalty among parts of the electorate? Were the voters ideologically committed to the party – or were they simply voting FrP in order to send protest signals to the established political actors? As shown above, recent development certainly indicates that the party is here to stay. Indeed, it has outlived its first leaders, initial volatile constituencies, as well as several ideological battles and organizational disputes. To what extent can this be explained by demand-side factors and/or favorable political opportunity structures?

General demand-side theories have linked the success of such parties to the emergence of a post-industrial economy, increased immigration, rising unemployment, and growing political cynicism. While the level of some of these factors in Norway indicates a potential for a right-wing populist party, others point in the opposite direction. The labor market has certainly become increasingly post-industrial. According to the classification scheme proposed by Erikson and Goldthorp (1992), Norway’s working class has shrunk, from 53% to 17% between 1957 and 2009 (Knutsen 2014: 191). In the same period, the service class has increased from 14% to 52%. However, some of the effects associated with this labor market transformation have been fairly moderate. Unemployment levels have been fairly low (around 3% in the first decade of the 2000s) – not least in a comparative perspective (Jupskås 2015). And even if it was high, Bjørklund (2007b) has demonstrated that FrP is likely to suffer electorally. Moreover, Norway has a comprehensive welfare state (Kuhnle 2000), usually seen as a constraining factor for right-wing populist mobilization (Arzheimer 2009).

Norway does not stand out as particularly fertile breeding grounds in terms of anti-immigration attitudes, or levels of political cynicism. While it is true that Norway has accepted relatively many refugees compared to the population size of the country, the percentage of foreign-born population – and especially from non-Western countries – has remained low (Herda 2010: 10). In a comparative analysis of attitudes towards the foreign population, Norway was among the countries with least skepticism (Semyonov et al. 2008), though it should be noted that skepticism was somewhat higher in the 1980s and 1990s (Aardal 2003a: 260). Longitudinal analyses show similar results. While Sweden, for example, has been exceptionally liberal towards immigration at the attitudinal level, Norway has been among the least skeptical of the skeptical ones (see Figure 1.1).

18 _NTB_, 09.09.92
19 e.g. _Aftenposten_, 18.04.94
Figure 1.1: Levels of anti-immigration attitudes in selected Western European countries, 2002–2010.


Note: Respondents were asked whether they would ‘allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group than majority’. The Figure shows the total sum of those who answered ‘allow a few’ and those who answered ‘allow none’ (which were usually less than 10% in countries depicted here). Most other countries in Western Europe (except Greece and Austria in 2002) have levels of anti-immigration attitudes somewhere between Norway and Finland.

Norway has also scored remarkably low on levels of political mistrust and cynicism. In fact, in the World Value Surveys from the early 1980s until the mid-1990s, Norway came out as the country with the highest confidence in its parliament (Newton and Norris 2000: 18). And even though confidence decreased in Norway too, it remained significantly higher than elsewhere. Figures from the European Social Survey from 2002/03, for example, show similar results as regard the level of political cynicism (see Figure 1.2). In this survey, respondents were asked to what extent politicians in general care what people like people like themselves (i.e. the respondents) think and to what extent politicians are primarily interested in votes rather than people’s opinions. In contrast to many other countries, the Nordic region (plus Switzerland and the Netherlands) emerges as characterized by low levels of political cynicism. This is particularly the case with Norway, where only 8% agreed that “hardly any politicians care what ordinary people think,” and only 13% agreed that “nearly all politicians are interested only in votes.”
Despite this lack of cynicism, two features of the party system which may benefit a rising populist party are worth noting. First, Norway has experienced a dramatic decline in class-base voting (Knutsen 2014: 198-199); second, there has been a gradual decrease in party identification (Aardal 2014: 212). Both trends could be interpreted as weakening ties between the electorate and the established parties, in turn creating favorable conditions for new parties, including right-wing populist ones.

![Figure 1.2: Level of political cynicism in selected Western European countries, 2002/03 (% of respondents who agree with the statement)](image)


Theories concerning the political opportunity structure have linked the electoral support of right-wing populist parties to party system cartelization, ideological convergence among mainstream parties, and the reactions from political opponents and mainstream media. As in many other Western European countries, the party system in Norway has become increasingly cartelized in recent decades. The established parties have become dependent upon state funding, and membership figures have decreased. However, this process has primarily taken place while FrP has consolidated its position in the electoral arena. In this sense, and even if the party founder argued vigorously against party bureaucrats and professionalization of politics, it makes more sense to see FrP as part of the cartel rather than as an outsider party mobilizing against it.

The ideological convergence thesis is not particularly useful, either. While the party system converge prior to FrP’s electoral breakthrough in 1973, it became more polarized afterwards (Narud and Valen 2007: 140), especially after mainstream right drifted towards the right in the 1980s (Harmel and Svåsand 1997). Furthermore, in contrast to some other consensual democracies in Europe (like Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland), Norway has never had any government coalition between the mainstream right (the Conservatives)
and the mainstream left (Labour party), in turn making it more difficult to argue that “they are all the same.” Voters have also seen the mainstream right and the mainstream left as two distinct ideological alternatives (see Narud 1999: 129; 2003: 197). And finally, party competition revolved around socio-economic issues throughout the period, with the exception of 1993 when the EU issue dominated the political agenda.

Mainstream reactions towards FrP have been fairly negative, though the party has not been excluded by the establishment to same extent as have similar parties in France, Belgium, or Sweden. Throughout its existence, the party has been consistently criticized by most civil society organizations, including new social movements, the elite in trade unions (Flote 2008), and leaders within the state church (Haugen 2014). Very few, if any, political journalists or newspapers have publically supported FrP (Johansen 2001: 167). On the other hand, however, it could be argued that the tabloidization of mass media and their focus on how individual citizens are victims of ‘the system’ have benefitted a populist party like FrP (Johansen 2001).

In any case, FrP seems to be an example of a right-wing populist party which has been able to persist despite not-so-fertile breeding grounds and not particularly favorable opportunity structures. Contrary to expectations widely held among Norwegian commentators and some academics – partly based on lessons learned from other first generation of right-wing populist parties and partly based on theory – FrP has successfully remained a key player in the electoral arena for more than three decades. In fact, it strengthened its position considerably between the 1973 electoral breakthrough and 2009. The party has penetrated both national and local politics, and voter volatility has become less of challenge. As we shall see later, in-depth analysis of a few key supply-side factors – programmatic platform, legitimacy, organization and leadership – might be needed in order to provide more complete explanation of FrP’s unexpected electoral persistence (for a similar argument, see Bjørklund 1999: 197-98).

Road Map of this Thesis

This first chapter has outlined the main puzzle – the persistence of populism in post-industrial societies – and noted some of the main theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to be made by this thesis. It has also presented some definitions of populism widely used in the literature. While acknowledging that populism is a contested concept – that it often serves as a rhetorical weapon and that it has a slightly different meaning in a Latin American context than in Europe, I will hold that populism remains an important analytical tool for studying (some of) the new political parties in many post-industrial societies. The thesis follows the dominant literature in which populism has been defined as a “thin ideology” rather than a specific organizational structure or programmatic profile. A purely populist party nevertheless tends to be associated with a charismatic leader, a non-bureaucratic organization and a very limited programmatic profile.

This first chapter has also provided a brief review of the existing theoretical approaches to the rise of right-wing populist parties and a more descriptive presentation of the Norwegian case – the electoral development of FrP, some critical junctures and the sociology of the voters. Although some of the sociological and political-institutional factors seem to be part of the explanatory equation, the lack of fertile breeding grounds in Norway with its strong welfare state, only weak cartelization, and a rather hostile socio-political environment
all suggest that internal supply-side factors should be taken into consideration in trying to explain the electoral persistence of right-wing populism in Norway.

Chapter 2 follows on by presenting an internal supply-side based framework aimed at explaining the persistence of right-wing populism. This framework is based upon the assumption that different phases of a party’s development require different qualities as to ideological/programmatic appeal and organizational structure – which, in turn, implies that parties must change and adapt in order to remain on the electoral scene. Briefly, then, I argue that in order to persist, right-wing populist parties need to broaden their programmatic appeal, credibly fend off accusations of extremism and racism, build an authoritarian mass party organization, and select leaders well-endowed with mobilizing and organizing qualities.

The next five empirical chapters present analyses of theoretically selected aspects of FrP’s ideological/programmatic and organizational development throughout the almost four decades of its existence. Chapter 3 covers its transformation from a single-issue party addressing and mobilizing exclusively on the basis of an anti-taxation platform in the early 1970s towards a several-issue party focusing on, recruiting members and attracting voters on the basis of at least four issues: anti-immigration, anti-taxation, geriatric care and motoring policy (more highways and cheaper gasoline). Chapter 5 delves into anti-immigration policy and how the party has dealt with extremists seeking to influence or infiltrate FrP. The party has always dissociated itself from almost all other anti-immigrant parties and groups in Norway and abroad. Many of its radical activists have been rapidly excluded due to contact with extreme right groups and/or extremist views, with a few notable exceptions. With regard to immigration policy, FrP has been repeatedly accused of racism, and to a lesser extent, right-wing extremism, but the party manifestos and leadership have anchored arguments against immigration in five different narratives – economic burden, welfare exploiters, security threat, cultural challenge and problems of illiberalism, none of which can be considered strictly “racist.”

The organizational development of the party is dealt with in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The main argument is that FrP has changed organizationally from a purely populist model towards an authoritarian mass party. It has become more institutionalized in the sense that organizational tasks are more routinized, and members and followers are infused with the party’s values. It has also become more centralized, particularly with regard to the power and control of the executive committee. And not least, the party has become more socially rooted in Norwegian society. Since the early 1980s, FrP has been able to develop a membership organization and several auxiliary organizations (most notably, a youth wing and a party magazine) and has become more integrated in civil society. However, in comparison with other parties, FrP’s organizational linkages are not particularly impressive (at least given the electoral size of the party): organizational density is not very high, membership activity remains low, and penetration of and contact with civil society is still significantly weaker than for other parties.

Chapter 7 focuses on party leadership – more specifically, on the mobilizing and organizing qualities of its four leaders, especially the leadership qualities of Carl I. Hagen, who served as party chairman for over three decades, between 1978 and 2006. While the first leader, party founder Anders Lange, certainly had mobilizing qualities, he was organizationally incompetent. The next leader, Arve Lønnnum, who served as party chairman
between 1975 and 1978, had neither mobilizing nor organizing skills. He was followed by Hagen, who represented the complete opposite: a mobilizer and a talented organizer. The current leader, Siv Jensen, who took over when Hagen stepped down in 2006, is perhaps somewhat less of a mobilizer or organizer. However, as a more institutionalized party with stronger organizational linkages, FrP has been generally less dependent upon its leaders towards the end of the period covered in this thesis (see also Jupskâs 2014).

The final chapter summarizes the findings and notes some possible implications for our understanding of the electoral persistence of right-wing populist parties.
Chapter 2: How to avoid ending up as a flash party: Towards a theory of right-wing populist persistence

The key to electoral persistence of populist radical right parties is their ability to transform protest voters into support voters. (Mudde 2007: 229)

Introduction

Populist parties – including those with a right-wing orientation – were not expected to persist electorally. Such parties are usually conceptualized as unstable phenomenon incapable of surviving more than one (or perhaps two) election(s). According to the influential historian Eric Hobsbawm (1990: 179), for example, the proto-type right-wing populist (RWP) party, Front National (FN) in France, proved to be a highly volatile and transitory phenomenon. This chapter presents a supply-side based theory of populist persistence, guided by the following theoretical question: What kind internal supply-side development is likely to enhance the electoral persistence of a populist party?

The literature provides an extensive range of possible internal supply-side factors (see Carter 2005; Mudde 2007: 256–276; Kitschelt 2007: 1193–1197; Klandermans and Mayer 2006; Art 2011; Rydgren 2007: 256–257). Four factors, however, seem to be particularly important: programmatic appeal, legitimacy, organization and leadership. Betz (1998: 9) claims that “one of the most important determinants of success is party organization” – an argument which received empirical support in a cross-case analysis by Carter (2005: 64–101). Art (2011: 38) and others (e.g. Ignazi 2005) have underlined the importance of legitimacy. Zaslove argues (2004a: 115, endnote 6) that RWP party success is dependent upon “a charismatic, populist leader, the combination of a hierarchical party organization, coupled with the ability to penetrate and mobilize voters within civil society who feel alienated and disenfranchised by traditional political parties.” And Mudde (2010: 1180) boldly asserts that electoral persistence can be explained by “a combination of leadership, organisation, and propaganda.”

We should bear in mind that the importance of these factors is not unique to RWP parties. Many communist parties, for example, lost their legitimacy and what remained of electoral potential with the fall of the Berlin Wall (March and Mudde 2005: 27). And “voluntarism” – the actions of party leaders – may have a huge impact on a party’s electoral trajectory and even persistence (Rose and Mackie 1988: 556–557). However, for RWP parties some aspects related to party change are likely to be particularly challenging, since these parties often start out as very loosely organized and leadership-dependent groupings without a comprehensive ideological platform, and with the risk of attracting both extremists and

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20 This is not to say that other supply-side factors are irrelevant; that these four are perceived as being the most important ones.
opportunists. Indeed, some of the initial features of populist parties may be conducive in the phase of electoral breakthrough. However, for various reasons, they generally prove detrimental in the phase of electoral persistence.

The presentation of each of the four factors is guided by the following steps. First, I discuss the extent to which RWP parties are associated with a specific programmatic platform, challenges of legitimacy, organizational pattern and leadership type. I then present some arguments suggesting that most, if not all, of these features are likely to de-facilitate electoral persistence; further, that a specific kind of party change (or maintenance, in the case of legitimacy) is needed in order to survive at the electoral arena.

Broadening the Programmatic Profile

In the early phase of party formation, most parties, including RWP parties, have limited resources, and have to concentrate on one issue or a small set of issues on which they can try to steal dissatisfied voters from the mainstream parties. In other words, it might be electorally rewarding to remain a “single-issue protest party” (Betz 1993: 415; see also von Beyme 1988) or “niche party” (Meguid 2005). However, in the phase of electoral persistence, parties are for various reasons (see below) likely to “shed their image of being a single-issue party” (Poguntke 2002a: 140). They may develop a more comprehensive platform and become what I have termed a ‘several-issues party’.

Many (but not all) RWP parties have mobilized on one specific issue and general feelings of resentment, rather than an encompassing political platform. Fennema (2005: 11) claims that the “main concern [of RWP parties] is discrediting the political establishment, without presenting a full-fledged alternative for the present regime.” He even argues that such parties may “have no political program at all.” However, in most cases, there is at least one single issue – such as opposition towards fiscal authorities or “gestapo fiscale” in the case of the Poujadists (Hoffmann 1956), a new agriculture tax reform in the case of the Finnish SMP (Sankiaho 1971: 36), or opposition to a rapidly expanding public sector as in the case of the Danish FrPd (Ringsmose 2003: 14–15). Some scholars have suggested that anti-immigration is the raison d’être of these parties (see e.g. Husbands 1992). In any case, the argument is that their appeal is very limited, and there tends to be no positive vision of how society should be organized.

The concept of a “single-issue party” has probably existed in the literature on party politics for many decades. As noted by Mudde (1999), the agrarian parties were initially seen as the “usual suspects,” since these parties focused almost exclusively on farming policies. However, the decline of the primary industry after World War II forced many agrarian parties to adopt policies on other issue areas (e.g. decentralization, local democracy and self-determination, and transportation) in order to survive. Some even developed into liberal-conservative parties (as with the Liberal Party in Denmark) or agrarian catch-all parties (like the Finnish party; see Arter 1999). In other words, they became “several-issue parties.”

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21 It should be noted that Betz (1993: 415) himself does not see them merely as single-issue oriented. In fact, he argues that their electoral success depends upon “their ability to mobilize resentment and protest and their capability to offer a future-oriented program that confronts the challenge posed by the economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced West European democracies.”

22 For a similar example of anti-taxation mobilization in California in the late 1970s, see Taggart (2000: 104)
However, if the agrarian parties have broadened their agenda and adopted (for them) new issues and can therefore no longer be described as single-issue parties, the emergence of various new parties in post-industrial societies in recent decades has resulted in a revival of the single-issue party concept and made it more widespread. Especially the Greens (Poguntke 2002a) and the radical right parties (Billiet and Witte 2006) are often cited as prime examples, but also Eurosceptic parties (Usherwood 2008), pirate parties (Pautz 2010), separatist parties (e.g. the early Bloc Québécois) and various idiosyncratic parties (e.g. the French party “Hunting, Fishing, Nature and Traditions”) have been labeled in this way.

The exact definition of such a party, however, either remains underspecified (with the indicators only implicitly presented) or it refers to aspects that are better seen as causes for or consequences of being a single-issue party, rather than features of the phenomenon in itself. Mudde (1999), for instance, sees the lack of a “particular social structure” as a defining feature of a single-issue party, whereas this is probably better seen as one of several possible outcomes of single-issue appeal. Moreover, the validity of this indicator more generally may be questioned, as it is no longer exclusively related to “single-issue parties.” All parties suffer from a less distinct social structure of their core electorate today, compared to the first decades after World War II (e.g. Abramson 1971; Franklin and Mughan 1978). Another indicator which seems somewhat misguided is the idea that single-issue parties are defined by their opposition to class-based politics (the “neither left nor right” doctrine), and the mobilization of new issues that do not “coincide with existing lines of political division” (Meguid 2005). Not only is this definition incorrect in empirical terms (tax protest parties are certainly right-wing and single-issue oriented), it is biased in terms of theory, by assuming that the political cleavage between labor and capital in the industrial community is somehow superordinate to other cleavages. In fact, there is no reason to believe that only traditional left-wing parties (e.g. Marxists, Socialists and Social Democrats) or right-wing ones (e.g. Liberals, Conservatives and Christian Democrats) are capable of being “several-issue” parties.

Intuitively, the number of issues put forward by the party would appear to be the primary feature distinguishing a single-issue party from other parties. In contrast to protest parties which have a rather diffuse agenda on one hand, and parties with a more comprehensive platform on the other, a single-issue party focuses solely on one specific issue. Such parties address only one “all-encompassing” issue (Mudde 1999: 184): nearly all political and societal problems tend to be explained with reference to this particular issue. However, acknowledging that this definition may be somewhat narrow, the term “single issue parties” can also include parties that “eschew the comprehensive policy platforms common to their mainstream party peers, instead adopting positions only on a restricted set of issues” (Meguid 2005: 348, my italics). In other words, even a party with only a few issues could still be considered a “single-issue party.”

In order to make a better judgment of the mobilizing breadth of a particular party, we need to move beyond the party perspective and include motivations and perceptions in the party’s electorate. As noted by Meguid (2005: 348), “[even] as the number of issues covered

23 This distinction resembles the typology of anti-immigration parties put forward by Fennema (1997). He distinguishes between pure protest parties (parties with a rather diffuse agenda), the anti-immigration party (what Fennema calls a racist party) which focuses exclusively on one specific issues, and the more ideologically-driven extreme right party characterized by several features.
in their manifestos has increased over the parties’ lifetimes, they have still been perceived as single-issue parties by the voters” (my italics). Introducing more issues as part the party’s programmatic toolbox does not necessarily mean that it has developed into a several-issue party. No, it remains single-issue oriented as long as the party is “supported primarily on the basis of a single issue” (Mudde 1999: 184). For instance, an analysis of electoral support for the Vlaams Blok (VB, now Vlaams Belang) indicated a very strong correlation between “negative attitudes towards immigrants” and voting for the VB, so the author argued that the party could be “considered as virtually a single-issue party” (Billie and De Witte 1995: 193).

Being a single-issue party might prove problematic for various reasons – including incomplete control of the political agenda, limited electoral potential, increased risks of factionalism, and problems of illegitimacy. Since parties in general, and single-issue parties in particular, “rely on the salience and attractiveness of their one policy stance for voter support” (Meguid 2005: 348), any party with a limited set of mobilizing issues is fundamentally vulnerable to an ever-changing agenda. Ever since Petrocik’s (1996) study of “issue ownership,” we know that voters’ party preferences are inextricably linked with the “problem agenda.” And because no party can control the agenda alone, it is highly risky to be too dependent on the saliency of only one issue. A narrow agenda may result in being left behind when other issues come to dominate the campaign.

Furthermore, addressing only one single issue is likely to attract a small segment of die-hard followers who believe this particular issue is far more important than all others. Parties will therefore broaden their agenda so as to appeal to more varied voter constituencies – and to expand the initial “hunting grounds” defined by the party leadership (Panebianco 1988). Research has shown that voters tend to prefer parties that can offer good policies on several issues (Karlsen and Aardal 2011). Even though voting behavior has become less ideological and more issue-based in recent decades, voters still evaluate the program package offered by the parties, rather than focusing exclusively on one particular issue.

Britain’s UKIP may serve as an empirical illustration. After its electoral breakthrough, the party has tried to broadening its agenda and offer policies on a range of issues to those who are already voting for UKIP and to attract new voters who are dissatisfied with the major right-wing party, the Conservatives. As argued by Abedi and Lundberg (2009), we would expect such a strategy to be successful, given the fact that polls indicates that very few in Britain (at the time of their article, only 4%) saw the EU as an important issue. Being a single-issue party may also result in lack of party cohesion. Since the territorial constituencies governing legislative representation compel politicians to take stances on a wide range of salient issues (Kitschelt 2007), having a fairly comprehensive platform also reduces the possibility of internal splits and increases the party’s ability to function in elected bodies.

The comprehensiveness of the political platform is also related to political legitimacy. Briefly put, it has been suggested that having a comprehensive platform before adopting an anti-immigration position provides a party with a certain “reputational shield” (Ivarsflaten 2006). A party that focuses exclusively on the anti-immigration issue is likely to be defined as a “racist party” (Fennema 1997), and experimental studies have shown that voters are significantly less likely to support anti-immigration policy when it is presented by an “illegitimate” political actor (Blinder et al. 2013). Having a “reputational shield” simply makes it easier to repudiate accusations of racism and extremism by political competitors and
to appear as a legitimate party in the eyes of the voters (see next section). The fact that several successful right-wing populist parties initially promoted issues other than immigration lends empirical support to this view. Austria’s FPÖ is an old party which was founded in 1949 by two journalists wanting to be independent of the socialist and Catholic-conservative Lager (Heinisch 2008). Both SVP and True Finns (PS) have agrarian roots (Albertazzi 2008; Arter 2010), and the LN and VB were initially concerned primarily with regional autonomy (Zaslove 2011; Swyngedouw 2000).

In the long run, being a single-issue party is not a viable programmatic profile to ensure party survival. A party is likely to transform into a ‘several-issue’ one. As such a party is preoccupied with several issues, political problems are explained in various ways (and not only by reference to immigration, pollution or urbanization, etc.). Thus, voters believe the party offers good policy in several issues and their (self-perceived) reasons for voting are heterogeneous. As this definition implies, being a several-issue party is a matter of degree. A party may mobilize voters on the basis of, say, two issues, or many more. Importantly, while being a several-issue party does not necessarily equate to being an ideologically cohesive party, it certainly makes party cohesion more likely. Exactly which issues are conducive for electoral persistence will be discussed in detail below, but two “winning formulas” have suggested. The most influential one, proposed by Kitschelt (1995), predicted that RWP parties would be electorally successful if their programmatic appeal rested on a combination of neoliberalism and authoritarian policies. More recently, this thesis has been modified somewhat. In parallel with the increasing proletarianization of the RWP electorate, at least some RWP parties have drifted leftwards. While the “new winning formula” still entails authoritarian policies, the neoliberalism position has, according to de Lange (2007), been replaced by a more centrist economic position, including greater saliency of welfare chauvinism.

**Maintaining Political Legitimacy**

The second factor important for RWP persistence relates to political legitimacy, by which I mean to what extent these parties are able to convince the voters that they follow the rules of democracy and are consistently committed to a non-racist worldview. Most scholars agree that the breakthrough of RWP parties is related to political legitimacy in one way or another. More specifically, it has been argued that RWP parties express no fascist nostalgia (Ignazi 1992), have adopted a “new master-frame” as regards opposition to immigration (Rydgren 2005), are in possession of a “reputational shield” (Ivarsflaten 2006) and even frame anti-immigration as a “defense of liberal values” (Akkerman 2005). However, these aspects of a more legitimate criticism of existing democratic procedures and acceptable anti-immigration discourse are not secured once and for all; on the contrary, they may well be undermined if the party attracts activists or representatives from the extreme-right subculture. That might make electoral persistence difficult to achieve.

Not surprisingly, after World War II, anti-democratic thoughts and biological racism – two features of classic far-right ideology – became discredited and relegated to the margins of European politics. The horrific mass killings carried out under the Third Reich, with the systematic genocide of six million Jews – *Die Endlösung* – as the final outcome, made it very hard, if not impossible, to advocate the politics of *Fremdenfeindlichkeit* in most Western
European countries for a long time. Parties that questioned the legitimacy of the democratic system and/or propagated extreme intolerance towards people of another skin color, ethnic background or religious beliefs were unlikely to enjoy success in elections. However, xenophobic sentiments and political cynicism had not disappeared in society: it became simply a question of presenting the anti-immigration and anti-(established) party arguments within a non-racist, democratic discourse.

When new RWP parties emerged in the 1970s and the 1980s, it became clear that the successful ones differed substantially from the unsuccessful ones. According to Ignazi (1992), the main division could be summarized as an emerging split between “new right” and “old right” parties (see also Ignazi and Ysmal 1992). Whereas both these formations are marked by strong anti-establishment attitudes (against established parties and politicians) and spatially located on the right wing of the political spectrum, only the “old right” exhibits nostalgic views about the fascist era and/or employs fascist symbols. It is precisely this ideological feature that makes a difference as regards the electoral potential. Since democracy has become “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996) and liberalism (focusing on the rule of law, human rights and principles of the separation of powers) is basically undisputed in post-industrial societies (Muller 2011), the fascist appeal is no longer useful in mass mobilization. Hence, the “old right” has tended to remain negligible in most countries of the Western world. The only two well-known exceptions – the National Alliance in Italy and Sweden Democrats – had both experienced an ideological transformation before becoming political forces at the national level (Ignazi 1996; Widfeldt 2008).

In parallel with the shift away from undemocratic attitudes and fascist nostalgia, the concept of biological racism was abandoned and replaced by the doctrine of ethno-pluralism (Rydgren 2005). This doctrine was characterized by “culturalism” (Carter 2005) or, more provocatively, “new cultural racism” (Taguieff 1990) rather than biological determinism. Moreover, not only was the concept of “race” replaced by the concept of “culture,” the traditional racial hierarchy in which the white “Aryan race” came out on top was superseded by a new discourse focusing on each nation’s right to preserve its own national culture – and, consequently, to defend the nation from mass immigration. Advanced primarily by French intellectual circles (often referred to as Nouvelle Droite), the philosophical premise within this new school of thought could be summarized as the “right to cultural differences” (Bar-On 2001; McCulloch 2006).

The French philosopher, Alain de Benoist, argued that biological racism belonged to the systematizing strategies within the natural sciences and that this view is symptomatic of an unfortunate biological-reductionist view of human beings (Bar-On 2001). According to Benoist, human nature is not dependent upon nature, but on culture; not on biology, but on history. Although this is not the place to trace the intellectual history of Benoist’s thinking, it should be noted that he was indebted to “the German ‘conservative revolutionary’ (CR) thinkers of the inter-war era, such as Ernst Jünger, Moeller Van Den Bruck, and Oswald Spengler” (Bar-On 2001: 340) – some of whom also played a role in the early phase of FrP in Norway (see Manifesto 1975). This new discourse proved electorally successful with the

24 The rise of Jobbik and of Golden Dawn more recently is another major exception (see Ellinas 2013; Kovács 2013). These two parties did not change ideologically before experiencing national electoral success.
breakthrough of Front National in 1984, providing other RWP parties with a powerful mobilizing master frame (see Rydgren 2005).

Somewhat different from the master frame, but with similar effects as regards increased political legitimacy is the existence of a “reputational shield.” The notion, which was introduced by Ivarsflaten (2006), aims at capturing the importance of party legacy when RWP parties are confronted with allegations of extremism and/or racism. The shield operates at three levels: in the public debate, in the local community and at the ballot box:

[…] a party that has a legacy as [something else than an anti-immigration] party will be able to use its reputation to fend off criticisms from other elite actors accusing the party of racism and extremism. By contrast, old fascist parties or brand new parties do not have such reputational shields at their disposal when facing such criticism. Second, a voter can more easily justify voting for a party proposing radically restrictive immigration policies to his or her peers and community as not being an act in support of racism or extremism if the party in question is known for promoting other policies, too. Third, voters can more easily justify their choice to themselves as not being motivated by racism when the party in question has a reputational shield (Ivarsflaten 2006: 6–7).

By having a reputational shield and adopting the “new master frame” created by Nouvelle Droite, RWP parties were able to once again mobilize on political discontent and anti-immigration sentiments. However, the position as a “new right” party showing unyielding commitment to democratic principles and the ethno-pluralist doctrine was, as noted, not secured once and for all. Mobilizing on an anti-establishment and anti-immigration platform is a risky business. Populist critique of the party system might shift from being a case of democratic corrective to a case of dangerous demagogy. Depending on the political situation, populism may, as argued by Arditi (2007: 54–87), be “a mode of representation,” “a symptom of democratic politics” or “an underside of democracy.” The distance from being a semi-loyal (and democratic) opposition to a disloyal (and undemocratic) opposition is not always that great. Furthermore, it matters whether opposition towards immigration is presented as motivated by racism or simply as skepticism towards high levels of immigration – because of concerns about unemployment, crime prevention, welfare exploitation, or cultural threat (Rydgren 2008). The latter seems more acceptable among the electorate, although mainstream parties may still be highly critical to parties using such frames.

Consequently, an influx of more militant extreme-right activist could be electorally damaging in at least three ways. Firstly, due the presence of a strong anti-racist norm (Blinder et al. 2013) and high levels of diffuse trust in post-industrial countries (Norris 1999), most voters will not support a party that is perceived as profoundly racist and/or undemocratic. Secondly, for strategic reasons, many voters are likely to refrain from casting their ballot for a party that seems to have no future prospects of direct policy influence through coalitions with mainstream parties (Givens 2005). Thirdly, and more indirectly, the presence of extreme militants within might de-facilitate a voter-friendly platform, as these groups tend to be more concerned with ideological purity than with electoral success (Art 2011: 39).

In sum, if RWP parties want to persist electorally they need to maintain political legitimacy and their initial reputational shield. Anti-immigration policies cannot be presented
within racist frames, but require frames that are widely accepted among the electorate. In other words, parties must “respond to anti-minority and anti-immigrant sentiment while also ensuring that their responses do not fall foul of the anti-prejudice norm” (Blinder et al. 2013: 854). Presenting immigration as a threat to specific “national values” is likely to prove particularly effective. While the Italian LN has presented immigration in general and Islam in particular as threat towards the regional identity of Northern Italy/Padania (Guolo 2000, cited in Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2005: 1089), Marine Le Pen has effectively argued that the Muslim communities are a threat to one of the core ideas of French republicanism, laïcité, supposedly under pressure in France (Betz 2013: 6–7). In countries generally viewed as more progressive, like the Netherlands and Scandinavia, it might be more effective to present immigration as threat towards liberal values, including gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech (e.g. De Koster et al. 2013). Indeed, this strategy was probably a main reason behind the unexpected success of LPF in the Dutch 2002 elections (Akkerman 2005). The liberal framing of Fortuyn’s xenophobia made it rather difficult to dismiss his policies as either extreme right-wing or nationalism (The Economist, 4 May, 2002, in Canovan 2005: 76), neither of which have any electoral potential in the Netherlands.

RWP parties will also need to deal with various kinds of potential extremists who are attracted by a (successful) party promoting anti-immigration policies and profound criticism of the ruling elite. Most effectively, parties may opt for the “zero tolerance” strategy towards activist who act militantly and/or proclaim racist statements. By doing so, they can send a clear signal to the voters and other parties that any kinds of relationships with extreme rightist and militant groups are unacceptable and unwanted. Moreover, transnational linkages may play a role. As noted by Almeida (2010: 247), many (but obviously not all) RWP parties tend to shy away from collaboration with other like-minded parties elsewhere because they need to stay within the realm of democratic acceptability in national politics.

**Towards an Authoritarian Mass Party**

The third factor to be considered in connection with the persistence of RWP parties is organization. Populism may not be defined as a specific organizational pattern (see Roberts 2006; Mudde 2004: 544–545), but it is certainly associated with some specific organizational features. Important ‘flavor enhancers’ include charismatic leadership (Zaslove 2008; Dix 1978), lack of institutionalization (Weyland 2001: 14) or at least an “anti-institutional bias” (Schedler 1996: 301), low levels of internal democracy (Mouzelis 1985) or autonomy within the movement (Barr 2009: 42), and weak – if any – ties with civil society (Kitschelt 2006). While this kind of organization might be effective in the first phase of electoral breakthrough, it is likely to become quite problematic in the phase of electoral persistence. In order to persist electorally, populist parties will generally need to institutionalize while remaining centralized, and to establish some organizational linkages. Here I will conceptualize this expected organizational change as a development towards an ‘authoritarian mass party’.

When RWP parties first emerged in post-war Europe, they were served not only to channel ideological resentment but also to present an organizational alternative to what was perceived as the unfortunate dominance of the bureaucratic-hierarchical party organization. They viewed the organizational model of the established parties as one of the main reasons explaining the inability of the latter to represent and implement the will of “the people.” Due
to cumbersome decision-making procedures and the influence of “special interests,” the established parties were both ineffective and undemocratic. What was needed was not only a new (thin) ideology, but also a new way of doing politics. In other words, the idea of launching a new organizational alternative was intrinsically linked to the ideology. As argued by Mouzelis (1985, 330), “there is a definite link between the goals and ideologies of movements called populist and their organizational and authority structures; ignoring this link results only in a vague and indeterminate understanding of what constitutes populism.” In this sense, the populist mobilization resembles the Green ideology, another post-materialist critique against the established party system that emerged in the early 1970s. However, whereas the Greens established parties on the principle of Basisdemokratie (Poguntke 1994) featuring amateur and collective leadership and high grassroots activism (Frankland et al. 2008), RWP parties seemed to be built around completely different principles.

The most frequently mentioned organizational feature of a populist organization is the presence of a political entrepreneur – the “charismatic leader” – who embodies the will of the people and who speaks on behalf of the “silent majority” (Meny and Surel 2002; Müller-Rommel 1998: 194; Taggart 2002: 67; Widfeldt 2000: 488; Zaslove 2008: 324). Since thin populist ideology sees “the people” as a homogeneous political entity, there is no need for parties with recurrent discussions on political tradeoffs. The leader already knows the will of “the people” and he (or in a few cases, she) is the only one capable of implementing this will.

The focus on a charismatic leader also affects other aspects of the organizational structure, such as organizational complexity, comprehensiveness and internal power structure. Populist parties are likely to be “non-bureaucratic” (Müller-Rommel 1998), as well as “selective and small in structure” (Taggart 1995). In a similar vein, Canovan (2005: 75) explicitly argues that populist parties can be identified by “their overwhelming dependence on personal leadership rather than institutional party structure,” whereas Zaslove (2008) claims that dominance of a charismatic leader “leads to a centralization of leadership and to a low level of party institutionalization.” Kitschelt (2006) proposes labelling them “movement parties,” arguing that such parties are characterized by meager investment in solving problems of collective action and social choice. In this sense, the populist model contrasts with traditional parties, which tend to have complex, hierarchal and bureaucratized organizations.

Furthermore, and as a consequence of the power of a charismatic leader and the lack of an effective organizational infrastructure, populist parties often exhibit “a type of authority structure that is quite distinct from that of other radically oriented popular movements and parties” (Mouzelis 1985: 341). Even though we should avoid concepts with negative connotations such as “Fürhrerparteien” (e.g. Wodak 2005), followers and activists in populist parties do not have much influence on the party’s development, and the level of internal democracy is low. Most of the power lies in the hands of the charismatic leader.

In other words, the organizational structure of a populist party is quite undeveloped – if there exists any organizational infrastructure at all. These parties are often “personal parties” (McDonnell 2013) or “personal vehicles” (Lucardie 2000); they are the product of the leader, rather than the other way around. The party leader is what Panebianco (1988: 145–146) calls the “unifying symbol.” Authority lies with the charismatic leader, who defines the identity and political behavior of the party. Party units typically found in other parties – local branches, county branches, auxiliary organizations (e.g. women’s branch, youth wing) – are loosely
connected, if they exist at all. Since the populist leader already embodies the will of “the people” and mobilizes followers through charismatic leadership, party members do not play an important role in terms of interest aggregation and campaigning. Furthermore, their entrepreneurial origins leave populist parties without any external promoter, and they tend to lack ties with organizations in civil society.

As a strategy for rapid mobilization of disaffected voters in increasingly mediatized democracies, the charismatic leader-based, non-bureaucratic organizational model may be electorally rewarding, for a while. In fact, it might even help populist party leaders to communicate core elements of the populist ideology to the voters:

Making themselves, in organizational terms, different from political parties also has the function of allowing the new populists to reinforce a crucial element in their appeal to the voters. Looking distinct from the other parties implicitly echoes the message of the need for a change of politics, for moving away from the cosy and corrupt consensus of the major parties (Taggart 2000: 75).

Perhaps needless to say, the ‘populist organizational model’ as described here, is, for several reasons, not very well suited for electoral persistence. Parties associated with or drawn towards charismatic leadership are likely to suffer when the party leader is eventually replaced by a new leader (Harmel and Svåsand 1993). They suffer from “organizational fragility” (Tarchi 2003: 200 in Vercesi 2014: 8). Similarly, Haegel and Lazar (2007: 310) argue that one of the weakest parts of the FN has been its organization, which they see as having been “small and regularly fac[ing] the problem of finding candidates, because their networks of influence remain fragile.”

While not specifically discussing populist parties, Bolleyer and Bytzek (2013: 788) argue that parties founded by individual entrepreneurs – a description which includes many populist parties – are less likely to sustain themselves electorally simply because they lack ties to already organized groups in society. And, based on observations from Belgium, Coffé (2005: 91) suggests that RWP parties might become better-organized if they operate within an environment characterized by “a traditionally well-organized nationalist subculture.”

Recently, scholars have become increasingly concerned with the organizational structure of populist parties and how it affects electoral persistence. Rydgren (2009: 3), for example, claims that a “well-developed organization may be a necessity for party survival after such a breakthrough.” Similarly, Mudde (2007: 265, italics in original) states that “electoral success can hardly be sustained without a functioning party organization.” Moreover, as noted by Kitschelt (1995: 71), having a well-organized party is not only a question of “instrumental significance for voter mobilization”: it represents a programmatic appeal too. Being able to organize one’s own organization effectively sends clear signals of Regierungsfähigkeit (the ability to govern). However, much of this literature says very little about the kinds of organizational features that constitute a “well-organized” or “well-functioning” party, or to what extent populist parties need to develop a specific organizational structure in order to survive electorally. In following, I discuss three organizational aspects which I see as important for electoral persistence: institutionalization, centralization, and lastly organizational linkages.
First of all, populist parties need to institutionalize. Following the seminal work by Huntington (1968), Janda (1980) and Panebianco (1988), (party) institutionalization can be conceptualized as both the routinization of internal party affairs and the development a distinct (party) identity beyond the current leadership. In other words, institutionalization involves not only a behavioral component but also an attitudinal one (see Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svåsand 2002). Huntington (1968: 12), for example, sees institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.” In a similar vein, Janda (1980) defines an institutionalized party as a party that is “reified in the public mind so that ‘the party’ exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued by those who identify with it.”

However, Panebianco’s (1980) definition does not explicitly include a behavioral component. He sees institutionalization primarily as the process whereby the party organization “becomes valuable in and of itself, and its goals become inseparable and indistinguishable from it.” Yet, as noted by Levitsky (1998: 81), the actual operationalization suggested by Panebianco (1988: 58–60) indicates that he also includes behavioral components in his conceptualization of institutionalization (e.g. the size of the party bureaucracy, the degree of homogeneity of the organizational units at various levels and the correspondence between actual and formal power structure). In this sense, Panebianco’s approach to institutionalization is, in practice, not so different from that of Huntington and Janda.

Second, such parties need to centralize. Following the work of Panebianco (1988: 67), a party trying to routinize the charismatic authority upon which it was initially founded has no other choice than to maintain its “highly centralized internal authority pattern.” And by centralization is meant “the degree to which power is concentrated in a social system” (Price quoted in Janda 1983: 27). A highly centralized party is therefore one in which power lies in the hands of a small group of people – at its most extreme, exclusively in the hands of the party leader. In a Weberian sense, such centralization could be said to replace the charismatic authority of the entrepreneurial party leader with the legal-rational authority of the party bureaucracy. This is the only way of keeping the party together until a common set of norms and values can be developed. After all, populist parties have “systems of belief which are diffuse; they are inherently difficult to control and organize, they lack consistency, and their activity waxes and wanes with a bewildered frequency” (Taggart 2000: 1-2).

Third, organizational linkages must be developed. According to Merkl (2007: 337), for instance, “maintaining dependable linkages between strong social groups and the party” is one of two key factors – the other being “pursuing desired policies” – for sustaining electoral support. The concept of organizational linkages refers to “a connection between those in elite positions [in the party] and the electorate at large” which “facilitates two-way communication between party elites and groups of voters, mediated through organizational channels and

25 The concept of institutionalization is frequently used in social science, including party research. For the most part it refers to a process at the systemic level rather than the development of political actors within the system (see Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Dalton and Weldon 2007). When the concept is used to analyze the actors it has mostly dealt with actors in new democracies rather than in established (see Randall and Svåsand 2002; Dix 1992). However, this does not render to concept less useful in the study of new parties – including the RWPs – in established democracies.

Here, in this short section, I mainly discuss contributions related to the ways in which institutionalization has been conceptualized in research on party organization.
based on the exchange of electoral mobilization for policy responsiveness” (Poguntke 2002b: 2, 5). In addition to the mass media, these organizational linkages connect the party to society, and may or may not help the party perform such basic tasks as interest aggregation, mobilization, and recruitment. It is the nature and strength of the organizational linkage that determines to what extent it will help the party to sustain its electoral support.

Based on Poguntke’s work, we may distinguish between three kinds of organizational linkages: the party’s own membership organization, auxiliary organizations, and ties to other organizations in civil society. Together, these three linkages constitute what Janda (1970: 107) calls “the pervasiveness of the organization.” Although party members are arguably less important in an “audience democracy” (Manin 1997) in which the media has replaced the intra-party discussion and inter-party negotiations in parliament as the main arena of political struggle, they are still important in terms of the core tasks of the political party: interest aggregation, recruitment, mobilization, and influence agents. It is the nature and strength of the organizational linkage that determines to what extent it will help the party to sustain its electoral support.

Mobilizing and Organizing Leadership

The fourth and final supply-side factor to be discussed is the role of the party leadership. Right-wing populism has frequently been associated with a specific kind of leadership: charismatic leadership (see Meny and Surel 2000; Müller-Rommel 1998: 194; Taggart 2002: 67; Widfeldt 2000: 488; Zaslove 2008: 324). As Canovan (1999: 6) notes, “associated with [the populist mood] is the tendency for heightened emotions to be focused on a charismatic leader.” In fact, some scholars even explicitly include the important and distinct role of leaders in their definition of “populism.” Dix (1978: 334, my italics), for example, has defined populism as “a political movement which challenges established elites in the name of a union between a leader and 'the people' (undifferentiated by group or class).” For parties without any organizational basis or even a coherent platform, charismatic leadership will obviously be advantageous in the phase of electoral breakthrough. However, for electoral persistence it might be problematic, primarily because charisma tends to counteract institutionalization, including routinization of behavior and value infusion.

The rise of many successful and unsuccessful (i.e. not persistent) RWP parties has been associated with charismatic leadership. In fact, in the literature there is even a “charismatic leader thesis” that holds that the rise of right-wing populism is inseparably connected to the presence of a charismatic leadership (Eatwell 2003: 65–67). Given that quite a few of the RWP parties that have experienced an electoral breakthrough have been headed by a charismatic leader, and that many of the voters voted for the leader rather than the party, this thesis seems plausible (for an overview of such claims, see Mudde 2007: 261).

A highly illustrative example is the case of the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn gained incredible popularity prior to the Dutch national elections in 2002; and even though (or perhaps because) he was killed during right before the election, his party – Lijst Pim Fortuyn – became the second-largest in the parliament after the votes were counted. Analyzing the
letters sent to Fortuyn after his assassination, Van Herwaarden (2005) claims he was almost like a political messiah and that his followers developed a distinct emotional relationship to him. Also others have pointed out that Fortuyn was highly charismatic in any reasonable sense of the term (see Lucardie 2008). In France, Front National voters were long simply called Lepénists, emphasizing the crucial role of the leader Jean-Marie Le Pen (see Mayer and Perrineau 1992; 1997). In Finland, the more recent rise of the PS appears closely associated with the popularity of Timo Soini, who is seen as a “text-book example of charismatic leadership” (Jutila and Sundell 2011: 7). Also other RWP leaders, such as FPÖ’s Jörg Haider, LN’s Umberto Bossi, SVP’s Christoph Blocher and REP’s Franz Schönhuber, have been seen as charismatic leaders. According to Zaslove (2004b: 71), for example, these leaders “represent an almost perfect incarnation of Max Weber’s ideal type of the charismatic leader.”

And Weber’s definition might be helpful for clarifying exactly what charisma does and why it matters in the phase of electoral breakthrough. According to Weber (quoted in Eisenstadt 1968: 46), charismatic authority is characterized by “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.” It is this authority that gives a new political entrepreneur exceptional mobilizing power and emotional magnetism. When a party is almost unknown to the electorate, a charismatic leader with rhetorical skills and the ability “to say aloud what people think” is obviously advantageous for promoting the new political alternative. From the perspective of the supporters, a charismatic leader is able to provide simple and appealing answers to complex problems of everyday life. Panebianco (1988: 66) also indicates that the charismatic qualities of the leader are capable of producing “a cohesive dominant coalition despite the absence of a process of […] institutionalization.” Furthermore, according to organizational psychology, a charismatic leader with clear visions may enhance cooperation patterns and motivations among followers (e.g. House 1977), whereas Mudde (2004: 556) claims that charismatic leadership is electorally successful in post-industrial society due to the presence of more critical citizens and the loss of traditional legal-bureaucratic authority.

All of these qualities may be very helpful in a phase of electoral breakthrough. In the long run, however, they may become problematic. Scholars have emphasized that the extremely personalized and charismatic leadership of such parties can serve to counteract any attempts at creating a more institutionalized and viable party organization (see Taggart 2000; Panebianco 1988: 53, 67; Müller-Rommel 1998). In other words, while charismatic leadership is advantageous in the early phase as way attracting disenchanted voters, the phase of electoral persistence requires a different kind of leadership. More specifically, and related to the process of organizational institutionalization, the leader will need organizational skills (Harmel and Svåsand 1993; Pedahzur and Brichta 2002). After the embryonic phase of parties founded by a political entrepreneur, it becomes equally important to have a leader who can effectively start building the party organization and consolidating the party’s relations with its political and social environment. In the words of Harmel and Svåsand (1993: 72–73),

 […] during the second phase of party development [i.e. electoral persistence], emphasis will be place on establishing the routinized mechanism of ‘control’ that were not necessary in the first phase [i.e. electoral breakthrough], when only the leader and
perhaps a few others represented the party in parliament. Also, demands ‘from below’ for development of electoral organisation are likely to arise during this second phase, as the taste of electoral success creates appetite for more of it. In addition, the presence of many office-holders and a growing number of party members eager to participate will create demands for delegation of responsibility, namely for ‘meaningful work’.

This is not to say that mobilizing qualities are rendered unimportant. RWP parties still need a creator (to expand the programmatic platform) and a preacher (to get the message out) (Pedahzur and Brichta 2002: 40). While this mobilizing quality is arguably more important in the early stage of party development, it remains important for a long time, far beyond the phase of electoral breakthrough. Building an institutionalized party organization and developing a comprehensive political platform takes time. Meanwhile, having a leader capable of further refinement of the key political message will remain important, not least in order to ensure that processes of de-alignment (from the mainstream parties) are turned into re-alignment (to the RWP party). Moreover, in a mediatized democracy, or what Manin (1997: 218) terms an “audience democracy,” a party leader should be able to communicate the message and draw attention to the party (see also Harmel and Svåsand 1993). This means, above all, being able to attract media coverage and handle the formats of modern mass media skillfully. Since RWP parties tend to lack other kinds organizational linkages – at least until these have been built and consolidated – they remain highly dependent on other channels of communication for electoral mobilization.

The Argument in Brief

The main argument put forward here is that the electoral persistence of right-wing populism is related to party change (actually, maintenance in the case of legitimacy) along with four key supply-side factors. Several features associated with an RWP party – limited number of issues, its “new right” ideological appeal, (non-existent) organizational structure and the conspicuous role of a charismatic leader – appear as valuable assets in the phase of electoral breakthrough. However, as argued in this chapter, each of these features may lead to various problems later, in the phase of electoral persistence. The prospects for further persistence are weak unless the party can expand its political platform to include several issues, can maintain its reputational shield and consolidate political legitimacy, can develop into an authoritarian mass party, and can select leaders with mobilizing and organizing skills. These four ‘survival strategies’ for populist parties are shown schematically in Table 2.1. The next five chapters present in-depth empirical analyses of the extent to which the development of FrP fits this theory.

Table 2.1: Four ‘survival strategies’ for RWP parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Electoral breakthrough</th>
<th>Electoral Persistence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Issues</td>
<td>Single-issue</td>
<td>→ Several-issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Ideology</td>
<td>New right; new master frame</td>
<td>→ Maintaining reputational shield and political legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Organization</td>
<td>Populist movement</td>
<td>→ Authoritarian mass party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Leadership</td>
<td>Charismatic</td>
<td>→ Mobilizer/organizer</td>
</tr>
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Chapter 3: From Single Issue to Several Issues

Yes, we are past the phase of protest. It is a time for everything; now we are a broad and responsible political party with an integrated alternative.

(FrP Chairman Carl I. Hagen to VG, May 18, 1991)²⁶

Introduction

FrP has gradually broadened its political platform. From being a single-issue party focusing and mobilizing exclusively on anti-taxation policies (see Bjørklund 1981; 2000), it has developed into a several-issue party with a comprehensive manifesto and at least four core mobilizing issues (immigration, geriatric care, taxation and policies on automobiles) as well as issue ownership to immigration policies (in 1997–2009) and geriatric care (in 2001).

As previously noted, being a single-issue party might be advantageous in the phase of electoral breakthrough but most, if not all, parties need to develop a broader political platform in order to survive in the long run. Not only does a detailed platform that deals with several issues tend to make a party’s actions in elected assemblies more predictable and reduce the potential of internal conflicts, it also provides opportunities for the party to reach different groups of voters. In a several-issue party, the manifestos address multiple issues or policy areas. Party elites and party members focus on different issues and display a fairly high level of issue cohesiveness, and voters are mobilized on the basis on a range of issues. Such a party has many strings to its bow and is less likely to suffer from emerging issue disagreement.

As in the other chapters in this thesis, the empirical analysis here draws on a wide range of sources: manifestos and surveys among party elites, members and voters. The main source is provided by 11 official FrP manifestos, where their length and content are in focus. However, party manifestos need to be complemented by other data sources. After all, the issues mentioned in any given manifesto are not necessarily identical with the party’s core issues, or with voter perceptions. For example, many of the issues mentioned in the manifesto might be “window-dressing,” whereas party elites, activists and voters in fact focus on other matters.

The chapter addresses this methodological challenge by assessing the party’s main campaign issues and analyzing data from two middle-level elite surveys (2001 and 2009), three party membership surveys (1991, 2000, and 2009) and national electoral surveys throughout the period (1973–2009). Unfortunately only the latter survey type covers the whole period of interest. The other surveys are included in order to examine potential developments over the last two decades and to put the party into a (Norwegian) comparative perspective. To make sense of the findings of the manifestos and the surveys, the chapter relies on contextual information provided by election reports, secondary literature, and general works on recent Norwegian history.

²⁶“All makt til Carl Ivar,” in VG, 18.05.91
The chapter begins by discussing and defining the concept of a “political issue.” It then goes on to investigate the number of issues and issue positions put forward in the party manifestos between 1973 and 2009. This section is limited to manifestos developed for parliamentary elections, although the party has also developed separate manifestos for the subnational level (county and municipal elections). As to methodology, the analysis draws on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2013). Third, the chapter examines issue saliency and party cohesion, based on the aforementioned surveys. This section discusses the extent to which the party elite and the party members care about more than just one single issue and the extent to which they hold similar views on less salient issues. The chapter ends with an analysis of the demand side, including voter motivations and issue ownership. Although the demand side is not the main focus of the chapter (or the thesis as such), this section serves as a corroborating analysis of the main findings. Throughout the chapter, FrP will be systematically compared with the three political parties Socialist Left (SV), the Labour Party (Ap) and the Conservatives (H).

What is a “political issue”?

Before presenting the empirical material, however, it is essential to clarify what meant by a “political issue.” A political issue may be specific (e.g. free abortion, anti-nuclear power, against a specific war or a specific tax), very broad (e.g. economic policy, welfare state, political system and fabric of society) or somewhere in-between (e.g. immigration policies, family policies, environmental policies). In any case, it differs from abstract ideological positions and ideological cleavages in the sense that a political issue refers to a specific aspect, challenge or part of social developments or society. Whereas ideology usually refers to “a system of collective held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements” (Hamilton 1987: 38), political issues are more concrete, and may (or may not) be an indicator of abstract political ideologies such as liberalism or socialism. Furthermore, whereas ideologies tend to travel across times and contexts (though their saliency may vary significantly), political issues tend to be time-specific and contextually bound. The existence of a political issue depends upon successful politicization of certain latent social, economic and cultural conflicts. For example, while universal male suffrage had been a political issue in many Western European countries in the second half of the 19th century, it became increasingly depoliticized in the first half of 20th century, before disappearing completely from the political debate. Concerns for the environment and the influx of immigration could serve as examples of the opposite. These two issues had not been particularly salient in the public debate until they were successfully turned into political issues and used for mobilizing voters in the 1970s and the 1980s, respectively.

As these few examples suggest, the political saliency of various issues changes over time, which implies that the necessity for political parties to address specific issues varies. Any analysis of the comprehensiveness of a party’s political platform must take into account the specific political context in which that party operates. Only then can the analysis assess to what extent the party presents a coherent and comprehensive political alternative.
**Party manifesto**

Party manifestos in FrP (as in other Norwegian parties) represent a joint product of party elites and local activists, debated at and adopted by the party congress – the highest authority in the party. In this sense, the manifesto could be interpreted as the official political position of the party as a whole. It is commonly used as the main indicator of a party’s social analysis, political diagnosis and practical-political solutions (see Narud and Valen 2004: 36ff).

**Manifesto Length**

When FrP experienced its electoral breakthrough in 1973, the party did not have a comprehensive political platform. The “manifesto” presented by the party was far from a typical party program: indeed, it could hardly be called a manifesto in the usual sense. The party’s founding leader, Anders Lange, viewed such a document as unnecessary; for him, comprehensive manifestos and programs of principles were associated with the old, outdated, established parties. Lange’s ideas dominated also after his death in 1974. Not even at the party congress in 1975, a few months prior to the party’s first municipal and county election, was any manifesto adopted. The party planned to run for local elections simply by advocating its initial political message: the need for fewer and lower taxes, downsized bureaucracy and less state intervention.

![Figure 3.1: Party manifesto length for SV, Ap, H and FrP, 1973–2009](image)

*Source:* “Vi vil” [We want], NSD party archive and party websites.

*Note:* FrP in 1973 refers to the "We want” manifesto and not the "We are tired of” manifesto. The manifesto in 1977 includes the “program of principles” (955 words).

Over time, however, the party’s manifesto has incorporated many issues and become fairly detailed. The first draft of a *Handlingsprogram* (action manifesto) was written by Carl I. Hagen prior to the 1976 party convention (Hagen 1984: 162). FrP chairman at the time, Arve Lønnum, wrote a draft version of a *Prinsippprogram* (program of principles). As the main

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27 Individuals or minor factions within the party may put forward other issues (and other issue positions) in the public debate, but the party manifesto still represents the view of the dominant group.

28 *VG*, 17.02.75
spokesman for the idea of developing a normal party, Hagen – unsurprisingly – developed a rather comprehensive manifesto. In fact, already by 1977 the party had developed a manifesto which was longer than those of Ap or SV and almost equal to H (see Figure 3.1). And in 2005 FrP had a longer manifesto than any of these three parties.

**Manifesto Comprehensiveness**

Length is only a superficial indicator of how comprehensive a manifesto is: more important is the number of issues covered by the manifesto. To what extent do FrP manifestos take up a range of policy issues? This can be analyzed using the CMP manifesto methodology.

The CMP methodology is fairly simple. Basically, it codes all sentences or quasi-sentences according to a pre-defined set of 56 policy indicators. These indicators capture most of the relevant policies put forward by political parties in Western democracies. To control for the differing lengths of party manifestos, the number of (quasi-)sentences is divided by the total number of (quasi-)sentences in the whole manifesto. It thus becomes possible to undertake a standardized comparison of how much of the manifesto is devoted to one of the 56 pre-defined categories.²⁹

Various scholars have noted several shortcomings of the CMP methodology, including the possible irrelevance of many categories (e.g. Mikhaylov et al. 2012), validity problems with fixed-scale components (Benoit and Laver 2007), and the lack of relevant indicators. While these criticisms should be seriously considered when using the CMP dataset, they are less problematic for the analysis in this chapter. Firstly, the problem of having pre-defined categories is at best marginal among political parties in Norway. With the exception of SV’s 1973 manifesto, more than 96% of the sentences in the manifesto were captured by some of the pre-defined categories. Secondly, the analysis here is not concerned with the actual policy position (which will be assessed qualitatively) but rather to what extent policy issues are covered by the manifesto at all.

In order to assess the comprehensiveness of FrP manifestos over time, and then compare it with the manifestos of three other Norwegian parties, the 56 policy categories must be collapsed into broader policy categories. Otherwise the material becomes extremely detailed making it very difficult to identify or present possible trends. The important question, then, is how to categorize the indicators. The CMP project (see Volkens et al. 2013) suggests subsuming all indicators under one of the following seven major policy areas: external relations; freedom and democracy; political system; economy; welfare and quality of life; fabric of society; social groups. While these categories might be useful for certain research questions, they are also fairly broad, collapsing policy issues that are normally regarded as distinct – at least in Norwegian politics (see below). For a more fine-grained and context-sensitive analysis of the development of manifesto comprehensiveness, we can profitably split the broad categories suggested by CMP into more distinct policy issues. However, it is important to keep issues at a certain level of abstraction and to ensure that the categorization scheme does not become too detailed.

²⁹ Through different techniques, the policy position of a specific party (or party family) can be estimated, but that is irrelevant in this chapter.
Based partly on elections surveys and election reports and partly on earlier surveys among middle-level elites in Norwegian parties, the following additional policy issues have been identified as distinct in the Norwegian political context: immigration, the environment, schools and education, infrastructure, moral issues (including abortion), culture, regional policy, and law and order. However, it should be noted that there are no set answers to how the CMP indicators could be organized into broader categories: it depends on the research question (see e.g. Bäck et al. 2011). Combining one or several of the pre-defined indicators in the CMP dataset, I have created these eight new issues listed above as follows. Infrastructure has been separated from general economic issues. A new category, “the environment,” has been constructed on the basis of references to either anti-growth economy (initially part of the “economy” category) or environmental protection (initially part of the category “welfare and quality of life”). Both education and culture have been separated from “general welfare policies” and are now treated as distinct policy issues. “Regional policy” has been created using measures of centralization and decentralization (initially part of “political system”) and references to farmers (initially part of “social groups”). The broad and rather unfocused category called “fabric of society” has been split into three more specific categories: immigration and national identity; moral issues; and law and order. The other categories remain almost identical. A complete list of all categories and indicators is provided in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Policy areas and respective indicators based on (but not identical with) those of the Comparative Manifesto Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Economy</td>
<td>Free enterprise, incentives, market regulations, economic planning, corporatism, protectionism (positive and negative), general economic goals, Keynesian demand management, productivity, controlled economy, nationalization, economic orthodoxy, Marxist analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Welfare</td>
<td>Welfare state expansion/limitation, social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Infrastructure</td>
<td>Technology and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Education</td>
<td>Education expansion/limitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Political system</td>
<td>Governmental and administrative efficiency, political corruption, and political authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Regional issues</td>
<td>Decentralization/centralization; farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Social groups</td>
<td>Labor groups (positive and negative), middle-class and professional groups, underprivileged minority groups and non-demographic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Culture</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Law and Order</td>
<td>Law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Immigration and national identity</td>
<td>National way of life (positive and negative) and multiculturalism (positive and negative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 Two minor exceptions: “Farmers” are, as noted, no longer part of “social groups” but are included under “regional issues,” and “freedom and democracy” now includes the indicator called “social harmony,” which had been part of “fabric of society,” a category eliminated from my analysis.
Table 3.1 continues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(11) Freedom and</td>
<td>Freedom and human rights, democracy, constitutionalism (positive and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>negative), and social harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) The environment*</td>
<td>Environmental protection and anti-growth economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) External relations</td>
<td>Foreign special relationships (positive and negative), anti-imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(positive), peace and internationalism (positive and negative), the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Union (positive and negative), and the military (positive and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>negative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) Moral issues</td>
<td>Traditional morality (positive and negative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (see Volkens et al. 2013). *Anti-economic growth was not used prior to 1989.

Table 3.2 shows the share of FrP’s general manifestos devoted to these fourteen policy issues over time. The development is quite clear: the manifestos have gradually become more diverse and more comprehensive. Initially, economic issues occupied a significant place: in 1973, as much as two thirds of the manifesto concerned economic policies – more specifically, orthodox economic policies and free enterprises. The manifesto argued vigorously against taxation (and progressive taxation in particular), as well as against expropriation of property and “towering public budgets” (ALP manifesto 1973).

Over time, however, economic policies have become a less important element in FrP manifestos. The share of the manifesto devoted to such issues decreased to two fifths already in 1977, before decreasing further to a quarter in the late 1990s and a fifth in 2009. As the party has become less concerned with economic issues, the content of such issues has changed as well. While the party has kept many references to free enterprises, there has been a sharp decrease in mention of policies classified as orthodox economic measurements – these basically disappeared during the 1980s and 1990s. Instead the manifestos refer to the importance of various incentives and general tax reduction for businesses (FrP manifesto 1989; 2009), increased productivity (see FrP manifestos 1977; 2009) and the need for less protectionism (FrP manifesto 2005). “Protectionist policies” and various kinds of subsidies will eventually lead to a one-sided development, making national businesses ill-suited for international competition (FrP manifesto 2005: 20). In this sense, the party has remained fairly consistently committed to economic liberalism throughout the period studied here.

In contrast to economic issues, which have decreased in prominence over time, welfare issues have increased quite significantly – from 10% or less of the (quasi-)sentences until the late 1980s to around 15% in the 2000s. In other words, whereas these issues were initially almost non-existent, they have gradually become among most important in FrP manifestos. Furthermore, for a long time, most references to welfare policies concerned welfare limitation rather than welfare expansion. The party held that social security benefits and social security systems should remain at a minimum level, so people would not become tempted to stop working (see FrP manifesto 1981). After the die-hard liberals left the party in the mid-1990s there was a sharp decrease in statements urging that the welfare state should limit its benefits and a sharp increase in share of statements referring to various kinds of...
welfare state expansion. Here the party has focused particularly on care for the elderly and health care (see FrP manifestos 2001; 2005; 2009).

Table 3.2: Policy issues* in FrP’s general manifestos, 1973–2009 (% of sentences or quasi-sentences)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Political System</th>
<th>External Relations</th>
<th>Social Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Law and Order</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Freedom and Democracy</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Moral issues</th>
<th>Regional issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project. *For detailed operationalization of the various policy categories, see Table 3.1.

Transportation (including technology) is another issue which has become a major issue in FrP manifestos. Between 1977 and 1997 such issues occupied between 4 and 8% of the (quasi-)sentences in the manifesto. In the three most recent manifestos, however, they constitute between 9 and 12%. To be sure, FrP has always been the party for car-owners and private motoring (see FrP manifesto 1977), but since the turn of the millennium such issues has featured more and more prominently in party manifestos. Basically, the party wants more roads to be built, and the speed limits to be raised. Moreover, it also advocates a hefty reduction, if not complete elimination, of various taxes and fees related to private motoring. These have been described as unnecessary “cash cow” (melkeku) for the state (e.g. FrP manifesto 2001).
Also education issues have gradually gained prominence in the manifestos. While the topic was barely mentioned in the first three manifestos and remained rather marginal in the 1990s, it occupied 9% of the manifesto in 2005 and 2009. Initially, the arguments advanced on this topic resembled the radical right’s account of the educational crisis observed elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s. As noted by Brown (1990: 72), this account argued that “the spirit of competition and excellence had been sacrificed in order to make the educational system conform to a socialist notion of social justice.”

Policies related to the political system have also been addressed in FrP manifestos – though to varying degrees. And in contrast to education and transportation, this issue has become somewhat less important over the years. In this broad category, it is especially governmental and administrative efficiency which has been discussed, while concerns about possible political corruption and lack of political authority have been almost non-existent. FrP has consistently argued in favor of cutting down bureaucracy and making public decision-making more efficient.

The share of policies related to external relations has remained fairly stable over time, ranging between 8 and 13% of the manifestos. Within this category the party has particularly advocated a strong pro-military position and, to a lesser extent, a pro-globalization position. Furthermore, it has been highly critical of state-financed foreign aid. With regard to Norwegian EU membership, however, the policy position has been far more ambivalent and unstable. In the 1993 manifesto, which has extensive coverage of the EU issue, the party presented both positive and negative aspects of the European Union. The reason was simple: the party was highly divided in this issue (see section on FrP’s elite and rank and file), and held that such questions should be decided by referendum.

Another significant change in FrP’s political platform is the increase in references to specific social groups. While such references were completely absent in the first manifesto in 1973, they appear in all other manifestos, especially after the late 1990s. However, further decomposition into more specific indicators shows very little consistency over time. It is hard to detect any clear pattern, as the references to different groups vary significantly from one election to another. For example, labor categories (i.e. workers, trade unions, or unemployed) are positively mentioned in 1997 and 2009, but not in 2001 and 2005. In fact, the only consistent feature with regard to social groups is the lack of references to middle-class, professional groups and underprivileged minorities.

Typical issues associated with right-wing populist parties elsewhere in Europe – law and order, cultural policies and immigration and national identity – are perhaps mentioned less in FrP’s manifesto than might have been expected. However, all of these have become more prominent over time. Cultural policies gained importance for the first time during the 1980s. Although such policies disappeared completely in the early 1990s, they reappeared in the early 2000s. In terms of content, mentions under cultural policies have become more nationalist over time, though still primarily inspired by liberalism (see also Hylland 2011). Law and order policies are also more comprehensively discussed in recent years, particularly since the early 1990s. Immigration policies – including references to national identity and opposition to multiculturalism – entered FrP manifestos already in the late 1970s. However,

31 Such issues were for example prominent in the 1975 manifesto, which is not covered by the table
the manifestos have never paid much attention to such issues. In fact, immigration questions have not taken up more than 5% of the whole manifesto (as happened in 2009). (A more detailed analysis of the content of immigration policy is presented in Chapter 4).

The policy category called “freedom and democracy” refers to the importance of personal freedom, civil rights, freedom from bureaucratic control, and freedom from coercion in the political and economic spheres, and individualism. It also includes statements referring to democracy as a preferable goal or a method of decision-making in organizations; the involvement of all citizens in decision-making; and the role of the Norwegian Constitution. Such issues are not among the major ones for FrP, but they are to a greater or lesser degree mentioned in its manifestos. Importantly, the party has always emphasized the need for more “negative liberty” – freedom from interference by other people. More specifically, the manifestos have been particularly concerned with the interference of the bureaucracy, politicians and the state. As noted in the 1977 manifesto, the party wants a state with limited powers and a “society with free, independent citizens;” it does not accept a “planned economic system which has resulted in an expert rule, a large state bureaucracy, a large county bureaucracy and large municipal bureaucracy.”

Three of the most negligible policy issues in the 2009 manifesto are moral issues, environmental issues and regional policies. However, even with regard to these issues, FrP has not been without distinct and well-known policy positions. In typical moral issues, it has been the staunchest defender of less restrictive alcohol policies. Moreover, the party has – together with the Christian People’s Party – actively supported the traditional nuclear family and opposed gay rights. As regards environmental policies, FrP manifestos have focused on problems of pollution, rather than anti-growth economy or climate change. In fact, the party has been the only one in Norway to question “human-caused climate change” (see Tjernshaugen et al. 2011). Båtstrand (2012: 12) even argues that FrP position is consistent with “anti-environmentalism.” And finally, with regard to regional policies, the party has, according the CMP data, been promoting both decentralizing as well as centralizing measurements. It has also addressed conditions in the agricultural sector by arguing that farmers should rationalize production and should rely less on various types of public subsidies.

**FrP’s manifesto comprehensiveness compared with other parties**

We can measure the degree of manifesto comprehensiveness by calculating the standard deviation across parties and over time. This measure of variability basically shows the distribution of policy issues per year for each party. High standard deviation means that the manifesto tends to focus on one or a few selected issues, whereas low standard deviation means more attention to several issues. The minimum standard deviation is always 0 (i.e. all issues are equally covered, in this case 7.14% for each issue), while the maximum standard is related to the number of categories. With fourteen categories, the maximum deviation is 26.8: a situation in which all content in a manifesto belongs to one category only.

Figure 3.2 shows how the standard deviation of the issue distribution for four Norwegian parties has changed over time. While FrP manifestos have generally become more comprehensive over time, the manifesto comprehensiveness of the three other parties – SV, Ap and H – has remained fairly constant throughout the period. As expected from the detailed analysis in the previous section, FrP was fairly single-issue oriented in its first “manifesto.” In
a comparative perspective, FrP manifestos remained less diverse throughout the 1980s and in the early 1990s, but since then issue comprehensiveness has been similar to that of the other parties. In fact, the most recent manifesto emerges as more diverse than the manifestos of either SV or Ap.

Figure 3.2: Standard deviation of fourteen policy categories* in the party manifestos of SV, Ap, H and FrP, 1973–2009

Source: The Comparative Manifesto Data. *The fourteen categories are listed in Table 3.1.

However, the standard deviation cannot tell us to what extent the manifestos actually cover the same issues. Quite different distributions across the fourteen policy issues may produce exactly the same standard deviation.\(^{32}\) To see if the manifestos are becoming more similar not only in terms of comprehensiveness but also with regard to what kind of issues they address, we need to calculate another standard deviation. This time the standard deviation is based on the differences between how much space a specific issue is accorded in the FrP manifesto (for a specific year) and how much space in the manifestos of the other three parties (for the same specific year). A minimum score of zero indicates that the manifesto focus to the same degree on precisely the same issues, while the maximum score of 39.2 refers to a situation where the manifestos of two parties focus exclusively on one single, but different, issue.

Figure 3.2 shows that FrP manifestos have gradually become similar to the manifestos of the SV, Ap and H. Needless to say, the similarity refers not to actual policy position, which

\(^{32}\) For example, if economic issues make up 10% of party A’s manifesto and 20% of party B’s manifesto, and, conversely welfare issues make up 20% of party A’s manifesto and 10% of B’s manifesto, the standard deviation will be exactly the same for party A and party B.
still differs quite substantially among the three parties; the figure refers to the fact that the issue saliency (not issue position) in the FrP manifesto is increasingly similar to the issue saliency of other Norwegian parties. FrP manifestos are most similar to those produced by the H, and less similar to those of SV. Which issues cause the difference between FrP and the H is not completely consistent over time, but in generally the latter has been relatively more concerned with education, the environment, social groups, cultural and regional policies, and relatively less focused on economic issues. The difference between FrP and the two left-wing parties are more related to the latter being relatively more concerned with welfare issues, external relations, environmental issues (SV in particular) and social groups, and relatively less concerned with economic issues.

![Figure 3.3: Standard deviation of ‘issue focus’ differences between FrP manifestos and the manifestos of SV, Ap and H, 1973–2009.](image)

Source: The Comparative Manifesto Data. *The fourteen categories into which the manifestos have been categorized are listed in Table 3.1.

Note: The graphs have been produced by the following two-step method. First, I have calculated the differences in issue focus for all fourteen issues in the manifestos of FrP, SV, Ap and H throughout the period 1973–2009. Second, the standard deviation has been calculated on the basis of the variation of difference in issue focus per year for three dyadic relationships (i.e. FrP/SV, FrP/Ap, and FrP/H).

However, although despite some methodological advantages associated with the manifesto data (for instance, they represent the party’s official policies and they allow for a longitudinal-comparative analysis of issue saliency throughout the period), there are a few but important limitations as well. Firstly, the manifestos may overestimate the extent to which the party
elites, members and voters actually care about, are attracted to or are mobilized by certain political issues. A manifesto that is comprehensive in terms of issue coverage does not indicate a several-issue party; it may simply reflect the interests of a few active members and/or representatives and the fact that most manifestos are produced in a way that almost automatically leads to expansion, as members, activists or internal policy committees propose new topics prior to the manifesto discussion at the party congress. There is also an element of path-dependency involved in the production process. Very rarely, if ever, does a party create a new manifesto from scratch. Any new manifesto is usually a modification of its predecessor.

Secondly, for obvious reasons, the manifestos seek to hide internal political disagreements. While certain paragraphs or sections in a manifesto might be fairly vague, they are rarely entirely inconsistent. And even if they were, it would be difficult to know whether such inconsistencies should be interpreted as lack of party cohesion or simply as unclear thinking. Thus, manifestos are inadequate as data if we want to test one of the most important implications of the single-issue thesis: that party elites, members and voters lack cohesion on other issues than the most important one(s). In the next sections we look into the validity of the single-issue thesis using data from surveys among the middle-level elite (congress delegates) and the party on the ground (rank and file members).

**Party Elites and the Rank and File**

**The FrP elite, and the rank and file**

To analyze empirically the extent to which the FrP elite (operationalized as delegates to party congresses) and rank and file (operationalized as party members) focus on only one single issue, and the extent to which they disagree on issues that are of less importance, two scales have been constructed: (1) issue saliency and (2) issue disagreement. The method has been inspired by the work of Niedermayer (1988) and Erlingsson et al. (2014).

The issue saliency scale was constructed as follows. In all surveys, members and delegates were asked their opinion on several policy statements, ranging from 18 statements in 1991 to 22 statements in 2009. Although the lists of statements in the various surveys were far from exhaustive in terms of policy areas, they certainly covered a wide range of topics, including economic policies, gender equality, immigration, the environment, and Norwegian EU membership (for a full list of statements, see Appendix). However, even though many issues were covered, it should be noted that the saliency scale is also to some extent a function of the statements that were presented to the members and delegates. For example, the statement regarding geriatric care, presented to members only in 1991 and 2000, and to the delegate survey in 2001, contributes significantly to the saliency of welfare politics among the FrP elite and the rank and file in these three surveys (see more below). For this reason, the survey results will be presented chronologically, with explicit comparison of members and delegates only in 2000/01 and 2009, when both groups were given identical lists of statements to choose from.

Having decided whether they agreed or disagreed with the statements (they were all Likert items), members and delegates were asked to judge which of the statements they personally regarded as the most important, the next most important and the third most important, irrespective of whether they agreed or disagreed with the statements as such.
Drawing on Niedermayer (1988), I then calculated the overall saliency of one particular statement according to the following formula: $(3 \times \text{most important} + 2 \times \text{second most important} + 1 \times \text{third most important}) \times 100/(3 \times \text{number of respondents})$. An item receives the maximum score of one hundred if all members or delegates view it as the most important issue, whereas it receives the minimum score of zero if no members or delegates see it as one of the three most important issues. This is the basic idea of the issue salience scale. However, in order to compare the survey data with the manifesto, the statements have been re-organized into larger policy categories mirroring the categorization discussed in the previous section. For a detailed description of how this was carried out, see Table A3.1 in the Appendix.

The construction of the issue disagreement scale is far more straightforward. For each of the statements, the standard deviation has been calculated. And the issue disagreement scale for the larger policy categories is simply the mean of the standard deviation for each of the statements included in the policy category. The minimum score of zero reflects a situation where all the answers of the respondents are identical, and the maximum score of two reflects a situation where half of the respondents’ answers agree completely and the other half disagree completely. While acknowledging that the standard deviation might be problematic — after all, it assumes a highly unrealistic level of measurement, namely that Likert items are at an interval scale — it provides more information about the level of disagreement than any other measurements of the distribution of answers.

The first survey carried out among FrP members was conducted in the early 1990s when the party — at least at the elite level — was struggling with factionalism. A few of these conflicts (the question of Norwegian EEC/EU membership and the role of Christianity) are represented also in the survey data, and will be commented upon shortly.

The relationship between issue disagreement and issue saliency is shown in Figure 3.4. We see that several issues are important for the rank and file, including welfare, economy and the EU-question. As previously noted, the saliency of welfare politics among party members is due almost exclusively to their interest in improved geriatric care. The saliency of economic issues is, on the other hand, due to a strong interest in economic growth and high productivity and to a lesser extent due to opposition towards public measures to fight unemployment. “Radical-right” issues such as immigration and law and order are far less salient than expected, though especially the statement tapping into law and order probably underestimates the saliency of this particular issue.

33 The maximum standard deviation in SPSS has been calculated as if it were trying to estimate the standard deviation in the population. Hence, it depends on the number of respondents and gravitates towards 2 as the number of respondents increases. In this case, there are enough respondents for each party, so the difference between the estimated standard deviation and the standard deviation of the actual respondents is marginal.

34 The most obvious alternative, the opinion balance, which is used by many electoral researchers, would miss out on the difference between a distribution where half the respondents answer agree completely and the other half disagree completely, and a distribution in which half of the respondents’ answers agree somewhat and the answers of other half disagree somewhat. In both cases, the opinion balance would be zero, yet the former is obviously characterized by more disagreement than the latter.

35 The statement did not refer to getting ‘tough on crime’ but to the idea that the main purpose of prisons should be re-integration of prisoners in society. While FrP has usually been more concerned with the principle of revenge than with rehabilitation, 59% agreed with this statement (which was positively formulated).
In terms of issue disagreement, members disagree somewhat on most issues, yet not profoundly. Two issues – the EEC/EU and immigration – could be considered exceptions to this rule, though in different ways. Whereas the idea that immigrant should not receive economic support to maintain their own culture is opposed by most of the members, the question of Norwegian membership in the EEC/EU is disputed. However, even on this issue there is a large majority for one position, namely that Norway should join (70% in favor and only 17% against). The only issue which hides substantial disagreement is moral issues, which is no surprise given that it includes both alcohol taxation (on which the members do not disagree at all) and the role of Christianity in society (on which the members do disagree). Nevertheless, the internal conflict between the Christian conservatives who emphasize the cultural importance of Christianity and the secular wing dominated by the liberalist faction hardly makes FrP a single-issue party.

The second survey was sent out in the early 2000s – to members in 2000 and delegates at the party conventions in 2001. As in the early 1990s, the party was again experiencing internal factionalism, though now this was more related to whether or not FrP should become an office-seeking party and how the party should frame its immigration skepticism. Thus, we

Figure 3.4: Issue saliency and issue disagreement among FrP members in 1991
Source: Membership survey 1991
Note: For issue operationalization, see Table A3.1 in Appendix.
should not expect very high scores on the disagreement scale. Moreover, without a liberalist faction, cohesion should have increased further.

Issue disagreement and issues saliency among delegates and members in 2000/01 is shown in Figure 3.5. As in 1991, the surveys confirm that the FrP elite and members care about more than just one issue. The most important issues seem to be welfare (geriatric care), economy (growth, tax cuts rather than welfare, and acceptance of income inequalities), external relations (military), skepticism to immigration, and law and order. These issues were important for both members and delegates, although the latters were less concerned with geriatric care, immigration, and law and order, and more concerned with economic issues and external relations.

![Figure 3.5: Issue saliency and issue disagreement among FrP members in 2000 and delegates in 2001](image)

Source: Membership survey 2000 and congress delegates survey 2001. Only the most important issues are labelled in the figure.

Note: For issue operationalization, see Table A3.1 in Appendix.

In the early 2000s, delegates seem to be fairly cohesive on welfare issues, economic policies, external relations, immigration and, to a lesser extent, law and order. Similarly, party members hold fairly cohesive views on welfare, external relations and immigration. In contrast to the elite, they seem to disagree more on economic policies, and on law and order. While members agree on the importance of economic growth and privatization, they disagree
on whether greater income inequalities should be accepted (57% accept greater inequalities, with 25% against). The fact that members also disagree on law and order issues probably reflects a cross-partisan “social democratic way of thinking about crime and punishment” (Pratt and Eriksson 2013: 192): that, when trying to curb crime, preventive work is better than harsh prison sentences. Although FrP is Norway’s most authoritarian party by far, a quarter of the members agree with the “social democratic way of thinking.”

The only issue profoundly disputed among members as well as delegates concerns Norway and EU membership. However, in contrast to 1991, this issue had decreased in salience on the political agenda by the early 2000s. In sum, the surveys show that the elites and members are concerned with a range of issues. Although they show lower cohesion on less important issues, they hold fairly similar views on such issues too – with possible exception of the EU question.

The third and final surveys to be commented upon were carried out in 2009, that is, at the end of the period covered in this thesis. At this point, the party seemed no longer plagued by internal conflicts; it had consolidated its position as the largest Norwegian right-wing party on the electoral arena, which also demonstrated that it was less leadership-dependent than assumed by many commentators and scholars. It could hardly be argued that voters, members and elites had been exclusively attracted by the charismatic qualities of the long-standing chairman, Carl I. Hagen. Instead, as seen from Figure 3.6, the issue saliency scale shows a consistent pattern of important issues for the party elite and members. As in previous surveys, the elite and the rank and file seem particularly concerned with economic issues (privatization, economic growth), immigration (assimilation, asylum seekers and immigration as cultural threat) and external relations (defense and foreign aid). Welfare issues appear less salient in 2009, but this was due to the absence of a statement regarding geriatric care, which is by far the most important welfare issue for FrP.

While these surveys suggest that the kinds of issues that members and delegates care about remain fairly constant (similar if not identical to previous surveys), they also indicate a growing gap between members and delegates with regard to the most important issues: anti-immigration and right-wing economic policies. While members are far more concerned with the former than the latter, it is the other way around for the delegates. I return to the implications of this finding shortly.

In terms of issue disagreement, party members and elites are fairly cohesive on most issues. Not surprisingly, the most cohesive issue is the immigration, but even on economic issues they seem to hold similar views. With privatization, members tend to hold more conflicting views on progressive taxation (29% in favor and 51% against) and rising income inequalities (46% in favor and 26% against).
The most disputed issues are the EU question and, to lesser extent, welfare matters. On Norwegian membership in the EU, the party has drifted towards a more Euro-skeptical position (see also Skinner 2011). While a large majority of the members were initially pro-EU (in 1991, see above), the skeptical faction had become slightly bigger than the positive faction by 2009 (43%/40% among members and 39%/38% among delegates).\footnote{The rest of the members said either ‘both agree and disagree’ (11%) or ‘don’t know’ (6%). Corresponding figures for delegates were 9% and 14%, respectively.} Fortunately for the party, the EU issue is far less salient than two decades earlier. Welfare questions have become more disputed partly because geriatric care is no longer included in the category (and everyone in FrP agreed on this topic) and partly because a growing share of the members believe that welfare is more important than tax cuts (7% for welfare and 79% for tax cuts in 1991, and 17% for welfare and 56% for tax cuts in 2009).

Despite some interesting developments regarding issue saliency (especially the elite/rank and file gap) and a few cases of growing disagreement, the overall picture is still that FrP seems to be concerned with a wide range of issues, that the issues are similar on
different levels within the party, and that the party is quite cohesive on most issues, especially on those that are perceived as important.

In sum, the membership and delegate surveys provide material that both supports the manifesto analysis and modifies previous finding. Both analyses indicate that FrP is far from a single-issue party. It party has attracted, mobilizes and recruited activists and representatives on the basis of more than one issue. However, the surveys also indicate that the party’s programmatic appeal is far more focused than suggested by the manifesto analysis. While the manifesto analysis showed a dramatic increase in the saliency of economic issues and a significant increase in coverage of a wide range of different issues (welfare in particular), the surveys highlight the importance of the immigration issue. There seems to be a core group of four issues that fairly consistently display high issue saliency among elites and members: economic issues, anti-immigration, external relations (military) and welfare (geriatric care). Unfortunately, the surveys did not touch on transportation or education – it would have been interesting to see if the increased manifesto saliency of these issues is anchored among elites and members. The growing importance of these issues is further discussed in the section on voter motivations and issue ownership.

The surveys also provide strong evidence against another implication of the single-issue thesis: that elites and members agree on a certain number of issues but completely lack cohesion on others. While the surveys do indicate a weak negative relationship between issue saliency and issue disagreement (less disagreement on more important issues), there is little evidence to indicate that FrP has been extremely cohesive on one (or two) important issue(s) and extremely disjointed on less salient issues.

Before briefly putting these finding in a comparative perspective, one interesting finding should be commented upon, although it is not directly linked to the single-issue thesis. As noted, it is – from a methodological point of view – highly problematic to use the surveys in a longitudinal analysis. The number and content of the statements differ too much. However, the survey results do indicate an “issue saliency gap,” which seems to have grown larger, between the elite and rank and file. Party members seem to be more post-materialist than materialist, focusing much more on immigration than economic issues – whereas the elite appear more materialist than post-materialist, as their issue focus is the complete opposite of the members. If this gap continues to grow, the party is likely to experience yet another ideological conflict.

**FrP elite and rank and file compared with other parties**

To what extent are the findings in the previous section typical, or a unique feature of FrP? That question can be answered only by analyzing the results in a comparative perspective. This section will not attempt to elaborate on issue saliency and issue disagreement for SV, Ap and H in all five surveys. Instead, I first present a table (3.3) showing the number of important issues for each of the parties’ members and delegates. An issue is regarded as “important” if it scores ten or more on the saliency scale. We then turn to the level of disagreement within the party between statements that are considered important (more than 10 on the saliency scale) and those that are considered unimportant (less than 10 on the saliency scale).

Table 3.3 shows the number of important issues for the FrP elite and members in a comparative perspective. Developments over time should be interpreted with caution, due to
methodological differences between the surveys, although the parties might be compared with each another within the same year. Overall, however, party differences are almost negligible. In 1991, the established parties (i.e. Ap and H) had a few more issues than the newer parties (SV, FrP), but one decade later, FrP is on top together with H, if we combine members with delegates. In 2009, Ap is on top (9 issues among members and delegates), and FrP comes second (7 issues among members, 9 among the delegates). Thus, FrP seems concerned with at least as many issues as the other established parties, and more than the other new party, SV.

Table 3.3: Number of important issues\(^1\) for party members and delegates, 1991–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party members</th>
<th>Congress delegates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SV</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrP</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note 1: “Important issue” refers to the number of policy statements in the survey that received more than ten on a saliency scale. Information about how this saliency scale was constructed is explained in detail in the previous section on the FrP elite and members. Due to differences between the surveys in terms of numbers of statements and the content of the statements, they are not directly comparable. They are not comparable to the presentation of the party’s elite and rank and file in the previous section either, since the issue categories there consist of several statements.

Figure 3.7 also confirms that, also in comparative perspective, FrP seems to be a fairly cohesive party. While SV comes out as slightly more cohesive, there are only marginal differences between FrP and the mainstream right (H) and mainstream left (Ap). As to be expected, all parties are more cohesive on important issues than unimportant issues. Ap in 2001 is the only exception to this rule – in fact, in Ap there is very little difference between important and unimportant issues throughout the period, a point closely linked to the profound disagreement within the party on Norwegian EU membership. And, in contrast to FrP which is also divided on this issue, EU membership is one of the important issues in Ap.
Figure 3.7: Level of disagreement\(^1\) on important and unimportant issues\(^2\) in SV, Ap, H and FrP, 1991–2009

*Source:* see previous table.

*Note 1:* The level of disagreement refers to the mean of standard deviation for each of the statements perceived as either important or unimportant by members and by delegates.

*Note 2:* Important and unimportant issues are defined as those statements which scored more (important) or less (unimportant) than 10 on a saliency scale. For information about how this scale was constructed, see previous section on the FrP elite and rank and file.

**Voters**

**Subjective Voting Motivations**

The manifesto, the party elite and rank and file might not provide a complete picture of the number important issues for FrP. The development towards a several-issue party may also be shown by assessing the number of mobilizing issues mentioned by its voters. In all electoral surveys since the party was founded in 1973 until 2009, voters have been asked to name two issues which they consider to be of crucial importance for their voting behavior. Analysis of these answers confirms previous analysis while also providing new insights, and could be seen as empirical test of the impact of supply-side changes on demand-side aspects. If being a ‘several-issues party’ is important for electoral persistence it is because the voters are mobilized on a range of issues and that the electorate sees the party as the “owner” of important policy issues.

The opposition towards taxes and duties has – not surprisingly – always been an important issue for FrP voters. And despite losing some of its significance in the 1990s, it has certainly remained one of the key issues in the 2000s. However, we should note that the issue
is even more important for the Conservatives (H); tax policy thus seems to be of general concern for all right-wing voters in Norway, and not something specifically related to FrP.

Health care and better welfare for the elderly are two other issues which have constituted important parts of the electoral mobilization since the early 1980s – perhaps even before that. Already in the early days, Anders Lange accused the established parties of ignoring the legitimate needs and demands of the elderly. For example, in the final TV debate in 1973, Lange said the following, directed to the leader of the Christian People’s Party: “I know a lot of elderly people who have come to my tremendously well attended meetings across the country [and] who have presented their desperate situation, and if you are not familiar with this [situation] in the Christian People’s Party it is because you only gather the elderly for prayer and hymn-singing.”

Opposition against immigration became an important issue for the first time in the local election in 1987 (not shown in the Table 3.4, but see Bjørklund 1988). Hernes and Knudsen (1989: 27) simply call the election an “asylum-seeker election.” Although the topic was not as salient in the 1989 campaign, it seemed very important in the eyes of FrP electorate: almost a quarter of its voters mentioned (tighter) immigration policies as a main reason for their voting behavior. In the 1990s, immigration policy was somewhat overshadowed by other issues, although it did play an important role in another local election, in 1995 (see Chapter 5 and Bjørklund 1999). In the 2000s, however, the issue has become increasingly important for FrP voters – in 2009 it was in fact the most important issue of all. As many as two out five voters mentioned immigration as one of the two most important issues for their voting behavior. The growing importance of the immigration question was probably related to the xenophobic statement made by party leader Siv Jensen regarding an alleged “sneak Islamization” of Norwegian society.37 Although Islam and Muslims are hardly mentioned in the party manifesto, criticism of this particular religion and its followers plays an important role in the public rhetoric of many prominent party representatives – including the party leadership, MPs and leaders at the subnational level (see Bangstad 2013; Berntzen 2011; Eriksen 2012). Similar trends away from general immigration skepticism and towards more specific criticisms of Islam, immigrants from “Muslim countries,” and Muslims have been observed elsewhere in Europe (see Betz 2007; Zuquete 2008)

Law and order – another issue associated with right-wing populism in Europe – has also been consistently important for the FrP electorate since the late 1980s.

Among other issues that have gained importance as the party has become established are infrastructure, education and family policy. Indeed, transportation and infrastructure seems to be particularly important for FrP voters.38 Conservative voters are equally concerned with transportation policies, but while the Conservative Party (H) has focused on overall improvement of infrastructure, FrP has pressed on specific issues like gasoline prices and, more recently, turnpike fees.

37 The media archive for national and regional newspaper shows a significant increase in references til Islam and Muslims in the weeks after Jensen’s introduced the concept of “sneak Islamization”.
38 The other two issues – education and family policies – score high due to general concern for these issues among the electorate in general.
Table 3.4: Subjective voting motivation among FrP voters, 1973–2009 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Taxation</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
<th>Geriatric care</th>
<th>Health care</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Law and order</th>
<th>Family policies</th>
<th>Car taxes</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Bureaucracy</th>
<th>EF/EU</th>
<th>Foreign aid</th>
<th>Abortion</th>
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<td>63</td>
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(N) (32) (19) (63) (66) (206) (82) (191) (170) (310) (280)

**Source:** Norwegian election surveys, 1973–2009. Calculations by the author.

**Notes:** All voters are asked to mention two issues that were important for their voting behavior. Only the most important issues for the FrP electorate are presented in the table. The shares do not add up to 100% since respondents may provide two reasons. Figures deviate slightly from the publications of the Norwegian Electoral Survey Project because this table did not exclude respondents who answered “don’t know” or “no issues important.” Figures on voting behavior in 1973 and 1977 have not been officially verified (mannitalskontrollert). The figures from 1973 are not strictly comparable, as respondents were asked about the most important issue in the election campaign rather than about their voting behavior.

Among issues that have disappeared from the broad range of FrP voters’ subjective evaluation of their own voting motivations are the following: the fight against bureaucracy, opposition to foreign aid, employment, abortion and the EU question. It may seem strange that many of voters of an anti-taxation party like Anders Lange’s Party (ALP) would be so concerned with the abortion issue in 1973. However, the high score tells us more about the generally high concern for abortion among the electorate as a whole at that time. Comparison with other parties shows that no other party had voters who were so little concerned with the abortion issue as ALP voters. Consistent with this finding, closer examination of the electoral survey shows no agreement among all voters on women’s right to free abortion. The question of Norwegian membership in the EU has also been important for the voters on a few occasions. But, as in the case of abortion, the EU question has always been relatively less important for FrP voters. The high scores in 1973 and 1993 simply tell us that this particular question dominated the agenda of most parties and that it gained massive attention in the media. With the exception of some party representatives (most notably the liberal faction in the early 1990s), the EU question has never been a key issue for FrP. In 1973, Lange’s view on Norwegian membership, for example, was simply a logical consequence of his anti-Communism: “When the Soviets say no to EEC membership, Anders says yes” (Bjørklund

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39 Even though the number of respondents is small, they roughly suggest that half of ALP voters were pro-choice and the other half against.
2000: 448). And in 1993, the party presented its view on the EU through the rather fuzzy slogan “Yes to EEC, no to Union.”

**Issue Ownership in a Comparative Perspective**

The last indicator tapping into the number of issues associated with a particular party are questions on “issue ownership.” While ownership could be conceptualized as a dichotomy (the party either has it or it does not), I see it as a scale (something a party might have to a greater or lesser extent). In short, issue ownership is measured by asking voters which party they believe has the best policy on specific but rather broad issues such as the environment, immigration, unemployment, health care, etc. Parties associated with a comprehensive policy agenda are likely to score fairly high on several issues, whereas those with a more narrow agenda are more likely to achieve high scores on a very few cases – perhaps only one single issue.

Unfortunately, the Norwegian electoral surveys do not allow for a strict comparison of the development of issue ownership among parties. Most importantly, questions tapping issue ownership were not asked before the national electoral survey in 1997. It is therefore impossible to study FrP’s issue ownership in its first two decades of existence – from when the party was founded in 1973 until the major ideological battle between the liberalists and the populist/Christian conservative faction in 1994. Secondly, the surveys conducted in connection with national elections between 1997 and 2009 have not asked about exactly the same issues. This lack of consistency not only rules out a comparison over time, but might possibly exclude policy issues to which FrP has (partial) ownership. That said, analysis of issue ownership 1997–2009 may still provide important insights into FrP’s consolidation as a several-issue party in the eyes of the Norwegian electorate.

The 1997 survey, which contains a rather limited number of issues – six in total – shows that FrP at the end of the 1990s had been able to gain substantial issue ownership as regards two quite important issues: (stricter) immigration policy and (better and more dignified) geriatric care (see Table 3.5). In fact, neither SV nor H had an equally strong position on any issues – at least among those covered by the survey. However, FrP lacked any issue ownership whatsoever to other central issues, including gas plants (a major issue in Norway in the late 1990s), district policy, Norway/ EU, and the role of Christianity in the schools. Comparison with SV, H, Ap further shows that FrP’s issue ownership was quite concentrated on a few selected issues.

A similar pattern in the distribution of issue ownership can be seen in the surveys carried out after the turn of the millennium: in 2001, 2005 and 2009: FrP’s issue ownership is heavily concentrated around a few issues only. The range of issues and the strength of the ownership were therefore fairly similar to SV, while both H and Ap had a relatively strong ownership to more issues. In particular the latter enjoys voter confidence on a wide range of issues and holds an almost hegemonic position on fighting unemployment.
Table 3.5: Issue ownership for SV, Ap, H and FrP, 1997–2009 (in %)

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Survey questions: 1997: “We would very much like to hear how you view the parties’ position on current issues.”

The question in each case is “Which party you think has the best policy […] if you have an opinion on the matter.” 2001–2009: “we would like to know which party you consider to have the best policy within different areas of politics.”

**Note 1:** “Regional policy” is referred to as “periphery [utkant] policies” in 1997.

**Note 2:** The environment category in 2009 includes both the environment and climate.
However, since surveys in the 2000s covered more issues – now including taxation policies, family issues, health care, regional policy and environment – they showed that FrP had issue ownership to more issues than observed in the 1997 survey. Although (stricter) immigration remained the most important topic in terms of issue ownership, the surveys also revealed that FrP had a strong position on health care (covered in 2005 and 2009) and transportation (covered in 2009). Moreover, and not surprisingly, it had a fairly strong position on taxes and duties (covered in 2001–2009), although here it should be noted that both Ap and H had stronger issue ownership than FrP on this historically important issue.

**Conclusion**

Based on various types of data, this chapter has shown that FrP has transformed from being a single-issue party to become a “several-issue” party. The diachronic analysis of FrP manifestos indicated that the party platform has developed from focusing almost exclusively on economic issues – most notably, anti-taxation. The party has gradually developed more comprehensive manifestos, with issues such as welfare, transportation, education, the political system, external relations (defense policies) and groups in society. Also law and order, culture, immigration and national identity are increasingly mentioned in the manifestos, but have remained fairly marginal. The party seems to pay the least attention to environmental issues, regional policies and moral issues. The development of its manifestos furthermore indicates that FrP has become more similar to other parties – in terms of manifesto length (SV, Ap and H) and content (particularly H).

Detailed analysis of a variety of attitudinal data, however, revealed some of the more problematic aspects of testing the single-issue thesis exclusively with manifesto data. While the manifesto data indicated that FrP has become increasingly concerned with a wide range of issues, the attitudinal surveys provide a more focused picture. Based on a self-constructed issue saliency scale, analysis of the elite and the members suggests that the party has been particularly concerned with four issues since the early 1990s: right-wing economic issues, anti-immigration, defense, and geriatric care.

The attitudinal surveys further confirm that FrP is no more plagued by issue disagreement than other parties. In contrast to a pure single-issue party which typically lacks cohesion on issues other than the one in focus, FrP has been cohesive on most issues since the 1990s. Obviously, there were ideological disagreement leading to the party split in 1994 and strategic disagreement – which also included some ideological aspects – leading to the exclusion of key representatives in 2001: however, these conflicts seem to have been related to a few issues only, rather than being conflicts that sapped cohesiveness across issues and ideological dimensions (see also Saglie 1994).

Since there are no surveys available among party elites and members from the 1970s and 1980s, the electoral surveys were also included in the analysis. Although the voters are part of the demand side and not the supply side, their voting motivations and their view on issue ownership may provide additional information about how parties mobilize on issues and the extent to which they successfully “own” certain issues in political sphere. These data confirm earlier findings: that FrP has a strong position on taxation, immigration, and welfare (health care and geriatric care). Over time, the anti-taxation issue seems to have decreased as a mobilizing force, whereas the immigration issue gained prominence. Further, the party has
consolidated its position as the primary defender of the automobilists, mobilizing on cheaper gasoline, better road infrastructures, and opposition to toll roads.

These findings clearly indicate a mismatch between issue salience as measured by FrP manifestos and how has played out in campaigns, among elites, members and voters. While the observations of the various levels of activists and representatives do not disprove the argument that FrP has become more of a several-issue party, they do point up the profound importance of the immigration issue. The ideological and organizational challenges related to this issue will be examined in depth in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: Maintaining Political Legitimacy

The voters have seen [...] in practice that FrP rejects any cooperation and contact with racist groups and racists.

– FrP chairman Carl I. Hagen in the party magazine *Fremskritt*, 09.09.95

(Hagen 2007: 261)

Introduction

This chapter argues that FrP has been able to maintain its political legitimacy by defending its reputation as a non-racist and non-extremist party, despite mobilizing on a strong anti-immigration and anti-establishment profile. The party has consistently rejected any overlap whatsoever with undemocratic right-wing ideologies like fascism and Nazism. It has also dismissed all attempts by political opponents, commentators and scholars to compartmentalize it together with other right-wing populist parties in other countries. Its anti-immigration policies have been presented within more acceptable frames, like economic burden, welfare chauvinism, challenges to law and order – to some extent as a cultural threat and more recently as a problem of illiberalism. The party has denied any similarities to other anti-immigration groupings in Norway or elsewhere in Europe, or to domestic right-wing extreme groups. Finally, it has to a large extent expelled and/or publicly rebuked party members and representatives who have expressed extreme rightist ideas and/or have been linked to extreme rightist circles.

The analysis here does not come to a final decision as to what really constitutes an extreme rightist ideology, statement and/or organization. I will not engage in what Mudde (1996) referred to as “the war of words” within research on the extreme right. Instead, given that legitimacy is a question of how something or someone are perceived, my point of departure is simply that whatever has been defined as extreme right in the relevant context counts as extreme right, and may constitute a problem for political legitimacy. In this sense, extreme right is (at least in this chapter) a purely socially constructed phenomenon.

The data in the chapter come from a range of sources. Most importantly, I have searched for newspaper articles linking right-wing extremism to FrP between 1973 and 2009. The search has been carried out in a comprehensive Norwegian media archive “Retriever” (A-tekst) covering newspapers like the liberal-conservative quality daily *Aftenposten* (since 1983), the two largest tabloids, center-right *VG* (since 1945) and center-left *Dagbladet* (since 1996), and the Norwegian news agency NTB (since 1985). In recent years, the archive has also covered smaller newspapers (like *Klassekampen*, *Vårt Land*, and *Ny Tid*), but my main empirical data come from the large tabloids and regional newspapers. In total, these media articles make up approximately 3,400 pages. Together, this material provides a detailed picture of how FrP has struggled and dealt with what has been perceived as right-wing extremism in Norway and abroad since the early 1970s.

40 The search string was "\(\text{høyreekstr* OR nazi* OR fascis*}\) AND (FrP OR Fremskrittspartiet OR "Anders Lange" OR ALP)"
Clearly, the mainstream media do not necessarily cover all relevant extreme rightist linkages. After all, if such links exist, right-wing populist parties will most likely seek to make sure that such information remains unknown, as would any party confronted with political extremism. Therefore I have supplemented the media archive with literature on extreme right-wing subcultures (e.g. Fangen 1999; Bjørgo 1997; Emberland and Laugerud 1993). The journalistic account by Per Bangsund (1984) “Arvtakerne: nazisme i Norge etter krigen” (The Heirs: Nazism in Norway after the War) has been particularly valuable since it provides a rare overview of postwar right-wing extremism prior to the upsurge of the extreme right in the 1990s. The anti-racist activist Henrik Lunde (1993; 2004) has made important observations regarding some recent developments on the extreme rightist scene. Additionally, I will quote from biographies on Anders Lange (Eide and Lange 1974; Norland 1973; Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993) and Carl I. Hagen (Hagen 2007; 1984; Ekeberg and Snoen 2001). These accounts have been useful for analyzing the political ideas of prominent party leaders, and have provided additional information about some important events. Finally, I present a qualitative analysis of the party’s immigration discourse based on the manifestos. This section is complemented with statements from key FrP figures, most notably the party leader, and some arguments presented in policy reports from the parliamentary group. Such additional empirical data are needed in order to illustrate important shifts in the party’s (framing of) immigration problems and policy.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss FrP’s view on undemocratic right-wing ideologies; and second, analyze how the party has dealt with attempts to categorize and link it to other emerging right-wing parties in Europe. These two sections draw primarily on newspaper articles and statements from FrP leaders and representatives. I then present five dominant interpretative frames in FrP anti-immigration policies, none of them explicitly racist. These are frames shared by many voters, which suggests that they are perceived as legitimate ways of criticizing immigrants to Norway. Finally, I look at how FrP has dealt with ‘extemists’ within the party, both at the local and national level.

Far From Nazism and Fascism

The founder of ALP, Anders Lange, had an ambivalent relationship to extreme ideas, ideologies, and regimes. He was initially sympathetic towards fascism, but came to realize, as he himself put it, that it was yet another ideology aimed at greater control over societal development and the behavior of individuals. Many years after World War II, Lange said the following about fascism: “I thought it was the solution until I discovered that it would be an unrivaled deprivation of liberty if one single party should decide everything” (Eide and Lange 1974: 65). However, despite being highly critical towards the authoritarian aspects of fascist thinking, Lange remained a staunch defender of the South African Apartheid regime until he died in 1974. There is even evidence that he might have received financial support from the South African regime in the early phase of building the party.42

Also concerning racism, Lange seemed somewhat ambivalent (Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993: 159–178). On the one hand, he claimed not to have any hierarchical

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41 This is not to say they cannot be based upon a racist way of reasoning. However, that issue is irrelevant for my research question.
42 Dagens Næringsliv, 27.05.06
understanding of races in the sense that some are “better” than others. On the other hand, he argued that the existence of different skin colors was perhaps a signal from God that indicated that racial mixing was a bad thing. And even though he argued along the lines of the equal-but-different doctrine, he also said that black people were unable to govern, partly because they were illiterate. The combination of this logic and the logic of profound anti-Communism explains why Lange was such a firm defender of the Apartheid regime.

While it should be noted that Lange shared his ambivalence concerning democratic ideas and non-discrimination with other right-wing (as well as left-wing) forces of the time, his ideological views should also be seen as a product of his early political socialization in the Norwegian right-wing interwar organization Fedrelandslaget (Fatherland’s League, FL). The FL was founded in 1925 in order to prevent the rise of the Norwegian labor movement. It mobilized against workers’ demonstrations, and organized “scabs”. To what extent the FL was indeed a proto-fascist movement has been extensively debated (Norland 1973: 218ff; Dahl 1966; Sjulseth 2008), but it is a historical fact that even prominent spokesmen for the league admitted being deeply inspired by authoritarian leaders like Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. For example, Joakim Lemkuhl, the founder of the organization, wrote in 1933: “We admire the great national advances, Mussolini’s, when he created a strong state out of a dilapidated society, Hitler’s, when he now eradicates Marxism from its strongest den” (quoted in Norland 1973: 218).

Anders Lange was appointed secretary in FL in 1930 in Kristiansand, a fairly large town on the south coast of Norway. According to Norland (1973: 100; see also Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993: 54–55), Kristiansand was the site of some of most intense interwar struggles between the Labour party and various right-wing forces. This suggests that Lange was politically socialized in a confrontational environment, in which there were very few shades of gray: you were either siding with the right-wing forces or with the labor movement. To FL activists, the labor movement was nothing but left-wing revolutionaries in disguise. Lange’s political activism showed firmly anti-leftist behavior and demonstrated his willingness to use extreme means. On one occasion, Lange campaigned against the Labour Party (Ap) by publicly covering a fellow activist in red paint, arguing that it represented Ap’s blood-curdling attack on bourgeoisie society (Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993: 59).

While Lange may have been among the most extreme activists in FL, he was not among the many members who joined the Norwegian Nazi party Nasjonal Samling (National Unity, NS) during the war, when Norway was occupied by German forces. Lange remained a resistance fighter. In other words, despite participating in Fatherland’s League before the war and expressing sympathy for the Italian fascist dictator Mussolini, Lange was never a Nazi collaborator or national traitor.

When he re-entered Norwegian politics in 1973, he was – perhaps not surprisingly – accused of being a fascist who promoted undemocratic ideas. Lange strongly opposed such labels: there was no similarity between his own political ideas on one hand and fascism and Nazism on the other. On the contrary, in his main speech at the founding meeting in 1973, Lange claimed that his ideas were founded upon true democratic principles. According to Lange, the major problem of the current political development in the 20th century was ideologies that put the interests of the state above the interest of the individual. Ideologies as diverse as communism, social democracy, Nazism and fascism were all depicted as being
fundamentally anti-liberal, as they all basically argued that “we are born for the sake of the party state and not for our own sake” (Lange 1973).

The attempt to clearly disassociate the party from any kind of totalitarian ideologies continued in the first comprehensive manifesto published in 1975. According to the two authors, the party chairman and the parliamentary chairman, the party could not accept that ALP activists were being harassed at work for openly supporting a party like ALP or that the party in general was repeatedly accused of having totalitarian sympathies (see introduction to ALP manifesto 1975). Therefore it seemed necessary to once again remind everyone of the alleged fundamentally anti-totalitarian impulses of the ALP. In contrast to claims made in the political debate, the manifesto emphasized that ALP was seeking a minimal state and a society characterized by “free, independent citizens.” Further, the “state should be the citizens’ friend, not their enemy and despotic master;” the party’s vision of the state was therefore fundamentally “incompatible with Nazism, fascism and communism.” However, it should be noted that Gjems-Onstad, who was later expelled due to extremism and disloyalty, argued in favor of the Portuguese colonists in Angola after Angola gained its independence in 1975.43

In the 1980s, FrP continued to be accused of undemocratic tendencies, particularly after it more than doubled its support in the 1983 local election (from 2.5 to 6.3%). Among other things, the party’s success was sometimes compared to the rise of Hitler in the interwar period44 and on May 1 in 1985 angry anti-racist youth called Hagen a “Nazi swine.”45 Similar Nazi remarks were made in 1988, when leader of the youth party visited Trondheim.46 Professor Harald Ofstad and Labour Party vice-chairman Einar Førde also compared the electoral success of the party to the situation in interwar Europe. Ofstad said, for example, that “Norwegian voters who voted for Fremskrittspartiet know as little about this party’s policy as those who voted for the Nazis in the 1930s.”47 Førde, on the other hand, refrained from calling Hagen a fascist leader, yet he too believed the party’s rhetoric had become more undemocratic.48 Assistant professor in social psychology and former leader of the Socialist Left Party (SV), Berit Ås, said that Labour (Ap) and the Conservatives (H) should work out a joint strategy to stop the growth of “fascist ideas” promoted by FrP.49 In 1990, assistant professor Kristoffer Gjøtterud compared New Age with Nazism and anti-Semitism, arguing that such ideas had most support within FrP and the extreme left-wing movements.50

FrP representatives usually dismissed such accusations. An up-and-coming local politician in the early 1980s, Oscar Hillgaar, said that a “party with a clear liberalist profile cannot, by definition, be neither [reactionary nor fascist].”51 In fact, Hillgaar argued that other Norwegian parties are more similar to undemocratic right-wing ideologies. Hagen accused the anti-racists of lacking historical and ideological knowledge: “There must be something wrong with history classes when you do not known that Hitler’s party was named Germany’s

43 Parliamentary minutes, 15.12.75, p. 1914. My thanks to Roar Ræstad for this observation.
44 VG, 15.11.83; 08.10.81
45 VG, 02.05.85
46 Aftenposten, 03.05.88
47 NTB 15.09.87
48 Aftenposten, 23.04.88
49 Aftenposten, 03.08.88; see also Nordlys 21.08.89
50 Aftenposten, 19.04.90
51 Aftenposten, 20.10.84
National Socialist Party. I am against socialists, whether they are internationally [oriented] like Lenin or nationally [oriented] like Hitler.”\textsuperscript{52} Professor of Law and MP Fridtjof Frank Gundersen defended the party against being labelled fascist, arguing that its immigration policy was a copy of Swiss policy: “Switzerland is one of the oldest and most rooted democracies in Europe which no one so far has called racist or fascist.”\textsuperscript{53} Former FrP chairman, Arve Lønnum, could not understand why the party was criticized for channeling “racism, Nazism and fascism,” when it only wanted “decentralization of economic power,” less subsidies, more law and order, better geriatric care and more effective health care. According to Lønnum, mainstream reactions to the party were best described as “anti-social, unchristian, snobbish and priggish.”\textsuperscript{54} Jan Simonsen, who later became one of the party’s most outspoken and opportunistic representatives in the Storting, said that FrP’s policy was not grounded in any “disparagement of other people as individuals” or “airy ideological ideas” such as Nazism or fascism, but rather based upon “practical turn of mind and common sense.”\textsuperscript{55} Peder I. Ramsrud, MP and previously a clergyman, contrasted FrP’s ideology with the collectivist ideas of the established parties: “Personally, I could never tolerate the collectivist view on human life which is present in the other parties.”\textsuperscript{56} He added that the liberalist profile of FrP did not hinder the party from having a social profile as well.

Not only were positive references to fascism and Nazism completely absent from the party’s rhetoric, these terms were occasionally used to stigmatize political opponents. For example, prior to the second referendum on Norwegian EU membership, it was FrP which decided to compare the fierce euro scepticism of the Center party and the Socialist Left Party to Quisling and national socialist parties of the interwar period.\textsuperscript{57} The campaign, initiated by FrP’s youth organization, showed a poster of the SP leader (Lahnstein), SV leader (Solheim) and the leader of the extremist organization, Folkebevegelsen mot innvandring (People’s Movement against Immigration). The poster was titled “Nasjonal Samling,” intimating that these three politicians could be compared to Quisling’s party during the war. Despite severe criticism by the political establishment, Hagen supported his youth party: “Historically, they [Solheim and Lahnstein] are closely related to Germany’s national socialists in the 1930s before the war… Back then the national socialist took charge over private industry through sky-high taxes and duties, they imposed comprehensive regulations and unwanted interference.”\textsuperscript{58}

It should be noted that the comparison between FrP and fascist ideology was not only dismissed by party representatives: some editors and commentators also criticized such comparisons. As one editor said, “more than the old memories of Adolf, the FrP leader is more similar to Pied Piper of Hamelin, who lured the village children with his flute as revenge because the people refused to pay his wages.”\textsuperscript{59} Similarly, in an op-ed in Aftenposten titled “Help from Jeanne d’Arc,” the author pointed out the many differences between the Front

\textsuperscript{52} VG, 0 2.05.85  
\textsuperscript{53} Aftenposten, 19.11.85  
\textsuperscript{54} Aftenposten, 17.12.85  
\textsuperscript{55} Aftenposten, 21.1.88  
\textsuperscript{56} Aftenposten, 20.04.90  
\textsuperscript{57} VG 29.04.92  
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{59} Nordlys 03.05.1988
National in France and FrP in Norway.\footnote{Aftenposten, 06.08.88} Whereas the former was described as an extreme-rightist party that recruited fascists as well anti-Semites, FrP was described as an old-school liberal party that promoted anti-liberal immigration policies. Reiulf Steen, former Ap leader, went even further arguing that the ideology of fascism – most notably the idea of corporatism – is “light years away from FrP’s liberalist philosophy.”\footnote{Aftenposten, 06.08.88} In a similar vein, another commentator, Wiedswang, argued that “to perceive Hagen as a brown-shirt seem equally pathetic as when Hagen calls himself the Einar Gerhardsen\footnote{Einar Gerhardsen was the influential Labour Prime Minister who served for many years in the postwar period.} of the 1990s.”\footnote{Kjetil Wiedswang in Dagens Næringsliv, 07.05.88}

After the turn of the millennium, FrP has been less accused of being an extreme rightist party or flirting with illegitimate political ideas. Whenever that has happened, party representatives have rapidly dismissed such statements or labels. In 2005, for example, the party was highly vocal against the Internet search-engine Google, for categorizing the party as “extreme right.” And even when Antirasistisk senter (Norwegian Centre against Racism, ARS) argued that the success of anti-immigration parties such as FrP has prevented Norway from having more extremist right-wing parties, the immigration spokesman for FrP was extremely critical. Not only did he argue that extremist members are more likely in other parties since FrP has “got rid of members who express extremist views,” he even asked the government to withdraw all public funding for ARS.\footnote{Dagsavisen, 05.02.05}

In short, with the exception of the early years of Anders Lange before he became party leader, FrP representatives have not publicly displayed any sympathy for fascist ideas or regimes. On the contrary, the party has actively opposed such ideas and consistently argued that right-wing extremism is equally bad as Marxist and/or socialist ideas. In the next section we turn to how this self-perception and possible strategic consideration has affected national and transnational linkages with extreme right-wing groups and individuals.

\textit{Relationship with Radical and Extreme Right Parties in Norway and Abroad}

\textbf{In Norway}

In the late 1980s, Norway witnessed an increase in extreme right-wing groups – particularly in Oslo. The existence of these groups may have helped FrP to be seen as a more moderate alternative – they were advocating much more restrictive anti-immigration policies than FrP. The chairman of the new party called \textit{Hvit Valgallianse} (White Alliance), for example, heavily criticized FrP for being too much of a pro-immigration party. In contrast to FrP, which accepted immigrants who could take care of themselves, Kjuus wanted a more comprehensive ban on immigration. Similarly, in 1990, a new party called \textit{Nasjonaldemokratene} (National Democrats) was founded. Its information leader, Hege Søfteland, said she expected frustrated voters from FrP and the agrarian party, SP.\footnote{Aftenposten, 04.10.90; see also Aftenposten, 22.08.91}

While these extremist groups somehow helped to put FrP in better light, the disassociation from other extremist groups has been difficult at times – not least because some of the groups and/or individuals have praised Hagen and/or FrP’s restrictive immigration and
anti-leftist policies. Before the election in 1989, an anonymous declaration signed by a group calling themselves “old Jøssings,” expressed deep antipathy towards the Ap leader, Gro Harlem Brundtland and strong sympathy for FrP leader Hagen. In the declaration, Brundtland was portrayed as a national traitor who accepted that foreigners settled down in Norway. A parallel was drawn between Brundtland and Quisling, who had accepted the wartime German occupation: “Now is the time to get rid of quisling-Gro before she transforms Norway into a hell of racial tumult.” Hagen, by contrast, was described as “Norwegian, a good Norwegian.”

In a similar vein, in 1990, a former voluntary Waffen-SS soldier and Nazi sympathizer declared publicly that FrP was the only party to support in Norway. In the interview, he supported traditional authoritarian values such as a strong military and corporal punishment in the home, and he criticized the alleged lack of decency and discipline in society.

It should come as no surprise that these endorsements were not appreciated by the FrP leaders (see more below). They were always rejected, if commented upon at all. Two other examples further demonstrate the party’s definite stand against extremism and vulgar racism. In 1998, it became publicly known that extreme rightist forces were trying to use the communicational infrastructure of FrP. Varg “Greven” Vikernes and Hvit Ungdom (White Youth, HU) were getting free advertising on the FrP webpage, and there were hyperlinks to Fedrelandspartiet (the Fatherland’s Party, FP) and the extreme rightist web page Dansk Forum (Danish Forum). Confronted with this situation, Hagen immediately opposed the content of the web sites and denied he had any personal knowledge about the advertisements and links: “This is completely unknown to me. If I had known about this, the pages would not have been there.”

The party also pursued other strategies to dissociate itself from extremism. Carl I. Hagen usually dismissed all kind of political support from groupings and individuals perceived as being slightly more anti-immigration than him, albeit not always very successfully. For example, after receiving “unwanted” support from the prominent extreme-rightist activist Arne Myrdal in 1993 following a speech by Hagen at an annual county party meeting, the latter said he was “embarrassed” and further claimed that it was not true that FrP only wanted immigrants from specific religious and cultural backgrounds. He also made use of a well-known legitimizing distinction between immigrants and immigration: FrP was not criticizing immigrants as such, only the immigration policy. In fact, Hagen even underlined that frustration with Norway’s immigration policy should not under any circumstances result in negative feelings about immigrants. He also repeated that party members guilty of attacking immigrants would be immediately kicked out of the party. The distinction between immigration policy and immigrants was nevertheless only partially accepted by the mainstream media. For instance, the largest tabloid media, VG, said that Hagen deliberately presented “blurry statements” with regard to his party’s anti-immigration policy. Not even among the party’s more liberal-oriented vice-chairmen was the clarification accepted or

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66 Nordlys, 28.98.89
67 Nordlys, 18.04.90
68 Bergens Tidende, 30.11.98
69 NTB, 26.01.93
70 NTB, 26.01.93
71 VG, 28.01.93
supported. Skjervengen, for example, argued that Hagen was legitimizing the rise of extremist nationalism, xenophobia and racism.\(^{72}\)

There are also a few minor events which have reinforced the image of a more respectable party willing to confront extremist forces. When it became known that the neo-Nazi organization Vigrid had decided to run in national elections, MP Ulf Erik Knudsen argued that the list of Vigrid sympathizers should be published publicly: “These people should get their names printed [in the newspaper]; people should know who they are. Nazism is so bad that it should be fought by all means.”\(^{73}\)

With regard to media coverage, there are not many episodes of extreme right-wing linkages after Kleppe and Simonsen – FrP spokespersons advocating more drastic measures on immigration issues – were expelled in 2001. However, a few exceptions are worth mentioning. In 2005, it became known that a former (in 2003) adviser to the FrP parliamentary group, Tommy Morsund, was about to attend a meeting with the grand old man of the Ku Klux Klan, David Duke.\(^{74}\) Confronted with the ideological commitment of their adviser, the general secretary in FrP, Geir Mo, said this was the reason why he was no longer employed, adding that “persons with sympathy for authoritarian regimes do not belong even close to FrP. Such people have misunderstood both our fundamental views and our policy.”\(^{75}\)

**Anti-immigrant parties and extreme right abroad**

FrP has also strengthened its legitimacy by denying any links to and/or similarities with other far-right and anti-immigrant parties in Europe. However, this has been more difficult than the rejection of other domestic extremist right groups, since the party has been frequently associated with such parties. In the late 1980s, for example, the highly respected British weekly *The Economist* compared FrP with parties like National Front in UK and the National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany.\(^{76}\) Moreover, the magazine made an implicit comparison between interwar far-right mobilization in Norway and the rise of FrP by encouraging its readers to pay more attention to the “home land of Quisling.”

In the public debate, however, the recurrent comparisons with the FN in France have probably been most consequential. Already in the late 1980s, *VG* published an interview with FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in which he expressed sympathy for the Norwegian FrP, though he admitted that he knew too little about the party’s policies and ideology.\(^{77}\) Since this interview, FrP has frequently been mentioned as part of broader European trend of emerging far-right parties. In 1997, alleged similarities between FN and FrP even became an important element in the Norwegian election campaign. On September 14, only a few days before election day, the largest private broadcasting company in Norway, TV2, presented an interview with Jean-Marie Le Pen in the evening news. In the interview – as well as in the

\(^{72}\) *Dagens Næringsliv*, 30.01.93

\(^{73}\) *Drammens Tidende* 25.01.09; NTB 25.01.09. In a somewhat different case related to extreme right-wing propaganda, FrP mayor Per Arne Olsen of Tønsberg forcefully disapproved of a German shop called “Tønsberg” which was selling Nazi material.

\(^{74}\) *Klassekampen* 25.08.05

\(^{75}\) NTB, 25.08.05

\(^{76}\) *The Economist*, 30.04.88

\(^{77}\) *VG*, 02.12.87
conservative journal, Tidens Tegn—Le Pen encouraged Norwegian voters to vote for FrP and expressed ideological affinity with the Norwegian party. Hagen reacted furiously, arguing that the two parties had nothing in common: “Of course, I oppose everything Le Pen stands for—profoundly and sincerely. It is White Alliance which has the most in common with Le Pen’s policy.” Moreover, Hagen reiterated that he and FrP, in contrast to other far-right parties in Europe, only criticized the immigration policy and not the immigrants as such (see below). Hagen was not the only one who reacted negatively to the newsflash presented by TV2. There was a storm of protests from viewers immediately after broadcast. Most of them claimed that linking FrP to the FN and Le Pen was unfair and highly inappropriate. Hagen may actually have benefitted from the news report. At least some opinion polls indicated that FrP received increased sympathy after being linked to FN. Le Pen has not been the only right-wing populist leader to support FrP and compare the party to his own. In 2006, for example, Filip DeWinter of the Flemish Vlaams Belang said that, although he had no formal contact with the Norwegian party, he was “very familiar with FrP” and added that FrP would fit perfectly in the anti-immigrant and nationalist party group in the European Parliament. One year later, Alessandra Mussolini made similar statements in another large newspaper. None of these statements have been welcomed by the FrP.

Instead the party has consistently sought to mark a clear distance vis-à-vis right-wing extremist and right-wing populist parties on the continent. As the only rightist parliamentary party in Norway, FrP has remained to a large extent transnationally disconnected (Heidar et al. 1996). With the exception of sporadic participation at the party congress of the Danish Progress Party, a short-lived group with the same party in the Nordic Council, and some contact with new liberal parties in the Baltics (Annual report 92/93: 26), FrP had for a long time very little contact with parties abroad (see also Jungar and Jupskås 2014: 228-231). When Mogens Glistrup re-joined the Danish FrP in the late 1990s, the Norwegian party decided to break off this relationship too. Already in 1990, the FrP leadership had argued that Glistrup was too extreme and unreliable. Instead of engaging in any kind of pan-European anti-immigration confederation, FrP has always tried to align with more mainstream right-wing parties in Europe. In the 1990s, for example, it joined the European group ERG consisting of, among others, the French mainstream right party Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) in Germany, Forza Italia, and the Danish FrP (Annual reports 94/95; 95/96). In short, this pan-European network wanted the EU to be based upon the principles of federalism and
free trade. Moreover, the group wanted to speed up the process of including Eastern European countries. More recently, FrP has actively tried to clear itself of accusations of racism and xenophobia within mainstream right-wing circles in Europe and the USA. In 2006, for example, the FrP national board discussed various strategies for counteracting the tendency to compare the party with right-wing populist parties elsewhere. Any direct contact with other parties tends to be limited to certain factions within the British Conservatives, the Danish Liberal Party and the Republicans in the US (Tea Party representatives and others) (Jungar and Jupskáš 2014: 231).

It should again be noted that FrP and its sympathizers are not the only ones to object to how the media have linked FrP to various anti-immigration parties elsewhere. Also influential mainstream Norwegian politicians like two recent prime ministers, Jens Stoltenberg (Ap) and Kjell Magne Bondevik (KrF) and several prominent professors in political science (e.g. Bernt Hagtvet, Frank Aarebrot, Bernt Aardal and Hanne Marthe Narud) have stressed the differences between FrP and parties like FN and FPÖ. Even in the international academic literature, FrP has been called a “doubtful case” (Ignazi 1992: 14) and “milder version” (Kitschelt and McGann 1995: 121). In this sense, the academic discourse has contributed to the party’s effort to create a fundamental distinction between the ‘harmless and democratically legitimate’ right-wing populism in Norway and ‘the dangerous’ right-wing populism found abroad. The next section identifies five of the most important narratives used by FrP when criticizing immigration. None of these interpretative frames can be considered racist, although they may be motivated by racist reasoning.

**Five Ways of Being against Immigration**

Analysis of FrP manifestos, parliamentary reports, and some public statements indicates that the party’s anti-immigration discourse can be summarized by the following five narratives: (1) immigrants cost too much, (2) immigrants exploit our welfare, (3) immigrants are (more likely to be) criminals, (4) immigrants undermine our way of life, and (5) immigrants challenge our liberal values. In others words, immigrants constitute a threat to Norway’s economy, welfare system, security, culture, and (liberal) values. Many of these frames have consistently been part of FrP’s anti-immigration discourse since the 1980s, when immigration emerged as a salient political issue. However, the three last narratives have certainly become increasingly dominant since the mid-1990s, the last narrative since the events of 9/11 in particular.

In the 1970s, immigration was hardly a political issue for FrP – or for other Norwegian parties for that matter. However, by the end the 1970s, there were a few signs of the first narrative – immigrants as an economic burden. The party argued that rising unemployment made it even more important to uphold the immigration ban which had been introduced in 1974 (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010: 223). Moreover, a welfare chauvinist agenda was evident, in the sense that the party argued that foreign aid should rather be spent on employment measurement for Norwegians rather than used to support authoritarian regimes abroad (FrP manifesto 1975). Even a cultural threat perspective was present, though it did not dominate the party’s approach to immigration-related issues. For example, already

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86 NTB, 06.05.88; Klassekampen, 27.09.08
in the late 1970s, Hagen criticized of the construction of a mosque in Oslo, partly because of potential costs for the taxpayers and partly because Islam was, in his view, a “misanthropic and dangerous religion.”\(^{87}\) Moreover, earlier the same year, Hagen had opposed Norway’s official policies on refugees. When the question of refugees became politicized due to increasing numbers arriving from Southeast Asia, Hagen basically argued Norway could help them more effectively by supporting the neighboring Asian countries economically. Allowing more refugees to Norway would only lead to “big problems.”\(^{88}\) The problem of existing intolerance within Norwegian population was explained as a rational, inevitable and universal reaction to people with a different culture and lifestyle. In other words, according to FrP, intolerance was a natural part of human reactions and not something which should or could be opposed politically.

In the 1980s, the discourse was still dominated by economic and welfare chauvinist arguments. The party opposed all kinds of differential treatment of immigrants; labor immigrants should only be allowed to work in Norway on short-term contracts (inspired by the Swiss model) and only if they possessed professional skills not already available on the Norwegian labor market; immigrants should be financially responsible for the costs related to mother-tongue instruction; and access to comprehensive social welfare benefits should be severely restricted (FrP manifesto 1981; 1985; 1989). In this period, FrP actually supported immigration, as long as it did not imply any economic costs or reduced welfare for Norwegian taxpayers (see also Simonnes 2011; Hagelund 2003b: 53).

However, although being primarily concerned with economic aspects of immigration prior to the cultural shift in the 1990s, the party did present cultural arguments against immigration and underlined the importance of assimilation also in the early 1980s.\(^{89}\) Already in 1981, the party said it was important to teach immigrants the Norwegian language and “Norwegian way of life.” Moreover, immigrants were “assumed to accommodate to Norwegian society” (FrP manifesto 1981). Even more importantly, in the 1987 local elections, after an substantial increase in the numbers of asylum-seekers and the “flow” and “stream” of new immigrants had been thoroughly covered by the press (Hagelund 2003b: 50), Hagen politicized the immigration issue using a cultural threat narrative. According to Hagen, Muslims were not only an economic burden but also a religious and cultural challenge. At a party meeting some weeks before the election, he read aloud a letter allegedly signed by a Muslim called Mustafa, who had written:

> […] you are struggling in vain, Mr. Hagen! Islam, the only true faith, will be victorious here in Norway too. One day, mosques will be as common in Norway as churches are today; […] my grandchildren’s children will experience this. I know, and all Muslims in Norway know, that Norway's population will come to the faith one day, and that this country shall become Muslim! We give birth to more children than you,

\(^{87}\) *Aftenposten*, 28.11.79

\(^{88}\) *VG*, 24.06.79

\(^{89}\) In fact, already in the mid-1970s, MP Erik Gjems-Onstad was concerned about the possible cultural challenges arising from greater immigration (Hagelund 2003b: 52-53). However, Gjems-Onstad was expelled from the party quickly after the party founder Anders Lange died in 1974. His nationalist ideas were rather unimportant in the party’s anti-immigration discourse until they emerged again in the mid-1990s.
and many right-believing Muslims come to Norway each year, men in productive age. One day the infidel cross in the flag will be taken away!

This event and the subsequent debate mark the “politicization of immigration” in Norway (Hagelund 2003b: 50), which became a mobilizing issue for FrP. Opinion polls before and after the above-mentioned party meeting demonstrate a pronounced “Mustafa effect.” While a survey conducted between August 18 and August 24 showed 7.3% support for FrP, the election result at the county level was 12.4% (but only 10.3% in municipal elections).

The cultural aspects of immigration became even more salient in the 1990s. In its manifestos, the party now included arguments underlining the importance of promoting a common set of “rules, norms and values” through “active integration policies” (Manifesto 1993). According to the party, the restrictive immigration policy was necessary in order to “prevent antagonisms and conflict between sections of the population rooted in different ethnic, cultural, or religious backgrounds.” However, the cultural threat narrative was highly disputed internally in FrP, and some factions within the party (most likely the liberal faction) actually defined integration as two-way process. In the 1993 manifesto, one section explicitly argued that it would be “desirable that Norwegians also learn to live in a natural community with people from other cultures than the Norwegian one.” Elite representatives from liberal faction within the party and the youth wing also expressed this view (see e.g. Iversen 1998: 171–172). At the voter level it was far more marginal: less than 20% of the core voters disagreed with a statement saying that immigration was serious threat to the Norwegian culture (according to the election survey in 1993). Not surprisingly, the liberal idea vanished after the liberals were defeated in the early 1990s. Simultaneously as anti-immigration policies became an integrated and constant part of the party’s identity and ideology, the official rhetoric was transformed “from problematizing immigration in terms of economy, expenses and welfare state issues, to problematizing immigration in terms of culture and ethnic conflicts” (Hagelund 2003b: 63).

The 1997 manifesto is probably the most nationalist in FrP’s history. Most importantly, the manifesto presented for the first (and the last) time arguments against immigration which could be interpreted as rather racist. While the previous manifesto had also argued against immigration on the basis of fear of increased ethnic tensions, the 1997 manifesto clearly expressed concern about “rapid changes of the general character associated with our population” (FrP manifesto 1997). Such a statement has obvious biological connotations. Moreover, while the previous manifesto discussed the importance of “active integration,” this manifesto discussed “active repatriation of immigrants” and underlined that family reunification should generally take place in the immigrant’s country of origin (FrP manifesto 1997).

In the late 1990s, the party’s rhetoric of fear and exclusion, and the prominent position of the cultural threat narrative, were made clear in one of the political advertisements in the 1997 campaign: a text stating “we wish all those who don't want to fit into Norwegian society

90 The original quote in Norwegian is as follows: «Det er heller ikke umoralsk å mene at man bør forebygge for raske forandringer av det helhetspreget som vår befolkning har.»
a really *bon voyage home!*” was illustrated with pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini, stone-
throwing Palestinians and Muslims bent in prayer (Madeley 1998: footnote 3).

The cultural shift did not necessarily imply less focus on the economic burden and
potential exploitation of a generous Norwegian welfare system (Manifesto 1993, 1997, 2001,
2005 and 2009). Family reunification, for example, was to be tolerated only if the immigrants
were able to provide for their family themselves, without public support or social benefits.
Moreover, all kinds of state to support for interest groups and/or civil society organizations
based on ethnic and/or national membership should be stopped.

The security threat narrative also became salient in the 1990s, although it did not
feature in the party manifestos until the early 2000s (see below). When asked, in a political
debate on television in 1992, which included leaders from other extreme right-wing
organizations (like Erik Gjems-Onstad and Jan Høegh), whether immigration had contributed
to anything positive, Hagen responded “No. There has been an increase in rapes, crime and
drugs” (quoted in Lunde 1993: 61).

Many of the narratives presented by FrP in the late 1990s – not least that of
immigrants as a security threat – found support in the electorate, far beyond the supporters of
FrP (see Table 4.1). For example, in a survey carried out during the 1999 election campaign,
more than 60% agreed that immigrants were responsible for a large part of criminality in
Norway and that immigrants were given better treatment than Norwegians with regard to
housing problems; and a majority of the respondents agreed that asylum-seekers and refugees
should be sent back to their native country as soon as possible.

Moreover, since many of the most extreme statements came from other MPs from FrP
than Hagen, he was perceived as fairly moderate. In fact, a survey showed that 24%
believed that Hagen was very or somewhat positive attitude towards immigrants, whereas 26%
viewed him as neutral. While the survey showed that many of these already were
sympathetic with FrP, it also demonstrated that large part of the electorate of the non-socialist
parties found Hagen’s attitudes towards immigrant to be acceptable. The survey results were
interpreted as a confirmation of the broad legitimacy of FrP’s official immigration policies.
However, the survey also indicated that FrP was struggling with its reputation. As many as
three out five voters agreed that the party’s immigrations policies could be labeled racist.

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91 This argument is at least presented by Professor Bernt Aardal in the article.
92 There is no information about the number of respondents in the survey, but it was conducted by the well-
reputed polling institute Markeds- og Mediainstituttet, MMI.
93 Dagbladet 21.02.99
Table 4.1: Perceptions of immigration-related issues in Norway, 1999. (% who agree with the statement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>FrP</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>Ap</th>
<th>KrF</th>
<th>H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants are responsible for a large part of criminality in Norway</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants receive better treatment than other Norwegians when it comes to help with housing</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants who do not learn their children Norwegian should be fined</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the asylum-seekers and refugees who have come to Norway should be sent back to their home countries as soon as possible</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The immigration policies of the Progress Party might be labelled racist</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey presented in VG 01.09.99. N=1002.

Note: Table shows percentage of the voters (above 15 years of age) who agree with the statement. While the survey results may have been simplified before being presented in the tabloid newspaper, it seems that the respondents could choose only between “agree” and “disagree”.

After good election results at the end of 1997, FrP became Norway’s second-largest party for the first time – and after the party elected Siv Jensen and Terje Soviknes as the party’s two vice-chairmen, a new strategy was adopted. For the first time, FrP was seriously considering participating in national government. With Siv Jensen in charge of revising the 1997 election manifesto, the party decided not only to get rid of controversial concepts like fjernkulturelle (people who are culturally distant, “alien”) and replace it with the more neutral utlendinger (foreigners) but also included a completely new section on “tolerance” in the beginning of its manifesto (Fremskrittspartiet 1997; 2001; Ekeberg and Snoen 2001: 330). In this section, the party claimed to support the equal value of all humans regardless of “race, color, gender, language, religion, ethnic background or personal convictions;” furthermore, it was in favor of “diversity” (Fremskrittspartiet 2001). Moreover, in addition to rather minor changes in a lengthy manifesto – which very few voters read anyway – the party also decided to tone down the immigration/integration issue in the forthcoming national elections in 2001. As noted by Snoen and Ekeberg (2001: 330), it was like an “echo” from the 1991 election. In sum, these rather minor changes could be interpreted to indicate that the party was moderating the position on immigration-related issues and policies.

Simultaneously as the manifesto became somewhat less xenophobic and some of the statements that could be interpreted as examples of biological racism were removed, the party officially included the security narrative in the manifesto. This particular narrative, which fits very well with the authoritarian policies of such parties, seemed to have strong popular support (see the above survey). The main argument presented was that even though most immigrants are law-abiding, there are likely to be “great problems in the wake of immigration, such as criminality and lack of societal adaptation.”

This became particularly important in the 2005 campaign. An election poster bearing the text “the perpetrator is of foreign origin” showed a juvenile foreigner with a gun pointed at the reader. Not surprisingly, the poster was heavily criticized by actors in civil society and political opponents. Olaf Thommessen from the Liberal Party (V), for example, said that this demonstrated that FrP was similar to the French Front National, or the Freedom Party in Austria. Per Sandberg, MP, defended FrP’s poster, claiming that it was necessary to “call a

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94 Dagbladet, 21.02.99

87
spade a spade” and that it was time to get rid of the “naïve idea” that the integration process is going well.95

The narratives presented by FrP continued to enjoy widespread support in the early 2000s, though not to the same extent as in the late 1990s, and actual support varied significantly among the various narratives (see Figure 4.1).96 Views of immigrants as an economic burden and as contributing to cultural impoverishment (in other words, immigrants as cultural threat) are the least supported among the five narratives. Moreover, these views received declining support throughout the first decade of the 2000s – the economic burden from 19 to 13% and the cultural impoverishment from 22 to 14%. The idea that immigrants represent a security threat or that they exploit the Norwegian welfare system was supported by a larger share of the population. However, this support has decreased too – from 41 to 29% in the case of welfare exploitation, and from 45 to 33% in the case of security threat. The most widely shared anti-immigration narrative has been the “assimilation imperative” – the idea that immigrants should strive to become more like “us.” This is also the only conception which does not display an equally clear pattern of decreasing support. Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, the assimilationist imperative was shared by almost half of the Norwegian population.

![Graph showing support for various anti-immigration frames in Norway, 2002–2009](image)

**Figure 4.1: Popular support for various anti-immigration frames in Norway, 2002–2009**  
*Source: SSB, Norway Statistics. Notes: The figure shows those that agree completely or agree somewhat with the following statements. Assimilation imperative = Immigrants in Norway should endeavor to become as similar to Norwegians as possible; Security threat = Most immigrants are a source of poor safety in society; Welfare exploitation = Most immigrants exploit the social welfare system; Cultural impoverishment = Most immigrants do not enrich the cultural life in Norway (the statement was initially reversed); Economic burden = Most immigrants do not make a useful contribution to the Norwegian labor market (the statement was initially reversed). Those who said “don't know” (with one exception less than 3%) were included when percentages were calculated. The number of respondents varies between 1410 (in 2002) and 1103 in (2009).*

95 Dagbladet, 16.08.05 (URL: http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2005/08/16/440336.html)
96 However, with regard to all these narratives it should be noted that the level of support depends on whether only those who “agree completely” are included or, as in this case, those who “agree somewhat” are included as well. If only those who “agree completely” are included, support for FrP’s anti-immigration narratives emerges as significantly lower. In 2009, the figures would have been as follows: 21% for assimilation imperative, 10% for the security threat, 8% for welfare exploitation, and 4% for economic burden or cultural impoverishment.
Bearing in mind and knowing that Islamophobic and/or anti-Muslim sentiments were widespread, it is perhaps no surprise that FrP has recently re-framed the narrative about Norway’s immigrant population in general and Muslim communities in particular (see also Akkerman and Hagelund 2007). Already in the 2001 manifesto, which was adopted prior to the terror attacks of 9/11 and the heightened focus on Islam, FrP extended the list of important “democratic values” that the immigrant community was expected internalize, implicitly suggesting that they did not share those values in the first place. Since then the list has been expanded to include not only liberal values like rule of law, freedom of speech, right of ownership, and freedom of associations, but also gender equality and the freedom to choose one’s spouse (Fremskrittspartiet 2001, 2005; 2009).

Interestingly, Islam or Muslims have not been explicitly mentioned in any of FrP manifests. However, this is not to say that this religion and its followers have played a marginal role in the party’s anti-immigration discourse in recent years. In fact, as shown, Islamophobia and/or profound skepticism to Islam have been featured in narratives through the party’s history. However, it is only since the turn of the millennium that Islam has been perceived as a threat to what are seen as Norwegian or Enlightenment values such as freedom of speech, gender equality and gay rights. The party’s negative focus on Islam is nevertheless conspicuous in a report on immigration and integration issues prepared in 2007. In this report, alleged problems with Muslims and Islam were interpreted using a wide range of the traditional narratives of the anti-immigration discourse: economic burden, security threat, cultural challenge and problems of illiberalism. This report is also an example of the transnational aspects of right-wing populism as it quotes the Dutch populist Pim Fortuyn stating that “Islam is a threat to liberal Europe” (Amundsen et al. 2007: 127). The report sees the high number of Muslim taxi drivers in Norway as a symptom of segregation, and it warns against sharia law (Amundsen et al. 2007: 105). Throughout the report, Muslim immigration or Islam is directly or indirectly linked to terrorism, forced marriage, welfare abuse, polygamy, a poor work ethic, increased crime, and even to poor school performance (Amundsen et al. 2007: 9, 55, 56, 68, 95, 141).

This narrative on Islam and Muslims as a threat to Norwegian society reached a new level of saliency when, early in 2009, party leader Siv Jensen conceptualized recent demands on halal meat in prisons; the right to wear hijab in the police force; time off work on religious holidays (except for those that are already established as such in Norway); gender-separated physical education in elementary school – all these, as “sneak Islamization.”97 This term, which allegedly appeared on Danish websites as early as 2001 (Døving 2012), has been a key concept in extreme right-wing discourse on Islam and Muslims in Europe since the early 2000s. It implicitly hints at hidden processes in society and serves to create fear. Jensen’s speech had a substantial impact on the political discourse, as the concept was mentioned almost two hundred times (191) in the two largest tabloids and the four largest regional newspapers in the course of the following year. And, according to the opinion polls, the support for FrP increased from 24.1% in February to 27.6% in March.98

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97 Speech given by Siv Jensen, February 2009. The clip is available on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgDA7cKQhnY (accessed 24.11.14)
98 The figures are from Bernt Aardal’s homepage. He calculates the mean of all published opinion polls within a month.
Zero Tolerance towards Extremists

To what extent a party is perceived as legitimate by the voters is not only a function of what party representatives say and how they argue: it is also a question of what they do. While the previous section analyzed how FrP has presented its anti-immigration position in its manifestos and in public, and briefly presented some data indicating that some of the main narratives were shared by large segments of the Norwegian population, this section examines how the party has dealt with extremists within the party.

At the subnational level and in the youth organization

The ALP had problems with extremist within already from the very beginning. When the party was founded in the early 1970s, it was not the only right-wing counter-reaction to social-democratic development of postwar Norway in general and the progressive ideas and left-wing policies of 1968 in particular. Several right-wing organizations – Frihetsalliansen (Freedom Alliance), Fedrelandssværnet (Defence of the Fatherland), Ultra Marine (Ultra Marine) – were established, some more extremist than others (see Emberland and Laugerud 1993). The boundaries between these organizations were in some cases quite porous. At ALP’s founding meeting in 1973, for example, activists from an extreme nationalist party called Norges Demokratiske Parti (Norway’s Democratic Party, NDP) tried to recruit potential members in front of the main entrance (Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993: 11–12). And Kristofer Almås, a key figure in the embryonic phase before he left FrP, explained that the party did experience “youths looking for a Führer,” although he maintained that they counted very few and that there were not more extremists in ALP than in other parties.99

One of the most active far-right organizations, Anti-kommunistisk allianse (Anti-Communist Alliance, AKA), led by activists like Dick Kobro and Alfred Olsen, even tried to infiltrate the ALP.100 In fact, the AKA was almost like an informal youth movement of the party in the early phase (see Bangsund 1984: 167ff). And although Kobro did not support using violent measurements against what he called “the red hordes,” he was certainly in favor of the Führer-principle and folkenasjonalisme – an ideology similar to the German Völkischer Nationalismus. In short, Kobro advocated a regime which could “secure the Norwegian people” and the independence of the Norwegian state, and which would promote values such as loyalty, commitment and sacrifice rather than “personal egoism and restricted group mentality” (Kobro in the journal Nordisk Fremtid, cited in Bangsund 1984: 168) and he tended to socialize not only with Norwegian neo-Nazis, but also with extreme right-wing activists in Sweden and Germany.101 Together with one of the secretaries in ALP, Kobro sought to unite various extreme right-wing forces under the umbrella Folkefront mot kommunisme (People’s Movement against Communism).

One of the other initiator of the AKA, Alfred Olsen, was also linked to Nazi groupings. Although Olsen strongly opposed being labelled “Nazi,” he clearly sympathized with undemocratic ideas such as Italian fascism. In May 1974, some months after the party had entered the parliament, most of these activists (30 in total) – including the so-called “Olsen

99 VG, 29.06.74
100 See also Klassekampen, 03.02.01
101 VG, 05.09.95
gang” – were excluded from the ALP (Emberland and Laugerud 1993). According to the party elite in ALP, the views and attitudes of the group conflicted with the party’s ideology. Lange, for example, said the activists were completely “fanatical” and that they therefore had to be excluded. Some of these activists – including Kobro – were able to re-join the party for a short period, only to be excluded again when Hagen gained power in 1978 (Bangsund 1984: 168).

Another extreme right-wing activist within the ALP was a young man called Erik Blücher. Blücher was initially a member of the Conservative youth organization. However, after having convinced a local branch of the Conservative Party to support the Apartheid regime in South Africa, he was forced to leave the party. In search of a new right-wing party, he ended up at the legendary meeting in Saga Kino in 1973 where the ALP was founded. Blücher quickly became active within the new party, and despite his track record as a staunch Apartheid supporter he was nominated as number fourteen on the parliamentary list in Østfold county for the 1973 general elections. However, his political carrier proved short-lived, as he was deemed too extreme for the ALP as well.

Hagen certainly pursued a more systematic and consistent strategy of cleaning out the neo-Nazis than Lange. The room for die-hard anti-immigrant activists became substantially smaller. A prominent member of Bergen FrP, Professor Harald Trefall, was among those who decided to leave the party in 1986, arguing that it had “moved away from its initial principles.” Already the year after, Trefall joined the new extra-parliamentary organization Folkeaksjonen mot innvandring (People’s Action against Immigration, FMI).

In 1987, after Hagen himself had played the immigration card for the first time, he publicly criticized one of the party’s county branch leaders, Bjarne Dahl, after the latter had revealed firm illiberal and racist beliefs. By voting against granting a liquor license to a local restaurant because the owner was an immigrant, Dahl had, according to Hagen, also voted against the party manifesto. However, before a decision had been taken on whether to exclude Dahl, he had already left the party (more or less) voluntarily. To the media, Hagen used the event to repeat the party’s self-proclaimed non-discriminatory ideology, stating that FrP “cannot accept any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, gender, religion, age, political affiliation or the like” and that “members with such political attitudes must realize that it is incompatible with membership in our party.”

Despite cases like those of Trefall and Dahl, who to a lesser or greater extent left voluntarily, FrP continued to be a hotbed for extremists in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Not of all these were immediately expelled. Michael Knutsen, for instance, allegedly the “spider” among Norwegian right-wing extremists, joined FrP in 1982. And, although he continued to distribute flyers for Erik Blücher’s party, Nasjonalt Folkeparti (National People’s Party, NF) and met as a witness in the court case after the bombing of a mosque in 1985, Knutsen

102 VG, 31.05.74
103 Stavanger Aftenblad, 20.01.06
104 Blücher went on to found a more extreme party called Norsk Front (Norwegian Front, NF) in 1975.
105 NTB 04.10.87
106 VG, 14.11.87
107 Aftenposten, 16.11.87
108 VG, 15.02.92
was undisputed as a candidate for FrP in the 1987 local elections. Knutsen was not elected, however, and he left the party – allegedly because he found it too boring (Lunde 1993: 68).

Despite leaving the party officially, Knutsen remained one of the players on the growing Norwegian extreme right-wing scene in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988, he founded *Norsk demokratisk union* (National Democratic Union, NDU) and one year later, in 1989, he launched a new organization, *Anders Langes venner* (Friends of Anders Lange, ALV) and a new far-right publication, *Norsk blad* (Norwegian Magazine, NB). Some of his activities were obviously peripheral to FrP, but he seemed to cultivate contacts with the members of the party’s youth organization. In the mid-1990s, for example, he showed up on a bus full of anti-immigrant and nationalist activists – including neo-Nazis and members of FrP’s youth organization – which was stopped by the police on its way to a demonstration (see below).

Knudsen might be seen as the exception that proves the rule. Many of the extreme right activists were rapidly excluded if they engaged in any militant activity and Hagen seemed to be skeptical to members participating in other anti-immigrant organizations. For example, in the aftermath of the infamous extremist meeting in Brumunddal in 1991, in which a public meeting organized by the racist and deeply xenophobic group FMI resulted in a street fight between far right activists and anti-racists, FrP expelled two local candidates who fought side by side with the other far right activists (Lunde 1993: 46).

The relationship between FMI and FrP was also at the center of another episode at the end of the decade. In 1999, the FMI organized a relatively large meeting somewhere in the Norwegian mountains. According to the tabloid newspaper *Dagbladet*, several of the 25 participants were active in FrP at local level, and they were not afraid of expressing undemocratic and racist attitudes. A 72-year-old FrP member and elected representative at the local level in Oslo, Egil Karlsen, argued that Norway was not a democracy but a “democraship” – combining feature of a democracy and dictatorship. In an interview the day after, Hagen claimed not to know about the meeting – in fact, he even argued that FMI as an organization was unknown to him and that he found dual membership in FMI and FrP to be an “awkward combination.” Although FMI members would not be automatically expelled, Hagen made it abundantly clear that no one with contact to neo-Nazi circles were welcomed in FrP.

In 1999, the chairman of another local branch (Oppegård, outside Oslo), Oddbjørn Jonstad, was suddenly regarded as too extremist by the party leadership, although he was

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109 VG, 05.09.95
109 VG, 15.02.92
111 See also NTB 10.09.91. The event may nevertheless have affected support for FrP in the subsequent local elections. At least the electoral decline in Hedmark County was almost twice the size as in the country as a whole. In Hedmark, the support dropped from 6.7% in 1987 to 2.3% in 1991. For Norway as a whole, support fell from 10.4 to 6.5%.
112 Dagbladet, 14.06.99
113 Former MP for FrP in the 1970s, Gjems-Onstad, was also present at the meeting. In the newspaper, he expressed explicit biologically-based racist ideas: “I have nothing against foreigners, but keep Norway Norwegian. Norwegians are one nation within the Aryan race. A Negro can never become Norwegian.” (Dagbladet 14.06.99)
114 Dagbladet 15.06.99
supported by others at the subnational level.\textsuperscript{115} When Jonstad proposed establishing closed camps for all asylum-seekers and refugees until return to their “own country,” the executive committee opposed his views, arguing it was against fundamental values and ideas of the party (e.g. respect for rule of law and the party’s official party manifesto).\textsuperscript{116} Before Jonstad was excluded, however, he met party leader Hagen in a public debate on television. Confronted with an extreme and to some extent an insignificant local chairman, Hagen was able to reinforce the image of FrP as a respectable, decent party. As he later stated in an interview, “Jonstad had crossed the line, and we have reacted.”\textsuperscript{117} In the subsequent public debate, Hagen was praised by Norwegian political scientists for neatly balancing between legitimate and illegitimate skepticism to immigration.\textsuperscript{118}

All of these four events described so far – the Brumunddal riots, the FMI meeting, and the Jonstad case – show that the party was willing and able to dissociate itself from other anti-immigration organizations and from militant activity. Even more important than these events, at least with regard to publicity and potential electoral impact, was the reaction against the neo-Nazi infiltration in the youth branch of Oslo in 1995/96. The infiltration began probably somewhere around early 1995 but did not become a major issue until early 1996. And while the leadership of the youth branch in Oslo and the national leadership in the party first trivialized the alleged extremist takeover, they eventually changed their minds and the extremists were finally expelled in late February 1996.

In late 1995, the youth organization (FpU) seemed to be infiltrated by extreme right-wing activists, many of whom embraced neo-Nazi sympathies.\textsuperscript{119} Youth party activists had been observed together with neo-Nazis and extreme nationalists on their way to a small Norwegian town (Tønsberg) in order to declare it a “Nazi zone.”\textsuperscript{120} A few months later, in Oslo, three nationalist youth tried to join the youth party organization, as they were looking for a more viable political alternative than the unsuccessful Fedrelandspartiet (Fatherland’s party, FP) and they viewed the FrP chairman as “the closest we get to Le Pen in Norway.”\textsuperscript{121} In 1996, infiltration had reached FrP, when two members of the extremist-rightist organization Viking were elected to the annual meeting of the Oslo branch, the largest county branch in the party.\textsuperscript{122}

Reactions to these developments were rather mixed. Whereas the leadership of youth branch had initially tried to expel the extreme right activists,\textsuperscript{123} there was no confrontation when more activists with extreme right-wing affiliation turned up at the annual meeting. In

\textsuperscript{115} For example, from the leader of the local branch in Kristiansund, Alf Terje Hansen (VG, 01.09.99). Hansen eventually left the party in 2001 during the “Søviknes-scandal,” in which a senior politician, Terje Søviknes, was accused of sexual relations with a 16-year-old activist in the youth organization. According to Hansen (as well as many others), the party did not handle this scandal very well (see also: http://www.tk.no/nyheter/article402679.ece). Jonstad had also support from other parts of the party (see e.g. NTB, 31.08.99).
\textsuperscript{116} N\textit{NTB}, 29.08.99; \textit{Aftenposten}, 30.08.99
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Aftenposten}, 02.09.99
\textsuperscript{118} e.g. \textit{NTB}, 31.08.99
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{VG}, 06.09.95
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Klassekampen}, 03.02.01
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{VG}, 06.09.95
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{VG}, 31.01.96, “Høyreekstreme som FrP-delegater”
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{VG}, 06.09.95. Vice-chairman Ole Tom Nomeland asked well-known nationalists for a list of names of youth active within \textit{Norsk Ungdom} (Norwegian Youth, NU).
fact, the youth branch leader publicly declared that the delegates would not be expelled.\textsuperscript{124} Even after it was revealed that 11 members of the extreme right-wing group Viking were also members of FpU – information further corroborated by former youth party leader at the national level, Klaus Jakobsen – both the national and subnational party elite remained passive.\textsuperscript{125}

To be sure, the leader of FrP’s city council group, Svenn Kristiansen, argued that “if there are extreme right nationalists in FpU – they need get out” and local party branch leader, Einar Lonstad, said it was is important to look into the situation more seriously.\textsuperscript{126} However, accusations of any extreme right linkage were basically dismissed as being unreliable and exaggerated.\textsuperscript{127} Carl I. Hagen, for example, refused to publish the documentation showing the alleged infiltration, and accused the leader of the youth organization of orchestrating a “witch-hunt” on members more anti-immigration oriented than himself.\textsuperscript{128} Not surprisingly, Jakobsen decided to leave the party and Hagen’s reactions were well received in extreme-rightist circles. For example, the magazine \textit{Fritt Forum} (Free Forum) wrote: “as Hagen said, it is not certain that membership in Viking is incompatible with FpU membership.”\textsuperscript{129}

However, when the irrefutable evidence was published showing that ten FpU members were connected to Viking, the party leadership rapidly changed its position.\textsuperscript{130} While Hagen had initially dismissed any accusations, he now criticized the former FpU leadership for handing over the evidence too late. FrP’s general secretary, Geir Mo, made it abundantly clear that any activist who was part of “racist or Nazi circles” would be excluded immediately.\textsuperscript{131} In the end, nine members of the youth party in Oslo were expelled, on grounds of membership in or close contact with Viking.\textsuperscript{132} At the press conference, the party tried to re-establish its public image as a serious and non-extremist political actor. Both the FpU leader and FrP leader of the county branch in Oslo forcibly argued that there was no room for racists or Nazis in neither FrP nor the FpU.\textsuperscript{133} In order to avoid similar experiences in the future, FpU would require all members to sign a loyalty declarative statement clarifying that members should behave according to the manifesto and statues.

While most of the examples of extreme right infiltration and extreme right members at the local level suggest that FrP has consistently rejected being linked with such groups and ideologies, there have been a few counter-examples which are worth mentioning before we analyze the relationship with extreme right at the national level. The first example is from a county branch in Southern Norway. In Aust-Agder in the 1990s, the top candidate Per Irving Bakke was not expelled even though he argued that only “Norwegian restaurants”\textsuperscript{134} should

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Klassekampen}, 03.02.01
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Arbeiderbladet}, 09.02.95
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{NTB} 09.02.96 and 12.02.96
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{NTB} 09.02.95
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{NTB} 16.02.96; \textit{VG}, 18.02.96
\textsuperscript{129} quoted in \textit{Klassekampen}, 03.02.01
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{VG}, 19.02.95
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Dagbladet}, 20.02.96
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{NTB}, 22.02.96. However, despite comprehensive documentation, the decision was not unanimous. Some of the board members (probably two, according to \textit{VG}, 23.02.96) in the Oslo branch were simply against kicking out the extreme right activists.
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{VG}, 23.02.96
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{VG},07.09.95
be granted liquor licenses and that he believed it was “an honor to be called racist.”¹³⁵ Despite these statements – and the fact that the county board in Aust-Agder wanted him excluded – he remained in the party.

Another example is perhaps more accurately seen as an example of extreme right trivialization. In the mid-1990s, Oslo FrP was considering excluding members due to linkages with racist and extreme right groups.¹³⁶ Allegedly, the most notable activist, Leif Kvigne, had founded the extreme organization Norsk organisasjon mot innvandring (Norwegian Organization against Immigration) and collaborated with the leader of the neo-Nazi and racist party Hvit Valgalliance (White Alliance). Despite these extreme right-wing links, he was not excluded. Instead the local branch leadership said they were unfamiliar with Kvigne’s statements and that his analysis of immigration policy should be seen as “private note” intended solely for an internal study circle dealing with “immigration, crime and security.”¹³⁷

The following interview with Oslo deputy mayor Sven Kristiansen (FrP) offers a good illustration of the pattern of reactions and excuses in Oslo FrP in the mid-1990s¹³⁸:

**Interviewer:** “Your party seems to have clear racist tendencies?”

**Kristiansen:** “No, we have a resolution from the annual meeting against [racism]. We have no room for racists.”

**Interviewer:** “But Leif Kvigne, who started Norwegian Organization against Immigration together with Jack Erik Kjuus [leader of the party White Alliance], is still a member of the Bygdøy and Frogner local sections of FrP?

**Kristiansen:** “Well, we cannot check everyone who wants to become a member. Moreover, Kvigne has no influence.”

**Interviewer:** “Doesn’t history show that FrP exerts an attraction on racist elements?”

**Kristiansen:** “Yes. We have seen this over time. This [fact] one cannot suppress.”

In this interview, the FrP representative was forced to admit that the party seemed to attract activists with racist beliefs, yet he attempted to maintain the party’s reputation by referring to (1) official statements from the party in which it clearly rejects these ideological tendencies and (2) that the party could not be held responsible for the ideas and beliefs of individual members. To what extent these arguments were accepted by the readers – and the voters more generally – is obviously difficult to assess. However, the electoral result in the capital city in 1997 suggests that Oslo branch had been able to re-gain its formerly strong position. While overall support increased from 6.3 in 1993 to 15.3% in 1997 (which corresponds to 9

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¹³⁵ Grimstad Adressetidende, quoted in Glåmdalen 30.10.08
¹³⁶ NTB, 05.09.95
¹³⁷ Aftenposten, 05.09.95
¹³⁸ Dagens Næringsliv, 20.04.96
percentage points), the support in Oslo increased from 8.3 to 17.9% (which corresponds to 9.6 percentages point). Oslo was thus the third strongest electoral district in the country.

At the national level

In general, there have been far fewer (public) linkages between extreme right circles and MPs and/or the party leadership. Yet, there have been a few important cases which deserve to be elaborated upon in detail, particularly the cases involving MP Øystein Hedstøm’s participation at an extreme right meeting in 1995 and the expulsion of MP and former vice-chairman Vidar Kleppe in 2001.

The first case, however, took place a few years earlier. As noted, there was an upsurge in extreme right and anti-immigration organizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One of these organizations was Den norske foreningen (the Norwegian Association, DNF) inspired by a similar nationalist but less radical organization in Denmark. The Norwegian version was founded in January 1991 in order to “promote the interests of the Norwegian people” (quoted in Lunde 1993: 66). Even though the meeting also attracted many of the best known extreme rightists and racist activists in Norway (among them, Søfteland, Kjuus, Gjems-Onstad, Aall and Høegh), several prominent MPs from FrP were also present (Jens Marcussen, Vidar Kleppe and Finn Thoresen) (Lunde 1993: 66). These extreme rightist members were not there by coincidence. In fact, the organization was led by Torfinn Hellandsvik, a former board member of FMI, an organization which Hagen had previously condemned due to its extreme views on immigration. Even though this meeting suggests a fairly close contact between extreme rightists and some members of the Storting, there was no (public) reaction against the three MPs.139

If the infiltration of neo-Nazis in the mid-1990s was the most important event showing FrP’s commitment to confront extremism (at least after gaining much media coverage), the “Hedstøm affair” was involved a more ambiguous position. The affair in question concerns a secret extreme right-wing meeting held at Godlia Cinema in the east of Oslo a few days before the 1995 local elections. A prominent FrP MP, Øystein Hedstrøm, attended this meeting together with well-known Norwegian extreme right and racist activists. Allegedly, the meeting was organized in order to prepare a joint strategy for dramatically minimizing or even completely halting all immigration to Norway. At the meeting, there were speeches on race theory and arguments presented in favor of White Aryan racial supremacy. According to Dagbladet, the tabloid newspaper which revealed the secret meeting, Hedstrøm tried to hide his identity when he realized that the media had found out about the unannounced meeting.140

Not surprisingly, public reactions to the meeting were strong and massive. SV leader Kristin Halvorsen labelled Hedstrøm a “classical racist,” and KrF leader Kjell Magne Bondevik was shocked by the disclosures (Iversen 1998: 177). The largest newspaper, VG, called the event “a gust of racism”: “It feels like a gust from a time in which barbarism

139 One possible explanation could be that the meeting did not receive much media attention (VG, 05.09.95). However, it could also be that Hagen was less skeptical to FMI than his previous statements seem to indicate. At least, Torbjørn Andersen, a rather unknown candidate in Aust-Agder, was not expelled either, even though he had claimed that FMI and FrP had “similar opinions on immigration issues” (Dagbladet 05.09.97). On the contrary, Andersen was elected to the Storting in 1997, and re-elected in 2001 and 2005.

140 See VG, 04.09.95
ravaged here [in Norway] and in our immediate surroundings.”\textsuperscript{141} However, the newspaper also – somewhat indirectly – accepted the rhetoric used by Hagen, arguing that he normally used an acceptable rhetoric, whereas Hedstrøm had crossed the line. In fact, VG explicitly stated: “Hagen is neither a racist nor an extremist.”\textsuperscript{142} According to that newspaper, Hagen’s frequent use of xenophobia was nothing more than a speculative vote-seeking strategy and could not be considered racist.

A survey indicated that a clear majority of voters disapproved of Hedstrøm’s participation at the meeting (see Figure 4.2) – about two thirds said it was unacceptable. The evaluation of Hedstrøm’s actions was obviously depended upon the party affiliation, but even about half FrP’s voters seemed to feel that Hedstrøm should not have attended the meeting.

![Figure 4.2: Should Hedstrøm have participated at the meeting with anti-immigration activists? Source: VG, 05.09.95. N=609](image)

Hagen’s first reaction was to oppose the DNF and subsequently to put a muzzle on MP Hedstrøm, forcing him to “limit his participation in the campaign.”\textsuperscript{143} Yet, Hagen still defended his MP, arguing that Hedstrøm had not violated the party statutes normally used to exclude racists.\textsuperscript{144} Moreover, when it became clear that the voters were not punishing the party in the polls,\textsuperscript{145} Hagen strategically exploited the event, accusing the media of biased coverage and the other parties of sweeping alleged problems of immigration under the

\textsuperscript{141} VG, 04.09.95. The original quote is as follows: “Det kjennes som et gufs fra en tid da barbariet herjet hos oss og i vår nære omverden.”

\textsuperscript{142} VG, 04.09.95

\textsuperscript{143} NTB, 27.12.95; see also Hagen (2007: 252)

\textsuperscript{144} In his autobiography, Hagen (2007: 252) later stated that he never believed Hedstrøm had done anything wrong and that the “muzzle” came as a result of an internal compromise aimed at pleasing more pragmatic forces within the party and to make sure that the party would remain cohesive until the upcoming election was over. A member of FrP executive committee, Per Ove Width, gave another story, arguing that Hedstrøm was simply “too valuable to be put on the sidelines” (Aftenposten, 06.09.95).

\textsuperscript{145} In Bergen, Norway’s second-largest city, the party even increased its support in the polls (Bergens Tidende, 05.09.95).
As many times before, blaming the media for being biased and the other parties for not wanting to discuss immigration-related topics proved extremely successful. Not only was Hagen able to make immigration the main issue during the last week prior to the election, he also “retained his composure” and criticized the main parties for racist politics due to so-called positive discrimination of immigrants (Iversen 1998: 181).

Although FrP was heavily criticized by political opponents and mainstream media, the event had less impact on its standing among the electorate. In fact, the polls showed an increase rather than a decrease, and about three-quarters of the voters said that the event had not changed their view on the party (see Figure 4.3). And while the event had some negative effects among those who voted for the Labour Party or the Conservatives, it actually reinforced party sympathies among some FrP voters. The municipal election result was a huge success. Despite the extensive internal turmoil and a subsequent organizational split one year earlier (in 1994), the party received an all-time high of 10.5% of the vote.

On the evening of that Election Day, Hagen repeated that there had been no real discussion about problems of immigration in Norway, and that his party had a victim of “opinion terror.” He held that FrP did not cultivate contacts with racist groups, and the actions taken against Hedstrøm (that he should play only a limited role in the election campaign) should be seen as a clear demarcation towards such groups. And in the internal party magazine, he stressed that “the voters in practice have seen that FrP rejects any collaboration and contact with racist groups and racists.”

Figure 4.3: How do you view FrP after this case (i.e. Hedstrøm’s participation at the extreme rightist meeting)?
Source: See previous figure.

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146 In fact, even before he knew how the voters would react, Hagen (2007: 251) was seriously considering using the Hedstrøm scandal instrumentally to gain more voters.
147 NTB 12.09.95
148 Fremskritt, 09.09.95
The second important event concerning challenges to the party’s political legitimacy is related to the role of former vice-chairman and prominent MP, Vidar Kleppe. As noted, already in the early 1990s Kleppe and others had demonstrated their linkages to more radical groups (like the Norwegian Association), but had not been expelled at that point. Throughout the 1990s, especially after the party split in 1994, Kleppe and Hedstrøm had become notoriously known for expressing radical views on immigrants and pushing a more stricter immigration policy than the official party manifesto (see also Lunde 1993: 61). Among many statements, Kleppe erroneously claimed that Muslim organizations wanted to remove the Christian cross in the Norwegian flag; he argued (together with Hedstrøm) that most wars and conflicts are caused by ethnic diversity or religious pluralism, that Norway is being destroyed by immigration and that the country is open for “Muslim fundamentalism”; and he proposed that certain social benefits should be restricted to “Norwegians.” While FrP certainly has advocated policies that would benefit Norwegian rather than immigrants, the latter is a more direct example of the “welfare chauvinism” expressed by other radical and extreme rightist parties across Europe (e.g. Rydgren 2005). Among the more innocuous initiatives, Kleppe and Hedstrøm sent a letter to the Norwegian King, asking if they could employ the slogan Alt for Norge (“All for Norway”) on their official visitkort (parliamentary calling cards). However, even this stunt was not well received by many other representatives and the party leadership. And finally, prior to the local elections in 1999, Kleppe and Hedstrøm provocatively created their own electoral road trip, traveling around and advocating strict immigration policies – using language which was far more direct than that of Carl I. Hagen.

Consequently, towards the end of the 1990s, Kleppe was increasingly seen as a “problem” due to his rather extreme, if not explicitly racist, anti-immigration statements. Hagen warned against the use of racist language, and the national board accepted a proposal from Hagen allowing the party leadership and executive committee to reprehend representatives who were using inappropriate language. Vice-chairman Siv Jensen publicly argued that Kleppe had reached the “blunder ceiling.” However, it was not until the national board adopted its new strategy of seeking participation in government that the demand for political legitimacy became increasingly urgent (see also Ekeberg and Snoen 2001: 329; Aardal 2003b: 12). The existence of rather extreme solo-players like Kleppe was thus perceived as a key obstacle to achieving such a goal. He was constantly attacked by political opponents and was frequently labelled a verstring (ruffian, scoundrel) by the press. Whereas Kleppe and a few other MPs wanted to remain controversial, the dominant faction led by Hagen “wanted to continue the development of FrP as a serious party” (Hagen 2007: 359). The party therefore continued and even reinforced its zero-tolerance strategies regarding extremism and racism. In the end, after unsuccessfully trying to interfere in the nomination

149 VG, 05.08.97; Aftenposten 05.02.98; Aftenposten, 11.07.99; NTB 5.8.99
150 VG, 18.02.98
151 Aftenposten, 25.04.98
152 See e.g. Aftenposten, 11.07.99. The same holds for another MP, Jan Simonsen, who argued that in order to stop refugees from stealing in supermarkets they should be led by the hand by “ethnic Norwegians” and he proposed creating a public web page with information on people convicted of pedophilia (Dagbladet, 30.07.00).
153 Aftenposten, 21.02.99 and 22.02.99
154 VG, 11.07.99
155 See e.g. VG, 07.8.99. Prime Minister Bondevik argued that Hedstrøm and Kleppe had lit a fire under racist attitudes and that their anti-immigration views were a threat to human dignity and human equality.
process (see Chapter 5), Kleppe was expelled.\textsuperscript{156} Five of the six other oppositional MPs were also either expelled or suspended (three MPs) or left the party voluntarily (two MPs) (Bjørklund 2003: 144, endnote 10).\textsuperscript{157} Hedstrøm was the only oppositional MP who remained in the party, but he no longer had a significant position in the public debate on immigration issues.

While it is difficult to measure the direct effects of expelling Kleppe, there is some evidence to indicate that FrP suffered only marginally on the electoral arena (most notably in Kleppe’s home county, Aust-Agder) and that the organization remained largely intact. In any case, these were merely short-term effects. In the long run, FrP as a party in the Storting became far more cohesive and it also seemed to be gradually perceived as legitimate party (see also Jupskås 2013).

\textbf{Conclusions}

This chapter has analyzed the extent to which and in what ways FrP has struggled to maintain its reputation since it was founded by Anders Lange, a former secretary of the semi-democratic \textit{Fedrelandslaget} in the prewar period, until it had consolidated its position as the largest right-wing party in Norway. Based primarily upon an extensive number of newspaper articles as well as party manifestos and secondary literature, the chapter has focused on four possible aspects of extreme right linkages: whether there ever was any fascist nostalgia in FrP rhetoric; if the party has had any organizational and/or ideological relationship with extremist parties in Norway or abroad; if the party has relied upon a non-racist way of framing its opposition towards immigration; and if the party consistently has expelled members or representatives who, in one way or another, have been linked to extreme right groups.

The short answer is that FrP, with a few notable exceptions, has been able to maintain its reputation and, in consequence, has been perceived as a legitimate party, despite massive criticism on several occasions. With the exception of some questionable statements regarding foreign policy (like support for the Apartheid regime and the Portuguese colonists in Angola), no sympathy for non-democratic regimes has been expressed. In fact, Lange’s support for the Apartheid regime was probably more the result of his deep anti-Communism rather than lack of democratic inclinations. FrP has refused to be compared with other anti-immigration parties elsewhere and has rejected any collaboration with such groups in Norway.

Furthermore, as noted by Gullestad (2002: 41), the party has never “articulated racism and evident references to racism.” Instead, the anti-immigration position has generally been presented within five dominant frames: (1) immigrants cost too much; (2) immigrants exploit our welfare; (3) immigrants are (more likely to be) criminals; (4) immigrants undermine our way of life; and (5) immigrants challenge our liberal values. The saliency of each of these frames has varied over time. While the importance of the economic frame has decreased, that of the cultural threat and liberal value frames has increased (see also Akkerman and Hagelund\textsuperscript{156} Technically, Kleppe was suspended before he left the party voluntarily.

\textsuperscript{157} Longstanding MP, Professor of Law, Fridtjof Frank Gundersen, who had been personally recruited to the party by Hagen in the early 1980s, was also expelled. He had previously defended the controversial right-wing populist leader in Austria, Jörg Haider, and had provocatively claimed that the German \textit{Stoßtruppen} (SS-Stormtroopers) should be seen as ordinary soldiers (Ekeberg and Snoen 2001: 333).
2007; Hagelund 2003b). Interestingly, fairly recent surveys presented in this chapter indicate that two latter seem to meet more approval in the electorate.

The most challenging events for FrP’s reputation are related to the existence of extremists in its midst. Initially, the party struggled with extremists at both the local and national levels. Most of these groups and individuals were expelled when Carl I. Hagen emerged as the dominant figure within the party. A second round of problems concerning extremists within came after Hagen played the immigration card in the 1987 local elections. Local representatives, members of parliament and youth activists seemed to cultivate contacts and share policy ideas with extreme right groups and strongly committed nationalist organizations. In most cases, they were expelled from the party. Table 4.2 summarizes how FrP has dealt with extremists within at the national and subnational levels.

Table 4.2: Strategy towards extremists within FrP, 1974–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>Why</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>30 persons(^1)</td>
<td>Activists</td>
<td>Expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Erik Blücher</td>
<td>Local activist</td>
<td>Expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Erik Gjems-Onstad</td>
<td>Vice-chairman</td>
<td>Expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Dick Kobro</td>
<td>Youth activist</td>
<td>Expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Michael Knutsen</td>
<td>Local representative</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Bjarne Dahl(^2)</td>
<td>Local representative</td>
<td>Expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Finn Thoresen</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Vidar Kleppe</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Jens Marcussen</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2 persons</td>
<td>Local activist</td>
<td>Expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Per Irving Bakke</td>
<td>Local representative</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Lars Kvigne</td>
<td>Local activist</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Øystein Hedstrøm</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>9 youths(^3)</td>
<td>Youth activist</td>
<td>Expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Torbjørn Andersen</td>
<td>Local representative</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Oddbjørn Jonstad</td>
<td>Local representative</td>
<td>Expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Egil Karlsen</td>
<td>Local representative</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Vidar Kleppe</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Expelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Øystein Hedstrøm</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Not expelled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various Norwegian newspaper articles and books on extreme right subculture in Norway. The list is by no means exhaustive. With the exceptions of a few cases that have been noted other scholars or writers, it only present cases in which activists, members and representatives have been publicly accused of linkages with extreme groups and/or presenting extreme views. ER = (perceived to be) Extreme Right. FrP has continued to expel members and representative during the leadership of Siv Jensen; however, few of these, if any, have been related to extreme right linkages (VG 02.05.08).

Note 1: Including Alfred Olsen and his “gang”

Note 2: By the time he was about to be expelled, he had already left the party.

Note 3: The Neo-Nazi activists were reluctantly expelled after extensive media coverage and pressure from the coalition partners at the local level.
Chapter 5: Towards an Authoritarian Mass Party

Introduction

This chapter argues that FrP has become institutionalized as well as centralized. However, the empirical analysis shows that these two dimensions of organizational change did not happen at the same time, but occurred at different stages in the life of FrP: birth, growth and consolidation. The institutionalization process – and especially the routinization of behavior – commenced almost immediately after the death of the party founder, Anders Lange, in 1974, although the party bureaucracy remained quite small until FrP experienced significant electoral growth in the late 1980s. The centralization process, on the other hand, took place primarily after a six-fold expansion of the parliamentary party in the late 1980s and two internal battles in the 1990s – one related to ideology, the other to strategy.

In order to get “inside the black box” of party organization, both formal and informal aspects, the chapter builds a range of data sources. Party statues (from 1974, 1976, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001–2007 and 2009) are used to analyze the development of a formal party structure and some aspects related to centralization. Annual accounts from the executive committee (from 1985, 1987–2009) illuminate some of the more informal aspects of routinization of behavior and party activities, and representative surveys among members (1991, 2000 and 2009) and congress delegates (2001 and 2009) shed light on processes of value infusion and existing norms about internal power structures. When there are no annual reports (as in the 1970s and early 1980s), the analysis relies upon secondary literature, historical accounts and autobiographies. Further details about the data are presented underway.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I briefly discuss ways of measuring institutionalization, before empirically assessing this process along two analytically distinct but complementary dimensions: routinization of behavior and value infusion. Next comes a comprehensive analysis of the vertical and horizontal centralization of FrP. In particular, I focus on some of the most important aspects of a political party: candidate selection, manifesto development, the distribution of authority to react to undesirable behavior, and the relationship between the extra-parliamentary party and the parliamentary party. Towards the end, the main findings will be briefly summarized.

Measuring Institutionalization

While the definitions of institutionalization provided by various scholars are fairly similar (see Chapter 2), the ways of measuring differ significantly (e.g. Randall and Svåsand 2002; Sharman and Phillips 2004). This was perhaps to be expected since both routinization of behavior and value infusion tend to be difficult to measure empirically. In many cases, scholars have therefore adopted indicators which, strictly speaking, actually measure potential causes or consequences of institutionalization, and not institutionalization as such. Randall and Svåsand (2002: 21), for example, propose measuring value infusion by assessing the comprehensiveness of auxiliary organizations and the number of local branches, on the premise that such organizational features lead to or cause a stronger party identity. Several scholars (e.g. Janda 1970: 89; Rose and Mackie 1988: 536; Pedahzur and Brichta 2002), on the other hand, include measurements of legislative and electoral stability, although these are...
best seen as consequences of institutionalization. At least, they cannot be included in this thesis, as that would make the relationship between institutionalization and electoral persistence tautological.

This chapter tries to avoid measurements of this kind. The empirical analysis will focus on aspects seen as being inherent parts of the institutionalization process. Although this is not an exhaustive list, the following three indicators will be used to measure behavioral routinization: (1) the size of the party bureaucracy, (2) the degree to which its activities become predictable and (3) the existence of a stable, similar and detailed formal structure throughout the organization. The third indicator aims to capture both Huntington’s (Huntington 1968: 12) concept of organizational “complexity” and Panebianco’s (1988) emphasis on homogeneity of organizational structures at the same hierarchical level. It should be noted that these indicators place considerable emphasis on the formal structure of the organization, perhaps at the expense of what Levitsky (1998: 86-87) has referred to as “informal routinization”. However, in the literature, routinization has typically been understood as the development of formalized behavior, relationships and division of labor within the organization (see Randall and Svåsand 2002).

The attitudinal aspect of institutionalization – value infusion – has been defined as “the extent to which party actors and supporters (whether or not falling into the formalized category of membership) acquire identification with and commitment to the party which transcends more instrumental or self-interested incentives for involvement” (Randall and Svåsand 2002: 13). However, one may also include support of basic organizational norms as part of the process of value infusing. In an institutionalized party there should not be too large discrepancy between the formal organization and attitudes regarding that specific organizational form, as this would most likely lead to organizational instability. Hence, I propose the following three indicators to measure value infusion: (1) party identification among voters, (2) membership turnover and membership length, (3) the correspondence between organizational norms among member (and activists) and the way the party is formally organized.

**Routinization of behavior**

The party organization of FrP was initially almost non-existent. There was neither any formal structure nor any central party bureaucracy, as the party founder, Anders Lange, was strongly opposed to both (see Chapter 7). For him, the parliamentary party should be the locus of power in a political party, not the extra-parliamentary party organization. MPs should not be constrained by a membership organization; they should not become what Lange called “a slave of the party” (Eide and Lange 1974: 74). The leader of the parliamentary group should act as the party leader and the parliamentary caucus should function as the executive committee (Eide and Lange 1974: 79). According to Lange, it was more democratic to represent the voters than to represent party members, based on a simple numerical argument that the former group is much larger than the latter. His opposition to a traditional organization was so strong that he referred to those who tried to build an extra-parliamentary organization and develop a more detailed manifesto as his “direct enemies” (Eide and Lange 1974: 76). In view of how heavily criticized by political opponents and the media Anders Lange’s Party was at the time, this statement tell us much about his profound anti-party
feelings. Furthermore, the existence of a large party bureaucracy was seen as the negation of a true people’s movement, and party officials were seen as yet another way of making ordinary people passive. At the founding meeting in 1973, Lange explicitly argued against the idea that the new party should hire party officials: “… the party should not start with big offices and staff office ladies and office managers with high salaries and a Secretary-General earning 120 [thousand kroner] and with car and all. It shall be you that are working … each one of you will be an agitator” (Lange 1973).

In its first year of existence, the organization was imbued with these strong anti-party sentiments. When an interim board was appointed a few months after the party had been founded, no attempts were made to establish a formal organization. Only two positions were seemingly predefined (party chairman and vice-chairman) and the relationship between the national and subnational level remained completely unspecified (see Organogram 5.1). Moreover, although around 1000 sympathizers had signed up as party members at the foundational meeting, they were not given any specified rights or obligations. The subnational level was only informally linked to the national level through various non-elected “regional contacts”. In many counties, these regional contacts were responsible for preparing a list of candidates for the upcoming elections. This lack of specified procedures created many internal problems, as many candidates saw the possibility of a rapid political career (Iversen 1998: 37-38).

Despite being highly skeptical towards any kind of formal structure, Lange was gradually convinced otherwise by the young and talented Carl I. Hagen. The party therefore adopted statutes at the first party convention in early 1974. Although the statutes were still fairly simplistic, they represented a significant step towards a party organization similar to other Norwegian parties. As with other parties, the basic structure resembled the multi-level political-administrative structure of Norway (see Organogram 5.2): Party members constituted the local branch at the municipality level; local branches constituted the county party and sent delegates to county meetings at the county level; and the county party sent delegates to the national party convention, which was given the task of preparing the party manifesto, and electing the party leader as well as the rest of the executive committee.

However, the formal statutes were not fully developed and they said very little about how delegates should be elected to county meetings or party conventions. Neither did they specify how the county party or the municipality party should organize. It soon became clear that further specification was needed, and in 1976 – only three years after the party had been founded as an entrepreneurial party with no formal structure – the party statues already resembled those of traditional mass parties (see Organogram 5.3). Not only were subnational party units properly specified, the party also created a national council consisting of the executive committee, MPs and, most importantly, the leaders of all county branches. The national council became the second highest authority, connecting the party in central office with the party on the ground between each party convention. In other words, the party seemed to become increasingly “vertically integrated” (Thorlakson 2013). The only notable change of the formal structure in the 1980s was the formal integration of the youth organization (see Organogram 5.4; see also Chapter 6). Since then, the youth leader at the national and subnational level has granted representation in the executive committees at the corresponding level.
Organogram 5.1: FrP’s organizational structure at the national level in 1973

1973

Partileder
(Executive chairman)

Interimstyre
(Interim board)

Stortingsgruppen
(Parliamentary group)

Fylkeskontakter
(County contacts)

Partimedlemmer
(Party members)

Represented on

Responsible to

Elected by
Organogram 5.2: FrP’s organizational structure at the national level in 1974

1974

Sentralstyret (Executive committee)

Stortingsgruppen (Parliamentary group)

Landsmøtet (National congress)

Fylkeslag (Provincial associations)

Lokallag (Local branches)

Represented on  
Responsible to  
Elected by
Organogram 5.3: FrP’s organizational structure at the national level in 1976

1976

- **Sentralstyret** (Executive committee)
  - **Landsstyret** (National council)
    - **Landsmøtet** (National congress)
      - **Fylkeslag** (Provincial associations)
        - **Lokallag** (Local branches)

- **Stortingsgruppen** (Parliamentary group)

- Represented on
- Responsible to
- Elected by
Organogram 5.4: FrP’s organizational structure at the national level in 1983
Organogram 5.5: FrP’s organizational structure at the national level in 2009

2009

- **Arbeidsutvalget** (Working committee)
- **Sentralstyret** (Executive committee)
- **Landsstyret** (National council)
- **Landsmøtet** (National congress)
- **Fylkeslag** (Provincial associations)
- **Lokallag** (Local branches)
- **Stortingsgruppen** (Parliamentary group)
- **FpU** (Youth organization)

Since 1990

Represented on

Responsibility to

Elected by
Svåsand’s (1985; 1990) concise overview of the formal structure in Norwegian parties in the mid-1980s shows only marginal difference between FrP and other parties in the Storting, which in turn indicates some kind of normalization of the party organization (see also Heidar and Saglie 2002: 59; Svåsand and Wörlund 2005). In recent decades, there have been only minor modifications of the formal structure (although the party certainly has become more centralized, see next section). FrP today now has a rather complex organizational structure (see Organogram 5.5) – quite similar to the mass party model.

Annual reports confirm the relevance of all party organs at the national level, as well as indicating a high level of routinization of behavior (see Table 5.1). The highest (party convention) and next highest authority (national council) meet either once (party convention) or twice, perhaps three times, a year (the national council). On a daily or weekly basis, most decisions are taken by the executive committee (which meets some 10 times a year) or the working committee (which meets less frequently). Importantly, the working committee meets as part of the executive committee, and in recent years many decision have been made per email rather than face-to-face meetings. Moreover, high meeting frequency is not necessarily a sign of power, but could also be related to party crisis – as was the case with FrP at turn of the millennium.

### Table 5.1: Frequency of annual meetings within party organs at the national level, 1985–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985–86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986–87</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>2004–05</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>2005–06</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>2006–07</td>
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<td>9</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2007–08</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>2008–09</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
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</table>

*Source: Annual reports 1985–2010*
The development of a party bureaucracy unfolded more slowly than the development of a formal and detailed party structure and routinization of meeting activity. Due to limited financial resources, the party bureaucracy remained weak throughout the 1970s. In fact, after the party lost its seats in the Storting 1977, there was only one general secretary – Erik Gifford – left at the party office.

In the 1980s, the party bureaucracy was somewhat strengthened, but it remained fairly small. In addition to a few advisors and one secretary in parliament (the wife of Carl I. Hagen), the party bureaucracy consisted in this period of between three and nine people (see Table 5.2). And far from all of them were full-time employed. The first three appointments – an organizational leader, a secretary and an editor for the party newspaper – took place already in 1981 when the party re-entered the Storting (Hagen 1984: 294). Later on, the central party bureaucracy was further enlarged, with a political advisor for local politics, a campaign secretary, an information secretary, and a leader and a secretary for the membership and subscription register (Annual report 88/89: 33–34). And by the late 1980s, FrP finally had enough resources to pay the chairman of the youth party and to hire Jan Arild Snoen, a young and talented liberalist, to conduct political analyses under Fremskrittpartiets utredningsinstitutt (Progress Party Fact-Finding Institute) (Annual report 88/89, see also section on FUI in Chapter 7). The bureaucracy was also developed at the subnational level and at least three of the county branches could afford to hire a part-time secretary (Svåsand 1992: 752).

The activities of the growing bureaucracy were related to basic tasks such as coordination of election campaigns; registration of elected representatives; creating an effective infrastructure for information; and developing organizational routines and a “good organizational culture” (Annual reports 87/88: 35; 88/89: 33). Most importantly, in order to field candidates to the subnational elections in 1983 in as many as possible of Norway’s more than four hundred municipalities, the party focused initially on establishing local branches throughout the country. Although FrP was gradually strengthening its position at the local level, it was still unable to field candidates in more than one out of three municipalities in the early 1980s (see Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6).

The year 1982 was therefore declared an “organizational year” by the party leadership (Hagen 1984: 296). However, bureaucratic expansion remained fragile, due not least to the relatively weak party economy. The surprisingly poor electoral results in 1985 resulted in a “very uncomfortable” workforce reduction, and for a short period there was an urgent need for “efficiency improvement” within the party (Annual report 85/86: 2–3).

It was not until FrP achieved 10% support in the late 1980s that the party bureaucracy increased significantly – and not only at the national level. In 1996, 12 party officials were employed at the national level, and the editorial office of the party magazine counted one editor and two journalists. Furthermore, the youth organization temporarily increased the number of paid staff from one to more than three before it was organizationally weakened in the mid-1990s – first due to a growing ideological conflict with the mother party in 1994, and then when it became known that the youth organization had manipulated membership figures in order to maximize public economic support.
The most important bureaucratic expansion in the 1990s, however, was not related to the central office or the youth organization: it was due to a significant increase in the number of county secretaries. In 1990, 16 secretaries were hired – mostly part-time – with the intention of being a “connecting link between the local branches and Youngstorget” (Annual report 90/91: 31). In the subsequent years, much effort was invested in improving the quality of subnational linkage, and the secretariat rapidly developed close relations with the county secretaries (Annual report 91/92: 14). For example, in order to streamline the organization and energize the party at the subnational level, county secretaries were invited to annual joint conferences at the party headquarter (Annual reports 92/93: 9; 94/95: 11). And in the mid-1990s, the national council adopted a document which further specified the task and responsibilities of the subnational level, arguing that the party needed to improve the flow of information internally (Annual report 95/96: 13). It was also decided that subnational units would be punished economically if they failed to provide necessary information to the central party bureaucracy.

As FrP became more vertically integrated, the general capacity of the party bureaucracy was gradually strengthened and further developed. In 1992, the executive committee claimed for the first time that the party bureaucracy was performing very well and that it was capable of offering proper service to the whole party organization (Annual report 91/92: 16). The party bureaucracy seemed to be involved in the following organizational tasks: general party building, establishing internal routines, training programs, producing organizational handbooks, and preparing for election campaigns (Annual reports 93/94: 11; 94/95; 95/96: 12; 96/97: 9). Common guiding lines for the candidate selection process were adopted and the bureaucracy produced various policy analyses relevant for representatives and party members across the country (Annual report 95/96: 12–13). However, several organizational challenges remained. In 1996, only 76% of the local branches managed to send in information from the annual meeting on time, even though the central office repeatedly reminded them to do so. In 1997, the share dropped to 45% (Annual report 96/97: 10).

The fourth significant expansion of the party bureaucracy took place in the late 1990s after the party had overtaken the Conservatives (H) as the second largest party in the 1997 national elections. Not only did the electoral growth at the national and subnational level bring an increased need for training of elected representatives, the party leadership continued to view organizational building as a key factor for electoral consolidation (Annual report 99/00: 9). In 2006, the party leadership even appointed a special organizational committee, Partiorganisasjonsutvalget, intended to further strengthen the membership organization, improve contact between MPs and local branches, develop better media strategies at the subnational level focusing on new technology (including blogs and podcasts) and explore the potential for international collaboration (see also section on membership organization in Chapter 7). In this period, FrP also experienced a rapid growth in external inquiries. Having become a significant party in Norwegian politics, it was frequently contacted by students, pupils and potential members interested in learning more about its ideology and activities. As a result of some of these processes, more and more party officials were hired. Since the late 1990s, the party bureaucracy at the national and subnational level have consisted of more than

158 Youngstorget refers to the square in the capital city, Oslo, where the party previously had its headquarter.
40 people – most of them in full-time positions, although many of secretaries at the subnational level for a long time only had part-time positions (Annual report 99/00: 7).

The central bureaucracy also became increasingly specialized. The division between an organizational and an administrative section in the central party bureaucracy, which had existed since the mid-90s, was replaced by a more sophisticated division between five separate sections covering various aspects of important internal party activities: administration, political counseling, organizational building, external and internal information and training of candidates and activists. According to the executive committee, this division contributed to the development of better routines and the clarification of lines of responsibility (Annual report 99/00: 69).

The administration section is in charge of the daily administration of party headquarters, including organizing meetings for the governing party organs (i.e. steering committee, executive committee, national council, party convention), coordinating campaigns and handling incoming and outgoing mail (Annual reports 00/01: 65; 05/06; 07/08: 20; 09/10: 27). For a long time, the administration was also responsible for keeping the party accounts, but this was eventually outsourced to a professional firm (Annual report 08/09: 24).

The political counseling section has mainly had a support function for the subnational level and for the general policy development of the national party, although it initially also provided direct support for the group in the Storting (i.e. the parliamentary party) (Annual reports 04/05: 37). In addition, the section has been responsible for answering question from the public, which at times have been fairly massive. For example, in 2004 alone the head of this section received some 1,900 emails with various kinds of questions (Annual report 04/05: 38). In 2005, the section was downscaled somewhat after some officials were moved to a new communications (and policy counseling) section in the Storting.

The organizational section has responsibility for general organization-building within the party. More specifically, it has been in charge of the membership register; tried to improve the organizational culture and work at the subnational level; helped the party with nomination processes; produced organizational handbooks; and traveled around annually at a wide range of subnational meetings discussing “organizational culture, organizational work, recruiting campaigns and conflict solving” (Annual reports 99/00; 05/06: 10; 08/09: 12). After the regional offices were established in 2004, the organizational section has also had daily contact with these offices, to ensure that the subnational secretaries are implementing the party’s organizational strategy (Annual report 04/05).

The information section is responsible for internal and external communications. Internally, the section has provided an overview of relevant news reports in regional and local press to MPs every morning, to help kept them updated and able to react quickly to the issues of the day (Annual report 99/00: 55). It has also helped MPs or the party leadership with external activities such as writing op-eds, press conferences and press releases. Already in the early 2000s, FrP had created an electronic data base with contact information to most newspapers in the country, allowing the party to get its message out quickly. Furthermore, the information section has produced the internal magazine, Fremskritt, and updated the party’s official web site, FrP.no.

The training section is responsible for the general political and organizational training of MPs, candidates and party members. Since the late 1990s, this section has become
increasingly important, and the party has invested considerable resources in creating a wide range of educational programs. While 775 candidates from 18 counties participated in the training program focusing on media performance and political skills prior to the 1999 local election (Annual report 99/00: 60), as many as 1 800 candidates attended a similar training prior to the 2007 local election (Annual report 06/07: 61). The section has also organized several other training courses, focusing on a range of topics, from how to make a municipal budget, to large conferences on political ideologies. Most notably, the section has focused on developing and improving Politikerskolen (the school for politicians), described as “the backbone” of the party’s educational program.

To summarize briefly, every year these five sections have carried out more or less the same activities. All party officials have been expected to take care of an increasing number of pre-defined organizational tasks. For example, at the end of the period, seven employees in the organizational and training section were responsible for as many as one hundred specified tasks. Even campaign strategies have become somewhat routinized. In both 2005 and 2009, the party advertised main campaign issues in the country’s largest tabloid (online and in printed version) and on one of the largest commercial radio stations (Annual reports 05/06: 9; 09/10: 10).

An important figure in the organizational development was FrP’s long-standing general secretary Geir Mo. Having been employed by the party since 1990, he became head of the secretariat in 1994 – a position he held until 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, as an attempt to further integrate the extra-parliamentary party and the parliamentary party, Mo was even appointed as administrative head of the party secretariat in the Storting. In annual reports and in several in-depth newspapers, Mo has been presented as one of the main architects behind organizational innovation and improvement – both internally (Annual reports 00/01: 14; 01/02: 11) and externally.\footnote{Dagbladet 10.11.02; Klassekampen 25.10.08; Morgenbladet 26.01.07} Towards the end of his career as an MP, Carl I. Hagen himself spoke of Mo as a “key person” in the process of re-structuring the party after the split in 1994 and in connection with the political training of a growing number of representatives.\footnote{Dagbladet, 11.06.09}
Table 5.2: Number of persons employed* in FrP’s party bureaucracy, 1973–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Admin.</th>
<th>Pol.</th>
<th>Info.</th>
<th>Org.</th>
<th>Train.</th>
<th>Subnational</th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>(Storting)</th>
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<td>(18)</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
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</table>


Notes: In general, the figures in the Table should be read with caution, as they all refer to the number of employed staff rather than to “work-years,” which would have been a more accurate indicator of the strength of the party bureaucracy. However, since the late 1980s, FrP has sometimes provided information about the number of full-time and part-time employees. If much of the staff is part-time employed, the number has been reduced between 0.5 and 1. The only exception is the number of employees at the subnational level, which means that the strength of this section is somewhat overestimated in the Table. As noted in the text, most of the subnational secretaries have been part-time employees. ‘Total’ refers to all other sections except the secretariat in the Storting (i.e. the last column). ‘Admin’ is the general administration section. Before 1985, this section probably included the editor of the party magazine. ‘Pol’ is the political counseling section. Part of this section was merged with a new information section in 2004 (called the communication section). ‘Info’ is the information section. Between 1988 and 1996, and in 2007, it refers to the number of staff working on the party magazine. In 2008 and 2009, it refers to the number of employers working in the new section called FrPMedia. ‘Train’ refers to the training section. In 2006, it was merged with the organization section. Subnational refers to the number of paid secretaries at the subnational level. Since 2007, these secretaries are no longer employed in 19 different counties but in 9 different regions. In the youth party, FrP, the chairman and the vice-chairmen are included if they are salaried part-time or full-time by the party. Other refers to the small party think-tank which was active in the late 1980s, Fremskritspartiets utredningsinstitutt. Since the boundaries between the extra-parliamentary party and the parliamentary bureaucracy is somewhat blurred in the case of FrP (more than in other Norwegian parties), the Table also provides information about size of the FrP staff in the Storting.
**Value Infusion**

The first indicator of value infusion is party identification among voters. According to Paul Goren (2005: 881) party identification can be defined as “[…] a sense of personal, affective attachment to a political party based on feelings of closeness to the social groups associated with the parties”. A strong identification with, or attachment to, a particular party suggests a high degree of value infusion, and therefore also a higher degree of institutionalization.

Fortunately, ever since FrP had its electoral breakthrough in 1973, the election surveys in Norway have asked a representative sample of the voters an identical question concerning their party identification. Thus, these longitudinal surveys make it possible to assess party identification over time – not only for FrP, but also in a comparative perspective. Moreover, the surveys include two questions which allow us to distinguish between two types of party identification: what could be labelled weak and strong identification. Weak identification, which is not the same as the complete lack of any identification, is measured by asking voters to what extent they feel attached to a specific party; strong identification is measured by asking the same voters if that specific attachment is strongly felt or if the attachment is less rooted and perhaps more temporary.

The results show that very few voters identified – either strongly or weakly – with FrP in its first two decades of existence (see Figure 5.1). With the exception of the general election in 1989 which took place only two years after FrP introduced anti-immigration and xenophobic policies in Norway, less than 1% of those surveyed expressed strong identification with FrP, and less 2% expressed weak identification between 1973 and 1993. And even in 1989, less than 4% identified weakly with FrP. However, after the party recovered from the ideological factionalism in the early 1990s and the liberalists were forced out in 1994, voter identification has gradually been on the rise. The share of weakly identifiers increased from 4% in 1997 to more than 7% in 2009, while the proportion of those who identify strongly with FrP increased from 2.4% in 2001 to 5.4% in 2009. This means that among those identify with their party, a large share identify strongly – more so in FrP than other parties (see Figure 5.2).

Despite this substantial growth in party identification, however, attachment to FrP remains at a relatively low level in comparison with the other parties. Especially Ap, but also H, has had a large share of party identifiers in the electorate, although this has decreased significantly since the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, even the much smaller and more recently founded SV had for a long time more voters who felt attached to the party (whether weakly or strongly). Not until the end of first decade of the 2000s did FrP surpass this other new party, which has been fairly successful in postwar Norway.

The relatively low level of FrP’s value infusion is furthermore demonstrated if we take into account the electoral size of the various parties (see Figure 5.3). In the 1970s, between 10% (1977) and 25% (1973) of the party’s own voters identified with FrP, while similar figures were much higher for Ap (80%), H (50–70%) and SV (30–60%). In 1980s, the proportion of those who identified with FrP increased somewhat, remaining stable around one out of three voters, until increasing further to almost 40% in 2009. However, this level of party identification among FrP voters is still fairly low – not only in historical perspective (compared to other parties in the 1970s and 1980s), but also in more contemporary
comparison with other Norwegian parties. In other words, the gradual convergence between FrP and the other parties in terms of value infusion is related more to the decrease for other parties than to an increase for FrP as such.

![Graph](image)

**Figure 5.1: Party identification: FrP, Ap, H and SV, 1973–2009**

**Source:** Norwegian Election Studies 1973–2009. Those who answered “don’t know” or “don’t wish to answer” are included in the population. “Weak party identification” refers to those who responded positively to the following question: “Would you say that you in general think of yourself as a Conservative Party man/woman, a Labour Party man/woman, a Socialist Left man/woman, and so on, or do you not feel any attachment at all to these parties?” “Strong party identification” refers to those who responded positively to the following question: “Do you consider yourself a strongly convinced supporter of this party, or are you not quite convinced?”

**Notes:** 1. the wording of the question of “strong” party identification is different in 1977, which makes it difficult to compare. 2. In 1997 the questions related to weak and strong party identification were slightly different. However, Berglund (1999: 148) argues that the question tapping “weak party identification” is comparable to earlier surveys (Do you feel attached to any particular party? Which party is this?). More problematic is the question tapping “strong party identification.” In 1997, respondents could choose between three – and not two – types of commitment (“very close,” “fairly close,” and “not very close”). While the upper and lowest alternative might be comparable it is very difficult to decide whether those who answered “fairly close” belong in the upper or lowest category. The level of strong identification is therefore not reported in 1997.

![Graph](image)

**Figure 5.2: Strong party identification among identifiers, 1973–2009**

**Source:** See previous figure.
The second indicator of value infusion is membership turnover. A high level of membership turnover indicates that many party members are less committed to the party as such, whereas less membership turnover indicates stronger commitment to the party. In the case of right-wing populist parties, it is particularly important to assess what happens with the membership base when there is a change of party leadership. If members are loyal to the party rather than the party leader, they are likely to remain members, even with a new front figure.

Measuring membership turnover in FrP is difficult, especially in the 1970s and 1980s when the membership register was infrequently updated and the figures were unreliable. However, since the mid-1990s, it has been possible to calculate how many members have left the party each year. In the annual reports, the party has usually published both total membership figures and the exact number of newly recruited members that particular year. Using these figures, we can calculate the expected membership figures if no one left the party and then use the discrepancy between this figure and the actual one to estimate the share of the membership base that left the party during the last year. To be sure, we cannot know whether the defecting members are “recent joiners” or “long-term members,” but it still provides a rough idea of the stability of the organization.

The results show that FrP lost approximately between one in four and one in five members annually at the end of the 1990s. In comparison, Ap lost between 7 and 11% (not shown here). In recent years, however, FrP has gradually stabilized its membership base, with an annual loss of between 13 and 16%.
These findings are corroborated by the party membership surveys conducted in 1991, 2000 and 2009 (see Figure 5.5). In these surveys members were asked when they joined the party for the first time. Based on this information of how many years they have been a member of the party, I have divided all members into four different categories: new members (0–2 years), recent joiners (3–5 years), stable members (6–10 years) and long-term loyalists (11 years or more). The results demonstrate an increasing value infusion among members, perhaps even to a greater extent than the annual turnover. In the early 1990s, a large share of the membership base was either new members (one in three) or recent joiners (just above one in three). Very few had joined the party already in the 1970s. A decade later, in 2000, there was still a large share of new members, and more than 40% had joined the party after the successful election in 1997. The suspension of former vice-chairman Kleppe in early 2001 also indicated that some members and representatives were more loyal to specific leaders rather than the party. According to the annual report (2000-01: 11), about 1,200 members left the party as a direct consequence of Kleppe being forced to leave the party. However, more important than noting the constant influx of new members and internal turbulence related to the Kleppe affair, the 2000 survey showed a growing share of “long-term loyalists.” In 2000, almost 30% had been member of FrP since the 1980s.

Moving forward yet another decade, the distribution of members according to membership length is almost the complete opposite of what it was in the early 1990s. Despite an almost continuous growth in the number of party members (to be further commented in Chapter 6), the group of new members no longer dominates the organization. By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, FrP had many highly experienced members. More than one in three members was a long-term loyalist, and one in four could be counted as fairly stable. Furthermore, detailed analysis reveals that the leadership change in 2005/2006 did not cause significant defections. Approximately two-thirds of those who were members in 2009 had joined the party before Siv Jensen became leader of the parliamentary party (in 2005) and in the extra-parliamentary party (in 2006).
A simple comparison with the other parties, however, shows that FrP is still a relatively ‘new’ membership organization (see Figure 5.6). Whereas the decade of enrollment of party members in the Ap, H and SV in 2009 was highly diversified, most of FrP party members joined fairly recently.

Figure 5.5: Membership length among FrP’s party members, 1991–2009

Figure 5.6: Decade of enrollment among party members in 2009

The third and last indicator of value infusion is a more direct measurement of organizational values and beliefs. An institutionalized party is characterized not only by a specific and detailed formal structure: there should also be substantial correspondence between the formal structure and the organizational values expressed by the members of the
party. Such a correspondence indicates that the formal organization has gained a certain level of normative legitimacy, which in turn is likely to contribute to more stable organizational routines and behavior.

The above-mentioned surveys among party members and congress delegates include several questions related to various organizational procedures, such as the formation of the party’s policies, candidate selection and election of leadership. Unfortunately the questions were not included in the 1991 survey, but Saglie and Heidar (2004) have analyzed the results from the membership survey in 2000 and the congress delegate survey in 2001. To summarize the findings and analyze potential party differences, they created a delegatory party democracy protection index. This basically adds the opinion balance on three indicators measuring support for different decision-making procedures associated with the mass party: (1) that the annual party congress should decide the manifesto and (2) elect the leader, and that (3) the selection of parliamentary candidates should take place at the subnational level with delegates from local branches. The index runs from −300 to +300; maximum score is achieved if all members (or delegates) support the above-mentioned three features; and minimum score if all members (or delegates) oppose them.

The empirical analysis suggests that even though Norwegian parties resemble the mass party in a formal sense, there is quite some variety in terms of support for the organizational values associated with the mass party. In fact, the study concluded that FrP-members had “the lowest score, indicating that they were not that keen on keeping decisions delegatory and within the party” (Saglie and Heidar 2004: 401). In other words, the infusion of organizational values did not seem particularly strong at the grassroots level. However, we should note that partisan differences were much smaller among congress delegates. Among these middle-level elites, who are generally more inclined to support the delegatory model, organizational values among FrP-representatives seemed fairly similar to what could be found in other parties.

Figures from the 2009 survey show similar patterns with regard to party member (see Table 5.3). Again, FrP members emerge as most skeptical towards the delegatory democracy model, and are particularly skeptical of having delegates deciding the party’s policies at the party convention. However, among congress delegates, the pattern is almost completely reversed. Support for the delegatory democracy model among FrP’s middle-level elite is significantly stronger than in Ap, H or SV. The ideas that the party convention should elect the party leader and that the candidates should be selected at the subnational level – in both cases without being directly influenced by the members or the voters – are widespread in FrP. These findings suggest that there is a tension within FrP between the organizational values found at the grassroots and those held by the middle-level elite. While there is persistent opposition at the grassroots level against the way the party is formally organized, the formal structure is widely supported among the middle-level elite.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Type of member</th>
<th>Forming party policy</th>
<th>Election of party leader</th>
<th>Selection of the party's MPs</th>
<th>Party organization protection points²</th>
<th>Lowest N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SV</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>–11</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ap</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrP</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>–23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Norwegian party member and congress delegates surveys, 2009.

Notes: 1. Direct democracy here includes any kind of membership influence – both option (b) and (c), see below.
2. Sum of the opinion balances on the three items.

Question: Party procedures for selection of personnel and policy formation have been discussed recently.
We would like to ask for your opinion on some proposals in three different areas:

1. Forming party policy: (a) on major and important matters, the national congress should have the final say; (b) on major and important matters, the national congress should have the final say, following an advisory ballot in which all members may vote; (c) on major and important matters, the decision should depend on the results of a binding ballot in which all members may vote.

2. Election of party leader: (a) the party leader should be elected by the national congress; (b) the party leader should be elected by the national congress following an advisory ballot among the members; (c) the party leader should be elected by the members through a binding ballot

3. Selection of the party’s MPs: (a) county list of nominees should be adopted at the county nomination convention, by delegates from the various local branches of the party; (b) county list of nominees should be adopted at the county nomination convention, by delegates from the various local party branches, following an advisory ballot among the members; (c) county list of nominees should be adopted by members, through a binding ballot.

Centralization

The second organizational aspect to be analyzed is centralization. According to Janda (1970: 107-108), centralization is a question of power distribution between different units within the party. In a highly centralized party the power lies in the hands of a small group of people or, at its most extreme, exclusively in the hands of the party leader. In a completely decentralized party, on the other hand, power is equally distributed among ordinary rank and file. The relationship between the party leadership at the national and ordinary members at the subnational level could be more precisely conceptualized as vertical centralization as it differentiates between parties where the local level enjoys large degrees of freedom and autonomy and parties where the maneuverability of units at the local level are very limited. The horizontal aspect of centralization, on the other hand, concerns the relationship between the extra-parliamentary organization and parliamentary group (i.e. the members of parliament). In short, a party is either characterized by “the dominance of the holders of
offices in party organizations over party members who hold public office” or, conversely, it is characterized by “the dominance of the office-holding (prototypically parliamentary) party over the support (extra parliamentary) organization” (Katz and Mair 1992: 4-5). This kind of horizontal centralization is particularly relevant as regards the authority to impose sanctions on unwanted behaviour of elected representatives and policy development. Not surprisingly, many indicators have been used to measure vertical and horizontal centralization (Pedersen 2010; Janda 1970). However, four indicators seem to be particularly relevant: leadership selection, candidate selection, control with policy development and the authority impose sanctions on unwanted behaviour.\textsuperscript{161}

**Leadership selection**

The leader of FrP is selected by the party congress rather than directly by the voters (or members), which would be more decentralized, or by a small party elite or the incumbent party leader, which would be more centralized. This makes the formal rules of leadership selection in FrP identical to that of other Norwegian parties (Allern and Karlsen 2014).

The only exception to this rule in the party’s history is the selection of the party’s first leader. Not surprisingly, given the entrepreneurial origin of the party, Anders Lange, the first party leader, was ‘nominated’ and ‘appointed’ by himself. The next leader, Arve Lønnum, was elected at the party convention in 1975 after having been nominated by the national council.\textsuperscript{162} Hagen and Jensen gained leadership through a similar procedure in 1978 and 2006, respectively. However, the leadership succession from Hagen to Jensen was more like a ‘managed transition’ than a ‘waiting game’ or ‘power struggle’ (Bynander and t’Hart 2008: 389). In fact, Jensen was more or less hand-picked by Hagen and turned into a ‘crown princess’ already in the late 1990s. In this sense, the leadership succession was formally decentralized (she was unanimously elected at the party congress) but \textit{de facto} quite centralized (Jensen was carefully cultivated and designated by Hagen).

**Candidate selection**

Putting forward candidates in elections is one the most important tasks for any political party. In fact, it is perhaps the most distinct feature of parties separating them from interest organizations and social movements. The basic question is to what extent does the central party organization control the selection of the candidates or if it is carried out at the local or regional level? In most cases, this is specified in the party statues. However, practice and official statutes are not always the same. Therefore, this section will also assess – based upon an open newspaper archive and other primary sources – the informal influence by the party

\textsuperscript{161} This means that I will not analyze indicators such as nationalization of structure, access to information, control with communication, distribution of economic resources, leadership concentration and representation. For an analysis of the distribution of economic resources, see Jupskås (2014a). The main argument is that the generous public funding of the party has, as in most other parties, contributed to an internal power displacement in favor of the central party organization. However, FrP has created a special regulation in their party statutes which make the national level entitled to the property and fortune of any local chapters that dissolves or are stripped of their status as a sub-national unit of FrP.

\textsuperscript{162} In some accounts, Eivind Eckbo is listed as the party chairman between Lange and Lønnum, but he was only acting leader.
elite concerning candidate selection in FrP throughout the period. However, even though such data brings us closer to the actual processes, one should bear in mind that there might be stories about non-regulated execution of power that have remained untold.

According to the party statutes, the process of nominating candidates for office has always been completely controlled by the subnational level (e.g. party statutes 1983, §6-C; 1986, §11; 1990, §11; 1995, §13; 2001, §13; 2009, §13). Any amendments of the party statutes have mostly been related to practical matters. Neither the formation of a separate nomination committee to avoid complete overlap between the executive committee at the county level and the nomination committee, or the advancement of deadlines for various stages in the process (i.e. the nomination of candidates and the actual realization of the nomination meeting) can be seen as changes which have affected the degree of centralization, though a separate nomination committee may lead to a diffusion of power within the county branch itself. Moreover, the composition of the nomination meeting was basically the same throughout the period (i.e. a mixture of party organization representatives, elected representatives and delegates from the local branches), although it has become slightly more inclusive (i.e. the youth party has been entitled to one delegate since the mid-1980s) and membership rewarding (i.e. local branches has been entitled to send one additional delegate according to membership numbers since 2007).

In theory, FrP’s candidate selection processes are almost as decentralized as possible (Bille 2001: 367) and they are identical to other Norwegian parties (Narud 2008; Valen 1988). In practice, however, the party leadership interfered with the candidate selection process in several counties throughout the party’s evolution. In fact, one well-informed journalist once claimed that “only with a few exception have anyone been nominated on top of the list without Carl I. Hagen’s approval”. In 1981, Hagen showed up in persona at the nomination meeting to argue in favor of Professor in Law, Fridtjof Frank Gundersen, even though Gundersen was not even a member of the party (Hagen 1984: 261). Similarly, in another county stronghold (Rogaland), Hagen believed that the party was short of candidates with the “necessary qualifications and necessary time to carry out a long and active election campaign” (Hagen 1984: 262). It was thus decided (by Hagen) that Jens Marcussen, Hagen’s challenger for the party leadership a few years earlier, should be re-located from a neighboring electoral district in which the party had no chance of having anyone elected to parliament. Not surprisingly, just as in Akershus, several local activists looked at this kind of interference with displeasure, and at least two prominent local representatives resigned from their positions.

Similar examples of leadership interference continued to take place throughout the 1980s. Hagen worked systematically to replace the incumbent MP and member of the party since 1973, Bjørn Erling Ytterhorn, with the upcoming and recently elected vice-chairman

163 I have looked for irregular interference in parliamentary candidate selection processes by searching the Norwegian media archive. Search string was: “nominasjonsprosess*” AND (FrP OR Fremskrittspartiet). The search was carried out 3.12.13.
164 In 1990, it was defined more precisely that only fully constituted local branches were entitled to send delegates to the nomination meeting (Party statutes 1990, §11-4). Most likely, the clarification was the result of experiencing many new and not fully constituted local branches sending delegates to the nomination meetings in 1989.
165 Olav Garvik in Bergens Tidende, 26.04.97
166 VG, 24.11.80
Helge N. Albregtsen in Hordaland (Ruud 1996: 58-59). And in Østfold, Hagen became personally involved when his favorite candidate and secretary for the parliamentary group, Harald Ruud, lost against a local candidate (Chris Peterson). In 1989, the leadership was accused of interfering in the nomination process in both Vestfold and Troms. In 1993, there is evidence to suggest that Hagen in some way or another interfered in the nomination processes in Hordaland, Aust-Agder, Rogaland and Vestfold. In 1997, yet several other counties, including Oppland, Sør-Trøndelag and Østfold, experienced how the party leadership in Oslo tried to influence processes which according to the party statutes were the responsibility of the subnational level.

The most obvious example of leadership interference, however, took place at the beginning of millennium. In early 2001, the national council almost unanimously (6 out of 30 voted against) decided that the party’s chairman and the vice-chairmen should be automatically nominated to the top of the list, hence violating the principle of subnational autonomy. Furthermore, general secretary Geir Mo encouraged all electoral districts explicitly not to re-nominate controversial candidates in an article in the internal party magazine (December 2000): “… now it is time to expose the trolls in FrP’s parliamentary group”. Moreover, the national council was given the competence to challenge any decisions made at the subnational level if they were perceived as “very harmful” or even potentially harmful for the party as a whole (Party statutes 2001, §7-3, §7-13). The subsequent year, in 2002, it was even decided to let the executive committee (or two thirds of the executive committees at the county level or one third of the executive committee at the local level) call for a new nomination meeting after the ordinary nomination meeting had been carried out (Party statutes 2002, §13-10). Whereas Hagen’s position was not threatened, the leadership was afraid that the county branches would not nominate the ‘crown princess’ Jensen in second place (after Hagen) in Oslo and the ‘crown prince’ Søviknes in first place in Hordaland. After the election in 2001, party leader Hagen admitted that the party leadership had been involved in setting up the candidate list (Valen et al. 2002: 181).

After the party leadership did away with most of oppositional forces in the early 2000s, the nomination processes have been less characterized by conflicts between the national and subnational level. In fact, the only publically known example took place in Vestfold in 2009. In an attempt to make sure that the vice-chairman, Per Arne Olsen, would be on top of the list, Siv Jensen reportedly tried to force Anders Anundsen down to second place. However, as in 2001, the county branch refused to take orders from the central party leadership. But this time no one was suspended or excluded; at the nomination meeting, Anundsen was elected on top of the list and Olsen in second place.

In sum, the official party statutes may not tell the whole story about how the processes of candidate selection are in practice. This is certainly the case with FrP. Indeed, the leadership of the party has been significantly more involved in these processes than prescribed by the party statutes. However, despite actively trying to put pressure on the

167 VG, 14.11.84
168 NTB, 25.10.88; Nordlys, 09.09.89
169 Bergens Tidende, 03.07.92; NTB, 30.1.93; VG, 13.02.93
170 Bergens Tidende, 26.4.97; Aftenposten, 20.12.00
171 quoted in Aftenposten, 07.12.00
nomination committee or other key actors at the local level, the leadership interference has not always been successful suggesting that there are certainly limits to authoritarian leadership even in FrP.

**Policy formation**

The influence over policy formation in FrP is—as in all parties—difficult to assess. However, a few observations can be made. In Norway, party manifestos tend to be fairly detailed and regarded as written contract between the voters and party. Therefore, policy influence is closely associated with controlling the process of manifesto formation. In FrP, manifesto development involves—at least since the late 1980s—the following steps. First, the party congress elects a program committee responsible for working out a draft of the party’s manifestos and program of principles. In this program committee, which typically consists of around ten individuals headed by one of the vice-leaders, different party units are represented: The party leadership, the parliamentary group, the youth organization, and county branch representatives. Second, based on policies developed by various policy committees at the national level and input from the subnational level, the committee presents the draft to the national council. Third, after being discussed in the national council, the manifesto is formally adopted at the party congress. The congress only votes on issues on which the national council disagrees. Thus, in contrast to parties in which the leader (or the party elite) develops the party policies, FrP seems to have a rather decentralized manifesto formation process at the national level. Surveys among congress delegates confirm that a comparatively large share of the middle level elite is involved in policy development at different levels within the party, including the executive bodies, the convention and parliamentary party (Figures not shown).

However, it should be noted that the autonomy both at the local level and for the parliamentary party to develop their own policies is very restricted (Allern and Saglie 2012: 964; Svåsand 1998: 81). In the early 1990s, after FrP experienced a significant increase of its parliamentary group, the party in public office was completely subordinated to the party in central office (consider organogram 5.5 again). The latter—both the executive committee and the national council—was even granted representation in the meetings of the parliamentary party. Lange’s idea of MPs as trustees with independence was now fully replaced by the idea of MPs as delegates constrained by majority decisions taken by either the extra-parliamentary party units (the party congress, national council or executive committee) or by the parliamentary party (in which the extra-parliamentary party is represented).

If MPs do not vote according to the manifesto, they may very well be expelled. At the subnational level, municipal and county party units are only allowed to develop their own policies as long as they do not challenge the official national policy or program of principles. Two surveys among the middle-level elite confirm that the horizontal centralization is widely accepted among the middle-level elite in FrP and that this more typical for left-wing and externally created parties (e.g. SV and Ap) than right-wing and internally created parties (H). Around 70% of the delegates believe that the party organization rather than the party in parliament should decide (see Table 5.4). Very little, if anything, is left of Lange’s initial spirit (see also Chapter 7). However, it should be noted that MPs are not completely without any influence on the party’s policy. After all, all MPs are granted the right to vote and speak
at the party convention. In parallel with growing electoral support, the parliamentary group at
the convention has become increasingly more influential (see Figure 5.7).

Table 5.4: Attitudes towards as regards whether the extra-parliamentary organization or the
parliamentary party should decide the policies on issues not covered by the manifesto, SV, Ap,

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The party organization decides</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The party in parliament decides</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(153)</td>
<td>(115)</td>
<td>(218)</td>
<td>(115)</td>
<td>(187)</td>
<td>(147)</td>
<td>(131)</td>
<td>(112)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Congress delegate surveys, 2001 and 2009.

Question: How do you judge the relationship between the leading body of the party (working committee,
executive committee and national council) and the party in parliament [stortingsgruppa]? On issues which are
not covered by the manifesto or other decisions by the national congress, should the party be able to instruct the
parliamentary group to adopt a specific position in case which is prepared in parliament [Stortinget]? Possible
answers were: (1) should possess the opportunity; (2) should not possess the opportunity; and (3) don’t know.

Figure 5.7: Composition of FrP’s party convention 1989-2009 (% of ordinary delegates)

Source: Annual reports 1989-2009

Hagen has metaphorically referred to the party as a corporation – a business firm – in
which the executive committee was the equivalent of the corporate executive board
(Bjørklund 2003: 132). The party leadership strongly emphasized the importance of ‘selling
the same product’ to voters all over the country and across different political-administrative
levels (i.e. national, regional and municipal level). Municipal and county branches were
simply regarded as subdivision of the party and they were expected to loyally implement the
leadership’s decisions.
Authority to impose sanctions on unwanted behaviour

While the leadership and candidate selection, as well as the manifesto process, make the party somewhat but not particularly centralized, the authority of FrP’s executive committee to initiate and decide whether members or representatives should be temporarily suspended or permanently expelled is quite different than in other parties. Interestingly, the party leadership has usually formalized its power by amending the party statutes. In this way, its interference and top-down control could be legitimized more easily.

Initially, Lange advocated an organizational model in which the members were granted high degree of autonomy. As noted by Iversen (1998: 31), ordinary members should not be dictated from the central organization (as opposed to in other parties, according to Lange), but rather control the development process themselves. However, already in the first party statutes, it was decided that the executive committee with at least two thirds majority would be allowed to exclude members which were seen as challenging the party’s goal and/or the party statutes (Party statutes 1974, §12).\footnote{In 1976, party executive committee at the local and county level was also given the opportunity to suggest exclusion of ordinary members (Party statutes 1976, §13). While this does not concern the relationship between the party at the national level and the subnational level, it makes the party slightly more centralized within the subnational level.}

However, the first major step towards a more centralized party came after the party experienced huge success in the 1989 national election. In 1990, simultaneously as the parliamentary party became subordinated the party organization (see above), the party adopted a new paragraph describing so-called “active resignation” (or withdrawal). At the agonizing national congress in 1994, and after an “explosive and aggressive debate”\footnote{Aftenposten, 18.04.94}, party chairman Hagen reminded all delegates that “disloyal behavior” would be interpreted as “active resignation”.\footnote{NTB, 17.04.94} Furthermore, in order to demonstrate the power of the executive committee (i.e. Hagen’s faction), the congress also adopted – with 94 votes in favor and 50 votes against – the infamous so-called “Stalin-clause” resolution stating that the executive committee “should reprehend those who commit infringements upon [a good organizational culture]”.\footnote{The resolution called ‘A future rooted in the past’, quoted in Bergens Tidende, 18.04.94}

The final step towards a more centralized party (so far) took place in 2001 (see also Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 257).\footnote{Indeed, there has been added a few sentences after the revisions in 2001 (e.g. Party statutes 2007; 2009), yet these are primarily additional clarifications and not related to the overall power distribution within the party.} Again, the backdrop of the revisions of the party statutes was conflicts within the party. Preparing for a confrontation with what Hagen (2007: 359) in retrospect has labelled the ‘Syverbanden’ (The gang of seven), the paragraph on “active resignation” was further developed (see also Bjørklund 2003: 133). From now on, it was decided that members who “trough public action seek to harm the party, the party’s representatives or the reputation of elected representatives” will be automatically defined as “actively resigned” (Party statutes 2001, §3). And if the excluded member by any chance would criticize the party elite – or anyone else in the party – for being excluded, he or she could never join the party again. Moreover, the party statutes provided the executive committee full control with membership enrolment and expulsion, and reasons for being
excluded were further broadened (Party statutes 2001, §21). Whereas the explicit reasons for exclusion until 2001 were either oppositional work or exploitation of positions, members could now be excluded if “behaving in such a way that they should no longer be a member of the party” (Party statutes, §21). This imprecise and hazy formulation could very well lead to rather Kafka-like processes of exclusion at the executive committee’s own discretion.\footnote{177} And while the clause obviously is an effective instrument of discipline, evidence suggests that it has been used rather frequently: at least twelve members and representatives were excluded or suspended for allegedly disloyal behavior between 2006 and 2008.\footnote{178}

**Conclusion**

This chapter has presented a fairly detailed empirical analysis of two key organizational aspects of FrP, namely the level of institutionalization and centralization. All these broad organizational concepts were then divided into more specific elements and further operationalized using a wide-range of relevant indicators. Adopting a methodologically pluralist approach has been important – not only because the concepts themselves are difficult to measure but also because they help to paint a picture that is more nuanced; some indicators may point in one direction, whereas other point in different direction. Seen together, they allow for more valid and reliable claims.

The empirical evidence demonstrates that FrP has become much more institutionalized, not only compared to its formative phase and first years of existence, but also compared to other Norwegian parties. Especially with regard to routinization of behaviour, the party must be considered institutionalized. In a Sartorian terminology, we might say that the party has transformed from an “unstructured” to a “structured” party (Sartori 1968: 281). However, with regard to the more symbolic aspect of institutionalization, namely the process of value infusion, FrP seems to be less institutionalized.

As regards centralization, this analysis indicates that there has been a concentration of power – both horizontally and vertically. The executive committee has become increasingly powerful at the expense of parliamentary party (i.e. horizontal centralization) and the local branches have lost some of its initial autonomy vis-à-vis the central board (i.e. vertical centralization). With regard to the former, the party has transformed from a situation in which parliamentary party was completely autonomous towards a situation in which the autonomy is severely limited and restricted. Most notably, since 1990, the parliamentary group has been subordinated the party organization. Moreover, the authority of the executive committee to intervene in local affairs if perceived to damage the reputation of the party and the principle of “active resignation” (exclusion without any formal procedures) makes the party highly centralized.

In addition to the strengthening of organizational linkages (see next chapter), the dual process of becoming increasingly institutionalized and centralized suggests that the party has developed towards an authoritarian mass party.

\footnote{177} See also *Aftenposten*, 24.02.00. The notion of a Kafka-process seem to fit when Simonsen describes how Hagen got rid of him after the 2001 election (Simonsen 2004: 4)

\footnote{178} *VG*, 02.05.08
Chapter 6: Building Organizational Linkages from Scratch

Introduction
FrP has gradually expanded and consolidated its organizational linkages since the late 1970s, particularly since emerging as Norway’s largest right-wing party in the late 1990s. However, the pattern of the expansion and the degree of consolidation varies with differing kinds of linkages. On the one hand, FrP has been able to improve the quantity and quality (i.e. political skills) of its party members; establish a belt of supporting organizations around the party; and partly penetrate some existing subcultures. On the other hand, the linkages have remained rather modest. This becomes even clearer when viewed in a comparative-historical perspective.

In line with Poguntke’s (2002) distinction between three different sub-types of organizational linkages, the chapter analyzes the development of the (1) membership organization, (2) auxiliary organizations and (3) ties to civil society. These three types of linkages represent different channels of connection between party elites and the general electorate, in addition to modern mass media (to be indirectly dealt with in Chapter 7). The first type of linkage, membership organization, concerns the quantity and quality of the party members, including their numbers and contribution to internal and external party activities – what Katz and Mair (1994) labelled “the party on the ground,” as opposed to the “party in central office” (i.e. the central party bureaucracy), dealt with in the previous chapter. The second type, auxiliary organizations, concerns intermediary organizations, such as the youth movement, the party magazine and senior organization. The third and final linkage type – ties to civil society – concerns the party’s informal and formal contacts and collaboration with organizations that have been established independent of the party. This includes not only what Poguntke (2002: 48) calls “new social movements” but also other organizations like trade unions and civil society organization more broadly.

My data stem from a range of sources. Most importantly, this chapter is based on annual reports from the central party bureaucracy and the three membership surveys from 1991, 2000 and 2009. Taken together, these sources provide a nuanced picture of how the linkages have evolved over time. Additionally, newspaper articles have been consulted to shed light on the actual relationship between FrP and other organizations in civil society.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it assesses the development of the membership organization. Next, I examine the role of auxiliary organizations, most notably the youth wing and the party magazine, Fremskritt. The chapter then investigates the extent to which FrP has had ties to civil society, and concludes with a brief summary of main findings.

Membership Organization
Founded as an entrepreneurial party without the support of any external promoter or organization, FrP had initially no party members. To be sure, Anders Lange claimed that his “Freedom movement” had some 2,000 members (Lange 1973), but even this relatively low figure was highly unreliable and most likely exaggerated (Iversen 1998: 19). Claiming to have many followers was probably part of wider strategy of signaling organizational strength and
democratic legitimacy. In any case, the actual number of activists working for Lange was most likely restricted to a few right-wing activists known as *Hundeguttene* (the dog boys) (Iversen 1998: 15–18; Bjørklund 2000). They helped Lange with all kinds of practical challenges (Bjørklund 2000: 447), including setting up the founding meeting in April 1973.

Despite gaining seats in the Storting and being surprisingly popular among the voters, FrP remained a small organization in its first year of existence. Though the figures are highly unreliable due to poor registration routines and lack of archive material, FrP probably had about 1,000 members, while the established parties Ap and H had 155,254 and 110,241 members, respectively (Heidar and Svåsand 1994: 357). However, it should be noted that compared with another new party, SV (founded as SF in 1961), the low number of members seems to be a typical feature of new parties in general rather than something unique about FrP.

Some of the organizational weaknesses of FrP were certainly related to its position as pariah party. It was widely viewed as “politically abnormal” (Iversen 1998: 42), and being an FrP member was widely seen as socially unacceptable. As one activist recalls: “I had to put home-made brochures in mailboxes at night in order to avoid being spit at.” 179 Many members received negative reactions even from their closest family. Moreover, the early split between FrP (or ALP as the party was initially labeled) and the Reform Party made a small membership organization even smaller, although the Reform Party never had more than 350 to 500 members (Iversen 1998: 61–62). Most of these members probably re-joined FrP when the two parties merged again in 1975. At least, Hagen took the membership register of the Reform Party back to FrP.

Throughout the 1980s, the organization slowly became stronger. The number of members in the party register – both paid-up and non-paid-up members – increased from around 10,000 in 1980 to 16,847 by 1989 (Heidar and Svåsand 1994: 357). While exact figures on local branches are unavailable, the party was unable to run for elections in less than 40% of the municipalities (see Table 6.1). However, the number of municipalities where FrP fielded candidates increased rapidly: from 52 in 1975 to 172 in 1987 (Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 265).

However, the party leadership was not satisfied. In order to consolidate its position at the local level and perhaps gain even more votes than in 1987, FrP would have to expand its organization, recruit more members and train candidates. In 1990, the party congress adopted a new strategy of organization-building, “Fremskriittsbevegelsen mot 1991 og 1993” (Annual report 90–91: 29). Some aspects of this strategy were related to the party bureaucracy at the regional level, but most of the focus was on the local level. FrP aimed for 300 lists of candidates at municipal level, 300 active local branches, 35,000 party members, and 7,500 subscribers to the party magazine. In retrospect, some of these objectives could certainly be considered wishful thinking – most importantly, membership figures remained below 20,000 for many years and have never exceeded 30,000. Nevertheless, these objectives suggest that party was committed to further development towards a mass party. As noted by Heidar and Saglie (2002: 59), the development is an example of “contagion from the left.”

One important factor that prevented FrP from strengthening its organization in this period was the growing factionalism within the party. The organization suffered significantly

179 *Fremskritt*, August, 2008, quoted from *Romerikes Blad*, 28.08.08.
when the party split in two in 1994 after lengthy ideological disagreements between the populist/socially conservative faction on one side and the liberal faction on the other. In 1994, there were only 3,671 paid-up members left in FrP and more than 40 local branches had been closed down in five years. The share of municipals with an FrP list decreased for the first time, from 54% in 1991 to 45% in 1995.

Table 6.1: Municipalities in which FrP fielded candidates in subnational elections and number of local branches, 1975–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of lists</th>
<th>National coverage</th>
<th>Local branches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures for 1975–2003 are from Svåsand and Wörlund (2005: 265). Data from 2007 are from Norway Statistics and calculated by the author. The number of local branches is taken from FrP annual reports. This figure is higher than the number of lists partly due to the inclusion of local city district branches in Oslo. Oslo counts as a single municipality in elections.

Somewhat miraculously, however, FrP was able to re-start its organization, although it continued to suffer from lack of representatives at the local level, low activity among members, and poor routines for recruiting new members (Annual report 1996/97: 8). As a consequence, the executive committee granted several local branches exemption from the party statutes regarding the number of elected representatives (Annual report 1996/97: 8). Moreover, many members who joined FrP or were recruited by existing members proved to have divergent ideological views. In fact, according to the annual reports, the party was persistently struggling with members holding ideological beliefs other than those of the party elite (Annual reports 1999/00: 52; 00/01: 11).

Despite some of these challenges, the party on the ground has been gradually strengthened since the mid-1990s. And while part of this development is related to the general electoral growth of FrP, it is also the consequence of strategic efforts by the party bureaucracy and party elite. In short, FrP has – not least due to the efforts of the general secretary Geir Mo, who was appointed in 1994 – become increasingly concerned with good registration routines, training and schooling of members, and the importance of being present at the local level. Mo seemed to share the key principles of Hagen’s organizational strategy: “… the local branches are the spearhead (of the party), they are present where people stay and live […] it is in the local community that people meet the party. The many thousands of volunteers are the foundation of our success.”

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180 Aftenposten, 07.01.09
Under the leadership of Mo, building a stable and active membership organization was seen long-term project and something which should be prioritized even though the main focus would be on winning elections (e.g. Annual report 96/97: 8). Having an active group of party members was seen as a prerequisite for maintaining electoral support. In the early 2000s, the national board explicitly stated that the member/voter ratio – often seen as a measurement of “membership density” (Poguntke 2002: 52) – should be at least 10% (Annual report 2000/01) and the party members were referred to as “the party’s most valuable resource” (FrP Strategy Plan, adopted June 13, 2004).

Several measurements were adopted in order to gain more members. Most importantly, FrP in central office carried out four nationwide recruiting campaigns between 1996 and 2008 (Annual report 1999/00: 52; 08/09: 9). Local branches were asked to improve their membership involvement and recruiting strategies. More specifically, all local branches were told to make sure that new members would receive information from the local party leadership at least twice per year in addition to the party magazine, the membership fee collection, and summon to annual meeting (FrP strategy plan, June 13, 2004). Moreover, rank-and-file should be invited to participate at training courses focusing on FrP’s ideological principles. This last point may be interpreted as a response to the alleged lack of ideological cohesion among members at the grassroots level.

While some of these measurements probably contributed to the strengthening of the membership organization, the number of members decreased in the years prior to the general elections in 2005. In fact, FrP was far from what were arguably more realistic objectives stated in the strategic plan from 2004. In 2004, the national committee decided that the organization should aim for a growth of 20 local chapters – from 345 to 365 – between 2005 and 2007, and that number of paid-up members should be 21 500 at the end of 2005 and 24 500 at the end of 2007 (Annual report 2005/06: 34). One possible and somewhat cynical explanation of the party’s inability to recruit more members is the absence of internal incentives structures to do so. By and large, the influence of each branch at the subnational level in terms of sending delegates to a superior level (i.e. local branches sending delegates to the annual county meeting, and county branches sending delegates to the annual party convention) was calculated on the basis of electoral results rather than membership figures. In other words, and in contrast to left-wing parties, the incentive structure gave the party an external rather that internal focal point (see also Jupskås 2014a).

The exclusive focus on the electoral arena was slightly altered in 2007. Since then, the local branches have been modestly rewarded for organizational strength, as they are granted one more delegate if the number of paid-up members in the local branch represents 1% or more of the inhabitants in the municipality (Party statutes 2007; 2009).

The stagnation of membership growth resulted in other kinds of organizational adaptations too. In 2005, the party adopted new measurements in order to formalize the cultivation of members at subnational level. In short, it was decided that all local and county branches were supposed to appoint one representative being responsible for the follow-up of party members. A similar administrative position was created at the central party bureaucracy. And after the general election, FrP in central office also created an internal committee – Partiutviklingsutvalget (the Party Development Committee) – tasked solely with developing an effective strategy for organization-building (Annual report 2005/06: 24–25). Among other
things, this committee was to find new ways of activate existing members and recruiting new ones.

By 2010, FrP had almost 23,000 paid-up members (see Figure 6.1). Figures from the 2009 membership survey reveal that FrP’s membership organization is almost completely new. 93% of the current members have been recruited after the party split. However, despite growing membership over the last decade, FrP remains smaller than Ap and H (and even the small KrF). In fact, if we analyze organizational density, that is the “the proportion of members of a party’s voters” (M/V) (von Beyme 1985: 170; Bartolini 1985: 186ff.), FrP comes out among the weakest parties in Norway (see Figure 6.2). In recent years, less than 4% of the party’s electorate has been party members. The fact that FrP seem have caught up with the established parties simply reflects the fact that these parties have experienced fairly significant declines in membership figures.

Furthermore, most new members are not recruited by existing party members: they join the party on their own initiative (see Figure 6.3). Of the 2009 members, almost two-thirds had joined by approaching the party on their own initiative. Moreover, with regard to this recruiting aspect of the party organization, there is no improvement over time, and FrP differs significantly from the established parties (though not from SV), where new members are often recruited by existing members and representatives. In short, the new parties – SV and FrP – seem to be a product of the age of individualization.

Figure 6.1: Number of paying party members in four Norwegian parties, 1993–2009
Source: The parties’ yearly reports. In order to make the comparison as correct as possible, the figures for Ap 1993–1995 and H are estimates (for further explanation, see Table A6.1 in Appendix).
Figure 6.2: Organizational density (member/voter ratio), 1973–2009
Note: In this figure, members from collateral and/or auxiliary organizations have been included.

Figure 6.3: Two different ways of becoming a party member in SV, Ap, H and FrP, 1991–2009
Source: Party member surveys 1991, 2000 and 2009. N = SV (343, 291, 574), Ap (276, 263, 425), H (207, 192, 450) and FrP (218, 222, 462). Question: How were you recruited to the party? The respondents could choose between four options: (1) Representatives of the party (incl. family/friends) approached me, (2) I received an enlistment brochure/saw an advertisement in the newspaper, (3) I approached the party on my own initiative, and (4) Other. Only option 1 and 3 are presented in the Figure. Very few respondents chose the other two options.
The number of party members provides a fairly good indicator of the strength of membership linkage between party elites and the party on the ground. However, pure quantitative indicators should when possible be supplemented with a more qualitative assessment of membership activity. After all, we cannot assume that party members are all the same; some member may be quite active whereas others remain passive.

Obviously, membership activity in the early phase of FrP is difficult to estimate. Since 1991, however, the three membership surveys mentioned earlier provide useful information about various aspects of party member activity within FrP. Inspired by Duverger’s typology of different kind of members, a new typology has been constructed. In all three surveys members are asked about whether they have recently participated at internal party meetings; if they worked for the party in the most recent elections; and to what extent they have been involved in any citizens’ initiatives or action groups aimed at influencing the political authorities. Various combinations of these three indicators produce four kinds of members which are mutually exclusive:

1. **Passive members**: members who have not participated in any internal or external party activity in the recent year
2. **Campaigners**: members who have been active only in election campaigns and not participated in internal meetings or extra-parliamentary activities
3. **Mass party activists**: members who have participated internally (at least one meeting in recent year) and in the most recent election campaign, but not in extra-parliamentary activities
4. **Amateur actionists**: members who have been active in extra-parliamentary activity (e.g. citizens’ initiatives or action groups) – either exclusively or in combination with internal activity and/or campaign participation.

The empirical analysis shows that FrP’s membership pool is quite diverse and that the distribution of membership types has remained fairly stable over the last two decades, perhaps with a small change in 2009. Between 33 and 47% of the members are passive members in the sense that they do not participate internally or contribute externally. Between 9 and 12% are pure campaigners, and between 23 and 32% comes out as mass party activists. With regard to amateur actionists, there has been a sharp decline, from 36% in 1991 to 12% in 2009. Although this probably reflects actual decreasing extra-parliamentary activity, it may also be a methodological effect (see notes to Figure 6.4).

In comparison with other parties, FrP’s membership profile differs considerably from that of SV, another new party. SV members are much less likely to be passive members and, conversely, more likely to amateur actionists. However, in comparison with mainstream left and mainstream right, the profile of FrP’s membership appears quite “normal” and not particularly passive. In fact, if anything, the mainstream right have more passive members than FrP. Ap has a few more mass party activists, but the difference between the two parties is less striking than might have been expected.
In sum, FrP certainly has become substantially stronger than it was in its first two decades of existence, though the organizational strength should not be overrated. The party increased its numbers of members and local branches, but the organizational density remained weak and the organization have not functioned particularly well with regard to its recruiting purpose. A large share of members have participated at internal meetings and electoral campaigns – in fact, in the 1990s, even a large share joined extra-parliamentary activity – yet almost half of the members in 2009 did not participate in any activity at all, which is more than in the other parties, though only marginally less than for the Conservatives (H).

**Auxiliary Organizations**

All of the established Norwegian parties have been characterized by a rather large number of auxiliary organizations (e.g. Svåsand 1985). Traditionally, these organizations include a youth wing, women’s organization or network, information association, press and publishing house, and, in some cases, a student organization (e.g. Norwegian Conservative Student Association and Norway’s Liberal Youth Organization) or senior branch (e.g. the Conservative party).181

The number of auxiliary organizations for FrP, however, has been relatively limited. Yet, the youth wing and the party newspaper have played important roles in socializing, mobilizing, recruiting and facilitating internal communication throughout the period. In addition, FrP has

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181 The Norwegian Labour Party (Ap) has also been organizationally connected to the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) through formally overlapping membership and a joint youth wing (AUF). The relationship with the trade unions will be analyzed later in this chapter in connection with civil society linkages.
had a few other auxiliary organization which have either been rather unsuccessful or – as in the case of the senior branch – relatively new.

**The Youth Organization: Fremskrittspartiets Ungdom (FpU)**

Not much – if anything at all – has been written about FrP’s youth wing, *Fremskrittspartiets Ungdom* (FpU). However, the organization has played an important role in FrP’s development: For the most parts in a constructive and supporting role but sometimes profoundly oppositional vis-à-vis its mother party. In the fiction literature, members of the youth wing have been portrayed as ambition and perhaps a bit too vulgar youths who are more interested in financial matters (e.g. “money and career”) than spiritual and cultural affairs (Olsen 1997: 64; Larssen 1998: 11). Sometimes they have also been described as rather militant, as when the main character in Frode Grytten’s *Langdistanesvømmar* (“Long distance swimmer”) describes a situation in which he was almost beaten by a member of FpU’s executive board (Grytten 1990: 76). These stereotyping images might have had some validity in the late 1980s and early 1990s (as I will return to later), but they are by no means representative for the youth party as a whole.

Initially, FrP had no youth wing. Anders Lange did not support the establishment of a youth wing (see also Chapter 7). In fact, he vetoed the foundation of such an organization even though close friends and allies tried to convince him otherwise (Iversen 1998: 72). To be sure, some of the youths who admired Lange and the idea of new right-wing party in Norway functioned as the youth wing in the early phase of the party’s existence. Yet, there was no formal youth organization with formalized influence on FrP’s development. However, the chairman who succeeded Anders Lange, Arve Lønnum, was much less hostile towards a separate organization for youth. According to Lønnum, it was important to take advantage of “the energy of the young people” since they were the most “active and vital” force in society (Lønnum 1977: 33). Furthermore, and “besides act in accordance with the party […],” Lønnum (1977: 34) wanted the youth organization to “carry out its own work in accordance with the distinct features of the young peoples.”

The actual founding of FpU took place simultaneously as Hagen was elected chairman, namely in 1978 – only a few months after FrP had lost its seats in the Storting. According to a former parliamentary secretary (1981–85) and contributor in the early phase of the FpU’s existence, Harald Ruud (1996: 46–47), the strategy of attracting ideologically trained and political knowledgeable youths thus became a top priority already in the late 1970s and continued in the early 1980s. Not only did the new leadership see the youth as a valuable campaigning resource, mobilizing the youth was also part of a strategic plan to liberalize the policy of the party and to diminish the influence of older and more reactionary activists (Ruud 1996). In short, the main idea was that ideologically unwanted, politically inexperienced and organizationally undisciplined activists would become ousted by skillful and hardworking youth.

FpU was quickly integrated into FrP’s organization. Members of FpU having turned 17 years old were given identical rights as ordinary party members of FrP (Party statutes 1983, §3). Local and regional chairmen were granted representation in the “mother party’s” executive committee at the corresponding level, and the FpU chairman was represented in the national council (Party statutes 1983). Furthermore, everyone in the executive committee of
the youth organization was entitled to meet as delegates of full value at FrP’s national congress (Party statutes 1983). A few years later, the youth party became further integrated, even though the number of delegates at the national congress was restricted to five only. Since 1986, the FpU has been entitled to send one delegate to the annual meeting at the county level and the national chairman was no longer only granted observatory status in the powerful executive committee, he was also allowed the right to speak and vote (Party statutes 1986; see also organogram 5.4 in Chapter 5).

The formal integration through official party statutes only tells half the story, however. Non-formalized regulations of FrP activity in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s shows that FpU was even more integrated than prescribed in the party statutes. For example, when Hagen decided to appoint a working committee after the national congress in 1979, even if this committee was not mentioned in the party statutes, the FpU chairman was selected to be one of a few representatives in the party’s inner circle of power (Hagen 1984: 220). Also after the existence of a working committee became part of the official party statutes, FpU’s chairman remained in powerful committee until the late 1990s (see below). Moreover, for a short period of time in the early 1990s, there was even a coordination committee consisting of members from executive committee in FrP and FpU (Annual report 1991/92).

FpU representatives played a pivotal role in the development of other auxiliary organizations as well as the central office. Not only did key FpU activists – Jan Simonsen, Pål Atle Skjervengen, Tor Mikkel Wara and Jan Erik Fåne – publish the party magazine Fremskritt, FpU representatives sat on most of the internal committees appointed by the party leadership (sometimes heading the committee) (Annual reports 1985/86; 87/88; 88/89; 90/91; 91/92; 92/93; 93/94). Most of these committees were related to policy-making, such as developing the manifesto or focusing exclusively on specific (often underdeveloped) policy areas (e.g. the environment, social security, fishery, Europe, engineering and biotechnology, agriculture, and culture and education). However, some of the committees in which the FpU took part were also dealing with perhaps even more important aspects of FrP’s development, including making decisions related to long-term, short-term and campaign strategies as well as organizational development, international networking and schooling of candidates. Already in 1985, Pål Atle Skjervengen, the chairman of FpU, was part of the influential “strategy committee” (Annual report 1985: 7) which had been established after the poor electoral result in 1985.

In terms of membership requirements, FpU has had a lower age limit than FrP. While FrP was not open to members younger than 17 years old, one could become a member of FpU already at the age of 15 (Party statutes 1983, § 8). The youth wing was therefore able to recruit and socialize party sympathizers before they eventually joined FrP. It is indeed doubtful to what extent the youth wing was able to recruit many members between 15 and 17 years old, but in any case the organization grew rapidly after it was founded in 1978. Already in the early 1980s there were local branches in all but four of the nineteen counties (i.e. Oppland, Sogn og Fjordane, Troms and Finnmark) and the activity was allegedly high.

182 This could very well have been different. After all, the first leader of FpU, Peter N. Myhre, was – as one of few youths – skeptical about Hagen. However, Myhre and Hagen soon came to work together rather smoothly. As noted in Hagen’s (1984: 218) first autobiography: “he [Myhre] had been against me as chairman, but he accepted the result and we became good friends.”
A few years later – in 1986 – the youth organization had 89 local branches and was finally covering all 19 counties (Annual report 1985: 6), and in 1991, the number of local branches had increased to 110.

Additionally, the youth organization had been able to establish 140 “high school contacts” (i.e. young FpU-sympathizers still in high school). The number of members also increased throughout the period: from just above 2000 in 1979 (Fjeld et al. 1995: 125), to just above 4000 in 1985 and just above 7000 in 1991 (Annual report 1985; 1991). Consequently, in terms of relative organizational strength, the FpU was actually the strongest youth organization in Norway in the early 1990s (see Figure 6.5).

Figure 6.5: Organizational strength of the youth wing relative to that of the “mother party,” 1975–2009


In short, FpU proved extremely valuable for FrP in its first decade of existence. Not only did the youth organization provide its “mother party” with organizational resources during the election campaign in 1979 and in 1981 (Iversen 1998: 72), due to limited economic resources, it was a youth activist who was de facto running the central party office. According to chairman at the time, Hagen (2007: 70), the youth party chairman had no social life outside the party and “he slept quite frequently at the party office.” In a similar vein, Ruud (1996: 47) notes the role played by the youth wing in densely populated counties like Oslo, Akershus, Buskerud, Hordaland, Rogaland, Østfold og Vestfold in terms of policy development and media coverage.

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183 However, these figures should be carefully interpreted. For example, according to Ruud (1996: 47), the number of actual paid-up members constituted only 10 to 15% of the total membership register – perhaps even less. Although the youth wing secretariat kept a membership index file, this index file included not only paid-up members but also anyone who had been in contact with the party at any point in time. In other words, and in contrast to many other partisan youth organizations (see e.g. Fjeld et al. 1995: 39), the FpU (and the Socialist youth) probably overestimated its actual number of members significantly.
The contribution by the FpU continued to be important in the 1980s. FrP’s executive committee emphasized the “enormous work efforts” carried out by the FpU in election campaign in 1985 (Annual report 1986: 6) and after electoral breakthrough in 1987, the executive committee was “proud of its youth movement” (Annual report 1988: 38). Two of FpU’s chairmen – first Skjervengen in 1987, then Wara in 1991– were elected vice-chairmen in the “mother party,” and the local breakthrough in 1987 brought many FpU representatives into municipality and county councils. At the youth party congress in 1988, almost 3 out 4 delegates had been elected to various councils at the local level the previous year (Annual report 1988: 37).

FpU worked systematically to reach out with its policy and to socialize and train new members and representatives. Through various activities members and representatives were supposed to become more skillful and visible ambassadors for FpU and FrP. Many of the activities contributed to become more skillful and visible ambassadors for FpU and FrP. Many of the activities contributed to organizational linkages aspects such as interest aggregation, recruiting members, training candidates and socializing activist. Among the most important activities were the following: Production of course material and handbooks; Extra-parliamentary activism (Annual report 1990: 93); organized elite courses (Annual report 1988; 1990: 34; 1992); summer camps with invited guests from other liberal youth wings in countries like Sweden, Denmark, Germany, UK, Switzerland, Hungary, Macedonia and US (Annual reports 1991; 1992; 1993); Tillitsmannskonferanse (“Representatives conference”) (Annual reports 1990; 1992: 12; 1993); the publication of the newspaper Siste Skansen (Annual report 1991); foundation of a student organization (Annual report 1990: 34). Occasionally, the youth organization was able to gain significant media coverage (Annual report 1992), yet in comparative longitudinal perspective it seemed to have been rather modest (see Figure 6.6).

Organization-building efforts seemed to pay off in electoral mobilization. At least, FrP repeatedly performed much better in the “school elections” held during the election campaign in most high schools after debates with youth politicians at the school. Whereas Ap in particular seemed to be relatively unpopular among pupils, the FpU (and Socialist Left party) was relatively popular – especially in 1989 and 1991 (see Figure 6.7).

If the campaign and administrative efforts made by the FpU were an indisputable contribution to the organizational persistence and parliamentary re-entry of FrP in the 1980s, the youth party was simultaneously drifting towards a pure liberalist position – not only with regard to economic policy but also with regard to cultural issues (Iversen 1998: 112–113). As a consequence, the youth wing was increasingly challenging FrP’s policy and ideological platform. For a long time FrP’s party elite accepted a diverging ideological development acknowledging that a youth organization should be allowed to “explore new ideas and to be more concerned with ideological debate and clarifications than the mother party” (Annual report 1986: 6). However, in the early 1990s, the relationship became increasingly strained. FrP’s party elite began to underline the importance of working together as a united movement and to campaign on issues common for the youth wing and the “mother party” (Annual report 1990/91; 91/92). Yet, the conflicts were still primarily described as problems of communication rather than profound ideological disagreement. In 1992, however, FrP’s elite underlined that FpU should be seen as FrP’s youth organization, thus indirectly criticizing FpU’s stubborn behavior (Annual report 1992/93; see also 93/94).
Figure 6.6: Media visibility for FpU, UH (Conservative youth) and SU (Socialist youth organization), 1985–2009.*

Source: Retriever, Norwegian media archive.

Note: The Figure shows the number of hits for each of the youth organizations between 1985 and 2009. In order to control for the size of the archive – the number of newspapers available in the archive increases significantly during the period – I have calculated the ratio between the youth organizations and the Norwegian word “og” (=and). There is no reason to believe that the usage of this word changes over time, so it can serve as a baseline for comparison. The Labour Party’s Youth Organization is not included due to the fact that this organization is generally referred to by its abbreviation, AUF, rather than its full name.

Figure 6.7: Popularity in school election compared with national and local elections, 1989–2009

Source: School results are taken from NSD. For election results, see Chapter 1.
None of the attempts made by FrP’s leadership to unite the party were successful. The support for hard-core liberalism within the youth wing was simply too strong. FpU was strongly in favor of Norwegian membership in the market liberal-oriented European Union, and it opposed the traditional role of Christianity in schooling system, the existence of general conscription and prohibition of drugs (Iversen 1998: 113). All these policy positions were seen as incompatible with liberalism. With regard to immigration, the FpU was liberal only in principle; in practice, FpU could not support a liberal immigration policy due to the Norwegian welfare state (which would collapse with “open borders”). On this particular topic then, the difference between FrP and FpU was not insuperable. Yet, the youth party leadership – and parts of the liberal faction in the mother party – was not particularly fond of exploiting latent xenophobia in elections. The party had therefore decided against playing the immigration card in the 1989, 1991 and 1993 campaigns, despite the mobilizing effects of the issue, incontestably evident in the 1987 campaign.

In the end, the profound ideological and strategic disagreements between FrP and FpU had become uncontrollable and insurmountable. After FrP’s agonizing national congress at Bolkesjø in 1994, in which FpU sided with the loosening liberalist minority, the chairman Lars Erik Grønntun continued to criticize the mother party publically. At FpU’s extraordinary national congress on July 2, a majority of the delegates (63 against 21) voted in favor of dissolving the youth wing. The chairman justified the resolution by criticizing FrP’s attempt to restrict the autonomy of youth wing and turn FpU into a “commando troop” of submissive youth activists.184 Grønntun also attacked the ideological transformation of the mother party calling it a “protectionist party, in particular with regard to humans and culture”.185 The decision taken by the youth organization was immediately cancelled by the FrP national council, which appointed a new executive committee with the single task of rebuilding a FrP-loyal FpU and organizing a new national congress.

The youth wing – re-launched

Ulf Leirstein was elected new chairman of the “new” FpU. In order not to be perceived as the puppet of party chairman Carl I. Hagen, he publically stated that even the new youth wing would not necessarily be loyal to Hagen; its loyalty was with FrP as whole.186 The “new FpU” remained integrated at all levels within the organization, but it certainly became less autonomous vis-à-vis its “mother party” and less influential in terms of policy and organizational development of the party. Whereas the old party statutes (e.g. Party statutes 1986, §17; 1990, §20) had granted the youth movement some degree of freedom with regard to policy positions and ownership to economic and organizational resources, the new party statutes (Party statutes 1995, §20) restricted the scope of independent action dramatically. From now on, FrP’s party elite could, by a two-thirds majority, withdraw the youth wing’s right to use the party name; and in case of dissolution, the economic and organizational resources would fall to the “mother party.” Moreover, since 1999, the youth party has no longer been part of the powerful working committee (Annual report 1999). The new FpU was also, until recently, less represented in various internal committees (Annual report 1995; 1996;
1997; 1999; 2000; 2002). For example, no one in the important committee “Project Government” appointed in 2001 was – or had ever been – member of the youth wing (Annual report 2002: 17).

Re-building the youth wing was no easy task. Firstly, FpU (together with other partisan youth organizations) was reported for comprehensive membership cheating in the 1980s and early 1990s, which hit the economy of the youth wing hard. This also resulted in the suspension of the chairman Ulf Leirstein and the resignation of the vice-chairman. In addition, two other members of the executive committee left FrP for political as well as apolitical reasons. Consequently, for a short period in 1995, there was simply no administrative staff in the new FpU. Secondly, there were still ideological tensions within FrP resulting in, among other things, the resignation of the vice-chairman Klaus Jakobsen (see also Chapter 5). Thirdly, the youth organization lacked competent personnel. About two-thirds of the organization had left at the extraordinary national congress and the number of members had decreased substantially in recent years. In 1994, there were no more than 347 paid-up members, and even though this increased in 1995 (to 685) and 1996 (to 714) the organization remained weak for many years. In fact, in comparison with other partisan youth organizations, FpU remained fairly weak until very recently. Whereas the Socialist Left (SV) and Conservative (H) youth organizations had approximately 1,500 members in the first years of the 2000s, and Labour’s (Ap) AUF counted as many as above 5,000 members, FpU was struggling to get as many as 1,000 (see Table 6.2). Also with regard to the number of local branches, FpU was significantly weaker than the other parties. The membership ratio between the youth wing and the mother party (as shown in Figure 6.5) also suggest that the “new FpU” was significantly weaker than the “old FpU.” The youth wing gradually became somewhat stronger, but it remained weaker than UH and AUF.

Table 6.2: Number of members and local branches in four partisan youth wings, 1998–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SV youth (SU)</th>
<th>Ap youth (AUF)</th>
<th>H youth (UH)</th>
<th>FrP youth (FpU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Local branches</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Local branches</td>
<td>Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1119</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6006</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6579</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1183</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>6435</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>6690</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1475</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>5484</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5345</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1513</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5040</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2051</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5599</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5034</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1217</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6753</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8441</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1393</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28491</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ødegård and Bergh (2011).

Note: 1. The significant drop for AUF from 2008 to 2009 was due new definition of “membership” (the annual fee needed to be more than 50 Norwegian kroner, effectively excluding a large share of youth members).
Despite having lost some of its previous autonomy vis-à-vis FrP and being noticeably weaken, the “new FpU” has carried out similar activities as the “old FpU,” such as the production of an organizational handbook (Annual report 2004); extra-parliamentary activism, including demonstrations against the religious rule in Iran (Annual report 2006) and collected signatures against the powerful relationship between the trade unions and Ap (Annual report 2007); training of candidates prior to school elections and through the so-called “Elite Academy” (Annual report 2004/05; 05/06; 07/08; 09/10); Summer camp with around 100 activists and international guests\(^\text{187}\) (Annual reports 1999-2009); Tillitsmannskonferanse with more than 100 participants (Annual report 2002; 2004; 2007); publication of the party magazine *Siste skansen*, which after a period of no or very few publication was digitalized in 2009 (Annual report 2008; 09); high school visits and networks aimed at recruiting well-educated members (Annual report 2004; 06; 09); foundation of a student organization called *Det liberale selskap* (The Liberal Society) in 2004 (Annual report 2004); successfully exploited the possibilities of new technology in terms of internal online forums for political discussions, emails, homepage and social media (Annual report 1999/00, 00/01; 05/06; 09/10).\(^\text{188}\)

And while the youth wing has challenged the ‘mother party’ politically from time to time\(^\text{189}\) also after the ideological battle in the 1990s, the relationship with FrP has also been significantly improved. At the end of 1990s, FrP’s party elite said that “the youth party [with a few exceptions] has demonstrated a reasonable understanding of their role as recruiting and training organization for FrP” (Annual report 1999). In recent years, communication between mother party and its youth wing has been further improved through joint participation in the coordination committee. In addition, since 2007, all FpU members automatically receive FrP’s party magazine *Fremskrift* for free (Annual report 2007; see also next section on *Fremskrift*).

Most likely, the youth wing has continued to play an important role in the party’s success in school elections; in all but one of these (2007), FrP has been the largest party of all. However, since FrP has increased its support in national elections substantially over the last years, the difference between school elections and national elections has decreased. The school performance has nonetheless been quite impressive.

The youth wing’s ability to function as a recruitment channel could also be made probable with some empirical observations. Already in 2004, the new FpU seemed to be producing many well-qualified politicians and political advisors: 6 out 15 advisors in FrP and 2 out of 3 city councilor secretaries in Oslo came from FpU; FpU activists have been elected to positions within the party organization and popular assemblies at the local level. More systematically, the parliamentary group seemed to be increasingly composed of representatives with a previous career in FpU. Figure 6.8 shows youth organizations’ penetration of their respective parliamentary parties. While there were no MPs with previous

\(^{187}\) Both the Danish liberal youth (Annual report 2007) and youths from Iceland and Estonia (Annual report 2004) have visited FpU’s youth camp. The liberal youth wing of the Danish Liberal Party visited FpU already in 2005 to celebrate the election result (Annual report 2005)

\(^{188}\) Though, the homepage has also suffered from infrequent updating and technical problems (Annual report 2000; 2002; 2006).

\(^{189}\) For example, when Hagen tried to make FrP more positive to state ownership in 1999, it was strongly opposed at the national congress by a faction dominated by the youth, and Hagen (2007: 420) lost the battle.
experience in FpU before 1989, their share was approximately 30% when the ‘old FpU’ was at the height of its organizational and ideological strength around 1990. This figure fell after the organizational dissolution in 1994, yet only to recover gradually after the turn of the millennium. In a comparative perspective, however, the youth wing of FrP seems to be a weaker recruiting channel than is the case with other parties. Ap, H, and especially SV in recent years, have had far more MPs with previous experience from their respective youth organizations AUF, UH and SU.

In sum, FpU has been important at critical junctures in the party’s history. However, it has not displayed any exceptional strength, especially not since the breakdown in the mid-1990s. Not only has FpU been unable to maintain viable and stable county branches in all of Norway’s 19 counties (Annual report 2000; 2004; 2008), it has not even been able to have active branches in municipalities governed by FrP (Annual report 2007). Furthermore, FpU does not seem particularly strong in comparison with other youth wings either. SU, AUF, and UH have all more local branches than FpU; and in terms of membership numbers, FpU has always been smaller than either AUF or UH. Even SU has in all but two years (2006 and 2009) counted more members than FpU. Finally, with regard to recruitment, FpU still seems to perform worse than other youth wings. MPs with a previous career in the youth wing are at least better represented in other parties.

Subscription Newspaper and Membership Magazine: Fremskritt

The party newspaper Fremskritt (Progress) first appeared in 1974. Its development can stand as a micro-cosmos of the development of FrP as a whole. The newspaper quickly became a valuable information source about parliamentary and organizational activity, yet the number of subscriptions remained very low and the newspaper was read only by some of the party’s own representatives (Hagen 1984: 205).
In the 1980s, Fremskritt was a weekly published subscription newspaper primarily seen as part of the internal communicational infrastructure. As noted by the executive committee, “Fremskritt shall bind the party together and function as information organ for all subparts of the party” (Annual report 1985/86: 5; see also 87/88: 36; 88/89: 36). The name of the newspaper made it symbolically connected to the party; however, it was also formally connected through observatory status at the bi-annual national congress (Party statutes 1983; 1986) and practically connected through overlapping personnel. The editor between 1982 and 1986 – previously a member of FpU’s executive committee, Jan Simonsen – also worked as press secretary for the parliamentary group. In fact, he (probably) received his salaries from the Storting, so that editing the magazine became part of his voluntary work for the party. The size of the magazine was rather limited (see Table 6.3). Due to limited resources, FrP established press contacts in all counties in 1985 and encouraged them to report on local initiatives and political ideas (Annual report 1985/86: 5).

In the late 1980s, the newspaper was also used for external purposes. In 1987, the magazine has special issues focusing on individual counties (Hedmark, Vestfold and Sør-Trøndelag) or municipalities (i.e. Røyken). The number of subscribers grew rapidly as well: from 2,700 in 1985 to 3,800 in 1988 (see Table 6.3). After the successful 1987 local elections, the daily organization of the magazine was slowly professionalized and it grew. Vice-chairman of the youth organization, Tor-Mikkel Wara, had been employed part-time before the election, but after the election the magazine hired another influential FpU activist, Jan Erik Fåne, as full-time editorial secretary and paid others to do freelance work (Annual report 1987/88: 36; 88/89). The magazine continued to create special issues covering the party’s most salient issues (law and order, tax policies) and informing about budget-making at the local level. After all, the success in the 1987 local elections had brought in many politically inexperienced representatives throughout the country (see Chapter 1).

The process of becoming more professionalized continued in the early 1990s. A magazine board was appointed by the executive committee in order to deal with long-term strategic and business related matters; issues related to advertisement and increasing the number of subscribers were outsourced (Annual report 1991/92); and new journalists were hired (Annual report 1990/91: 32).

The magazine also continued to make special issues on topical policy themes (on e.g. tax policies, the EU question, private sector), campaign issues or issues targeting younger voters in collaboration with the FpU. Campaign issues, often handed out to potential voters at campaign stands, were made (at least) in the local elections in 1991 and 1999, and printed in 94 500 and 100 000 copies respectively (Annual report 1991/92; 99/00). However, despite becoming more professionalized and being used as part of the campaign strategy, the magazine slowly but surely lost subscribers. Neither innovative recruiting techincs nor admonishes from the executive committee turned out to be very effective; not even party representatives seemed to care about the magazine, and the turnover rate among subscribers

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190 In 1999, three local units (i.e. Hedmark, Sarpsborg and Sørum) were supposed to have their own special issue. However, this did not turn out very well. The regional/local branches were not capable of deciding what the magazine should include or producing the actual content (Annual report 1999).
was very high (Annual report 1991/92; 92/93; 93/94; 94/95: 13). The decreasing number of subscribers also affected the advertisement income, which resulted in decreasing financial strength of FrP. In 1994 – in which the infamous national congress at Bolkesjø almost torn the party apart – the magazine had no more than approximately 1,250 subscribers.

After this *annus horribilis*, the magazine recovered somewhat and the number of journalists increased from two to three in 1996. However, the number of subscribers remained at a very low level (see Table 6.3) and the turnover was still high (Annual report 1996, 12). The party elite was thus everything but satisfied with *Fremskritt’s* power of penetration. After all, the executive committee viewed the newspaper as a necessary infrastructure “to communicate information from various party bodies out to the party’s representatives and those elected by the people, plus the party’s members and voters” (Annual report 1996: 17). Having such ambitions, the newspaper was probably considered close to a complete failure.

Due to the poor functioning of the magazine, as well as changes in state subsidy arrangements (Heidar and Saglie 2002: 75), ideas about turning the subscription newspaper into a membership magazine emerged in the organization and among party elites in the late 1990s. After consulting various sub-sections of the party, the national council decided to integrate *Fremskritt* into the membership organization. Since 2000, *Fremskritt* has therefore been bi-weekly (except during holidays) distributed to all paid-up members. The newspaper immediately became part of FrP’s general information department. According to the party elite, the transformation of the magazine was considered an “important contribution” in order to “improve the information development in the party” (Annual report 1999/00: 16). Not only was the new version of *Fremskritt* seen as an important channel for direct communication with members, the elite also noted that an enlargement of the impact area hopefully would increase the “political knowledge” and the level of participation among party members (Annual report 2000/01: 15). Moreover, all issues included recruitment coupons, so it would be easier for existing members to recruit new members (Mjelde 2013: 123).

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191 For many years, the executive committee reminded all members holding office and elected representatives that it is “an obligation” not only to take out a subscription but also to read the magazine regularly since it provides the quickest and best information about internal affairs in the party (Annual report 1991: 17; see also Annual report 1992; 1993). In 1994, it was simply stated that “*Fremskritt* exists in order to communicate information from different party bodies out to the party’s representatives and those elected by the people, plus the party’s members and voters” (Annual report 1994: 13).

192 The idea of linking membership to subscription had already existed at the local level. In autumn 1996, the executive board agrees upon a pilot scheme in which local branches were allowed to include the magazine fee as part of the general membership fee. However, this arrangement was rather limited until it became nationalized in 2000.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of subscribers</th>
<th>Issues per year/pages</th>
<th>Number of paid journalists</th>
<th>Advertisements sold (in NOK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>50/8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>48/8 and 2/12</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>8/8, 37/12, 4/16, 1/24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3138</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3325</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2776</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>46/12, 3/16 and 1/24</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>49/12 and 1/4 and 1/24</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>50/-,1/4 and 1/12</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>ca. 1600</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1542</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>All members (10 821), plus 350</td>
<td>24/20</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>All members (11 824), plus 319</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>All members (ca. 14 000), plus 300</td>
<td>24/-</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>All members (ca. 16 000), plus 400</td>
<td>24/-</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>120 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>All members (ca. 16 000), plus 400</td>
<td>25/-</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>150 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>All members (ca. 15 500), plus 400</td>
<td>23/-</td>
<td>3–4</td>
<td>67 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>All members (ca. 15 500), plus 400</td>
<td>23/-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>130 903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>All members (ca. 19 100), plus 400</td>
<td>23/-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>280 878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>All members (ca. 20 600), plus 400</td>
<td>23/-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>304 875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: 1. The number of subscribers refers to circulation numbers until 1989 and to the number of actual paying subscribers from 1990 until 1996.

The transformation of Fremskritt into a membership magazine was well received throughout the organization. Already in 2001, it was quickly considered a “huge success” by FrP elite (Annual report 2001/02: 16) and the information department has repeatedly referred to the magazine as their “flag ship” (Annual reports 2002/03: 80; 04/05: 54). Between 2000 and 2009, the magazine most likely became one of the most important channels for communication between the party in central office and the party on the ground. At least, the elite were quite satisfied with the magazine’s ability to “inform, train and motivate the party’s members” (e.g. Annual report 2006/07: 11).

While it is difficult to verify the impact of Fremskritt at the local level, the membership survey from 2009 seems to corroborate the views advocated by the party elite. When FrP members were asked about their most important sources for political information,
**Fremskritt** came out as the second most important source, only beaten by a comprehensive category including all kinds of mainstream media (radio, TV, newspapers and newsmagazines) (see Figure 6.9). More than half of the party members viewed **Fremskritt** as a ‘very important’ source of political information. In comparison with other parties, the consequential role played by **Fremskritt** is further clarified. Party magazines were not seen as particularly important as a source of information for party members in SV, Ap and H (or other Norwegian parties for that matter). Interestingly, the survey also shows that the various parties’ web sites, which in the case of FrP has been developed in an organizational symbiosis with **Fremskritt** in recent years (see below), is significantly more important for FrP members than for members of other parties.

![Figure 6.9: The importance of various channels among party members in 2009 for obtaining political information (% of party members answering 'very important' source of information).](image)


*Note:* All party members were asked ‘How important are the following sources to you, when you shall get information about politics?’ The question had four answering categories: Very important, quite important, less important and not important. The Figure shows the percentage answering ‘very important’. The categories are somewhat wider defined than presented in the Figure: (a) Radio, TV, newspapers (also online) and news journals, (b) public documents and materials, (c) Your party’s newspaper/magazine and other party, documents, (d) Party meetings, (e) Party website, (f) The Internet otherwise (i.e. beyond the party website), (g) Research publication and (h) Personal contact with fellow party members.

At the same time as **Fremskritt** has become an important source of information among party members, however, it has also remained a channel for making FrP policy known beyond the core of converted activists and followers. Firstly, it was still possible to take out subscription; an option which have been utilized by mainstream media, companies and libraries (Annual report 2002/03: 80). In 2008, the magazine was explicitly said to be a supplier of – and a corrective to – mainstream media news reporting (Annual report 2008). Secondly, several local branches has placed the magazine in strategically important locations such as the doctor’s waiting rooms, welfare service center for the elderly, libraries and cafes.
(e.g. Annual report 2002/03: 80; 04/05: 12). And thirdly, there have been produced issues specifically designed to recruit new members or to highlight specific issues (Annual report 2002/03: 80). In the election year of 2005, for example, the magazine produced one special issue for Labor Day (May 1) and one for the summer (Annual report 2005/06: 12). All these activities show that the transformation of Fremskritt did not prevent the magazine from being used for external purposes.

In particular, the magazine has played an important role in campaign strategies. The 2005 campaign clearly illustrates the party’s ability to carry out targeted large-scale propaganda in recent years. A special campaign issue was printed in 19 different versions (one for each electoral district), and then printed in 1,925,000 copies and distributed to all households in Norway. Similarly, though not as far-reaching: In the 2007 local election, all local branches could compose their own special issue by choosing from a pool of pre-written articles. In this sense, the magazine could be designed according to the local agenda. In 2009, Fremskritt was published weekly (10 pages) during the actual election campaign, in order for the activists to hand them out at different stands across the country. Occasionally, the magazine has also been explicitly used in order to create a positive internal atmosphere. For example, at the party’s campaign camp prior to the 2009 election (in Bø, Telemark), the magazine contributed to the general atmosphere by publishing daily editions reporting on social and political activities.

Over the last decade, and after the magazine became an internal membership newspaper, it has also become increasingly professionalized. The number of journalists has increased further – first from three to four in late 2006 and then from four to five in 2009. Interestingly, many of the journalists have been very well-educated, in sharp contrast to the party’s electoral profile (e.g. Berglund et al. 2011: 35). In fact, journalists in the editorial group have studied social sciences (often with a master’s degree) or journalism at various university colleges – or, as in some cases, both. However, in terms of political experience, they still tend to come from the youth wing – just as in the 1980s and 1990s.

Finally, it should also be noted that in recent years Fremskritt has strengthened its collaboration and contact with the information secretariat in parliament on one hand and with other externally oriented information platforms within the central party organization on the other. This has provided the magazine with additional competence. The party’s web page, Fremskritt and a newly created full-blown TV production studio have been merged together as part of FrP Media (Annual report 2008/09; 09/10). This new media section was supposed to take care of internal as well as external communication tasks, including Fremskritt, TV production, the FrP webpage, news surveillance, intranet, internal and external service, help with press releases, debate articles, chronicles etc. – everything related to the internal and external information infrastructure was linked together in order to produce synergy effects across the various platforms.

193 At least, the party elite argued that a recently hired former journalist from Drammens Tidende – a rather large city newspaper – will help Fremskritt to develop further (Annual report 2008).
Other Minor Auxiliary Organizations: FPO, FpS, FUI and FrS

Although these are not as important as the youth wing or the party magazine, FrP has also had other auxiliary organizations, such as the training organization *Fremskrittspartiets opplysningsorganisasjon* (the FrP Information Organization, FPO), *Fremskrittspartiets studieforbund* (the FrP Study Association, FrS), *Fremskrittspartiets utredningsinstitutt* (the FrP Fact-Finding Institute, FUI) and, more recently, the organization for senior citizens, *Fremskrittspartiets seniororganisasjon* (the FrP Senior Organization, FrS). These auxiliary organizations have at various stages been part of FrP’s effort to penetrate Norwegian society through diffusion of ideas, membership recruitment, training of activists, and socialization of sympathizers.

FPO was founded in the early 1980s. Some of its main tasks were drilling of candidates before campaigns, more specifically on how to present the party’s manifesto in front of the camera. Moreover, after the rapid increase in the number of councilors at the subnational level in 1983, the leader of FPO travelled across the country together with the general secretary, instructing newly elected representatives in FrP policies and how to respond to questions from the local media (Ruud 1996: 54). By 1985, the organization had established a repertoire of 35 courses and had conducted 161 courses across the country.

Table 6.4: Number of FrS training courses and number of participants, 1998–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of courses</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>–</td>
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Source: Annual reports (00/01: 63; 02/03: 57, 59; 07/08: 15; 08/09: 17)

The activity obviously varied significantly from county to county: in some counties many courses were carried out, whereas there was no activity at all in others (Annual report 1986: 4). In 1986, however, the FPO was dissolved and its tasks became an integral part of the party organization. Responsibility for the training and schooling was transferred from the FPO to the party organization at the central and county level (Annual report 1987/88: 35). Coordination tasks were to be taken care of by the local politics committee at the central level.

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194 *Aftenposten, 07.03.84*

195 The reason for dissolving the information organization was that the activity of such organizations was supported by the public authorities (i.e. the Ministry of Church and Education), and therefore also regulated by the authorities.
and the courses were to be conducted by the county branches. At the end of 1990s, however, a new organization, FrS, was created with the purpose of training candidates (Annual report 1999/00: 20). Since then, several thousand candidates have attended policy, media and organizational training courses held by the FrS (see Table 6.4).

FUI was founded in late 1988 (Annual report 1988/89: 35). At the time, FrP policy position was still underdeveloped on several topics and FrP was struggling to be accepted as a serious party in public. Seeking to improve this situation, the liberalist faction within the party and chairman Hagen were inspired by the ideology-producing and agenda-setting think tanks in the USA (Skarsbø Moen 2006: 184). Strategically, FUI’s main mission was to produce fact-based liberal policy and thus to increase the possibility of public policy impact (Annual report 1988/89: 35). Organizationally, it was regarded as part of the FrP party organization, but with separate finances and its own board. In fact, even politically, the FUI was supposed to be independent of FrP. However, the board was dominated by people from the executive committee and national council, including party chairman Carl I. Hagen.

Financially, the FUI was dependent upon contributions from the party and from private employers. Most notably, the financial investor Christen Sveaas supported the organization (Skarsbø Moen 2006: 184). However, it remained economically weak throughout its existence; most of the time, there was only one full-time position, held by the liberal intellectual Jan Arild Snoen, and there were never more than three persons working for the FUI. Some administrative work was carried out by FrP’s party secretary.

Despite being almost exclusively the work of a single ardent soul (Snoen), the FUI did play a role in terms of party-building, ideological development, and public visibility for FrP in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During its brief life, the FUI produced many reports covering a wide range of policy areas – including privatization of the public sector, environmental policy, unit pricing in the healthcare sector, cultural policy, education, the EU, and democracy and referendums. All these reports had at least one common denominator: political-ideological analysis in favor of market liberalism. The private sector would produce welfare more cheaply and effectively than the public sector; schools would be run better if pupils and parents were given greater powers at the expense of the teachers; the cultural sphere was to be free of public and political intervention; and the development of the EU was described as a transformation towards a “nanny-state.”

For instance, the report on environmental policy – titled “Put a price on the environment” – might be seen as an early example of what has later been labelled “free market environmentalism” (Anders and Leal 2001: 4) or referred to as “growing influence of neoliberal approaches to environmental governance” (Bailey and Maresh 2009: 445). Basically, the idea is that the problems of environmental deterioration are to be solved not by challenging the capitalist logic of (economic) growth, but by creating (economic) incentives for environmentally friendly behavior. However, the FUI not only represented a (neo-

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196 The association was – at least until 2007 – part of the Norwegian Association for Adult Learning and therefore entitled to public funding.

197 See also Aftenposten 25.02.07

198 Aftenposten, 31.01.89; 25.05.89; 21.11.89; 10.03.90; 07.05.93; Dagens Næringsliv 19.06.90. The clear-cut defense for an ideologically coherent and fact-based policy position resulted in some internal problems as it not only challenged the official policy of FrP, but also the statements from some of its more folksy MPs, like Jan Simonsen.
liberalist perspective on environmental challenges, it also presented ideas that could be interpreted as populist or radical right-wing oriented. Most notably, Snoen strongly criticized the alleged existence of “climate hysteria.”\textsuperscript{199} The environmental movement was accused of “scare propaganda” and “prophets of doom.”\textsuperscript{200}

FUI could also be seen as a transnational agent for FrP, as it developed networks with liberalist parties elsewhere and introducing political ideas from abroad. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the organization helped to kick-start liberalist newspapers in the Baltic republics\textsuperscript{201} and it translated a report published by the Adam Smith Institute in London presenting market liberalist arguments against the Maastricht Treaty.\textsuperscript{202}

The overall mass-media coverage of the FUI should not be exaggerated. However, FrP’s “ideological one-man firm” did receive some mass-media coverage in two major right-oriented daily newspapers, the market-liberal Dagens Næringsliv and the liberal-conservative Aftenposten (see Figure 6.10). Moreover, the way FUI was mentioned in the largest business newspaper as an organization extremely concerned with the tax-payers in an article about a completely different topic suggests that its political agenda was well-known beyond the inner circles of party politics.\textsuperscript{203}

FUI never became an institutionalized auxiliary organization of FrP. Most importantly, there were not enough financial resources; after FrP’s poor election results in 1991, the mother party had even less resources. In addition, the organization was far too dependent upon the intellectual capacity of Snoen – activity decreased significantly when he stepped down as director in 1992. In 1994, in the aftermath of the ideological confrontation between the liberalist and the populist-conservative faction within the party, the FUI was formally dissolved. While no similar organization was created by FrP, another right-wing think-tank, Civita, was launched in the early 2000s, with the aim of challenging the social democratic ideological hegemony in the public sphere and facilitating party-political collaboration among the non-socialist parties (including FrP).

\textsuperscript{199} Aftenposten, 19.01.91
\textsuperscript{200} Dagens Næringsliv, 18.03.91
\textsuperscript{201} Aftenposten, 22.01.92
\textsuperscript{202} Aftenposten, 07.05.93
\textsuperscript{203} Dagens Næringsliv, 19.10.91
More recently, FrP has founded yet another auxiliary organization aimed at a specific demographic segment of society: the elderly (FpS Veileder 2010 and FpS Annual report 2009/10). In early 2009, it created an integrated senior citizens’ branch, initially headed by the former party chairman, Carl I. Hagen. The main goals has been to attract older voters, to present FrP’s policy to the ageing part of electorate, and to help elected representatives in the Storting and in county and municipality councils to pursue good policy for the elderly – an issue which has always been of particular concern for FrP (see Chapter 3).

**Ties to Civil Society**

Anders Lange’s Party (ALP) has often been depicted as an entrepreneurial party without any formal or informal linkages to other organized groups in civil society (see e.g. Harmel and Svåsand 1993: 77–78). Indeed, ALP and later FrP were not officially supported by or connected to any large interest group, social movement, labor market organization or subcultural milieu. As such, the party clearly falls outside Duverger’s (1963) famous distinction between parties that are created internally and parties that are created externally. Indeed, while the party was created externally, it certainly did not have the kind of extra-parliamentary organizational structure typically associated with such parties (see also Svåsand 1994: 114).

However, this is not to say that the party was completely without any linkages with external groups and milieus. For example, it should be noted that there was a “15-person committee” which helped Lange financially in the months before the first national election (Bjørklund 2000: 446–447). According to a former party activist, although this is hard to verify, a greater part probably came from two wealthy individual ship-owners (see Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993: 158). In addition to financial help, Lange received organizational support from the so-called Hundeguttene (dog boys). This was a group of right-wing oriented
young men extremely dedicated to Lange’s anti-statist project, who remained very loyal to him as a person in the phase of party formation and breakthrough (Iversen 1998: 15–18).

Furthermore, ALP received support – ideological and as well as organizational – from more organized right-wing groupings and influential individuals associated with the magazine Folk og Land (People and Land) and Moderat Ungdom (Moderate Youth, MU). Folk og Land was a nationalist magazine edited by, among others, Anders Lange’s brother Alexander Lange. The magazine sought to represent former members of Nasjonal Samling (National Unity) and they welcomed Lange’s criticism of the established parties (Hårseth 2010: 61–75). For them, Lange simply confirmed what they had been arguing for many years, namely that Norway was not a real democracy and that left-wing forces had too much influence. The magazine was particularly supportive of Anders Lange’s re-interpretation of the interwar period. According to Lange, it was Ap’s naïve disarmament policies and not Quisling’s coup that was responsible for the German occupation in 1940. Moreover, Lange criticized the postwar trials for being left-wing biased.

The relationship between this group and ALP was never formalized. The editorial staff of the magazine participated at the founding meeting of ALP in 1973 and the meeting was extensively covered in its publications. While the old ones focused on Lange’s anti-establishment position, the young ones were more interested in Lange’s anti-taxation and anti-foreign aid appeals (Hårseth 2010: 65). Not surprisingly, the magazine several times encouraged its subscribers to vote for Lange (Hårseth 2010: 63). Exactly how important this was for Lange’s breakthrough is difficult to say, however, but the magazine had about 2,000 subscribers and represented a center of gravity within small nationalist milieu in Norway.

Another group that was informally linked to the ALP (and later to FrP) was MU. This organization was founded in 1975 and even though they presented themselves as a ‘cross-party organization’, it was basically a splinter group from UH, the Conservative youth organization. Many of its members had been excluded from UH because they were seen as being too radical and militant. The organization presented itself as an uncompromising defender of human rights and democracy, but in most cases it only criticized the lack of democracy and violation of fundamental human rights in left-wing dictatorships around the world. Its main goal was to counteract the influence of radical left ideas at the universities (Collett 1991: 150) and to make sure that the Conservatives would not drift further leftwards (e.g. Simonsen 2009). Moreover, much of the propaganda was an attempt to collapse fascism and Nazism in the same category with communism – most notably by introducing the concept of ‘commununazism’ (see Søgaard et al. 1979) – presenting all these non-democratic ideologies as simply different strands of left-wing thought. The main argument was that they all would lead to a strong state and less individual freedom. In the public debate, MU was often labelled an extreme rightist organization – not only by left-wing organizations, but also in the mainstream media. However, it still managed to recruit right-wing youth across the country, and to establish a senior council with various prominent members of the social elite, including several professors, war veterans, editors and lawyers.206

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204 However, it should be noted that the two brothers did not enjoy a close relationship.
205 e.g. VG 11.05.77; see also Simonsen (2009)
206 Members of the Moderate Youth Council were Professor Jan Brøgger, Professor Fridtjof Frank Gundersen, Professor Jan Jansen, Professor Ole Jacob Malm, former editor of the Norges Handels- og Sjøfartstidende
The relationship between FrP and MU was never formalized, but there were ideological, organizational and personal links between the two organizations. In terms of ideological partnership, the strong anti-communist sentiment has already been mentioned; the MU was also pushing another key FrP issue – the lengthy struggle against the broadcasting monopoly of the Norwegian Broadcasting System (NRK). The opposition towards NRK was partly based on ideology (it was against liberalist principles) and partly because it was seen as an Ap propaganda machine. Hagen, for example, often referred to NRK as ARK – Arbeiderpartiets Rikskringkasting (the Labour Party’s Broadcasting System).

A shared worldview between FrP and MU was further developed through joint meetings. The leader of MU in the early 1980s, Kåre Petter Hansen, gave at least one lecture to the youth organization, FpU, in Rogaland in 1981 (Simonsen 2009: 74); and at another meeting a few years later, it was an MP from FrP, Bjørn Erling Ytterhorn, who gave a lecture about politics in El Salvador (where he had recently been monitoring the elections) at an MU meeting (Simonsen 2009: 130). An even more important indicator of the relationship between MU and FrP is the fact that several key figures in the MU were either already members of FrP or would later join, some serving as MPs for the party. Jan Simonsen, for example, was leader of the local chapter of FrP’s youth organization in Rogaland at the same time as he was, according to himself, a “passive member of Moderate Youth [MU]” (Simonsen 2009: 95). Professor Fridtjof Frank Gundersen, who was elected to the Storting in 1981, was a member of MU’s senior council. In addition, three other members of MU were elected to the Storting; one of them – Pål Atle Skjervengen – even became FrP vice-chairman and functioned as its chief ideologue.

There were also links at the local level, at least in some parts of the country. For example, when a faction associated with the MU was excluded from UH in Rogaland in 1980, they collectively joined FrP (Simonsen 2009: 96). In this sense, FrP became an organizational haven for anti-communist and/or anti-establishment right-wing activists who were expelled from the Conservative Party or found it too moderate. From the perspective of the FrP leadership, the MU represented a valuable source of skillful candidates. And the party actively tried to promote itself in these circles, partly by advertisements in MU’s magazine, Aktuell Argument (Contemporary Argument) (Simonsen 2009: 128).

In 1980s, there was little contact between FrP and other organizations. At least, the various committees founded by the central party bureaucracy did not report about any contact or collaboration with external resources in this period (Annual reports 1985/86; 87/88; 88/89). However, in early 1990s, as part of the emerging debate on Norwegian EEC/EU membership, FrP organized several meeting with introductory speakers from civil society (Annual reports 1990/91; 91/92: 31). As the party was divided in this issue, it invited speakers with highly diverging views, ranging from Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon (the Confederation Norwegian of Enterprise, NHO) to Nei til EU (No to the EU, NTE), as well as more “neutral”

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207 e.g. Aftenposten 05.12.88

208 The two other MPs were Stephen Bråthen and Dag Danielsen. The latter was the brother of Per Danielsen, who founded the MU.

There was also some contact between an extra-parliamentary nationalist milieu in the 1990s and a few of FrP’s MPs. For a while, this milieu seemed to have some influence on the immigration policies of FrP and the well-known MP Øystein Hedstrøm participated at the secret meeting with far right activists and people from the extra-parliamentary extreme rightist subculture in Norway (Annual report 1995/96). In fact, this milieu played an active part in developing the party’s immigration policies in the mid-1990s. However, the FrP leadership was strongly opposed to such contacts, and, it was never part of the party’s official strategy to strengthen the linkages with such groups (see also Chapter 4).

At the end of the 1990s, FrP seemed to change its strategy towards civil society markedly. Basically, it seemed to realize that the political, marketing and societal knowledge possessed by party members and the party bureaucracy were insufficient to ensure an optimal development of FrP’s policies and organization (see e.g. Annual report 2002/03: 62). For the first time the internal policy developing committees were explicitly encouraged to invite external speakers if deemed suitable and the various committees were encouraged to “connect to external contributors who through their positions in society are influential forces in society” (Annual report 1999/00: 32–33).

The idea that internal committees should work to strengthen FrP’s links with circles and organizations outside the party itself remained a key goal of almost all of the internal committees that were established in the 2000s (Annual reports 2000/01: 32ff; 02/03: 36ff; 05/06: 15ff; 07/08: 16ff). The economy and business committee, for example, was asked to establish better contact with small and medium-sized companies, which have traditionally supported the Liberals and the Conservative Party (Annual report 2000/01: 32). The meetings in this committee were thus increasingly held as joint meetings with companies and various organizations (Annual report 2002/03: 36). From 2005, the strategy of the committee was further developed: it would now be responsible for establishing an “information channel” between the party bureaucracy and the parliamentary party on one side, and trade and industrial enterprises and companies on the other. In particular, the committee was to focus on small and medium-sized companies (Annual reports 2005/06: 22; 06/07: 24; 07/08: 24).

Throughout that decade, a range of organizations and companies – mostly materialist-oriented and consumers’ organizations – became linked to this committee, including Kjøttbransjens landsforbund (Meat and Poultry Association, KLF), Norsk Industri (Norwegian Industry Association), Norske Shell (the Norwegian branch of Shell), Bedriftsforbundet (Companies’ Association), Småbedriftsforbundet, Forum of familieeide bedrifter (Forum for Family-Owned Businesses), NHO, IKT-Norge (interest group for the Norwegian ICT industry), Argentum Fondsinvesteringer AS (asset manager specializing in investments in private equity funds)

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209 See e.g. Aftenposten 05.09.95
210 Including Kommunalpolitiske utvalg (local politics), Fremskrittspartiets økonomiske og næringspolitiske utvalg (economy and business), Europautvalget (Europe/EU, health and social policy committee and Fremskrittspartiets familiepolitiske utvalg (family policy), Kriminalpolitiske utvalg (justice policy). The only committee without an explicit mandate to build relationships with external milieus or influential persons was the Oppvekst og skolepolitisk utvalg (childhood and school policy)
Other FrP committees have also made use of external resources, though not to same extent as the economy and business committee. For instance, the committee on childhood and school policy has invited a wide range of relevant organizations to comment on the party’s educational policies, including the Union of Education Norway, Norwegian Association of Graduate Teachers, the School Student Union of Norway and the National Parents' Committee for Primary and Lower Secondary Education (Annual report 2006/07: 28). However, committees dealing with foreign policies and security-related issues and Europe/EU issues seem to have been particularly active. Here FrP has certainly opened up for external impulses. Organizations such as Europaprogrammet, Nei til EU, and Europabevegelsen (The Norwegian Movement for Europe) have been present at meetings discussing European policies (Annual 2004/05: 60). Furthermore, journalists and academics have been invited to write short essays or analyses of Norwegian foreign policy and at different meetings, the party invited speakers from the military establishment, Friends of Israel, University of Oslo, organizations dealing with European relations, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) (Annual reports 2002/03: 44; 05/06: 19; 07/08: 21; 08/09: 16). Prior to the 2009 election, FrP also managed to recruit Doctor of Philosophy from Cambridge University, the foreign policy analyst Asle Toje, to join the International Relations committee (Annual reports 07/08: 22; 08/09: 15). Toje has been a key player in developing part of the party’s foreign policy; he has also strongly criticized the public view of FrP voters as group of uninformed and rather vulgar voters. In both cases, his academic background may have boosted the party’s legitimacy within certain groups.

Interestingly, FrP tried to establish contact not only with like-minded organizations (i.e. organizations that share some basic ideological principles with FrP) but also with organizations, interest groups and academics that cannot be seen as being particularly close to FrP’s ideological core. In fact, the party seemed to be actively searching for opposing views and critical remarks to its own policies. For example, the Family Policy Committee asked Norsk Kvinne- og familieforbund (Norwegian Women’s and Family Association) and Barneombudet (the Ombudsman for Children) for advice on how to develop a better family policy (Annual report 2002/03: 38).

Another profound change which took place in the early 2000s was FrP’s increased interest in organizations concerned with the labor market. While many political parties to varying degree have been associated with either employees or employers’ associations, FrP has always been weakly connected to organizations at the labor market – including both employers’ and employees’ associations. FrP’s strategy towards the trade unions has always been two-fold. On the one hand, the party has been highly critical of the ‘special relationship’ and elite collaboration between the Ap and the trade unions, in particular the Federation of Trade Unions, LO. In fact, in the early 1990s, FrP even assigned two well-known politicians (Pål Atle Skjervengegen and Arve Lønnnum) to investigate the various benefits and networks

211 See e.g. Dagens Næringsliv, 26.07.08; Dagbladet, 03.08.08
arising from the joint partnership between the trade unions, the Ap and public sector. On the other hand, FrP has, in contrast to for example the Conservatives, attempted to re-define and co-opt International Workers’ Day, May 1, since the late 1980s arguing that it is FrP which most consistently defend the interests of the working class (Terjesen 1990: 154). This latter strategy has, not surprisingly, been completely rejected by trade union elites (Flote 2008), and trade union membership has usually reduced the propensity to vote for FrP among working class voters (see Bjørklund and Hagtvet 1981: 55; Berglund 2007: 153).

In 2004, a new strategy committee, headed by Siv Jensen, at the time FrP vice-chairman, was asked to consider various strategies to improve relations with labor market organization, including NHO, LO and other associations not affiliated with either of these two large umbrella organizations (Annual report 2004/05: 20). The increased contact with the employers’ associations has already been mentioned (in connection with the FrP committee dealing with the economy and business); the party also tried to improve its relations with trade unions. It was for example decided that this committee should work to make FrP’s policies better known within the labor market organizations, and that it should collect information about the preferred policies of various labor market organizations. Moreover, the party leadership wanted the committee to routinize contacts and collaboration with such organizations, especially those outside the traditionally Ap-friendly LO (Annual report 2005/06: 24). After all, FrP still saw LO – and especially the so-called Pampeveldet (the rule of trade union bosses) – as the main obstacle to the necessary structural modernization of the Norwegian economy. And the close relationship between LO and Ap has been defined as “political corruption” by the current party leader Siv Jensen.

A professional committee was set up after the 2005 elections; prior to the 2009 elections FrP even established a larger group of 33 trade unionists (Annual report 2008/09: 14). The latter group was basically to prepare a policy handbook on professional policies, participate in various relevant forums, present FrP’s policies in various trade unionist publications, and prepare for the upcoming elections. In 2009, the committee also organized conferences with introductory speakers from various trade union organizations, including LO, UNIO and the Confederation of Vocational Unions (YS) (Annual report 2009/10: 19). Interestingly, establishing the “professional committee” quickly paid off, giving FrP publicity in channels previously not available.

In early 2007, FrP featured for the first time on the front page of the traditional trade unionist magazine LO-Aktuelt. In the accompanying article, which documented that many of the members of professional committee were organized in or had experience from a wide range of trade unions, the professional committee was rather uncritically allowed to present its main policies and to criticize various elites in society – experts, bureaucrats and journalists – for being against “the party for ordinary people” (i.e. FrP) simply because of prejudice and...

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212 See e.g. Dagens Næringsliv, 18.03.91
213 However, it should be noted that the negative effect of being unionized is much stronger as regards voting for the Conservatives (H) than for FrP.
214 Strategy adopted by FrP’s national committee in 2004, p. 34, available in annual report from 2005/06: 33-34
215 e.g. Dagens Næringsliv, 17.03.07
216 UNIO has 12 national affiliates, organized according to profession. The members are university or college educated, and most work in the public sector (http://www.unio.no/no/english, accessed 27.5.14).
217 LO-Aktuelt, 2007, no. 2, p. 6-10
lust for power. The party also received comprehensive publicity in another magazine published by *Fellesforbundet* (the United Federation of Trade Unions, FF), the largest private-sector union in Norway.\(^{218}\) On the front page, the magazine presented Egel Torkelsen from a small coastal municipality in the southern part of Norway, who served as both a trade union leader at the local level and as mayoral candidate for Frp.\(^{219}\) The magazine also published an article covering the first meeting between the leader of the professional committee and FF leader, Kjetil Bjørndalen, which took place in mid-2007.

The increased penetration of and influence within labor market organizations can be further illuminated by survey data among party members. While these surveys show that members of left-wing parties are more likely to be organized either in traditional trade unions (Ap) or trade unions for professions and academics (SV), it also emerges that Frp members are almost equally organized as are H members (see Figure 6.11). These two right-wing parties differ only to the extent that Frp members tend to be organized in industrial trade unions, whereas H members are more likely to be organized in post-industrial trade unions. Moreover, members of this old, established right-wing party are somewhat more likely to belong to the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO).

![Figure 6.11: Party members with membership in labor market organizations, 1991–2009 (in %)](image)

*Source:* Party membership surveys, 1991–2009. Authors own calculations. N = SV (337, 295 and 581), Ap (269, 268, 428), H (208, 198, 458) and FrP (212, 225, 465). “Missing” is included in 2000 and 2009 since many respondents most likely did not answer when they should have answered ‘not a member’.

More importantly, however, the surveys show that Frp has become more integrated in recent years. The share of members who are organized in industrial trade unions ((LO)) increased from 12% in 1991 to 18% in 2009. Similarly, the share of members who are also members of post-industrial trade unions (the Confederation of Vocational Unions, YS) has

\(^{218}\) FF mainly organizes workers in the iron and metal industry, the shipbuilding industry, graphical sector, car repair workshops, aircraft repair workshops, hotel- and restaurants, the textile industry, the shoe industry, the building trade, the building industry, the paper industry, graphical branches, fish farming, and agriculture and forestry

\(^{219}\) *Magasinet for fagorganiserte*, 2005, no. 5
increased from 5% in 1991 to 14% in 2009, whereas the share of those belonging to any kind of employers’ associations seems to have remained fairly stable around 5%.

Furthermore, the data show that FrP members are not only becoming rank-and-file, but that they have been able to gain offices within these organizations. While the share of members with a position of trust has either decreased (in Ap and SV) or remained stable (in H), it has increased among FrP’s members. In 1991 only 16% of those who were organized on the labor market were currently or previously holding office, but this figure had risen just above one fourth in 2000 and 2009 (see Figure 6.12). In sum, FrP seems to be increasingly anchored in trade unions, with its members increasingly gaining influential positions. However, it should be noted that, despite increased contact with and acceptance within the labor organizations, these organizations – perhaps especially the elite within them – have remained fairly hostile towards FrP in the public debate (Flote 2008).

Figure 6.12: Party members currently or previously holding office in labor market organizations, 1991–2009 (in %)
Source: Party membership surveys, 1991–2009. N = SV (222, 231 and 479), Ap (191, 181, 317), H (109, 97, 237); FrP (62, 86, 196). Note: The Figure only shows how many FrP members with membership in either employers’ or employees’ associations who also holds a position of trust.

Labor market organizations are not the only way parties may connect to civil society. Indeed, many of the minor Norwegian parties have primarily been anchored in other kinds of organizations. While SV, as a new left party, has been embedded in new social movements (i.e. the women’s movement, peace movement, environmental movement and anti-racist movement, secularism organizations), the Christian People’s Party (KrF) and the agrarian Centre Party (Sp) have been anchored in countercultural organizations (i.e. evangelicalism, Low Church movements, the temperance movement and organizations defending the nynorsk form of the Norwegian language). The Liberal Party (V) has had a foot in both of these organizational camps. Moreover, all established Norwegian parties have to varying degrees
been connected to civil society through organizations like sports associations, leisure and humanitarian organizations. These organizations are less politicized, but are potentially influential and they provide parties with “eyes and ears” in civil society. Moreover, they may function as a basic introduction to organizational mechanisms and democratic decision-making. To what extent is FrP embedded in countercultural organizations, new social movements and non-political associations?

First, we may note that FrP has remained basically detached from the two first of these kinds of organizations, the new social movements and countercultural organizations (see Figure 6.13). As expected, given FrP’s liberal alcohol policies and anti-nynorsk position, very few party members are involved in temperance movements or language organizations. FrP also seems to be weakly connected to religious organizations, though the survey from 2009 may indicate a development towards greater penetration in this subculture.

Second, we may note that a similar pattern of weak integration holds for new social movements as well. Being known for its anti-feminist, anti-environmentalist, anti-foreign aid
and pro-military position, it is perhaps no surprise that very few FrP members are active within the women’s movement, environmental organizations and peace movement. The party is also weakly connected to secular belief groupings like the Humanist Association. The fact that members are active neither in religious nor secular belief organizations fits well with recent research arguing that FrP embrace of Christianity is based on tradition rather than faith (Holberg 2007).

When it comes to non-political organizations, however, FrP members are not as weakly connected, though they tend to be less active than the members of other parties (see also the civil society index below). Integration in connection with sports seems fairly stable: between 30 and 40% of the members also belonged to a sports associations or sport club between 1991 and 2009. Two types of organizations are increasing in terms of overlapping membership: humanitarian, social organizations and charities (e.g. Save the Children, Red Cross, the Cancer Society, and health-related voluntary groups) and motorist associations.

![Figure 6.14: FrP’s party members and their membership in non-political organizations, 1991–2009 (in %)](image)

Notes: Special users’ organizations (e.g. for the disabled, for the blind) were not included in 1991 and 2000, and motorist associations were not included in the 1991 survey. Humanitarian organizations include also social organizations and charities (e.g. Save the Children, Red Cross, the Cancer Society and health-related voluntary groups). Leisure interests and community includes organizations involved with culture, youth, retired people, hobbies and leisure interests, or local residents'/community associations. Seven and four categories from 1991 and 2000 respectively have been merged in order to be able to compare the numbers with the 2009 survey. See Table A6.2 in Appendix for details of how this merging process was carried out.

The first has increased from just above 10% overlap to just above 20%, whereas the second, motorists’ organizations, has increased from almost 20% to 34%. However, most popular civil society “organization” is a large umbrella category covering organizations
involved with culture, youth, retired people, hobbies and leisure interests, local residents’ and community associations. As many as between 38% and 47% FrP members belong to organizations of this kind. There are also quite a few members – one in four – who belong to some kind of organization not explicitly mentioned in the surveys.

On the whole, very few organizations have openly supported the policies promoted by FrP – most organizations tend to criticize the party. Religious leaders within the Norwegian State Church, for example, have repeatedly warned against voting for FrP or supporting its ideology (Haugen 2014: 6–7).220 However, there are two exceptions to the general picture of a hostile civil society which are worth discussing, namely Human Rights Service (HRS) and Kristenfolket (literally: the Christian People).

HRS, founded in 2001, has been associated with two women in particular, information director Hege Storhaug and leader Rita Karlsen. It sees itself as an independent think-tank focusing particularly on “human rights,” “democracy” and “children, young and women” (HRS web site).221 According to Berntzen (2011: 92, 112), HRS is rooted in a feminist worldview and has become one of the most influential anti-Islam actors in Norway. Its main argument is that Islam is threat to female emancipation and gender equality – quite similar to the “immigration as a threat to our liberal values” narrative (see Chapter 4).

In contrast to the many other Islam-skeptic or islamophobic organizations and circles which have emerged in Norway in recent decades (e.g. Stop Islamisation of Norway, Norwegian Defense League, and Document.no), HRS has been sought to influence political parties, most notably Ap, Sp and FrP (Berntzen 2011: 86). The organization is also inspired by individuals in Denmark, such as Karen Jespersen and Ralf Pittelkow, who published the book Islam og naïvister (Islam and the naïve ones) in 2006.

In recent years, HRS has been one of several milieus with an explicit focus on so-called cultural challenges within the Muslim community. This has led to an obvious ideological overlap between HRS and FrP, though the motives for criticizing Islam may differ between key figures within the two organizations. In any case, the HRS has been frequently embraced by the FrP leadership and key MPs; and during the state budget negotiation between FrP and the government in the early years after the turn of the millennium, FrP secured project funding of NOK 0.5 million for the HRS.222

While the HRS mainly has refrained from explicit support to specific parties in public, Storhaug (2008) was the only contributor who presented a positive view on FrP’s policy in an edited volume called FrP-landet. Norge etter valget 2009? (“FrP country: Norway after the 2009 election?”), published prior to the 2009 election. While the other contributors – professors, former ministers of state, well-known activists from civil society organizations – were highly critical of FrP’s policies on education, health care, environment, transportation, justice, culture, foreign affairs and security, Storhaug argued that FrP’s immigration policies were characterized by “realism” (Storhaug 2008: 165) and that more restrictive policies on citizenship could lead to a “positive integration spiral” (Storhaug 2008: 166). She also praised FrP’s unyielding and confrontational defense of freedom of speech in the “cartoon

220 See also NTB, 02.09.1997: “Kristenledere ut mot kristen muslimfrykt” (Christian leaders disapprove Christian-inspired Muslim xenophobia).
221 See www.rights.no
222 Stortingsgruppens beretning [annual report from FrP group in the Storting] 2002/03, p. 16
controversy” that arose in 2006 after a small Norwegian Christian newspaper, Magazinet, reprinted the offending cartoons of the prophet Muhammad previously published by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.

Kristenfolket (KF) another organization which illustrates how FrP has gradually become more accepted within certain subcultures – in this case within the deeply conservative Christian circles that in the southern and western parts of Norway known as the “Bible belt.” The KF was established in 2009 by well-known figures connected to the weekly Christian-conservative newspaper Norge idag (Norway today) and received substantial media publicity prior to national elections the same year – not only in Christian newspapers (Dagen Magazinet, Norge idag and Vårt Land), but also in the tabloids and the National Broadcasting System (NRK). The main goal of KF was to reverse the ongoing secularization of Norwegian society and to mobilize Christian voters in favor of a non-socialist government, one in which FrP would be accepted by the other non-socialist parties as a legitimate and necessary governing partner.

More specifically, this new conservative Christian organization focused on four key issues: to reverse the Marriage Act that recognizes marriage for gay couples and lesbian couples; oppose any attempt to legalize euthanasia; move the Norwegian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; and support the wall built by the Israeli authorities. On many of these issues, FrP was the most clear-cut alliance partner among the parties represented in the Storting. In a survey among candidates conducted by the organization, FrP candidates came out strongly in favor of KF’s preferred policies.223 While FrP was somewhat inconsistent on the question of euthanasia (about one third supported a more liberal policy, in line with a majority of the party congress)224, it was highly consistent with regard to the Israeli wall and the (re)location of the Norwegian embassy.

The relationship between FrP and the most conservative and pro-Israeli parts of organized Christian groups has gradually been strengthened. In 2002, on the west coast of Norway, the principal at the college of the charismatic nonconformist congregation Levende ord Bibelsenter (Living Word Bible Center), Torkil Åmland, announced that he was going to run as a candidate for FrP in the forthcoming local election.225 Paradoxically, however, his main motivation was not local politics but the Israeli–Palestine conflict. Similarly, in North Norway, where FrP has traditionally been weak, another key person from the local religious community (Bjørn Lian) decided to run as mayoral candidate for FrP.226 Lian summarized his platform with the following three key issues: Israel (and stronger dissociation from “the terrorist” Arafat); opposition towards gender quotas; and more focus on divorced men and their problems. FrP was also publically endorsed by the editor of the small but important Christian newspaper Norge idag.227

The attempt to build legitimacy within Christian circles by focusing on problems with Islam, and Israel’s alleged vulnerability, seems to have been an explicit strategy of the FrP

223 NTB, 19.08.09.
224 The fact that FrP party congress in 2009 adopted pro-euthanasia policies after intense mobilization by the youth organization created some problems for the party within certain Christian groups. In fact, even FrP-members within these groups warned against voting for FrP (see Dagens Magazinet 02.08.09).
225 Dagbladet 07.10.02
226 Nordlys 26.02.03
227 Dagbladet 22.10.04
party leadership in the early 2000s. And this strategy was apparently more successful than Hagen’s strategy, in the early 1990s, of re-branding Jesus as a market liberalist (Jønsson 1993: 51). In 2004, Hagen, chairman at the time, certainly reinforced the linkage between these kinds of pro-Israeli religious groups and FrP by giving a highly anti-Islamic lecture at the already mentioned Bible center, Levende Ord, in Bergen.\textsuperscript{228} While this was not the first time he strongly criticized Islam (see Bjørgo 1996: 72; see also Chapter 4), the event received significant media coverage and FrP was dubbed the “Christian Progress Party.”\textsuperscript{229} And in 2007, Hagen again accepted an invitation from conservative Christian circles in Bergen.\textsuperscript{230} The meeting, which was organized by Bjarte Ystebø (who was to found Kristenfolket less than two years later) and Finn Jarle Særle, editor of Norge idag, was broadcast on a Christian private TV channel. FrP sought to capitalize primarily on its favorable policies vis-à-vis Israel; its criticism of Islam and the alleged Islamization of Norwegian society; and its profound opposition towards Norway’s gender-neutral marriage legislation. Hagen explicitly argued that FrP’s policies were based upon the “fundamental Christian values.”\textsuperscript{231}

Let me end this section with a brief analysis of the development of integration over time and the degree of integration compared to other parties through the construction of a very simple civil society index. The index, which is also based on overlapping membership, does not differentiate between those who are ordinary members of other organizations and those who hold office. Instead, it simply calculates how many other organizations – including labor market organizations – a party member belongs to, in addition to his or her party membership (which already to some extent makes the individual integrated in civil society). Unfortunately, the surveys do not include identical organizational categories, but by merging some of the categories in the three different surveys they become fairly comparable. Exactly how the process of creating comparable surveys was carried out is described in Appendix. Merging various categories to make them comparable left the following categories:

1. Labor organizations within the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO)
2. Labor organizations within the Confederation of Vocational Trade Unions (YS)
3. Organizations within the primary sector
4. Employer or business organizations
5. Religious organizations
6. Sports associations
7. Women’s organizations
8. Humanitarian and social organizations
9. Leisure associations
10. Environmental organizations
11. International solidarity movements
12. Secular belief associations
13. Other organizations

\textsuperscript{228} e.g. Aftenposten 14.07.04
\textsuperscript{229} Dagbladet 03.07.05
\textsuperscript{230} Aftenposten 09.11.07
\textsuperscript{231} Aftenposten 09.11.07
To be sure, this list does not cover the whole spectrum of possible organizations or associations, but it does include the most important ones in the Norwegian society. For the purpose of presenting the main patterns of civil society linkages, all members have been divided into five types, based on the number of overlapping membership in the above-mentioned thirteen organizations. Members are either very weakly linked (belonging to no other organizations except their own party), weakly linked to civil society (one additional organization), medium linked (two additional organizations), strongly linked (three additional organizations) or very strongly linked (belonging to four or more additional organizations).

The empirical analysis confirms previous results: FrP members are not completely without linkages to organizations in civil society, and they are slowly becoming more integrated (Figure 6.15). According to the 2009 survey, almost two in five party members are either strongly (19%) or very strongly (19%) linked to civil society organizations – as against only 16% and 31% in 1991 and 2000, respectively. However, in comparison with other parties, FrP still remains weakly connected to civil society. Particularly in comparison with SV, but also members of the mainstream left party (Ap) and the mainstream right party (H) are much more likely to belong to other organizations in civil society. Those with strong or very strong linkages make up 85% among SV members, 65% for Ap members and 60% of H members. Moreover, FrP members stand out in the sense that a substantial share of them – approximately one fifth – do not belong to any other organizations at all: they are simply not linked to any other organized activity. Such “unattached” members make up less than 10% in the other three parties at all three time-points.

![Figure 6.15: Integration in civil society among party members in SV, Ap, H, and FrP, 1991–2009.](chart)


The pattern of growing civil society integration and contact is corroborated in other recent studies of FrP’s contacts and relations with various kinds of interest groups (Allern
2010; 2013). Using data from official documents, interviews with key respondents in the central party bureaucracy and a survey among the party elite, Allern (2010) convincingly demonstrates that FrP is not so very different from other parties. Although she finds that FrP remains less connected (in terms of frequency and range) than many other parties at the level of the individual, FrP has established inter-organizational links for contact with interest groups, and the party elite seemed to have frequently contact with a wide range of organizations in civil society. In fact, even in a comparative perspective, FrP appeared comprehensively connected to civil society. As noted by Allern (2010), FrP has significant links with more numerous organization types than many other parties in Norway today. In this sense, her findings differ slightly than those that emerge from the civil society index above.

However, these findings – that FrP is above average connected to civil society at the elite level, but below average at the rank-and-file level – might be interpreted as reinforcing the “party-building from above” thesis, which seemed a fairly accurate description of how FrP has developed its organization. In any case, both Allern’s findings and the findings of this chapter indicate that, in contrast to conventional wisdom about right-wing populist parties, the entrepreneurial origin of FrP does not seem to have precluded it “from developing organized, wide-ranging links with various interest groups” (Allern 2013: 86–87).

Conclusions

This chapter has presented a detailed analysis of FrP’s organizational evolution along three distinct linkages: the membership organization, auxiliary organizations, and ties to civil society. Whereas the party was initially founded as “a purely person centered movement without any organizational basis” (Rokkan and Valen 1974: 206), the empirical data indicate that it has managed to establish fairly robust and comprehensive organizational linkages. The overall analysis also indicates that this process has largely been initiated top–down.

FrP’s membership organization – in terms of members and local branches – gradually expanded throughout the 1980s. And while there was a temporary setback due to ideological conflicts in the mid-1990s, membership was further strengthened in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Key persons in this process were the longstanding chairman Carl I. Hagen (1978–2006) and longstanding general-secretary Geir Mo (since 1994). However, it was not until towards the end of period that the organization shifted its incentive structures in order to reward organizational strength rather than electoral performance exclusively. Moreover, in a comparative perspective, FrP’s organizational building is perhaps not as impressive as some commentators and scholars have suggested. In fact, the number of members and the organizational density at the end of the period were still quite low, and a large proportion of the party members did not participate in any kind of party activity, be it internal meetings, election campaigning, or extra-parliamentary activities.

A similar pattern – from a non-existent to quite moderate linkage – emerged regarding the development of auxiliary organizations. To varying degrees, FrP has cultivated a more distinct party culture, more skillful candidates, and more targeted campaigning and policy development through the party newspaper Fremskritt, FUI (in the late 1980s and early 1990s), FrS (since 1998) and FpS (since 2009). However, most important by far has been the youth organization, FpU. FrP’s youth wing has provided the party with valuable organizing, training, socializing and mobilizing activities. In terms of interest aggregation, however, the picture
has been more mixed. Although the youth wing clearly contributed to policy development in the late 1980s, its ideological contribution was more detrimental at “the day of reckoning” in the mid-1990s. Together with some other liberals in the party and the party leadership, the FpU played a key role in the ideological battle that led to the party split in 1994 and subsequent organizational setback. Since the late 1990s, FpU has had a less prominent position, though the youth organization has been gradually strengthened.

FrP’s links with organizations in civil society have also improved over time. Initially, as an entrepreneurial party, it had very little contact with any other organization, though there seems to have been some sporadic contact with other right-wing organizations. However, after the party continued grow electorally and the membership stabilized at turn of the millennium, the patterns of contact with and strategic focus on organizations within civil society shifted significantly. Most importantly, FrP has established organizational linkages with materialist and consumerist organizations, trade unions (especially at the local level), evangelical Christian subcultures and anti-Islam organizations – the latter motivated by what I have elsewhere referred to as “xenophobic feminism” (Jupskås 2013). And while most of the contact has taken place at the elite level, there has been organizational penetration among the rank and file as well. In sum, it seems highly likely that these linkages have played a crucial role for FrP’s ability to reach new voters, develop policy, and boost its legitimacy.
Chapter 7: Party Leadership in a Populist Party

No other party is so dependent upon its leader
(Ekeberg and Snoen 2001: 359)

Introduction
FrP’s leadership has to a large extent passed through three distinct phases of institutionalization: charismatic mobilization, organizational building and media-savvy mobilization, and organizational consolidation. Anders Lange (1973-74) was a charismatic mobilizer, Carl I. Hagen (1978-06) an organizer and media-savvy mobilizer, and Siv Jensen (2006-present) an organizational consolidator. Quite impressively, Hagen was thus able to combine mobilizing qualities with organizational competence. His successor, Jensen, is also a media-savvy party leader, but the importance of this leadership quality has declined as the party has developed other organizational linkages (see Chapter 6). The short-term chairman between Lange and Hagen, Arve Lønnum (1975-78), was neither a mobilizer nor an organizer, and the party fell out of parliament when he was the front figure.

The data in this chapter comes primarily from Norwegian electoral surveys (1973-2009) and secondary literature. The surveys provide valuable comparable quantitative indicators of leadership popularity in all Norwegian parties, including FrP. Unfortunately, the most relevant indicators were first included in the 1981-survey, which render any direct comparison of FrP’s three first party chairmen impossible (i.e. Lange, Lønnum and Hagen). However, one question concerning leader recognition provides some information about the qualities of the different party leaders in the 1970s. While this question cannot be used to compare the qualities of leaders diachronically, it allows us to examine some aspects of Lange’s and Lønnum’s qualities in comparison with other party leaders in the 1970s.

This chapter also presents data that are of qualitative nature, given that the existing surveys provide very little, if any information at all regarding why the party leaders are (or aren’t) popular. Some qualitative information about the performance in party leader debates come from the tabloid newspaper VG and the quality newspaper Aftenposten. According to surveys, they are the two most important newspapers in Norway in terms of political information (Waldahl and Aardal 2004: 269). Moreover, a unique online archive where almost 2 000 followers of FrP has sent their greetings to chairman Hagen when he stepped down allow us to gauge how Hagen’s followers view and evaluate his leadership skills at the end of his carrier. Some aspects of the party’s leader charisma will be examined using data from the membership surveys. Finally, the assessment of media presence and performance is primarily based upon data from the national newspaper archive, and further supplemented with data from Allern’s (2011) comprehensive and longitudinal study of Norwegian electoral campaigns on television.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, the mobilizing capacity of different party leaders of FrP will be assessed based upon different indicators, primarily the level of support
among voters and party identifiers, but also their ability draw attention to the party and function within the framework of modern mass media. Secondly, the chapter discusses the organizational skills of the different party leaders, including their organizational philosophy, internal legitimacy and delegatory skills. The presentation will be carried out chronologically, starting with Lange, before continuing with Lønnum, Hagen and Jensen. Given Hagen’s position as party chairman for almost three decades, the chapter will pay more attention to his skills or lack thereof than those of the other chairmen or party leaders. As in previous chapters, the main findings will be summarized towards the end.

**The Leader as a Mobilizer**

The first aspect of the party leader that will be assessed is the ability to mobilize activists, followers and voters. Based upon the work by Svåsand and Harmel (1993), this section analyzes the extent to which the various party leaders of FrP have had (1) the ability to develop and communicate a distinct political message, particularly through the mainstream media; (2) been able to draw attention to the party; and (3) if they could be considered charismatic. Most of these indicators can be measured relatively straightforward. In terms of charisma, however, it is necessary to draw an important distinction between coterie charisma and centripetal charisma (Eatwell 2006a; 2006b: 267). While the first type refers to the kind of charismatic relationship between a leader and his (or her) core followers, the latter describe the relationship between a leader and a boarder audience. Put differently, the first relationship concerns a leader’s ability to mobilize those that are already convinced by the message; the second relationship focuses on the leader’s ability to attract new voters.

Anders Lange, the party founder and first party leader, definitely had the skills of developing a new and distinct political message. In the aftermath of the referendum on membership in the European Economic Community in 1973, which had made many voters “politically homeless” (Valen 1981: 67), and growing resentment among right-wing oriented voters after six years of non-socialist government (1965-71) without any profound change of the political course, Lange’s critique of ‘the establishment’ resonated with many voters. His long-term commitment to anti-statist policies and anti-leftist policies thus seemed to pay off.

Furthermore, his unorthodox style and frequent breach of existing political etiquette also provided the party with much needed attention for a newly created party as the ALP. Many of his public meetings attracted a large audience. A few months before the election, for example, as many as 4000 showed up at Youngstorget – the main Labour party square – in Oslo to see Lange and his anti-tax colleague in Denmark, Mogen Glistrup, criticize the establishment. But even more importantly, his unprofessional and somewhat unpredictable behaviour made him a popular figure on television, which in turn rapidly made him a well-known public figure. In the final party leader debate, for example, he challenged the rules of the debate several times by refraining from a civilized discussion and breaking the time limit each participant had been given in advance. Moreover, he even drank egg liqueur and smoked a pipe(ful) of tobacco during the debate, and towards the end he lifted an old-school Viking

232 The distinction has also been referred to as the difference between internal and external charisma (see Eatwell 2003: 65-67; Mudde 2007)

233 VG, 15.06.73
sword and a sheath knife.\footnote{VG, 08.09.73} One of NRK’s hosts, Lars-Jacob Krogh, argued that Lange had gained perhaps as much as three more seats in parliament due to excellent participation in the debate. While this is somewhat exaggerated (ALP did well in the polls also before the debate), NRK’s switchboard received several hundred phone calls from viewers expressing support for Anders Lange.\footnote{VG, 08.09.73}

Not surprisingly, the national electoral survey in 1973 convincingly demonstrates that despite being a political newcomer, Lange had been able to turn himself into a political celebrity within a few months (see Figure 7.1). As many as 9 out 10 voters knew his name, which made Lange equally recognized by the voters as the established party leaders of mainstream parties, including Labour-party leader Trygve Bratteli, Conservative party leader Kåre Willoch and Prime Minister Lars Korvald (KrF). Moreover, in contrast to two other well-known politicians – Helge Seip (V) and Finn Gustavsen (SV) – almost all voters were able to link Anders Lange to the correct party. The latter suggest that the party benefitted from using Anders Lange’s name when labelling the new party. If voters were attracted by Lange’s political message, they would know which party to vote for.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.1.png}
\caption{Name and party recognition of party chairman and leaders, 1973 (in %)}
\end{figure}


Despite being able to gain mass media coverage, the extent to which Lange was a charismatic leader is perhaps more debatable. Svåsand and Harmel (1993: 77), for example, have argued that Lange did not have any “natural charisma”, while Bjørklund (2000: 454) has referred to Lange as “political revivalist preacher” which at least suggests that he possessed some kind of
charismatic qualities. While these two claims, at first glance, may seem incompatible, they may nevertheless make sense if we distinguish between coterie and centripetal charisma.

Based on this distinction, it seems reasonable to argue that Lange possessed coterie charisma, but lacked the centripetal charisma. On one hand, he surely managed to articulate political views that resonated with dissatisfied right-wing sympathizers and his way of presenting these views were highly appreciated by a group of core followers. The people around Lange were certainly fascinated by him. Not only did a small group of loyal young men, previously referred to as Hundeguttene (Dog Boys) (Iversen 1998: 15-18, see also Chapter 6), help him carry out various tasks, the foundation meeting of ALP was described as a revival meeting (e.g. Morgenbladet, quoted in Iversen 1998: 26). Carl I. Hagen (1984: 54), who was elected chairman some years later, has explained in his autobiography how Lange was able to stir up his audience and bring forth a distinct sense of being ready to fight. During his two and half hours long speech, Lange was interrupted by applause no less than 96 times (Kvanmo and Rygnestad 1993: 13): “Throughout the marathon speech,” Norway’s largest tabloid newspaper described the following day, “Lange invoked applause and stomping of feet and laughter from the jam-packed cinema auditorium.”

On the other hand, Lange could hardly be described as being particularly silver-tongued and he was, by and large, perceived as a political curiosity (Iversen 1998: 39). Many voters were attracted by neither Lange’s style nor his message (Eide and Lange 1974: 10). After all, despite a favorable opportunity structure, the party gained no more than 5% of the votes, which was quite low also in comparison with a similar party in Denmark led by Mogens Glistrup which received almost 16% of the votes. Consequently, it seems reasonable to argue that Lange’s leadership was less characterized by the external type of charisma, the centripetal charisma.

When Lange died in 1974, MP Eivind Eckbo temporarily acted as party leader until Arve Lønnum was elected in 1975. Just as Lange, Lønnum was an elderly man when he was elected party chairman (64 years old). However, apart from age and gender, Lønnum represented the diametrically opposite of Lange. Not only was he part of the professional and academic elite, working as doctor at the Akershus University Hospital and as a professor in neurology at the University of Oslo, his style was far from provocative, confrontational and unorthodox. Already in 1973, when Lønnum represented the party (together with party secretary Erik Gjems-Onstad), he seemed unable to exploit the format of television. Instead of simple answers, Lønnum was – as the other established politicians – more characterized by detailed reasoning and calm conduct (Allern 2011: 115, 121). Four years later, the situation was fairly similar. In contrast to Lange, Lønnum did not do anything extraordinary to gain much needed public attention to the party. As argued elsewhere (Jupskås 2008: 76, 96), his performance in the final party leader debate demonstrated the inability to manage the format of modern mass media as he was simply reading statements from a manuscript. Moreover, his statements were much less anti-establishment oriented than Lange. As a consequence, he sounded occasionally like a traditional old-school conservative politician and political opponents did not bother responding to his challenges (Jupskås 2008: 76). The largest tabloid

236 VG, 09.04.73
VG even called him an inexperienced debater. In other words, he failed to communicate a political message that was sufficiently distinct from the established parties. After the debate, Carl I. Hagen, who was the leading candidate in Oslo at the time, admitted that the party’s TV-appearance before the election was “not fortunate” and that Lønnum had been “far too lame.” In sharp contrast to what had happened with Lange four years earlier, neither Lønnum nor the party was mentioned in media reports the day after the debate.

The election survey from 1977 also suggests that Lønnum was unable to gain similar public attention as Lange (see Figure 7.2). Although the radio questionings of the party leaders in general attracted only a limited audience (as most voters already in 1977 would rather watch television than listening to the radio), the questioning of Lønnum was the least popular. Only just above 4% of the voters listened to the show when Lønnum was asked about FrP’s policies, while almost twice as many listened to Steen (Ap) or Norvik (H).

Figure 7.2: Popularity of radio questioning of party leaders prior to the 1977 election (in %)
Note: The figure shows the share of voters who listened to the radio show questioning the party representatives.

After the poor election results in 1977, Lønnum was replaced by a much younger and more energetic man called Carl I. Hagen. Unlike Lønnum, Hagen had exceptional media skills and he was definitely able to draw attention to the party. While Lønnum was sober and somewhat insecure, Hagen was more provocative, self-confident and impertinent. More than any other party leader, he interrupted the journalists when he disagreed about framing and content of

237 VG, 10.09.77
238 VG, 13.09.77
239 VG, 10.09.77
question (Allern 2011: 157). In the election campaign in 1989, before the party passed 10% in a national election for the first time, he portrayed himself as an underdog consistently referring to NRK (National Broadcasting Company) as ARK (Labour Broadcasting Company). As argued by Allern (2011: 198-199), FrP’s chairman was highly successful in turning all kinds of critical remarks about the party’s manifesto into a question of left-wing biased media (see also Chapter 4). Moreover, despite having almost open access to mainstream media and being invited to debates – including a duel with the Prime Minister at the beginning of the election campaign in 1997 – Hagen continuously and convincingly claimed that he was treated unfairly.

In other words, from the very beginning, Hagen mastered the tabloid format of modern mass media in general and television in particular. He was perhaps one of the first Norwegian politicians who realized the mobilizing potential of television – or he was at least one of the first ones who consciously exploited this way of communicating with the voters (e.g. Eide 1984: 15). The Norwegian historian Berge Furre (1991: 409), for example, argues that Hagen was an “unusual popular orator” and that he managed to “exploit the television more than any other contemporary politician”. Krogstad (1999: 189) even claims that Hagen occasionally was able to present himself as a “statesman”, though she shows that his penetrating power obviously varied from debate to debate (Krogstad 1999: 177). Hagen often adopted techniques well suited for tabloid newspaper. For example, he frequently referred to ‘ordinary men and women’ who were victims of (what Hagen believed was) unacceptable public regulations and rules (Eide 1995: 433). In this sense, one might argue that he was able to emerge as the voice of the ‘silent majority’.

Hagen’s media strategy when he put his foot down for the Conservative party leader Rolf Presthus attempt to become Prime Minister in 1987 is perhaps the most famous example. Eide (1987: 48) suggests that this event demonstrated how Hagen fully mastered the logic of modern mass media. Instead of telling the other non-socialist parties whether or not FrP would support a motion for ‘a vote of no confidence’ against the incumbent Labour government, he summoned a press conference starting simultaneously as the evening news. Consequently, his and the party’s position would be publically broadcasted and he would be in full control of the political message. Hagen received maximum attention and influential electoral researchers summarized his performance as a “persuasive live act” (Aardal and Valen 1989: 307). Hagen’s strategy also seemed to pay off among the voters: a survey carried out after Hagen decided not to support the Conservative’s initiative showed that support for Conservative had decreased (by 7.4 percentage points) and that support for FrP had increased (by 4.2 percentage points) (Eide and Hernes 1987: 50).

While one could easily show that the popularity of Hagen surpassed the popularity of the party (see Figure A6.2 in Appendix), it remains difficult to examine exactly how important his external appeal has been for the electoral persistence of FrP. However, there is some evidence that Hagen’s personality and skills were key factors for the party’s electoral mobilization in the 1980s. In a ‘five on the street’ questionnaire in Stavanger after the 1983 election: Linda Danesi, a waiter, said the following to VG: “I have never voted before, but Carl I. Hagen got me out of the couch. Even though you have to take what he says with a

240 Aftenposten, 05.12.88, VG, 31.01.89, NTB, 14.02.89
pinch of salt, I believe in the Progress Party”.241 A survey carried out a few years later corroborate this anecdotal finding and demonstrate the importance of a new political profile created by Hagen himself, namely the party’s anti-immigration profile. Immigration and Hagen were the two most important reasons mentioned by “new” FrP-sympathizers (i.e. those that did not vote FrP in 1985): 35% mentioned a strict refugee and anti-immigration policy as their main reason and 23% mentioned Hagen (see Table 7.1). However, Hagen should perhaps be credited for the third and the fourth reason as well, as they refer to the way the party frame politics (simple language and understandable message) and the fact that the party differed from other parties. After all, he was by far the most well-known figure of the party at this point in time.

Table 7.1: Self-reported reasons for voting FrP among new FrP-voters, 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Share of new voters mentioning the issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee and immigration policies</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple language and comprehensible message</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different than the other parties</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes, health care and social welfare</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dagbladet/NTB, 18.09.87

Note: The table only shows the answers among new FrP-voters, as those who did not vote for the party in 1985 were asked why they had switched to FrP. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the reasons mentioned by these voters are systematically different than those of the loyal voters, but the survey showed no differences as regards geography or age. The only difference concerned gender: 48% of the women and 26% of the men mentioned the immigration issue.

While Hagen probably remained fairly important in the 1980s and early 1990s, his importance most likely decreased during the late 1990s, simultaneously as the party became more institutionalized and organizationally stronger. When voters were asked about their main reasons for voting for FrP more than a decade later, in 2000, only 7% mentioned Hagen (see Table 7.2). Now, other issues like taxes and duties and health care services came out as much more important mobilizing factors. In other words, Hagen had been replaced by issues and ideology as the main mobilizing factor for the party (see also Aardal and Narud 2003), though some scholars still argued that Hagen, as well as the party leader of Ap and SV, played a significant role as regards increasing the party’s popularity (Jenssen and Aalberg 2004: 368).

Hagen’s ability to manage the format of modern mass media has been acknowledged by pundits as well as the television audience. In the final leadership debates regularly held few days before the elections – debates that have been perceived as an important opportunity to convince undecided voters (Waldahl and Aardal 2004: 267) – Hagen has very often but not always made a good impression; not only among the commentators, who, after all, are not his primary audience, but also among the viewers. Since the early 1990s, commentators in the largest tabloids have “rolled the dice” as a way of selecting the winner of the debate.

In 1981, Hagen’s performance was characterized as being light weighted compared with other more established politicians. A commentator in the tabloid newspaper VG

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241 VG, 13.09.83
concluded that despite having previously demonstrated his media skills, Hagen had “nothing doing last night.” In 1985 and 1989, VG did not publish any review of the party leader. However, Henry Valen, professor in political science, argued in an interview in the newspaper that Hagen had become more blurry in the 1985-campaign as compared to previous elections and that this might have been a contributing factor to the declining support for the party. A journalist form the quality and right-wing oriented newspaper Aftenposten, on the other hand, reported that Hagen, “as usual”, “made good impression on TV”.  

Table 7.2: Self-reported reasons for voting FrP among all FrP-voters, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of voters mentioning the issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxes and duties: 28 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care services: 23 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfaction with the government: 12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfaction with others parties: 11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline prices: 10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stricter immigration policy: 10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl I. Hagen as a leader: 7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend more oil money: 5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Bergens Tidende, 22.09.00.*  
*Note: The share of FrP-voters is more than 100% because respondents were allowed the name more than one issue.*

In the early 1990s, FrP was plagued by internal factionalism, as well as it suffered from ambiguity with regard to Norwegian EEC/EU-membership. The party was losing support in the polls. Against this background, Hagen seemed rather desperate presenting novel arguments in the final party leader debate. While he normally used these debates to consolidate the core narrative of FrP’s policies, he made a complete u-turn this time. In the debate he surprisingly suggested to set aside the party’s anti-tax policies challenging the other party leaders to set aside an issue close to their hearts. According to some journalists who reviewed the debate, Hagen’s new position in economic policies did not come out as particularly trustworthy or well-thought through. Nevertheless, Hagen’s performance was not rated much worse than many other politicians. In fact, only the incumbent Prime Minister (Brundtland) and the KrF-leader (Bondevik) received a higher score.

If Hagen’s performance was on the average in 1993, he repeatedly demonstrated his media skills in final party leader debate in the three next national elections. In 1997, VG simply stated that “television is Carl I. Hagen’s medium.” According to the journalist who evaluated the seven party leaders, Hagen had once again had demonstrated his “position as Norway’s most supreme TV-politician”. He cleverly spoke about the party’s policies, focusing in particular on better quality and faster treatment within the health care sector. Only

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242 VG, 12.09.81  
243 VG, 07.09.85  
244 Aftenposten, 07.09.85  
245 VG, 11.09.93  
246 VG, 13.09.97  
247 VG, 13.09.97
the vice-chairman of the Labour party (Hill Martha Solberg) was rated higher than Hagen by the newspaper.

In 2001, after a difficult campaign with less coverage than a few months earlier (Narud and Waldahl 2004: 172) and much less media attention than most other parties (Waldahl and Narud 2004: 191), Hagen made a good impression in the final debate on television. According to the VG-journalists, Hagen was “back in good, old peak condition” and he convincingly argued that more ‘oil-money’ should be spent on geriatric care and health care.248 This impression is confirmed by two surveys: one presented by the tabloid newspaper Dagbladet showing that Hagen was barely beaten by the Socialist leader (Halvorsen) and the Labour leader (Stoltenberg).249 The other survey suggested that the viewers believed Hagen was among the three best debaters; 19% thought he performed well, whereas only 7% thought he performed badly (Waldahl and Aardal 2004: 268).

Similarly, in 2005, in Hagen’s final party leader debate, the journalists concluded that the long-standing chairman again demonstrated his position as “the country’s best political salesman” and that he seemed to know “exactly how to present his issues.”250 Indeed, the journalists argued that Hagen spoke “enthusiastically and plain and simple” on key FrP-issues such as taxes, gasoline prices, geriatric care and spending of Norwegian ‘oil-money’. And while most viewers believed that the Ap’s party leader (Stoltenberg) was the ‘winner of the debate’, Hagen came in second place before the leaders of all other non-socialist parties, including the leader of the Conservatives (Solberg). Allegedly, the latter lacked necessary political “weight” compared with the KrF-prime minister (Bondevik) and the liberal party leader (Sponheim).

Hagen’s media skills have also been acknowledged by the viewers of these leadership debates, though the results are certainly mixed and should be carefully interpreted due to very small number of respondents (see Table 7.4). In 1995 and 2005, Hagen was only beaten by the Ap-prime minister candidate (Brundtland and Stoltenberg, respectively) and in one of the debates in 2001 he was beaten by party leaders from SV and Ap.251 On other hand, the first leadership debate in 2001 was not very well received; only 8% thought Hagen did a good performance, which was significantly lower than the party support at the time. In comparison, the performance in 1985 was well received by 7%, but this was actually much better compared to the overall party size.

248 VG, 08.09.01
249 Dagbladet, 08.09.01
250 VG, 10.09.05
251 Different survey data presented by Waldahl and Aardal (2004: 268) yields slightly different results. The Socialist Left party leader Kristin Halvorsen is still the “winner”, but the Conservative party leader Jan Petersen is in second place and Hagen in third, just ahead of the Labour party Prime Minister candidate Jens Stoltenberg.
Table 7.3: Dice rolling on party leader performance in leadership debates before election day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RV</th>
<th>SV</th>
<th>Ap</th>
<th>Sp</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>KrF</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>FrP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 (5)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (5)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 (5)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: VG, 11.09.93; 09.09.95; 11.09.99; 05.09.01; 08.09.01; 13.9.03; 10.09.05.

Note: The dice score refers to the traditional last leadership debate on Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) just a few days before the Election Day. In 2001, the table includes both the state (2001b) and private broadcasting corporation, TV2 (2001a).

Table 7.4: Voter perceptions of which candidate who won the debate, 1985-2009 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RV</th>
<th>SV</th>
<th>Ap</th>
<th>Sp</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>KrF</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>FrP</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001a</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001b</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Just below SV</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Just below SV and Ap</td>
<td>657</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aftenposten, 9.9.85, VG, 9.9.95; VG 5.9.01; Dagbladet 08.09.01; VG, 10.9.05; VG, 12.09.09

In terms of charisma, Hagen has been perceived as a leader with an exceptional relationship with both an inner group of party activists and with broader group of voters. Aftenposten, for example, described Hagen as follows in a portrait interview in the 1980s: “He has charisma. He is open, know the political game, scores in debates and has a simple and straightforward way of talking (formuleringsevne) […] in many ways Hagen is the Progress Party.” 252 The question is if Hagen’s alleged centripetal charisma can be demonstrated empirically. Although many scholars note that charisma is difficult to measure, van der Brug and Mughan (2007: 36-37) have suggested that the sympathy thermometer often used in election surveys might be a valid measurement of charismatic qualities. In these kinds of sympathy thermometer, the respondents are asked to score party leaders on a scale ranging

252 Aftenposten, 19.09.87. Even in foreign press, Hagen was often mentioned as a key factor to explain the rise of FrP. After the party passed the ten per cent hurdle for the first time in the 1987 election, for example, the Danish press made several remarks about Hagen’s leadership qualities. Politiken (16.09.87) argued that the only thing FrP-voters had in common was their fascination for the “young and well-spoken” chairman Hagen, while Jyllands-Posten (16.09.87) claimed that Hagen elegantly had been able to “to speak to the Norwegian folk soul in its darkest recesses”.

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Those who perceive a leader as having charismatic qualities (whatever they might consist of) is assumed to give maximum score (10).

This way of measuring charisma has at least four advantages related to theory, context-sensitivity, validity and data availability. First, it seems to capture the relational aspect of charisma as it lets the followers decide if someone is charismatic rather than any distant observer. Second, it is less context-sensitive than many alternatives since it asks respondents about their general sympathy towards the leader rather than any specific qualities. Respondents in different countries or different parties might perceive someone as a charismatic leader for different reasons – what makes someone charismatic in a new left party might be fundamentally different from a right-wing populist party. In this sense, even if it is not perfect, it makes more sense to use a “vague” indicator such as general sympathy. Third, sympathy thermometer does not measure charisma indirectly by poor proxies such as good debater or having a strong personality – features which may or may not be related to charisma. Fourth, it enables a longitudinal perspective since questions about party sympathy are available in all Norwegian election surveys since 1981.

If charisma is operationalized in this way, Hagen’s overall charismatic qualities seem to resemble the kind of charisma associated with the party founder Anders Lange: fairly weak centripetal charisma, but strong coterie charisma. However, the level of these charismatic qualities varies over time, suggesting that charisma is something which can fade, persist or even invigorate.

Hagen was never perceived as having charismatic qualities by more than 7% of the electorate (see Figure 7.3). In fact, in the early 1980s, only 3% of the electorate said that they strongly liked Hagen. This share increased somewhat in the late 1980s, before decreasing to less than 2% in 1993 when the party was plagued by internal factionalism and an ambiguous position in the Norwegian debate on EEC-membership. Since then, the share has increased gradually reaching almost 7% in 2005. A comparison with the leaders of SV, Ap and H shows that all these parties have had leaders who have been perceived as charismatic by more than 7%, though the comparison also shows minor and decreasing party-differences. Despite these qualifying observations, however, it is a fact that only a small segment of the electorate has perceived Hagen as being particularly charismatic and the variation over time has been rather insignificant.

Instead, the most notable development over time as regards Hagen’s standing in the electorate is related to decreasing strong antipathy rather than increasing strong sympathy. While one out of five voters strongly disliked – one might even say hated – Hagen in the early 1980s, less than 10% did so in 2005. In other words, the attitudes towards Hagen became less polarized between 1981 and 2005. However, Hagen has remained a far more controversial leader than party leaders of other parties, perhaps with the exception of SV’s Berge Furre in 1981 (and to a lesser extent the Conservative’s party leader Jan P. Syse in 1989).

If we turn to the coterie charisma, the data paint another picture. In the early 1980s, Hagen was seen as a leader with charismatic qualities by almost two thirds of party’s core electorate, that is, those who identified with FrP (see Chapter 5 on value infusion). His

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253 Quite often the scale ranges from 0 to 100, so for reasons of comparison, the scale has been re-coded in this section.
position was somewhat weakened, however, throughout the 1980s and in the 1993 – an election marked by internal factionalism – no more than just above 20% of the core followers believed he had such skills (see Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.3: Strong antipathy and strong sympathy towards party leaders among Norwegian voters, 1981-2009


Note: The figure shows that the share of respondents rating the party leader as either 0 (strong antipathy) or 10 (strong sympathy) on a 0-10 scale. H and Ap are represented by their prime minister or prime minister candidate in cases where this was another politician than the party leader. They tend to be somewhat more popular the party leader.
Figure 7.4: Levels of coterie charisma, 1981-2009 (in %)


Note: Coterie charisma refers to those who gave their party leader maximum score on a sympathy thermometer ranging from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like). The party identifiers are those who say they identify with the party – in other words, a core group of fairly loyal followers. The patterns are almost identical, though less distinct, if we look at exceptional party leader sympathy among voters (see Figure A6.1 in Appendix). The score for the small centrist parties are not shown in the figure, but with the exception of the leader for the agrarian party, Anne Enger Lahnstein, in the extraordinary election in 1993, none of party leaders within these parties have the same standing as FrP’s leader.

The drop of charisma among core followers could be further elucidated with data from leadership selection at the party convention (see Figure 7.5). While Hagen initially had to battle with the former Conservative politician, Jens Marcussen, to become party chairman at the party convention in 1978, he has been unanimously selected by the delegates at most other conventions. The only exception is 1993, where just above 72% of the delegates voted in favor of Hagen despite the fact that there were no other candidates running. In other parties, this lack of internal support from the delegates has only taken place in cases of ballot races between several candidates (Allern and Karlsen 2014).
Despite having his authority seriously challenged in the early 1990s, however, Hagen regained some of his former position at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s (as shown in both Figure 7.4 and 7.5). In 2005, the last election with Hagen as a party chairman, almost half of the core electorate—a group which had grown significantly since the early 1980s—was exceptionally sympathetic towards him. Such high numbers indicate that Hagen had far more coterie charisma than the party leaders of SV, Ap and H between 1981 and 2005 (see Figure 7.4). The only exception to this rule is 1985 in which SV’s leader, Hanna Kvanmo, was extremely popular among SV’s core voters. Neither the Ap-constituencies nor the H-constituencies have been equally attracted by their party leaders, although former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (Ap) and former prime minister Kåre Willoch (H) had a strong standing in the early 1980s. In recent years, the party leaders of these two mainstream parties have—with the exception of Jens Stoltenberg in 2005 (at the time Ap’s prime minister candidate)—reached maximum score on the sympathy barometer from less than 15%. The popularity of SV’s leader has been somewhat higher, but not at the same levels as FrP.

While party leaders generally are less perceived as exceptional among the party’s voters (as opposed the core followers), Hagen scores well even within this group (see Figure A6.1 in Appendix). Again with the exception of the 1993 election, between 24 and 36% of the FrP-voters were exceptionally sympathetic towards their own party chairman. The figures are somewhat lower for the SV and Ap, although Kvanmo’s charisma qualities seem to have an impact on the voters too. Conservative voters, however, are much more modest as regards the levels of exceptional party leader sympathy. With the single exception of Kåre Willoch who

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**Figure 7.5: Support among congress delegates in leadership selections, 1976-2008 (in %)**

Source: Data collected by Allern and Karlsen (2014) as part of the leader selection research project organized by William P. Cross and Jean Benoit Pilet.

Note: There were leadership selections between 1981 and 1992, but data on how the congress delegates voted are unavailable.
enjoyed a similar position as Hagen when he became prime minister in the early 1980s, the level of exceptional sympathy has varied between 3% (in 1989) and 13% (in 2009).

As already touched upon, the surveys show not only a high levels of exceptional support for Hagen among those who identify or vote for FrP, they also show that Hagen’s strong position has decreased over time. Comparing Hagen’s three first elections (i.e. 1981, 1985 and 1989) with his three last (1997, 2001 and 2005), the share of party identifiers expressing exceptional sympathy for Hagen decreased from 53 to 42%. Similarly, among the voters this share decreased from 32 to 26%. In this sense, it seems reasonable to argue that Hagen initial coterie charismatic qualities were somewhat weakened throughout his period as party chairman.

The numbers and figures presented so far tell us very little, if anything at all, about the content of Hagen’s charismatic qualities. What was it that made him so popular among the party’s followers and voters? Among key activists and representatives, Hagen seemed to have had a unique position. The current leader, Siv Jensen, for example, has argued that few others have managed to fend off criticism the way Hagen did (Aurdal 2006: 203). Jensen seemed to admire Hagen’s ability to consistently defend FrP’s policies whenever they were massively criticized by political opponents, the mainstream media, and/or left-wing intellectuals.

When Hagen resigned from national politics a few years after he stepped down as party chairman, VG created an online page where ordinary people could write down one last greeting to the long-standing chairman.254 Almost 2,000 (1958) wrote a greeting to Hagen – which makes up almost 85,000 words. Some of most frequent adjectives used to describe Hagen were honest, unafraid and competent. Several greetings pointed to the role of Hagen as an unafraid politician going against the current in order to defeat the policies of the establishment. One greeting said: “In this all years, I have wanted you in government. Sad that the Norwegian people have been cowardice during elections – the country needs people like you.” Another even compared Hagen with the previous Norwegian King and argued that Hagen had a special connection to ‘the people’: “You are the best politician in the Norwegian history […] words become poor in such times. You have touched the Norwegian people more than any other politician will ever do. We all say that King Olav was a king of people, but you have been the politician of the people. You have been one of us.” Some were also afraid that there would be no one to carry on Hagen’s political ideas: “it won’t be easy to replace you.” The emotional aspect is certainly present as several greetings used words like “sad.”

The current party leader Siv Jensen has not been perceived as equally important for the party as Hagen, yet she too seems to have mobilizing qualities. While her media skills have been less discussed than Hagen’s skills, Jensen has definitely been able to deliver ‘the political message’ through modern mass media. In the final party leader debate in 2009, she made a very good impression according to both the pundits and the viewers. Some journalists observed, for example, that Jensen successfully exploited the unrealistic possibility of entering government (due to the complete rejection by the centrist parties).255 They highlighted Jensen’s ability to present clear-cut political message without any pragmatic

254 VG, 03.05.08: «Carl I. Hagen trekker seg fra rikspolitikken. Send din hilsen til Frp-veteranen, og gi terningkast over hans politiske liv her!» 1958 persons «rolled the dice» on Hagen’s performance and the mean score was 5. URL: http://www.vg.no/protokoll/?pid=21 (accessed 15.05.13)
255 VG, 12.09.09
reservations and to remind the voters about FrP’s key policies. These observations seemed to have been shared by the viewers. In a survey carried out immediately after the debate, approximately one in four viewers believed that Jensen performed best (see also Table 7.4). Corresponding figures for the other party leaders were as follows: 34% for Jens Stoltenberg (Ap-leader and prime minister), 19% for Erna Solberg (H) and less than 10% for all others. While these figures in many cases are highly correlated with the support for the different parties, they also testify to the fact the Jensen was able to get the message out to potential FrP-voters. Many times, she has been able to set the public agenda on salient political issues, not least when she introduced the concept of “sneak Islamization” some months prior to the national elections in 2009 (see Chapter 4).

As regards charismatic qualities, Jensen seemed to enjoy the same level of internal support as Hagen. Not only has she been unchallenged at the party conventions (see Figure 7.5), more than 40% of the followers gave her maximum score on the generalized sympathy thermometer, which was way more than the party leader of any other parliamentary party (see figure 7.4). Among other center-right party leaders Jensen has been recognized as a more predictable and professional party leader than Hagen (Jupskås 2014). Interestingly, however, in the electorate at large, Jensen actually seems to receive less exceptional sympathy and more profound antipathy than her predecessor (see figure 7.3).

**The Leader as an Organizer**

As previously argued, the mobilizing leader is particularly important when the party is completely new on the political arena and/or lacks any organizational linkages. However, the capacity to build such linkages requires a different set of skills. Most importantly, such a leader should be able to develop and routinize internal procedures; delegate and coordinate various internal and external tasks; build an electoral organization capable of functioning without a charismatic leader; and, finally, build and maintain consensus among competing factions within the party.

FrP’s first party leader, Anders Lange, lacked most of these skills. He principally opposed any kind of organization (see Chapter 5). In fact, in 1969, a few years before he founded ALP, he explicitly presented his main enemies as follows: “the socialist states, political parties, organizations, and monopolistic tendencies in private capitalism” (quoted in Bjørklund 2000: 130). Lange’s ideal was the independent man who was the master of his own house. Being a member of an organization was thus perceived as a potential restriction of a man’s freedom and autonomy. According to Lange, “an organization has no conscience, no hearth, not even does it understand anything but the distribution of membership fees and frivolity” (quoted in Bjørklund 2000: 130). Political parties were perceived as being especially characterized by servility and obedience. It should not come as any surprise that Lange was opposing any kind of organizational infrastructure. And without any organization, there was no internal delegation of power, tasks or responsibilities.

As regards external delegation, Lange was not the only one representative acting on behalf of the party in public debates, even if he certainly was the dominant public figure of the party. For example, Lange was neither represented in the important television program

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256 *VG, 12.09.09*
Partiene svarer (the parties answer) nor in a radio questioning of the different parties. Instead, the influential party secretary Erik Gjems-Onstad participated in both debates, while the third candidate in Oslo, Carl I. Hagen, joined the radio program and top candidate in Sør-Trøndelag joined the television debate (Hagen 2007: 52).

The second leader, Arve Lønnum, was not opposing the existence of an organizational structure (Iversen 1998: 65-66), though he also believed that the party should be more like movement than a party (Lønnum 1977). Lønnum was more of a writer than an organizer. In the early 1970s, he wrote several books criticizing an expanding welfare state (i.e. Lønnum 1974) and the importance of having an active life of retirement (i.e. Lønnum 1973). And, a member who later became secretary-general before he eventually left the party, he seemed to have been incapable of dealing with so-called “extremists” within the party (Ruud 1996: 33).

Hagen had a completely different organizational philosophy than Lange and organizational capacity than Lønnum. While Lange believed in the independent representative following his own convictions and gut-feeling, Hagen accepted the idea of delegatory democracy, although his principles occasionally conflicted with practice (see Chapter 5). According to Hagen, the leadership within a political party should be ready to defend position they do not necessarily agree with. As he argued in an interview in the early 1990s: In a party it is sometimes necessary to “hide what you believe [yourself] because you shall defend an organization which have adopted a manifesto […] occasionally you need to lie and say ‘I’m in favor’ this or that without really being [in favor] because the party has decided so at the congress” (quoted in Jønsson 1993: 44)

Seemingly in contrast to Lønnum, Hagen also realized that the party initially had too many unskilled and unpredictable representatives. After having focused on building an organization and cultivating gifted members for about a decade, he proudly and metaphorically argued as follows: “It started with excessive fertilization were all plants and weed grew in a wild chaos without care. Gradually [the garden] has gotten more into shape. Still, it is somewhat wild. But there is more order, and more strong and good plants now” (quoted in Eide 1990: 12). Hagen emphasized the need for a strong electoral organization and he gradually seemed to succeed (see Chapter 5).

Obviously, the organizational skills of Hagen have to some extent already been demonstrated in the previous chapter. However, the organizational analysis only examined the actual organizational building; it did not look at how this process was perceived at the grassroots level within the party, i.e. among the party members themselves. Moreover, the previous analyses were unable to look at this process from a comparative perspective. Unfortunately, there are no questions in the 1991-survey among members specifically addressing the organizational skills of the party leader, but the party members were asked to evaluate the party leadership. Not surprisingly, the leadership in FrP received a comparatively high approval from its party members (see Figure 7.6). Almost half of the members agree that the leadership did a good job of maintaining the organization; 37% were indifferent, 12% did not know. Only 5% disagreed. The figures were somewhat less impressive for the SV and the Ap-leadership, and rather poor for the H-leadership. Among H-party members, only 20% agree and as many as 24% disagree.
Figure 7.6: Approval of the organizational efforts of the party leadership by party members, 1991 (in %)


Note: All party members were asked the following question: “If we look at the party leadership at the national level, do you think that they generally do a good job when it comes to organizational work”. The respondents were given four response alternatives: agree, neither, disagree and don’t know. The latter category is included as part of the percentage base.

During Hagen’s first years as newly elected chairman, the party was characterized by low levels of delegation, both internally and externally. Due to poor economy, most of the internal work was either done by Hagen himself and a few other volunteers whom were close allies with Hagen (1984). At the end of the 1980s, the party established several internal policy and organizational committees and the leadership of these committees were to a large extent dominated by few selected members of the ideologically skillful youth (for a complete list of internal committees, see Table A6.1 in Appendix). The vice-chairman of the party, Pål Atle Skjervengen, for example, who had been recruited by Hagen (2007: 85) at a school meeting and appointed secretary of the youth organization already at the age of 21, was head of most of the policy-related committees, including the committees responsible for the manifesto, municipal policy, campaign preparations, cultural policy, policy regarding the European Economic Community (Annual reports 1987-88: 38-39; 88-89: 32-40; 90-91: 35-38). Among the few committees not headed by Skjervengen, we find other young activists belonging to the youth organization. The youth chairman, Paal A. Bjørnestad, was head of the committee of fishery policies (Annual Report 1988-89: 39), while his successor, Jan Erik Fåne, was head of the media committee which developed a strategy on how to improve the quality and quantity of the party’s media presence (Annual report 1990-91: 36).

In the early 1990s, the level of internal delegation increased somewhat. In contrast to earlier times, most of the committees were headed by different representatives. However, having experienced a poor election result in 1991 subnational elections, partly because the liberalist faction had been able to fade down the immigration issue, some important alternation was carried out. Rather than being headed by any of the vice-chairmen, Hagen himself took charge of the important campaign committee. However, most of the leaders of
the internal committees were still primarily part of the liberalist wing (i.e. Skjervengen, Wara, Fåne, Bjørnøstad, Wibe and Christiansen) and they had in most cases been recruited and slowly cultivated by Hagen. Ellen M. Wibe, for example, who became leader of no less than four committees right before the infamous party congress in 1994 – program of principles, Europe, Women, and International Affairs (Annual report 1993-94: 19-27) – was actively pushed upward by the party leadership (Hagen 2007: 198). And though she was initially reluctant of becoming part of the part of the leadership, Hagen convinced her otherwise.

After the libertarians left in 1994, most of those who had been leaders of internal committees had to be replaced. This time Hagen distributed committee leadership among several different representatives – men and women, young and old, experienced and inexperienced, and different geographical strongholds. Only Lodve Solholm, a loyal and long-standing representative of the party (he was elected already in the 1975 municipal election), was head of more than one committee (the program of principle committee and the strategy committee). This pattern of delegation persisted until Hagen resigned as chairman in 2006. In fact, Hagen even appointed representatives from the local level, most notably Terje Søviknes from Hordaland, who was elected vice-chairman in 1999 and seen as Hagen’s successor for many years until he was caught in a sex scandal. The only two internal committees in which Hagen participated himself was the committee named Prosjekt Regjering (PROREG, Project Government) and a less active committee on security policies and foreign affairs called SIKPOL (Annual reports 2002/03: 17; 04/05: 26).

The pattern of increased delegation can be observed also with regard to the external arena. Initially, Hagen had almost monopolized the public image of the party. He represented the party in all important debates (see Table 7.5) and he spoke on behalf of the party in the mainstream press (see Figure 7.7). The vice-chairmen of the party were almost invisible. In fact, as one of the first parties in Norway, FrP started to send the same representative – that is, the party’s chairman – to both the televised questioning of party leaders and the final party leader debate (Allern 2011: 150). Consequently, the distinction between the party and Hagen became rather blurry in the public sphere almost turning the party into what McDonnell (2013) refers to as a “personalized party.” In the mainstream press, the party was frequently referred to as “Hagen’s party.”\(^2\)\(^{257}\) The situation of almost complete Hagen-domination changed, however, at the end of the 1980s when the liberal youth gained more media exposure, especially in the largest conservative newspaper, Aftenposten (see Figure 7.7). The peak came in the early 1990s right before the liberals either left the party voluntarily or were kicked out by Hagen after intense political and strategic disagreement. Hagen once again temporarily monopolized the public image of the party (see Figure 7.7). However, at the end of the 1990s, the party was once more associated with other politicians. Not only did Siv Jensen and Terje Søviknes – the party’s ‘crown princess’ and ‘crown prince’ respectively – become increasingly exposed after being elected vice-chairmen in 1999, several members of parliament were highly visible in the mass media, including former vice-chairman Vidar Kleppe, MP Øystein Hedstrøm and MP Jan Simonsen. Together with a few other MPs, these three prominent politicians gained much media coverage due to highly controversial statements related to immigration policies and law and order (see Chapter 4).

\(^{257}\) Aftenposten, 11.11.83; VG, 22.04.85
Figure 7.7: Vice-chairmen/chairman ratio\textsuperscript{1} under different party leaders\textsuperscript{2}

\textit{Source:} Atekst (Norwegian Newspaper Archive). The figure is based upon hits in two key Norwegian newspapers: the largest tabloid (VG) and the largest quality newspaper (Aftenposten). The latter is distributed across the country, whereas the latter is mainly for the Eastern region (especially the capital city).

\textit{Note 1:} The ratio refers to the number of hits for the two vice-chairmen divided by the number of hits for the chairman. 0 means no hits for the vice-chairmen, whereas 1 means that they are equally covered. More than 1 would mean that the vice-chairmen are more covered than the chairman. A complete list of vice-chairmen is listed in the Table A6.2 in Appendix.

\textit{Note 2:} The figure should be carefully interpreted given the reliability problems associated with the newspapers archive. Random checks suggest that a few articles are not registered as hits, although they do contain the name of the party chairman and/or one of the vice-chairmen. This problem seems to be most critical for the early period (i.e. 1970s).

On television, however, Hagen continued to dominate. In 1997, Hagen represented the party in no less than 9 out of 13 debates on television (4 on NRK and 5 on TV2, see Table 7.5). Also on TV2, the private broadcaster, Hagen completely dominated, and represented the party in all but one debate, regardless of the topic; he would participate in debates concerning labor market policies, justice policies, government alternatives and other topics. His position was somewhat less prominent in 2001 (only 6 out of 13 debates), but only Siv Jensen – vice-chairman at the time – participated in more than one debate. In 2005, Hagen’s last campaign as chairman, he still dominated completely. In no less than 15 out 22 debates, Hagen was representing FrP. With the exceptions of the up-and-coming female politician Listhaug participating in a debate on education and Birkedal, the skilled chairman of the youth organization, participating in a party questioning together with Hagen, the public image of the party was reserved for Hagen and Jensen.

Although this overview clearly shows how Hagen dominated the public image of the party, one minor comment about the usage of TV-appearance as an indicator of delegation is in order. After all, it is important to remember that Hagen’s dominance on television is not
simply reflecting the party’s (or Hagen’s) own strategy; it is also related to external factors such as the changing role of journalistic norms and the logic of mass media. Most importantly, since the late 1990s, the media has developed from being primarily an “arena” to become more of an independent “actor” (Bjørklund 1991). As a consequence, they tend to be more concerned with ratings and more autonomous in relation to how debaters are selected. In short, it means that politicians who are likely to create ‘good TV’ and thus to boost ratings will be invited more often than politicians who despite being more knowledgeable are less likely to perform well in a televised debate. The commercial broadcasting company TV2 functioned according to this logic already in 1997 and since 2001, even the public broadcasting company, NRK, have decided more or less autonomously which politicians they would invite to their election programs and debates (Allern 2011: 253). Without a doubt, Hagen’s dominance was related to this emerging medialization of politics; not only was he the chairman, he was also the party’s and one of Norway’s most gifted ‘television politician’.

While Hagen was able to develop a routinize procedures and delegate tasks internally as well as externally, he was less able to maintain consensus among competing factions within the party. The emerging conflict between ideologically skillful liberalists and more other more folksy and morally conservative factions turned out to be too big to handle (Iversen 1998: 132-138; Hagen 2007: 179-226; Ekeberg and Snoen 2001: 249-259). The ideological battle over the party’s soul was repeatedly played out in public. In November 1993, the private commercial even broadcasted a whole debate in which the debaters represented different ideological factions within the party.258 The party continued to decline in the polls and ‘the day of reckoning’ seemed inevitable. At the party convention in 1994 at Bolkesjø – infamously renamed to Dolkesjø (Stab-lake) – Hagen confronted the liberalists and told them to ‘pack off’ and leave the party if they were unwilling to accept majority decisions. While members and representatives until 1994 had been allowed to choose between leaving the party, expressing opposing views, or supporting the party leadership – that is, between exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman 1970) – the choices were now reduced to loyalty or exit. As previously noted, Hagen’s authority was severely challenged at this convention. In the mainstream press, it was tellingly described as “Hagen’s worst party congress as chairman.”259 Hagen himself told the newspaper that he was “desperate” and “worn-out”, and that the profound factionalism within the party had been – and still was – psychologically challenging.260

258 Holmgang on TV2, 09.11.93
259 VG, 18.04.94
260 VG, 18.04.94
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FrP representative</th>
<th>TV Channels</th>
<th>Topic of the debate</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NRK</td>
<td>TV2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Arve Lønnum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALP’s manifesto</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erik Gjems-Onstad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ALP’s manifesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anders Lange</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Party leader debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FrP’s manifesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jens Marcussen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FrP’s manifesto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arve Lønnun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Party leader debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FrP’s manifesto and party leader debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FrP’s manifesto and party leader debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Welfare, unemployment, FrP’s manifesto, party leader debate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen</td>
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<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Tor Mikkel Wara</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Health care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
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<td>Health care, unemployment, FrP’s manifesto, party leader debate (NRK), FrP’s manifesto (TV2)</td>
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<td>Ellen Chr. Christiansen</td>
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<td>Lars Erik Grønntun</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Economic policies</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>John Alvheim</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Health care</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vidar Kleppe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Duel on immigration policies</td>
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<td>Duel on health care (NRK) and welfare (TV2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jan Simonsen</td>
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<td>Justice</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
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<td>Housing policies (NRK), oil money (NRK), Muslim men (TV2) and economy and welfare (TV2)</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Duel with prime minister, governing Norway, government question, immigration and integration, FrP’s manifesto, immigration policy, party leader debate (NRK), unknown topic, geriatric care, care duties, social policies and poverty, FrP’s manifesto, price shock on gasoline, ‘outsourcing grandma?’, Mulla Krekar is threatening Norway (TV2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown topic (NRK), justice, social security, economy and welfare, school, childhood and children (TV2)</td>
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<td>Education policies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trond Birkedal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>FrP’s manifesto (with Hagen)</td>
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Table 7.5 continues

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<thead>
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<th>FrP representative</th>
<th>TV Channels</th>
<th>Topic of the debate</th>
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<td>TV2</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Per-Willy Amundsen</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Per Sandberg</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ketil Solvik Olsen</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jøran Kallmyr</td>
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Note: In 1993, many representatives participated also in debates on another commercial TV-channel (TV Norge), including Hagen, Wibe, Røsjorde, Simonsen and Kleppe.

Internally, the leadership style of Hagen has been severely criticized. Not surprisingly, many of those that have been excluded or been pushed out of the party by Hagen have accused Hagen of authoritarian leadership. In 2000, longstanding MP, Fridtjøf Frank Gundersen, claimed that Hagen’s interventions in internal party affairs was “almost Stalinist” (Ekeberg and Snoen 2001: 333). He was particularly critical to the influence allegedly exerted by the party leadership in nomination processes in his own electoral district. To Dagbladet, Gundersen compared Hagen to Haider: “Carl I. Hagen is like Jörg Haider, but not equally bad.”

Similarly, when Jonstad was excluded for having suggested that refugees and asylum-seekers should be locked up in close-off camp, he claimed that Hagen used “Stalin-methods to take down opponents” and that Hagen controlled “most of what was going in the party”. While these examples (and other similar ones) might suggest that Hagen’s internal legitimacy were at bursting point from time to time, the overall impression is that Hagen enjoyed a very strong position within his own party. The importance of Hagen was repeatedly mentioned by other high-ranked representatives (e.g. John Alvheim in 1992). Moreover, the surveys among party members actually show that they have been more satisfied with party leadership responsiveness than members of other parties (see Figure 7.8), which truly fits the populist idea of being responsive rather than responsible. Almost three out five party members agree that the central party leadership has been good at paying attention to the views of ordinary party members in 1991 and 2000. Similar figures for other parties were: between 40 and 49% in SV, between 20 and 26% in Ap and between 17 and 24% in H. In other words,

261 Dagbladet, 11.09.00
262 VG, 2.09.99
263 In the discussion related to Hagen’s extra payment in 1992, the main spokesman of the Christian-conservative faction, John Alvheim, said that Hagen was “so valuable for the Progress party” that it was completely fine to give him an extra salary of NOK 250 000 (Bergens Tidende, 15.8.92).
even if FrP was far more centralized than many other parties, the party members seemed to be satisfied anyway.

The organizational philosophy and skills of Siv Jensen was fairly similar to Hagen, though she tended to be more inclusive (see below). Several observations suggest that Jensen also believed in the importance of a strong political organization and that she (and the rest of the party leadership) has been able to further strengthen the organization. Firstly, general secretary Geir Mo – the chief architect of the party building – continued to play a crucial role within the party. The central party bureaucracy continued, among other things, to recruit new party members and to offer extensive training to representatives and activists. In an in-depth interview with a well-known feminist journalist, Jensen even explicitly opposed the idea that contemporary parties are nothing but hollow vehicles without any internal discussion and participation (Aurdal 2006: 204). In order to counteract such trends, Jensen argued in favor of creating accessible arenas for internal participation (e.g. Intranet).

![Figure 7.8: Responsiveness of the party leadership according to the party members, 1991-2009 (in %)](image)


Note: Party members were asked to whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “The central party leadership is good at paying attention to the views of ordinary party members”. The statement was a Likert-item (the respondent could choose between five options). Those who said ‘don’t know’ (very few) were excluded from the analysis.

Secondly, Jensen has stated that political and strategic decisions should be firmly anchored within the organization in order to make sure that activists remain unified (Aurdal 2006: 203). Indeed, it is difficult to measure the extent to which this strategy has been successfully implemented. Yet surveys among party members indicate at least that FrP’s grassroots were increasingly satisfied with leadership responsiveness (see Figure 7.8). The share of ordinary party members who agreed somewhat or agreed completely that the central party leadership was good at paying attention to the views of ordinary party members increased from 58% in 1991 to 66% in 2009. The most recent survey also confirms previous patterns of cross-party variation. FrP’s grassroots have been much more satisfied than
members of other established and/or new parties, though these party differences might reflect
different expectation of the members. After all, it seems reasonable to assume that highly
educated members and/or members committed to the ideas of participatory democracy (such
as some of the members in SV) are more demanding vis-à-vis their party leadership than
members of parties with a stronger emphasis on charismatic party leadership (as some of the
members in FrP).

Thirdly, in the in-depth interview mentioned above, Jensen also claimed to be
concerned with team-building and the importance of delegation of internal decision making
(Aurdal 2006: 203). Internally, the party has continued and widened the distribution of
powerful positions among a large group of representatives, including the youth organization.
Only with a few exceptions, all of the internal policy and/or organizational committees were
led by different politicians (see Table A6.1 in Appendix). And while the committees were
dominated by men and/or members of the party elite (i.e. executive committee), the
committee leaders represented a variety of different tendencies of the party and/or different
geographical strongholds (e.g. Hordaland, Rogaland). In fact, even counties with less electoral
support were provided chairmanship of several internal committees. For example, Endre
Skjervø, from one of the weakest counties of the party (Nord-Trøndelag), was head of the
health care and social policy committee – a key issue for the party (see Chapter 3).

The continuing importance of the youth organization – not only in terms of campaign
mobilizing and recruitment of new activists, but also with regard to policy development – was
demonstrated by the fact that one of the committees (i.e. Childhood and education) was led by
FpU-chairman, Trond Birkedal. Similar to Hagen, Jensen herself was not member of any of
the internal standing committees (2006-2009) with the notable exceptions of the not-so-
important committee of defense-, foreign- and security policies and the more important
campaign committee prior to the 2009 national election.

As regards the external arena, Jensen successfully delegated tasks, but only after a
while. The visibility-ratio between Jensen and the party’s vice-chairmen (Olsen and
Sandberg), which is based upon the number of hits in the two largest newspapers, actually
suggests that Jensen dominated the public image of the party to a larger extent than Hagen,
including the late 1980s when Hagen actively promoted the young liberals within the party
and at the turn of the millennium when he cultivated Jensen as the party’s future chairman
(see Figure 7.7). In other words, Jensen was not able or perhaps not willing to share the public
image of the party with the other vice-leaders in her first years as a fresh(wo)man. This may
come as no surprise. After all, she needed to demonstrate that the party would survive without
Hagen as the undisputed chief.

Over time, however, Jensen stopped being the only ‘front stage’ face of the party. In
an interview, Jensen said this was part of a deliberate strategy: “I want to lift more of [our
politicians]” (quoted in Aurdal 2006: 195). When she was less prominent in public debates
about immigration, for example, it was allegedly because she believed that the spokesman on
this issue, Per Willy Amundsen, did an excellent job.

More generally, based on systematic data, it is clear that Jensen gradually allowed,
encourage and/or in some cases simply experienced that several other key politicians emerged
as important public figures, including the former chairman, Carl I. Hagen, who remained
highly active in the mainstream media. In addition, the vice-chairman Per Sandberg gradually
became a key figure in the public debate and several members of parliament represented the party in public, including for example MP Christian Tybring-Gjedde. In Jensen’s first national election campaign, the party’s public image was much more diverse than during the Hagen-era (Allern 2011: 378-384). Six FrP-politicians in total participated in different debates on NRK and TV2, and one local politician was invited to a specific debate on the economy related to Holmenkollen (winter-ski facilities in the capital city). Indeed, Jensen participated in many more debates than the other politicians, yet the party had been able to cultivate well-informed and rhetorically skillful spokesmen on many issues such as environmental policies (e.g. Ketil Solvik Olsen), immigration policies (e.g. Per Willy Amundsen) and justice policies (e.g. Per Sandberg).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored two important aspects of the leadership qualities of FrP’s party leaders (Lange, Lønnunum, Hagen and Jensen): their capacity to mobilize and organize, respectively. Of all leaders, Hagen’s leadership qualities have been discussed the most, simply because he has been chairman for almost three decades.

The analyses show that Lange, the party founder and the first leader, was able to effectively communicate a new political message to a broader audience of voters who, for a variety of different reasons, were dissatisfied with the existing political parties. His image as a politically unorthodox outsider rapidly turned him into a political celebrity. The extent to which he could be labelled charismatic, however, is more debatable. On the one hand, one could argue that he had “coterie charisma” in the sense that he attracted what Eatwell (2006a: 153) refers to as “a hard core of supporters […] who accorded [him] great loyalty and [were] willing to make special efforts on behalf of the cause”, namely significantly lower and fewer taxes. On the other, he lacked “centripetal charisma”, i.e. the ability to mobilize the masses. One should bear in mind that only 5% of the voters voted for ALP in 1973. In any case, if his overall mobilizing skills were fairly good, his organizational skills were correspondingly limited. In short, as long as Lange was the party leader, the internal situation in ALP echoes Panebianco’s (1988: 146) description of a party dependent upon charismatic leadership: “the division of labor is constantly redefined at the leader’s discretion, career uncertainties are considerable, no accepted procedures exist, and improvisation is the only real organizational ‘rule’”.

Lange’s successor, Arve Lønnunum, represented the opposite of Lange as regards mobilizing skills. Moreover, he was not particularly good at building an organizational infrastructure either. Gradually, Lønnunum’s successor, Carl I. Hagen, acted as the de facto party leader although he had not yet been elected. Contrary to Lønnunum, Hagen had both mobilizing and organizing skills. Hagen developed a broader political platform (not least by picking up the immigration issue), recruited talented activists (see also Chapter 6), and turned a non-existent organizational infrastructure into a comprehensive structure resembling the mass party (see also Chapter 5). The organization became, in Janda’s (1985: 148) terminology, “strongly articulated”. As regards external and internal delegation, however, the development seems to be less non-linear as the first attempt to delegate tasks and positions resulted in a profound ideological party crisis in 1994. Briefly put, one may summarize patterns of
delegation as four distinct phases: monopolization (1978-mid-80s), delegation (mid 80s-1994), re-monopolization (mid-1990s-late 1990s) and cultivation (of a new leader) (late 1990s-2006).

Although Hagen’s mobilizing skills should not be underestimated, they were probably most important in the early phase before any organizational linkages had been sufficiently developed. More than any other party leader, Hagen has been perceived as having “coterie charismatic qualities” by his followers, even if the electorate at large has been less sympathetic towards him. However, more important than his coterie charisma, was his TV appearances. Even pundits who have been highly critical to Hagen’s political project have repeatedly recognized his talented exploitation of modern mass media.

When FrP selected Siv Jensen as their new party leader in 2006, the party was fairly institutionalized and centralized, and with well-functioning organizational linkages. FrP was no longer equally dependent upon its leader, even if some scholars continued to say so (e.g. Svåsand and Wörlund 2005: 278). Jensen has primarily consolidated the party organization as regards routinization and delegation, and she has fine-tuned the political message. Similar to Hagen, she has a strong standing internally and a better relationship vis-à-vis the other center-right parties. Amongst the electorate, however, she has actually been slightly more controversial than Hagen was at the end of his period.
Chapter 8: Not so Populist After All?

Introduction

The Norwegian right-wing populist (RWP) party, FrP, could be seen as a least likely case for electoral persistence: founded on the basis of a very narrow – if not pretty diffuse – political platform; having blurry boundaries vis-à-vis illegitimate right-wing groups; non-existent organizational basis or infrastructure; and based upon charismatic leadership. But the party has managed to persist. In fact, in the first decade of the new millennium, it consolidated its position as the largest right-wing party in Norway. Why? How? Obviously, the answer is partly related to demand-side factors such as changing social structures, the decline of class voting and the erosion of existing cleavages, on the one hand, and partly related to political opportunity structures such as the cartelization of party politics, ideological convergence of mainstream parties, and the tabloidization of mass media, on the other. Yet, as suggested in this thesis, one cannot explain the electoral persistence of FrP without understanding how the party itself has changed. The demand-side and political opportunity structures are necessary but not sufficient explanations of RWP-persistence. Thus, a complete explanation must take into account the supply-side. Having this theoretical point of departure, this thesis has focused on party change along four key supply-side factors: programmatic appeal, legitimacy, organization and leadership.

Along with summarizing the main findings of the thesis, this concluding chapter firstly discusses the extent to which the findings are unique for the Norwegian case (including existing research and other empirical observations) or if they could be generalizable to other cases. Secondly, it addresses possible implications for supply-side theories of populism and future research on RWP-parties. In short, the kind of party change carefully observed and thoroughly documented in this thesis begs the question: to what extent can FrP still be considered a populist party? And does this party change suggest that the electoral persistence of RWP-parties is dependent upon their transformation away from most of its initial characteristics towards a more ‘normal’ or, more precisely, a mainstream party? However, before trying to provide some preliminary answers to these questions, let me recapitulate the main findings and their theoretical implications.

Not a single-issue party

FrP is no longer a single-issue movement, or niche party as Meguid (2005) would have called it. While it initially mobilized almost exclusively on the anti-tax issue and possibly on a more diffuse anti-establishment platform, the programmatic appeal has expanded gradually throughout its existence. The party played the immigration card for the first time in the late 1980s, though its representatives had hinted towards a restrictive position already in the 1970s. In the 1990s, the party increasingly focused on better and more dignified geriatric care, and in recent years, it has consolidated its position as the primary defender of automobile interests; in other words, a Norwegian version of the Swiss Autopartei, which was founded in the mid-1980s and played a role in SVP’s electoral growth (Albertazzi 2008: 102-03). Moreover, issues such as increased military spending, law and order, and opposition to (state-initiated)
foreign aid have been relevant at various stages in the party’s evolution – foreign aid since the very beginning; anti-pacifism since the late 1970s; and law and order more recently, often in combination with anti-immigration (i.e. immigrants are depicted as a security threat). And finally, contrary to another important implication of the single-issue thesis, the party – including both congress delegates and party members – does not seem to be less cohesive on less salient issues than other parties. Especially since the liberalists were forced to leave in the mid-1990s, the party has been fairly ideologically coherent.

While many of FrP’s most important issues resemble Kitschelt’s (1995) “winning formula” (i.e. the combination of authoritarian policies and neoliberalism), some fit more with de Lange’s (2007b) notion of a “new winning formula” (i.e. the continuing focus on authoritarian policies in combination with an increased saliency of welfare chauvinism). Not surprisingly, the combination of neoliberal issues, authoritarian policies and the defense of certain welfare arrangements has enabled FrP to reach out to a variety of different social groups (Jupskås 2013: 12).

In many countries, the combination of neoliberal policies and publically financed (though not publically organized) welfare would seem paradoxical. However, this can be explained rather straightforwardly. Basically, FrP has been able to mobilize on both the original and the new winning formula due to a country-specific feature: the existence of Norwegian sovereign “oil fund” (Narud and Aardal 2007; Narud and Valen 2007). Listhaug (2007) has compared the challenge of rising expectations among Norwegians with the “resource curse”, initially intended to explain problems experienced in resource-rich countries of the Third World. In any case, against the background of accumulated and permanently growing public wealth, FrP has effectively criticized all kinds of problems, shortages and failures regarding the welfare state in general and the care for the elderly in particular – “those who built this country”, as the longstanding chairman Carl I. Hagen would have put it.

The analysis presented here is far from the first to question the validity of the single-issue thesis. In fact, already in the late 1980s, Mitra (1988: 62) argued that the “emergence of [FN] might be both more complex and more enduring than [the single-issue thesis] would seem to suggest”. The ideological profile of the voters and their self-reported voting motivations, as well as high levels of party identification, indicated that FN should not be perceived as a flash party incapable of electoral persistence. In similar vein, Mudde (1999) rejected the single-issue thesis for parties like FN, FPÖ, LN and VB. Contrary to expectations, the electorate of these parties appeared to have a distinct socio-demographic profile (e.g. private sector, low-educated, male, blue-collar workers, and no religious affiliation); they were supported on the basis of several issues (as in the case of FrP); they presented an ideological program; and societal challenges were not explained by one single-issue only. All these parties seemed to profit electorally on several issues, including immigration, law and order, social welfare and political resentment. More recently, in a similar analysis to the one presented in this thesis, it has been shown that even the SD – a party emerging from the extreme right subcultures almost exclusively concerned with so-called “mass immigration” – cannot be considered a single-issue party (Erlingsson et al. 2014; see also Widfeldt 2008: 272). Neither SD’s parliamentary candidates nor its voters care about and/or support the party exclusively based on the anti-immigration issue, though it is the most important one. Socio-economic issues unrelated to immigration seem to be important too (Erlingsson et al. 2014:}
In sum, these findings imply that RWP-parties should not be reduced to mere “anti-immigration parties” (Fennema 1997; van der Brug et al. 2000; Art 2011), even if opposition towards immigration and multiculturalism has been the key mobilizing issue in most countries (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2008).

In addition to the rejection of the single-issue thesis, the analysis revealed some interesting patterns of intra-party ideological tensions. While such tensions between rank and file and dedicated activists has been known since long (e.g. May 1973), it seems as if the upper echelons of the party not only are more cohesive than the lower echelons, but also that their rank order of core issues are different. In short, the party elite (i.e. the congress delegates) is far more materialist than the rank and file (i.e. the ordinary party members) who is more post-materialist. The former is strongly concerned with economic issues, whereas the latter cares more about national identity, immigration and integration. In the early 1990s, a similar ideological gap between a liberalist faction, on the one hand, and the combination of a nationalist and a value-conservative faction, on the other, resulted in defections from the parliamentary group, the disintegration of the youth organization and the resignation of several key ideologues within the party leadership. Although ideological intra-party conflicts decreased after the battle for the party’s soul in 1994, the ideological gap between the elite and ordinary members has increased since the early 2000s, partly because some of the more nationalist MPs have been either excluded or left the party voluntarily, and possibly because the party has continued to recruit liberalist-oriented members who are more educated and more active internally than other members (Jupskås 2014a). As a party in opposition, this growing ‘saliency gap’ might be unproblematic; however, as a governing party, which the party became after the 2013-election, internal disruption may very well emerge again at the subnational level.

**Preserving political legitimacy**

FrP has been able to remain a politically legitimate party and maintain its reputational shield (i.e. the legacy as a non-extremist party) by pursuing several strategies. Firstly, the party has consistently and effectively opposed any attempts to label the party fascist and/or right-wing extremist. Secondly, it has denied linkages with and refused to support any other anti-immigration party or organization. Nationally, the party has dissociated itself from various anti-immigration organizations belonging to what could be called “uncivil society” (Kopecky and Mudde 2005). Transnationally, the party has opposed any collaboration with other RWP-parties and rarely expressed any sympathy towards such parties.\(^{264}\) Instead, FrP has more recently tried to cultivate contact with, or at least been inspired by, established right-wing parties such as the British Conservatives, The Liberal party in Denmark and The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands (see also Jungar and Jupskås 2014: 231).

Thirdly, opposition towards immigration and multiculturalism has not been framed in explicitly racist terms but rather through a variety of more legitimate frames, at least from perspective of (parts of) the electorate. This includes the perception of immigrants as (1) an economic burden, (2) welfare exploiters or “tourists”, (3) a cultural threat, (4) a security

\(^{264}\) The exception being the defense of FPÖ’s right to be a governing party in Austria in 2000 (see *Dagbladet*, 06.02.00)
problem, and (5) an illiberal challenge. The first four of these frames have been identified elsewhere (Rydgren 2004: 175-183), whereas the fifth seems to be more innovative (but see Akkerman 2005). Additionally, party representatives have frequently argued that they are against the immigration policy (the system) rather than the immigrants themselves (the actors). Interestingly, this is a reversed logic of the anti-establishment appeal in which the politicians (the actors) are defined as the main problem rather than democracy as such (the system).

Fourthly, and finally, the party leadership has cracked down on most members and representatives who have been linked to the extreme right in one way or another and/or those who have argued against immigration or immigrants on the basis of biological-racist arguments. Similar strategies have been pursued in other RWP-parties, not least in DF (Trads 2002: 31-33). In UKIP, another recently successful RWP-party, the leadership has, in order to filter out politically incompetent and/or racist members, invented a test – known as the “fruitcake test” – for everyone who wants to run as candidates for the party.265

While the existence of a (close to) zero tolerance strategy vis-à-vis extremism within is relevant in this thesis primarily as regards its indirect contribution to electoral persistence, there is also another interesting implication of the finding. As in many other countries, Hagelund (2003a; 2003b) has convincingly shown that the Norwegian public debate on immigration has been soaked in moral rather than political terminology. Instead of being a question of left vs. right (or authoritarian vs. liberal), immigration has been turned into a question of right vs. wrong. More specifically, from early on, the mainstream parties in Norway introduced a new defining cleavage between those who were decent and those who were not. As noted by Gullestad (2002: 112-113), “the condemnation of [FrP] as shady [has made] the other parties appear as decent.”266 Not surprisingly, policy proposals from FrP have therefore usually been defined as indecent, inhuman, and/or non-acceptable. Interestingly, however, the analysis in this thesis demonstrates that this kind of moralization of the political struggle is not only restricted to the relationship between the mainstream parties on one hand and FrP on the other. In fact, the question of where to draw the line between the acceptable and unacceptable has often taken place within FrP as well.

One final remark about the struggle for political legitimacy is in order. Surprisingly, and contrary to what we would expect, the analysis of FrP shows that even when the “reputational shield” (Ivarsflaten 2006) was under pressure in the mid-1990s as several events suggested ideological and organizational links with the extreme right subculture, the party did not necessarily suffer electorally. There are at least two possible lessons to be learned here: (1) if successfully exploited by the party leader (e.g. accusing the mass media of a left-wing biased ‘witch hunt’), even seemingly damaging events could be electorally rewarding, and (2) in the absence of any other credible anti-immigration alternative, voters will cast a RWP-vote even if the party is perceived as being straightforwardly racist (as many FrP-voters did).

266 “Shady” and “decent” are translations of “grumsete” and “anstendige”, respectively.
More than just a ‘good’ organization

As regards organization, FrP has transformed away from a populist model characterized by low levels of institutionalization, charismatic leadership, a non-existent ‘party on the ground’ and weak ties with civil society, towards a more institutionalized and centralized party with stronger organizational linkages (the latter will be discussed in the next section).

The process of institutionalization could be observed primarily with regard to routinization of behaviour and less so with regard to value infusion. While the formal organizational structure was subject to major changes in the 1970s and 1980s, it has remained almost identical since the early 1990s. The party bureaucracy followed a similar evolution: from being small and poorly routinized in the first decade of existence to becoming larger and increasingly specialized, especially after the electoral success (and increased public financing) in the late 1980s. Value infusion, on the other hand, has been fairly weak throughout the period. To be sure, a growing share of the electorate seems to identify with FrP as a party. Yet two thirds of FrP’s voters do not, albeit with a small increase towards the end of the period. Among party members, however, there is a growing level of value infusion, if measured by membership turnover and membership length. In any case, the analyses show how the two dimensions of institutionalization – routinization of behaviour and value infusion – may vary independently of each other, just like in the case of Peronism in Argentina (Levitsky 1998). However, whereas the (Peronist) Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party) was weakly routinized and strongly infused with value, the opposite seems to be the case with FrP. There is no such thing as the “iron law of party institutionalization” (Ignazi 1998); some parties fail, and some parties succeed. To a large extent it depends upon the strategic choices made by the party leader (see below, but see also Rose and Mackie 1988: 556-557).

FrP has also created a fairly centralized organization (especially by Norwegian standards) in which the executive committee enjoys comprehensive powers (most notably with regard to the authority to impose sanctions on unwanted behaviour) and in which the autonomy of subnational branches and the parliamentary party are quite restricted. This organizational development fits with well-established expectations of how parties founded upon charismatic leadership are likely to develop organizationally if conducive for electoral persistence (e.g. Panebianco 1988: 67). In order to survive their founding leaders and develop a fairly consistent ideological and programmatic position, RWP-parties would have to develop an organization in which the power rests within the party elite. FrP seems to be a case in point. At least, this analysis shows that the party leadership has resorted to centralizing measurements whenever confronted with different kinds of party crisis, including internal disruption, factionalism and opportunism in the parliamentary party or at the subnational level.

Again, this not the first analysis suggesting that RWP-parties are far from as disorganized and weakly institutionalized as assumed by some scholars (e.g. Kitschelt 2006). Betz (1998: 50) metaphorically argued more than a decade ago that LN’s organization “resembles a pyramid”. The combination of democratic centralism – which was certainly more centralized than democratic – and selective membership recruitment was regarded as an important factor in explaining the high degree of party cohesion and, conversely, low levels of factionalism. Similarly, scholars have claimed that FN is a “highly centralised machine with a strong, pyramid-like organisation” (Marcus 1995: 47; see also DeClair 1999: 158). The
problem with this metaphor is not its uselessness in the cases of FN or LN, but that some scholars have seen it as an accurate description of populist model of party organization. As argued by Bille (1994: 141-42, italics added) on the basis of Danish observations, it is the established parties that are typically characterized by “a relatively simple, territorial-defined, pyramidal organization”, whereas the populist party (FrPd) has a rather eclectic organization in which much power is concentrated around the (charismatic) party leader (Mogens Glistrup). In other words, the existence of pyramidal organizational structure means that the party is no longer, if it ever was (as in the case of LN), organized according to populist principles. Having or adopting a pyramidal structure should rather be seen as sign of organizational ‘normalization’ and as an important factor explaining electoral persistence. Indeed, comparative analyses shows that FrP’s organization to a large extent has become more similar to the established parties in Norway (Heidar and Saglie 2002: 59; Svåsand 1994: 307-08), even if the populist-entrepreneurial origin continues to have an impact on certain aspects of the organizational culture (Jupskås 2014a).

Cultivating its own subculture

Having a well-functioning party bureaucracy and centralized organization do not necessarily imply strong organizational linkages and that the party succeeds as regards training of candidates; recruitment of activists; policy development; and cultivation a distinct party culture. As noted by Janda (1983: 330), “it appears that party organizations, like leprechauns, do have special powers, but some use their powers better than others.” However, FrP must be seen as a party capable of converting bureaucratic and, we should add, financial strength into a distinct party culture and party identity.

Being primarily a top-down process of party building, in which the leadership has borrowed organizational insights from the mass party model, FrP has gradually developed a comprehensive structure with a powerful extra-parliamentary organization, nationwide coverage of local branches and a stable core of party members. And while many of the rank and file are inactive and membership density is quite low, this seem to be the case across (Norwegian) parties rather than something unique to FrP. Moreover, while the party initially had no supportive organizational environment whatsoever, several auxiliary organizations – most importantly, a youth wing, a party magazine and a party school association – have made significant contributions to basic party organizational and ideological tasks.

In recent years, the organizational linkages have been further strengthened as the party has cultivated contacts and exchanged ideas with materialist and consumerist organizations, some trade unions (especially at the local level), evangelic Christian subcultures and (xenophobic-feminist) anti-Islam organizations. Together with FrP’s bureaucracy, these organizations help the party to develop policies, as well as to recruit, train, and socialize both

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267 When I was invited a few years ago to join a comparative project on populist parties in Western and Eastern Europe, the proposal simply assumed that such parties would be characterized by the pyramidal-structure.

268 Similarly, it is the conservative party in Austria (i.e. ÖVP) that has been described as a party with a “pyramidal organizational form” and not the RWP-party (i.e. FPÖ) (Müller 1994: 59).

269 Perhaps except for the new left party, the Socialist Left Party, in which most members are quite active, especially in extra-parliamentary activity.
new members and representatives. In combination with a more centralized organization, the infusion of core ideological and organizational values has certainly made the party more coherent in recent years.

The way FrP – and its chairman Hagen since the late 1970s and general-secretary Geir Mo since the early 1990s in particular – has built organizational linkages from scratch is quite rare, even in comparison with many other persistent RWP-parties. Most of the other RWP-parties which have been able to persist in the electoral arena have to a varying degree benefitted from pre-existing nationalist subcultures (as FN, FPÖ, VB and SD) (e.g. Art 2011: 106-147; Widfeldt 2008); originated on the basis of minor regionalist parties at the subnational level (as LN) (Cachafeiro 2002); emerged as agrarian or neoliberal populist predecessors (like PS and DF) (Arter 2012; Ringsmose 2003: 100-101); or simply transformed from a ‘mainstream party’ into a RWP-party (like SVP) (Meny and Surel 2000: 260). Consequently, FrP is seemingly the only truly “resilient entrepreneurial party” (Arter 2013, italics added) among contemporary RWP-parties, though Geert Wilders’ PVV may turn out to be another one (see e.g. de Lange and Art 2011).

The concept of an ‘authoritarian mass party’ has been suggested in this thesis in order to capture the overall organizational development of FrP: ‘mass party’ due to its degree of organization; its internal delegatory structure; the linkages to civil society; and its emphasis on (mass) membership, and ‘authoritarian’ because it seems to be far more centralized than a traditional social-democratic mass parties, though they too are/were probably more centralized than initially assumed (e.g. Michels 1962). However, it should be noted that there are a few organizational aspects of the party that are not very well captured by this term. As noted in the organizational analysis, Hagen himself has referred to party as a “business firm.” And while he was metaphorically describing how subnational units, other auxiliary organizations and the parliamentary group in FrP are subjected to the will of national extra-parliamentary organs (i.e. the party convention, the national council and the executive committee), the party does display other organizational features associated with the emerging “business firm model” (Krouwel 2006; Hopkin and Paolucci 1999). This includes the permanent struggle for media attention (Jupskås 2013), the focus on issues and personalities (Karlsen and Narud 2004: 127) and the comprehensive usage of external campaign expertise (Karlsen 2010: 202). In an “audience democracy” (Manin 1997), these organizational aspects may have contributed to electoral persistence too.

**Decreasing importance of the party leader**

The party leader has been important for FrP, but not primarily as a charismatic figure. In fact, the analysis shows that the longstanding chairman Hagen’s most important quality was the combination of being media-savvy and organizationally competent. He was the first politician in Norway to truly master the tabloid format of modern mass media. And in contrast to the party founder Lange, he also recognized that electoral success and electoral persistence could only be realized through organizational building step by step. In other words, and somewhat contrary to Harmel and Svåsand’s (1993) influential theory of party leaders and party institutionalization, the skills required for the first phase (mobilization) and the second phase (organization) may be possessed by the same political entrepreneur.
However, these remarks do not imply that Hagen was without any coterie charisma (i.e. strong appeal to core followers) – because he was not. On the other hand, the centripetal charisma (i.e. appeal to the electorate at large) was never particularly high. At one point in time, even his coterie charisma was severely challenged. While Hagen was able to maintain party cohesion throughout the 1980s, the party’s politicization of the immigration issue and the increasing saliency of the EU-question eventually forced him to choose between the liberalists, on the one hand, and the nationalists and value conservatives, on the other. Despite seeing his authority crumble to a minimum, his choice of siding with the latter probably saved the party.

Hagen’s successor, Siv Jensen, has been of less importance for electoral persistence, even though she has also performed well on television and enjoyed strong sympathy among core followers. As regards organizational skills, she has continued along the lines of Hagen, but given the level of institutionalization, her organizational contribution has been more a question of gradual adaption rather than necessary innovation. Moreover, while Hagen stepped down in 2006, the skillful secretary-general since 1994 remained in the party constituting an important part of the collective memory of the organization.

The declining importance of the party leader within RWP-parties is certainly not restricted to the Norwegian case (see also Mudde 2007: 261). Marine Le Pen has successfully replaced her father as the leading figure of the FN (Mayer 2013), while Kristian Thuelsen Dahl has successfully replaced DF’s longstanding leader and party founder Pia Kjærsgaard (Jupskås 2015). Likewise, Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen (2014) argue that even the PS is far more institutionalized than claimed by those who view it as the product of Timo Soini’s charisma alone. In the Italian case (LN), the successful leadership of Umberto Bossi was suddenly turned into a scandal as he allegedly had misused party funds for the private affairs of his family (Bull 2013). However, even though the party has lost a significant number of members and voters, it has not (yet) disappeared from the electoral arena.

In sum, this analysis and a few observations elsewhere clearly indicate that whereas RWP-parties may very well be leadership-dependent (though not always due to charisma) – as FrP was in its formative phase as well as throughout its first two decades of existence – the importance of the leader is likely to decrease as the organization becomes more institutionalized. In a highly institutionalized party even leadership successions after a long-standing leader, often referred to as “hard acts to follow” (Horiuchi et al. 2013), becomes possible and unproblematic. By overestimating the role of the leader (e.g. Johansson 2014: 12) and underestimating the role of the party organization, we most likely fail to explain why RWP-parties have been able to survive leadership changes and to persist electorally.

Not so populist anymore?

Perhaps needless to re-state, the overall findings of this thesis imply that RWP-parties will not necessarily end up as “short-lived vehicles of protest” (Betz 1994: 24). On the contrary, such parties are indeed capable of persistence, just like other types of political parties. In fact, even RWP-parties with an entrepreneurial origin could wind up being extremely successful in consecutive elections. While this may sound as a rather trivial finding, it is not. Based on the in-depth analysis of the decline of the Finnish Rural Party in the mid-1970s, Matheson and Sänkiaho (1975: 222, italics added), for example, boldly claimed that “the failure to
institutionalize the party through routinized organizational behaviour and doctrinal codification appears to us a shortcoming generic to populist movements everywhere.”

Similar arguments by Taggart (2000: 99ff; 2004), Canovan (1999; 2005) and others were presented in the introductory chapter. According to these scholars, populism is, by definition, episodic, short-lived and unstable. Jones (2007: 37) even claims that contemporary “European populists organize movements and not parties, they appeal to voters and not activists, they focus most of their attention on discrete issues and they seem to care less about how their programs hang together.”

In light of these theories, the kind of party change carefully observed and thoroughly documented in this thesis begs the following question: to what extent could FrP still be considered a populist party? After all, not much of its initial “flavor enhancers” (Vossen 2010) or features associated with populism (Barr 2009: 38-43) remain present. It has developed an extensive programmatic platform and displays a fairly cohesive position along several key ideological dimensions. The party bureaucracy has developed from non-existent to rather extensive; the local chapters from organizationally heterogeneous to homogenous; and the gap between formal and informal power structure has been gradually decreasing. The main locus of power is no longer the party leader or a small inner-circle around the leader, even if the party is quite centralized. Membership turnover has decreased and membership figures have increased. An effective, if not particularly large, belt of auxiliary organizations has been built to recruit, educate and socialize members. And finally, despite being an entrepreneurial party, the ties to organizations in civil society have been gradually strengthened. In this sense, one might argue that FrP has been co-opted by the ‘system’ in ways that are not very dissimilar to what happened with the Greens (Frankland and Rihoux 2008: 284-85). Alternatively, one could see party change from the perspective of the shifting strategies of party elites, i.e. away from being primarily protest-seeking or perhaps “publicity-seeking” like the LN in its early years (Tambini 2001: xiii) and Geert Wilders more recently, towards policy-seeking and/or office-seeking party goals.

However, FrP remains, I maintain, a case of populist persistence. As argued in the introduction, populism is first and foremost a (thin) ideology pitting various elites against the homogenous and virtuous people. It message is that the current democratic system is not capable of producing policies in accordance with the will of the people, and that there is an urgent need for more plebiscitarian politics (e.g. Barney and Laycock 1999). After all, populists claim, the common sense of ordinary people is better than the so-called “expertise” of the bureaucratic, political, academic, and/or economic elites. In many of these respects, FrP is still a populist party. The main slogan since the mid-1990s remains: ‘FrP – partiet for folk flest’ (FrP – the party for ordinary people’). The parliamentary candidates in 2009 also seemed to hold populist views to a greater extent than the candidates of other parties. 63% agreed that Norwegian democracy is about to lose credibility among its citizens as opposed to

270 It should be said in their defense that Matheson and Sänniaho (1975) were well aware of the limitation of a single-case study and asked explicitly for additional studies to confirm or disconfirm their hypothesis.


272 The unpublished data come from a parliamentary candidate survey in 2009 carried out by Hanne Marthe Narud and Rune Karlsen at the Department of political science, University of Oslo. N is between 130 and 160 for all parties.
less than 32% in all other parties. 61% agreed that the Norwegian democracy needed significant reforms as opposed to less than 41% in all other parties. And finally, only 57% agreed that it is the parliament rather than the voters who should make the final decisions as regards law and politics as opposed to more than 80% in all other parties. Moreover, FrP is still the most uncompromising defender of plebiscitarian politics. Both the manifesto and the candidate survey show that FrP is strongly in favour of the increased usage of politicians’ initiated referendums, citizen’s initiatives and veto rights against decisions made by representative bodies (FrP manifesto 2009: 6). In other words, Duverger’s (1954: xxxv) observation still holds true: “It is the whole life of the party which bears the mark of its origins.” To what extent the current government participation of FrP will further wash away the initial ideological features of the party, only time will tell.

**Future research: Towards a third phase of populist politics?**

Scholarly work on populist parties has certainly become a minor industry of its own (e.g. Bale 2012). Yet there is still more research to be done. The rise of populist parties can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase was characterized by electoral breakthrough, many flash parties, charismatic leaders and parties that were only weakly connected to any existing social cleavages, including the class cleavage and the post-materialist cleavage. The second phase, which has been discussed in this thesis, has been characterized by electoral persistence, party building, successful leadership successions, and a more stable foothold within certain socio-demographic and socio-economic groups. The question is whether we have entered a third phase of populist politics characterized by government participation and policy impact, and to what extent and how the transformation from the second to third phase is related to specific supply-side factors. Let me end with a few suggestions.

The most obvious change is related to programmatic profile and ideology. Being mostly concerned with socio-cultural issues (FrP is an exception at this point), RWP-parties aiming for office need to develop a more comprehensive socio-economic platform. While a restricted set of socio-cultural issues – immigration, law and order, and opposition to multiculturalism – might be enough for electoral persistence, government participation requires such parties to implement and to take responsibility for economic policies beyond welfare chauvinism (but see Albertazzi and McDonnell 2011 for a different view). Moreover, many scholars have noted the inherent dilemma of being a populist party in government (Zaslove 2012; McDonnell and Newell 2011). And the dilemma is not without consequences. The voters of such parties are more likely to be disappointed by the loss of ideological purity than other voters (Van Spanje 2011). To compensate for the loss of a clear-cut outsider position, RWP-parties have adopted various strategies, including “one foot in-one foot out” (as in the case of LN) (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010) or mobilizing heavily on referenda (as in the case of SVP) (Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 2007). FrP has so far pursued a combination of blame avoidance (i.e. whatever is malfunctioning is the fault of the previous government) and selective credit claiming (i.e. repeatedly emphasizing political victories

273 Obviously, von Beyme’s (1988) influential classification of far right politics in post-war Europe into three distinct waves has served as an inspirational source of this periodization. However, as noted in the introductory chapter, the first wave in von Beyme’s scheme is not particularly relevant as it contains marginal extreme right parties (most notably in Germany and Italy) rather than right-wing populist parties.
however insignificant or symbolic they might be). So far, these strategies could be considered successful as popular support has dropped much less than anticipated.

Having a strong and well-functioning organization is probably conducive to government participation, or at least successful participation (Zaslove 2012). De Lange (2007a: 27, 39), for example, argues that organization is important in becoming a reliable governing party. Others have pointed out that being strongly institutionalized helps the party maintain its autonomy vis-à-vis the environment, including the state bureaucracy (Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 2007: 94). And Heinisch (2003) reminds us, based on the Austrian experience, that being heavily dependent upon a charismatic leader seems to be extremely disadvantageous for government participation, especially if the charismatic leader stays out of the government. In the Norwegian case, the degree of centralization played an important role. In line with arguments presented by Ringsmose and Pedersen (2005; see also Bolleyer 2008: 27-30), the growing centralization in the early 2000s after becoming the largest right-wing party in the 1997 national election could be interpreted as part of an office-seeking strategy. While the provocative behavior and the strong anti-immigration position of some prominent MPs most likely attracted many votes, these features were incompatible with the aspiration of entering the government. Without expelling ‘the fundis’ and promoting ‘the realos’, the party would probably not have been considered salonfähig by other non-socialist party elites. Such actions were necessary to improve FrP’s political legitimacy.

If the first phase of the party’s history required a mobilizer and the second phase an organizer, the third phase is likely to require a stabilizer (Harmel and Svåsand 1993). Such a leader is necessary primarily for two reasons: firstly, the party needs to develop a reputation for credibility and to fine tune its political message, perhaps by preparing its voters for the necessities of accepting political compromise once in office. Secondly, in the Norwegian case – a country characterized by a consensus-oriented political culture – the leadership succession from a controversial and unpredictable leader (Hagen) to a more teambuilding and predictable one (Jensen) seemed to be a necessary condition for becoming accepted as a governing party (Jupskås 2014b). However, whether or not Jensen has the leadership qualities to keep the party in government is yet another question. In opposition, the leader is oriented towards the internal party arena and/or concerned with the relationship vis-à-vis other parties trying to enter viable governing coalitions. In government, the field of actions and the degree of public spotlight changes fundamentally, and the existing patterns of principal-agent relationships become even more complex. Hence, as noted by Rose and Mackie (1988: 554), “the pressures of office, institutionalized by large bureaucratic ministers with established program committees enacted by predecessors, often force party leaders to act in ways that would not occur in opposition.” Again, to what extent FrP and its current party leader survive the ‘corridors of power’ remains to be seen.
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Appendix

Appendix to Chapter 3: From single-issue to several-issues party

Policy statements asked in the different membership and delegate surveys. For each statement, the respondent was asked to indicate whether he/she agree completely, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat or disagree completely. They were also allowed to answer ‘don’t know’.

Party member survey 1991

1. To stimulate individual effort, we should accept greater income differences than we have today.
2. Increased economic benefits for family-based care should be given higher priority
3. It is still necessary to maintain a strong defense
4. We should make provisions for achieving greater gender equality
5. Taxes and duties on alcohol should be reduced substantially
6. We should increase the support for immigrants, so that they can maintain their own culture
7. We should work towards a society with high economic growth and high productivity
8. We should work for larger grants to peripheral areas
9. The most important purpose with prison should be to lead the convicted back to society
10. We should push for pollution abatement facility for emissions from private households, industry and agriculture, even if it implies higher taxes and duties
11. It is more important to expand public services than to reduce taxation
12. Employment problems are not solved by increased efforts by public sector
13. We should increase our development assistance transfers to the Third World
14. One should prohibit the establishment of private hospitals based on business-like logic
15. The biggest business and labour organizations have become too powerful in society
16. Substantial grants to strengthen the finances of the big cities should be provided
17. We should increase grants to care for the elderly strongly
18. Norway should become a full member of the EEC as soon as possible

Party member survey 2000 and congress delegate survey 2001

1. We should accept larger income differences than we have today, as incentives for individual effort
2. Increased economic benefits for family-based care should be given higher priority
3. The EEA agreement should be terminated, and replaced with a free trade agreement
4. It is still necessary to maintain a strong defense
5. We should make provisions for achieving more gender equality
6. Taxes on alcohol should be substantially reduced
7. We should work for larger grants to peripheral areas
8. To curb crime, preventive work is better than tough sentences
9. We should work towards a society with high economic growth and high productivity
10. We should make it easier for immigrants to enter Norway
11. We should work to strengthen the role of Christian faith and morality in society
12. In lower secondary school, grades are necessary to stimulate pupils to greater effort
13. It is more important to develop public services than to reduce taxation
14. We should build gas power plants in Norway, on the basis of existing technology
15. The large business and labour organizations have got far too much power in society
16. We should increase the aid to the developing countries
17. The political control over several deregulated public companies, e.g. the telephone, railway and postal services, is too weak and should be strengthened
18. Substantial grants to strengthen the economy of the big cities should be provided
19. We should increase grants to care for the elderly strongly
20. Norway should be a full member of the EU
21. We should do much more for environmental protection, even if it means considerably lower personal consumption for the individual

Party member and congress delegate survey 2009

1. To stimulate individual effort, we should accept greater income differences than we have today.
2. Today’s arrangement of cash support to family-based childcare should be discontinued
3. The EEA agreement should be terminated, and replaced with a free trade agreement
4. Allocations to the defense budget should be increased considerably
5. We should make provisions for achieving greater gender equality
6. Taxes and duties on alcohol should be substantially reduced
7. We should work for larger grants to peripheral areas
8. To curb crime, preventive work is better than tough sentences
9. To secure economic growth we need to continue industrial expansion, even if this may conflict with conservation/environmental interests
10. We should make it easier for asylum seekers to enter Norway
11. We should build gas-fired power plants in Norway, even if the CO2 emissions cannot be curbed with today’s technology
12. The biggest business and labor organizations have become too powerful in society
13. We should increase our development assistance transfers to the developing countries
14. Many public services could be run better and more cheaply if they were privatized
15. Substantial grants to strengthen the finances of the big cities should be provided
16. Immigration represents a serious threat to our national identity
17. Norway should become a full member of the European Union
18. We should do much more to protect the environment, even if it means considerably lower personal consumption for the individual
19. It is important for immigrants to adapt to Norwegian customs and norms
20. Our military forces should concentrate on the defense of Norway, not involvement in conflicts abroad
21. High incomes should be taxed more heavily than today
22. It is more important to expand public services than to reduce taxation
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Notes:
1. For the Socialist Left party, data from 1999 is missing and calculated as the average of 1998 and 2000.
2. For Labour the official figures from 1993 to 1995 include collectively affiliated party members. ‘Self-paying members’/individually paying members are therefore estimated for these years by the known ratio self-paying members/total membership for the years 1990, 1991 and 1996. The average ratio is 0.756 and varies little over these three years (0.73-0.78).
3. The Conservatives only present figures for paying members from 2003. The figures 1993-2002 presented in the table are therefore estimates. First I calculated the average ratio Paying/total membership 2003-2010 which is 0.697246 and varied between 0.688-0.718. Paying members were then estimated for 1990-2003 on the basis of total membership.
4. The Progress Party do not judge their own figures from before 1993 as reliable, which is why figures from 1980s and early 1990s are excluded from the table.
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Figure A6.1: Level of exceptional sympathy among the party’s own voters, 1981-2009 (in %)

Source: Norwegian election surveys 1981-2009. Note: “Exceptional party leader sympathy” refers to those who gave their party leader maximum score on a sympathy thermometer ranging from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like). The score for the small centrist parties are not shown in the figure, but with the exceptions of Anne Enger Lahnstein (Sp) in 1993 and Kjell Magne Bondevik (KrF) in 1985, none of party leaders within these parties have the same standing as the party leader of FrP.
Figure A6.2: Popularity of the party leader compared to the popularity of the party, 1989-2009


*Note:* The figure shows the percentage point differences between the popularity of the party leader and his/hers party. The differences have been calculated by subtracting the share of respondents giving the party (leader) the value 6 or higher on a sympathy barometer ranging from 0 to 10. In the surveys between 1981 and 1993, the sympathy thermometer has been recoded form the initial scale ranging from 0 to 100 to a scale which is comparable to the surveys carried out between 1997 and 2009 (which use a scale ranging from 0 to 10). Values above the x-axis mean that the party leader is *more* popular than the party and values below the x-axis mean that the party leader is *less* popular than the party.
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Lodve Solholm</td>
<td>Vidar Kleppe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Lodve Solholm</td>
<td>Vidar Kleppe</td>
</tr>
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<td>1997</td>
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<td>Lodve Solholm</td>
<td>Vidar Kleppe</td>
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<td>Lodve Solholm</td>
<td>Vidar Kleppe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>Terje Søviknes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>Terje Søviknes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>John Alvheim**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>John Alvheim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>John Alvheim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>John Alvheim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>Per Sandberg</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>Per Sandberg</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>Per Sandberg</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
<td>Per Sandberg</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Annual reports, VG, 19.10.74; 02.02.76; 16.05.77.

**In 1974, after Lange died, Eivind Eckbo was acting chairman (Hagen 1984: 131).**

**Søviknes stepped down February 12, 2001, due to a sex scandal.**
Table A6.2: Overview of internal committee-leaders in FrP, 1985-2009  
(MP= Member of Parliament, EC= executive committee, PL= party leader, VPL= Vice political leader, VOL= Vice organizational leader, VL = Vice leader, YL= Youth leader)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Leader of the committee</th>
<th>Secretary of the committee</th>
<th>Is the party leader in the committee?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy committee</td>
<td>Anne Beth Moslet (VPL and from Rogaland)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee</td>
<td>Anne Beth Moslet (VPL and from Rogaland)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy committee</td>
<td>Odd Pedersen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen (VPL)</td>
<td>Odd Magnar Brubæk (Org. secretary)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe committee</td>
<td>Peter N. Myhre</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment committee</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen (VPL)</td>
<td>Jan Arild Snoen (Oslo)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security committee</td>
<td>Tor Mikkel Wara (YL)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational committee</td>
<td>Hroar A. Hansen (VOL)</td>
<td>Odd Magnar Brubæk (Org. secretary)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Norway Committee*</td>
<td>Hroar A. Hansen (VOL)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for bestowal of honour to senior activists and representatives</td>
<td>Lodve Solholm (national board mayor)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program committee</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen (VPL)</td>
<td>Odd Magnar Brubæk (Information leader)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen (VPL)</td>
<td>Odd Magnar Brubæk (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election campaign committee</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen (VPL)</td>
<td>Odd Magnar Brubæk (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political committee for fisheries</td>
<td>Paal A. Bjørnstad (YL)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational committee</td>
<td>Hroar A. Hansen</td>
<td>Odd Magnar Brubæk (Municipal political adviser) og John Petter Fagerhaug</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural committee</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen (VPL)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (-91)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program committee</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen (VPL)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political committee for fisheries</td>
<td>Paal A. Bjørnstad (Bergen)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media committee</td>
<td>Jan Erik Fåne (FpU)**</td>
<td>Anders Bayer</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen (VPL)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC-committee</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjervengen (VPL)</td>
<td>Odd Magnar Brubæk (Information leader)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for culture and education</td>
<td>Ola O. Ingvaldstad (EC)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Name</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>Advisers and Secretaries</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen- and biotechnology committee</td>
<td>Per Haram (EC)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political committee for agriculture</td>
<td>Jan Erik Fåne (EC, YL)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser) og Vegard Marthinsen (Group secretary)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1991-92</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee</td>
<td>Ellen Chr. Christiansen**** (EC)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for culture and education (established in 1989)</td>
<td>Ellen Chr. Christiansen***** (EC)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen- and biotechnology committee</td>
<td>Per Haram (EC)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political committee for agriculture (established in 1991)</td>
<td>Jan Erik Fåne (EC,YL)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling committee (established in 1991)</td>
<td>Jan Simonsen (VOL)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC-committee (established in 1990)</td>
<td>Tor Mikkel Wara (VPL)</td>
<td>Morten Høglund</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election campaign committee (for the 1991-election)</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjerven (MP)</td>
<td>Anders Bayer (information secretary)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political committee for industry</td>
<td>Tor Mikkel Wara (VPL)</td>
<td>Stephen Bråthen (Group secretaray, Stg)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bylaws committee</td>
<td>Terje Nyberget (EC)</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen (office manager)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy committee</td>
<td>Hakon Lunde (Oslo)</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen (office manager)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for cooperation with Danish FrP (established 1991)</td>
<td>Pål Atle Skjerven (MP)</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen (office manager)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1992-93</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee (dismantled in 1992)</td>
<td>Paal A. Bjørnstad</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for culture and education (Established in1989)</td>
<td>Ellen Chr. Christiansen (EC)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political committee for agriculture (established in 1991)</td>
<td>Jan Erik Fåne (EC, and YL)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser) and Rudolf M. Christoffersen (Group secretaray)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling committee (established 1991)</td>
<td>Jan Simonsen (VOL)</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC- committee (established in 1990)</td>
<td>Tor Mikkel Wara (VPL)</td>
<td>Morten Høglund</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Election campaign committee (for 1993-election)
Carl I. Hagen
Hans Andreas Limi (secretary general) and Jøran Ledal (secretary general, FpU)
Yes

Program committee (established in 1992)
Tor Mikkel Wara (VPL)
Hans A. Limi (secretary general)
No

Women’s committee
Ellen Wibe (appointed by EC)
No

Economy committee
Hakon Lunde (Oslo)
Per Arne Olsen (office manager)
No

Committee for cooperation with Danish FrP (established 1991)
Pål Atle Skjervengen (MP)
Per Arne Olsen (office manager)
No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Secretary General</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>Political platform committee</td>
<td>Ellen M. Wibe (1. VL)</td>
<td>Hans A. Limi (secretary general) and Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>Schooling committee</td>
<td>Lodve Solholm (EC)+</td>
<td>Stein A. Torgnesøy (Municipal political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>Europe committee</td>
<td>Ellen M. Wibe (1. VL)</td>
<td>Morten Høglund</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>Women’s committee</td>
<td>Ellen M. Wibe (1. VL)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>Economy committee</td>
<td>Hakon Lunde</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>Committee for cooperation with Danish FrP</td>
<td>Danish leader (Kim Behnke) (Peter Skaarup, danish FrP)</td>
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<td>1993-94</td>
<td>International committee</td>
<td>Ellen M. Wibe</td>
<td>Morten Høglund</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>1994-95+++</td>
<td>Schooling committee</td>
<td>Svenn Kristiansen (Oslo)</td>
<td>Morten Høglund (political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95+++</td>
<td>Europe committee</td>
<td>F.F. Gundersen (MP)</td>
<td>Morten Høglund</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-95+++</td>
<td>Platform committee</td>
<td>Lodve Solholm (1. VL)</td>
<td>Geir Mo (secretary general) and Morten Høglund</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-95+++</td>
<td>RUFF (previously Women’s committee)</td>
<td>Inger Marie Ytterhorn</td>
<td>Trine Jordskar (secretary general)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-95+++</td>
<td>Economy committee</td>
<td>Peter N. Myhre++++</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-95+++</td>
<td>Bylaws committee</td>
<td>Tormod Sæbø (EC)</td>
<td>Geir Mo (secretary general)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-95+++</td>
<td>Strategy committee</td>
<td>Lodve Solholm (1. VL)</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen (committee secretary)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>1994-95+++</td>
<td>Collectively financed – privately produced</td>
<td>Hans A. Limi (Oslo)</td>
<td>Morten Høglund</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>1994-95+++</td>
<td>Committee for cooperation with Danish FrP</td>
<td>Kim Benke (danish FrP)</td>
<td>Danish FrP</td>
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<td>1995-96</td>
<td>Schooling committee</td>
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<td>Morten Høglund (political secretary)</td>
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<td>1995-96</td>
<td>Platform committee</td>
<td>Lodve Solholm (1. VL)</td>
<td>Geir Mo (secretary general)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>RUFF</td>
<td>Inger Marie Ytterhorn (EC)</td>
<td>Trine Jordskar (secretary general)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>Economy committee</td>
<td>Peter N. Myhre</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen (office manager)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>Strategy committee</td>
<td>Lodve Solholm (EC)</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen and Morten Høglund</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>Privatization committee (established 1996)</td>
<td>Terje Søviknes (Hordaland)+++++</td>
<td>Morten Høglund</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
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</table>
### Schooling committee
- Einar Endresen (EC)
- Morten Høglund (pol. sec.)

### Program committee
- Lodve Solholm (1. VL)
- Morten Høglund and Andre Kvakkestad

### RUFF
- Inger Marie Ytterhorn (EC)
- Trine Jordskar (secretary general)

### Economy committee
- Peter N. Myhre
- Per Arne Olsen (office manager)

### Strategy committee
- Lodve Solholm (EC)
- Per Arne Olsen and Morten Høglund

### Privatization committee
- Terje Søviknes (Hordaland)*
- Morten Høglund

### Political committee for energy
- Per Ove Width (EC)
- Andre Kvakkestad (pol. sec.)

### IT-committee
- Victor Skimmeland (Porsgrunn FrP)
- Anders Anundsen (political adviser, Stg)

#### 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Chair</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RUFF</td>
<td>Inger Marie Ytterhorn (EC)</td>
<td>Leif Hjeltnes (organizational chairman)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province secretary committee</td>
<td>Terje Søviknes (2. VL)</td>
<td>Leif Hjeltnes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy committee (internally called the Jensen-committee)</td>
<td>Siv Jensen (1. VL)</td>
<td>Geir Mo (secretary general)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee</td>
<td>Terje Søviknes (mayor in Os)</td>
<td>Peter N. Myhre (political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrPs political committee for economy and commerce</td>
<td>Åse Schmidt (EC, Vest-Agder)</td>
<td>Ronny Røste (leader of pol. dep.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrPs political committee for schools and education</td>
<td>Inger Marie Ytterhorn (EC, Oslo)</td>
<td>Bård Hoksrud</td>
<td>No</td>
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#### 2000-01

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Chair</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RUFF</td>
<td>Liv Røssland (EC)</td>
<td>Morten Høglund (political adviser Stg) and Ronny Røste (leader pol.dep.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program committee</td>
<td>Siv Jensen (1. VL)</td>
<td>Leif Hjeltnes (org. leader) and Sigvart Bilstad (org. adviser.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bylaws committee</td>
<td>Terje Søviknes (2. VL)</td>
<td>Sigvart Bilstad (org. adviser.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee</td>
<td>Ulf Leirstein</td>
<td>Peter N. Myhre (political adviser.) and Sigvart Bilstad (org. adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrPs political committee for economy and commerce</td>
<td>Åse Schmidt (EC, Vest-Agder)</td>
<td>Ronny Røste (leader of pol.dep.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrPs political committee for family relations</td>
<td>Inger Marie Ytterhorn (EC, Oslo)</td>
<td>Anne-Britt H. Johannessen</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 2002-03

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Chair</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROREG. (Project Government)</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Geir Mo (secretary general) and Per Arne Olsen (leader of the secretariat Stg)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local political platform committee</td>
<td>Siv Jensen (1. VL)</td>
<td>Ronny Røste (leader pol.dep.) and Bård Hoksrud (adviser pol.dep.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>Adviser(s)</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European committee</td>
<td>Morten Høglund (MP)</td>
<td>Thor Magne Bostad (political adviser, Stg) and Espen Espeseth (political adviser, party org.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee</td>
<td>Ulf Leirstein (deputy mayor Moss)</td>
<td>Bård Hoksrud (political adviser) and Endre Skjervø (political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrPs political committee for family relations</td>
<td>Solveig Horne Kolnes (Rogaland)</td>
<td>Anne-Britt H. Johannessen/Espen Espeseth</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political committee for crime</td>
<td>Einar Endresen (EC and Rogaland)</td>
<td>Ståle Urbuye</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political committee for defence, security and foreign relations</td>
<td>Morten Høglund (section leader in foreign affairs committee) Åse Schmidt (Mandal)</td>
<td>Per Christian Krogh (political adviser)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program committee</td>
<td>Siv Jensen (1. VL)</td>
<td>Ronny Røste (special adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy committee</td>
<td>Siv Jensen (1. VL)</td>
<td>Geir Mo (secretary general)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMPOL</td>
<td>Ulf Leirstein (EC)</td>
<td>Endre Skjervø (political adviser) and Bård Hoksrud (regional secretary)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMU</td>
<td>Solveig Horne Kolnes (Rogaland)</td>
<td>Espen Espeseth (political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe committee</td>
<td>Morten Høglund (MP)</td>
<td>Espen Espeseth (pol. ad) and Thor Magne Bostad (pol. ad.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIKPOL</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen</td>
<td>Per Christian Krogh (political adviser)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRIPOL (dissolved Feb, 2005)</td>
<td>Einar Endresen (Rogaland)</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2004-05
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Chairperson</th>
<th>Adviser(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KOMPOL</td>
<td>Ulf Leirstein (EC)</td>
<td>Endre Skjervø (political adviser) and Bård Hoksrud (regional secretary)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMU</td>
<td>Solveig Horne (Rogaland)</td>
<td>Espen Espeseth (political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe committee (dissolved in 2005, transferred to SIKPOL)</td>
<td>Morten Høglund (MP)</td>
<td>Espen Espeseth (pol. ad.) and Thor Magne Bostad (pol. ad.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIKPOL</td>
<td>Carl I. Hagen #</td>
<td>Per Christian Krogh (political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care and social policy committee</td>
<td>Liv Røssland (EC)</td>
<td>Finn Terje Tønnesen (pol. ad.) and Ole Berget (pol. ad.)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and transportation committee</td>
<td>Oskar Grimstad (EC)</td>
<td>Espen Espeset (political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childhood and school policies committee</td>
<td>Trond Birkedal (YL)</td>
<td>Andre M. Larsen (political adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and trade union policies committee</td>
<td>Per Sandberg (parliamentary vice leader)</td>
<td>Ståle Urbuye (special adviser)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party organizational development committee</td>
<td>Per Arne Olsen (2. VL)</td>
<td>Øistein Lid (Org.- and skoleringssjef)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Political platform for local politics committee

**Per Sandberg (1. VL)**

Ronny Røste (special adviser)  
No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006-07 and 2007-08</strong></td>
<td>Per Sandberg (1. VL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ronny Røste (special adviser)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Municipal political committee | Terje Søviknes (Hordaland)                   |
| Professional and trade union policies committee | Per Sandberg (MP)                           |
| Forsvars-, utenriks- and sikkerhetspolitisk utvalg | Morten Høglund (section leader in foreign affairs committee) |
| Health care and social policy committee | Liv Røssland (EC)                           |
| Trade and transportation committee | Oskar Grimstad (EC)                         |
| Childhood and school policies committee | Trond Birkedal (FpU)                        |
| Party organizational development committee | Per Arne Olsen (2. VL)                     |
| Political platform for local politics committee | Per Sandberg (1. VL)                        |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008-09</strong></td>
<td>Siv Jensen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign committee (i 2009)</td>
<td>Louis Edvardsen (Troms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political committee</td>
<td>Per Sandberg (1. VL, Robert Eriksson from Nord-Trøndelag took over 20.02.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and trade union policies committee</td>
<td>Morten Høglund (section leader in foreign affairs committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense, foreign affairs and security policies committee</td>
<td>Endre Skjervø (Nord-Trøndelag)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care and social policy committee</td>
<td>Oskar Grimstad (EC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and transportation committee</td>
<td>Trond Birkedal (YL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
* Established in 1986. The committee developed a political platform for Northern Norway, which subsequently was adopted by the national council in May 1987.
** Is not listed with any affiliation.
*** Sits in the EC committees committee along with Skjervengen. In the committee Morten Høglund is secretary - not Brubæk.
**** Took over for Pål Atle Skjervengen who resigned from the executive committee in this period.
***** Took over for former central director Ola O. Ingvart who resigned from the central committee after the party congress in March 1991.
****** Formally speaking, Inger Marie Ytterhorn is the elected deputy, but she sits in the EEC committee together with the Chairman and the Secretary.
+ Ytterhorn and Grønntun are represented in the EEC-committee’s working committee.
+++ First time where Jensen is a member of internal committees: the schooling committee and RUFF.
++++ Former chairman Hakon Lunde is an ordinary member.
+++++ Siv Jensen is also a member of this committee.
++++++ Liv Røssland succeeded Ytterhorn during this period.
§§ Søviknes is also represented in the Jensen-committee.
## The IT-committee was incorporated in the Progress Party’s political committee for economy and commerce.
### Søviknes was the leader until he resigned from all positions in February 2001.
#### Bård Hoksrud was secretary until February 2001.
##### The Study Association is not included in recent years.
###### Søviknes took over for Leirstein after the 2005 elections (December 2005). Hoksrud was no longer secretary.
# From December 2005, Morten Høglund is the head of SIKPOL.
## Changed its name to International Committee in 2008.