Preventing Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo

A Study of a Western Development Project Targeting Soldiers in the Congolese State Military

Nora Mehsen

Master in Criminology
Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law
The Faculty of Law
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
Spring 2015
© Nora Mehsen

2015

Preventing Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Study of a Western Development Project Targeting the Congolese State Military

Nora Mehsen

http://www.duo.uio.no/

Print: Mail Boxes Etc.

ii
Summary

Title: Preventing Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Study of a Western Development Project Targeting the Congolese State Military

Student: Nora Mehsen

Supervisor: Kjersti Lohne

Place: Institute for Criminology and Sociology of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Oslo

Submission date: May 8th 2015

The changing landscape of development and security has created new operational spaces for Western development NGOs addressing occurrences of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This thesis is devoted to an exploration of those new spaces through in-depth analysis of a development project targeting acts of sexual violence committed by the Congolese state military (FARDC).

The development project in question is called the mobile cinema tool (MCT), jointly created by a Dutch film production team, a Western development NGO called Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and the FARDC. Distinguishable from the majority of Western development efforts focused on sexual violence in the DRC – which are often oriented toward post-perpetration victim-support – the MCT has a perpetrator focus with a preventive ambition. By screening thought-provoking short films to FARDC soldiers and inviting them to reflect on the detrimental consequences of sexual violence, the MCT aims to educate its audience in refraining from perpetration.

Based on interviews with the film production crew, SFCG and targeted soldiers, as well as observations during MCT sessions in various military camps in the eastern part of the DRC, the thesis’ research questions are as follows: How did the film production team and SFCG envision the MCT contributing to sexual violence prevention? And how was the project received by the targeted soldiers? Drawing on the Foucauldian concepts of power/knowledge,
discourse and governmentality, as well as postcolonial theory, the thesis demonstrates the complexities involved in the interface between the MCT’s envisioned strategy and its on-the-ground employment.

Inspired by a genealogical approach, I approached the aforementioned research questions by contextualizing the wider discursive space the MCT was operating within. While the MCT’s targeting of FARDC soldiers as a (perceived) perpetrator group is rare in the DRC context, I argue that the project must be understood as part of larger processes connected to the changing landscape of development and security. One major process I identified is the evolution from the Belgian colonizers’ sovereign approach of molding the sexual conduct of the Congolese to the approach I consider most widespread in contemporary Western-led development efforts in the Global South – developmentality. Developmentality, an adaptation of governmentality, refers to development agents’ utilization of technologies of freedom to achieve a desired behavior change among beneficiaries. The second major process I found influential is the securitization of conflict-related sexual violence. With the international community’s application of the development/security approach, large-scale manifestations of sexual violence are increasingly seen as a security issue stemming from “underdevelopment,” “state fragility” and lack of “good governance.” As a result, a space has been created in which Western development NGOs like SFCG can engage in efforts previously considered a part of the traditional security realm.

In my analysis of the film production team and SFCG’s envisioned preventive strategy in the MCT, I located a myriad of different discourses. While some discourses evolved around “educating,” “sensitizing” and “motivating” the soldiers to alter their conduct, others addressed a need to confront the soldiers with the negative consequences of sexual violence by “scaring,” “breaking” and “deterring” them. Ultimately, a key finding was the intersection of these discourses, meaning that the knowledge provided by the MCT was meant to scare the soldiers into altering their conduct by their own free will. Rather than relying on a hierarchal power exercise to change soldiers’ behavior, the Western development agents utilized
developmentality. This developmentality approach could be traced both on an institutional level – transferring responsibility for execution of the MCT sessions to the FARDC itself, and on an individual level – encouraging soldiers to self-govern.

An important finding derived from my fieldwork in the DRC was that the relationship between the film production crew and SFCG’s visions and the implementation of the MCT was marked by a number of discontinuities. Rather than merely absorbing the film production team and SFCG’s discourses or actively resisting, the soldiers decoded them in a range of different ways. Among these decodifications were adaptations, appropriations, subversions and contestations. Consequently, the Western development agents’ envisioned strategy often became fragile when presented to the soldiers, making the successful enactment of developmentality a complex endeavor on a practical level.
Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have materialized without the kindhearted effort of a small ensemble of people.

First, I want to express deep gratitude to all the informants I have interviewed. Thank you for patiently answering my questions and, at many points, sharing intimate stories about your lives. To FARDC soldiers I was fortunate to meet while in the Congo, thank you for generously facilitating my visits to your camps. A special thanks goes to the employees at Search for Common Ground’s office in Bukavu, IF Productions and WHYZE, for allowing me to get insight into your effort to better people’s lives. Christian, you are not only an excellent translator, but also a dear friend. Although your explicit presence in the thesis is scarce, you have been a crucial element throughout this project. I also want to thank Madel for opening your home to me (not to mention all the late nights accompanied by the faithful Drosdy Hof), along with the other lovely people I met while in the DRC.

Thank you to the Norwegian Defence University College, the Norwegian Council for Applied Media Research and the Institute for Criminology and Law Sociology at the University of Oslo for generously providing the financial support to the execute the fieldwork. Additional thanks go also to the Nordic Africa Institute for accepting me on a study scholarship, as well as to the inspiring Maria Ericsson Baaz for the guidance I received there from her.

Finally, a big thank you to my supervisor at the University of Oslo, Kjersti Lohne, and my co-supervisor at the Norwegian Defence University College, Anita Schjølset. Your mentorship and patience has been invaluable.

Nora Mehsen
Oslo, May 2015
Abbreviations

AFDL  Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
BUFC  Bulletin des Femmes Coloniales
DRC   The Democratic Republic of Congo
EU    European Union
EUSEC European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FARDC The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
CNDP  National Congress for the Defense of the People
HRW   Human Rights Watch
ICC   International Criminal Court
IR    International Relations
MCF   Mobile Cinema Foundation
MCT   Mobile Cinema Tool
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PTSD  Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
SCR   Security Council Resolution
SGBV  Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SFCG  Search for Common Ground
SSR   Security Sector Reform
UK    United Kingdom
UN    United Nations
UN Action UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict
UNDP  United Nations Development Program
UNESCO The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map of the provinces North Kivu and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Picture source: Church Mission Society/Flickr 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
A group of soldiers from the Congolese armed forces participating in the development project *Mobile cinema tool*. Picture source: Nora Mehsen
### 1 INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 SCOPE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

#### 1.2 CRIMINOLOGICAL RELEVANCE

#### 1.3 THE WESTERN DEVELOPMENT AGENTS BEHIND THE MCT

##### 1.3.1 THE FILM PRODUCTION TEAM

##### 1.3.2 SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

##### 1.3.2.1 The mobile cinema tool

#### 1.4 THE WARSCAPE OF THE DRC

#### 1.5 THEORETICAL APPROACH

##### 1.5.1 POWER/KNOWLEDGE AND DISCOURSE

##### 1.5.2 GOVERNMENTALITY/DEVELOPMENTALITY

##### 1.5.3 DISCOURSE, PRACTICE AND THE “MESSY ACTUALITIES”

#### 1.6 OUTLINE

### 2 METHODOLOGY

#### 2.1 WHILE IN NORWAY

##### 2.1.1 INTERVIEWS WITH THE FILM PRODUCTION TEAM AND FILM ANALYSIS

#### 2.2 WHILE IN THE DRC

##### 2.2.1 INTERVIEWING AND OBSERVING

##### 2.2.1.1 Recruitment of soldier informants

##### 2.2.1.2 Informed consent

##### 2.2.1.3 The observations

#### 2.3 METHOD OF ANALYSIS

##### 2.3.1 ETHNOGRAPHY AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

##### 2.3.2 TRANSLATING MEANING

##### 2.3.3 CATEGORIZING MEANING

#### 2.4 RESEARCH AS “DOING GOOD?” REFLECTIONS ON REFLEXIVITY
### 3 THE DISCURSIVE SPACE OF THE MCT

#### 3.1 FROM SOVEREIGNTY TO DEVELOPMENTALITY: CIVILIZING, ENLIGHTENING, EMPOWERING

#### 3.2 THE SECURITIZATION OF CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

### 4 DEVELOPMENTALITY IN THE MCT

#### 4.1 THE NEXUS OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN THE MCT

#### 4.2 NURTURING BEHAVIOR CHANGE IN THE MIDST OF PATRIARCHY

#### 4.3 “EDUCATION IS THE KEY TO CHANGE”

#### 4.4 REVIVING MORALITY: THE PERPETRATOR AS A “BRUTAL ANIMAL”

#### 4.5 SEXUAL VIOLENCE PERPETRATION – “IT’S BAD FOR YOU”

##### 4.5.1 THE PERPETRATOR AS A CONSUMER

#### 4.6 “I AM HAUNTED BY THE EVIL THINGS I HAVE DONE”

##### 4.6.1 THE THREAT OF TRAUMA

##### 4.6.2 CONFESSING EVILNESS

#### 4.7 SUMMARIZING REMARKS

### 5 DEVELOPMENTALITY DECODED

#### 5.1 THE “MESSY ACTUALITIES” OF DEVELOPMENTALITY

##### 5.1.1 “POVERTY IS ONE OF THE WEAPONS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE”

##### 5.1.2 “LOOK AT THEIR FACES”

##### 5.1.3 “MZUNGU” MATTERS AND THE NEED TO “GREASE THE MACHINERY”

#### 5.2 SUMMARIZING REMARKS

### 6 CONCLUSION

#### 6.1 THE DISCURSIVE SPACE OF THE MCT

#### 6.2 DEVELOPMENTALITY IN THE MCT: EMPOWERED THROUGH KNOWLEDGE AND SCARED STRAIGHT?

#### 6.3 DEVELOPMENTALITY DECODED: ADAPTATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, SUBVERSIONS AND CONTESTATIONS

#### 6.4 PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE DRC – CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
8 APPENDIX

8.1 SCREENSHOTS FROM THE MCT SHORT FILMS

8.1.1 FIGURE 1
8.1.2 FIGURE 2
8.1.3 FIGURE 3
8.1.4 FIGURE 4

8.2 QUESTIONNAIRES

8.2.1 EMPLOYEES IN THE FILM PRODUCTION TEAM
8.2.2 SFCG EMPLOYEES
8.2.3 SOLDIERS FUNCTIONING AS DEBATE MODERATORS IN THE MCT
8.2.4 SOLDIERS PARTICIPATING IN THE MCT

8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS GIVEN TO SFCG BY THE END OF THE FIELDWORK
1 Introduction

1.1 Scope and research questions

It has to be understood that this is a security problem, not just men behaving like men. It's not an inevitable consequence of war – it's something that is planned. It can either be commanded, condemned or condoned. We need to say that we can stop it. It's not inevitable (Margot Wallström – former UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict – in Crossette 2010).

The changing landscape of security and development has resulted in reconfigurations of the definitions of phenomena and subjects that are considered to pose threats and the actors that are to obliterate them. Since the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, conflict-related sexual violence has increasingly been conceptualized by the international community as a security issue (UNSC 2000). Within this relatively new framework, sexual violence is not considered as an unfortunate and inevitable by-product of war (Baaz & Stern 2013:1-2). Rather, perpetrating subjects are perceived as capable of altering their behavior, rendering sexual violence a preventable matter.

As criminologists Paul J. Brantingham and Frederic L. Faust state in their groundbreaking work “A Conceptual Model of Crime Prevention” preventing crime is a complex endeavor that can be executed by a multitude of actors (Brantingham & Faust 1976). Building on this, the recent framing of sexual violence as a security issue can be seen as having created new operational spaces for Western development NGOs as additional crime prevention actors. As a consequence of the reconceptualization of development and security, Western development agents have taken on the task of hindering conflict and post-conflict-related sexual violence in the Global South, rather than solely attempting to alleviate human suffering after perpetration has occurred. The Western development industry’s approach to sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is perhaps one of the most pressing examples of this rendered gaze. In contemporary DRC, sexual violence is perceived as one, if not the threat to the advancement of both development and security (Baaz & Stern 2010a:7). Consequently, a substantial number of Western development agents have entered the scene, engaging in various crime prevention efforts for the sake of development. This devolvement constitutes the main interest point for this thesis.

Based on fieldwork in the DRC, my research project analyzes the relationship between Western development agents’ vision to contribute to sexual violence prevention and the on-
the-ground implementation of that vision. Although the majority of Western development NGOs’ efforts come in the form of awareness-raising campaigns directed to the general public, I have specifically looked at a project targeting (perceived) perpetrators (Douma & Hilhorst 2012:42). My interest for this particular development project emerged after watching the Dutch documentary *Weapon of War*, which was broadcasted on a Norwegian television channel in 2011. While the Western media reports on the DRC at the time mainly described the situation of female victims of sexual violence, this documentary sought to give the perpetrators a voice. A driving aspect throughout the documentary was its attentiveness to cover individual testimonies from combatants who had committed sexual violence. The perpetrators’ own narratives were placed at the centre of the film, covering their motivations to commit the violence as well as the consequences they experienced after perpetrating it. Later on, I discovered that the film production team behind the documentary had teamed up with a Western development NGO called Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and the Congolese army (FARDC), in order to create the so-called *mobile cinema tool* (MCT). By screening thought-provoking short films to FARDC soldiers and inviting them to reflect on the detrimental consequences of sexual violence, the MCT’s ambition is to alter the conduct of its audience. The project’s ultimate envisioned outcome is sexual violence prevention (Douma & Baroani 2014:17-21).

Given my academic background in criminology, gender studies and human rights, the MCT’s goal to prevent sexual violence by addressing perpetrators caught my attention. Though the Western development industry operating in the DRC has laid a pervasive focus on protecting, honoring and empowering victims of sexual violence, the agents behind the MCT chose to orient their focus towards perpetrators – an intriguing diversion from what has come to be expected. Interestingly, several scholars of criminology have traced a reversed trajectory in Western criminal justice policies. David Garland, for instance, claims that the interests of the crime victim have become the new political imperative in the penal debate, often counterposed to the interests of the offender (Garland 2002:11). The MCT’s atypical angle in approaching sexual violence prevention made me curious to explore the film production team
and SFCG’s motivation. Why did they choose a perpetrator-oriented strategy for working toward the prevention of sexual violence? What effect did they anticipate the MCT would have on the targeted soldiers? Outside of interviewing the film production team and a Western SFCG employee working with the MCT, I was also interested in the on-the-ground implementation of the project. How did the soldier audience respond during the MCT sessions? What post-film reflections did they communicate, and how did those reflections work into the MCT’s sexual violence preventive ambition? Over the course of this research project, these reflections culminated in the following research questions:

- How did the film production team and SFCG envision the MCT contributing to sexual violence prevention?
- How was the MCT received by the targeted FARDC soldiers?

Given the rarity of perpetrator-oriented NGO projects in the DRC, the thesis aims to provide new insight in a Western effort aimed to shape the sexual conduct of Congolese subjects. In addition to including narratives from the creators of the MCT, the film production team and SFCG, the voices of those targeted by the project – the FARDC soldiers – are also included, and are considered to be paramount to the unique nature of this thesis. Based on interviews with the above-mentioned stakeholders and observations during MCT sessions, the subsequent pages will demonstrate the complex interface between the project’s envisioned strategy and its practical deployment.

### 1.2 Criminological relevance

Stanley Cohen, one of the leading writers within criminology, has condemned the scarcity of criminological analyses of crime in the Global South. In his words: “Criminologists have either ignored the Third World completely or treated it in a most theoretically primitive fashion […]” (Cohen 1998:172). With this understanding, mainstream criminology may be said to reflect a methodological Westernism, where study objects have been predominately
located in the Western realm. While agreeing that the Western criminological gaze traditionally has showed scarce interest in studying crime in the Global South per se, I claim that the West’s production of criminological knowledge on the Global South has been a longtime endeavor. In the European colonizer’s civilizing missions in the remainder continents in the world, confident understandings of both “deviance” and “normalcy” were enshrined. In this sense, the notion of colonization can be perceived as a prime example of the normative regulation of human conduct into compliance. Postcolonial criminologist Biko Agozino captures this argument well, by emphasizing that “[c]riminology emerged as a discipline for disciplining and controlling the Other at a time when colonial administrators were imprisoning most regions in the world” (Agozino 2003:6).

Indisputably, today’s Western development efforts aimed to shape the conduct of residents in the Global South are strongly distinguishable from those executed during the days of colonialism. The former manner of regulating behavior was imposed from above by a sovereign colonizer, whereas today’s development efforts are often characterized by the empowerment of beneficiaries to alter their own conduct (Mohan 2014:132, Lie 2006:4). Nevertheless, contemporary development projects attempting to influence behavior continue to rest on normative understandings of “normalcy” and “deviance.” In the case of MCT, which entails a crime-preventive approach for the sake of development, the relevance of criminological knowledge seems particularly pressing. In SFCG’s targeting of a perceived perpetrator group, the desired behavior change rests on successfully influencing the soldiers to the point that they refrain from sexual conduct considered illegitimate. Moreover, this endeavor carries normative notions on for instance “development,” “security,” “sexuality,” “soldiering” and “morals.” Along with the MCT’s merging of issues related to development and security, SFCG can be said to play the role of both development actor and security provider. Thus, the art of molding behaviors of targeted populations remains a shared interest point for criminologists and development practitioners. This argument will be revisited later in this thesis.
In the paragraphs that follow, the Western development agents involved in the MCT will be introduced: the film production team that developed the film material, and the NGO responsible for implementing the effort on the ground, SFCG. The target audience for the MCT, the FARDC, will be introduced after the subchapter on the DRC warscape.

1.3 The Western development agents behind the MCT

1.3.1 The film production team

The audiovisual part of the MCT was developed by IF Productions, a Dutch film production company, and WHYZE, a consulting company specialized in development organizations operating in post-conflict countries. Together, IF Productions and WHYZE have formed a film production team consisting of two creative directors and one field producer. This team specializes in creating documentaries that expose injustice in the Global South, intended for international audiences. Two of the films in their portfolio are the above-mentioned documentaries, *Weapon of War*, which focuses on soldier perpetrators of sexual violence in DRC, and *Fighting the Silence*, which highlights testimonies of female victims of sexual violence in DRC. In addition to creating documentaries for an international audience, the film production team also brings films back to local communities as educational tools (MCF 2014a, IF Productions 2014). A guiding principle behind this work is the belief in film as a powerful instrument “to generate awareness, stimulate debate and initiate change in people and societies” (MCF 2014b).

1.3.2 Search for Common Ground

SFCG is the international non-governmental organization (NGO) responsible for implementing the mobile cinema tool in partnership with the Congolese state military. The organization was founded in 1982 by John Marks, a former diplomat in the U.S. Department of State. Like several other NGOs established during the Cold War, its driving aim was to build bridges and facilitate cooperation between the East and the West. Initially, SFCG had only two employees (SFCG 2014a, Ashoka 2008). Since its founding, however, the
organization has seen a great expansion. Currently, it has approximately 600 staff workers worldwide, as well as peace-building projects in 34 countries across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the United States (SFCG 2014b). SFCG’s defined mission is to strengthen the capacity of societies to deal with conflicts constructively. Central to that mission is the use of media as a tool for change. Film, television, radio and print are used as peace-building tools to foster dialogue and strengthen local capacity to respond to issues hindering development. Eighty-three percent of SFCG’s employees are native to the countries they work in, which the organization considers key in ensuring cultural appropriateness in their conflict transformation efforts (SFCG 2014d, SFCG 2014e). The DRC country program was established in 2001, and ranks the second largest in SFCG. More than 100 employees are working in the DRC, with offices located in Kinshasa, Dongo, Uvira, Kalémie, and the two cities I visited during my fieldwork, Bukavu and Goma (SFCG 2014c, SFCG 2014f). SFCG’s efforts in the DRC are especially directed toward addressing the threat that violence poses to long-term stability in the country (SFCG 2014c).

1.3.2.1 The mobile cinema tool

In 2007, SFCG launched their peace-building project Lobi Mokolo ya Sika (in English: Tomorrow is a New Day). By providing training and capacity-building for the FARDC, the project was oriented towards improving civilian protection. With funding from the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands and the European Commission, SFCG implements activities aimed at raising awareness of human rights and conflict transformation principles in selected brigades within FARDC. They also fight impunity with activities that engage the army to denounce violations and work to improve civilian-military relations. SFCG’s sexual violence prevention efforts range across participatory theatre, comic books, posters, soap operas, radio programs and mobile cinemas (SFCG 2014g). The activities are intended to act synergically (SFCG 2012:3).

The MCT consists of six short films, including footage from both Weapon of War and Fighting the Silence and new material filmed specifically for the project. In a collaborative
effort between the film production team, SFCG and the FARDC, these recordings were adapted into educational short films that would be screened for soldiers in the FARDC. Each film, which lasts from 5 to 15 minutes, highlights the negative consequences of sexual violence from a range of different perspectives. The films include the mission of the FARDC, testimonies from soldiers that have committed rape, consequences of rape for the survivors, trauma among combatants that have been to war, the legal consequences of committing sexual violence, and the future goals of the FARDC. After each short film is screened, the soldiers are invited to participate in a facilitated debate led by a high-ranking soldier in the FARDC, turning the content of the film back to the individual soldier. By confronting the soldiers visually with thought-provoking testimonies and inviting them to reflect on the negative outcomes of perpetrating sexual violence, the tool is meant to function as a starting point for change, ultimately contributing to prevention of the acts it targets (SFCG 2012, Douma & Baroani 2014:17-21). Central to the MCT is the partnership between SFCG and the FARDC. Selected FARDC soldiers are delegated the responsibility of executing the actual MCT sessions and function as debate moderators. SFCG provides salary to the FARDC soldiers who work for the implementation of the MCT, adding on to their regular salaries. In the first screening phase in 2011, SFCG carried out 72 screenings and reached a total of 2,191 FARDC soldiers (SFCG 2012). The second screening phase began shortly after my arrival in the DRC in July 2012. According to one of my SFCG sources, external evaluation to measure effectiveness of the MCT has not been prioritized due to financial reasons.

1.4 The warscape of the DRC

In 1996, the beginning of what is often referred to as “Africa’s first world war” began in the DRC (then called Zaïre). Fueled by spill-over from the Rwandan genocide in 1994, existing political, economic and ethnic components in the Zaïrian state intertwined into one of the deadliest conflicts in modern time (MONUSCO 2014, Leatherman 2011:120, van Reybrouck 2011:398). During the hundred days of the Rwandan genocide, more than 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were massacred. Sexual violence was used in a widespread and systematic manner by the genocidaires (Mechanic 2011:7). In the closing and aftermath of the genocide,
1.5 million Hutus fled into the eastern Zaïre, fearful of retaliation at the hands of Tutsi liberation forces (Prunier in van Reybrouck 2011:376, Malkki 2002:356). Among the refugees were remnants of the militia that had taken part in the genocide (Leatherman 2011:120). Thousands of Hutus, now on the Zaïrian side of the border, managed to arm themselves anew and began a new wave of attacks (Mechanic 2011:7). With the destabilization that followed the influx of both refugees and foreign rebels into the east of Zaïre, the new Tutsi regime in Rwanda feared an insurgency. In response to the potential crisis in his own country, Rwandan president Paul Kagame backed the foundation of the Congolese rebel group AFDL. The rebel group mainly consisted of Congolese Tutsis, also known as Banyamulenges (Van Reybrouck 2011:378-379, Check 2011:2). Led by the Congolese rebel commander Laurent-Desiré Kabila, the AFDL’s mission was to break down the threat that the banished Hutus posed. In collaboration with the Rwandan armed forces, AFDL started attacking Hutu camps, killing tens of thousands, many of whom were unarmed civilians (Van Reybrouck 2011:378, Mechanic 2011:8). Kabila continued to push the forces towards a full-scale rebellion, eventually overthrowing the 31-year reign of president Mobutu Sese Seko (Leatherman 2011:120). Following this, Zaïre was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the AFDL was established as the Congolese national military (MONUSCO 2014). After Kabila entered the presidency in 1997, he withdrew from his alliance with Kagame. The dissatisfaction with foreign interference in the country was increasing, and Rwanda was considered a threat to national interests. One claim, central to this political falling out, was that Rwanda hungered for the mineral-rich areas in the eastern DRC, and planned to establish a new state that included the Kivu regions. Consequently, the Tutsi soldiers in the AFDL were increasingly viewed as Rwandan occupants rather than members of a force that had helped to liberate the DRC from Sese Seko. In 1998, Kabila declared that all Rwandan soldiers were to leave the country immediately. This declaration opened the floodgates for a five-year long war. Since the war’s beginning, it is estimated that five millions lives have been lost, making it one of the deadliest conflicts the world has seen since World War II (Van Reybrouck 2011:396-398, Leatherman 2011:120-121). At the height of the war, eight neighboring countries were involved, including a multitude of militaries and rebel factions. Practically all
armed groups, including the state military, exercised illicit practices during this period. There were reports of illegal trade of natural resources, looting, abduction, torture, civilian killings, and widespread sexual violence (Leatherman 2011:117, 120, Douma 2014). While exact numbers are unknown, a UN report estimates that several hundred thousand individuals have been subjected to conflict-related sexual violence (UN Women 2012:9). Despite the signing of an official peace agreement in 2002 between the conflicting parties and the establishment of a new transitional government in 2003, pockets of conflict rage in the eastern parts of the country up to this day. Sexual violence remains a challenge, and combatants are still considered as one of the key perpetrator groups (Baaz & Stern 2010a:43, OHCHR 2014).

1.4.1 FARDC

After the end of the war in 2003, the belligerents agreed to intermix into a new government army called the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). This process of security sector reform has been a central element in the sustained violence in the eastern part of the country (Van Reybrouck 2011:425, Baaz & Verweijen 2013:1). Instead of representing the beginning of peace, the integration of the rebel groups and former government army into the FARDC turned out to embody the conflict in itself. Power struggles, parallel commando lines and divided loyalties across ethno-regional lines contributed to continuation of severe instability and outbreaks of violence, which also deeply affected the civilian population. Some factions refused to integrate, while others disintegrated and established new armed groups. In its first response to these divisions, the Congolese government sought to re-integrate the disintegrated rebels. However, in 2012 President Joseph Kabila - son of the previous President Laurent-Desiré – tried to regain control over the military by announcing new military reforms and crack-downs on power held by former rebel groups. Previous members of the group CNDP, which was mainly made up of Banyamulenges, were especially targeted. This resulted in the formation of a new revolt of former CNDP members. They eventually broke out from the FARDC and formed the rebel group M23. M23 grew to pose a considerable military and civilian threat in the eastern part of the country, largely due to Rwandan backing (UNSC 2012:3). Alongside all its internal
disputes the FARDC was, and still is, faced with substantial challenges when it comes to providing support and equipment for its soldiers. Salaries remain low and pay days are often delayed, sometimes by months, damning soldiers and their families to generally poor living conditions. This not only contributes to a weakening of military capacity, but also results in soldiers preying on the civilian population (Baaz & Stern 2009:501). On top of all this, the level of professionalism within the FARDC ranks is low due largely to the lack of training for those soldiers who enter the military via the on-going integration processes (Baaz & Verweijen 2013:34). When it comes to sexual violence in the DRC, the FARDC has been reported as one of the main perpetrator groups since its formation (UN Action 2009:54). While several reports have underlined their strategic use of sexual violence, especially as it connects to the integration of former rebels, much of the perpetration is committed without a political agenda. This aspect will also be touched upon in the analysis chapters of this thesis (HRW 2009:4, 21, Baaz & Stern 2010:16).
1.5 Theoretical approach

The Foucauldian concepts of power/knowledge, discourse and governmentality constitute an important theoretical framework in my analysis of the logic of thoughts and actions in the MCT. In particular, I have been inspired by an adaptation of governmentality specifically for the development realm, developmentality. This framework has proved fruitful in my analysis of both the Western development agents’ vision to contribute to sexual violence prevention by creating the MCT and the targeted soldiers’ various responses to the project. In the following, the concepts of development as discourse and developmentality will be described, in light of Michel Foucault’s terminology.

1.5.1 Power/Knowledge and discourse

“Development” is not a clear-cut concept. Throughout history, as well as in contemporary times, its imagining has been marked by flux, rather than ontological stability. In the case of Western efforts aimed at nurturing development in the Global South, these endeavors have relied on the interveners’ “expert knowing” (Escobar 1995:6). It is relevant to introduce Foucault’s formulation of power as intimately embedded in our perceptions of knowledge in this context. In the lecture Power/Knowledge, Foucault explains how dynamics of power constitute the representation of social reality. He outlines the concept as follows: “We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (Foucault 1980:93, Escobar 1995:5). Intrinsic to the production of knowledge are the permissible modes of that which “truthfully” constitutes a problem, how that problem should be solved, who is to solve it and who is extraneous to “knowing” it (Foucault 2002b:131, 90, 103, Engelstad 2005:18).

Foucault emphasizes that the consolidation and implementation of power is dependent on the production and circulation of a discourse (Foucault 1980:93). This term, “discourse,” is an essential component in his writings about the intricate liaison between power and knowledge. In The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault describes the term as pointing to a group of
statements made up of “rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated, or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it” (Foucault 2002b:131, 90, 103). These rules do not denote a system that is consciously developed by a speaking individual. Rather, they refer to a system of conditions that enables the formulation to be spoken in the first place (Foucualt 2002b:134). In *The Order of Discourse*, Foucault explains how the production of discourse is controlled, organized and redistributed by various procedures, one of them being systems of exclusion. The opposition between true and false is mentioned as an important exclusionary system. In this system, “true” discourse is authorized through institutions which hold the legitimacy to reinforce and renew the statements they depict as true (Foucault 1981:54-55). This process of exclusion is particularly interesting to devote attention to, as it entails an argument that there are multiple and also competing versions of “truth” rather than simply one ontological truth (Richmond 2007:6). Discourse, then, enables what can be thought, said and done, while at the same time disqualifying the formulation of other thoughts, sayings and actions.

In the last three decades or so, there has been an expansion of postcolonial literature applying Foucauldian theory in the analysis of Western representations of the Global South (Mawuko-Yevugah 2010:69). Edward Said’s *Orientalism* from 1978 was a groundbreaking publication within this field. In this book, Said critically demonstrates the European creation of “Orientalism” as a discourse, in which the Orient is depicted as “the Other” (Said 2003:3). Said argues that

> without examining Orientalism as discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period (Said 2003:3).

An important point Said makes is that the Western absolutist practice of imagining the Orient as an Other did not end in the supposed post-imperialist era (Said 2003:xvii, Richmond 2007:5). Rather, reductionist images of the “uncivilized” and “ignorant” Orient continues even now. An example used by Said in an updated foreword to *Orientalism* written in 2003 is
the Western world’s conceptualization of the Arab as a “degenerated Muslim menace” and “terrorist threat.” In the eyes of Said, these imaginings have been crucial in legitimizing Western military interventions in parts of the Islamic world because they often are done in the name of “enlightening” and “civilizing” alleged underdeveloped nations (Said 2003:xv-xvi). This argument can also serve as an illustration of Foucault’s notion that the discursive and the practical are deeply intertwined (Foucault 2002:134).

While Said’s *Orientalism* has been a key factor in illuminating Western knowledge production on the Orient, it was not until the 1990s that postcolonial perspectives on the discourse of development gained momentum (Mawuko-Yevugah 2010:71). Tayyab Mahmud is among the scholars who has applied the power/knowledge matrix in his theorization of development as discourse. According to him, “development is, above all, a way of thinking” (Mahmud 1999:26). With this claim, he suggests that a development agent’s professional gaze defines, locates and studies “underdeveloped” subjects, rendering them beneficiaries of projects where certain behaviors are to be cultivated (Mahmud 1999:27). He continues his conceptualization:

> As a full-time enterprise, with confident notions of time and space, of nature and culture, of society and individual, of the good and the truth, development is the primary mechanism through which particular parts of the world and particular subjects are produced and produce themselves, thus precluding other ways of imagining, seeing and doing (Mahmud 1999:26).

With this understanding, the Western development apparatus appears as a space where systems of knowledge on the Global South enable certain forms of power and intervention (Mahmud 1999:27).

Another seminal publication within the postcolonial tradition is *Encountering Development* by Arturo Escobar, which draws on both Foucault and Said’s writings. Viewing development as a historically produced discourse, Escobar questions the Western development agent’s professional gaze on “underdevelopment” and “the Underdeveloped.” Differentiated from
Said and Mahmud, Escobar pays closer attention to the implementation of discourse through concrete practices of development interventions. With this perspective, he seeks to illuminate examples where subjects in the Global South actively contest the “underdeveloped” appellation (Escobar 1995:6, 11). This also points back to Foucault’s argument that “truth”, in this case the “truth” about development, is marked by multiple, often competing, versions (Foucault 1981:54-55, Richmond 2007:6). Additionally, my own research focus parallels Escobar’s approach in my exploration of the on-the-ground implementation of the MCT and the FARDC soldiers’ decoding of the Western development agents’ envisioned strategy.

1.5.2 Governmentality/developmentality

As previously mentioned, Western development efforts implemented in the Global South today are often characterized by a discourse of empowering beneficiaries to alter their own conduct (Mohan 2014:132, Lie 2006:4). This behavior change strategy holds parallels to the Foucauldian concept of governmentality. Exercised by a wide array of authorities in society, instead of deriving solely from a monolithic state, governmentality is a form of power that circulates through a capillary system of various organs and instruments (Foucault 2002a:45, Roberts 2010:38). In this decentralized form of power, conformity is achieved by applying “technologies of freedom” which encourage individuals to internalize the governing power’s mentality and henceforth self-govern (Mawuko-Yevugah 2010:63, Rose 2000:324).

In the lecture Governmentality, Foucault explains how this form of power gained momentum in early modern societies in the Western world (Foucault 2002a:39). In this lecture, Foucault distinguishes governmentality from the two other types of power central in his writings, discipline and sovereignty, contrasting it especially against the latter. In feudal times, he claims, sovereignty was the predominant form of power, concerned with securing the Prince’s dominance over his territory. The subjects’ main task in this system was to act as minions and obey the law of the established order. From the 16th century onward, however, a shift occurred from which government emerged as a prominent form of power occupied with the “conduct of
conduct”, namely governmentality (Foucault 2002a:54-55, 68, Sending & Neumann 2006:656, Neumann 2003:10). Unlike sovereignty, Foucault explains, governmentality:

> is a question not of imposing law on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved (Foucault 1991:95)

The “art of government” then, is not centered around a notion of the state’s demand of law-abiding from the people populating its territory; rather, it puts in place a range of suggestions guiding the population’s behavior to a certain end. This end is characterized by the will to improve the population’s welfare, health, wealth and life expectancy, rather than simply securing sovereignty (Foucault 2002a:45). Closely connected to governmentality is Foucault’s concept of bio-power, which places the body at the centre of regulatory practices. Bio-power, Foucault argues, revolves around the “calculated management of life” where power/knowledge inscribes on the human body from its birth to its decay (Foucault 1978:140).

In its focus on human welfare, bio-power can also be connected to the concept of human security, which is widely applied in the contemporary Western development realm (Roberts 2010:22). This connection will be revisited in chapter 3, where the merger of development and security will be discussed.

A key aspect of governmentality is that the governing occurs “at a distance,” making the exercise of power productive and relational, rather than repressive (Rose 2000:324, Lie 2006:14). Accordingly, the matriculation of the governor’s mentality does not constitute a power exercise imposed from above. Rather, it is a process internalized by the subject (Foucault 2002a:113). Those defined as targets of government are therefore not considered as minions in need of dominance, but “as members of a flock to be shepherded, as children to be nurtured and tutored, as citizens with rights, as rational calculating individuals whose preferences are to be acted upon” (Rose 2000:323). In this complex power system dependent on “disposing things” and “employing tactics,” appeals to freedom and agency become central technologies to govern through (Sending & Neumann 2006:656).
Foucault developed his understanding of governmentality late in his authorship and therefore only briefly explored it. Over the past twenty years or so, the concept has flourished and inspired a number of academics occupied with describing the technologies involved in the conduct of conduct (Leira 2013:113). While the majority of these studies have focused on examples of governmentality in the Western world, it can also be applied effectively in the analysis of the Western development apparatus operating in the Global South. According to Lord Cephas Mawuko-Yevugah and Jon Harald S. Lie, developmentality has emerged as a particularly prominent feature in contemporary development efforts in postcolonial societies. A variant of the Foucauldian governmentality, developmentality applies to the relationship between Western development actors and the beneficiaries in the Global South targeted by development interventions (Lie 2004:123). Unlike the repressive power exercised by the colonizer – which resembles Foucault’s idea of sovereignty – many of today’s Western development actors govern at a distance by utilizing technologies of freedom (Lie 2004:123, Mawuko-Yevugah 2010:51). Through the application of discourses such as “empowerment,” “participation” and “partnership,” beneficiaries are encouraged to conduct themselves “freely and rationally” (Burchell 1996:29). Development agents then, are to nurture beneficiaries to develop the skills needed to make development-advancing choices, enabling them to control their own lives (Lupton 1995:58).

1.5.3 Discourse, practice and the “messy actualities”

Governmentality analyses are often applied with the intent of highlighting the intersections of discourse and practice. From this perspective, the “discursive” refers to identification of the enunciative statements that enable the aim, target and means of governing, while the “practical” refers to locating the technologies used to govern (Villadsen 2006:78). However, Pat O’Malley, Lorna Weir and Clifford Shearing argue that many scholars who apply the governmentality framework have an excessive methodological emphasis on the envisioned strategy of governmentality. With such a focus, they warn, comes the risk of neglecting the “messy actualities” – contestations and social variety in the voices subjected to government (O’Malley, Weir & Shearing 1997:504-505, Barry, Osborne & Rose 1993:265-266).
In my analysis of the MCT, the exploration of the discursive and practical complexities involved has been a central concern. Similar to much of the governmentality literature, my focus laid in studying the power/knowledge involved in an effort aimed at altering conduct and the particular technologies utilized to achieve the desired behavior change (Villadsen 2006:78). However, my research agenda is not limited to exploring the envisioned strategy of the governing body, in this case, the film production team and SFCG. Another important aspect is the discussion of how the subjects of that government, the FARDC soldiers, interpreted and responded to the effort’s appeals to conduct themselves in a certain way. My ethnographic approach has provided the possibility of an in-depth exploration of the “messy actualities” involved in the MCT (Barry, Osborne & Rose 1993:265-266). At the core of this is an analysis of the intricate relationship between the strategy of government that the MCT sought to deploy and the empirical encounter with its subjects.
1.6 Outline

This thesis consists of six chapters, including the introduction chapter. **Chapter 2 – Methodology** – covers the manner in which I have gathered and processed the empirical data this thesis is based on, as well as my reflections on the ethical aspects of my research project. **Chapter 3 – The discursive space of the MCT** – lays out some of the historical and political conditions that I consider to have made it possible for a Western development NGO like SFCG to embark on the mission to prevent sexual violence committed by FARDC soldiers. **Chapter 4 – Developmentality in the MCT** – includes an exploration of the envisioned sexual violence prevention effect of the MCT as it was articulated by the interviewed Western development agents behind the MCT. The discourses articulated by these sources are analyzed in the light of the discursive space described in chapter 3. **Chapter 5 – Developmentality decoded** – deals with how the targeted soldiers responded to the MCT, both during the MCT sessions and in the interviews with me. Particular attention is devoted to the relationship between the narratives articulated by the Western development agents and those articulated by the soldiers. **Chapter 6 – Conclusion** – summarizes the main findings and includes some reflections on the implications my research may have for Western development agents seeking to prevent sexual violence perpetration by FARDC soldiers.
2 Methodology

In my introduction I explained how my theoretical focus is located within the Foucauldian perception of the interconnected and interdependent relationship between knowledge and power. This perception is not merely theoretical; it also has a direct role in the method of analysis applied to this thesis, which I will describe below.

2.1 While in Norway

2.1.1 Interviews with the film production team and film analysis

Before the fieldwork in the DRC was conducted, the research questions were formulated with an evaluative angle. The soldiers participating in the MCT were intended as the main informants, and the research agenda was oriented towards comparing their statements on sexual violence related issues before and after participation. However, after interviewing the film production team about their thoughts on how the effort was envisioned to contribute to sexual violence prevention, the research questions were revised. Listening to the film production team’s descriptions of the effort’s strategy to achieve behavior change, their role as knowledge producers emerged as a fundamental aspect to devote attention. Intrinsic in their narratives laid a range of discourses regarding what they believed were the “true” causes of sexual violence and the “right” way it should be addressed. Following their positioning as holding expert knowledge on sexual violence prevention, the research questions were rephrased to include an exploration of the discourses immanent to their envisioned strategy.
The three members of the team were interviewed separately in semi-structured interviews lasting approximately one-and-a-half hours. Some of my key questions explored their motivation to develop the MCT, their understandings of the conflict in DRC and the FARDC, as well as factors that they identified as the causes of sexual violence and how they believed that the MCT could contribute to prevention.\(^1\) Two of the film crew members were interviewed before I went to the DRC, which also served as valuable preparation for the fieldwork. The last member of the film crew was interviewed after I returned from the DRC in order to get her perspective on my main findings.

Since the MCT applied a filmic approach in the attempt to prevent sexual violence, the MCT short films have also been a central data source in this thesis. After receiving a copy of the films, the extensive work of transcribing its contents started. This transcribing included detailed descriptions of the visual and audible aspects of every frame, as well as verbal transcriptions. Central reflections during this process of deconstructing the films concerned the selection of stories that were presented, which messages they conveyed and which function they were intended to have on the soldier audience. Sound effects, music and camera angles were also given attention. Even though the films were supposed to be used as a starting point for the moderated discussions, they provided valuable insight into the messages the MCT sought to convey. As I will further demonstrate in chapter 4, the film medium played a key role in achieving the desired behavior change in the soldiers.

\(^1\) See the appendix for the full interview guides.
2.2 While in the DRC

The second aspect of my research agenda was devoted to the targets of the MCT, the Congolese FARDC soldiers. What was the relationship between the envisioned strategy and the soldiers’ decoding of this strategy? Did the vision convert seamlessly into practice or did the implementation of the MCT entail any “messy actualities” (Barry, Osborne & Rose 1993:265-266)? In order to explore these questions, I undertook a fieldwork in various areas in the eastern part of the DRC, over a period of nine weeks from June to August 2012. In the following subchapters, I will lay out a selection of methodological and ethical aspects connected to the two data gathering techniques I utilized, namely interviewing and observing.

2.2.1 Interviewing and observing

A few days after my arrival in the DRC, I received SFCG’s time schedule for the MCT sessions that were to be conducted during my fieldwork period. Realizing that I would only be able to observe screenings in the South Kivuian cities of Bukavu and Nyamunyunyi, I was concerned about the potential for methodological weakness this narrow geographical span held. As these two cities are not in an operational deployment area for the FARDC, I expected that the lack of proximity to actual conflict could affect the data I would be accessing. This perception was also supported by my sources at SFCG, who found that soldiers responded differently during the MCT sessions depending on where the session took place. Unfortunately, there was no possibility of conducting observations in other areas than South Kivu, as I was limited by the schedule SFCG had set up for the implementation of sessions.
As a result, I recognized that the soldiers I would observe might represent a particular narrative as a result of being stationed in a relatively stable area. As an effort to amend my limited geographical scope of observations, I took a boat to the North Kivu province capital Goma. At the time of my fieldwork, pockets of conflict were happening not far from Goma and the soldiers stationed there experienced several confrontations with rebel groups, in particular with M23. Using my contacts in the FARDC, I managed to get in touch with soldiers in Goma who had participated in MCT sessions in the previous project phase. After comparing the gathered interview material, I did trace variations in the soldiers’ narratives according to deployment area. One key finding was that the Goma-based soldiers generally made more direct statements about Rwandaphone combatants being the “true” sexual violence perpetrators. This point will be revisited in chapter 5, where the soldiers’ response to the MCT will be covered.

The interview data gathered in the DRC consists of twenty-one semi-structured interviews, with both FARDC soldiers and local and Western SFCG personnel. The informants can be grouped into the three following categories:

- Twelve soldiers who had previously participated in MCT sessions, ten men and two women. The soldiers came from three different camps in Bukavu (the capital of South Kivu), the camp in Goma (the capital of North Kivu) and the camp in Nyamunyunyi (a rural area close to Bukavu). Six of the soldiers participated in the project during the

---

2 Shortly after my fieldwork ended, M23 rebels took control of Goma.
3 See the appendix for the full interview guides.
previous phase, while the other six participated during my stay, at the same screenings where I made my observations. The questions I asked the soldiers were intentionally broader than the actual theme of my research in order to remain open to the possible discovery of unanticipated, relevant data. The questions covered a broad range of information, including the evolution of the soldiers’ military careers, their current life situation, their personal experience of being a soldier, their perspectives on the causes and consequences of sexual violence, how each soldier had responded during the MCT session, what they thought about the MCT after participation and whether they had suggestions for improvements. As I was curious about the narratives they presented to me after having participated in the MCT, I also asked them to comment on different statements about sexual violence and gender roles that fulfilled attitudes or behaviors that the MCT sought to prevent. Each soldier’s interview lasted anywhere from thirty minutes to two hours.

• Four soldiers with the function of debate facilitators during the MCT sessions. These soldiers held high ranks and had undergone a SFCG training course on how to facilitate the discussions that followed the screening of the films. The interviews with these soldiers followed a similar line of questioning as those of the aforementioned participants, with additional questions regarding the facilitators’ perceptions of participant reactions to the screenings. I also asked the facilitators about suggestions for MCT improvements. I found it particularly important to ask questions oriented towards their perceptions regarding sexual violence, as the facilitators held an important role in the dissemination of the MCT’s encouragement to refrain from acts
of sexual violence. The length of these interviews ranged from one-and-a-half to three hours.

- Three staff members from SFCG working on the MCT, one with a Western\textsuperscript{4} background and two with Congolese backgrounds. Most of the questions I asked the film production team were included in the interviews with the soldiers, but I also added a new section of questions regarding the implementation of the tool. These questions revolved around the staff’s thoughts on the project’s aim to prevent sexual violence and the challenges the project faced during its implementation. The interviews lasted approximately one to one-and-a-half hours.

All of the soldier interviews were conducted with the assistance of an interpreter, who was a Congolese male civilian in his early thirties with proficiency in English, French, Kiswahili and Kinyarwanda. The interviews with the SFCG employees were conducted in English and thus without the interpreter.

2.2.1.1 Recruitment of soldier informants

The soldier informants were recruited in various ways, which both had their strengths and weaknesses. Ten of the soldiers were recruited through two contacts I had in the FARDC who also operated as debate moderators for the MCT. Using these contacts gave me the opportunity to find soldiers that had participated in the MCT in the previous project phase.

\textsuperscript{4} “The SFCG informant” in this thesis will refer to the Western employee, unless otherwise mentioned. For anonymity, the nationality of the Western SFCG employee will not be specified.
Through interviewing people whom had participated in the past, I gained insight into what they retained from the MCT session and which perspectives they presented about the MCT’s preventive ambition after participating. However, my translator and I were concerned that this recruitment procedure provided me with informants that had been “hand-picked” by my soldier contacts. To avoid this, we agreed to change the recruitment method and choose informants from the screenings I observed. In this way, a greater degree of control was gained in the selection process and the pool of informants grew much more diverse. Some informants were very active during discussions, while others did not speak at all. Some made comments that were consistent with the development discourse expressed by the Western development agents, while others retained the attitudes the MCT had aspired to alter. I also selected a variety of ages, ranks and sexes. The latter proved to be somewhat challenging, as the gender distribution in the military is majority male, which resulted in a low number of female soldiers attending the MCT sessions.

None of the informants I interviewed were Tutsi because Tutsis were almost entirely absent from the screenings I observed. When I asked the Western SFCG employee about this, he told me that the explanation was simple: They had left the FARDC to join the rebellion in North Kivu. Although the absence of this soldier group in my data material was outside my control, the analysis could surely have benefited from their inclusion. I lack a foundation from which to speculate on the additional narratives I might have had access to, but can assume that increased diversity in the informant group would have resulted in an increased diversity in the data material. This is especially pertinent because the majority of my soldier informants claimed that Tutsis were the “true” sexual violence perpetrators. This topic will be covered more in chapter 5 when I discuss the soldiers’ decoding of the MCT’s envisioned strategy.

2.2.1.2 Informed consent

Sexual violence can be a sensitive topic to research, so informed consent was an essential step in ensuring the informants’ integrity. The principle of informed consent stresses that the
research participant has been provided with information about the research project’s purpose as well as potential benefits and risks of being involved. Based on this, the individual can make an informed, voluntary decision on whether they wish to participate (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996:315-316, Fangen 2008:155). Obtaining informed consent can be challenging when “issues of culture come into play” (Mani 2006:6). Knowing that the DRC has a strong oral tradition and that many soldiers have reduced literacy, I found that the most culturally appropriate way to obtain the consent was through an oral statement taped on a voice recorder. Because I was dependent on an interpreter during the interviews, it was important to underline that the informants' rights were communicated clearly, emphasizing that participation was completely voluntary, that they could refuse to answer any question or withdraw at any time, that the information would be treated confidentially, and that the recordings would be destroyed at the end of the project. In several cases, the soldier informants would share information that could be considered a critique of the Congolese government. One person explicitly stressed the danger he would be in if his identity was connected to the information he gave me, further highlighting the importance of full confidentiality. In an effort to assure safety, I did not keep written records of names and removed any identifying characteristics from quotes.

None of the soldiers I approached about being informants declined directly. However, there were a few occasions when soldiers with whom I had interview appointments did not show up. In the end, this affected the gender balance in the recruitment process, as my no-shows

5 The thesis is granted research approval from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, a resource center dealing with research ethics.
were primarily women. It is difficult to determine the reason for this, but my interpreter suggested that this could be the women’s way of declining the invitation to participate in the study, though it is also possible that they simply had something else they preferred to spend their time on.

2.2.1.3 The observations

The last main data in this thesis is the observations done at eight MCT sessions in four different soldier camps. As described above, all the sessions I observed were executed in South-Kivu; seven of them were in different soldier camps in Bukavu, while one was in the camp in Nyamunyunyi. I also observed a number of meetings between SFCG and the FARDC, as well as a five-day training session for high-ranking soldiers who were preparing to function as debate facilitators in the MCT.

During the observations, I did not have any direct interaction with my research subjects. This method of observing is similar to what Junker and Gold refer to as being a complete observer (Junker & Gold in Hammersley & Atkinson 1996:135). My motivation to assume this role was founded on a desire to minimize the influence I had on the research subjects’ conduct in the given situation (Thagaard 2009:74). Despite my intention of remaining in the background as a quiet observer, I still expected that my presence could influence those I observed. One situation I anticipated was that soldiers would present themselves in accordance with what they believed I wanted to see or hear. Before I arrived in DRC, a member of the film production team told me that she noticed the soldiers behaving differently during the screenings because of her presence. During the MCT sessions I observed, the soldier participation displayed a variety of narratives ranging from being in line with the goals expressed in MCT to being those the effort sought to alter. This implies that my presence did not restrict the soldiers from expressing themselves altogether, though it certainly may have influenced some of the soldiers at some points.
The combination of different techniques to study the same phenomena is often referred to as *triangulation* (Martin 2000:225). In my case, the amalgamation of observing and interviewing proved valuable in the analysis of the soldiers’ narratives, as it provided a broader scope of material to analyze (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996:135). The observations gave me the opportunity to witness the soldiers’ responses during their first encounter with the messages in the MCT as well as to take note of the statements they expressed in a group setting with their peers. The interview setting, on the other hand, provided an opportunity to access narratives in a more secluded environment, with only my interpreter and myself present. One discovery I made was that topics that emerged as pressing in one setting were often either articulated in a different manner or completely absent in the other. The motivation of low salaries as a push toward sexual violence was the clearest case: None of the soldiers mentioned this topic during the MCT sessions, but it was regularly articulated in the interviews. As I will demonstrate in chapter 5, this could both be connected to the sensitivity of soldier salaries as well as to a perception that the interview might lead to income-generating opportunities.

### 2.3 Method of analysis

#### 2.3.1 Ethnography and discourse analysis

Similar to many studies applying the method of ethnography, I have taken on a micro-approach by interviewing and observing subjects in the demarcated field surrounding the MCT (Tamboukou & Ball 2003:4). This approach has been crucial to the exploration of the relationship between the MCT’s envisioned strategy and its on-the-ground decoding. However, differentiated from many ethnographic studies with a micro-focus, I have sought to demonstrate the nexus between the MCT as a concrete development project and the broader historical and political conditions its deployment relied on (O’Malley, Weir & Shearing 1997:503). Following this, I have chosen to combine my ethnographic approach with a method of discourse analysis.
Discourse analysts perceive their research subjects’ narratives as discursive acts, conditioned by a wider economy of that which can be thought, said and done. In this context, the term “discourse” can be interpreted as pointing to the representations of truth the informants articulate regarding a given topic (Potter & Wetherell 2001:198-199, Wetherell 2001:16-17). According to Iver B. Neumann, discourse analysis is a useful tool to study situations where a certain truth representation holds a hegemonic position (Neumann 2001:60). Implicit in this is an understanding of truth as a matter emerging through human meaning-making rather than a static given (Neumann 2001:60, Wetherell 2001:16). Thus, the typical task of the discourse analyst is to explore the discursive “work” that acts to uphold a particular version of truth, as well as to locate the multiple and competing formulations depicted as “false” (Neumann 2001:60-61, Foucault 2002b:134). Drawing on this, my research agenda has revolved around identifying how truths on sexual violence prevention emerged in my informants’ narratives, which function these representations had, and how they related to a wider discursive economy (Wetherell 2001:16-17). Another key concern was to explore the relation \textit{between} the truth representations articulated by the Western development agents behind the MCT and the targeted soldiers. The purpose of this comparative approach did not include an ontological evaluation (as in “which of the informants’ ‘truth’ is ‘true’?”). Rather, my focus was to explore the ampler conditions these truths grew from, and how they inflicted the creation and implementation of the MCT.

In several of Foucault’s discourse analyses, he applies a \textit{genealogical} tool to demonstrate the complex power dynamics involved in the production of truth (Foucault 1999a, Foucault 1984a, Foucault 1978). By using history as a means to problematize the present, he demonstrates the process of continuities and discontinuities that have brought the contemporary into being. Foucault’s eminent expression “to write a history of the present,” is often used as an epitome of his methodological use of genealogy (Foucault 1999a:32, Dean 1994:20). Central to the genealogical approach is the establishment of how truth representations about phenomena considered ubiquitous throughout history, have in fact been subjected to struggles,
coincidences and exclusions through the course of time (Villadsen 2006:85). As Mitchell Dean puts it, genealogy is concerned with the

“relation between forms of discourse, the historical struggle in which they are immersed, the institutional practices to which they are linked, and the forms of authority they presuppose” (Dean 1994:71).

Postcolonial scholars Said, Escobar and Mawuko-Yevugah all draw on a genealogical approach in their writings on “the Orient” and “development” as historically produced discourses. In applying this perspective, they demonstrate a range of continuities of truths and practices from the imperial and colonial past into the contemporary, as well as ruptures and reconfigurations connected to the shift to decolonization (Said 2003:3, Escobar 1995:10, Mawuko-Yevugah 2010:31, Foucault 1984:76). Although this thesis does not include a detailed genealogical account of Western efforts aimed to shape the sexual conduct of Congolese subjects, my method of analysis has taken inspiration from the approach. In this laid a research strategy of exploring my informants’ truth representations parallel to asking how these versions were held up by the interplay of power/knowledge within specific historical sites (Tamboukou & Ball 2003:8, Wetherell 2001:16).

2.3.2 Translating meaning

In cross-cultural ethnographic research, translating meaning across languages is a key issue researchers experience while gathering, processing and analyzing data (Liamputtong 2010:154). This is particularly a concern when the researcher is not fluent in the informants’ native languages, which has been the case in this research project. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the majority of the interviews took place with the assistance of an interpreter. Consequently, much of the interview data analyzed in the thesis has been based on a secondary text produced with the interpreter, rather than on the informants’ verbatim narratives (Twyman, Morrison & Sporton 1999:322). Also important to note is that my use of an interpreter brings epistemological consequences, as it carries certain implications on the data which was produced (Temple & Young 2004:164). As Temple and Young highlight:
The translator always makes her mark on the research, whether this is acknowledged or not, and in effect some kind of ‘hybrid’ role emerges in that, at the very least, the translator makes assumptions about meaning equivalence that make her an analyst and cultural broker as much as a translator (Temple & Young 2004:171).

Although it is difficult to evaluate the exact imprint my interpreter made on the interviews and translations, some reflections can be made. One important aspect I have considered is how the translator’s positioning to the FARDC, the conflict and the topic of sexual violence, influenced the translations. For instance, civil-military relationships in the DRC have a long history of being marked by hostility (Baaz & Stern 2010:24). With this in mind, the interview situation with the soldier informants could have easily been influenced by the fact that the translator was a civilian. In discussions I had with the translator about the political situation in the DRC and the FARDC, he said nothing negative about FARDC soldiers. The critique he did express to me regarded the Congolese and Rwandan governments’ contribution to the conflict situation in the DRC. As chapter 5 on the soldiers’ response to the MCT will show, negative portrayals of the Rwandan and Congolese governments were central to the soldiers’ narratives. It should be noted that these narratives could have been emphasized by the interpreter, since they partly correspond with his own beliefs. However, while several soldiers expressed direct hostility toward the Congolese and Rwandan governments, my interpreter’s descriptions were considerably more moderate.

Mika Crang and Ian Cook point out that despite the central role of language in cross-cultural research, quotes from informants are often presented as their own words, lacking a description of the processing these words have undergone (Crang & Cook 2007:24). In this thesis, I have done my best to present quotes in a way that preserves the meaning in my informants’ narratives, while still making sense when translated to English. In instances when I considered language errors and linguistic inaccuracies to distort the meaning in the quotes, corrections were made. This way of translating meaning is not unusual within cross-cultural ethnographic research, as Jordan also has emphasized (Jordan 2002:96). In order to ensure that the corrections preserved the informants’ meaning, my interpreter served as an invaluable discussion partner. Nonetheless, all translation involves room for meaning to be both lost and
invented, which also applies to the data material this thesis is founded on (Hoggart, Lees & Davies 2002:260, Twyman, Morrison & Sporton 1999:322).

2.3.3 Categorizing meaning

The coding of interview material was executed by using HyperRESEARCH, a software program for analysis of qualitative data. With such a rich empirical foundation for my analysis, I felt that it was crucial to approach the data in a way that allowed for the emergence of both complexity and patterns. The coding was broken down into two stages. The first stage involved a broad thematic classification of 70 different codes (for example “Identified cause of sexual violence,” “Motivation to join the military,” “Feelings after participating in the MCT”). The second was guided by a categorization of the discourses that emerged most prominently (for example “Education is the key to change,” “Low soldier salaries fuels sexual violence perpetration,” “Rwandaphones are the ‘true’ perpetrators”). Combined, these two stages of categorizing the interview material provided a rich comparative starting point for the analysis of the informants’ narratives. This comparative foundation is particularly important to this thesis, as the relationship between the Western development agents’ and the soldiers’ truth representations has been central to the analysis.

However, a consequence of this research focus is that the informants’ narratives have been deconstructed into fragments and compared vertically. Thus, my focus on the relationship between the informants has, in many instances, occurred at the expense of the complexity within the narrative told by the individual informant. This also highlights the power I as a researcher have had in presenting truth representations – emphasizing certain aspects of the informants’ narratives while excluding others. Consequently, my research perspective can present an ethical dilemma because the individual informant may feel alienated from the segments I have chosen to present (Thagaard 2009:187). While acknowledging a negligence of the complexity within each individual narrative, I have emphasized the intricate relationship between the truth representations articulated by the Western development agents.
and those articulated by the soldiers. This not only ensures a higher degree of anonymity for the informants, but also corresponds better with my research agenda of analyzing the interface between the envisioned strategy of the MCT and the projects’ practical deployment.

A central implication following my notion of the constructed and constructive aspects of reality is that my carrying out of this research project is based on subjectivity, rather than objectivity. An author can not transcend the social world they write about, as Foucault claims, therefore the individual author is a crucial factor of any scientific writing (Foucault 1984:b101, 118). The next subchapter is devoted to a selection of reflections regarding my position as an author, of both methodological and ethical relevance.

2.4 Research as “doing good?” Reflections on reflexivity

Excerpt from the field diary: At my residence in Bukavu, 7th June 2012

One of the first epiphanies I’ve had after arriving in Bukavu is the concept of the “NGO bubble.” Many expats deployed here can live fairly cocooned lives, greatly contrasted with the distress they have come here to amend. Of course, the level of insecurity in the area is a legitimate reason for the cocooning. Nevertheless, I find the parallel lifestyles of the (usually Western) interveners and the general Bukavan population striking. It seems that the daily routine in the NGO bubble that I now have become a part of can be summed up like this: Living in a beautiful home protected by high walls and local security guards (formerly inhabited by Belgian colonizers), being picked up in the morning by a local driver in the NGO’s SUV, driven to an office that also is barricaded by high walls and security guards, work, being driven back home, find that the local housekeeper has cleaned your home, made your bed, prepared dinner and placed beer in the fridge. While my objective of coming here is driven by sincere intentions, as is the case with the vast majority of the other Westerners here, it is impossible not to feel uneasy about the comfortable lifestyle I am surrounded with and have adopted.
Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient – and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologists, historian, or philologist – either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism (Said 2003:2)

Historically, the ethnographic discipline has been dominated by Western researchers who travel to the Global South to study “natives” with the mission to “help” (Liamputtong 2010:109, Crang & Cook 2007:27). According to Linda T. Smith, this research mission has involved a colonization of “reality”, whereby the Western gaze has engaged in the production of knowledge on colonial subjects (Smith 1999:66-67). She sums up her argument in the following sentence: “They came, they saw, they named, they claimed” (Smith 1999:80).

Being a Western-situated researcher applying an ethnographic approach to the postcolonial context of the DRC, the question of research ethics has been of particular importance. Many of my reflections have dealt with identifying the purpose of my research. What outcome should I work towards? Should I strive for a result that had a positive impact on the people that my research concerned, or could this intention of “doing good” actually be ethically problematic in itself?

First and foremost, my research has been driven by my own curiosity about a Western development agent’s attempt to contribute to sexual violence prevention in a postcolonial context. At the same time, other stakeholders have influenced the methodology of the research. My collaboration with the film production team and SFCG was established at an early stage of the research project. One wish for this collaboration expressed by those partners was that the data I gathered could also be used to improve the MCT. SFCG had not initiated any
external evaluations of the MCT, as they considered this too costly to do well on their budget. SFCG therefore called for my feedback on the weaknesses in the implementation, as well as concrete recommendations on how to improve. While I acknowledged the need for constructive feedback on the MCT, I found it limiting to execute my research purely within an evaluative framework. As a compromise, I developed a list of twelve recommendations for SFCG: an overview of weaknesses I had identified and some possible solutions.  

Although I hoped that the Western development agents found these recommendations useful, it was also necessary to question whether my research was to be of “use” for MCT’s target group itself, the FARDC soldiers. In Meike J. de Goede’s research project on democracy in the DRC, she rejected that her research was supposed to “help” the Congolese. In de Goede’s eyes, this would imply that she positioned herself as enlightened and the research subjects as ignorant and in need of being “helped” (De Goede 2012:16-17). Furthermore, she questions whether the notion of “helping” in this context could be viewed as a form of epistemic violence. Building on Foucault, Gayatri C. Spivak applies this term to refer to the West’s privileged position of “knowing” the colonial subject as an Other, thereby excluding the voice of the Subaltern (Spivak 1988:76, Foucault 2002b:211). With this in mind, it is possible for cross-cultural research to function as yet another colonizing construct.

In my fieldwork, I definitely fulfilled the characteristics of being an outsider in relation to my research subjects (Junker & Gold in Hammersley & Atkinson 1996:137). Being a young, female, master student from Norway, with a Hungarian and Iraqi heritage, the structural

---

6 The list of recommendations can be found in the appendix.
differences between myself and the Congolese FARDC soldiers I interviewed were prominent. Additionally, I am certainly not the first person with these characteristics embarking on a research mission on sexual violence in the DRC. According to Maria E. Baaz and Maria Stern, sexual violence in the DRC has functioned as a tourist attraction for Western academics, pointing to the substantial number of researchers that have entered the country with a mission to “do good.” From Baaz and Stern’s perspective, this extensive focus has caused an exoticization of sexual violence committed by Congolese combatants (Baaz & Stern 2010b, Baaz & Stern 2008:58-59, Baaz & Stern 2013:89).

Although I do not intend to present a thesis that exoticizes sexual violence committed by soldiers in the DRC, it is important to acknowledge that this thesis does contribute to the system of Western knowledge production on postcolonial subjects. Parallel to this acknowledgement, I have sought to take a critical perspective on the knowledge I have produced. In an attempt to reduce the risk of epistemic violence, I have turned my academic attention towards exploring the power/knowledge involved in a Western NGO’s attempt to shape Congolese conduct, and the way the targets of the effort related to this attempt. This approach bears resemblance to what Escobar terms hyperethnography, where the Western development industry is an object of study, rather than solely focusing on those residing in the Global South (Escobar 2012:xv). As David Mosse, a pioneer within hyperethnography, writes:

Here, anthropology’s business is to focus on the social relations underpinning thought work; to show how development’s traveling rationalities are never free from social contexts, how they begin in social relations, in institutions and expert communities, travel with undisclosed baggage, get unraveled as they are unpacked into other social/institutional worlds […] (Mosse 2008:120-121).

Adapting this approach to fit this thesis, I have chosen to direct the criminological gaze toward the study of a Western effort to prevent crime in the DRC, as well as to the perceived criminal subjects’ unpacking of this effort. Hopefully, my application of this perspective will
contribute to a thesis that offers a different analysis of the conduct of conduct in a postcolonial context, rather than being “yet another paper on sexual violence in the DRC.”

This chapter has described the methodological aspects of this thesis, in regards to my gathering and processing of data derived from the MCT short films, the interviews and the observations. It also covered a selection of reflections on the ethical aspects of my research project. Before the analysis of this data material, the following chapter will situate the MCT as part of larger processes connected to the changing landscape of development and security. The identification of these processes has served as an important backdrop for the analysis of my main findings.
3 The discursive space of the MCT

No development intervention exists in a blank space. In my analysis of the MCT’s attempt to regulate the sexual conduct of FARDC soldiers, I have found it useful to explore the historical and political underpinnings of its discursive workings. This resembles the Foucauldian genealogical approach of using history as a means for grasping the workings of the contemporary (Foucault 1999a:32, Garland 2014:367, 379). When comparing the colonial DRC to today’s postcolonial context, there has been a major shift in the way Western agents attempt to govern Congolese sexual practices. Nonetheless, the discontinuities of certain discourses and styles of government can occur alongside elements of continuities as well (Foucault 1984:76):

Colonial history still shapes contemporary identities, not only in the sense that past ideas and images remain embedded in contemporary discourses and identities but in the sense that the colonial constitutes one of the histories in relation to which people are positioned and position themselves (Baaz 2001:6).

Accordingly, the discursive space the MCT operates within and works through today results of a process of historical practices combining power and knowledge. Furthermore, this space not only renders the Western development actors as licensed to “know” the causes of sexual violence and ways to prevent it, it also positions the Congolese subjects targeted by the intervention (Dunn 2003:11).

3.1 From sovereignty to developmentality: Civilizing, enlightening, empowering

The sexual body is constructed by a number of discourses seeking to constrain forms of behaviors deemed deviant while legitimizing other forms considered appropriate (Lupton 1995:136). While there are numerous discourses which have been used to legitimate the conduct of sexual conduct, I have identified three major discourses that are relevant in the analysis of the MCT: civilizing, enlightening and empowering. In interviews with the Western development agents, elements from each of these discourses appeared. It is important to
underline the word “elements” in this regard, as the information that follows is not meant to imply that the MCT constitutes a contemporary variant of colonialism. Rather, the point is to demonstrate how postcolonial DRC is entrenched in history, and that history has its own implications in the production, circulation and consumption of the discourses related to the MCT.

Efforts directed at the molding of sexual conduct have been a central area of interest for Western development agents since the early days of colonialism (Cornwall 2014:425). According to Kevin Dunn, the Belgian colonizers’ endeavors to shape the attitudes and behaviors of the Congolese were predominantly marked by a sovereign and authoritarian exercise of power. Along with this form of governing came a strongly paternalistic approach, as if the Congolese were considered to be unable to govern themselves (Dunn 2003:70).

Foucault has demonstrated that the molding of sexual conduct was a core issue in the Western world during this time, an issue he believes involves bio-power. In addition to being a moral endeavor, the administration of sexuality came to include a rational plan of management along political and economic lines. Governments considered the population’s sexual conduct to be a matter of public concern, as the prosperity of the state was seen as dependent on individuals’ sound management of their own sexuality (Foucault 1999b:32, 35-36, Foucault 1978:140). These notions of social engineering fed into the European colonizers’ civilizing missions in the Global South. When European countries set out to conquer parts of the African continent in the 18th and 19th centuries, the transferal of European sexual morals was a central part of the imperial expansion. Moreover, civilization missions included a highly gendered approach to development. Foucault argues that sexual conduct within marriage was the most saturated space of prescriptions in the Western world throughout the 18th century (Foucault 1978:37). In the DRC, an important part of the colonizers’ remolding was steering of sexual practices towards the contour of monogamous marriage and a nuclear family (Hunt 1990:451):
Whereas men would be useful to the colony as producers, as a labor force, women would be important as reproducers, as mothers and wives ensuring the vitality and perpetuation of this labor force and the proper rearing of children (Hunt 1990:451).

Foucault claims that from the 19th century, the focus in the Western world shifted from the productive role of the married couple towards sexual perversions: the sexuality of mad men, the sexuality of criminals, and I would like to add; the sexuality of Africans (Foucault 1978:37-38). Edward Said describes a similar categorization scheme in Western views on deviance:

Along with all the other people variably designated backward, degenerate, uncivilized and retarded, the Orientals were viewed in a framework constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political admonishment (Said 2003:207).

In the DRC, the colonial authorship of fixing and policing difference between the conqueror and the conquered set the foundation for domination and domestication itself (Dunn 2003:26-27). During these colonial endeavors, the imagining of the Civilized European Self and the Unruly African Other had an instrumental purpose (Mbembe 2001:2-3). In the Othering of African subjects, the civilizing of so-called “unruly” bodies was considered a pressing issue. African sexuality was commonly constructed as “obsessive,” “abnormal,” and “immoral,” directly opposed to the imagined moral purity of the white European body (Rahier 2005:3-4). Accordingly, the eradication of “barbaric” sexual practices became a prime concern (Cornwall 2014:425).

The colonizers’ civilizing imperative was highly inspired by the Enlightenment ideas dominating in the Western world. Controlling the future, development and rationality were driving concepts of the social engineering during this time. A quote from a Belgian organization for colonizers can serve as an epitome for this perception: “One has to say, ‘to colonise’ is to educate, it is to become more civilised, it is to diminish the suffering and misery due to ignorance” (BUFC in Mertens 2013). Correspondingly, the burden of the white man was to cast the “light of reason” over the underdeveloped settlements living in evolutionary darkness, remolding them to align with the modernity characterized by the West
“Science” became the new mantra in the conduct of conduct, which could be defined in the fields of criminology, medicine, and genetics, and later in psychology and sociology. Scientists within these professions focused on developing instruments for causal analysis and planned action, both directed at societal institutions and at the population operating within them (Sahlin 2000:51-52, 75). Furthermore, these sciences had a norm producing function: creating knowledge about human behavior in response to categories of “conformity” and “deviance.” Along with the production of criminological knowledge came for instance a range of visualization techniques for codifying certain physical traits as reflectors of psychological pathology (Andersson 2004:6-7). Similar techniques were also deployed by Belgian colonial agents in their codification of the Congolese as evolutionary degenerated. Photography was frequently use as “evidence” in this regard, for instance by depicting Congolese next to apes to demonstrate their “animalistic” stage on the evolutionary ladder (Dunn 2003:29-30). Cesare Lombroso’s criminal anthropology relied on Social Darwinist theories for defining physical, mental and social traits among “uncivilized criminals;” colonizers applied the same to “uncivilized Congolese” (Lombroso & Ferrero 2009:94).

The 20th century marked the death of colonial rule in DRC. With the decolonization of the country in 1960, the discourses underpinning Western efforts to govern Congolese sexuality underwent a process of re-articulation. However, the shift from colonialism to postcolonialism did not constitute a complete break with the hierarchal relationship between the Western actors and the Congolese (Baaz 2001:6). Still, Western agents continued to depict themselves as superior holders of the knowledge required to achieve a developed society (Cornwell 2014:426). In the 1960s and 1970s, development studies came into the being as a new scientific discipline of the social sciences. Along with this, a wide array of knowledge was produced regarding how “underdeveloped” countries in the Global South could progress into the prosperity and order considered to reign in the Global North. Modernization theory, claiming the progressive nature of social evolution, was particularly widespread in the
decades following decolonization (Schuurman 2014:21). Sending and Neumann explain this theory:

With the “traditional” and the “modern” being placed on a evolutionary, progressive scale, modernization theory identified the genesis of western society as the model upon which traditional societies could and would develop, assisted by western expertise and know how (Sending & Neumann 2006:659).

As such, concepts like “modernization,” “industrialization” and “economic growth” were placed at the centre of development efforts implemented in postcolonial countries (Duffield 2005:152). In this framework, one phenomenon emerged as a considerable threat to development progress, namely rapid population growth in the Global South (Sending & Neumann 2006:660). As a result of the considered need for “population control,” efforts directed towards the management of sexuality, in particular reproduction, were framed as a strategic move to curb the growth (Sinding 2009:3). With this, sex “came to be represented within international development as a cause of unwanted pregnancies, disease, harm and hazard” (Cornwell 2014:426). However, from the 1980s onwards, the notion of “population control” to govern sexual conduct in the Global South lost its sway in the development realm (Sinding 2009:5). As a result of substantial critique directed at the ineffectiveness of the top-down and sovereign-like approach applied in many development projects, the notion of participation and empowerment started to gain momentum (Mohan 2014:132, Lie 2006:4). Reproductive rights activists, many from the women’s health movement, advocated for a human rights-based approach to the conduct of sexual conduct (Rao 2004:188-189). Accordingly, development agents’ efforts to govern behavior “increasingly operated through affected individuals rather than on them” (Sending & Neumann 2006:661). With the discursive shift to participatory empowerment, individuals in the Global South were to be given the assistive tools to self-govern their sexual conduct rather than be commanded by Western agents (Lie 2006:1-2). This approach resembles the governing approach of developmentality, which will be revisited later in the thesis.
When it comes to sexual conduct that has been identified as problematic by contemporary Western development agents, large-scale manifestations of sexual violence have been formulated as one of the main issues (UNIFEM 2015:2). Following the scale and brutality of the conflict and post-conflict-related sexual violence in the DRC, a strong incentive has emerged among Western NGOs to implement interventions providing *victim-support* (Autesserre 2012:209). In the eastern part of the DRC, there is a high density of these development projects. Among these are efforts providing medical support (physical assistance, anti-HIV transmission treatment projects), psycho-social support (therapy, mediation to reintegrate victims rejected by their community), economic support (distribution of food and other essentials, skill-based training, micro-finance) and judicial support (victim-support during legal procedure). Although the vast majority of NGO-led efforts in the DRC linked to sexual violence are reactive and victim-centric, preventive efforts are also present (Douma & Hilhorst 2012:7-8, 12). Following Gerald Caplan’s model of levels of prevention, the preventive efforts in the DRC mainly take on a *primary approach*, through the targeting of whole communities (Caplan in Sahlin 2000:39). Awareness-raising campaigns are frequently implemented, aimed to educate the general public on various sexual violence-related issues (Douma & Hilhorst 2012:42). Preventive efforts with a *tertiary approach*, meaning efforts aimed to alter the conduct of (perceived) perpetrators of sexual violence, are seldom (Brantingham & Faust 1976:284, Douma & Hilhorst 2012:12). SFCG is one of the few NGOs which is applying a tertiary approach, through their targeting of FARDC soldiers as a perceived perpetrator group (SFCG 2014g).

---

This chapter has laid out a selection of discourses that have been used to legitimize Western efforts to shape Congolese sexual conduct in colonial and postcolonial times. I now turn to an analysis of the international community’s mobilization to combat conflict-related sexual violence in the DRC in light of the post-Cold War merging of development and security. The MCT’s targeting of perceived perpetrators is a rare approach among NGO-led efforts linked to sexual violence in the DRC, and it can potentially be seen as being deduced from larger ongoing processes of securitization of development and developmentalization of security.

3.2 The securitization of conflict-related sexual violence

While sexual violence has been recognized as an interest point for development agents, it was only relatively recently framed as a security issue by the international community. After centuries of perceiving conflict-related sexual violence as inevitable “spoils of war,” the contemporary understanding of rape as a weapon of war has moved it to the high politics of global security (Baaz & Stern 2013:1-2). The term “securitization” has been explored by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde in their analysis of the character and dynamics of post-Cold War security. According to these scholars, an issue is securitized when it is “presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998:23-24, vii). I argue that sexual violence has undergone a process of securitization within international relations, depicting sexual violence as an exceptionally horrendous crime that requires emergency measures. In effect, sexual violence has become a primary concern in the international community’s risk portfolio, meaning a threat that has emerged as a priority for collective action (Rose 2010:87). Below, this evolution will be linked with the introduction of a security logic in development issues, as well as to the application of a development logic in security matters.

While the merging of “development” and “security” was apparent as a tool to ensure geopolitical interests during the Cold War, it grew particularly visible in the 1990s with the rise of intrastate conflicts (Lie 2004:32, Buur, Jensen & Stepputat 2007:9). Intrastate conflicts,
also known as *New Wars*, were seen as state failure in the most basic sense (Goodfellow 2014:499). Dunn also notes that the term “New Wars” was often replaced with “New Barbarism” in the context of the DRC, referring to an “unfinished civilizing process” (Dunn 2003:167). As the international community proclaimed that the governments of these states had failed in upholding their monopolies on violence within their own territories, “poor governance” and “underdevelopment” were increasingly interpreted as roots for conflict and crime (Buur, Jensen & Stepputat 2007:9, Goodfellow 2014:499). It is this devolvement that is referred to as the *securitization of development*.

Within the development context, securitization has often been analyzed in relation to the War on Terror since 9/11 and its subsequent implications on foreign aid (see for instance Howell & Lind 2009, Brown 2014). With regards to the upsurge of intrastate conflicts in postcolonial countries – the DRC being a prime example – many classify insecurity as a legacy of weak post-independence statehood (Duffield 2005:144). However, the presence of insecurity in the Global South has not just been perceived as a risk to its own populations. Increased global interconnectedness has brought an awareness of transnational ripple effects (Devetak 2008:13, Aas 2007:13, 111). The intertwining of the local and the global, termed by Roland Robertson as a situation of *glocalization*, has made local intrastate conflicts a matter of world stability (Robertson 1995:28). As a response to the global security threats in the Global South, aid donors have increasingly implemented development efforts aimed at transforming weak states into states that are able to exercise “sound management” (Gibert 2009:623, Howell 2014:513). With this understanding, development is perceived as an effective instrument to prevent insecurity, while a situation marked by security is seen as a catalyst for development. In many instances, the effect of this interface between “development” and “security” makes it difficult to differentiate the two concepts, as they can be interpreted as two sides of the same coin.

The widespread and strategic use of sexual violence during the intrastate conflicts in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia brought a precedence to the consideration of sexual violence as an act of war rather than a mere “side-effect” of war (Skjelsbæk 2008:46-47). Furthermore, the
establishment of the ICC and the Rome Statute provided the mandates and mechanisms to investigate and prosecute persons for serious crimes of international concern. Several of the articles in the Rome Statute articulate prohibitions against sexual violence in relation to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Leatherman 2011:26-28, 167). With the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, the gendered aspect of conflict-related violence against women was for the first time given momentum within a security framework (UNSC 2000, Leatherman 2011:167, Bastick 2008:1). According to Janie L. Leatherman, this milestone resolution sprang out of the political impetus gained after the ad hoc tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as the adoption of the Rome Statue of the ICC. The urgency of women’s empowerment in the maintenance of international peace and security is a paramount point in SCR 1325. Furthermore, all parties in a conflict are called to take special measures to protect women from sexual violence, and states are held responsible for holding perpetrators accountable (UNSC 2000). Eight years after SCR 1325, another landmark resolution was adopted, namely 1820 on sexual violence in conflict. In its first article, the resolution

\[s\]tresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, affirms in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and expresses its readiness, when considering situations on the agenda of the Council, to, where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence (UNSC 2008:2).

Here, widespread or systematic use of sexual violence is articulated as a pervasive security challenge on a global level, rather than as the sum of individual acts that harm only those subjected to the violence. Furthermore, reactive and preventive efforts are identified as a prerequisite for achievement of international peace and security. In the one-year follow up report on the resolution, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon further highlighted the urgency to implement preventive efforts. Among his suggestions is the importance of conducting trainings and facilitating awareness-raising of military forces on their obligations under
international human rights, humanitarian and criminal law. The Secretary General also stressed the need for a better understanding of profiles and motivations of perpetrators (Ban 2009:8, 21).

Along with the introduction of a security logic in development work for the purpose of reducing insecurity, development actors have taken on the role of security providers for the advancement of development. In addition to witnessing a securitization of development, one can thus also trace a development of security (Buur, Jensen & Steputat 2007:7). The 1994 Human Development Report from UNDP is considered a key document for the conceptualization of security as a development issue (UNDP 1994). By criticizing the inefficiency of the traditional state-centric approach, the report advocates for a security concept oriented towards human security. The focus on securing territories of nation states from external aggression during the Cold War is argued to have diverted attention away from the insecurities most people are faced with in their daily lives:

For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighbourhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become a victim of violence because of their gender (UNDP 1994:22)?

Given the focus on human welfare, health and wealth within the concept of human security, development efforts operating after its logic can also be seen as exercising a form of bio-power. With the human body placed at the centre, the key task of these development agents can be said to revolve around the “calculated management of life,” where their “expert knowing” of development is to be deployed on subjects residing in the Global South (Foucault 1978:140, Roberts 2010:22).

Following the developmentalization of security, humanitarian NGOs are not exclusively perceived as development agents, but as security actors as well. This devolvement has also been traced by Benoît Dupont, Peter Grabosky and Clifford Shearing. According to them,
there is a general tendency in “weak” states for international NGOs to take on the role of security agents. Weak states, they argue, are marked by disintegrated governmental institutions and often limited in willingness, capability or legitimacy in the provision of security to their citizens. This can create a space where alternative providers residing outside the state domain, such as Western development NGOs, may find a flourishing market (Dupont, Grabosky & Shearing 2003:337-340, Tvedt 2002:374). In addition to implementing efforts contributing to human security, such as generating advances within health, education and economy, humanitarian NGOs may therefore also engage in efforts that traditionally have been left to the security realm (Buur, Jensen & Stepputat 2007:9). Consequently, crime prevention, security sector reform, post-conflict reconstruction and re-integration of soldiers are now often tasked to Western civil society actors (Howell 2014:513-514, Eliasson 2015).

In the context of sexual violence prevention in the DRC, one can trace both a developmentalization of security and a securitization of development. These processes have resulted in an expansion of the two concepts, as well as the actors engaging in them. Security sector reform is one type of initiative that can exemplify both trends, and also relates to this thesis’ focus on prevention of sexual violence perpetration committed by the FARDC. MONUSCO has stated that before the development/security nexus was a fact, security agencies and development NGOs were marked by a sharper division of labor. Development agents had largely refrained from engaging directly in military security issues. However, in the 1990s sustainable development was increasingly seen as intertwined with the security environment. Parallel to this, the international community acknowledged that human security, rather than state security, should be the main concern of security agencies. As MONUSCO summarizes, there could be “no development without security and no security without development” (MONUSCO 2015b). In the official UN strategy against sexual violence in the DRC, security sector reform is described as carrying a clear sexual violence prevention effect (UN Action 2009:4, 89). This approach is rooted in a claim that the pervasive presence of sexual violence to a great extent stems from “state fragility” (MONUSCO 2015a). Currently, both MONUSCO and the EU mission in the DRC are engaged in reforming the FARDC.
Strengthening the FARDC’s capacity to execute, in their own words, “good governance” is a primary concern (MONUSCO 2015b, EUSEC 2008, EU Delegation to the UN 2014). Specifically, the provision of basic training in gender, human rights and international humanitarian law is seen as a central component in mitigating poor governance within the FARDC (UN Action 2009:55). In the company of these two security bastions’ reform initiatives, SFCG is the only civil society actor engaged in reforming the FARDC to prevent sexual violence perpetration.

The first part of this chapter included a description of Western attempts to alter the sexual conduct of Congolese subjects from the era of colonization to today’s postcolonialism. This included an explanation of the trajectory of Western agents’ sovereign approach to alter conduct to the widespread developmentality strategy in contemporary Western development efforts. The second part of the chapter covered how the merging of the concepts “development” and “security” led to the framing of conflict-related sexual violence as a security issue, opening up a space in which Western development NGOs such as SFCG can operate as security experts. The identification of these processes has served as an important backdrop for the analysis of the empirical data material, which I will now present. The next chapter will be devoted to the analysis of the envisioned sexual violence preventive effect of the MCT as it was presented by the film production team and the Western SFCG employee.
4 Developmentality in the MCT

Intrinsic to the envisioned sexual violence preventive effect of the MCT is a belief in the capacity for change and governability of individuals. This vision entails a range of discourses regarding the cause of sexual violence, the actors who engage in perpetration, the actors that work to hinder perpetration and the manner in which it is to be hindered. Furthermore, this particular way of “knowing” how to shape the sexual conduct of Congolese subjects does not merely point to theory. Rather, it is deeply intertwined with material practices. With this understanding, the MCT can be seen as the practical enactment of the Western development agents’ “knowing” of development and security (Foucault 2002:134, Dunn 2003:10-11). As this chapter will demonstrate, a myriad of different discourses appeared in the film production team and SFCG’s envisioned sexual violence preventive effect of the MCT. Throughout these discourses was an emphasis on placing the soldiers’ at the centre of their own development – an echo of developmentality.

4.1 The nexus of development and security in the MCT

In its entirety, the tool adopts a positive approach to motivate the military to get involved in changing attitudes and behaviors in relation to sexual violence (Douma & Baroani 2014:7, translated from French).

The quote above is taken from the MCT manual, which was co-written by one of the members of the film production team and a Congolese SFCG employee and intended for debate facilitation. In the manual, the MCT is described as an educational project, aimed to raise awareness in the FARDC about human rights and work ethics, particularly regarding sexual violence and the protection of women. The soldiers participating in the MCT are to be sensitized regarding the causes and consequences of sexual violence, not only for the victim but for the perpetrator as well. This is said to stimulate the thoughts and actions required to professionalize the army (Douma & Baroani 2014:7). While the majority of Western-led NGO projects related to sexual violence in the DRC are angled towards assisting victimized women, the MCT is targeting a group considered contributors to insecurity: the Congolese state military. What motivated the film production team to embark on the mission to prevent
sexual violence perpetration committed by FARDC soldiers? And how did they rationalize their choice of a perpetrator-oriented strategy?

In my interviews with the film production team, I traced clear links between a critique of the development industry’s traditional focus on sexual violence victims and the team’s incentive to work within the development/security nexus. According to them, the substantial prevalence of NGO interventions directed towards victims did not correlate with actual needs on the ground. While victim assistance was acknowledged by the team members as important, it was also used as a synonym for preserving the status quo and for seriously overlooking a sustainable response to the problem of sexual violence. As one of the team members said: Care for victims “will never solve the problem of rape. It will just continue.” The two quotes which follow exemplify the frustration that team members expressed over the traditional, victim-centric approach:

The focus on victims is easy to sell abroad. It’s the story that people, well… not necessarily want to hear in Western audiences, but it’s a story that is touching. It’s a story that is provoking a reaction in terms of “oh, this is terrible and we need to do something about it.”

I think it’s time that these organizations ask themselves: “What we are doing, is it still needed or are we just still following the funds”? […] And in that case, yes, sexual violence is a business, because there is too much money flowing in for this one person [the raped woman].

As can be derived from these quotes, the informants claimed that the Western world considers female victims of sexual violence as especially worthy beneficiaries of aid. This aspect of the worthiness of the victim parallels Nils Christie’s concept of the ideal victim. According to Christie, cultural perceptions in society render certain individuals as legitimate victims. Central attributes ascribed to this distinct victim category concern the weakness of the victim, the absence of their blameworthiness and the respectability of the errand the concerned was undertaking when victimized. An ideal case he describes, is “the young virgin on her way home from visiting sick relatives, severely beaten or threatened before she gives in” (Christie 1986:18-19). In the specific case of sexual violence in the DRC, the “ideal victim” category
requires contextualization. Baaz and Stern are among the scholars who have embarked on this mission in their analysis of Western efforts to alleviate the suffering of raped women in the DRC. According to Baaz and Stern, the Western gaze has singled out raped women as the “prioritized bodies whose lives are constructed as the most precious” (Baaz & Stern 2013:96). It was this singling-out of female sexual violence victims that the film production team saw as a problem.

In addition to appealing to the sentiments of the general public and donors, the informants from the film production team underlined that NGOs prefer reactive efforts because they are considered easy to quantify:

Focus on the consequences for victims is easier, because focusing on the root causes is a long-term investment and does not necessarily show any immediate results. Whereas a victim-centered approach allows organizations to justify their project in terms of “so many victims medically assisted, so many legally assisted.” It’s sort of a quick, short-term quantification of what they are doing.

With aid effectiveness being a debated topic in many Western donor countries, quantifiable results (as in “so many victims medically assisted, so many legally assisted”) were seen by the film production team as an easy way for NGOs to document the success of their efforts. According to Shannon Kindornay and Bill Morton, contemporary development policy is increasingly centered around measuring effectiveness (Kindornay & Morton 2010:315). This focus especially evolved after the turn of the century as donors, civil society and aid recipients raised critique around the lack of desired results (Glennie 2014:551). Partly because of this, Robert Martinson's famous question “What works?” – central to many debates on the effectiveness of crime prevention efforts – is also persistent in the contemporary development realm (Martinson 2009:517). However, in the eyes of the informants from the film production crew, the question of “What works?” has been rephrased to “What can be measured?” As a consequence, NGOs were seen to angle their efforts according to outcomes that could be quantified, as this generated the highest amount of funding. To these informants’ chagrin, this
occurred at the expense of projects that could hinder sexual violence from occurring in the first place.

In contrast with the massive amount of reactive responses, which the informants largely considered as originating from “following the funds” and Western sentiments on “worthy beneficiaries,” the MCT was ascribed one of few efforts that truly corresponded to the “reality on the ground.” By applying a focus on prevention and perpetrators, the MCT was seen as equipped to address the root causes of sexual violence, rather than simply “picking up the pieces” after the violence had occurred. As one of the member from the film production crew said:

> Like, if we wanted to continue to work on sexual violence and we would have followed the money, we wouldn’t have made critical films about it. [...] And now we really want to attack the money flow, in a way, because we will tell governments and funders that they have to change their policies. Who, of course, we are not going to make big friends with. But I think it’s important for the development of the Congo.

Here, the informant described that their critical approach to the humanitarian industry that operates in the DRC served as a fundamental motivator in the creation of the MTC. At the same time, the critique of the “money flow” was categorized as a controversial opinion to confront donor governments and other funders with. Even though the film production team risked losing powerful “friends” by upholding this standpoint, it was deemed as necessary in order to contribute to development/security in the DRC:

> Of course it’s difficult to work with perpetrators and of course it’s difficult to tell your donors that you are not helping the victims, but that you have started to work with perpetrators. But it’s just a matter of how you explain it. Because if you explain that it will prevent that more women are raped, people will be fine with it.

Framed in this manner, working with perpetrators harmonizes seamlessly with the developmentalized security concept, placing human security in the center of the effort. As the earlier-mentioned 1994 UNDP report states:
it is far cheaper and far more humane to act early and to act upstream than to pick up the pieces downstream, to address the root causes of human insecurity rather than its tragic consequences (UNDP 1994:iii).

Combining the two quotes above, the preventive approach is considered to be not only the most rational response for alleviating human suffering, but also the most cost-effective route that achieves both security and development. Following this, efforts aimed at identifying and obliterating potential threats are preferred rather than dealing with the ampler consequences after these threats have materialized.

Another reason listed by the film production crew for stepping away from seeing victims as their natural group of beneficiaries was the preventive potential of addressing those considered contributors to insecurity. On an institutional level, this entailed the Western development agents’ transfer of the executing responsibility of the MCT to the FARDC. SFCG’s strategy in this regard was to train a selection of FARDC soldiers who would function as debate facilitators during the MCT screening sessions rather than operating as moderators themselves. Participatory approaches like this appear frequently in contemporary Western development projects implemented in the Global South. Through the eyes of Lie, delegation of responsibility to beneficiaries is also one the cornerstones of developmentality, with its appeals to activate self-government. According to Lie, responsibility transfers entail an expectation of the beneficiaries’ internalization of the development agents’ development discourse (Lie 2004:123). Central to the MCT’s developmentality approach was that the sexual violence prevention messages they sought to convey appeared as more legitimate by the military audience if they were communicated through their soldier peers. With this, the FARDC was not seen as taking the role of passive recipients of aid. Rather, they can be thought of as active and participative contributors towards their own development.

Sending and Neumann are among the scholars within the governmentality literature who have written about the role of non-state actors in shaping and executing global governmental errands in late modern society. An important point they make is that civil society actors, such as NGOs, have assumed roles that are integral to production of governmental rationalities,
generating specific types of actors and actor-orientations (Sending & Neumann 2006:658). This is also a perspective I have found applicable to the case of the MCT, as the project involved that SFCG, a civil society actor, undertook the mission of educating Congolese state agents in soldiering. This point can be exemplified in the following quote from one of the employees in the film production crew:

[NGOs have to] look into groups that are considered to be perpetrators or that are considered to be counterproductive to eradicating impunity or whatever around those issues and other human rights violations. That demands that you also work with groups like the army, that you work with different departments of the Congolese government. The structures are officially there, but people [working in Western development NGOs] still consider that the government is not functioning and therefore it is bypassed in many activities. Which is in a way understandable, because a lot of the people working for the government and the departments are very incompetent and lack the will and lack capacities, lack the means to even function. So, yeah. Where to start? […] But even though a lot of organizations say “we cannot interfere in the domain of the state”, in a country like Congo, I mean you almost have to. Otherwise it will create and sustain a parallel system, which is already visible in the field, which is entirely counterproductive to all the efforts that you are doing.

According to the informant, the security vacuum caused by the dysfunctional Congolese state created a space in which external civil society actors could, and should, interfere in the state domain. Moreover, NGOs’ unwillingness to work with the state was seen to contribute to development of parallel systems that further undermined the state’s capacity to execute good governance. In cases in which the state was deemed incapable of providing security for its citizens, NGOs were prescribed to enter the state domain in order to ensure the sound performance of governmental tasks. In light of these remarks, the MCT can be interpreted as a prime example of an effort that operates within the development/security nexus. While essentially being a development NGO, SFCG approached the state military as security experts, taking on the responsibility of teaching soldiers the adequate way of providing for its population’s security. Importantly though, this endeavor was not to be perceived by the FARDC as imposed from above by the film production team and SFCG. In the Western development agents’ referral to the FARDC as a partner, rather than an aid recipient, the Congolese were portrayed as contributors to their own development. The creation of the MCT
was thus a means to empower the FARDC so that it could execute a task essentially considered to lay under its own remit. In addition to identifying the preventive potential of cultivating developmentality on an institutional level in the FARDC, the film production crew and SFCG emphasized the benefits of encouraging self-government among individual soldiers. The following subchapters will be devoted to the envisioned sexual violence preventive effect of developmentality on an individual level.

4.2 Nurturing behavior change in the midst of patriarchy

In my interviews with the film production crew and SFCG, a key aim of the questions was to learn more about their reflections around the goal of the effort. What was the envisioned outcome they sought to achieve? One of the members from the film production team formulated herself in the following manner:

Well, probably the biggest aim is behavioral change, so that the men start to understand that it is not their right to claim sex. That I think is the most important one, that they have to respect other human beings, and women in particular, and that it is wrong. And a lot of times, the men still see it as their right. Because they are serving the country and protecting it, they can have sex whenever they want and they can take women whenever they want. So it’s the behavior and the mentality that has to change, the awareness.

Following this statement, it was made explicit that the primary goal of the effort was to alter the attitudes and behaviors of the soldiers. This change was described as an outcome following an awareness-raising process. Parallel with identifying the envisioned outcome of the MCT, the root causes of perpetration were adumbrated. Male soldiers were described as lacking an understanding of the concepts of gender equality and respect for women’s bodily integrity. With this conceptualization, sexual violence perpetration committed by soldiers manifested unequal gender relations present in the Congolese culture at large.

As the informant framed soldiers as bearers of patriarchal attitudes, what was characterized as sexual violence by the employee was presented to constitute a legitimate act among the
soldiers. This claim bears resonance to the concept of cognitive distortion, which appears frequently within the social psychology literature on sexual violence. Susan Pervan and Mick Hunter describe the term as referring to the set of “thinking errors” that enables perpetration (Pervan & Hunter 2007:76). The perception of men’s sexual entitlement can be seen as an example of such cognitive distortion, in which a traditionally masculine ideology is depicted as linked with rape-supportive attitudes and behaviors (Hill & Fischer 2001:39). In the informant’s narrative above, patriarchy is what serves as a blocker for the soldiers’ access to “reality,” whereby the illegitimate action of sexual violence is rendered legitimate. In other words, soldiers were perceived as unable to comprehend that they were not entitled to sex, as the general culture in the DRC legitimized their feeling of entitlement.

The notion that sexual violence is essentially rooted in patriarchal and hierarchal gender relations is not unfamiliar within the literature on sexual violence (Skjelsbæk 2010:34). Diana Scully is one of the scholars favoring this perspective, by claiming that sexual violence has sociocultural origins. “Men learn how to rape,” as she puts it, through a socialization process stemming from shared cultural values of patriarchy and misogyny. Because women are rendered as meaningless objects within this framework, men do not experience restraint from “taking” women by force (Scully 1990:162, 166). Janie L. Leatherman has framed a similar argument regarding the occurrences of sexual violence in the DRC. In her perception, the DRC is a patriarchal society, in which women’s bodies are considered to be “for the use and benefit of others, especially for men” (Leatherman 2011:75, 146). Moira Carmody and Kerry Carrington warn us that the “patriarchy explanation” of sexual violence tends to rely on essentialist notions of gender. Furthermore, they argue that such representations risk constructing all men as potential criminals, naturalizing perpetration as something uncontrollable (Carmody & Carrington 2000:8). While the informant above may be said to frame male FARDC soldiers as potential perpetrators, she did not present this as a static condition. Reconfigurations were possible through a strategy of awareness-raising of gender equality issues and a parallel unlearning of patriarchal attitudes.
In another quote from the same informant, she elaborated on her perception of the FARDC soldiers’ experience of sexual entitlement:

They have the power and misuse it with their guns, they feel it’s their right to have sex with a women because they have been in the field fighting for the nation, they have to blow off steam after being in the bush for a long time, they don’t have their own wives with them because they are not at the battlefield, you know, not having sex for a long time they can just get any other wife. I think those are the most common ones. And then you have sort of the more war crime ones, but these are the FARDC ones.

Here, sexual violence perpetration committed by FARDC soldiers was seen as a result of the link between the feeling of sexual entitlement and military professions. In the informant’s view, FARDC soldiers found it admissible to claim sex from civilian women due to the lack of access to their own wives when they were in the battlefield. Furthermore, sex was seen as something that was claimed in return for the soldiers’ contributions to defense of their nation. The access to weapons military status inherently brings was perceived to lower the threshold against perpetration by granting the soldiers additional power to claim what they considered rightfully theirs.

The description given by the informant holds similarities to a militarized form of rape known as recreational rape. This term points to the sexual violence that soldiers engage in due to a perceived inadequate supply of sexual partners (Enloe 2000:111). In this perspective, sex by force functions as an acceptable substitute for “regular” sex (Wood 2009:135). Interestingly, the informant made a distinction between the motivation for perpetration committed by FARDC soldiers, and sexual violence executed by combatants in militia groups. While rebels could utilize sexual violence as a weapon of war, FARDC soldiers were considered to perpetrate because of sexual desire. This division between the “common soldier’s lust-driven rapes” and “war strategy rapes” is an interesting point. As I demonstrated in chapter 3, conflict-related sexual violence has undergone a process of securitization. Among the international community’s narratives on the DRC, the main storyline has focused on the global security threat of sexual violence as a weapon of war. As a result, the eastern DRC is marked by a high density of international humanitarian interveners seeking to combat rape
used as a war strategy. Non-strategic use of sexual violence, on the other hand, has not evoked the same interest in the media, politics or research (Autesserre 2014:60, Baaz & Stern 2013:42). With this in mind, the informant’s emphasis on lust-driven perpetration represents an alternative perspective to the grand narratives on the DRC. Rather than describing sexual violence as an extraordinary phenomenon, it was presented as a routine activity, an act to “blow off steam” in the everyday life of the soldiers (Cohen & Felson 2009:318). As this informant from the film production crew explained it, sexual violence perpetration committed by FARDC soldiers was rooted in a combination of societal and individual factors. The structural conditions present in the DRC’s patriarchal society were seen to create a cognitive distortion among the soldiers, enabling a perception of sexual entitlement. Perpetration occurred when the individual soldier chose to act on these cultural premises. Consequently, the task of the MCT was to raise awareness on gender equality among the soldier audience. If the soldiers absorbed this knowledge, it was imagined that it would diminish the detrimental mindsets causing sexual violence perpetration and result in prevention. The next subchapter will elaborate on the MCT’s educational strategy in achieving sexual violence prevention.

4.3 “Education is the key to change”

The virtue of education in preventing undesired sexual conduct has been a highly articulated discourse among Western agents operating in the Global South. The very act of colonization often referred to Enlightenment ideas that were dominant in the 19th century, depicting a historical imperative of progress (Power 2014:95, 99). In contemporary development efforts, education is frequently presented as a cornerstone for achieving human development (Colclough 2014:475, 479, UNESCO 2015). Many of these projects pair education with a discourse of empowerment (Parpart 2014:407-408, Colclough 2014:479). This pairing was also present in the narratives of the development agents behind the MCT as the knowledge the project disseminated represented an opportunity the soldiers could choose to act on. As an informant from the film production team explained it:
Education is the key to change. But it takes time. And I think that for me, [name of the main soldier character in the MCT films] is a really good example. I think most of the persons who are in the army are a product of their parents, with good human values, but in the war, that just goes away and it can change them into brutal animals. But if you have the right people around, there is a possibility to turn your life around. But it has to do with luck as well, it has to do with opportunities and chances and if you as a person are ready to take those chances. So I believe in it. But I am realistic that it will not change from one day to another.

According to this informant, *education* was the key to sexual violence prevention. Parallel to acknowledging the tardiness of altering the cultural sentiments legitimating perpetration, the individual soldier was presented as an actor who could refrain from engaging in the patriarchal system. If the soldier was exposed to the right stimuli, and chose to act on this, sexual violence prevention was the anticipated outcome. The soldier the informant referred to as an example of the successful accumulating effect of education, is the main character in the MCT films. A central storyline that cuts through all the films, is the portrayal of this soldier as a role model that managed to change from being a “perpetrator” to becoming an “ideal soldier” and “protector of women.” Thus, the preventive effect of the MCT laid in encouraging a similar transformative process in the soldier audience. Central to this, was to re-educate the soldier audience on the importance of good morals, facilitating a behavior change initiated by their own free will.

The informant’s emphasis on education being the key to change can imply that sexual violence prevention was linked to the soldier’s cognitive ability to absorb the knowledge provided by the MCT. With this understanding, sexual violence is the result of the individual perpetrator’s deficit of a specific form of knowledge that, if successfully absorbed, would have refrained him from committing the wrongful deed in question (Daykin 1993:96). This notion is frequently applied in sexual violence preventive efforts, in particular among cognitive behavioral programs addressing perpetrators (Gondolf 2002:10, Interfund 2004:20-21). Based on social learning theory, cognitive behavioral programs address the perceived problematic thought patterns in perpetrators, inviting them to engage in consequentialist thinking (Newburn & Souhami 2005:368, Interfund 2004:21). The role of the intervener is to
present the tools the perpetrator needs to break down his own destructive thought processes. With this perspective, deviant sexual conduct is understood as caused by a lack of interpersonal skills, for instance low self-control or inability to realize the consequences of one’s actions (Andersson 2004:9-10). In the Western crime control realm, cognitive behavioral programs especially gained ground in the wake of the “What works?” movement in the 1990s (Newburn & Souhami 2005:368). As Malcolm M. Feeley and Jonathan Simon note, the penological gaze in this period turned actuarial, meaning that it was directed towards “identifying and managing unruly groups” (Feeley & Simon 2009:360). Opposed to rehabilitating individuals through the use of psychological tenets, crime prevention efforts increasingly shifted towards cognitive behavioral programs directed at high-risk populations (Mathiesen 2007:278, Feeley & Simon 2009:360).

According to Robert Andersson, the cognitive skills approach is marked by an anti-expert strategy to prevent criminal conduct. Rather than referring to knowledge derived from a professional figure, these programs utilize the concepts of recognition and confession to achieve the desired behavior change. With this, the message communicated is: “I have been there, I know how it is or I know what it looks like” (Andersson 2004:10-11, translated from Swedish). The MCT applied a similar message in its portrayal of the role model character’s trajectory from “perpetrator” to “protector of women.” The following excerpts from the MCT short films, in which the role model character explains his transformative process, can exemplify this:

You understand, my life was terrible. If I met someone who was bigger than me, I beat him up, stole his watch and everything. Every woman you met was your wife, and that was the only thing that counted. Everything is well with me now and everyone knows this. I think everyone here knows this. I wish that you could become like me.

I hope that the example that I show to the whole DRC army will contribute to that they will stop with the rapes. I will travel to the bush, rivers, mountains and hills to talk to them, so they stop raping. I hope that we will have a good army again.
The role model character’s presentation of himself as a reformed individual carried the message that there was hope for all soldiers to turn their lives around. By addressing the soldier audience from a position of experience, his narrative of reformation was framed to have an inspirational effect on his peers. It also carried a rhetoric of empowerment by pointing to the role model character as a change agent, not only in his own transformation, but in the reform of the FARDC on an institutional level.

Deborah Lupton is critical of the perception of knowledge as a key to behavior change, claiming that it reduces human behavior to the micro-level of cognitive skills. In her view, the emphasis on self-efficiency oversimplifies the complexity of the social world in which subjectivities are made and remade (Lupton 1995:57). Important to underline as well is the fact that the development agents I interviewed situated the soldiers’ supposed cognitive distortion on a social-cultural level by claiming that Congolese society in general was permeated by a system of gender inequality. Subsequently, their explanation for sexual violence perpetration did not solely regard the individual soldier’s deficit of knowledge, but included structural factors as well. Parallel to this, they argued that it was possible for the individual soldier to choose to refrain from engaging in the patriarchal system. Active participation from the subject itself was thus still a crucial element in the MCT’s envisioned sexual violence preventive outcome.

4.4 Reviving morality: The perpetrator as a “brutal animal”

Animalistic references have frequently appeared in the imagining of African subjects. According to Achille Mbembe, the entire discourse on Africa tends to be deployed in the framework of “a meta-text about the animal – to be exact, about the beast: its experience, its world, and its spectacle.” In this perspective, the African continent emerges as a primitive “Other,” in Lacanian terms, making it “the world par excellence of all that is incomplete, mutilated, and unfinished, its history reduced to a series of setbacks of nature in its quest for humankind” (Mbembe 2001:1-2). Animalistic references are widespread in Western imaginaries of sexual violence perpetration committed by Congolese soldiers. These
references are often coupled with a notion of perpetrating soldiers as animals unleashed by the conditions of war. In the eyes of Baaz and Stern, this narrative carries a notion “that war suspends the social constraints that hinder the soldiers from being the sexual animals that they ‘naturally’ are/can be” (Baaz & Stern 2013:18-19, 26).

In the quote introducing the previous subchapter, the informant from the film production team articulated that participation in warfare functioned as an eraser of the moral education the soldiers had received in their upbringing. Another argument the informant posed in the same quote was that perpetrating FARDC soldiers were deprived of the characteristics of being human altogether, converting them into brutal animals. A reminder of that informant’s statement for the reader:

I think most of the persons who are in the army are a product of their parents, with good human values, but in the war, that just goes away and it can change them into brutal animals.

The animalization the informant depicts can be interpreted as form of moral disengagement after having participated in warfare. With this followed an assumption that involvement in extreme violence replaced the soldiers’ learnt civility with brutality. This argument resonates with Jean Jaques Frésard’s writings about the effect warring has on soldiers. A central point he puts forward is that the making of soldiers requires an alteration of their conscience. Human beings, he claims, are born with extensive neuropsychological barriers that make acts of inflicting pain upon others a particularly difficult ordeal. Thus, an important aspect of becoming a soldier is to transcend mental barriers that otherwise would create moral struggles (Frésard 2004:56, 68). Applying this notion to the informant’s statement above, one can interpret the “brutal animals” narrative as a reference to a process through which the soldier’s moral sense had been transcended altogether. In this rationale, the “emotional anesthesia” that Frésard presents as an imperative for soldiers in the battlefield had gone into overdrive among the FARDC soldiers, increasing the likelihood of sexual violence perpetration (Frésard 2004:56, 68, Linke 2009:147).
A dualism can also be traced in the informant’s statement between the “civilized” and “contained” soldier body pre-warfare and the “animalistic” and “grotesque” soldier body post-warfare (Lupton 1995:7). Lupton’s description may serve to illuminate this dichotomous relation:

The civilized body is controlled, rationalized and individualized, subject to conscious restraint of impulses, bodily processes, urges and desires. This mastery, it is believed, is what sets humans apart from animals: the more an individual can display self-control, an unwillingness to ‘give in’ to the desires of the flesh, the more civilized and refined that individual is considered. Under this model, the individual who chooses to engage in intemperate behaviour is less than civilized, indeed is bordering on the animalistic (Lupton 1995:8).

Applying this logic to the informant’s quote, soldiers who were in a situation of pre-warring were seen as being in possession of human values cultivated by good parenting. On the battlefield, however, this learnt humanity was deconstructed, resulting in uncivilized and animalistic behavior even involving sexual violence. Accordingly, warfare functioned as an eraser of the civilized behavior originally nurtured in the “normal” civilian sphere (Stern & Zalewski 2009:621). The soldiers’ acquisition of human values thus required a proper moral education during upbringing, as well as a mastery of the self in respect to containing the humanity in situations where it was put under pressure.

Worth noting, the informant’s animalistic reference to FARDC soldiers that had committed sexual violence, is highly articulated when it comes to “dangerous and predatory sex offenders” in the Western world as well (Maguire & Brookman 2005:540-541). Sex offenders are one of the categories placed highest on the contemporary risk portfolio in the West. In opposition to supposedly “normal individuals,” Nikolas Rose explains that sex offenders are constructed as a fundamental Other:

They are ‘monstrous individuals.’ A monstrous individual is an anomaly, an exception. This is not merely one who diverges from a norm, but one who is of a radically different nature, implacably pathological, evil (Rose 2010:87-88).
With regards to sexual violence perpetrators in the DRC, Baaz and Stern locate a similar mechanism of Othering in Western narratives, although often with a colonial and racialized scripting (Baaz & Stern 2013:26). This scripting of the conflict in the DRC and its main players portray them as continuing to reside in a bygone era where and when beasts rule the jungles. Despite their simplistic, racist and mistaken base, such portrayals seem to offer a reasonable lens through which to address conflict-related rape in this context. This reasonableness resides in the implied notion that this backward state can be rectified through, for example, the enlightenment and modernization of both the armed forces and society more generally. The Congolese too can thus leave behind the dictates of bestial sexuality and learn to be more productive and less violent gendered subjects (Baaz & Stern 2013:26).

Within this framework, the “beast-like” perpetrating FARDC soldier does not appear as divergent from the norm. Rather, he is the norm. Traces of this argument can also be located in the informant’s quote above, where the animalization of FARDC soldiers was presented as a generalized form of behavior post-warfare, rather than occurring in extraordinary cases. Thus, the abnormality had in fact become a normality. With this supposed mass-deterioration of morality among FARDC soldiers, their risky brains, to use an expression from Rose, constituted a dangerousness in need of being handled (Rose 2010).

Since the early 1980s, the Western world has increasingly oriented itself towards handling dangerous offenders with incapacitating measures for the sake of “protecting the public” (Garland 2002:12, Maguire & Brookman 2005:541). Incapacitation of sexual violence perpetrators in the DRC has also been a central demand from the international community, especially through a discourse to “end impunity” (MONUSCO & UNHCR 2014). As described in chapter 3 on the development/security nexus, the importance of non-punitive responses, such as security sector reform, has also entered the DRC development scene (MONUSCO 2015b). “Enlightening” sexual violence perpetrators in the FARDC for preventive purposes has been a central part of this reformatory process. In other words, the risky brains can be amended into safe brains through the right care, or rather the right self-care, to use a Foucauldian expression (Foucault 1986:43). Thus, the animalization of
perpetrators did not refer to an erasure of the possibility of rational choices. Rather, it pointed to the perpetrator as indulging in a rationality belonging to an animal. Behind the supposed “animal” was a rational subject that could be encouraged to reform (Baaz & Stern 2013:56). The MCT’s task in this regard was to supply the perpetrating soldier with the knowledge that made it possible for him to convert from an animal back into a human.

An important strategy the Western development agents utilized to motivate the soldiers to break out of the cycle of animalization was to use an appeal to egocentric motives. The following subchapters will cover the envisioned sexual violence preventive effect of making the soldiers aware of the individual risks of perpetrating.

4.5 Sexual violence perpetration – “It’s bad for you”

4.5.1 The perpetrator as a consumer

As a behavior-changing technique, emphasis on individual risk-awareness is often referred to as fear appeals. According to Howard Leventhal, fear appeals assume that an individual’s exposure to threat evokes emotional stress within the targeted recipient. Motivated by a desire to relieve themselves from this discomfort, the person accepts the messenger’s recommendation to alter their conduct (Leventhal 1971:1209, Stark & Frenkel 2013:26). Consequently, the individual’s perception of risk is an axiom for the consumption of fear and the desired adjustment of conduct that follows (Gagnon, Jacob & Holmes 2010:249). In the crime prevention realm, so-called Scared Straight programs can be said to constitute prime examples of using fear as a behavior-changing technique. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Scared Straight programs are based on a notion that intimidating confrontations with the negative consequences of criminal behavior culminates in law-abiding conduct. The principal strategy of these programs is to deter at-risk youth from engaging in delinquent activity, by exposing them to the brutal life in adult prison facilities. The more fear the exposure manages to evoke in the youth, the more aversion to delinquency it is thought to develop (U.S. Department of Justice 2014).
In the film production crew and SFCG’s narratives, fear appeals appeared as essential in the envisioned effect of the MCT. However, as they relied on an approach of empowering the soldiers to alter their own conduct, the “scared straight” element was framed to avoid coercion. As Linda Brennan and Wayne Binney are careful to point out, “[s]elling compliance to the unwilling requires some innovative packaging” (Brennan & Binney 2008:3). In the MCT, this “innovative packaging” involved that the soldier audience was communicated the individual risks connected to sexual violence perpetration. In an interview I had with one of the Western SFCG employees stationed in the DRC, the informant explained that the MCT used the tenets of commercial advertising to communicate these risks:

Our theory of change is that it’s like a marketing strategy. If you just keep handing down the same message in different ways in repetition, then people might start buying the product. You know, like the commercials, right? [...] It's just like knowing that smoking is bad. Of course everybody knows the smoking is bad, but some people actually stop smoking when they discover that it's bad for them and manage to change their behavior.

Applying marketing logic to the phenomenon of sexual violence, the perpetrator was to be “sold” the conduct considered legitimate by the Western development agents. Even though the communicators behind the MCT, the film production team and SFCG, were the ones defining the product, the selling process was not to be perceived as defined on their terms. Rather, the perpetrator was presented as a consumer whose desires ought to be catered to (Weinreich 2006). Within this understanding, the Western development agents appeared as an intellectual authority communicating “facts” about the detrimental effects perpetration. Accordingly, the envisioned preventive strategy in the MCT was presented as based on “objective” knowledge, rather than being a moralistic enterprise.

Interestingly, the informant above made an analogy between sexual violence and smoking, both being behaviors that pose a risk to the “consumer.” Indeed, the commercial advertising principles outlined in the informant’s statement hold many similarities to public health campaigns aimed at discouraging individuals from engaging in behaviors deemed risky (Gagnon, Jacob & Holmes 2010:245). As the informant also touched upon, many of these
communication campaigns seek to persuade the target audience to refrain from the “risky” behavior by using a threatening message (Frésard 2004:98). “Smoking kills” is a classic phrase in the health promotion realm pointing to the severe danger the individual puts himself into by engaging in the practice in question. A segment from one of the MCT short films exhibits a similar fear-invoking strategy, in which a medical professional explains the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS following sexual violence perpetration:

If you commit sexual violence, you do not know if that woman has a sickness. You also do not know if you have it. If you commit sexual violence, you take a woman by force. You directly get that sickness and there is no cure for that. There is no medicine in this country for that. If you get it, you will surely die. Because there is nothing to treat that sickness. Those people that commit sexual violence, they must know that they make an end to their own lives.

In this section, sexual violence is communicated as a health risk to the perpetrator, rather than as an immoral act per se. By engaging in the act of perpetration, soldiers are exposing themselves to a situation of death and decay. With this, HIV/AIDS appears as a form of corporal punishment for the soldiers that would choose to resume the detrimental sexual conduct (Foucault 1999a:13). For the sake of their own survival, the soldier audience was advised to exercise self-containment. The threat of demise has appeared in several public health campaigns seeking to prevent HIV/AIDS in the Western world. This can be exemplified in slogans such as “If you think you can't get it, you're dead wrong” and “Don't die of ignorance” (New York City Department of Health in U.S. National Library of Medicine 2015, UK Central Office of Information for Department of Health in UK National Archives 2015). Marilou Gagnon, Jean D. Jacob and Dave Holmes suggest that this type of utilization of fear appeals reflects a bio-political technology to govern subjects’ sexual conduct. By referring to an invasion of the body by a sexually transmitted infection, with particular emphasis on the threat of death, the subject is expected to avert from the conduct deemed deviant by the governor. In this sense, the governing of subjects is envisioned to occur through a dissemination of insecurity (Gagnon, Jacob & Holmes 2010:251).
Analyzing the SFCG employee’s quote with the developmentality concept in mind, one can identify several parallels. According to the strategy expressed by the informant, the soldiers were viewed as agents with the responsibility to take control of their own risks. Along with the delegation of responsibility to the individual, the behavior change was expected to occur without coercion from the governing body. Rather, it was to be initiated by the soldier’s own free will. The soldiers were perceived as “rational calculating individuals whose preferences [were] to be acted upon” (Rose 2000:323). In this *modus operandi*, the Western development agents left it up to the “consumer” to choose whether they wanted to “buy the product” and refrain from committing sexual violence. By focusing on fulfilling the needs of the individual, the marketing strategy can be said to use a bottom-up approach to achieving behavior change. However, it is worth questioning whether the focus on the consumer involves efforts of meeting the individual’s needs, or if it involves *creating* needs that did not previously exists, the latter being differentiated from a consumer-centric approach. From what I trace, the subjectivity position the MCT articulates of the soldier represents a complex position. On one hand, the soldier is assumed to be a *homo economicus*, a rational actor who actively chooses to purchase the product. On the other hand, the soldier is considered to need persuasion in order to buy the product, turning the prime attention to the question: “How can we make him want it?” (Lupton 1995:112, Ling et al 1992:355). The Western development agents’ answer to this will be explored in the subchapters below as it relates to the MCT’s utilization of the threat of trauma.

### 4.6 “I am haunted by the evil things I have done”

One of the six short-films in the MCT is headlined “I am haunted by the evil things I have done.” The topic of the film is devoted to trauma that soldiers experience after committing so-called “evil” acts. In the manual of the MCT, the key message in the short film is described to be that participation in war can lead to a trauma among soldiers. Particular attention is devoted to show the detrimental effects of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), such as mental and physical deterioration and difficulties in coping with everyday life. In order to heal from trauma, the soldiers are advised to express their feelings in an understanding
environment and seek psychological and medical assistance (Douma & Baroani 2014:9-10, IF Productions & WHYZE 2009:16). The headline of the film, however, does not simply refer to trauma following participation in “ordinary” warfare. Rather, it points to trauma occurring after committing evil acts. The reference to evil includes an association with something deviant and immoral as opposed to acts that are deemed legitimate in the context of warfare. While it is not made explicit in the manual, the beginning of the film includes a section in which a psychologist explains that raping can cause a psychological trauma to the perpetrator himself:

To take a woman, undress her and rape her violently, those are shocks. Even if they do these things during the war, they think it is normal during war, but afterwards it comes back. And when it comes back, it troubles the person. It makes life complicated, he is no longer calm. He says to himself: “I should not have done it.” Or wonders: “Why did I do that?”

In the content of the film, considerable emphasis is placed on the need for soldiers to be assisted in recovering from trauma following evil acts. This is also underlined by the role model character in one of the segments in the film:

Many traumatized soldiers are behaving badly and this kind of soldiers we call “96” [crazy]. We must help them to be cured to like me. We should not hate them because they are 96, because that does not help them. We have to help them and make them better. And I hope they can become like me.

This encouragement can be read as a nuancing of the “animal-like bestiality of rapists” narrative, which was described earlier in this chapter. By portraying the soldiers’ major difficulties in coping with everyday life after perpetrating, this can serve as an illustration of them as “actual human beings” equipped with a moral sense and the ability to feel emotions. It also provides an emphatic and understanding approach to the difficulties soldiers face from participating in warfare and in the aftermaths of perpetration. Consequently, the soldiers can be understood as one of many groups that are victimized by the war rather than being essentialized as “the bad guys.”
According to Vanessa Pupavac, the concept of post-warfare trauma is increasingly framed as a risk management task for Western development NGOs operating in the Global South. In her perception, development agents tend to interpret distress caused by conflict as a trigger for dysfunction and violent behaviors. This is often materialized in a mass-labeling of populations residing in conflict-ridden areas as being affected by PTSD. In effect, PTSD is often conceptualized as a norm in conflict and post-conflict societies rather than a pathologic abnormality (Pupavac 2001:1, 5, 10). A similar perception can be traced in the project proposal for the MCT, written by the film production crew. As the project proposal describes it, the conflict in the DRC has had a devastating impact on their [soldiers’] lives as well; an impact that is both cause and consequence of their violent behaviour. Combatants in Congo have experienced or participated in gruesome killings, rapes and other crimes. Once they return back from the forest or the frontline they may become depressed, aggressive, alcoholic or develop the so-called Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (IF Productions & WHYZE 2009:9).

Following this rationale, sexual violence perpetration committed by soldiers can be seen both as a trigger for and triggered by trauma. Assisting soldiers to recover from trauma can thus have the potential to prevent sexual violence. This perspective can also be interpreted as being linked to a form of bio-power taking place within the development/security nexus (Foucault 1978:140). If deteriorated mental health among soldiers is perceived as a source of insecurity, the potential risk of culmination in new instances of sexual violence is underlined. Originated with a desire to prevent reoccurring perpetration, focus is placed on fostering a stable mental state among the soldiers. Central in this mission is helping the soldiers feel capable of overcoming the mental distress following acts of sexual violence.

In the interviews I had with the Western development agents involved the MCT, I was interested in their reflections on the role of trauma post-perpetration. How did they link the MCT’s ambition of helping soldiers to overcome trauma with an emphasis on the inherent evils of perpetration?
4.6.1 The threat of trauma

In an interview with one of the members from the film production team, the informant described the threat of trauma as being utilized as a trigger to achieve the desired behavior change. She explained the expected process in the following manner:

The [debate] moderators are moderating in a way leading up to “OK, you have seen this film, you have seen this film, and now we have seen this film about trauma. It is also affecting you. So by raping or using violence, you are not only affecting the lives of the women and the community, you are also affecting your own life.” And I think actually that that film is the most important and triggering section of the tool, because everyone is egocentric, everyone only reacts when it comes down to their own well-being. So you can be you quite harsh and like “I don’t care if I ruin that woman’s life,” that’s easier. But if you start to realize that “also I have nightmares, I don’t function very well anymore,” but you don’t know why, then you start realizing “OK, it has a very negative effect on me.”

The threat of trauma was designated to have an instrumental effect in the Western development agents’ mission to prevent sexual violence. According to the informant, the film about trauma held the highest triggering effect on the soldier audience. The educational aspect of the MCT laid in providing the soldiers with knowledge about the risk of developing traumas post-perpetration. Based on this knowledge, the soldiers were imagined to be compelled to alter their conduct in accordance with the suggestion presented by the MCT. Relating this to the marketing strategy described in the paragraphs above, the fear appeals in the MCT were based on raising the perceived risk of perpetrating by communicating trauma
as an immediate and severe con for the individual soldier. The presumption that “everyone is egocentric” was presented as a key component in the preventive prospect, assuming that when the soldier realized that sexual violence represented a risk to his own well-being, he would alter his behavior patterns accordingly. Perpetrators were thus presented as rational actors who evaluate the pros and cons for committing sexual violence prior to the potential act. Such an approach is not unfamiliar within the tradition of criminology and is often known as the rational choice theory. First set out by Derek B. Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke, this perspective assumes that the individual is a rational decision maker who considers the effort, reward and risks involved in conducting a criminal act (Cornish & Clarke 2014:3). According to Garland, the criminological corollary of rational choice theory replaces a focus on “root causes” with a concern for the straightforward process of individual choice (Garland 2002:130):

An example of FARDC soldiers being presented as “career perpetrators” can be found in the project proposal for the MCT. Here it is described that many of the FARDC soldiers that have committed sexual violence in the past would probably rape again if the opportunity arose (IF Productions & WHYZE 2009:11). Combining this with the presumption that humans make choices based on egocentric motives, FARDC soldiers were presented as operating opportunistically, basing their decision to perpetrate on a calculation of the costs and benefits

---

8 See figure 1 in the appendix for a screenshot from the film about trauma, where an ex-combatant with PTSD explains about the mental struggles he is experiencing post-perpetration.
of the act in question. Because the MCT is a development effort and not a punitive effort, the “deterrence” Garland speaks about came in the form of fear appeals that were employed to reduce the incentives to perpetrate.

In the interviews I had with the Western development agents, it was clear that the film medium itself played a crucial role in the creation of emotional stress within the individual soldier. One of the employees from the film production crew explained her vision of the deterrent effect of the MCT in the following manner:

If you see images of real people sharing their experience, like if you see a raped woman and you see a traumatized soldier, those images, because it’s an image, that will probably stick with you. Plus it is spoken word and you can feel emotions, that image will probably sit somewhere in your brain. And our hopes is that at a certain point, after seeing the first film or sessions, because it will stick with you somewhere, that there will be moments when that door opens in your brain and all those images and emotions will come out. And I think that is the moment that people can change or that they can freeze, in a way. That maybe a soldier is raping a woman again because he was in the battlefield for so long and he deserved a woman, but then having all these images and all these stories and these discussions, it will… somewhere it will stick with you. And maybe that one time that you are raping that woman, suddenly an image comes forward. I am not a an expert on that, but I now how that works with me. For example, just out of the blue, not thinking about it, suddenly that image comes. And I think that that can be the moment when a person can’t rape, because suddenly he knows too much.

As the informant explained, the communicative medium of film played a key role in the dissemination of fear. Visualization had the anticipated effect of making an “imprint” in the soldier’s mind regarding the act of sexual violence perpetration. Prevention was envisioned to occur when the scaring succeeded in creating an emotional stress within the soldier that would re-emerge in situations where he otherwise would have committed the undesired sexual act. The Western development agents’ strategy of utilizing confrontational messages can with this be seen as an attempt to puncture the “cognitive distortion” legitimizing sexual violence.

Disseminating fear through graphical and emotive measures is also a widespread tactic in the marketing industry, from which the MCT took inspiration. This resonates with what Darren
Dahl, Kristina D. Frankenberger and Rajesh V. Manchanda term shock-advertising. By deliberately startling the consumer, this is expected to “break though the clutter” of established thought patterns. When the attention is aroused through shock, the message retention is expected to be enhanced, consequently leading to behavior change (Dahl, Frankenberger & Manchanda 2003:268-269). Returning to the smoking example, visual shock-advertising can involve the placing of explicit pictures of dissected, damaged lungs on cigarette packages. Rather than simply spelling out the letters “smoking kills,” the message is amplified by visualizing for the consumer what will happen to them if they continue with the undesired conduct. This advertising strategy can be traced to an understanding of visual media as effective propaganda devices. Relying on their ability to seductively persuade their audiences, visual media technologies are envisioned to increase the cognitive retention of the fear appeal (Lupton 1995:106). Transferring this logic to the MCT, the message of post-perpetration trauma was disseminated through film to make the enlightening aspect “stick to the soldiers’ brains.” The MCT films’ portrayal of traumatized soldiers could thus serve as graphic evidence supporting the message of the risks involved in perpetration. By visually displaying the many struggles soldiers suffering from PTSD experienced, the message becomes: “This is what will happen to your body if you do not contain yourself” (Lupton 1995:120).

4.6.2 Confessing evilness

As described in the previous subchapter, the threat of post-perpetration trauma was considered to hold preventative potential against violent sexual situations. An extension of this, one of
the film production crew informants explained, was the preventive effect of confronting the soldiers with the MCT short film portraying testimonies from victimized women.\(^9\)

Maybe they have seen or have done an exact copy of the story that one of those women are telling. That’s really confronting. And some men are more open for it than others, because some are really though, toughened up. So it will take a lot longer before they will break. So we hope that at lest for a few of them it will cut through and sit with them and come out at certain points.

Here, the informant explained the envisioned outcome following the MCT’s confrontational strategy. As the soldiers were expected to be bearers of a patriarchal attitude, devaluing the bodily integrity of women, they were also seen as lacking a sense of empathy toward those they victimized. However, if the soldier successfully absorbed the knowledge provided by the MCT, this was expected to culminate in a breakage of the soldier. In this sense, “knowing too much,” as the informant said in the quote in the previous subchapter, can be interpreted to point to the soldier’s realization of the “truth”: the immorality of his perpetrating behavior.

As Susan Shott claims, \textit{cognitive role-taking}, the act of placing ourselves in the position of others in empathy, is an important motivator in the exercise of self-control (Shott 1979:1329). For Scully, however, patriarchal societies render this self-control as inoperative towards female subjects, thereby culturally permitting the act of taking women with the use of force (Scully 1990:99). This echoes earlier quotes from the Western development agents in which the soldiers’ feelings of sexual entitlement were located in a cognitive distortion on a societal

\(^9\) See figure 3 in the appendix for a screenshot from this short film, where a young girl explains how she was raped by a soldier.

76
level. In order to break through this supposed distortion, the informant above described a strategy of confronting the soldier audience with the consequences of their actions, thereby activating feelings of sympathy, guilt and regret. Anders Nyman, Olof Risberg and Börje Svensson describe a similar approach to preventing undesirable conduct:

Cognitive distortions serve the purpose of justifying what is not justifiable, of deconstructing reality, of making reality unreal, and are very effective at doing so. They are maintained as long as they remain unspoken and serve their purpose. They need to be brought out into the open, confronted and challenged so that they can hopefully be punctured and abandoned (Nyman, Risberg & Svensson 2001:112-113).

Bringing the suppressed and unspoken out into the open was a central theme in the MCT film on trauma. One segment from the film includes a statement from a psychologist prescribing the necessity of talking about the experience of trauma by the committing of “evil” acts:

Talking is the first step, to find help and to be helped. Talk, be listened to, be understood and understand. That is very important, you have to talk, say what you are going through. Without feeling shame, without being afraid, without being ashamed. It is very important.

In an interview with one of the employees from the film production team, the necessity of articulating trauma was not framed as simply being driven by a motivation to ensure the soldiers’ well-being. Rather, she emphasized the sexual violence preventive effect of the soldiers’ recovery from trauma. According to her, there is a causal link between trauma and sexual violence perpetration, where a derogated mental state increases the likelihood of violent behavior. This notion considers the spiraling effects of violence, in that acts harming others lead to changes in the perpetrator’s cognizance, consequently making further violence easier to execute (Staub 1999). Encouraging the soldiers to recover from trauma was thus seen as reducing the risk of re-perpetration, consequently leading to sexual violence prevention. Accordingly, the soldier’s statement that he was “haunted by the evil things he had done” was an important indicator of his redemption of moral sense and prevention of further perpetration.
The MCT’s encouragement of the soldiers’ acknowledgment of evilness can be associated with Foucault’s concept of *confession*. Since the Middle Ages, Foucault argues, the role of confession has emerged as one of the most valued techniques in the Western world’s production of truth (Foucault 1978:58-59):

> The confessions has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and the most solemn rites; one confesses one’s crimes, one’s sins, one’s thoughts and desires, one’s illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling, with the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell (Foucault 1978:59).

As Foucault also notes, confessions are not necessarily initiated by the individual themselves. Therefore, external agents may also take on the role of encouraging self-examination:

> One confesses – or is forced to confess. When it is not spontaneous or dictated by some internal imperative, the confession is wrung from the person by violence or threat; it is driven from its hiding place in the soul, or extracted from the body (Foucault 1978:59).

While this may appear as a repressive exercise of power, Foucault makes it clear that the element of force is not imposed from above by the governor. Rather, confession – the articulation of truth – is to appear as a necessary and beneficial deed from the individual himself. From the 19th century, Foucault argues, the desire to seek the “truth” on sexuality brought a ritual of confession framed as a scientific enquiry. Scientific experts began examining sexuality as a pathological site, calling for normalizing interventions. The clinical procedure of inducing subjects to speak the truth about their own sexuality is classified by
Foucault as a normalizing procedure. He terms this the *medicalization of confession*, with confession prescribed as a therapeutic operation and a prerequisite to regain normalcy (Foucault 1978:60, 67-68). A similar logic can be located in the MCT in its portrayal of the beneficial aspects of confessing trauma following the committing of “evil acts,” particularly when the confession is made to psychological professionals. Although the MCT recommended that the soldier audience seek help from medical professionals to deal with trauma, the soldiers were not presented as passive and helpless subjects in need of treatment. Rather than dictating change, considerable emphasis was laid on presenting the soldier as an actor fully realizing the need to change and consequently executing that change. Andersson locates a similar strategy in cognitive behavioral programs in which the key approach is to encourage agency among the participants by inviting them to engage in interactive communication (Andersson 2004:15). In this context, confession emerges as a strategy to make the targeted subject produce the “truth” about himself (Petersson 2002:68). An excerpt from one of the MCT films can demonstrate this process of self-examination, in which the role model character describes his own confessional exercise to a group of traumatized soldiers:

To be cured from my trauma was not easy for me. But an organization came to my camp and held a seminar. They showed us that we were all sick. Doctors came to train us about our mental sickness. It was a long process. There is no other way to explain how I was cured from my trauma. Doctors and pastors helped out a lot.

---

10 See figure 3 in the appendix for a screenshot from a scene where a traumatized ex-combatant makes his first visit to a centre for psychotherapy.
11 See figure 4 in the appendix for a screenshot from a scene.
Building on this, the trauma the MCT displayed following perpetration can be interpreted as a manifestation of the moral difficulties the soldiers were expected to experience after committing evil acts. Additionally, the soldiers’ acceptance of the invitation to a moral awakening was presented as a strategically wise move for the soldiers themselves, as the denial of evil could hinder the recovery from trauma. Due to this, trauma was not only considered as a common reaction to perpetration, but could also appear as a prerequisite for the moral catharsis experienced by confessing the “truth.” This can also be seen as an example of developmentality, as the Western development agents provided the potentially transformative knowledge and left it up to soldiers to execute the suggested self-care.

4.7 Summarizing remarks

The previous chapters have described a selection of discourses articulated by the film production team and SFCG regarding the envisioned sexual violence preventive effect of the MCT. While these discourses encompassed a myriad of different strategies, both empowering the soldiers through knowledge and scaring them straight, a pervasive theme was the emphasis on self-government. Still approaching this research with a genealogy-inspired approach, I found a continuation of certain elements from discourses that were prevalent during the colonial era. These discourses regarded the Western agents’ strategy of civilizing and enlightening the Congolese to refrain from a sexual conduct deemed illegitimate. This could be seen in the informants’ use of animalistic descriptions of sexual violence perpetrating Congolese subjects, and the subsequent need to educate them on the moral and strategic benefits of refraining from the deviant sexual conduct. Important to note, these discourses had undergone considerable reconfigurations in comparison with the form they took during colonialism. Rather than attempting to sovereignly force an alteration of conduct, the MCT utilized appeals to technologies of freedom. The process of educating the “animal-like” perpetrators in the MCT was explained as following a consumer-based approach, emphasizing the soldiers’ agency. Consequently, the techniques of civilizing and enlightening were reformulated and merged with a discourse of participatory empowerment. In the narratives of the Western development agents, the soldiers were presented as rational actors.
who could maneuver their way around structural and institutional factors of patriarchy, underdevelopment and poor governance, as well as individual factors of cognitive distortions and moral erosion if they were sufficiently persuaded by the MCT. Therefore, the role of the MCT was to disseminate knowledge that encouraged an alteration of conduct, whereby the choice to actually change behavior was left to the soldiers themselves. As the soldiers’ agency in contributing to their own development was accentuated, I find that the MCT operated within a developmentality framework.

As described earlier in the theory chapter, several scholars have criticized the governmentality literature for an excessive research focus on the envisioned strategy of government (O’Malley, Weir & Shearing 1997:504-505). While the exploration of the Western development agents’ envisioned strategy of developmentality has been central in my analysis of the MCT, I have also been interested in the voices subjected to government. Following this, the coming chapter is devoted to the targeted soldiers’ response to the MCT. What was the relationship between the developmentality the MCT sought to deploy and the encounter with the subjects it had set out to activate?
5 Developmentality decoded

5.1 The “messy actualities” of developmentality

Foucault underlines that the fluctuation of “truth” is marked by a struggle over which truth representations that are to be authorized as enunciative and which that are to be excluded and labeled as “false” (Foucault 1981:54-55). When it comes to the “truth” about subjects residing in the Global South, several postcolonial scholars have identified the hegemonic authorship of the West. In this line of thought, Said’s concept of “the Orientalist,” Escobar’s “the Underdeveloped” and Spivak’s “the Subaltern” all point to subjectivity positions in the Global South that have been constructed under the Western gaze (Said 2003, Escobar 1995, Spivak 1988). There have been several debates among postcolonial theorists regarding the possibility for (post)colonial subject to create systems of knowledge which do not confer to the Westernized system of knowing (Spivak 1988, Escobar 1995:223). Spivak’s seminal text Can the Subaltern Speak? concludes with a resolute “no.” For Spivak, the reason for this does not lay in the Subaltern’s inability to speak, but in the dominant culture’s unwillingness to listen (Spivak 1988:104, Baaz & Stern 2013:132). Indisputably, the Western world’s “knowing” of the Global South has had substantial imprints on the subjective positions of those residing there. Although the West may be said to hold a hegemonic authorship in the production of the development discourse, the circulation of this discourse follows a more complex route than the linear sender – message – receiver (Hall 1973:128). In the words of Stuart Hall, it

is in the discursive form that the circulation of the product [discourse] takes place, as well as its distribution to different audiences. Once accomplished, the discourse must then be translated – transformed, again – into social practices if the circuit is to be both completed and effective. If no ‘meaning’ is taken, there can be no ‘consumption.’ If the meaning is not articulated in practice, it has no effect (Hall 1973:128).

Following this logic, the effectiveness of developmentality relies on a process through which the target of government decodes the governor’s development discourse into social practices. However, the subject’s decoding may differ from the intended meaning, breaking or interrupting its passage of forms (Hall 1973:128-129). Linked to this understanding, is Barry,
Osborne and Rose’s concept of the “messy actualities” of governmentality (Barry, Osborne & Rose 1993:265-266). Despite the ruler’s ambition to activate self-government among its targets, unintended, unexpected and complex responses may follow. Inspired by these notions, I consider targets of government to be neither fully powerless nor powerful. Rather, they continually position and reposition themselves in relation to power (Henriques et al 1984:225). Thus, instead of viewing the postcolonial relationship as primarily based on collaboration or resistance, I have been attentive to the entanglements, negotiations and ambiguity in the relationship between the Western development agents’ envisioned strategy of developmentality and the soldiers’ response to this strategy (Mbembe 2001:104, 129, 133). The following subchapters are designated to the empirical heterogeneity I located in the soldiers’ decodifications.

5.1.1 “Poverty is one of the weapons of sexual violence”

In the previous chapter, the Western development agents identified the cause of sexual violence to be rooted in a patriarchal gender system in which men – especially male soldiers – believed they had a right to claim sex. In addition, warfare was viewed as an eraser of the moral sense the soldiers had received in their upbringing, increasing the likelihood of sexual violence. As a response to address these circumstances, the MCT was created to provide the soldiers with knowledge encouraging them to reimagine their behaviors. Given this ambition, a key interest I had during the observations of the MCT sessions and the soldier interviews was the exploration of the relationship between the two informant groups’ explanations of sexual violence.

A widely articulated narrative in the soldier interviews was the causality between low salary levels in the FARDC and sexual violence perpetration. Nine of the twelve soldier informants and two out of the four debate facilitators explicitly stated this link. According to these informants, soldiers had a reduced financial ability to get access to sex in “ordinary” ways. The following quotes can exemplify this line of reasoning:
Many soldiers would like to get married, but the salary does not allow them to do so. A soldier might like a woman, but the money he has is not sufficient to convince her. He will be tempted to wait for her somewhere until she passes and then rape her. (Male corporal, 27 years)

Soldier: If we get more money, everyone will be happy. We will start to buy it [sex]. If we are happy, civilians also are going to be happy.

N.M.: So if the salary is increased it will reduce the sexual violence?

Soldier: Yes, it will. Every soldier would try to get married, because he could pay the dowry. But if they don’t have money, they will just look for another way to satisfy their sexual needs. (Male head sergeant, 25 years)

In these quotes, low salary levels were presented as an explanation for sexual violence perpetration committed by FARDC soldiers. For soldiers without the means either to pay the dowry necessary for marriage or to buy sex, the use of force was the only remaining option for satisfying their sexual needs. In the interviews, the soldiers were careful to stress that FARDC soldiers did not utilize sexual violence as a military strategy. A 57-year old male captain explained this, reformulating the international community’s widely articulated discourse on sexual violence as a weapon of war, by stating: “Poverty is one of the weapons of sexual violence.” This account can also be interpreted as a reference to a skewed perception on sexual violence in the DRC, assuming that all the soldiers engaging in forced sex were using it as a military tactic.

In Baaz and Stern’s study on the complexity of violence committed by the FARDC, they traced a similar link between poverty and sexual violence in their soldier interviews. “Lust rapes,” as their informants termed them, were the consequence of soldiers’ poor financial situations making it impossible to access women the “normal” way. Following this line of reasoning, a man deprived of sex would eventually need to fulfill his natural need by taking a woman by force. Baaz and Stern cite the “lust-driven” sexual violence narrative as concerning an idea of militarized male sexuality rather than poverty itself. According to them, the Congolese military considers (male) soldiers’ libido to be particularly potent, requiring satisfaction from women (Baaz & Stern 2010a:31-32). Several studies on military behavior have identified the military institution as a site within which hegemonic representations of masculinities are constructed and reproduced (Morgan 1994:165, Whitworth 2008:114). Thus,
the entangled myths of masculinity, soldiering, violence and heterosexuality inculcating soldiers may naturalize the perception of a pressing and un-ignoreable urge for sex (Whitworth 2008:114, Baaz & Stern 2010a:47).

Accompanied by or immanent in my soldier informants’ articulated link between low salaries and sexual violence perpetration was a critique of the Congolese government and its inability to provide a decent living standard for the soldiers. Indeed, the military work is among the poorest paid professions in Congolese society (Baaz & Stern 2008:64). The soldiers’ generally low living standards were apparent when I entered the various camps to observe the MCT sessions. In addition to low salary levels, payments are often delayed or not paid at all (Baaz & Stern 2009:501). Many of the soldiers I interviewed expressed resentment toward Congolese authorities due to the persistent money problems they were faced with, stating that they often had to rely on the civilian population for survival. Moreover, some soldiers also described sexual violence against civilians as a form of response to the government's neglect of FARDC soldiers. Two soldiers articulated this argument in the following manner:

Soldier: Increasing the soldiers’ salary could be a solution to reduce sexual violence. When you are well paid, you have a good life and you don’t have that kind of things on your mind.
N.M.: So if soldiers would have higher salaries, they wouldn’t commit sexual violence?
Soldier: Yes. There is a triangle: The government doesn’t pay soldiers – soldiers aggress the people – the people go back to the government asking why soldiers mistreat them. (Male lieutenant, 42 years)

Soldiers can use sexual violence to revolt. They can create disorder to call the attention of the authorities to make them change something. Some are revolting because of money, and raising their salaries can reduce these cases. (Male corporal, 25 years)

Here, sexual violence committed by FARDC soldiers was not described as being driven by sexual desire, but as a means to protest against the mistreatment they experienced from the state. In this regard, the emphasis on sexual violence as a particularly illegitimate act, could in fact serve to enforce its effectiveness as a tool of resistance (Baaz & Stern 2010a:33).
Notably, the two female soldiers I interviewed did not articulate a link between sexual violence perpetration and low salaries. On the contrary, they were strongly opposed to the claim of a causal relationship. A female 32-year old captain I interviewed explained herself in the following manner:

Sexual violence is not linked to money. It’s a question of mentality, not money. It’s psychological. Raising the salaries can reduce stealing, but not rape.

When I asked her about what she thought could be the reason for sexual violence perpetration committed by FARDC soldiers, she replied that sexual violence was linked to militias, rather than the government army. She mentioned the rebel group M23, mainly consisting of Banyamulenges, and Mai Mai, an umbrella term for Congolese community-based militias (Van Rebrouck 2011:373). Rather than presenting sexual violence committed by these groups as based on “bad intentions,” this informant explained it as resulting from the enemy’s “male instinct” and lack of access to women while in the field:

I think it’s instinct, it’s not a conscious choice. When a soldier sees a woman washing at the river and he has spent six months without having sex, he will automatically rape her. Or if he sees a woman with nice breasts, he will be tempted. If he’s a virgin he can resist it, but if he’s tried [sex], he will be tempted.

During the screenings, the male soldiers also brought up FARDC soldiers being deployed to areas far away from their wives, which in some cases could lead to sex by the use of force. In the interviews, many of the male soldiers coupled the explanation of “male instinct” with the “low salary” argument. According to these informants, spending a certain amount of time without access to the “usual” source of sex, combined with the lack of financial means to buy sex from other women, resulted in a limited scope of action that could lead to sexual violence.

In contrast, my other female informant, a 43-year old adjutant, contested the explanation of “male instinct” as causing sexual violence. She considered rebel groups as the “true” perpetrators, rather than FARDC soldiers. When I asked her about what she thought could be the cause for perpetration, she replied:
Soldier: They have no reason. They’re just bad guys with bad intensions. Nobody orders them to do it. It’s an evil will that comes from the devil.
N.M: Some say that when combatants spend a long time in the forest, they have needs. What do you think about this argument?
Soldier: It’s not a reason. A guilty person always looks for excuses.

The informant emphasized that perpetration committed by rebels was caused by “bad intentions” and an “evil will,” and contested the argument of “lust rapes.” In her eyes, the claim of sexual drive was used as an excuse for perpetration, covering up the true intent, which is to cause harm. Thus, it seems that her consideration of rebels as the “actual” perpetrators brought about a notion of sexual violence as a war tactic rather than as “recreation.”

The male soldiers’ linkage between poverty and sexual violence echoes the perception of sexual entitlement that the Western development agents located in the soldiers’ supposed cognitive distortion. Thus, in the eyes of the development agents, the narratives given by the male soldiers above could serve to legitimize the need for the education provided by the MCT. While the causal relationship between low salaries and sexual violence was prevalent in the interviews I had with the soldiers, the link was intentionally excluded from the MCT. In the development phase of the MCT, the film production team considered including an acknowledgement of the soldiers’ living conditions. In the end, they decided against this, out of concern that it could be used by the soldiers as an excuse for perpetration. One of the members from the film production crew explained this concern to me:

We have had reflections about acknowledging the situation in which soldiers work under, the living conditions, the salary, we reflected to include that in the beginning. But in the end we decided not to, because it might provide an incentive to only debate on that. It’s really in their personal interest and it might sort of compromise the debate on the other topics. So that is why we didn’t include it. Even though the living conditions are like they are, it cannot be an excuse.

Although the final film material in the MCT did not acknowledge soldiers’ low living standards, one of the members from the film production team pointed out to me that it was often brought up by the soldiers themselves during the discussions.
At the debates that are organized with the films, a lot of soldiers often bring up things like: “How should we function when we don’t even have a salary? We don’t even have the basic needs the army should have to really be operational and we are living in camps that are worse than a pig stall.” And this is actually true. So that is a claim that is logical that occurs quite often after the films. This is a claim that the moderators of the debate should try to sort of acknowledge exists, so not to wipe certain reactions off the table, but at the same time bring it back to: “Yeah, but even though you are living the poor life, you shouldn’t be allowed to abuse women.”

An interesting finding was that local stakeholders central to the implementation of the MCT also brought up low salaries as a cause for the perpetration. This included one of the key persons in SFCG working on the MCT, as well as two of the four debate facilitators I interviewed. One of the Congolese SFCG employees I interviewed, who also was involved in training the debate moderators, explained the connection between low salaries and perpetration in the following manner:

Local SFCG employee: When we discuss with some soldiers, they can say: “Commanders have money. If they want to have prostitutes, they can pay them. But we are penniless, what can we do?” I’m not sure this is a good reason, but somehow it can explain the behavior.
N.M.: I see. So do you think that raising the soldiers’ salaries could solve the problem of sexual violence? Do you think it’s actually rooted in an economic problem?
Local SFCG employee: It can be one of the keys. They use violence because they are suffering. I’m trying to explain, not to justify. I see them suffering. They are paid 50,000 Congolese Francs per month, that means 55 American Dollars. Kabila doesn’t say “you have a weapon, use it”, but he is behaving like someone who says “you have a weapon, use it.”

Here, the SFCG employee explained that low-ranked soldiers were more likely to commit acts of sexual violence, as opposed to soldiers with higher ranks who had the financial means to pay for sex. Along with this claim, the informant differentiated between explaining perpetration and justifying perpetration, the initial presented as a statement of facts. Following the logic of low incomes as an explanatory for perpetration, the informant identified raised salaries as central to prevention of sexual violence. By referencing Congolese President Joseph Kabila, he pointed out the lack of political will to acknowledge the potential negative consequences of underpaying soldiers. When the government placed soldiers in situations of
suffering and economic despair, it indirectly enabled those soldiers to use the means available, in other words their guns, to provide for themselves.

One of the debate facilitators I talked to also made a connection between income levels for soldiers and perpetration. Interestingly, he emphasized a discrepancy between his communication with soldiers while moderating debates and what he was convinced was an actual cause of sexual violence.

Debate facilitator: I always say that there is no logical reason that can push someone to commit sexual violence, we learned that at the training. No reason. But in reality, men have a certain number of needs to entertain themselves and among those needs, there is also the need of a woman. When you cannot access a woman, you can take her by force. Mostly it’s lower ranked soldiers who commit sexual violence, because they don’t have access to women. Women are a part of men’s amusement and vice-versa. I think that if soldiers are well treated in a certain measure, it can reduce sexual violence.

N.M.: So if you think that this is an important reason for perpetration, should it have been covered in the movies or discussions?
Debate facilitator: We were sent to a meeting in order to work on this movie. We had to determine the official aspect of this movie, because the persons who were working on it were not soldiers. We estimated that if we included that part, Kinshasa wouldn’t authorize the mobile cinema tool. That’s the truth, we had the choice between giving it chance or to stop it.

In this way, the connection between poverty and sexual violence perpetration was firmly established by the debate facilitator. A soldier finding himself both sexually and financially deprived could be pushed to violence by “the male instinct” to fulfill his “natural need.” As the lowest-ranked soldiers also have the lowest salaries, perpetration was considered more likely to be executed by them. Therefore, increasing soldiers’ salaries could potentially have preventive effects on sexual violence.

In the MCT, the debate facilitator had a key role in the encouragement of the soldier audience’s behavior change. In the case described above, the beneficiary to whom the Western development agents had transferred the responsibility of executing preventative
efforts held similar arguments as the peers he was “empowered” to stimulate. The development agents’ development discourse was thereby not internalized by the debate facilitator himself, even though he was trained to transmit its message to his peers. In addition to contesting the “truth” presented to him during the SFCG debate facilitator training, he saw the labeling of insufficient salary levels as a root cause of sexual violence as politically sensitive. Since his perception of the facts could be interpreted as a critique towards Congolese authorities, the topic could not be covered in the films or the discussions. According to the debate facilitator, discussing the effects of low salaries was a “no-go” topic, regardless of Western development agents’ opinions. It was apparent that the informant articulated a range in the interests at stake for the beneficiaries. In the case of soldier salaries, he described a direct conflict between the different sections of the military. Due to the restrictions the debate facilitator experienced, one can question how participatory and empowering the transfer of responsibility was for the debate facilitator himself. He was clearly aware of which discourse he was meant to articulate during the discussions and which he should keep to himself. Consequently, his debate moderating can be characterized as parroting the development discourse, rather than a successful enactment of developmentality.

While my interview material demonstrated that several of the stakeholders saw low salaries as a causal factor in sexual violence perpetration, my observations showed that soldiers refrained from raising this issue during discussions. There was a clear difference in what the soldiers expressed to my interpreter and me in interview situations and what they expressed in a group setting with other soldiers and a debate facilitator. During the discussion observations, none of the soldiers expressed a link between low salaries and perpetration, though it was a pressing issue for them in the interviews. It is difficult to be certain of the reason for this, but based on my data one important factor could be that certain discourses were considered legitimate to bring into the conversation and others were not. By not encouraging a climate in which a cause of perpetration seen as central by the soldiers themselves could be discussed, the debates did not seem to serve as an arena that placed beneficiaries at the centre of their own development.
5.1.2 “Look at their faces”

Discourses of inclusion and exclusion linked to ethnic identity have been prominent features in the DRC conflict, from the upsurge on the war in 1996 to present times (Jackson 2006:96). This was also touched upon in the introduction under the subchapter on the DRC warscape. During my observations of the MCT sessions and in the soldier interviews, discourses on ethnicity were highly articulated regarding the topic of sexual violence. Ten of the twelve soldier informants (including the females) and two of the four debate facilitators expressed clear perceptions of the ethnic identity of the “true” sexual violence perpetrators. While the Western development agents involved in the MCT identified FARDC soldiers as a main perpetrator group, the majority of my soldier informants rejected this notion. According to these soldiers, the core of the problem of sexual violence did not lay in the “lust rapes” the average underpaid FARDC soldier could turn to when in need. Rather, it was the “brutal sexual violence” committed by the Rwandaphone.

During the screenings, the MCT’s attempts to hold FARDC soldiers responsible were often met by a transferal of blame to Rwandaphone combatants. “Why do you only accuse FARDC soldiers?” one of the soldiers asked the debate facilitator during one of the discussions, continuing, “What about cases of rape that are brought by the conflict, by AFDL?” The sentence “look at his face” was also whispered in the soldier audience during an MCT session, when a combatant with a Tutsi appearance was shown in one of the short films. Another example of the mitigation of responsibility occurred when a soldier asked: “Why could we see a stranger’s face, a Banyamulenge, in the beginning of the movie? Is it to tell us that they are the ones who brought this practice, since it didn’t exist before?” Whereby the debate facilitator replied, “this has nothing to do with a specific ethnic group. It might be that it has existed for a long time, but that nobody spoke of about it before. What is important is to stop, whoever you are.” Randi Solhjell traced a similar pattern of blame transfers in her research on sexual violence in the DRC. “Congolese often maintain that the violence is a result of Rwandan genocidaires within the Congolese territory who have used sexual violence as a weapon of genocide,” she writes (Solhjell 2009:17-18). While the majority of the Rwandans
responsible for the 1994 genocide were of Hutu origin, the soldiers I observed during the MCT sessions mainly pointed to AFDL, CNDP and M23, Rwanda-backed rebel groups led by Congolese Tutsis (Van Reybrouck 2011:466).

Stephen Jackson’s writings about the political implications of identity constructions in the DRC, may serve to illuminate my soldier informants’ perception of the Rwandaphone as the “true” perpetrators. According to him, Rwanda’s role in the conflict situation in the DRC has fueled a re-galvanization of political discourses on autochthony and allochtony. The concepts of “autochthony,” which means “sons of the soil”, and “allochtony,” which means “sons of a different soil”, entered the DRC scene with the Belgian colonizers (Jackson 2006:96-99). While today’s eastern DRC and Rwanda were characterized by highly intermixed populations with porous ethnic and tribal categories, the Belgian colonizers reorganized this geographical area according to a perception of an equation combining territory and fixed identity categories (Dunn 2003:148, Jackson 2006:98). In contemporary DRC, the sense of autochthony, as “the true Congolese” and allochtone, as “the Rwandaphone/Rwandans” hold striking currencies (Jackson 2006:96-99). As mentioned, this narrative was also emphasized during my observations of the MCT sessions and the soldier interviews. Important to underline, complex and diverse definitions regarding the enemy’s true identity also emerged. The state of Rwanda and Rwandan rebels fighting in the DRC were uniformly described as allochtone, and the majority of informants also described them as the main sexual violence perpetrators. Additionally, many articulated Rwandaphone Congolese Tutsis, Banyamulenges, as essentially Rwandan. In this perspective, Banyamulenges constituted a “Trojan horse” threatening the country from within (Jackson 2006:109).

Several of my soldier informants described the FARDC itself as an institution marked by ethnic tensions. As described in the introductory chapter, major security sector reforms were initiated after the signing of the peace treaty in 2002, merging former rebel factions into the national army (Baaz & Verweijen 2013:1, 10). In other words, when my soldier informants talked about “the enemy,” they did not solely refer to an entity external to the FARDC. They
also pointed to groups operating from within the state military. This was particularly linked up with the integration of Congolese rebels with Tutsi backgrounds into the FARDC. The rebel group M23, led by Bosco Ntaganda, consisted mainly of Congolese Tutsis. Many of these combatants had formerly been a part of the rebel group CNDP, led by Laurent Nkunda, which integrated into the FARDC in 2009 (Baaz & Verweijen 2013:16). Among the soldiers I interviewed, several expressed great dissatisfaction with the integration of Congolese Tutsi combatants, claiming that they were, in reality, “Rwandans running Rwanda’s errands.” Ex-CNDPs’ breakout from the FARDC to form M23 was seen as proof of this. As described in the chapter on the DRC warscape, the Rwandan government did actively support M23 rebels. This was established in a report from the UN Security Council a few months after my fieldwork:

The Government of Rwanda continues to violate the arms embargo by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice. The de facto chain of command of M23 includes Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and culminates with the Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe (UNSC 2012:3).

One of the soldiers I interviewed in Goma was fighting against the M23 rebels. When I asked him what he thought was the reason why some soldiers in the FARDC committed sexual violence, he immediately identified Rwandaphones as the real perpetrators:

Soldier (Male head sergeant, 25 years): In FARDC, we don’t do that kind of things. Those are our sisters. Why should we destroy them? It’s the people coming from outside who destroy our sisters.
N.M.: Who are you talking about, which people?
Soldier: The CNDP and the M23, they are the same ones. It’s Nkunda and Ntaganda’s men who are responsible for the disorder here. It’s them who rape, who cuts up women’s wombs and take the babies out. For us, it’s a massacre. When we reach those places, we see what they have done.
N.M.: So what happened when CNDP merged with you?
Soldier: First we fought against them, then we accepted to merge with them and now they are gone again. What does that mean? That they want to colonize us. This shows that they have an agreement with our authorities and that we have no value for them.
Our authorities let that happen. They want us to be bad to each other. We are just soldiers, we wait for orders. Only God knows what we dying for.

Here, the informant referred to sexual violence as a war tactic used by Tutsi rebels. “True Congolese” perceived the women in the country as their sisters, so the real source of perpetration must derive from groups alien to Congolese soil. According to Dunn, the notion of the Congolese government as a “Rwandan puppet” has been a widely accepted narrative in the DRC (Dunn 2003:135). This can be linked to the informant’s claim that Congolese authorities constitute an accomplice of the enemy through encouraging the integration of rebel groups into the national army. According to him, this resulted in fueling more violence rather than contributing to peace. When I asked the informant what he thought could be done to prevent sexual violence committed by the former rebels who had joined the FARDC, he responded that behavior change was unlikely.

They can’t stop doing it, because it’s in their nature. Those people have Rwandan faces. We cannot live with them, even if they are trying to merge with us in the military, we don’t have the same mentality. They have been messing with us since we accepted to live with them. Congo is our country. They should go back to Rwanda, their country. They are Kagame’s soldiers.

The soldier’s explanation of perpetration committed by Rwandaphones included the layout of a pathologic psyche in which perpetration lies “in their nature.” This mental state was linked to the conception of a distinct Rwandan morphology, categorizing Rwandans as a fundamental Other in relation to the Congolese. Moreover, the informant not only traced Kinyarwanda speakers’ inherent disposition to sexual violence perpetration to a Rwandan nationality, but also linked it to mega-ethnic and mega-racial lines:

The difference is physical, their body is a different race. They have a long nose, ours is not. When they speak, they sound like Rwandans. Even when they speak Lingala or Swahili, you can find out that they are Rwandans. Also, they have another ideology, the Ethiopian ideology, white people’s race. That’s why white people support them.

According to this informant, Rwandaphones adhere to the “Ethiopian ideology,” which eventually connects to the “White race.” This notion echoes a legacy from colonial
anthropology, which constructed the mega-ethnic categories of “Nilotes” and “Bantu” (Van Reybrouck 2011:397). In this categorization Bantu people are deemed the autochthon population of Central Africa. Nilotes, supposed ancestors of Tutsis, are considered as invaders from the Horn of Africa, allochtons par excellence (Jackson 2006:107). As the informant explained, the physiognomic traits of Rwandaphones were seen as linked to the white race and differentiated them from “true Congolese” (for example, long noses versus flat noses). This also reflects a colonial image of Tutsis as superior/exterior to Bantu groups (Eltringham 2006:431). One example of this can be found in the writings made by a Belgian colonizer in 1917: “The Tutsi is “closer to the White man than the Negro… he is a European under a black skin” (Menard in Eltringham 2006:432). A noteworthy conclusion drawn by the informant above was that the Kinyarwanda-speakers’ status as essentially Caucasoid made them endeared by white people. Because of this alleged disposition to whiteness, the enemy also harvested support from the West. This notion was recurring in many of the soldier interviews.

One important question that I raised with the soldier informants was whether they had suggestions for improvements to the MCT in order to reach its goal of sexual violence prevention. Many used the opportunity to underline their beliefs that perpetration would not end unless Western actors withdrew their support to the enemy. The following excerpt can serve as an example:

Soldier (Male captain, 57 years old): I have one recommendation: Talk to your government about the situation in our country. We are tired of war. Maybe Norway can be an interlocutor for DRC in order to end these wars that are imposed on us […]. Because you cannot see a friend suffering when you have the solution for his pain. We know that the war in the DRC comes from Europe or the USA.

N.M.: Can you tell me a bit more about what you mean by that?

Soldier: We listen to radios. If the neighbor is attacking us, it’s because he has the support from powers like the USA and British. I talk about Rwanda. We know that without that support, Rwanda can’t fight Congo.

Later in the interview, the informant’s reference to the USA and the UK as backers of Rwanda was linked to the support these countries offered Rwanda after the 1994 genocide.
Post-genocide, American and British “aid taps were turned,” in the words of David Smith, out of shame for being bystanders in the killing of 800,000 Rwandans (Smith 2012, van Reybrouck 2011:385). Several of the soldier informants argued that this shame had led to Rwanda’s current position as a “development darling,” overshadowing its critique-worthy involvement in the DRC conflict. In their eyes, the West did not only fail to acknowledge identities of the “true” perpetrators, but also actively supported them through aid partnerships.

As my findings indicate, the intricacy of identity categories in the DRC conflict culminated in a number of remonstrations from the soldiers, both during the MCT sessions and in the interviews with me. The MCT’s attempt to encourage behavior change among FARDC soldiers was interpreted by many as a continuation of a lack of acknowledgment of the “actual” perpetrators. The term moral panic can serve as an illustration of the soldiers’ portrayals of the MCT sexual violence preventive ambition. Developed by Stanley Cohen, “moral panic” refers to a situation in which somebody or something is presented as a deviant posing a substantial threat to society’s moral concerns in an exaggerated way. Following many of my soldier informants’ reasoning, the MCT’s “moral crusade” was mistakenly directed at the common Congolese soldier rather than at the “folk devil,” the Rwandaphone (Cohen 2002).

5.1.3 “Mzungu” matters and the need to “grease the machinery”

In some instances, the soldier informants articulated the MCT itself to be an embodiment of the West. “You and your customs from Europe are destroying our way of living,” as one of the soldiers phrased it during an MCT session. One of the local SFCG employees I interviewed confirmed that there were occasions where soldiers claimed the MCT to parrot Western discourses:

It’s bizarre, because the film is in Swahili and we tell them that what they are seeing is from DRC, from South Kivu region, that the people are not actors. But sometimes they still consider it like something from far away. And it’s difficult to change that, because when you come with a land cruiser, a generator and a mobile cinema, it’s strange for
them. They consider it as something coming from mzungu [white people/the West]. Even if there is no mzungu!

Despite the Western development agents’ utilization of a participatory approach in delegating responsibility to the local SFCG personnel and selected FARDC soldiers, the MCT was still regarded by some as a Western contrivance. The spectacle created by the arrival of the MCT entourage and their technological film screening gadgets made them classify the effort as a “mzungu matter.”

One 36-year old male corporal I interviewed, claimed sexual violence to be a “mzungu” concept:

N.M: Do you think that something should be done in order to prevent sexual violence committed by soldiers?
Soldier: I don’t know. But I can tell you this: When the churches came, people here started misbehaving. Bad behaviors came from white people. Today, you have the example of porno movies. You can have them in your mobile phone, you watch them and when you see a woman coming, you feel like having sex. The world has changed. I’m asking you, where did all these things come from?
N.M: What do you think?
Soldier: I think it’s the devil that change people’s mind. Just look at what whites do in those movies. Those movies can be watched by everyone, and then they want to try it too.

Here, the question of preventing sexual violence committed by soldiers was answered by the claim that “bad behaviors” originate from the Western world. The informant traced this evolvement back to when Europeans entered the DRC scene in the 15th century (Dunn 2003:27). While the informant did not specify which “bad behaviors” he believed were imported by white people during that time, one interpretation is that he considers Western sexuality to generally transgress “good” morals. This argument is clearer in the example he mentions from contemporary times, where pornography is framed as a devil-like mzungu concept. By answering my question regarding sexual violence perpetration committed by Congolese, with a new question about where this behavior essentially came from, the informant can be said to have performed a “Re-Othering.” To use Said’s terminology: Rather
than perceiving sexual violence committed by Congolese soldiers as a product of the Orient, he explained it as matter imported by the sexually deviant Occident (Said 2003:2).

Interestingly, the same soldier informants who were critical of the MCT, claiming that the focus on FARDC soldiers was excessive and that the messages it sought to convey originated from the West, could also express that the MCT was a great effort later in the interview. After having examined this aspect closer in the interview transcriptions, one pattern that emerged was that these seemingly conflicting perceptions often were accompanied by requests to be enrolled as a debate facilitator. Keeping in mind that an on-the-ground military position is one of the poorest paid in Congolese society, it does not seem unlikely that some soldiers considered the MCT to be a potential income-generating opportunity. One question that can be posed in this regard is whether the shift from criticizing the MCT to applauding it can be linked to a perceived economic gain for presenting the effort in positive terms.

In the interview with the Western SFCG employee, he described how the role model character in the MCT films was portrayed as having undergone a “sinner to a saint” transformation. As described earlier, this transformative process meant that the role model character had changed from being a “trauma-ridden perpetrator” to a “morally revived protector of women.” The Western SFCG employee, on the other hand, questioned the sincerity of this account:

The whole “from a sinner to a saint” thing is relative. Do you know how much an almoner [the position held by the role model character] earns in the army? $60 or $70 a month. In one debate moderation for us, he gets $25. That means that if he does two screenings, he nearly doubles his salary. So there is a lot of money involved for the soldiers who facilitate, it's a lifeline. He is making his money now by declaring that what he did was wrong. We shouldn't underestimate the importance of money in this.

As explained by this quote, the role model character was seen as merely regurgitating the Western development agents’ discourses. From the SFCG informant’s perspective, the supposed reformation was essentially driven by economic incentives. With this understanding, the intended developmentality resulted in simulations of successful self-government rather than an actual behavior change. Furthermore, the SFCG employee described that the
challenges brought by the MCT’s participatory approach were not limited to the role model character or the debate moderators. Rather, the entire collaboration with the FARDC was marked by challenges:

The specific mission we have is to work directly with the military. This is something that none of the other actors can claim. So we have a special entry. But I am telling you, this requires a lot of patience.

Later in the interview, he explained that this “patience” he was referring to, regarded the military hierarchy’s “numerous and extreme demands for money.” Thus, in addition to the salaries the military hierarchy received from SFCG for taking on the executive responsibility of the MCT, extracurricular payments were requested. An example given by the SFCG employee was that he had received phone calls from the highest-ranking soldier working with the MCT, stating that no papers would be signed unless he got a $4000 jeep. In other words, while the transfer of responsibility to the FARDC was central in the SFCG’s envisioned strategy, the acceptance of this responsibility by the beneficiary was presented as based on conditionality. The concept of conditionality is widespread in the aid industry, though usually presented from the donor’s perspective. In return for grants, technical assistance and loans, donors frequently impose conditions on beneficiaries (Temple 2014:547). According to Temple,

aid conditionality seeks to make aid more effective: the donor induces or ‘buys’ certain policy actions or reforms which, if the donor is altruistic and well informed, should benefit the poor (Temple 2014:548).

In the case described by the SFCG employee, however, it was explained that the beneficiary attached conditions for the aid to be received. In his words, it was necessary to “grease the machinery of the army” to ensure the implementation of the MCT. The two following quotes from him can exemplify this argument:

It’s a very dirty business. Because the army here is not paid, it is all about the money. We need to make sure that when they try to negotiate for the $4000, we negotiate for
50 and then we end up with 100. You know? Nobody are angels in these times. It was a tough lesson, but that’s the way it is.

We have high expectations, but let’s just see if we can get the ball moving and get the message out there. For me, it’s more important to do that, than to do it perfectly.

Thus, the dynamic between the two negotiating parts in the MCT relied on an acknowledgement of the mutual benefit in closing continuous small “partnership deals.” In this *modus operandi*, SFCG’s bargaining chip was the promise of additional money transfers, and the FARDC’s was the promise of engaging in “developmentality.” The military hierarchy and the debate facilitators financial incentive to engage in the MCT was met with a rather pragmatic approach from the Western SFCG employee. Without the development agent’s provision of these economic inducements, collaboration was described as improbable, diminishing the entire viability of the MCT.

According to Oliver P. Richmond, the interests of development interveners are always subjected to “a process of negotiation over those interests with recipients and local actors” Compromises involving this search for a common ground are present in all development efforts whether oriented as top-down or bottom-up (Richmond 2007:112). At the same time, the SFCG employee’s willingness to make additional payments to Congolese state officials – the FARDC members – can be perceived as a risky overlap of public power and private wealth. According to Susan Rose-Acherman’s definition of corruption, the FARDC soldiers’ acceptance of extracurricular money transfers for personal gain would classify as illicit. Among the possible consequences of corruption Rose-Acherman lays out are the encouragement of the creation of a “bribe generating machine” and “bringing the state to the edge of outright failure” (Rose-Acherman 2014:564-565). On the other hand, Marijana Trivunovic, Jesper Johnson and Harald Mathisen emphasize that circumstances similar to the SFCG employee descriptions are all but unique. Quite the opposite, they claim that irregular money transfers are a reality that all NGOs working with development assistance in the Global South can be faced with:
The only way that corruption risks can be eliminated altogether is by not engaging in development activities at all. The choice, therefore, is not between accepting and not accepting corruption risks, but rather, how much risk is acceptable and how much investment (in particular, financial investment) should be made in risk mitigation measures, in proportion to the broader development objectives of a given project or programme (Trivunovic, Johnsøn & Mathisen 2011:25).

In this sense, what some would consider as engaging in acts of corruption, was classified by the Western SFCG employee as a necessary measure in a context where “nobody is an angel.” “Greasing the machinery of the army” was merely an adjustment to a Congolese reality considered difficult to avoid. Following this, the focus of the SFCG employee was to emphasize the MCT’s potential contribution to sexual violence prevention within this challenging context. The central question in this regard was to negotiate the amount of “grease” acceptable for both the development agent and the beneficiary, in order to keep the developmentality machinery hobbling on.

5.2 Summarizing remarks

As the previous chapters have demonstrated, my findings derived during the fieldwork indicated that the film production team and SFCG’s attempts to utilize developmentality was decoded by the soldiers in a variety of ways. The soldiers’ responses constituted neither passive accumulation of the development agents’ development discourse nor a counter-hegemonic resistance. Rather, the discourses the MCT entailed turned into substances that were adapted, appropriated, subverted and contested in the encounter with the soldiers. A central response I located to the MCT’s attempts at sensitizing the FARDC soldiers was that the project was interpreted as deriving from a Western “rape hysteria.” Several of the soldier informants described a lack of correspondence between the acts that Westerners considered to constitute “sexual violence,” and the acts that “actually” constituted sexual violence. Many also claimed that there was clear difference between the “lust-driven” rapes the average FARDC soldiers could commit, and the “evil” sexual violence that was fuelled by the enemy’s desire to destroy the country. FARDC soldiers were commonly described to only turn to sexual violence if they lacked the financial means to pay the dowry or to buy sex,
rendering the acts merely “semi-sexual violence.” According to these informants, the MCT’s targeting of perpetration committed by FARDC soldiers was excessive and unreasonable, especially as compared to the “evil-driven” massacres the Rwandaphones were responsible for. In light of these “messy actualities,” the Western development agents’ envisioned developmentality strategy often became fragile in its on-the-ground attempt of enactment.
6 Conclusion

Throughout the chapters in this thesis, I have sought to explore the discursive and practical complexities involved in the MCT, a Western development effort seeking to prevent sexual violence committed by the Congolese state military. In this concluding chapter, the findings will be revisited in light of the two research questions that have informed the analysis: *How did the film production team and SFCG envision the MCT contributing to sexual violence prevention? How was the MCT received by the targeted FARDC soldiers?* The chapter concludes by sketching out some recommendations to Western development agents that seek to prevent sexual violence committed by FARDC soldiers.

6.1 The discursive space of the MCT

While the MCT’s targeting of (perceived) perpetrators is rare among NGO-led efforts linked to sexual violence in the DRC, I have argued that the project must be understood as part of larger processes connected to the changing landscape of security and development. The identification of these processes has served as a necessary backdrop for the analysis of the findings I derived from the interviews and observations.

1) The first major process I identified, was the trajectory from the Belgian colonizers’ sovereign approach where they would mold the sexual conduct of the Congolese, to the approach I consider most widespread in contemporary Western-led development efforts in the Global South, *developmentality*. In my genealogy-inspired account of Western efforts to shape the sexual practices of Congolese subjects, I traced three major discourses as important to the analysis of the MCT. These discourses concern Western agents’ legitimization of their behavior changing efforts by referring to tactics of *civilizing, enlightening* and *empowering* Congolese individuals. In the film production crew and SFCG’s narratives, I traced a continuation of elements from discourses which dominated during the colonial era on civilizing and enlightening Congolese subjects to alter their sexual conduct. However, these discourses were clearly separate from the sovereign-like behavior change strategy prevalent
during colonialism. In the Western development agents’ narratives, the tactics of civilizing and enlightening were reconfigured and merged with a discourse of empowerment. As such, I have found the MCT as operating within a developmentality framework.

2) The second major process I found influential in shaping the context that the MCT operated within, was the post-Cold War merging of development and security. Following the rise of intrastate conflicts in the 1990s, the international community turned to perceiving security and development as interconnected and interdependent, rather than as two separate concepts. I argue that this devolvement led to the securitization of conflict-related sexual violence, moving it to the high politics of global security. With the international community’s application of the development/security approach, large-scale manifestations of sexual violence are increasingly considered as stemming from “underdevelopment,” “state fragility” and lack of “good governance.” Due to this, reconfigurations have emerged regarding the actors that are working to obliterate the development/security threat posed by sexual violence. This has created a space in which Western development NGOs, such as SFCG, can engage in efforts traditionally considered to belong to the security realm.

In the following, the empirical findings will be summarized in light of this thesis’ research questions. Although the research questions have been structured in a binate manner, first pointing to the discourses articulated by the Western development agents, then discussing how soldiers related to these discourses, the discursive and the practical have not been perceived as separate concepts in an ontological sense. On the contrary, an important analytical point has been to demonstrate that the discursive and the practical are deeply enmeshed in the MCT, articulating certain ways of governing the development beneficiaries’ sexual conduct and certain positions of subjectivity of those to be governed.
6.2 Developmentality in the MCT: Empowered through knowledge and scared straight?

How did the film production team and SFCG envision the MCT contributing to sexual violence prevention?

The film production team and the Western SFCG employee were clear in their description of the MCT as an educational project that utilized a positive approach for raising awareness among FARDC soldiers. The soldiers participating in the MCT were supposed to be sensitized on the causes and consequences of sexual violence, not only for the sake of the victims and local communities, but also for the sake of the perpetrators themselves. From this perspective, sexual violence was the result of the individual perpetrator’s deficit of a specific form of knowledge that, if successfully absorbed, could keep him from committing the wrongful deed in question. Thus, education was the stimulus needed by the individual perpetrator that could bring the change needed to achieve sexual violence prevention. The virtue of education in preventing undesired sexual conduct was also a highly articulated discourse during the colonial era in the DRC. In fact, colonization was often presented as a synonym for education. The task of the colonizers in this context was to cast the “light of reason” over the underdeveloped settlements in the DRC, remolding Congolese subjects to align with the sexual conduct characterized as legitimate by the West. In the interviews with the Western development agents behind the MCT, I found that they articulated a greatly diverse range of thinking regarding the envisioned preventive effect of “education.” Furthermore, this diversity carried different perspectives on the cause of sexual violence, strategies to prevent the violence and subjectivity position of targeted soldiers:

1) The first discourse I traced in the interviews with the film production team pointed to sexual violence as an outcome of the lack of good governance skills on an institutional level in the FARDC. As the FARDC was considered incompetent in educating its soldiers on “proper” sexual conduct, the MCT was created to alleviate this development/security threat. In this way, the Western development agents approached the Congolese state military as
security experts, taking on the responsibility to teach soldiers the adequate way to provide for the public’s security. The sexual violence preventive effect laid in engaging in a partnership with the perceived contributors to insecurity, the FARDC, and offering them educational tools to strengthen their ability to provide security. Central to this was the transfer of executive responsibility from the Western MCT creators to the FARDC by training a selection of debate facilitators to disseminate a message of abstinence from sexual violence. With this, the FARDC was not considered a passive recipient of aid but an active contributor to its own development. To summarize this discourse:

- Cause of sexual violence perpetration: Poor governance, state fragility, underdevelopment
- Strategy to prevent sexual violence: Engaging in a partnership with a perceived contributor to insecurity, educating the FARDC on how to educate its soldiers to refrain from sexual violence
- Assigned subjectivity position to the targeted FARDC soldier: Unprofessional, underdeveloped, uneducated

2) The second discourse I traced in the interviews with the Western development agents claimed that sexual violence was rooted in a patriarchal gender structure in the Congolese society. Due to this, the soldiers were perceived as cognitive distorted in their belief of men’s sexual entitlement. Simultaneously, the individual soldier was presented as an actor who could choose to refrain from engaging in the patriarchal system. In this sense, the Western development agents appeared as an intellectual authority, offering an opportunity to the targeted soldiers to convert the gender equality education provided by the MCT into attitude and behavior change. If a soldier chose to act on this knowledge, sexual violence prevention was the envisioned outcome. To sum up this discourse:

- Cause of sexual violence perpetration: Patriarchal society that enables soldiers to legitimize the act of taking women by force when feeling sexually aroused
• Strategy to prevent sexual violence: Enlightening the soldier through the provision of knowledge on gender equality
• Assigned subjectivity position to the targeted FARDC soldier: Uneducated, bearer of patriarchal attitudes

3) The third discourse I traced was the conception of participation in warfare as an eraser of the moral education the soldiers received in their upbringing. With this supposed erasure, perpetrating FARDC soldiers were presented as being deprived of human characteristics altogether, converting them into “brutal animals.” In the Western development agent’s portrayal, the animalization of FARDC soldiers was a generalized form of post-warfare behavior, wherein the abnormality of being deprived of a sense of morality had become the norm. With this supposed mass-deterioration of moral, the soldiers’ “risky brains” constituted a danger. Re-educating the soldiers on the importance of good morals was seen as essential in the process of nurturing “safe brains.” The MCT’s task in this regard was to supply the perpetrating soldier with the knowledge that made it possible for him to convert from an “animal” back into a human, initiated by his own free will. To sum up this discourse:

• Cause of sexual violence perpetration: Erasure of human values due to participation in warfare
• Strategy to prevent sexual violence: Reviving the soldier’s moral sense, normalizing, civilizing, taming the animal
• Assigned subjectivity positions to the targeted FARDC soldier: Animalistic, immoral

4) The fourth discourse I found was a view of sexual violence perpetration as rooted in the soldiers’ lack of individual risk-awareness. The preventive strategy laid in utilizing threatening messages that evoked emotional stress within the soldiers, which in turn was envisioned to motivate them to alter their behavior. In this rationale, the perpetrating soldier was presented as a consumer in need of being sold the product of self-restraint. A key element in this selling process was to communicate the risk the soldier placed himself under when
committing acts of sexual violence. The MCT’s task in this regard was to supply the soldiers with “facts” about the detrimental effects of sexual violence perpetration. The likelihood of developing traumas post-perpetration was utilized as one such “fact.” Consequently, the educational aspect of the MCT laid in providing the soldiers knowledge about the risk of developing trauma following acts of sexual violence. The use of film as a channel for communication played a key role in the dissemination of fear appeals, as visualization had the anticipated effect of making the enlightening aspect stick to the soldiers’ minds. The soldier audience targeted by this message was then encouraged to act on the knowledge provided to them and adjust their behavior accordingly. To sum up this discourse:

- Cause of sexual violence perpetration: Lack of awareness of individual risks involved in perpetration
- Strategy to prevent sexual violence: “Factual” education on individual risks involved in perpetration through fear appeals
- Assigned subjectivity positions to the targeted FARDC soldier: Consumer, rational, calculative, egocentric

5) The last discourse I identified was that the soldier’s absorption of knowledge provided by the MCT was seen to culminate in a breakage of the soldier. The method of scaring the soldier straight by making him “know too much” involved the soldier’s realization of the evil of his behavior. With this understanding, trauma could be interpreted as an expression of the moral struggles that were expected to follow acts of sexual violence. In order to deal with these struggles, the soldiers were recommended to engage in confessional self-examination and confide the “truth” to medical experts. Furthermore, admitting wrongness was presented as a prerequisite for redeeming the moral sense the soldiers had lost in combat. Hence, the confessional exercise was to have a sexual violence preventive effect, as it involved regaining humanity after animalization. Moreover, the soldiers’ acceptance of the invitation to a moral awakening was presented as a strategic move for the soldiers themselves, as the denial of evil could hinder recovery from trauma. To summarize this discourse:
• Cause of sexual violence perpetration: Lack of awareness of personal risks involved in refraining to acknowledge the evilness of perpetration, lack of awareness in benefits of confessing the evil acts
• Strategy to prevent sexual violence: “Factual” education on personal risks involved in perpetration through fear appeals, “factual” education on personal benefits involved in confessing the evilness of perpetration
• Assigned subjectivity positions to the targeted FARDC soldier: Evil, immoral, consumer, rational, calculative, egocentric

As I have demonstrated, a myriad of different discourses appeared in the envisioned preventive effect of the MCT. While some descriptions of the preventive strategy evolved around “educating,” “sensitizing” and “motivating” the soldiers to alter their conduct, others referred to the need to confront the soldiers with the negative consequences of perpetrating by “scaring,” “breaking” and “detering” them. How did the development agents envision a strategy for both empowering the soldiers through knowledge and scaring them straight? Although these two tendencies could appear as contradictory, I found intersections in the Western development agents’ narratives. The film production crew and SFCG did not simply divide their preventive approach into one process of empowering the soldiers through knowledge and one process of scaring them straight. Rather, the knowledge provided by the MCT was to scare the soldiers to alter their conduct by their own free will. Unlike the repressive power prevalent during the colonial era in the DRC, which resembled Foucault’s notion of sovereignty, the Western development agents sough to govern at a distance by utilizing technologies of freedom. Because of this, I argue that they applied developmentality as their envisioned behavior change technology. This developmentality approach could be traced on both an institutional level, through transferring the executing responsibility of the MCT sessions to FARDC itself, and on an individual level, by encouraging the soldiers to self-govern. Thus, the Western development agents’ role in the MCT was not to demand an altered conduct through the use of repressive means, but rather to lay out the assistive tools facilitating the prescribed behavior change.
6.3 Developmentality decoded: Adaptations, appropriations, subversions and contestations

*How was the MCT received by the targeted FARDC soldiers?*

The second element of this thesis’ research inquiries has been to explore the relationship between the film production crew and SFCG’s envisioned preventive strategy in the MCT and the soldiers’ reception of the MCT. An important finding derived from my fieldwork was that the relationship between the visions and the implementation was marked by a ray of discontinuities. Rather than merely accumulating the Western development agents’ development discourse or exercising resistance, the soldiers decoded the developmentality in a number of different ways. Following this, the development agents’ discourses turned into substances that were adapted, appropriated, subverted and contested in the encounter with the soldiers.

As I have argued, the film production team and SFCG emphasized a developmentality approach, encouraging behavior change by appealing to the soldiers’ self-government. However, many of the soldiers I interviewed held considerably different perceptions on the “true” causes and solutions to the sexual violence in the country. In the interviews I had with the film production team, two topics were described as being downplayed in the MCT, namely the link between low soldier salaries and sexual violence perpetration, and sexual violence committed by Rwandaphone combatants. The Western development agents expressed reservations about including these topics, as they were considered to skew the discussions during the MCT sessions and function as “excuses” for perpetration. Despite the attempts to angle the discussions in a way that held the FARDC soldiers responsible for adjusting their sexual conduct, the two “no-go” topics were placed on the agenda by the soldiers themselves. While the Western development agents identified FARDC soldiers as a main perpetrator group, the majority of the soldier informants rejected this notion, transferring the blame to Rwandaphone combatants. According to these informants, the main problem of sexual violence was not the “lust rapes” the average underpaid FARDC soldier could turn to
when in need. Rather, it was the “brutal” and “evil-driven” sexual violence committed by the Rwandaphone. According to several soldiers, the MCT’s attempt to responsibilize them was interpreted as a lack of acknowledgement of the “true” sexual violence perpetrators: the Rwandaphone. As a consequence, many soldiers considered the MCT as a “mzungu” contrivance disseminating “false” discourses on normalcy and deviance.

In my analysis of the soldier informants’ narratives, several fragments suggested that there was an economic incentive to reproduce attitudes they perceived were in line with discourses held by the Western development agents. This could, for instance, be seen when soldiers went from criticizing the MCT to describing it in positive terms while asking about becoming debate facilitators. The Western SFCG employee also described the prominence of economic incentives in regards to the application of a developmentality approach with the FARDC. While the transfer of responsibility to FARDC was central in the development agents’ theory of change, the Western SFCG explained that this transfer was dependent on “greasing the machinery” of the FARDC. In this sense, the criteria for FARDC to engage in the development agents’ rhetoric of developmentality was a matter often negotiated on financial terms. Since the MCT emerged as an income-generating opportunity for the beneficiaries, I consider it as likely that some of the soldiers parroted the Western development agents’ development discourse, rather than successfully embodying developmentality.

One could, of course, interpret the soldiers’ decodifications described in this thesis, the adaptations, appropriations, subversions and contestations, as evidence for the need of the MCT. Was not the foundation for the creation of the MCT based exactly on the soldiers’ unwillingness to self-govern? Clearly, the Western development agents’ motivation to develop the MCT was rooted in a perception of the soldiers’ lack of “sound management” of their bodies. In this perspective, the soldiers’ reluctance to accept the Western development agents’ attempt to execute developmentality, could serve to support the effort in itself. On the other hand, to dismiss the soldiers’ truth representations by simply referring to them as illegitimate or false does not seem to be in accordance with placing the beneficiaries in the
centre of their own development. So what did this developmentality approach of the MCT entail? In my view, the MCT’s envisioned strategy to remold the minds and bodies of Congolese subjects was marked by a high level of ambiguity. Despite the Western development agents’ extensive inclusion of local stakeholders in the planning and implementation of the MCT, which surely can outdo the inclusion levels seen in many other NGO efforts, they still positioned themselves as an *intellectual* authority. It was *their* discourses on “legitimate sexual conduct,” “good morals,” “development,” “security” and “prevention” that were considered true, regardless of their peripheral position in the execution of the MCT sessions. However, since the developmentality strategy involved the delegation of responsibility to the beneficiaries, the decoding of “truth” did not occur under the development agents’ auspices. As my findings have indicated, this resulted in a myriad of interpretations of the sexual violence prevention discourses disseminated in the MCT. In many instances, these decodifications were also in discrepancy with the development agents’ visions. Thus, the Western development agents’ intellectual authority often became fragile in the encounter with the soldiers, making the successful enactment of developmentality a complex endeavor on the practical level.

### 6.4 Preventing sexual violence in the DRC – Concluding reflections

As this thesis had demonstrated, Western efforts to mold Congolese sexual conduct are not clear-cut endeavors, neither in a historical perspective nor in the contemporary DRC. Although I have focused on one concrete development effort, the MCT, many of the complexities I have described are not unique to this effort. In fact, in many instances these complexities say more about the context the MCT operates within – historically, politically, discursively, practically – than the MCT itself. Given these complexities, Western development interventions are rarely implemented in full accordance with the original intentions. On the contrary, discrepancies are to be expected, as human thoughts, actions and reactions cannot neither be fully forecasted, nor fully orchestrated. While this awareness is a paramount for most Western development agents operating in the DRC, there are different approaches to how one should contribute to sexual violence prevention within this
challenging context. Which reflections can this thesis offer to Western actors in their navigations?

Firstly, I support the notion that sexual violence prevention requires the inclusion of soldiers as positive change agents. FARDC holds a key role in advancing both development and security in the DRC context, and should not be bypassed due to a considered lack of “good governance.” Nonetheless, the impact of Western-led short-term awareness raising sessions targeting FARDC soldiers can be questioned. While there is surely a possibility that such sessions provide an opportunity for soldiers to reflect on the detrimental aspects of sexual violence perpetration, their effectiveness with regard to behavior change remains uncertain. Regardless of the good intentions of Western development agents, a potential risk with these efforts is that they can give an impression to the international community that “something is done,” while actual change on the ground is left to speculation. Poor sustainability prospects are also a characteristic among these efforts, since they largely, if not exclusively, rely on external donor support. In instances of Western NGOs applying a participative approach and engaging local stakeholders in the implementation of preventive efforts, the injurious effects of economic incentives for participation should also be considered. Additionally, Western NGOs should be aware of potentially undermining effects of using extracurricular financial incentives to secure the participation of beneficiaries, especially since the original goal of these preventive efforts often is to cultivate “good governance.”

Based on these remarks, I suggest that Western NGOs orient their efforts away from stand-alone short-term educational sessions, to creation of sustainable efforts that can be integrated with a long-term security sector reform. Along with the need for structural reforms, strengthening the military training curriculum is an essential component in the reform process. Many Western development NGOs can offer valuable knowledge in the creation of training modules on topics like human rights and gender equality. From my point of view, these training modules should utilize appeals to professionalism, cohesion and military discipline, rather than attempting to break, scare and deter soldiers straight. Regardless of the potential
preventive effect of fear appeals, excessive application might cross the ethical standards I believe Western development agents should abide by when shaping conduct in a postcolonial context. The least desirable situation would be that development agents go to such lengths in their ambition to prevent sexual violence that their utilization of deterrence infringes on the integrity of those they consider potential perpetrators.

As this thesis has demonstrated, the changing landscape of both security and development has resulted in new configurations of phenomena and subjects considered threats and the actors meant to obliterate them. While SFCG can be considered unique in their perpetrator focus in attempting to prevent sexual violence in the DRC, the merging of development and security will surely expand the portfolios of other NGOs in the years to come, as well as the portfolios of criminologists.

Number of words: 37 951
7 Bibliography


118


Engelstad, Fredrik (2005): Hva er makt. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget


Foucault, Michel (2002a): Forelesninger om regjering og styringskunst. Oslo: Cappelens Forlag

Foucault, Michel (1999a): *Overvåkning og straff*. Oslo: Gyldendal

Foucault, Michel (1999b): *Seksualitetens historie 1*. Oslo: Pax


120


IF Productions (2014): About IF. URL: http://www.ifproductions.nl/eng/about_bio_eng.html. [Reading date: 11th November 2014]


Join Good Forces (2014): Hjelp til voldtatte kvinner og barn. URL: http://www.joingoodforces.no/?page_id=99. [Reading date: 9th September 2014]


MCF (2014a): The People Behind MCF. URL: http://mobilecinemafoundation.com/website/?page_id=26. [Reading date: 11th November 2014]

MCF (2014b): About MCF. URL: http://mobilecinemafoundation.com/website/?page_id=26. [Reading date: 11th November 2014]


Norwegian Church Aid (2014): *DR Kongo.* URL: https://www.kirkensnодhjelp.no/her jobber-vi/kongo/. [Reading date: 9th November 2014]

Nyman, Anders, Olof Risberg & Börje Svensson (2001): *Young Offenders: Sexual Abuse and Treatment.* Stockholm: Save the Children Sweden


SFCG (2014b): Employment. URL: https://www.sfcg.org/employment. [Reading date: 7th June 2014]

SFCG (2014c): Democratic Republic of Congo. URL: https://www.sfcg.org/programmes/drcongo/drcongo_ourwork.html. [Reading date: 7th June 2014]


SFCG (2014e): About Us. URL: https://www.sfcg.org/about-us/. [Reading date: 7th June 2014]


SFCG (2014g): Democratic Republic of the Congo: Preventing Sexual & Gender-Based Violence. URL: http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/drcongo/drcongo_sgbv.html#more [Reading date: 7th June 2014]


Skjelsbæk, Inger (2010): The Elephant in the Room: An Overview of How Sexual Violence Came to be Seen as a Weapon of War. Oslo: PRIO


128


Temple, Bogusia & Alys Young (2004): “Qualitative Research and Translation Dilemmas”, *Qualitative Research* 4 (2): 161-178


8 Appendix

8.1 Screenshots from the MCT short films

8.1.1 Figure 1

An ex-combatant lies in bed in a dark room and stares into the air. In a voice-over he says:

When I go to sleep I think about my sins. I feel sorry and ask for forgiveness. I regret that I have behaved like an animal. My brain did not work like a normal person’s. I really tipped over to being a wild beast. I could not distinguish between good and bad.
A girl explains how she was raped by a soldier:

I went to fetch firewood and I helped carry the wood. We walked back the same way. On the road we saw a man who ran after us. He said: “You have stolen my palm nuts.” We said: “No, we have searched for wood.” We ran, he ran after us. We ran and I fell into a hole in the ground. He grabbed me and he did bad things to me. He said to me: “Do you want to die or sleep with me?” I said: “Have your way with me”. (Her voice is shaking, she starts to cry) And then he said: “You have stolen my palm nuts.” I said: “No”. He said: “You are the one who has stolen my palm nuts.” And he said: “You will die today.” I asked: “What have I done wrong?” He took me here and bit my neck. He pressed his leg against mine.
An ex-combatant makes his first visit to a centre for psychotherapy, to get help for the PTSD he is suffering from post-perpetration. The dialogue in the scene goes as following:

Doctor: What do you do?
(The doctor takes notes)
Ex-combatant: I am unemployed.
Doctor: But you are wearing a soldier’s hat. Have you been in the army?
Ex-combatant: I have, but that is behind me now.
Doctor: Do you think about this often?
Ex-combatant: If I talk a lot about it, I dream about it at night. Therefore I do not think about it.
Doctor: But you know you need to talk about it. So it disappears from memory.
Ex-combatant: Talk about it?
The role model character has gathered a group of soldiers to explain the importance of articulating the trauma they experience post-warfare/post-perpetration. The dialogue goes as following:

Role model character: I will not talk much. I want everybody to share your own problems. So that we together can find a solution that can help us to get a stable life one day. If there is anyone who knows his problem he can share it. What was the worst thing you saw at the front?

Soldier 1: I do not know if anyone can imagine how it is there. Everyone that sees all those things will turn crazy. Therefore, the best is not to think about it.

Soldier 2: Your goal is to conquer territory and not thinking about everything back home. Every woman you meet is your wife and that is everything that counts. But if you do not fight, you start to think about everything you have not achieved. You think about your friends who bought a house, a car and have a good life. And then you start to think. Aaaah! (Holds himself on the sides of his head, the other soldiers nod).
8.2 Questionnaires

8.2.1 Employees in the film production team

Background
Can you tell me about the background for the project?
What was the motivation to develop it?
How was it developed?
Which persons or groups did you talk to in the development phase of the project?
Did your contact with these groups affect the development of the film project? If yes, in which ways?
Are there any similarities or differences in the information you got from the different groups?
From where have you received funding?
Have the funders influenced the project/films? If yes, in which ways?
Do you collaborate with any other humanitarian actors in DRC?

Objectives
What are the objectives of the project?
Which changes does the project seek to obtain? Short-term effects/long-term effects?
Are you expecting different results in different groups of soldiers?
Which feelings do you hope that the soldiers get while and after watching the films?

Films
Which stories are presented in each of the films?
Have you used any particular effects in the films to enhance the message? Music/sound effects/film angles/cutting?
Which types of sexual violence are described in the films?
What are some explanations that the films present for why some soldiers commit sexual violence?
What message do you wish to pass to the soldiers who watch the films?
Are there any other topics you wish you had included in the films?
Have you made any ethical considerations in the process of filming? If yes, what are they?

Implementation
Which geographical areas does the project cover?
What do you think about how the project works in practice?
How do the film screenings and workshops come about?
How do the soldiers react during the screenings?
What kind of feedback have you received from SFCG and FARDC?
Has the project been evaluated?
Can you think of scenarios where the project could have counter-productive effects?
How would you like to develop the project in the future?

**Attitudes**

How do you define sexual violence?
In your opinion, what does it mean to be good soldier?
What do you think could be reasons that some soldiers in FARDC committed sexual violence during the war?
Why do you think that some soldiers still commit sexual violence, even though the war is officially over?
What do you think could prevent sexual violence committed by FARDC?
What are some key challenges in the work against sexual violence committed by FARDC?

**Film as communication method**

Why did you think using films would be a good tool for sharing your message?
What role does film play in Congolese culture?
How does your project relate to other tools that seek to prevent sexual violence?
Has there been any previous or are there any ongoing measures that aim to prevent sexual violence committed by FARDC?
Which other forms of communication have been used in the work to prevent sexual violence committed by FARDC?

**Outreach**

Is there any knowledge from the project that can be useful for the work against sexual violence in other countries?
Which recommendations would you give to other humanitarian actors who wish to prevent sexual violence committed by soldiers?

Is there anything you would like to add?
Do you have any questions?
8.2.2 SFCG employees

**Background**

Can you tell me about the background for the project?
What was the motivation to develop it?
How was it developed?
From where have you received funding?
Have the funders influenced the project/films? If yes, in which ways?
Do you collaborate with any other humanitarian actors in DRC?

**Objectives**

What are the objectives of the project?
Which changes does the project seek to obtain? Short-term effects/long-term effects?
Which feelings do you hope that the soldiers get while and after watching the films?

**Films**

Which messages do you wish to give the soldiers who watch the films?
Are there any other topics you wish were included in the films?

**Implementation**

Which geographical areas does the project cover?
What do you think about how the project works in practice?
How do the film screenings and workshops go about?
How do the soldiers react during the screenings?
Have the different films received different responses from the soldiers?
What kind of feedback have you received from FARDC?
Has the project been evaluated?
Can you think of scenarios where the project could have counter-productive effects?
How would you like to develop the project in the future?

**Attitudes**

What do you think are the reasons for why some soldiers in FARDC committed sexual violence during the war?
Why do you think that some soldiers still commit sexual violence, even though the war is officially over?
What do you think can prevent sexual violence committed by FARDC?
What are the key challenges in the work against sexual violence committed by FARDC?

**Film as communication method**

Why did you think film would be a good tool for bringing out your message?
What role does film play in Congolese culture?
How does your project relate to other tools that seek to prevent sexual violence? Have there been any previous or are there any ongoing measures that aim to prevent sexual violence committed by FARDC? Which other forms of communication have been used to prevent sexual violence committed by FARDC?

Is there anything you would like to add? Do you have any questions?
8.2.3 Soldiers functioning as debate moderators in the MCT

**Personal background**

What is your current position in the military?
What did you do before you became a soldier?
What is your educational background?

**Before facilitating**

How did you hear about the mobile cinema project?
What was your initial reaction to the project?
What do you consider as the goal of the project?
How did you become a facilitator?
How did you experience the facilitator training?
Is there something that missed in the training or that can be improved?
What were your expectations in regards to being a facilitator? (Challenging, easy?)
What is the role of the facilitator?

**Experience as a facilitator**

How did you experience your first facilitation?
How many screenings have you facilitated?
What do you think about how the project works in practice?

**Implementation**

Can you tell be about a typical day being a facilitator, how does it go about?
What are the typical reactions that the soldiers express when they watch the films?
To what degree are the soldiers active during the workshop?
Which themes typically raises discussion?
What kind of feedback have you received?
How can the tool be improved?

Do you have any questions or is there anything you would like to add?
8.2.4 Soldiers participating in the MCT

**Personal life**

How old are you?
Are you married or in a relationship?
What does your husband/wife work with?
Do you have children? How many?
Where are you from?
Where do you live now?
How do you normally spend your days?

**Military background and experience**

How long have you been in the military?
How old were you when you became a soldier?
What did you do before you became a soldier?
What was your motivation to join the military?
Have you been a part of any other army groups before joining FARDC?
What rank do you have today?
What is your function?
What combat experience do you have?
Are there any subjects that you wish you would get more training about in your military service?
Have you gotten any training from the military on human rights issues?
Have you gotten any training from the military about sexual violence?

**Soldier profession**

What are the positive aspects of being a soldier?
Are there any negative aspects of being a soldier?
What qualities should a soldier have to be a good soldier, in your opinion?
What does it mean to be a bad soldier, in your opinion?
How do you feel that the civilian population treats the military?

**Sexual violence**

Now I am going to ask you about your opinions on issues related to sexual violence. If there are some questions you do not want to answer this is not a problem, it is completely voluntary.

How do you define rape?
How do you define sexual violence?
Do you know of any other types of sexual violence other than rape?
Do you know what legal responses a soldier in uniform risk by committing sexual violence?
What do you think about the prevalence of sexual violence committed by soldiers?
What do you think are the reasons for why some soldiers commit sexual violence?
What can be done to prevent sexual violence committed by soldiers?
Have you experienced a wrong way to prevent sexual violence?

Now I am going to present you with a few statements that I would like you to give your opinion about. You can agree, disagree and comment as you like.

First statement: In order to be protected at the front line you must not approach women before battle.
Second statement: Having sex with a young girl can cure HIV.
Third statement: Male and female soldiers cannot perform the same tasks in the army.
Fourth statement: Sexual violence committed by soldiers is not a big problem.
Fifth statement: Increasing the soldier’s salary in FARDC will reduce sexual violence committed by soldiers.
Sixth statement: There are a lot of fake rape cases.
Seventh statement: If a soldier witnesses another soldier raping a woman, he should stay out of the matter.
Eighth statement: If a woman is raped, the husband should leave her.
Ninth statement: If a woman dresses provocatively and gets raped, she is to blame for the rape.

**The mobile cinema tool**

What are your thoughts about the screening?
What do you think about how the screening was arranged?
Are there any stories from the films that you remember particularly well?
Are there any stories you did not like?
What did you feel during/after the screening?
How did the films portray soldiers, in your opinion?
What do you think about the women in the movie who tells about their experience of sexual violence?
What do you think about the part that deals with trauma?
Could you relate to the part about trauma?
What reactions did the group have during the discussions?
Did you say something? If yes, what did you say?
Do you feel that you learned something from participating in the project? If yes, what?
Do you think that the project can contribute to preventing sexual violence committed by soldiers?
If no, what do you think can be done to prevent sexual violence committed by soldiers?
Did you talk about the screening to anyone after participation?
How can the tool be improved, in your opinion?

Do you have any questions or is there anything you would like to add?

142
8.3 Recommendations given to SFCG by the end of the fieldwork

The following recommendations are based on an analysis of the data I gathered during my fieldwork in the DRC June – August 2012. The data was gathered through interviews with the developers of the MCT, staff from SFCG, and debate facilitators and soldiers from FARDC. In addition, observations were made during the training of debate facilitators and MCT screening sessions.

1. **Recommendation:** Emphasize that husbands should not leave their wives after they have been raped. Inform about the possibility of protecting oneself against if the wife has contracted an sexually transmitted diseases from the sexual violence.  
   **Background:** Most of the interviewees responded that they would leave their wives if she had contracted a sexually transmitted disease from being raped, so it seems that this point of view has been difficult to alter. A greater focus on this question is therefore recommended.

2. **Recommendation:** Underline that the PEP-kit is not a miracle cure that removes all diseases, but that it may contribute to preventing HIV when given within 72 hours.  
   **Background:** Both at the facilitator training held by SFCG and at several of the screenings, it was communicated out that the PEP-kit removes all diseases. This is not correct, as there is no drug that can remove “all sexually transmitted diseases.” Simplifying information may at some times be necessary to make sure that the information communicated actually is understood and remembered by the recipients of the information. It may certainly increase the tendency to bring both people subjected to rape and the people who have committed rape to the hospital to receive the kit, and thus help reduce the risk of HIV contraction. But the message that the kit removes all sexually transmitted diseases may also lead to a notion that “everything” can be fixed and that the severity of the potential physical consequences that rape can cause is minimized. In the worst case, it could also contribute to a belief that one is not really risking contracting any diseases by committing rape because the kit easily could remove any diseases after the act. It is therefore my recommendation that both the facilitators and the soldiers participating in the screenings be given clarity about the fact that it is very important to bring both the person who was raped and the person who committed the rape to the hospital within 72 hours because it may contribute reducing the risk of contracting HIV. To present the kit as a miracle cure that combats every sexually transmitted condition is not only inherently problematic, but it may have also have consequences to foster a notion that minimizes the severity of sexual violence.

3. **Recommendation:** Underline that perpetrators of sexual violence also have the right to receive the PEP-kit and that it is the responsibility of FARDC to also bring the perpetrator to the doctor for medical attention.  
   **Background:** At the facilitator training, it was emphasized that both victim and perpetrator should receive the PEP-kit after a rape. At the screenings, none of the facilitators mentioned that both parties should receive it. In order to reduce
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases from the perpetrator to future sexual partners, it is recommended that FARDC have a practice within which the perpetrator also is taken to the hospital.

4. **Recommendation:** Try to map the reason for the lack of Banyamulenges at the screenings and take measures to include them. The tool should reach soldiers from all tribes and losing the Banyamulenge perspective renders the tool less effective.

**Background:** In several of the interviews I had with the soldiers, Rwanda and/or Banyamulenges were seen as the main perpetrators of sexual violence, implicitly or explicitly presenting Congolese soldiers as innocent (it varied depending on whether Banyamulenges were seen as Rwandan or Congolese by the interviewees). Several soldiers also made comments that pointed to Rwandans/Banyamulenges as the main perpetrators during the screenings and the following discussions. According to my interpreter there was only one Banyamulenge at the screenings where we made our observations, even though the camps also had Banyamulenge soldiers. The combination of the tendency among the soldiers I observed and interviewed to blame other ethnic or tribal groups for the sexual violence committed by soldiers within FARDC or in DRC in general and the lack of presence from Banyamulenge soldiers at the screenings may have enforced the perception that sexual violence is only committed by certain ethnic groups. Including all tribal groups at the screenings may contribute to killing some myths about the perpetrators of sexual violence. It may also motivate FARDC soldiers to acknowledge that all tribal groups commit sexual violence and therefore the problem should be addressed generally, rather than placing blame on specific groups. This could also be considered to facilitate a platform where reconciliation between tribal groups within FARDC may take place.

5. **Recommendation:** Make sure that there is at least one female soldier, preferably two, attending every screening. The facilitator must be attentive to whether other soldiers are making degrading comments to her when she talks and, if so, correct their statements.

**Background:** At the majority of the screenings I observed, female soldiers were not present. When they were present, there tended to be negative comments from their fellow soldiers that went forth without correction from the facilitator. The topic of gender and sexual violence can be said to represent themes that are seldom discussed between men and women in many parts in Congolese society. It may be considered beneficial for the effect of the tool to create a space where both male and female soldiers can meet and discuss these topics and share their views and experiences.

6. **Recommendation:** Make sure that sodomy is not mentioned by the facilitators as a criminal act defined in the law against sexual violence. Sodomy is a legal act according to Congolese law.

**Background:** Some of the facilitators defined sodomy as a type of sexual violence. Sodomy is a legal act according to Congolese law and it is not mentioned as a violation in the law against sexual violence. It is important not to spread confusion regarding lawfully and punishable acts.

7. **Recommendation:** Make sure that the pre-tests and the post-tests are handed out at every screening. Follow this up closely.
Background: The pre-tests and the post-tests was not handed out by the facilitators and the screenings I attended, even though this is supposed to be done at each screening (the military receive money for this in the budget.) It only occurred once during my observations and the person who handed out those tests was an SFCG staff member.

8. Recommendation: Discuss low salaries in FARDC and the connection this could have to sexual violence. It should be made clear that the use of force to get sex should not be used, regardless of the financial circumstances the soldier finds himself in.

Background: The majority of the interviewees brought up low salaries in FARDC as an explanation for committing sexual violence. According to these informants, soldiers have a reduced ability to get sex in legitimate ways, perhaps by paying a marriage dowry or to buy sex from women. Low salaries as a legitimate reason for committing sexual violence seems like a difficult notion to alter and therefore should receive particular attention at the discussions.

9. Recommendation: Make sure that the control over the execution of the tool is not limited to a minor percentage of the persons in the committee, but that questions regarding the execution are discussed within the committee and in a close dialogue with SFCG. Decisions regarding, for example, changing of dates, location and facilitator must be discussed with the leader of the committee and an SFCG staff member. It is not recommended that one person administer the project in a way that that person receives unfair advantages, for example by giving themselves the task of facilitating an extensive number of times instead of sharing the work load among facilitators.

Background: Several changes were made in the schedule without consulting SFCG.

10. Recommendation: On occasions where the screenings last over 1,5 hours it is recommended that the soldiers are given a short break. If possible it may be more beneficial for the efficacy of the tool that the sessions are done over two days rather than one in order to cover the themes in a thorough way and to keep the concentration at the highest level possible.

Background: It was obvious on several occasions that soldiers lost their concentration when the session lasted for 2-3 hours without any breaks. Long lasting sessions resulted also in poor air quality, which can reduce concentration even more. Some of the soldiers even fell asleep during the screenings. The issues that are brought up during the screenings and discussions are heavy and require full concentration from the soldiers in order to be beneficial. It is my recommendation that the screenings should be executed in a quality-oriented way rather that with a focus on achieving the highest quantity of screenings. In other words, fewer good and thorough screenings rather than many superficial ones.

11. Recommendation: At the end of every session, the soldiers should have the opportunity to ask questions of the facilitator regarding sexual violence, in addition to having the chance to ask questions during the discussions.

Background: The sessions were often ended abruptly, even though the soldiers had questions they wanted to ask. It is essential that the soldiers get answers to the
questions they have come up with themselves in order for them to better reach an understanding about the subject.

12. **Recommendation:** A person from the SFCG staff should be present at the screenings from time to time in order to monitor the execution. This person should offer constructive feedback to the facilitator.

**Background:** As the recommendations above show, there are a few things about the project that I have concluded is not working in the most beneficial way according to the intentions of the project. One suggestion to improve this, is that the screenings are followed up more closely by SFCG.