A clean sweep of renewing political activism in South Asia by the “cricket bat” and the “broom”

A comparative case study of India and Pakistan

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Abstract

The recent political events in Pakistan and India have marked the ushering of a new era of political transformations in the South Asian region. The dawning of two new political parties *Pakistan-tehreek-e-Insaf* literally translating into “The justice party” of Pakistan (bearing the symbol of a cricket bat) and the *Aam Admi Party* literally translating into “the common man’s party” of India (bearing the symbol of a broom), as a result of the anti-graft/ rights based movements, has taken the region by storm presenting new political alternatives to the people, promising to swing the bat hard enough to sweep out corruption that has hindered progress and development in their respective countries. With the Broom, which symbolizes dignity of labour/ common man, AAP hopes to clean the filth, which has permeated the government and the legislature. Irrespective of caste, class, creed, and religion, the factors that have dominated the politics of these countries, these actors of change are claiming to voice the concerns of the common man and have successfully created a new political block challenging the age-old elitist democracy at the ballot box. The upcoming of the new political alternatives and their similarities are not only thought-provoking given the diverging contexts they are appearing in, but they remains contrary to the established theories of democratization in the global south. This thesis sets out to explain the aforementioned puzzles.
Abbreviations

AAP : Aam Admi Party
BJP : Bharatiya Janata Party
BISP – Bhutto Income Support Program
CNIC : Computerized National Identity Card
EGA : Employment guarantee act
INC: Indian National Congress
KPK : Khyber Pakhtunkwa
MNA: Member of National Assembly
MTA: Market trading association
MQM: Mutthahida Quami Movement
NAC: National advisory council
NADRA: National database registration authority
NDA :National democratic alliance
NFSA/B: National Food Security Act/ Bill
NREGA: National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
NWFP : North West Frontier Province
PDS : Public distribution system
PML-N: Pakistan Muslim league – Noon
PPP: Pakistan Peoples Party
PTI: Pakistan Tehreek e insaf
UPA : United progressive alliance
RWA :Residential welfare association
UPA : United progressive alliance
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No journey worth taking is easy, and mine is no exception. The journey towards the completion of this dissertation has been laborious but worth struggling for. I believe that hardships bring out the best in us, and with zeal for a healthy purpose, discipline and self-confidence, there is nothing worthwhile that we cannot accomplish. To work hard and to be hard has been my secret for realizing this project of academic character.

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I take full accountability for any errors or omission in this thesis.

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1 Introduction

The recent political events in Pakistan and India have marked the ushering of a new era of political transformations in the South Asian region. The dawning of two new political parties Pakistan-tehreek-e-Insaf literally translating into “The justice party” of Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as PTI and bearing the symbol of a cricket bat) and the Aam Admi Party literally translating into “the common man’s party” of India (hereinafter referred to as AAP and bearing the symbol of a broom), as a result of the anti-graft/ rights based movements, has taken the region by storm presenting new political alternatives to the people, promising to swing the bat hard enough to sweep out corruption that has hindered progress and development in their respective countries. With the Broom, which symbolizes dignity of labour/ common man, AAP hopes to clean the filth, which has permeated the government and the legislature. Irrespective of caste, class, creed, and religion, the factors that have dominated the politics of these countries, these actors of change are claiming to voice the concerns of the common man and have successfully created a new political block challenging the age-old elitist democracy at the ballot box.

But as utopian and realistic the present in India and Pakistan may appear, it remains difficult to understand empirically and theoretically. Firstly, the unexpected emergence and (relative) success of these parties is puzzling given the political conditions/settings of their respected countries. As it will be discussed in the next section (1.1), both countries have political characteristics (like elitist bureaucracy, political dynastic, corruption, weak governance), which don’t open, up political spaces for struggles like these to appear and succeed. Turning back the leaves, efforts like these have often found themselves either being co-opted by political elites or losing chord with the voters due to fragmentation issues. Even if they have activated some sort of political activism, they have failed to stir the same excitement at the ballot box, sometimes refuting the idea to contest elections. Secondly, the similar uprisings in two contextually and politically countries represent another puzzling aspect of the new happenings. India and Pakistan are known for taking two diverging routes towards the path of democracy. While India has had an unbroken chain of democratic rule, Pakistan still struggling with its self-perception as a democratic state due to the military dominance. Furthermore, these happenings are contrary to the traditional established theories of democratization. The mainstream theories of democratization fail to explain the change as
they downplay the importance of actors appearing outside the elite set framework. For example, as discussed more detailed in the next section, while the conservative stream argues the postponement of the emergence of democracy till the right conditions are set, the liberal stream, argues that radical, non–elitist/ populist parties should be held back in favour of elite-pact democracy. This makes it difficult to explain the aforementioned cases theoretically.

In the above foreground, there are certain notions which pose very unique puzzles that deserve attention and which this thesis sets out to explain: *rise of two parties in two different political contexts of diverging paths towards democracy but leading to similar political uprisings overcoming historical precedent and not merging into the pre-existing dominating politics.*

1.1 Stating the puzzle

Till the partition, India and Pakistan shared the same fate. Both countries started off at the exact same time, August 14-15, 1947. Both countries inherited a British civil service architecture, an intact local government system, and an intact British railroad system for communication and transportation infra-structure (Oldenburg, 2010a, p. 17). Both countries had a strong political class borne out of the struggle for independence from Great Britain, and both countries had identified a charismatic leader with strong credentials and the public support of their respective constituencies (Jawaharlal Nehru and Ali Jinnah). But divergence occurred post partition. The geo-politics that surrounds these two countries isolates them from the rest of the continent. A peak into the annals of history reveals, that from being ‘one’, the countries have come a long way in their own struggles internally and with each other. The shared history and culture does present its own list of commonalities but there lies a difference of outcomes as the two countries stand today poised at different levels of political and economic growth. The history and politics changed radically after partition. India has had an unbroken chain of democracy since its inception and adoption of its constitution in 1950. On the other hand, Pakistan has had an unbroken chain of ineffective democratic governments, followed by dictator-led ineffective governments since its inception and adoption of their constitution in 1956. And yet even in that, the two countries are yet again united in the aspect that corruption has permeated the deepest levels of governance and
public institutions retarding the two countries and leaving them entrapped to constitute the “developing world or the global south”. The difference appears to be a culture of democracy that has evolved in India over the six decades, while in Pakistan, democracy remains stillborn (Oldenburg, 2010b, pp. 1-4).

Now, Pakistan has since its independence experienced different political phases, each phase leaving a scar on the country’s economy and social development. Since it was carved out from its neighbouring country, India, it has been alternating between a limited/ non-functional democratic system and military coups, leaving the country’s political and economic situation unstable. It can be asserted that the democratic history of Pakistan has been in doldrums, fluctuating at various points on the timeline of its existence. However, even though Pakistan may be characterized as a democratic state (as the elected government has for the first time been able to finish its ruling term without any major disruptions avoiding military intervention); corruption, weak governance, political dynasty, elitist bureaucracy and the strong role of the military remains as a political reality. Pakistan has, therefore, been in the need of a radical change to rewrite its democratic perception (Jaffrelot, 2004).

India has on the other hand, despite the cultural, religious and linguistic heterogeneity, witnessed a strong formal democratic history compared to its neighbouring state Pakistan: the tradition of comparatively long standing, not always successful, devolution of power to the local governments1, the relatively strong party system, the electoral franchise in action and its history of transition of power from one civilian government to another. The formal democracy in India is often considered to be a success but while there does exists a formal democracy in the post colonial world, there has not been seen any shift towards a substantive democracy which is defined in terms of broad based participation, inclusive policy and positive feeling of involvement in politics among the masses (John et al, 2013).

Another disturbing aspect of Pakistan politics, apart from military dominance, is the fact that it is highly elitist/ dynastic – like India. Nepotism and feudal politics has led to the creation of “The Establishment” preventing new political actors from carving out a space for themselves. Even the parliamentary system has not been favourable to new attempts that have tried to

1 Decentralization worked some places not on the general level. Kerala is a good example of
break the legacy of The Establishment in Pakistan – as 60 per cent of Pakistan is rural areas, with the feudal classes and influential people prevailing over local vote banks and dominating the representation in the parliament (Ali, 2011).

But even though political activism in the two countries has been merely a reflection of the existing democracy, there has never been lack of political participation. Similar attempts were made in the 1960s and 70s but did not succeed. This is the problem with petty bourgeoisie democracy - even those who want to move away from the beaten track fall in line sooner than later. The Congress, before independence was an exciting mass movement, which in no time fell into utter decadence and a never-ending dynasty; and the communists, who interestingly had an AAP-lingo in the 1960s, fell into the trap of violence, capital, opportunistic secularism, and a third front substitute to the BJP and the Congress. At the same wavelength, the lawyers’ movement in Pakistan evoked public attention only to die a silent death owing to fragmentation. Furthermore, nature of the parliamentary structures in the two nations is majoritarian leaving any small party to lurk in the shadows of lobbying with the larger parties for stronghold or eventually merging with them. And yet, the fledgling AAP, (and similarly, PTI in Pakistan) born from the crucible of the anti-corruption/rightbased movement that began in 2011, is generating a new kind of energy and hope in the country never witnessed before. For the first time, a civil society movement has transformed itself into a political organization and challenged the established political parties (in the case of India) at the ballot box. In Pakistan a similar tendency have occurred. In 1997, PTI failed to win a single seat in the national elections. But after being beaten up at the ballot box for 17 years the party now celebrates it’s new political avatar. Pakistan witnessed a three-way electoral contestation for power where PTI emerged as the third significant party not only challenging the legacy of the old dynastic political parties, PML- N (Pakistan Muslim League Noon) and PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party), but also rewriting the history of electoral politics of the country.

By putting their emphasis on promoting political stability, social harmony and economic prosperity for all segments of the society, these actors of change stand distinguished to set a new precedent in Pakistan and India. Their rise and electoral participation has not only shaken the current political landscape of the two countries, but also stirred the democratic
spirit by reviving the realization to exercise electoral franchise by classes that have remained on the side lines and outside the political sphere. The poster-boy of AAP and ex-Chief Minister of Delhi, Arvind Kejriwal (for a mere 49 days) grabbed the citizens of the city-state at the 2013 state assembly elections, while Imran Khan’s PTI’s electoral participation led to a massive voter turnout that had otherwise been quite dismal since the 1970’s in Pakistan at the general elections. They vowed the voters by using slogans (symbols like the Bat and the Broom) that echoed unification of the different sections of the society for the common good. Both, vocal and illustrative methods were used to revive the democratic aspiration that had been dormant in the different sections of the society. Firstly, given the diverging paths of democracy in both countries, how do we understand the rise of the two similar parties? And secondly, In countries where voting behaviour is more often driven by patronage and kinship rather than by potential and performance (Flamenbaum, 2012, p. 2), how has it then been possible for these two political parties to champion themselves to an electoral success?

The new scenarios in Pakistan and India challenge the dominating theories about democratization in the global south. The current democratization theories conforms to the conclusion of the democratic transition in the global south being in doldrums, but suggests different pathways to resolve the issue. The conservative outlook of the proponents of the elite negotiated democratization process emphasises the need for preconditions like strong state institutions and rule of law in the fight against corruption and social rights. Their main argument is that the new freedoms and elections tend to be abused by the contesting groups thus leaving the already decayed system entrenched with corruption. Popular control should therefore be restrained until the necessary prerequisites like rule of law and ‘good governance’ has been introduced to avoid social and political chaos. To reform the state system, stability is an important precondition and for that a ‘sequencing’ of the democracy rather than popular sovereignty is needed (Mansfield & Snyder, 2007, p. 7). For this perspective, the growth of the new political parties in Pakistan and Indian can therefore not be explained by using this theoretical lens. Within this framework of elitist negotiation the popular movements are problematic than problem solving. The focus is on elites role or more authoritarian means (like the military) to bring about a change ignoring the other actors of change on the ground, which should by their argument remain in the civil society rather than contesting for power.
The liberal outlook of the proponents of the elite negotiated democracy finds some similarities and crucial breaking points from the above-mentioned discourse. In line with the conservative strand, they hold on to the thought that right institutions should be crafted for democracy to proceed; once the institutions are there the elites will adhere to the principles of it, applying a very procedural approach to democracy. They emphasize the need to open up for elections and an active participation of the civil society to foster better representation and accountability mechanism but sticks to the idea of crafting liberal institutions by pacts between moderate elites, keeping radical/anti-elitist forces outside the framework of democratic transition (Törnquist, 2013, p. 7). The cases falls out of being explained by using this theoretical lens as they are opting for more radical democratic mobilizations and portraying themselves as anti-establishment/elitist parties. Furthermore, in the case of AAP, originating from a civil society movement appears to be problematic for this explanatory lens as they emphasize that the civil society should be an alternative channel promoting better representation rather than engaging in political processes. Their main argument is that political parties fails to provide representation as they more often are rooted in section based interests or subordinated caste and class politics (Törnquist, 2013).

The structuralists on the other hand also fail to explain the new cases appearing in the south Asian region. They emphasize the need to alter the power structures by demanding for structural changes rather than holding elections. Their main argument is that the elites dominate the state and the local governance, not combating the issues of corruption or promoting social rights, but gives impetus to the former and ignoring the latter through a number of power sharing agreements between the major elites that see through the demands of the ordinary people. Therefore, addressing the power structures is crucial to avoid new institutions from being captured or bypassed by the dominant groups. The progressive actors have to voice for structural demands like social and economic reforms to alter the power hierarchy to be able to fight corruption and promote social rights. The puzzling part of the political events in Pakistan and India in accordance to this theory is the occurrence of such events despite the existence of the patronage democracy and the power hierarchies. These movements are not revolutionary in the sense that they are asking for structural changes but because they are going for electoral politics despite the unfavourable conditions in their countries (Törnquist, 2013).
1.2 Research question and the scope of the thesis

In the above-mentioned backdrop, the scope of this thesis is to explain the rise and electoral success of the new political parties in Pakistan and India where the political conditions for popular movements to foster/grow have been minimal in the past. Much has been written about the differences between Pakistan and India politically, and it is in this backdrop that it becomes even more interesting to see if there are similarities in the political parties due to the shifting political scenario in the global south and that how two contextually different platforms have the same outcome. The path-breaking trend in political history of the two countries is parallel in the sense that there is mass mobilization of people by engaging the common man and involving him in the political process. It also seeks to discuss theoretical explanations for the emergence of these new politics parties. A feasible question to ask regarding the empirical - theoretical puzzle is:

In spite of the many differences between India and Pakistan, what would possibly be the common factors in the two different contexts that explain the similar movements and its similar outcomes?

The puzzle arises from the observed political changeovers in the state elections of India and national elections of Pakistan, which marked the emergence of the two new political alternatives. Therefore, in order to answer the purposed research question, this paper will focus on the electoral process of the two political parties, discovering and analysing their political strategies and agendas by discussing various theoretical explanations extracted from the literature discussed below (1.3). The puzzle suggests that the turning point of both parties was between 2011 – 2015, but to grasp the whole picture, there is a need to elaborate on political events prior to the uprising of these parties. Therefore, I focus on including the study of main political actors (Indian National Congress in India and Pakistan Peoples Party in Pakistan) that dominated the political scenario, given their prominence at the time. In the case of India, the discussions mainly dates back to 2003 – 2015, while in Pakistan, it dates back to 1996 – 2013.
1.3 Literature review

The puzzle illustrates a discrepancy between the dominating theories of democratization and the actually happenings in the south Asian region. The cases are not taking an elitist, authoritarian or structuralism route to fight corruption or for social rights but are rather going for democratic means to combat the issues. Transformative politics is a fourth less extreme position that has developed as a response to the mainstream explanations and opts for a broader understanding of the democratization process, encompassing other problems and options that have been neglected by other theories. Scholars of this theoretical stream conforms to the conclusion drawn by the former established theories about the new democracies in the global south being lost in transition but refutes the idea of postponing democracy or the popular participation till the right preconditions are at place (Törnquist, 2013, p. 7).

Contrary to the old theories, they argue that the problem of the recent democratic transition in the developing countries is the fact of it being depoliticized that have led them to stagnate. For instance, the poor democratic representation mechanism makes it difficult to hold the representatives accountable and the increasing fragmentation of the masses hinders collective action that can demand for a real democratic transition. Scholars of this strand criticize the dominant theories for the narrowing focus on political dynamics and causes in discussing the pathway ahead for a democratization process. As discussed in section 1.1, while the conservative stream of ‘sequencing democracy’ downplays the role of using democratic means to fight corruption and inequality, suggesting not to open for popular representation/participation until the right conditions are at place like strong institutional framework and rule of law, the liberal argument swears to their procedural understanding of democracy emphasizing the need for elites to introduce democratic institutions limiting the potential of the actors of change on the ground (Stokke & Tornquist, 2013, p. 307).

To counter the problems of depoliticization, there is a need to politicize the democracy and opt for mechanism that improves the linkages between the people and their representatives (Stokke & Tornquist, 2013, p. 4). Transformative politics yields a framework for asking new types of questions to study political agendas, strategies and alliances that can help using the fledgling democracy to introduce politics and policies that may enhance peoples chances of improving democracy as well as their capacity to use it to foster democratic aims (Stokke &
Tornquist, 2013, pp. 6-9). Scholars points out to the importance of identifying new problems and options of transformative politics associated with the emerging economies and the potential for post–clienteslistic transformations that can open up democratic spaces for progressive actors aiming for substantial and substantive democratization. In concluding various studies conducted in the global south relating to this, the scholars of this strand point out to key lessons of importance that should be used taken into account in support of transformative democratic politics: 1) the primacy of politics 2) ensuring mobilizations from below for institutional reforms from above and 3) providing channels for representation and popular participation (ibid p. 12-13).

The puzzles this thesis seeks to explain suggests the need to scan various explanatory theoretical arguments in the existing literature that can provide an understanding of what possible spaces and democratic openings that exists and can be used by agents of change to enter mainstream politics. The thesis therefore finds this theoretical lens convincing in order to shed light of the purposed research question. Review of what type of theoretical arguments will be scanned is extensively discussed in chapter 2 and will not be repeated here.

1.4 Approach to the study

This thesis is both descriptive and analytical. It first gives a descriptive and analytical historical overview of the significant political events in India and Pakistan that took place during the time-period in question, presenting the party history of the two cases under examination elaborating on the various theoretical arguments outlined in chapter 2. Thereafter it turns to a comparison of the two cases, in line with the ‘most different’ case design (discussed in section 3.1), focusing on contextual factors that can explain the similarities of the movements and its outcomes.

First and foremost the paper aims at providing an explanation to the aforementioned puzzles, but put in the broader perspective, it also wants to contribute to the on-going debate about the democratization process in the global south by illustrating the importance of addressing the changing political and economic dynamics that can pave the way for progressive actors to enter the arena for mainstream politics by not postponing democracy or out-locking popular participation.
1.5 The structure of the thesis

The thesis is divided in 7 chapters, each serving its own explanatory purpose. Chapter 2 contains the presentation of theoretical concepts and arguments that will be used to approach the study in order to elaborate on the puzzles and answer the purpose research question. This will include various theoretical arguments extracted from various writings of scholars.

In chapter 3 I discuss the methodological choices and challenges encountered during the research process. This will serve the purpose of guiding the reader through how the research project was conducted.

Chapter 4 and 5 presents the analytical backdrop of the cases (AAP and PTI) before it turns to the research questions and concluding remarks in chapter 6.
2 Theory and Approach

The overall objective of this thesis is to explain the empirical and theoretical puzzle presented in the previous chapter. Therefore in this part of the paper I will discuss how and what theoretical concepts and arguments will be used that can serve as possible explanations/analytical tools for examining the cases individually and answering the purposed research question. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the main setback of the mainstream theories is that they are static and exhibit an inability to consider the processes and dynamics of democratization that appear outside their given framework. The arguments purposed in this chapter find its roots in the transformative politics theoretical approach that encourages discussion and identification of new dynamics, problems and options in the global south and will therefore try to discuss new political economic openings/dynamics that may have paved the way for the new political parties in India and Pakistan.

In the first section (2.1) I discuss the creation of new political blocks in the global south, introducing the concept extracted from the writings Törnquist, Webster, and Stokke (2009). This will serve the purpose of determining if there is a new element to the parties/movements under examination that can explain their success. By looking at their agenda’s, demands and political organization I want to see if they distinguish themselves from the old political elite, forming a new political block. In the second section, (2.2) I go on to discuss the changing nature of mode of political integration, emphasizing the recent observed change by Manor (2010), Agarwala (2013); Roberts (1995) in how politicians in the global south have opted for new methods and strategies to reach out to their voters because of the insufficiency of the traditional methods. I further suggest that there is a need to look at other methods that serve as an alternative to clientelism, pointing to populism that may help to explain the puzzling success of the two parties under investigation. The third section (2.3), I discuss the possibility of a growing state dependency as another explanation for the emergence and success of these parties and how it possibly have opened up for the new cross class alliances. I discuss the occurrence of new problems and options connected to the expansion of the neoliberal agenda like informalization of workplaces and revisit the old problem with corruption. What ensues thereafter in the fourth section (2.4) is a summarization of the chapter.
2.1 Building of new political blocks

The depoliticisation of the neoliberal democracy in the global south has produced a weak mechanism for popular representation (Harriss, Stokke, & Törnquist, 2004). The empirical/theoretical puzzle illustrated the long-time problem for progressive actors with some kind of democratic aspirations to enter mainstream organized politics to make a difference or push for positive democratic transformations in the elite dominated democracies in the global south. One of the major challenges has been to coordinate the different efforts and demands due to the lack of unity and fragmentation among the various groups and has stood in the way to scale up new progressive initiatives from a regional to national level. The initiatives often lack a common ground with other progressive actors; divided by caste, class, and religion or on sectarian lines. And even if there have been forces that have tried their luck in the organized politics, as illustrated in the case of Pakistan and India, they have been co-opted by other established political parties or failed, more often, to make a difference (Törnquist et al., 2009, p. 219).

But having said that, there have been cases in the global south where the issues of scaling up, coordination and fragmentation have been resolved through fostering a better political collaboration among progressive actors. The case of the Brazilian participatory budgeting program, the ANC (African National Congress) joint efforts for building effective citizenship in South Africa and the people’s planning campaign in Kerala illustrate the possibilities of building alliances across different interests and demands to achieve egalitarian social and economic outcomes – strengthening people’s capacity to lay demands on the state. The factor for unification of the masses was none other than the demands posed on the State being universal in nature and not the enforcement/procurement of individualistic rights and interests. Thus, creating a broad based agenda encompassing other issues and problems (Heller, 2013).

The successful cases show that political coordination of sorts was envisioned and implemented for the fruition of these efforts. Törnquist et al. (2009) have on this basis suggested a pathway to resolve or try to overcome the issues with fragmentation using the experiences drawn from the cases mentioned above. To reach out to the state, a sort of an
overarching political organization between the parties and specific groups at national and local level is needed to contest elections. It is suggested that there is a need to build intermediate political blocks to be able to include people in politics; to provide a political organizational structure for the broad array of combined interests. Citizens and denizens need to combine their issues and alliances without subordinating themselves to top down parties and politicians. They need to find ways to address the fragmentation issues and avoid letting identity, class or caste politics to play in. To reach out to the wider sections of the society, the voter base should be expanded by including efforts, interests and demands that reflects the will of the broader population – building more unity at the grassroots. The political machinery on the other hand needs to allow more people when choosing candidates, agendas and priorities and foster good forms/practices of democratic representation. With the aforementioned falling in place, the block can emerge as a truly representative party with the potentials of entering mainstream politics (Törnquist et al., 2009, pp. 219 - 220).

To investigate the cases under examination for this thesis, the indication of making a new political block will be done by assessing the party – building process of AAP and PTI, tracing the following traits that the scholars emphasizes is possibly necessary for building a intermediate political blocks: first, there is a need to see if the movements or parties in focus have switched from voicing single issues towards voicing for more broad based political agenda, including more issues and demands to their approach, representing a broader section of the society. Secondly, another indication, which is important to address is to see if some sort of political organization is provided to scale up the demands and contest elections. Thirdly, the effort towards democratic practices that ensures representativeness within the political organization (political party) is accentuated. One way of indicating this is to look at the candidate selection for the party, which should be reflecting the different interests and segments of the society.

2.2 The changing methods of political inclusion

This section is divided into two subchapters, each serving its own explanatory purpose. In section (2.1.1) I first discuss the argument purposed by Manor (2013) about how politicians in the global south have started de-emphasizing the usage of patronage through clientelistic networks by not abandoning it but opting for ‘post clientelist initiatives’ which serves merely as ‘add ons’ to the old practices. As the parties under examination seems not to be indulging
in clientelism, I further argue that his explanation is insufficient to understand the cases, and should be used only to show which openings and spaces they may have used to enter mainstream politics. In section (2.1.2) I introduce the argument of populism as an alternative to clientelism in quest of seeing if this serves as an explanation to the way these new actors have mobilized the voters.

2.2.1 The Insufficiency of clientelist networks and re–emergence of Populism

The traditional ways of how people are included into politics in the global south seems to be at change. In the article “post clientelist initiatives”, Manor (2013) argues that the politicians in the developing countries have started to downplay the distribution of patronage through networks of clients, a mode of political inclusion often used by politicians to cultivate political support in the global south. Politicians have instead embraced a number of post clientelist initiatives introducing programs and policies that are partially or entirely protected from politicians/ subordinates who seek to siphon off resources from these networks, encompassing a larger share of the population moving beyond their traditional constituencies (Manor, 2013, p. 243). This change has mainly occurred due to the observed insufficiency of patronage networks. For long, such distribution networks have been vulnerable to bosses/ politicians at the local level of clientelist networks who seek to divert resources from patronage distribution (Manor, 2013, p. 244). Subordinates who are responsible for the effective workings of these networks have in many cases misallocated the resources; at times pocketing them or by demanding exorbitant payments from clients and interest groups in exchange for largesse. Loyalties are challenged when intended key recipients do not receive enough to maintain their loyalty to the patron and due to corrupt party structures it makes it difficult to uphold the networks. The distribution of patronage is therefore seen as an insufficient method to win elections leave alone re- elections. Also, the transition towards democracy in the global south has created a society, which is more political, assertive and demanding. People seem to have a better understanding of the political situation, their right and options. To produce satisfactory development outcomes to keep the crowd captive has become quite important to gain electoral support. Politicians therefore, in desire to maintain

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2 Political scientist call patronage distribution ‘clinetelism’ (Manor, 2013, p. 243).
their popularity and legitimacy try to opt for new political strategies, keeping the old ones only an arm length away (Manor, 2013, p. 244).

Manor (2013) argues that even if the nature of patronage distribution is changing due to its insufficiency to win elections, clientelism still matters for some sections of the society, especially those groups who are too marginalized to organize themselves like the peasants. In most developing countries the peasants still use this channel to promote their interests and demands. Even if patron – client networks have lost some of their feasibility, it still remains a dominant mode of political organization, particularly in the rural areas in almost every developing country. To abandon this practice is too dangerous; else there is a risk of alienation of powerful interests (Leonard et al., 2010; Manor, 2013). He further argues that this trend falls short to be called transformative. Political dynamics change over time and so do the initiatives that vary with new politicians and parties. To illustrate that, he outlines seven different post-clientelist initiatives politicians opt for to cater to the shifting political environment. The argument is that these initiatives are not pursued, in most cases, instead of clientelism, but work as a supplement to it; the initiatives serve as ‘add ons’ to the old practices. One of the categories that most cases in the global south loom around is the strategy of supplementing clientelism (Manor, 2013, p. 245). This strategy is adopted to supplement the clientelist activities with new programs without curtailing the existing clientelist networks, which means that the change is only on paper not by its practices.

However, the two cases under examination can’t be explained by using the strategy outlined by Manor (2013) as none of them seemed to have surrendered to clientelism as a method of political inclusion and still won the elections (AAP) or got sufficient amount of votes (PTI). The loophole in his argument may be that he does not offer explanation for why this trend is trending in the global south, apart for saying that the people have become more political assertive and discussing the embedded problems of corruption in party organizations. He ignores the importance of addressing structural changes as a possible reason that may have caused the shift and made clientelism unattractive, even the limited form of it. In the last few decades the transformations in the global south, which are both of economic and social in nature, have changed the way traditional societies are organized. This has also altered the ways of people relating to politics and politicians. For instance the employment patterns in the global south, which will be closely discussed below, can be noticed. As an example, in India a number of people move out from the traditional labour industry to other sectors in the
urban areas, like the IT sector where they are met with new problems and challenges. When facing new problems people are in need of more direct and proximate political relations. Since the patron – client relationship builds on indirect linkages; people have to turn to the government for support through various governmental programs and benefits (Agarwala, 2013). Other justifications for why the vote banks do not stay intact over time is that there are changes like increasing migration of labour, people adapting to different multiple identities and religious affiliation that makes people break out of the old patron – client linkages (Mohmand, 2014).

It is true that the withering away of the traditional relationship between the patron and client may hurt some sections of the society, especially the marginalized section that doesn’t have the ability to use other channels to claim rights and get their demands fulfilled. But on the other hand, people’s dependency on the state and the weakening of the old patron-client linkages due to structural changes opens up spaces for progressive actors who are opts for new methods of integration of all sections of the society in a more democratic and representative manner (Manor, 2013).

In order to discuss the new possible political openings that may have paved the way for these new actors to come up, Manor (2013) strategy of supplementing clientelism will be used and applied to different post-clientelist initiatives that has been taken by the previous government of India (United Progressive Alliance) and Pakistan (PPP headed government) in order to improve their electoral performances but which seem to have failed the parties at the state and general elections. I will first explore their initiatives, asking if there is a tendency towards programs, which is less targeted and have a more universal approach that conforms to the strategy and idea Manor outlines. In the case of India I will be looking at the ‘right for food campaign’, ‘National rural employment guarantee scheme’ and the ‘Bhidagiri scheme’ that were adapted by Congress. In the case of Pakistan I will be looking at the program introduced by the Bhutto government in 2008, BISP – Bhutto income support program. To discuss the possible openings, I will discuss the performance of the programs and the parties’ recent electoral fall that may conform to the idea that clientelism (in any form) and the indirect
linkage it creates with its voter is unattractive given structural changes and therefore not always a viable method to win elections or uphold political legitimacy⁴.

2.2.1 Populism

Populism is another method that has been used by politicians of the global south to engage people in political processes. It is a type of politician–citizen linkage that serves as an alternative to clientelism and distinguishes itself from the former mode of inclusion by creating a direct link to people rather than the asymmetric power structure the former suggests. Populism employs a catchall strategy that defines its social base as the ‘common’ masses often by avoiding the class analysis. It serves is an antithesis to the unfortunate and dismal status quo that is believed to be protected by parties/ politicians of corrupt nature. Scholars argue that the occurrence of populism is a bi-product of the backlash the capitalist transition brings forth, both of political and economic character. If successful, most of the times the movement transcends into a political party (Agarwala, 2013).

There is a widespread discussion around the usage of populism. The most recognized argument about populism is that it does not offer any change in the structures or the system and, therefore, is merely an illustrative power rather than an action power. Populism can stabilize a democracy but also destabilize it. Populist leaders promise to improve the situation of those downtrodden, but not by encouraging their empowerment through well-knit political organizations. They manage to unify the masses by creating an oppressed mass against the dominant ones, often by outflanking the middle level creating a connection between those at the apex of the power hierarchy and the lowest level (Jalal, 1995, pp. 66-67). The populist support base often lied within the lower rungs of the society, excluding the middle section. Furthermore, the sustainability of this method of political inclusion has also been up for scholarly debate. Many argue that the frequent adaption of neoliberal policies create organized and educated social classes that no longer find broad populist promises appealing which will make populism disappear or diminish once capitalism is developed (Agarwala, 2013, p. 80).

⁴Having said that, it is important to highlight that this method of political inclusion and winning elections is still viable in countries like India and Pakistan, given the general election victory which were credited to patronage parties.
But as a matter of fact, it has resurfaced again and its rise in the contemporary era deserves attention. Scholars like (Agarwala, 2013, p. 80) Roberts (1995) and Agarwala (2013, p. 80) are in the quest for the new meaning of the term, in the capitalist era, refuting the idea of treating neoliberalism and populism as two exclusive tendencies. To exemplify this, Agarwala (2013) shows to the case of Tamil Nadu where populism has strengthened the democratic participation by enabling representation of new groups, by redefining their support group to the one that co – exist with the neoliberal agenda. Which groups have emerged is linked to how particular populist leader defines his or her support base of underprivileged masses and how groups frame themselves to fit into that definition. In the case of Tamil Nadu, Agarwala points out to the redefinition of the populist support base which has given the informal workers to frame their needs in a way that appeals to politicians. The one that co – exist with the neo liberal agenda. The elements of the populism as seen in the case of Tamil Nadu, is less ethnic / caste based and than what has been experienced before and conforms to the shifting trend of modes of political inclusion and the argument put forth by Manor (2013) the need for politicians to move beyond their constituencies to uphold their popularity and legitimacy.

The rebirth of the phenomena in a neoliberal context challenges the former static understanding of populism. Therefore, there is a need to see how populism has metamorphosed with time to suit the neoliberal era and the shifting political scenario in the global south to be applicable, looking at their approaches and social base (or function as a political inclusion method). Turning back the leaves in history, the global south has experienced different types of populism. The diversity of its usage suggests that the definition of populism should be capacious enough to include different types of regimes and ideologies (Subramanian, 2007, p. 82). There is no predefined category for types of populism and neither does one find a conceptual clarity of it. They share possibly some traits, but the types we discover are contextually contingent; one can find different combinations of it. For instance in Latin America, populism has often ended up adapting to clientelist practices, while in Pakistan and India, most cases of populism has been identity based, representing confined sections of the society (Jalal, 1995; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). What types of regimes the populist have led has also varied; in Brazil, Getulio Vargas, led repressive authoritarian regimes while in India, Indira Gandhi participated in both democratic and authoritarian regimes (Subramanian, 2007, p. 82). Jalal (1995, p. 66) argues that populism is
by nature an elusive concept. There is no conceptual clarity of it and therefore defining or the identification of a category/type should be done empirically.

However, there needs to be developed indicators that help us to discover its usage and define a category. To indicate that the actors are using populism as a method of political inclusion this thesis operate with a minimalistic definition of the phenomenon as its purpose is not to engage in the broader discussing of the concepts clarity. Therefore by looking at some core characteristics, a populist party will be defined by following these four criteria: (1) the people are defined as a homogeneous and pure entity, avoiding class analysis, (2) the elite as a corrupt entity, (3) the people and the elite as two antagonistic groups, and (4) favour measures to give power back to the people, measure suggesting direct democracy (Pauwels, 2011, p. 101). To uncover that, I will scan the parties’ manifestos. This will also serve the purpose of identifying if there is a certain newness to the method like Rina Agarawala argues for in the case of Tamil – Nadu, which is less caste and ethnic based.

2.3 State dependency: informalization of workplaces and corruption

As the industrial revolution has given capitalism a foothold in the third world, where economic productivity has become the object of the society and activities are profit driven, the trend has resulted in innovations and economic growth in this particular part of the world. Today, there has been a remarkable volte-face in the trend as the globalization of the world economy has made a way for these countries to compete in the international market. The developing states of the South Asian region for instance have become very export and progress oriented giving them an important role on the international trading market (Tan, 2001). In order to make the developing countries more investment worthy the global south countries has increasingly taken to neoliberal policies to make their economies more attractive to foreign investors. At the centre of these neoliberal policy reforms has been an ideological shift from a belief in state regulation of capital, labour and citizens’ welfare towards a new ideal of unfettered markets (Agarwala, 2013, p. 2). This shift has definitely
increased the economic growth of the developing countries in the recent years, but also contributed to an enlargement of the informalization of work life, effecting employment opportunities, working conditions and how production units are organized.

First, it is important to elaborate on the difference between what we term as *informal* and *formal* labour going by Agarwala (2013) definition. The distinction between formal and informal employment is that the latter like the former does not operate with the types of legal protections concerning working hours, health and safety; those who are under formal employment, enjoy the protective hood of the state policies and labour welfare legislation (Agarwala, 2006, p. 421). The informal employment on the other hand is bereft of bargaining with the state for working conditions and wages; they are delinked from the state’s employment legislation, unorganized and receive no benefits from their employers (Corbridge, Harriss, & Jeffrey, 2013, p. 84). The term, *informal labour*, has often been used to define workers who are poor, marginalized and often uneducated (Agarwala, 2013). But with this trend being evident in almost all working sectors affecting a larger share of the working population, other groups/people should be included in this categorization. The informalization process is not appearing in one working sector only, but is a pattern observed in many production/service units, both of traditional and modern character. A concrete example of this are those with formal employment status working in modern units who are now experiencing an increased informalization of their workplaces where their long-term jobs are changed into fix term contract based employment. Today the informal sector represents the majority of the labour force in the developing countries. This form of labour force has transcended itself into becoming a central component to the contemporary economies as it covers a wide range of working fields like construction, road building and home based services/ businesses. In India, for instance, it comprises 93% of the labour force whereby 82% of them are engaged in non-agriculture fields (Agarwala, 2013).

A general assumption voiced by researchers and policy makers before was that there would be a decline in the informalization process as the economic growth rises, but the increase in the informal employment in the recent years has been continuing in spite of the rapid economic growth in global south which serves as contrary to this general assumption (Agarwala, 2013). The employment trends in the global south have been subjected to the negative consequences of the rapid economic liberalization. Harriss (2011) in his writings about India points out that there exists an inverse relationship between output growth and
employment growth in India. The economic growth fails to translate into productive employment and the new sectors being created due to the transformation of the economy seem not to be generating jobs. India is a great example for that. The IT sector in the country has boomed over the past years, but it still contributes only 0.21 per cent of aggregate employment of the country. More and more people are engaging in self-employment and falling outside the capital accumulation processes, especially the youth, who is pursuing higher education and not getting jobs (Corbridge et al., 2013). What the global south is witnessing is a jobless growth.

The process is seen as an absolver of the employers and states responsibility towards the labour which increases insecurities and poverty levels. The informalization lessens the state enterprises in securing welfare rights and working rights connected to work, thus making workers more vulnerable than before; the neoliberal policies have strengthened the trend by making informal, unprotected workforce more attractive on the labour market. Other than employment opportunities, the informalization of workplaces not only affects the way production units are organized but also minimizes the labour force’s ability to organize them to ask for their rights and demands. The production structures due to the capitalist development create a fragmented working class, therefore finding a common ground is difficult due to the structures that dives them with and across different production units (Pranab Bardhan, 2011). Also the importance of the traditional trade unions in the new era of the economic development that takes a capitalist en route, has problems finding its place in this development, making it harder for workers to influence the state and their employers. Thus, the long – standing understanding of the informal labour is that they are temporary, insignificant and marginalized: unorganisable, shorn of agency, fragmented by interest and production structures (Agarwala, 2013).

But with this process of informalization of workplaces being on the rise, Agarwala (2013) in her study on the informal sector, emphasizes the need to recapture the importance of this labour force. Contrary to the long-standing perception of this labours inability to organize and influence due to the decline of trade unions and the change of production structures, she argues the opposite. The new production structures have led to new forms of struggles among the workers in the informal sector, where the labour strategies appearing differentiate themselves from the old classic movements. The informalization of labour has resulted in new ties between workers and the state, in which the informal work force rather than
demanding workers’ rights from the employers, direct claims for social welfare towards the government, to whom they in turn give their political support. This labour has according to Agarwala (2013) argument transcended themselves into a distinct class, marking their importance.

One of the main findings in her study is that the informal labour organizations have been more successful to win demands for welfare arrangements in states with liberation and competitive popular elections involving pro – poor political candidates. It is not that they are going against capitalism, as the prospects of formalization of work is little, but they are rather working within the given framework of it, transforming themselves into a distinct class that is a vital component in the modern economy. The class identity provides informal workers with a degree of social legitimacy, despite their extra-legal economic activities. It empowers them, beyond their vulnerable individual status and traditional identities. It also gives them yet another political identity through which they can offer the promise of their group votes in return for group based benefits. Finally being a member of an organization helps workers focus and target their demands through large, unified, and more powerful political voice. While Agarwala (2013) argues that it is the transformation into distinct class that explains to success of the informal labour organizations, Harriss (2013, 172) suggests the opposite. He says it’s rather about the demands this labour force put forth than the class aspect that makes them unified and successful. The class aspect offers a limited explanation to the long run movements in the society. Without ignoring the importance of the class, its more effective if they stand for more than their own interests and demands, going beyond that. He further uses an example from India, saying that various “economic strata’s” in India today have unconsciously joined forces to meet the danger posed by the increased liberalization. Another argument to complement this argument can be the case of corruption.

Corruption is usually defined as the abuse of public office or entrusted power for private gain (Kohli & Singh, 2012, pp. 222-223). The problem with corruption is that it is rampant in the global south, both political and petty corruption. It has taken the form of an epidemic plaguing the democratization process in the developing world. Corruption finds itself deeply embedded in the governing structures; it has evolved to become the system itself rather than being an exception. This is further aggravated by weak accountability practices prevalent in the democracies of the third world, thus fanning the flames. Corruption hampers and fetters development of the countries in various ways; it contributes to poor targeted social
programmes, limits social spending and investments and impairs people’s access to public service (P. Bardhan, 1997). Citizens of the developing countries are demanding better performance from the government as they are increasingly aware of the costs of the poor management and corruption (UNDP, page 1).

The dominant assumption is that the victims of corruption or those who are concerned about it are comprised of the middle class. The middle class can afford an education and its constituents are the ones most likely to be found working in the public sector. This class is concerned with the progress and modernization of their cities (Ruparelia, Reddy, Harriss, & Corbridge, 2011). The flourishing corruption impinges their opportunities in various ways. Employments are devoid of meritocracy and jobs are reserved for the those privileged enough to know people in the right places thus eliminating the possibility of fair competition as a means to promote just, fair and equitable opportunity in recruitment. Invariably, politicians let their influence creep here to leave the educated and qualified standing in the rain for want of an opportunity, already passed on to a less deserving but better networked individual. The realm of development is at no variance. Political actors wielding power in government seldom engage in activities whereby the taxpayer’s money sets the pace for development. Instead, the money is used in the direction to help in placating the vote banks that are mostly comprised of religious minorities and poverty stricken groups. In the eyes and perspective of the middle class the government encourages the underdevelopment of the cities – for in that lies the opportunity of votes by allowing squatters, pavement dwellers as they pledge their allegiance by exercising their electoral franchise to bring back the government that once let them prosper at the cost of development. Unfortunately, the scenario is so bad, that the countries in the global south are entangled in a vicious and unending circle of misery. The brunt of this is borne by the middle class while the cascading effect on the larger population is mostly unseen since the middle class remains the only vocal strata of the society. The public services and utility system is in shambles. The money for improvisation often gets siphoned of in corrupt misdirection and in the myopic approach of appeasement of the poor. Initially, the middle classes benefitted from the increased privatization only to be left vulnerable as their dependence on crucial public services like electricity and water in the realm of the State decapitated by brimming corruption affects their business and everyday life (Ruparelia et al., 2011).
And all of the above has a domino effect, affecting not only the middle classes but also the urban/rural poor. For instance those who move to urban areas are also dependent on the public services and are affected by the insufficiency of the government to provide the basic services. The concept of social security as existent in the western hemisphere is absent. The rural poor are the ones at bigger risk because of the corrupt practices. Economic growth promised by politicians is a mere euphemism that comes at the cost of displacement of the rural translating into favours to multinationals (Ruparelia et al., 2011, pp. 35 - 48). The rural populace is by far place at the whims and fancies of the political class in power. Dispossession in the name of economic growth and development affects the lower strata of the society. The harsh reality is that the police themselves assume the role of Mafia, demanding “pizzo” (protection money) from the poor to let them be and yet the government in power led by corrupt politicians can use the police machinery to displace the very poor. Land acquisition on the pretext and in the garb of development is the new bureaucratic scheme for procuring the interests of the land mafia and securing construction projects. Such public policies which fail to attend to and address the exponential dimensions of corruption are unlikely to be successful (Kohli & Singh, 2012, pp. 222-228).

Politics was always foreseen as the instrument of good governance with change and development being the necessary precursors. But corruption has permeated abysmally that development schemes propagated even by NGOs fail to make a dent as the state machinery lacks accountability and politicians veer tax money and benefits to heir vote banks skewing the development and rendering growth programs inefficient. For the state to be welfare oriented, corruption has to be wiped away. In this background a realization has finally dawned upon the middle class that at the end of the day, it is them who has to negotiate with the poor. They have concluded that for their own aspirations to see the light of day, they need to commit to inclusive growth – offer them something so that they are willing to move away from corrupt politics and in pursuance of the same foster new linkages with the poor population. There as to be a conscious endeavour to disengage them from the corrupt politics and develop a positive rift such that the poor and corrupt politicians can never reconcile, thus, eliminating the limb for corrupt politics (Kohli & Singh, 2012).

The arguments elaborated above suggest that changes in employment structures and the persistence of corruption may foster new cross-class collaborations where people come together, as citizens, despite the fact of their belongings to different economic strata’s to pose
their demands and claim their rights from the state. The unifying factor, as the arguments suggests, is the increasing state dependency.

To discuss the possibility of the two aforementioned dimensions contribution to understand AAP and PTI. First, I will assess their electoral base to see if there are new voter groups who are coming up, affected by the increasing state dependency. This will also serve the purpose to see if there has been a cross – class voting for these parties. Furthermore, to measure corruption is difficult as there are no international consensus on its meaning and how it should be measured. The two most common and widely used measurement tool to capture the perception and prevalence of corruption is provided by Transparency international index (CPI). This indicator is perception- based indicator that are based on the opinions and perceptions of corruption given in a country among the citizens and experts. For the purpose of indicating the level of corruption in India and Pakistan these indicators will be used. Moreover, as mentioned above, the common analysis is that corruption has mainly been preoccupation of the middle classes and related to their problems with ‘theft’ of taxes, lack of good services in return and lack of impartial employment criteria, but it now also affects the lower sections of the society. Even if they don’t usually pay the taxes, they have become more dependent on public services in the cities and needs the state, rather than their patronage linkages they had while living in the rural areas, protection against accumulation by dispossession.

To see if the argument of corruption helps to understand the emergence and gluing of the different strata’s of the society, I will in the Indian case focus on the linkages between the formation of AAP and the protest against corruption related to the largest corruption cases in India; the mismanagement of the commonwealth games and the 2G telecommunication scam, which triggered public anger in Delhi, where there have already been problems with service delivery like electricity and water supply. In the case of Pakistan, I will be focusing on the possible linkages between PTI’s re – emergence and PPP five years of rule, mainly focusing on the prevalence of corruption in the government program of BISP.
2.4 Summing up

In this chapter I have discussed various possible theoretical concepts and arguments to approach the empirical puzzle and the purposed research question. Firstly, I have discussed the formation of new political blocks in the global south. Secondly, I have argued that there is a change in the way politicians in the global south reaches out to their voters, focusing on the shifting trend regarding clientelist politics and pointed out to an alternative explanation of populism. Thirdly, I have argued for a possibility a state dependency being prevalent in the global south countries looking at two dimension, informalization of workplaces and corruption, that may have contributed to the new cut class alliance. Before I turn to discuss the cases individually where these concepts and arguments will be applied and further elaborated, I will in the following chapter discuss methodological choices and challenges that have guided the work during the research process.
3 Methodical Considerations

This chapter entails a discussion on the method of inquiry used in this thesis by elaborating on the methodological decisions that have been taken in order to enhance the validity and reliability of the research project. Research is about looking for the truth in social reality (Lund, 2002). The road leading to the search of truth is ridden with many methods. However, there is seldom any consensus on any of these methods being the right one. The use of one is often justified over the other. The process does involve tailoring the preferred one to suit the scenario to arrive at a desired result/goals. However, the question of validity and reliability are central to all research conducted, the former referring to whether the researcher is measuring what it thinks it is, whereas the latter concerns the degree of transparency and trustworthiness on how the research has been conducted (George & Bennett, 2005; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, pp. 23 - 25). The first section of the chapter (3.1) explains the research design, discussing case study as a method and elaborating on the case selections. Thereafter, the second section (3.2) elaborates on the collection of data and sources. The aforesaid paves the way for an evaluation of the method used and the methodological challenges encountered in the study.

3.1 Research design

The project takes a qualitative approach to the case study. Since the objective of the study is to shed light on the purposed empirical-theoretical puzzle concerning the upcoming of two similar new political alternatives in Pakistan and India, employing a qualitative method will open up the possibilities to study the important processes that may have led to the almost similar outcomes in the two countries. This would have been difficult if the study took a quantitative approach that focuses merely on observing correlation between certain factors and its outcomes, ignoring the contextual differences that may exists and be decisive among the cases (Gerring, 2007). Furthermore, the descriptive and explanatory nature of a case study as the method, allows the researcher to conduct a comprehensive and detailed analysis of one or few cases (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 49). To explain the rise of the new political alternatives and the similarities between the two contextually different countries a deeper comprehension of the context is the pre-requisite. As this research project is of an inductive
character, employing this method helps me to generate explanatory theoretical arguments by conducting in depth analysis of the cases focusing on the processes argued for in the previous chapter. Furthermore, nature of the method used in this research project gives a better internal than external validity. The exhaustive and thorough study of the context and the greater elaboration of the concepts, secures the measurement validity of the concepts.

In comparative case studies, a case is commonly referred to as either “most-similar” or “most–different”, relative to the degrees of likelihood for validating the predictions of a model of hypothesis (Gerring, 2007, p. 213). And as it is evident from the empirical puzzle, the present project is a ‘most–different’ comparative study, where both the cases differs contextually but are experiencing political resurgence leading to the rise and emergence of political parties which are quite similar in their approaches and demands, following the same trajectory of political event, addressing corruption and challenging the elite dominated democracy. The cases under examination have, therefore, been handpicked on a substantial basis rather than representative sampling. In south Asia there are few other cases that represent similar historical ties, like Pakistan and India and therefore the sampling universe is limited for this research project (Gerring, 2007).

But having said that, as the external validity of the project is concerned, there is possibly a scope of generalization. Reflecting back on the puzzle this thesis set out to explore, generalization of the findings might be of interest (Gerring, 2007). The purpose of this study is to comprehend the rise of the new political alternatives in the South Asian region. And, therefore, this project contributes to the larger literature about the democratization processes in the global south looking at new explanatory arguments that captures new and addresses problems and options. Several findings may be relevant to other cases as well. This study serves to illustrate and illuminate specifically the scenario in India and Pakistan but along with that it also evolves as a comparative perspective on such other case studies to be conducted. Therefore, by identifying the processes examined in this research project one can argue that the findings in the two cases of the south Asian region might say something about the changes in other countries in the area. In the coming years there will be an upswing of
political engagement in the countries of South Asia and in this regard the experience found in Pakistan and India can provide useful tools to assess the other like changes⁶.

3.2 Collection of data and methodological challenges

This section of the chapter presents some methodological reflections around the usage of the sources for this research project. The section is divided into two subsections where the first part (3.2.1) highlights on some important lessons from the fieldwork and interviews conducted in Pakistan, while the last section (3.2.1) elaborates on the selection and use of the sources.

3.2.1 Fieldwork and interviews

Conducting fieldwork for this project was a natural choice for informing my research process at an early stage in order to elaborate on my empirical puzzle but also for the formation of the explanatory theoretical arguments purposed in the previous chapter; it strengthened my knowledge about the political context in Pakistan and helped me capture the sentiments, political events, perspectives and arguments surrounding the case. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to ensure that important perspectives needed in exploration of the empirical puzzle were not missed. The objective of the interviews was to collect data that would help in either confirming or disputing the explanatory theoretical arguments that I selected for cases. Open – ended questions were asked to let the respondents clearly articulate their thoughts and add as much as they could in their best judgment. This further allowed not only for follow-up questions to be asked but also helped establish a good rapport with the respondents which in turn opened up quite many doors for me regarding the information I wanted to acquire from the interviews (Bryman, 2004).

Moreover, often language serves as a barrier for other researchers not speaking the local language. To overcome these problems one can use an interpreter but there is still a risk of being unsure if the content provided is right or at times the content can be misunderstood and lost in translation. In this research project I have had the chance to secure the internal validity

⁶ Afghanistan and Indonesia – sees a similar emergence of parties. Jokovi and the new elected professor in Afghanistan.
since I am fluent in understanding the language. This again secured a better measurement validity of the concepts used in this thesis.

However, I was only able to conduct a few numbers of interviews, in contrast to what was planned initially due to an unexpected political happening, the drone attack of October 2013 that jeopardized my meeting with the Chief of PTI, Imran Khan. But what worked in my advantage that compensated partially for this were my meetings with three professors (Javid Hassan, Mohammad Waseem and Rasul Baksh), who had been following the elections closely. I also got to interview a known political opponent of the party, Daniyal Aziz, an elected PML –N MP, who shared his views on the party. The snowballing method was used to get in touch with the informants. With my exposure being only nascent to the field, it was difficult to map key informants for the study. Hence, I reached out to one professor at LUMS (Lahore University of Management Sciences) who were kind enough to guide me and put me in touch with other informants.

But since the study uses qualitative interviews, which by natural reason may not be easy to replicate. There are selection biases for whom I have interviewed and whom they have put me in contact with. The results could have turned out differently if someone else conducted the same project; other researchers may interpret the data and conduct the interviews differently from me. One should be aware that people go into the field with different perceptions and knowledge obtained beforehand. I am aware of the fact that my analysis is not unbiased. When entering into the field one needs to overshadow the obtained knowledge from beforehand, but candidly admitting no one enters the field empty handed. Ideas and perceptions obtained from before may play a slight role in how the analysis that has been conducted reflects those thoughts. Not to forget, the nature of the method chosen opens up for subjectivity when analysing the material. Another drawback with conducting qualitative interviews is that it becomes hard to reach people and ask the questions that are similar to the previous researcher. This is the case of this research project where one cannot guarantee that the same people will be available.

Given the challenges met in Pakistan and on account of difficult immigration policies I was unable to travel to India to conduct interviews. Therefore, in line with the triangulation method, I have relied much more on documents as a substitute in both the Indian and Pakistani case. But, the interviews were relevant for the project to construct the complete
picture of the political situation in Pakistan before the elections. As mentioned above, the professors at LUMS closely followed and kept constant tabs on the election and I was able to reap beneficial conversations given their knowledge and experience in this regard.

3.2.2 Document analysis

Document analysis has served as a way of identifying the different explanatory theoretical arguments and important political processes that provides the analytical tools for the study. The sampling of documents has been done on the basis of careful evaluation of the type of information and perceptions of credibility. Parts of the analysis rely on old political events, conducting document analysis have therefore been important to recreate some of the political events this thesis. Document analysis was also necessary on account of my inability to travel to India for conducting interviews and also makes up for the lost opportunities in Pakistan. It is for this reason, as mentioned earlier, that document analysis for this project has been the main source of data.

Relevant media coverage has been used to contextualize the information from the data obtained through interviews and other documents. Since the phenomenon under examination was new, all relevant media coverage has been useful. The preferred sources have been online news portal of Tribune Express, Dawn, India Today, Hindustan Times, Economic and Political Weekly and The Hindu. These have provided an exhaustive coverage of the cases, which has been useful in getting the overview of the public sentiment, people’s perspective, political happenings and the public debates surrounding the entire spectacle. The timespan for the articles used in the case of Pakistani are in the frame of 1996 to 2014, while in the Indian case it’s been mainly the period of 2000 – 2014 that has been examined. It must be noted here that in the case of Pakistan, articles and news reports have been selectively chosen since it was not before the year 2007 that the media emerged from being unbiased and uninfluenced by the government and military in Pakistan. The talks conducted in Pakistan, however, compensate for any bias or prejudice that may have set in so far as media articles are concerned.

Even though the material used has given an insight into the position of the political parties under examination, it has been important to take into account the subjectivity of the
journalists who write these articles. This is one of the reasons for why a combination of different types of sources has been used to get a more nuanced and a comprehensive picture of the situation. And therefore, I have drawn on secondary literature like books and journal articles. These have been useful as means of identifying relevant sources of data as well as verifying and substantiate findings. Previous research has also been useful in terms of filling information gaps, which this project would not otherwise have been able to capture due to limited time and resources. By using secondary literature there is a certain danger of misinterpretation of the fact and the analysis presented, implying an additional threat to validity (George and Bennett, 2005). This risk has been attenuated to a certain extent through reading different scholarly contributions made to the topics relevant for the purpose of this paper to get a more extensive, holistic and critical view on the subject.
4 “The common man politics in India: from the streets to the ballot box”.

This chapter seeks to present the case of Aam Admi Party (of India) by historically recreating the political events that shaped the party in order to answer the proposed research question and empirical/theoretical puzzle. The idea is to give the reader an insight of the politics in India and give a bird’s eye view of the crucial and vital landmarks in the timeline running till the recent electoral developments. Therefore, the chapter intends to establish the analytical backdrop for the further comparison with the case of Pakistan (PTI) in chapter 6, which will elaborate on the purposed research question. The case discussion focuses on the processes/indicators that has been argued for in chapter 2, following this given structure; the first section (4.1) gives an overview of the political situation of today’s India, highlighting some of its major challenges. Thereafter, the second section (4.2) presents the downfall of the Congress led local and national government discussing some of its stumbling blocks, the Bhagidari, NREGA and NFSA scheme. The third section (4.3), presents the formation of AAP by focusing on the anti – corruption movement and its political translation. What ensues thereafter in section four (4.4) is reflections on the theoretical arguments outlined in chapter 2.

4.1 The making of a neo – India

Even after being on the precipice of the 68\textsuperscript{th} year of independence and democracy, the shift from a formal towards a more substantive and substantial democracy, is still an on-going process as the structure still has crevasses to cure (Corbridge et al., 2013). There are diverse reasons that contribute to this problem and just to state two of them: firstly, the enduring and unending corruption and secondly, the nature of the state constantly adapting to the neoliberal policies, has resulted in the overlooking of the needs of the common man as against the prioritization being attributed to high growth and making the corporate class as the main ally of government (Singh, 2013, pp. 8-10). Democracy in India in founded on the minimalistic understanding of the term where voters are needed primarily in the periodic elections and seldom taken into consideration while planning the development of the country. Their role
rarely exceeds the exercise of the electoral franchise as their participation and involvement with the elected representatives is next to zilch. Thus, it is the elites that support political parties financially, contribute to their election funding that end up calling the shots. The interest of the creamy layer achieves superiority as their lobbying with the political parties earns them favors and support and also excludes them from accountability. They, thus, remain insulated while the common man is left to suffer on account of a subservient status (ibid).

Major setbacks to the democracy in India are the uneven development of the country and the issue of corruption that exists at every level of the governance (Kohli & Singh, 2013, pp. 222-223; Singh, 2013, pp. 8-10). It stems from a variety of factors that give impetus to these practices; first of all it is the struggle to keep up with the rest of the world, the struggle for growth. Given the fact that it still enjoys the status of being a growing and developing economy, the country attracts many foreign investors that exploit the country for being labour intensive and having labour wage rates that attribute to persistence of poverty. These firms are awarded government contracts in the name of job creation and development while the picture that actually comes to be painted as against the one projected is more of a jobless growth rather than job creation (Corbridge et al., 2013, pp. 81-85)

Secondly, the country continues to be agrarian in nature and the high population density creates an imbalance in achieving sustainable growth, as dependence on agriculture alone cannot suffice. The result of this is that industrialization marked by factories, manufacturing units, etc. must come at the cost of displacement of the agriculturists. Therefore, the government indulges in its use of the power of eminent domain to seize land from small landholders at rates that are a pittance in the name of growth and development and redistribute it to the highest bidder leading to further corruption and a strengthening of a sense that business people and politicians form a clique held together by a fabric of graft. To get a perception of how much corruption has permeated through the different levels of the country, the world ranking by transparency international reveal that in 2010, out of 178 countries India was ranked at 87th place in corruption, which is even worse than China, Malawi and Mexico⁷ (Kohli & Singh, 2013, pp. 222-223). Attempts to counter these practices have served as lips service. Initiatives combating these issues of corruption have never really

⁷ http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results
garnered much success or political support. The anti–corruption legislation for instance, the Lokpal Bill (dealt with later), been attempted to be passed through the Parliament several times but ended up in vain (Sengupta, 2013). However, the exposition of a series of high profile corruption cases and scandals, the telecommunication scam in 2008 and the mismanagement of the commonwealth games of 2010 (case discussed in detail later) sparked new public anger and brought the issue of corruption in the forefront triggering widespread public anger against the political elite (more precisely the incumbent government) demanding for a clean leadership.

4.2 The Fading legacy of Indian national Congress in Delhi – explaining its electoral defeat

The political elite in Delhi has always enjoyed a position of strength. The state has been a two party state where the contestation for power has mainly been between Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party⁸ (a Hindu nationalist party). The Indian national Congress⁹ (henceforth referred to as Congress) has for three consecutive terms lasting almost a decade and a half governed the city without facing any major party opposition. The city has been a true companion of the party leading it to electoral success in both, state elections (1998, 2003 and 2008) and national elections where the party has swept the city twice by winning 6 seats in 2004 and all seven seats in 2009 (B. Mohanty, 2009). In Delhi the party has had a strong position and has always been predicted as the solid winner of the city; capitalizing on Muslim votes, the slum dwellers and the business elites. Congress, known for their patronage politics have maintained their clientelist networks in the city over the years. Traditionally, the party has been perceived to be an ally of the business elite yet catering to the needs of the voters in the lower sections of the society. Their linkage with the corporate class has been a strong fabric of interwoven relationships and the ‘needy’ ones their main electoral allies. It has also opted for inclusive identity politics gaining votes from the Muslim, lower caste and Sikh societies recognizing the social composition of Delhi (B. Mohanty, 2009, p. 176)

⁸ A hindu nationalist party
⁹ India’s independence party
With the turn of the millennium, to widen their electoral base while keeping intact the traditional vote banks became quite crucial. The frequent adoption of neoliberal policies not only raised the middle classes giving them a significant political role, but also created a divided and unequal society making the lower section more vulnerable than before. The party opted for several new initiatives in hope of serving and gaining votes from all classes and thus changed its political strategy by moving slightly away from their traditional usage of patronage towards adapting more welfare-oriented schemes (Elliott, 2011; Khera, 2013; Singh, 2013). For instance, the electoral win of Congress in the national elections for first 2004-2009 and the second ruling term 2009-2013 came very unexpected and much credit was due to the new initiatives they opted for. Despite the good governance and high growth rates of the former seated government (National democratic Alliance), Congress swept the national elections in Delhi by bagging 6 out of 7 seats in 2004 and 7 out of 7 in 2009. Even at the state elections of Delhi in 2003 and 2008, Congress came out victoriously. The innings of the party was seen as a public rejection of NDA’s economic, social and political agenda and acceptance for their new self-proclaimed image of the ‘aam admi’ (ordinary men). Coined as India shining, the campaign was used as a marketing slogan for the government to promote an economic optimism in India. But even though the economic growth rates of the country increased with nearly 8% annual growth rate under the ruling terms of NDA, it had created a divided and unequal society benefiting certain sections of the society (Khera, 2013; Wilkinson, 2005). The India shining campaign was seen as a cruel propaganda by most Indians who continued to struggle to make ends meet. Even if the statistics presented showed an overall positive development concerning the macro – economic parameters such as GDP growth rate and export, the reality on the ground reflected another truth. For the vast majority, there were still problems concerning job creation, the health services and education. People didn’t buy the promises of a new India that confined itself to specific classes and castes anymore and refuted the manipulative agenda of NDA at the ballot box, looking for other voting options (Reddy, 2004). The bets for two ruling terms were put on Congress and their allies, which formed the United Progressive Alliance\textsuperscript{10} (henceforth referred as UPA), who in this shifting/difficult political landscape found legitimizing formulas that ensured electoral victories opting for flagship programs that related to the broader sections of the society (at least on paper) like the Bhagidari scheme in Delhi, NREGA National rural

\textsuperscript{10} NDA – national democratic alliance
employment guarantee act (henceforth NREGA) and National food security act (henceforth NFSA) (Ravishankar, 2006).

4.2.1 From success to failure: The case of Bhagidari, NREGA and NFSA

The Bhagidari scheme

The concept of Bhagidari (collaborative partnership) envisaged collaboration between the citizens and the city administration for the improvement of the civic services to solve governance problems. The rise of the middle classes in the urban spaces due to the increased economic liberalization seems to play a decisive political role in winning elections. In the national elections of 1999, Congress lost all its seats to its political rival BJP in Delhi, who seemed to have vowed the middle class voters with its agenda for economic growth and development (Wilkinson, 2005). To resonate with and capture the voting middle class, Congress opted for a new governance scheme in Delhi, the ‘Bhagidari’ (citizen-government partnership program) initiative that launched in 2000. The program was not only introduced to dent the middle class support for BJP, but also to respond to the mixed results of governance in the on-going ruling term of Congress in Delhi by creating a form of representative participatory governance (Mehdudia, 2003; A. Mohanty, 2014)

Turning back to the leaves of history, the middle classes political support and relevance for Congress has varied over time. For instance, in the national elections of 2004 they seemed to have played a weak role, numerically, in bringing back the party to power. The mid section of the society was still not sizeable enough, given the high growth rates provided by NDA, and still under construction. The middle classes clanged to the idea of a ‘shining India’, upholding their linkage to NDA who promised growth, jobs and internationalism, viewing Congress as a party prone to the working poor and rural society. But the national polling of 2009 ended the long-standing romance between the mid section of the population and BJP coalition. The reason for the ended relationship finds its roots in UPA -1’s political performance. When voted for in 2004, UPA-1 provided people a steady government with a growth rate of 8,5%\(^{11}\) that expanded the number of middle classes. Another attribute that

\(^{11}\) It is important to note that UPA-1’s steadiness in the growth and social sphere was much due to former (NDA) governments economic policies.
stroke the right chords with the middle classes was their commitment of providing a corrupt-
free and clean political leadership. The trust had already been built back in 2000 when the
party in Delhi as mentioned above gave a larger leverage of self-governance of the city
through the Bhagidari scheme, institutionalizing the collaboration mechanism that gave them
a greater say in managing the city and fuelled the ideas of transparency and accountability
(Mehdudia, 2003; Reddy, 2004).

The initial idea of the Bhagidari scheme was to foster a joint ownership and responsibility
regarding issues connected to the governance of the city empowering the citizens thus
creating better transparency and establishing clear accountability mechanisms. Earlier the
problems were reported to the government that solved the issues without paying attention to
the consequences it had for other sections of the society. The Bhagidari program served as
arena for citizens to come together, discuss the problem and reach a solution with mutual
acceptance. For the first time citizens got the opportunity to meet the appointed officials face
to face to spell out their problems, monitoring their projects and yielding a great deal of
influence over the development projects. This created a feel of empowerment among the
citizens while also reducing the role of governmental officials and MLA’s, infringing their
decision making over spending of the received governmental funding (Mehdudia,
2003(Singhal, 2010)). To institutionalize the citizen’s participation in governance the part
takers had to register or form under an association relevant for them like RWA (residential
welfare association), MTA (Market trading associations). From a humble start of 20 such
associations there was a spatial growth of 1300 registered associations. People found a way to
put their interests and demands to the state. (ibid). The initiative captured not only national
but also international limelight winning the UN award for best public service initiative in
2005. Reflecting back at the repeated electoral success of Congress ministerial candidate,
Sheila Dixit, in 2003 and 2008, the double innings was much due to new avatar of becoming
more developmentalist in their approach capturing the missing middle but at the expense of
losing a chunk of its traditional voters; the voting patterns for the Delhi state elections after
the inception of the program showed uplift in their middle class support (S. Kumar, 2009;
Mehdudia, 2003; A. Mohanty, 2014)

*Congress commitment to inclusive growth*
Similarly then, Congress shifted its political route again for the national elections. The step towards what Congress coined as inclusive growth was first catalyzed by the right-based agenda that sparked up in the shift of the millennium that required social welfare measures. After having performed badly in the previous national elections staying 6 years out of power and doing poorly in the state elections, the party was in hunt for a political issue that could resonate with the voters nationally and attract the lost rural and poor electorate. Since the independence days, Congress knitted itself to its voters, being mostly the rural and poor sections, by adapting a socialist strategy that refuting the idea of economic liberalization. But with the twist of the time they had to support the more market oriented strategy to be able to foster and sustain growth, which disillusioned the sections they initially were supporting against this economic trend catering to other emerging voters; the middle class. However, capturing the opportunity of people’s dissatisfaction with the neoliberal developments under the rule of NDA as earlier discussed, mainly expressed by the rural and poor sections of the society, Congress reconstructed its political strategy that translated into several vote winning pro–poor policies. In its government program ‘The National Minimum Program’ the party introduced two political schemes, which had a national and electoral appeal, the NREGA (National rural employment guarantee act) and NFSA (National food security act). The scheming ideas were both embraced prior to the national elections and became the centerpiece on which the election was contested and won on in 2004 and 2009(Khera, 2013; Ravishankar, 2006).

Both of the initiatives were a direct consequence of the devastating droughts that took place in the state of Rajasthan in 1999 – 2002. The droughts caught a national coverage when it sat in motion several state campaigns that addressed the failures of the state government’s poorly worked out relief measures and the insufficiency of the public distribution system who failed to meet the basic need of people in the affected areas; a report disclosed that food grains for over 60 million was kept in by the Indian government instead of being distributed. Borne out of these events, a number of campaigns gained momentum with their agenda for social rights. NREGA came out as a result of the Right to food campaign that caught the attention nationwide with its member filing public interest litigation before the Supreme Court demanding that accumulating stocks of food in government warehouse be used to meet endemic conditions of scarcity and deprivation. The review of the case by the court, focusing on the pre-existing nutrition schemes and the central government and state governments’
efforts in implementing them turned the already existing nutrition–related schemes into legal entitlements. This further led the foundation for the recognition of both right to food and work as legal entitlements, providing framework for NREGA and NFSB (Corbridge et al., 2013; Khera, 2013, pp. 8-9; Ravishankar, 2006, pp. 9-10).

The campaigns initiated on the state level became political useful for Congress after the party was defeated in several state elections in prior to the general elections. Seeing the activism on the ground for these demands, Congress seized the opportunity to push for the EGA (Employment guarantee act) onto the national agenda for the elections of 2004. The NREGA was enacted in 2005 by the parliament giving the right to 100 days of work of wage employment in public works to all rural households. In 2008, a year before the general elections of 2009, it was extended to all districts of the country. The creation of Congress NREGA, originated from the previous existing schemes of employment guarantees in India. But what differentiated this scheme from the older ones was that it went beyond them to offer a legal entitlement instead of an administrative privilege with a capped budget, which had been the structure of all the previous employment programs (Khera, 2013, p. 10). It was accounted as the largest employment scheme in the world. Another striking difference was that NREGA was a demand-based program, meaning that resource allocation was to be driven by citizens demanding work, rather than bureaucrats determining where work was needed. But meeting the criticism of the programs limitation for not providing any help to elders, pregnant women and the disabled, the demand for a complement to this scheme gained voice. For the national elections of 2009, which Congress won much due to the popularity of NREGA forming UPA-2, the party promised to enact a food security bill if placed in power again. The enactment of what was titled as NFSB took a slow course being an object of several controversies regarding its content. However, it was passed by the parliament in September 2013 into a law that ensured the legal entitlements of several existing food schemes while also aiming to provide subsided food grains to two third of India’s 1.2 billion people. The NFSA was placed under the account of PDS, the Public Delivery System, that ensures the distribution of subsidized food and non–food items to the poor (Khera, 2013).

The high and stable growth rate much credited to the previous government of NDA secured a wide acceptance by the people for Congress to roll out a welfare scheme like NREGA given its extensive character and to even bring onboard the discussion of a possible introduction of
a national food security bill. In the first UPA government in 2004, Congress contributed to the creation of the National Advisory Council (NAC), who played the key role in drafting the NREGA and NFSA legislations (Khera, 2013). The advent of the advisory body was rooted in the historic mandate of the 2004 election and came to be set up by Sonia Gandhi on June 4, 2004. The NAC was set up to provide the government with inputs on policies – together with the civil society activists, inviting those who had been active during the campaigns, and to watch over the National Common Minimum Programme of the UPA government headed by Congress. In the discharge of its functions, thus the NAC placed a special focus on social policy and the rights of the disadvantaged groups. The NAC was viewed by it’s opponents as an extra-constitutional body, a vehicle for populist agendas, kitchen cabinet; it has been criticized and battered by opposition parties and scholars as not in keeping with India's constitution, and that it is actually an alternative, cabinet. The NAC headed by Sonia Gandhi and its council had access to all the cabinet papers and files. This was a departure from the conventions governing a cabinet system. It was like a form of parallel power center that was governing the country without transparency and accountability and diminishing the role of the Planning Commission. However there was an alternative view which stated that the NAC would deepen democracy by facilitating greater pre-legislative/pre-policy consultation. Thus, in another light, it was actually an institutionalized space for giving voice to the marginalized sections while recognizing the supremacy of government and Parliament ("The National Advisory Council Experiment," 2008; Sankaran, 2010).

From success to failure

However, devoting space for social policies in their manifesto may have helped them climb the ladder of power but the allegations against them for serving people dirty and weak leadership became quite evident at the elections; Congress experienced an historical defeat at the state elections held in Delhi in 2013 and the re – election in 2015, receiving 8 out of 70 seats at the first polling and bagging no seats in the second round in 2015. The party performed equally bad in the national elections of 2014 where it failed to garner support from the capital state, contradicting the trend of electoral victory in Delhi. The initiatives, as

12 The NAC was dismantled with the new government BJP after the general elections of 2014.

13 An appointed from top-down and one can’t really say that its members were accountable to anyone.
planned, translated into winning votes for the party during the period of 2003-2009 but the increasing insufficiency of governance and corruption problems affected and tarnished the reputation of the party damaging its rural, and also urban poor and middle class vote banks (Lakin, 2006).

Even though the congress voters, be it the middle class, poor or the rural sections of the society, harvested the benefitted of the different social-governance schemes and enjoyed the stable growth index, it parted ways with the party, withdrawing their electoral support for a number of reasons. Much of their dissatisfaction with the party had to do with Congress association with the large-scale corruption cases that hampered the party’s performance in the second ruling term of UPA-2 and which effected the larger share of the society. In 2008 Congress was hit by one of the largest corruption cases that captured worldwide attention putting the country in the limelight, when 122 mobile licenses covering a third of India’s 2G spectrums were awarded to eight companies out of a total of fourteen. The money collected did not match up with the amount that was mandated to be collected under the law and as reported by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. A scam of sorts, it involved both Congress government officials and politicians being hand-in-glove with each other. Instead of an auction or a fair bidding process, the telecom licenses were awarded on a first-come-first-serve basis and at highly undervalued figures causing a substantial loss to the national exchequer. The loss went much beyond a mere dent in the Indian treasury and would rightly amount to a big hole. Furthermore, in 2010 Congress was yet again hit by another eye-grapping corruption case, the mismanagement of the commonwealth games. The preparation for the event was rife with inefficiency, delays, and embarrassing failures of infrastructure, unhygienic conditions and allegations of graft. The event was projected to cost $500 million, but ultimately cost a staggering and whopping $7.5 billion, becoming the most expensive commonwealth games ever held. A committee was appointed to investigate the matter, and it showed many irregularities: the money spent for the event did not match along the budget projected for the event. The games were criticized not only because of the irregularities but also for the damaging social impact the renewal of the urban city had on the poor. A number of people were dispossessed of their lands/house and not promised resettlement since the year 2004 (and is still questionable till the date), when the Commonwealth planning started. While the urban landscape evolved, it came at a very heavy price of a substantial population being left in the doldrums, unsettled. Being in the limelight for all the wrong reasons got much worse when there was a missing action from Congress side to counter these allegations. No
one from the party’s leadership came out to condemn the increasing corruption. The lack of interest in debating this problem openly seems to have been quite unappealing to the voters (Raghav, 2009)\textsuperscript{14}.

Furthermore, the party failed to address the corruption problems that came within the party, which also contributed to their poor governance performance. Even with a leading scheme like the Bhagidari which was supposed to better the governance performance, congress lost due to the poor implementation of the initiative. The Bhagidari scheme seems to have lost its steam for the last five years and it comes forth that almost 33\% of the programs planned never found their inception dates. Another fact to be tabled is that program has not worked in favor all the sections of the society, even though the initial idea was based on collective decision making. When the Bhagidari scheme rolled out, it seemed to have been more exclusionary rather than inclusive for the poorer sections living in Delhi. The program was elite captured, thus meaning by the middle classes, who clearly had a greater say influencing the collective bargain this scheme sought to promote (Chakrabarti, 2008). Firstly, leaving alone that this program initially was Congress tactic to target the middle classes, its activities was restricted to the ‘planned’ middle class areas as no one indulged in extending this to areas where land occupation of informal settlements challenged the legal aspects. Secondly, there was conflict of interests and concerns. Since the Bhagidari scheme only involved the citizens who had formed an RWA/MTA it limited its reach and undermined the representation aspect of it. There was a large section of the society, which had no form of association; especially people living in clusters, sellers on the street and hawkers. The RWAs had a social composition that reflected a pro-middle class dimension (Chakrabarti, 2008) and therefore the initiatives purposed by these associations more often directed against the poor (A. Mohanty, 2014).

Moreover, the scheme had created a parallel governance track that undermined the power of local politicians affecting the traditional ties between the clients - patrons. As mentioned above, the MLA didn’t possess the power to use funds to breed their traditional patron-client relationships which contributed to loosening their ties to the poor and sections of the society who found themselves excluded and resorted to formal politics. Another widespread problem with this scheme was that it didn’t cater to the frequent migration flow in Delhi. As

\textsuperscript{14} ("Megahurts; India's telecoms scandal.(what the telecoms scandal says about doing business in India)," 2012) – the Economist
newcomers to the city, more often belonging to the lower section of the society had no way in engaging in the on-going governance. The program, which was supposed to create a bridge between the different groups, ended up disillusioning the lower sections of the society (Singhal, 2010).

The soaring inflation and the slowing economy contributed to the already existing discontent. The growth rate in 2013 halved since Congress took to office in 2009 and the inflation rate reached its peek, being the highest since 20 years, outdoing the world average. In times like these, Congress strategy of promising welfare schemes that delivers rations of grains to two-third of Indians, or a guarantee of low paid rural work for poorer households in the name of inclusive growth, seemed to have no traction, especially for the middle class voters. The loss of the mid-section vote was much due to the party’s inability to resonate with them after having opted for increasingly pro-poor policies. As mentioned earlier, the support for NREGA and NFSA, came from almost every strand of the society. Not necessarily because of the nobility, but because the economic growth rate which allowed these actions to be taken; to redistribute wealth there is a need to create wealth too, which the UPA -2 government failed to do so (Reddy, 2004). During the second term of UPA-2, the economy seems to have been growing at less than 5% yearly, which resulted in poor job creations; the evidence that Rina Agarwala (2013) represents in her latest book on India’s informal labour addresses the fact of a growing informalization process both in the formal and informal sector in India. Having their own employment status hijacked, resonating with Congress led government programs that captures the lower/ rural sections of the society became uninspiring for the middle class voters.

Moreover, the initiatives lost their steam in the lower rugs of the society too. Since the inception of NREGA, it has been countering the allegations of corrupt practices, lack of a proper delivery system and resources. Its implementation and effectiveness seems to have vary among the states and in an evaluation of the scheme its been revealed that despite of being fairly successive in meeting the objectives of the legislation, like opening up employment opportunities for women, it still found vast sums which was intended to the scheme in the pockets of local elected and other officials. On the other hand, even the NFSB finds itself of being in doldrums since its inception. Being under the account of PDS, has fuelled a large debate about its feasibility given the corruption charges the PDS faces. Evaluations of the performance of the system reveal its inability to deliver to the poor in a
satisfactory manner and the high rate of diversion of food grains. Even if it prides itself with feeding a large number of the poor in India, the system is regarded as a flawed unit that faces corruption on daily bases on every level, from the elected officials to the ration shops who are charged with theft and corrupt practices (Harriss, 2012, pp. 218-219; Khera, 2013).

The slowing pace of the economy, bad governance, increasing corruption and the soaring inflation seems to have created a mass anger and dissatisfaction giving recognition and opening new spaces to AAP (dealt with later), a new political party as the panacea of all evils and marked the emergence of the majority hope that the situation would be ameliorated by taking Congress out. Congress has led the central government for two terms and faced a deep anger among voters over widespread corruption. Its voters perceived the party to be a dynasty which was disinterested and incompetent to deliver public services due to its own embedded troubles with corruption.

4.3 From propagandists to being the instrument of change: Formation of the Aam Admi Party

4.3.1 The anti-corruption movement: translating into political power

The trajectory of the corruption events in 2008 and 2010 and the increasing corruptibility fuelled public anger against the political leadership of the country, which erupted into large-scale demonstrations in New Delhi, the national capital of India. There had been initiatives in protest against the rampant corruption earlier as well, through the launch of the “India against corruption” campaign, but it did not garner much support. The anti-corruption movement in India caught the eye of the world with a storm on April 5, 2011, when the very popular social activist Anna Hazare supported by a large number of concerned citizenry from different walks of life along with Arvind Kejriwal, a former bureaucrat, sat on an indefinite hunger strike at the monumental Jantar Mantar located in the heart of New Delhi at Parliament Street (better known as Sansad Marg, a stretch of the street is demarcated for protests) in a united stand to put an end to corruption pervading the system at every level. The demand was drafting of a legislation that could establish an anti-corruption ombudsman known as Lokpal, which would serve as a politically independent functionary capable and empowered
to hold all parts of the government, including the office of the prime minister accountable for
corruption charges/allegations. The movement was true reflection of the Indian Constitution
tenet, “unity in diversity” against corruption. The protests in New Delhi grew and so did the
pressure on the government. After seeing the public anger and the expansion of the
movement the government succumbed to the pressure and agreed to draft and introduce the
bill. The bill unfortunately drafted was merely a compromised legislation and opened up for

There were speculations of this movement turning into a political party, but Anna Hazare
refuted the news. He was quite clear about the fact that the political route was not for him. He
stated that he could support a progressive party, but would not lead it as he was an ordinary
man and not a politician. He wanted to stay outside the political arena to fight for his cause
rather than creating a political party, pointing towards three major reasons for his political
abstinence. Firstly, he argued that meeting the expenses of the election process is difficult for
social movements due to lack of resources. Secondly, he held the voters accountable for
progressive parties demise due to their lack of loyalty, which more often was steered and
influenced by material and parochial considerations rather than the issues of common good
and public interests. Thirdly, he further questioned the discipline and loyalty of the
candidates presented by the movement. He argued that even if they would be elected
successfully it would be near to impossible for the elected representatives to remain faithful
to their cause due to the tempting trappings of power (A. Kumar, 2013, p. 13; Sengupta,
2013).

However, the guess – work of this movement transforming into a political party became a
reality when the news of the split became public on the October 12 in 2012 and India saw the
formation of a new political party christened the Aam Admi Party (common mans party)
headed by Arvind Kejriwal. The split was explained as a disagreement between Anna Hazare
and the forces within the movement who wanted to go political. The main and the underlying
reason was that the movement had started to lose the pace and the unresponsive government
triggered the activists to take a political step. The bill was seen to have hit rough weather
enshrouded in dark clouds and the second round of drafting the Lokpal bill clearly showed
that the movement had lost its steamy edge and media coverage. In addition to that, there
were several voices that started appearing in the public discourse that called this movement
undemocratic given its demands and methods that stood outside and in stark contrast to the
constitution. Even the civil society organization and a strand of the supporters joined the establishment in their accusation against the movement.

The reasoning for this was the much-celebrated political fact of India having a democratic tradition of elected government that makes the policies, takes the decisions, and decision-making following the due process through the democratic channel. This allegation being in line with the idea of protecting the procedure of democracy gave the government the change to justify their dear ears to the movement by stating that the street ‘capturing’ and demands was undemocratic – therefore the argument of creating a political party that could legitimzie the demands served as a crucial point in achieving the demands proposed. On the launch of the AAP party, the leader of the party stated that they were not up for power, but wanted power to change the system not only to replace the government. He further stated that they did not give up the Jan Lokpal Bill movement, but paved a more progressive way for this bill to succeed realizing that change only comes through politics. In an interview with a newspaper, Arvind Kejriwal stated the following: “Initially we did not start out wanting to contest an election. For two years now we have been asking the UPA government for just one thing, to pass the Lokpal bill. They said, if you want one, why don’t you enter Parliament and pass the bill yourself?” With this AAP challenged the political establishment in Delhi by announcing that they were going to enter the race themselves and contest the state election in Delhi and promised to go national for the general elections of 2014 (Singh, 2013,(A. Kumar, 2013, p. 13).

4.4 Challenging the old political elite: the spectacular win in Delhi of AAP

It was predicted by the leadership of Congress that AAP would not create history in Delhi and they really underestimated the power of the newly formed party. Defying all the predictions, the assembly elections of 2013 in Delhi saw a huge turnout for the AAP. It bagged around 40% of the votes in the city, which translated into 28 seats sweeping out the dominance of Congress and preventing the resurgent of BJP from securing a majority, Even though the government led by Arvind Kejriwal resigned after being barely in office for 49 days due to the opposition it faced by BJP and Congress over the introduction of the Jan Lokpal Bill, the party keeping its promise went on to contest the national elections emerging
as the second important political force but only to gain mediocre results. But the active campaigning by AAP watered down the political elites image (Harriss, 2015, p. 23).

The party stuck to their anti-corruption and citizens’ stand (including citizens’ right to public services) keeping the people reminded throughout their electoral campaign. Living the day and night by courage, the party brought to light names of corrupt politicians whose names were covered up and protected by the government in power which results in some high profiled resignations. The outcome of this was that the legitimacy and political position of the old elites, especially Congress, both took a fall (A. Kumar, 2013). The party struck chords with the voters again at the assembly elections of 2015 in Delhi, celebrating their spectacular win of 67 out of 70 elected seats, leaving many of political analysts who had blown off AAP’s victory due to its ‘passable’ performance in the Lok-Sabha elections stumped. From being initially dismissed with epithets like “anarchists”, “populist” or the “fleers”, the campaign seems to attract the vast, hitherto silent but now stirred majority, given the admiring response to its innovative campaign style and unblemished personal records of its leadership. It was the first party in India that had been created by people from the civil society, who usually thought that politics is a dirty game plagued with corruption (Singh, 2013). This political party has been seen as the bulwark against the established political governance in Delhi, and is perceived to be a new political block that stands against all the old parties.

4.4.1 The projection of newness

There were several aspects and practices of the party that people found novel, attractive and new, which were not to be found in any other ruling party. For instance AAP’s electoral campaign projected a newness which was based on promises like cleansing the system from all corruption in a fixed number of days, to recreate politics and democracy from scratch focusing on issues like citizens’ livelihood, basic amenities, active participation and corruption. Here is looking at the different traits of the party, which helped them create the new political block:

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15 Lok Sabha is the name for the general elections held in India.
Being an ideological offspring of the anti-corruption movement earned the party and its founding members great credibility. The activists’ contribution in the movement and their long repertoire of campaigning for issues relating to the poor, the environment, for peasants, workers mobilization, which has resulted into several laws and legal entitlements for the underprivileged, seems to have worked the party’s favor. Their profile being known in the public sphere further tossed the allegation made by the rival parties of their upsurge being merely an opportunistic stunt to capture power by cashing in on the popularity of the anti-corruption movement (A. Kumar, 2013, p. 11). Another attribute of the party, which distinguished them from the other ruling elite, was their stand against the dynastic political culture. Emphasizing the need for democratic practices within the party, they fielded candidates for the Delhi elections of 2013 and 2015 locally focusing on three selection criteria giving every aspiring a fair chance, tossing away the old embedded structures of nepotism found in the elite party; 1) members of the same family were not allowed contest the elections, 2) it did not promise or allow special privileges for elected representatives emphasizing their disgust with the prevalence of the VIP culture inherited from the British Raj, 3) the eligibility of the candidates were also to be scanned for corruption charges before giving them a clean chit (Harriss, 2015).

Furthermore, the party’s focus was set on building an active citizenship reviving the Gandhian Swaraj model that embrace the idea of transferring the power of steering governance and rights in the hand of the people, without indulging in what is called ‘politics of usual’ in this case being the caste and class based politics. Tossing the regular ways of attracting voters with material incentives, ideological affinity or collective identity projects, the party chose to invite people as citizens emphasizing the need to overturn the politics from above by creating a mobilization of people from below. In line with this vision, AAP built their 2013 manifesto by having a door to door campaign by talking to people in Delhi. Their strategy was to indulge in personal interaction with the masses to understand their grievances to convince the people that the party was serious in their claim to reinstate democracy that spelt transparency in its every decision-making and sans corruption. Following up on this strategy, AAP launched the concept of ‘Delhi Dialogue’ in which it organized a number of meeting, round table discussion and opened up for online consultations in order to forge a partnership between the party and the citizens to draw up the electoral manifesto for the elections of 2014 – 2015 fuelling the idea of deliberative democracy. This came clearer to expression when the party in its electoral manifesto for 2015 promised to legislate the Swaraj
act to devolve power directly to the people to ensure local considerations for decision making, through its ‘70 point action plan’ (A. Kumar, 2013, p. 11). In the previous election of 2013, the party had voiced for an alternative citizen based collaboration scheme in Delhi titled Mohallah Sabhas, which they argued, was done in a more democratic manner. These actions represented a shift from offering citizens mere representation to actively engage them in a participatory model of democracy making them conscious of their rights and roles as citizens (Harriss, 2015, p. 22). Moreover, the party’s 49 days in office became the visible testament to the results of AAP’s politics defying the allegations of being a mere reflection of the old timed populist agenda. The party convinced the citizens of Delhi by turning their politics into actions, implementing all its poll promises made for the elections of 2013 illustrating its capacity to bring a change in providing good and clean governance.

A huge crowd had come out to vote for AAP and consisted of even those who were apolitical non – voters in India, the middle class section, the awakened youth and also the urban poor seemed to have been attracted by the new political alternative much credited to its achievements in its brief tenure. The party extracted votes from constituencies with large number of slum clusters/ jhuggies who before the entre of AAP belonged to Congress support base. AAP’s direct relation to and inclusion of the poor seemed to have circumvented the traditional patronage networks, which usually established itself on indirect relationship, upholding the hierarchical power structure. On the other hand a number of professionals and middle class voters (mainly those who are linked to the public sector, petty show owners) voted for the party in need for a non – corrupt political alternative due to their experience with everyday issues like inflation, unemployment and insufficiency in public delivery (Harriss, 2015, p. 24) In addition to partly erasing the importance of class, the party’s citizen approach to politics resonated with different religious and caste groups. The Muslim vote has traditionally belonging to Congress given the strong pro-hindu aspect of BJP. At the assembly elections of 2013 the Muslim vote found itself divided between Congress and AAP but shifted its course for the elections of 2015 voting for AAP. Also the Sikh community voted for the party in a sizeable proportion. Turning to caste based votes, the Dalits seemed to have voted for AAP in large numbers as all the fielded candidates for the reserved seats was swept by the party (Sanjay Kumar, 2015). Its electoral focus being on issues like access

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16 The document is available on their website: www.aamaadmiparty.org
17 The achievements stated in their ’70 point action plan’ - http://aamaadmiparty.org/sites/default/files/Action%20Plan.pdf
to water and electricity and its pricing seems to have glued the society which in real divides itself along class and caste lines.

### 4.5 Summing up: Reflections on the theoretical arguments

In this chapter I have discussed the downfall of Congress, pointing to the rise of the new political alternative AAP. The following section will present some reflections around the processes and indicators that were outlined in chapter to in order to explain and analyze the case in question.

*The changing method of political inclusion: Clientelism versus Right-based Populism*

In order to discuss new possible openings that may have paved the way for AAP to come up, I argued in section 2.1.1 that Manor’s strategy of *supplementing clientelism* would be used to assess the different initiatives taken by Congress, the Bhagidari scheme, NREGA and NFSA to show how the party lost the elections by indicating that clientelism in any form, seems to be unattractive to the voters who are in need of direct relations due to the structural changes that pose new economic and social problems. The political reality of the schemes examined in this chapter, the Bhagdari scheme, NREGA and NFSA, were much in line with Manor’s argument about politicians in the global south opting for ‘post clientelist’ initiatives only aiming to supplement the already existing networks rather than curtailing them. The initiatives aimed to capture the larger share of the society but showed quite many irregularities in implementation and efficiency due to corruption. The party failed to detect the programs from elected officials and politicians who shuffled the resources for their own benefits. The schemes seem to have contributed to the electoral fall of Congress in the Delhi state elections where the indirect linkages between the voters and the party seem to have weakened over the tarnishing reputation of the party. They appeared to be disconnected from the voters, from the lower sections of the society to the middle classes, due to the increasing corruptibility and failing to resonate with its voters on the ground, being caught up in solving their own corruption cases. This as argued, opened up the political space for other actors to come in to fill the position of the missing leadership.
As an alternative to this method of political inclusion I discussed the possibility of the emergence of populism. The type of populism, given the different forms it takes, needed to be empirically decided, but to determine that the party takes a populist en-route needs to be assessed by looking at four common characteristics by scanning the party manifesto: (1) the people are defined as a homogeneous and pure entity, avoiding class analysis, (2) the elite as a corrupt entity, (3) the people and the elite as two antagonistic groups, and (4) favor measures to give power back to the people, measure suggesting direct democracy.

The case reveals that contrary to Congress, the AAP opted for a method of political inclusion that tossed the usage of any form for clientelism. Without confining itself to a certain section of the society or to adapting to any ‘ism’ that could divide the voters along ideological lines, the party leader defined the people as citizens, dodging the party away from caste, class and religious affiliations. Instead of providing its voters with ideological packages, they put up four conviction points that sought to place the power in the hands of the people: the building of the Gandhian Swaraj, abolishing the VIP culture putting the common man first, pinpointing the importance of democratic institutions and voiced against the elitist majoritarianism. Furthermore, as discussed above, the party had throughout its election campaign portrayed the elite as corrupt by charging several politicians in position with corruption allegations, publicly announcing their names, creating a feel of us versus them. This helped the party to position themselves away from the elite and came fourth as a new political force, mobilizing people using right-based populism, focusing on demands for effective citizenship and universal rights.

State dependency

I discussed two dimensions that encapsulated the meaning of the argument of state dependency in this thesis; the informalization of workplaces and corruption. The arguments suggests that changes in employment structures and persistence of corruption may foster new cross – class collaborations where people come together, as citizens, despite the fact of their belongings to different economic strata’s to pose their demands and claim their rights from the state. In order to see if this argument served as a feasible explanation, I pointed out to three assessing point. Firstly, by scanning the electoral support base to see if there had been new voter groups coming up effect by this and to see to combo of it to see the cross cut class
alliance. Secondly, the corruption perception index by Transparency International would use to get a perception of how much corruption has permeated through the different levels of the country. Furthermore, to see if the argument of corruption helps to understand the emergence and gluing of the different strata’s of the society, I argued to focus on the linkages between the formation of AAP and the large – scale corruption cases in India.

As the case reveals, the breeding ground for the formation of AAP was the eruption of the massive cut-class demonstrations in Delhi against the large – scale corruption cases that Congress was drawn into in the beginning of 2010. The perception of the country being highly corrupt by the Indian citizens was revealed by the CPI index in 2010 that placed India on the 87th position in the ranking of 178 countries, surpassing China, Malawi and Mexico. Middle classes, the youth and even the lower sections of the society, which normally confined themselves to political parties being hooked in their patronage – client networks, joined the movement. By scanning the electoral support base of the party, the case revealed that the party drew votes from all sections of the society in Delhi, from the non – voters, middle class and the youth who mainly had opt out of politics to the slum – dwellers and informal workers.

*New political block*

In assessing if the party represents a new political block, I pointed to three indication indicators to be assed in the party building process of AAP. Firstly, there needs to be a shift in demanding one issue towards more ideas. Secondly, there is a need to see if some sort of political organization is provided to scale up the demands and contest elections. And thirdly, there has to be effort towards democratic practices and representativeness within the political organization that reflects the different interests and segments of the society.

The party building process of the party reveals that they sought to build a new political block against the elite. The formation of AAP as discussed was an ideological offspring from the anti – corruption movement that translated itself into a political party after the movement met with critics and was losing pace with the protesters due to the growing fragmentation. They turned into being a political block by shifting its focus from demanding the lokapal bill by adding other demands to their approach, adding demands from grassroots in their manifestos. AAP provided a political overarching organization to the demands and announced the
electoral contestation. To appear as new and democratic, they operated with democratic practices within the party to appear contrary to the dynastic parties. The fielding of their candidates followed processes that ensured that the elected representatives for the party had no corruption charges on them or were related to any other representative aimed to fight on the party ticket.
5 Towards a new Pakistan: the return to democracy

This chapter serves the same purpose of the previous one. Here I will present the case of Pakistan Tehreek –e- insaf by historically recreating the political events that shaped the party. The chapter intends to establish the analytical background for the further comparison with the case of AAP, which will elaborate on the purposed research question. The case discussion focuses in the processes that have been argued for in chapter 2 following this given structure; the first section (5.1) starts with situating the political situation of Pakistan today, focusing on the recent democratic transition experienced in the country. Thereafter, the second section (5.2) presents the downfall of Pakistan People’s Party led national government discussing its major stumbling block, the BISP scheme. The third section (5.3), presents the formation of PTI by discussing its re– emergence on the political map of Pakistan. What ensue thereafter in section four (5.4) is reflections on the theoretical arguments outlined in chapter 2.

5.1 Elections of 2013: marking five years of democratic rule

Pakistan’s democratic future has been quite uncertain since its initial years of independence. The country has been alternating between military and civilian rule; on one hand the democracy has never gotten the chance to be rooted while on the other hand the military domination, which has been on - going for almost 31 years of the state’s existence, has never garnered enough legitimacy from the people as a ruling form (Cohen, 2011, p. 91). The civilian governments have always found itself overturned by the military due to allegations of corruption and mismanagement issues. The constant tug of war for power between the elected government and the military has created a political instability, which has further given impetus to the strengthening of the regional divides, poor governance, a polarized party system, radicalization of Islamic politics and endless corruption. Struggling in the mid of this, Pakistan has therefore found it difficult to uphold a democratic self-perception time to time. However, the general elections of 2013 marked a new historical chapter in Pakistan’s democratic history. The democratically elected government finished its five years rule
without being interrupted by the military, upholding the idea of supremacy of the elected parliament. Accompanying that, there are other striking achievements that need to be celebrated; firstly, the alternation of the usual bipolar election contestation. The emergence of new political activism manifested the last 5 years made the electoral environment more competitive and unpredictable, challenging the old elite. Almost all political pundits got the results of the elections wrong, which usually has been easy to predict In the longest time, Pakistan saw a three-way contestation for power (Ayesha, 2013; Basit, 2013; S. Zaidi, 2013).

In addition to that, the voter turnout was also impressive. If the allegations of the election rigging is put aside, the election turnout was around 60%, which was remarkably high compared to previous elections in the country. Other than that, Pakistan saw a number of new voter groups, who usually opts out of politics, reaching the ballot box, especially the youth who seemed to have really been politically engaged (Iqtidar & Munir, 2013, p. 1).

But given these extraordinary accomplishments, there is still a need to ask what really is being celebrated. If the five is to be summed up, the picture that appears is less celebrative and more disturbing. Pakistan still finds itself in a grim situation of dealing with massive terrorist attacks fuelled by foreign intervention, military domination, increasing tales of corruption, poor governance, rising unemployment and a sagging economy. Political actors committing to a change of this situation find themselves missing the opportunity to turn around the situation in Pakistan due to the political structures fostered in the country, which doesn’t allow progressive actors to succeed The remarkable high voting turn – outs should been seen as people’s dissatisfaction with the current situation that they have marked through casting their votes, voting out the seated government in hope for a new real democratic transformation (Irfan Ghauri, 2012; Talbot, 2012, pp. 232 -233).

5.2 The fading legacy of Pakistan Peoples Party: explaining its electoral defeat

In the early years of 2000, Pakistan experienced an increased political activism on the ground that challenged the dominance of the military and reinstating the idea of democracy in the minds of the voters. In 1999 the military had seized power and Pakistan experienced a major democratic setback. It was accounted as the worst reversal in the era of third wave of
democratization given its population size and geographical placement. The collapse of the democracy was drastic as it conflicted with the newly flourishing idea of democracy in the global south (Diamond, 2000, p. 92). It was a bloodless coup that was encouraged and supported by all the opposition parties that accused the government led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the time for mismanagement and corruption. However, the nine years of military rule proved to be even more devastating. Pakistan was dragged into the international fight against terrorism post 9/11 that created security issues and damaged the economy; the state sovereignty seemed to have been overtaken by external forces, while the General fulfilled every demand from the allies at the expense of the population’s security that seemed to be under threat. The double-digit inflation numbers, superficial price rises and the declining economy further strengthened the resentment on the ground. Pakistan’s GDP and security issues became closely linked; the direct foreign investments declined and the constant bombings took at toll over the infrastructure and the employment opportunities (Talbot, 2012, p. 203).

It was the lawyers’ movement in 2007 that enacted the move towards a democratic process, by toppling the military dictator due to his decision of suspending Iftikhar Chaudry, the chief justice of Supreme Court, who ruled against the General Musharraf’s improper privatization of the country’s steel mill. The suspension of the judge set in a motion of grass-root movements that reinvigorated Pakistan’s civil society which clearly expressed a widespread democratic will of participation and representation. The General who failed to resonate with the shifting public political opinion on the ground towards the military due to the martial law and the fight against terrorism post 9/11 that had created security issues and damaged the economy of the country, opened up for election by resigning from his post as the Chief of army, inviting former exiled politicians (Benazir Bhutto from PPP and Nawaz Sharif from PML-N) to contest the elections. Even if the movement lost its steam owing to the fact of its increasing fragmentation and sectional interest aspect, it marked the opening of the spaces that allowed other forms of political activism to create and bring about democratic process in the country where the democracy from the past had largely been limited to the voting system. It offered yet another opportunity for a political transformation of the country handing the marathon stick of change to Pakistan Peoples Party (Ahmed, 2010).
5.2.1 Democracy as a revenge: the comeback of PPP

Pakistan Peoples Party (henceforth referred to as PPP) is one of the oldest parties in Pakistan, which was formed in 1967 by a left-leaning populist and a feudal leader, Zulfikar Bhutto. The Bhutto’s prominences and popularity was first earned in its initial years of formation when he reinstated democracy in the country in the 70s, being the first one post-independence, to confront the military dictatorship in Pakistan. Promising to break Pakistan from its past through his charismatic and radical appeal, he held out for the masses the prospects of economic as well as political empowerment (Ahmed, 2010). Bhutto enjoyed a nationwide political support due to his expressed want for a real democratization of the country. He claimed to represent the masses that opposed the military dictatorship and to abolish the culture of elite - and feudal dominated politics. After being sworn into office in 1971, he brought to live his vision of introducing an Islamic social democracy by opting for numerous policies that were in line with the idea of socialism; land reforms for the peasants, nationalisation of the industry in order to weaken the industrialist and administrative reforms to reduce the power of the elitist bureaucracy (Talbot, 2012, p. 109). However, four years in power didn’t bring about any changed that the masses had hoped for. Bhutto obtained political control and legitimacy through merging into the existing political structures, reinventing the patronage system, military domination and upholding the tension between the centre and the provinces, narrowing the democratic opportunity that was served to him. He seemed to have adapted to the old concept of politics that favoured patronage and vertical rather than horizontal networks of mobilization and also remaining committed to the long standing idea of the elite in Pakistan that strong army and a unitary state were crucial for its survival. Even if he voiced for a real democracy in Pakistan, the reality beneath the surface was from being democratic; on one hand he appeared to be an autocratic leftist while on the other hand he was still catering to the feudal lords demands. Bhutto was replaced by the military again in 1977s in the charges of corruption and mismanagement and hanged to death (Talbot, 2012)

The PPP was inherited by Zulfikar bhutto’s daughter Benazir Bhutto, who lead the party through short period victories again in 1988 and 1993, being the first ever Muslim woman to head the government (Talbot, 2012, pp. 112-113). The party has upheld the usage of ‘Bhuttoist’ politics in maintaining the dynastic leadership, their patron – client linkages in the
rural communities of Sindh and Punjab, indulging in corruption and the left leaning populist sloganeering of ‘Roti Kapraa and Makan’ (Food, clothes and house). However, its national support base has been reduced to extracting votes from the landowning community, workers and rural voters. Charged with a number of corruption allegation and mismanagement the leader went to self – imposed exile to London and remained outside the political arena for almost a decade. When invited back to contest the elections in 2007, the party who was out of credibility and lost connection with its voters the party tried to find an opportunity to reinvent its image and party to resonate with the broader sections of the society and the polling of 2008 opened up the possibility to do so (Malik, 2010, p. 66).

After nine years of being absent from the political sphere, the party regained its political position in 2007 when its leader, Benazir Bhutto, returned from exile to contest the national elections. The active campaign rallies resonating and fuelling the publics’ opinion for a political change earned the party great scores at the pre- election opinion polls. However, the party suffered a temporarily setback when its Charismatic leader, Bhutto, was assassinated at the rally held in Rawalpindi. The death of Bhutto at first shuffled the winning potential of PPP as it lost its central political figure. Keeping that in mind, the party fell in doubt on if it would contest the elections at all, given that the PPP voters mainly casted their votes based on the party’s political figure rather than its policies or ideology. However, PPP overcame that problem by strategically capturing the public outpouring of grief and anger against the many misdeeds of the military, announcing it’s electoral contestation emphasizing the need to reinstate democracy as a response to the brutal act of killing Bhutto and to end the long standing military dominance (Malik, 2010). The electoral win of PPP came at no surprise due to the Pro – Bhutto sentiments that flourished throughout the election period. The party experienced a landslide victory at the polling of 2008 by securing 88 seats in the national assembly, putting the leader of the party, Asif Ali Zardari (the widower of Bhutto) in position. It seemed to have nested votes in all for provinces of Pakistan; in Punjab PPP where the party usually performed averagely, it secured 29% of the votes. Similar trends were seen in Sindh and NWFP (North West Frontier Province). What came as the biggest, and probably only surprise was the party’s performance in Baluchistan where it received 4 out of 10 seats, given the dominance of the regional separation sentiments (S. A. Zaidi, 2008, p. 8).

Apart from the gaining sympathy votes, the party showed an active part – taking in the election campaigning. Seeing the recent political activism on the ground by the lawyers, PPP
saw the need to reinvent itself to resonate with the larger share of the population in order to gain power. Prior to the elections, PPP seemed to have struck chords with the voters by addressing several ambitious electoral promises in its manifesto it sought to deliver once in office. In addition of promising to solve the nationwide security and economic issues, it voiced for the need to opt for social protection programmes to address the after effects of the devastating almost a decade long military rule which had given rise to unemployment and poverty for indulging in the foreign led war against terrorism (News, 2013). There were numerous of newness points in the manifesto of 2008. For instance, the party articulated the idea of introducing a ‘Public work Program’ (PWP)\textsuperscript{18} that would guarantee a years work to one working member of a poor family\textsuperscript{19}. Furthermore, as idealistic as it sounded given the political situation they were about to be handed over, it promised to deal with the security threats, a rapid growth of the economy based on equity and promotion of a much awaited real democratization\textsuperscript{20}. Even if the PWP never saw its inception date, it was replaced by another social protection program that partially compensated for it. In its projection of bringing a true democracy on the plate and to obtain its political legitimacy, the party created an extensive and the largest social welfare program in Pakistan, BISP (Bhutto Income Support Program), shortly after being sworn into office, which was welcomed by a cross party agreement who shared the party’s sentiments that something significant needed to be done to protect the poor from the on-going economic crisis (Talbot, 2012, pp. 201-223). With BISP, the party aimed to fulfil its electoral promise of alleviating poverty and to uplift the purchasing power of the lowest sections of the society by unconditional cash transfers of 1000 rupees monthly. The government of PPP earmarked 2\% of the GDP to its new flagship program and on-boarded international donors, like the World Bank, for technical and financial, which provided a stronger base of legitimacy to the program (Koehler & Chopra, 2014, p. 157).

There were several aspects of the program that projected the newness PPP hoped to portray to its voters to uphold its political legitimacy and popularity: firstly, the program was launched in all four provinces of the state, targeting the poor households in the areas and transferring the money directly to the women instead of giving it to the “head of the family”. Moving away from its usual representation and political biasness towards specific segments of the

\textsuperscript{18} Inspired by the Indian NREGA Scheme (Manor, 2013, p. 243)
\textsuperscript{19} \url{http://www.ppp.org.pk/manifestos/manifesto2008.pdf} (the manifesto is available on the website of the party)
\textsuperscript{20} ibid
society, the party opted for a more universal program, being the first party in Pakistan to do so, by voicing for its national reach. Also the idea of women empowerment seemed to have been new, given the trend of placing the state benefits in the hand of the man. Secondly, the program was designed in a way that tried to overcome the long-standing problem of the existence of patronage systems at the local level. In ensuring that the money reached the needy ones, the elected representatives, who identified the beneficiaries for the program, were to be held in check by a third party to assure a transparent and political unbiased targeting. NADRA (The National database registration authority) got the task of verifying the selections by re-checking it with its own database (Koehler & Chopra, 2014, pp. 150 - 154).

The first years after the inception of the program, the initiative seemed to have generated a number of positive outcomes. It had during 2008 – 2009 given cash transfers to 3.5 million families, which accounted for approximately 40% of the people living under the poverty line in Pakistan. Moreover, 34 billion rupees were further allocated to the program ensuring that school going kids were sent to school by the cash transfers. Other than that, it provided more than 27 billion marginalized women with an identity through the making of CNIC (Identity cards). However, there were still loopholes in the program that skewed the early successes in the opposite direction, merging into what was called ‘politics of usual’: political favouritism and corruption (Koehler & Chopra, 2014, pp. 150 - 163).

5.2.2 From success to failure

Even if the party prided itself for marking a new political chapter in Pakistan’s democratic history, by hosting the transition and creating the largest social protection program, it was far from being appreciated for completing its 5 years in office. The general election of 2013 illustrated the anti – PPP sentiments of the voters who put a question mark on the party’s credibility and long-standing popularity. Experiencing a historic nationwide defeat, the party translated its votes into 31 national assembly seats, marking a noticeable downfall from the previous popular election of 2008. The declining graph of the party was much attributed to its poor performance in delivering public services, the slow economic growth, the increasing unemployment and the endless corruption scandals. The party, since it took office seemed to have aimed at solely surviving the five years of rule by keeping the military under its wings, indulging in corruption, maintaining their old patronage system and ignoring its electoral promises, rather than bringing about the democratic transformation of the country it had
promised to its voters at the foregoing electoral polling. The security issues related to the rising radicalization remained a bitter political reality due to the lack of will and ability to deal with nations biggest demon, Taliban, who continued to target civilians and the government. Furthermore, economic and social issues went unattended by PPP. Even though the economy seems to be stable it still didn’t deliver on the party’s promise for a rapid and inclusive growth. The power crises and the high inflation digits contributed to massive lay–offs, falling export and production rates and a decline foreign investment (Ayesha, 2013). Another drag on their party’s reputation was their handling of the flood crises in 2010. Not only was, the president and Chief of PPP, Asif Ali Zardari out of town, but the political interference in the flood aid delivery was bothersome as they ensured that their voting constituencies were prioritized for medical care and supplies for food at the expense of others (McElroy, 2010). The following year Pakistan was also ranked as 143th most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency international21.

PPP electoral failures got strengthened with its inability to manage the corruption and insufficiency charges on the BISP program that showed many irregularities. Since its initial days of inceptions, even though it gained widespread popularity, it struggled to keep its new image and be the practical example of the long time sloganeering of the party ‘roti, kapra and makaan’. The program was charged with allegations of corruption, being highly politicized and subjected to political favouritism. The opposition parties together with the government allies accused the party of using this program to gain electorally. A number of disturbing facts about the program and its implementation were revealed. Firstly, the program had an extensively outreach in the provinces that were the party had a stronghold. Punjab, being the most populace province, and also a stronghold of PML- N, had the lowest ratio of the beneficiary families, where Sindh, a province with traditional ties to the party, beneficiary families were trice as higher than Punjab (Irfan Ghauri, 2012). Furthermore, it failed to overt political opposition by the elected representatives. Indulges in corruption and extraction from the program for private gains continued to be a reality. The cash transfers was also not direct, was going through the post offices, and complaints were made that the beneficiaries had to pay bribes to get their money. Moreover, the targeting proved to be insufficient when untargeted subsides like oil, rice and wheat prices increased. Even the soaring economy and

21 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results
the problems with tax allocation posed serious problems to the sustainability and efficiency of the program (Koehler & Chopra, 2014, pp. 154-158).

Having pumped in billions in the BISP program, ignoring problems like electricity and ending load shedding, the program did not help PPP to emerge any strong, in fact quite the opposite. The party’s leadership reached out during the election of 2013 to promise that the stipends for BISP would be increased if put in power, but they still failed to leave their mark on the elections (AAP, 2013).

Most of promises in BISP program, economic and social issues went unattended and remained a bitter political reality due to irregularities of the scheme. The party lost a great share of votes in all four provinces; the vote share in Punjab went from 29% to 11%, translating into 2 NA seats. In Baluchistan and NWFP, the party was almost wiped out of the political map by not retaining a single seat in Balochistan and gaining barely 3 seats in NWFP. Sindh was the only province in which it upheld its legacy, however with a slight reduction in the vote share (News, 2013). The reduction of the party was much attributed to its poor performance in delivering public services, the slow economic growth, the increasing unemployment and the endless corruption scandals. The mismanagement of five years surely opened up spaces for other actors to come in and fill the space.

5.3 From a cricketer to a game-changing politician: The formation of Pakistan Tehreek – e insaf (PTI).

5.3.1 The early stumbling block for PTI

The popularity of Imran Khan, a former cricketer and now the chief of PTI, has always been huge in Pakistan. Ever since he led the country to the victory of Cricket world cup in 1992, he has been marked as the national hero. Not only cricket hooligans look up to him, but also over the past years Khan has made his place in the society through his philanthropic activities, which have earned him respect and painted a very righteous portrayal of him (McElroy, 2010). In 1996 Imran Khan announced his political debut with the formation of the party Pakistan Tehreek-e-insaf (henceforth PTI), also labelled as Pakistan’s social
movement for justice, aimed against the corrupt ruling elite and politicians. The movement arose as a reaction to the endemic corruption and political instability of the country in the late 90s. In the 1988 – 1999, the governments that was formed failed to fulfil their tenure due to allegations of corruption and mismanagement leading the country into economic and socio–political struggles. The failure to govern seemed to have stem from the constant change of governments and the tug of war for power between the two ruling elites at the time, Pakistan people’s party’s leader Benazir Bhutto and leader of PML- N, Nawaz Sharif. On their agenda regional politics and interests of the elites dominated the political discourse and there was little interest in improving the social and economic situation, which was worsening nationally. They were more confined to their traditional voter constituencies and respected home provinces they belonged to, Punjab and Sindh, leaving a number of other groups in marginalization. Moreover, own fortunes were extracted from programmes they introduced and there was a clear biasness in which o they helped, all depending on voters party and regional affiliations (Ali, 2011, pp. 3-4). The social spending in Pakistan went tremendously down in this period and the country found itself contradicting the regional trend of public spending which was on the rise everywhere in the region but in Pakistan (Giunchi, 2011). In reaction to this situation, the newly formed party decided to contest the general elections held in 1997. Highlighting corruption as a national issue it over ambitiously stood from seven constituencies facing nothing but seatless humiliation at the ballot box by not securing a single seat in the National assembly. In 2002, the party again attempted to create a stir at the ballot box, but failed to create a hype and received 0.8% of the popular vote which secured one out of 272 seats in the parliament. It boycotted the elections of 2008 elections declaring it as ‘illegitimate’ failing to again translate its ideas into an electoral force (Giunchi, 2011, p. 1273).

The main reasons for PTI’s early fall was its lack of political capacity and perception. Firstly, the absence of nationwide party machinery failed khan in reaching out to the broader sections of the population. Given the fact that more than 60% of Pakistani voters belong to the rural and tribal areas, PTI was to be found merely in the urban cities. Moreover, Khan never found his electoral base. Pakistan being a highly polarized society divided in two factions, the liberals and conservatives, PTI never found a middle ground. For the conservative voters it was seen as a western aspiration and the liberal voters were sceptical of Khan’s soft islamization and speculated military ties. Compared to the two mainstream parties in Pakistan, it never had a clear constituency/vote banks to count on; while Pakistan’s people
party found its breeding ground in the rural areas and among labours and rural electorate, the PML – N (Pakistan Muslim league Noon) associated itself with the business community and the modern middle classes (Ali, 2011).

Another problem was PTI’s weak political position. Even though the social movement for justice caught the eye of many, it failed to hold the crowds captive. The blurring political ideas and strategies in encountering the political elites of Pakistan did not seem to be very appetizing to the people who already found themselves in a chaotic situation and disconnected from the political leadership. Though the voters knew that their political leaders were corrupt, they still didn’t buy into Khan’s anti-corruption and anti-feudal sentiments, doubting the captain’s political capacity to bring about a change. The party’s absence from the political arena scrutinized its opportunity to make any progressive changes that could prove their reliability to its voters. Even if his appeal for a change questioned the systems legitimacy, many weren’t ready to give Imran khan a place on the political map, just yet. People supported parties that had the power to at least fulfil some of their daily needs experienced by the economic hardship that haunted the country at the time. The widespread agreement among political pundits doubted Khan’s ability to conduct politics characterizing his visions as idealistic and his presence in the political sphere as a passing phenomenon (Ali, 2011).

The fact dawned upon the party that it had to go political in order to have a say in the political matters. As mentioned earlier, after remaining politically untested for 17 years, the party needed a reinvention to obtain any form for legitimacy and political support. Lessons from the past indicated that Khan had to strengthen his political capacity as an actor and also engage a broader section of the society to be able to win elections. It had to formulate policies to win the elections and not the other way around (Ali, 2011, p. 3)

5.3.2 The re- emergence of PTI: Learning from the past

The year of 2011 marked a new beginning of PTI. In the heart of country, the city of Lahore, the streets were packed with people from all age groups and strata’s of the society holding banners and shouting political slogans that targeted the seated government headed by PPP. The party mobilized the youth, academicians and middle classes who took to the streets
expressing their concerns for the country situation, demanding a radical change of status quo. Khan gathered thousands of people to mark his party’s dissatisfaction with the political leadership due to the increasing corruption scandals, the soaring economy and the foreign political occupation that had been on – going since the country’s engagement in the war of terror. More than 200,000 supporters showed up to welcome the much-awaited change that clinged in his speeches and political slogans that resonated with the larger sections of the society, especially the youth, who had experienced to be disconnected with the political leadership in the country. He seemed to have capture voters by not only his charisma but also by offering them a new ideology of a ‘Naya’ (new) Pakistan, recreating the spirit of nationalism that lacked in the country (Hanif, 2013; Jawaid, 2012). The party’s slogan ‘Insaf, Insaniat, Khuddari’ (justice, humanity and self-esteem) encapsulated its philosophy of seeing Pakistan as an egalitarian modern Islamic welfare state’ emphasizing the fundamental rights of all citizens regardless caste, creed and religion. The shared ‘ethos’ of the party suggested that PTI refuted the old ‘politics of usual’ in Pakistan by not indulging in caste, class or identity politics. It stood for a unification of the country and building of a nation that the party accused the political leadership had hampered by political favouritism and corruption. To reclaim Jinnah’s Pakistan (that embraces the differences in a society, be it ethnic or religious), ensuring a representation of all the sections of the society was emphasized. In his expressed desire to change the politics at the top, he voiced for cleaner politics, out – wiping of corruption, increased transparency and a real democratization of the country, promoting equal economic and social rights for all. The mismanagement of PPP and the increasing corruption tales of the party resulted in giving Khan’s charges against the elite a stronger credibility. Capturing the growing dissent at the ground, he announced his electoral contestation for the elections planned by the government in 2013 (Ali, 2011, p. 4).

For the elections of 2013, the party launched a renewed manifesto and throughout the election period it focused on rebuilding PTI from scratch. One of the main problems for the party in the past had been its lack of a nationwide party machinery and narrow political agenda that offered little beyond the vision of fighting corruption and injustice. Even though the party remained outside the crucial political terrain, it managed to strengthen its political position by active election campaigning and organizing grass-root movements in all the four provinces, interacting directly with the voters. To revive and create an electoral base, the

22 The whole manifesto available at their website: http://www.insaf.pk/about-us/know-pti/manifesto
party launched a nationwide membership campaign in 2012, mobilizing 4 million new members. It emerged as the largest mainstream party based on its high membership numbers and became the fastest growing international party (Nation, 2012; S. Zaidi, 2013).

Khan had earlier stressed that his political party was not going to be a vehicle in upholding the culture of family politics, but to emerge as a political institution open for everyone. Tossing political favouritism and the dynastic party culture in Pakistan, PTI selected their candidates impartially based on merit. Even the seats reserved for women and ethnic and religious minorities were selected that way, being the only party to nominate maximum candidates of 22 seats (AAP, 2013). In order to make aspiring candidates to contest elections, the party created a fund, the Naya (new) Pakistan fund, that would collect money to drive these election campaigns, encouraging the youth to take an active participation. All the innings in the fund and outgoing were put up on the website and was accessible for everyone to see which ensured accountability and transparency, an aspect of newness not to be found in any other party. Furthermore, in that spirit the party held intra – party elections, being the first party in Pakistan to do so. The common man would therefore get a chance to clinch to party portfolios (Nation, 2012).

Furthermore, they attracted the voters with many bold political stands against corruption, the American intervention and the political elite that was unlike the past, accompanied by clear commitment strategies and political measures. For instance, PTI promised to eradicate corruption within 90 days in office and by providing an extensive policy formulation; measures like protection for whistle blowers, new accountability mechanisms and increase transparency were emphasized. One specific demand to fight and hinder hijacking of local development funds was PTI suggestion to infringe the MNA’s (member of Nation Assembly) power over deciding the fund spending. It should, as they argued, go directly to the project it was allocated to instead of being en routed first to the MNA’s for further distribution. Moreover, in line with their accusation against the elite for representing interest of confined sections, the party forged partnerships with local NGO’s and neighbourhood associations in order to integrate their interests and demands opening up for a collaboration to ensure that local demands and ideas were manifested in their politics.23

23 The whole manifesto available at their website: http://www.insaf.pk/about-us/know- pti/manifesto
The duality in Khan’s approach and the less commitment to any confined section, it provided a form of a universal ideology of a new Pakistan that created a bridge between the two ideological streams in the country, the conservatives on the right and the liberals on the left. It catered both extremes in the country, the highly liberal young and middle class voters in the city and conservative voters in the rural areas (Ali, 2011). Due to that, Khan emerged as a winner in Pakistan’s most dangerous and unwanted region. He struck chords with the Pashtuns and made inroads for the party to form a provincial government in KPK by opposing the American led war and drone attacks, using a million dollar rhetoric to shoot down the American drones. Being the first one to deal with Taliban militants directly, Khan secured a major chunk votes from the region. On the other hand the youth and the middle classes in the urban places, like Punjab, appeared to be the main electoral ally of the party, tossing their image as non -voters. Furthermore, PTI was also the first party to encounter identity politics in Karachi, bringing MQM, known for its autocratic and authoritarian regime in the city, to a shameful defeat. Khan’s party received more than 30,000 votes from Karachi, which signifies that his political sloganeering reached the shores of Karachi and turned to a shift in the city’s politics. The youth were the main voters from the city, and didn’t confine themselves to identity politics anymore. They vouched for more progressive thoughts (Jawaid, 2012).

The party fell short on its own electoral expectations and the victory of 11 may 2013 was credited to PML- N, and Nawaz Sharif (the Chief of the party and former two – time winner) was instated to be the new elected prime minister of Pakistan. Even though the party failed the winning predictions of many it emerged as a strong electoral contender that challenged the old-aged political elite of PPP, sweeping out their long-standing dominance in all four provinces. The party bagged 27 seats altogether in the National assembly, receiving 18% of the popular vote, placing itself in the opposition. In Punjab it almost balled out PPP by receiving 8 seats compared their 2 seats and emerged as the second largest party in the province. Also in Sindh it dented the long standing legacy of MQM and PPP. In addition to archiving an acting voice in the parliament, it also swept the provincial elections in one of the most important and sensitive province of Pakistan, KPK, where it formed its first government in partnership with two other political parties, Jamaat- e- Islami and Awami league (BBC, 2013).
5.4 Summing up: Reflections on the theoretical arguments

In this following chapter I have discussed the downfall of Pakistan Peoples Party pointing to the rise of the new political alternative of PTI, discussing its early failures and the recent success. In this section I reflect back on the processes and indicators that had been chosen in chapter 2 in order to analyze the case in question. In the following section, the indicators won't be presented again as they have already been introduced in section 4.5 in the previous chapter.

The changing methods of political inclusion

I have in the following chapter examined the political initiative of PPP, BISP, arguing that it served as one of the many contributing factors for the electoral downfall of the party. The program was created much due to the fact that the party needed to rectify its past political image and to resonate with the larger share of the society to uphold its party position being nine years out of the political map. The initial idea was quite appealing as it revealed several aspects of newness and went beyond confining itself to its own constituency having a universalistic approach, being the first party in Pakistan to opt for an initiative like this. However, the change was merely on the paper and the program showed several signs of being skewed towards political favouritism and corrupt practices; the implementation of the program stood strong in places where the party’s vote banks resided, like Sindh and Multan. Furthermore, several cases of corruption were revealed within the program. The survival tactic of PPP failed them at the ballot box as it ignored to capture the changes in the society that made this initiative unattractive, like the rising unemployment among the youth and the increasing security issues. Given the amount of money that was pumped in the program, the ‘common’ man living above the poverty line found the program ineffective and useless. Even people eligible for the program, seems to have been tired of the many misdeeds it represented. To exemplify this, the legacy of PPP was dented in Sindh where the program saw its widest outreach. This opened the space for new actors to come in and capture the dissatisfied crowd.
Capitalizing on the leadership vacuum created by PPP, PTI resorted itself to populism to capture the sentiments on the ground. Even if Khan’s appeals clanged the same lingo as the former populist Bhutto, he still bought the masses by introducing the ideology of a Naya (new) Pakistan. Firstly, they linked themselves with the crowds by inviting them as citizens to build a new Pakistan (using nationalism as a triumph card), tossing the caste, class and religious affiliation strategy. Secondly, PTI successfully created an Us versus them scene by crediting the old Pakistan to the political elite. Thirdly, the party voiced for measures that spoke the language of reinstating the governing power of the country in the hand of the people like abolishing the feudalistic and dynastic politics emphasizing the need for devolution of power to secure every regions interest being on the table in the parliament.

State dependency

The re – emergence of PTI was much credited to the mismanagement of PPP. The reduction of the popularity of the party was strengthened by its five years of ruling term that had as revealed ignored to address the problems on the ground, like unemployment rates, social and economic challenges that played a major role in pulling down the legacy of the party. Furthermore, the endless tales of corruption charges revealed in the BISP program and in the political leadership had created a distance between the voters and the political leadership. The party was successful in providing a political linkage between the voters and the party. Scanning the electoral support base for the party reveals that Pakistan saw new voter groups coming up at the elections, the youth and middle classes. it seemed to have drawn out the ‘drawing room’ revolutionists, meaning the upper and middle class section of the society to vote. The fact that factors like unemployment and corruption played its part in reinstating PTI on the political map can be argued by using Karachi as an example. The rule of MQM as argued earlier has been quite strong in the region. The voting pattern at the elections of 2013 revealed that people had casted their votes against the party in rejection of basing their electoral choice on identity but rather on agenda and ideology. Even middle classes came out in Punjab to vote for PTI – due to shortage of electricity and water tossing their ties with the political elite. But having said that, these explain only the half picture of the new voting’s in Pakistan. The perspective of nationalism, foreign policy and security issues played crucial role sin bringing out and bridging the people across regions and class. In KPK, where the party won the largest share of votes, people had casted their votes in favour of PTI due to its
purposed state-measures in ensuring security, renewed foreign policy and stability in the region.

New political block

In the above – foreground I have presented the case of Pakistan Tehreek – e- insaf which appears to be the new political block against the old – aged political elite in Pakistan. By studying the party- building process, the case reveals several aspects of newness. Firstly, PTI strengthen its political position by moving from the single issue of corruption to include other demands in their political agenda. They went on the local level to forge partnership with people on the grass roots to ensure that their demands were included. Secondly, in line with the argument of new political block, they provided a political organization to the demands by including these demands into their manifesto and strengthening their party machinery in ever region of the country. Thirdly, they ensured democratic practices by holding intra – party elections and selected candidates based on merits rather than political favouritism, ensuring that different segments of the society were represented. Even though the political block can argue to be confined to the middle class and the young voters, it still appears to be new compared to the old elite parties.
6 Research question and concluding remarks

The previous two chapters (4 and 5) examined the cases individually using the processes and indicators outlined in chapter 2. In the remaining part of the thesis, I first turn to the research question purposed in the beginning of the paper: *In spite of the many differences between India and Pakistan, what would possibly be the common factors in the two different contexts that explain the similar movements and their similar outcomes?* In order to answer this question I will point to the main empirical findings in the previous two chapters. What ensues thereafter are some concluding remarks.

The cases highlights some of the main attributes and practices embedded in the political system/ culture of the countries that has served as obstacles for a real change; the lack of commitment to change and representation, the domination of personalized dynastic patronage politics, the endless corruption, the missing of a unifying factor and exploitation of the caste, class and religious difference between the people. The established and deeply entrenched political parties, in both India and Pakistan, have clinched themselves to power much due to the lack of alternative political options, protecting and promoting the corrupt order. Occasionally, there has been anti – establishment rebels, recycling the ‘common man’ phrase time to time in urge to stand up against the elite, but the agents of change have either forged partnerships with the elite or been driven by their own interests, failing to form a universal umbrella. The potential in actors have been there, but tactically they have preferred to stick to power rather than going down the revolutionary road, thus only using change as a rhetoric rather than creating the right climate for constructive collective transformation.

This study reveals that cases of political activism (the Anna Hazare and lawyers movement) in both countries have been manifested surpassing the idea of reaching the ballot box. The counter – movements against the political elites that has largely been observed on the street, lacking an overarching political organization, facing problems in overturning the establishment due to the increasing recognition by the Indian and more surprisingly Pakistani voters (who most of the times have supported the overturns of democracy in favour of military rule), of the parliaments supremacy as an elected organ. But it is important to
highlight that efforts appearing outside the given framework of the parliament in the countries have triggered government responses to progressive demands, but quite often also been charged with allegations of derailing democracy by using undemocratic measures. The successes of AAP and PTI, as the analysis reveals, was dependent on their commitment of engaging politically for their demands. Whereas some actors of anti-corruption movement in Delhi transformed themselves into a political force to accommodate their demands for the Jan Lokpal Bill in a political manifesto ensuring the legitimacy of the claim, PTI returned to contest elections in 2013 to strengthen its political position in order to impact the decision — making in the parliament. By upholding the primacy of politics, the both actors worked within the given framework of democracy to bring about the aspired changed.

Furthermore, the contexts of the countries appear similar also because both of the cases disclose the insufficiency of the traditional modes of including people in political processes. Having said that, it is important to note that this method of inclusion still finds its place in the two political contexts. The study reveals that this mode showed signs of insufficiencies in places where there were weak clientelist networks. AAP won a landslide in Delhi due to the weakening of the client – patron linkages between Congress and its voters in the city, while PTI swept the province of KPK where politicians have hardly put any effort in creating such networks. However, the democratic spaces surely opened up when the old uninspiring elites failed to address the changes in a society posed by new economic and social dynamics that effected the political ties it had with the people, opening up for new inspiring candidates who went beyond their commitment to a confined section of the society, opting for bold political initiatives bringing back the electoral confidence among the voters by showing them that a change necessarily is not merely on the piece of paper but relies in the actual practices. Both PTI and AAP emerged as a third political alternative and challenged the usual two – party electoral contestation.

Both parties arose against statues quo, reading the growing dissent on the ground correctly. The measures taken to include people into politics showed a numerous of newness which included a efforts toward ensuring substantive representation and reforms in order to fix the accountability mechanisms in the system and aiming for empowerment of the voters as citizens. AAP fared better in providing more realistic demands than PTI’s iconoclastic visions given the political context of the country. However, even if issues corruption and
unemployment appears to be the dominating denominator between the two contexts, national consensus and security issues played a crucial role in mobilizing people in Pakistan.

Moreover, the parties seems to have found their main voting constituencies among the middle classes and the youth providing with new long lost political linkages that went beyond the idea of caste, class and patronage distribution. The vision of Naya Pakistan and the revolution against the political elite in Delhi seem to have brought back the idea and importance of casting votes and resonated with the demographic changes the political elite ignored. The youth and the middle class have for a long time suffered from lack of vision and political objectives. Their potential of change has stayed in a dormant form. But with the change of political landscapes, they have found goals to pursue and realize. This transformation, from a visionless state to a state of actively utilizing the electro-franchise, is a great feat of achievement. Both the youth and the middle class, as revealed in the cases demanded a political shift, from exploitive character to an egalitarian political system, thus meaning a moving away from the traditional method of political inclusion that upholds the old structures of dominance instead of curtailing them in order to introduce better mechanism for representation through an integrative form of political activity where demands below reflects on the apex of power. Even lower sections of the society who usually finds itself entangled in the party political linkages supported the sweeping change. The issue of corruption as argued earlier doesn’t seem to be confined to the middle section of the society but appears problematic for the lower rugs as it impact the functioning of pro – poor programs that these groups are dependent on.

In the above foreground I have shed light on the research question that was purposed in order to explain the puzzles stated in section (1.1). Contextually, as a known fact, both countries have taken different courses towards democracy. The recent upheavals gave us a reason to believe, at the very first eye – cast at the cases, that the political processes seems to be similar. It was the rise of new political alternatives in the two antagonistic backgrounds that made the in- depth case study intriguing, thought provoking and engaging. This research had two main objectives; firstly to trace similarities in the two diverging contexts that gave birth to the two new political alternatives, and secondly to discuss various theoretical arguments that could provide an explanation for their emergence. By using the framework of transformative politics I discussed various theoretical explanations extracted from the literature. I first pointed out that there was a creation of new political blocks in both cases.
Thereafter, I argued for the insufficiency of the old methods of political inclusion pointing towards the need to discuss alternatives, like populism. Furthermore, I elaborated on arguments related to state dependency arguing for its impacts on forging cut class alliances. The key lessons drawn out of this study finds itself of conforming to the 3 main important points of transformative politics in order to introduce better linkages between the people and its representatives: the importance of primacy of politics, the mobilization from below and introducing better channels for representation and popular participation.

As the objective of this thesis has been to shed light on the similarities between the two countries, it has not engaged broadly in pointing out to the many differences that should not be ignored. At the point of writing this thesis, new political happenings in both countries have entered the scene, once again setting Pakistan and India on diverging paths. Whereas AAP won a landslide in the re–elections of Delhi, capturing 67 out of 70 seats upholding the idea of fighting through democratic means, PTI finds it struggling in positioning itself in the democratic framework of Pakistan. It has post the 2013 elections, at several point boycotted the national assembly and led movements against the political leadership demanding for the resignation of the office holding Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The question of the potentials of these actors to bring about a change in their respective countries depends on how the parties perform holding political position. While AAP has already won the confidence of many Delhi-ites, delivering on their electoral promises, PTI still has along way to go to achieve a similar political curve of confidence.

Furthermore, having said that, the processes and discussions elaborated on in this thesis may not be context or country specific. As mentioned in section 3.2, there are now cases in the global south that represents the similar curves of political developments newly observed in India and Pakistan. By not exaggerating the similarities and keeping in mind the major contextual difference, one can point out to cases like Afghanistan and Indonesia where a common track towards achieving a substantive and substantial democracy was adapted in 2014 by Joko Widodo and Ashraf Ghani in Afghanistan. In the changing

political landscape of global south, studies that focuses on actors of change can provide valuable lessons cross – country and also provide useful insights to the on – going democratization debate in the academia.

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